Question Thirteen
Whether the suffrages of the living can lessen or shorten the punishment of hell
It is asked whether the punishment of hell can be lessened or shortened through the suffrages of the faithful living.
To this some answer that it can, wishing to revive ancient and forgotten positions. For, first, they argue thus. In 2 Maccabees 12 it is said that beneath the tunics of those who had been slain there were found coins of idols, from which the law forbids the Jews; and nevertheless it is afterward added that Judas, after a collection had been made, sent twelve thousand drachmas of silver to Jerusalem to be offered there for the sins of the dead. It is agreed that they had sinned mortally by acting against the law, and that they had died in that sin, and consequently had been damned to hell. Therefore suffrages benefit those damned in hell.
Second, because Augustine says in the Enchiridion: “For those whom suffrages benefit, they benefit toward this end: that either there may be full remission, or that their damnation may be more tolerable.” But only those who are in hell are called damned. Therefore suffrages benefit the damned existing in hell.
Third, Dionysius, at the end of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, says thus: “The prayers of the just, both in this life and more after death, operate only upon those who are worthy of sacred prayers.” From this it seems possible to gather that suffrages benefit the dead more than the living. But they benefit the living who exist in mortal sin. For the Church prays for sinners, heretics, Jews, pagans, and so forth, that they may be converted. Therefore suffrages also avail the dead in mortal sin, whom it is certain to be damned in hell if they departed thus.
Fourth, because it is read in the Lives of the Fathers, and is also set down by Damascene in a certain sermon, that blessed Macarius found the head of a certain dead person on the road; and, after he had first prayed that he might know whose head it had been, it gave the response that it had belonged to a certain pagan priest who was damned in hell. Yet there he confessed that, through the prayer of Macarius, he and others were helped.
Fifth, as Damascene recounts in the same sermon, Gregory, pouring forth prayer for the emperor Trajan, heard a voice divinely brought to him: “I have heard your voice, and I grant pardon to Trajan.” As Damascene says in the same place, all the East and West are witnesses to this event. But it is agreed that Trajan had been damned in hell, because he instituted the cruel killing of many martyrs, as Damascene says in the same place. Therefore suffrages benefit those existing in hell.
Sixth, because as the blessed stand in relation to glory, so the damned stand in relation to punishment. But, at least until the day of judgment, suffrages benefit the blessed toward an increase of glory. Therefore they could also benefit the damned toward a lessening of punishment.
The minor is proved, for in a certain collect it is said As they benefit your saints unto glory, so may they benefit us unto healing.” Likewise, in the ancient books the sacred prayer concerning Saint Leo read thus: “Grant us, O Lord, that this offering may benefit the soul of your servant Leo,” as is contained in the chapter Cum Marthae, On the Celebration of Masses.
Seventh, because, just as it is not repugnant to the state of beatitude that the accidental reward - which is joy concerning a good work - be increased until the day of judgment, so it ought not to be repugnant to the state of misery and final damnation that the accidental punishment - which is remorse of conscience, or grief concerning an evil work, insofar as it causes punishment - be diminished. But accidental joy increases for the blessed, because it is said in Luke 15 that there is joy among the angels of God over one sinner doing penance. Therefore the accidental punishment, or remorse of conscience, can also be lessened for the damned. Moreover, joy increases for the blessed through the suffrages themselves, as was advanced in the preceding argument. Therefore some grief is similarly decreased for the damned through the same things, and thus they will benefit them.
Eighth, Augustine says in the Enchiridion that when sacrifices of the altar, or of any alms whatsoever, are offered for all the baptized, they are acts of thanksgiving for the very good, propitiations for those who are not very bad, and no helps for the very bad dead, but consolations of whatever kind for the living. For those whom they benefit, they benefit toward this end: that either there may be full remission, or that their damnation may be more tolerable.
From these words the Master, in Book IV, distinction 45, and the text in the chapter Cum Marthae, On the Celebration of Masses, final section, draw the conclusion that sacrifices of the altar and so forth do not benefit the very bad, and likewise do not benefit the very good. Indeed, one who prays for a martyr does an injury to him, since he ought rather to have been commended by the martyr’s prayers, as Augustine and the text in the same place say. But they benefit the moderately good toward expiation, and the moderately bad toward mitigation of punishment. Yet the moderately bad are damned. Therefore they benefit the damned.
The minor is explained, because by that fourfold distinction nothing else seems capable of being understood except that the very good are those who immediately after death flew to heaven. The very bad are unbelievers who were never of the bosom of the Church, either in number or in merit. The moderately good are those who carry with them into Purgatory some sins, and for these the suffrages benefit toward release from punishment. The moderately bad are those who were in the faith and sacraments of the Church but departed in mortal sin; and for these the suffrages benefit toward mitigation, or so that their damnation may be more tolerable.
Ninth, the same is confirmed from another saying of Augustine which the Master of the Sentences adduces in Book IV, distinction 46, where he says: “It is asked concerning the very bad whether they too experience, through the mercy of God, some mitigation of punishment.” And after the Master has argued that they do not, he adds the solution and says: “Augustine also, mocking those who contend that the punishments of the reprobate will have an end, so rejects their opinion and asserts that the reprobate are to be punished perpetually that he nevertheless does not deny that their punishments may be mitigated to some extent.”
Tenth, the same is confirmed from a certain prayer or collect that is found in a missal, whose title or inscription is “A Prayer for One concerning Whose Soul There Is Doubt.” By this, however, it does not intend to pray for one who is in Purgatory, because this inscription is singular. The same is also evident because in it it is said that, if they cannot obtain full pardon, they may at least obtain a diminution or refreshment.
In response to this little question, it must be said that there was formerly an opinion concerning the damned that suffrages benefit them, and this in two ways.
One way concerned time: namely, until the day of judgment. For they say that until the day of judgment the damned can be helped by the suffrages of the Church, but not afterward.
The other way concerned the persons detained in hell. For suffrages in no way benefit there the very bad who died without faith and the sacraments, since they were not of the bosom of the Church either in number or in merit. Others there, however, are not very bad: namely, those who were of the Church in number, possessed the faith and the sacraments, and performed some works good in kind, but died in mortal sin. They said that suffrages benefit such persons.
And these persons said that although the punishment of the damned is infinite according to duration, it is nevertheless finite according to intensity.
But against this it is argued thus. What is finite can be consumed through continual subtraction, or be taken away entirely. Therefore, if the suffrages of the Church lessen punishment, they could be multiplied so much that nothing of the punishment would remain, but it would be taken away entirely. This is the error of Origen.
But the Praepositinus, in order to escape this unacceptable consequence of Origen, said that the suffrages for the damned can be multiplied so much that all punishment will be removed entirely from them - not absolutely, as Origen held, but for a time, namely until the day of judgment. For then their souls, joined again to their bodies, will be thrust down into hell without any hope of pardon.
But against this: an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause has been taken away or diminished. Yet fault is the cause of punishment in the genus of meritorious cause, and fault always remains unexpiated in the damned. Therefore their punishment can at no time be taken away entirely.
And therefore the Porrectani devised another manner, saying that in this manner the diminution of punishments through suffrages is like the division of a continuum. For although one line is finite, it can nevertheless be divided to infinity, and the division will never be completed, provided that the subtraction of parts is made according to the same proportion and not according to the same quantity: for example, if first one half is taken away, then half of the half, and thus to infinity.
And similarly they imagined that through the first suffrage some aliquot part of the punishment is diminished - for example, one half of the punishment - then through the second, half of the half, which is one eighth of the whole, and so onward to infinity. In this way the punishment will never be ended, but something of the punishment will always remain.
The gloss on the chapter Tempus, cause 23, question 2, pursues this opinion. But Thomas answers against it in two ways.
First, because an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause has been taken away or diminished, as has been said.
In another way he answers with ridicule, saying that this manner of speaking is defective, because infinite division, which belongs to continuous quantity, is transferred to spiritual quantity. Hence, although a line, if divided into parts of the same proportion, can be divided to infinity, nevertheless, if punishment is divided in the aforesaid manner, it will not always be divided into punishments because of the same perceptibility. For flesh is not always divided into flesh, nor fire into fire, since there is a minimum of flesh, as is said in Book I of the Physics. It is said similarly concerning a minimum punishment, which would cause so little perceptibility that it would thus not be punishment, since punishment includes cognition and perception.
For this reason the Altissiodorensis spoke otherwise: namely, that suffrages benefit the damned not through a diminution or interruption of punishment, but through the strengthening of the sufferer. It is as if a person carries a heavy burden and his face is bathed with water: he is strengthened to carry it better, although the burden is not thereby made lighter in itself.
But Thomas contradicts this. For while the fault of the damned remains unchanged, the damned person cannot bear the punishment more lightly. The strengthening of the subject occurs only through the removal of passibility. Passibility, however, is according to the measure of fault. Therefore, if the fault is not diminished, consequently neither can the subject be strengthened.
For this reason others say that although their punishment is not diminished with respect to the fire, it is nevertheless diminished with respect to the worm and the remorse of conscience. For just as accidental joy - that is, joy concerning a good work - increases in the saints, so accidental punishment - that is, grief concerning an evil work - is diminished in the damned.
But against this: just as fire follows the fault of the damned, so too does the worm of conscience. Hence the reasoning ought to be similar concerning each.
Moreover, Albert says on the final chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy that suffrages do not benefit the dead in hell either with respect to a diminution or interruption of punishment, or with respect to a diminution of the punishment of sense, as the preceding persons said. But, because by suffrages of this kind some matter of grief is taken away from them which could exist for them if they saw themselves so cast aside that no one had care for them, this matter is taken away when suffrages are made for them. Albert says in the place cited above that this lessens punishment accidentally.
But Thomas contradicts this, because that cannot occur according to the common law. For, as Augustine says in the book On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead, what is especially true concerning the damned is that the souls of the dead are there where they do not see whatever things are done here or whatever things occur in this life. And thus they do not know when suffrages are made for them, unless perhaps this remedy were divinely granted to some damned persons beyond the common law. But this is altogether uncertain, and therefore must not be asserted.
But it might be said that Albert does not say that punishment is diminished. Rather, when he said only that it can be diminished in this manner, it is as if he were saying that this manner can be imagined.
Moreover, certain moderns wished to say that through the suffrages of the Church the fear which the damned possess is diminished. For they fear that many will be damned on their account, as is evident from the rich man who asked that Lazarus be sent to his brothers, lest they too should come into that place of torments. Fear, however, has punishment, just as hope has joy.
Therefore, since the damned can be freed from this fear through the suffrages of the Church when certain living persons are brought back to penance through the suffrages of the Church - persons whom the damned know to be saved, or not damned, although they had feared for them - therefore through those suffrages the damned will be freed from the punishment which they had from that fear.
But against this: this manner fails in two ways.
First, because it does not follow that, if until the day of judgment they do not see those persons in hell, they therefore know those persons not to be damned.
Next, even if it be granted that this follows and that they know it thus, they do not on that account obtain what they intended, because envy concerning the salvation of those persons can well equal, and indeed surpass, the punishment which they had from that fear. For that rich man, while he knew that some persons would not be damned, would have wished rather that his brothers were among them; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, he would have wished all his brothers to be damned, if this were possible, since the hatred of the damned is consummated. And thus, if they know that those whom they feared would be damned are saved, their punishment is not diminished but increased.
Therefore it must be concluded with blessed Thomas that it must be said simply and absolutely that suffrages do not benefit the damned, either toward taking away punishment, toward diminishing it, toward alleviating it, or toward interrupting it.
This conclusion is proved by reasons and authorities.
The first reason is that of Saint Thomas in Book IV, distinction 21, as follows. Suffrages, or works of the living, are continued or applied to the dead through the bond of charity, according to John 17: “Father, I will that they may be one, as we also are one.” But the damned are altogether outside charity. Therefore the works or suffrages of the living cannot be applied to them.
The major can be explained thus. In the work of suffrage there are two individuals: namely, the one making or performing the suffrages, and the one to whom the power of the suffrages must be applied. What one person does cannot be applied or continued to another except insofar as both are members of the same body, because in this way they are united and joined beneath one head.
Nor is it sufficient that they be united through faith; rather, they must also be united through charity. For a dead member receives neither influence from the head nor remedy or assistance from another member, although they may be continuous in quantity; rather, they must be continuous through form. This is like a dry branch that is continuous with the root or trunk through quantity, by which their extremities are one, but not through the form of a living thing. The damned, however, have been cut off from the Church irrevocably through the final sentence, and thus they are not members of the same body.
The second reason is as follows. Whoever have wholly arrived at the end of the way receive a recompense which cannot be diminished. For if it were diminished, they would not have received the end of their way. But the damned are absolutely outside the way. Therefore they receive punishment without diminution. Those, however, who are in Purgatory are in some manner wayfarers, and in some manner are not, as Thomas says.
The third reason is that of Durandus, as follows. Other things being equal, what someone does while living for himself ought to avail more for him or what another does for him, than what a living person does for a dead person - or at least no less - since the living communicate with one another more than they do with the dead.
But what a living person in mortal sin does, when he does not repent of that sin or propose to repent, or what another does for him, avails him nothing at all toward a diminution of the punishment owed for such a sin, although it can avail so that such a person is disposed toward repentance. Therefore, all the more, what a living person does for the damned dead, who do not repent of their sins or propose to repent but are obstinate in them, does not benefit them toward any diminution of punishment. For this reason, he says, it would appear contrary to reason and justice that something of the punishment owed should be remitted in one who does not repent and perseveres in impenitence.
The fourth reason is as follows. The office of mercy and charity, or love, is owed to those who are our neighbors, as is evident from the Master of the Sentences in Book IV, distinction 28, and according to the parable of the Samaritan in Luke. But the damned are not our neighbors. Therefore the love of charity or mercy is not to be shown to them. For the love of charity is founded upon communion in eternal beatitude, from which they are immovably excluded.
The fifth reason is as follows. If the suffrages of the living could benefit the damned, it would follow that indulgences granted by a prelate could also benefit them in the manner in which they can benefit the dead in Purgatory. The consequent is false, and no one asserts it. Therefore the antecedent is also false; and the consequence is evident.
For although indulgences do not avail the dead as persons who can perform that through which an indulgence is conferred, they can nevertheless avail if something is done for them by the living, if this is contained in the form of the indulgence. For example: “If anyone visits this church, so much of the punishment of hell is diminished for his father.” The consequent is false, because, as has been said, those existing in hell are not in charity, and therefore the satisfactions of others do not benefit them.
The authorities follow.
The first is Augustine, who says in the book On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead: “The suffrages of the living do not benefit all, but only those who, while they lived, cooperated in order that these things might benefit them.”
And in the Enchiridion he says: “These things benefit those who, when they lived, merited that these things could benefit them.” And in the same place he says likewise: “Those who departed from the body without the faith that works through love and without its sacraments receive such offices from their living relatives in vain.”
And in The City of God he says: “If I knew that my father was damned, I would no more pray for him than for the devil.”
And Gregory says to Boniface, as is contained in cause 13, question 2, chapter Pro obeuntibus: “For the impious, although they were Christians, it will not be lawful to make such a thing - namely an offering and suffrages.”
And in Book XXXIV of the Moralia, upon the words of Job, “He will esteem the abyss as growing old,” he says: “The reason why prayer is not made after the day of judgment for human beings damned to eternal fire is the same as the present reason why prayer is not made for the devil and his angels, appointed to eternal punishment.”
And Jerome, as is contained in the chapter In praesenti, cause 13, question 2, says: “In the present age we know that we can help one another either by prayers or by counsels. But when we have come before the tribunal of Christ, neither Job, Daniel, nor Noah will be able to petition for anyone; rather, each person will bear his own burden.”
Here Gratian says: “This is to be understood concerning the impenitent, of whom the prophet says: ‘He will not give God his propitiation, nor the price of the redemption of his soul, but he will labor and will live still unto the end.’” He is not speaking concerning those impenitent in this life, because it is lawful here to pray for them, but concerning the impenitent in the other world, because they died here impenitent.
And Chrysostom says in On the Restoration of the Fallen: “In hell there is never and nowhere any solace.” Therefore there is no consolation, diminution, or alleviation of punishment.
And Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: “The supreme priest does not pray for the unclean, because in this he would be turned away from the divine order”; and he is speaking concerning the damned.
And Albert, in his commentary upon this passage, says: “The opinion holding that suffrages benefit the damned is contrary to the sayings and authorities of the doctors,” and he alleges the aforesaid words of Augustine and Gregory.
And the gloss upon the final chapter of 1 John, on the words “There is a sin unto death,” says: “A sin continued unto death is called a sin unto death. I say that one should not pray for him: that is, I teach and command that one should not pray.”
The same is contained in cause 23, question 5, chapter Placuit, where prayers and commemorations are forbidden for those who kill themselves or who are punished for their crimes. Understand, according to the gloss, “unless they were contrite.”
And in cause 13, question 2, final chapter, the same is said concerning anyone who is known to have died in mortal sin.
Likewise, in cause 23, question 5, chapter Quicumque clericus: “If any cleric dies in war, in a brawl, or in the games of the pagans, no request is to be made for him either in the offering or in prayer” - the gloss adds, “unless at the end he repents.” Nevertheless he is not deprived of burial, says the gloss Canina.
The Church, however, would not prohibit prayer for these persons if our prayers could benefit them, because it would prohibit that which would be both good for them and meritorious for those praying. Therefore our prayers do not benefit them.
The same is also evident from the example of the rich man, who could not obtain from Abraham that the tip of Lazarus’s finger be dipped in water so that his tongue might be cooled in hell.
From all these things it must be concluded that suffrages do not benefit the damned.
But if you say, “Father, let us suppose that suffrages are made for certain persons whom they cannot benefit: does the one offering suffrage sin?” I say that if we know with certainty that certain persons are such, then we act wrongly, because we act against the divine ordering and against the statute of the holy Church.
But if we are ignorant, and those persons are saved, then indeed the suffrages do not benefit them, but the saved person is in a certain way obliged to pray for the one offering suffrage. If, however, they are damned, our prayer and our alms will return into our own bosom, as the prophet says.
Now, in the third place, the arguments must be answered.
To the first, it is said that those offerings of the idols were not found among those dead persons in such a way that from them a sign could be taken that they carried those objects out of reverence for the idols. Rather they had taken them as victors, because they were owed to them there by right of war; and thus they sinned venially through greed, wherefore they were not damned in hell, and so suffrages could benefit them.
Or it must be said, according to certain persons, that in the battle itself they saw danger threatening them and repented of the sin, according to the words of the Psalm: “When he slew them, they sought him,” and so forth. And because this could probably be judged, the offering was therefore made for them.
To the second, it must be said that “damnation” is taken broadly there, namely for any punishment whatsoever, so that it includes the punishment of Purgatory. For someone is sometimes called damned or condemned to pay a certain monetary penalty or to endure some punishment, although such condemnation is not unto death.
And because the punishment of Purgatory is sometimes entirely expiated through the suffrages of the faithful, while at other times it is not entirely expiated but is diminished, Augustine therefore says in the same place that suffrages benefit either so that there may be full remission - that is, so that the punishment may be entirely taken away - or so that it may become more tolerable.
To the third, it must be said that, with respect to this, suffrages for the dead are more acceptable than suffrages for the living, because the dead person is more in need, since he cannot aid himself as the living person can. But with respect to the other matter the living person is in a better condition, because he can be transferred from the state of mortal fault into the state of grace and glory, which cannot be said concerning the dead. Therefore the reasoning concerning prayer for the dead and for the living is not the same.
Moreover, the suffrages of the living do not benefit other living persons by way of satisfaction if those for whom they are made are in mortal sin. Hence, since they cannot benefit the dead except by way of satisfaction - for they cannot do so by way of merit, because the dead have departed from the state of meriting, so that neither they themselves nor others can merit for them - it follows that they cannot benefit the dead in mortal sin either. By contrast, they benefit the living who exist in sin by way of congruous merit, so as dispositively to merit grace for them. Therefore the reasoning is not similar.
To the fourth, concerning Macarius, it must be said that this help was not such that their punishment was diminished but consisted only in this, as is said in the same place: that, when Macarius prayed, it was granted that they might see one another in their torments. From this there could be no true joy, but only an imaginary joy, while what they desired was fulfilled - namely, to see others in punishments.
For the damned desire everyone to be damned. When this desire is fulfilled, they are said to rejoice with an imaginary joy, although yet greater grief increases for them. Demons are likewise said to rejoice when they draw human beings to sins and to hell, although through this their punishment is in no way diminished. Likewise, the joy of the angels is not diminished because they are said to suffer compassion for our evils.
To the fifth, concerning Trajan, it must be said that it can probably be judged that by the prayers of blessed Gregory he was miraculously recalled to life, and there obtained the grace through which he had remission of sins and, consequently, immunity from punishment. This is likewise apparent in many who were miraculously raised from the dead, several of whom are known to have been idolaters.
For concerning all such persons it must similarly be said that they had not been assigned to hell by final sentence, but only according to what their merits then required. According to the higher causes, however, by which it was foreseen that they were to be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.
Or it may be said, according to certain persons, that Trajan’s soul was not absolved absolutely from liability to punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, namely until the day of judgment.
Nor does it follow that this occurs commonly through the suffrages of the Church, because some things happen according to the common law and other things are granted singularly to certain persons by privilege. As Augustine says in the book On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead: “The limits of human affairs are one thing; the divine signs of power are another.”
What John the Deacon, who compiled the history of Gregory, thinks concerning this may be seen in Master Jacobus de Voragine, in the Legends of the Saints.
To the sixth, where the collect is introduced, it must be said that expressions of this sort are not to be understood as meaning that the saints advance in glory with respect to themselves through our celebrating their feasts. Rather, the matter benefits us, because we celebrate those feasts. Just as, from the fact that we know or praise God, his glory in us in a certain way increases - although nothing thereby accrues to God - so we celebrate the saints’ feasts not because it benefits them, but because it benefits us that we celebrate them.
Nevertheless, it must not be denied that the accidental joy of the saints increases at least extensively, because they rejoice concerning more things.
And in accordance with this is found in the ancient books the secret prayer concerning Saint Leo mentioned in the argument. This must be explained according to the things said in the chapter Cum Marthae, On the Celebration of Masses, third section.
To the seventh, which was a confirmation of the preceding argument, it is said that the case of the blessed and that of the damned are not similar. For the blessed communicate well with the living in charity, upon which the efficacy of suffrages is founded. But the damned in hell are excluded from such communion.
And again, although the blessed rejoice concerning the good things which the living do, and so some accidental glory increases for them, this is nevertheless not through any fruit of suffrage which they receive, but on account of the perfect charity which they possess; and therefore they rejoice concerning every good.
The argument also errs in the similarity which it adduces, because it ought rather to argue that, just as it is not repugnant to the state of beatitude that the accidental reward be increased until the day of judgment, so it is not repugnant to the state of the misery of damnation that accidental punishment be increased; and this is conceded. It is, however, incompatible with beatitude that glory be diminished, and thus incompatible with the state of misery that punishment be diminished.
To the eighth, it must be said that those who say that suffrages benefit the damned existing in hell explain Augustine’s saying as was treated in the argument. It can, however, be said otherwise that those who possess many venial sins are called moderately bad, while those who possess few are called moderately good. The gloss on the aforesaid chapter Cum Marthae touches upon this meaning.
Or the moderately bad are those who committed mortal sins and died penitent, without at least complete satisfaction having been made for them. The moderately good are those who are to be expiated only from venial sins. And thus both groups are in Purgatory, so that the very good are called those who are blessed in Paradise, and the very bad those who are damned in hell; the moderately good and likewise the moderately bad, however, are those who are in Purgatory to expiate their sins.
These latter are those who departed in grace with venial sin, or with a debt of punishment for mortal sins of which they repented before death. They are called moderately good to the extent that they fall short of the perfection of goodness, but moderately bad insofar as they fall short of perfect wickedness, which is mortal sin. Suffrages benefit them toward the mitigation of punishment and sometimes toward complete release, according to the difference in the quantity of their sins and of the suffrages.
Accordingly, although this distinction appears fourfold with respect to the words, it is nevertheless only threefold with respect to the reality, because the moderately good and the moderately bad are the same persons: namely, all those existing in Purgatory. Similarly, that which is moderately icy is also moderately cold, and that which is moderately white is also moderately black. Thus Durandus.
To the ninth, it is said that Augustine does not say that the punishment of the damned is at some time diminished or interrupted, but places those words beneath a disjunction. For the truth of a disjunction it is sufficient that one part be true, and thus it does not follow that those words which are placed for the other part of the disjunction are true. This is evident because Augustine says, “Or if he judges this,” and so forth.
To the last, concerning that prayer, I say that it is not authentic, nor is it found in all missals, especially those according to the custom of the Roman Curia. And if anyone should find it in certain missals, the reason why it was admitted there is nevertheless unknown.
I say that the Church never intends to pray for anyone damned in hell, as is evident from the things said. The same is also evident from the inscription of the prayer, for it is called “A Prayer for One concerning Whose Soul There Is Doubt.” If there is doubt, however, it is not firmly believed that the person is saved or damned, and so forth.
This little question is from Lord Dominicus Venetus, bishop of Brescia, formerly bishop of Torcello.
And let these things suffice concerning the second receptacle, namely hell.