Volume 1 · p. 61
Chapter II. On two questions concerning the things said before.
ponendo speciem in generis diffinitione, quando dicimus, quod genus est quod de differentibus specie praedicatur in eo quod quid sit: et nunc tractando de specie dicimus, quod species est id quod ponitur sub genere: et sic genus ponimus in diffinitione speciei: nemo reputet hoc inconveniens. In talibus enim nosse oportet, quoniam et genus non est absolutum, sed relativum: ideo genus alicujus est genus, et species est non absolutum quid, sed species alicujus species est, quia generis. Et ideo necesse est in utrorumque, scilicet generis et speciei, rationibus diffinitivis utrisque uti: ita quod genus in diffinitione speciei, et species in diffinitione generis ponatur. Assignant ergo Philosophi per diffinitionem praedictas intentiones de specie, etiam sic speciem diffinientes: Species est quae ponitur sub genere, et de qua genus in eo quod quid est praedicatur: praedicatur enim ut substantia et subjectum in specie, quod differentia constitutiva individuatur et formatur in specie, quod est quid speciei et non quale.
Amplius adhuc ipsi Philosophi sic quoque assignant diffinientes speciem: Species est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est: et sic est formale quid individuorum, et totum esse ipsorum. Esse enim quod est post speciem in individuis, est et de individuantibus, et non est idem esse simpliciter, quia materia nulli dat esse, nec est proprie de esse: sed est actus essentiae in eo quod est materia. Et ideo materiae non est praedicari: quia in ante habitis jam diximus, quod non praedicatur nisi forma: nec etiam forma praedicatur secundum quod forma, sed forma totius: nec adhuc forma totius ut forma totius praedicatur, sed in quantum est notio totius esse vel in potentia vel in actu.
Inter hanc tamen assignationem et praedictam differentia est: quia haec secunda assignatio est solum speciei specialissimae: aliae vero duae praecedentes conveniunt et speciebus non specialissimis. Quid autem hic dictum sit, non potest sciri, nisi ponatur tota ordinatio praedicabilium in generalissimis et specialissimis et mediis: et ad hoc deinceps attingemus.
placing species in the definition of genus, when we say that genus is what is predicated of things differing in species in that which is what; and now, treating species, we say that species is that which is placed under genus, and thus we place genus in the definition of species. Let no one regard this as unfitting. For in such matters one must know that genus too is not absolute, but relative; therefore genus is the genus of something, and species is not an absolute what, but species is the species of some species, because it is of a genus. And therefore in the definitive notions of each, namely of genus and species, it is necessary to use both, so that genus is placed in the definition of species and species in the definition of genus. Therefore the Philosophers assign by definition the aforesaid intentions of species, also defining species thus: species is what is placed under genus and of which genus is predicated in that which is what; for it is predicated as substance and subject in species, which constitutive difference individuates and forms in species, which is the what of species and not quale.
Moreover the Philosophers themselves also assign species thus when defining it: species is what is predicated of several things differing in number in that which is what; and thus it is the formal what of individuals and their whole being. For the being which is after species in individuals belongs also to the individuating things, and is not the same being simply, because matter gives being to no one, nor is it properly of being, but is the act of essence in that which is matter. And therefore it does not belong to matter to be predicated, because above we have already said that only form is predicated; nor is form predicated according as it is form, but the form of the whole; nor yet is the form of the whole predicated as form of the whole, but insofar as it is the notion of the whole being either in potency or in act.
Yet between this assignment and the aforesaid there is a difference: because this second assignment belongs only to the most special species, while the two preceding ones also belong to species which are not most special. But what has been said here cannot be known unless the whole ordering of predicables is posited in most general, most special, and middle things; and we will next touch upon this.
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