(printed p. 247:)

[Margin: 1. Opinion — on the proper form moving the heavens.]

[I.] The first opinion was that the heavens are moved by their own form, that is, from within—lest that form be idle and inferior to the forms of the elements, since each thing exists for the sake of its own operation, as the Philosopher says (On the Heavens bk. 2, ch. 3, text 17); and lest that perpetual motion in a circle be violent, since (from the Ethics bk. 3, ch. 1) the violent is that whose principle is outside [the thing]. And certainly it does not seem repugnant that some body could be made by God to which there is a natural appetite for perpetual circular motion, and so a power of moving itself perpetually in a circle—just as an impetus once impressed on a stone for circular motion, if it were not gradually corrupted by a contrary impetus produced by gravity, would perhaps last forever, as some say. Since, therefore, in the heaven there is no gravity or levity, what wonder if that impetus—acting on the celestial body from the beginning, once [impressed], in a circle by the force of its own form—should perpetually whirl it around?

[Margin: Major, [William of] Paris, Albert of Saxony, Gabriel, Trallianus, Strato.]

Therefore of this opinion were John Major (bk. 1 On the Heavens), [William of] Paris (part 2 On the Universe, ch. 152), thinking the opposite vain and frivolous; and Albert of Saxony (Physics bk. 8, last question); and others, in [the report of] St. Bonaventure and Bassolis (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, art. 3, q. 2); and Gabriel [Biel] thinks it probable (ibid., q. 1, art. 3, dub. 2). And of old too Trallianus and Strato of Lampsacus, as the Conimbricenses relate (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 1); and Pererius (On Genesis bk. 2, q. 5) said that the motion from right to left—that is, from East to West—is from an Intelligence, but [the motion] from left to right is from [the heaven’s] own form.

[Margin: Longomontanus. Vallesius. Camerarius.]

Among the more recent [writers], Longomontanus (Theorics bk. 1, in the proem) says [the heaven is] moved from within; but Vallesius (Controversies 11 and 26, Physics) teaches that it is moved partly by its own form, partly from without—for an Intelligence moderates the velocity; and Camerarius (disp. 25), whom that [text] of Psalm 18 [19] moved—“He hath rejoiced as a giant to run his course”—to think that the Sun is moved from within, although it is said metaphorically; and that [phrase] in the Preface of the Mass, “the heavens and the powers of the heavens,” where the powers of the heavens are numbered [as] distinct from the Angels—as if, forsooth, there by the name “powers” could not be understood forces for influencing, or even some order of Angels, since [the Preface] goes on to say, “And the blessed Seraphim.”

[Margin: Eusebius Nieremberg. — St. Francis Xavier stops the Sun.]

Toward the same opinion strongly inclines Eusebius Nieremberg (in his Philosophy, bk. 6, On the Life of the Stars), who, however, concedes that some Intelligence was appointed—of old, or [for the moment]—for stirring up extraordinary motions, or for stopping their motions; as when, at the death of Christ, the full Moon was brought back to conjunction with the Sun; and [as when] the Sun’s course was held back—not only at Joshua’s command, but also at the prayer of St. Francis Xavier (that the ship, which was being tossed by a violent storm, might reach harbor before sunset)—as Velasquez, Sherlock, and Oviedo (the single controversy On the Heavens, point 1, num. 7) relate of St. Xavier.

[Margin: Téllez.]

But that the Stars are moved absolutely [unqualifiedly] by their own form, Baltasar Téllez affirms (disp. 44, sect. 3), who also had taught (disp. 40, sect. 3) that, if the stars are considered in themselves and without respect to inferior [things], circular motion is not connatural to them, but [comes] from without; but if they are considered as they are the chief part of the Universe, having

(printed p. 247, right column — the column opens mid-sentence, completing the claim that, in virtue of their natural powers for influencing, circular motion is natural to the heavenly bodies, as held by the author of the Philolaic Astronomy (bk. 4, ch. 2).)

[Margin: Bullialdus.]

Ismaël Bullialdus [Boulliau] too (Philolaic Astronomy, ch. 12, and in the Philolaus, bk. 4, ch. 2) concludes that both the Sun—about its own axis, in the center of the World—and the rest of the Planets (among which he had placed the Earth) are moved by their own form.

[Margin: Kepler.]

But Kepler (in the introduction to [the commentary on] Mars, and ch. 33; and bk. 4 of the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, parts 2 and 3, that is, from p. 499 to 530) teaches that the Sun is in the center of the World, and has a moving soul with a certain corporeal life, by which it is perpetually moved about its own axis: “For although by another means,” he says (p. 514), “that motion could be continued, yet by the aid of a soul the long-lastingness and perpetuity of this motion—in which the life of the whole World consists—is more rightly obtained.” He says, then, that the Sun emits from itself a certain species [emanation] similar to that which a magnet emits, and by it, as if with a hand, grasps the other Planets; and that, while it is itself turned by [its] rotation about its own axis, it leads the other Planets around—yet in such a way that, when that magnetic power falls upon the friendly part of the Planets (according to the disposition of [their] magnetic fibers), it attracts them to itself, and they become perihelial; but since the Planets have a power of holding themselves in the parallel position which they once obtained from the beginning, with respect to [their] position in the Universe, it comes about that gradually the hostile and contrary part and face is turned toward the Sun, and therefore they are repelled by the magnetic species or quality of the Sun, and become aphelial—just as a magnet allures to itself the friendly part of the magnetic needle [and] repels the unfriendly. Finally, he says that in the other Planets there is a certain inertia toward motion, and a greater resistance the farther they are distant from the Sun. And so he teaches that the Sun is moved from within, but the rest of the Planets from without—namely, set in motion by the Sun—but by no means by an Intelligence (p. 508); whose ingenious figments Bullialdus refutes at length in the place cited above. Yet the same Kepler, in the Hyperaspistes (p. 6), admits that “Christian scruples transfer these motions of the heaven to Angels”; and (p. 7) [admits] that the Star of the Magi and Comets are moved either by a Genius [spirit], or by an inborn knowledge, according to Tycho.

[Margin: What of Tycho?]

Hither likewise seems to be referred Tycho, who (vol. 1 of the Progymnasmata, p. 268) says: “It is proved, therefore, even from the observations of two ethereal Comets alone—namely of the year 1577 and 1585—by reason of their motion peculiar [different] from the rest of the Planets, that no orbs really exist in the ether, and that the heaven itself does not consist of hard and impervious matter; but that the stars themselves possess a certain natural and congenital—or rather divinely implanted from the beginning, and perpetually preserved—knowledge of regular motion, by which, impelled or supported by no orbs, they perform their courses most perfectly and most constantly.” But from these very [words], and from what was said in the preceding section (ch. 8, num. 4), it is sufficiently established that he [Tycho] is to be referred to the second class, which teaches that the stars are moved by a soul not only sensitive but also intellective—to which [class] Kepler too in part belongs.

[Margin: What of Suárez and Raynaudus?]

But now Suárez said (Metaphysics disp. 29, sect. 1, num. 16; and earlier disp. 18, sect. [—], num. 36)—yet, in disputing, he concedes that motion can be attributed to an incorruptible proper form; and Theophilus Raynaudus (in the Natural Theology, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 1) says that the opinion of those affirming that the heaven or stars are moved by an intrinsic and proper form is to be condemned for rashness.

[Margin: 2. Opinion — on a moving soul.]

The second Opinion was that of those who said the heavens and Stars are indeed moved by their own form, but [a form] which would be an Intellective soul, or even a sensitive and vegetative one—[the views] which I reviewed distinctly in Section 1, ch. 8, from num. 1 to [4]; which therefore we do not repeat.

[Margin: 3. Opinion — on God as mover.]

The third Opinion, then, [is] that the heavens are moved by God himself immediately. So judged Albertus Magnus (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, art. 6), Alpetragius [al-Bitrūjī] (On the Physical Cause of the Celestial Motions), and—if you believe the Conimbricenses—Ptolemy himself, [and] Leonard Lessius (the book On Providence, from num. 20). Which [view] also Ga—

[…continues on p. 248 (PDF 283): ”…Gabriel [Biel] (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, q. unica) and Gregory of Rimini (on 2, dist. 8, q. 3) thought probable. For although the Abulensis denies that local motion can be made immediately by God, yet it is an error to deny this, as St. Thomas teaches…” — then Riccioli’s digression giving his own (Cartesian-style) argument for God’s existence, against the Atheists; then the 4th and most common opinion: the heavens are moved by the Angels/Intelligences as assisting movers.]

(printed p. 248 — continuing the third opinion (God moves the heavens immediately): further authorities are cited for its probability, Gabriel Biel and Gregory of Rimini, while Tostatus’s denial that God can immediately cause local motion is rejected as an error, with St. Thomas. The page then argues that denying God’s immediate particular causation of the supreme heaven’s motion neither entails an infinite regress of movers nor undermines the demonstration of God’s existence from creatures.)

[Margin: God’s existence is demonstrated by a new argument.]

And besides, there are other modes of demonstrating the Divine existence, among which this one occurs to me as the most evident of all: namely, that we evidently judge it possible that there be a being supremely perfect, and having all the pure perfections [perfectiones simpliciter simplices] which are compossible—(for if any perfection is mixed with imperfection, or repugnant to another more necessary and more to be chosen, of this we do not speak)—but among the other pure perfections, and repugnant to no such perfection, is necessary existence; that is, so to exist that it can never, and could never, not exist, as any intellect not badly disposed judges. Therefore, if such a being is possible, it also exists in reality, since that perfection does not include a mere possibility of existing, but an actuality, and indeed a necessary one. And in this one case alone does the argument from the possible to [actual] being hold—that is, from being-able-to-be to being-in-fact. Which argument, many years afterward, I found later indicated—but in another form of words—by René Descartes (in the Principles of Philosophy, part 1, num. 14).

[Margin: Some said the heaven is moved by chance.]

Let these things be said against the Atheists. But to those who wish to demonstrate God from the motion of the heaven, [there] are diametrically opposed those who said the heaven is moved by chance—namely Democritus and Epicurus.

[Margin: 4. Opinion — moved by the Angels.]

[III.] The fourth Opinion, and the most common, is: that the heaven and stars are moved by Intelligences, that is, by Angels—as assisting, and immediate, efficient causes; but not as by souls informing the heaven; and so [that they are] moved by an extrinsic principle, but a created one. In which opinion are all [those] already enumerated in Section 1, ch. 8, from number 5; and [those] expressly treating this controversy—namely St. Thomas (Prima Pars, q. 70, art. 3; and q. 6 On Power, art. 3; and Opusculum 10, art. 3; and Opusculum 11, art. 2; and 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 92, and there Ferrariensis); likewise the Scholastics almost universally (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14)—

[Margin: Authors of the 4th opinion.]

especially St. Bonaventure (art. 3, q. 2), Scotus (q. 1), Durandus (q. 2), the Argentine [Gregory of Rimini] (q. 1 and 2); [Gregory] of Rimini (on 2, dist. 1, q. 1), Capreolus (dist. 9, q. 1, art. 3), Albert [the Great] (On the Four Coevals, part 1, q. 4, art. 26), Nicolaus Cusanus (Exercitations bk. 7), Soncinas (Metaphysics bk. 12, q. 36), Jandun (On the Substance of the Orb, q. 2, 13, and 14; and 2 On the Heavens, q. 92). Among the more recent: the Conimbricenses (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 5), Rubius (ibid., and 1 On the Heavens, ch. 2, q. 8), Toletus (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5), Suárez (in the Metaphysics, disp. 18, sect. 7, num. 36; and disp. 35, sect. 1, num. 20), Pererius (bk. 2 On Genesis, q. 5; and bk. 7 Physics, ch. 7, q. 2), who says it is, as it were, handed down by the Philosophers and received by the Theologians; and Bubalus (On the Angels, q. 1, diff. 2, art. 15), who thinks the opposite dangerous; Arriaga (the single disputation On the Heavens, sect. 5, num. 64), Hurtado (disp. 2 On the Heavens, sect. 4), Oviedo (the single controversy On the Heavens, point 1, num. 7), Mastrius and Bellutus (disp. 2 On the Heavens, q. 4, art. 3), George Polaccus (in the Anti-Copernicus, assertion 111), Aversa (q. 34, Physics, sect. 7), John Anthony Delphinus the Franciscan (the opusculum On the Celestial Orbs, from p. 80), John Punch (disp. 22, Physics, q. 9), Amicus (tract 5, On the Heavens, q. 6, dub. 2), [and] Claramontius [Chiaramonti] (bk. 2 On the Universe, ch. 17).

[Margin: St. Thomas’s notable sayings.]

But it pleases [me] to note St. Thomas’s opinion, who (q. 6 On Power, art. 3) says: “But it is a matter of Faith that the Angels move the celestial bodies locally by their command—and also other bodies, God ordaining and permitting [it]”; for he had reported the opinions of the Philosophers conceding to the Angels the motion of the heavens, but denying [it] of other bodies. And in Opusculum 10, art. 3: “But that the celestial bodies are moved by a spiritual creature, I do not remember to have read denied by any of the Saints or Philosophers.” Finally, in Opusculum 11, art. 2: “But it seems to me that it can be demonstratively proved that the celestial bodies are moved by some intellect—either by God immediately, or by means of the Angels. But that he moves them by means of the Angels agrees with the order of things, which Dionysius asserts to be infallible: that inferior [things] are administered by God through intermediaries, according to the common course.” And that this is the opinion of the ancients, Trithemius taught (the book On the 7 Intelligences moving the orb), whose words I have already reported in bk. 7, sect. 1, ch. 1, where I reviewed many things—not unworthy of a learned reader—about the 7 spirits moving the 7 Planets.

The Single Conclusion

Although it can be demonstrated neither Metaphysically nor Mathematically—but at most Physically or morally—that the heaven or stars are moved by Intelligences; nevertheless, the Authority both sacred and profane being regarded, it must be said that they are moved by Intelligences.

[IV.] The first part of the Conclusion is clear, because from neither the principles of Metaphysics nor those of Mathematics can a necessary connection be deduced between the motion of the heaven or stars and the Intelligences—whether their motion be regarded according to [its] substance, or [its] essentials, or as regards accidental perfections, but especially the most perfect order and harmony (that is, the uniformly non-uniform anomaly), and the infallible rules which they keep in their periods and revolutions, and the perpetuity and constancy through so many ages. For it is repugnant neither to the principles of being-as-being, nor to bounded quantity as such (whether it be continuous or discrete), that bodies could be made by God which are moved from within in this way—by a power and qualities connatural to them and implanted by God from the beginning of the World (as we were saying, under number 1, in reporting the first opinion); and [that] by such a motion they are so moved toward the good of inferior [things], that this very thing is their good—to exercise their power and communicate their influences to others—just as it is the perfection of a Master to teach others, and of a Physician to heal others, though it be an extrinsic perfection, which nevertheless betrays an intrinsic [one]. For the things which some have attempted against [this] are too slight to need a response: as when they say that circular motion is reflexive upon itself, and that reflection is from a soul; and that every mover supposes an immovable part on which it rests, as when an animal rests on [pushes off with] its foot—for what will they say about the fins of fishes and the wings of birds? Or when they say that the same [thing] cannot be at once in potency and in act, and that therefore every movable must be moved from without. But neither is a moving Angel necessary, such that the existence of [the Angel] could be demonstrated from this; for either it is known from elsewhere—and so is not necessary on that account—or it is unknown, and so is not shown from things more known [than] that very [thing] about which, as [if] less known, the question is here [raised].

[Margin: Whether the existence of the Angels is demonstrated from the motion of the Heavens.]

Moreover, we have already shown at length in the treatise On the Angels (when we were publicly professing Theology) that there is no natural means by which the existence of the Angels may be demonstrated; for all effects either include a determination to a moral fault or to falsity, and [so] can be attributed to separated souls; or they do not include [it], and [so] can be attributed either to the same [souls], or to God. And so [it goes], reasoning through the rest.

[Margin: 2. Part of the Conclusion.]

The second part—about the Physical or Moral demonstration, conceded rather than asserted—is proved because, on the one hand, we have no indication in the stars, or from the stars, of an animal [vital] operation, since neither organs nor other similar [things] appear in them; but, on the other hand, the admirable harmony of the celestial motions, and the reason and order constant through so many ages—far greater than in the humors of the human body, nay, than in any machines whatever devised by human artifice—is an argument of a soul or a mind continually preserving and directing such motions. Therefore it is physically, or at least morally, evident that the heaven or stars are moved by some mind, which nevertheless is not properly their soul—especially since so great is the variety and subtlety in the motions of the Planets, that not even the most skilled of Astronomers have hitherto fully comprehended it. There is added that, by sufficient induction, we have [the principle that] whatever is moved locally is moved so that it may be better off in a different place; and to be moved [toward] its proper place is proper to living beings: but neither [of these] belongs to the heaven or the stars.

The third part is confirmed, first, from the multitude of Authors—

[…continues on p. 249 (PDF 284): “…of both classes [philosophers and theologians], then from the Sacred writings: for that [text] of Job 9, ‘Under whom they are bowed who bear the world’; and Job 26, ‘The pillars of heaven tremble’; and ch. 38, ‘When the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy’; and that of Matthew 24, ‘The powers of the heavens shall be moved’ — many Fathers expound of the Angels. Finally, St. Dionysius (On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 5), St. Augustine (On the Trinity bk. 3, ch. 4), and St. Gregory (Dialogues bk. 4) teach…”]

(printed p. 249 — completing the third part of the Conclusion, that the heavens are moved by Angels: the thesis is confirmed from the multitude of authors, from Scripture (Job 9, 26, 38; Matthew 24), and from Dionysius, Augustine, and Gregory, who teach that divine providence governs corporeal things through spirits. Nor is it absurd, against Lessius’s scruple, that some Angels be perpetually occupied in this ministry, since God can easily substitute others.)

[Margin: Kepler’s objections resolved.]

[V.] But now the objections of John Kepler are to be dissolved, by which (in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, from p. 508) he contends that created Intelligences do not move the Planets, but that they are moved by the Sun by a certain material necessity and natural [one]. For solid orbs, he says, cannot be admitted, since it has been shown that the heaven of the Planets is fluid; but without solid orbs a created Intelligence cannot move the Planets—both because a mind destitute of an animal and locomotive power cannot, by a mere nod, or by the desire or command of [its] will, effect motion in another body; and because, if a Mind were to move [them], it would surely move the Planets in a perfect circle, of which there is a mental beauty and perfection. But from Astronomical observations legitimately handled, we are convinced that the path of a Planet is not a perfect circle, but either an ellipse or a similar figure, which savors rather of the nature of a balance [steelyard] and of material necessity than of the conception of a mind. Again, although the tempering of the extreme motions—that is, of the slowest and the swiftest in each Planet—is most exquisitely harmonic, and the work of the supreme and adorable creative mind, yet the lengths of the periodic times do not have a mental beauty, because they do not have effable [expressible] or rational proportions (such as double, triple, etc.), but ineffable or irrational ones, and so tending to infinity; nor are the times of one period gathered from equal [motions], but from unequal motions in different parts of the circle, according to the ratios of a balance. Finally, no place can be assigned in which the Intelligence resides, and from which it might know the path along which it could direct the Planet—not in the center of the circle, nor in the centers (that is, foci) of the Ellipse; for in the ethereal breeze those places do not differ from other points, nor could the mind perceive thence whether a Planet so far distant went along the path by which it ought, unless you give it eyes, or a cord by which the Planet, tied [to it], is led around. For to have a mental idea of the planetary orbit does not suffice, but there is need of some instrument by which the real path of the Planet—having a definite magnitude—is carried into execution. But neither can it be placed on the circumference of the orbit; for either it will rest in one point (and the argument just made recurs, when the Planet will be at very distant points), or it will be moved from place to place, like a soul with a body; but since this mind lacks a body, and is not of itself movable or place-able, it will have no means by which to measure its distance from the center of the world (since this center is outside the center of the planetary orbit), or to keep its position with respect to it. Yet Kepler concedes that the figure of the planetary orbit, and the periodic motions, are the work of the creative Mind—that is, of God.

This is plainly Kepler’s reasoning, the more obtuse to me, the more acute it seemed to him—both because he assumes as conceded certain things which cannot be conceded without injury and disgrace redounding upon the Intelligences, and because he entangles reasons mutually repugnant. But I shall have done [something] worth the effort, if I reduce these arguments to form and blow them away.

[Margin: 1. Argument, from Kepler.]

[VI.] The first Argument is of this kind: “If a Mind or created Intelligence moved the Planets, it would move them in a perfect circle, and in such a way that the periodic time of the Planet would have a rational proportion, gatherable from equal motions.” Its proof: For such a figure and motion have a beauty and perfection worthy of a mind, and befitting an Intelligence. But the Planet’s motion is not made in a perfect circle, nor does its periodic time have a rational proportion, nor [one] gathered from equal motions. [Therefore it is not moved by a Mind.]

[Margin: 1. Response.]

I answer, first, by denying the Major [premise]; for there is no necessity of such a proposition. For not the circle alone is a perfect figure—especially with respect to the end to which the motion is ordained—but the Ellipse too, and many other figures; nor are [only] those proportions effable to us beautiful, but also [those] ineffable to us, [yet] to God, who ordained them, rational and effable, at least by his divine Word, to whom he tells all things finite and infinite. Nor is it necessary that [God] distinctly communicated to the Angels an idea or knowledge of them; but it suffices, if he willed them to move the Planets along such and a determinate path of the ethereal breeze, with such velocity, and within such a time to revolve them to the same or nearly the same point—whatever proportion, after all, may arise between the parts of that motion, or of the whole period with the period of another Planet.

[Margin: 2. Response (ad hominem).]

I answer, secondly, by retorting the argument thus: “The imperfection of figure and motion which is unbecoming to an Intellectual nature, and not worthy of a created mind on account of the perfection of such a nature, is much more unbecoming to the Divine nature, and unworthy of that supreme Mind; but the figure and periodic motion of the Planets are of this kind, according to you, O Kepler; therefore they are not the work of the divine mind”—which it is impious to say, nor indeed do you [Kepler] say it; nay, you have expressly professed the opposite. Nor will you escape if you say that that figure and motion are not immediately from God, but from the Sun moving the other Planets; for since the Sun does not determine it freely, but by natural necessity, all this determination [comes] at last from God, and is not to be attributed to him, if it contains an imperfection unworthy of God [as its] author.

[Margin: 2. Argument, from Kepler.]

[VII.] The second Argument is of this kind: “The motion of the Planets is made in an Ellipse according to the ratios of a balance and steelyard—that is, according to a material necessity arising from the nature of a balance—rather than according to an intellectual reason, or a voluntary appointment. But if [the Planets] were moved by an Intelligence, they would not be so moved; therefore, etc.” It could be answered, [first,] by denying the Major—if the discourse be about a reason primarily intended per se by the motive faculty of the Planets; granted that some likeness or analogy of such motions with motions made by a balance and lever be not conceded, yet it is worthy of God that he willed to represent this analogy primarily per se; nor is that [saying] of Wisdom 11 to be restricted to these mechanical narrows: “He disposed all things in weight, number, and measure”—but [it extends] to higher ends, and to determinate proportions of the means with their ends. I answer, secondly, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor; for the knowledge of such ratios could be infused into the moving Angels, so that they might move the Planets, and so move them that the analogy [with a balance] be preserved—as it were more accommodated to us, who are of a grosser intellect—yet not repugnant to the end of these motions.

[Margin: 3. Argument, from Kepler.]

[VIII.] The third Argument is such: “If an Intelligence moved the Planets, it would need some body by which it might perceive along what path they were to be directed, and the distance of them from the center of the world to be preserved in such motion. But the Intelligences have no such body—because neither are there solid Planetary orbs, by whose motion that path and distance would be kept; nor do they have cords or similar supports by which they might lead the Planets around; nor are they forms informing or animating the Planets; or if they were, yet there are not in the Planets organs of senses through which the aforesaid path and distance could be perceived. Therefore [they cannot move them].” I answer, [first,] by denying the Major—as [a thing] unworthily brought against the most perfect mode of understanding with which the Angels are endowed; for they understand, without sensations, all sensible things, and all corporeal motions, and the figure describable by them, by impressed species alone and ideas divinely infused—indeed far more perfectly than Kepler [understood] those Ellipses and librations of his; unless he is so dull as to think that the Angels, without eyes or hands, etc., do not understand the figures and ratios of the motions, and the intervals between the Planets and the center of the world—which Kepler himself thinks are understood by himself (although not immediately through the senses, but deduced by reasoning from observations); or [so dull as to think] that they do indeed understand, but cannot, without corporeal organs, impress on the Planets a motion such as shines forth in the intelligible Ideas of them.

[…continues on p. 250 (PDF 285): “Than which saying or thought, what can be more stupid? Could a painter, then, be found who would draw a perfectly straight line and a most perfectly round circle without ruler and compass — and an Angel will not be able, without any corporeal instrument, to impel a Planet, or lead it around through that orbit through which the Keplerian Sun and its soul (which is neither intellective nor sensitive) drive the Planets around by a certain blind direction? But I am ashamed, in Kepler’s name, to linger longer on these trifles…”]

(printed p. 250 — concluding the rebuttal of Kepler: it is ridiculed as stupid to grant that a painter might draw perfect lines freehand yet deny that an Angel can impel a Planet without corporeal instrument, when Kepler’s own solar soul drives the Planets by blind direction. Riccioli declares himself weary of refuting such trifles and turns to three further Questions of the chapter.)

On the Mode by which the Intelligences move the Heaven or the Stars

[IX.] It is wont to be asked whether the Intelligences move the heavens—or generally whether the Angels move bodies—by intellect and will alone, or rather by a power distinct from both of these. For [that] the Intellect and the mere desire or command of the will suffices, [this] thought Averroes, Durandus, Bassolis, the Argentine [Gregory of Rimini], Capreolus, Soncinas, [William of] Paris, Hervaeus, Aquarius, Victoria, and certain other Thomists (whom the Conimbricenses cite, 2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 7); and Amicus (tract 5, On the Heavens, q. 6, dub. 6); and among ours [Jesuits] there follow Vasquez (disp. 102, ch. 5), Delrio (2 of the Magical Disquisitions, q. 6), and Molina (Prima Pars, q. 54, art. 5). And St. Thomas strongly favors them (ibid.; and Quodlibet 2, art. 2; and Opusculum 11, art. 3 and 13; and q. 16 On Evil, art. 1, ad 14); and Aristotle (On the Soul bk. 3, text 49), where he said: “Both of these, therefore, are motive with respect to place—the intellect and the appetite.” For another power seems to be multiplied in vain, especially in a merely intellectual nature, in which it is fitting that those [powers] which in inferior [beings] are dispersed be united, and [that] all its powers be merely intellectual.

[Margin: An Angel’s locally-motive power is distinguished from intellect and will.]

But, on the contrary, [that] a power locally-motive of itself and of bodies is distinguished from the intellect and will of the Angels—[this] more rightly taught Scotus (on [Sentences] 4, dist. 10, q. 7; and on 1, dist. 45), Henry of Ghent, Mayronis, Aureolus, Cajetan, Godfrey [of Fontaines], and others (whom the Conimbricenses and Amicus adduce and follow above); Suárez (disp. 35, Metaphysics, sect. 2, num. 21; and On the Angels bk. 4, ch. 29), Raynaudus (in the Natural Theology, dist. 4, q. 3, art. 4), Rubius (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 11), Tanner (Prima Pars, disp. 5, q. 5, dist. 1), Meratius (disp. 21 On the Angels), and Alarcon (disp. 6, ch. 8). For both the objective concept of these powers, and the proper object, are different; nor can the intellect elicit any operation other than intellection, nor the will [any] but volition, as it is such a power; but neither of these is local motion, or the production of the impetus effecting it—otherwise [the Angel] could move [a body] in an instant, and to any distance, and [a body] however large, because the Angel can understand and love these [things]. Therefore the intellect, by directing and proposing, and the will, by commanding, can be only the moral cause of this motion; but there is need of an executive power, to which the command is given—as St. Thomas also taught (q. 6 On Power, art. 7; and Quodlibet 9, art. 10); nay, in the Prima Pars (q. 25, art. 1) he teaches that the divine power implies the character of a principle executing what the will commands, and to which knowledge directs. When, therefore, he teaches that God and the Angels move by intellect and will alone, he is to be understood as excluding a motive power really distinct [from them], or adequately including corporeal organs, such as is in animate beings. But I suppose, from what we said elsewhere in the treatise On the Angels, that they impress a certain quality—translative of the movable from place to place—which is called impetus, and from which motion immediately follows (as Molina also teaches, Prima Pars, q. 110, art. 3; Vasquez, disp. 128 and 218; and Tanner, above, dub. 2), at least when the movable body is separated from the Angel. Granted that Suárez teaches that only motion is produced by them (disp. 35, sect. 6, num. 24; and On the Angels bk. 4, ch. 31), and Amicus above—at least when [the Angel] is immediately present—whether that impetus be spiritual (inasmuch as [it is] from a spiritual principle), or rather corporeal (inasmuch as [it is] ordained for moving a body, and received in a corporeal subject).

Whether, and where, the Moving Intelligences are at rest

[X.] It is asked, moreover, whether the Intelligences, while they move the heaven or the Planets, are at rest—and in what part of the heaven—or whether they fly around together with them. That an Intelligence resides in one determinate place of the heaven, and thence impresses motion on the heaven (to which it is immediately present), which is afterward diffused into the other parts of the heaven, [this] taught Aristotle (Physics bk. 8, last chapter, text 84; and On the Heavens bk. 2, ch. 2), St. Thomas (Prima Pars, q. 52, art. 2), St. Bonaventure and Scotus (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 2, q. 5), the Conimbricenses (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 8), Tanner (vol. 1 of the Theology, disp. 5, q. 5, dub. 2), [and] Amicus (tract 5, On the Heavens, q. 6, dub. 6). And that that part [where the Intelligence resides] is at the Equator (where the motion is swiftest) and in the East (whence the motion begins), the Peripatetics teach. But others distinguish, and say that the Intelligence which moves the total heaven (that is, one whole heaven—say, the prime mobile) rests in one determinate part of it; but those [Intelligences] which move the Planets, they say are moved according to the motion of the Epicycle, so that they may impress a different motion on it and on the Planet—so Bartholomew Mastrius and Bonaventure Bellutus (disp. 2 On the Heavens, q. 4, num. 148)—granted that they say it seems to Scotus inconvenient that the Angels run around, and are moved according to the motion of the heaven.

[Margin: The Angels that move the Planets are moved with them.]

But I think it must be answered otherwise. For, speaking of the Planets—since they are moved in the fluid ether (from what was said in sect. 1, ch. 7, num. 21)—it is consonant that the Planets are led around by the Intelligences; for [the Intelligences] are not everywhere, nor can they produce an impetus or motion in a body enormously distant (as I suppose, from Sts. Damascene, On the Faith bk. 2, ch. 3; Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit bk. 1, ch. 10; Chrysostom, homily 3 on [the Letter] to the Hebrews; and Gregory, Morals bk. 2, ch. 2); for their place is circumscribed and limited, and [their] power finite. And this is conformable to Sacred Scripture, if that [text] of Ecclesiastes 1—“The Sun rises and sets, and returns to its place; and there, rising again, it wheels through the South and is bent toward the North: the spirit, surveying all things, goes on in its circuit, and returns into its circles”—be understood of the Spirit, that is, of the Intelligence moving the Sun (with St. Thomas, Opusculum 10, art. 6)—Pineda and Lorinus not refusing [this] on that passage of Ecclesiastes (although they bring other interpretations too); nay, nor [refusing it] St. Jerome, who, since he concedes that it can be understood of a spirit or mind setting the Sun in motion, and elsewhere disapproves of Origen’s granting a soul to the stars, seems able to take [it] of an Intelligence not informing, but extrinsically moving, the Sun. This being posited—if Sacred Scripture be taken to the letter, as it can be—it can sufficiently be confirmed from this that the Angel which moves the Sun also itself goes around, and accompanies the Sun which it moves. The same opinion—about Angels carrying the Planets around—I afterward saw defended by John Anthony Delphinus (in a truly learned opusculum, On the Celestial Globes, p. 80), and in Arriaga (the single disputation On the Heavens, num. 54). But if the discourse be about the heaven of the Fixed [stars]—whether it be moved by one, or by several, Intelligences—it can be conceded that they reside in a single place of the heaven; but if it be one [Intelligence], and any point of the heaven at the Equator be rising with respect to some horizon, it will be necessary to determine some particular region—say Palestine—in whose eastern horizon that Angel is; or, to avoid this singular position, and the difficulty in moving so vast a machine, it could be done by several Intelligences disposed in a circle. But to divine about these [things] is not for our weakness; and so we ought to remember those divine rebukes of Job 38: “Dost thou know the order of heaven, or wilt thou set down the reason thereof on the Earth?”

How many are the Moving Intelligences of the Heavens, and [whether] God [is] among them?

[XI.] There were not lacking certain unnamed [persons]—[noted] by Fracastorius (in the Homocentrica, sect. 1, ch. 7)—who would say that all the celestial orbs are moved by a single Intelligence (among whom [holding this] Alpetragius [al-Bitrūjī] is numbered): just as by one soul all the vital operations of one body are carried out; especially since no heaven resists a motion once impressed, nor is there need that the contact of the Angelic power be immediately—

[…continues on p. 251 (PDF 286): “…applied to all the parts of the body to be moved, but [it suffices] to be present to one part, whence the motion is diffused into the others. But, as the Conimbricenses note (On the Heavens bk. 2, ch. 5, q. 8), and Mastrius and Bellutus (disp. 2, q. 4, num. 147), it is the common opinion of the Theologians that the sphere of Angelic activity is defined by certain spaces, and their power limited…” — then the question of the number of Intelligences (4? 12? 24? seven?).]

(printed p. 251 — completing [XI.], the refutation of the single-Intelligence view: angelic power need touch only one part of the movable body, yet the common opinion of the Theologians holds that angelic power is limited to definite spaces, so one Intelligence could not impart such various motions to so many vast heavens. Since the planetary heaven is fluid, at least seven Intelligences besides that of the Fixed stars are required, in conformity with the order of offices and with Aristotle, who posits an Intelligence for each partial orb.)

[Margin: Whether God [is] among the moving Intelligences?]

But, moreover, it is disputed whether Aristotle numbered God among these Intelligences, as the immediate mover of the supreme heaven—as the Conimbricenses think (2 On the Heavens, ch. 5, q. 6), Piccolomineus, Pendasius, Rubius, Aversa, and Amicus with Gregory (on 2, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1); or whether [God] is rather outside and above this number, inasmuch as he does not move that heaven except by means of some created Intelligence—as St. Thomas thinks (1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13) and with him the Thomists, likewise Jandun (12 Metaphysics, q. 17), the Abulensis [Tostatus] (on ch. 27 of Exodus, q. 3), Scotus (on 1, dist. 2, q. 1; and dist. 8, q. 5; and Quodlibet 7), Contarenus (On the Heavens, in the question on this matter), Suárez (disp. 35 Metaphysics, sect. 1), [and] Mastrius and Bellutus (disp. 2 On the Heavens, q. 4, art. 4). And indeed, since Aristotle thought that God necessarily acts toward the outside [ad extra], as St. Thomas teaches (q. 16 On Evil, art. 10; and 12 Metaphysics), and so exerts his whole effort; and that besides he is of infinite power—it would follow, from Aristotle’s discourse (8 Physics, text 78 and 79), that God moves with infinite velocity and in no time; or, if anything resisted him, that finite power could prevail over, or be equivalent to, infinite [power]—both of which are absurd. Moreover (12 Metaphysics, text 36) he taught that the first mover moves as [something] lovable and desirable, inasmuch as the created Intelligences, contemplating his supreme goodness in communicating being to themselves and to other things, strive to assimilate themselves to him by moving the heavens, and through their motions and influxes to communicate very many goods to inferior natures: whence it comes about that God moves the heavens by way of the good and the end, or even of an Idea—yet not excluding the effective concourse by which, as a universal cause, he concurs immediately with all effects. And thus he is to be understood in the same place, text 38, where he says that the prime mobile is moved by the first Intelligence; and text 45, where he numbers as many Intelligences—the first not excluded—as there are orbs.

[Margin: The Aristotelian number of Intelligences.]

Therefore, since [Aristotle] had learned from Eudoxus that the whole inequality of the Planets in motion could be demonstrated by 25 anastric [reverting] orbs, and by Callippus [by] 33, Aristotle himself, believing the heaven to consist of solid orbs, added 22 other orbs, ἀνελίττοντας [anelittontas]—that is, “Revolving” [counter-rolling] ones—namely, so that any lower orb might be freed from the carrying-along [raptus] which, on account of the contiguity of the surfaces, it was going to suffer from the higher one, by means of an interposed Revolving [orb] striving in the contrary [direction] with an equal time, and by that reluctancy exhibiting the appearance of a [body] at rest; so that the lower or inner orb, resting upon that orb as upon an immovable one, might accomplish its own proper period: as Kepler expounds (on Mars, ch. 2; and in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, bk. 4, p. 505)—but in those passages he wrongly says that the Movers set down by Aristotle [are] 49, or according to Callippus 53 or 55. For below (sect. 3, ch. 5, num. 5) we shall show that, according to Aristotle’s mind, they are 55, and with the prime Mobile 56; but under another hypothesis 47, and with the sphere of the Fixed [stars] 48; and we shall uncover the errors of many in this Aristotelian number. Again, [in] sect. 3, ch. 7, there will be treated the 70 solid orbs which Fracastorius devised in the Homocentrics, compacted of Circitors, Anti-circitors, Circumducents, [and] Contravects, etc.

[Margin: A conjecture about the number of Intelligences.]

[XII.] If, moreover, it were permitted me to determine anything by some conjectures about this number, I would say that—besides the Intelligences (whether 4, or 12, or 24) moving the supreme orb of the Fixed [stars]—there are seven principal Intelligences, destined for revolving the seven Planets; and that these are those seven Spirits about whom, with Trithemius and Cornelius a Lapide, I said many things worth knowing in bk. 7, sect. 1, ch. 1—which it will be helpful to reread in this place. I would add, however, less principal Angels, either for the less principal motions in altitude and latitude, or at least for Companions [satellites]—two to be turned about for Saturn singly, and four for Jupiter; for to the spots of the Sun, which are generated and perish from time to time, I would by no means assign individual Angels. But I fear lest God and the Angels themselves, if it be lawful to say [so], deride these efforts of ours, as [those] of men who would wish to investigate the things which are above us.