Chapter III. On the definition or description of physical genus.

CHAPTER III.

On the definition or description of physical genus.

Therefore since genus is said triply among the Philosophers, it is taken according to the third intention of its signification. And according to this intention of genus they describe genus, saying: genus is what is predicated of several things different in species in that which is what. This description is of genus insofar as genus states the order of one thing to another, as of superior to inferior, not simply, but in the thing itself which is thus ordered: as animal is a genus, and animated body, and substance; for substance and living thing and animal are those to which it happens to be genera. But the generality which is in them states the notion of this order or relation by which they are ordered to their inferiors; on account of which it was said above that genus is that under which species or a multitude of species is placed.

In all substantial commons it is thus, that from the very community by which one thing is substantially in another, several other analogies, or proportional communities, result. For from this, that animal is in man and of man, and is in ass and of ass, and so of the other species, from a certain similar respect of animal to the supposed species, there results that it is common and universal as genus, because the name of genus is imposed on animal from such a respect. And so concerning species, and from the similar respect of man and ass and the others to animal, all of which are species because they participate in the name and notion of animal, another community arises, because each of the inferiors so looking to a superior is called species; for the name of species is imposed according to the likeness of such a respect. And so it is in the respect of individuals to species: for from the similar respect of this one to man and of that one and another, and so of the others, it is effected that this one is a supposit of man and those and all the others are. But from this, that by one likeness the common is determined in any nature, each is called a particular man; and from this, that similarly all determine the common nature particularly by a discerning accident, each is called an individual. And thus from the respects of common nature to inferiors, and from the respects of the inferior to the superior, many communities are caused; and according to each name a universal predication is made. Nevertheless, because there is only one thing which is predicated by name and nature and notion of genus, there is only one thing which is genus, and the others are predications predicated by the mode of genus by accident, which happens to the predicate or subject from such a mutual respect, or from such a respect to the superior. And from such a case it does not follow when it is said: man is animal, and man is species, therefore animal is species; or man is animal, animal is genus, therefore man is genus; or Socrates is man, Socrates is individual, therefore man is individual. For in all such cases there is the fallacy of accident: for such community is caused by an accident which is founded in the mode of the respect of superior to inferior, or of inferior to superior, or also in the respect of the particular to the common nature. All these respects are caused from this, that common nature is understood in a less common nature, which is species or individual. And therefore it is clear that it does not follow: genus is predicated of several species-differing things, therefore genus is genus, and thus one would go to infinity. For only to that which is genus through the nature which is in several things differing in species does it belong to be genus, so that genus states the notion of order and predication; but animal, that which is thus predicated, is predicated as genus.

Attend, however, that to be predicated is the same as to attribute through the mark of composition. For when one thing is attributed to another by means of composition, which this verb is signifies, then it is predicated; and when one thing is divided from another by means of the negation of such composition, as when it is said, man is not stone, then stone is divided from him. And this happens in the intellect composing or dividing; for in the thing itself, without the mark of composition or division, one thing is in another, or is not. But the intellect composing or dividing cannot signify this here without the mark of composition or division; and, in order that it may signify this, it finds the mode of composition of one thing with another; and this is to predicate one thing of another, or to deny one thing of another. But this happens sometimes essentially, sometimes accidentally. Essentially, when one thing is taken in another through nature and substance. And this happens triply: for it takes either as a prior nature in a posterior, or as a common nature determined in matter, or as convertible, and the same in a convertible. In the first way it is predicated as genus, in the second as species, and in the third as definition of the defined. But concerning difference the treatment will be below. Therefore genus is that which is predicated in the aforesaid mode.

For no substantial common through which genus is defined can be posited, because thus some substantial common would be placed under every genus, which is not true. For when I say animal, it is that which is predicated of several things differing in species. And if you ask what animal is, I say that animal is a sensible living thing which is predicated of several things differing in species. But when I say genus, it is what is predicated of several things differing in species. If it is asked what genus is, I cannot assign what genus is through something more common than it, because, as has now been said, genus is a name imposed from an accident which is the notion of order and the respect of a superior nature to an inferior, in which it is substantially and taken in the intellect of it. And that name is transcendent, and it cannot be made known through any other name of certain signification; rather it must be made known through an infinite term, that is, through a name of undefined signification, by saying: genus is what is predicated. And it is the same as if it were said: that which is predicated of several things differing in species is called genus, although that, insofar as it is indefinite, is unknown and of uncertain signification. And thus it can be placed in the notification of a description or definition.

But what is added, of several things differing in species, is for this reason, that genus is not led down to species except as divided through differences; and because these are opposed and divisive with respect to genus, but constitutive with respect to species, they must be several. Divisive difference, as Damascene says, is the cause of the matter of forms, just as division through matter is the cause of the number of individuals. And therefore the community of genus encompasses species constituted by opposed differences.

And even if it were posited that there were only one species, so that we should say there is only man and no other species of animal, still animal would be predicated of man as genus, because it belongs to the power and natural range of animal and to the aptitude of genus that it be divided by opposed differences. For a universal is not only what is predicated, but what is apt by nature to be predicated of many, as has now been said above ¹. And if those many differ by forms, and the division of differences makes this difference and number, which first and per se divides the power of nature, then it is predicated of several things differing in species, because genus is divided by differences when its power has been divided. For by one power genus is in one species, and by another in another; and such is not the division of species through matter, for by the same power species is in one individual and in another, and it is not divided, but according to integral being, with its natural power remaining, it is in each of the individuals.

But what is added, in that which is what, is added for this reason, that every superior which through essence and name and difference is in the inferior is the what of it, according as what is quiddity. And if someone says that it is not the whole quiddity, we say that it is the whole being of it, but not the perfected being of its species: for the whole being is in potency, and there is nothing of being which in potency is not before the ultimate act at which the motion of potency is terminated; but being in potency is being in genus, and this is the true cause why genus is predicated. It is not only because it is form, but because it is form and in some mode states the whole being. And what has itself thus to a subject is predicated of that subject not by accidental denomination, but by essential predication.

And this is what is said by many, that the form of the whole is the form of a part which is not predicated, and is the form of the whole which is predicated. But one must add that the form which is predicated is of the whole, and signifies the whole being, and does not signify the essence of which it is the proper act. For animality is not predicated, nor even humanity, although the being of animality is animal, and the being of humanity is man. Therefore such a form designating the form of the whole and being is predicated, and not otherwise; and the sensible soul placed in the place of animal is not predicated, because animal is not the sensible soul; and similarly the soul of man is not predicated of man. For these state the form of a part, and not the being of the whole. But animality and humanity are not predicated of those things of which they are forms, for they do not designate forms as the being of a subject, but as essences. But animal and man are predicated, because they designate forms as the whole being of the subject, either in potency or in act; I mean of the subject of which they are predicated. And so also in all accidental forms. And therefore man is risible, and not risibility; and man is white, and not whiteness. This, therefore, is what is said, that genus is what is predicated of several things differing in species in that which is what; for what a thing is and its being belong to that of which it is predicated. And therefore genus is a universal which by immediate and substantial predication is in many species and of many.

Thus therefore it has been demonstrated that genus is a universal and first among universals, and how the community of genus differs from the other later communities denominated from accidents.