805. This question, as is clear of itself, cannot be discussed except among those who already acknowledge the existence of active infallibility in the Church; hence we shall especially use those arguments which ought to be valid and fixed for them. The Vatican Council, defining the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, teaches that he “possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals.” By these words it expressly declared that the object of infallibility is “doctrine concerning faith or morals.”
806. But what is the true understanding of these words, and what is their extension? In order to answer this question, a twofold deposit of Christian faith must be distinguished: one taken strictly, the other taken broadly. The first is usually called the direct object of infallibility; the other, the indirect object.
807. The deposit of Christian faith taken strictly comprehends all those truths which, explicitly or implicitly, are so contained in the word of God, written or handed down, that they are truly revealed by God, and therefore are certainly to be believed with divine faith. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 473 ff. But the deposit of faith taken broadly comprehends those truths which, although they have not been revealed, nevertheless are so intimately connected with revealed truths that without them the deposit, strictly taken, of Catholic revelation either cannot be preserved, explained, and defended integrally, or can be so less well. Namely, if some truth is so related that, if error concerning it were admitted or permitted, faith in revealed truths would be rendered impossible or at least endangered, that truth belongs to the indirect deposit of faith.
808. Moreover, from what was demonstrated in the preceding article it is manifest that at least the deposit of faith taken strictly is the object of the Church’s infallibility. Hence her infallible authority, under the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, pertains chiefly to guarding, proposing, and explaining revealed truths, and therefore to warding off errors directly opposed to these, or to condemning heresies.
809. Therefore the whole question is contracted to the deposit of faith taken broadly. But so that this may be well understood, two things chiefly must be noticed. First: two questions very distinct from one another are not to be confused: 1) “whether truths pertaining to the deposit of faith taken broadly are the object of the infallible authority of the teaching Church”; 2) “whether this or that truth, which in the judgment of all is subject to the infallibility of the Church, pertains to the direct or the indirect deposit of faith; and consequently, whether it must be believed with divine faith or not.” To the first question Theologians unanimously answer affirmatively, as we shall see, and others call the contrary opinion a most grave error, many even a heresy. But with respect to the other question the answer of Theologians is not always the same.
810. To illustrate the matter by an example, it can be asked whether it must be believed with divine faith that this ecumenical Council in the individual case has authority over the universal Church. Some affirm it; for, they say, by the very fact that the universal proposition “all ecumenical Councils legitimately celebrated have authority over the universal Church” is revealed, the particular proposition, which is contained in it formally and implicitly, is also revealed: “this ecumenical Council legitimately celebrated has authority over the universal Church.” Nor is it an obstacle that it is not revealed that this Council is legitimately celebrated; for it is enough, they say, that this be certainly established. In the same way it is enough that it be certainly established that Peter was born from Adam by natural generation, so that we believe that he is infected with original sin, and that he is mortal; since it has been revealed that all naturally generated from Adam, unless a privilege is established, contract original sin and are subject to death. But others hold that the truth about which we are treating is not properly revealed, but only connected with revealed truths, insofar as, if the certitude of the authority of this individual Council were made unstable, the certitude of those things which it defines would be made unstable. Hence they say that that truth cannot be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, or with divine faith, but with faith which some call ecclesiastical, others mediately divine: ecclesiastical, insofar as those truths are believed on account of the infallibility of the Church; mediately divine, insofar as this very infallibility, on account of which they are believed, is believed on account of the authority of God revealing. Compare what we have disputed concerning this matter in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 499 ff.; compare also, if you like, Muzzarelli, Whether a Dogmatic Fact Is an Object of Theological Faith.
811. But it is established among all that the truth which we have adduced as an example, and other similar truths, fall under the infallibility of the Church. If therefore that truth is not revealed, and consequently not believable by immediate divine faith, it must be said that the object of the Church’s infallibility extends more widely than the object of divine faith. For the latter comprehends only truths divinely revealed; the former, besides these, comprehends also truths having a necessary connection with revealed truths, about which we have spoken. Hence he would argue badly who said: this or that truth is not revealed; therefore the Church cannot define it infallibly.
812. The other thing which must be noted here is the distinction between the general question and certain special questions. Namely, it can be asked: 1) Does the infallibility of the Church extend to the indirect deposit of faith? 2) Is the Church infallible in defining this determinate object? To the first question Theologians unanimously answer affirmatively; but with respect to some particular objects they disagree. Yet from this disagreement it does not follow that they doubt concerning the infallibility of the Church with respect to the indirect deposit of faith; rather, they doubt whether some determinate object pertains to it.
813. Let us illustrate the matter by examples. If it is asked, for example, whether the Church is infallible in the Beatification of the Servants of God, there is a twofold opinion of the Doctors; Benedict XIV brings forward the arguments of each, On the Canonization of Saints, book 1, chapter 42. But if it is a question of the Canonization of Saints, although a few older authors denied that the Church is infallible in it, as Benedict XIV reports, loc. cit., chapter 43, no. 3, nevertheless he himself with the common opinion teaches, ibid., no. 27: “If not a heretic, nevertheless rash, bringing scandal upon the whole Church, injurious to the Saints, favoring heretics who deny the authority of the Church in the canonization of Saints, savouring of heresy, as laying a path for unbelievers to mock the faithful, an assertor of an erroneous proposition, and liable to the gravest penalties, we shall call him who would dare to assert that the Pontiff erred in this or that canonization, and that this or that Saint canonized by him is not to be honored with the cult of dulia; just as even those agree who teach that it is not of faith that this or that canonized person is a Saint.” Footnote 1. It will be enough for us on this matter to indicate what St. Thomas has (Quodlibet 9, q. 8, no. 1). a) “In the Church,” he says, “there cannot be a damnable error; but this would be a damnable error, if one who was a sinner were honored as a saint, because some persons knowing his sins would believe this to be false, and if it so happened, they could be led into error; therefore the Church cannot err in such things.” b) “Furthermore Augustine says in the Epistle to Jerome that if some lie is admitted in canonical Scripture, our faith, which depends on canonical Scripture, will waver. But just as we are bound to believe what is in Sacred Scripture, so also what has been determined by the Church; hence he is judged a heretic who thinks contrary to the determination of Councils. Therefore the common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous, and thus the same as before.” c) But responding to objections, he says: “To the first it must be said that the Pontiff, whose office it is to canonize saints, can be certified concerning the state of someone through the instinct of the Holy Spirit,” who searches all things, even the deep things of God, as is said in 1 Corinthians 2. “To the second it must be said that divine providence preserves the Church, lest in such things she be deceived through the fallible testimony of men.” Footnote 1 ends.
814. Similarly it is usually asked whether the Church is infallible in the approval of Religious Orders. In this matter it must first be noted with Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 41): “When the Pontiff approves some Religion, that is, some definite institute of life, two things must be considered in such an act of the Pontiff. One is placed in the very definition and judgment of the Pontiff: namely, that he asserts that that institute of life is not evil, but rather wholly consonant with Evangelical perfection. The other pertains to a certain prudence of the Pontiff in governing: namely, that to such an institute of life, at such a time, etc., he grants a certain place of its own in the Church.” Now, with respect to the first, all concede that the Church cannot err. But with respect to the other, Bannez, Sylvius, Tanner, and others deny this. Nevertheless Valentia, loc. cit., with several others, affirms it, saying: “Yet that opinion is rightly and deservedly reprehended. For it must in no way be conceded that the Pontiff can oblige the universal Church to some matter which itself would pertain, not to the edification, but to the destruction, in whatever way at last, of the Church, as can now be understood sufficiently and more than sufficiently from what has been said. But when the Pontiff grants a place in the Church to some Religion, certainly he also binds and obliges the universal Church to that extent in that matter, so that it cannot resist so as to prevent such Religious Orders from being able to live among the faithful themselves. Therefore, if this could be a disadvantage to the Church herself, the Pontiff would now oblige her to a matter which would not regard the edification of the faithful, but rather their destruction.”
815. Therefore, these particular questions having been omitted, we first treat the general question, namely, whether besides the direct object of infallibility an indirect object must also be acknowledged, so that the infallibility of the Church is not to be restricted only to those things which, if defined, according to all must be believed by immediately divine faith. But since a special question has been raised concerning two determinate objects, we shall inquire especially whether the Church is infallible: 1) in condemning propositions with a note lower than heresy; 2) in dogmatic facts. Each of these objects needs to be declared briefly.
816. With respect to the first it must be noted that, if it is established that the judgment of the Church is infallible in decreeing censures below heresy, by that very fact the opinion of certain more recent writers in Germany is refuted; proclaiming the absolute independence of science, compare On the Infused Virtues, nos. 1058 ff., they say (Syllabus, proposition 11): “The Church not only ought never to take action against philosophy, but even ought to tolerate the errors of philosophy itself, and leave it to correct itself.” For either 1) philosophy or another human science teaches something which has no connection with revealed doctrine, no opposition to it; and then the Church, as we said in the treatise On the Virtues, no. 1044, does not judge concerning it. Hence the Vatican Council (Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4) teaches: “Nor indeed does she [the Church] forbid disciplines of this kind to use, each in its own sphere, their own principles and their own method; but, acknowledging this just liberty, she carefully guards lest, by opposing divine doctrine, they receive errors into themselves, or, transgressing their proper boundaries, they occupy and disturb those things which belong to faith.” Or 2) it teaches something which is directly and immediately opposed to revealed doctrine; and since this is heresy, the Church infallibly judges it by the force of the authority which she has with respect to the deposit of faith strictly taken. Or 3) it teaches something which has an indirect or mediate opposition to revealed doctrine; and then this is precisely what the Church either simply reproves, with no theological censure affixed, or marks with a censure lower than heresy. But when the Church condemns some proposition as rash, scandalous, and so forth, she infallibly declares that such a note belongs to that proposition. Whether, however, she infallibly decides that the same proposition is false depends on the notion of those censures. Compare what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, nos. 520 and 537.
817. Now, with respect to a dogmatic fact, we first suppose that it is one which is so connected with dogma that knowledge of that fact is necessary for teaching the dogma, or for preserving it safely. Moreover, several dogmatic facts are usually distinguished. Thus some call it a dogmatic fact that “this Pontiff is the legitimate successor of St. Peter”; that “the Council of Trent is a legitimate Council, and therefore has authority over the universal Church,” and so forth. But we are treating by name of one of these: namely, whether the Church is infallible in deciding that this or that book contains depraved doctrine, or that this doctrine is found in some proposition insofar as it is in this book.
818. The Jansenists gave occasion to this question, for, in order to elude the condemnation brought by Innocent X (Cum occasione, May 3, 1653) and confirmed by Alexander VII (Ad sacram, October 16, 1656), of the five propositions which had been excerpted from the Augustinus of Jansenius, they began to distinguish between right and fact. They professed that those propositions, considered in themselves, had deservedly been proscribed, and that they too condemned them from the heart even as heretical; but they refused to believe and profess that they were contained in Jansenius’s Augustinus, and were heretical in the mind and sense of Jansenius. For, they said, this fact is merely human; and concerning a human fact it is admitted among all that the Church by no means possesses infallibility. Hence that celebrated case of conscience, in which a cleric is imagined to whom sacramental absolution had been denied because he had declared “that he truly condemned the five propositions simply and absolutely, and indeed had subscribed to the formula of faith of Alexander VII; nevertheless, with respect to the question of fact or the attribution of those five propositions to the book of Jansenius, he judged that a respectful silence sufficed.” Forty Parisian doctors solved this case thus: “The undersigned doctors, having seen the exposition of the case, judge that the opinion of this ecclesiastical man is neither new, nor singular, nor condemned by the Church, nor such that the confessor can deny him sacramental absolution unless he retracts it. Deliberated in the Sorbonne on July 30, 1701.” Yet Clement XI condemned this solution (Vineam Domini Sabaoth, February 13, 1703), saying: “So that every occasion of error in the future may be entirely cut off, and all the children of the Catholic Church may learn to hear the Church herself, not only by keeping silence, for even the wicked grow silent in darkness, but also by obeying inwardly, which is the true obedience of an orthodox man, by this our constitution, to have perpetual force, we decree and declare,” etc., “that the obedience which is owed to the above-inserted apostolic constitutions is by no means satisfied by that obsequious silence.”
819. In order rightly to determine the sense of the question on this point, several things are usually noted, which Sardagna nevertheless briefly and clearly touches upon, nos. 215 ff. Therefore, when it is asked whether the Church is infallible in defining the Orthodoxy or Heterodoxy of propositions in relation to the sense of the author: 1) the question is not whether the judgment of the Church is infallible by which she judges that this book belongs to this or that author; or whether it is necessary to believe that the propositions which the Church condemned in some book are read in it expressed in just so many words or syllables; or whether the Author whose propositions are condemned bore in mind that sense, which they call subjective, which the words display. These are questions of mere fact, which the Church prudently supposes, not defines, when she judges concerning books. 2) Nor, however, is the question about the merely external and literal sense of some proposition, separated from the author whose it is, and from the book in which it is, and considered only in itself; for in a judgment of this kind, if the proposition touches matters of faith or morals, even the Jansenists confess that the Church cannot err. 3) Therefore the question turns on this: whether the Church, by an infallible judgment, can establish that the sense, which they call objective, of one or more propositions, insofar as it is drawn from the whole doctrine, book, or system of an author, for example of Jansenius or Quesnel, is true and orthodox, or on the contrary false and heterodox.
820. Hence it is clear: 1) that the present question is not about a mere fact, but about a fact connected with right, or with dogma. For whether the sense of some proposition is orthodox or heterodox pertains to right; but whether the Author expressed that sense in his book, when the whole sequence, texture, and system of the book are considered, is referred to fact. 2) This fact is deservedly called dogmatic. For if the fact is denied, namely, that the author, Nestorius or Jansenius, considering the whole sequence, texture, and system of his book, expressed that sense which the Church condemned, then it is also denied that anything was defined by the Church against Nestorius or Jansenius. On the contrary, it is asserted that the Church fought with a fantastic and imaginary enemy, and that she is either malicious, because by calumny she accused Nestorius or Jansenius of error, or unskilled and foolish, because she in no way grasped their literal sense.
821. Therefore, these things having been laid down beforehand: Section II The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXV. 1. The object of the infallibility of the Church ought not to be restricted to those truths which are certainly divinely revealed; but it is extended also to those truths which are so connected with certainly revealed truths that without them the deposit of Christian faith cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended. Therefore they err who think the judgment of the Church fallible, whether when she proscribes science falsely so called, or condemns doctrines with a note below heresy; 2. or when she declares the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of propositions in the objective sense of the Author.
822. The first part is proved. I. How far the object of the Church’s infallibility extends cannot be known better than from the sense of the Church herself; for since it is now established that the Church is infallible at least in the custody and true understanding of the deposit of faith strictly taken, and since this infallibility is revealed, it pertains to the Church to judge concerning the true sense of infallibility and concerning its extension and intension; or, what is the same, concerning the object and conditions of her infallible authority. But by her perpetual magisterium the Church has constantly taught that her infallible authority extends also to truths without which certainly revealed truths cannot be integrally guarded, rightly explained, and defended. Therefore. The minor is proved. In documents which are held by all to be dogmatic, together with propositions upon which the note of heresy is branded, others are condemned with notes lower than heresy. Yet neither Councils nor Roman Pontiffs put any difference between the manner in which they condemn heretical propositions and other depraved propositions, as though their authority and judgment were safer with respect to the former than with respect to the latter. On the contrary, they establish all and individual censures in the same manner, by the same authority, and command that firm internal assent be given to them all. But the adversaries whom we are attacking here admit that the Church is infallible in bringing the censure of heresy. Therefore. The major of this argument can be illustrated by several things; but we select the following. 1) In condemning the errors of John Hus, “This most holy Synod of Constance declares and defines that the articles written below… are not Catholic, nor to be dogmatized as such, but that several of them are erroneous, others scandalous, others offensive to pious ears,” etc. Moreover, the same Council willed that from all followers of Hus and Wycliffe there be asked “whether he believes the sentence of the holy Council of Constance… namely, that the aforesaid 45 articles of John Wycliffe and 30 of John Hus are not Catholic, but some of them are notoriously heretical, some erroneous, others rash and seditious, others offensive to pious ears.” 2) Clement XI, in the proemium of the Bull Unigenitus, says: “Thus, namely, the errors [of Quesnel] having been laid bare and set, as it were, in the open, not one or another, but very many and most grave errors, both those condemned long ago and also those newly devised, we plainly trust, with the Lord blessing, that it will be the case that all at last are compelled to yield to the truth now opened and manifest.” Toward the end of the same Constitution these things are had: “We command all the faithful of Christ of either sex that concerning the said propositions they not presume to think, teach, or preach otherwise than is contained in this same our constitution.” But in the Bull Pastoralis Officii the same Supreme Pontiff declares all who would not receive the Bull Unigenitus to be plainly alien from the bosom of the Roman Church. 3) Pius VI, at the end of the Constitution Auctorem Fidei, by which he condemned the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia, says: “Therefore we command all the faithful of Christ of either sex that concerning the said propositions and doctrines they not presume to think, teach, or preach contrary to what is declared in this our constitution; so that whoever shall teach, defend, publish them, or any of them, jointly or separately, or shall treat of them, even by disputing, publicly or privately, unless perhaps by attacking them, is subject by the very fact, without any other declaration, to ecclesiastical censures and other penalties established by law against those perpetrating similar things.” 4) In the Encyclical Quanta Cura the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX condemned several propositions, of which the tenth is this: “That assent and obedience can be refused without sin and without any loss of Catholic profession to those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See whose object is declared to regard the general good of the Church, and her rights and discipline, provided that it does not touch dogmas of faith and morals.” And at the end: “All and individual depraved opinions and doctrines commemorated individually in these Letters, by Our Apostolic authority We reprove, proscribe, and condemn; and We will and command that they be held by all the children of the Catholic Church altogether as reproved, proscribed, and condemned.” 5) The Vatican Council (Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4) teaches: “Moreover the Church, which together with the apostolic office of teaching received the mandate of guarding the deposit of faith, also has from God the right and office of proscribing science falsely so called, lest anyone be deceived through philosophy and vain fallacy. Therefore all Christian faithful are not only forbidden to defend opinions of this kind, which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith,” it does not say only immediately and directly, “especially if they have been reproved by the Church, as legitimate conclusions of science; but rather are altogether bound to hold them as errors,” it does not say as heresies, “which bear before themselves the fallacious appearance of truth.” But it concludes that Constitution by saying: “But since it is not enough to avoid heretical depravity, unless those errors also are diligently shunned which approach it more or less, we admonish all of the duty of observing also the Constitutions and Decrees by which depraved opinions of this kind, which are not expressly enumerated here, have both been proscribed and prohibited by this Holy See.”
823. II. The right and office of infallibly guarding the deposit of faith strictly taken certainly belongs to the Church. Therefore the right to the means without which she cannot protect that right and fulfill that office must be attributed to her; unless we wish to say, which is absurd, that Christ imposed a most grave mandate on the Church, without conferring on her the necessary means by which she could satisfy it. But a necessary means for rightly guarding the deposit of faith strictly taken is infallible authority in proscribing false science opposed to faith and morals, and in condemning errors which indirectly and mediately attack faith or morals. For: 1) When attention is paid to the character of the human mind and to the corruption of our nature, it is easily understood that one who did not retain altogether firmly in his mind that errors of this kind, condemned by the Church, are to be rejected absolutely, would gradually dispose himself to the loss of faith itself. For by reasoning from those errors he would arrive at conclusions which sometimes openly fight against faith; and since he makes little of the Church’s authority with respect to the condemned errors themselves, he would easily give first place, even in conclusions openly repugnant to faith, to his own judgment rather than to the Church. This is confirmed by the very perversion and manner of acting of heretics. For both at the beginning they themselves, adhering to some error often not yet openly against the faith, by degrees made shipwreck concerning the faith; and always, using excessive cunning, they proposed not first open heresy, but ambiguous and captious propositions. Hence to the point Pius VI (Constitution Auctorem Fidei) says: “They [the Pontiffs] knew the crafty art of the innovators in deceiving, who, fearing the offense of Catholic ears, very often strive to cover the snares of their deceits under deceitful wrappings of words, so that error lying hidden amid differences of meanings may flow more gently into minds, and so that, the truth of the sentence having been corrupted by a very brief addition or change, a confession which was working salvation may by a certain subtle transition turn toward death.” “For these [books which contain doctrine openly false and evil] deceive only those who are willing, or perhaps the altogether ignorant; but those which bear hidden poison deceive even the more prudent. Hence it happens not rarely that they are more pernicious, and spread their poison more widely, than those whose open corruption discourages the faithful, not unmindful of their salvation, from reading.” 2) Hence the Apostles and their successors, just as they received “apostleship for obedience to the faith among all nations” (Rom. 1.5), so in this very preaching of faith they have “weapons of warfare that are not carnal… destroying counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every intellect into captivity unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. 10.4-5). Does not doctrine condemned by the Church as rash, false, scandalous, and so forth, exalt itself against the knowledge of God? Fulfilling the office of apostleship, they confirm the faithful, lest they “be deceived by loftiness of speech, through philosophy and vain fallacy according to the tradition of men” (Col. 2.4, 8), and they proscribe “science falsely so called, which some promising have fallen away concerning the faith.” Would not the faithful be deceived through doctrines in any way opposed to certain faith? Hence the Apostle himself (2 Tim. 1.13-14) commands that the form of words not be changed when it is a matter of guarding the deposit of faith. “Hold,” he says, “the form of sound words which thou hast heard from me in faith and in love in Christ Jesus. Guard the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells in us.” 3) Obeying this command of the Apostle, the Church has always been solicitous in defining forms of sound words. The Council of Trent, for example, consecrated the word Transubstantiation to signify the conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ: “Which conversion is fittingly and properly called transubstantiation by the holy Catholic Church” (session 13, chapter 4); and in canon 2: “Which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls transubstantiation.” In the Constitution Auctorem Fidei, proposition 29, the omission of the word Transubstantiation in the exposition of the faith concerning the Eucharist is condemned as an omission “of the word consecrated by the Church for protecting the profession of that [faith] against heresies.” But what would happen if, under the pretext that the Church cannot take action against science, when three Persons in God and one Person in Christ are spoken of, it were permitted to each one to embrace the Guntherian concept of Person? If, when one divine substance and two natures in Christ are spoken of, anyone were to use the words substance and nature with impunity in a Pantheistic sense? etc. 4) Therefore let us conclude this argument with the words of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (Gravissimas, December 11, 1862): “The Church, from her divine institution, ought most diligently to guard the deposit of divine faith whole and inviolate, and with the greatest zeal continually to watch over the salvation of souls, and with the greatest care to remove and eliminate all those things which either can oppose faith or in any way bring the salvation of souls into danger. Wherefore the Church, from the power committed to her by her divine Author, not only has the right, but especially the office, not of tolerating, but of proscribing and condemning all errors, if the integrity of faith and the salvation of souls shall so require. And upon every philosopher who wishes to be a son of the Church, and also upon philosophy, there lies the duty never to say anything against those things which the Church teaches, and to retract those things about which the Church has admonished them. But the opinion which teaches the contrary we pronounce and declare to be altogether erroneous and most especially injurious to the faith of the Church itself and to her authority.”
824. III. From the consensus of the Doctors. The Vatican Council, as we have seen, no. 805, declared that the Roman Pontiff, just as the Church, is infallible “in doctrine concerning faith and morals”; and the Council of Trent (Labbe, Councils, vol. 20, p. 23) had said the same thing, namely, that the Church is infallible “in matters of faith and morals.” Now, if the words alone are considered, they can indicate either those things which strictly are matters of faith insofar as they are truly revealed, or those things which, although not revealed, nevertheless are joined with revealed things by an intimate connection. For those things which pertain to guarding faith integrally, explaining it rightly, and protecting it are rightly called matters of faith. Which, then, of these two senses is subject to those words “in matters of faith and morals”? The following words of the Council of Trent suggest the latter; for the Council adds, “pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine.” Do not truths without which revelation cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended pertain to the edification of Christian doctrine? But so that every doubt may be dispelled, it will be useful to investigate the sense of the Doctors antecedent and consequent to those definitions. And 1) we have already seen, no. 813, that in the doctrine of St. Thomas the Church is infallible in the canonization of Saints; which certainly is held by the adversaries as an object not pertaining to the deposit of faith strictly taken. 2) All theologians teach that the Church is infallible in bringing censures lower than heresy; and to deny this, some judge a) to be heretical: thus De Panormo (Sacred Doctrine, chapter 3, article 13, nos. 9 ff.); Diana (On the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, resolution 10, nos. 8 ff.); Amici (On Faith, disputation 7, no. 55); Viva (Theses Condemned, prodromal question, no. 18); to whom Malderus, Coninck, Oviedo, and others must be added. b) Others either doubt whether this is heretical, erroneous, or proximate to error, or they call it erroneous. Thus de Lugo (On Faith, disputation 20, section 3, nos. 109-113); Ripalda (tom. 3, disp. 1, section 7, no. 59); Herinx (Summary of Scholastic and Moral Theology, dub. 9, no. 98); Ferraris (under the word condemned proposition, no. 37); Cardenas (Theological Crisis, proemial disputation, no. 140); Turrianus (Solution of Theological Disputations, part 1, disputation 30, dub. 3), and others. 3) The Doctors also expressly extend those words “in matters of faith and morals” to the deposit taken broadly. Suarez (On Faith, disputation 5, section 6) teaches: “It is Catholic truth that the Pontiff defining ex cathedra is a rule of faith which cannot err when he authentically proposes something to the whole Church as to be believed of faith.” But speaking (On the Religion of the Society of Jesus, book 3, chapter 4, no. 5) concerning the Bull Ascendente Domino, by which Gregory XIII declared that simple vows can constitute a religious state, he adds that in this declaration the Supreme Pontiff was “altogether infallible, so that it cannot be denied without error in faith. The reason is that the sentence of the Pontiff in those things which pertain to doctrine contains infallible certitude from Christ’s institution and promise: ‘I have prayed for thee…’ But the providence of Christ the Lord concerning his Church would have been greatly diminished if, in deciding such questions ex cathedra, he permitted his Vicar to slip.” De Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 40) extends infallibility to all things which regard piety; and (q. 5, section 27) to those things which pertain to the good state of the Church; and (section 36) to those things which pertain to the good of the Church. It is pleasing to transcribe only what he teaches (section 40): “It must not be denied,” he says, “that what has been said concerning the infallible certitude of the definitions of the Pontiff has place first of all in those things which the Pontiff has proposed to the faithful for ending controversies of doctrine and exterminating errors, as revealed by God and to be believed by faith. Besides, since the Church is always bound to hear her Pastor, and divine Scripture absolutely proclaims the Church to be the pillar and ground of truth (1 Tim. 3), and therefore she can never err as a whole, there ought to be no doubt that in asserting all other matters also which regard piety and concern the whole Church, the authority of the Pontiff is infallible. Nor indeed do I think that this can be denied without error… This certitude indeed rests upon those same promises of God from which we have ascertained that it will never happen that the universal Church is deceived in matters of religion.” Compare also Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 5).
825. The second part is proved, by applying the arguments already brought forward to dogmatic facts. I. By her constant practice the Church has asserted that the right of judging concerning the objective sense of books belongs to her; she has often struck this sense with the same anathema as the doctrine itself considered in itself, enjoining the faithful to acquiesce in this sentence of hers. But, as we have said, it belongs to the Church to declare and define the intension and extension of her infallibility. Therefore. The major is proved. In the fourth century the Nicene Fathers, in the Synodical Letter to the Church of Alexandria (in Socrates, book 1, chapter 6), say: “It pleased the Council by common votes to denounce with anathema both him himself and his wicked opinion, and the execrable words and sentences which he used to load the Son of God with blasphemies.” The same Socrates (book 2) testifies that the book of Arius, which he had inscribed Thalia, was likewise proscribed by the Nicene Fathers. In the fifth century Pelagius was compelled to condemn the erroneous sense which the Church had detected in his writings. Hence Innocent I (in the letter to the five Bishops, which among the Augustinian letters is 183) writes: “We unrolled the book which was said to be his, in which we read that many things had been written against the grace of God, many blasphemous things, nothing that pleased, and almost nothing that did not utterly displease, to be condemned and trampled upon by anyone… Therefore let him anathematize those things which he thought.” In the Council of Ephesus (Act 1), first a lengthy Letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius was read, which the Fathers approved in all things. Afterward, however, the Letter of Nestorius to St. Cyril was also read, which they declared to be alien from the orthodox faith, saying: “All things which this Letter comprises openly fight against the Nicene faith, and are altogether alien from the same; wherefore we judge that all who believe thus are alien from the right faith. All the Bishops together cried out: Whoever does not anathematize Nestorius, let him be anathema. We all anathematize the Letter and dogmas of Nestorius… we anathematize the impious faith of Nestorius.” Famous is the case of the Three Chapters, that is, the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, certain writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas. The Second Council of Constantinople (Collation 7) says: “Keeping in memory the promises made concerning the Holy Church, and him who said that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her… we have thought it necessary to comprehend in chapters both the preaching of truth and the condemnation of heretics and of their impiety.” Then it adds (canon 12): “Therefore if anyone defends the aforesaid impious Theodore and his impious writings, in which he poured forth both the aforesaid and other innumerable blasphemies… but does not anathematize him and his impious writings… let such a one be anathema.” And (canon 13): “If anyone defends the impious writings of Theodoret, which he wrote against the right faith and against the first holy Synod of Ephesus and St. Cyril… let such a one be anathema.” And (canon 14): “If anyone defends the Letter which Ibas is said to have written to Maris the Persian, a heretic… If anyone therefore defends the mentioned impious letter, but does not anathematize it… and those who say that it is right… let such a one be anathema.” Pope Vigilius held ratified the condemnation of the Three Chapters (Letter to Eutychius of Constantinople), saying: “Therefore we anathematize and condemn the aforesaid Three Chapters… Moreover, whoever shall believe at any time that those Chapters ought to be received or defended, or shall have attempted to overturn this present condemnation, we subject to a like anathema.” Footnote 1. So that these things may be vindicated from cavils, let it be recalled: 1) that at the beginning the Latins falsely thought against the Greeks that the Council of Chalcedon had approved the letter of Ibas; which the Latins themselves, the error of fact having been detected, afterward acknowledged. 2) Although heretical writings are worthy of condemnation, nevertheless there can be circumstances in which, the depraved doctrine having been condemned, from a certain prudent economy silence is preserved for a time concerning the writings in which it is contained. Thus it was done in the Council of Ephesus with respect to the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, “namely lest, as Cyril testifies (Letter to Proclus, Bishop of Constantinople), some persons, looking to the great reputation of the man, should separate themselves from the Churches.” 3) It is false that Vigilius retracted the condemnation first issued by him before the Fifth Synod; using only a prudent dispensation, lest he give an occasion to the threatening schism, he remitted something from the severity of discipline. But when the danger had passed, since few defenders of the Three Chapters remained, Vigilius confirmed the preceding condemnation, and the dissenters were not received into communion unless they had first condemned the Three Chapters. 4) The Bishops of Venetia and Istria, still dissenting, became schismatics. Compare Natalis Alexander (Ecclesiastical History, sixth century, dissertation 3). Footnote 1 ends.
826. II. Christ instituted the Church so that through her he might supply to men so great a means unto salvation; and for this reason, as we have shown, he furnished her with infallibility. But infallibility in dogmatic facts is no less necessary for obtaining this end than infallibility with respect to the deposit of faith strictly taken. Therefore, unless we wish absurdly to affirm that Christ by no means gave his Church a suitable means for obtaining the end, it is necessary to confess that he conferred on her infallibility in deciding dogmatic facts. The minor is proved. 1) Christ (John 21) said: “Feed my sheep… feed my lambs”; Peter exhorts the Bishops (1 Pet. 5), writing: “Feed the flock of God which is among you”; and Paul (Acts 20) thus addresses the elders whom he had gathered from Ephesus: “Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you Bishops to rule the Church of God.” But giving the reason for an admonition of this kind, he adds: “I know that after my departure ravening wolves will enter in, not sparing the flock. And from among yourselves men will arise speaking perverse things, that they may draw away disciples after themselves. Therefore watch.” Now the office of feeding, in order to be rightly fulfilled, requires that poisonous pastures be certainly discerned, and that thus the sheep be safely kept from them; just as it is necessary to know wolves with certainty, lest the sheep be torn by their ways. But the Church cannot effect this unless she were infallible in the dogmatic facts about which we are treating; for however much she condemned the blasphemies of heretics, they themselves would always except that the Church had not attained their mind, and therefore had wrongly condemned their doctrine. 2) The Jansenists themselves ought to confess that the Church is infallible in discerning the sense of the individual Fathers by whom the series of tradition is shown; for otherwise how could she judge that this or that doctrine has come to us also from tradition, unless she had first judged that the Fathers handed it down thus? Therefore, if the Church judges infallibly concerning sound doctrine as it is exhibited in the writings of the Fathers, she also judges infallibly concerning depraved doctrine as it stands forth in the writings of heretics. 3) This argument has still greater force against the Jansenists, who assert that the Church by an infallible judgment approved the doctrine of St. Augustine on Grace, no. 349. Hence Claude Pajot, a Calvinist preacher, in the celebrated debate which he had with Antoine Arnauld, author of the book On the Perpetual Faith of the Church Concerning the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, says: “If it is permitted to you, Arnauld, to dispute concerning the sense of Jansenius after the definition of the Church, why will it not be permitted to us to dispute concerning the sense of Augustine, Chrysostom, and others in our discussion concerning the real presence?” 4) Wherefore Fenelon deservedly (dissertation 1, On the Infallibility of the Church Concerning Dogmatic Texts, chapter 2, in Perrone) demonstrates that, “this infallibility being removed, the whole infallibility of the Church falls. For she could always be deceived in understanding the texts of the Fathers, in understanding the propositions of heretics, and the decrees of Councils; and consequently she could present as heretical a doctrine which in reality is orthodox, or conversely judge as orthodox a doctrine which is heretical, and thus any judgment of the Church could be eluded. From this besides it would follow that the infallibility of the Church would always be admitted theoretically, always eluded practically; all her anathemas brought against doctrine which she judged heretical, for example, that of Nestorius, Pelagius, Luther, Calvin, would be an empty terror; then she herself, unarmed, and the nerve of censure having been cut, would lie powerless; whence the gates of hell would prevail against her.” Moreover, he illustrates all these things with examples.