The species of political lot.
Question I: On the Divisory Lot
Judges were chosen by lot at Athens, at Rome, and in Sicily. The cases in which laws permit casting lots; chapter 1, 26, question 2.
The conditions required for this lot to be lawful.
How the things found in sacred Scripture concerning casting lots are to be understood.
The rites which were solemnly used. The chalice for the lot. Psalm 15:16.
Question II: On the Contract of Lot, or Lottery
On this twofold contract: the private one, called larisse, and the public one, called lalotherie.
It is proved that the contract is lawful. Conrad is reproved. Why the game of dice is forbidden. Several contracts are involved here.
On the kinds of persons who enter into this contract. What the masters or sellers of the merchandise may gain here. What sins belong to the sellers or owners of the merchandise. On the way in which, as soon as all the lots have been collected, the lots are drawn. What the buyers or lot-casters may gain.
What their sins are, and what obligation there is to make restitution; whether a fraudster must be admitted to the drawing of the restored goods.
What the ministers and officials may gain.
By whom those ministers must be supported. What the public and the poor may gain here. A prince may reserve something for the republic, the poor, or himself. Something may be given to the one who first offers a lot, or several lots.
Question III: On Canonical Purgation
What it is, and what its species are. On purgation by oath. The canons approving this.
The examples of Sophia, queen of Poland, and of Popes Sixtus III, Leo III, and Pelagius.
On purgation by presumption of the Most Holy Eucharist. The examples of Lothair, king of France, and Gregory VII: he performed it himself and required it from Emperor Henry.
The cause and formula of this purgation. It is defended against the Calvinist Francois Hotman. His opinion is explained. The story of Erkimbald the Bearded; another of Bishop Sibicho. Often the dead, when they were guilty and justly accused, nevertheless presumed to receive. Examples are set down by reference. Why God sometimes permitted this judgment to deceive, as in Emperor Andronicus.
Question IV: On Vulgar Purgations
Why they are so called; likewise why they are called exploratory purgations, and why they are called “equal laws.” They all tempt God. The species of this is to ask for a miracle.
Section I: On Provocation to Divine Judgment
With what conditions present this is lawful. Examples: Sarah, David, Zechariah the daughter of Jehoiada, the seven Maccabean brothers, St. Paul, the martyrs of the New Testament, St. Eustace the abbot, and Gualtherus Burgensis, bishop of Poitiers.
How dangerous it is to summon God in this way. Who sins mortally by summoning. When those summoned may disregard the summons, and when and in what way they must consider it. The example of Ganzulius Hernandez of Cordoba.
Examples of summonses that were not futile: the summons of the two brothers de Carvajal; of Menuercus of Paderborn; of Henry, archbishop of Mainz; of Burchard and Meginher; of the Goth about to be punished by beheading; of Gothalanus the admiral; and of the brother of the Duke of Brittany.
The Templars. This history is defended against certain people. On the death of Pope Clement V and Philip the Fair, king of the Franks. The provost of St. Lambert of Liege. The British fable about Innocent IV is rejected.
Section II: On Purgation by Monomachy, or Duel
On the inventor of the duel; on the peoples who used it; on the causes for which it was introduced.
On the rites and the arms. The duel of a paralytic against a Jew who had violated an image of the Mother of God. Duels between kings for a kingdom; between private persons on behalf of kings; for testimony of chastity; of a boy against a giant; of Burchard against Conrad.
On the succession of ancestors between the patrons of a grandson and of an uncle; those who fought for the grandson won.
The marvelous duel of King Wenceslaus against Radislaus. Sometimes God decides by a miracle, as in the case of Wenceslaus; sometimes the matter remains doubtful, as between the Spanish knights Ruy Paez de Viedma and Pae Rodriguez de Avila. Often the just man is defeated.
It is shown that the duel conflicts with divine law. The prohibition and penalty of the Council of Trent; earlier prohibitions of Julius II, and his excellent reasons. Gregory XIII’s extension to private duels and to those that take place without solemn rites. Certain declarations or inferences from the preceding bull. It is extended to those who say, “Come, I will wait for you in such-and-such a place.” It does not proceed against princes who would permit a duel among infidels.
A just war can be decided by a duel on the authority of a prince. Yet they cannot do this in the manner of divination, or for glory, and so forth. The passage 2 Samuel 2:15.
Which advisers incur the penalty, and which spectators. Mention is made of the bull of Clement VIII, not yet seen.
Section III: On Vulgar Purgation by Fire
On the test of glowing iron; what kind of judgment it is. Solemnities and formulas.
The example of Theobald the furrier. Military law among the Radenici. The Frankish, Lombard, Slavic, and Flemish laws.
What the number of ploughshares was.
What the consecration of iron was like; the formula is set down. A passage of Sophocles concerning this purgation. Whether nobles too underwent it; and that they did. Examples: Conrad of Marburg against heretics; the empresses Richarda and Kunigunde; Queen Emma; the disagreement of historians is reconciled.
Other examples in Greece. A Christian matron in Rugen. The countess of Modena. King Ludwig of Germany. The murdered legates. The count of Oldenburg. A man of Wittenberg unjustly accused of arson, and afterwards the real culprit detected. The example of a fisherman of Utrecht, and of a certain hypocrite. A passage of Ivo is discussed, and it is shown that this practice conflicts with the canons. A remarkable deed of Rollo of Normandy.
The contest of a Spanish Catholic with an Arian. Robert of Canterbury grieved because he had recommended this purgation. Queen Emma purged herself in this way.
On the judgment of coals. Examples: an Egyptian monk, Blessed Brice bishop of Tours, and Harald the Irishman.
They also took this judgment from other things. Eulalius purged himself by throwing a little basket into the fire. A certain bishop brought the Russians to the faith by throwing a book of the Gospels into the fire. In this way the Mozarabic Mass was also approved in Spain.
On testing by passing through a pyre. Examples: Peter of Marseilles, Poppo apostle of the Danes, and a Catholic bishop challenging an Arian. Savonarola’s deed, or rather his boast. Peter of Albano in this way convicted Peter of Florence of simony. The ritualia of this judgment.
As the Catholic faith was supported by these things, so by the same things heresy was detected and punished, as is proved by examples: the heretics of Cambrai and those of Strasbourg. Flame is to heresy what shadow is to the body: with the flight of error the force of burning perishes; it returns when error returns. Another example of a heretic.
Various prohibitions of this test: of emperors and pontiffs. The chapter Mennam, 2, question 5, and the chapter Consuluisti, 2, question 4, are discussed.
Section IV: On Vulgar Purgation by Water
On boiling water: which nations received it, and on what foundation.
On the cup of jealousy in Numbers 5.
The prohibition of purgation by boiling water.
The example of the legates of Ludwig, king of Germany. A certain tradition of the Hebrews is refuted. The ritual prayer. People used to put in the hand, as is proved from the example of Hyacinthus the deacon of Ravenna.
Two formulas of this test are compared with one another.
On purgation by cold water.
How it was performed. The example of the wife of Blessed Gangulph; the Alsatian law.
Another mode: immersing the whole person.
Imperial and pontifical prohibitions. The chapter Ex tuarum, on canonical purgation, is explained, and the chapter Sententiam sanguinis, “That clerics or monks not,” and so forth.
On the present-day test of witches by cold water, and the opinion of German writers. A recent little book of a certain jurist on this matter.
Question V: On the Test, as They Call It, of Cold Water, Which Some in Germany Use in Examining Witches
Section I: The Opinion and Arguments of Adolf Scribonius Are Discussed
It is argued against the fictitious lightness by which a demon is said to hold up witches. It is not credible that this has been predestined by God in this way from the beginning of the world. The supernatural and fictitious antipathy between water and witches is refuted. Luther is rejected, since he wished all liquids able to provide a bath to be suitable matter for baptism.
In what way the elements praise God.
By what reason water is the instrument and seal of salvation.
Section II: The Opinion and Arguments of a Certain Catholic Jurist Are Examined
The opponent is praised, and the reason for this disagreement is set forth. Which judges use this test, and where and how far.
It is the practice of a few unlearned judges. The contrary opinion is summarized.
This purgation is shown to be very little necessary according to the opponent’s own mind.
Contradiction in his statements is shown, as well as the uncertainty of this test. The example of an old witch who betrayed herself.
From this another contradiction is shown. Likewise, this floating on the water is not to be attributed to good angels, but to a demon. The cautions which he proposes are shown to be superfluous.
A third contradiction in the opponent’s statements. The alleged difference between harmful magic and other crimes is invented without cause, and is neither proved nor true.
But it shows the vain defense of this purgation. An argument is brought from a witch accused only of theft, if she were thrown into water according to the ancient custom for purgation; and it is shown that, if this purgation were true and certain, the judge would necessarily be perplexed.
Many side-arguments of the opponent are briefly refuted. What the chief cause of the rarity of miracles now is.
All evils of creatures are not to be attributed to God, and such a proposition conflicts with the faith.
The intention of the opponent writing this is excused.
In what sense tests are arbitrary judicial procedures.
It is carefully shown that this test is entirely forbidden by canon law.
It is not lawful for a judge to inflict whatever penalty the accused fear most.
This purgation is not especially favorable to the commonwealth.
Nor can this alone make it lawful. For an act to be good, it is not enough that it tend to a good end.
Witches do not hate this purgation most of all. If they do hate it, that is an indication of a pact.
This judgment is not more certain than the testimony of accomplices.
The same reason does not apply to this judgment as to the testimony of Gillis, nor to the indication from a bleeding corpse and from this test.
It does not follow: God helps the judge in one thing, therefore always and in everything.
A judge is not deceived who, according to the acts, absolves the guilty. God does not wish all crimes to be punished here in act. Sometimes witches harm both the judge and the judgment. This lot is divinatory, not consultory.
Even today the consultory lot is forbidden. The law Eorum, Code on harmful magicians and mathematicians; how it is to be understood so that it is not unjust.
That harmful magic can be destroyed by harmful magic is an error. That harmful magic can be collected by superstitious means is either an erroneous or plainly rash proposition.
Scotus is falsely cited by the Malleus Maleficarum.
Someone can sin in what he does with a good intention.
The free and full discretion of the judge which the opponent grants him is attacked as wholly spurious and tyrannical.
A judge must judge according to law; otherwise he imitates beasts.
In what way all judges are subject to laws. It is better to absolve the guilty than to detect them by this test.
What a judge should fear here and what not.
Not to obey the Church is mortal sin.
The reason why judges make so little progress by legitimate indications. A passage of St. Bernard on this test is discussed.
Section III: The True Negative Opinion Is Proposed and Proved
Judges who know the pontifical prohibition and use this test sin.
This is proved first by the definition of sin.
What the Roman pontiffs thought about this test. They are to be believed and obeyed in this matter. The chapter Mennam, at the end, 2, question 5; and the chapter Ex tuarum, on canonical purgation.
The opponent’s arguments are dissolved, by which he tries to show that one thing must be established about the other vulgar purgations and another about this one.
It is shown that there is not a different reason for judges and private persons.
It is shown that this is a tempting of God.
How signs were sought by holy men.
When it is lawful to ask for a sign.
It is proved that here there is no miracle.
Many examples show that the test is false.
Judges are not bound to have faith in this test.
What kind of pact intervenes here.
The matter is declared.
Here the pact intervenes between the judges and the demon, not between the witches and the demon.
A certain recent example is discussed.
The disagreement of judges in this purgation.
Why the demon entered into this pact, and what profits he gains from it.
It is shown that this test contains the sin of disobedience and of ariolation.
The passage 1 Samuel 15:22.
To make the demon corporeal is rash and next to error.
Many side-arguments of the opponent, and certain untrue things. The judge is bound here to follow the common opinion. Otherwise he sins, and can be sued by an action for injury. One who tortures in this way is a tyrant; the sentence is null; one who kills is guilty of homicide.
Question VI: On Certain Other Vulgar Purgations
On purgation by weights and scales.
On purgation by the cross.
What kind of purgation this is, as asked.
The custom of the Frisians.
What it is to contend or compete with the cross, and likewise what it is to stand at the cross.
On a certain lot cast at Constantinople concerning the empire.
On those who threw away certain things so that, from their recovery, they might know that their sins had been remitted to them by God.
The examples of St. Attilanus, bishop of Zamora, and St. Arnulf, bishop of Metz.
End.
There are certain names which, when they are taken broadly, are commonly confused: divination, vaticination, foreknowledge, prophecy, conjectation, and prediction. Taking them in this way, I have placed in the title the single name “divination” for all of them.
If they are taken more strictly, I recognize some distinction. Foreknowledge and prediction always include the other four; but prediction denotes an order toward another act and an external act, while foreknowledge denotes only internal cognition. Vaticination is a name common to divination and prophecy, but it is usually restricted to an oracle, because an oracle is given by the living voice of a human being, whereas divination extends further.
St. Jerome notes that prophecy is always taken in the sacred writings in a good sense. This is plainly true when they speak absolutely. For if they honor pseudo-prophets too with this name, they add some qualifying particle, as “foolish prophets,” “prophets of Baal,” “prophets of Samaria,” “of the groves,” and so forth; or else they speak by a not obscure irony, taken from the judgment and opinion of the people, who regarded them as such, just as Scripture calls idols gods. And so something is always added in the context which does not allow one to be ignorant that they were pseudo-prophets.
[margin: Jerome on Micah 3; Jeremiah 23:13; Hosea 9:7; Exodus 12:12 and 18:11; Daniel 11:8; Deuteronomy 13; Jeremiah 23:25 and 28:1, 14; Ezekiel 21:21; Micah 3:6]
Divination is never used in the Bible for prophetic light. For that saying of Solomon, “Divination is on the lips of the king; in judgment his mouth will not err,” has nothing to do with the gift of prophecy, but with the sagacity necessary for a judge in discovering hidden and tangled recesses of judgments, concerning doubtful facts. For just as there is a metaphorical divination in medical causes, so too there is one in judicial causes, by which past things, whose truth is unknown, are conjectured by skillful examination.
Thus it was in Solomon’s judgment when he restored the son to his true mother. Thus it was in Daniel’s investigation, by which, after the treachery of the old men was uncovered, he restored Susanna to life, honor, and her husband. Thus it was in the judgment of Ariopharnes, king of the Thracians, which is related in this way.
[margin: Proverbs 16:10; 1 Kings 3; Daniel 13]
Three sons of the king of the Cimmerians were contending over their father’s kingdom, and they chose Ariopharnes as judge. He ordered their father’s corpse to be dug from the tomb and tied to a tree, and ordered them to compete with the bow, so that the one who pierced his father’s heart should succeed to the kingdom. The firstborn pierced the throat; the second pierced the middle of the chest without touching the heart. The hope of the kingdom remained for the youngest. Piety conquered: professing that he preferred to yield the kingdom rather than show himself superior in piety toward his father’s corpse, he refused to shoot. The Thracian awarded the kingdom to him, because by the inclination of nature he had shown himself both truly a son and superior in virtue.
Did Alfonso I, king of Naples, have this story in mind when he gave a similar judgment? Or could he have done it by natural sagacity, which was remarkable in him? For when he was still almost a boy and was assuming in Aragon the kingdoms of both Sicilies, it happened that a certain maidservant had borne a child by her master and appealed to liberty under Spanish law. The master, so that he would not be deprived of the mother together with the child, denied that the child had been born from him. In a matter usually done in secret, proofs were lacking. What should he do? He extricated himself finely. He ordered the child to be sold under the spear. The master was overcome by the bidding. “So then,” he said to himself, “will my son enter slavery while I am alive? Rather, I confess what the matter is.” And behold, tears burst forth from the father’s heart against his will. The tongue followed the confession of the eyes. Thus the king secured the son for the father, and due liberty for the mother.
[margin: Diodorus Siculus, book 10; Antonio Panormita, book 2, On the Deeds of Alfonso]
Theodoric, king of the Goths, did not lack someone to imitate in this judgment, since he had Tiberius. An Italian woman had promised second marriages to her lover, having bargained that she would first drive her son from the house. When she tried to do this, the son resisted, and both went to the king: the son said that support was owed to him and that he ought not be expelled from his father’s house by his mother; against this the woman said that she did not acknowledge him as son and that he had been substituted. The woman began to become suspect to the king. “Come, woman,” said the king, “if you listen to me, you can both free yourself from this trouble and enter into a better marriage. Why not take as husband this young man who says he is your son? He is younger than you and of rather noble appearance.” Struck by so unexpected an order, the woman first fell silent. Soon she collected herself and wove many excuses for refusal, little coherent or suitable, so that the king could easily understand she had been caught. Therefore he pretended that he would add a penalty unless she consented. What remained for the unhappy woman, if she wished to avoid the dreadful crime, was to acknowledge her son.
Before Charlemagne, a father and son were accused of homicide. Each denied the deed, and neither could be brought by any torments to confession of the crime. The emperor condemned both to hanging. Then the father, conquered by love for his son, declared himself guilty and his son innocent of the crime.
Frederick III’s judgment was of smaller weight but no smaller ingenuity. When a peasant came to him and complained that one of a pair of draft-horses had been stolen from him in an inn, the emperor ordered the thief to be pointed out to him. When the peasant denied that he could do this, since he did not know the man, Frederick said, “I am surprised that the other was not stolen from you too, since there are so many horsemen in this city and so few horses.” “The other, Caesar,” said the peasant, “is a mare, of little use to soldiers.” “Then go,” said the emperor, “mount the mare and ride through all the streets, open places, crossroads, and alleys of the city. The stolen horse is lying hidden in some stable, and when he senses the odor of his yoke-mate, he will immediately neigh.” The peasant obeyed, and as the lowing of the ox once betrayed Cacus, so the neighing of the horse then betrayed the thief.
[margin: Suetonius, Tiberius; John Magnus, History of the Goths, chapter 29; Andrea Barbazza, on the chapter Praesenti, on proofs; Aeneas Silvius, book 2, On the Deeds of Alfonso]
Nor should the prudence of Suleiman, king of the Turks, be passed over in silence. A Jew of Byzantium had lent a Christian a fixed sum of gold, on the condition that on the appointed day, besides the principal, he would receive two ounces of that Christian’s flesh in place of interest. On that day the Christian repaid the principal, but denied the interest. Suleiman was approached to decide the matter. Detesting the Jew in his heart, he ordered a razor to be brought and gave the Jew power to cut two ounces of flesh from whatever part of the debtor’s body he wished, on this condition: that they be exactly two ounces; if he cut less or more, he would pay with his head. The Jew, not daring to undergo this hazard, absolved the Christian.
Therefore Solomon was speaking about this kind of divination of the king’s lips. For just as the heart of the king is in the hand of God, so are his lips. God directs both equally; and those to whom he has delegated his own offices on earth, he often endows above other mortals with great skill and prudence. Thus divination is put there for conjectation.
[margin: Corrozet, On Memorable Sayings and Deeds]
Conjectation proceeds from the consideration of causes or signs, whether these are joined with true prudence or covered with vanity. Therefore some conjectation is lawful and some unlawful. Henceforth we shall restrict the name divination to the unlawful kind alone. This differs from conjectation because it does not proceed through signs or arguments, as conjectation does.
Henceforth foreknowledge will be for us the general name. Its parts, like members of a body, will be three. Divine foreknowledge, which flows from God, will be called prophecy. To this belongs a certain class of miraculous or divine portents and prodigies, which are accustomed certainly and ordinarily to announce the future, as, after the death of Blessed Beatrice of Este, it was observed for a long stretch of time that whenever something new threatened the Este family from which she had arisen, for many days beforehand a very great noise was heard in her chapel, and her body, which usually lay on its back, was found rolled over onto its other side. Scardeone reports this in book 2 of the Antiquities of Padua, class 6, folio 120. I have related other things about certain bells below, chapter 3, question 1, and about many other things in chapter 2, question 7, section 2.
Demonic foreknowledge is derived from a tacit or express pact with demons, and will be called divination. Natural foreknowledge is taken from natural signs or causes; this we shall call presage or conjectation, taking the words strictly.
[margin: Scardeone, Antiquities of Padua, book 2, class 6, folio 120; cross-references below to chapter 3, question 1, and chapter 2, question 7, section 2]