Little Question Two of Principal Question Four
What fortune is according to philosophers and theologians
It is asked what fortune is according to philosophers and theologians.
To this it is answered that Aristotle in Book II of the Physics, and Thomas in his commentary there, define it thus: “Fortune is an accidental cause in those things which are done according to purpose in the minority of cases.”
In this definition three things are touched upon which pertain to the nature of fortune.
The first is that fortune is an accidental cause. Hence, although the name of fortune is sometimes popularly transferred to the effect, so that we say, “Such a fortune happens to such a person,” when some effect of prosperity or adversity happens to someone, nevertheless the name fortune does not signify this.
Rather, that which is the cause of that prosperous effect is properly called fortune. Therefore, it is said that fortune is not a cause of the effect in itself, but accidentally. For an accidental effect which is joined to a cause in itself, and which lies outside the account of the cause in itself and outside the account of the agent, is a fortuitous effect and is from an accidental cause, which is called fortune.
For example, the descent of a stone is in itself, and the going of a human being to the forum, if he has purposed this, also happens to be in itself. But that, while he is going to the forum, a stone happens to descend and break his head is accidental.
Thus this effect—the breaking of the head—arises from the concurrence of two causes. And although each of them exists in itself, nevertheless their concurrence for producing such an effect, which is the breaking of the head, must be accidental and from fortune.
The second thing which pertains to the nature of fortune is that fortune is a cause of those things which happen in the minority of cases.
This is evident through an example. If someone goes to the forum for some other thing and brings back from there money which he did not intend to bring back, then the bringing back of the money, whose cause was the arrival at the forum, occurs neither from necessity nor always. It therefore occurs in the minority of cases, because it happens only in fewer cases.
The third thing which pertains to the nature of fortune is that fortune is not a cause of those things which are done by nature, but of those things which are done according to purpose and by intellect.
That it is not from nature is evident, because nature operates either always or frequently and in a similar manner. Fortune, however, operates in fewer cases and dissimilarly.
Likewise, neither an inanimate thing, nor a child, nor a beast acts from fortune, since they do not act voluntarily as though possessing free choice. Hence neither good fortune nor misfortune can happen to these except by way of likeness.
Thus someone said that the stones from which altars are made are well-fortuned, because honor and reverence are shown to them while the stones joined to them are trampled underfoot. This is said by likeness to human beings, among whom those who are honored are called fortunate.
Hence good fortune is when some great good happens to someone beyond his intention. Misfortune, however, is when some great evil follows someone beyond his intention.
But if some curious person should ask here whether these things which are fortuitous accidentally and by chance are subjected to divine providence, it is answered that they are, yet not casually, contingently, and fortuitously, but providentially, preordainedly, certainly, and necessarily.
To understand this, Avicenna says that everything which happens can be compared with a twofold cause, namely a universal cause and a particular cause.
In relation to the universal cause, nothing happens fortuitously or by chance; for “nothing happens on earth without a cause,” namely, a cause in itself, as is said in Job 5. But it does so in relation to a particular cause.
The reason for this is that, since a universal cause has a more universal end than a particular cause, something certainly falls under the intention of the first cause, which is universal, although it lies outside the intention of the second cause.
Thus, in relation to the first cause, which is most universal, nothing happens casually or fortuitously. Nevertheless, in relation to inferior causes, many things happen and can happen casually and fortuitously, and this in greater and lesser degree.
Thomas in Book III Against the Gentiles, and Lord Bonaventure in Book III of the Sentences, distinction 37, declare the same thing and say thus: Although something may be casual or fortuitous with respect to nature, a particular agent, or a created intellect, nevertheless nothing is casual or fortuitous with respect to the providence of God, by whom all things have been foreseen and preordained.
For example, if a lord sends one of his servants to some place to which he had then also sent another servant, the first being ignorant of this, the servants’ meeting with one another lies outside the intention of each servant sent, but not outside the intention of the one sending them. Hence, although such a meeting is fortuitous with respect to the servants, it is not so with respect to the lord, with respect to whom it is preordained and foreseen.
Thus, therefore, I speak of contingent things in this world. With respect to secondary causes they occur fortuitously and contingently; nevertheless, with respect to the first universal cause, namely God, from whom nothing can be withdrawn, nothing fortuitous or casual happens. Rather, all things follow providentially, in an ordered manner, and necessarily.
I say likewise concerning the good fortunes or misfortunes of human beings which happen to a human being by comparison with secondary causes—that is, with respect to the heavens, angels, and other secondary causes. By comparison with God, however, nothing can happen, since nothing is casual or unforeseen for him, and since all things fall under his providence and under his certain foreknowledge, intention, and ordering.
These things are from theologians and philosophers.