Volume 1 · pp. 65–67
Chapter IV. How the things which have been said are reduced to a compendium.
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CAPUT IV.
Qualiter ea quae dicta sunt ad compendium reducantur.
Capitulariter autem ista ab antiquis tradita sunt dicentibus hic, quod dictum est planum esse hoc modo, quod in unoquoque praedicamento sunt generalissima quaedam, ita quod non in uno plura, sed in singulis singula. Et rursus in unoquoque sunt quaedam alia specialissima. Et inter generalissima et specialissima sunt quaedam alia intermedia. Est autem generalissimum quidem, supra quod secundum ordinem superpositionis vel superveniens non est genus. Specialissimum autem, post quod non erit inferior species quae sibi supponatur ut generi, et in qua sit secundum partem suae potestatis. Inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum secundum ordinem positionis omnia quae sunt, genera sunt et species, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud comparata.
Sic autem hoc quod dictum est, per exemplorum positionem in uno praedicamento substantiae manifestum est: substantia enim perfectius genus est, et in ipsa exempla sunt magis nota: substantia enim est quid, et ipsa est genus, quia non habet cui ut generi supponatur, ut species fiat: et ideo tantum genus est, et non species. Sub hac autem substantia est corpus, sive substantia corporea. Sub corpore vero sicut sub genere est animatum corpus, sub quo sicut sub genere est animal. Sub animali vero sicut sub genere est animal rationale secundum Stoicos: quamvis Avicenna et Arabes dicant, quod animal rationale est ut genus ad hominem et ad Angelos: quod falsum est, quia Angelus nullo modo proprie est animal, sed dicitur animal aliquando propter vivere secundum intellectum. Et si rationalis Angelus dicitur, aequivoce dicetur rationale quod est differentia hominis: sed propter Stoicos et Epicureos dictum est, qui deos terrestres, sicut Cererem et Aesculapium, et deos infernales, sicut Plutonem et Vulcanum, animalia rationalia esse dicebant. Sub animali autem rationali sicut sub genere est homo: sub homine vero non sicut sub genere, sed sicut sub specie sunt Socrates, et Plato, qui sunt particulares homines.
CHAPTER IV.
How the things which have been said are reduced to a compendium.
But these things were handed down chapter by chapter by the ancients saying here that what has been said is plain in this way: that in each category there are certain most general things, so that there are not several in one, but single ones in each. And again in each there are certain other most special things. And between the most general and the most special there are certain other intermediates. The most general is that above which, according to the order of superposition or supervening, there is no genus. But the most special is that after which there will be no lower species which is placed under it as under a genus, and in which it is according to part of its power. But between the most general and most special, according to the order of position, all things which are there are genera and species, compared indeed to one thing and to another.
But what has been said is manifest through the positing of examples in one category, that of substance. For substance is a more perfect genus, and in it the examples are better known: for substance is what, and it itself is genus, because it has nothing to which it may be placed under as under a genus so that it would become species; and therefore it is only genus and not species. But under this substance is body, or corporeal substance. Under body as under genus is animated body, under which as under genus is animal. Under animal as under genus is rational animal according to the Stoics, although Avicenna and the Arabs say that rational animal is as genus to man and to Angels; this is false, because an Angel is in no way properly an animal, but is sometimes called animal because of living according to intellect. And if an Angel is called rational, rational, which is the difference of man, will be said equivocally. But this was said because of the Stoics and Epicureans, who used to say that earthly gods, such as Ceres and Aesculapius, and infernal gods, such as Pluto and Vulcan, were rational animals. But under rational animal as under genus is man; under man, however, not as under genus but as under species, are Socrates and Plato, who are particular men.
Sed omnium horum substantia quidem est generalissimum: eo quod genus sit solum, et species esse non possit. Homo vero est specialissimum: eo quod species sit solum, et genus esse non possit. Corpus vero species quidem est substantiae, cui tanquam generi supponitur: genus vero est corporis animati, quod sibi ut generi supponitur. Et animatum corpus species quidem corporis est, cui ut generi supponitur: genus vero est animalis per eamdem rationem quae dicta est. Et animal secundum eamdem rationem species est corporis animati: genus autem animalis rationalis. Sed rationale animal eodem ordine species quidem animalis: genus autem hominis. Homo vero species est animalis rationalis: non est autem genus particularium hominum, sed species solum. Id autem quod ad individua proximum est, ut leo, et asinus, et equus, species erit solum et non genus.
Quemadmodum igitur substantia quae est suprema, eo quod nihil sit genus supra eam, est generalissimum: sic et homo, cum sit species post quam non est alia inferior species, nec aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi formaliter per oppositas differentias, sed sola individua sunt post eam, individua enim sicut diximus, sunt Socrates, et Plato, species erit sola ultima, in qua stat formalis divisio: erit autem species, ut dictum est, specialissima. Quae vero sunt in medio extremorum eorum quidem quae supra ipsa sunt, erunt species: eorum vero quae post ipsa sunt, erunt genera.
But of all these, substance indeed is most general, because it is genus only and cannot be species. But man is most special, because he is species only and cannot be genus. But body is indeed a species of substance, to which it is placed under as to a genus; but it is the genus of animated body, which is placed under it as under a genus. And animated body is indeed species of body, to which it is placed under as to a genus; but by the same reason which has been stated it is genus of animal. And animal by the same reason is species of animated body, but genus of rational animal. But rational animal in the same order is indeed species of animal, but genus of man. But man is species of rational animal; he is not genus of particular men, but species only. But that which is proximate to individuals, such as lion, ass, and horse, will be species only and not genus.
Therefore just as substance, which is highest, because there is no genus above it, is most general, so also man, since he is the species after which there is no other lower species, nor anything of those things which can be divided formally through opposed differences, but only individuals are after it, for individuals, as we have said, are Socrates and Plato, will be the sole ultimate species in which formal division stands; and it will be, as was said, the most special species. But the things which are in the middle of the extremes will be species of those which are above them, and genera of those which are after them.
Quare haec quidem media duas habent habitudines: eam scilicet quae est ad superiora, secundum quam species eorum dicuntur esse: et eam quae est ad posteriora, secundum quam eorum genera esse dicuntur. Et sic via naturae extrema in summo et infimo unam tantum habent habitudinem. Namque generalissimum solum ad ea quae sibi posteriora sunt, unam solum habet habitudinem, cum secundum illam sit genus omnium posteriorum id quod est supremum. Eam vero habitudinem quae est ad superiora non habet, cum sit supremum et principium primum, ex quo per divisionem omnia alia principiantur: et quod per nomen et rationem est substantia, hoc est, secundum id quod in omnibus est inferioribus. Specialissimum similiter unam habet tantum habitudinem, eam scilicet quae est ad superiora quorum est species: eo quod supponitur omnibus illis ut generibus. Eam vero quae est ad inferiora ut ad communia non habet: quia non superponitur communibus. Sed individuorum species dicitur, de quibus praedicatur ut indivisum secundum substantiam et potestatem. Aliter ergo individuorum dicitur species, et aliter superiorum. Dicitur enim species inferiorum quidem in eo quod est esse formale ipsorum eam continens. Species autem dicitur superiorum, sicut quae ab his in eo quod per differentias et potestate divisa sunt continetur.
Et ad hunc modum figura per modum arboris scribi consuevit, quae si secundum esse et essentiam consideratur, radices quibus principiatur, superius habet. Si autem secundum esse actuale consideretur, radices quae sunt in individuis, habet inferius.
Therefore these middles have two relations: namely the one which is to superiors, according to which they are said to be species of them, and the one which is to posteriors, according to which they are said to be genera of them. And thus in the way of nature the extremes at the top and bottom have only one relation. For the most general has only one relation to those things which are posterior to it, since according to that it is genus of all posteriors, that which is highest. But it does not have the relation which is to superiors, since it is highest and the first principle, from which through division all other things are principled; and what by name and notion is substance, this is according to that which is in all inferiors. The most special likewise has only one relation, namely that which is to superiors of which it is species, because it is placed under all those as genera. But it does not have that which is to inferiors as to common things, because it is not placed above commons. But it is called the species of individuals, of which it is predicated as undivided according to substance and power. Therefore it is called species of individuals in one way and of superiors in another. For it is called species of inferiors in that it is their formal being containing them. But it is called species of superiors as what is contained by those things insofar as they have been divided through differences and in power.
And in this way the figure is accustomed to be written by the mode of a tree, which, if it is considered according to being and essence, has above the roots by which it is principled. But if it is considered according to actual being, it has below the roots which are in individuals.
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