948. Having asserted and vindicated the institution of the Primacy in blessed Peter, and its perpetuity in the Roman Pontiffs, we proceed to examine more deeply its nature; and in this matter also we have the Vatican Council as guide. For after renewing the definition of the Council of Florence, by which the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter, are said to have full power of governing the universal Church (no. 903), the Vatican Council, in the cited constitution Pastor Aeternus, chapter 3: 1) declares the true character of the Primacy, saying: “We therefore teach and declare that the Roman Church, by the Lord’s disposition, obtains the principate of ordinary power over all others, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate; toward which pastors and faithful of whatever rite and dignity, both each one singly and all together, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world; so that, with unity of communion and of the profession of the same faith with the Roman Pontiff preserved, the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme shepherd. This is the doctrine of Catholic truth, from which no one can deviate while preserving faith and salvation.” 2) Then it anticipates the objection usually made, saying: “So far, however, is this power of the Supreme Pontiff from standing in the way of that ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which Bishops, who, placed by the Holy Spirit, have succeeded in the place of the Apostles, as true pastors feed and rule the flocks assigned to them, each his own, that the same power is asserted, strengthened, and vindicated by the supreme and universal Pastor, according to that saying of St. Gregory the Great: My honor is the honor of the universal Church. My honor is the solid vigor of my brothers. Then I am truly honored, when due honor is not denied to each and every one.” 3) It then infers certain rights flowing from the power of Primacy, and condemns contrary errors which derive from the nature of the same being wrongly understood. For it says: a) “Furthermore, from that supreme power of the Roman Pontiff of governing the universal Church, it follows that the same Pontiff has the right, in the exercise of this office of his, of communicating freely with the pastors and flocks of the whole Church, so that they may be taught and ruled by him in the way of salvation. Therefore we condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who render the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that the things which are constituted by the Apostolic See or by its authority for the government of the Church do not have force and value unless they are confirmed by the placet of secular power.” b) “And since by the divine right of apostolic primacy the Roman Pontiff presides over the universal Church, we also teach and declare that he is the judge of the faithful, and that in all causes pertaining to ecclesiastical examination recourse can be had to his judgment; but that the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is not greater in any other, is to be retracted by no one, nor is it lawful for anyone to judge concerning its judgment. Therefore they wander from the right path of truth who affirm that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an ecumenical Council as to an authority superior to the Roman Pontiff.” 4) Finally it concludes this whole doctrine with a canon, saying: “If anyone therefore shall say that the Roman Pontiff has only an office of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world; or that he has only the more important parts, and not the whole fullness of this supreme power; or that this power of his is not ordinary and immediate either over all and each of the churches, or over all and each of the pastors and faithful: let him be anathema.”
949. In order that the force of these definitions may become known, and at the same time that the limits of the present question may be defined beforehand, we note first that here we suppose the things established above concerning the institution of the Primacy immediately in blessed Peter, and concerning its perpetuity and the succession of the Roman Pontiffs in the same. Hence the present question is not so much against the Innovators as against the Jansenists and their followers; against the pseudo-Catholics who in Italy are called Regalists, in France Parliamentarians; against the Gallicans, who, having admitted the institution of the Primacy, pervert its true nature.
950. Now, in order to oppose the errors of all these, the Vatican Council declared, I, that the Primacy of the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter, is “a power of jurisdiction which is truly episcopal”; and therefore that those err who say that “the Roman Pontiff has only an office of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power over the universal Church.” From these things it is clear that the Primacy truly consists in episcopal power; not properly in power of order, since with respect to the power of order the Roman Pontiff agrees with the other Bishops, but in power of jurisdiction; indeed of full and supreme jurisdiction. But since the Primacy is of divine institution and pertains to the intimate and essential constitution of the Church, that episcopal power of full and supreme jurisdiction in which the Primacy consists is intrinsic both to the Primacy and to the Church, and this by divine right.
951. This affirmation of Catholic doctrine is directly against those who, with Febronius, Tamburini (The True Idea of the Holy See, chapter 2), and others, distinguish in the Roman Pontiff a twofold dignity: namely, the episcopal dignity, in which, with no distinction made between the power of order and jurisdiction, they say he is simply equal to the other Bishops, and the primatial dignity. The Roman Pontiff, they say, as Bishop exercises episcopal jurisdiction in the Roman diocese; but as Primate he stands to the whole Church as a Metropolitan or Patriarch stands to the province or provinces respectively subject to him. Therefore the Roman Pontiff is not properly Bishop of the whole Church, as Bishops are those to whom individual dioceses to be governed are handed over, but a mere inspector, to whom the presidency and direction of the whole sheepfold belongs. Hence also, which Tamburini with his followers intends last and primarily, they say that the government of the Church, from Christ’s institution, is not monarchical; but that only from error and abuse, and from usurpations of the Roman Pontiffs, did it become monarchical.
952. The Vatican Council adds, II, that that full and supreme episcopal power of jurisdiction is “immediate, whether over all and each of the Churches, or over all and each of the Pastors and faithful.” Immediate power is opposed to mediate power. But he has mediate power over some persons who reaches them only through the mediation of their immediate superiors. Therefore immediate power is power which reaches those same persons as its own subjects, with no other power interposed. In fact, after Febronius, some French theologians taught that the whole power of the Primacy consists in this: that the Roman Pontiff moves the bishops of the various dioceses to exercise their proper office rightly, so that he can exercise his jurisdiction over all the faithful only through them as mediators. They affirm, says Bailly, and he himself subscribes to the opinion, “that the Pope cannot, against the will of the Bishops, exercise in the dioceses the usual functions of Bishops; that he cannot, for example, ordinarily approve priests, ordain ministers, or exclude from the communion of the pious the faithful subject to other Bishops; in one word, that the Supreme Pontiff is not the immediate Pastor in alien dioceses. Yet they confess, and it is agreed among all, that universal solicitude falls upon the Supreme Pontiff, as being head of all the churches; that it belongs to him to watch over all dioceses; that he can, by reason of the primacy, if necessity urges, or in other extraordinary cases, and according to the prescriptions of the canons, exercise the functions of Bishops, or delegate another to do this.”
953. Therefore, according to this part of the Vatican definition, it must be held that the Roman Pontiff, who by force of the Primacy has universal episcopal jurisdiction, can immediately reach as his own subjects, and not as alien subjects, all the rest of the faithful just as he can reach Bishops; that is, he reaches these faithful not through those Bishops as mediators. Yet note: 1) from this it by no means follows that no one besides the Roman Pontiff possesses jurisdiction; just as in a truly and absolutely monarchical society, although the King by his own power can act immediately upon all subjects, inferior magistrates are by no means excluded on that account. This holds all the more in the ecclesiastical monarchy, in which by divine right there must be Bishops. 2) But it is not necessary that the Roman Pontiff exercise this immediate power over all the faithful through himself; he can also exercise it through his delegates, yet without the aid of the Bishops of particular dioceses. 3) In the Church, mediate and immediate superiors can be distinguished to designate the order of rulers among themselves, insofar as he who exceeds the simple faithful by one grade is called an immediate superior in comparison with those who exceed them by two or more grades, and therefore are called mediate. But they are not so distinguished to designate the order of subjects to rulers, as though they are subject immediately to the jurisdiction of one, and to that of another only through the mediation of the former. Hence, just as the Parish Priest, with respect to the Bishop, is the immediate superior of the faithful, without its following that the Bishop cannot do by himself in his own diocese what Parish Priests can do; so particular Bishops can be called immediate superiors in their own diocese, without denying that the Roman Pontiff can do there, by himself or through his delegates, whatever the Bishop can do, and something more.
954. The Vatican Council declares and defines, III, that the immediate power of the Primacy over the universal Church is ordinary. Power can be called ordinary by opposition either to delegated power or to extraordinary power. In the first way, ordinary power is that which by divine or human right is annexed to some office, so that he who obtains the office exercises jurisdiction by force of that office and not by force of a special delegation. In the second way, ordinary power is that which is always in force, and not only when extraordinary circumstances concur. Now those would call the power of the Primacy delegated who asserted that it was conferred immediately upon the Church, so that the Roman Pontiffs would exercise it only by delegation of the Church; this error was refuted above. But those would call it extraordinary who, as Bailly has already suggested, would indeed concede to the Roman Pontiff immediate power over all Pastors and faithful, but only in certain extraordinary cases, when special circumstances require it, in a case of negligence or malice of Bishops, as Febronius says.
955. The Vatican Council properly condemned this error, for it had already condemned the other in chapter 1 (compare no. 847), when it asserted that the immediate power of the Primacy is ordinary. Therefore it must be asserted that the office of universal and immediate Pastor in the Roman Pontiff is ordinary and native, not accidental; that it flows from the intrinsic nature of the ecclesiastical monarchy, as it was instituted by Christ, and does not arise from occurring circumstances. These indeed provide an occasion for exercising it, but they do not give it origin. Yet it will help to note here that one thing is what cannot be done because of a defect of authority, and another is what is not expedient or not lawful to be done everywhere and at will. A Bishop, for example, can validly join in marriage any of his own diocesans; nevertheless it is not expedient that, continually running about into the parishes of his diocese, he exercise this office. In the same way it is not expedient that the Roman Pontiffs everywhere involve themselves in lesser affairs when no urgent cause exists; in fact they neither do this nor ever have done it. But if the Pope wishes to decide some matter which may seem smaller, either by himself or through his delegate, he uses his own right, and he can in no way be impeded or judged by anyone. To this point belongs that saying of St. Bernard to Eugene III (On Consideration, book 2, chapter 4): “What is so unworthy of thee as, holding the whole, not to be content with the whole, unless thou shouldst somehow strive still to make thine certain small details and tiny portions of that universal thing entrusted to thee, as though they were not thine?… By doing thus you prove that you have the fullness of power, but perhaps not so of justice. You do this because you can; but whether you ought to do this is the question.”
956. Having defined the supreme episcopal, immediate, and ordinary power of the Roman Pontiff, the Vatican Council adds, IV: “toward which [power] pastors and faithful of whatever rite and dignity, both each singly and all together, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience.” By these words it has been defined that the Supreme Pontiff is superior to a Council.
957. “This question, whether the Pope is superior to a Council, arose,” says Bellarmine (On Councils, book 2, chapter 13), “at the time of the Council of Pisa; because, when the two Pontiffs who were seated at the same time in the schism, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, did not seem to be thinking seriously about removing the schism by spontaneous abdication, as each had vowed and sworn before the Pontificate, the Cardinals of both parties withdrew to Pisa and began to treat whether it was lawful for them, against the will of those Pontiffs, to convoke a general Council and depose those Pontiffs… Then, when shortly afterward the Council of Constance was held, and John XXIII, who alone had come to the Council, had secretly departed from the Council, and thus the Council had remained without a head, the Fathers began to treat whether the Council could judge and depose an unwilling Pontiff. But the controversy grew especially at the time of the Council of Basel; for since Pope Eugene IV wished to dissolve the Council of Basel, once begun, and prevent it from proceeding further, the Fathers began to ask whether they were bound to obey the Pontiff, or whether the Pontiff rather was bound to obey them, that is, the general Council. And since a little before they had seen two Pontiffs, John XXIII and Benedict XIII, deposed by the Council of Constance, and thus an end imposed on the greatest schism, they began to fear that if the Pontiff were not bound to obey the Council, schism would again be renewed, and the Church would remain without any remedy. Therefore on this occasion very many then went into that opinion, that the Council was above the Pontiff. But while they wished to close off the way to schisms, they themselves made a new schism, creating the Pseudo-pope Felix V, who afterward, having recognized the error, abdicated the Pontificate.”
958. Although the sounder part of the doctors, especially after the Council of Florence and the Lateran Council, constantly adhered to the ancient doctrine, nevertheless certain Gallicans, taking leave of the tradition of their own Church, proclaimed that a Council is above the Pope. The second article of the celebrated declaration issued in the name of the Gallican clergy on March 19, 1682, reads thus: “That the full power of spiritual things so inheres in the Apostolic See and in the successors of Peter, the Vicars of Christ, that at the same time the decrees of the holy ecumenical Synod of Constance, approved by the Apostolic See, confirmed by the use of the Roman Pontiffs themselves and of the whole Church, and preserved with perpetual religious observance by the Gallican Church, concerning the authority of general councils, which are contained in the fourth and fifth sessions, are valid and remain unmoved; nor does the Gallican Church approve those who weaken the force of their decrees as though they are of doubtful authority and less approved, or who twist the sayings of the Council only to the time of schism.”
959. But lest we remain in ambiguity, it must be observed: 1) with Bellarmine (loc. cit.), that the Pope can be compared with a Council in two ways: “In one way, so that on one side the true and undoubted Pope alone is taken, and on the other a general Council over which the Pope presides by himself or through legates, so that nothing is defined without his consent. In another way, so that on one side the Pope alone is taken, and on the other a general Council over which the Pope presides neither by himself nor through his legates. But I understand him not to preside through his legates even when a legate sent by him indeed presides over the Council, but acts against the will of the Pontiff himself; for then he is not truly his legate, although he conducts himself as such.” The present question does not turn on the first comparison, according to which we would almost ask whether the Pope is greater than himself. “That question is superfluous,” says the same Bellarmine (loc. cit.), “whether a Council with the Pope is greater than the Pope alone; for whether it is greater or lesser, it will never judge, condemn, or depose an unwilling Pope. For how would that Council do this, which does nothing without the consent of the Pope? Would the Pope wish himself, unwilling, to be judged and condemned?” Therefore the question treats of the Pontiff taken by himself, separately from the assembly of Bishops, which likewise is conceived separately from the Roman Pontiff and by itself. 2) It must be observed that here we are not treating of a deceased Pontiff, or especially of a doubtful one, but of a certain one. For if the Pope is doubtful, especially if there are several doubtful claimants having their own obediences, all agree that they are bound to submit themselves to a Council. For, says Suarez (On Faith, disputation 10, section 6, no. 19), “in that case no true Pope is given in the sight of the Church, which therefore is by no means bound to obey him; therefore the right of the Church remains to elect the true Pontiff, whom it is bound to obey, and therefore also to depose the doubtful one.” 3) But what if you say: therefore if the Pope becomes contumacious and scandalous, with the greatest danger to the Church - concerning heresy there will be discussion elsewhere - there will be no remedy? I answer: 1) therefore if a Council without the Pope becomes contumacious - we know that this has sometimes happened - there will be no remedy? 2) If the Pope becomes scandalous and contumacious, he can be admonished by a Council; but he is bound to obey this admonition, according to the common opinion, not by its coercive force, but by natural and divine right. But if, not at all obeying the admonition, he perseveres in evil, “it would be unlawful to proceed further, but meanwhile his return to sound mind would have to be committed to the Providence of God, and to be begged from it alone by prayers and groans.” Footnote 1. Sylvius notes (Controversies, book 4, q. 3, art. 6, ad 11): “Although the Church cannot cut off or depose the Pontiff in the case in which he becomes a rotten member, there is nevertheless someone who can cut him off, namely he who constituted him and gave pontifical power to him, that is, Christ. Therefore, just as provision has not been badly made for a kingdom, although its nobles cannot depose a vice-king if he becomes harmful, provided the king himself can depose him, so in the present matter.” And Bellarmine (loc. cit., chapter 19): “It is not marvelous if the Church remains without an efficacious human remedy, since her salvation does not rest chiefly on human industry, but on divine protection, since her king is God. Therefore, even if the Church cannot depose the Pontiff, nevertheless she can and ought to supplicate the Lord that he himself apply the remedy; and it is certain that God will have care for her salvation, who will either convert such a Pontiff or take him out of the midst before he destroys the Church.” Footnote 1 ends.
960. These are the heads of doctrine which we undertake to defend here; whence we establish the following: Proposition 39. 1) The nature of the Primacy which the Roman Pontiffs, as successors of Peter, obtain by divine right, properly consists in an episcopal power of jurisdiction which is full and supreme, indeed immediate and ordinary over all and each, both faithful and pastors. 2) Whether these pastors are considered each singly or all together, the Roman Pontiff is therefore superior to the very body of Bishops, or to all Bishops gathered in an ecumenical synod. Section II It Is Shown That the Nature of the Primacy Is This: That It Is the Supreme Episcopal Power of Jurisdiction, Immediate and Ordinary.
961. And first, the nature of the Primacy consists in episcopal jurisdiction. This is proved by recalling the very testimonies by which we demonstrated the institution of the Primacy. For: I. With respect to the testimony of Matthew 16, the Primacy: 1) is exhibited under the metaphor of foundation, from which the Church receives firmness and unity. But the Primacy cannot be the principle of the firmness and unity of the Church unless it is a true and supreme power of ruling, and not a simple office of inspection and direction (no. 857). Therefore the Primacy consists in that power of ruling. But the power of ruling the Church is episcopal power; for Christ instituted the ecclesiastical hierarchy in clerics, not in laymen (nos. 525 ff.); and among clerics, God placed Bishops to rule his Church. Therefore. 2) In the same testimony the Primacy is exhibited under the symbol of the keys. But the handing over of the keys imports true authority, and not simple inspection and direction. This is clear a) from what has been said (no. 857); b) from the confession of the adversaries, who for this reason say that the power was conferred by Christ on the Church itself and not on Peter, because they imagine that Christ immediately gave the keys to the Church. Therefore. 3) A similar argument is taken from the words, “whatever thou shalt bind,” etc. For these import true power, as is clear a) from what has just been said; b) from the repetition of the same words in Matthew 18, where, according to Tamburini and his followers, they import in the Apostles and their successors true episcopal jurisdiction.
962. II. The same is brought about from the testimony of John 21. For 1) we have seen (no. 868) that that word “feed” imports a true power of ruling; and in no. 869 that “my lambs” and “my sheep” signifies all those who are of the Church, whether faithful or Pastors. But in those words the institution of the Primacy is contained, as has been demonstrated. Therefore the Primacy is a true power of jurisdiction of ruling the universal Church. But this power, as we said a little before, from the very constitution of the Church is nothing other than episcopal power. Therefore. 2) The same is confirmed by biblical and ecclesiastical usage, according to which a Bishop is represented under the symbol of Shepherd, and episcopal power is expressed by the verb “to feed.” Thus in 1 Peter 5.2 it is said of Bishops: “Feed the flock of God which is among you”; and in Acts 20.28 Bishops are said to have been placed by the Holy Spirit to feed, poimainein, the Church of God. Indeed, in 1 Peter 2.25 Christ is called “the shepherd and bishop of our souls, and prince of shepherds”; and Paul, in Hebrews 13.20, calls Christ “the great shepherd of the sheep”; Christ himself in John 10 frequently exhibits himself under the symbol of shepherd. Hence the Church calls all the Apostles, and Christ himself, Pastors; for in the Preface of the Apostles it is said: “that, eternal Shepherd, thou mayest not desert thy flock… to which thou hast granted the vicars of thy work to preside as pastors.” Since, therefore, “feed” was said to Peter in relation to the universal Church, he was constituted Bishop of the universal Church. 3) Hence we conclude generally: according to the Scriptures and the Fathers, indeed according to the very way in which the adversaries conceive the matter, the episcopal office consists in this: that the bishop feeds or rules, coerces the people of the faithful, makes laws, commands, etc., according to that saying just recited from Acts 20: “Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God.” But there is nothing of these things which, from what has been said, is not demonstrated to have been conferred primarily and of itself on Peter and his successors. Therefore.
963. III. The same thing is drawn from constant and universal tradition. Certainly 1) Councils and Fathers understood the testimonies of Matthew 16 and John 21 in the same way as we understand them. 2) They attributed to the Roman Pontiff in the government of the universal Church those parts which belong to a Bishop in the government of his particular Church. These things are clear from the testimonies exhibited above. 3) They expressly called the Roman Pontiff Bishop of the universal Church; concerning this matter it will help to exhibit some testimonies here.
964. In the Council of Chalcedon, first his Legates called St. Leo the Great “Pope” or “Bishop of the universal Church”; then those who in the same synod gave to the Fathers of the Council a supplicatory libellus against Dioscorus; finally Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, did the same, the synod not disapproving. In the Synodical letter of the Sixth Ecumenical Council to Pope Agatho it is read thus: “Therefore to thee, as Prelate of the first See of the universal Church, we leave what is to be done.” The author of the little book on the exile and death of Pope St. Martin calls the Roman Pontiff “chief Priest and apostolic universal Pope.” Maurus, Bishop of Ravenna, in the letter to Pope St. Martin which was approved in the Lateran Council in the year 649, calls him “universal Pontiff throughout the whole apostolic world.” The synodical letters of three African councils from the Numidian, Byzacene, and Mauritanian provinces to Pope Theodore have this inscription prefixed: “To the most blessed lord, exalted with apostolic eminence, holy Father of Fathers Theodore, Pope and supreme Pontiff of all prelates.” The eastern Bishops, in a letter to Pope Symmachus in the year 512, write: “Daily thou art taught by thy sacred teacher Peter to feed the sheep of Christ entrusted to thee throughout the whole habitable world.” In the letter of St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, written in the name of the Gallican Bishops to the Palmary synod in the cause of Pope Symmachus, these things are read concerning the Roman Pontiff: “He who presides over the Lord’s sheepfold will render an account by what administration he dispenses the care of the lambs committed to him; moreover it does not belong to the flock to terrify its own shepherd.” We have already recited the words of Tertullian, who in the book On Modesty, chapter 1, calls the Roman Bishop “Supreme Pontiff and Bishop of Bishops.” It is true that he wrote the aforesaid book after his lapse into the heresy of Montanus, and that he reproves the Roman Bishop because he absolves even adulteries, and, as if mocking, says: “But the Supreme Pontiff and Bishop of Bishops gives pardon even to adulterers.” Nevertheless by these words he exists as a witness concerning the designation that at that time was customarily given to the Roman Bishop. St. Augustine, in the cited place against Faustus, chapter 7, names the Roman Bishop “Pastor of the whole Church”; and in book 4 Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 12, he calls him “Pastor of pastors.” To the Roman Pontiff pertain the words which we recited above from the sermon on the birthday of the Apostles: “First he committed lambs to him, then sheep; because he constituted him not only shepherd, but shepherd of shepherds.” Hence St. Bernard rightly addresses Eugene III thus: “They [the Bishops] have flocks assigned to themselves, each one his own; to thee all have been entrusted, to one, one. Nor only of sheep, but also of shepherds, thou alone art shepherd of all. Dost thou ask whence I prove this? From the word of the Lord: feed my sheep.”
965. IV. From this it is easily shown that the power of the Primacy is immediate. For since 1) it is episcopal power over the universal Church, or over all and each of the pastors and faithful, the authority of the Primacy over all in the Church will be such as the power of a bishop over all the faithful of his own diocese. But, as the adversaries confess, this is immediate. Therefore. 2) Since the Roman Pontiff in blessed Peter was constituted Pastor, he certainly ought immediately to rule some persons. But whom, except those who were handed over to him to be ruled? And who were handed over to him to be ruled, except sheep and lambs? Indeed, just as Christ said to Peter, “feed my sheep,” that is, Pastors, so he said, “feed my lambs,” that is, the faithful. Therefore Peter and his successors have the same power over Pastors and faithful. But the power over Pastors is certainly immediate. Therefore.
966. V. In the same way it is shown that the immediate power of the Primacy is also ordinary. For 1) the power of the Roman Pontiff over the universal Church is not less than the power of a bishop in his own diocese, since both are episcopal power. But a Bishop has ordinary power in his own diocese. Therefore. 2) As we saw a little before, the power of bishops over particular churches and the power of the Primacy over the universal Church are expressed in the same way in the Scriptures. For just as it is said to bishops, “feed the flock which is among you,” so it is said to Peter and his successors, “feed my lambs, feed my sheep.” But through that “feed” said to bishops, ordinary power is expressed. Therefore.
967. VI. But the things which we here assert concerning immediate power can easily be confirmed from the things established above. For in any society that power ought to be held as immediate which: 1) depends on no other authority in the same society; 2) extends to all the members of that same society; 3) and in all and each of them can do, by itself alone, all those things which are attributed to any other superior of that same society. But the power of the Primacy in the Church is of this kind. Therefore. And 1) that it is independent is clear: a) because Peter was superior to the Apostles themselves; b) because consequently the successor of Peter is superior to the successors of the Apostles, and therefore, just as Peter, he must feed or rule the sheep themselves, or Bishops; c) because the sentence of Peter alone, with no other authority interposed, is ratified in the heavens; d) because finally if there were any visible power in the Church superior to the Primacy, it would be the power of the ecumenical Council, or the body of bishops; but a little below we shall prove that the Roman Pontiff is superior to that Council. 2) That the power of the Primacy extends to all the members of the Church is shown by the same arguments, and is abundantly clear from things often disputed. 3) That the Roman Pontiff alone, by force of the Primacy, can effect all things which belong to any superior of the Church is clear: a) because it was said to Peter: “Whatever thou shalt bind… whatever thou shalt loose… shall be bound… loosed in heaven”; b) because he who has immediate and ordinary episcopal power over all and each of the pastors and faithful can do in all what bishops can do in their own subjects; c) because Scripture and tradition acknowledge the indivision of supreme power in one Head of the Church, namely in Peter and his successors.
968. Therefore let us conclude with the words of Pius VI, who in the Response to the Metropolitans of Mainz, Trier, etc., clearly expressed Catholic doctrine: “The Fathers,” he says, “and Councils, both before and after Gregory the Great, as if having entered a treaty among themselves, vied with one another in calling the Roman Pontiff Priest of Priests, Father of Fathers, Pastor of Pastors, Bishop of Bishops, and universal Bishop… This authority of feeding, joined with the power of the keys, attributed in a peculiar way to Peter, just as it shows ordinary and immediate authority over all the faithful, so it also shows that same ordinary and immediate authority over all Pastors, who, with whatever dignity they may shine, not only are not equal to the Pontiff, but are so subject to his authority that those who are called and are pastors, if you look at the peoples, are, if you look at the Pontiff, held only in the number of sheep.” Section III Certain Difficulties Against the Things Just Established Are Answered.
969. You will say, I: St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church, no. 5) writes: “The episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each singly in solidum.” Hence: 1) if the episcopate is one, it cannot be supreme and universal in the Roman Pontiff, but inferior or dependent and circumscribed in the other bishops. 2) If a part is held by each singly in solidum, then all bishops are equal, and only all together have the fullness of the episcopate. I answer by distinguishing the text: the episcopate is one by reason of nature, origin, and the body which all bishops together form, I concede; by reason of power, I subdistinguish; of the power of order, I concede; of the power of jurisdiction, again I distinguish: which nevertheless is not possessed by all with the same fullness, I concede; which is possessed by all with the same fullness, I deny. And similarly that phrase is distinguished, “a part is held by each singly in solidum”: with the proportion of power proper to each preserved, I concede; equally and in every way possessed by all, I deny. Therefore: 1) the objected words can be considered in themselves, abstracting from the mind of St. Cyprian, and thus they can be understood: the episcopate is one in all Bishops in almost the same way as human nature is one in all men, namely in those things which constitute the essence of human nature. Therefore, just as the unity of essential human nature in all men does not prevent individual men from being more excellent than one another in talent, learning, authority, etc., so the essential unity of the episcopate does not prevent one among the Bishops, possessing the episcopate more fully, from ruling the others. Indeed, the adversaries hold that, with that unity preserved, some can preside over others by human right; and hence Patriarchs and Metropolitans are superior to Bishops. What, therefore, prevents such inequality from being established by the one divine right, while the essential unity of the episcopate remains intact in all? Thus Tournely with other theologians. 2) The words of St. Cyprian, considered according to his mind, display this sense: the episcopate is one insofar as all Bishops effect one body, which is the ruling and teaching Church. “The episcopate,” says Ballerini (On the Force, Nature, etc., chapter 12, no. 10), “is one according to the opinion of Cyprian in the way that the Church is one; and therefore a part of the episcopate is held in solidum by each Bishop insofar as his particular church, or his particular flock, which is a part of the whole Church, is ruled by each one. But the Supreme Pontiff, successor of St. Peter, although as Bishop he rules one particular Roman flock, which likewise is part of the Catholic Church, nevertheless, from the primacy by which he presides over the whole Church, is the center and origin of the unity of the whole Church according to the very opinion of Cyprian, etc.” And this interpretation is drawn from the context; for the context has: “This unity [of the Church] we Bishops especially, who preside in the Church, ought firmly to hold and vindicate, so that we may prove the episcopate itself also to be one and undivided. Let no one deceive the brotherhood by a lie; let no one corrupt the truth of faith by faithless prevarication. The episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each singly in solidum. The Church also is one, which is extended more widely into a multitude by the increase of fruitfulness.” Therefore St. Cyprian affirms the same species of unity concerning the episcopate and concerning the Church. The holy Doctor inculcates this doctrine also in other places: “And since,” he says, “there is from Christ one Church divided throughout the whole world into many members, likewise one episcopate diffused by the concordant numerousness of many Bishops,” etc. “One Church… and one faith joined together into the solid unity of the body by the glue of concord.” 3) As is clear from the context itself, the episcopate is also one by reason of origin according to the mind of St. Cyprian. For immediately after the words of the context just recited, he adds: “As the rays of the sun are many, but the light is one; and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded in a tenacious root; and when from one source many streams flow down, although the numerousness may seem diffused by the largeness of the overflowing abundance, nevertheless unity is preserved in the origin. Tear a ray from the body of the sun; unity does not receive a division of light. Break a branch from the tree; it will not be able to bud forth fruit. Cut a stream off from the source; once cut off, it dries up. So also the Church, flooded with the light of the Lord, stretches her rays through the whole world. Yet there is one light which is spread everywhere, nor is the unity of the body separated.” But a little before he had taught that unity proceeds from Peter (no. 887). Therefore, according to St. Cyprian, the episcopate exists originarily and fully in Peter and his successors, but participatively in the rest. Thus the episcopate in Peter and in the others is one, just as the light in the ray and in the sun is of the same nature; the branches are of the same substance with their tree; and streams also with the source. But just as the fullness, dependence, force, and intensity of light is not the same in the ray and in the sun; the fullness, dependence, and quantity of water is not the same in the streams and in the source; so the fullness of the episcopate, the intensity and extension of jurisdiction, is not the same in Peter, from whom it proceeds as from a source, and in the other Bishops, who derive it from Peter.
970. You will say, II: St. Cyprian, in his writings on rebaptizing, and the Councils of Carthage held under him concerning the same controversy, teach many things which openly conflict with the Primacy, or the episcopal jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff over the other Bishops; and especially in letter 74 to Pompeius, he reproaches St. Stephen with “obstinacy, presumption, blindness of mind, depravity,” etc. But a holy man, such as St. Cyprian was, would certainly have abstained from these insults if he had regarded Stephen, the Roman Pontiff, as his superior. I answer: 1) Not a few hold that such writings of St. Cyprian and acts of the Councils are adulterated. Compare the excellent dissertation of Marcellinus Molkenbuhr, which appears in Migne, Patrologia Latina, volume 3, page 1357; Tizzani in the work which he published at Rome in 1862; and Revue des sciences ecclesiastiques, volume 7, pages 221, 305, 419, 513. Nor is this opinion new, since - let it not be wearisome to recall these things - St. Augustine had already written in letter 93 to Vincent the Rogatist, nos. 38 and 40: “But that Cyprian thought otherwise concerning baptism than the form and custom of the Church held is found, not in canonical writings, but in his own letters and in those of the council. But that he corrected this opinion is not found; nevertheless it is not incongruent to judge of such a man that he corrected it, and perhaps it was suppressed by those who were excessively delighted with this error and did not wish to lack so great a patronage. Although there are not lacking those who contend that Cyprian did not think this at all, but that it was fabricated under his name by presumptuous and deceitful men. For the integrity and knowledge of the letters of one Bishop, however illustrious, could not be guarded in the way that canonical Scripture is guarded by the letters of so many languages, and by the order and succession of ecclesiastical celebration; nevertheless against it there have not been lacking those who forged many things under the names of the Apostles.” Compare what was said (no. 669). 2) But the insults of St. Cyprian against Stephen the Roman Pontiff would be commemorated here in vain, even if they had truly been uttered. For just as a man can act against faith and the dictate of reason, so he can resist legitimate authority from passion, without nevertheless denying it. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Cyprian was a holy man; for to protect his sanctity it is enough that he was such before the controversy with Stephen arose, and especially at the end of life. But if he uttered those insults against Stephen, while he uttered them he certainly was not holy. Hence St. Augustine writes in the cited place: “But then Cyprian either did not at all think what you Donatists recite him as having thought, or afterward corrected this in the rule of truth; or this as a blemish of his most candid breast he covered with the richness of charity, while he most abundantly defended the unity of the Church growing throughout the whole world, and most perseveringly held the bond of peace. For it is written: Charity covers a multitude of sins (1 Pet. 4). To this was also added that, as a most fruitful branch, if there was anything to be corrected in him, the Father purged it with the pruning-hook of suffering.” But since the objections which are here taken from St. Cyprian can also be solved in another way, we shall also follow that way.
971. You will say, III: St. Cyprian in the Seventh Council of Carthage, which is the third on baptism, says: “Nor does any one of us constitute himself bishop of bishops, or by tyrannical terror force his colleagues to the necessity of obeying.” Therefore he denies that the Roman Pontiff is Bishop of Bishops. I answer by denying the consequence. For 1) St. Cyprian speaks of the African Bishops who, assembled in that Council (“any one of us”), were debating the question of rebaptizing; not of the absent Roman Pontiff. And in fact, the decree of Stephen concerning not rebaptizing heretics had not yet reached St. Cyprian; for it was not read in that Council, as similar documents of the Supreme Pontiff were accustomed to be read. How therefore could St. Cyprian complain about it? Compare the dissertation published at Paris in 1724, On the Dissension Between St. Stephen and St. Cyprian. 2) St. Cyprian contends nothing else except that the right is inherent in each Bishop of freely bringing forth his own opinion in Council, without any one being able to force others into his opinion; but he is always treating of the Bishops present there. “Wherefore,” he says, “it remains that concerning this very matter we, each one, bring forth what we think, judging no one or removing anyone from the right of communion if he shall have thought differently. For no one of us constitutes himself bishop of bishops, or by tyrannical terror forces his colleagues to the necessity of obeying, since every bishop has, according to the license of his liberty and power, his own judgment; and he can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another.”
972. You will insist: But St. Cyprian denies even of the Roman Bishop that he can judge others, for he adds: “But let all of us await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone and singly has the power both of setting us over the government of his Church and of judging concerning our act.” It is answered: these words of St. Cyprian are to be understood of doubtful and obscure matters. For as long as they are such, truth is investigated; and in this investigation St. Cyprian asserts the liberty of Bishops. Hence even if some Bishop in this investigation of matters still doubtful should wander from the right path, he will render an account of this matter to Christ, to whom the secrets of conscience are known. Moreover, if after the investigation is completed, the matter is finally defined, the sentence must be stood by. Indeed, if St. Cyprian had thought that the Roman Pontiff could not pass sentence on bishops, how in letter 67 could he have exhorted St. Stephen to order that Marcian, the Bishop of Arles who had defected to the Novatians, be reduced to order and another be constituted in his place? “Wherefore,” he says, “it is fitting that you make very full letters to our co-bishops constituted in Gaul, so that they no longer allow Marcian, perverse and proud and an enemy of divine piety and fraternal salvation, to insult our college.”
973. You will insist: St. Cyprian judged that Basilides, bishop of Asturica in Spain, who had been deposed by his fellow provincial bishops and restored by St. Stephen the Roman Pontiff, was not to be held as bishop; indeed he asserted that the one who had been substituted in his place was true and legitimate Bishop. I answer: St. Cyprian did not judge the restoration of Basilides invalid from a defect of authority in the Roman Pontiff, but from a defect of justice, insofar as he judged the sentence of restoration to be surreptitious. This is clear from the very words of St. Cyprian, in the letter to the clergy and people of Asturica: “Nor can it rescind an ordination perfected by right, that Basilides, after his crimes had been detected and his conscience laid bare even by his own confession, going to Rome, deceived Stephen our colleague, who was far away and ignorant of the matter carried out and the truth kept silent, so that he ambitiously sought to be unjustly restored to the episcopate from which he had been justly deposed,” etc. Meanwhile, from these things it is established that bishops in Spain, driven from their see, fled to the Roman See; and this indeed further confirms our thesis.
974. You will say, IV: St. Gregory the Great rejects the name “Bishop of the universal Church.” For in book 4, letter 32, he says that the appellation “bishop of the universal Church” is “a name of blasphemy”; and in letter 36 to Eulogius of Alexandria and Anastasius of Antioch he says that none of his predecessors used “so profane a word.” Therefore. I answer by distinguishing: he rejects the name Bishop of the universal Church in the sense that he is the only Bishop, I concede; in the sense that, with the jurisdiction of the other Bishops preserved, he rules the universal Church by episcopal authority, I deny. That this is the mind of St. Gregory is clear from the very places objected. For in letter 32 he says: “But let that name of blasphemy be absent from our hearts, in which the honor of all priests is taken away while it is madly arrogated to himself by one.” And in letter 36: “But none of my predecessors ever consented to use so profane a word, because, namely, if one patriarch is called universal, the name of patriarch is derogated from the rest.”
975. You will insist: if it is so, why then does St. Gregory absolutely reject the very name “Bishop of the universal Church”? I answer: a twofold reason for this matter can be assigned. First, John the Faster, Bishop of Constantinople, had arrogated to himself the title of ecumenical Bishop, which created great scandal. Hence St. Gregory, writing to him in book 5, letter 18, says: “You have been led to this, that, the brothers being despised, you desire to be named Bishop alone.” By his humility St. Gregory wished to cure the pride of John. Then, as we said, the name Bishop of the universal Church seemed to display a certain ambiguity; therefore, lest by excluding the false sense St. Gregory seem to vindicate it for himself, he entirely rejects it. And, his biographer testifying, from then on he began to call himself “servant of the servants of God.” Moreover, Gregory confesses that this name could belong to him by right. For in book 5, letter 17, he says: “Surely, as your Fraternity knows, through the venerable Council of Chalcedon the prelates of this Apostolic See, which by God’s disposition I serve, were called universal with honor offered? But nevertheless no one ever wished to be called by such a word [St. Leo the Great did not call himself universal Bishop, but Bishop of the universal Church]; no one seized this rash name for himself, lest if in the grade of pontificate he seized the glory of singularity, he should seem to have denied it to all the brothers.” But St. Gregory constantly asserted for himself the thing itself signified by that name. Thus, for example, he writes in book 5, letter 20 to Maurice: “To all who know the Gospel, it is clear that by the Lord’s voice the care of the whole Church was committed to blessed Peter. Behold the care of the whole Church and the principate are committed to him, and yet he is not called universal Apostle; and my most holy fellow-priest John tries to be called universal Bishop?” Compare Schrader, On Roman Unity, part 2, no. 88 ff.
976. V. They object here again the words of St. Jerome: “If authority is sought, the world is greater than a city. Why do you bring before me the custom of one city? Wherever a Bishop has been, whether at Rome, or Eugubium, or Constantinople, he is of the same merit and of the same priesthood. The power of riches and the humility of poverty does not make a Bishop higher or lower.” To confirm the answer already given (no. 938), note: 1) St. Jerome certainly speaks of the power of order when he says, “Wherever a Bishop has been… he is of the same merit,” since a little before he had said: “For what does a Bishop do, except ordination, that a presbyter does not do?” These things certainly cannot be understood of the power of jurisdiction, since presbyters were and are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops. 2) But when St. Jerome teaches, “if authority is sought, the world is greater than a city,” this must be understood per se and in the subject matter. Per se, indeed, because the authority of a custom is of itself greater the broader it is; but in the subject matter, because the custom then prevailing at Rome, by which deacons were preferred to presbyters, as St. Jerome himself indicates, was not approved by the Roman Bishop, and therefore was rather an abuse to be eliminated. Compare Bellarmine (book 2, chapter 15).
977. You will say, VI: There cannot be two immediate pastors over one and the same flock without confusion arising in the flock and between the pastors themselves. But this would happen if the Roman Pontiff had immediate episcopal jurisdiction over all in the Church. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major: there cannot be two immediate pastors of the same order, or without the subordination of one to the other, I concede; otherwise, I deny. “It is unfitting,” says St. Thomas (on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 17, q. 7), “that two be constituted equally over the same flock. But that two, one of whom is more principal than the other, be constituted over the same people, is not unfitting; and according to this, both the Parish Priest and the Bishop and the Pope are immediately over the same people.” To confirm this answer, it is helpful to note that the episcopate can stand in three ways: 1) with universal and independent jurisdiction, as is the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff; 2) with universal but dependent jurisdiction, as it was in the Apostles; 3) with particular and dependent jurisdiction, as it is in the other bishops. Now although the Apostles were universal bishops, this nevertheless did not prevent those ordained by the Apostles themselves from being true bishops, with true episcopal power, “placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God.” Certainly Paul left Titus in Crete, so that he might carry out episcopal functions there; yet the Apostle himself was not prohibited from exercising episcopal authority in the Cretan church as before. The same must be said of St. John and the other Apostles with respect to various churches, as is clear from the Epistles, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Apocalypse. Therefore the universal episcopate and the particular episcopates of others over the same flock do not conflict with one another. Indeed in any kingdom it not only is not repugnant, but is required, that under the king, who has supreme and full power, there be other magistrates, prefects, and finally superiors, by whatever name they are called. For the king cannot by himself rule and govern the whole kingdom. Therefore in the same way there can be other superiors in the Church besides him who has supreme and full power, without preventing this power from immediately reaching all. The only difference is that in the Church Christ himself, just as he instituted the Primacy, so under it he instituted the episcopal order, which therefore must always be in the Church, so that Bishops are not properly vicars of the Roman Pontiff (no. 542); whereas in other kingdoms it belongs to the king himself to determine what kind of inferior magistrates there are, who assist him in the administration of the kingdom and who perform their office in his place. Section IV It Is Shown That the Roman Pontiff Is Superior to Bishops Taken Collectively.
978. I. From Scripture. For 1) as we demonstrated above, the authority of the Primacy is contained under the metaphor of foundation, which Christ used when addressing Peter (Matt. 16). But this imports authority over Bishops even taken collectively. Therefore. Proof of the minor. a) It belongs to a foundation to sustain, not the various parts of a building taken separately, but all of them insofar as they grow together at once; nor otherwise does it properly sustain the building. b) It belongs to a foundation to effect firmness and unity; and the question is of the firmness of the building itself, and not only of its parts separately; and unity properly regards the parts insofar as they are gathered together. c) Wherefore, if the Bishops collectively taken were superior to Peter, they themselves would be his foundation, and Peter would not be theirs; which indeed is contrary to the institution of Christ, who constituted Peter the foundation of his whole Church, from whom the Bishops themselves would derive firmness and unity. 2) Peter and his successors are the foundation, or superiors, of that Church against which Christ promised that the gates of hell would never prevail; for Christ constituted the Primacy, that is, the foundation, precisely so that through it the Church might resist its enemies invincibly and have perpetual firmness. But the Church against which the gates of hell will never prevail is the universal Church, or the Church collectively taken, and not the faithful or Bishops taken singly, against whom it is evident that the gates of hell have sometimes prevailed. Therefore. 3) Peter is superior to that Church which Christ simply called his Church: “upon this rock I will build my Church.” But this is the whole, universal Church, according to its parts collectively taken; for if they are taken separately, they do not constitute the Church of Christ. Therefore. 4) In like manner the keys were promised and delivered to Peter, but the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But a kingdom imports the whole collection of those who belong to it. Therefore Peter has the keys, or supreme power, over all those who belong to the Church collectively taken. Surely one who received the keys of a city would have power not only over the individual citizens, but over their body; Bishops, who have jurisdiction in a particular diocese, are superior to all the diocesans taken together. Therefore Peter, who received the keys of the kingdom, or of the universal Church, is superior to all who are of the Church collectively taken. Only to this extent could it be understood that the assembly of Bishops is superior to the Roman Pontiff: insofar as the supreme executive power alone, as they say, were with him, but the legislative power were with that assembly. But we have vindicated for Peter the plenitude of supreme power; and we have shown that the form of government in the Church, by the institution of Christ, is simply monarchical. Therefore. 5) It is evident from the things disputed above that the Pontiff is the head, pastor, father, teacher, and leader of the Church. But a head stands above not only the members taken separately, but the whole body; a father presides not merely over individual sons, but over the whole family; a pastor, not only over individual sheep, but over the whole fold; a teacher, not only over individual disciples, but over the whole school; a leader, not only over individual soldiers, but over the whole army at once. Therefore the Roman Pontiff similarly presides with power not merely over the faithful or Bishops taken separately, but over all at once, or over the whole collection, and thus over the universal Church. No sane person would say that the individual sheep are subject to the shepherd, but that the collection of sheep can stand above the shepherd and command him; that the individual lesser leaders are subject to the supreme leader, but that their assembly stands above him, and so on. 6) Wherefore, if we consider the whole complex of the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, it is evident that Christ willed Peter, after his ascension into heaven, to be in relation to the Church what he himself was while he was visibly dwelling on earth. Hence Peter and his successors have been called the Vicars of Christ on earth. But Christ was in no way subject to the Church or to the Apostles collectively taken. Therefore. Hence it is that the Protestant Mosheim, in his dissertation on the appeals of the French, etc., writes: “That they say the Pontiff presides over all or individual churches, but not over the universal Church, seems to me as judicious as if someone were to affirm that the members indeed are ruled by the head, but not the body which consists of the members; or that all cities, villages, and estates are subject to a king, but not the province itself which is contained by these.”
979. From Tradition the doctrine with which we are dealing could be most abundantly confirmed. But, mindful of our plan and consulting brevity, we shall recall certain principal heads, which are sufficient. Therefore, I. from Tradition it is evident that the Pontiff is judged by no one. Nicholas openly teaches this from ancient decrees, writing in his letter to the Emperor Michael: “The first see will be judged by no one”; and: “The first see will be judged neither by the Augustus, nor by Kings, nor by all the Clergy, nor by the people.” The synod held under Hadrian II, chapter 4, declares: “We read that the Roman Pontiff has judged concerning the prelates of all the Churches; but we do not read that anyone has judged concerning him.” The Third Lateran Council, canon 1, treating the case of a delinquent Pontiff, says: “Recourse cannot be had to a superior.” Ivo of Chartres, letter 235, speaking of Paschal the Roman Pontiff, says: “The Pope seems to me to have to be admonished, that he judge himself or retract his deed. But if he does this, let us give thanks to God, and let the Church, which languishes while its head labors under such a weakening affliction, rejoice with us. But if in this languor he shall be incurably sick, it is not ours to judge concerning the Supreme Pontiff.” The Bishops of Gaul, called to the cause of Leo III, answer: “We do not dare to judge the Apostolic See; for it itself is judged by no one, as was also the custom anciently.”
980. II. Tradition explicitly teaches that the Pontiff cannot be judged even by a general Council. The Synod of Chalcedon first declared this by deed, in the letter to the Emperors and in the letter to Leo, related in Act 3; for it writes that it condemned Dioscorus chiefly for this cause, that he presumed to pass sentence against the first see. But the Third Council of Constantinople, Act 10, canon 21, declares in express words: “If a universal synod shall have been gathered, and any ambiguity and controversy shall even have arisen concerning the holy Roman Church, it is necessary, with veneration and with suitable reverence, to inquire concerning the proposed question, and to receive the solution, or to profit and make progress; nevertheless not boldly to pronounce sentence against the Supreme Pontiffs of elder Rome.” Hence Hadrian, in the same place, Act 7, through Peter the Deacon, after condemning the “intolerable presumption of Photius,” by which he dared to institute judgment against the Roman Pontiff, teaches and confirms by examples that this cannot be done even by a general Council, unless the Roman See itself concurs or precedes in judging.
981. III. All these things receive a stronger force from the reasons which are brought forward. For Nicholas assigns this reason: “there is no authority greater than that of the Apostolic See”; Hadrian: “it is not lawful for inferiors to resist superiors”; the Roman Fathers under Symmachus: “a singular power belongs to the Apostolic See in the Churches”; the Gallicans under Leo: “the Pontiff is the head of all the Churches of God”; Ennodius: “to Peter alone it was said, upon this rock I will build my Church”; Avitus: “if the arbiter of heaven commands us to be subject to earthly powers, it is not easily given to be understood by what reason or by what law the more eminent should be judged by inferiors. For when the Apostle cries out with a celebrated precept that an accusation ought not to be received even against a presbyter, what must be judged lawful in accusations against the principate of the general Church?” And: “the See of Peter is no less to be cherished in the Church than the summit of the world in the city”; finally: “if the Pope of the City is called into doubt, the Episcopate will now seem to waver, not the Bishop.”
982. IV. For this reason Tradition declares that the causes of the Pontiff are reserved to the judgment of God alone. This is asserted in the Acts of the Fourth Roman Synod under Symmachus, which pronounces this Pontiff immune from every imputation “as far as regards men,” but “reserved the whole cause to the judgment of God.” The Fathers subscribed to this Council in this form: “we have subscribed to this statute, in which we committed the whole cause to God.” Ennodius, in the Apology of this Council, confirmed by the Roman Synod under the same Pontiff, says: “God perhaps has willed the causes of other men to be terminated through men; the prelate of the See of Rome he has without question reserved to his own judgment. He willed the successors of blessed Peter to owe their innocence to heaven alone.” Avitus, in the same cause, writing in the name of the Gallican Bishops to the Roman Senators, says: “We understand that Pope Symmachus, if he had first been accused before the world, ought to have received the solace of his fellow-priests rather than their judgment. The synod itself, foreseeing this by a praiseworthy constitution, reserved to divine examination the cause which it had almost rashly undertaken to inquire into.” Hence Innocent III, in sermon 2 on the consecration of the Pope, writes: “Faith is necessary to me to such a degree that, although concerning other sins I have God alone as judge, because of the sole sin which is committed in faith I can be judged by the Church.” And St. Peter Damian, in the Debate between the Advocate of the King and the Defender of the Church: “The condemnation of a Pope is so grave and inexplicable that it must be treated only by divine judgment, not by human judgment.”
983. V. On the contrary, it is evident that the Roman Pontiffs can correct, and have corrected, the decrees of Councils. And 1) this doctrine is expressly handed down. Thus concerning the pseudo-synod of Ephesus, Gelasius wrote in his letter to the Bishops of Dardania: “The Apostolic See by its own authority condemned Dioscorus, the prelate of the second see, and by not consenting set aside the impious synod; and, for the truth, it alone decreed that the Chalcedonian synod be held. Just as that which the first see had not approved could not stand, so what it judged should be judged the whole Church received.” The same Gelasius then adds, in a more general formula in the cited letter: “The whole Church throughout the world knows that the see of blessed Peter the Apostle has the right of loosing what has been bound by the sentences of any Pontiffs whatsoever.” And in the book On Anathema he says: “The whole matter is placed in the power of the Apostolic See. Thus what the Apostolic See confirmed in synod obtained force; what it rejected could not have firmness.” The same is taught by Julius I in Socrates, book 2, chapter 13; Sixtus III in the letter to the Bishops of Illyricum; Pelagius II in letter 4 to the Bishops not assembled with John of Constantinople; Nicholas I in letter 8, etc. Wherefore, in agreement with these declarations of Gelasius, Hincmar writes in his book On the Divorce of Lothar and Theutberga: “By all these things it is shown that a synod of bishops of one province judges the judgments of its provincial bishops, while a general synod either approves or corrects the judgments or dissensions of provincial bishops; but the Apostolic See reviews, reopens, and confirms the judgments both of provincial and of general synods; as the letters of Leo and Gelasius and of the other Roman Pontiffs, and the Sardican synod, evidently show.” Hence also arose that wise saying of Ratherius, Bishop of Verona, in the Itinerary: “Nowhere is that ratified which is there made void, namely with the Apostolic See; nowhere is that made void which has there been ratified”; and of Ratramnus, book 4 Against the Objections of the Greeks: “Whatever Councils were strengthened by its sentence remained ratified; but those which it condemned were reckoned as nothing and could have no authority.” 2) All these things are confirmed by the fact itself. We all know that the little Council of Ephesus was rejected by Leo I; Damasus rejected Ariminum; since the Roman Pontiff alone, as we recalled above, had opposed canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon, that same canon never had any force; hence the Greeks themselves expunged it from the codex of their Church. The Synod of Constantinople, held in the year 755 by 388 Bishops against the cult of holy images, was condemned by Hadrian II, etc. 3) We pass over here the things which pertain to the authority of convoking councils, presiding over them, confirming the same, prescribing to them their norm and rule, etc., which all antiquity acknowledged in the Roman Pontiff; for these things belong to another place. It suffices here to transcribe the testimony of Leo X, who in the constitution Pastor Aeternus, promulgated in the Fifth Lateran Council, session 11, says: “That the Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority over all Councils, has the full right and power of indicating, transferring, and dissolving Councils is manifestly evident, not only from the testimony of Sacred Scripture, from the sayings of the Fathers and of other Roman Pontiffs, and from the decrees of the sacred canons, but also from the proper confession of those same Councils.”
984. VI. But in truth that Gallican distinction between the Church collectively and distributively accepted was unknown to all antiquity, and had its origin, as we said in no. 957, at the time of the Council of Pisa. This is also clear from the manner of acting of the adversaries, who, to strengthen their doctrine, could praise no authors other than some who wrote around the times of the Council of Constance, when, namely, blinded by the darkness of the schism, they could not sufficiently attain the truth. Hence Andreas Duval could most truly say, in On the Comparison of the Supreme Pontiff and the Council, question 7, that the doctrine which we here defend glories in such a number and weight of authors that “the whole world, except for a very few doctors, embraces it.” Indeed Gerson himself admits that it savored of heresy to say that the Pope is inferior to a Council. For he has these words, On Ecclesiastical Power, consideration 12: “I am mistaken if, before the celebration of this Synod of Constance, this tradition had not so occupied the minds of very many, of letters rather than of learned men, that one dogmatizing the opposite would have been either marked or condemned for heretical depravity. Receive this as a sign of the matter: after the declaration of the same holy Synod, there are found those who do not fear to assert such things everywhere.” Hence whatever monuments of ancient tradition extol the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, those same monuments exhibit the Primacy also over the universal Church, even collectively accepted.
985. From the things said certain theological reasons can be drawn to confirm the matter. And 1) no supreme authority can be acknowledged in the Church unless it is evident that it was constituted by Christ. But nowhere is it read that supreme power was conferred by Christ on a Council without the Pope. Therefore. The minor is proved. If all testimonies both of Scripture and of tradition are brought together, we find a twofold subject of supreme power, inadequately distinct: namely Peter alone, “whatever thou shalt bind,” etc.; and the body of the Apostles, Peter included, “whatever you shall bind,” etc. But when there is a Council without the Pope, neither of those subjects of supreme power is had. Therefore. 2) If supreme authority were to be attributed to a Council without the Pope, this authority would belong to it either a) by reason of the episcopal authority in which the gathered Fathers rejoice; or b) by reason of the collection itself; or c) by reason of representation, insofar as that Council would represent the universal Church. But supreme authority belongs to the Council of which we are treating under none of these heads. Not under the first, for episcopal power was thus conferred on each one so that it would be determined to certain subjects and dependent on another authority; this is evident from reservations, from the hierarchy which ought to flourish and does flourish in the Church, etc. Not under the second, for the very collection of Bishops of itself effects jurisdiction extensively greater, insofar as it is extended to more subjects, but not intensively, insofar as it can do more in all of them than the individual Bishops can do in their own subjects. An authority intensively greater could belong to it in no other way than from the institution of Christ; and we have often said that Christ promised nothing of this kind to Bishops without the Head. Not under the third, for first of all all Bishops apart from the Head would represent the Church without its principal and essential part; and this indeed is not to represent the universal Church. Then, too, the representation of the universal Church could confer supreme power only insofar as Christ had conferred it immediately on the Church and not on Peter. But we have shown that supreme power over the universal Church was conferred immediately by Christ on Peter. Therefore. Hence the University of Paris, in the year 1396, in the cause of Peter de Luna, appealing to a future, certain, and legitimate Pontiff, says: “It is certain that the Bishop of Rome, as Vicar of Christ, does not have a superior, since Christ did not have one, and since he handed over the Catholic Church, founded by himself and through himself, to Peter as Head to be governed.” And the two principal Doctors of Paris, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, taught the same. The first, On Power, question 10, article 4, reply to 13, writes: “But just as a later Synod has the power of interpreting the Symbol composed by an earlier Synod, and of adding certain things for its explanation, as is clear from the things said above, so also the Roman Pontiff can do this by his own authority; by whose authority alone a Synod can be gathered; and by whom the sentence of a Synod is confirmed; and to whom appeal is made from a Synod. All these things are clear from the acts of the Synod of Chalcedon.” The other, in the little work On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, part 2, chapter 1, says: “The Supreme Pontiff, however, with whom the first authority on earth resides, is not judged by a king, not by a prince, not by a man; he is reserved to the judgment of God alone.”
986. SCHOLION. We have already seen, in no. 948, that the Vatican Council, from the established true nature of the Primacy, immediately infers both certain special rights proper to the Primacy and the condemnation of certain special errors which are opposed to it. Nevertheless it is not necessary to pursue these expressly and more at length; for 1) by the very fact that these are immediate corollaries of the defined nature of the Primacy, by those arguments by which this is established, those also are confirmed. 2) Several authorities which we recited in establishing the true nature of the Primacy directly and expressly set forth the same corollaries. 3) A question concerning certain special rights or errors which pertain to the Primacy or are opposed to it cannot be agitated except among those who, on the one hand, acknowledge the Primacy, and to whom, on the other hand, its nature is not yet altogether clear. Such were the Gallicans. But since the Primacy of Peter and of his successors has now been demonstrated, and its nature defined, those questions become almost superfluous. In truth, the head of the Gallican errors in this matter was the superiority of a Council over the Pope. Therefore it will be enough to touch those corollaries briefly.
987. I. The Vatican Council infers the right of the Roman Pontiff “of communicating freely with the Pastors and flocks of the whole Church.” Now if the Roman Pontiff has supreme ordinary and immediate power over the individual faithful and Pastors, there belongs to him a right to the means without which he could not exercise his right and fulfill his office. But free communication with the Pastors and flocks is a necessary means for exercising immediate jurisdiction over all. Therefore he has the right to this free communication. In like manner the Council condemns the opinions of those who say that the free communication of the Roman Pontiff with all in the Church “can licitly be impeded.” And indeed, by whom could it licitly be impeded? Not by some power external to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, since we have proved that the Church is independent of every civil power and superior to it, dissertation 3, article 10; not by some power in the Church itself, since we have demonstrated that the Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter, obtains supreme and full power above the Council itself.
988. II. The Vatican Council infers that “in all causes belonging to ecclesiastical examination, recourse can be had to his [the Roman Pontiff’s] judgment.” Now from an inferior authority there is always, of itself, recourse to a superior. But the power of the Roman Pontiff is supreme in the Church. Therefore in all causes belonging to ecclesiastical examination recourse can be had to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. In like manner the Vatican Council condemns the error of those who “affirm that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an ecumenical Council.” And indeed it is not lawful to appeal from a superior authority to an inferior; nor is there any appeal from supreme authority. But we have proved that the Roman Pontiff is superior to a Council, and that he possesses supreme power in the Church. Therefore it is not lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiff. In truth, whence did the Gallicans draw the absurd opinion concerning the right of appeal from the Pope to a Council? Precisely from this, that they taught that the Council is above the Pope. Besides, in the demonstration of the thesis we gave several testimonies which both directly establish the right of appeal to the Roman Pontiff and directly exclude appeal from the Roman Pontiff to a Council.
989. III. Here also can be recalled another error of the Gallicans, by which they establish that the power of the Roman Pontiff is bound and restricted by preceding canons. “The use of apostolic power,” it is said in the Declaration of the year 1682, “is to be moderated by the canons established by the Spirit of God and consecrated by the reverence of the whole world; the rules, customs, and institutes received by the Kingdom and Church of Gaul also remain valid, and the boundaries of the Fathers remain unshaken; and this pertains to the amplitude of the Apostolic See, that statutes and customs, confirmed by the consent of so great a See and of the Churches, should obtain their proper stability.” The author of the Defense of that Declaration, book 11, develops these things more fully and strives to confirm them by many arguments, not without great confusion of things and many contradictions.
990. Therefore, to avoid confusion and to determine the point of the question, let it be noted: 1) the question is not at all about the canons of the Church by which matters of divine or natural right are declared and confirmed. In these the power of the Supreme Pontiff is bound, not precisely by the canons, but by divine or natural right itself, against which he can establish nothing. 2) But in canons which do not touch matters of divine or natural right, but establish matters of merely ecclesiastical right, a twofold force must be distinguished: one directive, the other coercive. Their directive force consists in this, that one ought to follow the canons in order rightly to fulfill his office and thus act licitly, although for a just cause he can also dispense. But the coercive force of canons is placed in this, that one is subject to them as an inferior to a superior, so that unless he follows them he acts invalidly.
991. Now no one denies that canons have directive force over the Roman Pontiff. Therefore he ought to care for their observance, generally to follow them, and not to dispense from them without just cause; otherwise, acting illicitly, he would have to render an account to God. Surely canons which regard the universal Church, having been established not without the special assistance of the Holy Spirit, tend to the good of the Church, and therefore generally require observance, unless the circumstances of things change. But the Roman Pontiff is bound to procure the good of the Church. Therefore he ought generally to follow the canons, unless because of changed circumstances the good of the Church itself requires their change. Therefore, unless he generally follows them, he would transgress the divine or natural law, in the same way as if he neglected to establish a law necessary for the Church.
992. But the question properly concerned the coercive force of canons with respect to the Roman Pontiff; and this certainly must be absolutely denied. For either 1) those canons are considered insofar as they proceed from the other Bishops, and thus they cannot bind the Roman Pontiff, who is superior to them; 2) or they are considered insofar as they proceed from the Roman Pontiff himself, and not even thus can they bind him. For it is known that no one has coercive force over himself; moreover successors, having the same power, can loose what the predecessor bound; 3) or finally they are considered insofar as they proceed from the Roman Pontiff together with the other Bishops, and not even thus can they bind the Pontiff. For the authority of the Bishops together with the Roman Pontiff is not greater than the authority of the Pontiff alone, who, as has been proved, possesses the plenitude of supreme power. Therefore, unless the divine constitution of the Church is entirely overturned, by denying that its form of government is simply monarchical, it is impossible to assert a coercive force of canons over the Roman Pontiff. But enough concerning these matters. Section V The Difficulties of the Gallicans Are Answered.
993. I. The principal foundation of the Gallicans was the authority of the Council of Constance, which, because a plague was raging, Martin V transferred to Basel. The Council of Constance, session 4, decrees: “This Synod itself, legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit, making a General Council, representing the Catholic Church militant, has power immediately from Christ, to which anyone, of whatever state or dignity, even if it be papal, is bound to obey in those things which pertain to faith and to the extirpation of the said schism and to the general reformation of the Church of God in head and members.” And in session 5: “Likewise it declares that anyone whatsoever, of whatever condition, state, and dignity, even if papal, who shall contumaciously despise to obey the mandates, statutes, ordinances, or precepts of this sacred Synod and of any other General Council legitimately gathered, concerning the aforesaid things or things pertaining to them, made or to be made, unless he comes to his senses, is to be subjected to fitting penance and duly punished, recourse being had even to other remedies of law, if need shall be.” But the Council of Basel confirmed the decrees of Constance five times. I answer: This foundation of the Gallicans totters from a double head; for 1) the objected decrees are of no authority; 2) they speak only of a doubtful Pope.
994. As to the first: decrees of a Council not approved by the Pope are of no authority. But the aforesaid decrees were not approved by the Pope. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the Council of Constance. The approval which is usually opposed is that which is attributed to Martin V, who, in session 45, professed “that he wished to hold all and each of the things determined, concluded, and decreed in matters of faith by the Council of Constance in conciliar fashion, and to approve and ratify the things thus done in conciliar fashion, and not otherwise, and not in another manner.” But these words do not contain approval of the two decrees of sessions 4 and 5. For: 1) By these words Martin V approves decrees in matters of faith. But the two objected decrees were not in matters of faith, because a) the adversaries wished, without injury to the faith, that it was possible to dispute on either side concerning the present matter; I say they wished, because after the Vatican Council they can no longer still wish this. b) In session 5 itself, this Synod placed these decrees among the synodal constitutions, which it distinguished from the advisements in matter of faith. Nor were they passed under penalty of anathema, or with the note of heresy, as is usually done in definitions of faith, but only under penalty of penance and punishment against contumacious transgressors. 2) By the same words Martin V approves the things which had been done by the Council of Constance in conciliar fashion. But the two objected decrees had not been done in conciliar fashion. This is evident a) from defect of convocation; for it had been made neither by an undoubted Pope, nor by certain or more numerous Cardinals of the Roman Church, nor by another legitimate and universal authority, especially since John XXIII conceded to Gregory, and the Fathers in session 20 conceded to Benedict, that a new convocation of the Council should be celebrated by them. b) From defect of gathering; for from the Acts, in Van der Hardt, the Bishops from the obedience of John alone were present, and not all of them; but from the Bishops furnishing obedience to Gregory and Benedict, of whom there was the greater part, none attended. Hence Eugene IV, in the Bull given at Florence in the year 1439, on the day before the Nones of September, after warning that those decrees had been made at Constance by Fathers of the obedience of John XXIII alone, concludes: “Therefore what was done by the Fathers sitting there ought not to be ascribed to the universal Church, but only to those who were sitting there and were making a synod of one obedience only.” And the same is testified by Cardinal Torquemada, book 2, Summa on the Church, chapter 39, and in the Apology for Eugene IV. c) From defect of consent; for, as John testifies in his letters to Ladislaus, King of Poland, and to the Duke of Berry, and as is clear from the Acts relating the protestation of the Cardinals and Nations, many things were done in this Council by force, terror, clamor, and insult. Then it is evident from the relation of the Acts itself that before the fourth session the Cardinals warned the Nations “that they should suspend for a time the matters which have great difficulties and require mature deliberation.” Finally, before the fifth session, the same Cardinals, with the Orators of the King of France, secretly protested that “for the sake of avoiding scandal they were going to the Session, not with the intention of consenting to the things which they had heard had to be established in it”; and in each session, according to the witnesses Torquemada and Eugene, “some of the more serious men, protesting, were forced to be silent by the noisy multitude.” The minor is proved as to the Council of Basel. The adversaries contended that it had been approved by Eugene IV in the Bull Dudum, in which, moved both by the armed persuasion of the princes and by fear of schism and the iniquity of the times, the Pontiff revoked the dissolution of the Council made by himself, just as he revoked the Bulls that set it forth, and declared the Council of Basel legitimately begun and continued. But: 1) Here there is not an approval of those decrees which come into controversy. For a) Eugene IV approved “the progress of the Council, but not the decrees”; Cardinal Torquemada testifies that Eugene himself declared this, book 2, Summa, chapter 100. Surely Damasus approved the Council of Constantinople, Leo the Council of Chalcedon, and Martin the Council of Constance; and yet they are not understood to have affirmed all their decrees. b) In the Bull Dudum Eugene neither revokes the dissolution nor approves the continuation simply, but under a double condition: first, “that all and each of the things done and carried out against pontifical authority by the said Council first be entirely removed and restored to their original state”; then, “that the deputies sent by him be admitted effectively to the presidency of the aforesaid Council.” Yet neither of these conditions was observed. c) Hence in a letter to his Legates in Germany, in Raynaldus at the year 1446, he writes that “the Councils of Constance and Basel were received by him and had been received, yet without prejudice to the right, dignity, and preeminence of the Apostolic See and of the power granted to him.” 2) The Synod of Florence, in the session held in the year 1439 on the day before the Nones of September, condemned the declarations of Basel as impious, scandalous, and tending toward manifest rupture of the Church; and the Lateran Council pronounced the same thing in session 2. But Aeneas Sylvius, afterward Pius II, in the Oration against the Austrians, writes: “Among the bishops and the other conscript Fathers we saw cooks and grooms at Basel, judging the affairs of the world. Who would judge the sayings or deeds of these to have the force of law?” And St. Antoninus, Chronicle, third part, title 22, chapter 10, section 4, says that the Council of Basel was a synod “bereft of strength, a synagogue of Satan, a rash and presumptuous assembly.” And St. John of Capistrano, On the Authority of Pope and Council, part 3, calls that synod “profane and excommunicated, a den of basilisks, a band of demons.”
995. As to the second, it can be shown by many arguments that the decrees of the Council of Constance regard the case of a doubtful Pontiff. For this is evident 1) from witnesses. For a) Eugene IV, in the Bull Moyses given at Florence, condemns the “wicked sense of the men of Basel” concerning the decrees of Constance. But it could not have been condemned if they had thought only that a doubtful Pope is subject to a Council. Therefore, since the men of Basel subjected a certain Pontiff to a Council, and, as Eugene testifies, had a wicked sense, the sense of the Council of Constance was only concerning a doubtful Pope. b) Aeneas Sylvius, in the cited oration held at Vienna, affirms that the Council of Constance itself implies that an undoubted Pontiff can neither be subjected nor brought before a council. c) Cardinal Torquemada asserted the same in the Council of Florence, namely at that time when the memory of the decrees of Constance was recent, and before those who could have convicted him of manifest falsity if he had proposed an alien interpretation of those same decrees. 2) From the very words of the decrees. For the Council begins thus: “This holy Synod of Constance, making a General Council for the extirpation of the present schism and for the union and reformation of the Church,” etc. But in the text of the first decree it is read thus: “He is bound to obey in those things which pertain to faith and to the extirpation of the said schism”; and in the context of the other decree it is had: “Whoever shall contumaciously despise to obey this sacred Synod and any other General Council legitimately gathered concerning the aforesaid things,” that is, the extirpation of the present schism and the union and reformation of the Church, “or concerning things pertaining to them,” etc. Now it is evident that in that schism there were three Pontiffs dividing the Church into diverse parts, all then doubtful, and finally deposed. 3) From the purpose. Certainly no question was then being raised concerning the authority of a certain Pontiff; nor was the Council in any way gathered to discuss or define this question. The question, as far as regards the Pope, was a) that the schism be extinguished by constituting a certain Pope; b) that it be established how, in the meantime, action should be taken with doubtful Popes. But it is altogether improbable, nor is it to be admitted without manifest documents, that the Council, as if forgetful of its purpose, in almost the very beginning of its deliberations, wished to issue a definition of faith in a matter about which neither was there any controversy nor did it in any way pertain to the end for which it had been gathered. 4) But in vain would you say that the Council, in the second decree, speaks not of itself alone, but of all Councils generally. For the Council of Constance indeed speaks of any other Council gathered “concerning the aforesaid things,” that is, to remove a schism; but not of any other Council simply. Surely that Council, having before its eyes the outcome of the Council of Pisa, could rightly fear that the schism would not even be removed by itself. 5) In vain also would you say that the Pope is declared subject even as to things pertaining to faith which would be decreed, and that the condemnation of Wyclif and others proceeded from this Council. For a) those words, “to faith,” are not found in the first editions of the Council. b) It is utterly incredible that by these words the Council looked to heresy to be condemned under a certain Pope; for no question was then being agitated, as we have said, whether a certain Pontiff is bound to obey a Council defining concerning faith. Therefore those words “to faith” were employed by the Council only conjunctively with the extirpation of the schism. In truth, at that time a favorer of schism was held to be “vehemently suspected of heresy”; just as an author of schism, or its principal cause, such as the Antipopes were, was condemned “as a heretic and schismatic,” as the Cardinal of Cambrai warns in the schedule exhibited at the beginning of the Council. Hence it also happened that those refusing to lay down the supreme Pontificate were accused of heresy and schism by the Procurator of the Council. Compare Roncaglia concerning all these things, in the observations on dissertation 4 of Natalis Alexander on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and on dissertation 8.
996. You will say, II: It is read in Matthew 18.15 ff.: “But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone… but if he shall not hear thee, take with thee one or two… if he shall not hear them, tell the Church; but if he shall not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican.” Hence they say: 1) these words are directed to Peter. 2) Under the name of brother comes also the Pontiff, who has often been addressed by this name by Bishops, and is a son of the Church. 3) But under the name of Church here comes a general Council. Therefore Peter, if he is guilty, can both be denounced to that Council, and he himself must denounce contumacious guilty persons to it; and thus he is inferior to the same Council. I answer: 1) It can altogether be denied that these words were said to Peter in the singular. For from the beginning of the chapter up to the objected words, Christ addresses all universally, treating of the sin of scandal and of fraternal correction. Not until verse 21 does Peter rise up, asking: “Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?” To this question Christ adapts a particular response. But in this very thing, as anyone sees, Peter asks as a private person; for he asks how often an injury by our brother is to be forgiven. And therefore Christ’s response regards Peter as a private person. Surely when these words were uttered, Peter was only a private person; for he had not yet been constituted Pontiff. 2) But the name of brother, however it may have been used, certainly detracts nothing from the authority of the Pontiff. The example of Christ, who also addressed the Apostles as brothers, shows this. And similarly the appellation of son can in no way be an obstacle, as Pius II teaches in the Bull of Retraction, year 1463, saying: “Although the Pontiff is a son of the Church because of regeneration, nevertheless because of dignity he is held as father; and just as by reason of sonship he himself ought to venerate the Church as mother, so by reason of prelacy he is preferred to it, as shepherd to flock, prince to people, ruler to family.” 3) But how is it shown that under the name of Church here comes a Council? For if a Council with the Head is understood, the text does not bear on the proposed question; but if a Council without the Head is understood, it does not represent the universal Church. Finally, in either sense an absurdity is attributed to the text, namely the convocation of a general Council for any sin whatever of a refractory brother. Therefore it must be said more rightly that here under the name of Church is understood the Prelate of the Church. Hence St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 19, question 2, reply to 4, says: “A Prelate can be considered in two ways: either according as he presides over judgment, and thus to tell the Prelate is to tell the Church, and thus witnesses ought first to be brought in before it is told to the Prelate; or as he exists outside judgment, and thus to tell the Prelate is not to tell the Church, but to tell the person who can profit and not harm. And according to this it ought first to be told to the Prelate rather than to other witnesses.”
997. You will say, III: Roman Pontiffs have often confessed that they are subject to the canons of general Councils. Therefore they are inferior to those Councils. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: they have confessed that they are subject to the canons of general Councils without the Head, I deny; with the Head, I subdistinguish: to canons treating of matters of faith, of divine right, or of natural right, I concede; to canons containing positive ecclesiastical dispositions, I subdistinguish again: they have confessed that they are subject directively, or coercively insofar as this is from natural or divine right, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Therefore let us first note two things: 1) this whole difficulty wanders outside the question; for the sayings of the Pontiffs do not treat of canons issued by headless councils. 2) Many canons were issued not by ecumenical Councils, but by Roman Pontiffs. But if successors were bound by the canons of these, they would be powerful with less authority than their predecessors; that is to say, the authority of the Primacy would gradually and continuously be diminished. That the Roman Pontiff cannot abrogate all canons, because under these both dogmas of faith and determinations of natural and divine right are comprehended, any Catholic admits. But as to canons which contain positive ecclesiastical dispositions, if they have any force for coercing the Pontiff himself, this does not come from their intrinsic force, so to speak, but from an extrinsic one, namely from natural and divine right, as we explained above in no. 991. Hence, for a just cause the Pontiff can dispense in those canons, and, when circumstances have changed, he can also abrogate them both validly and licitly. But if he does this without just cause, the dispensation or abrogation will always be valid; and if it is illicit, concerning this fault he will render an account to God alone. But several authorities which are opposed here carry with them a clear and reasonable explanation. Thus, for example, they object the words of Celestine: “Let the rules lord it over us; let us not lord it over the rules, but let us be subject to the canons.” But these words are directed by the Pontiff to the Vicar of Illyricum, to whom, while fixing the just limits of power, the superior, by the courtesy of condescension, speaks in the person common to both of what pertains to the inferior. They oppose the statement of Agapetus concerning “the authority of the canons to be guarded inviolably”; but this regards the attempt of Caesarius, who wished to squander the goods of the Church. The Pontiff, refusing to give a faculty for this matter, which was illicit of itself, said that he was “forbidden by the vengeance of divine judgment.” Likewise Leo teaches that “it was not lawful even for the Fathers of Chalcedon to change what the Nicenes had established”; that is, in matters of divine right or things necessary of themselves to the Church, but not in other and diverse matters. Hence, in the same letter, he did not wish to recognize as invalid the ordination of the Bishop of Antioch, made by Anatolius contrary to the Nicene canons; and elsewhere, in the letter to Rusticus of Narbonne, he says: “Just as there are certain things which can be torn away by no reason, so there are many things which ought to be tempered either because of the necessity of times or because of the consideration of ages,” etc.
998. You will say, IV: More than once the Pontiffs themselves declared that causes can and ought to be terminated not by themselves, but by Councils. Thus Siricius wrote to the Council of Capua in the cause of Bonosus; Innocent I to the Clergy of Constantinople in the cause of St. Chrysostom; Innocent III, register book 3, letter 15, epistle 18, in the cause of Philip Augustus, King of France. I answer: First, it is evident that the recited testimonies prove nothing, since they would prove too much. For the Councils of which there is question are not general, but particular; and thus the Supreme Pontiff would be inferior to particular Councils, which is so absurd that no one has ever said it. But a brief exposition of the causes which are objected will settle the matter. And 1) the Synod of Capua had committed the cause of Bonosus, Bishop of Sardica, to Anysius, Bishop of Thessalonica, who, on account of an occurring difficulty, referred the judgment to Siricius. But he refused to hear the matter, not because of a defect of power, but either because, on account of the distance of place and the absence of the parties, it was difficult to receive due information, or because the Pontiff did not wish to seem to judge the matter as if subdelegated by the delegate of the Council. And Siricius touched on each of these reasons in his response. 2) So far was Innocent I from confessing that the cause of Chrysostom could not be defined by himself, that rather he rescinded the sentence of the pseudo-synod at the Oak and restored Chrysostom to his see. Nevertheless he declared that a Council was necessary for the cause to be completely ended; not as if a greater intrinsic authority belonged to the Council than to himself, but because, in that case, the diverse interests of the peoples, the rivalry and hatred of Bishops, and the arts and violence of the court demanded a certain greater extrinsic authority before men, arising from number. 3) Innocent III had written to Philip Augustus that he by no means dared to effect anything for dissolving his consummated marriage; for it was indubitable that this was by no means lawful by divine right. But he added: “If we should attempt to determine anything concerning this without the deliberation of a General Council, besides the offense and worldly infamy which we could incur from it, perhaps danger to order and office would threaten.” But by these words he certainly did not assert that the authority of a Council is greater; for otherwise power to establish something contrary to divine right would have to be conceded to the Council, which no one would say. Therefore he employed that way by which he would more easily decline the solicitations of the King in an honorable and even human way.
999. You will say, V: St. Augustine, letter 162, otherwise 43, no. 19, speaks thus concerning the judgment rendered by Melchiades, the Roman Pontiff, against the Donatists in the synod held at Rome: “See, let us suppose that those Bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges; there still remained a plenary Council of the universal Church, where the case could be agitated with those judges themselves, so that, if they were convicted of having judged badly, their sentences would be dissolved.” I answer by distinguishing: St. Augustine asserted this, arguing as if ad hominem against the Donatists, I concede; as if from his own opinion it were lawful to appeal from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff to a Council, I deny. That is to say, the Donatists contended that the Roman judges, who had declared Caecilian innocent, had been unjust. But St. Augustine replied: even if this is conceded, nevertheless the plenary Council of the universal Church is against you. That this distinction is according to the mind of the holy Doctor is clear from the whole letter; but here are the words immediately preceding: “But if they [the Donatists] could not [convict Caecilian of false accusation], they would indeed persist in the same perversity, but yet they would as it were have something to say, that they had suffered bad judges. This is the voice of all bad litigants, when they have been overcome even by most manifest truth; as if this could not be said to them for this purpose, and said most justly. See, let us suppose those Bishops,” etc. Besides, by the words “plenary Council of the universal Church,” St. Augustine signifies the consent of the whole Church with the Roman Pontiff in absolving Caecilian from the accusations of the Donatists, and not an assembly of gathered Bishops. For in the cause of Caecilian or of the Donatists no general Council was ever held. Whoever desires to know the judgment of St. Augustine should recall his celebrated saying, sermon 137, no. 10: “For already concerning this cause [against the Pelagians] two Councils [the Carthaginian and the Milevitan] have been sent to the Apostolic See; from there also rescripts have come. The cause is finished; would that the error might at last be finished.” And the holy Doctor often used this principle.
1000. You will say, VI: The Pope is a member of the Church; therefore he is less than his whole, which is the Church represented through all the Bishops. I answer: The Pope is a member of the Church which is compared to the rest of the Church as monarchical head and prince, I concede; as a simple member, I deny. This difficulty sins from many heads, although the Gallicans repeated it rather often. Surely 1) even in the human body the head is less than the whole in quantity of mass; and yet by reason of dignity and power, it is more powerful than the whole remaining body. 2) But here the question is not of a physical whole, but of a moral whole; but it is absurd to rise from physical magnitude to moral authority, as though this were to be measured by that. On this hypothesis the authority of the army would be greater than that of the leader; of the sons than that of the father of the family; of the Church than that of Christ; for considered according to mass, the leader is less than the army, the father than the family, Christ than the Church. 3) Authority flourishes in the Church only insofar as it has been communicated by Christ. Therefore it is found greater where Christ placed the greater authority. But Christ set not the Church over Peter, but Peter over the Church. 4) Finally, the adversaries perpetually assume that a headless Church is the whole, or the whole Church; but when cut off from its head, it cannot even be called the Church of Christ. 5) Wherefore, if we wish to speak rightly, since the plenitude of power resides in the Roman Pontiff, he together with the Bishops makes more persons having authority, but not a greater authority; just as, because God is the plenitude of being, he together with creatures makes more beings, but not a greater or more perfect entity.