Chapter Ten and Last Principal Chapter of This First Decade
Concerning the Beatitude of the Rational Soul
Around this subject six little questions will be resolved, each of which will be set forth below in its order.
Question One of Chapter Ten
In the act of which of the soul’s powers its beatitude consists
It is asked: in the act of which of the soul’s powers does its beatitude consist?
To this it is answered that there have been three opinions concerning this question.
The first is that of the school of the Reverend Scotist Fathers of the Order of Minors. The second is that of certain moderns. The third is that of Saint Thomas and all the doctors of the common school.
But before the opinions are recited, it must be known that, when it is asked in the act of which of those powers beatitude consists, the question is not whether the ultimate beatifying end, considered as a thing, is in an act of the intellect or of the will. No one has ever maintained this, since the ultimate end, considered as a thing, is the divine essence and not something created.
Rather, the meaning of the question is: through which act of those powers is that end—which beatifies objectively and simply effectively—reached?
Thus, once the title of the question has first been understood, I say that the Scotist school holds that beatitude consists in an act of the will.
This is proved first as follows. Beatitude is the highest good. But the good, as such, is the object of the will. Therefore, beatitude is more properly the object of the will.
Likewise, that which is better in beatitude is more principal within it. But with respect to the object of beatitude, it is better to love than to know: both because love proceeds from the most perfect habit of charity; because it unites more, since love is a unitive power according to Dionysius; and because, according to Hugh of Saint Victor, love is more penetrating, since love enters where knowledge stands outside. Therefore, beatitude consists more principally in an act of the will.
Likewise, according to Boethius, beatitude is “the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” Therefore, every good which pertains to beatitude, since it falls within its perfection belongs to its being.
Likewise, delight, which is of the essence of beatitude, pertains to the will. Therefore.
The antecedent is proved. That without which beatitude is not desirable is of the essence of beatitude. But without delight beatitude is not desirable, as is evident in Book VIII of the Ethics, where the Commentator says that no one would sustain the good itself if sadness were present in it. And he says again that the good itself is nothing other than felicity. Therefore.
Likewise, Augustine says that beatitude is joy concerning the truth. But there joy is principally expressed in the abstract. Therefore.
Likewise, beatitude must be placed in that act which God requires more from us. But God requires more from us that he be loved than that he be known. Therefore, the creature ought to desire this more and to rest in it more. But that in which the creature rests more pertains more essentially to beatitude. Therefore.
Likewise, it is more perfect to love God than to know him. This is proved because many knew him and nevertheless did not love him, as did the philosophers who, although they knew God, did not glorify him as God, as Paul says in the first chapter of Romans.
Likewise, beatitude must be placed in that act through which we are united more closely with God. But through an act of the will we are united more closely with God. Therefore.
The minor premise is evident because some things which are understood are not pleasing, and therefore union with them does not occur, but aversion does. Nothing, however, is loved unless it is pleasing.
Likewise, the order of Seraphim is above that of Cherubim. Seraphim is interpreted as “conflagration,” and Cherubim as “fullness of knowledge.” It follows, therefore, that love is better than knowledge.
Likewise, the reward ought to consist in that power in which merit consists, as justice requires. But merit consists in an act of the will. Therefore.
Likewise, the nobler operation must be attributed to the noblest power. But the will is a nobler power than the intellect.
This is proved because that which possesses the character of moving and commanding is nobler than that which possesses the character of being moved and obeying.
Finally, and twelfth, it is argued as follows. With respect to things which are below the soul, an act of love is less perfect than an act of cognition. But with respect to those things which are above it, it is more perfect.
The reason for this is that things exist in the soul in a higher mode than they do in themselves. But the will is moved toward things according as they exist in themselves.
Therefore, when through love the will is joined to things which are below it, it becomes in a certain manner lower than itself. But when it is joined to those things which are above it, it is elevated above itself.
Conversely, when things which are below the soul are in the intellect, they possess there a nobler being than they possess in themselves. But things which are above the soul possess a less noble being in the created intellect than they possess in themselves.
Since, therefore, God is the object of beatitude and, with respect to him, the act of love is nobler than the act of cognition, beatitude will consequently be in the act of love, which is an act of the will, and not of the intellect.
The second opinion is that which says that beatitude consists essentially in the acts of both powers.
For according to these men, fruition includes within its formal definition a twofold act, namely an act of the will and one of the intellect. For fruition is the final delight and rest which is possessed concerning the ultimate end attained through the intellect.
And because felicity consists principally in fruition, and fruition itself is more principally in the will than in the intellect—as Saint Thomas also says in Book I of the Sentences—it therefore follows, according to these men, that felicity consists principally in the will and not in the intellect.
But this opinion is false.
It is proved because one and the same act cannot exist in both the intellectual and the affective part.
And when it is said that fruition is the final delight in the ultimate end attained through the intellect, and that felicity consists principally in fruition, and so forth, it is answered that fruition can be understood in two ways.
In one way, formally, and thus it is an act of the will.
In another way, radically and originally—that is, according to that which is necessarily presupposed by fruition and which fruition immediately follows, just as a passion follows its proper subject. In this manner I say that fruition follows an act of the intellect.
And in the first manner felicity does not exist in fruition except as in the proper passion of felicity. But in the second manner felicity is essentially in an act of the intellect, so that, if it were granted by an impossibility that someone had attained the ultimate end through an act of the intellect, he would immediately be essentially happy even if fruition in that end did not follow.
It must therefore be denied that two acts exist in fruition formally understood. Rather, there is one act, which is not felicity essentially, but completively, with the completion of perfection in the second mode and not in the first.
It is customarily said scholastically that to enjoy initiatively, objectively, and effectively is through an act of the intellect. And in this manner we enjoy God alone.
Formally, however, we enjoy created beatitude. Electively, we enjoy charity as the habit eliciting the act of fruition. Instrumentally, we enjoy the power whose act fruition is. Completively, however, fruition is in the will.
There is also a third opinion—which, with the leave of others, I would call the more common opinion of Saint Thomas—which holds that the object of beatitude, namely God, is attained first and principally through an act of the intellect.
This is proved first as follows.
In every motion, the movable thing, so long as it is in motion, is imperfect, because motion is the act of that which is imperfect, according to Book III of the Physics. And when it is at the terminus, it possesses the perfection toward which it tended through motion, as is evident in every motion, but more plainly in local motion.
But the time of faith is like a certain motion; hence the faithful are called wayfarers in the fifth chapter of Second Corinthians: “We walk by faith.” Therefore, this time is imperfect, and it lasts until God is attained through his essence.
But he is first attained through vision, because vision itself is the terminus of the motion of faith. Therefore, beatitude consists in vision.
If it is said that vision does not terminate the motion of faith, it would follow that one seeing God would be a wayfarer.
If it is also said that it is true that beatitude is at the terminus of motion, but that this is on account of love, which terminates the motion of faith just as vision does because it exists with vision in the same instant, this does not avail. For although vision and love exist together in time and duration nevertheless vision is prior to love by nature, and they are two really different acts. Hence, if vision did not terminate the motion of faith, it would follow that one seeing, insofar as he is seeing, would be a wayfarer.
And this argument, in my judgment, demonstrates that beatitude consists in an act of the intellect.
Likewise, the proposition is proved secondly as follows.
Desire is perfected when the desired thing is possessed, not because it is loved—whether by preceding love, which concerns a thing not yet possessed, or by subsequent love, which concerns a thing already possessed.
Thus, when someone desires money, his desire is made perfect when he has acquired it. From this it is evident that perfection lies in possessing and in no manner in loving, whether the love precedes or follows.
But God is possessed by the blessed through an act of vision and not through an act of love. Hence Augustine says in Book I of the Soliloquies: “To see God is the same as to possess him.” Therefore, desire is perfected in possessing.
Third, as follows. If beatitude consists in an act of love, since the love of the way and of the fatherland is the same—because charity never fails—it follows that one who is in charity is blessed, even though he loves less now than he will then. In the same way, one who is less or more white is white.
If it is said that beatitude does not consist in love simply, but in as great a love as is the love of the fatherland, to the contrary: someone on the way possesses a greater love than someone in the fatherland. Therefore, that person is blessed.
Likewise, beatitude must be placed more in that state from which there is a change of state than in that from which there is no change of state. But the change of state is in vision and not in love, because love there and here is of the same kind, but vision is not. Therefore.
Likewise, merit is ordered toward reward. But merit consists in love. Therefore, the reward ought not to be placed in love, for this would be nothing other than to say that we love in order that we may love, which would seem absurd.
For we do not love, in any kind of love, in order that we may love, but rather in order that we may be loved.
But because beatitude consists in one’s own act and not in another person’s act, we therefore do not love even in order that we may be loved. Since, therefore, we do not love in order that we may be loved as for the sake of a reward, it remains that we love in order that we may see. Therefore, the final reward is vision.
Further, the reward when attained is loved. Therefore, if beatitude is placed in an act of love, it follows that love is loved, which is said incongruously.
But if it is said that the vision of God is loved immediately, no one would admit that this was said incongruously. Therefore, it must be said that beatitude consists essentially in vision, but in love secondarily and outside its essence.
For love and delight of this kind are accidents which perfect beatitude, just as beauty perfects youth.
Nor should anyone say: because vision precedes love, love is therefore nobler, since it adds some goodness to vision. For according to this reasoning delight would be still better, since it adds its own goodness to each of them, and yet beatitude is not placed in delight.
Likewise, it is proved that the blessed person is joined to God in no manner through an act of the will.
For there are three operations of the will and no more: to desire, to love, and to delight.
It is established, however, that the desired object is not joined to desire through desiring, because desire properly concerns that which one does not possess.
Nor is it joined through delighting, because delight is caused by conjunction and presupposes it.
Nor is it joined through loving, because love concerns that which is possessed just as it concerns that which is not possessed. Hence, since love is of the same kind before the thing is possessed and after the thing is possessed, if conjunction does not occur through it before possession, neither does it occur through it after possession. Rather, love follows the conjunction which must occur through an act of the intellect.
This position is also evident through John, chapter 17, who says: “And this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. I have glorified you upon the earth; I have completed the work which you gave me to do,” and so forth.
And in Luke, chapter 10, it is said: “Blessed are the eyes which see the things that you see.”
And Augustine says in On the Trinity, at the reference printed as “17”: “Vision is the whole reward.”
And in the Enchiridion, at the place cited, it is said: “Full vision is the highest felicity.”
The position is elicited from Thomas, Book III Against the Gentiles, chapter 59; the First Part, question 12, articles 1, 2, and 3; and the Master of the Sentences, with many other doctors, in Book IV, distinction 49.
Now, however, let us answer the arguments of the lords and Reverend Scotist Fathers.
To the first, Thomas replies in the First Part, question 26, article 2, reply to the second objection, saying that, although beatitude, insofar as it is a good, is the object of the will, nevertheless the object is understood prior to the act of the power.
Thus, according to the mode of understanding, divine beatitude is prior to the act of the will resting in it, and this prior beatitude can be nothing except an act of the intellect. Hence this beatitude is considered in the act of the intellect. Thus he.
To the second it is said that the love of the fatherland is not as good as cognition, although here on the way the reverse is true. For on the way God is loved immediately and seen mediately, and therefore love is better. But in the fatherland the reverse is true, because he is seen immediately and loved through the mediation of a habit, and therefore vision is worthier.
The reason is that here the intellect is borne toward God through an inferior likeness, but the will is borne toward God himself according as he is in himself, since it belongs to the will to be inclined toward a thing as it is in itself.
And when it is said that love penetrates within, and so forth, I say that this authority is understood concerning the love and cognition of the way, where cognition in general is the principle of desiring, and therefore desire commands that the matter be searched more profoundly. But it is not so in the fatherland.
To the third it must be said that Boethius intends there to give the common account of beatitude, according to which the Philosopher says that beatitude is a sufficient good—that is, one which, when possessed, brings possession of every good.
To the fourth it is said that the inference does not follow: “That is not desirable without beauty; therefore beauty is of its essence.”
The reason is that something is desirable insofar as it is essentially good, but beauty or delight is superadded accidentally. Therefore, through the former it is good simply and a being without qualification; through the latter it is good and a being in a qualified respect.
To the fifth it is said that beatitude is not essentially in joy but by concomitance, because supreme joy follows upon the truth known. From this it should rather be concluded that the contrary is true, because it is evident from the authority that joy presupposes truth known by the intellect.
To the sixth it is said that on the way the act of love is required more because it is more suited to meriting. It is not so in the fatherland, because the intellect is more suited to seeing.
To the seventh it is answered by making a distinction: either in moving or in attaining. I say, therefore, that loving God is more perfect in moving, but knowing him is more perfect in attaining.
To the eighth it is said, by denying the major premise, that it is not incongruous that we should be united more through something and yet not be beatified through it.
Thus delight adds something beyond vision, yet it is outside the essence of beatitude. In this manner we are united more through delight, but we are nevertheless not beatified through it.
And when it is said that the intellect does not unite because we understand things which are not pleasing to us, it is said that, whether they are pleasing or not, the intellect is nevertheless made one with the intelligible object.
To the ninth it is said that, if beatitude were placed in an act of love, every blessed person would have to be in that act; therefore, all the angels would be called Seraphim, which is false.
To the tenth, the major premise is denied. For the desire for the sweetness of wine is in the appetite, and nevertheless its sweetness is perceived in the taste.
And if it is said that divine justice requires this, it must be said that, where there are diverse persons, this has truth. But it must not be understood of diverse powers rooted in one essence, because all are rooted in one essence. Moreover, the power does not merit; rather, the composite does.
To the eleventh it is said that the will is nobler with respect to the command of the act, but the intellect is nobler with respect to the specification and determination of the object.
To the twelfth it is said that on the way love is nobler than cognition, but in the fatherland the reverse is true.
The reason is that on the way we do not know God through his essence, and therefore God exists in our intellect in a lower mode than he exists in himself. But in the fatherland God is known through his essence by the intellect, so that there his essence is both the principle of understanding and the object. And since the intellect is nobler than the will, therefore and so forth.
And thus it is evident what must be held concerning the question.
These things are from the theologians.
Addition
See Lord Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, question 3, article 4. From him you have that beatitude consists essentially in an act of the intellect, and in an act of the will as in a certain extrinsic perfection.
It appears also from this that his final statements increase the difficulty for some. Hence the doctors hold various and diverse opinions, such as Giles in Book I, Richard in Book IV, Brulifer, and Lord Bonaventure.
Some—such as our Ambrose Spiera of Treviso—reconcile the Holy Doctor with Scotus by saying that fruition is initiatively on the part of the intellect, but completively on the part of the will, because those things which are prior in cognition are posterior in perfection, from Book XII of the Metaphysics.
But you should hold, if it pleases you—for it is the common opinion—that the total account of beatitude consists in the intellect, but that it consists in the will as in something supervening and adorning it.
In this the Blessed Thomas and the Philosopher are followed: the latter says in Book X of the Ethics that felicity consists in contemplation; and John, chapter 17, says, “This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God”—though not as Thomas of Strasbourg expounds and glosses it.