Article 5. On the Existence and Eternity of the Punishments of Hell — On God the Creator

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644. Loquuti sumus de beata sorte animarum, quae in statu gratiae a corpore separantur, et perfecte purgatae ad beatitudinem perveniunt. Sed Deus, qui novit "in die obitus retribuere unicuique secundum vias suas," aeternas paravit poenas iis, qui in statu lethalis peccati ex hac vita decedunt. De perpetua earum duratione agimus in hoc articulo, imprimis ex principiis revelationis - deinde ex principiis rationis.

§ I.

Aeternitas poenarum inferni ex revelatione.

644. We have spoken of the blessed lot of souls which are separated from the body in the state of grace and, perfectly purified, arrive at beatitude. But God, who knows "on the day of death to render to each one according to his ways," has prepared eternal punishments for those who depart from this life in the state of lethal sin. In this article we treat of their perpetual duration, first from the principles of revelation, then from the principles of reason.

§ I.

The eternity of the punishments of hell from revelation.

645. Non defuerunt qui non modo aeternitatem poenarum, sed ipsas poenas post hanc mortalem vitam omnino negarent: unde aliqui ostendunt 1. existentiam poenarum - 2. earundem aeternitatem. Sed cum argumenta, quibus poenarum aeternitas comprobatur, certe earum existentiam demonstrent, non est opus de hac specialem instituere quaestionem.

645. There have not been lacking those who denied not only the eternity of punishments, but also the punishments themselves after this mortal life altogether. Hence some show 1. the existence of punishments, and 2. the eternity of the same. But since the arguments by which the eternity of punishments is proved certainly demonstrate their existence, there is no need to institute a special question concerning this.

646. Profitemur in Symbolo Athanasiano: "Qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam aeternam: qui vero mala, in ignem aeternum. Haec est fides catholica; quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit." Eamdem veritatem definivit Ecclesia in Conc. Ecum. V. - Concil. Niceno II. Act. I. - Concil. Later. IV. - et, caeteris omissis, Conc. Trid. sess. 6. c. 5.

646. We profess in the Athanasian Creed: "Those who have done good will go into eternal life, but those who have done evil into eternal fire. This is the Catholic faith; unless each one has believed it faithfully and firmly, he will not be able to be saved." The Church defined the same truth in the Fifth Ecumenical Council, the Second Council of Nicaea, act 1, the Fourth Lateran Council, and, passing over the rest, the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5.

647. Attamen vel a primis Ecclesiae saeculis orta est haeresis poenarum aeternitatem negans, quae deinde saepius ad nostra usque tempora renovata est. - Non omnes vero eadem ratione permoti fuere. Alii enim ideo negarunt aeternitatem poenarum, quia docebant animas non esse immortales. Alii concedebant animae humanae immortalitatem, sed impiorum animas destruendas potius, quam perpetuo puniendas esse autumabant. - Alii nec mortales nec destruendas impiorum animas dicebant; sed tamen temporariis poenis purgandas, et tandem liberandas esse censebant. - Alii aeternitatem admiserunt pro Angelis, sed non pro hominibus. Alii pro infidelibus, sed non pro Christianis. Alii pro iis qui obstinati perseverant in propria iniquitate, non vero pro iis, qui poenitentiam agunt; putabant enim quod in inferno adhuc est locus poenitentiae. Merito exclamabat S. Joan. Chrys. (hom. 31. in Ep. ad Rom.): "O dementiam! O stultam et asinariam sententiam, O animam peccati et voluptatis amantem, atque ad nequitiam respicientem! Etenim a voluptatis amore haec dogmata omnia nascuntur, ita ut si ii, qui talia dicunt, virtutem amplecti vellent, cito de gehenna persuasi essent, omnique dubitatione exuerentur."

647. Nevertheless, even from the first centuries of the Church there arose a heresy denying the eternity of punishments, which afterward was renewed rather often even down to our own times. But not all were moved by the same reasoning. For some denied the eternity of punishments because they taught that souls are not immortal. Others conceded the immortality of the human soul, but judged that the souls of the impious were to be destroyed rather than punished perpetually. Others said that the souls of the impious are neither mortal nor to be destroyed, but still held that they were to be purged by temporal punishments and finally liberated. Others admitted eternity for Angels, but not for men. Others for unbelievers, but not for Christians. Others for those who obstinately persevere in their own iniquity, but not for those who do penance; for they thought that in hell there is still a place of penance. Deservedly St. John Chrysostom exclaimed (homily 31 on the Epistle to the Romans): "O madness! O foolish and asinine opinion! O soul loving sin and pleasure and looking toward wickedness! For all these dogmas are born from love of pleasure, so that if those who say such things wished to embrace virtue, they would quickly be persuaded concerning gehenna and would be stripped of every doubt."

648. Contra hos omnes itaque, dicimus:

PROP. XLVII. Ex fontibus revelationis luculentissime ostenditur damnatorum in inferno poenas esse aeternas.

Prob. Ex Scriptura. Ad tres praecipue classes revocamus testimonia S. Scripturae. Prima classis eorum est, quae poenas inferni directe appellant aeternas. Dan. 12. 2.: "Multi de his qui dormiunt in terrae pulvere, evigilabunt: alii in vitam aeternam, et alii in opprobrium ut videant semper." - Matth. 25. 41. 46.: "Discedite a me maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus." - "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum; justi autem in vitam aeternam." - Is. 33. 14.: "Quis habitare poterit de vobis cum igne devorante? quis habitabit ex vobis cum ardoribus sempiternis?" etc.

Ut hujus argumenti vim infirment adversarii, observant vocem aeternum non raro adhiberi in S. Scriptura ad significandum solum diuturnam durationem.

Sed a) Ex eo quod aliqua vox habet duplicem significationem, propriam et minus propriam, certe deduci nequit semper adhiberi sensu minus proprio. Imo semper ac aliqua vox habet sensum proprium et metaphoricum, nisi aliqua evidens ratio contrarium suadeat, semper proprius est retinendus.

b) Testimonia, quae adversarii congerunt, et in quibus vox aeternum revera non adhibetur sensu proprio, obvia signa prae se ferunt, ut vox illa sumatur sensu minus proprio. At ubi agitur de aeternitate poenarum, nullum habetur hujusmodi fundamentum, imo habetur contrarium.

c) Revera si substratam materiam consideremus, agitur de Angelis, et hominibus puniendis. Angeli vero, et animae humanae sunt natura sua immortales et perpetuo duraturae. Quod si hominis corpus mortale est, scimus quod a mortuis resurget, et nihil obstat quominus illud in aeternum Deus conservet. Unde S. Gregorius (Mor. l. 15.): "Persolvit impius in tormento ea, quae hic illicite servavit desideria, et flammis ultricibus traditus semper moritur, quia semper in morte servatur. Non enim in morte consumetur, quia si consumeretur vita morientis, cum vita etiam poena finiretur. Sed ut sine fine crucietur, vivere sine fine in poena compellitur: ut cujus vita hic mortua fuit in culpa, illic ejus mors vivat in poena. Luet, quae fecit, omnia, nec tamen consumetur, quia cruciatur et non extinguitur; moritur et vivit; deficit et subsistit; finitur semper, et sine fine est."

d) Si consideremus contextum, quemadmodum damnatorum poena dicitur aeterna, ita aeternum dicitur justorum praemium: sed hoc, ipsis adversariis fatentibus, vere non habet finem. Ergo. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 23.): "Christus in uno eodemque loco, in una eademque sententia dixit: Ibunt isti in supplicium aeternum, justi autem in vitam aeternam. Si utrumque aeternum, profecto aut utrumque cum fine diuturnum, aut utrumque sine fine perpetuum debet intelligi. Par pari enim relata sunt, hinc supplicium aeternum, inde vita aeterna. Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu vita aeterna sine fine erit, supplicium aeternum finem habebit, multum absurdum est."

e) Si consideremus denique alia S. Scripturae loca, ea omnino exigunt ut, cum inferorum poenae dicuntur aeternae, vox illa aeternae sumatur pro duratione sine termino; uti ex statim dicendis patebit.

Secunda classis est eorum testimoniorum, quae expresse negant quemcumque finem in inferni poenis, quin adhibeant vocem aeternum. Matth. 3. 12.: "Congregabit triticum suum in horreum, paleas autem comburet igni inextinguibili." Is. 66. 24.: "Et vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis eorum non extinguetur: et erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni." Marc. 9. ter Christus repetit: vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur, etc.

Ut vim horum testimoniorum effugiant adversarii, dicunt vel ignem non extingui quamdiu manebunt impii cruciandi; sed ex hoc non inferri eos semper esse mansuros - vel ignem quidem esse inextinguibilem, sed necesse non esse eo semper damnatos comburi.

Sed a) Ultima verba cit. testimonii ex Isaia "et erunt usque ad satietatem, etc.," aperte excludunt illas interpretationes.

b) Dicitur vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur; ergo sermo est de verme et igne prout poena sunt: prout poena sunt ergo sine fine sunt: sed quomodo poena, nisi adsint puniendi?

Unde S. Augustinus (de fid. et oper. c. 5.): "Neque illud dici potest, in quo nonnulli seipsos seducunt, ignem aeternum dictum, non ipsam combustionem aeternam. Per ignem quippe qui aeternus erit transituros arbitrantur eos, quibus propter fidem mortuam per ignem promittunt salutem, ut videlicet ipse ignis aeternus sit, combustio vero eorum, hoc est operatio ignis, non sit in eos aeterna, quum et hoc praevidens, Dominus sententiam suam conclusit ita dicens: Sic ibunt illi in combustionem aeternam, justi autem in vitam aeternam. Erit ergo aeterna combustio, sicut ignis, et eos in illam ituros veritas dicit, quorum non fidem, sed bona opera defuisse declaravit."

Tertia classis est eorum testimoniorum, in quibus praedicatur impossibilitas liberationis a poenis inferni; seu in quibus indicatur nullam expectandam esse liberationem, nisi sub conditione impossibili. Matth. 5. 26.: "Amen dico tibi, non exies inde, donec reddas novissimum quadrantem." - Et 18. 34.: "Et iratus Dominus ejus tradidit eum tortoribus, quoadusque redderet universum debitum." - Luc. 12. 59.: "Dico tibi, non exies inde, donec etiam novissimum minutum reddas." - Eccle. 9. 10.: "Quodcumque facere potest manus tua, instanter operare: quia nec opus, nec ratio, nec sapientia, nec scientia erunt apud inferos, quo tu properas." - Eccle. 11. 3.: "Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum, aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit," etc.

Unde: Conditio ad liberationem adjecta est ut qui inferni poenis puniuntur perfecte debitum solvant, quo erga Deum obstringuntur. Atqui hanc conditionem damnati numquam implere possunt, uti patet ex cit. testimoniis, et inferius melius patebit. Ergo.

Unde S. Cyprianus (ad Demetr. cc. 24. 25.): "Cremabit addictos ardens semper gehenna, et vivacibus flammis vorax poena; nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint aliquando vel finem. Erit tunc sine fructu paenitentiae dolor poenae, inanis ploratio et inefficax deprecatio. In aeternam poenam sero credent, qui in vitam aeternam credere noluerunt. Quando istinc excessum fuerit, nullus jam poenitentiae locus est, nullus satisfactionis effectus."

Ut vim hujus argumenti enervent adversarii, dicunt 1. poenas privativas esse aeternas, non vero positivas: privativas autem aeternas esse, quia, cum animae damnatorum destruantur, numquam Deum visurae sunt.

Sed hoc supponit a) mortalitatem animarum, quod alibi ostenditur falsissimum. - b) Scriptura asserit durationem sine termino non modo de poena damni "Discedite a me maledicti;" sed etiam de poena sensus "in ignem aeternum" ut patet ex superius dictis.

Dicunt 2. Quamvis Deus minetur poenas aeternas, a quibus damnati liberandi non sunt nisi convertantur; inde tamen non sequitur poenas vere futuras esse aeternas. Quando enim Legislator comminatur aliquam poenam, nihil impedit quominus illam, quoad partem vel quoad totum condonet: ita agens, nihil facit contra jus aut fidelitatem.

Sed a) Legislator humanus, etiam facta comminatione absoluta poenae, potest mutando consilium condonare. Sed Deus est immutabilis, ideoque quamvis liberatio damnatorum per condonationem poenae non repugnet justitiae et fidelitati, repugnat tamen immutabilitati divinae.

b) Nec dici potest comminationem poenae in casu esse conditionatam. Etsi enim talis sit respectu hominum in hac vita degentium; absoluta tamen est respectu damnatorum in quos tulit sententiam "Discedite a me," quae jam est executioni mandata "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum." - Praeterea satis in Scripturis manifestavit voluntatem suam non condonandi damnatorum poenas. Unde jure merito S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 20. c. 24.) eos graviter redarguit "qui minaciter potius, quam veraciter" quae de aeternis poenis dicta sunt, interpretantur. "Eos," inquit, "Scriptura divina planissime, et plenissime redarguit et refellit."

NOTA. Testimonia Patrum collecta et debito ordine disposita invenies apud Knoll (Par. 5. sect. 3. a. 1.) Ibi etiam leges sententias de hac re apertissime catholicas eorum Patrum, qui ut adversarii dogmatis de aeternitate poenarum citabantur. Praecipuas objectiones ex Scriptura jam praeoccupavimus; reliquas, sicut et alias ex Patribus, vide vel apud cit. Auctorem, vel apud Perrone.

648. Therefore against all these we say:

PROPOSITION XLVII. From the sources of revelation it is shown most luminously that the punishments of the damned in hell are eternal.

Proof from Scripture. We reduce the testimonies of Sacred Scripture especially to three classes. The first class is of those which directly call the punishments of hell eternal. Daniel 12:2: "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto eternal life, and others unto reproach, that they may see forever." Matthew 25:41, 46: "Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." "And these shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life." Isaiah 33:14: "Who of you will be able to dwell with devouring fire? who of you will dwell with everlasting burnings?" etc.

In order to weaken the force of this argument, the adversaries observe that the word eternal is not rarely used in Sacred Scripture to signify only a long duration.

But a) from the fact that some word has a twofold signification, proper and less proper, it certainly cannot be deduced that it is always used in the less proper sense. Indeed whenever some word has a proper and a metaphorical sense, unless some evident reason persuades the contrary, the proper sense must always be retained.

b) The testimonies which the adversaries heap together, and in which the word eternal is really not used in the proper sense, bear obvious signs that that word is taken in the less proper sense. But where the eternity of punishments is at issue, there is no foundation of this kind; indeed there is the contrary.

c) In reality, if we consider the underlying matter, the question concerns Angels and men to be punished. But Angels and human souls are by their nature immortal and will endure perpetually. But if the body of man is mortal, we know that it will rise from the dead, and nothing prevents God from preserving it eternally. Hence St. Gregory (Moralia, book 15): "The impious man pays in torment for the desires which he unlawfully kept here, and handed over to avenging flames he always dies, because he is always preserved in death. For he will not be consumed in death, because if the life of the dying one were consumed, the punishment also would be ended with the life. But that he may be tortured without end, he is compelled to live without end in punishment, so that he whose life here was dead in fault, there his death may live in punishment. He will pay for all that he did, and yet he will not be consumed, because he is tortured and is not extinguished; he dies and lives; he fails and subsists; he is always ended, and is without end."

d) If we consider the context, just as the punishment of the damned is called eternal, so the reward of the just is called eternal; but this, as the adversaries themselves confess, truly has no end. Therefore. Hence St. Augustine (City of God, book 21, chapter 23): "Christ in one and the same place, in one and the same sentence, said: These shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life. If both are eternal, surely either both must be understood as long-lasting with an end, or both as perpetual without end. For they are related as equal to equal: on this side eternal punishment, on that eternal life. But to say in this one and the same sense that eternal life will be without end, while eternal punishment will have an end, is very absurd."

e) Finally, if we consider other places of Sacred Scripture, they altogether require that, when the punishments of hell are called eternal, that word eternal be taken for duration without terminus, as will be clear from what must immediately be said.

The second class is of those testimonies which expressly deny any end whatever in the punishments of hell, without using the word eternal. Matthew 3:12: "He will gather his wheat into the barn, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire." Isaiah 66:24: "And their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished; and they shall be even to satiety of sight to all flesh." Mark 9: Christ repeats three times: their worm does not die, and the fire is not extinguished, etc.

In order to escape the force of these testimonies, the adversaries say either that the fire is not extinguished as long as the impious remain to be tormented, but that from this it is not inferred that they will remain forever, or that the fire is indeed inextinguishable, but that it is not necessary that the damned always be burned by it.

But a) the final words of the cited testimony from Isaiah, "and they shall be even to satiety, etc.," openly exclude those interpretations.

b) It is said that their worm does not die and the fire is not extinguished; therefore the discourse concerns the worm and the fire insofar as they are punishment. Therefore, insofar as they are punishment, they are without end. But how is there punishment unless those to be punished are present?

Hence St. Augustine (On Faith and Works, chapter 5): "Nor can that be said by which some deceive themselves, namely that the fire is called eternal, not the burning itself eternal. For they think that those to whom they promise salvation through fire on account of dead faith will pass through the fire which will be eternal, so that indeed the fire itself is eternal, but their burning, that is, the operation of the fire, is not eternal upon them. Since the Lord, foreseeing even this, concluded his sentence by saying thus: So those shall go into eternal burning, but the just into eternal life. Therefore the burning will be eternal, just as the fire is, and Truth says that those will go into it whose lack not of faith but of good works he declared."

The third class is of those testimonies in which the impossibility of liberation from the punishments of hell is predicated, or in which it is indicated that no liberation is to be expected except under an impossible condition. Matthew 5:26: "Amen I say to you, you shall not go out from there until you pay the last farthing." And 18:34: "And his lord, angered, handed him over to the torturers until he should pay the whole debt." Luke 12:59: "I say to you, you shall not go out from there until you also pay the last mite." Ecclesiastes 9:10: "Whatever your hand can do, do earnestly, because there will be no work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge in the underworld to which you hasten." Ecclesiastes 11:3: "If the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it shall be," etc.

Hence: the condition attached to liberation is that those who are punished with the punishments of hell perfectly pay the debt by which they are bound toward God. But the damned can never fulfill this condition, as is clear from the cited testimonies and will be clearer below. Therefore.

Hence St. Cyprian (To Demetrianus, chapters 24 and 25): "Burning gehenna, always burning, will burn the condemned, and a devouring punishment with living flames; nor will there be any source from which torments could ever have rest or end. Then the pain of punishment will be without the fruit of penance, the weeping vain, and the entreaty ineffective. They will believe late in eternal punishment who refused to believe in eternal life. When departure from here has occurred, there is no longer any place of penance, no effect of satisfaction."

In order to weaken the force of this argument, the adversaries say, 1. that privative punishments are eternal, but not positive punishments; and that privative punishments are eternal because, since the souls of the damned are destroyed, they will never see God.

But this supposes a) the mortality of souls, which elsewhere is shown to be most false; b) Scripture asserts duration without terminus not only concerning the pain of loss, "Depart from me, accursed ones," but also concerning the pain of sense, "into eternal fire," as is clear from what was said above.

They say, 2. although God threatens eternal punishments, from which the damned are not to be liberated unless they are converted, nevertheless it does not follow from this that the punishments will truly be eternal. For when a Legislator threatens some punishment, nothing prevents him from pardoning it, either in part or in whole; by acting thus, he does nothing against right or fidelity.

But a) a human legislator, even after an absolute threat of punishment has been made, can pardon by changing his counsel. But God is immutable, and therefore, although the liberation of the damned through pardon of punishment is not repugnant to justice and fidelity, nevertheless it is repugnant to divine immutability.

b) Nor can it be said that the threat of punishment in this case is conditional. For although it is such with respect to men living in this life, nevertheless it is absolute with respect to the damned against whom he has passed the sentence "Depart from me," which has already been entrusted to execution: "And these shall go into eternal punishment." Besides, in the Scriptures he has sufficiently manifested his will not to pardon the punishments of the damned. Hence deservedly St. Augustine (City of God, book 20, chapter 24) gravely rebukes those "who interpret the things said concerning eternal punishments as threatening rather than truthful." "Divine Scripture," he says, "most plainly and most fully rebukes and refutes them."

NOTE. You will find the testimonies of the Fathers collected and arranged in due order in Knoll, part 5, section 3, article 1. There you will also read the openly Catholic opinions concerning this matter of those Fathers who used to be cited as adversaries of the dogma concerning the eternity of punishments. We have already anticipated the principal objections from Scripture; the remaining ones, as also the others from the Fathers, see either in the cited Author or in Perrone.

649. Dogma de aeternitate poenarum plures, ut vidimus, nactum est adversarios inter eos ipsos, qui revelationem christianam haud respuere affectant; qui vero hanc aperte rejiciunt, ut ii qui saeculo elapso philosophi audiebant, et recentiores rationalistae omnes, idem dogma naturalis luminis principiis, divinisque attributis repugnare contendunt.

649. The dogma concerning the eternity of punishments, as we have seen, has obtained many adversaries even among those who affect not to reject Christian revelation. But those who openly reject it, such as those who in the past century were called philosophers, and all the more recent rationalists, contend that this same dogma is repugnant to the principles of natural light and to the divine attributes.

650. Fatemur aeternitatem poenarum solo rationis lumine non apodictice demonstrari; simul tamen contendimus, illud nihil in eo reprehendere, imo multis argumentis persuadere.

650. We confess that the eternity of punishments is not demonstrated apodictically by the light of reason alone; at the same time, however, we contend that reason finds nothing in it to reprehend, and indeed persuades it by many arguments.

651. Omittimus hic generales animadversiones, quibus veritates revelatas rationi minime contradicere communiter et invicte ostenditur (vid. nn. 547. seq.), ut ea solum breviter indicemus, quae hujus loci propria omnino sunt.

651. We omit here the general observations by which it is commonly and invincibly shown that revealed truths in no way contradict reason (see nos. 547 and following), in order that we may briefly indicate only those things which are altogether proper to this place.

652. Itaque dicimus:

PROP. XLVIII. Bene consulta ratio non modo nihil absurdi deprehendit in dogmate de aeternitate poenarum, sed ea suppeditat argumenta, quae illud suadere apprime valeant.

Prob. I. Maxime convenit tum rectae rationis principiis, tum divinis attributis, ut proportio sit inter culpam et poenam; atqui hujusmodi proportio maxime elucet in aeterna damnatorum poena. Ergo.

Prob. min. Peccatum lethale quamdam habet infinitam malitiam; ergo maxime proportionatur ei poena, quae sit quodammodo infinita. Atqui talis est poena aeterna. Ergo.

Ut vera hujus argumenti vis intelligatur, notamus 1. cum D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 87. a. 4. c.: "In peccato autem duo sunt: quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum; aliud quod est in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum, et ex hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile est finitum, tum etiam quia ipsa conversio est finita; non enim possunt esse actus creaturae infiniti."

3. Idem S. Doctor suppl. q. 99. a. 1., ait: "Per eam (culpam mortalem) contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur. Unde cum non possit esse infinita poena per intensionem, quia creatura non est capax alicujus qualitatis infinitae, requiritur quod sit saltem duratione infinita."

Ne ullis sit locus cavillationibus contra hanc quamdam infinitatem culpae, notamus cum Lessio (de divin. perf. l. 13. c. 26. nn. 118. seqq.): "Malitia formalis peccati non solum consistit in recessu a regula rationis, sed etiam in quadam injuria quae irrogatur Deo, quae reperitur in omni peccato mortifero. Omnia enim peccata mortifera in eo conveniunt, quod includant quemdam contemptum Dei, alia majorem, alia minorem. In quibusdam enim magis directe contemnitur Deus, ut in odio Dei, in blasphemia et similibus, quae magis directe sunt contra Dei honorem: in aliis solum indirecte et interpretative, quatenus violatur et contemnitur lex divina in re gravi, et consequenter ipse legislator, ejusque amicitia et promissa omnia et minae omnes. Inde sequitur, peccatum mortiferum continere malitiam infinitam, non quidem absolute et omnino, sed respective. Ratio est, quia quo majestas quae contemnitur est major, eo offensio est gravior; atqui majestas Dei quae contemnitur peccato mortifero, est infinita; ergo offensio etiam quamdam infinitatem habet. Ratio vero, cur illo argumento non concludatur absoluta infinitas in ratione malitiae, est, quia objectum non attingitur adaequate, unde non adaequate influit in actum, nec tribuit ei plene sui infinitatem. Sicut enim Deus sine fine potest perfectius et perfectius amari, ita etiam per peccatum potest sine fine magis et magis odio haberi et contemni. Hoc ipso tamen, quod absolute censetur contemni, actus contrahit quamdam infinitatem malitiae, utpote superioris ordinis respectu omnium bonorum operum. Tanta enim est peccati mortiferi malignitas, ut posita in lance divinae justitiae praeponderet omnibus bonis operibus omnium Sanctorum, etiamsi ea millies plura et majora forent quam revera sunt: quae consideratio est valde terribilis. Neque hoc mirabile videri debet; quia omnia bona opera, quibus Deus honoratur a Sanctis, etsi in se considerata sint maximae aestimationis, et ipsi propterea sint digni vita aeterna, tamen respectu majestatis divinae sunt instar nihili: nulla enim gratia fit ei per ista omnia, cujus majestati et beneficiis omnia ista sunt debita, nec ista solum, sed infinities plura et majora. Itaque nihil magni omnia ista sunt Deo. At contemni a sua creatura, quae infinitis nominibus ipsi est obstricta, et quae infinitum amorem et honorem ei praestare deberet, si posset, hoc maximi aestimatur, utpote maxime repugnans ejus majestati et beneficiis. Unde pluris aestimatur a Deo in ratione mali, quam omnia opera bona in ratione boni, ac magis Deum affligeret, si capax esset doloris, quam omnia bona opera exhilararent. Hinc docent SS. Patres, nullam puram creaturam Deo potuisse satisfacere, ac proinde necessarium fuisse ad justam satisfactionem, ut Deus fieret homo. Ex his potest adferri ratio, cur peccatum mortiferum plectatur poena aeterna. Si enim tanta est ejus malignitas, ut nullis bonis operibus purae naturae potuerit ex aequo compensari, sed ad hoc necessarium fuit, Deum incarnari, ut condigna satisfactio divinae justitiae exhiberetur, mirum non est, si dicatur mereri poenam aeternam. Quod enim adeo malum est, ut nullis bonis quantumvis longo tempore continuatis compensari et exaequari possit, meretur poenam quovis tempore finito longiorem, ac proinde aeternam, idque per se et directe ratione malitiae quae est in actu, non autem quia peccator non potest pro eo satisfacere, aut se in eo ordine, ex quo excidit reponere, aut vitam spiritualem reparare, aut maculam delere. Etsi enim haec omnia concurrant in peccato mortifero, ex his tamen non est petenda propria ratio cur ei debeatur poena aeterna, sed ex ipsa malitia actus, ex qua etiam ista impotentia sequitur, sicut in aliis peccatis mensura poenae statuenda ex mensura culpae, non ex impotentia satisfaciendi."

Prob. II. maxime convenit ut qui pro aeterno peccat, in aeternum puniatur; atqui qui lethale peccatum committit se avertendo a Deo, quantum in se est, pro aeterno peccat. Ergo.

Decl. ex D. Thoma suppl. l. c.: "Gregorius dicit in IV. Dialog. cap. 44. antec. med.: 'Ad magnam justitiam judicantis pertinet ut numquam careant supplicio qui in hac vita nunquam voluerunt carere peccato.' Et si objiciatur quod quidam peccantes mortaliter proponunt vitam suam in melius quandoque commutare, et ita secundum hoc non essent digni aeterno supplicio, ut videtur, dicendum est, secundum quosdam, quod Gregorius loquitur de voluntate quae manifestatur per opus. Qui enim in peccatum mortale labitur propria voluntate, se ponit in statu a quo erui non potest, nisi divinitus adjutus: unde ex hoc ipso quod vult peccare, consequenter vult in peccato manere perpetuo. Homo enim est spiritus vadens, scilicet in peccatum, et non rediens per seipsum: Psal. 77. 39. Sicut si aliquis se in foveam projiceret, unde exire non posset nisi adjutus, posset dici quod in aeternum ibi manere voluerit, quantumcumque aliud cogitaret. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod ex hoc ipso quod mortaliter peccat, finem suum in creatura constituit. Et quia ad finem vita tota ordinatur, ideo ex hoc ipso totam vitam suam ordinat ad illud peccatum; et vellet perpetuo in peccato manere, si hoc sibi esset impune. Et hoc est quod Gregorius in 34. lib. Moral. cap. 16. cir. med. super illud Job. 41.: 'Aestimabit abyssum quasi senescentem,' dicit: 'Iniqui ideo cum fine deliquerunt, quia cum fine vixerunt; voluissent quippe sine fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in suis iniquitatibus permanere; nam magis appetunt peccare quam vivere."

Prob. III. Maxime convenit ut Deus sanctionem de se sufficientem et valde efficacem statuat, ne ejus legem homines transgrediantur et ut quemadmodum absoluta oppositio est inter malum et bonum, ita non idem tandem sit finis eorum, qui virtutem coluerunt, vel vitio servierunt. Atqui haec praestat poena aeterna. Ergo.

Ad prob. min. et declar. totius argumenti, notamus 1. Ardua est virtutis semita - humanae mentes admodum sunt in vitia pronae - sensuum illecebris homines vehementer alliciuntur - assidua opus est animi contentione, ne officia violentur - atrocia aliquando supplicia sunt sustinenda, mors ipsa contemnenda ut in officio persistamus - sine magnis virtutibus societates pereunt, etc. - His bene perpensis, patet, quod et infideles viderunt (Lucr. de nat. deor. l. 108.), quod sublata aeternitate poenarum, vix efficax superesset motivum ad homines constanter sub lege Dei continendos.

2. Notamus cum S. Hierony. (in Jon. c. 3.): "Si longos post circuitus atque infinitis saeculis omnium rerum restitutio fiet, et una dignitas militantium, quae distantia erit inter virginem et prostibulum? Quae differentia erit inter matrem Domini et (quod dictu quoque scelus est,) victimas libidinum publicarum? Idemne erit Gabriel et diabolus? Idem apostoli et daemones? Idem prophetae et pseudoprophetae? Idem martyres et persecutores? Finge quot libet annos, et tempora duplica, et infinitas aetates congere cruciatibus, si finis omnium similis est, praeteritum omne pro nihilo est, quia non quaerimus, quid aliquando fuerimus; sed quid semper futuri sumus."

Prob. IV. Potest certe Deus, suis omnibus attributis salvis, praestituere tempus, ultra quod nulla sit spes reliqua veniae obtinendae et quo elapso semper perseverabit peccatum. Atqui aequum est, ut quamdiu peccatum perseverat, perseveret et poena. Ergo.

Ad prob. et decl. hujus argumenti notamus 1. Nec potest ostendi Deum vel semel obstringi ad veniam peccantibus elargiendam: cur ergo teneretur semper?

2. Notamus cum S. Augustino (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 11.): "Cur iniquum sit, cum judices hujus mundi peccata multa gladio punientes, homines in aeternum ex societate vitae humanae exterminent, Dominum aeternae civitatis impios et hostes suos, qui indesinenter peccant, in aeternum ex civitate sua ejicere, et sub ira et maledictione ipsius et legis manere eos, qui impuri et injusti in Deum et proximum perpetuo malevoli sunt?"

3. Addit D. Thomas suppl. q. 99. a. 1.: "Quod autem poena, quam civitas mundana infligit perpetua non reputetur, hoc est per accidens, vel in quantum perpetuo homo non manet, vel in quantum etiam ipsa civitas deficit. Unde si homo in perpetuum viveret, poena exilii, vel servitutis, quae per legem humanam infertur, in eo perpetuo maneret."

4. Finis poenae praecipuus non est emendatio rei, sed reparatio ordinis; unde justum est poenam infligere quamdiu peccatum durat, etiamsi reus emendari nequeat. "Impiorum poenae," inquit D. Thomas l. c. ad 4., "in perpetuum duraturae non erunt omnino inutiles. Sunt enim utiles ad duo: primo ad hoc quod in eis divina justitia conservetur, quae est Deo accepta propter seipsam; unde Gregorius 4. Dialog. cap. 44. circ. med.: 'Omnipotens Deus, quia pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur; quia autem justus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non sedatur.' Secundo ad hoc sunt utiles ut de his electi gaudeant, cum in his Dei justitiam contemplantur, et dum se evasisse eas cognoscunt."

5. "Voluntatem," ait D. Thomas c. g. l. 4. c. 93., "a peccato mutari in bonum, non contingit nisi per gratiam Dei." Jamvero Deus nulla lege tenetur gratiam suam etiam damnatis elargiri - praesertim cum tam dives fuerit, in misericordia ut ea homines vitarent cum Filium suum Unigenitum dederit, etc."

Dices I: Juxta immutabilem justitiae ordinem, poena non debet gravitatem culpae excedere; atqui hoc fieret, si poena esset aeterna; siquidem culpae brevi temporis spatio commissae responderet poena sine termino. Ergo.

Resp. 1. Debet quidem esse inter culpam et poenam proportio; sed haec exigit, ut probavimus, aeternam poenam. - Nec obstat brevitas temporis, quo culpa committitur; semel enim commissa, nisi ex Dei gratia remittatur, semper manet: quamdiu autem culpa manet, debita, ut vidimus, est poena.

2. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 87. a. 3. ad 1., ait: "Sicut Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 11.) dicit, in nullo judicio requiritur ut poena adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, quandoque etiam morte; in qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium: et sic repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus."

Et Theodorus Abucarae Episcopus (Disput. 14. cont. Orig.): "Lex Dei hominumque leges, homicidam capitis damnantes, extremoque supplicio facinorosum aliquem afficientes, non unius in eum horae spatio animadvertunt; sed si morte quidem plectant, aeterno eum supplicio afficiunt, vel si verberent, diuturnum ei dolorem ex rebus inferunt. Quin tu quoque si adulterum quempiam cum uxore, filiave deprehenderes, non unius illum horae spatio puniendum, sed trucidandum censeres: quod quidem aeternum est hominum supplicium. Sed ipse quoque rerum naturae perinde se habent. Cum enim nobis ne frigidam, verbi gratia, bibamus aquam, neve quoque noxio cibi genere utamur, interdictum sit, in vetitum tamen nitamur, diuturnas nimirum poenas damus. Itaque saepe numero fit, ut ex frigidae potu, ignisve contactu, vel aceti usu, continuum morbum incurramus: atqui natura justissima est."

Dices II: Infinita est Dei bonitas, et infinita ejus misericordia; atqui cum his divinis attributis nequit poenarum aeternitas consistere: nam poenae aeternae Deum, earum auctorem, potius crudelem exhibent.

Resp. 1. Bonitas Dei relativa, seu benignitas, est sincera Dei voluntas communicandi felicitatem suis creaturis secundum earum naturam et consilia sapientiae suae. Eadem Dei sincera voluntas dicitur misericordia, quatenus tendit ad opitulandum creaturarum miseriae, eamque depellendam. Utrumque Dei attributum est infinitum in se; sed infinitum nequit esse in sui manifestatione in creaturis, siquidem effectus nequeunt esse nisi finiti. Quemadmodum autem Deus libere se manifestat ad extra, ita se libere manifestat eo gradu, quo vult. Unde Deus vere bonus et misericors est; omnium enim vult salutem, omnibus media ad eam necessaria subministrat, omnium miseriae in hac vita opitulatur; at si quis divinae bonitati et misericordiae resistens, mediis salutis abutitur, et seipsum constituit in perditionis statu; nequit certe Deo vitio verti quod ille in aeternum in perditionis statu perseveret, nisi aut divina benignitas uti caecus quidam affectus concipiatur, aut ipsa creatura jus habeat praescribendi gradum et modum, quo Deus illi suam bonitatem communicet. Quae quidem sunt absurdissima. Vid. etiam (n. 104. NOTA.)

2. Notamus cum S. Hieronymo (Comment. in c. 3. Jonae): "Scimus clementem esse Deum, nec qui peccatores sumus, crudelitate illius delectamur; sed legimus: 'Misericors et justus Dominus, et Deus noster miseretur.' Justitia Dei vallatur misericordia, et tali ad judicium ambitione procedit: sic parcit ut judicet, sic judicat ut misereatur. 'Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi: justitia et pax osculatae sunt.'" Vid. etiam D. Thomam 1. 2. q. 87. a. 3. ad 3.; 2. 2. q. 157. a. 2. ad 1.

652. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XLVIII. Reason, well consulted, not only detects nothing absurd in the dogma concerning the eternity of punishments, but supplies arguments which are especially able to commend it.

Proof I. It is especially fitting both to the principles of right reason and to the divine attributes that there be proportion between fault and punishment; but proportion of this kind shines forth especially in the eternal punishment of the damned. Therefore.

The minor is proved. Lethal sin has a certain infinite malice; therefore a punishment which is in some way infinite is especially proportioned to it. But eternal punishment is such. Therefore.

In order that the true force of this argument may be understood, we note, 1. with St. Thomas, I-II, question 87, article 4, body: "In sin there are two things: one of them is aversion from the immutable good, which is infinite, whence on this side sin is infinite; the other thing which is in sin is inordinate conversion to a mutable good, and on this side sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and also because the conversion itself is finite; for acts of a creature cannot be infinite."

3. The same holy Doctor says in the Supplement, question 99, article 1: "Through it, namely mortal fault, one sins against God, who is infinite. Hence since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because a creature is not capable of any infinite quality, it is required that it be at least infinite in duration."

Lest there be any place for cavils against this certain infinity of fault, we note with Lessius (On the Divine Perfections, book 13, chapter 26, nos. 118 and following): "The formal malice of sin consists not only in withdrawal from the rule of reason, but also in a certain injury which is inflicted upon God, which is found in every deadly sin. For all deadly sins agree in this, that they include a certain contempt of God, some greater, some lesser. In some sins God is more directly contemned, as in hatred of God, blasphemy, and similar things, which are more directly against the honor of God; in others only indirectly and interpretatively, insofar as the divine law is violated and contemned in a grave matter, and consequently the legislator himself, his friendship, all his promises, and all his threats. From this it follows that deadly sin contains infinite malice, not indeed absolutely and altogether, but respectively. The reason is that the greater the majesty which is contemned, the graver the offense; but the majesty of God, which is contemned by deadly sin, is infinite; therefore the offense too has a certain infinity. But the reason why absolute infinity in the ratio of malice is not concluded by that argument is that the object is not attained adequately, whence it does not adequately flow into the act, nor does it fully bestow on it its own infinity. For just as God can without end be loved more and more perfectly, so also by sin he can without end be more and more hated and contemned. Yet by this very fact, that he is judged to be contemned absolutely, the act contracts a certain infinity of malice, as being of a higher order with respect to all good works. For the malignity of deadly sin is so great that, placed in the balance of divine justice, it would outweigh all the good works of all the Saints, even if these were a thousand times more numerous and greater than in reality they are. This consideration is very terrible. Nor should this seem wonderful, because all the good works by which God is honored by the Saints, although considered in themselves they are of the greatest estimation, and they themselves on account of them are worthy of eternal life, nevertheless with respect to the divine majesty are like nothing. For no favor is done to him through all these things, to whose majesty and benefits all these things are owed, and not these only, but infinitely more and greater things. Therefore all those things are nothing great to God. But to be contemned by his creature, who is bound to him by infinite titles, and who ought to render to him infinite love and honor if he could - this is esteemed greatest, as being maximally repugnant to his majesty and benefits. Hence it is esteemed by God as greater in the ratio of evil than all good works are in the ratio of good; and it would afflict God more, if he were capable of sorrow, than all good works would make him rejoice. Hence the holy Fathers teach that no pure creature could have satisfied God, and accordingly that it was necessary, for just satisfaction, that God become man. From these things a reason can be brought forward why deadly sin is punished with eternal punishment. For if its malignity is so great that it could not have been compensated and equaled from equality by any good works of pure nature, but for this it was necessary that God be incarnate so that a condign satisfaction might be exhibited to divine justice, it is not wonderful if it is said to merit eternal punishment. For that which is so evil that it cannot be compensated and equaled by any goods, however long continued in time, merits a punishment longer than any finite time, and therefore eternal; and this per se and directly by reason of the malice which is in the act, not because the sinner cannot make satisfaction for it, or restore himself in that order from which he has fallen, or repair spiritual life, or remove the stain. For although all these things concur in deadly sin, nevertheless the proper reason why eternal punishment is owed to it must not be sought from these, but from the very malice of the act, from which that impotence also follows, just as in other sins the measure of punishment is to be established from the measure of fault, not from the impotence of making satisfaction."

Proof II. It is especially fitting that one who sins for eternity be punished for eternity; but one who commits lethal sin by turning himself away from God, as far as lies in him, sins for eternity. Therefore.

This is explained from St. Thomas in the Supplement, same place: "Gregory says in book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 44, before the middle: 'It pertains to the great justice of the judge that those should never lack punishment who in this life never wished to lack sin.' And if it is objected that some who sin mortally propose sometimes to change their life for the better, and so according to this they would not seem worthy of eternal punishment, it must be said, according to some, that Gregory speaks of the will which is manifested by deed. For one who falls into mortal sin by his own will places himself in a state from which he cannot be rescued unless divinely helped. Hence from the very fact that he wills to sin, he consequently wills to remain perpetually in sin. For man is a spirit going, namely into sin, and not returning by himself, Psalm 77:39. Just as if someone threw himself into a pit from which he could not leave unless helped, it could be said that he had willed to remain there eternally, whatever else he might think. Or it can be said, and better, that from the very fact that he sins mortally, he constitutes his end in the creature. And because the whole of life is ordered to the end, therefore from this very fact he orders his whole life to that sin; and he would will to remain perpetually in sin if this were unpunished for him. And this is what Gregory says in book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 16, around the middle, on that saying of Job 41, 'He will esteem the abyss as growing old': 'The wicked sinned with an end because they lived with an end; for they would have wished to live without end so that they could have remained without end in their iniquities; for they desire to sin more than to live.'"

Proof III. It is especially fitting that God establish a sanction sufficient of itself and very efficacious, lest men transgress his law, and so that, just as there is an absolute opposition between evil and good, the same end should not finally belong to those who have cultivated virtue and those who have served vice. But eternal punishment accomplishes this. Therefore.

For proof of the minor and explanation of the whole argument, we note: 1. The path of virtue is arduous; human minds are very prone to vices; men are vehemently enticed by the allurements of the senses; constant exertion of soul is needed lest duties be violated; at times atrocious punishments must be sustained and death itself contemned so that we may persist in duty; without great virtues societies perish, etc. These things being well weighed, it is clear - and even unbelievers saw this (Lucr., On the Nature of the Gods, book 1, no. 108) - that if the eternity of punishments were removed, scarcely any efficacious motive would remain for holding men constantly under the law of God.

2. We note with St. Jerome on Jonah, chapter 3: "If after long circuits and infinite ages there will be the restoration of all things, and one dignity of those who serve as soldiers, what distance will there be between a virgin and a prostitute? What difference will there be between the Mother of the Lord and, what is even a crime to say, victims of public lusts? Will Gabriel and the devil be the same? The Apostles and demons the same? The prophets and pseudo-prophets the same? Martyrs and persecutors the same? Imagine as many years as you like, double the times, and heap up infinite ages with torments: if the end of all is similar, everything past is as nothing, because we do not ask what we once were, but what we are always going to be."

Proof IV. God certainly can, with all his attributes preserved, set beforehand a time beyond which no remaining hope of obtaining pardon exists, and after which sin will always persevere. But it is equitable that as long as sin perseveres, punishment also should persevere. Therefore.

For proof and explanation of this argument we note: 1. Nor can it be shown that God is bound even once to bestow pardon on sinners; why then would he be bound always?

2. We note with St. Augustine (City of God, book 21, chapter 11): "Why should it be unjust, when the judges of this world, punishing many crimes by the sword, remove men forever from the society of human life, for the Lord of the eternal city to cast out forever from his city the impious and his enemies, who sin unceasingly, and for those who are impure and unjust toward God and neighbor and perpetually malevolent to remain under his wrath and curse and that of the law?"

3. St. Thomas adds in the Supplement, question 99, article 1: "But that the punishment which a worldly city inflicts is not reckoned perpetual happens accidentally, either insofar as man does not remain perpetually, or insofar as even the city itself fails. Hence if man were to live forever, the punishment of exile or servitude which is inflicted by human law would remain perpetually in him."

4. The chief end of punishment is not the amendment of the guilty party, but the reparation of order; hence it is just to inflict punishment as long as sin endures, even if the guilty one cannot be amended. "The punishments of the impious," says St. Thomas in the same place, reply 4, "which will endure forever will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two things: first, that divine justice be preserved in them, which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory, Dialogues, book 4, chapter 44, around the middle: 'Almighty God, because he is kind, is not fed by the torment of the wretched; but because he is just, he is not forever quieted from the vengeance of the wicked.' Second, they are useful so that the elect may rejoice over them, when they contemplate God's justice in them and when they know that they have escaped them."

5. "That the will be changed from sin to good," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 93, "does not happen except through the grace of God." Now God is held by no law to bestow his grace even on the damned, especially since he was so rich in mercy that, in order that men might avoid these punishments, he gave his Only-Begotten Son, etc."

You will say I: According to the immutable order of justice, punishment ought not exceed the gravity of fault; but this would happen if punishment were eternal, since to fault committed in a brief space of time there would correspond punishment without terminus. Therefore.

I answer: 1. There must indeed be proportion between fault and punishment; but this, as we have proved, requires eternal punishment. Nor does the briefness of the time in which the fault is committed stand in the way; for once committed, unless it is remitted by God's grace, it always remains. But as long as fault remains, punishment is owed, as we have seen.

2. Hence St. Thomas says in I-II, question 87, article 3, reply 1: "As Augustine says in City of God, book 21, chapter 11, in no judgment is it required that punishment be equal to fault according to duration. For it is not because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment that it is punished with a momentary punishment, but sometimes with perpetual imprisonment or exile, sometimes even with death; in death one does not consider the delay of the killing, but rather that one is forever taken away from the society of the living. And thus in its own way it represents the eternity of punishment inflicted divinely."

And Theodore Abu Qurrah the Bishop, disputation 14 against Origen: "The law of God and the laws of men, condemning a murderer to death and afflicting some criminal with the final punishment, do not punish him for the space of one hour; but if they punish by death, they afflict him with an eternal punishment, or if they beat him, they bring a long-lasting pain upon him from things. Indeed you too, if you found some adulterer with your wife or daughter, would judge that he should not be punished for the space of one hour, but should be killed; and this indeed is the eternal punishment of men. But the very things of nature also stand in the same way. For when it has been forbidden to us, for example, to drink cold water, or to use some harmful kind of food, and nevertheless we strive toward the forbidden thing, we certainly pay long-lasting penalties. And so it often happens that from drinking cold water, or contact with fire, or use of vinegar, we incur a continual illness. But nature is most just."

You will say II: The goodness of God is infinite, and his mercy is infinite; but the eternity of punishments cannot consist with these divine attributes, for eternal punishments exhibit God, their author, rather as cruel.

I answer: 1. The relative goodness of God, or benignity, is God's sincere will of communicating happiness to his creatures according to their nature and the counsels of his wisdom. The same sincere will of God is called mercy insofar as it tends to assist the misery of creatures and to drive it away. Both attributes of God are infinite in themselves, but the infinite cannot be infinite in its manifestation in creatures, since effects can only be finite. But just as God freely manifests himself outwardly, so he freely manifests himself in the degree in which he wills. Hence God is truly good and merciful; for he wills the salvation of all, supplies to all the means necessary for it, and assists the misery of all in this life. But if someone, resisting divine goodness and mercy, abuses the means of salvation and establishes himself in a state of perdition, it certainly cannot be charged as a fault to God that he perseveres eternally in the state of perdition, unless either divine benignity is conceived as a certain blind affection, or the creature itself has a right to prescribe the degree and mode in which God communicates his goodness to it. These things are indeed most absurd. See also no. 104, Note.

2. We note with St. Jerome, commentary on Jonah, chapter 3: "We know that God is merciful, and we who are sinners do not delight in his cruelty; but we read: 'The Lord is merciful and just, and our God shows mercy.' The justice of God is surrounded by mercy, and proceeds to judgment with such ambition: he so spares that he judges, he so judges that he has mercy. 'Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace have kissed.'" See also St. Thomas, I-II, question 87, article 3, reply 3; II-II, question 157, article 2, reply 1.