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751. Solent Theologi, post D. Thomam, quaestionibus de creatione generatim, immediate subjicere tractationem de Angelis; ut qui praestantissimae sunt creaturarum, primum etiam locum, post Deum eorum Creatorem, in sacra scientia teneant.
751. Theologians, after St. Thomas, are accustomed immediately to join the treatment of Angels to the questions concerning creation in general, so that those who are the most excellent of creatures may also hold the first place, after God their Creator, in sacred science.
752. Nobis tamen non licuit hunc ordinem sequi. Quamvis enim multa pie, utiliter et jucunde de Angelis quaeri possint; pauca tamen sunt quae de iis ex revelatione cum certitudine haurimus. Haec quidem pertractandi tempus non defuturum ratum nobis ab initio fuit; at simul periculum erat, ne, si caetera statim persequeremur, tempus deesset majoris momenti quaestiones explicandi.
752. Nevertheless it has not been permitted to us to follow this order. For although many things can be asked piously, usefully, and pleasantly concerning Angels, nevertheless few things are drawn with certainty concerning them from revelation. Indeed, from the beginning we judged that time would not be lacking for treating these; but at the same time there was a danger that, if we immediately pursued the remaining things, time would be lacking for explaining questions of greater importance.
753. His jam in tuto positis in praecedentibus disputationibus, nunc de Angelis dicere aggredimur. Sed temporis angustia pressi, nonnisi praecipua delibabimus.
ARTICULUS PRIMUS.
Utrum existant Angeli.
ARTICULUS PRIMUS.
Utrum existant Angeli.
753. These things now having been placed in safety in the preceding disputations, we now undertake to speak about Angels. But pressed by the narrowness of time, we shall merely touch upon the chief things.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Whether Angels exist.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Whether Angels exist.
754. Concilium Vaticanum Const. Dei Filius, cap. 1. Concilii Later. IV. verba repetens et confirmans, ait: "Solus verus Deus ... simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam." Vid. (n. 27.)
754. The Vatican Council, Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 1, repeating and confirming the words of Lateran IV, says: "The one true God ... at once from the beginning of time founded each creature from nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human as constituted in common from spirit and body." See no. 27.
755. Ad explicandam hanc, quoad Angelos, Ecclesiae definitionem, notamus imprimis cum S. Augustino (in Ps. 103. serm. 1. n. 13.): "Spiritus Angeli sunt, et cum spiritus sunt, non sunt angeli; cum mittuntur fiunt angeli, angelus enim officii nomen est, non naturae. Quaeris nomen hujus naturae, spiritus est; quaeris officium, angelus est. Ex eo quod est, spiritus est; ex eo quod agit, angelus est."
755. To explain this definition of the Church with regard to Angels, we note first with St. Augustine, on Psalm 103, sermon 1, no. 13: "Angels are spirits, and when they are spirits, they are not angels; when they are sent, they become angels, for angel is the name of an office, not of a nature. You ask the name of this nature: it is spirit. You ask the office: it is angel. From that which it is, it is spirit; from that which it does, it is angel."
756. At licet nomen Angeli vi sua nativa non significet spiritum; ex usu tamen Bibliorum, Patrum et Ecclesiae substantiis spiritualibus veluti proprium factum est. Imo duplici sensu, nomen illud usurpatur ad spiritus significandos: latiori nempe, cum importat quamcumque substantiam spiritualem completam Deo inferiorem, cujuscumque demum sit ordinis et Hierarchiae - strictiori vero, cum significat solos spiritus, qui infimo ordine continentur. - Nunc secundum latiorem significationem Angeli nomen usurpamus.
756. But although the name Angel by its native force does not signify spirit, nevertheless from the usage of the Bible, the Fathers, and the Church, it has become as it were proper to spiritual substances. Indeed, that name is used in a twofold sense to signify spirits: in a broader sense, namely, when it imports any complete spiritual substance inferior to God, of whatever order and Hierarchy it may be; but in a stricter sense, when it signifies only those spirits who are contained in the lowest order. - Now we use the name Angel according to the broader signification.
757. Sadducaei perhibentur primi negasse Angelorum existentiam, juxta illud Act. 23. 8.: "Sadducaei dicunt, non esse resurrectionem, neque Angelum neque Spiritum." De eodem errore accusantur etiam Samaritani. Alii vero licet nomen concesserint, rem tamen inficiati sunt. Hinc, ut recte statuatur thesis, et contrarii errores simul refutentur, dicimus: "per Angelos non significamus, nisi quasdam substantias spirituales Deo inferiores, ab hominibus distinctas, iisdemque superiores."
757. The Sadducees are said to have been the first to deny the existence of Angels, according to that saying of Acts 23:8: "The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, nor Angel nor Spirit." The Samaritans also are accused of the same error. Others, although they conceded the name, nevertheless denied the reality. Hence, in order that the thesis may be rightly established and contrary errors at the same time refuted, we say: by Angels we signify only certain spiritual substances inferior to God, distinct from men and superior to them.
758. Dicimus a) substantias, ad excludendum errorem eorum, qui nomine Angelorum in Scripturis significari autumabant inspirationem divinam, vel energiam, potestatem divinam, qua miri producuntur effectus. Teste Kemnitio, Anabaptistae saeculo XVI. statuerunt "Angelos non esse peculiares creaturas, quae vocentur Angeli; sed siquando Deus exserat suam potentiam ad nocendum, vel puniendum, hoc vocari malum angelum, et contra bonum appellari, si quando Deus nos custodiat et conservet."
Dicimus b) Intellectuales seu Spirituales, sive ut jam innuamus Angelorum naturam inferius explicandam; sive ut indirecte saltem refutentur Materialistae, qui nunc temporis praeter materiam nullam aliam substantiam agnoscunt.
Dicimus c) Deo inferiores. Quibus verbis tum vitatur Manichaeorum error qui unum tantum Spiritum, Deum, modo suo, admittebant; tum rejiciuntur Pantheistarum recentiorum commenta. Hi enim omnia unum esse dicunt, et hoc Unum - Deum appellant, qui solummodo in mente humana sui conscius fit: ex hoc ipso principio aliorum spirituum existentiam negare coguntur; ideo jam Spinoza Angelos negavit, eorundemque existentiam etiam schola Hegelii admittere recusat.
Dicimus d) ab hominibus distinctas, iisdemque superiores, ut excludamus errorem eorum, qui Scripturas nomine tenus admittentes, quae in illis de Angelis dicuntur, de hominibus interpretantur: siquidem, aiunt, homines prout specialem aliquando a Deo missionem habent, (mittuntur) nuntii (Angeli) vocantur.
Dicimus b) Intellectuales seu Spirituales, sive ut jam innuamus Angelorum naturam inferius explicandam; sive ut indirecte saltem refutentur Materialistae, qui nunc temporis praeter materiam nullam aliam substantiam agnoscunt.
Dicimus c) Deo inferiores. Quibus verbis tum vitatur Manichaeorum error qui unum tantum Spiritum, Deum, modo suo, admittebant; tum rejiciuntur Pantheistarum recentiorum commenta. Hi enim omnia unum esse dicunt, et hoc Unum - Deum appellant, qui solummodo in mente humana sui conscius fit: ex hoc ipso principio aliorum spirituum existentiam negare coguntur; ideo jam Spinoza Angelos negavit, eorundemque existentiam etiam schola Hegelii admittere recusat.
Dicimus d) ab hominibus distinctas, iisdemque superiores, ut excludamus errorem eorum, qui Scripturas nomine tenus admittentes, quae in illis de Angelis dicuntur, de hominibus interpretantur: siquidem, aiunt, homines prout specialem aliquando a Deo missionem habent, (mittuntur) nuntii (Angeli) vocantur.
758. We say a) substances, to exclude the error of those who thought that by the name of Angels in the Scriptures there is signified divine inspiration, or energy, the divine power by which wondrous effects are produced. According to Chemnitz, the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century held that "Angels are not peculiar creatures which are called Angels; but if at some time God puts forth his power to harm or punish, this is called an evil angel, and, on the contrary, is called good if at some time God guards and preserves us."
We say b) intellectual or spiritual, either so that we may already hint at the nature of Angels to be explained below, or so that at least indirectly the Materialists may be refuted, who at the present time acknowledge no substance other than matter.
We say c) inferior to God. By these words both the error of the Manichaeans is avoided, who admitted only one Spirit, God, in their own manner, and the fictions of more recent Pantheists are rejected. For these say that all things are one, and this One they call God, who becomes conscious of himself only in the human mind. From this principle itself they are compelled to deny the existence of other spirits; for this reason Spinoza already denied Angels, and the school of Hegel also refuses to admit their existence.
We say d) distinct from men and superior to them, so that we may exclude the error of those who, admitting the Scriptures in name, interpret those things which are said in them concerning Angels as concerning men. For, they say, men, insofar as they sometimes have a special mission from God and are sent, are called messengers, Angels.
We say b) intellectual or spiritual, either so that we may already hint at the nature of Angels to be explained below, or so that at least indirectly the Materialists may be refuted, who at the present time acknowledge no substance other than matter.
We say c) inferior to God. By these words both the error of the Manichaeans is avoided, who admitted only one Spirit, God, in their own manner, and the fictions of more recent Pantheists are rejected. For these say that all things are one, and this One they call God, who becomes conscious of himself only in the human mind. From this principle itself they are compelled to deny the existence of other spirits; for this reason Spinoza already denied Angels, and the school of Hegel also refuses to admit their existence.
We say d) distinct from men and superior to them, so that we may exclude the error of those who, admitting the Scriptures in name, interpret those things which are said in them concerning Angels as concerning men. For, they say, men, insofar as they sometimes have a special mission from God and are sent, are called messengers, Angels.
759. Posita autem hac explicatione nominis Angeli, sequitur 1. quod, si probemus Angelos existere, hoc ipso constabit eos non esse a se, sed esse a Deo conditos. Etenim ens a se non potest esse nisi unum - qui necessitatem essendi habet, debet infinitae perfectionis esse: angeli vero sunt Deo inferiores - omnia, quae extra Deum sunt, nonnisi per creationem a Deo esse possunt, uti ostendimus in prima disputatione. Unde Dan. 3., postquam pueri dixerunt: "Benedicite omnia opera Domini Domino etc.," addiderunt: "Benedicite Angeli Domini Domino."
2. Imo si Angelorum existentia semel probetur, hoc ipso constabit eos esse immediate a Deo per creationem. Substantiae enim intellectuales nequeunt aliter produci. Vid. (nn. 169. seqq.) Unde Apostolus Coloss. 1. 16. ait: "In ipso condita sunt universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt." Merito igitur Conc. Bracarense (an. 563.) can. 5. ait: "Si quis animas humanas vel angelos ex Dei credit substantia exstitisse, sicut Manichaei et Priscillianistae docent, anathema sit." Et Conc. Vat. (l. c. can. 4.): "Si quis dixerit, res finitas tum corporeas tum spirituales, aut saltem spirituales e divina substantia emanasse; anathema sit."
Sequitur 3. Deum liberrimo suae voluntatis consilio, ut loquitur Conc. Vaticanum, Angelos creasse. Necessitas enim nec ex natura et conditione ipsius causae effectricis Angelorum, nec ex natura ipsorum Angelorum oriri potest, et ideo nulla ratione esse potest. Prior pars antecedentis probatur, quia repugnat Deo aliquid agere extra se ex necessitate naturae, tum quia intellectualis est in summa perfectione, ac proinde maxime liber, tum etiam quia nulla re extra se indiget, et ideo nihil extra se ita amat, ut necessario illud esse, aut facere velit, tum etiam quia cum sit omnipotens, et infinitae efficacitatis, nihil determinatum agere posset, nisi per liberam voluntatem id determinaret. Nam si ex necessitate naturae ageret, cur potius hos Angelos, quam alios possibiles, vel cur tot potius, quam plures creasset? Unde facile demonstratur pars altera, scilicet, hujusmodi necessitatem non posse ex peculiari conditione angelicae naturae provenire: tum quia cum sit finitae bonitatis, et non sit finis Dei, nec illi aliquid conferat, non potest voluntatem ejus ad se amandum, vel efficiendum ex necessitate determinare, tum etiam quia cum infiniti Angeli possibiles sint, cur magis illi, qui facti sunt, hanc in Deum necessitatem invexissent, quam infiniti alii, qui facti non sunt? Vid. (nn. 105. seqq.)
2. Imo si Angelorum existentia semel probetur, hoc ipso constabit eos esse immediate a Deo per creationem. Substantiae enim intellectuales nequeunt aliter produci. Vid. (nn. 169. seqq.) Unde Apostolus Coloss. 1. 16. ait: "In ipso condita sunt universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt." Merito igitur Conc. Bracarense (an. 563.) can. 5. ait: "Si quis animas humanas vel angelos ex Dei credit substantia exstitisse, sicut Manichaei et Priscillianistae docent, anathema sit." Et Conc. Vat. (l. c. can. 4.): "Si quis dixerit, res finitas tum corporeas tum spirituales, aut saltem spirituales e divina substantia emanasse; anathema sit."
Sequitur 3. Deum liberrimo suae voluntatis consilio, ut loquitur Conc. Vaticanum, Angelos creasse. Necessitas enim nec ex natura et conditione ipsius causae effectricis Angelorum, nec ex natura ipsorum Angelorum oriri potest, et ideo nulla ratione esse potest. Prior pars antecedentis probatur, quia repugnat Deo aliquid agere extra se ex necessitate naturae, tum quia intellectualis est in summa perfectione, ac proinde maxime liber, tum etiam quia nulla re extra se indiget, et ideo nihil extra se ita amat, ut necessario illud esse, aut facere velit, tum etiam quia cum sit omnipotens, et infinitae efficacitatis, nihil determinatum agere posset, nisi per liberam voluntatem id determinaret. Nam si ex necessitate naturae ageret, cur potius hos Angelos, quam alios possibiles, vel cur tot potius, quam plures creasset? Unde facile demonstratur pars altera, scilicet, hujusmodi necessitatem non posse ex peculiari conditione angelicae naturae provenire: tum quia cum sit finitae bonitatis, et non sit finis Dei, nec illi aliquid conferat, non potest voluntatem ejus ad se amandum, vel efficiendum ex necessitate determinare, tum etiam quia cum infiniti Angeli possibiles sint, cur magis illi, qui facti sunt, hanc in Deum necessitatem invexissent, quam infiniti alii, qui facti non sunt? Vid. (nn. 105. seqq.)
759. But once this explanation of the name Angel has been posited, it follows 1. that, if we prove that Angels exist, by this very fact it will be established that they are not from themselves, but have been founded by God. For a being from itself can only be one; that which has necessity of being must be of infinite perfection; but angels are inferior to God; all things which are outside God can be only through creation from God, as we showed in the first disputation. Hence in Daniel 3, after the young men had said, "Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord, etc.," they added: "Bless the Lord, Angels of the Lord."
2. Indeed, if the existence of Angels is once proved, by this very fact it will be established that they are immediately from God through creation. For intellectual substances cannot be produced otherwise. See nos. 169 and following. Hence the Apostle says in Colossians 1:16: "In him all things were founded in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers; all things were created through him and in him." Therefore deservedly the Council of Braga, in the year 563, canon 5, says: "If anyone believes that human souls or angels existed from the substance of God, as the Manichaeans and Priscillianists teach, let him be anathema." And the Vatican Council, same place, canon 4: "If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the divine substance, let him be anathema."
It follows 3. that God created Angels by the most free counsel of his will, as the Vatican Council says. For necessity can arise neither from the nature and condition of the efficient cause itself of Angels, nor from the nature of the Angels themselves, and therefore in no way can it exist. The prior part of the antecedent is proved, because it is repugnant to God to act outside himself from necessity of nature: both because he is intellectual in the highest perfection, and therefore supremely free; and also because he needs nothing outside himself, and therefore loves nothing outside himself in such a way that he necessarily wills it to be or to make it; and also because, since he is omnipotent and of infinite efficacy, he could act on nothing determinate unless he determined it by free will. For if he acted from necessity of nature, why would he have created these Angels rather than other possible ones, or why so many rather than more? Hence the other part is easily demonstrated, namely, that necessity of this sort cannot come from the peculiar condition of angelic nature: both because, since it is of finite goodness, and is not the end of God, nor contributes anything to him, it cannot determine his will by necessity to loving or effecting itself; and also because, since infinite Angels are possible, why would those who have been made have brought upon God this necessity rather than infinitely many others who have not been made? See nos. 105 and following.
2. Indeed, if the existence of Angels is once proved, by this very fact it will be established that they are immediately from God through creation. For intellectual substances cannot be produced otherwise. See nos. 169 and following. Hence the Apostle says in Colossians 1:16: "In him all things were founded in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers; all things were created through him and in him." Therefore deservedly the Council of Braga, in the year 563, canon 5, says: "If anyone believes that human souls or angels existed from the substance of God, as the Manichaeans and Priscillianists teach, let him be anathema." And the Vatican Council, same place, canon 4: "If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the divine substance, let him be anathema."
It follows 3. that God created Angels by the most free counsel of his will, as the Vatican Council says. For necessity can arise neither from the nature and condition of the efficient cause itself of Angels, nor from the nature of the Angels themselves, and therefore in no way can it exist. The prior part of the antecedent is proved, because it is repugnant to God to act outside himself from necessity of nature: both because he is intellectual in the highest perfection, and therefore supremely free; and also because he needs nothing outside himself, and therefore loves nothing outside himself in such a way that he necessarily wills it to be or to make it; and also because, since he is omnipotent and of infinite efficacy, he could act on nothing determinate unless he determined it by free will. For if he acted from necessity of nature, why would he have created these Angels rather than other possible ones, or why so many rather than more? Hence the other part is easily demonstrated, namely, that necessity of this sort cannot come from the peculiar condition of angelic nature: both because, since it is of finite goodness, and is not the end of God, nor contributes anything to him, it cannot determine his will by necessity to loving or effecting itself; and also because, since infinite Angels are possible, why would those who have been made have brought upon God this necessity rather than infinitely many others who have not been made? See nos. 105 and following.
760. Quod si de tempore quaeratur, quo Angeli creati fuere; a) certum est Angelos non fuisse ab aeterno, uti docet Ecclesia in cit. definitionibus. - Pariter certum est, eos fuisse creatos ante hominem, et non post absolutam totius universi dispositionem. Adducuntur enim ipsi angeli in libro Job ut praesentes in molitione et dispositione rerum. Ita scilicet Dominus loquitur ad Job: "Ubi eras, quando ponebam fundamenta terrae? Indica mihi, si habes intelligentiam. Quis posuit mensuras ejus si nosti? vel quis tetendit super eam lineam? Super quo bases ejus solidatae sunt, aut quis dimisit lapidem angularem ejus: cum me laudarent astra matutina, jubilarent omnes filii Dei?" Nomine filiorum Dei intelliguntur angeli, qui Deum quum terram disponeret laudabant, et ejus opera admirabantur.
b) Quamvis non pauci Patres, praesertim Graeci, docuerint Angelos creatos fuisse ante mundum corporeum et visibilem; communior tamen et vera sententia tenet eos simul cum ipso creatos esse. Quod patet praecipue ex Prov. 8. 22. seqq.: "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram." - Huic sententiae maximum pondus accessit ex recitatis Ecclesiae definitionibus, ubi dicitur Deus simul ab initio temporis condidisse naturam angelicam et mundanam, ac deinde humanam.
Hinc non defuerunt Theologi, qui censerent hanc veritatem ad fidem pertinere. Communius tamen hoc negant. "Et ratio est," inquit Suarez (de Ang. l. 1. c. 3. n. 14.), "quia Concilium (Later.) non ex instituto ad id definiendum, sed obiter, et quasi aliud agens id dixit. Non enim in eo capite intendebat Concilium, nova dogmata definire, sed antiqua profiteri, et ita illud explicuit D. Thomas in dicto opusc. 23. et ita etiam est communi sensu Ecclesiae receptum." - Addit tamen (n. 15.) "ex illis verbis Concilii non parum auctoritatis accessisse huic sententiae, atque adeo non carere temeritate contra illam nunc sentire ... quia modus ille loquendi Concilii ostendit sensum Ecclesiae valde communem, cui postea concors sententia Scholasticorum, et posteriorum Patrum accessit, et ideo merito temeritatis argueretur, qui nunc oppositum doceret. Neque per hoc fit injuria antiquioribus Patribus, quia illis temporibus res erat magis controversa, minusque declarata. Potestque uno tempore propositio aliqua non esse temeraria, et postea esse, interveniente Ecclesiae auctoritate, et communi conspiratione, ac consensu."
b) Quamvis non pauci Patres, praesertim Graeci, docuerint Angelos creatos fuisse ante mundum corporeum et visibilem; communior tamen et vera sententia tenet eos simul cum ipso creatos esse. Quod patet praecipue ex Prov. 8. 22. seqq.: "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram." - Huic sententiae maximum pondus accessit ex recitatis Ecclesiae definitionibus, ubi dicitur Deus simul ab initio temporis condidisse naturam angelicam et mundanam, ac deinde humanam.
Hinc non defuerunt Theologi, qui censerent hanc veritatem ad fidem pertinere. Communius tamen hoc negant. "Et ratio est," inquit Suarez (de Ang. l. 1. c. 3. n. 14.), "quia Concilium (Later.) non ex instituto ad id definiendum, sed obiter, et quasi aliud agens id dixit. Non enim in eo capite intendebat Concilium, nova dogmata definire, sed antiqua profiteri, et ita illud explicuit D. Thomas in dicto opusc. 23. et ita etiam est communi sensu Ecclesiae receptum." - Addit tamen (n. 15.) "ex illis verbis Concilii non parum auctoritatis accessisse huic sententiae, atque adeo non carere temeritate contra illam nunc sentire ... quia modus ille loquendi Concilii ostendit sensum Ecclesiae valde communem, cui postea concors sententia Scholasticorum, et posteriorum Patrum accessit, et ideo merito temeritatis argueretur, qui nunc oppositum doceret. Neque per hoc fit injuria antiquioribus Patribus, quia illis temporibus res erat magis controversa, minusque declarata. Potestque uno tempore propositio aliqua non esse temeraria, et postea esse, interveniente Ecclesiae auctoritate, et communi conspiratione, ac consensu."
760. But if it is asked concerning the time at which Angels were created: a) it is certain that Angels were not from eternity, as the Church teaches in the cited definitions. - It is likewise certain that they were created before man, and not after the completion of the whole disposition of the universe. For the angels themselves are brought forward in the book of Job as present in the construction and arrangement of things. Thus the Lord speaks to Job: "Where were you when I was laying the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who set its measures, if you know? Or who stretched the line upon it? Upon what have its bases been made solid, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" By the name sons of God Angels are understood, who were praising God when he was arranging the earth and admiring his works.
b) Although not a few Fathers, especially Greek Fathers, taught that Angels were created before the corporeal and visible world, nevertheless the more common and true opinion holds that they were created together with it. This is especially clear from Proverbs 8:22 and following: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived." - The greatest weight has come to this opinion from the cited definitions of the Church, where it is said that God at once from the beginning of time founded the angelic and worldly nature, and then the human.
Hence there have not been lacking Theologians who judged that this truth pertains to faith. Nevertheless more commonly they deny this. "And the reason is," says Suarez, On Angels, book 1, chapter 3, no. 14, "because the Council, Lateran, did not say this from its purpose of defining it, but incidentally and as though doing something else. For in that chapter the Council did not intend to define new dogmas, but to profess old ones; and St. Thomas explained it thus in the said opusculum 23, and thus also it has been received by the common sense of the Church." - Yet he adds, no. 15, "that from those words of the Council no small authority has come to this opinion, and therefore that to think against it now is not free from rashness ... because that mode of speaking of the Council shows the very common sense of the Church, to which afterward the concordant opinion of the Scholastics and of later Fathers has been added; and therefore he who now taught the opposite would deservedly be accused of rashness. Nor through this is injury done to the older Fathers, because in those times the matter was more controversial and less declared. And it can happen that at one time some proposition is not rash, and afterward is rash, with the authority of the Church and the common concurrence and consensus intervening."
b) Although not a few Fathers, especially Greek Fathers, taught that Angels were created before the corporeal and visible world, nevertheless the more common and true opinion holds that they were created together with it. This is especially clear from Proverbs 8:22 and following: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived." - The greatest weight has come to this opinion from the cited definitions of the Church, where it is said that God at once from the beginning of time founded the angelic and worldly nature, and then the human.
Hence there have not been lacking Theologians who judged that this truth pertains to faith. Nevertheless more commonly they deny this. "And the reason is," says Suarez, On Angels, book 1, chapter 3, no. 14, "because the Council, Lateran, did not say this from its purpose of defining it, but incidentally and as though doing something else. For in that chapter the Council did not intend to define new dogmas, but to profess old ones; and St. Thomas explained it thus in the said opusculum 23, and thus also it has been received by the common sense of the Church." - Yet he adds, no. 15, "that from those words of the Council no small authority has come to this opinion, and therefore that to think against it now is not free from rashness ... because that mode of speaking of the Council shows the very common sense of the Church, to which afterward the concordant opinion of the Scholastics and of later Fathers has been added; and therefore he who now taught the opposite would deservedly be accused of rashness. Nor through this is injury done to the older Fathers, because in those times the matter was more controversial and less declared. And it can happen that at one time some proposition is not rash, and afterward is rash, with the authority of the Church and the common concurrence and consensus intervening."
761. Juverit hic demum animadvertere, quod illis verbis Gen. "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram" alii dicunt Moysen non descripsisse Angelorum originem, quia id a suo scopo alienum erat, quo generis humani originem et eorum, quae cum hominum statu connexa, et horum aspectui subjecta erant, creationem describendam susceperat. Ita S. Hier., Cyr. Alex., S. Jo. Chrys., qui (Hom. 2. in Gen.) ait: "Moyses nihil de invisibilibus virtutibus disserit, neque dicit: in principio fecit Deus Angelos vel Archangelos ... Judaeis enim loquebatur, qui toti rebus praesentibus inhiabant, neque spirituale quidquam comprehendere valebant. Itaque eos a sensibilibus ad cognoscendum universi opificem inducit." - Alii cum Origene et S. Augustino contendunt, Angelos non omnino fuisse praetermissos in mosaica creationis narratione, sed nominibus rerum corporalium, coeli scilicet, aut lucis, fuisse significatos: "Et hoc ideo," ait S. Thomas, "quia Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, qui nondum capere poterat incorpoream naturam; et si eis (initio Genesis) fuisset expressum, aliquas res esse super omnem naturam corpoream, fuisset eis occasio idololatriae, ad quam proni erant, et a qua Moyses eos praecipue revocare intendebat."
761. It will be useful here finally to observe that concerning those words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," some say that Moses did not describe the origin of Angels, because that was foreign to his scope, by which he had undertaken to describe the origin of the human race and the creation of those things which were connected with the state of men and subject to their sight. Thus St. Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Chrysostom, who in homily 2 on Genesis says: "Moses discusses nothing concerning the invisible powers, nor does he say: in the beginning God made Angels or Archangels ... For he was speaking to Jews, who wholly gaped after present things and were not able to comprehend anything spiritual. And so he leads them from sensible things to knowing the maker of the universe." - Others with Origen and St. Augustine contend that Angels were not altogether passed over in the Mosaic narration of creation, but were signified by the names of corporeal things, namely heaven or light. "And this," says St. Thomas, "because Moses was speaking to a rude people, who could not yet grasp incorporeal nature; and if it had been expressed to them, at the beginning of Genesis, that some things exist above every corporeal nature, it would have been an occasion of idolatry for them, to which they were prone, and from which Moses chiefly intended to recall them."
762. His itaque declaratis, dicimus:
PROP. LII. Praeter hanc rerum adspectabilium universitatem creavit Deus etiam Angelos, seu existunt Angeli.
Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Saepissime in Scriptura mentio fit de Angelis; atqui nomine Angelorum in Scripturis veniunt 1. substantiae spirituales - 2. ab hominibus diversae, iisque superiores - 3. Deo tamen inferiores. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1um. Nam Scriptura illas proprietates, et actiones Angelis tribuit, quae non nisi in creaturam intellectualem cadunt. Una est videre Deum, Matth. 18. "Angeli eorum in caelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in coelis est." Alia est benedicere, et laudare Deum, quod passim in Scriptura Angelis tribuitur. Tertia est custodire homines Psalm. 90. Matth. 4. Ad quem etiam pertinet dirigere defendere, illuminare, docere, instruere, et loqui, ut Zachar. 1. "Et dixit Angelus, qui loquebatur in me," quae omnia et similia, quae in Prophetis et alibi saepe leguntur, sine intellectu cogitari non possunt, ut per se notum est. Quarta sit peccare, et fieri poena dignum. 2. Petr. 2. "Angelis peccantibus non pepercit Deus." Ex quo etiam evidenter colligitur, Angelos esse liberi arbitrii, sine quo nec male agitur, nec recte vivitur. Et inde evidenter concluditur eorum intellectualis natura, quia libertas arbitrii in ratione fundatur. Hinc Bernard. dicto lib. 5. de considerat. cap. 4. dixit, "Angelos intellectu capimus, quia non possunt hujus expertes, Dei simul participes esse."
Prob. min. quoad 2um. a) Ps. 8. dicitur: "Minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis": ubi Psalmista de homine loquitur, quem dicit fuisse minoratum ab angelis, utique in natura, et ideo paulo minus, nam gratia, et gloria prae angelis honoratur. Paulus vero ad Hebr. 2. nos docuit haec verba licet de tota humana specie dicta sint, per antonomasiam de Christo scripta esse, qui ratione humanae naturae ab angelis minoratus est. - b) Hebr. 2. 16. legitur: "Nusquam enim Angelos apprehendit sed semen Abraham apprehendit." - c) 2. Pet. 2. Angeli dicuntur fortitudine, et virtute esse majores homine: loquitur autem de malis angelis, unde nonnisi de perfectione naturae loquitur. Et Job. 41. de Satana dicitur: "Non est super terram potestas, quae comparetur ei." Sicut ergo potestate ita etiam naturae perfectione homines excellit.
Prob. min. quoad 3um. a) Hebr. 1. Apostolus ostendit superioritatem Christi respectu Angelorum; quia Angeli sunt ministri, Christus vero Filius Dei. - Unde usurpat illud Ps. 96.: "Et adorent eum omnes Angeli ejus." Vide vv. 1-8. - b) Ut vidimus, Coloss. 1. 16. Angeli dicuntur a Deo creati.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Quorum testimonia vide praesertim apud Petavium.
Prob. III. Ex ratione. a) Ratio a priori, ut omnes conveniunt, nequit demonstrare Angelorum existentiam; ostendit tamen maximam ejus convenientiam. Inter rationes autem convenientiae praecipuum locum tenet ea, quam tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 50. a. 1. c., et multis illustrari solet. Sic autem se habet: "Id quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit, est bonum, quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum, sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, qu. 14. art. 8. et qu. 19. art. 4. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicujus virtutis corporeae: quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura."
b) A posteriori. "Fideles," inquit Suarez (l. c. c. 1. nn. 7. 8.), "etiam nunc aliquos effectus daemonum in obsessis ab illis, seu energumenis, et arreptiis experiuntur, quae plane ostendunt et majorem perspicaciam daemonum in intelligendo, et majorem potentiam in operando, quam in homine sit. Quod etiam apertissime cernitur in magorum incantationibus, et falsis miraculis ministrorum daemonis quae signa profecto ostendunt esse in mundo quasdam invisibiles substantias virtute, ac perfectione naturali homines superantes quas angelos vocamus. - Neque enim illi effectus soli Deo tribui possunt, tum quia non est ad causam primam recurrendum, cum possunt effectus in causas secundas reduci; tum etiam quia tales effectus saepe sunt pravi, et ad malum, et perniciem hominum; imo in odium, et injuriam ipsius Dei facti, ut ipsimet daemones saepissime manifestant: tum denique in ipso modo operandi saepe ostenditur vel malitia moralis, et impotentia quaedam operantis; quia non per imperium, et supremam potestatem, sed veluti arte aliqua applicando activa passivis hujusmodi opera faciunt. Neque etiam hi effectus possunt tribui animabus separatis aliquorum hominum, qui ex hac vita decesserunt, quia juxta veram Philosophiam anima separata non plus potest circa praejacentem materiam operari, quam posset conjuncta, imo minus, quia corpori conjuncta saltem per illud poterat alia corpora immutare, quamvis limitato, et ordinario modo: separata vero nihil potest."
c) Addi posset populorum consensus. Vid. Perrone, etiam pro objectionibus.
PROP. LII. Praeter hanc rerum adspectabilium universitatem creavit Deus etiam Angelos, seu existunt Angeli.
Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Saepissime in Scriptura mentio fit de Angelis; atqui nomine Angelorum in Scripturis veniunt 1. substantiae spirituales - 2. ab hominibus diversae, iisque superiores - 3. Deo tamen inferiores. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1um. Nam Scriptura illas proprietates, et actiones Angelis tribuit, quae non nisi in creaturam intellectualem cadunt. Una est videre Deum, Matth. 18. "Angeli eorum in caelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in coelis est." Alia est benedicere, et laudare Deum, quod passim in Scriptura Angelis tribuitur. Tertia est custodire homines Psalm. 90. Matth. 4. Ad quem etiam pertinet dirigere defendere, illuminare, docere, instruere, et loqui, ut Zachar. 1. "Et dixit Angelus, qui loquebatur in me," quae omnia et similia, quae in Prophetis et alibi saepe leguntur, sine intellectu cogitari non possunt, ut per se notum est. Quarta sit peccare, et fieri poena dignum. 2. Petr. 2. "Angelis peccantibus non pepercit Deus." Ex quo etiam evidenter colligitur, Angelos esse liberi arbitrii, sine quo nec male agitur, nec recte vivitur. Et inde evidenter concluditur eorum intellectualis natura, quia libertas arbitrii in ratione fundatur. Hinc Bernard. dicto lib. 5. de considerat. cap. 4. dixit, "Angelos intellectu capimus, quia non possunt hujus expertes, Dei simul participes esse."
Prob. min. quoad 2um. a) Ps. 8. dicitur: "Minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis": ubi Psalmista de homine loquitur, quem dicit fuisse minoratum ab angelis, utique in natura, et ideo paulo minus, nam gratia, et gloria prae angelis honoratur. Paulus vero ad Hebr. 2. nos docuit haec verba licet de tota humana specie dicta sint, per antonomasiam de Christo scripta esse, qui ratione humanae naturae ab angelis minoratus est. - b) Hebr. 2. 16. legitur: "Nusquam enim Angelos apprehendit sed semen Abraham apprehendit." - c) 2. Pet. 2. Angeli dicuntur fortitudine, et virtute esse majores homine: loquitur autem de malis angelis, unde nonnisi de perfectione naturae loquitur. Et Job. 41. de Satana dicitur: "Non est super terram potestas, quae comparetur ei." Sicut ergo potestate ita etiam naturae perfectione homines excellit.
Prob. min. quoad 3um. a) Hebr. 1. Apostolus ostendit superioritatem Christi respectu Angelorum; quia Angeli sunt ministri, Christus vero Filius Dei. - Unde usurpat illud Ps. 96.: "Et adorent eum omnes Angeli ejus." Vide vv. 1-8. - b) Ut vidimus, Coloss. 1. 16. Angeli dicuntur a Deo creati.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Quorum testimonia vide praesertim apud Petavium.
Prob. III. Ex ratione. a) Ratio a priori, ut omnes conveniunt, nequit demonstrare Angelorum existentiam; ostendit tamen maximam ejus convenientiam. Inter rationes autem convenientiae praecipuum locum tenet ea, quam tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 50. a. 1. c., et multis illustrari solet. Sic autem se habet: "Id quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit, est bonum, quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum, sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, qu. 14. art. 8. et qu. 19. art. 4. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicujus virtutis corporeae: quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura."
b) A posteriori. "Fideles," inquit Suarez (l. c. c. 1. nn. 7. 8.), "etiam nunc aliquos effectus daemonum in obsessis ab illis, seu energumenis, et arreptiis experiuntur, quae plane ostendunt et majorem perspicaciam daemonum in intelligendo, et majorem potentiam in operando, quam in homine sit. Quod etiam apertissime cernitur in magorum incantationibus, et falsis miraculis ministrorum daemonis quae signa profecto ostendunt esse in mundo quasdam invisibiles substantias virtute, ac perfectione naturali homines superantes quas angelos vocamus. - Neque enim illi effectus soli Deo tribui possunt, tum quia non est ad causam primam recurrendum, cum possunt effectus in causas secundas reduci; tum etiam quia tales effectus saepe sunt pravi, et ad malum, et perniciem hominum; imo in odium, et injuriam ipsius Dei facti, ut ipsimet daemones saepissime manifestant: tum denique in ipso modo operandi saepe ostenditur vel malitia moralis, et impotentia quaedam operantis; quia non per imperium, et supremam potestatem, sed veluti arte aliqua applicando activa passivis hujusmodi opera faciunt. Neque etiam hi effectus possunt tribui animabus separatis aliquorum hominum, qui ex hac vita decesserunt, quia juxta veram Philosophiam anima separata non plus potest circa praejacentem materiam operari, quam posset conjuncta, imo minus, quia corpori conjuncta saltem per illud poterat alia corpora immutare, quamvis limitato, et ordinario modo: separata vero nihil potest."
c) Addi posset populorum consensus. Vid. Perrone, etiam pro objectionibus.
762. And so, these things having been declared, we say:
PROPOSITION LII. Besides this universe of visible things, God also created Angels; or, Angels exist.
Proof I. From Scripture. Very often in Scripture mention is made of Angels; but by the name of Angels in the Scriptures there come 1. spiritual substances, 2. diverse from men and superior to them, 3. nevertheless inferior to God. Therefore.
Proof of the minor with regard to the first. For Scripture attributes to Angels those properties and actions which fall only in an intellectual creature. One is to see God, Matthew 18: "Their Angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Another is to bless and praise God, which is everywhere attributed to Angels in Scripture. A third is to guard men, Psalm 90, Matthew 4. To this also belongs directing, defending, illuminating, teaching, instructing, and speaking, as Zechariah 1: "And the Angel who was speaking in me said," all of which and similar things, which are often read in the Prophets and elsewhere, cannot be thought without intellect, as is known of itself. A fourth is to sin and become worthy of punishment. 2 Peter 2: "God did not spare Angels sinning." From this also it is evidently gathered that Angels are of free choice, without which there is neither acting badly nor living rightly. And from this their intellectual nature is evidently concluded, because freedom of choice is founded in reason. Hence Bernard, in the said book 5 of On Consideration, chapter 4, said: "We grasp Angels by intellect, because they cannot be without this and at the same time be sharers of God."
Proof of the minor with regard to the second. a) In Psalm 8 it is said: "You have made him a little less than the Angels"; here the Psalmist speaks of man, whom he says has been made less than the angels, certainly in nature, and therefore a little less, for in grace and glory he is honored above angels. But Paul in Hebrews 2 taught us that these words, although said of the whole human species, were written by antonomasia of Christ, who by reason of human nature was made less than the angels. - b) Hebrews 2:16 reads: "For nowhere does he take hold of Angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham." - c) In 2 Peter 2 Angels are said to be greater than man in strength and power; but he is speaking of evil angels, whence he speaks only of the perfection of nature. And in Job 41 it is said of Satan: "There is no power upon earth which can be compared to him." Therefore just as he excels men in power, so also in perfection of nature.
Proof of the minor with regard to the third. a) In Hebrews 1 the Apostle shows the superiority of Christ with respect to Angels, because Angels are ministers, but Christ is the Son of God. - Hence he uses that saying of Psalm 96: "And let all his Angels adore him." See verses 1-8. - b) As we have seen, in Colossians 1:16 Angels are said to have been created by God.
Proof II. From the Fathers. For their testimonies, see especially Petavius.
Proof III. From reason. a) A reason a priori, as all agree, cannot demonstrate the existence of Angels; nevertheless it shows its very great fittingness. But among the reasons of fittingness, the chief place is held by that which St. Thomas hands down, I, question 50, article 1, corpus, and which is usually illustrated by many things. Thus it stands: "That which God chiefly intends in created things is good, which consists in assimilation to God. But perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is attended to when the effect imitates the cause according to that by which the cause produces the effect, as the hot makes hot. But God produces a creature through intellect and will, as was said above, question 14, article 8, and question 19, article 4. Hence for the perfection of the universe it is required that there be some intellectual creatures. But to understand cannot be an act of a body, nor of any corporeal power, because every body is determined to here and now. Hence it is necessary to posit, in order that the universe be perfect, that there be some incorporeal creature."
b) A posteriori. "The faithful," says Suarez, same place, chapter 1, nos. 7 and 8, "even now experience certain effects of demons in those possessed by them, or energumens and the seized, which plainly show both greater perspicacity of demons in understanding and greater power in operating than there is in man. This is also most openly perceived in the incantations of magicians and the false miracles of the ministers of the demon; these signs certainly show that there are in the world certain invisible substances surpassing men in power and natural perfection, which we call angels. - Nor can those effects be attributed to God alone, both because one must not have recourse to the first cause when effects can be reduced to secondary causes, and also because such effects are often depraved, and toward evil and the destruction of men; indeed, they are done in hatred and injury of God himself, as the demons themselves very often manifest. Finally, also because in the very mode of operating there is often shown either moral malice and a certain impotence of the operator, because they do works of this sort not through command and supreme power, but as if by some art, applying active things to passive things. Nor can these effects be attributed to the separated souls of certain men who have departed from this life, because according to true Philosophy the separated soul can do no more about preexisting matter than it could do when joined, indeed less, because when joined to the body it could at least through that body change other bodies, although in a limited and ordinary mode; but separated, it can do nothing."
c) The consensus of peoples could be added. See Perrone, also for the objections.
PROPOSITION LII. Besides this universe of visible things, God also created Angels; or, Angels exist.
Proof I. From Scripture. Very often in Scripture mention is made of Angels; but by the name of Angels in the Scriptures there come 1. spiritual substances, 2. diverse from men and superior to them, 3. nevertheless inferior to God. Therefore.
Proof of the minor with regard to the first. For Scripture attributes to Angels those properties and actions which fall only in an intellectual creature. One is to see God, Matthew 18: "Their Angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Another is to bless and praise God, which is everywhere attributed to Angels in Scripture. A third is to guard men, Psalm 90, Matthew 4. To this also belongs directing, defending, illuminating, teaching, instructing, and speaking, as Zechariah 1: "And the Angel who was speaking in me said," all of which and similar things, which are often read in the Prophets and elsewhere, cannot be thought without intellect, as is known of itself. A fourth is to sin and become worthy of punishment. 2 Peter 2: "God did not spare Angels sinning." From this also it is evidently gathered that Angels are of free choice, without which there is neither acting badly nor living rightly. And from this their intellectual nature is evidently concluded, because freedom of choice is founded in reason. Hence Bernard, in the said book 5 of On Consideration, chapter 4, said: "We grasp Angels by intellect, because they cannot be without this and at the same time be sharers of God."
Proof of the minor with regard to the second. a) In Psalm 8 it is said: "You have made him a little less than the Angels"; here the Psalmist speaks of man, whom he says has been made less than the angels, certainly in nature, and therefore a little less, for in grace and glory he is honored above angels. But Paul in Hebrews 2 taught us that these words, although said of the whole human species, were written by antonomasia of Christ, who by reason of human nature was made less than the angels. - b) Hebrews 2:16 reads: "For nowhere does he take hold of Angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham." - c) In 2 Peter 2 Angels are said to be greater than man in strength and power; but he is speaking of evil angels, whence he speaks only of the perfection of nature. And in Job 41 it is said of Satan: "There is no power upon earth which can be compared to him." Therefore just as he excels men in power, so also in perfection of nature.
Proof of the minor with regard to the third. a) In Hebrews 1 the Apostle shows the superiority of Christ with respect to Angels, because Angels are ministers, but Christ is the Son of God. - Hence he uses that saying of Psalm 96: "And let all his Angels adore him." See verses 1-8. - b) As we have seen, in Colossians 1:16 Angels are said to have been created by God.
Proof II. From the Fathers. For their testimonies, see especially Petavius.
Proof III. From reason. a) A reason a priori, as all agree, cannot demonstrate the existence of Angels; nevertheless it shows its very great fittingness. But among the reasons of fittingness, the chief place is held by that which St. Thomas hands down, I, question 50, article 1, corpus, and which is usually illustrated by many things. Thus it stands: "That which God chiefly intends in created things is good, which consists in assimilation to God. But perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is attended to when the effect imitates the cause according to that by which the cause produces the effect, as the hot makes hot. But God produces a creature through intellect and will, as was said above, question 14, article 8, and question 19, article 4. Hence for the perfection of the universe it is required that there be some intellectual creatures. But to understand cannot be an act of a body, nor of any corporeal power, because every body is determined to here and now. Hence it is necessary to posit, in order that the universe be perfect, that there be some incorporeal creature."
b) A posteriori. "The faithful," says Suarez, same place, chapter 1, nos. 7 and 8, "even now experience certain effects of demons in those possessed by them, or energumens and the seized, which plainly show both greater perspicacity of demons in understanding and greater power in operating than there is in man. This is also most openly perceived in the incantations of magicians and the false miracles of the ministers of the demon; these signs certainly show that there are in the world certain invisible substances surpassing men in power and natural perfection, which we call angels. - Nor can those effects be attributed to God alone, both because one must not have recourse to the first cause when effects can be reduced to secondary causes, and also because such effects are often depraved, and toward evil and the destruction of men; indeed, they are done in hatred and injury of God himself, as the demons themselves very often manifest. Finally, also because in the very mode of operating there is often shown either moral malice and a certain impotence of the operator, because they do works of this sort not through command and supreme power, but as if by some art, applying active things to passive things. Nor can these effects be attributed to the separated souls of certain men who have departed from this life, because according to true Philosophy the separated soul can do no more about preexisting matter than it could do when joined, indeed less, because when joined to the body it could at least through that body change other bodies, although in a limited and ordinary mode; but separated, it can do nothing."
c) The consensus of peoples could be added. See Perrone, also for the objections.