1016. The solution of the preceding question, as we warned at its beginning, more clearly determines the dependence of individual Pastors on the successors of Peter; but these successors, according to the definition of the Vatican Council, are superior also to Bishops taken together. Therefore it is useful also to determine more clearly this preeminence of the Roman Pontiff over the body of Pastors. For this it is necessary to set forth briefly the doctrine concerning Councils, at least as to its principal heads.
1017. Therefore, “By the name Council,” says Bellarmine, On Councils, book 1, chapter 3, “the same thing is signified in the Church as by the name of assemblies in kingdoms. For just as, when a controversy arises in a commonwealth, the princes of the kingdom or magistrates come together into one place and establish what needs to be done, so in the Church, when some controversy concerning religion arises, the prelates of the Churches come together, and, after their judgments have been compared together, establish what seems good.” Hence a Council can generally be described as “a legitimate gathering of the Prelates of the Church for judging or establishing concerning ecclesiastical matters.” It is called 1) a gathering of Prelates, because although sometimes the word Council has designated the assembling also of other persons, nevertheless for many centuries it has constantly been applied to signify an assembly of Prelates, especially Bishops. 2) It is called a gathering, so that the common action and judgment of Bishops may be expressed; for if someone were to seek and obtain the judgment of several Prelates one by one, that would not properly be a conciliar action or judgment. 3) It is called legitimate; for if a gathering of Bishops did not have all due conditions, it has been customary to call it not a Council, but a brigandage. But what the conditions required for legitimacy are, we shall say below. 4) It is called for judging or establishing, because if a gathering of Bishops were made only for conferring counsels, discussing judgments, etc., without the Bishops authoritatively establishing or judging anything, that gathering would not be called a Council in ecclesiastical usage. 5) Finally, it is called concerning ecclesiastical matters, because if Bishops came together for some end other than treating ecclesiastical business, their gathering would not be called a Council. For, as Bishops, they cannot define by their authority other business than ecclesiastical business.
1018. Councils thus generally accepted are divided into general and particular. A general Council represents the universal Church; a particular Council represents some part of the Church. But according to the part of the Church which it represents, a particular Council can be national or provincial. A national Council is that in which the Archbishops and Bishops of one kingdom or nation come together, over whom a patriarch or primate presides, or, if these are lacking, some delegate from the Apostolic See. A provincial Council is that in which only the Bishops of one ecclesiastical province come together, over whom the Archbishop or Metropolitan presides. To these can be added a diocesan Council, in which the presbyters of one Episcopate come together, with the Bishop presiding. But that is called not a Council, but rather a Synod; for, as Bellarmine observes, chapter 4, “they can scarcely be called Councils [diocesan], since in them ordinarily there is no one who has jurisdiction [in the external forum], except the one Bishop who presides.” There are not lacking, nevertheless, particular Councils at which several Bishops from another nation or province were present. These are customarily called mixed. Compare Benedict XIV, On the Diocesan Synod, book 1, chapter 1.
1019. A general Council is also called plenary, universal, ecumenical, although as to this last appellation some discrepancy of name exists among authors. For some, attending to the force of the name, do not call a Council ecumenical if Bishops from the whole world were not present at it; just as, on the contrary, they call that Council ecumenical at which Bishops from all provinces were present, even if the Roman Pontiff was absent. But if we consider the matter itself, just as a Council is rightly called general, so also it is rightly called ecumenical if all Bishops were called to it, even though not all were present, as we shall explain below. Likewise it is ecumenical if the Roman Pontiff is present, even though not all Bishops came together; for just as, if the Head were lacking, the representation of the universal Church would be lacking, so with him present, while others are absent in part, this representation could be had, as we shall say. Therefore, having regard to the matter rather than to the name, we take the appellation ecumenical as synonymous with general, and we call ecumenical “a Council representing the universal Church, with the Roman Pontiff assenting to the acts.” It is called 1) a Council: this is the proximate genus, already declared. 2) Representing the universal Church: this is the ultimate difference, which imports two things: a) that the Roman Pontiff, Head of the Church, be present; for just as the human body is not represented whole if the head is lacking, so neither is the whole Church represented if the Roman Pontiff is lacking; b) that at least some Bishops from the greater part of ecclesiastical provinces be present, so that the universal Church may be morally represented. 3) With the Roman Pontiff assenting to the acts: for if his assent is lacking, the decrees lack all force, and the Council itself will be of no authority. But a Council can be perfectly or imperfectly ecumenical and general, as will at once be clear from what is to be said concerning the celebration and acceptance, or approval, of a Council.
1020. Since we are dealing here with Councils in order that we may more clearly determine the relations of the Roman Pontiff to that Council, and thus better attain the force and nature of the Primacy, omitting those things which directly regard particular Councils, we shall pursue the things which pertain to a general Council. From this it will be clear how the Roman Pontiff is above the Body of Pastors. But so that we may set forth in order the many things which must be touched briefly, we shall treat 1) of convocation; 2) of celebration; 3) of confirmation; and 4) finally of the necessity of a general Council.
1021. I. As to convocation, it must first be established that “the office of convoking general councils properly belongs to the Roman Pontiff; yet in such a way that another also can announce a Council, with the Pontiff consenting; indeed it is enough if he afterward ratifies and confirms the announcement once made. But if neither he himself announces the Council, nor someone else by his mandate or consent, nor does he at least approve the announcement, that will be not a Council, but a little council.” This can be proved: 1) From the things already established concerning the Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. For he alone has the right of convoking a general Council who has power over all the Bishops of the whole Church; for the question concerns a coercive convocation, which all Bishops are bound to obey. But only the Roman Pontiff has power over all Bishops. The right of convoking a general Council belongs to him alone who has supreme power over the universal Church; for the question concerns establishing and defining those things which regard the universal Church. But the Roman Pontiff alone has supreme power over the universal Church. Suppose that others, for example the Bishops themselves, can convoke a general Council without the consent of the Roman Pontiff; his power would not be full, nor would he be Monarch in the Church. But the Roman Pontiff has the plenitude of power, and the form of government in the Church is monarchical by the institution of Christ. 2) Hence the Church has always acknowledged this right in the Roman Pontiff. Surely in the Council of Chalcedon it was asked by the Legates of the Apostolic See why they wished Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, excluded; and they answered: “because he dared to make a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, which has never been done, nor is it lawful to be done.” The Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X pronounced: “The Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority over all Councils, has the full right and power of announcing Councils…” Gregory II disapproved the synod of 300 Bishops convoked by Leo the Isaurian for this reason, that it had been celebrated without the authority of the Roman Pontiff. For the same reason the pseudo-ecumenical synod gathered by Constantine Copronymus was rejected by Stephen IV. Hence all the western ecumenical Councils were convoked by the Roman Pontiff, and indeed by him alone; but the eastern Councils, although they are said to have been convoked by the Emperors, were nevertheless never convoked without the consent or ratification of the Roman Pontiff. Certainly as to the Third Council of Constantinople it is read in Act 18, the prosphonetic or acclamatory discourse: “Arius, divider and divider-up of the Trinity, was rising up, and at once Constantine, ever Augustus, and the praiseworthy Sylvester gathered a great and distinguished Synod at Nicaea.” Celestine ratified the convocation of the Council of Ephesus made by Theodosius the Younger, writing in the letter to Theodosius: “To this Synod, which you have commanded to be, we exhibit our presence in those whom we have sent.” St. Leo, writing to the Emperor Marcian, who had convoked the Council of Chalcedon, says: “I accepted so willingly the holy zeal of your clemency, by which you willed that a Synod be held for the restoration of ecclesiastical peace, that,” etc. Basil the Emperor convoked the Fourth Council of Constantinople; but Hadrian II, writing to him in Act I, says: “But we will that, through the industry of your piety, a numerous Council be celebrated at Constantinople, over which our Legates also, presiding, after the distinction of crimes and men has been inspected, shall at once take away all copies of the impious little council [the Photian one] from those who retain them and hand them over to be burned by fire.” And so concerning the rest. 3) Wherefore a) if others than Roman Pontiffs seem to have announced Councils, they are said to have convoked them by exhorting and advising. But if they seem to have acted by authority, they could have effected this either by mandate of the Pontiff, or as a ministerial cause, or with the Pontiff consenting or ratifying. b) But if Pontiffs in their letters seem to have attributed more than was fitting to Emperors, this must not be ascribed to a defect of authority in the Pontiff, or to proper power in the Emperors, but to certain circumstances of affairs that were wholly extrinsic. For ancient laws were in force prohibiting frequent gatherings of men, through fear of seditions; Councils could not conveniently be celebrated except in some city subject to the Emperor; the force of heretics or schismatics, which was feared, had to be restrained by the arms of the Emperors; because of the poverty of the Churches, Bishops from far-separated regions could come together into one place of Council only by the liberality of the Emperors. Therefore for these reasons the Pontiffs permitted something to the Emperors as to the convocation of Councils. Compare Bellarmine, book 1, chapters 12-13.
1022. But who are to be convoked to a Council? First let it be noted with Bellarmine, in the cited place, chapter 15: “In Councils, some can be present for many reasons; for some are present as judges, who are said to have a decisive vote; others so that, by disputing, they may examine difficulties, who are said to have a consultative vote; others so that they may minister, such as notaries and guards, and others so that they may defend the Council and take care that all things within and without are peaceful.” Therefore the question concerns those to be convoked as judges, so that they may cast a decisive vote.
1023. The innovators, after denying the distinction by divine right between clerics and laymen, and after asserting a democratic form of government in the Church, consequently hold that Emperors, laymen, etc. are to be convoked to a Council. Hence one of the causes on account of which they resisted the Council of Trent, according to the same authors, is that in it none had a vote except Cardinals, Bishops, Abbots, and Generals of Religious Orders, when all learned men, even laymen, ought to have had a decisive vote. This error, having been more than sufficiently refuted in the principles on which it rests, does not need to be refuted here again. It is enough only to recall the censure passed by Pius VI on proposition 10 of the Synod of Pistoia: “The doctrine by which parish priests or other Priests gathered in Synod are pronounced, together with the Bishop, judges of faith, and at the same time it is implied that judgment in causes of faith belongs to them by proper right, and indeed also by ordination received, is false, rash, subversive of the hierarchical order, derogating from the firmness of the definitions or dogmatic judgments of the Church, at least erroneous.”
1024. Therefore, first of all, all Bishops having jurisdiction are to be called to a Council by ordinary right. For 1) in ecumenical Councils the question concerns defining dogmas, condemning heresies, and establishing disciplinary laws. But these offices pertain to those who, constituted by God as Pastors and Teachers, have jurisdiction in the external forum and represent the teaching and ruling Church. But these are the Bishops, whom the Holy Spirit has placed to rule the Church of God. 2) Hence Bishops having jurisdiction are to be called by divine right. For by divine right there ought to be Bishops who rule particular Churches; but a Council cannot be ecumenical unless the Fathers represent the universal Church. But the Fathers taken together cannot represent the universal Church unless, by ruling particular Churches individually, they juridically represent them. Since therefore by divine right there are Bishops of particular Churches, by divine right their assembly represents the universal Church. 3) There is added the testimony of all antiquity. For Eusebius, book 5, chapter 23, says: “on account of which cause [because of the question of Easter under Pope Victor] gatherings of Bishops and councils were convoked through each province.” The Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, Act 4, exclaimed against the profane persons who had entered the Council: “Send the superfluous ones outside: it is a Council of Bishops.” Hosius said to Constantine, in Athanasius, letter to those living the solitary life: “God committed the empire to thee; to us Bishops he entrusted the things which are of the Church.” And St. Ambrose against Valentinian, letter 32: “If there is to be consultation concerning faith, that consultation ought to belong to Priests [Bishops], just as was done under Constantine, who gave judgment to the Priests,” that is, to Bishops. Compare Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 15.
1025. But among the Bishops to be convoked to a Council there seem also to be Bishops elect and not yet consecrated; for they already have jurisdiction. And, as Cano says, On Theological Places, book 5, chapter 2, “the whole business of an ecclesiastical Council is transacted not by the power of order, but by the power of jurisdiction.” But it is controverted whether Bishops in partibus infidelium, or titular Bishops, enjoy the same right. Suarez, On Faith, disputation 11, section 1, no. 15, says: “Titular Bishops can without doubt be called to a Council and have votes. But of itself this is by no means necessary, because they lack episcopal jurisdiction. And thus usage has it.” In the Vatican Council Bishops of this kind were admitted, yet with the question of right remaining intact. Compare Cecconi, History of the Vatican Council, book 2, chapter 1, article 1.
1026. It must be noted here that all Bishops having jurisdiction are indeed to be called to a Council, “so that,” says St. Leo, letter 80, “with priests called from all provinces, it may truly be a universal Council”; but that it is by no means necessary for the ecumenicity and legitimacy of a Council that all come together. For this is not necessary for the representation of the universal Church, and otherwise one or another could easily impede the Council. Therefore it suffices: 1) that the convocation be universal, so that it becomes known to the principal parts of the Church, and no Bishop having jurisdiction is excluded. 2) Some determinate number cannot be assigned; nor is it required that that number be notably great, since national councils have been celebrated in which the number of Bishops was greater than in certain ecumenical Councils. 3) This certainly is required: that there be a moral representation of the whole Church. But what is required and sufficient for this cannot be known better, says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 17, “than from the custom of the Church and from those Councils which by the consensus of all were general.” Hence he adds that it is required “that at least from the greater part of the Christian provinces some should come; and if indeed the Council is in the East, it has always seemed sufficient if many Bishops come together from all the provinces of the East, while from the whole West some are sent by the Supreme Pontiff who may supply the place of the others; and if it is celebrated in the West, many should come together from all the provinces of the West, while from the East some few should come in the name of the others”: which he then confirms from the history of the Councils.
1027. Besides Bishops, there are also to be called to a Council: 1) Cardinals. But by what right is not settled among the Doctors, and, as Suarez observes, On Faith, disputation 11, section 1, no. 17, this depends “on that question, whether the dignity of Cardinals was introduced by human right, as Soto wills… or by divine right, as Torquemada holds.” Schmalzgrueber, Introductory Dissertation, section 8, no. 326, says: “Cardinals, even those who are not Bishops, ought to be called. And this either by privilege or custom, as some think, or, as others with Suarez, even by ordinary right. Because acts of jurisdiction which are ordered to the external government of the Church, and do not depend intrinsically on episcopal consecration, can be communicated to any capable ecclesiastical persons.” 2) For the same reason, the General Superiors of religious orders ought to be called, and Abbots who possess quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over some people and over some territory. 3) As to exempt Abbots, however, who have jurisdiction only over their own monks, unless they are Generals, the matter was disputed. Bouix, On the Pope, part 8, chapter 1, section 5, proposition 7, before the Vatican Council strove to prove by many arguments that Abbots of this kind should be called; but they were excluded from the Vatican Council for the reasons which Cecconi indicates, History of the Vatican Council, volume 1, book 2, chapter 1, article 1.
1028. II. As to celebration, the right of presiding over an ecumenical Council must first be established. “All Catholics,” says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 19, “teach that this office is proper to the Supreme Pontiff, so that he presides over the Synod either through himself or through Legates, and moderates all things as supreme judge.” Therefore the question concerns not only a presidency of honor, but of jurisdiction, by force of which the president moderates all things. Hence it belongs to him to determine the object concerning which there is to be treatment, the order in which it ought to be treated, etc. That this right belongs to the Roman Pontiff is proved: 1) From the things established above. For a) the right of presiding over a Council belongs to him who has the supreme government of the Church, since this presidency is part of the supreme and universal government of the Church. But the Roman Pontiff obtains the supreme and universal government of the Church. b) It belongs to him to preside over a Council who is superior to all Bishops. But the Roman Pontiff alone, as we have proved, is superior to all Bishops even taken together. Therefore. 2) From the practice of the Church; for over all Councils which were ecumenical in their celebration, the Roman Pontiff presided. Surely the matter is manifest, and is called into doubt by no one, that Roman Pontiffs presided over Councils held in the West. But as to the Eastern Councils, at Nicaea I, according to the testimony of Gregory VII, Apology, chapter 3, “Hosius of Cordoba, Victor and Vincent, presbyters of the Roman Church, presided on the part of Sylvester”; nor can it be understood otherwise that Hosius subscribed first of all. The same is testified by Gelasius of Cyzicus, History of the Council of Nicaea, book 2, chapter 3; Pope Hadrian, canonical letter sent to Charlemagne; concerning Hosius, Athanasius, letter to those living the solitary life concerning the presbyters; Socrates, History, book 1, chapter 5; Theodoret, History, book 1, chapter 2, 7; Photius, book On the Seven Synods, etc. At Ephesus, as is evident from Act 3, there presided in the name of the Roman Pontiff Cyril of Alexandria, Arcadius and Projectus, Bishops, and Philip, Presbyter, all Legates of the Roman Pontiff. To the Council of Chalcedon St. Leo wrote: “In these brothers, Paschasinus and Lucentius, Bishops, Boniface and Basil, presbyters, who have been directed from the Apostolic See, let your Fraternity judge that I preside over the Synod.” Concerning Constantinople III it is read in Act 1: “When the holy Synod came together, that is, Theodore and Gregory, presbyters, and John, deacon, acting in the place of Agatho, Archbishop of ancient Rome,” etc. In Nicaea II, Peter, Roman Archpresbyter, and Peter, Abbot of St. Sabas, hold the place of the Apostolic See; hence before Tarasius and the remaining Bishops they subscribed thus: “Peter, acting in the place of Hadrian, Pope of old Rome, defining, have subscribed.” In Constantinople IV, Hadrian, in the letter to Basil the Emperor, writes: “We will that through the industry of your piety a numerous Council be celebrated there, over which our envoys also preside, namely Donatus and Stephen, Bishops, and Marinus, deacon,” etc. Constantinople I was not at first ecumenical in celebration, but became such when in the following year the confirmation of Damasus came in the Roman Council, to which three Eastern Bishops also were sent. “Not much later,” writes Photius, in the Book on the Seven Synods, “Damasus also, Bishop of Rome, came in, confirming and thinking the same things.” Nor was Constantinople II ecumenical in celebration, since not only did the Roman Pontiff not attend, but the representation of the Westerners was lacking. But afterward it was made ecumenical by the confirmation of Vigilius and the other Roman Pontiffs. Besides, the Fathers of this Synod wrote to Vigilius: “we ask that, with your Beatitude presiding over us, by common treatment these same chapters be proposed in the midst and examined and completed, and an end be placed upon the question.” 3) Wherefore, if they object that Emperors presided over certain Eastern Councils, the answer must be: they presided in place and honor, I concede; by authority, either I deny, or I subdistinguish: by authority for impeding violence and preserving order, or for protecting the Council, I concede; for establishing or defining anything in the Council, I deny. The truth of this answer is historically manifest. For the Council of Chalcedon, letter 98, writes to Leo the Great: “Thou indeed, like a head over the members, didst preside over them [the Bishops], displaying benevolence in those who bore thy place; but the faithful Emperors presided most fittingly for adornment, like Zerubbabel to Joshua, inviting the renewal of the Church, as the building of Jerusalem, concerning dogmas.” In the Eighth Ecumenical Council, canon 17, it is read: “But we have repelled from our ears, as something hateful, that which is said by certain inexperienced persons, that a Synod cannot be celebrated without the principal presence; since nowhere have the sacred Canons sanctioned that secular Princes come together in Councils, but only Prelates.” The Emperors themselves acknowledged this. Theodosius the Younger and Valentinian, sending Count Candidian to be present at the Council of Ephesus, signify that this is done “on this law and condition, that he have nothing whatever in common with the questions and controversies which arise concerning the dogmas of faith; but that he remove those who can bring some obstacle,” etc. Constantine Pogonatus wrote to Gregory the Roman Pontiff: “For neither will I sit with them [the Bishops] as Emperor or speak imperiously, but as one of them; and as the Pontiffs shall establish, I will execute.” Basil the Emperor in the Eighth Synod admits that “it is not his, nor that of any Layman, to mix himself in ecclesiastical judgments”; hence he subscribes after all the Patriarchs, and indeed not defining, but “receiving and consenting.” Compare Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 19 ff.
1029. The other thing which must be established as to the celebration of a Council is this: although it belongs to the Roman Pontiff to preside over it, nevertheless the other Bishops are true judges. Only the Innovators deny this, according to whose opinion it belongs to a Council to inquire, but Christ alone and the Word of God has the decisive vote. Therefore we say, says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 18, that the sitting of Bishops in legitimate Councils is truly a sitting of judges, and that their decrees and laws must necessarily be followed. Now from all Councils, from ancient and universal practice, it is manifest that the things defined and established in Councils have always obtained the force of obliging. Hence anathema is pronounced on those who deny the things defined as of faith; decrees are called canons or laws of the Church; against those resisting, action has always been taken as against rebels; and in the Council of Chalcedon, for example, Act 4, ten Bishops who refused to acquiesce in the sentence of the Council were held as heretics. But it cannot be said that the decrees of Councils obtain this force by the Roman Pontiff alone exercising judgment. For although, on account of the supreme and full power with which he alone is endowed, he can define the whole matter alone, nevertheless he does not do this when he convokes a Council and defines with it; otherwise the sentence would not be conciliar, nor would Bishops subscribe: “I, N. N., defining, have subscribed.” Therefore it must be said that Bishops defining with the Supreme Pontiff are truly judges and exercise true judgment. Compare Bellarmine, cited place.
1030. From this, however, some have very badly deduced that at least a moral unanimity of votes is necessary for definitions of faith in Councils; nor have others rightly said that the Roman Pontiff ought to follow at least the greater part. In truth, even if he follows the lesser part, he does not judge alone; and therefore the sentence will truly be conciliar. We know from the institution of Christ that Bishops without the Head can ultimately establish and define nothing. But certainly it is not proved that from the divine institution itself the Head ought to be directed by the greater part of the members, since it rather belongs to him to direct all things. Is the greater part of Bishops said to be the foundation upon which Peter himself was built? Is the greater part of the sheep said to have to feed or rule the Shepherd? Wherefore, as Bellarmine rightly notes, cited chapter 18, the Supreme Pontiff is not a simple president of a Council, who is constituted such by a king; rather he is truly king in relation to that tribunal. Hence, just as a King could rescind a sentence passed by the greater part of the judges, so if the greater part of Bishops decreed something, the Roman Pontiff could withdraw from their judgment. Besides, Bellarmine himself observes that, apart from a case of violence, as in the Council of Ariminum, or of fraud, as in the Council of Chalcedon concerning the decree rejected by Leo, it has never happened that the greater part of Bishops erred. Compare what we wrote on this matter in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 612.
1031. III. As to the confirmation of an ecumenical Council, here first we suppose that, when it is truly ecumenical, it cannot err in matters of faith and morals. This does not require demonstration by other arguments than those by which we established the infallibility of the Church in teaching, no. 787. Hence Bellarmine, after weighing individually the various places of Sacred Scripture, concludes, book 2, chapter 2: “from all these places we can reason thus: if we are commanded by God to hear and follow Bishops as Prelates, Pastors, Teachers, Watchmen, Fathers, certainly either they will not be able to deceive us, or we will be able to cast the fault back upon God. But without doubt individual Bishops can err, and sometimes do err, and sometimes disagree among themselves, so that we do not know which of them is to be followed. Therefore at least all together, especially gathered in the name of the Lord, when with one mouth they teach us, will not be able to err.” Compare the arguments given, no. 796 ff.
1032. But in order that a Council may be truly ecumenical and enjoy supreme infallible authority, the approval or confirmation of the Roman Pontiff is altogether necessary. This is proved: 1) From the things established above. For a) a Council is truly ecumenical to the extent that it represents the universal Church. But a Council of all Bishops without any approval of the Roman Pontiff does not represent the universal Church, since it represents the body without its principal part, which is the head. b) The infallibility of which we are treating cannot be had except through the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ. Therefore it cannot be had unless there is that subject to which Christ promised this prerogative. But a subject of this kind is not the body of Bishops without the Head, as is clear from the testimonies which we gave to prove the promise of infallibility. 2) From the testimony of the Councils themselves. Surely concerning Councils held in the West the matter is manifest; for at all of them, except Trent, the Supreme Pontiff himself was present and consented while present. But the Fathers of Trent in the last session expressly declared that confirmation was to be sought from the Pope. What was done in the Vatican Council for the two Constitutions issued, all know. But as to Councils held in the East: concerning the first, it is read in the Synodical Letter of Rome, written in the year 484 under Felix III: “The three hundred eighteen Fathers gathered at Nicaea, following the voice of the Lord, brought the confirmation and authority of the things done in it to the holy Roman Church”; concerning the second, Photius writes: “Not much later Damasus, Bishop, came in, confirming and thinking the same things”; concerning the third, it is said in Act 5: “Because it is necessary that all things which are customary be signified to your holiness, we could not fail to write”; concerning the fourth, the letter sent to Leo has: “We ask that with thy decrees thou honor our judgment. We have insinuated the force of all the things done to you for the proof of our sincerity, and for the firmness and consonance of the things which have been done by us”; concerning the fifth, it is evident that a legation was sent to Vigilius, and the preface of the sentence against the Three Chapters declares: “because it happens that the most religious Vigilius, dwelling in this royal city, was present at all things which are noted concerning these three chapters, and both without writing and in writings often condemned them,” etc.; concerning the sixth, it is read in the letter given to Agatho: “Together with you we have clearly preached the splendid light of the orthodox faith, which we ask your paternal holiness to confirm again through your honorable rescripts”; concerning the seventh, we have as witness the letter of Tarasius to Hadrian I, from which it is evident both that the Pontiff sent his Legates and that the Fathers wrote to him; concerning the eighth, the Synodical Letter to Hadrian II has: “Proclaim that the assembly of us all and the consensus of this universal synod are to be received for consonance; confirm it more and more, as your own, more solidly by evangelical precepts and by your admonitions.” 3) Hence a) Councils disapproved by the Roman Pontiff the Church has always disapproved. Thus Damasus rejected the Council of Ariminum, at which 600 Bishops were present; Leo disapproved the Second Council of Ephesus, etc. b) Other Councils partly approved and partly disapproved by the Roman Pontiff obtained force and authority only for that part which was confirmed by him. Thus the Council of Frankfurt, celebrated, as it seems, in the year 794, was confirmed by Hadrian as to that part in which it is defined that Christ is not the adoptive son of God; but it was disapproved by the same Hadrian as to the other part, in which, through error, it condemned the Seventh Synod. Similarly, the decrees of the Council of Constance partly approved by Martin V the universal Church received; the others not likewise. But you will find many more examples of all these things in Bellarmine, On Councils, book 1, chapters 5-8.
1033. But the approval or confirmation of Councils through the Roman Pontiff can be obtained in many ways. For 1) the Supreme Pontiff himself can be present at the Council with the other Fathers, and at once pronounce his sentence with them. In this case there is already had that body with its Head, to which Christ promised infallibility, and thus its sentence becomes irreformable. 4) The Supreme Pontiff can preside over the Council through his Legates. But Legates, as Bellarmine notes, book 2, chapter 11, are sometimes sent “to the Council with the instruction of the Apostolic See, as we read was done in Councils IV, VI, and VII; sometimes without instruction, as was done in the Council of Trent. The reason for this is that in those first Councils only one question was treated, and therefore the Pontiff could easily explain to the Legates what his sentence was concerning that question; but in the Council of Trent so many and such various questions had to be treated that an instruction of this kind could not conveniently be had.” Hence the Legates were bound to refer all things to the Roman Pontiff. Now in the first case, with the Fathers consenting to the sentence of the Roman Pontiff, a decree is formed by the Legates in the name of the Pontiff; and at once there is had a definitive and irreformable judgment. For there is had the consensus of the Head and of the members, or of the whole subject to which Christ promised infallibility in teaching. In truth, the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to send Legates instructed concerning his sentence on this condition: that if the Fathers consent, by their judgment and that of the Apostolic See a decree be formed; but if not, the decree be deferred until the Roman Pontiff, having been consulted, responds, as is clear from the Council of Chalcedon, Act 3. But in the other case, the sentence of the Council, even with the Legates assenting, would not be the ultimate definitive judgment; rather it must be sent to the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is open to approve or disapprove it. Compare the letter of Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania, the letter of Nicholas to Michael, the Bull of Pius IV by which he confirms the Council of Trent, etc. A fortiori, however, a definitive and irreformable judgment would not be had if the Fathers define with the Legates dissenting, or indeed with the Legates consenting, but against the mandate of the Roman Pontiff. Thus the Second Council of Ephesus erred, because it wished to define with the Legates of Pope Leo resisting; and the Council of Constantinople under Nicholas I, when the Legates acted against the instruction of Nicholas. 3) Hence there can be a confirmation properly so called, or an authority imparted to the judgment of the Fathers, by which the Roman Pontiff, as Supreme Head and Prince of the whole Church, gives obliging force to the sentence passed by the Fathers. Compare Bellarmine, cited place, and Suarez, On Faith, disputation 5, section 7.
1034. IV. As to the necessity of Councils, it is useful first to indicate by what law Councils exist. In this matter the institution of the substance, so to speak, of a Council must be distinguished from the mode not pertaining to the substance and from the time at which Councils are celebrated. If the mode and time are in question, divine institution must be altogether denied; for from Scripture or from tradition nothing can be brought forward which determines certain fixed times for the celebration of Councils. But if the very substance of Councils is in question, “the origin of Councils,” says Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 3, “although Albert Pighius contends that it is plainly human and devised by natural reason, nevertheless more probably is divine.” And Suarez, On Faith, disputation 11, no. 1, says: “Nor indeed is pleasing what Pighius thinks, that the gathering of these Councils is from human institution, unless perhaps he understands this as to time and ordering, or because it is perhaps not simply from divine precept that these councils be assembled.” Surely 1) it cannot be denied that councils have always been the principal means of governing the Church after the supreme means, which is the authority of the Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter. “For always,” says Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 11, “there has been in the Church of God this custom, that for explaining doubtful matters councils of Bishops should be held. But it seems absurd that God did not reveal at least the principal means of governing the Church.” 2) Just as Christ the Lord, saying to Peter alone, “whatever thou shalt bind,” etc., conferred on him supreme power over the Church, so, saying to the other Apostles together with Peter, “whatever you shall bind,” etc., Christ seems to have instituted the judgment of the assembly of Bishops in those things which pertain to the Church. 3) Since it is conceded by all that a truly ecumenical Council is a subject of infallibility in teaching, I do not see how it can be doubted whether it is, as to substance, of divine institution. For infallibility cannot be sought anywhere else in the Church than from the promises of Christ; nor can Christ be thought to have promised infallibility to a subject humanly devised.
1035. But are Councils necessary? To dispatch this complex question briefly, we shall distinctly and in order set forth the various points which answer it. Therefore first we say that Councils are not necessary by reason of intrinsic authority, namely insofar as without them there would be lacking the supreme and full power which can finally settle all controversies of faith. For 1) according to the Council of Florence, we have proved that “in blessed Peter full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ” to the Roman Pontiff. But the power of Peter would not be full, nor would Peter’s successor truly be Head, Prince, or Monarch of the whole Church, if he himself could not settle some controversies by an ultimate and definitive sentence without a Council. 2) The Council of Florence likewise teaches that the Roman Pontiff “exists as the father and teacher of all Christians.” But that would be false if supreme and full power to settle all controversies without a Council did not belong to him; for then, at least in part, he would be taught rather than teach. 3) The office of confirming the brethren was committed to Peter and his successors, as we shall establish more clearly in the following article. But if he lacked the authority which could finally settle controversies of faith without a Council, far from confirming the brethren, he would be confirmed by them.
1036. But secondly, a Council can sometimes be not only useful, but also necessary for effectively obtaining the effects of the supreme sentence which is passed. For, speaking generally, judgment is passed for extirpating heresies or errors, for reducing schismatics to unity, for uprooting abuses and establishing disciplinary matters. Now, although the Roman Pontiff has full authority, as we have said, to pass judgment of this kind, and consequently all are bound to obey him just as if the sentence had been passed by a Council, nevertheless it can happen that in fact some do not obey a sentence passed by the Pontiff alone, who would furnish obedience to the sentence of a Council. In truth, when Bishops are convoked from the whole world, discuss together the things to be defined, raise difficulties and obtain their solution, and finally themselves pronounce sentence together with the Head, it cannot happen that they do not attain a richer understanding of the dogma, that they do not lay aside national prejudices, if there are any, that they are not more ready to publish, explain, and urge everywhere in the world the sentence which, the cause having been duly known, they themselves passed with the Pontiff. These things indeed as to Bishops; but as to others, it cannot be denied that a sentence passed not by the Roman Pontiff alone, but by the whole Council, bears before it a certain greater solemnity and extrinsic authority; that by that sentence the consensus of the whole Church is at once manifested; that this solemnity and this consensus more strongly strike the senses and minds of heretics, schismatics, and any erring persons whatsoever, and more easily bend their spirit to obedience. But if the question concerns extinguishing abuses and establishing discipline, information about the diverse circumstances in which different peoples can be placed is received more easily and more solemnly when Bishops of all nations come together at once, although it could be obtained by other means; and therefore lesser obstacles also are opposed to the execution of those things which have been established in Councils. Each person can develop these things for himself.
1037. From these things, thirdly, the doctrine of Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 10, and of others is shown to be most true: namely, that ecumenical Councils are not absolutely and simply necessary. For 1) without them the full and supreme power of the Roman Pontiff is had, and it can rule the universal Church. But that heretics and schismatics be in fact recalled to the truth of faith and subjection is not absolutely necessary in order that the Church subsist and attain its end, that is, bring to salvation the number of the elect preordained by God, no. 667. 2) “I easily persuade myself of this,” says Bellarmine, cited place, “from the fact that in the first 300 years the Church lacked general Councils, and nevertheless did not perish. For just as in those 300 years the Church remained unharmed without general councils, so also without doubt it could have remained for another 300, and again another 600, and another thousand. For even at that time there were not lacking many heresies, many schisms, many vices and abuses; yet all these things could not oppress the Catholic Church, although it was destitute of the protection of general Councils.” Here it could be added that after the Council of Trent, the Church again remained for three centuries without an ecumenical Council, namely until the Vatican Council.
1038. From these things it is permitted briefly to answer certain propositions which are customarily brought forward. They say: 1) Ecumenical Councils are necessary. I answer by distinguishing: they are necessary with a necessity arising from a defect of full authority, and of themselves, I deny; with a necessity arising from extrinsic circumstances, and per accidens, I concede. The authority of the Pontiff alone is so full that none is greater than it; hence the Pontiff alone, defining, produces the same obligation as the sentence of a Council. But because of the fault of the human will, an obstacle can be placed against the execution of the sentence of the Pontiff; and this obstacle is removed through the conciliar sentence. They say: 2) A Council adds something to the definition of the Pontiff. I answer by distinguishing: it adds something of intrinsic force for obliging, I deny; of solemnity and extrinsic authority, I concede or subdistinguish: and this of itself, I deny; per accidens, I concede. Since the authority of the Pontiff alone is full and supreme, nothing of intrinsic strength can be added to it from the consensus of Bishops. If the authority of a Council is said to be greater, it is greater at most extensively, insofar as there are more judging persons; but not intensively, insofar as the judgment is firmer, no. 1000. Therefore the whole thing that is added is extrinsic and per accidens, as we have said. They say: 3) Councils are by divine precept. I answer by distinguishing: as to a certain time and mode not affecting the substance, I deny; as to substance, I subdistinguish: that the precept arises from the intimate constitution of the Church, as though without a council there were lacking authority which could finally define the matter, I deny; that it arises from circumstances, so that the end may be prudently provided for, I concede. Therefore, if there is any law of having an ecumenical Council, it is certainly no other than that by which any social authority is obliged to consult in a suitable way for the good of the society committed to it. But that an ecumenical Council appears to be the one efficacious means, as we have said, can occur only per accidens; and therefore that law would oblige only per accidens.