Annotation CCX

”And he will give you another Paraclete.” — John 14:16

Whether all believers are certain that they are in grace.

John Ferus, in the commentary on this passage, weighing for what reason the Holy Spirit is called Paraclete, among other [things] which he had brought forward to this sense, had also assigned that cause: that he [the Spirit] certifies believers, as a pledge and earnest [arrhabo]. Which assertion Domingo de Soto reprehends, as flattering the Lutherans, who assert that all believers are certain that they are in grace. But Michael [Medina] refutes his reprehension with the following confutation:

“THIS opinion our Censor [Soto] calls a ‘Lutheran perversion’ — as if he would not have used a milder word (one which would not, by its novelty, express [his] zeal) in judging the opinion of a catholic man, whatever it might be. But such is, of old, the disposition of man, that before he understands a matter, he rushes headlong into the worse opinion. But now hear the reasons by which [Soto], to be triumphed over, insults the author: ‘ALTHOUGH,’ he says, ‘as many as have faith may have some testimony that they are the sons of God, yet not a certainty. SECONDLY, heretics think themselves more securely to be in grace than some just [men do], although they are deceived. THIRDLY, finally: since — although the Holy Spirit, Paul being author, bears testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God — yet whether that testimony be from an angel of Satan, who sometimes transfigures himself into an angel of light, we know not.’ These [things] Soto [says]. But by us it must first be discussed in how many ways certitude is distinguished, and then, indeed, of what certitude Paul and the author [Ferus] speak.

SINCE, therefore, certitude is nothing else than a certain firmness of mind, by which the cognitive powers, adhering to their knowables, are rendered stable — from the threefold means by which this is wont to be done, the wise have found a threefold certitude.¹ For there is a certain [certitude] which, because it is sought from evidence, they have called the certitude of evidence. Which they then distinguished [as] threefold: namely, of a principle, of a conclusion, and that which is derived not from the evidence of reason, but from a rightly-disposed sense. The first they say [is] such as is had concerning this principle, ‘Every whole is greater than its part.’ The second, such as [the certitude] which is possessed, after reasoning, from this conclusion (derived from that principle), ‘The whole world is greater than the earth.’ The third, finally, they say [is] that which is produced from a sensible [object] duly brought near — as that the wall is white, which I see close [at hand], or the iron [is] hot, which I touch.² Of the second kind is the certitude which — because it descends from belief, or from the evidence of the thing — it has pleased our theologians to call the certitude of faith. For this [certitude] is not, like the others, produced first from the knowledge of the thing, then from adhesion, but immediately from adhesion — by which the mind, compelled by credible authority, adheres [to what is believed]. And this too they established [as] twofold, from a twofold faith: one which descends from divine authority, another which [descends] from human. Of the first they bring forward, [as] an example, the certitude which is had by Christians concerning the articles of faith. Of the second, that which is possessed concerning the existence of Rome, on account of the authority of a trustworthy man.³ There is, finally, a certitude of the third kind, which they call moral and human certitude — which, although it is much more imperfect and weaker than the preceding [kinds], is yet called certitude, because in its own kind it confirms and establishes the mind in the knowable. For in mortal [i.e. earthly] things that exact certitude cannot be had which is either produced from the perfect knowledge of the thing, or flows from the very constitution and firmness of the mind, such as the preceding [kinds] are held [to be]. But this moral certitude — by as much as natural things excel moral things in constancy and invariability — by so much is it inferior to the certitude of evidence, which flows from them [natural things]. And it is altogether inferior to the certitude of faith, since between the mean of each certitude there is no proportion. Assuredly natural and moral certitude are as far distant from each other as [are] moral and natural evidence, from which they are immediately born. But the certitude of faith, since it is not derived from evidence, nor depends on any natural principle by reason of which it might be comparable [to them], is in no way comparable to it.⁴ But this moral certitude is divided into that which descends from the strongest arguments and the firmest testimony (which, retaining the generic name, is called ‘moral evidence’), and into that which is derived from apparent indications [indicia]. Of the first [kind], we are certain that adultery is evil — because both by human reasoning and by the authority of the human race its perniciousness and malice is proved. But of the second, we are certain that a man was slain by Socrates after inveterate hatreds — because, although the same

—although we did not see the same Socrates attacking [him], yet we saw Socrates stand near the newly-prostrated corpse with a drawn sword.

Of which certitude the author speaks.

And let these [things] be said concerning the first [point]. From which, with little labor, the second is had: of which certitude, I say, the author [Ferus] and holy Scripture speak in this matter, and as often as they attribute to us a certitude concerning our predestination, or concerning the obtaining of the divine friendship on account of some works of ours. For that certitude of evidence — since it descends from sense, or from evident reasoning, which have no place in [things] to be believed — is doubtless far from the opinion of the author and of Paul; for that [certitude] is proper to those things which reason alone measures. But neither can we, in this [present] state, be certain, by that [certitude] which is called the certitude of faith, that we have obtained justice, or the divine sonship. For concerning this it is most truly handed down that a man knows not whether he be worthy of hatred or of love⁵ — against the perfidy of the German heretics. And elsewhere, “If I shall be innocent,” said Job, “this very [thing] my soul shall not know.”⁶ Finally, that species of moral certitude which rests not on conjectures, but on arguments and reasons — although it is otherwise most usual, and most frequent in holy Scripture — yet by it we cannot be certain that we have the Spirit of God in us, because of this [there] are no arguments worthy of faith, nor testimonies, by which it might be established in the mind of man. Whether, therefore, Paul [said] that the Holy Spirit bears witness, etc., or Peter handed down that we are certified through the Holy Spirit concerning the divine sonship — [it is] because the just, by a certain internal inspiration, perceive the presence of the Holy Spirit, and a certain special instinct of divine sonship, not by trifling conjectures. But that a most probable conjecture and persuasion of mind (such as this is) is called “certitude” in the Scriptures⁷ — [this] the Censor seems not to have sufficiently understood, [as] is gathered from many passages both of the Old and of the New Testament. But let it suffice to have adduced a few for [the] many, since the human custom of speaking too makes this manifest. That wise Judith, therefore, about to deceive Holofernes, thus making words concerning the Bethulians, said before him: “And since the children of Israel know that they have offended their God, thy trembling is upon them. Moreover, famine also has invaded them, and by the dryness of water they are already reckoned among the dead. Finally, they ordain this, that they should kill their cattle, and drink the blood of them, and the holy [things] of the Lord their God, which God commanded not to be touched, in the corn, the wine, and the oil.” And thereupon: “THEREFORE, since they do these [things], it is certain that they will be given over to destruction.” Moreover, the Apostle, writing to Timothy, “I give thanks,” he says, “to my God, whom I serve,” etc., and afterward:⁸ “Being mindful of thy tears, that I may be filled with joy, receiving the remembrance of that unfeigned faith which is in thee, which also dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois and thy mother Eunice; but I am certain that [it is] in thee too.” In these passages, doubtless, “certitude” is called a certain conjecture, which is derived not from natural evidence, nor from a firm adhesion of the mind through faith, but from a probable conjecture. From these [things], thus, it will now be lawful to rise up against the Censor. That firmness and adhesion of mind which flows from probable conjectures is, by the catholic manner of speaking, called “certitude.” Therefore [that] which contributes probable signs of the salvation to be obtained,

certifies concerning the obtaining of the same salvation. But the Holy Spirit gives us those signs and conjectures: therefore he certifies us concerning the divine sonship, and that we shall obtain salvation — which the author taught. And what? Does not the Apostle everywhere insinuate this? Assuredly to this tends [that] which he says to the Galatians:⁹ “God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father.” And [that] which the Censor had brought forward from the same apostle, “For the Spirit itself renders testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God” — for what else is it, [that] the Spirit of the Son is sent into our hearts, crying, “Abba, Father,” than that, by a certain internal paternal whisper, a certain filial confidence is begotten in us, [namely] that we are called into the lot and inheritance of the sons? “We would not dare,” says Jerome upon these words, “to say, ‘Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name,’ except from the consciousness of the Spirit dwelling in us.” And again, what else is it, [that] the Spirit bears witness to our spirit that we are the sons of God, than that, by a certain hidden insinuation, by a certain divine foretelling [prælagium], we conjecture ourselves to have been summoned into the divine sonship and the heavenly inheritance (which is the lot of the sons)?

BUT, SAYS THE CENSOR, a man is not certain whether that testimony be from an angel of Satan. But he thought far otherwise who said,¹⁰ “We know that his testimony is true.” And how, I ask, shall the creature not recognize the loving speech of its creator? Or how shall the sheep of Christ not hear the voice of their shepherd, and [his] internal whistling? or in what way does a son not recognize the speech of [his] most dear parent? Assuredly, in John, Christ cried out:¹¹ “He who is of God hears the words of God.” Those, therefore, to whom the Spirit bears witness that they are the sons of God, will hear the internal cry of God, [and] will discern his testimony from a Satanic murmur, just as a lamb discerns the bleating of its bleating mother from the bleating of the other sheep. Nay, and to this, without doubt, seems to look [that] which Paul, with apostolic confidence, boasted — that he was certain that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, etc., could move him from, and disjoin him from, the charity of Christ. For from these affections, which — crucified together with Christ — he experienced in himself; from that most close conjunction of mind with the same [Christ]; from that admirable and divine metamorphosis, by which he had been wholly converted and transformed into Christ; and finally from the growing-old and death of the old man, which he most certainly experienced in himself — so great a certitude of the divine adoption and of the salvation to be obtained flowed [in him], that it thrust him into these stupendous hyperboles. And in this sense Augustine expounds this passage, in the book On the Morals of the Church, and Theophylact, in the commentary on the same words — saying that these [things] came forth from the highest love of Christ, which he experienced in himself. Into our sense, indeed, the same words of the apostle Pope Liberius uses, in the epistle to all the faithful, transferring the same [words] to himself and to others, and at the same time expounding the apostle, when he says: “But WE ARE CONFIDENT concerning you, most dear brethren, of better [things], and [things] nearer to salvation; because neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor [things] present, nor [things] to come, nor power, nor height, nor any other creature (the teacher of the nations

—[the teacher of the nations] teaching [it]) could separate you from the charity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and from the right faith which is in him.” Thus far Liberius. Where thou seest a passage of the apostle to the Hebrews adduced to the same opinion. And no wonder: for the sense of both is the same, except that to the Romans the Apostle was speaking of himself, but to the Hebrews of others; for the word πείθω, which is placed in both passages, is the same as “I am confident, I am certain,” etc. And [that] thou mayest see the apostle making words concerning this moral certitude, he at once subjoins the cause why he had persuaded himself of this: “For God,” he says, “is not unjust, that he should forget your work, and labor, and love — [you] who have ministered to the saints, and [still] minister.” From the rectitude of the divine justice, doubtless, the apostle was persuaded that the Hebrews possessed [things] near and close to salvation — which are those [things] which dispose us toward the state of perpetual salvation. But if it was lawful for the apostle to pronounce this of a whole people, why shall it not be lawful, without the suspicion of Lutheran perversion, for a catholic man to say of the just that they are certified through the Spirit concerning the divine sonship — especially with the support of apostolic doctrine? etc. Thus far Medina.