Question 1. On the Simplicity and Composition of the Heaven
[I.] The first opinion was that the whole heaven is a simple body—that is, not composed of matter and form really distinct [from each other]—both because Aristotle seems to have asserted this, and because we have no argument from change by which we might gather that there is in the heaven a matter receptive of contraries, or [receptive] of an alteration tending toward the corruption of one substantial form and the generation of a new form; and because, if that matter existed, it would crave other and ever other forms, and since these are denied [it], that appetite would be in vain, and [the matter] would be forcibly and perpetually deprived of them; finally, because the perfection of the Universe requires that there be in it this grade of substance too—namely, of a fifth essence, and of an altogether simple body—since it cannot be demonstrated that a created corporeal substance which is simple is impossible. So judged Averroes (the book On the Substance of the Orb, ch. 2; and Metaphysics bk. 8, comment 12; and bk. 12, comment 20; and On the Heavens bk. 1, comment 20), Zimara (Theorem 107), Faber (Theorem 59), Antonius Andreas (Metaphysics bk. 8, q. 4), Jandun (ibid., q. 7, and On the Heavens bk. 1, q. 23), Saxonia (on On the Heavens bk. 1, q. 4, art. 1), Cajetan of Thiene (Physics bk. 1, q. 21), Piccolomini (On the Heavens, ch. 106), Achillini (On the Orbs bk. 1, q. 1); and among the Scholastics, on [book] 2 of the Sentences, Durandus and Gabriel [Biel] (dist. 12, q. 1 or 2), Mayronis (dist. 14, q. 2), [John of] Bassolis (q. 1, art. 4); and certainly Aristotle—if he be understood in the plain sense and without forced interpretation—in On the Heavens bk. 1, from text 20 and from text 121, teaches that the heaven is ingenerable and incorruptible, like the Intelligences, because
(printed p. 233 — The page continues the exposition of Aristotle’s position that the heaven has no matter: from its simple and circular motion he gathers that it is a simple body, and he treats the question expressly in Metaphysics bk. 12, text 10.)
All things, indeed, that change have matter—but a different [matter]; for of the everlasting things themselves, those which are not generable but movable by locomotion have matter, yet not [matter] fit for generation, but [only] for motion of whence and whither.
[Margin: 2. Opinion—on the composition of the heaven.]
[II.] The second opinion was, and is, that the heaven is composed of Matter and substantial form; for the argument for such composition has seemed to some almost necessary—both because it falls under the senses, and [because] quantity, rarity, and density [are] in a matter that is not [merely] local, and so a physical matter is present; and finally because, besides the philosophers and Fathers who say the heaven consists of one or more elements, [this is] the view of St. Thomas (Prima Pars, q. 66, art. 1 and 2; and On the Heavens bk. 1, lect. 6; and Physics bk. 8, lect. 20—though earlier he seemed to incline toward the prior opinion, in [Sentences] 2, dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1; and Metaphysics bk. 8, ch. 14; and in the Disputed Questions, the question On Spiritual Creatures, art. 6, ad 2), Avempace (in Albert, On the Heavens bk. 1, tract 1, ch. 3), Avicebron (in the book The Fountain of Life), Plotinus (bk. 1, Ennead 2, q. 1), Simplicius (On the Heavens bk. 2, comment 3 and 35), Philoponus (on [propositions] 6 and 13 of Proclus), Avicenna (Sufficientia bk. 1, ch. 2), Niphus (On the Substance of the Orbs, comment 39 and 42), Soncinas (Metaphysics bk. 12, q. 7), Javellus (Metaphysics bk. 8, q. 12), Soto (Physics bk. 2, q. 1), Flandria (Metaphysics bk. 8, q. 7), Paul of Venice (On the Heavens, ch. 1, attributing it to Themistius and Theophrastus), Aegidius [Giles of Rome] (the tract On the Matter of the Heaven), Gianninus (On the Nature of the Heaven, part 1, ch. 21), the Conimbricenses (On the Heavens bk. 1, ch. 2, q. 4), Rubius (ibid., q. 5), Suárez (Disputation 13, Metaphysics), Hurtado (disp. 1, On the Heavens, sect. 1), Morisanus (disp. 2, On the Heavens, dub. 2), Amicus (Tract 4, q. 2, dub. 2), Tanner (On the Heavens, q. 3), Arriaga (disp. 2, Physics, sect. 11, subsect. 2), Oviedo (the single Controversy On the Heavens, point 2); and among the Scholastic Theologians, Capreolus and Ockham (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 12, q. 1), St. Bonaventure (on 2, dist. 12, art. 2, q. 1), Aegidius (on 2, dist. 12), Alensis [Alexander of Hales] (Summa, part 2, q. 44, member 2), Hervaeus (Quodlibet 4, q. 3), Albertus Magnus (Summa, part 1, q. 4, “On the Four Coevals,” art. 3), and the Carthusian [Denis the Carthusian] (on 2, dist. 14, q. 1)—[this last] saying that the opposite [view] is erroneous, nay contrary to Aristotle; since they try to draw Aristotle into their own opinion, on the ground that in Metaphysics bk. 8, text 3 and 10, he says that every sensible substance consists of matter; and that in On the Heavens bk. 1, ch. 9, from text 93 to 95, [he says] therefore no other heaven can be given, because this [heaven] which we see consists of [its] whole matter; and again that in Metaphysics bk. 12, text 22, and On Generation bk. 2, text 51, [he says] the principles of all sensible things are the same—matter and form. But in these passages Aristotle takes “matter” for a corporeal and sensible entity which is the subject of sensible accidents, not for a matter really distinct from form, which he is wont to call the matter of Generation. And although in Metaphysics bk. 7, text 5, he seems to say that the heaven and the stars are [made] of elements, yet in truth he does not say this in the Greek text, but [says] that these are substances, like the elements and the mixed [bodies] and all natural bodies.
[Margin: Authors of the 2nd Opinion.]
[III.] The third opinion, then, either holds both of the prior [opinions] probable—as Zerbus (Metaphysics bk. 8, q. 3)—or distinguishes: for Scotus (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, q. 1), Aversa (q. 33, sect. 5), and Mastrius and Bellutus (Disputation 2, On the Heavens, q. 2, art. 1) say that, the authority of Aristotle being regarded, the Heaven is not composed of matter and form; but that, the authority of many Theologians and the truth being regarded, it is composed of matter and form. But John Punch, himself a Scotist (Disputation 22, Physics, q. 1), concludes that, if reason be regarded, it is uncertain whether the heaven is simple or composite; but if authority [be regarded], it is more probable that it is composite. I, however, use a threefold distinction; for which let [the following] stand.
[Margin: 3. The problematic, or distinguishing, Opinion.]
First Conclusion
[Margin: 1. Conclusion.]
The visible Heaven, if the authority of Aristotle be regarded, is a Simple body—that is, [a body] having matter, but [matter] not really distinct from [its] substantial form. This is sufficiently established from the passages of Aristotle adduced at the end of numbers 1 and 2.
Second Conclusion
[Margin: 2. Conclusion.]
The visible Heaven—whether the authority be regarded, both of many ancient and more recent Philosophers and of many Fathers, Doctors of the Church, and Theologians resting upon Sacred Scripture; or [whether] the more probable reasoning [be regarded]—is not simple, but consists of matter and form really distinct between themselves.
For [the view] that the heaven consists of, or is generated from the matter of, one or more elements, almost all the Philosophers before Aristotle held—as will be clear from what is to be said in the following chapter. And very many of the Fathers affirmed that the heaven—either as a whole, or indefinitely, or at least the Eighth sphere—was made of elemental water solidified in the manner of ice or crystal; and that, moreover, above the heaven there is a watery heaven consisting of true and elemental water—[authorities] whom I have already cited to this end at length in ch. 2, q. 1 and 3, where we also showed that this is highly consonant with Sacred Scripture understood to the letter (as indeed it must be understood, since from this no inconvenience follows). Not a few, too, affirm that the starry heaven is Fiery—nay, that it is the fourth element itself, fire; whom I adduced both in ch. 1, q. 4, and in ch. 3, Conclusion 4, argument 5. Very many, finally, assert that the Planets and the other stars are either fiery, or [made] of earth, or of fiery vapors—whom I reviewed in ch. 4, q. 4, from number 10. But to say that they speak metaphorically, or analogically, or because the stars are hot only virtually, not formally, is not to take their meaning in its plain and obvious [sense]; nay, it contradicts the reasonings of several of them, who, in order to temper the heat of the stars, supposed that waters are preserved in the heaven and above the heaven. And a distinction of this kind [between virtual and formal heat] does not arise except from a presumed opinion of the simplicity of the heaven, whether on account of the authority of Aristotle, or on account of the reasons indicated under number 1 and to be dissolved presently. Wherefore the prior part of the conclusion remains sufficiently proved.
The latter part of the conclusion is proved: First, from the new Stars, and from certain bearded or hairy [cometary] stars, some of which we showed probably to have been in the heaven—that is, above the Moon—(bk. 8, in the Conclusions of the chapters), and indeed generated in that manner in which the spots and faculae of the Sun are wont to be generated (according to what was said in bk. 3, ch. 4). > [Margin: 1. Argument for the affirmative side.] Secondly: Because either the grades of beings are not to be multiplied without grave necessity and solid foundation—and this [positing of a simple celestial substance] is a greater multiplication than [the positing] of two really distinct entities within the order of composite being—or, if they are to be multiplied, and if for the perfecting of the Universe a simple substance is required, it suffices that the Empyrean Heaven be of this kind, which is invisible to us; nor is it necessary that every heaven, or any [heaven] among the visible ones, be such. > [Margin: 2. Argument.] Thirdly: Although sensible Quantity, rarity, density, opacity, diaphaneity, light, color, and the other accidents of this kind are not necessary indications of composition from corporeal matter and form, yet so long as the simplicity [of the heaven] is not established for us from elsewhere, they are rather indications of such matter and composition—on account of the kinship which they have with the other sensible accidents that accompany such composition, nay, [the kinship they have] with themselves taken specifically, and [considered] in so many elements and mixed [bodies] together—by reason of which presumption and possession stand for composition and for corporeal Matter and Form. > [Margin: 3. Argument.] Nor, for this to be a probable indication, is a substantial transmutation physically evident required; otherwise it would now be not merely a probable, but an evident, argument of composition. And those who think the heaven consists of elemental matter, or of some element, will say that a sufficient indication of this change is had in that part of that element which is near the earth, and that it is not necessary that such changes occur in every part of it; for neither—if there is some part of earth, or of air, never transmuted substantially since the beginning of the world—is it on that account to be called simple. And thus is dissolved one of the reasons wont to be adduced for the first opinion. > [Margin: Solution of the objections.] For the reason which is drawn from the incorruptibility of the heaven will be dissolved from what is to be said in ch. 6. But as to what concerns the appetite for other forms—which seems to be a property following from matter in the fourth mode, since otherwise, if [matter] craved only one form, it would not seem to have potentiality and indifference toward several—it can be answered that such an appetite is not in [matter] except on the supposition that it be despoiled of its former form, and that there be an agent which intends and is able to introduce another form, of which kind, without doubt, is God.
Question 2. On the kind of Matter of which the Heaven consists
[Margin: 1. Opinion—that the Matter of the Heaven is different from the elemental.]
[IV.] The first opinion is that the Matter of the heavenly Bodies is of a different kind from the matter of the sub-celestial, or inferior, bodies—
[…continues on p. 234: this opinion is one Aristotle himself would maintain (On the Heavens bk. 1, ch. 2 and 1; Meteorology bk. 1, ch. 3) if he thought the heaven consisted of matter distinct from form; its absolute champions were Simplicius, Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, and Algazel, likewise Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, William of Paris, and others.]
(printed p. 234 — Continuing Chapter V, Question 2: the page carries on the opinion that the matter of the heavenly bodies is of a different kind from that of sub-celestial bodies, a view Aristotle would maintain if he granted the heaven matter distinct from form. Its absolute champions were Simplicius, Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, and Algazel, followed by a long roll of scholastics including Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas and his school, Suárez, Pererius, Fonseca, Amicus, Tanner, Aversa, and Punch.)
And among the Astronomers, Tycho Brahe (in the letter to Rothmann of the year 1588, 17 August, from p. 106), where, although he admits a fluid heaven, he yet does not admit it to be airy—as John Pena and Rothmann contended; nay, he says:
I shall by no means admit [the heaven] to be airy, or to share in any elemental nature; for far be it that anything elemental, corruptible, and variable, etc., be stitched onto the most pure, most perfect celestial nature, subject to no changes.
And shortly after:
for all unanimously determine that the heaven is wholly exempt from the number and nature of the four elements, and exhibits a certain more excellent nature; and therefore [hold] it to be a certain fifth essence wholly different from those four elemental [natures].
Then he derides the Theologians who, understanding Moses too little correctly, said the heaven consists of watery matter; and he concludes that, although it is uncertain of what nature the heaven is, and unsearchable by us, yet it is certain that it shares in no elemental nature—which he confirms in the letter of the year 1589, 21 February, from p. 137.
[Margin: Arguments for the 1st opinion.]
[V.] The arguments for this opinion are: First, the authority of St. Dionysius (On the Divine Names bk. 1, ch. 4), saying that the heavenly bodies “are of that nature and essence which can neither grow nor be diminished, nor be changed in any part”; and [the authority] of St. Basil (homily 3 On Genesis), saying:
Yet it does not please us to assert that the Firmament is either [made] of one of the simple bodies, or mixed of them all; because we have now been so instructed by the divine Scripture itself, that we are permitted to think and imagine nothing beyond those things which are granted to our mind.
But from these passages nothing else is gathered than that the heaven is incorruptible, and not actually composed of elements. Secondly, the same [opinion] seems to be proved by: the simplicity of celestial motion, the nobility of the spherical figure, the eminence of [its] place, the predominance of [its] influences, [its] independence from inferior [things], the perfection of the Universe requiring this grade of matter; and especially the ingenerability and natural incorruptibility of the heaven. For to these heads are at last reduced the reasons, more fully produced by the defenders of this opinion. But some of these reasons are merely topical [dialectical], and have very slight probability; some prove only the nobility and excellence of the form, to which incorruptibility is owed. Wherefore, although the incorruptibility of the heaven is better defended, and with greater dignity of the heaven, if it is said to have a different matter—as Suárez and Amicus say above—nevertheless from natural incorruptibility it does not follow that the matter of the heaven is of a different species from the sublunary matter, as Arriaga, together with Molina, notes (Disputation 2, Physics, sect. 11, subsect. 2). Granted that Suárez (Disp. 13, Metaphysics, sect. 11, from number 14) contends that the heaven would of itself be corruptible no less than the elements, if it consisted of the same matter—for [he holds] it suffices for that, if the matter has the privation of some form, for the having of which it is proximately or remotely apt; and thus the heaven would be generable from air per se, and air from the heaven, granted that per accidens an agent introductive of such a form be lacking—the solution of this controversy therefore depends on the question of the incorruptibility of the heaven, to be treated a little below.
[Margin: 2. Opinion—that [the heaven’s] matter is of the same kind.]
[VI.] The second opinion is that the visible heaven has matter of the same kind as the matter of sublunary [bodies]. In which [opinion] were not only the ancient Philosophers, or those more recent ones who thought the heaven and the heavenly bodies consist of one or more elements, but besides them Avicenna (Sufficientia bk. 1, ch. 4), Avicebron (in [the report of] St. Thomas), Scotus (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, q. 1), St. Bonaventure (on 2, dist. 12, art. 2, q. 1, and dist. 14), Ockham (ibid., q. 22), Aegidius [Giles of Rome] (in the tract On the Matter of the Heaven, and on 2, dist. 13), Gabriel [Biel] (on 2, dist. 12), the Abulensis (on ch. 1 of Genesis), Morisanus (disp. 2, On the Heavens, dub. 3), Angestus (bk. 1 On the Properties of Matter, prop. 9), Molina (the tract On the Work of the Six Days, disp. 2, 3, and 5), Scaliger (Exercitation 61), Mastrius and Bellutus (disp. 2, On the Heavens, q. 2, art. 2), Baltasar Téllez (in the Physics, disp. 40, sect. 1, num. 22), Salianus (in the Annals of the Old Testament, at day 2 of the world), [and] Francisco Oviedo (the single Controversy On the Heavens, point 2).
The arguments of this opinion are: First, because a specific diversity of matters seems impossible, since all distinction of species and of genera is from the Form, according to that [saying] of Aristotle (Metaphysics bk. 7, text 49): “It is the act that separates, or distinguishes”—which, however, admits many explanations; and the adversaries will say that the substantial Form constitutes the physical species, yet not every species, nor the essential metaphysical character; and Suárez (disp. 13, Metaphysics, sect. 11, num. 8) teaches at length that a specific diversity of matters is not repugnant. Secondly, because if anything compels positing a different matter, it is the incorruptibility of the heaven; but this can stand even if the matter of the heaven is of the same kind—because either by reason of a form not having contrary qualities conquerable by the qualities of other bodies, or because it is outside the hazard and sphere of sublunary agents, the heaven’s natural incorruptibility can belong to it; although that incorruptibility is not yet demonstrated or demonstrable. Thirdly and chiefly: very many Fathers and Doctors of the Church teach that the heavens, or the heavenly bodies, are [made] of water or of fire—whom I cited at length partly in ch. 1, q. 4; partly in ch. 2, q. 1; and partly in ch. 3, Conclusion 4, argument 5; and St. Thomas (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, art. 2) says that Sts. Basil and Augustine, and several of the Saints, following Plato, posited the heaven [to be] of the nature of the elements.
[Margin: 3. Opinion—suspending assent.]
[VII.] The third opinion, on account of the uncertainty, or the equal weights of reasons and authorities on both sides, teaches either that both of the preceding opinions can be upheld problematically, or dares to affirm nothing determinately. And so both opinions are held probable by: the Conimbricenses (On the Heavens bk. 1, q. 6) as regards the matter (for as regards the nature derived from the form, they had already, in q. 5, defined [it] to be different from the sublunary); Hurtado (disp. 1, On the Heavens, paragraph 15), though he inclines toward the second opinion; [and] Arriaga (disp. 2, Physics, sect. 11, subsect. 2). And Philo (in the book On Dreams) has it thus:
But the Heaven has an incomprehensible nature, nor does any true knowledge of it flow down to us. For what can we pronounce about this? That it is concrete ice, as some hold? Or purest fire? Or a certain fifth body movable in a circle, akin to none of the four elements? What of that outermost sphere of the fixed stars—has it solidity, or only a surface without depth, like figures painted on a plane?
With like moderation St. Basil, speaking of the Firmament (homily 3 on the Hexaemeron), [declares] that it does not please him to assert the heaven [to be] mixed of one or of all the elements, because from the divine Scripture he has learned to think nothing beyond what is granted. And St. [John] Damascene (On the Faith bk. 2, ch. 6), when he had reviewed the various opinions, concludes: “But there is no need to search out the substance of the heaven: it is unknown to us.” But let us hear St. John Chrysostom (homily 2 On the Incomprehensible Nature of God):
Of what substance the heaven consists, we do not know. Let him who contends, and affirms that he himself knows, say of what substance the heaven is. Is it some moisture congealed into ice? Is it a condensed cloud, drawn over into a thicker substance? Is it thick and more corpulent air? Surely no one can plainly teach what it is.
Let us also repeat the words adduced elsewhere from his homily 4 On Genesis. “But what, after all,” says Chrysostom there,
shall we say this firmament to be? Condensed water, or compacted air, or some other essence? Let none of the prudent rashly assert this: for it behooves that, with great modesty and gratitude, the things that are said be received by us, and that we not advance beyond our nature and scrutinize the things that are above us; but to know and hold among ourselves this only—that by the command of the Lord the firmament was produced, making a separation of the waters, [a firmament] which is able to contain some [waters] beneath itself, but to bear others upon its back.
Whose opinion altogether—in other words, but in the same sense—Hugh [of St. Victor] expressed (On the Sacraments bk. 1, part 1, ch. 18), concluding:
[…continues on p. 235: Hugh of St. Victor’s words — “Now, however, in the questions of these matters it does not seem to me that I must labor much, [questions] which neither any reason comprehends nor any authority that should be trusted proves.” These weighed, Ascanius Martinengus (in the great gloss), though on p. 605 he grants that God made the starry heaven on the second day from the elements or from chaos (if the plain sense of the Mosaic history and the Fathers’ opinions be regarded), nevertheless on p. 607 concludes that the substance of this heaven is unknown and imperceptible to us. — Then follows the CONCLUSION of Question 2.]
(printed p. 235 — The page completes Chapter V, Question 2, ending with a concluding citation of Hugh of St. Victor, and opens Question 3.)
Now, however, in the questions of these matters it does not seem to me that I must labor much—[questions] which neither any reason comprehends, nor any authority that should be trusted proves.
These things weighed, Ascanius Martinengus, in the great gloss (although on p. 605 he admits that God made the starry heaven on the second day from the elements, or from chaos, if the plain sense of the Mosaic history and the opinions of the Fathers be regarded), nevertheless on p. 607 concludes that the substance of this heaven is unknown and imperceptible to us. Let it therefore be [thus].
Conclusion
[Margin: 3. Conclusion.]
Although it cannot be known by us demonstratively and evidently what the substance and nature of the visible heaven is, yet it is more probable that it consists of matter of the same kind as the elemental.
[VIII.] The prior part of the conclusion is established both by the authorities adduced for the 3rd opinion, and by the mere consideration of the arguments which we said are wont to be adduced for the 1st and 2nd opinions—for there is none [of them] that exceeds mere probability. And certainly, if once we admit that the matter of corruptible bodies can be the same as [that] of incorruptible bodies, and that corruptibility is to be sought not only from the indifference of the matter, but also from the properties of the form (forms having or not having qualities corruptible by [their] contraries, or [corruptibility being sought] even from the nearness and power of an agent), there remains for us no way of certainly inferring, from any change or defect of change, a matter different rather than not-different.
The latter part is proved: Because that conclusion is more probable which is taken from Sacred Scripture according to the letter, and according to the interpretation of very many Fathers, than its opposite—so long as this [opposite] is not deduced from valid arguments and demonstrative reasons, or [reasons] coming near to demonstrative ones. But [the view] that the starry heaven consists of a matter different from the sublunary is neither demonstrated, nor persuaded by valid arguments approaching demonstration; while on the other side, [the view] that it consists of a watery, or fiery, or some elemental matter is gathered from Sacred Scripture taken to the letter, and from the Fathers—as I have already taught in ch. 2, q. 1 and 3; and ch. 1, q. 4; and ch. 3, Conclusion 4, arg. 5. And so the Carthusian rightly (on [Sentences] 2, dist. 14, q. 2) pronounces that it is safer, from sacred Genesis and from many Fathers, to assert the heaven [to be] of an elemental nature. And surely, if above the Firmament there is a watery heaven, or waters of the same matter as the elemental [waters], and the Firmament itself (taken for the 8th sphere), if not the whole starry heaven, is [made] of elemental water—as we gathered from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers in ch. 2, q. 1 and 3—who, then, would deny that the rest of the starry heaven, beneath the eighth sphere of the Fixed [stars], is of the same matter?
Nor indeed ought either we, or the authority of Aristotle in this matter, or one or another reason of physical or metaphysical congruity and subtlety, move [us] to interpret Scripture and the Fathers forcibly. Especially since Aristotle’s opinion about the diversity of celestial matter, and about a certain fifth essence, sprang up from an infected root—namely, from the opinion of the eternity of the World, and of the necessity by which he thought the heaven and the World were produced by God; and tends to this, that it insinuates to us that the heaven cannot be destroyed even by God. Of which St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron bk. 1, ch. 6) gravely and prudently admonished us in these words:
[Margin: St. Ambrose’s admonition against the fifth essence.]
Others, therefore, considering that these [elements] could not be stable, introduced a certain fifth nature of body, by which they thought the substance of the heaven would remain long-lasting. But that opinion could not withstand the Prophetic statement, which the divine Majesty also of our Lord Jesus Christ, our God, confirmed in the Gospel.
He then adduces the words of Psalm 101 [Vulgate; = Ps 102:26]: “The heavens are the works of thy hands; they shall perish,” etc.; and of Christ (Matthew 24): “Heaven and earth shall pass away”; and he adds:
They therefore accomplish nothing, who, in order to assert the perpetuity of the heaven, think a fifth ethereal body must be introduced—since they equally see that a portion of one member, joined dissimilar to the rest, is wont rather to bring decay to the body.
Question 3. From what, or from which Elements, the Heaven consists
[IX.] According to the number of the four Elements, we have adduced just as many opinions about the nature of the stars (ch. 4, q. 4, from number 10); now we shall report just as many about the nature of the heaven itself, to be compared with those. Moreover, the opinions of the ancient Philosophers about the nature of the heaven are reported by Diogenes Laertius (in their Lives), Plutarch (On the Opinions of the Philosophers bk. 2, ch. 11 and 13), Theodoret (the book On Matter and the World), Clement of Alexandria (the book of the Stromata), Justin (in the Admonitory [Cohortatio]), and [Pico] of Mirandola (bk. 1, Examination of the Vanity of the Gentiles, ch. 12).
The first opinion was that the heaven is fiery—nay, the very element which we call fire, yet pure, [and] on account of the rarity of its substance not apt for combustion. > [Margin: Authors for the 1st opinion.] For which opinion I reviewed, in ch. 3, Conclusion 4, argument 5, the Stoics, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras, the Egyptians, Plato, [and] Pliny; and of our own [authors] Sts. Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, Innocent [III], Bede, Junilius, Hugh Carensis, Delrio, Paracelsus, and Baltasar Téllez. But because I see that there is doubt about Plato’s opinion, what I said there must be confirmed. So Plato, in the Timaeus, says: > [Margin: Plato’s opinion of a fiery heaven confirmed.]
God first created fire and earth; but two [things] alone, without some third, cannot fitly cohere, and the two demanded some middle bond.
Then after a few [words]:
By which conjunction the World was compacted, so that it can be seen and touched.
Accordingly, from things of this kind, four in number, the body of the World was made. And shortly after:
Four, therefore, [taking] each of those things whole, the World received; for of all the fire, air, water, [and] earth its maker so composed it, that he left outside no part or force of any of them.
From which Plotinus, Porphyry, Taurus, Marsilio Ficino, and very many Platonists gather that the World consists of those four bodies; and since the supreme of them is fire, [they hold] the heaven to be nothing else than Fire. So too Philoponus (Disputation 13 against Proclus, ch. 15 and 18) teaches that for Plato the heaven is the same as fire; and Nemesius (the book On the Nature of Man), and St. Gregory of Nyssa (bk. 3 of [his] Philosophy, ch. 4), say that the heaven—which Aristotle calls a fifth essence—is asserted by Plato to consist of Fire and Earth. Nor does it stand in the way that Plato numbers five kinds of souls—earthy, watery, airy, fiery, ethereal—to which (in the Epinomis) he distributes five regular bodies, or as many figures of them; and that in the Timaeus he says that that Fire is not a burning flame, but a light gently illuminating; from which [grounds] John Pico, Maynettus, and Simplicius (On the Heavens bk. 1 and 2) try to reconcile Plato with Aristotle, as if they differ in the term alone, and Plato in fact acknowledged in the heaven a certain fifth essence. For, as Philoponus replies, [Plato] did not divide the fifth body of the World adequately from the four Elements, but [made it] inadequately distinct from the parts taken separately, and to this whole he attributes a fifth [nature]; and he calls Fire “ether,” as if a purer air, and on account of [its] rarity least apt for combustion. Add to these the very many whom I noted in ch. 4, num. 12, asserting the stars to be Fiery, or fires; and Tycho (in the Letters, p. 137), who indeed thinks the heaven to be a certain fifth essence, [but holds] that if it nevertheless consists of any element, it must rather be called fiery, because fiery stars sparkle in it.
The second opinion was that the starry heaven—either the whole, or at least the Firmament, that is, the eighth sphere, together with the waters set above [it]—is watery. > [Margin: 2. Opinion—of a watery heaven.] In which opinion how many Fathers and Doctors there were, we made manifest in ch. 2, q. 1 and 3, by their own words sincerely, and weighed and expounded without violence; of which opinion also were Martius, Molina, Delrio, Cornelius a Lapide, Serarius, Salianus, and Tanner—we said [this] in the same chapter, at the end of question 1. Add to these those whom I adduced in ch. 4, num. 11, affirming that the stars are [made] of, and nourished by, watery vapors.
The third opinion affirms that the heaven is airy—and not only that [region] in which the birds of heaven fly (for this airy [region], our Téllez asserts, is truly and properly called “heaven”: Disp. 40, Physics, sect. 1), but also that [region] in which the stars are; for all [of it] is of the same substance as pure air, from [its] similar rarity and diaphaneity. > [Margin: 3. Opinion.] [So] asserted John Pena, and Giordano Bruno (in the book On the World, against the Peripatetics), and for many years Christopher Rothmann—as Tycho reports (vol. 1, Progymnasmata, p. 92; and in the Letters given to Rothmann in the year 1587, January 20, p. 60; and again in the Letter of the year 1588, August 17, p. 107, and
[…continues on p. 236: …p. 107; and in Rothmann’s letter of 1588, September; and in the letter of 1589, February 21. Which Rothmann took his argument from the refraction of the rays of the stars being the same in the ether and in pure air; but Tycho, in the same place, teaches that this argument is of very little force—for it often happens that wine and water, or another liquid, are of different species, and yet so agree in density that they refract rays equally. To this opinion likewise seems able to be recalled John Kepler (bk. 4 of the Epitome)…]
(printed p. 236 — Concluding Chapter V, Question 3: the page finishes with the Tycho–Rothmann correspondence of 1587–1589. Rothmann argued from the refraction of starlight being the same in the ether as in pure air, but Tycho teaches that this argument has very little force, since liquids of different species, such as wine and water, may agree in density and refract rays equally.)
To this opinion likewise seems able to be recalled John Kepler, who (bk. 4 of the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy) so explains the Creation of the World described by Moses, that the heaven of the fixed [stars] is a crust or wall of the Universe, consisting of water or crystal; but within, all the way to the Sun, the center of the world (as he himself thinks), all things are full of pure air—which, moreover, he everywhere elsewhere calls “ethereal,” and “expanse” (from the Hebrew name Raqia [רקיע])—in that manner in which air is contained within watery bubbles produced by blowing. These things being posited, since—according to what was said in Conclusion 2—it is more probable that the visible heaven consists of elemental matter, I express my [own] opinion briefly in the following Conclusion.
Conclusion
[Margin: 4. Conclusion.]
It is more probable that the Heaven in which are the Fixed stars is Watery; but that the heaven in which are the Planets is Fiery.
[X.] For that proposition is more probable than the rest which, even if it cannot be proved by valid reasons, [yet] rests on more authorities, and reconciles more authors, and is more consonant with Sacred Scripture together with the adjoined interpretation of the Fathers, and renders the Workmanship of God neither unseemly nor inelegant. And of this kind is our conclusion. For that some visible heaven congealed from water solidified in the manner of ice or crystal, both the Hebrew name of the Firmament and a great multitude of Fathers and Doctors confirm, as we showed at length in ch. 2, q. 1. Yet that some starry heaven is fluid, in which the Planets are moved by themselves and not by the motion of the heaven, many Fathers and Doctors likewise assert, as is clear from what was said in ch. 2, q. 2. And that the former [Fathers], who introduce solidity, are to be understood chiefly or solely of the orb of the Fixed stars, but the latter of the heaven of the Planets, I have sufficiently taught in ch. 3, Conclusion 4; and that in this way those Fathers are best reconciled among themselves—in which way also almost all the more recent Astronomers, in order to save the celestial Phenomena, concede solidity to the sphere of the Fixed [stars] alone, but affirm the heaven of the Planets [to be] fluid and permeable. But because the heaven of the Planets could be fluid, and yet either watery, or airy, or fiery, [that it is] rather fiery we are at last persuaded by these reasons:
[Margin: 1st Reason.]
First, because, since some of the Fathers said the heaven is indefinitely watery, [and] some [said it is] fiery, they cannot be better reconciled than if you interpret the former of the sphere of the Fixed [stars], the latter of the heaven of the Planets, and do not adjudge the whole dispute to one party; for the reasons which they adduce for that solidity militate uniquely for that supreme heaven—namely, that the solidified waters might be as it were the outermost walls of the world, bounding our sight; or like the shell of an egg, or the vault of the world; and able to sustain the upper waters upon their back; and to contain the innumerable fixed stars scattered through the whole heaven, and to temper their burning, preserving that heaven until the last day of the world: just as, on the contrary, the reasons which others adduce for the fluidity of the heaven militate only of the heaven of the Sun, Moon, and Planets. Therefore, if one of these heavens must be called watery, the other fiery, then surely the heaven of the Fixed [stars] must be called watery, and [the heaven] of the Planets fiery.
[Margin: 2nd Reason.]
Secondly, some of the Fathers and Doctors speak not indefinitely but distinctly, and expressly say that that heaven which they gather from the Scriptures to be made from firmed and consolidated water is the eighth sphere, or the highest of the visible heavens—which therefore, for many ages now, has been wont to be understood by the name of the Firmament; just as not a few expressly teach that the heaven of the Planets is fiery, nay, the very fourth element, fire, as I showed (by citing those Authors’ own words) in ch. 1, num. 16, and ch. 3, Conclusion 4, argument 5. And therefore this heaven, by which the Sun—or Titan—and the Titanian stars (that is, the Planets, which receive from the Sun their light and the law of their motion) [are illumined], they suppose to be what is called “Ether”—namely, pure fire.
[Margin: 3rd Reason.]
Thirdly, there is added the fittingness of the divine workmanship. For although, if the good of the elements alone be regarded, their natural order ought to have been such as it was in the first instant of creation—namely, that the earth should be lowest, which the abyss, or water of great depth, would surround above; and that above the waters should be each of those [elements], the one which earned its name from the thinness of a “spirit” (namely, air), and in the supreme place fire (for that both are signified by those words, “the Spirit was borne over the waters,” we showed in ch. 1, num. 13)—nevertheless the good of the remaining natural bodies required another order, which therefore God established on the second and third day; namely, that the part of the earth uncovered from the waters might become fit for containing men and the other living things in spacious lodging and habitation, and for nourishing and refreshing crops, flowers, herbs, and foliage; while the more humid Air was left for the respiration of the animals around earth and water, and for the flight of the birds (which mostly nest and rest upon the earth), and above it [the air], fire.
But since a great mass of waters had been created from the beginning, as its proportion with the earth demanded—so much that it earned the name of “abyss,” or water having an almost unsearchable depth—and since not all of it, nay, not even the greater part, could fittingly be enclosed within the cavities of the Earth or its subterranean caverns, the supreme Workman, most prudently—lest he should seem to have made anything superfluous, and to be destroyed immediately after creation—obtained five opportune uses from that superabundant mass of waters.
For [first] he raised up a part of them, and placed [it] immediately beneath the splendor of the Empyrean, so that from that mixture of light and watery opacity he might form a most beautiful and perpetual Rainbow, and refresh the eyes of the Blessed with an incredible variety of colors far more delightful than ours; and that, besides, it might be a kind of mirror, in which and from which the bodies of the Blessed and their splendors might be reflected in an admirable and manifold spectacle. And so that watery heaven beneath the Empyrean one may imagine as a kind of vast Rainbow set around the whole firmament, whose blue and darker part is at the bottom, toward us; the red in the middle; and the yellow, or golden, the highest.
Then [second] he consolidated the remaining part into a crystalline heaven, and by its density and opacity established a boundary between the invisible heavens—namely the Watery and the Empyrean, which pertain to the other life—and the visible or sensible heavens, namely the fiery and the airy. Thirdly, he fixed the non-wandering [fixed] stars in this Firmament, or crystalline heaven, which therefore perpetually keep the same distance among themselves, and are moved with equal step to the motion of that orb. Fourthly, he immediately tempered the burning of the innumerable fixed [stars] by the cold and humidity of the aforesaid waters, because the fixed [stars] had to be each in the same place of that heaven, and scattered through that whole heaven. But this immediate tempering was not necessary for the heaven of the Planets, which are only seven, and move only within the Zone of the Zodiac, and do not remain in the same place of their heaven, but are rolled most swiftly into other and other parts, and so do not threaten one and the same part with destruction or consumption by excessive heat; and it was enough to restrain and temper the elements of fire and air, enclosed on both sides by waters. Fifthly and finally, he perhaps used the Watery heaven for the Prime Mobile—not that that water should be a water-clock [clepsydra], measuring universal time by its falling downward, but that, by a perpetual whirling in a circle, it might carry off with itself the sphere of the Fixed [stars], and—turned about the poles of the Equator in the space of 24 hours—might revolve it around with itself; yet in such a way that the sphere of the Fixed [stars], upon the poles of the Ecliptic, might gradually advance toward the East. I said “perhaps,” because perhaps in another way the motion of the Fixed [stars] toward the West could be reconciled with the motion of the same toward the East, as we shall say in Section 2.
And so, for us, the number of the elements and of the heavens—visible and invisible—is saved, without a superfluous heap of orbs, and without any inelegance of the works of God; the authority of the divine writings is saved; the interpretation of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, conspiring as into a single council, is saved; and finally the consensus of the more recent Astronomers is saved. Which [considerations] indeed, with me, far outweigh the subtleties of certain Peripatetics—conjectures topical rather than physical or metaphysical. And so the saying of our Oviedo greatly pleases [me] (p. 463 of his Course of Philosophy):
In a Question whose resolution is destitute of every natural reason—that is, of a valid or forceful [one]—recourse must be had to the authority of the Fathers and the Doctors, etc.
[Here Chapter V ends.]
[…continues on p. 237 (PDF 272): CHAPTER VI — Whether the Heaven is Generable and Corruptible. “The first opinion was, and still is, that the heaven is, from within and by its own nature, ingenerable and incorruptible; in which [opinion] were engaged not only Aristotle (the book On the Heavens), but also…”]