[Margin: A very necessary admonition.]

[I.] What I have resolved to observe, in this so celebrated and arduous controversy, with the whole effort of my mind—the same I should wish to be obtained from the Reader: namely, that all the arguments which are wont, or shall seem able, to be brought either for the Earth’s motion or against it, be weighed in a most equal balance and with a sincere affection toward the truth; and that as much weight as can be be added to them; and that the arguments be unfolded one by one (which, often very many heaped together in one as it were sorites, confound the mind); and that with equal indifference, the prejudice of a presumed opinion being set aside, the responses to the arguments be balanced—the final and decisive verdict being held off until the very end of this disputation. Wherefore I shall not be loath to restrict the arguments, collected into syllogistic form, wherever it shall be needful.

First Argument, from the Figure of the Earth; where, in passing, [it treats] of the Figure of the Heaven

[II.] Copernicus went before the rest in this argument (bk. 1, ch. 8) with those words: “Whether, therefore, the world be finite or infinite, let us leave [that] to the disputation of the Natural Philosophers: holding this for certain, that the Earth, enclosed by its poles (that is, hemmed in by mountains), is bounded by a globose surface. Why, then, do we still hesitate to grant to it the mobility congruent by nature to its [own] form, rather than that the whole world should glide, whose end is unknown and cannot be known?” As if he should say: the diurnal motion of the prime mobile, if it must be conceded to one of the two bodies—namely either to the Earth or to the supreme heaven, which contains the whole world in itself—is rather to be attributed to that one which certainly has a spherical figure (as being, on account of the lack of angles, most apt by its own nature for the motion of whirling), than to that one whose figure is unknown. And it is certainly established that the Earth—nothing standing in the way of the roughness and very slight height of the peaks or mountains—is everywhere spherical, as is clear from what was said by us (bk. 2, ch. 1); but the supreme heaven the Stoics thought spherical (in Plutarch, bk. 2 of the Placita, ch. 1), [and] Pythagoras and Plato (in Laërtius, in the Lives), Cleomedes (bk. 1 of the Cyclic Theory), Pliny (bk. 2, ch. 2), Aristotle (bk. 2 On the Heaven, ch. 4), Ptolemy (bk. 1, ch. 3).

[Margin: Whether the heaven is spherical or not is uncertain.]

But the arguments of Aristotle, Cleomedes, Pliny, Ptolemy, and others, which are adduced for the roundness [of the heaven], are only probable; of which kind are those [drawn] from the mobility, the capacity, and the dignity of the spherical figure, or from a certain similitude with the divine Immensity, with the void space, etc. But those which are drawn from circular motion militate only for concavity, not for convexity, and already involve the very thing which we now call into controversy: and so the argument thence drawn for the finite extension of the outermost heaven and of the world has no force in the present question. Nor is it open from the sacred letters that the last heaven, as to its outermost surface, is everywhere round. For those words (Ecclesiasticus 24): “I alone have compassed the circuit of the heaven,” and “the things which are contained within the ambit of the heaven”—can be understood of the concave visible surface of the heaven, or of the “circuit” broadly taken for a boundary closing on every side some space (as one is said to have gone round the whole city, even if it perchance has a square figure).

[Margin: The opinions of the Fathers about the figure of the heaven.]

Wherefore, that the heaven is only hemispherical, or expanded over the earth in the manner of a vault, an arch, or a tent, the Saints Justin (q. 59 & 130), Basil (Homily 1 on the Hexaemeron), Ambrose (bk. 1 of the Hexaemeron, ch. 6), Chrysostom (On the incomprehensible nature of God, ch. 2), and likewise Theophylact and Primasius (on the Epistle to the Hebrews), Theodoret (in the book On Matter and the World), Lactantius (bk. 3 On false wisdom, ch. 24), Euthymius (on Psalm 103), and Procopius, Severianus, and Acacius (on ch. 1 of Genesis) thought. Nay, St. Augustine (bk. 2 On Genesis to the letter, ch. 9) doubted whether it were not rather a human fiction of those saying the heaven is everywhere spherical—though afterward he concedes it: to say nothing of the profane authors who (in Plutarch, bk. 2 of the Placita, ch. 2) gave to the world the figure of a [spinning-]top or of an egg, or another diverse from the spherical. Although more other Fathers favor the roundness of the heaven—especially St. [Gregory] Nazianzen (Oration 4, Against Julian, and there Elias the interpreter; and in the Oration On Holy Baptism, and there Nicetas), St. Hilary (on Psalm 135), St. Ambrose (Sermon 12 on Psalm 118), St. Jerome (bk. 11 on Isaiah), St. Augustine (on Psalm 103, and bk. 1 On Genesis to the letter, ch. 20, and bk. 2, ch. 9), Bede (in the book On the creation of the six days), and with them Alensis [Alexander of Hales] (part 2, q. 50) and the Scholastics (on [Sentences] bk. 2, dist. 14). Whatever may be the case about the Empyrean—which some thought round, some square or cubic, as I said (this bk. 9, sect. 1, q. 6, ch. 1, num. 31); for there we taught that it is held [to be] immovable, but we are speaking of the heaven which, at least as to appearance, is held [to be] mobile. Wherefore, even if the world be supposed finite, it is nevertheless uncertain whether it be spherical on every side; by how much the more, if it be uncertain whether it be finite or not—for that it is not infinite can be demonstrated by no natural arguments, since we once maintained (in the Physical disputations) that an actually Infinite magnitude can be given; but that a figure is repugnant to an infinite body (as being [something] terminating and bounding it) so many affirm that they cannot be convicted of the opposite. But enough has been digressed by us on the occasion of this argument, which—yet in very few words—William Gilbert took up from the spherical figure of the earth (bk. 6 On the Magnet, ch. 3), Kepler (in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, p. 110), Origanus (in the dedication of the Ephemerides), and Gassendi (Epistle 2, On impressed motion, p. 112). At whom indeed I wonder, [for] having numbered this argument among the necessary [ones], saying: “It seems worthy of consideration that, if the Earth had been established by its own nature for resting, it would doubtless have obtained either a pyramidal or a cubic form, not, as it has, an orbicular [one]; [a form] whose cause [is] as well-fitted for use toward motion, so it seems thoroughly to be moved by its own nature.”

[Margin: A pre-emption of the objection [instance].]

[III.] Nor say that by this argument more is inferred than the Copernicans would wish—namely, that all the bodies of the world which the Copernicans shall have conceded to be globose (of which kind are the whole elementary sphere, and the globes of the Planets and of the Fixed [stars]) ought to be moved by a motion of whirling about their own center. For they will answer, either by conceding to them this whirling—that they may have hence likewise a cause of the scintillation in the most distant Fixed [stars], or for other causes, on account of which this whirling has been admitted by some in all the planets except the Moon, as we said (bk. 3, ch. 4, and bk. 7, sect. 1, ch. 3, schol. 3, and ch. 7, num. 12); but in the Moon [the whirling is] not admitted by those who move it by a simple Eccentric, because otherwise it would not always turn the same spots toward us, to the same region; and in turn, on account of this very phase, the motion of whirling must be admitted by those who think it is moved by an Epicycle carried by an Eccentric. But as to the whole elementary sphere, they will deny that it is necessary that the diurnal motion be attributed to one of the two (namely either to the earth or to the supreme air and fire), and [will deny] that [the elementary sphere] concurs with the Earth in this hypothetical necessity, so that this motion is attributed altogether to one of the two.

[Margin: The hypothetical form of the aforesaid argument.]

[IV.] The form, therefore, of the aforesaid argument can be either hypothetical or categorical (absolute). The hypothetical is of this kind: “If the motion of the diurnal whirling must necessarily be attributed either to the Heaven or to the Earth, it is rather to be attributed to the Earth than to the heaven. But the motion of the diurnal whirling must necessarily be attributed either to the heaven or to the Earth. Therefore, etc.” The Major is now sufficiently established, because such a motion is rather to be attributed to that [body] which is certainly known to have a figure by its own nature apt for this whirling, than to that body which either has not such a figure, or [of which] it is not certainly established whether it has it or not; but it is certainly established that the Earth has such a figure, while about the heaven it is doubtful. The Minor is sufficiently plain,

[…continues on p. 312 (PDF 347) with the catchword “tet”: ”…[is sufficiently] plain” — the proof of the Minor (the diurnal motion must belong to one of the two), then the categorical form and Riccioli’s reply to this First Argument.]

(printed p. 312 — within Chapter V: the First Argument is completed and answered with Riccioli’s three Responses, denying that the spherical figure is either necessary for whirling or given to the Earth for that end. Then the Second Argument — the absurdity of the Prime Mobile snatching the vast heavens while the tiny Earth rests (Maestlin, Kepler, Galileo) — is stated in form, and Riccioli’s reply begins.)

[Header: BOOK IX. SECTION IV. — 312]

—plain, because the world is adequately divided into Heaven and Earth—comprehending certain Elements either under the name of “heaven” or under the name of “Earth,” and under [the name of] heaven the celestial bodies; nor does it appear to what other body the daily appearance of the diurnal whirling could be ascribed.

[Margin: First Response to the Argument.]

[V.] It can be answered, first, by conceding the Major and its proof, on the supposition that this motion necessarily comes about by a whirling of some body—that is, a motion of it about its own center, really distinct from the other motions; but by denying [it] if it does not so necessarily come about, but its appearance can be saved by a translation of the body wholly from place to place. For the diurnal motion (which is called [the motion] of the prime mobile) can be attributed both to the individual globes of the Planets and to the individual fixed stars—[each] led around through the fluid heaven by its own movers severally, without any whirling of the Heavens to whose motion they [would otherwise] be moved. But because it is more probable that the Planets indeed are moved thus, yet that the Fixed [stars] are moved to the motion and whirling of the eighth sphere—or at least together with the whirling of the Firmament—rather than the individual non-wandering [stars] [being each carried] in a liquid heaven (as we said, sect. 2, ch. 3): therefore [this response is the less likely one].

[Margin: Second Response.]

[VI.] It is answered, secondly, by conceding the Major proposition and its confirmation indeed, if all else be equal; but denying [it] if [things be] unequal, and other reasons prevail over—or at least equal—this reason drawn from the aptitude for the motion of whirling [taken] from the roundness of the figure. For from all the arguments (at least taken together) which we shall bring below against this diurnal motion of the Earth, there rises up a reason prevailing over, or equipollent to, this [reason] of which we were speaking.

[Margin: Third Response.]

[VII.] It is answered, thirdly, by denying the Major—and conceding its proof indeed, if that aptitude [arising] from the figure for whirling be necessary, so that what lacks it is altogether incapable of whirling; or [if it be] useful indeed, but ordained for that [whirling] per se or chiefly: but otherwise denying the proof of the Major. Now in truth the spherical figure was not necessary for this whirling, because the diurnal motion did not have to be made either upon some plane, nor within some solid body enclosing the mobile and resisting it (if it were angular), but [it occurs] either in the air, or in the liquid aether, or in the ethereal breeze, with nothing resisting. Nor, again, was this figure bestowed by God upon the land-and-water globe for this end chiefly—since it was not granted even for this [end] (as those must say who deny this motion to it)—but that, by a mass and weight everywhere duly tempered, it might retain its own equilibrium, nay, even the equilibrium of the Seas, lest otherwise the waters, not equally distant from the center but higher than others, should rush in headlong course to the depths; and that living things—especially men—might enjoy the survey of the whole celestial hemisphere, and that it might lie open to the celestial influences everywhere equally and by an ordered succession through its circuit; and for many other causes, which it is not necessary to recount one by one. Especially since I am sufficiently certain that the Copernicans, even if the Earth were not at all round, would not on that account deny it the diurnal motion; and accordingly that it is not rightly denied to the Eighth sphere [either], even if it be not certain that it is round on the outside; granted that, if this whirling be conceded to it, its roundness is not improbably confirmed from that [whirling]. And hence can appear the response to the aforesaid Argument, if it be put forward without the hypothesis.

[Margin: The absolute form of the Argument, and the Response.]

[VIII.] For it could be said absolutely: “The diurnal revolution is to be attributed rather to that one of the two bodies which is certainly spherical, than to that which is not—or is not certainly established to be—spherical, etc.” For to this Major proposition any of the three responses adduced can be applied, but especially the second and the third.

Second Argument, from the Mobility of the snatchable Earth to the motion of the Prime Mobile

[Margin: The Argument of Maestlin and Kepler.]

[IX.] “Not unjustly” (the words are Kepler’s, in the Epitome of Astronomy, bk. 1, p. 106) “does Maestlin too ask this” (namely in the preface to the First Narration of Rheticus), “how it can come about that, the whole System of the World being whirled about—no orb of it, not the sphere of fire (if there be any), not the upper Region of the air, excepted—this single little globe, whose diameter is less than the twenty-thousandth part of the diameter of the world, should not be snatched round together [with it]?” “How can it come about,” says Maestlin, “that, the whole system of the world being whirled about, this single tiny point should not be turned round?” But still more explicitly Galileo brings forward this same [point], in his 7th instance, by which he introduces [an argument] for the diurnal motion of the earth (Dialogue 1, On the System of the World, Latin p. 86).

[Margin: And of Galileo.]

For he says: “If we attribute the diurnal conversion to the highest heaven, we must establish it to be of so great a power that it snatches along with it the innumerable multitude of the fixed stars—all of them vastest bodies, and not a little larger than the Earth—and moreover all the spheres of the Planets, although both these and those by their own nature are moved in the contrary direction. Nay, besides, it is necessary to concede that the Element of Fire and the greater part of the air are snatched along [too], and that only the small globe of the Earth, by a pertinacious rest, resists so great a power. Which matter, in my judgment, has much of difficulty: nor can I see how the Earth—a pendent body, equally balanced about its own center, indifferent toward motion and rest, surrounded by an encompassing liquid—ought not itself too to yield and be whirled round along [with the rest]. But such obstacles we do not find, if we attribute the motion to the Earth, [it being] a most minute body, and, in respect of the Universe, imperceptible, and so unfit to bring any force upon the Universe.” But in these words many [things] are involved and presupposed which pertain to other arguments to be unfolded afterward. In this place, however, we weigh only that [point] which is drawn from the mobility of the earth, the motion of the prime Mobile being posited. And that it may have its [full] sharpness, I thus reduce it into [syllogistic] form.

[Margin: The Argument reduced into form.]

[X.] “If, of two mobiles, the one be so disposed toward the motion of the other that, the other moving in advance and about itself, it too must necessarily be moved, because it cannot resist the motion of [the other]; but the other be not so disposed, but can rest though the first move—then the motion is rather to be attributed to that mobile which does not necessarily drag with itself the motion of the other. But if the heaven be moved by the diurnal whirling, the Earth must necessarily be snatched by the same whirling; whereas if the Earth be moved in advance by the diurnal whirling, it is not necessary that the heaven be snatched by the same whirling: therefore the motion is to be attributed to the Earth rather than to the heaven. The Major of this Syllogism seems noted [self-evident], lest motions be multiplied to no purpose in nature, and lest that be done through more [causes], without necessity, which can be done through fewer. The Minor in truth now seems proved—both from the comparison of the heavens and of the upper elements, which (according to the opinion of the Peripatetics) cannot at all resist the motion of snatching; and absolutely, from the slightness of the Earth, [its] indifference toward motion and rest, and the negation of resistance from the surrounding [medium].”

I answer, however, most briefly: the Major being granted, by denying the Minor proposition. For it is not necessary that, the supreme heaven being moved, the Earth too be moved and snatched; nay, the diurnal [motion] of the heaven being posited such as appears to us, it is necessary that the Earth rest, or not be moved by a sensible diurnal motion. For, first, it is more probable that the heaven of the Planets is fluid—which Kepler and Galileo themselves concede, as we taught (sect. 1, ch. 7)—and accordingly that the ethereal breeze adhering to the concavity of the Firmament is so snatched by its [the Firmament’s] motion that nevertheless, by its own thinness, that motion at last vanishes in the lower parts, and is not sufficient to snatch along with it the globes of the Planets; and so the heavens of the Planets are not stirred by that motion, nor the fire in the concave of the Moon, much less the air or the Earth carried off by it. Nay, since we are here engaged in a controversy of a necessary argument (for such is supposed by Galileo), it is not altogether improbable—much less impossible—that even the Fixed [stars] themselves are moved severally, as it were in a liquid aether, and accordingly that far less danger of snatching hangs over the lower heavens and the elements. Besides which, in many other ways the Prime Mobile can be admitted as communicating the impetus or exemplar [of its motion] to the lower [bodies] without snatching [them along] in its own motion, as is plain from the opinions adduced (sect. 2, ch. 3). Secondly, even in the opinion of Aristotle—who admits solid heavens and a motion of snatching—that motion not improbably so languishes from the fire down to the air that it scarcely reaches the middle, much less the lowest region of the air, on account of the thinness and fluency of these elements. For now it is sufficiently established (Galileo himself urging it) that the lightest feathers and chaff are most unfit to conceive an impetus; how much more unfit, then, the air? But on the other side the Earth [is] most dense and most heavy, in all its parts which strive toward the center; and although gravity of itself resists only straight motion upward, yet, joined with density, it cannot be moved save by a vast impetus, through its whole depth—

[…continues on p. 313 (PDF 348) with the catchword “tem”: “…through its whole depth [diffused]“—the rest of Riccioli’s reply (the air cannot impress such an impetus on the Earth; nor is the Earth of itself “indifferent,” as Galileo gratuitously supposes), then the Third Argument, from Circular Motion befitting the elements per se rather than Straight motion.]

(printed p. 313 — within Chapter V: the reply to the Second Argument concludes (the air cannot impress a snatching impetus on the dense Earth, which is not “indifferent” to motion as Galileo supposes). Then the Third Argument, from Circular Motion befitting the elements per se, is stated with quotations from Copernicus and Galileo, and Riccioli’s rebuttal begins — defending Aristotle’s account of natural rest and straight motion for displaced bodies.)

[Header: ON THE SYSTEM OF THE MOVED EARTH — 313]

—through its whole depth diffused; which impetus the air—immediately set round it, and affected by no sensible motion of snatching—cannot impress upon it; nor is it [the Earth] of itself indifferent toward motion and toward rest, as Galileo gratuitously supposes. Therefore it is not necessary that it be snatched by the motion of the prime mobile.

But I said, rather, that it is necessary that the Earth not be snatched by the diurnal conversion, the phenomena that appear to us being posited; because if the Earth were snatched by it, we should always see the Sun, or the same star [we saw] once, in the same circle of position (say the Meridian)—except for the very little [amount] by which they recede toward the East by their proper motion—for we should follow their diurnal motion with equal paces. And so it behooved Galileo—who in those Dialogues so severely exacts from others the formulas [proper forms] of consequences—to beware for himself, and not so easily to assert that as necessary which we have [now] taught to be by no means necessary.

Third Argument, from Circular Motion befitting [the Elements] per se rather than Straight [Motion]—and so [befitting] the Earth

[XI.] This argument likewise is ad hominem, as it is said in the Schools, and [is directed] against the Peripatetics who admit that Fire, and the supreme region of Air, are moved perpetually by the concave of the Lunar heaven, by the force of the snatching of the prime Mobile—but per accidens, and not indeed against the nature of these elements, yet beside [their] nature; while the straight motion upward from the middle is natural to them, just as to Water and Earth [is natural] the motion downward, or toward the middle. These things being posited, the Copernicans contend that the circular motion ought rather to be called natural and per se [belonging] to these elements, but the rectilinear preternatural, and belonging [to them] per accidens; and so that to the Earth too a perpetual circular motion is naturally owed. This indeed was the mind of Copernicus (bk. 1, ch. 8), so very speciously arguing:

[Margin: Copernicus’s doctrine on the motion of heavy and light bodies.]

“Therefore, what they say—that a simple body has a simple motion—is verified first of all of the circular [motion], so long as the simple body shall have remained in its natural place and in its [own] unity. For in [its] place there is no other than circular motion, which, abiding wholly in itself, is like to one at rest. But straight [motion] supervenes upon those [bodies] which wander from their natural place, or are thrust out, or are in any way outside it. Now nothing is so repugnant to the order of the whole, and to the form of the world, as for [a thing] to be outside its [own] place. Therefore straight motion does not befall save things not rightly disposed, and not perfect according to nature, while they are separated from their whole and forsake its unity. Besides, [the bodies] which are driven upward and downward, even apart from the circular, do not make a simple, uniform, and equal motion. For by [their] lightness, or by the impetus of their own weight, they cannot be tempered [kept even]; and whatsoever fall, making a slow motion at the beginning, increase [their] velocity in falling. Whereas, on the contrary, we discern that this earthly Fire (for we see no other) snatched on high at once languishes—as though the cause of the violence of the matter were confessed [by it]. But the circular [motion] is always turned evenly; for it has an unfailing cause: whereas those [straight motions] have [a cause] that ceases when, having reached its place in haste, [the bodies] cease to be heavy or light, and that motion ceases. Since, therefore, the circular motion belongs to whole [bodies], but the straight also to [their] parts: we can say that the circular abides together with the straight, as the living being [abides] together with sickness. And indeed this too—that Aristotle distributed simple motion into three kinds, from the middle, to the middle, and about the middle—will be reckoned only an act of reason; just as we distinguish line, point, [and] surface, although nevertheless one cannot subsist without the other, and none of them without a body.”

[Margin: Galileo’s propositions, full of various novelty.]

[XII.] From which discourse Galileo—but on the supposition of Aristotle’s mind, not his own—tries to teach, from the circular motion of Fire beneath the concave of the Moon (Dialogue 2, On the System of the World, Latin p. 9), that straight motion cannot exist in a well-ordered World, but only circular; and that straight motion is of itself infinite, because a straight line is of itself indeterminate and infinite; and that straight motion perhaps existed in the first Chaos; he adds, however, that straight motion was instituted for reducing disordered bodies into order; and he adduces the authority of Plato, who thought that the bodies of the world were at first moved by a straight motion, then by a circular, after they had acquired through straight motion a certain degree of velocity. And (p. 17) he affirms that the circular motion, and its determinate velocity, cannot be acquired naturally—or without a miracle—without a preceding straight motion; but [that], once acquired, it is thenceforth perpetual and uniform. And (p. 18) he says that straight motion cannot naturally be perpetual, but is given only that it may restore natural bodies into their place if they have fallen out of it; whereas circular motion can of itself be continued perpetually, and is finite, because any point whatever of the circumference is a beginning and an end, and therefore (p. 19) [he says] that circular motion alone, and rest alone, are apt for the conservation of order; and he denies that it is evident that descending heavy bodies are moved by a straight motion. And (p. 28) he says that rest, rather than a straight motion downward, ought to be called natural to the terrestrial globe; and (p. 29) that straight motion is attributed by a stronger reason to the parts than to the whole element; and there too he affirms that it is ill assigned by the Peripatetics to the elements Air and Fire that circular motion [should be] as it were preternatural, but straight as it were natural—because by circular motion they have always been moved and will be moved, whereas by straight [motion] they have never been moved as wholes, nor will it be that they are [so] moved; and [he says] that [the Peripatetics] have forgotten their own axiom, that nothing violent is perpetual; and that the motion which is perpetual ought rather to be called natural, but the straight preternatural.

[Margin: The weakness of Copernicus’s and Galileo’s reasoning against the Peripatetics.]

[XIII.] Nevertheless, neither in the discourse of Copernicus nor in that of Galileo do I see anything solidly brought forward, either for themselves or against Aristotle, but only either an itch for carping at Aristotle, or a beggary of the slightest little reasonings—and ones little consistent with themselves—hunted up for the diurnal motion of the Earth. For neither does Aristotle affirm that there befits the Elements a simple motion from the middle or to the middle—that is, straight [motion] absolutely, and [taken] by comparing motion with rest; for absolutely he attributes to them, per se, rest in their natural place; but [he says that], if the wholes or the parts of them be removed from it, they have from [their] generator—that is, [have] from their very birth—an intrinsic power of moving themselves by a simple motion, but the briefest [possible], and so through a straight line to their natural place. Wherefore, if Aristotle should admit that the World was made in time, and that the elements had previously been confused in Chaos, he would assuredly assert that they acquired their place afterward by a straight motion; and that if the whole Earth were placed outside its place, in the sphere of Fire, but Fire in the middle of the elementary sphere, the Earth would descend to the place in which it now is, but Fire would fly upward: of which motion he had the most probable—if not evident—arguments from the motion of the parts of Earth and Fire, which he supposed to be moved thus, on the testimony of sense and by common consent. But that the loftier portion of Fire and of Air is snatched by the motion of the prime Mobile is not violent to them, since they are not on that account removed from their place, but is only beside nature; and therefore it is not against that Peripatetic axiom, “Nothing violent is perpetual.” Now, that hypothesis being made—namely that they be removed from their place—it is natural to the elements to return to their place rather by the shortest and most determinate way, which is the distance of them from their natural place, than by a longer way; but the shortest is the straight line perpendicular to the earth, whereas that curvilinear [line], or [the line] compounded of straight and curved into one, which in such a descent or ascent the Copernicans are forced to admit, is longer. Moreover, that same hypothesis being made, it is better for the elements and their parts to be moved unequally—but always accelerating the motion toward their native place—than [by] a uniform and equal motion; whether this come about because they are borne magnetically from here, [and] drawn from there, and the more strongly the nearer; or because the impetus once impressed by gravity or lightness ought not to be destroyed by a new impetus, but at any instant of time in which they are not in their natural place they have the power of producing in themselves an impetus according to a determinate degree, which, superadded to the prior or to the prior [degrees], renders the motion swifter and swifter toward the end.

[Margin: Why the motion of heavy and light bodies becomes faster?]

Wherefore, since an infinite impetus could not—or ought not—to have been given to them from the beginning (for it would have been in vain, if they were to be removed from their natural place only by a finite, and for the most part very brief, space), yet lest they should return to their place too slowly, it was better that that velocity should be finite, but augmentable to infinity—that is, ever increasing until they should arrive at the term of their natural rest. That straight line, therefore, is not infinite, but determined here and now by [the agent] removing the parts of the elements from their natural place; nor [is] the inequality uni-

[…continues on p. 314 (PDF 349) with the catchword “formi-”: ”…[nor the inequality] uni-formly [disuniform]“—the rest of Riccioli’s account of the accelerated fall, and his further dismantling of the Third Argument.]

(printed p. 314 — within Chapter V: the rebuttal of the Third Argument concludes, with a sustained critique that the Copernican reasons comparing rectilinear with circular motion are light, weak, and inconsistent — if circular motion is preferred as rest-like, rest itself is more perfect and owed to the Earth. The argument is then cast in syllogistic form with two Responses, and the Fourth Argument, from the immense Magnitude of the eighth sphere, opens with Galileo quoted.)

[Header: BOOK IX. SECTION IV. — 314]

—uniformly, obstructs the naturalness of such a motion; but rather it is most congruent with it; nor, in order to be natural, does it require perpetuity absolutely, but [only] in that mode in which it is natural—namely conditionally, or on the hypothesis that [the bodies] ought to tend to their natural place, in which they are not; which hypothesis, if it were in reality perpetual, then the second act of that motion too would in reality be perpetual, in either hypothesis. And these [things] in defense of Aristotle—whose reasoning, although not so explicitly unfolded by him as by us, is far more solid, and more conformable to the experience of the senses, on which Physical science ought to build its discourses.

[Margin: The reasons of Copernicus and Galileo from the motion of the Earth [are] most light and inconsistent.]

[XIV.] That the reasons of Copernicus and Galileo for the diurnal revolution of the earth, begged from the comparison of rectilinear motion with circular, are light and weak, and in some places little consistent with themselves, I thus show. Copernicus prefers the circular motion to the straight for this reason: that the circular “abides wholly in itself, like to one at rest”—that is, because the whole mobile is not transferred by the force of [the circular motion] to another adequately distinct place; therefore when he transfers the earth annually, this perfection is really taken away from the circular motion, granted it be not taken away formally by the force of the diurnal whirling. Next, if the circular [motion] is more perfect because like to rest, and on that account owed to the Earth—then rest itself in its own place is the more perfect, and accordingly this [rest] is rather owed to the Earth than any motion; and therefore no sane Philosopher or Theologian would dare ascribe to God the circular motion of whirling in Himself, or in His own immensity—because local motion itself, although not translative, compared with rest and immobility, not only includes a change repugnant to God, but also involves a perfection not simply simple; and it is absolutely better not to be moved, or better to rest, than to be moved and not rest. Again, the straight motion, as being in fact enclosed within two distinct termini and shutting in a finite interval, is finite; but the circular is rather like the infinite, because it always begins to be repeated from the same point where it seemed about to cease, since there is no greater reason, from the nature of the circle, why it should terminate at one point rather [than another]. Besides, if straight motion is not natural to the elements placed outside their place—because it is unequal and disuniform in velocity, and therefore not simple—much less is the motion compounded of straight and circular natural to those same [elements], such as Copernicus attributes to them in [their] descent to their natural place; because, besides the inequality which it has in the space acquired in equal times, it has also an inequality of figure, which it is compelled perpetually to change, approaching the circular or receding from it, always by a diverse drawing[-course]: for a straight line is far simpler than a parabolic, or a hyperbolic, or any curvilinear [line] which is not circular—to say nothing of the prolixity of this curvilinear way. Besides, when the circular motion is called equal [uniform], that is now supposed gratuitously, for of itself it can be as unequal as the rectilinear is. But Galileo too feigns for himself many such [things], of which kind are: that circular motion, or its determinate velocity, cannot be acquired naturally—or without a miracle—except by a preceding disuniform straight motion; but, once acquired, [that] it is perpetual and uniform; [and this he asserts] not only gratuitously but with little coherence; for the means ought to agree with the end, and the end with the means, but certainly the straight does not agree with the circular, nor the disuniform with the uniform motion. Nor, when we spin a top, do we impress on it the circular motion by means of a straight [motion], but by means of a circular whirling made through a cord; nor, on the contrary, when with a sling we impress a straight motion on a stone, do we beg that straightness from a circular motion, but we whirl the sling in a circle for this reason: that we may impress on the stone one impetus after another, which afterward we convert into the straight by means of a straight projection. Now indeed the circular motion is said to be finite, and yet perpetual; but by the very fact that it is perpetual, it is of itself infinite in duration; nor is it on that account terminated [merely] because any point can be taken for a beginning or end, but by the very fact that none of them is determinately an end rather than a beginning, it has a certain indetermination, on account of which the circle is wont to be rather the symbol of infinity. But the same Galileo carps at Aristotle for attributing to the elements per se the straight motion, which they never had as wholes, and for saying that the circular—which fire and air always have—is theirs per accidens. Let Aristotle, then, reprehend Galileo for [maintaining] that he attributes to the Earth and to Water per se the circular motion, which they never had; but that the straight—which, on Plato’s opinion received by Galileo, [the earth] had from the beginning—was (so [Galileo] said) intended by nature [only] per accidens or secondarily. For [Galileo] ought not to suppose that which he is certain will be denied him by Aristotle, namely that the Earth is moved, or was at some time moved, circularly. But now it is irksome to pursue these flies, troublesome though they be; and it is better to dissolve the argument which they contrive, [once it has been] forced into form. It can, then, be formed thus.

[Margin: The kernel or form of the Third Argument.]

[XV.] “If Aristotle attributes to Fire and Air a circular diurnal motion, and that motion is more natural to them than the straight, then he ought also to concede to Earth and Water a circular diurnal motion, as more natural to them than the straight. But Aristotle attributes to Fire and Air a circular diurnal motion, and that motion is more natural to them than the straight; therefore Aristotle ought to concede to the Earth and Water a circular diurnal motion, as natural to them, more than the straight.” The Major is plain from the parity of the elements, which Aristotle too acknowledges in this, that they agree in sharing a simple motion of the same kind, namely the rectilinear. The prior part of the Minor is known from Aristotle; but the posterior part is proved: namely, that that motion is more natural which is perpetual and uniform and simple, than [one] which either never was nor will be, or is not perpetual nor uniform nor simple; but the circular and diurnal motion of Fire and Air is perpetual, uniform, and simple, whereas the straight either never was nor will be (if the talk be of the whole element), or is not perpetual nor uniform, since at the end it is swifter and swifter: therefore, etc.

[Margin: First Response, and the chief one.]

It is answered, primarily—the Major of the prior syllogism being conceded, and the prior part of the Minor—by denying the posterior part of the Minor. To the confirmation of which it is answered: by conceding its major [premise] if that [circular] motion be perpetual from an intrinsic principle, but the straight from an extrinsic; [but] by denying [it] if [the circular be] perpetual from an extrinsic [principle], and the straight not perpetual, yet from an intrinsic principle.

[Margin: Second Response.]

It is answered, secondarily, by denying the Major and its proof made from the parity [of the elements]: because, even if it were natural to Fire to be moved circularly from within toward the West, that it might imitate the motion of the prime mobile, nevertheless to the Earth, and to the Water enclosed in the Earth, this ought not to be natural, but rather natural rest—so that thus the living things dwelling in them might experience successively the vicissitudes of risings and settings, which in fact they do experience; otherwise, if they were moved by the same motion toward the West, they would not experience them, nor would the Phenomena be saved. But it would suffice, in such a case, that the four elements should agree in this: that if they were removed outside their place, they would have the power of tending toward it by a straight motion. Truly it is strange that Galileo, from the circular motion of Fire and Air asserted by Aristotle, should wish to elicit a circular motion of the Earth—and yet a contrary one, namely toward the East; for it ought rather [to be] toward the West.

Fourth Argument, from the immense Magnitude of the Eighth sphere, and from the ratio of the Whole compared with the slightness of the Earth as a particle of the Universe

[XVI.] In the second argument we saw this fourth [argument] included; but we judged that it should be drawn out separately, and contended with one by one—especially since the Copernicans try to arm it with certain specious similitudes. For Galileo (Dialogue 2, On the System of the World, Latin p. 81), having said, in the person of Salviati: “If we consider only the immense mass of the Starry sphere in respect of the smallness of the terrestrial globe—smaller by so many thousands of myriads—and besides look upon the velocity of the motion which an entire conversion must accomplish in the space of one day and night; I cannot persuade myself that anyone can be found to whom it would seem more reasonable and credible that this whirling-round should fall upon the celestial sphere, and the terrestrial globe stand unmoved.” At once he brings in Sagredo conceding that, if all else were equal in either hypothesis, it would be more improbable to deny the diurnal motion to the Earth and ascribe [it] to the heaven—

[…continues on p. 315 (PDF 350) with the catchword “adscri-”: “…to ascribe [it to the heaven]“—Sagredo’s concession completed, then the watch-tower, kitchen-spit (Kepler), and ship/orator (Gassendi) similitudes, and Lansberge’s “ratio of the Whole.”]

(printed p. 315 — within Chapter V: the Fourth Argument is completed with the similitudes of Galileo, Kepler, and Gassendi, then answered with three Responses — mass-greatness does not imply power-greatness (a single contemplative man outweighs the heavenly machine), the heaven moves for God’s glory, and the argument can be retorted. The Fifth Argument, from the Ease of motion, then opens with its first Response begun.)

[Header: ON THE SYSTEM OF THE MOVED EARTH — 315]

—to ascribe [it] to the heaven; and one so doing [would be] not a little more absurd than that man who, ascending the summit of his watch-tower for no other cause than to contemplate the city or the surrounding country, should ask that the whole region be driven round for him in a circle—namely, that he himself might not have to undergo the labor of turning his head about.

[Margin: Galileo’s similitude for this argument.]

But from the watch-tower Kepler preferred to descend to the kitchen, that he might thence draw a similitude conformable to his own palate; for (bk. 1 of the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, p. 127) he has thus:

[Margin: Kepler’s similitude.]

“But it is utterly absurd that so great a mass”—he is speaking of the whole machine of the heaven, which the Philosophers contend is also more perfect than the globe of the Earth—“on account of the figure of this most cramped little pill (whereby it comes about that [the Earth] cannot enjoy the whole fire of the Sun at one time), should traverse so great a journey by going around, when the Earth could relieve [the heaven] of this burden by the most compendious rolling of its own little body: for it would be just as if an unskilled cook, disdaining to turn the meat fixed on the spit, should rather drive the fire in a circle around the meat.” For elsewhere he had said that the Earth roasts itself about its own axis, as on a spit, by turning itself to the Sun. Far more elegantly and wittily [does] Pierre Gassendi [argue] (Epistle 2, On impressed motion)—not himself absolutely a Copernican, but yet putting on their person, and inclining toward that Sect, if the decrees of the sacred congregation did not stand in the way—who (p. 108) discourses thus:

[Margin: Gassendi’s similitudes.]

“Since, reason persuading, it is more likely that a ship moves toward the harbor than that the harbor and the ships and the houses and the adjoining lands move toward the ship itself; and [since], when someone looks out from a raised tower upon the whole surrounding city, it is more probable that the man emerges onto the summit of the tower and turns himself round toward every part, than that the whole city is lowered and turned about him; and [since], when an orator perorates from the pulpit, it is more consonant that his face be directed in order toward all the parts of the audience round about, than that the whole audience [be turned] about his immobile face—and like things of that kind: why should it not, the same reason persuading, become more likely, more probable, more consonant, that the Earth move toward the East and salute in order the whole machine of the world and all the stars, than that so great a machine and so many and so great stars go around it and salute it? Surely the ship is some sensible portion, or rather is of some magnitude in respect of the harbor and of the whole opposite shore; the man, in respect of the city; the face, in respect of the audience: but the Earth, compared to the amplitude of that so great machine, is not only a point, but even—if anything more imperceptible can be feigned—is less than a point.” And thus indeed do these men play the rhetorician. To whom Lansberge adds, in the Progymnasmata of restored Astronomy, the ratio of the Whole, saying that it is absurd that the Whole—namely the world or heaven—should move, and the part—namely the Earth—should rest.

[Margin: The argument reduced into form.]

[XVII.] Hence, therefore, there rises up such an argument: “If, of two mobiles—or of two [things] to be moved—the one is to be moved with relation to the other, it is absurd that that one should rather be moved which is incomparably greater, and has the ratio of a whole, than that which is incomparably less, and has the ratio of a particle. But the whole heaven is incomparably greater than the Earth, and has the ratio of a whole, while [the Earth] is as it were a particle. Therefore it is absurd that the Heaven, the whole [of it], should rather be moved than the Earth.”

[Margin: First Response.]

It is answered, first, by conceding the Major if that which is greater in quantity of mass be also greater than the other in quantity of power, or in perfection of substance and of other properties; [but] by denying [it] if it be not greater in this second mode, but less; and therefore the Minor proposition is conceded in the prior sense, [but] denied in the posterior. For incomparably greater is—I do not say the whole Earth with its inhabitants, but [even] a single man—than the whole machine of the heaven, [the] Intelligences being set apart, which are not parts of the heaven, nor forms of the celestial bodies. Nor indeed ought we here to take the bare globe of the Earth without living things, and without a creature [that is] a contemplator of the divine works; for thus perhaps neither heaven nor earth would be moved: for to what good or end? We, therefore—unless we begrudge ourselves our own felicity granted by the bounty of the Creator—we, I say, are those spectators for whom, as we sit in the theater, that vast scene, kindled with so many lights and turning about with its [stage-]machinery, exhibits those Dances and Catastrophes [denouements], to be contemplated in their turns; we [are] those kings and princes, to whom the whole soldiery of the heaven—and, that I may borrow the words of the divine codex, that “vessel of the camps on high”—repeating its circuit and coursing around as it were for a census, runs back to the number. Unless perchance we deem it unworthy that God should have wrought so great [things] for the sake of men—for whom even Angels, and (what is inestimably greater) His Only-begotten Son, He expended, for [their] instructing and redeeming. But as to what regards the ratio of the Whole and the part, it is denied that the heaven, in respect of the Earth, has the ratio of a whole; for it is a co-part, and indeed greater in mass, but less in power than the other co-part. But because someone might take, together with the heaven, the Intelligences—by which, as movers, this motion [is accomplished] (as we conceded, sect. 2, ch. 1, num. 4 and 9, that they go round together [with it])—and the aforesaid argument would seem to have greater force (for thus the heaven is greater than the Earth not only in mass, but also in power): although in reality the Intelligences are not an intrinsic part of the heaven as the soul of animals [is], therefore it is answered in another way.

[Margin: Second Response.]

It is answered, secondly, by conceding the Major if that which is greater be moved for the sake of the lesser, as for an ultimate end, and precisely that it may serve the lesser; but by denying [it] if it does not stop there, but orders its motion (or has it ordered) to a nobler end of its own, and that it may serve a worthier [being]—of which kind is GOD the Best and Greatest: namely, that for the manifesting of His perfections and glory the Intelligences move themselves while [God] moves the celestial bodies. This is not to be shown in this place, but is to be supposed as certain from sound Philosophy, much more [from] Christian Theology.

[Margin: Third Response, and a retortion of the argument.]

It is answered, thirdly, by retorting the argument in two ways. For if it is absurd that the heaven be moved for the sake of the Earth because it is of greater mass than the Earth, it would be absurd also that it be moved by any motion at all, much less the diurnal; and thus neither would the superior Planets be moved by their [own] motions: for it cannot be said that [a planet] is moved per se about the Sun [and] per accidens about the Earth, since they complete [their circuit about] the Earth, not the Sun—or else uncertain and controverted [claims] are thrust upon us. Equally would it be absurd that the Earth be moved by a diurnal motion for the sake of men, that it might furnish them the spectacles of the heaven to be enjoyed in succession—since the whole earth is of far greater mass than all men taken together.

Fifth Argument, from the Ease of motion, arising from the Magnitude of the Mobile

[XVIII.] This is an offshoot no more fortunate than the preceding argument, from which it sprouted. “Let it be [granted],” say the Copernicans, “that it is not absurd that the greater be moved for the sake of the lesser; nevertheless Nature is wont to do that which is easier, or less laborious and of lesser expense. But by the very fact that the Earth is of the least mass compared to the eighth sphere—much more to the whole heaven—it is also easier to impart motion to it; and if motion is not exercised without some impressed quality, it is assuredly of less expense to impress the impetus of whirling on this [small] sphere than on the vastest sphere of the Firmament.”

[Margin: The syllogistic form of the argument, and the First Response.]

Let this argument too now be constructed to the norm of a syllogism: “GOD and nature do[es] what is easier and of less expense; but it is easier and of less expense to move the globe of the Earth by a diurnal whirling than the Machine of the Heaven; therefore, etc.”

It is answered, first, by conceding the Major if all else be equal, and the same end which GOD and Nature intend can be obtained equally well [the other way]; but otherwise by denying [it]. For GOD’s purpose was to show the magnitude of His Wisdom and Omnipotence—on the one hand, by balancing the immobile Earth upon nothing (that is, upon its [own] center) and upon the air, [a thing] so fluid; on the other, by conjoining so many motions—though in appearance contrary—in the single motion of the heaven or of the Planets, and thus to provide for living things and especially for man; nor can it be demonstrated naturally that this was not His end: but this could not be obtained by moving the Earth. But granted that, by conjoining several motions in the single motion of the Earth, He would have shown great wisdom too—nevertheless, so long as it is not certain or more probable that this rather than that was purposed by Him, we cannot conclude with certainty or [greater] probability that He had regard to the greater ease or to the lesser expense. And truly, if we should follow our own estimation, [which] weighs nothing beyond number or mass, it would have been of less expense to conserve the same light which was once produced in the air and aether, than to produce a new light continually at each moment; and [it would be] less laborious [to move] the Planets by a single and most simple motion, comprehensible in round numbers, at once—

[…continues on p. 316 (PDF 351) with the catchword “motu”: “…by a single…most simple motion”—the rest of Riccioli’s First Response to the Fifth Argument (our human estimate of “ease” and “expense” does not bind God), and the remaining responses.]

(printed p. 316 — within Chapter V. Completes the First and adds a Second Response to Argument 5 (mass as such does not make motion harder; the heaven is no harder for God or the Intelligences to move than the Earth). The Sixth Argument, from the infinity of the world and supreme heaven, then opens with Copernicus’s discourse (an infinite heaven could not move), followed by a survey of ancient opinions on the world’s infinity and the beginning of the Scholastics’ four opinions on actual infinity.)

[Header: BOOK IX. SECTION IV. — 316]

—to stir [them], and to illuminate the night with fewer fixed stars, and to direct sailors and farmers by fewer constellations, and to construct heaven and Earth with less mass, and to found fewer species of plants, of crops, and of living things. But GOD does not always have regard to that which seems easier to us, but to that which is better according to the end prescribed by Himself to Himself and to inferior Nature.

[Margin: Second Response.]

It could be answered, secondly, by denying the Minor proposition. For mass does not render its own motion more difficult [precisely] as it is mass, or precisely on account of its greater magnitude, but only by reason of weight, or of some similar quality: I add, indeed, that [it does so] not even absolutely, but comparatively to the motive power, as to the medium through which [a thing] must be moved. But the machine of the heaven cannot, on any of these heads, be more difficult to move, either for GOD or for the Intelligences, than the Earth [is].

Sixth Argument, from the Infinity of the World and of the supreme Heaven; where, in passing, [are treated] certain [things] concerning the Infinity of the World

[Margin: Copernicus’s discourse upon the Infinity of the heaven.]

[XIX.] Before we turn our arms elsewhere from the arguments hunted up from Magnitude—[arguments] led in triumph, or at least invincibly repelled—the argument drawn from the Infinitude of the World must be dispatched, which Copernicus already touched (bk. 1, ch. 8), discoursing thus: “But according to that Physical axiom, ‘That which is infinite cannot be traversed, nor moved in any way’: the heaven will necessarily stand still. But they say that outside the heaven there is no body, no place, no void, and absolutely nothing, and therefore there is nowhere whither the heaven could escape: then surely it is strange if something can be confined by nothing. But if the heaven were infinite, and finite only by its inner concavity, perhaps it will the more be verified that outside the heaven there is nothing—since each thing, whatever magnitude it shall have occupied, will be within it—but the heaven will remain immobile. For the chief [thing] by which they strive to establish that the world is finite, is motion.” To these [words] he at once subjoins that conclusion which we recited above, but [which is] to be repeated here: “Whether, therefore, the world be finite or infinite, let us leave [it] to the disputation of the Natural Philosophers: holding this for certain, that the earth, enclosed by its poles, is bounded by a globose surface. Why, then, do we still hesitate to grant to it the mobility congruent by its own form from nature, rather than that the whole world should glide, whose end is unknown and cannot be known? And [why do we not] confess that the appearance of its daily revolution is in the heaven, and the truth [of it] in the Earth?” To this argument, in the part where it leans on the spherical figure of the earth, response has been made (unless I am mistaken) at number 5; but in the part where it touches the uncertainty of infinity in the heaven, and the certainty of finitude in the Earth, it must be beaten back in this place—but [only] after first hearing what the Physico-Mathematicians, and not only the mere Physicists, teach concerning the infinity of the world or of the supreme heaven.

[Margin: The opinion of Democritus, Epicurus, [and] Metrodorus.]

[XX.] If we believe Plutarch (bk. 2 On the Opinions of the Philosophers, ch. 1), Democritus, Epicurus, and their disciple Metrodorus posited innumerable worlds in the infinite, [the infinite] spreading out into the immense through its whole compass. Seleucus [posited] a boundless world; Diogenes, an infinite Universe but a finite World: for he distinguished the world from the Universe—as did also the Stoics, who (as Plutarch there adds) said that the Universe consists of the World and of the void, and that this complex of both is infinite, but that the World is distinguished from the void, and is one, and bounded by a globose figure. But Aristotle (Physics 3) endeavors to overturn every actual infinite, and (Physics 7, text 78) denies that a finite [body] can move in an infinite time; and (bk. 1 On the Heaven, from text 33) contends that the World is not infinite—as very many of the ancient philosophers (he himself says) thought—by this argument above all: that it is impossible for an infinite body to be moved circularly, much less in a finite time; otherwise there would be a proportion between a finite line and an infinite [one], [both] comprehended by similar arcs and under an equal angle; and in a finite time—namely of 24 hours—an infinite space could be traversed (besides other more obscure arguments, which can be seen up to text 75). He supposes there, then, for certain, that which is now in question, namely that the heaven is turned circularly. But before him too, Plato and Pythagoras (as Laërtius relates in their Lives) asserted the World [to be] finite and of spherical figure. Cleomedes too (bk. 1 of the Cyclic Theory [τῆς κυκλικῆς θεωρίας]), insisting on Aristotle’s reasons, establishes the World to be both globose and finite.

[Margin: Pliny.]

But Pliny (bk. 2, chh. 1, 2, and 7) speaks of the World in such a way that he makes it [out to be] God and Nature, or makes God Himself the soul and nature of this World; and therefore he does not sufficiently express whether it be finite or infinite. For (ch. 1) he says: “The World, and that which it pleased [men] to call by another name ‘the heaven,’ by whose circumflex all things are covered—it is fitting to believe it a deity, eternal, immense, neither begotten nor ever to perish. To search out its outer [parts] is of no concern to men, nor does it fall within the conjecture of the human mind. It is sacred, eternal, immense, the whole in the whole—nay, rather itself the whole; finite, yet like the infinite; of all things the certain, and like the uncertain.” And a little after, against those who had posited infinite and innumerable Worlds, he adds: “Or if this infinity may be assigned to the artificer of all things, why may not that same [infinity] be more easily understood in one [world], so great a work especially [being in question]?” And soon [after]: “It is madness, surely madness, to go out of it [the world]; and to scrutinize the outer [things] as though all its inner [things] were plainly known: as if forsooth one could take the measure of any thing who is ignorant of his own [measure]; or the mind of man could see things which the world itself cannot contain.” For it is the bent of Pliny, that he may forge some subtle and lofty opinion, to speak impiously and audaciously even of God Himself; so in this place he makes this God of his [to be] uncertain and half-corporeal, ignorant and incapable of His own immensity—concerning whom, however (ch. 7), he says: “Whoever the God is (if indeed He is another),” that is, distinct from the world, “and in whatever part, He is all sense, all sight, all hearing, all soul, all mind, all His own.” But because he asserts a spherical figure of the world, and acknowledges that it is turned in the space of 24 hours, he seems to acknowledge it terminated and finite: for he says (ch. 2): “Its form is rounded into the appearance of a perfect orb.”

[Margin: The excellence of the spherical figure.]

“The name, in the first place, and the consensus of mortals calling it an ‘orb,’ but the arguments of things [themselves] also teach [this]: not only because such a figure in all its parts bends toward itself, and must support itself, and includes and contains itself, needing no joinings, feeling no end or beginning in any of its parts; nor only because it is most apt for the motion by which it must again and again be turned (as will presently appear): but also by the proof of the eyes, because it is discerned as convex and middlemost on every side—which could not happen in another figure.” [Riccioli interjects:] He had better said “concave,” for the convexity of the heaven cannot be beheld by us. Finally (ch. 3), [Pliny speaks] of its motion thus: “This form of it, then, by an eternal and unresting circuit, with unspeakable swiftness, in the space of four-and-twenty hours, the risings and settings of the Sun have left beyond doubt [to be] whirled round. Whether it be immense, and therefore exceeding the sense of the ears [in] the sound of so great a mass turned by an assiduous whirling, I should not indeed easily say.” And so again he recalls into doubt the immensity and infinity of the World.

[Margin: The opinions of the more recent [thinkers] on the Infinity of the World.]

[XXI.] Hitherto, let it be enough to have tasted these few but choicer [points] concerning the infinity of the world, from the opinions of the Ancients. But what the more recent Scholastics and Physicists thought, I have related more fully in the Physical questions; nor is it of this place to repeat that controversy with all its arguments pro and con: only this must be recalled, that there are four opinions on this matter. For some deny that the World is actually infinite—either because they think every actual infinite (a “categorematic” [infinite], as they call it) impossible, or because no sufficient evidence is at hand for this infinity, and beings must not be multiplied or extended without necessity. But some concede that the World is Infinite, yet deny that it is terminated by any figure, or that it is mobile—the whole [of it] within itself, much less outside itself. Others, however, admit that it is Infinite and yet terminated by a spherical figure; but they deny that it can be moved in a finite time. For with them it is not the same to be finite and to be terminated or figured: for the Infinite, they say, is spoken of analogically, and its first analogate is that which has all the perfections signified by the name of “infinite”—namely, that it embraces within itself all things possible in its [own] genus, and lacks a terminus on every side, [the term being] taken negatively rather than privatively—that is, so that nothing can be designated in it to which the negation of further extension would immediately belong, even if that further extension were said to be impossible; and therefore the negation of it, as not connoting an aptitude toward the thing denied, would be a mere negation, not a privation: for from these perfections it follows that it is untraversable. But among the second analogates, [there is] the infinity [of a] part—

[…continues on p. 317 (PDF 352) with the catchword “parti-”: ”…[the infinity of a] part[ial thing]“—the rest of the third and the fourth opinion on the world’s infinity, then the more recent astronomers (Copernicus, Gilbert, Ficino, Descartes, Bruno, Galileo, Kepler), and the Sixth Argument cast in syllogistic form.]

(printed p. 317 — within Chapter V. Finishes the four Scholastic opinions on the world’s infinity, then surveys recent astronomers and physico-mathematicians on the question — Copernicus, Gilbert, Ficino, Descartes, Bruno, Galileo, and Kepler. The Sixth Argument is cast in form (the diurnal motion belongs rather to the certainly mobile Earth than to a heaven not certainly mobile) and met with two Responses; the Seventh Argument begins.)

[Header: ON THE SYSTEM OF THE MOVED EARTH — 317]

—participating [in infinity] receive this too: that, although it be terminated by some figure, and does not comprehend in itself the whole possible in that genus, yet it is so great as to be untraversable, and not measurable by any finite and determinate measure among the least [measures] that can be taken and repeated—so that, however many measures of this kind be repeated, there always still remains in it something to be reckoned. Some, finally, agree that the World can be called infinite, and configured by a spherical surface on the outside, and nevertheless mobile and convertible in the finite time of 24 hours—but by an infinite power producing an infinite impetus; nor does it follow necessarily, from the infinity of the space traversed, [that there is] an infinity of time in the motion. Or, at any rate, if the World above the Planetary heaven be fluid, or not wholly nor continuously solid, [they hold] that that part which contains the stars and Planets visible to us could—being finite—be moved within 24 hours, while the remaining part stands immobile: which opinion, among those admitting the infinity of the World, seems less absurd, and less difficult to understand.

[XXII.] It remains, therefore, that—as I promised a little before—we indicate what certain Astronomers, or Physico-Mathematicians, thought concerning the infinity of the World and of the heaven. And indeed concerning Copernicus’s ambiguous opinion we have learned enough from himself: how much, in his view, the infinity of the World (if it were admitted), or even an infinite distance of the Fixed stars, would not stand in the way—nay, would greatly profit—his hypothesis of the annual translation of the Earth.

[Margin: William Gilbert’s opinion on the Infinity of the World.]

But William Gilbert too (bk. 6 On the Magnet, ch. 3) calls the sphere of the Fixed stars immobile; and [holds] that, if the prime mobile were in it or above it, that [prime mobile] would be infinite, and therefore he subjoins: “But there can be no motion of an infinity and of an infinite body; nor, on that account, [can there be] a diurnal [motion] of that vastest prime Mobile.” Wherefore, on account of this argument among others, he concludes that the diurnal revolution is rather the Earth’s than the supreme heaven’s.

[Margin: Marsilio Ficino’s opinion.]

On the contrary, Marsilio Ficino (on Plotinus’s book On the Heaven, ch. 3) teaches that the World is not infinite: either because it would lack order and figure; or because, if it were imagined to be moved circularly, its slowness toward the center would [be one thing], but from the center upward [there would be] an infinite velocity—for the parts nearer the center, [being] finitely-designable-toward-infinity, would be slower and slower, but from the center upward swifter and swifter; and thus, on the one side, its motion would be none on account of the infinite slowness, [while] on the other it would happen in a moment on account of the infinite velocity; or infinite slowness and velocity would concur into a [state of] standing-still, or rest. Or because, between any lines whatever drawn out from the center, there would be an immense space, [so that] the effort of the mover would be in vain, and accordingly there would be no motion.

[Margin: René Descartes’s opinion.]

But René Descartes, in the Principles of Philosophy (part 1, from num. 25 to 27), pronounces that we ought not to be wearied with disputations about the infinite—because, since we are finite, it seems absurd to him that we should try to determine anything about it, and thus as it were to finish and comprehend it. But all those [things] to which no certain terminus can be assigned, beyond which God could not make more or greater or better [things], he calls not Infinite but Indefinite, and adds: “And these we shall call ‘indefinite’ rather than ‘infinite’: both that we may reserve the name of ‘infinite’ for God alone, because in Him alone, on every side, we not only acknowledge no limits, but also understand positively that there are none; and also because we do not in the same way positively understand other things to lack limits in some respect, but only negatively confess that their limits, if they have any, cannot be found by us.”

[Margin: Giordano Bruno’s opinion. And Galileo’s.]

On the contrary, Giordano Bruno of Nola, in the book On the Greatest and the Immense, and in the book On the Infinite and the Innumerable, does not hesitate to affirm that this World is infinite upward. But Galileo (Dialogue 3, On the System of the World, Latin p. 239) recalls into doubt whether the World be finite, figured, and having a center; or rather infinite, unterminated, and lacking a center and a circumference; and [holds] that Aristotle’s reasons, which in the end rest upon the mobility of the diurnal motion, are as uncertain as is the motion assumed by him and attributed to the heaven rather than to the earth. Granted [that] Simplicio—with whom he brings in Salviati disputing—may concede, meanwhile, for the sake of argument, that the World is finite and spherical and has a center: so that, even this being liberally granted, [Salviati] may teach that it does not follow that the Earth is in the center of the universe, or that heavy bodies tending toward the center of the earth tend toward the center of the Universe.

[Margin: Kepler’s [opinion].]

Among the Copernicans, however, Kepler—both in the book On the new star seen in Serpentarius (ch. 17), and in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy (bk. 1, p. 39)—denies that any of the visible stars is distant from us by an actually infinite interval. For (he himself says) it is mutually repugnant to be infinite and [yet] terminated; and likewise to be infinite and [yet] to have a finite proportion to another infinite; but both these incongruities would follow if some visible star were distant from us by an infinite interval. For the apparent diameter of the star would be increased by an infinite increment, as also the distance of the lines under whose angle it would be seen; and yet, [even] thus increased, it would still be enclosed within the termini or points bounding the diameter, and under a certain visual angle. Besides, in the same place, he denies that—even if, on account of the immense distance, some stars were not visible—the space upward is nevertheless infinite; because their number would be finite, and from a finite magnitude and number an infinite cannot be put together. In which discourse certain [things] would need the file [polishing], if it were of this place to expatiate in this controversy—concerning which I have wished to indicate the bare opinions, so that it might be established that, although among the Copernicans and some others there has been some suspicion of the infinity of the World, yet [it was] not among all of those, much less among all [men]; and by what arguments especially its infinity is wont to be assailed—to which add the conjecture of finitude drawn from the Refractions of the Fixed stars, which I set down (bk. 6, ch. 7, in the last Scholium). Now to the argument enclosed in Copernicus’s words, which we form thus.

[Margin: The Sixth Argument recalled into form.]

[XXIII.] “If the motion of the diurnal revolution must be attributed to one of the two bodies—namely either to the supreme heaven or to the Earth—it is rather to be attributed to that which certainly is established to be mobile, than to that which is not mobile, or [of which] it is not certainly established whether it be mobile or not. But it is certainly established that the Earth is mobile, whereas the supreme heaven either is not mobile, or it is not certainly established whether it be mobile. Therefore, etc.”

[Margin: Proof of the Major.]

The Major seems most certain; for, although it is allowed to God, who imparted this motion to one of the two, [that] that which we say cannot be uncertain—nevertheless to us, to whom it is not certain, prudence dictates that we not expose ourselves to the danger of erring, [and] that we ascribe the motion to that body of which we are certain that it [the motion] is not repugnant to it, rather than to that of whose repugnance it is permitted to suspect.

[Margin: Proof of the Minor.]

The Minor also, as regards the Earth, is now certain, from its figure and finite measure found out by the Geometric method (according to what was said, bk. 2, ch. 7); but as regards the supreme heaven, it has not yet been demonstrated by anyone that it is not infinite; and if it be infinite, it is not certain that it is mobile; or, if it has been demonstrated [to be mobile], [it is] by no other argument than from the diurnal motion, which is here called into controversy.

[Margin: Response to the Sixth Argument.]

It can be answered by denying the Minor, if by the name of “supreme heaven” be understood either the Firmament, or at least the aggregate of the visible Fixed stars; for to us it is Physically evident that they are moved by the diurnal revolution, and so we are certain of [their] mobility from the motion itself—since Copernicus himself and the Copernicans confess that in the heaven there is the appearance of this motion, if we wish to stand by sense—just as it is evident, dependently on sensible experiments, that the Earth is of a finite measure. Granted that, for the evidence of the former, a simple experiment may suffice, by which we see the Fixed stars ascend above the Horizon, and roll down toward the West, and after 24 hours return to the East, and traverse arcs similar and proportional to the arcs of the terrestrial circumference in a finite time; whereas, to measure the Earth and to determine its figure, more is needed. But if the Copernicans say that it is evident to us [only] that one of these two [moves] disjunctively—namely, either that the Fixed stars or that the Earth moves—I say that this disjunctive is evident Mathematically, or even Metaphysically, [it] being supposed (which the adversaries assuredly do suppose) that the apparent local variation between the stars and us comes about by local motion, and not by deceptions of the eyes, or by a reproduction of bodies, etc.; but from this it does not follow that the other part [namely, that the Earth moves] is not Physically evident, and the burden of proof lies on the one who denies. To say nothing meanwhile of Sacred authority; for now we are examining the bare reasons. But what happens about the part of the heaven above the Fixed stars—whether it move and be finite, or be infinite and immobile—pertains nothing to this argument.

It is answered, secondly, by conceding the Major if all else be equal; [but] by denying [it] if [things be] unequal, as in reality they are. For many other [considerations] are given, which prevail over this comparison of certitude concerning the finite circumference of the Fixed stars and of the Earth—on account of which the diurnal motion is rather to be attributed to the Earth.

[…continues on p. 318 (PDF 353) with the catchword “VII. Ar-”: the Seventh Argument (“Ar[gumentum]…”) and its proposal and dissolution.]

(printed p. 318 — within Chapter V. Three arguments are proposed and dissolved: the Seventh, from the nature of place (motion befits the located Earth rather than the containing heaven), answered by a Peripatetic distinction and a retortion; the Eighth, from the heaven’s incorruptibility (Copernicus and Kepler), answered on both fronts; and the Ninth, from the heaven’s fluidity and the fixed stars’ constant mutual distance (Longomontanus and Gilbert), which opens.)

[Header: BOOK IX. SECTION IV. — 318]

Seventh Argument, deduced from the nature of Place and of the Container

[XXIV.] Copernicus has not yet ceased to press the rest of the Earth toward [its] motion; for he says (bk. 1, ch. 5): “Since the heaven is that which contains and conceals all things—the common place of all things—it does not at once appear why motion is not attributed rather to the contained than to the container, to the located than to the locating.” And again (ch. 8): “I add also, that it would seem rather absurd that motion be ascribed to the container, or to the locating, and not rather to the contained and the located, which is the earth.” Which reasoning seems to have greater force against the Peripatetics, together with their Aristotle (bk. 4 Physics, ch. 5, text 42), defining place to be “the first immobile terminus of the containing body,” and conceding to the heaven the nature of universal place. Thus, therefore, it is allowed to argue: “Local motion is to be ascribed rather to the located than to the place, as [to that] which requires immobility: but the Heaven is the place in respect of the Earth, and the Earth is located. Therefore motion is to be ascribed to the Earth rather than to the heaven.”

[Margin: The form of the Seventh Argument.]

[Margin: First Response.]

The Peripatetics would answer, from the same text 42 of the fourth [book] of the Physics, [and] from the doctrine handed down by Aristotle at text 35, by distinguishing the Major, and conceding it either of the motion by which the whole place, together with the located, is transferred to another place (for thus the place would lose the nature of place and put on the nature of a vessel), or [of the motion] by which at least, deserting the located, it ceased to surround [it]—and of the immediate place; but by denying [it] if the proposition be understood of any local motion whatever, or of a remote place. Now the supreme Heaven is neither wholly transferred to another place, but remains, as to its whole self, in the same place; or, if it is not precisely in a place (because it has no other body outside by which it may be contained), much less is it transferred to another place, and much less does it desert the Earth outside itself, as the parts of a river desert the fishes—although [the fishes be] at rest; but it stands as the air agitated about a Tower, which does not on that account cease to be the place of the Tower. Nor is the supreme heaven the immediate or first surface containing the earth.

[Margin: Second Response.]

But someone might answer, secondly, by retorting the argument against the motion of the earth asserted by Copernicus: because the Earth too, with the neighboring air, is the place of plants and animals; therefore either it ought not to be moved, or, if it suffices for its mobility that it not desert the located, that suffices much more for the heaven, which neither deserts the located, nor carries it elsewhere with itself like a vessel—as [it does] in Copernicus’s hypothesis of the annual motion of translation, the earth adding [that motion] too: wherefore the Earth becomes for it [the located] a vessel rather than a place.

Eighth Argument, drawn from the Incorruptibility of the Heaven

[XXV.] Copernicus uses this argument in one way, Kepler (from Origanus) in another.

[Margin: Copernicus’s Argument.]

For [Copernicus] (bk. 1 of the Revolutions, ch. 8) discourses thus: “To these is added also, that the condition of immobility is esteemed nobler and more divine than [that] of change and instability, which [latter] therefore befits the earth more than the world.”

[Margin: Kepler’s argument from Origanus.]

But in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy (bk. 1, p. 128) Kepler says that motion is of the genus of those things which are not [yet], but come to be; and therefore that it does not pertain to those things which have the degree of their perfection perennial in themselves, but to those which, unless they be moved, grow torpid with sloth and are corrupted: of which kind, in these very Lands, are Water and Air, and many bodies dwelling in these elements.

[Margin: Response to Copernicus.]

But to Copernicus it is answered that the heaven is not incorruptible from within, as we said (sect. 1, ch. 6, num. 6)—nay, Kepler admits that it is in reality capable of corruption; next, if it be contended to be incorruptible, [we say] that only that motion is repugnant or unsuitable to it which tends to corruption—of which kind is surely not the diurnal revolution; otherwise the Earth, to which he ascribes it, ought long ago to have been wholly corrupted; and that this motion is not unsuitable even to the Intelligences themselves, much less to the heaven or the stars; and lastly, that by this argument all motion ought to have been banished from the heavens: wherefore, since it proves too much, it proves nothing.

[Margin: Response to Kepler.]

But for Kepler it will be abundantly satisfied if the Air be blown through by winds now and then, and the Waters, by the course of rivers and by the flux and reflux of the Seas (besides the remedy of saltness), be preserved from putrefaction; and since [the Earth] does not fear corruption for the Earth, [we say] that there is no reason why he should ascribe motion to it on that account: for if he concedes that motion can befit it from elsewhere, let him concede also that it can befit the heaven, even if [the heaven] does not need it for its own conservation. Finally, let him acknowledge, from this or from the motion of the Planets, that local motion is not per se primarily, or universally, instituted, so that by agitation and ventilation [a thing] may be preserved from corruption.

Ninth Argument, from the Fluidity of the Heaven, and the Constant Distance of the Fixed stars among themselves

[XXVI.] Perhaps the Copernicans seem to have deserved excellently of the heaven, since they were so solicitous about the integrity and health of the heaven—especially those who, dreading its fluid substance (or at least simulating fear), thought that all motion must be driven away from the bounds at least of the supreme heaven, lest either its substance, or the stars themselves, should be dissipated and flow apart by so great a swiftness of whirling.

[Margin: Longomontanus’s argument, supposing the heaven fluid.]

And so Longomontanus—an asserter, not indeed of the annual, but yet of the diurnal motion of the Earth (bk. 1 of the Theorics, toward the end of ch. 1)—confesses himself confirmed, by this argument too, in transferring this motion onto the Earth, when he says: “I add also, that since it would have been agreeable that the fixed stars—which it is reasonable are removed at unequal distance from the center or earth, and that they hang in a most limpid heaven, and like the globe of the earth are balanced upon their own centers by equal weights—should have suffered no distraction in their distances toward one another from the founding of the world: who, therefore, with such assertions, will attribute real motions to them, except one who bites at Sacred Scripture (accommodated in few places, and not—as they seem—accommodated except apparently to the human grasp)?” And in the same place (ch. 4), he repeats, among other things, that the motion (both the diurnal and that of the precession of the Equinoxes) must be recalled from the heaven [and] brought onto the earth: “Lest the stars cohering in the most limpid heaven should be distracted from one another, if you should presume that the individual [stars] are stirred separately by some motion of lation—although perhaps this too could in some way be conceded in the celestial expansive firmament [stereoma]”; that is, even if one should admit that heaven [to be] solid; for στερέωμα signifies a solid-foundation, or a solid body.

[Margin: Gilbert’s argumentation, supposing the heaven fluid.]

[XXVII.] In a different manner William Gilbert (bk. 6 On the Magnet, ch. 3) discourses from the liquid thinness of the Firmament; for thus he philosophizes: “Moreover, what craftsman ever found out by reason that the stars which we call fixed [are] in one and the same fluid sphere, or confirmed [by reason] that there are any real and as-it-were adamantine spheres? No one ever demonstrated this very thing. Nor is there any doubt but that, just as the planets are distant from the earth at dissimilar intervals, so those huge and most frequent lights are disjoined by various and most remote altitudes from the earth, and do not inhere (as they feign) in any spherical framework or firmament and vaulted body: thus the intervals of some [stars] have been conceived rather by a certain opinion than in reality, on account of the inscrutable distance; others far surpass those, and are by far the most remote—which, since they are placed in the heaven at various distances, either in the most thin aether, or in that fifth most subtle substance, or in a void: how shall they remain [whole] amid so great a whirling of the vast orb, a most uncertain body?” Therefore, because he reckons the non-wandering stars [to be] in a fluid aether, and indeed scattered among themselves at various distances into the immense, upward and downward, he thinks it to be feared lest, if they were turned to the motion of so vast a heaven, they should fluctuate hither and thither by a turbulent and wide-wandering agitation, like planks in a shipwreck. And below he again establishes thus: “Therefore they are not borne or moved by the firmament, nor have [their] position [from it]; much less is that confused crowd of stars torn loose and perturbed by the prime mobile, by a contrary and most rapid impulse. Ptolemy of Alexandria seems to me too timid and pusillanimous, who shudders at the dissolution of this lower world, if the earth were moved circularly: why does he not fear the ruin, dissolution, perturbation, conflagration of the universe, and the celestial and supercelestial calamities, from a motion insuperable, ineffable, and incomprehensible beyond all thoughts, dreams, fables, and poetic licenses? Wherefore we are borne by the diurnal rotation of the earth, by a motion namely more fitting; and as a skiff is moved upon the waters, so we, together with the earth—

[…continues on p. 319 (PDF 354) with the catchword “lure”: ”…[together with the earth] are whirled round, and yet seem to ourselves to stand and rest”—the close of Gilbert’s quotation, then Galileo’s and Gassendi’s versions of the Ninth Argument, its syllogistic form, and Riccioli’s reply.]

(printed p. 319 — within Chapter V. Completes the Ninth Argument (fluid heaven and the fixed stars’ constant distances) with Galileo’s and Gassendi’s versions, casts it in form, and gives Riccioli’s Response — the stars may be moved by Intelligences, or a solid firmament given sufficient coherence by God — reinforced by a Scriptural meditation on the Firmament’s motion displaying God’s glory. The Tenth Argument, from the Earth’s neediness and the stars’ independence (Gilbert, Lansberge), then opens.)

[Header: ON THE SYSTEM OF THE MOVED EARTH — 319]

—are whirled round, and yet seem to ourselves to stand and rest.” The argument from the incredible swiftness also urges, of which more must be said separately in the following chapter.

[Margin: Galileo’s reasoning, supposing the heaven fluid.]

[XXVIII.] And this, of course, is the sixth confirmation for the diurnal rotation of the Earth which Galileo reckons up (Dialogue 2, On the System of the World, Latin p. 85), when he says: “There is added an absurdity (and this is the sixth inconvenience), for those discussing the matter [on the hypothesis of] a solid [heaven]: that it cannot be comprehended by any thought what the solidity of that vastest sphere must be, in whose depth so many stars are so tenaciously founded, which—without any variation of position among themselves—are snatched round in an orb with so great a disparity of motions. Or, if indeed the heaven is fluid (as it is more reasonable to believe), so that each star wanders through it by itself: by what law are their motions governed, and to what end does it come about that the same [stars], beheld from the earth, appear made [to move] by one single sphere? It seems to me, for obtaining this, that there is a reason so much the easier and more accommodated, to establish those [stars] immobile, not wandering, by how much it is readier to keep a courtyard paved with stones [in order] at one’s nod, than a crowd of boys running about in it.”

[Margin: Gassendi’s opinion on this.]

Although in truth Gassendi does not sufficiently express whether he supposes the sphere of the Fixed stars solid or fluid, nor makes mention of a Crystalline [heaven] above it and below the prime mobile except from the opinion of others—nevertheless he insinuates that a dissipation of the stars, from the diurnal rapidity, is to be feared (Epistle 2 On impressed motion, etc., p. 111): “How great, do you think,” says he, “will the absurdity to be increased present itself, when a point [the earth] shall have been taken [reckoned] in the compass of the prime mobile—especially with one or another crystalline heaven interposed? And [when] they object, besides, that the parts of the earth would be torn apart by that so great whirling: how much more is the tearing-apart to be feared for the parts of the prime mobile, as being snatched by an incomparably swifter whirling?” But before we take away from the minds of these [men] this panic terror, let us call the whole force of this argumentation to the norm of a syllogism, which finally is such.

[Margin: The Ninth Argument in form.]

[XXIX.] “If the non-wandering Stars were moved to the motion of the Firmament by the diurnal whirling, they would not keep perpetually the same distance among themselves. But the non-wandering stars do keep perpetually the same distance among themselves. Therefore the non-wandering stars are not moved by the diurnal whirling to the motion of the Firmament: it remains, therefore, that the Earth itself is rather moved by such a motion.” The Minor is certain from what was said (bk. 6, ch. 10). The Major is proved, on the one hand, from the incredible velocity of that whirling; on the other, from the fluidity of the Firmament, unfit to contain any fixed stars whatever always in the same distance from all the other stars; or also from [its] solidity—unless that solidity itself were posited so great as human belief and estimation cannot attain.

[Margin: Response.]

It is answered by denying the Major of the proposed syllogism, and its proof. For if the Firmament be supposed fluid, it is neither necessary, nor congruent with the more probable reasoning, that the non-wandering stars be moved to the motion of the Firmament; but they would more likely be posited as moved by the Intelligences, whether severally, or [as] enclosed together by some other bond, as it were a net, as we said (sect. 1, ch. 7). But if—the chief reason for asserting the Firmament solid being, after the authority of many Fathers and Doctors, that very perpetuity of equal distance of the Fixed stars preserved from those same stars, and observed from the most ancient times of Astronomy—if, I say, the Firmament be so solid that it is neither worn down by another body apt, through the extrusion of warmer spirits or latent sparks, to concur toward ignition, nor dashes itself against another body, nor is forced by a sudden concussion to halt or recede, but is carried round, by an even tenor of motion, always within the same space: in vain is it feared lest it be broken, or burst asunder, and thus, the framework being dissolved, perturb the intervals of the Fixed stars. Nor can Gassendi in particular spurn this response, who similarly answers concerning the Earth, saying in the same place: “Although for the parts of the Earth itself there is no danger—because they all cohere among themselves, and are borne by an ever natural and even motion—it is just the same as if they were at rest; and the only mischance to be feared would be if the earth were dashed against a resisting body, or otherwise halted by a sudden rest.” And [I ask], could not GOD infuse into the Firmament a coherence and solidity as great, and much greater, than He implanted in the Earth—even if that solidity were to be reckoned so great as to exhibit an admirable work of God?

[Margin: God’s glory shines forth most in the Firmament and its motion.]

[XXX.] Wherefore, if the Copernicans do this, that they may [build up] a marvelousness in the divine works—or [rather] detract either the admiration or the belief of it from human minds, [then] they do not act consequently, who, from the vast immensity of the interval between Saturn and the Fixed stars, and from the immensity of that supreme heaven, [should rather] inculcate to us the divine Omnipotence and Majesty of the Creator (as we shall afterward see); nor do [these notions] cohere with [the views] of most of the Wise, and especially with the eloquence of the divine letters. For what else do those most-celebrated songs of Psalm 18 sound forth: “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament announces the work of [His] hands”? For how does it announce, except chiefly by the harmony of the diurnal revolution, by which the alternating turns of days and nights, repeated by a law so constant from the very founding of the world, by a certain hidden sound excite mortals to the knowledge of God and the acknowledgment of His power? For there is subjoined: “Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge; and Into all the earth their sound hath gone forth, and their words unto the ends of the world.” What likewise do those words insinuate to us in Ecclesiasticus, ch. 43: “the Vessel of the camps on high, in the firmament of heaven shining forth gloriously”? Or what else does the Prophet Baruch signify, ch. 3, when, from the light of the rising stars [coming] successively over the orb of the earth, by the sublimity of [his] eloquence he commends GOD, saying: “He that sendeth forth light, and it goeth; and He called it, and it obeyeth Him with trembling. And the stars gave light in their watches, and rejoiced; they were called, and they said, Here we are; and they shined forth with cheerfulness to Him that made them. This is our GOD, and no other shall be accounted of against Him.” What, I say, do these [things] hint to us, but that it was, and is, equally easy for our GOD to direct the array of the stars in order, by the Intelligences, at His nod, without any confusion of the place once assigned to them as it were for a watch-post; and that it is done [as] for a most expert Field-marshal, or a most skilled Emperor [General] of an army, [who] so moves his troops, however great, by great and most swift marches, in companies—and governs [them] by their centurions and tribunes—as if the camps were transferred, with the rampart itself, as it were enclosed in a certain vessel? Finally, let us hear GOD Himself, asking (Job 38): “Canst thou join together the glittering stars, the Pleiades, or canst thou dissipate the gyre of Arcturus?” Just as if He should say: canst thou, or any little man like thee, in so small a space of heaven—however small is that which the asterism of the Pleiades occupies—bind together such a multitude of stars, in an order so perpetual and constant and with an immutable constancy of intervals? (For not seven only, but far very many [stars] in that tract has the Telescope brought to light); or wilt thou be able to bring it about that Arcturus, though it repeats its gyre daily with so ample a circuit and so great a velocity, be dissipated and otherwise thrust out, and forced to run out, wandering, by one and another path? By no means, surely by no means.

Tenth Argument, from the Neediness of the Earth, and the Independence of the Stars from the Earth—which [Earth] is not the end for which the stars are ordained

[XXXI.] This is the last of the arguments pertaining to this head. “It is ridiculous,” says Gilbert (bk. 6 On the Magnet, ch. 3), “that the Heaven, and for the sake of the earth—so small a globe—should be moved.” For it seems unworthy of the majesty of the Heavens that they should be moved by the diurnal motion for the sake of the Earth, since they themselves do not need that motion; whereas the Earth itself remains unmoved—[the Earth] which alone, or most of all, needs the good consequent upon that motion. For whatever is moved locally is moved to this end: that it may acquire some good which it never had—and thus living things are moved, which on that account are called by the Philosopher “living,” because they acquire for themselves something beyond what they have from birth, and perfect themselves chiefly through motion, which plants accomplish without motion; or at least it is moved that it may recover a lost good, or restore itself to a place in which it can best be conserved—by which reason the bodies of the elements, and of inanimate mixed [bodies], are moved. Lansberge urges this argument in the Progymnasmata, adding that the earth is moved with less expense than the stars; just as a mother more easily moves the boys to the fire, that she may warm them, than [she] leads the fire around—

[…continues on p. 320 (PDF 355) with the catchword “eorum”: ”…[leads the fire] around them”—the rest of Lansberge’s similitude, and Riccioli’s dissolution of the Tenth Argument.]

(printed p. 320 — closes Chapter V and opens Chapter VI. The Tenth Argument concludes with Kepler’s claim that the Earth must move for man’s contemplation, cast in form and answered (the heavens perfect others by their motion, and are indeed ordained for man). Chapter VI then opens with seven arguments for the Earth’s diurnal motion, beginning the “Achilles” argument from the incredible velocity of the fixed stars, with Maestlin’s calculations and the start of Kepler’s.)

[Header: BOOK IX. SECTION IV. — 320]

—to warm them, than to lead the fire around them. Kepler too urges [it] (bk. 4 of the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, p. 500), saying: “The other argument destroys all motion whatever of the sphere of the Fixed stars—nay, I say, [the motion] of all the Planets; since it does not appear to what good [end], when there is nothing outside, whence or whither that translation should vary both position and appearances; and [since the Earth] obtains by rest whatever it could attain by any motion. For from its rest are understood the motions of all bodies; and unless it provided the place (which it most rightly performs by resting), nothing could be moved.” But the same [thing] he had said in the Dissertation with the Sidereal Messenger: “Let man, therefore, acknowledge that he is not the fount and origin of the mundane ornament, but depends on the true fount and origin. Add also this, which I said in the Optics: that for the sake of the contemplation for which man was made, and adorned and furnished with eyes, man could not rest at the center, but it behooved that he be carried about by the annual motion in this ship of the Earth, for the sake of surveying—no otherwise than the measurers of inaccessible things change station for station, that from the intervals of the stations they may contrive a just base for the surveyor’s triangle.” For what he here says of the annual motion holds also (if it holds at all) of the diurnal. Let the argument now be gathered into a summary.

[Margin: The Form of the Tenth Argument.]

[XXXII.] “Motion is to be attributed to that which needs that motion for its own good, but not to that which does not need it. But it is the Earth that needs the diurnal—nay, even the annual—motion for its own good, not the heaven. Therefore the diurnal (nay, even the annual) motion is to be attributed to the Earth, not to the heaven.”

It is answered by denying the Major, if that which is to be moved (or is moved) be [moved] not from within, but from without, by [an agent] ordaining it to the good of another; or [if] the mobile—whether it be moved from within or from without—be by its own nature ordained to the perfecting of other [things] by means of that motion, so that its [own] good is to be perfective of others, while meanwhile it itself takes no detriment—of which kind are the heavens and stars; but by conceding [the Major] if none of these [conditions] militate in such a mobile. But to that which is added—that we are not the end for which the stars and heavens and their motions are ordained—we deny that proposition. For now (sect. 2, ch. 4, num. 10) we have taught the opposite clearly enough, as consonant with sacred Scripture, much more with the Fathers.