Fifth Principal Chapter of This First Decade
Containing Four Questions
Question One
Whether the damned can, by right reason, desire not to exist, in order to escape the miseries of hell and attain their absence
It is asked whether the souls of the damned can, by right and deliberative reason, desire not to exist for the sake of escaping and lacking the miseries and eternal punishments of hell.
To this it seems at first that an affirmative answer must be given. For Apocalypse 9 says that in those days human beings will desire to die; and chapter 6 of the same book says that the damned will say to the mountains, “Fall upon us.” And Christ says concerning Judas in Matthew that it would have been better for him not to have been born than to be perpetually damned.
I answer by saying that, concerning this matter, Scotus in Book IV, distinction 1, question 2, and in part Francis of Meyronnes in his Conflatus, distinction 40, say with Anselm in chapter 17 of the Monologion that the souls of the damned cannot by right reason desire not to exist in order to escape the miseries of hell and attain absence from infernal punishments.
They endeavor to prove this opinion of theirs with the following ten reasons and authorities.
First, as follows. According to right reason, no one ought to desire a greater evil for the sake of escaping a lesser evil. But the punishment of hell which is fled is a lesser and, as it were, particular evil in comparison with nonexistence, which takes away every good because it takes away the whole nature. Therefore nonexistence is not to be desired according to right reason for the sake of lacking punishments.
Second, the flight from a greater perfection is not to be desired for the sake of obtaining a lesser perfection. But being is a greater perfection than joy arising from escape from punishments. For being, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, is the noblest among all divine participations. Therefore, and so forth.
Third, no one according to right reason can desire anything contrary to a natural inclination, which always intends what is better because it is regulated by the intelligence which does not err, namely God. But there is a natural appetite for being, as is evident in Book II On Generation and Book II On the Soul, and it was caused immediately by God in the rational creature. Therefore nonexistence cannot by right reason be desired for the sake of lacking punishments, especially also since eternal punishments accord with the divine will which inflicts them.
Fourth, no one can by right reason desire not to exist in order to flee what is just and good, because the punishment is positive and punitive. Therefore nonexistence cannot be desired in order that punishment may be avoided.
Fifth, every habit is better than its privation. But being is a habit, form, and perfection, while nonbeing is a privation. Therefore nonbeing cannot be desired so that we may be deprived of being itself.
Sixth, that which more persons—indeed, all persons—choose and desire is better, according to Book I of the Ethics. But all things desire being, and more choose it; nonbeing is the contrary. Therefore in punishments being is to be preferred above nonbeing.
Seventh, the more common a good is, the more divine and consequently the more desirable it is. But not to exist, in order that we may lack punishments, yields to the confusion of God through the absence of divine justice. Therefore it is better to exist.
Eighth, where there is no character of goodness, there is no character of what is better and consequently none of preference. But nonbeing possesses no character of goodness, since it is the privation of the whole nature. Therefore it ought not to be chosen or preferred for the sake of lacking the punishments of hell.
Ninth, the greater evil is more to be fled than the lesser evil. But to exist miserably in torments is a lesser evil than not to exist, because the former posits being, while the latter takes away every good since it leaves nothing. Therefore miserable existence in torments is to be preferred to simple nonexistence.
Tenth, Francis of Meyronnes says in the place cited above that the things which God can do by absolute power will be able at some time to be done and brought into being, because absolute and ordained—or distinct—power are the same in God. Therefore it is better for the damned to be and to exist in torments than simply not to exist, because at least they are subject to this absolute power of God, which will be able at any time to be brought into being and act.
As they say, the authorities of Augustine support this opinion. In Book XI of The City of God, chapter 26, he says:
If immortality were given to even the most wretched person, by which not even his misery would die, he would surely exult for joy and would thus always choose to exist rather than not to exist at all. For by a certain natural force, being itself is so pleasing that for no other reason even those who are wretched do not wish to perish.
These are his words.
And in the book On Free Choice he says: “Consider how great a good it is to exist, which both the blessed and the wretched desire. For it is a greater thing to be wretched than not to exist at all.”
There is the example of those who are in prisons, bound by chains and fetters, vexed by torments, and sick with many kinds of infirmities, who nevertheless prefer to exist thus rather than to die. And although they call for death with their mouth, they deny it in their heart. Similarly, decrepit old people, whom all diseases pursue, prefer to remain thus rather than to die.
And thus those of this school hold this as the truth and their position.
They answer the first two authorities of John in the Apocalypse by saying that, when the damned say those things, they desire not to exist by reason that is not right, just as a sinner deceived by an error of reason admits a greater evil after dismissing a lesser evil for the sake of some particular delight.
To the authority of Jesus Christ they say that it is understood with respect to the second birth outside the womb, not with respect to the first, which consists in the infusion of the rational soul into an organized body.
There is another common manner of speaking belonging to Blessed Augustine in many places, which Saint Thomas follows in Book IV of the Sentences, distinction 5, question 2. It holds that the damned can by right and deliberative reason wish—and do wish—for themselves not to exist, for the sake of lacking punishments.
Those of this school prove their intention by reasons and authorities, and answer the reasons of the school of Lord John Scotus introduced above.
First, as follows. Everything delightful is desirable; but the absence of evil is delightful, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Rhetoric. Therefore it is desirable.
Second, that which does not include evil is desirable.
Third, it is better to be blessed than merely to exist. Therefore, by the topic of the proposition and its opposite, it is worse to be damned than not to exist.
Fourth, the misery and punishment of the damned exceeds every punishment and misery of this world, just as the glory of the blessed who comprehend exceeds all the glory and delight of wayfarers. But for the sake of avoiding the misery of this world, death is desirable to some. Therefore, much more strongly, according to deliberative reason, nonexistence is desirable to the damned for the sake of escaping eternal punishments.
The minor is proved. Ecclesiasticus 41 says: “O death, how good is your judgment to a human being in need, whose strength is diminished, who fails through age, who is anxious concerning all things, and who has lost wisdom.”
What Pliny says in Book VII of the Natural History also bears upon this by the topic from the lesser: “There have been many who judged it best not to be born, or to be abolished as quickly as possible.”
Similarly, Cicero in Book I of the Tusculan Disputations adduces the saying of the philosopher Silenus to Midas, king of the Lydians: “By far the best thing for a human being is not to be born; the next best is to die as soon as possible.” This is on account of the miseries of the world; how much more on account of eternal punishments.
Fifth, that which is not evil of itself is more desirable than an infinite evil. But nonbeing is not evil of itself. Hence the doctors say that the privation of the benefit of creation does not yield to the detriment of the uncreated, because the uncreated incurs no punishment from this. Eternal punishment, however, is an infinite evil. Therefore by right reason nonexistence—which is not evil of itself—is more desirable than eternal punishment, which is an infinite evil.
In support of this side is the first authority of Augustine in the sermon On Murmuring, which begins “While you were dwelling in the desert,” where he says thus:
For it is better, my brothers, to lack being than to be tortured perpetually. For I do not know what it is not to exist; but to possess being and to be tortured perpetually—what else is this than always to possess death without death? Therefore, brothers, truly and without doubt I dare to say that it would be better not to exist than, while existing, to be tortured perpetually or afflicted eternally.
These are his words.
And in the book On the Misery of the Damned he says: “O death, you are sweet to those to whom you were bitter. You alone are desired by those who vehemently hated you,” and so forth.
And Jerome, upon the words of Matthew 26, “It would have been better for him if he had not been born,” and so forth, is cited and set down by Saint Thomas in the Catena Aurea upon this passage: “For one hidden in the maternal womb, it is better not to exist than to exist for torments.”
There are also the authorities of Apocalypse 9 and 6 set down at the beginning of the question.
Finally, there is the authority of Christ which concludes all things, also introduced at the beginning of the question: “It would have been better for him,” and so forth. Here the Ordinary Gloss says: “Christ’s word was spoken simply with respect to being in the womb and outside the womb.”
In support of this side are the daily examples of those who kill themselves for the sake of lacking temporal punishments. Therefore, if what appears less likely is granted, what is more likely is granted; consequently no wise person will deny it concerning the eternal punishments of hell.
Now, however, in answering the reasons of the contrary school, it is said first, with a distinction in reply to the first nine arguments, that nonbeing can be considered in two ways.
In one way, in itself, and thus it can in no manner be desirable, since it possesses no character of good but is a pure privation of good. The nine arguments stated above proceed according to this way.
In another way, nonbeing can be considered incidentally, insofar as it removes a penal or wretched life, and thus nonbeing assumes the character of good. For to lack evil is a certain good, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Ethics.
It is customary here to distinguish whether the expression “incidentally” is taken on the side of the subject, namely, that someone incidentally desires not to exist. In that case nonbeing possesses the character of an object in itself, and thus this is not true, because being, which is the contrary of nonbeing, is objectively the natural appetite and inclination.
In another way, the expression “incidentally” is taken on the side of the predicate. The sense then is that someone desires not to exist, but incidentally, because nonbeing is not thus the object of the appetite in itself; rather, something else—namely, not to be wretched—is desired in itself, and nonbeing follows incidentally.
In this manner it is said and granted by the saints and by Thomas that it is better for the damned not to exist than to exist wretchedly. Hence, upon the words of Job 3 and Jeremiah 20, “Cursed be the day on which I was born,” Jerome says formally that it is better for the damned not to exist than to exist badly; and in this sense the damned can choose nonexistence according to deliberative reason.
Blessed Vincent gives this example:
Which is better: that the king give you a castle, or not? Certainly it is better that it be given. But which would be better: to give a castle producing a return of one hundred ducats, together with an annual payment of two hundred, or not to give it? Certainly it would be better not to give or accept it.
And so forth.
To the tenth argument of Francis of Meyronnes it is answered that the things which God can do by absolute power never occur merely as such, because it implies a contradiction that he should do something and that it should not be done ordinately. For all things which are from God are ordered, according to the Apostle. Thomas adduces this in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 48, question 1, final article.
To the authority of Augustine it is said that nonbeing is not desirable in itself, but incidentally insofar as it is the termination of misery. Hence, although being and living are naturally desired by all, they are nevertheless not desired by all who exist in sadness, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics.
The example concerning those imprisoned requires no answer, for it is rejected with the same facility with which it is approved.
If, nevertheless, you wish to sustain both opinions on account of such great men, conclude that, absolutely and abstracting from punishment, nonexistence cannot be desired—and understand Scotus in this way—and that absolutely they cannot desire those punishments upon which being follows—and understand Saint Thomas in this way. But incidentally, by abstracting either one from its consequences, it both can and cannot be desired.