Annotation CCXLIX

”Whom he foreknew, and predestinated.” — Romans 8:29

Whether future things are the cause of the divine foreknowledge, or the contrary.

Origen, [in] the seventh book of the commentaries on the epistle to the Romans, seems to hand down that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of future things, but that future things are the cause of God’s foreknowledge — writing thus: “For although we think of Foreknowledge according to the common understanding, [yet] not on that account will a thing be [future] because God knows it [to be] future; but because it is future, it is known by God before it comes to be. For although, for example’s sake, we feign that God does not foreknow something, [that thing] without doubt would [still] be future — as, for instance, Judas was made a traitor: and the prophets foretold that this would thus be. Not, therefore, because the prophets foretold [it], did Judas on that account betray [Christ]: but because he was going to be a traitor, the prophets foretold those [things] which he, out of the wickedness of his [own] purpose, was going to do.” Augustine is thought to be opposed to this opinion, [in] book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 13, saying: “[God knew] ALL creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, not because they are, [and] therefore knew [them]: for he was not ignorant of [the things] which he was going to create. Because, therefore, he knew, he created; not because he created, [did he] know; nor did he know [them] created otherwise than [he knew them] to be created. For nothing accrued to his wisdom from them; but, they existing as it behooved, and when it behooved, that [wisdom] remained as it was. Whence [it is said] in Ecclesiasticus: ‘Before they were created, all things were known to him; so also after they were completed.’” St. Thomas, in the first volume of the Summa, question 14, article 8, says that Origen speaks of the knowledge of simple cognizance, to which the approbation of the will is not yet joined; but that Augustine spoke of the knowledge [to which] the purpose of the will [is] joined. But [as to that] which was said by Origen — that God foreknows some [things] for this [reason], because they are future — he [Aquinas] says [it] is to be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of being. For it follows, if some [things] are future, that God foreknew them: yet future things are not the cause that God knows [them].