Volume 1 · pp. 41–44
Tractate III. On universals in particular. Chapter I. On the diverse signs of genus.
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TRACTATUS III.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS IN PARTICULARI.
CAPUT I.
De diversis signis generis.
Primo igitur in tractatu de universalibus de genere loquendum est. Sed quia genus secundum intentionem logicam diffiniri non potest, nec diffinite cognosci, nisi prius multiplicitas hujus nominis, genus, determinetur: ideo in primis determinanda est et distinguenda nominis generis multiplicitas, et maxime in his modis qui aliquam habent similitudinem ad intentionem illam generis, secundum quam logici genere utuntur. De aliis intentionibus 1 quia ad propositam intentionem non valent, est omittendum. Nihil enim confert ad propositum scire masculinum genus, vel femininum, vel activum, vel passivum in grammaticis non ad propositam intentionem. Et ideo de similibus generis intentionibus non est hic interponendum.
Dicitur autem per similitudinem et per proprietatem, ad quod etiam genus per similitudinem dictum transfertur. Per similitudinem autem dicitur dupliciter. Uno scilicet modo dicitur genus multitudo aliquorum uno quodam modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod sui aliquid habet in tota multitudine illa, ita quod est in singulis ipsorum: in quo etiam communi existente in omnibus quodam modo secundum convenientiam se habent ad invicem, ita quod quilibet ad alium habeat similitudinem in illo quod inest sibi ex illo uno primo, quod causa est similitudinis in tota alia collectione. Secundum quam significationem Romanorum genus dicitur collectio tota parentelae quae a Romulo descendit per successivam generationem. Hoc enim totum dicitur Romuleum genus secundum habitudinem qua se habet ad unum primum parentem, scilicet Romulum. Et in hoc genere distinguitur illa collectio ab illa collectione quae ab aliquo alio parente descendit, sicut a primo genere Priami cum quo tota collectio ista Priami genus vocatur. Hoc autem advertendum est in ista generis significatione, quod unum est in omnibus illis qui ad illam pertinent generationem. Et hoc est semen propagationis a Romulo perfusum in tota illa collectione.
Secundo modo adhuc dicitur genus per annexum modum ad ante habitum, id quod est uniuscujusque generationis sive multitudinis generatae principium, quo fortissime generatum et a quo fortissima virtute exortum est. Et hoc dupliciter dicitur: vel a patre, qui primus genitor est in genere illo: vel ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est. Et priori quidem modo dicimus Orestem quidem a Tantalo proavo suo habere genus; Hilum vero dicimus habere genus ab Hercule, a quo sicut ab atavo genitus est. Secundo autem modo, secundum quem patria sive locus principium generationis est, dicimus Pindarum Thebanum esse genere, Platonem vero dicimus genere Atheniensem. Sicut enim pater est principium generationis per translationem seminis ex quo in omnes funditur ex uno virtus formativa multorum secundum propagationem, sic etiam patriam sive locum generationis dicimus esse principium, quia in loco et centro loci generationis tota virtus periodi caelestis adunatur, ut dicit Ptolemaeus, et in omnes in illo loco natos diffunditur. Et ideo frequenter magis accedunt ad unum colorem et ad unum morem, qui ex uno loco nati sunt. Unde etiam elementa in diversis locis valde sunt diversa in virtutibus suis quibus conveniunt ad generatorum constitutionem. In isto etiam modo patet, quod multitudo ab uno patre vel ab uno loco natorum ad unum refertur in quo continetur per unum quod in omnibus est, et ab illo quod principium illius multitudinis est, in omnes derivatur.
TRACTATE III.
ON UNIVERSALS IN PARTICULAR.
CHAPTER I.
On the diverse signs of genus.
Therefore, first in the treatise on universals, one must speak about genus. But because genus according to the logical intention cannot be defined, nor definitely known, unless first the multiplicity of this name genus is determined, therefore first the multiplicity of the name genus must be determined and distinguished, and especially in those modes which have some likeness to that intention of genus according to which logicians use genus. The other intentions 1, because they have no force for the proposed intention, must be omitted. For it contributes nothing to the proposed matter to know masculine genus, or feminine, or active, or passive in grammatical matters that do not belong to the proposed intention. And therefore there must be no insertion here concerning similar intentions of genus.
But it is said by likeness and by property, to which also genus said by likeness is transferred. But by likeness it is said in two ways. In one way, namely, genus is said to be a multitude of some things having themselves in one certain way to some one thing, which has something of itself in that whole multitude, so that it is in each of them; in which common thing also, existing in all, they have themselves in some way according to agreement toward one another, so that each has a likeness to another in that which is in him from that one first thing, which is the cause of likeness in the whole other collection. According to this signification, the genus of the Romans is said to be the whole collection of the kinship which descends from Romulus through successive generation. For this whole is called the Romulean genus according to the relation which it has to one first parent, namely Romulus. And in this genus that collection is distinguished from that collection which descends from some other parent, as from the first genus of Priam, with which that whole collection of Priam is called a genus. But this must be noticed in this signification of genus, that one thing is in all those who belong to that generation. And this is the seed of propagation poured forth from Romulus in that whole collection.
In a second way genus is still said, by a mode joined to the preceding one, to be that which is the principle of each generation or generated multitude, by which the generated thing has been generated most strongly and from which it has arisen by the strongest power. And this is said in two ways: either from the father, who is the first begetter in that genus, or from the place in which someone was begotten. And in the former way we say that Orestes indeed has genus from Tantalus his great-grandfather; but we say that Hyllus has genus from Hercules, from whom he was born as from a remote ancestor. But in the second way, according to which country or place is the principle of generation, we say that Pindar is Theban by genus, but Plato Athenian by genus. For just as the father is the principle of generation through the transmission of seed, from which the formative power of many according to propagation is poured from one into all, so also we say that country or place of generation is a principle, because in the place and center of the place of generation the whole power of the celestial period is united, as Ptolemy says, and is diffused into all born in that place. And therefore those born from one place often come closer to one color and to one custom. Whence also the elements in diverse places are very diverse in their powers by which they agree for the constitution of things generated. In this mode also it is clear that the multitude of those born from one father or from one place is referred to one thing in which it is contained through one thing which is in all, and from that which is the principle of that multitude it is derived into all.
Differunt autem istae duae generis significationes: quia prima est unius partiti in multa, secunda autem est multorum respicientium ad unum, quod est principium generationis eorum secundum modum parentis vel loci in quo generatur aliquis ad illius loci complexionem vel figuram. Quod enim quidam dicunt patriam et locum non esse principium generationis, nisi quoad figuram, penitus falsum est: quia sic tota destrueretur scientia generationis uniuscujusque, quam in libro qui dicitur arabice Adarba, quadripartitum autem latine, Ptolemaeus ostendit: in quo ostendit periodi virtutem in centro loci ejus qui nascitur congregari: et ex virtute sic in centro nati congregata natum accipere complexionem et formam et figuram et colorem et morem et fortunam.
Et haec quidem secunda generis significatio, propter hoc quod est in uno in multa se diffundendo secundum suae virtutis potentiam, in quo omnia uniuntur et continentur, videtur promptissima ad generis logici declarationem. Secundum hanc rationem sunt et dicuntur, qui ex genere Romuli descenderunt. Nec collectio illa diceretur genus unum, nisi esset unum continens ea sicut principium a quo per generationem descenderunt. Et hoc modo dicuntur multi Cecropidae, qui ex genere successive descenderunt primi Cecropis: et horum, proximi secundum lineam ejusdem consanguineitatis. Sic enim multa essent ab uno, sicut in genere logico ab uno genere primo per divisionem differentiarum essent multae species, in quibus omnibus salvatur generis natura potestate sive virtute ad speciem determinatam, sicut et semen generantis primi per successivam generationem formatur ad hunc et ad illum. Patet igitur, quod primus modus generis causatur a secundo, et reducitur ad ipsum sicut ad causam. Et ideo secundus modus principalior est quam primus, et promptior ad designandum genus logicum, sicut per similitudinem potest describendo designari.
Per prius ergo quoad istam similitudinem dicitur genus uniuscujusque generationis principium. Dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus et multitudo collecta eorum quae ab uno principio ut Romulo descenderunt, sicut dictum est in prima generis designatione. Hujus autem probatio est: quia multitudinem sive collectionem dividentes sive discernentes et ab aliis separantes, qui sunt alterius generis, dicebamus ante illam collectionem genus esse Romanorum vel Romuleorum, et in hoc ab aliis collectionibus separari: nec multitudinem genus esse diceremus, nisi prius intelligeretur unum generationis principium, a quo illa descendit multitudo. Et ideo primus modus generis non dicitur genus, nisi per secundum, et ideo reducitur primus ad secundum sicut ad causam. Fuit etiam prius a nobis positus, quia minus facit ad propositum: sicut et de ambabus istis significationibus prius dicimus, quam de genere logico, ut minus intenta dimittantur, et longius a proposito ponantur. Et ut sciatur, quod similia paulatim et gradatim perficiuntur ad propositi declarationem. Et ideo etiam genus intentum post omnia similia dicimus ultimo.
But these two significations of genus differ, because the first is of one thing divided into many, while the second is of many looking to one thing, which is the principle of their generation according to the mode of parent or place in which someone is generated according to the complexion or figure of that place. For what certain people say, that country and place are not the principle of generation except as regards figure, is altogether false: because thus the whole science of the generation of each thing would be destroyed, which Ptolemy shows in the book that is called in Arabic Adarba, but in Latin quadripartite; in which he shows that the power of the period is gathered in the center of the place of the one who is born, and that from the power thus gathered in the center of the one born, the one born receives complexion and form and figure and color and custom and fortune.
And this second signification of genus, because it is in one thing diffusing itself into many according to the potency of its power, in which all are united and contained, seems most ready for the declaration of logical genus. According to this notion those are and are called those who descended from the genus of Romulus. Nor would that collection be called one genus unless there were one thing containing them as the principle from which they descended by generation. And in this way many are called Cecropidae, who descended successively from the genus of first Cecrops; and among these, the nearest according to the line of the same consanguinity. For thus many would be from one, just as in logical genus from one first genus through the division of differences there would be many species, in all of which the nature of genus is preserved in potency or power toward a determined species, just as also the seed of the first generator is formed through successive generation to this one and to that one. Therefore it is clear that the first mode of genus is caused by the second and is reduced to it as to a cause. And therefore the second mode is more principal than the first and more ready to designate logical genus, as it can be designated by description through likeness.
Therefore first, with respect to this likeness, genus is called the principle of each generation. Thereafter and later, genus is also called the collected multitude of those things which descended from one principle, as from Romulus, as was said in the first designation of genus. The proof of this is that, dividing or discerning a multitude or collection and separating it from others which are of another genus, we said before that that collection was the genus of the Romans or Romuleans, and was separated in this from other collections; nor would we say that the multitude was a genus unless first one principle of generation were understood, from which that multitude descended. And therefore the first mode of genus is not called genus except through the second, and therefore the first is reduced to the second as to a cause. It was also posited earlier by us because it contributes less to the proposed matter; just as concerning both of these significations we speak first before logical genus, so that the less intended things may be dismissed and placed farther from the proposal, and so that it may be known that similar things are perfected little by little and step by step toward the declaration of the proposal. And therefore we also speak last of the intended genus after all the similar things.
Est autem attendendum, quod a matre una a qua multi descenderunt, non sumitur ad genus logicum similitudo: quia mater non est principium formale multorum, sed materiale, et sicut formatum, et non sicut formans. Genus autem logicum principium est ut forma: quia aliter non praedicaretur de eo cujus est genus: sed est ut forma indistincta, quae totum est esse speciei secundum esse informe et indistinctum, distinguibile tamen ad formam speciei.
Et quamvis a loco similitudo trahatur ad generis logici designationem, tamen a tempore non trahitur aliqua similitudo: quia tempus est mensura et numerus motus et mutationis. Et ideo est in fieri, et non est in esse generatorum principaliter. Genus autem natorum est et in esse constitutorum. Propter quod etiam in libro de intelligibilibus dicitur locum esse mensuram entis, tempus autem esse mensuram motus dicitur, quia ejus esse est in motu et mutatione.
Est autem attendendum, quod Avicenna dicit 2 quod isti ambo modi extenduntur etiam ad artificialia. Aliquando enim dicuntur coriarii omnes, qui sunt de collectione coriariorum ab uno aliquo qui excellebat in illo artificio: sicut nautae dicuntur calepsitae a quodam Calepso, qui floruit in arte nautica: et fabri dicuntur Tubalcaitae a Tubalcain, qui artem fabrorum invenit: et musici dicuntur pythagorici a Pythagora, qui perfecit ea quae in arte sunt musica. Hoc tamen est minus proprium: quia id quod est in omnibus ex isto principio, non est substantiale et naturale, sed accidentale illis in quibus est. Genus autem logicum omnibus speciebus inest ut natura et substantia. His ergo modis genus dicitur in quolibet. Aliter autem accipitur apud Philosophos, sicut in sequenti patebit capitulo.
Colligentes igitur summatim quae dicta sunt, dicimus quod videtur neque genus neque species simpliciter sive modo uno et in una intentione dici. Dico autem videtur, et non, est: quia istae generis acceptiones magis sunt in nostra acceptione et cognitione, quam in rei natura et existentia. Et primo quidem quoad nos dicitur genus collectio multorum quodammodo uno modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod est illius collectionis secundum generationem principium, et quae se aliquo modo habent ad invicem in uno quod a principio suae generationis est in singulis ipsorum secundum totam illam collectionem. Secundum quam significationem Romanorum collectio genus dicitur ab habitudine unius, dico autem Romuli. Et dicitur genus multitudinis illius per relationem aliquo modo ad invicem secundum id quod est in eis ex Romulo. Et hoc est, quia habent ad invicem eam quae ab illo Romulo est cognationem secundum divisionem vel separationem ab aliis generibus aliorum avorum, quae dicitur vel denominatur ab aliis patribus vel avis.
But it must be attended to that no likeness is taken for logical genus from one mother from whom many descended, because the mother is not the formal principle of many, but the material principle, and as formed, not as forming. But logical genus is a principle as form, because otherwise it would not be predicated of that of which it is the genus; but it is as an indistinct form, which is the whole being of the species according to unformed and indistinct being, nevertheless distinguishable to the form of species.
And although a likeness is drawn from place for the designation of logical genus, nevertheless no likeness is drawn from time, because time is the measure and number of motion and change. And therefore it is in becoming, and is not principally in the being of things generated. But the genus of things born is both of things constituted in being. On account of this also in the book On Intelligibles place is said to be the measure of being, while time is said to be the measure of motion, because its being is in motion and change.
But it must be attended to that Avicenna says 2 that these two modes are extended also to artificial things. For sometimes all are called leatherworkers who are from the collection of leatherworkers from some one who excelled in that craft; just as sailors are called Calepsitae from a certain Calepso, who flourished in nautical art; and smiths are called Tubalcaitae from Tubalcain, who discovered the art of smiths; and musicians are called Pythagoreans from Pythagoras, who perfected the things which are in musical art. This, nevertheless, is less proper, because that which is in all from this principle is not substantial and natural, but accidental to those in which it is. But logical genus is present to all species as nature and substance. Therefore genus is said in each thing in these modes. But it is taken otherwise among the Philosophers, as will be clear in the following chapter.
Therefore gathering summarily the things which have been said, we say that it seems that neither genus nor species is said simply or in one mode and in one intention. But I say seems, and not is, because these acceptions of genus are more in our reception and cognition than in the nature and existence of the thing. And first, with respect to us, genus is called a collection of many having themselves in some one way to some one thing, which is the principle of that collection according to generation, and which have themselves in some way to one another in one thing which is in each of them from the principle of their generation according to that whole collection. According to this signification, the collection of the Romans is called genus from the relation of one, and I mean of Romulus. And it is called the genus of that multitude through relation in some way to one another according to that which is in them from Romulus. And this is because they have to one another that kinship which is from that Romulus according to division or separation from other genera of other ancestors, which is said or denominated from other fathers or grandfathers.
Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est unius generationis principium ab eo parente qui genuit, vel ab eo loco in quo quis generatus est propter causam quae in ante habitis posita est. Sic enim Orestem dicimus a Tantalo quidem habere genus: Hilum autem cum domo et familia sua genus habere ab Hercule. Et rursus quidem a loco denuntiantes Pindarum Thebanum esse, Platonem vero Atheniensem. Etenim patria uniuscujusque generationis principium est, quemadmodum et pater, ut in prae habitis expositum est. Haec autem secunda generis acceptio videtur esse promptissima generis significatio. Romani ideo dicti sunt Romani, quia illi a genere descenderunt Romuli: et Cecropidae sunt, qui ex genere descenderunt Cecropis: et horum proximi per eamdem causam sunt de eodem genere. Et prius quidem, hoc est, per prius appellatur genus uniuscujusque generationis principium: dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus etiam multitudo eorum qui descenderunt ab uno principio, ut a Romulo Romulei. Cujus signum est: namque dividentes hoc genus sive discernentes et ab aliis generibus separantes ipsum, dicebamus omnem illam Romanorum collectionem esse genus Romanorum.
Est autem in duobus dissimilitudo ad genus logicum. In uno quidem: quia principium generationis non secundum substantiam et secundum se totum est in collectione quae genus dicit, ita quod sit in quolibet totum. Genus autem logicum secundum se totum et secundum substantiam est in collectione specierum et in qualibet specie: propter quod etiam non praedicatur nomine et ratione principium generationis de collectione multorum qui descenderunt de ipso nisi denominative. Dicuntur enim Romani vel Romulei, non Romuli. Genus autem logicum praedicatur praedicatione substantiali de his quorum est genus. In alio etiam est dissimilitudo: quia collectio quae dicitur genus, est quasi totum integrale ad genus vel in genere, cujus quilibet est pars integralis, et omnes sunt totum. Genus autem logicum est totum essentiale, cujus quaelibet species est pars subjectiva. In hoc tamen aliquid similitudinis est: quia quamvis genus logicum secundum totam essentiam salvetur in qualibet specie, tamen non salvatur in qualibet specie secundum totum ambitum suae potestatis. Et hoc habet aliquid similitudinis cum toto integrali praedicativo, cujus potestas ex multis potestatibus particularis integratur.
But genus is also said otherwise again to be that which is the principle of one generation from the parent who begot, or from the place in which someone was generated, because of the cause which was posited above. For thus we say that Orestes indeed has genus from Tantalus, but Hyllus with his house and family has genus from Hercules. And again, denoting from place, we say that Pindar is Theban, but Plato Athenian. For the country of each generation is a principle, just as the father is, as was set forth above. But this second acceptance of genus seems to be the readiest signification of genus. The Romans were therefore called Romans because they descended from the genus of Romulus; and Cecropidae are those who descended from the genus of Cecrops; and the nearest of these are of the same genus through the same cause. And first indeed, that is, in the first way, the principle of each generation is called genus; thereafter and later, the multitude of those who descended from one principle is also called genus, as the Romuleans from Romulus. Its sign is this: for dividing this genus, or discerning and separating it from other genera, we used to say that that whole collection of Romans was the genus of the Romans.
But in two things there is unlikeness to logical genus. In one, because the principle of generation is not according to substance and according to itself whole in the collection which it calls a genus, so that it is whole in each one. But logical genus according to itself whole and according to substance is in the collection of species and in each species. On account of this also the principle of generation is not predicated by name and notion of the collection of many who descended from it except denominatively. For they are called Romans or Romuleans, not Romuli. But logical genus is predicated by substantial predication of those of which it is the genus. There is also an unlikeness in another point: because the collection which is called genus is as it were an integral whole to genus or in genus, of which each is an integral part, and all are the whole. But logical genus is an essential whole, of which each species is a subjective part. Yet in this there is some likeness: because although logical genus according to its whole essence is preserved in any species, nevertheless it is not preserved in any species according to the whole range of its potency. And this has some likeness with the predicative integral whole, whose power is integrated from many particular powers.
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