Question Three
That in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault, and every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin
It is asked whether in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault, and every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin.
To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given.
For it is easier to sin than to rise again from sin. But those who exist in Purgatory cannot sin. Therefore they cannot rise again from sin.
Second, the argument is as follows. Actual fault is not destroyed except through contrition. But after this life there will be no contrition which is a meritorious act, because there will be neither merit nor demerit; for according to Damascene, death is to human beings what the fall was to the angels. Therefore after death no venial fault can be remitted in Purgatory.
Third, venial sin arises from the tinder of sin. But the tinder belongs to the composite, not to the soul in itself. Therefore, when the tinder is dissolved, venial sin is dissolved. But the tinder is dissolved in death. Therefore venial sin is dissolved in death, and not after death in Purgatory.
To the contrary stands Gregory in Book IV of the Dialogues, and his text is placed in the Decretum, distinction 25, chapter Qualis. He says that after this life certain faults are expiated in Purgatory. Augustine also says in the book On True Penance that certain light faults are remitted in the future.
By way of answer, two conclusions corresponding to the two parts of the question’s title will be set down.
The first conclusion: in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault.
Albert the Great proves this conclusion as follows. Let the case be posited that someone exists in grace but has venial faults, and that in the final instant he is in this condition and dies with the intention of repeating venial sins—that is, without grieving over them. It is established that he will be saved, because he is in grace, and venial sins do not take grace away. It is also established that a sin which remains in the will is not remitted. Therefore it seems necessary that it be remitted after death as to fault.
If perhaps you say that it is converted into mortal sin because of the intention to repeat it, and consequently because of the delay of his glory, which he appears impenitently to love, Durandus and Peter of Palude answer this in Book IV. If someone at death does not wish to repent of a venial sin, he need not on this account sin mortally, for a human being is no more bound to expiate a sin than he is to avoid venial sin. But one who exists without mortal sin is not necessarily bound to avoid venial sin; therefore neither is he bound to expiate it in this or that manner.
“And nevertheless,” the objector says, “he wills the delay of glory.”
Peter answers that it also does not follow from this that he sins mortally, because to will the delay of glory is not of itself mortal, since to will to be separated from a friend for a time is not contrary to friendship. Hence to desire a long life, on account of which one is delayed from the blessed life, is not for this reason mortal. For Hezekiah did not sin mortally when he wept for the addition of fifteen years.
For this reason it is said conclusively, with Gregory and Augustine in the places cited above, that venial fault in one who departs with grace is remitted after this life through purgatorial fire. For that punishment, being in some measure voluntary by virtue of grace, will have the power to expiate every fault which cannot stand together with glory. Otherwise, it could happen that someone died in charity with a venial fault which would never be remitted to him. Thus someone could die in charity who would never see God beatifically, which is repugnant to the disposition of divine law. Therefore the first conclusion is true.
But Lord Henry of Hesse asks here, more precisely, when in the future age the remission of light sins as to fault occurs: whether in the first instant of the human being’s nonexistence, or at the end of the discharge of the punishment for each one of them. Hence, if by merit before death—as Gregory says—the soul is absolved from venial fault after death, why would this not happen in the first instant of the soul’s separation from the body?
He answers that every fault not remitted in this life is coeval with its punishment. Thus, if it is mortal, it will be coeval with its eternal punishment. If, however, it is venial, it will not be remitted until the whole temporal punishment has been discharged for it.
In this consists the difference between the punishments of sins in the present life and in the future age. In the present age, fault is first remitted, and afterward the punishment for it is discharged. But in the future age, fault is not remitted before the punishment owed for it is brought to an end. Gregory intends this in Book IV of the Dialogues, chapter 27.
The second conclusion: in Purgatory every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin is remitted.
This conclusion is proved as follows. The punishment of Purgatory is more grievous than any punishment of this world, Augustine says in distinction 25, in the following chapter. But through a satisfactory punishment which someone sustains in this life, he is expiated from the debt of punishment. Therefore, much more is he expiated through the punishment of Purgatory.
Likewise, the argument is as follows. Whoever is a debtor to some punishment is absolved from the debt by discharging the debt. But liability is nothing other than a debt of punishment. Therefore, through the fact that someone sustains punishment to the extent that he owes, he is absolved from liability. Therefore the punishment of Purgatory purges from liability.
Here it must be observed, according to Richard of Middleton in Book IV, that of the souls departing from their bodies in charity, some have discharged in this life the whole punishment owed by them. Since such souls possess nothing to be purged, they are not punished in Purgatory but, immediately upon being separated from their bodies, are admitted to the enjoyment of eternal life.
There are other souls which have not completed the whole punishment owed by them. It is consonant with divine justice that such souls be punished after this life—not, however, with eternal punishment, but with purgatorial punishment. For since they depart with charity, it is not consonant with divine justice for them to be punished eternally, because they are worthy of eternal life. And because they are still bound to some punishment of divine justice, it is consonant that they first sustain it before they receive the joy of eternal life. For an obligation to any punishment cannot stand together with that joy, because nothing defiled can enter into it.
Hence it must be observed, according to Lord Henry of Hesse, that venial sins as to liability to punishment are remitted either in this world by the merit of certain works done here in grace—for example, because someone freely and, in part, from piety has forgiven those who sin against him. Hence Christ said in Luke 6: “Forgive, and you shall be forgiven”; and in Matthew 5: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” Or this occurs by praying earnestly for sinners so that they may be converted, as in the final chapter of James: “He who causes a sinner to be converted from the error of his way shall save his soul”—namely, the soul of the one converting and of the one converted—“from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins.”
Or venial sin is remitted in the future age as to fault and punishment, if it happens that a human being dies in some venial sins, by the merit of the grace which preceded them. Concerning this Gregory said in Book IV of the Dialogues, chapter 4: “It must be known that there no one will obtain even the least purgation unless, while still placed here in this life, he merits by good deeds that he should obtain it there,” and so forth.
The arguments made to the contrary are now answered.
To the first argument, it must be said first that the premise, “It is easier to sin than to rise again from sin,” is true as long as free choice is flexible toward either alternative. But when it is now confirmed in the good, as it is in those who are in Purgatory, it is impossible to sin. Yet it is easy to detest sin, since this is a good. In this detestation consists the ordering of the will and the remission of venial sin as to fault. These things are from Lord Bonaventure and Lord Durandus in Book IV.
To the second argument, it must be said, according to Saint Thomas, that the minor premise is denied. For we say that after this life there cannot be merit with respect to the essential reward, but there can indeed be merit with respect to some accidental reward, as long as the human being remains in the state of the way in some manner. Therefore in Purgatory an act can be meritorious with respect to the remission of venial fault.
To the third, it must be said that the consequence is denied.
For Lord Bonaventure says that, although when the tinder of sin has been taken away venial sin is taken away as regards the power to sin venially in the future, it is nevertheless not necessary that a venial sin previously perpetrated be taken away. For not every cause of introducing a thing is a cause of preserving it, as is evident in many examples.
When a knife has been destroyed, a wound cannot be inflicted; but when the knife is destroyed, it is not on that account necessary that the wound previously inflicted be healed.
Albert and Thomas agree upon Book IV.