Book VII of the Topics, Treatise II, Chapters III-IV

genus and proper difference are predicated of the defined thing in respect of what it is, immediately it is uncertain whether that definition which is made from this genus or this difference, or another which is made from other things which are predicated in respect of what it is, is the true definition of the thing: because definition is speech signifying what the being of the thing is, and it has this from its components, that it is predicated in respect of what it is, and that not another thing is predicated in respect of what it is, and that it is convertible from the proper and essential things of the thing, and many things of this sort. But to take away a definition is easy, because for taking it away any one of those things suffices for one thing (that is, against one thing): for by taking away one such thing, we will be destroying the definition. But for one constructing a definition it is necessary to construct all things, since all the things which are, are present in the definition: and a true definition is not made unless all these things at once exist and agree. Further, still, universally one must construct a syllogism concerning the definition and affirmatively: for the definition must be predicated universally of every thing of which the name of the defined thing is predicated: because name and definition differ only as the implicit and the explicit: for definition says explicitly what the name said implicitly. Still further, the definition must be converted and be convertible, so that of whatever the name is predicated, the definitive account is predicated of the same, if what is assigned ought to be a proper definition. But for one destroying, it is not necessary to show universally that nothing agrees: for it suffices for destroying that, concerning some one of those things of which the name is predicated, the definition is not true. And if sometimes one must destroy universally, nevertheless in destroying one need not show that it is converted with the defined thing, as is necessary in constructing, because without this it is destroyed through many things: for it suffices for one destroying to show that the definition is predicated universally of none of the things of which the name is predicated, even apart from the conversion of the definition. But conversely in destroying it is not necessary to show that the name is predicated of none of the things of which the definition is predicated. Further, also, if it be conceded that the definition belongs to every thing of which the name is predicated, nevertheless it must still belong to it alone: and when this has been taken away, the definition will have been taken away. From these things, therefore, it is clear that it is difficult to construct, and easy to destroy, a definition.

But it stands similarly in problems concerning genus and proper: for in both it is easier to destroy than to construct the problem. But this concerning proper is manifest from those things which have been said in the method concerning proper and in this method concerning definition: for in many cases, and for the most part, if the proper is well assigned, it is assigned as in a complex: for since it flows from the essentials, it must have in itself the genus and the accident of the species: on account of which it happens for one taking away to destroy one thing, and it suffices for taking away the proper. But no one can construct the proper unless he syllogizes and proves all the things which agree for constructing the proper. And almost all the remaining things whatsoever are said to be necessary for definition, both that it is predicated universally and that it is predicated convertibly, agree also to be said of proper. For the one constructing the proposed thing must show that the proper which is contained under the name belongs to every thing, but for one destroying the proposed thing it suffices to show that it does not belong to some one single thing. But if it is also conceded to be in every thing universally, and yet it does not belong to that species alone, again the proper will have been destroyed, as was said just now also in definition.

But concerning genus it is clear by this reason that it is more difficult to construct than to destroy, since to construct genus is indeed in one way, if it belongs to every thing and universally, and likewise if it is predicated of that which is also subjected, in respect of what it is. But it belongs to one destroying genus to destroy in two ways: for whether it is shown that it belongs to none, or that it does not belong to some one thing, the genus will have been destroyed, and through the contrary and through the contradictory the genus which was posited in the beginning as genus is always taken away. Further still, for one constructing genus it does not suffice to show that it belongs universally, but that it belongs as genus, as that which belongs not convertibly, and is predicated in respect of what it is. But for one destroying it suffices to show that it does not belong to some one thing or to every thing. But from many things what is destructible is easier to destroy: whence in such problems it seems to be as in other things in which to corrupt is easier than to make: and thus in these it is easier to destroy than to construct.

But in accident, whether in a problem of accident or concerning universal accident, indeed it is easier to destroy than to construct, because it can be destroyed from several things and constructed in one way only: for the one constructing must show of it that it belongs to every thing universally: but for one destroying the universal it suffices to show that it does not belong to some one thing: and through the contradictory the universal affirmative will be destroyed. But a particular problem concerning accident stands in the contrary way, because it is easier to construct it than to destroy: because for the one constructing it suffices to show that it belongs in any way to some one thing: but for the one destroying, it must be shown that it belongs to none: for to belong to some one thing is not taken away through not belonging to some one thing, because they are true at the same time: and therefore one must show that it belongs to none, if “to belong to some one thing” ought to be destroyed; and this is difficult.¹

CHAPTER IV.

Why, of all predicates, it is easiest to destroy definition and proper, and most difficult to construct them, but accident conversely.

Now when the predicates have thus been compared one by one, according as one is compared to another with respect to the ease or difficulty of constructing or destroying, in this comparison it is also manifest why, or on account of what, among all predicates it is easiest to destroy definition. The cause of this is that very many things assigned in it (if those things which have been said are well assigned) are also in other predicates. But from several things (that is, against several things), taken one by one, a destructive syllogism more quickly comes about. But it seems likely that fault is made more and more easily (of omission, or of acceptance not according to reason) in many things than in few, because it is difficult to consider and accept many things by reason.

Further, another reason for the same thing is that concerning definition (that is, against definition) it is fitting to argue also through the other predicates: because they are elemental to it. For example, whether someone argues that it is not a definition as proper, or argues that what was assigned as genus is not in it as genus, or that something of those things which are in the definition does not belong: immediately the definition will have been taken away. But for destroying the other predicates (or against the other predicates) it does not happen that one argues from definitions: for only those things which were said concerning accident (according as to belong generally belongs to accident) are common to all the predicates introduced in the methods already had: because each one of the things which are said to belong, belongs to an existing subject: and what belongs to an existent thing belongs as accident. But if genus does not belong as proper, it does not follow from this that genus has been taken away: and thus from proper one cannot argue for taking away genus. Likewise also it is not necessary that proper belong as genus, and thus from proper one cannot argue to genus, nor that accident belong or proper, but only simply without determination. On account of which it is not possible to argue from the other predicates to others except only in definition. Therefore it is manifest from this that, among all predicates, it is easiest to take away definition, because from any of the others its taking-away is argued, and from none of the others can the taking-away of any other be argued, nor from accident taken away according to belonging.

But of all predicates it is most difficult to construct a predicate concerning definition, for for the construction of definition one must also syllogize all the other predicates constructively. For example, one must syllogize that the things which are said in the definition belong, which is from the predicate of accident; and that there is a true genus and proper thing which is assigned in the definition in place of genus, and this is from genus; and that it is proper and convertible with the defined thing, which is from proper; and beyond these things one must still syllogize that the definition itself indicates what the whole being of the thing is. And the definition must do this well, perfectly, and also clearly and not obscurely. But among the other predicates, proper is especially difficult to construct after definition, for indeed it is easier to take away proper than to construct it: because, as we said a little before, proper, when it is well assigned, is made of many things and from many things. But to construct proper is most difficult, because many things must agree for the constitution of proper, and because it is only, or agreeing to one alone, and because it is predicated convertibly of the thing.

But easiest of all is to construct the predicate of accident. The cause of this is that in the other predicates we not only show that they belong, if they belong simply, but it is also necessary to show that they belong in this way or in that way: and this is difficult. But in accident it suffices to show that it belongs simply, and this is easy. But to destroy accident is most difficult, since the least and very few things are given for belonging as accident: for nothing is given for this, that it belongs as accident, except that it belongs only: for in accident there is not signified how it belongs in this way or in that way, but that it belongs only. On account of which in the other predicates there is taking-away in two ways, as by showing that it does not belong, or by showing that it does not belong thus: and this is easier. But in accident there is no taking-away except for him who grants that it does not belong simply: and this is more difficult.

Therefore it is recapitulated by saying: the places or considerations through which we will be fit to argue to individual problems have been described and enumerated almost sufficiently in six books, from the second up to this one: for more can exist from probable things, but let those which have been said suffice, etc.

BOOK VIII OF THE TOPICS.

TREATISE I ON DIALECTIC, ACCORDING AS IT IS OBVIATIVE FROM THE SIDE OF THE OPPONENT.

CHAPTER I.

How one ought to interrogate, and what and in what way, so that the opponent may more easily exact the consent of the respondent.

Dialectic, as now a science, has been determined in the first book of this science: because there it was said concerning what things, and from what things, and to what things. But as it is an inquisitive science, it has been determined thus in the following books. But dialectic as it is an art constituting a work, and thus toward another and as obviative and exercitative (according as it frequently does this), and insofar as it is an inquisitive science toward disciplines according to philosophy, must be determined in this last book of this science, namely insofar as it is an art ordered to obviation and to exercise. Therefore now it must be determined, and first insofar as it is for obviation: because through obviation one comes to exercise. But insofar as it is obviative (because it principally belongs to the opponent to meet the respondent), it must first be considered from the side of the opponent, and secondly how it is determined as obviative of the respondent: and these are the three treatises in which the present business will be completed.

Therefore after these things which have been said concerning dialectic as a science considered in itself in the first book, and the things which have been said concerning it insofar as it is inquisitive and ordered to the disciplines which are according to philosophy, which have been determined in the six following books up to this point, it must be said how dialectic itself also, insofar as it is an obviative art, ought to order its work in disputing toward another, whose consent it must seek: because it proceeds from probable things: and because these are the things which seem so to all or to many, they cannot be accepted without the consent of the respondent: and here it will have to be said how one ought to interrogate and what, and what should be put first in interrogation and in what way, so that it may more easily be conceded by the respondent. Therefore this must be said first in this book.

Therefore one must know that the opponent (who ought to find the place of consideration, and whence he will draw argumentation and the proposed problem to be determined constructively or destructively) must interrogate the intended conclusion: because otherwise he could not order the place found, since there would not be a proposed thing to which it would be led. In all things the end must be set beforehand so that we may be directed by it. But the second thing is that, once the conclusion has been interrogated and the place whence one must argue has been found, then one must shape the interrogations to be proposed in a form by which they are made more concessible by the respondent, and order the individual things to one another and to itself, so that he may see in what order they are more concessible and more likely to be conceded. And these two things which the opponent does within himself are one, insofar as they are ultimate with respect to the same end. But the remaining and third thing (which is remaining as a kind of second thing, insofar as two predicates are one in form, and the third is from them insofar as two things said are accepted in number) is now to say or propose to the other or to the respondent the things thus found and ordered: because dialectical disputation is a common work, and must exist between two, on account of the cause which we have stated, because it also proceeds from those things which seem so.

Therefore until dialecticians find the proper place and order the things found, philosophers (that is, demonstrators) and dialecticians stand similarly (that is, according to one likeness) in their proposed considerations, in this, that neither proposes to another, but each is occupied within himself concerning finding the middle of arguing and the order of things to be proposed. But now to order those things which have been found, or to interrogate toward another and by interrogating to propose the mode by which they are more concessible, is proper to the dialectician and not to the demonstrator: because in this the dialectician and the demonstrator differ, that this sort of business of the dialectician who interrogates consent is toward another, and cannot proceed without the consent of another: but for the philosopher (that is, the demonstrator), and also for the dialectician first inquiring according as he is toward disciplines according to philosophy, then the dialectician inquires within himself and does not require the consent of another. Therefore for these, the demonstrator and the dialectician seeking within themselves, it does not matter how it is proposed to another, if indeed the things from which they make syllogisms are true and known: although perhaps the one who responds does not posit (that is, does not concede) them: for in such things the consent of the respondent is not awaited, when in being they themselves are true and known to one hearing beforehand before they are proposed: because such things are near to those things which are from the principle which is believed through itself and is known through itself: and he may foresee that what follows from them is easy or happens to occur through consequence, whether the respondent concedes them or does not concede them: for they are not probable things which are judged to seem so from these or those persons, but are true and known through themselves, and not judged to seem so from these or those; but perhaps in such things both the demonstrator and the dialectician inquiring within himself will also hasten, immediately concluding from such things and not awaiting the consent of the respondent: since (that is, because) such propositions are also most known, and with respect to truth are near to those which are called maximal propositions: for Boethius says that such are those which each person approves upon hearing them: for from these true and known propositions, composed in this way, there are teachable or demonstrative syllogisms. Therefore it is recapitulated by saying: the places whence, or from which, one must take or draw arguments for determining a problem have been stated previously in the six preceding books.

CHAPTER II.

How many preter-necessary propositions there are, and for what they must be taken and proposed to another.

Therefore concerning the order toward another, and concerning interrogation or concerning the mode of interrogation ordered to the consent of the respondent, it must next be said, first dividing the preter-necessary propositions, how many there are and for what, whichever must be taken or proposed to another. But here (because they cannot be known except through the necessary ones from which they fall short) it must first be determined that the necessary propositions to be inferred in construction are those through which the syllogism is made, so that they enter its substance and the conclusion is inferred only from them. And such are necessary by the notion of necessity by which that is called necessary without which that which is intended cannot be made; this, as Boethius says, is the necessity of supposition.

And whatever other propositions there are besides these, without which the conclusion can be made, are preter-necessary: but such propositions as are taken by the opponent besides these are taken in four ways and for four utilities. For either they are taken for the sake of induction, so that from them the proved universal principally proposed in the syllogism may be given or conceded in the major or minor proposition. Or they are taken secondly for the magnitude or amplification of speech or discourse, or by which the respondent may less receive what follows and more quickly be inclined to construction. Or they are taken and brought in thirdly for the hiding of the intended conclusion; when the one who responds foresees it as hidden, he assents more easily. Or they are assumed so that the discourse may be more manifest, because the respondent consents more quickly to what is manifest: and these are brought in in prosyllogisms, because propositions either need proof, and because of doubt the respondent does not consent, and thus there is the first; or he does not consent for this reason, that the conclusion is reached quickly, and thus an ampliative proposition or a prolongative proposition of discourse is taken; or he does not consent for this reason, that what is proposed is obscure, and thus an explanative one is taken. Besides these, however, no preter-necessary proposition must be assumed, because it does not avail for inclining the respondent to consent: but through these four propositions one must try to increase the reasoning and to interrogate the consent of the respondent.

Nevertheless there is an objection concerning one of the preter-necessary propositions, that it is not dialectical, but sophistical: for it is for the sake of contest: and thus it seems to be for the end of glory, and not for the end of the discovery of knowledge.

But the solution of this is that dialectical business is directed to another: because it rests upon what seems so to another, and sometimes this one is perverse, unwilling to concede or receive those things which are useful for the business of discovery, when namely that which follows from the proposed interrogation is useful: therefore the proposed thing must be hidden until he receives some proposition through which he is compelled to consent: therefore in this way, even if it is for the sake of contest, nevertheless it is for the sake of a just contest, and one useful to dialectical business, because it hands down the mode of inquiry of truth through inquiry: and therefore it is necessary and best for the dialectician to use even those propositions which are called hiding propositions: for dialectic, insofar as it is obviative, has regard more to position, the problem: and it is not released from this, since it has regard to fiction, according as Aristotle says in the third book of First Philosophy, that what is fictive is what is compelled to a position: then for this reason such a contest is just, and is not for the end of glory, but so that truth may more easily be found without impediment.

Of these propositions the use ought to be such that we say that it does not belong to the opponent immediately to pre-order and propose those principal and necessary propositions from which the principal syllogism is made (as from propositions): because from those, the respondent, seeing what follows, does not consent, until he says what seems to him: but the opponent must withdraw from those propositions into more supreme universals, in which nevertheless those things which the opponent intends are hidden: because they will be proved from them. As if the opponent's proposed aim is to show that there is not the same discipline of contraries, this must not be proposed immediately, but from a more universal thing, as from opposites: for from this it will be syllogized that there is also the same discipline of contraries, because contraries are of the number of opposites. Therefore this is the use of a hiding proposition. But if the respondent does not posit or concede the universal proposed, then it must be taken through induction in this way, that this must be taken, that there is the same discipline of contraries: and if the respondent does not concede, then the opponent must attend to bringing in particular contraries. For the propositions necessary for a syllogism must be taken either through induction or through syllogism: or indeed some, the major or even the minor, through induction; but those also, the major or the minor, through syllogism. And this is the use of an inductive proposition.

But whatever of the necessary propositions are very manifest, and it appears immediately what can be concluded against the respondent, those must be stretched out (that is, drawn away from the proposed thing) through other propositions to other middles, through which nevertheless these things can be concluded: because many middles are found for probable matters: because that which is to happen through the consequence of a conclusion, and which is principally intended, is always made more obscure for the respondent to understand in the departure from the proposed thing and the induction of those things which are drawn away from the proposed thing: and at the same time those things which have been introduced for the intention of the principal things must be stretched further into other middles, and thus prepared and separated by stretching them before that respondent, who can in no way take them unless they have been stretched into many middles. But those propositions (which besides those which are necessary have been taken for the syllogism) are to be accepted on account of those which are necessary, from which in another way these propositions are explained either by prohibiting, or as hiding propositions, or are led down to further middles: for each one of such propositions must be used on account of that for which it is introduced: and this mode of introducing must indeed be used from singulars to the universal, and from known things to more unknown things: because the unknown is proved through the known. Those things are commonly more known which are known according to sense, either simply to all or at least to many, because more people judge according to sense. But from those things which universally seem so to all or to many, the dialectician proceeds. Therefore this is the common use of preter-necessary propositions. But concerning the inductive proposition in particular, it has already been said.

But for one hiding, he must strive to pre-syllogize those things from which that syllogism ought to be made which from the beginning is intended, by departing from the proposed thing into higher things; and he pre-syllogizes these, so that he may make very many, or many higher, syllogisms: but this will be if someone not only pre-syllogizes necessary propositions in their more universal things, but also if, of those propositions which are useful and preter-necessary for these things and introduced for hiding, he still pre-syllogizes some from that superior proposition, so that, by ascending still further to a prosyllogism, he makes a prosyllogism.

Further, one hiding in such a way must not immediately say the intended conclusions, but afterwards, after he has departed into higher things in which the things principally intended are hidden and shut up: for then he ought to infer the conclusion as from a remote middle: for thus he departs very far from the proposed principal proposition, which from the beginning is intended: and nevertheless he attains the proposed thing by leading through all the middles very far down to the proximate ones. And universally it must be said in hiding propositions that the one who has hidden and has wished to use hiding propositions must interrogate in such a way that, after the whole or entire proposed discourse has been interrogated and the intended conclusion has now been stated, the respondent himself is asked on account of what (or from what middle) this concluded thing follows: but this happens when the proposition is concluded from a middle very far distant, without deduction to the proximate. Therefore this will happen chiefly and most frequently through the aforesaid mode. For because, when the last conclusion alone has been stated (without the proximate principles from which it follows), it is doubtful to the respondent how, or from what middle, the conclusion happens or follows: because the respondent himself has not foreseen from what things the principal conclusion happens or follows, the prior syllogisms, which have been concluded through remote middles, not having been disentangled by deduction to proximate things. But the superior syllogism will least of all, or in no way, be disentangled when the conclusion has been properly posited, if for the middle of the conclusion which we infer from afar we do not posit the proper and proximate propositions, but those remote ones from which a higher and superior syllogism is made. And those two documents must be observed greatly: because the first is taken from the side of the principles to be proposed, and the second from the side of the construction to be inferred.

But the third document (which is very useful, from the fact that he proposes several syllogisms and the propositions of several syllogisms) is that he should not propose them continuous according to the position which they ought to have in the proper syllogism, but by permutation, proposing the major of one syllogism with the major of another syllogism by permutation toward one and another conclusion. For if the propositions are placed beside one another in position in the syllogism in their due order, then that which happens through syllogistic consequence (that is, the conclusion) will be more manifest: and the respondent, seeing this, resists and dissents more.

But this also must still be considered by those hiding in such a way, that in arguing enthymematically one must take the definition of the proposed thing: because the place from definition is more efficacious for concluding: and such a proposition must be taken in an enthymeme: in which enthymemes a universal proposition is placed: nor even in the abstract things themselves must the universal definition be taken, but rather in those assumed and conjugate and concrete things: because they more easily paralogize the respondents when they do not see the instance: because the definition is proposed in the conjugate or concrete, and they concede, thinking that they are not conceding universally, as they would think when the definition would be taken universally in the principal proposition. For it can be believed that, by reason of the subject in which it is, it is thus defined: and thus they concede the proposed definition more easily. But an example of this is: if it is necessary to take and have conceded the proposed thing by the opponent, that he who is angry desires to inflict punishment and to repel injury because of the apparent faint-heartedness inflicted. But the account is taken, in departing to what is higher, that anger is universally the appetite of punishment on account of apparent faint-heartedness: this would not have been accepted for the proposed thing. For it is manifest that, once this has been taken in the principal proposition, we have, either in the conjugate universally, what we chose beforehand from the beginning: because from these things it universally follows that an angry man desires punishment on account of apparent faint-heartedness or exacerbation: for this follows. Therefore it must be observed thus from the side of the speech signifying the principal thing or the assumed or concrete thing: because those who put forward (that is, first propose) an instance of the definition in those concrete things rather than in abstract things oppose them through the opposite, as is clear: because if that universal proposition is proposed, that every angry man desires punishment, it is easy to take an instance, for it is proved immediately that not everyone who is angry desires punishment: for we are angry at parents indeed, but we do not desire punishment. Whence one must first propose in the assumed thing not universally, and afterwards, by departing to the higher abstract thing, accept the universal definition, and through it conclude universally what had been proposed particularly or indefinitely.

But perhaps to someone the instance which was introduced seems not to be an instance, because to some it seems that even one angry at parents desires punishment: because to some it seems that sufficient punishment is that the parents be saddened and be made to repent. But although this perhaps is true, nevertheless the instance does not have anything likely: because an angry person does not desire punishment from parents: and therefore the document is also likely, that first he should propose particularly in the concrete, and afterwards through the definition of the abstract conclude universally through the place from conjugates, so that the respondent himself may seem not irrationally to deny the proposed thing, even if it is proposed universally, since he has an instance ready, at least an apparent one. But in the generally proposed definition of abstract anger, it is not similarly or not equally easy to find an instance: and therefore he will concede it universally.

Further still, another document of the opponent is that those things which he has proposed should seem not to have been proposed on account of the principal intended thing itself, but to have been proposed on account of another thing disparate from the proposed thing, or even on account of the opposite: because the respondents themselves are more afraid of those things which are useful for the principal position, and deny them. But simply and universally it must be said that that document is useful to the opponent which, as much as possible, can make doubtful for what purpose the proposed things are introduced, whether they are proposed for this which is the proposed thing, or the opponent wishes to take them for its opposite or for something disparate. For when it is doubtful for what they are introduced, the respondent will more concede that which is useful for concluding the proposition: but this can happen only in one way, that the opponent also depart into that which is consequent upon both the proposed thing and its opposite, and into the consequent of both the proposed thing and what is disparate from the proposed thing. But for one beginning to argue from this, it is doubtful whether he tends toward concluding the proposed thing or the opposite. Now this document is taken from the side of those things into which the one who uses hiding propositions departs.

Further, another document of the same thing is (taken from the side of the mode of proposing what he proposes principally to conclude) to seek a likeness, so that from the very likeness introduced he may have what is likely and may be conceded more easily. For what is likely is made from the like, and the more universal thing lies hidden in the like itself more than if it were proposed in itself by itself. For example, if we wish to conclude that there is the same discipline of contraries, we will propose it not by itself, but wrapped up in likenesses, as, do you think that there is the same discipline and the same ignorance of contraries? because it is like in sense that there is the same sense of contraries: or conversely it may be proposed, there is the same sense of contraries, because similarly there is the same discipline of contraries. But this, to prove through a likeness, is like induction: nevertheless it is not reduced to necessary propositions, but to hiding propositions: wherefore it is not the same as induction, although in some respect it is like it. For in induction, from the singulars introduced, the universal is taken and constructed: and thus from the parts one proceeds to the whole. But in likenesses introduced one does not proceed to the universal whole: nor is what is taken from likenesses a universal under which, as under a universal whole, all like things have been introduced.

But there is still another document of him who uses hiding propositions, taken from the side of the opponent himself in comparison to the respondent, that if he proposes universally some other thing which has an open instance and one which is easily seen, then the opponent himself must also bring an instance against himself: for then the respondents themselves do not hold the opponent suspect, because he acts without suspicion with them: because he seems to argue justly without snares and to do nothing against the respondent, but for him.

Still another document, taken from the side of that which is proposed, is that it is useful for the opponent to say that he proposes that which is customary to be said and that this sort of thing is said commonly: because the respondents themselves are sluggish, from shame, to move (that is, to deny and remove) what is customary to be said, when they have no instance against it, and especially because the respondents themselves use such things that are usual and customary to be said, and do not take care to move or remove them.

Further still, a document of the one hiding, taken from the side of the opponent himself in the act of opposing, is not to hurry toward the conclusion by opposing. And the cause of this is that respondents resist more against those who hurry: and therefore, although what he proposes is altogether useful for the proposed aim, nevertheless he ought not hurry toward it, but with a delay, with other things interposed, gradually approach the proposed thing.

And there is still another document taken from the side of the mode of proposing, that he should not propose what he intends in itself, but in a certain parable, according as a parable is said to be a comparison of diverse things made under something proportionally similar, in which several things are compared which have some likeness of proportion to one another: as if I should say, as bronze and figure stand to a statue or idol, so genus and difference stand to species. But this must be done for this reason, that because of which something else is proposed, or seems to be proposed, the respondents themselves will posit or concede more.

Further, a document of one wishing to hide is that, if he wishes to propose something else, he should not posit it in itself, but in its accident, to which the proposed thing is a necessary consequent: because the respondents themselves more concede the antecedent proposed in an accident than in itself: therefore what is to happen through the consequence of the conclusion is not similarly (that is, equally) manifest from the antecedents, as if it were proposed through itself: and when this which is the antecedent has been taken and conceded, that will also have been taken and conceded: because when the antecedent has been posited, the consequent also is posited.

And last, after many things have been premised, the opponent must interrogate that which he principally wishes to take: and therefore this must be done, because respondents chiefly refuse the first things interrogated: because more of the number of those interrogating or proposing first interrogate those things about which, interrogating, they principally and most of all propose, and they most of all hasten to these. But toward certain people, such as grave and sluggish melancholics, this document must be used in the contrary mode: for toward those who are grave in the stated way, one must first put forward the things which are such and principally proposed: for the grave especially admit the first proposed things, conceding them, unless it is altogether and universally manifest to anyone what can happen from them according to syllogistic consequence: for at the end, once aroused, they resist more and more.

Similarly, it must be done toward those respondents, whoever judge themselves sharp in responding: for such persons, easily positing or conceding the first things first proposed, are broken in the end, and begin to disagree and contradict: and then they persevere in contradicting, and say that the conclusion does not happen or follow from the things which have been posited: for such persons posit as those believing in their habit (that is, taking credulity from their melancholic habit), which is slow: and they are suspecting that they will suffer nothing from the first things proposed.

Further still, another document of a certain one hiding is that through several proposed things the proposed things ought to be prolonged and interrupted, or that even those things which are not useful for the proposed thing, or seem not to be useful for the intended discourse, ought to be intermixed: almost in the way that in false drawings they do when they distribute figures: and this must be done for this reason, that when there are many things interrogated (the very plurality confusing the respondent), it will be doubtful in which interrogated thing the false thing is, as in the middle and in the cause: on account of which those interrogating or opposing are sometimes also hidden, when this happens in a hidden way, as has been said: and things are conceded by respondents which, if they were proposed through themselves and openly placed, would not be conceded. Therefore by way of recapitulation we say that one must use that (which has been said in these documents and precautions for hiding in these hiding propositions).

CHAPTER III.

In what way ampliative and explanative propositions must be used.

But for the proposed thing or for the amplification of the proposed thing, one must use induction of similar things in particulars, or division of the proposed thing into parts: nevertheless things cognate or similar to the proposed thing ought to be introduced, and it ought also to be divided into these: because such things help toward the proposed thing. But what induction is, as to what sort of thing, is manifest from what has been had before. But division, which is for the amplification of the proposed thing, is such through comparison: as that one discipline is better than another discipline, either because it is more certain in demonstrating, or because it is better, that is, of a better and nobler subject: and this is also said in the first book On the Soul. Or one must divide with respect to the end, as some are speculative, whose end is truth. Others are active, whose end is action or the work effected, which is called apotelesma. But others are poetic, which according to a fable composed from wondrous things invite to the good: for each one of such things indeed adorns the discourse, and nevertheless is not necessary to be said for the conclusion, so that it would be among the things entering the syllogism.

But for explanation one must use preter-necessary propositions in this way, that we introduce examples and parables which are similitudinary speeches comparing similar things in diverse things. But fitting examples ought to be brought in, and manifest ones, from which the proposed thing can be known and made manifest, such as Homer was accustomed to set down: not obscure ones which obscure the proposed thing, such as the poet by the name Choerilus was accustomed to set down: for thus, in such examples and parables, what is sought will be plain. Thus therefore ampliative and explanative propositions must be used.

CHAPTER IV.

In what way induction or inductive propositions must be used.

But after these things we shall say how inductive propositions must be used. But one must note beforehand that in disputing one must use syllogism more than induction toward dialecticians, insofar as we call those dialecticians exercised in reasonings: for toward them we use dialectical syllogism more than induction, and toward them more syllogism than toward the many. But conversely we use induction more toward the many than toward dialecticians, and more than syllogism: but this has also been said before: the many follow the judgment of sense, but dialecticians attend more to reasonings.

But it is possible to use inductive propositions, and to interrogate inductive propositions in which there is a univocal universal, because they regard all singulars by one likeness and account. But in some common things, namely, it is not easy to induce, because in not all like or singular things is there posited one univocal name to which all singulars have regard according to induction by one likeness. But since one must take and concede the universal through induction of particulars: then, when certain things have been introduced, they say, “thus in all such things,” and thus concerning singulars, marking that all things have regard similarly to the universal. But to divide and distinguish this is most difficult in those things which do not participate in the common name univocally: for it is difficult to distinguish what sort of things they are (that is, in what way they regard the common thing) which are of the number of those things which are brought forward by inducing, and what sort are of this, and what sort similarly receive the predication of the common thing, and what sort do not. And this is so because such a thing is said of the things introduced either equivocally or according to analogy. If the first, then the things introduced do not