Volume 1 · pp. 37–39
Chapter VIII. Whether the universal is form, or matter, or composite; and if it is form, what sort of form it is.
A marker with ≈ is an approximate page boundary, placed by measure of the text; the page photographs remain the authority. In the paired views, clicking a page marker brings that page into view.
CAPUT VIII.
An universale sit forma, vel materia, vel compositum: et si forma, cujusmodi forma sit?
Est autem adhuc dubium apud quosdam, an universale sit forma, an compositum, an materia: et si est forma, utrum sit forma totius, vel partis? Quod enim universale non sit materia, patet ex hoc quod materia ei, in quo est, nec dat esse, nec nomen, nec rationem: quae omnia dat universale substantiale ei cujus est universale: igitur non est materia. Adhuc autem materia non est imago agentis in eo quod producitur. Universale autem est imago agentis intelligentiae in eo quod producitur, ut jam probatum est. Adhuc autem omne quod praedicatur de eo in quo est, forma est. Universale praedicatur de eo in quo est. Ergo universale forma est. Adhuc autem nihil est communicabile multis unum existens in eis secundum essentiam nisi forma: materia enim non est communicabilis multis, nisi per divisionem, ita quod non tota est in singulis. Universale autem totum est in singulis. Ergo universale non est materia, sed forma.
Sed quia innegabiliter verum est, ideo quaeritur cujusmodi forma sit? Est enim forma totius, ut humanitas est forma hominis: aut forma partis, sicut anima est forma corporis humani. Forma autem partis sive materiae non praedicatur de re cujus est forma, sed universale bene praedicatur. Universale ergo non est forma partis vel materiae secundum quod materia perficitur per formam. Eodem modo probari videtur, quod nec forma totius est: quia etiam humanitas de homine non praedicatur, et est de ratione ejus de quo praedicatur.
Haec autem et similia solvere non est difficile. Dicendum enim est, quod universale est forma, et quod est forma totius. Sed forma totius dupliciter designatur in nomine: designatur enim ut forma tantum, sicut humanitas est forma designata ut forma tantum, quae est essentia formalis: et ideo non praedicatur de eo cujus est forma, quia homo non est essentia sua formalis, nec aliquid aliorum quae formas habent. Designatur etiam ut forma totius totum esse dicens cujus est forma: et tunc designatur per esse quod dat ei in quo est et nomen, sicut homo dicit esse formale quod forma totius dat huic composito quod est hic homo. Et hoc docet Aristoteles dicens 1: cum dico caelum, dico formam: cum dico hoc caelum, dico formam in materia. Et forma est universale praedicabile nomine et ratione de eo cujus est universale secundum substantiam: cujus probatio est, quia nisi universale tale esset forma, diffinitio data secundum nomen universalis non diceret totum esse rei, nec totam quidditatem ipsius secundum illud nomen secundum quod diffinitur, sive nomen generis sive speciei. Relinquitur ergo, quod universale sit forma totius ut totum esse dicens designata: propter hoc etiam praedicatur de eo de quo praedicatur, ita quod et statim posito subjecto per intellectum concipitur in illo sive subjectum sit in actu, sive non: omni tempore enim verum est, quod homo sit animal, sive homo sit, sive non sit: et quod animal est corpus animatum, et quod corpus animatum sit substantia: sed ex hoc non sequitur, ergo corpus animatum est ens secundum actum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna 2, quod esse et existentia accidit ei quod est: verum enim est hominem esse animal, sive aliquod animal sit, sive non sit: et accidit ei esse, vel non esse. Haec igitur sunt, quae digrediendo a proposito, et altioris scientiae assumendo negotium, de universalibus propter doctrinae perfectionem esse dicenda videbantur.
CHAPTER VIII.
Whether the universal is form, or matter, or composite; and if it is form, what sort of form it is.
But there is still doubt among certain people whether the universal is form, or composite, or matter; and if it is form, whether it is the form of the whole or of a part. That the universal is not matter is clear from this, that matter gives to that in which it is neither being, nor name, nor notion; all of which a substantial universal gives to that of which it is the universal. Therefore it is not matter. Further, matter is not the image of the agent in that which is produced. But the universal is the image of the acting intelligence in that which is produced, as has now been proved. Further, everything which is predicated of that in which it is, is form. The universal is predicated of that in which it is. Therefore the universal is form. Further, nothing is communicable to many while existing as one in them according to essence except form: for matter is not communicable to many except through division, so that it is not whole in each. But the universal is whole in each. Therefore the universal is not matter, but form.
But because this is undeniably true, it is asked what sort of form it is. For it is the form of the whole, as humanity is the form of man, or the form of a part, as soul is the form of the human body. But the form of a part or of matter is not predicated of the thing of which it is the form, but the universal is rightly predicated. Therefore the universal is not the form of a part or of matter according as matter is perfected by form. In the same way it seems to be proved that it is not the form of the whole either, because even humanity is not predicated of man, and yet it belongs to the notion of that of which it is predicated.
But these and similar points are not difficult to solve. For one must say that the universal is form, and that it is the form of the whole. But the form of the whole is designated in a name in two ways: for it is designated as form only, as humanity is form designated as form only, which is formal essence; and therefore it is not predicated of that of which it is the form, because man is not his own formal essence, nor is anything else which has forms. It is also designated as the form of the whole, saying the whole being of that of which it is the form; and then it is designated through the being which it gives to that in which it is, and the name, just as man says the formal being which the form of the whole gives to this composite which is this man. And Aristotle teaches this when he says 1: when I say heaven, I say form; when I say this heaven, I say form in matter. And form is the universal predicable by name and notion of that of which it is the universal according to substance. The proof of this is that, unless such a universal were form, a definition given according to the name of the universal would not state the whole being of the thing, nor its whole quiddity according to that name according to which it is defined, whether the name of genus or of species. Therefore it remains that the universal is the form of the whole designated as saying the whole being; on account of this also it is predicated of that of which it is predicated, so that as soon as the subject is posited, it is conceived by the intellect in that subject, whether the subject is in act or not. For at every time it is true that man is animal, whether man exists or does not exist; and that animal is animated body, and that animated body is substance. But from this it does not follow, therefore animated body is a being according to act. And therefore Avicenna says 2 that being and existence happen to that which is: for it is true that man is animal, whether some animal exists or does not exist; and being or not being happens to it. These, therefore, are the things which, by digressing from the proposal and taking up the business of a higher science, seemed to have to be said about universals for the perfection of doctrine.
Redeuntes igitur ad propositum dicamus, quod cum ad scientiam praedicamentorum Aristotelis utile et necessarium sit nosse quid genus, quid species, quid differentia, quid proprium, et quid accidens sit. Praeterea utile ad demonstrationem et diffinitionem et divisionum scientiam, tentabo tradere istarum rerum, quae universalia dicuntur, speculationem sive scientiam speculativam compendiosam, brevem quidem, sed tamen sufficientem et facilem, quae competat introducendis, per assignationes et similitudines tradens scientiam, tentans aggredi quae ab antiquis dicta sunt, ut qualia dicta sunt accipiantur. Hoc autem faciam ab altioribus quidem quaestionibus abstinens: quae licet tactae sint propter doctrinae perfectionem, tamen ex principiis propositae intentionis determinari non possunt. Simpliciores vero de his universalibus quaestiones mediocriter inter subtilem et rudem tractatum conjectans, ex probabilibus sive similibus tractare, conjecturare est: multa enim talia oportet adducere, ut fides fiat de eo de quo tractatur.
Returning therefore to the proposed matter, let us say that, since for the science of Aristotle's categories it is useful and necessary to know what genus is, what species is, what difference is, what property is, and what accident is. Moreover, useful for demonstration and definition and the science of divisions, I will try to hand down the consideration or speculative science of these things, which are called universals, in a compendious way, brief indeed, but nevertheless sufficient and easy, which befits those to be introduced, handing down science through assignments and likenesses, attempting to approach the things which were said by the ancients, so that what sort of things were said may be received. But I will do this while abstaining from higher questions; although they have been touched for the perfection of doctrine, nevertheless they cannot be determined from the principles of the proposed intention. But the simpler questions concerning these universals, conjecturing moderately between a subtle and a rough treatment, must be treated and conjectured from probable or similar things: for many such things must be brought forward so that confidence may be produced about that concerning which the treatment is made.
Ne autem lateant ea quae ex istius scientiae principiis tractari non possunt de universalibus, mox, id est, prima facie occurrit quaerendum de generibus, et speciebus, utrum scilicet subsistant, vel in solis, nudis purisque intellectibus posita sint: si etiam sint subsistentia extra intellectum posita, utrum sint corporalia, sive incorporalia: et sive hoc vel illo modo sint, utrum sint separata secundum esse a sensibilibus sive singularibus, an in ipsis sensibilibus posita sint. Et alia quaedam circa tales difficultates circumstantia in hoc libro dicere recusabo. Hujusmodi enim negotium altissimum est, quia altissimae scientiae proprium, et ideo majoris et subtilioris egens est inquisitionis: altioris quidem quoad subjecti nobilitatem, majoris autem inquisitionis quoad demonstrationum subtilitatem. In his enim duobus scientiae differunt, ut Aristoteles dicit in principio libri de Anima 3. Illud vero quod de his dicendum videtur probabiliter quemadmodum de his tractaverunt antiqui Philosophi, et horum maxime Peripatetici, quos hic sequi suscepimus, nunc tentabo demonstrare modo introductionis.
But lest those things about universals which cannot be treated from the principles of this science be hidden, immediately, that is, at first sight, there occurs the need to ask about genera and species, namely whether they subsist or are posited in bare and pure intellects alone; if also they are subsistents posited outside the intellect, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; and whether, being in this or that mode, they are separated according to being from sensibles or singulars, or are posited in sensible things themselves. And I will refuse to speak in this book of certain other things standing around such difficulties. For business of this sort is very high, because it is proper to the highest science, and therefore it needs a greater and subtler inquiry: higher indeed with respect to the nobility of the subject, and greater in inquiry with respect to the subtlety of demonstrations. For sciences differ in these two things, as Aristotle says at the beginning of the book On the Soul 3. But what seems to have to be said about these things in a probable way, in the manner in which the ancient Philosophers treated them, and especially the Peripatetics, whom we have undertaken to follow here, I will now try to demonstrate by way of introduction.
Notes
- Aristotle, in the book On Heaven and the World, in book I, text, commentary 92. (Aristoteles, In libro de caelo et mundo, in I. tex. com. 92.) ↩
- Avicenna, in the first book of his Logic. (Avicenna, In primo libro logicae suae.) ↩
- Aristotle, in book I, text, commentary 1. (Aristoteles, In I. tex. com. 1.) ↩
If a page does not appear, its photograph has not been uploaded yet.