THE MIRROR OF UNUSUAL QUESTIONS

Bartholomaeus Sibylla of Monopoli, O.P.

Revised by Cyprianus Guidus of Lucca, O.P.

Title page

THE MIRROR

OF UNUSUAL

QUESTIONS,

of Brother Bartholomaeus Sibylla of Monopoli, of the Order of Preachers, a most distinguished theologian.

In it are treated souls, heaven, hell, purgatory, good and evil angels, human beings, and also other matters most worthy of being known, through various questions arranged in three decades.

Revised anew and, in this latest edition, most diligently and exactly purged of all errors, and restored in every passage to conformity with the teaching of Saint Thomas, the Angelic Doctor,

by the Reverend Father Brother Cyprianus Guidus of Lucca, professor of sacred theology, of the venerable Order of Saint Dominic.

With an index of the questions and of noteworthy matters, newly issued.

VENICE, 1587.

At the press of Marcus Antonius Zalterius.

Dedicatory letter of Cyprianus Guidus

This book, as Cyprianus Guidus writes in his dedication to Giovanni Battista Castrucci of Lucca, cardinal, had formerly, through carelessness in printing and a fault of the press, been everywhere so stuffed and filled with grave faults and errors - which not only distorted the true and Catholic sense and the genuine meaning, but, what is worse, very easily led less cautious and prudent readers into manifestly false opinions - and also with...

...besides innumerable monstrosities and faults even in its spelling, so that it truly would be necessary either to consign the book, printed as it was, to be entirely consumed by fire, or else to apply anew, by day and night, every diligence, every care, and every exertion, sparing no labor and no inconvenience, so that it might nowhere again be offered in so uncorrected and erroneous a state.

Considering within myself, therefore, on the one hand, the natural and intrinsic benefit of a work of this kind, and its usefulness both for the spirit and for the intellect - a usefulness which, as though from a most limpid and abundant spring, could easily flow from it to pious readers, for the common benefit and advantage of all Catholics, if it were properly corrected and again delivered to the press for printing - although I was distracted and entangled on every side by the weightiest and continual occupations, nevertheless, as if by stealth, I took away so much time from my own nightly rest that, applying every diligence, casting aside every impediment and sluggishness, and employing all the powers both of mind and body, I finally applied and wholly devoted myself to purging this book of the innumerable and almost infinite faults and errors with which it bristled everywhere. I did so to such a degree that now, with God favoring the undertaking, it will be possible for everyone to read it without any danger of stumbling anywhere or of falling into any error or doubt - provided that, as has very often been accustomed to happen, especially in this city, through the execrable greed and very great negligence of printers, there does not once again vanish...

...all the labor, industry, study, and vigilance so earnestly undertaken and assumed by me.

Then, turning myself again to another consideration no less fitting than necessary - namely, that I should not permit a book so well corrected to be printed again without some particular and very great protector and leader, as is customary - and also not forgetting how greatly the Eminence of Your Most Illustrious Lordship has always deserved well of the servants devoted to it, and what benefits it has bestowed upon them up to the present, under what leader and protector could I ever have brought it forth more suitably, and by whom could it have been defended and protected more powerfully against detractors, the envious, and the malevolent, than under that most illustrious prince who draws his distinguished origin from a most eminent and never sufficiently commended lineage and family: a family which has always been the protectress and defender of the wretched and of men unjustly oppressed; which once, by so abundant an outpouring of noble blood, defended its own fatherland and the public liberty, and extended and enlarged all its dominion, patrimony, and boundaries far and wide; which, moreover, guarded the honor, chastity, and reputation of innumerable abducted maidens against their savage abductors and drove out cruel and fierce tyrants; and which, finally - lest by a longer account I offend the modesty of your ears - in time of peace, by incredible prudence...

...and counsel, preserved itself and other families safe, unharmed, free, and glorious?

Recognizing inwardly, exactly and perfectly, from long experience and many trials, that Your Lordship has become a true imitator of the leading men of this most illustrious family,

burning in soul with ardent zeal and shining in a body clothed in purple with purity like a blazing seraph, the Supreme Pontiff also distinguished you outwardly and sealed you with the red galero - not in order to close up, but to disclose and make openly known to everyone what, among all mortals, had been inwardly manifest to him alone. He did this to the incredible, very great, and perfect joy and exultation not only of our entire commonwealth, truly and perpetually free, but also of the whole Christian name and jurisdiction.

This ineffable and universal joy is certainly seen to be very unlike every other joy with which people are ordinarily affected on any great and happy occasion of new events, since such joy always vanishes together with the novelty itself. This joy, however - as everyone marvels - has grown so greatly up to the present and grows from day to day that all the more prudent and powerful persons, together with the entire people, await Your Eminence until you shall have advanced in age and the time shall have come; and they earnestly desire and long with all their prayers that you will bring the final completion to the exultation already conceived, not only for the Italian nation, as occurred in the case of your ancestors, but also wherever the Christian name is heard and resounds, with the firm and undoubted hope that everyone will have to say, *Plus ultra* - "Further beyond."

But lest perhaps I should seem to have wished to digress from a dedicatory letter into praises of the most illustrious House of the Castrucci - a task which, I truly confess, has not been granted to me, although I am moved toward it by the most ardent desire and love, nor indeed is this the proper place to pursue it - I shall therefore put the finishing hand to this letter, but only after I have earnestly and humbly begged Your Most Illustrious Lordship to receive, with a cheerful, willing, and grateful mind, this poor and very small beginning, which I offer to you as part payment of my infinite debt toward you, for I am not otherwise capable of paying it. When this offering is joined and considered together with the great and grateful willingness of the one making payment and with the authority of the mediator and intermediary, it is by no means to be rejected.

In this matter also I pray and beseech Your Most Illustrious Lordship that you not disdain to imitate the Supreme Giver of the universe, who does not scrutinize and accept the quality or any other condition of the gift offered, but instead has always been accustomed to behold, contemplate, and receive the mind and heart of the giver himself.

May you fare well. Venice, 1586, in the convent of Saints John and Paul.

To Your Most Illustrious Lordship,

your most devoted and humble servant,

Brother Cyprianus Guidus of Lucca, O.P.

Index of Doubts of the *Speculum peregrinarum quaestionum*, arranged according to the order of the Decades

First Decade

- Whether the rational soul is made from the essence of God. 1.
- Whether souls were created at the beginning together with the angels in the Empyrean Heaven. 4.
- Whether the soul is propagated anew from seed at the same time as the human body is sown. 8.
- Whether those whom we call souls are souls, or demons enclosed in bodies. 12.
- Whether souls, once the body has been organized, are successively created out of nothing by God, at once by being created and infused. 13.
- Whether God acts reasonably in cooperating in souls arising from illicit intercourse. 15.
- Why God creates souls which he knows are to be damned, and angels whom he knew would fall. 16.
- Whether the rational soul is immortal and incorruptible. 19.
- Whether the corrupted human body can rise, be vivified, and return numerically the same. 30.
- Whether the world is eternal, or whether it must at some time come to an end. 41.
- Whether the world, or any creature, could have been produced from eternity. 50.
- Whether, when a human being is dead, the soul informs the body. 51.
- Whether, when the heart is dead, the soul still informs the body or some part of it. 53.
- Toward what difference of position the soul goes out when it departs from the body. 54.
- Toward what termini the soul, having departed from the body, goes. 55.
- Whether the particular judgment is conducted by Christ or by angels. 58.
- Whether there is an interval between a human being's death and the particular judgment. 60.
- How many places there are for souls released from the body. 62.
- Whether the Empyrean Heaven is found in truth. 63.
- What the Empyrean Heaven is. 64.
- What the spiritual dowry of the soul and of the blessed body in the Empyrean Heaven is. 67.
- How many dowries souls existing in the Empyrean Heaven have. 72.
- How many dowries glorified bodies have. 75.
- Whether the dowries of souls and bodies in heaven are identical with their blessedness. 84.

- Whether anything else is necessarily required for true and perfect blessedness beyond the four dowries. 85.
- Whether the five senses of the glorified body are made blessed. 87.
- What and how many are the aureoles that are given to some of the blessed. 96.
- Whether hell exists in truth. 101.
- Where the site and position of hell are. 123.
- Whether, elsewhere than at the center of the earth, a place is found on the surface of the earth in which the souls of the damned undergo punishments. 118.
- What relation Purgatory, Limbo, and Abraham's bosom, or the bosom of the holy fathers, have to hell. 119.
- Which is the greater region of the penal places. 121.
- Which region is more lasting among the four penal places. 124.
- How many mansions the infernal region has. 124.
- Whether the fire of hell is corporeal, similitudinary, or imaginary. 126.
- Whether demons and spiritual souls can suffer and be tormented by infernal and corporeal fire. 128.
- Whether there is any difference between the fire of hell and that of this world. 133.
- Whether the bodies of the damned, joined to their souls after the judgment, can subsist perpetually unconsumed in fire. 134.
- On the kinds of punishments which are in hell. 137.
- Whether the suffrages of the living can lessen or shorten the punishment of hell. 141.
- Whether Purgatory is truly and really found in the center of the earth. 157.
- Whether another place of Purgatory is found besides that which is in the center of the earth, where the souls of the moderately good are purged. 169.
- That in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault, and every liability to punishment owed to venial and mortal sin. 174.
- Whether the punishment of Purgatory exceeds every temporal punishment of this life. 180.
- Whether purgatorial fire differs from the fire of hell. 183.
- Whether the punishment which souls sustain in Purgatory is voluntarily assumed. 186.
- Whether those detained in Purgatory can in any manner sin mortally or venially. 188.
- That souls existing in Purgatory cannot merit. 189.
- Why the punishment of the damned always grows and is increased. 190.
- Why the soul alone suffers in Purgatory, although the whole human being commits sins. 194.
- Whether the souls of Purgatory are relieved by the works of the living. 194.
- Whether the pope can remit, wholly or in part, the punishments of those who are in Purgatory. 199.
- Whether the pope, from the plenitude of his power, can bind or absolve one existing in Purgatory. 206.

- Whether the pope can rescue from punishment all those existing in Purgatory. 210.
- Whether, of two persons existing in Purgatory and deserving equal punishment, one can be liberated from there more quickly than the other. 212.
- Whether Abraham's bosom differs from the limbo of children. 215.
- What punishment is owed to children dying in original sin. 216.
- That in the limbo of children there is neither punishment of sense nor are there demons. 219.
- Whether indulgences avail for children existing in limbo, and whether prayer should be made for them. 221.
- Whether all children dying without baptism will rise on the day of judgment. 221.
- Where the place of the Elysian Fields is according to the pagans. 223.
- Whether the terrestrial Paradise is something corporeal or something spiritual. 225.
- Where the Paradise of pleasure is situated. 231.
- How many have been translated into the terrestrial Paradise. 237.
- Which region is more desirable: the east of the unbelievers, or the west of the Christians? 240.
- Whether the dead can appear to the living. 245.
- Whether the dead have sometimes appeared in fact. 248.
- By which angels the soul is accompanied when it departs from the body, and whether it is immediately conducted to the place assigned to it there. 251.
- Whether it is lawful to ask a dying person to reveal his state after death. 253.
- Whether the damned can, by right reason, desire not to exist, in order to escape the miseries of hell and attain their absence. 254.
- Whether it is lawful to desire death. 260.
- Whether it is more desirable to desire not to exist than to sin. 263.
- Whether one who is brave with political courage ought to flee the sin opposed to courage more than bodily death. 264.
- Whether the dead know the things which are done among the living. 267.
- Whether a separated soul knows itself, and how. 271.
- Whether separated souls speak with one another. 273.
- Whether the soul retains after death the sciences and virtues acquired here, and whether the damned use them with delight. 274.
- Why revelations occur more often to women than to men. 292.
- Whether the prophecies of holy women should be received as true and preached. 293.
- Why it was permitted to the Sibyls alone to prophesy concerning Christ. 299.
- What bodily sleep is and whence it is caused. 295.
- The question concerning universal and partial sleep. 297.
- Whence Adam's sleep was caused in the beginning. 301.
- On the causes of dreams and their definition. 303.

- Whether good or evil spirits can send dreams to the living. 306.
- Whether the dead can in dreams admonish the living toward good or draw them away from evil, and whether credence should be given to their admonitions. 308.
- Whether the dreams of the insane and of fools have a presage of some truth. 309.
- Why good spirits instruct human beings enigmatically and parabolically, and not clearly. 309.
- Whence it is that the influx of spirits upon human beings concerns

  sleep rather than wakefulness. 311.
- How many and who are those who divine well by dreaming. 312.
- Whether it is lawful to give credence to dreams. 314.
- Whether it is a sin to foretell future things through dreams. 316.
- Why children and the insane sometimes predict future things. 317.
- Why brute animals show future effects by certain motions. 318.
- Whether the powers of the rational soul are subjected to and necessitated by celestial bodies. 320.
- Whence it is that one person has a sharper or slower understanding than another. 325.
- Whether one person is inclined by the stars toward one science and another toward another science. 326.
- What are the causes by which acuity of understanding is directed toward diverse sciences. 326.
- Who judges better concerning the goodness or depravity of the intellect, a physician or an astrologer. 328.
- Why a diversity of customs, namely of vices and virtues, appears among human beings in different regions. 331.
- On fate according to the poets. 338.
- What fate is, and what must be ascribed to fate. 339.
- How, according to some, all things are subjected to fate. 340.
- That there are three execrable dogmas concerning fate. 343.
- That not all things are necessitated by fate. 349.
- How one must respond theologically to those who think badly concerning fate. 355.
- What fate is according to theologians, and whether it is to be conceded. 356.
- What fortune is according to the poets, how it is depicted, and what things are subjected to it. 359.
- What fortune is according to philosophers and theologians. 363.
- What things make a human being well or badly fortuned. 366.
- On the conditions of fortune. 369.
- Whether a physician, farmer, gambler, and soldier are made fortunate by the stars in their actions. 372.
- Whether God placed in the firmament images of animals and of the species of this inferior world. 377.

- Whether images can in some manner be transferred superstitiously into heaven. 381.
- Whether a certain divinatory practice concerning future events can be obtained from the stars and images. 383.
- Whether astrologers can judge truly concerning the length and brevity of the lives of those born from inspection of the ylech and alcocoden in the degrees of the Zodiac. 386.
- That no astrologer can predict and judge certain things concerning future events. 389.
- In the act of which of the soul's powers its beatitude consists. 395.
- Whether one person is more blessed than another in heaven. 403.
- Whether a less good but more learned soul is more worthy in heaven than a better but less learned soul. 406.
- That the person who possessed a more intense degree of charity in this life is more blessed in heaven. 406.
- How many names the soul obtains. 407.
- Why the soul does not rule the body invincibly. 408.

Second Decade

- Whether demons are found in the nature of things. 411.
- What the spirits whom we call angels are. 412.
- On the number of angels. 415.
- On the beginning of the angels. 416.
- Where the angels were created. 418.
- Whether free choice is found in God, in angels, in the blessed, in demons, in the damned, and in wayfarers. 419.
- Whether angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings. 426.
- Whether the guardian angels of souls, when sent, enjoy their happiness in heaven. 429.
- To which hierarchy of angels it belongs to guard human beings. 430.
- That, notwithstanding divine governance, the guardianship of angels also ought to be given. 432.
- To whom the guardianship of angels is necessary. 433.
- That one or several angels can be assigned to the guardianship of human beings. 436.
- Why a guardian angel is assigned to a human being. 437.
- On the beginning and end of the guardianship of angels. 437.
- Whether the guardianship of angels is sometimes withdrawn from a human being. 438.
- That angels receive accidental joy from the salvation of those whom they guard. 440.
- That they have no sadness over the damnation of the one guarded. 441.
- That angels are more solicitous for the salvation of human beings than demons are for their destruction. 443.
- Why angels permit human beings to be vexed by demons. 445.
- That the fear of falling away from God through sin is not in angels or in the blessed. 446.
- How angels can alter the interior and exterior powers of human beings. 447.
- Whether angels can consecrate the body of Christ. 449.
- Whether an angel, having assumed the appearance of a priest, can baptize or absolve. 450.
- Whether one angel understands another. 452.
- On morning and evening cognition in angels. 453.
- On the speech of angels among themselves. 454.
- How a spirit can address a human being. 455.
- Whether local distance impedes the speech of angels to one another. 456.
- On the threefold conflict of angels. 457.
- Whether the conflict of the angels with the dragon was real and corporeal. 459.
- On the cause of the conflict of Michael with the dragon. 460.
- Whether human beings after their death are assumed into the company of the angels. 461.

- Whether the Blessed Virgin was assumed above the choirs of angels. 464.

Third Decade

- Whether evil angels, who are called cacodaemons, truly exist in the nature of things. 469.
- What demons are. 474.
- Whether the fall of the demons was possible. 478.
- On the interval between the creation and the fall of the angels. 483.
- Whether the evil angels fell into hell. 485.
- How many angels fell from heaven. 486.
- Whether demons possess bodies naturally united to them as form to matter. 487.
- Whether among demons there is generation through seed, as among human beings and perfect animals. 490.
- That demons assume bodies from the nature of an element. 493.
- What operation of life a demon exercises in an assumed body. 493.
- That a demon transformed into an angel cannot be adored without sin, even by one who is ignorant. 495.
- Whether demons can enter the bodies of human beings and animals. 496.
- Whether a demon can enter the whole body or some part of it. 498.
- Whether a demon can move bodies by the command of the will alone. 500.
- That a demon cannot enter the soul. 501.
- Whether the spirit of a damned human being can enter the body of another human being. 503.
- That credence is not to be given to a possessed person who says that he is the spirit of someone deceased. 504.
- Whether a demon can produce a natural effect without seed. 505.
- On the miracles of Pharaoh's magicians and of necromancers. 507.
- Whether, from the teaching of demons, a human being can form a true human body through the operation of natural powers alone. 509.
- Whether demons attack human beings. 510.
- How, and in how many ways, a demon deludes a human being's senses. 515.
- On the many ways by which a demon deceives human beings. 517.
- Why God permits the human race to be tempted by demons. 521.
- Whether tempting human beings is the office of demons. 522.
- Why demons tempt human beings. 524.
- How many and who are the tempters of human beings. 524.
- Whether temptations are to be desired. 525.
- Why the demon, having attacked the woman Eve, tempted her in the form of a serpent and by vocal speech. 527.

- That Hebrew speech was the first language, and after the judgment will be the last language. 528.
- Whether demons know future things. 529.
- Whether demons know the thoughts of human beings. 531.
- Whether demons can perform miracles. 534.
- Whether women said to ride at night with Diana are a demonic illusion. 535.
- Whether demons can be compelled by some natural art to give oracles to human beings. 536.
- How demons can be expelled from possessed bodies. 540.
- Whether fascination is a natural or diabolical work. 543.
- Whether preservation in the bodies of the dead is a work of God, nature, or the devil. 544.
- Whence the reason is to be taken that certain marvels are from the devil and not from God. 547.
- Whether anyone can predict future things through invocation of demons without sin. 548.
- How many genera and species of divinations there are in which demons are invoked. 550.
- Whether it is lawful to use natural things in order to acquire bodily health. 553.
- Whether signs employed to induce certain effects accomplish anything naturally. 553.
- Whether it is lawful to observe certain signs in order to foreknow future good or bad fortunes. 553.
- Whether observation of a time for doing something is lawful. 554.
- Whether it is a sin to investigate stolen things by inspection of an astrolabe and by judgment of the stars. 555.
- Whether, besides the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, it is lawful to recite charms or use other observances when gathering herbs. 556.
- Whether it is lawful to hang divine words around the neck. 556.
- Whether it is lawful to keep relics of saints with oneself. 557.
- Whether it is lawful to charm serpents or another genus of animals. 558.
- Whether it is lawful to use red-hot iron or boiling water for the investigation of something hidden. 558.
- Whether it is lawful to use the notory art for acquiring sciences. 559.
- Whether illusions and divinations of demons are to be believed when the effect occurs. 561.
- Whether it is evil to use lots. 562.
- Why sortileges, divinations, and incantations abound more among women than among men. 565.
- Whether evil spirits or evil human beings have greater power over human beings. 566.
- Whether greater power to afflict the good is given to a natural agent or to a free human being. 567.
- Why the afflictive action of natural agents was sometimes permitted by God and sometimes impeded when applied by free agents. 568.

- How many species of demons there are which torment human beings before and after the judgment. 569.
- On the causes why demons tempt human beings. 570.
- Whether demons always appear to everyone who is dying. 573.

End of the Index of Questions

Scriptural epigraph

From Wisdom, chapter 6

I will not hide from you the mysteries of God, but from the beginning of their birth I will investigate them, and I will bring the knowledge of him into the light, and I will not pass by the truth. Nor will I travel in company with wasting envy, for such a man will not be a participant in knowledge. But a multitude of wise men is the health of the whole world, and a wise king is the stability of the people. Therefore receive instruction through my words, and it will profit you.

The Mirror of Unusual Questions

Adorned with various precepts of theology, canon law, the philosophers, and the astrologers; comprising three decades.

By Brother Bartholomaeus Sibylla of Monopoli, master of sacred theology, of the Order of Preachers.

First Decade

Chapter One

Containing seven questions concerning rational souls.

Question One

Whether the rational soul is made from the essence of God

It is asked whether rational souls were made from the essence of God, as Parmenides and Marcus Terentius Varro said.

In answering this question, it must be known that, because of the essential perfection of rational souls and their invisibility - since they do not fall under the senses, from which all our...

...proper cognition arises - various errors, opinions, and difficulties have therefore arisen concerning them, as is evident in Book I of *On the Soul*. Hence the Philosopher also says there: "It is altogether and exceedingly difficult to grasp what the soul is."

According to Augustine, however, in his book *On the Origin of the Soul*, the first teaching about rational souls that is openly perverse and contrary to the Catholic faith is that which certain persons asserted when they said that God made them not from nothing but from himself. They were moved to assert this because, when certain persons began to consider the natures of things, they were unable to transcend imagination and sense so that they might believe that any spiritual substances existed. They therefore asserted that nothing exists apart from the bodies that are seen, imagined, and represented in the phantasy. For this reason they said that God is a certain infinite body - namely, either this whole ethereal and elemental body, as Parmenides said, or all this corporeal light which we see, as the Manichaeans used to say. They said that this whole body, or all this light, was the principle of all things and of all bodies, and thus they asserted that God was the soul of the world and was of the essence of all things. They asserted that the rational soul was of the nature of that infinite body, or was a certain power of that light, and consequently was of the essence of God himself.

This error belonged first to Parmenides himself, who said that all things are simply one and differ only according to sense and estimation, in Book I of the *Physics*. Marcus Terentius Varro later followed him and asserted, as Augustine reports in Book VII of *The City of God*, that God was the soul of the world, governing it by motion and reason. He asserted that the human soul was a part of that great soul of the world, that is, of God. Virgil also related this opinion, following Aratus, the Greek poet, when he said:

> *Jupiter is whatever you see and whatever is moved.*

They could furthermore have strengthened this opinion with the following argument. That which is breathed forth by someone is made from that which is emitted by the one breathing, as is evident in the case of the spider, which, in...

...forming webs to catch flies, breathes them forth from its own substance and thus wastes away and is weakened, as the Psalmist says. But when God had formed man from the clay of the earth with respect to his body, he breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul, Genesis 2. Therefore the rational soul, by which man lives, was breathed forth and is something actually taken from the substance of God.

But Augustine, in the book *On the Origin of the Soul*, says to the contrary that this teaching is openly perverse. For if souls were of the essence of God, they would be of the same nature as he, and consequently there would be as many gods as there are souls.

Moreover, this opinion contradicts sense, is opposed to the faith, is rejected by the philosophers, and is condemned by the sacred doctors, especially by Saint Thomas in Part I, question 90, article 1, through an argument possessing the following force. The divine nature is pure act, invariable, immovable, always understanding, and its power does not really differ from its essence. The rational soul, however, is mingled with potency and is variable from one affection to another, from one cognition to another, from truth to error, and from virtue to vice. Before it learns, it is like a scraped tablet upon which nothing has been depicted, as stated in Book III of *On the Soul*; it understands at one time actually and at another potentially. Its powers, according to Thomas, really differ from its essence. Therefore the soul is not of the essence of God.

To the argument given above on the contrary side, it is said that "to breathe into" in the book of Genesis is not to be understood corporeally; rather, for God to breathe is the same as to make a spirit. Even a man who breathes corporeally does not emit anything from his own substance, but from an extraneous nature, namely air. A spider, moreover, is not said to breathe forth its webs, but to weave them from its own substance.

Addition

On the fact that the rational soul is not of the substance and essence of God, see Augustine, the book *On the Knowledge of the True Life*; likewise, the epistle of Blessed Augustine to Saint Jerome, *On the Origin of the Soul*...

...where he asks Jerome whether that opinion is to be followed according to which, as each individual is born, a newly created soul is infused into him. See likewise Jerome, *To Marcellinus and Anapsychia*; Saint Thomas, *Opusculum* 3, chapter 94; Part I of the *Summa*, question 90, article 1; *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 85; and Augustine, *On Psalm 41*.

Question Two

Whether souls were created at the beginning together with the angels in the Empyrean Heaven

It is asked whether all souls were created at the beginning together with the angels in the Empyrean Heaven, as Origen said.

The answer is that Plato, together with certain philosophers and Manichaeans, and, among our own writers, Origen alone, as is charged against him, said that all souls were created by God before bodies, in the Empyrean Heaven together with the angels - and, according to Plato, in the finite number of the heavenly constellations and stars.

Origen said that in the beginning souls and angels were created equal according to the condition of their specific nature, namely in power, perfection, and duration. Afterwards, however, through free choice, according as they adhered to God more or less, or withdrew from him, they were variously promoted or punished by divine justice, so that some became angels according to the diverse functions of the orders, some became souls according to diverse states, and some became demons in diverse states.

They also said concerning souls that, according to the diversity of their merits or demerits, some had been promoted to the diverse orders of angels. Some were bound to celestial

bodies, and hence they asserted that the celestial bodies were ensouled. Others were thrust down into the baser bodies of brute animals. For this reason Pythagoras, as Cicero says...

...in *On the Ends of Good Things*, and Juvenal in Satire 14,

Abstained from all animals, nor indulged his belly with every kind of legume.

That is, he abstained from beans, either because of their flatulence or because of a worm hidden within them, which he believed to be the soul of some human being and to be undergoing purification there.

Other souls, moreover, in proportion also to the inequality of their estrangement from God, were bound to nobler human bodies or to baser and badly formed ones, such as those of the lame and the blind, so that they might be purified in such bodies. For he maintained that God had created this diversity of corporeal creatures for the punishment and purification of spiritual creatures, and that, after they had been purified in these bodies, they would, according to Plato, be recalled into heaven, to the stars corresponding and comparable to them, as gods or goddesses.

Origen, however, to whom this opinion concerning the co-creation of angels and souls is principally attributed, strengthened it with arguments and an authority. His first argument proceeds as follows. Everything that does not depend upon another with respect to its being can be created by God without that other. But the rational soul does not depend upon the body with respect to its being, as is evident in Book I of *On the Soul*. Therefore it is not necessary that it be created in the body; rather, it could have been created before the body, together with the angels.

Again, Genesis 1 states that on the seventh day God rested from every work, that is, he ceased. Therefore he did not create souls afterwards, but made them all in the beginning together with the angels. The same is proved by the authority of Ecclesiasticus 18, which says: "He who lives forever created all things together."

But to the contrary stands the Master of the Sentences in Book II, distinction 28, rejecting as false this opinion of Origen concerning the co-creation of angels and souls, as will be adduced below at the end of this question.

The aforesaid opinion of Origen can also be refuted by two arguments of Avicenna. The first proceeds as follows. It is impossible for numerical diversity to be caused under the same species except from a diversity of matter. For there would never be two instances of whiteness except by reason of the diverse subjects in which they exist as...

...in subject matter. If, therefore, all souls had been created together without bodies, since they themselves do not have matter as a part of themselves, as everyone confesses, it would be necessary either for them to be diverse in species - since diversity of species always follows upon diversity of formal principles - and thus all souls would differ in species, and consequently so would all human beings whose forms those souls are, which is unfitting; or else it would be necessary to say that there was at that time one soul in number, and thus the error of Averroes concerning a single intellect in all human beings would follow. Since, therefore, these two alternatives are unfitting, it remains for us to say, in the Catholic manner, that souls were created not before bodies but together with them.

The second argument proceeds as follows. A proper act exists in its proper potency and matter; but the soul is the proper act of the body, according to Book II of *On the Soul*. Therefore, as is evident, the soul cannot be created except in the body.

What Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues* also contributes to this conclusion: almighty God created three kinds of living spirit. One is not covered by flesh, namely the spirit of angels. Another is covered by flesh and dies with the flesh, namely the soul of brute animals. The third is covered by flesh but does not die with the flesh, namely the soul of human beings.

Avicenna answers Origen's first argument as follows. Although the soul does not depend upon the body with respect to its being or its end, it nevertheless depends upon it with respect to its individual being; and this individual being begins in the body of which the soul is the form. Because this individual being acquired by the soul in the body is an absolute being, neither submerged in nor bound to the body, its individual being therefore remains to it after the corruption of the body.

To the second argument it is said that Scripture states that God ceased from every work on the seventh day in this sense: as Thomas says in Part I, question 73, article 1, in reply to the third objection, nothing made by God afterwards was entirely new without having in some manner preceded among the works of the six days. Some things preceded materially only, as Eve did in Adam's rib. Some preceded both materially and really, as the individuals now generated preceded in the first individuals of their respective species. Some...

...species also which appear as though new - especially among animals generated from putrefaction - preceded in certain active powers of the stars and elements. A new species which appears to be produced from many also preceded causally in diverse animals according to species, from whose mixture it is generated, such as from a male ass and a mare.

Certain things, however, preceded according to likeness, as do souls which are created anew. This likeness can be considered, first, according to genus and the nature common to souls and angels, namely intellectuality. In this way souls preceded in the work of creation in which all things are said to have been created together, Ecclesiasticus 18: "He who lives forever created all things together."

Alternatively, this likeness can be considered according to the specific rational nature. In this way souls preceded in the works of the six days, in which Adam's soul was created united to his body, since the soul is an essential part of human nature and God established the first things in the perfect state of their nature and species.

Or this can be understood according to what Augustine says, not by asserting it but by reporting it, in Book VII of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*: Adam's soul was created before his body, perfect and complete in species, with an inclination of the will toward governing the body.

Similarly, the work of the Incarnation also preceded, because, as Philippians 2 says, the Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." Spiritual glory, too, preceded according to likeness in the angels; bodily glory preceded in heaven, especially the Empyrean, as Thomas says in Part I, question 66, article 3, in the reply. Hence it is said in Ecclesiastes 1: "Nothing under the sun is new. For those things have already preceded in the ages that were before us."

If it is objected against this from John 5, "My Father works even until now, and I work," and therefore he did not rest on the seventh day, the answer is that God is said to have rested on the seventh day from establishing new genera and species of things, which had existed in the first works, as has been said; and he is said to work continually by preserving and governing the creature he established.

To the authority which Origen brought forward concerning...

...Ecclesiasticus 18, "He who lives forever," and so forth, Albert answers in his book *On the Four Coevals* that this is understood with respect to the knowledge of God, which apprehends all things together; or it is understood with respect to the four coeval things created together, namely the angelic nature, the Empyrean Heaven, time, and the matter of the four elements, in which all things existed, as has been said.

To Origen's final assertion, that this corporeal nature was created for the punishment of spiritual creatures, Augustine replies in Book XI of *The City of God* that nothing is more foolish than to say that God created this sun and the other corporeal things not for the ornament of beauty or for the well-being of corporeal things, but for the punishment of sinning souls.

Addition

Lactantius Firmianus, at the end of his work addressed to Demetrianus, explains the origin of the soul and why God gave the tempting spirit. That souls were not created together with the angels at the beginning is affirmed by Saint Athanasius; Alexander, *On Various Questions*; John Chrysostom, *On John*; and Bede, *On Genesis*.

Blessed Gregory also agrees with them, saying, "We believe that not all things were made together." Augustine, in Book III of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, maintains that the angels were created in the upper part of the air and afterwards admitted into heaven, just as Adam was fashioned outside the paradise of pleasure and afterwards led into it. Saint Jerome, writing to Pammachius, also condemns Origen.

Question Three

Whether the soul is propagated anew from seed at the same time as the human body is sown, as Cyril says

It is asked whether souls are propagated anew from seed at the same time as the human body is sown, as Cyril says.

Certain persons, together with Cyril, answered this question by saying that souls are not created anew and successively by God, but rather are propagated through seminal...

...power and come from propagation when the body is sown by the parents, so that, just as the body of the son is from the body of the father, so the soul of the son comes from the soul of the father.

They attempted to prove this from Deuteronomy 12: "Take care that you do not eat the blood, for their blood is in place of the soul." Hence certain philosophers and physicians also say that the soul is in the blood and that the blood is its seat. But blood exists by propagation; therefore the soul does also.

Again, that which comes forth from the loins of a man is caused from seed. But Genesis 46 says that sixty-six souls came forth from the loins of Jacob. Therefore the souls also came from seed.

Their third argument proceeds as follows. We are commanded to show reverence to our parents by reason of the being which we have from them. But being comes from the soul. Therefore the soul flows with the seed by propagation and comes from the parents.

But to the contrary stands the text of Augustine's book *Questions of the New and Old Testament*, which is also incorporated by way of extract into the *Decretum*, 32, question 2, chapter *Moyses*.

This truth is first also proved by arguments. Every form that is brought into being through the transformation of matter and the separation of seed is a form educed from the potency of matter. For this is what it means for matter to be transformed, namely to be brought from potency into act. But the soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter. Therefore neither can it be produced through transformation.

The minor premise is made clear as follows. No active power acts beyond its own genus. But it is certain that the soul transcends every genus of body, since it possesses an operation elevated above all bodies, namely understanding. Therefore no corporeal power can produce the intellective soul.

The same point is secondly evident as follows. In the case of any principles whose operations cannot exist without a body, neither can their beginning exist without a body. For as a thing has being, so it operates, and conversely. In the case of any principles whose operations exist without a body, their generation does not occur through the generation of a body. The operation of the nutritive and sensitive soul cannot exist without a body; therefore these begin to exist through the propagation of seed. The operation, however, of the...

...intellective soul, since it does not occur through a corporeal organ, as has been said, does not begin to exist through the propagation of seed. Therefore it is produced in another way.

Furthermore, the acts of active agents exist in a well-disposed recipient, according to Book III of *On the Soul*. But the soul is the act of a physical, organic body possessing life in potency, as is evident in Book II of that work. Therefore, before the body receives life from the soul, it must be disposed, organized, and brought to a suitable temperament. For the soul must have a house in which to dwell before it is created. Otherwise it would dwell upon dry ground, as is said in the gloss on the decree cited above.

Secondly, this is proved from the order which God observed in the formation of Adam. In Adam's creation he first formed the body and afterwards breathed the soul into it, Genesis 2.

It is proved thirdly from an unfitting consequence. It would follow that, just as many bodies perish when the emission of seed sometimes does not result in birth and hence no human being is born, so also many souls would perish together with those bodies. This is unfitting, since souls are immortal. It therefore remains to say that, once the body has been organized, the soul is created by God.

For this reason chapter *Sicuti*, 37, question 2, maintains that if a fetus perishes before the infusion of the soul, homicide is not committed, because it cannot then be said that a human being has been born; but the guilty person must be fined money. If, however, the fetus has been animated by a rational soul, the guilty person must suffer capital punishment, as chapter *Moyses* says in the cause cited above.

The Master of the Sentences also speaks as follows concerning this matter in Book II, distinction 28: "The Catholic Church teaches that souls were made neither all together nor by propagation, but that they are infused into bodies sown through intercourse and already formed, and that in being infused they are created."

To the arguments on the opposite side: to the first it is said that blood is not the soul, but, among the other humors, it contributes most of all to disposing the soul's union with and

preservation in the body. For, as Albert says, spirit is generated from the humor of the blood, and through these spirits the powers of the soul are conveyed to the organs of its faculties. Hence the statement made by certain natural philosophers and physicians, that the soul is in the blood, and so forth...

...is not to be understood as meaning that blood is an animate thing, or that the soul principally coexists with the blood, or that the soul is nowhere in the body where there is no blood. For bones and nerves do not contain blood, although the soul is their substantial form.

Moreover, if a sudden removal of all the blood from the body were supernaturally effected without injury to the temperament of the members, it would still seem possible for the soul to exist there, and for the vital and animal spirits to suffice for their operations for some time after all the blood had been removed from the body.

Furthermore, before the first instant of the production of the soul in the embryo there was no blood there; nor could blood have been generated in that instant, but some additional time was required. Therefore the soul is naturally fitted to exist in a body without blood.

Accordingly, the statement of the philosophers in Book III of *On the Parts of Animals*, chapter 3, and of Averroes there in the chapter *On the Heart*, that blood is the seat of the soul, appears to be understood from the fact that the condition of the vital operations follows upon the condition of the blood. Thus, if blood is lacking, the operations fail; if the blood is most excellently disposed, the operations will be most vigorous; but if it is corrupted, infected, or otherwise badly qualified, the vital operations are impeded and fail.

The cause of this is that the instruments of the soul - namely the vital and animal spirits, for the exercise of whose vital operations the soul needs the body and without which it is not naturally fitted to perform those operations - are originally generated from sublimated blood, with the substance of air concurring in a certain manner. Consequently, blood that is corrupted, infected with poison, crude, or undigested is not fit for generating the vital and animal spirits in the liver or in the heart; and consequently it is not fit for their operations. Hence it is sometimes necessary that the composite should fail entirely on this account.

To the second argument it must be said, as Thomas says in Part I, question 118, article 2, that in the cited authority a part is put for the whole - that is, "soul" is put for "body" through the figure of synecdoche.

To the third argument it is said that parents do not give rational being, as though through an outflow, but dispose the body in the womb with the final disposition upon which the rational soul follows of necessity.

Addition

It can be proved by many testimonies of Scripture that the rational soul is created immediately by God and, in being created, is infused into prepared matter; that it is neither educed from the potency of matter, nor produced from the substance of God, nor effected by an intelligence, but has its being from God alone.

Isaiah 27: "I made every breath." Genesis 1: "He breathed into him the breath of life." Psalm 32: "He fashioned their hearts one by one." And when Genesis 2 says, "This is bone of my bones," it appears that rational souls are not from the soul of the first man, but that flesh is from flesh.

Saint Augustine holds this view in *On the Soul and Its Origin*, addressed to Renatus, chapter 4. He also agrees with it in the book *On the Two Souls*. Saint Thomas does so in the *Compendium of Theology*, Opusculum 3, chapter 93, and in *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 86; Paulus Cortesius in Book II, distinction 5; Biel in distinction 17, question 1; and Scotus affirms the same in Book II, distinction 17, question 1, where he attacks the error of the Manichaeans and Origenists. Tertullian also fell into this error.

Question Four

Whether those whom we call souls are souls, or rather demons - apostate spirits enclosed in bodies so that they may be purged there

It is asked whether those whom we call souls are not souls but demons - apostate spirits enclosed in bodies so that they may be purged there - as Cyril says.

Certain persons answered this simply by saying that those whom we call souls in human bodies...

...are not souls, but reprobate spirits and apostate angels, that is, demons enclosed in human bodies so that they may be purged there. They are said to pass from body to body, so that, if they had not repented and had not been purged in one body, they might repent and be purged in another. But this opinion is ridiculous and errs in three ways.

First, because it maintains that demons are to be saved through repentance. Against this it is said in Matthew 25: "Go, you accursed, into everlasting fire."

Second, because it maintains that there are no souls, contrary to Matthew 11: "In your patience you shall possess your souls."

Third, because it says that demons are enclosed in all human bodies, which is the saying of a foolish person. For it is foolish to concede that demons dwell where the Holy Spirit dwells. But the Holy Spirit dwells in human minds and bodies, according to 1 Corinthians 14: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit?" Therefore their opinion is false and heretical, and deservedly to be rejected.

Addition

Augustine marvels very greatly at this error when he attacks the Platonists who thought that human souls were demons after [leaving] their bodies. See Augustine, Book IX of *The City of God*, chapter 11.

Question Five

Whether souls, once the body has been organized, are successively created out of nothing by God, at once by being created and infused

It is asked whether souls, once the body has been organized, are successively created out of nothing by God, at once by being created and infused.

In answering this, one notable point and two conclusions are set down. The notable point is that in the womb, or embryo, through the action of the agents - that is, of the parents - the matter...

...and the body are disposed for the reception of the rational soul, since all corporeal matter acts as an instrument of a spiritual power, and especially of God himself; and by disposing it in this manner, it is said to generate something like itself.

Then let this be the first conclusion: the intellective soul is created out of nothing by God. It is proved as follows. Since an agent is threefold - namely, artificial, natural, and supernatural - a being in act is necessarily placed beneath the action of an artificial agent; a being in potency, that is, matter, is subjected to the action of a natural agent; but nothing is necessarily subjected to the action of a supernatural agent. Since, therefore, the soul is created by such an agent, God creates it with no preexistent matter, but out of nothing.

The second conclusion is that, once the body has been organized by the action of the parents, God infuses the soul into the body and, by infusing it, creates it: in the body of a male, commonly after forty days from the first conception; but in the body of a female, after eighty.

Pliny and Master Dominicus Tholosanus, following the philosophers in connection with Leviticus, chapter 12, assign the following reason for the difference between male and female in the infusion of the rational soul. A male fetus is conceived from hot seed in the right part of the womb, which is hot; a female fetus, however, from cold seed in the left part of the womb. What is cold is slow and sluggish in its operation, while what is hot is swift. The formative power therefore organizes and forms the members more swiftly and quickly in the one seed than in the other.

Augustine proves this conclusion in his book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, speaking as follows: "We say that the souls of human beings were not created at the beginning among the other intelligences, nor that they were all created together, as Origen fabricated; nor that they are sown together with bodies through intercourse, as the Luciferians and Cyril and certain presumptuous persons among the Latins affirm. But we say that the body alone is sown through the union of marriage. The Creator alone knows the creation of the soul; and each person's body is coagulated in the womb, compacted and formed; and when the body has been..."

"...formed, the soul is created and infused so that it may live. Finally, a human being consisting of soul and body is born and comes forth alive from the womb, full of human substance." Thus he speaks.

Addition

Saint Augustine touches upon this question in Book VII of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, affirming that the soul is out of nothing and that it truly is not produced from any matter. For the rational soul is a subsistent form to which being made and being belong *per se*. It cannot, however, be made from preexistent matter: neither corporeal matter, because it would then be of a corporeal nature; nor spiritual matter, because spiritual substances would then be transmuted into one another. Hence it is necessary to say that it comes to be only through creation, and therefore out of nothing, as all theologians conclude.

Question Six

Whether God acts reasonably in cooperating in the souls arising from illicit intercourse

It is asked whether God acts reasonably in cooperating in the souls arising from illicit intercourse. Certain persons argue falsely against this as follows. If God infuses souls from without, as has been said and as the Philosopher adduces in his book *On the Generation of Animals*, God will cooperate in adulteries, from whose illicit intercourse offspring are sometimes generated.

To this it is said, according to Thomas in Part I, question 118, article 2, in the reply to the final objection, that in the action of adulterers that which belongs to nature is good, and God cooperates with this. That which belongs to disordered pleasure, however, is evil, and God does not cooperate with this. Thus Thomas in Part I, and Master Johannes de Turrecremata, cardinal of Saint Sixtus of the Order of Preachers, on the *Decretum*.

Addition

Augustine teaches that God is not to be...

...blamed for the offenses of any vices, but is to be praised in the consideration of all natures, in Book XII of *The City of God*, chapter 5, and in his book against Adimantus, the disciple of Manichaeus. For even if he may seem to cooperate in the act, he nevertheless does not cooperate in the deformity of the act.

To this pertains what Saint Bonaventure says in Book IV, distinction 31: evil can be joined to a good in two ways, either to it as corruptible or insofar as it is medicinal. In the first manner evil defiles the good; in the second manner it is thus cured and expelled.

For example, a disease joined to nature vitiates and weakens it; but a disease joined to medicine does not render the medicine diseased, but is instead cured by it. And because matrimony is a medicinal good, it is therefore not defiled by evil, but rather cures the evil. In this way the Master is to be understood in Book IV, distinction 31, when he says that intercourse which takes place for the sake of offspring is without fault.

Question Seven

Why God created, and creates, souls which he knows are to be damned, and angels whom he knew would fall

It is asked why God creates souls which he knows are to be damned, and angels whom he knew would fall.

The theologians answer this first by saying that God's foreknowledge imposes no necessity upon rational souls, whether to be created or already created, with respect to their works in either direction, but rather leaves them in the hand of their own counsel and choice. Therefore, although God foreknew that souls would be damned, he nevertheless willed to create them, because he also knew that they would act freely in whatever they did.

For this purpose it must be known that God foreknows that certain things will be by necessity, that is, from a necessary cause, as that the sun will rise tomorrow; but that certain others will be from free will, as that this person will run or perform some other action. The sun, therefore, will rise necessarily, because God foreknew and ordained it thus; and a human

being will act voluntarily, because God thus foreknew and foresaw it. Those things, therefore, which are from a cause...

...acting necessarily are necessary by necessity; but those which will come from a cause acting freely will come freely, because God established and foreknew that they would occur in this manner. Nevertheless, because the divine intellect from eternity knows each contingent thing, not only as it is in its causes but also as it is in its own determinate being - namely, the being which it has when it is in the nature of things - and because a thing is then known with certainty when it is known according as it exists in act, as is evident in one who sees Socrates actually running, the divine intellect therefore knows from eternity each future thing with certainty and unfailingly. Yet on this account it does not impose necessity upon contingent and free acts.

In the same way, if someone sees another person making a wheel, it follows necessarily that the latter is making a wheel; nevertheless, the former's seeing is not the cause of the latter's making the wheel. Thus God also foresees a person's evil works, but he is nevertheless not the cause of that person's doing evil.

Second, Augustine answers this question, and likewise the one concerning evil angels, in Book XI of *On Genesis*, saying: "To those who ask such things I answer: I cannot penetrate the depth of God's counsel, and I confess that this matter is far beyond my powers and has been reserved to be disclosed by better and holier persons. Nevertheless, since we concede that a rational nature which is altogether unwilling to sin is better, let those who ask such things therefore concede that a creature which was so made that it can refrain from sin if it wills is not evil. Just as true reason teaches that a nature which is pleased by absolutely nothing illicit is better, so reason also teaches that a nature which has it in its power to restrain illicit things is good, so that it may not only rejoice in good and rightly performed acts, but may also rejoice in the violation of the wicked.

"Since, therefore, such a nature would be good, but the former better, why would the Lord God make that one alone, and not rather both? The former now exists in the holy angels, and the latter in holy human beings. Those who from the beginning chose rather..."

"...the side of iniquity did not therefore have to go uncreated merely because they had been foreknown. For the evil also had their place among things, both for the beauty of the universe and for the usefulness of the saints. Since, therefore, the just advance through the unjust, and the pious through the impious, why should the most wise God not have created those whom he also foreknew would be evil? Why should he not have made those whom he knew would be useful to the good in so many ways - for stirring up and exercising the wills of the good, and for being punished on account of their own perverse will, for the manifestation of justice?" Thus he speaks.

Reasonably, therefore, just as God made the human being upright, leaving him in the hand of his own choice, setting before him commandments and water and fire, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 15, so that he might put his hand to whichever he willed, so in his own manner God made all the angels upright from the beginning. He gave them knowledge and power sufficient for standing in the rectitude of justice, and left them in the liberty of their choice with respect to good and evil.

He decreed that he would concur with their wills in every good or evil act which they might wish to produce elicitively; and this with respect to the entity of the acts, but not with respect to their deformity. Thus, if through their own liberty they should decline toward the

side of injustice, divine justice would be manifested in their punishments; but if they should prefer to stand in rectitude, the abundance of divine mercy would be demonstrated in the bestowal of most excellent felicity. Thus Henry of Hesse.

Since, moreover, as Pliny the Elder bears witness, "It is generous and full of honorable modesty to acknowledge those through whom you have advanced," I shall therefore sometimes note, at the heels and feet of the questions, the doctors and the places from which I have squeezed out and elicited what I write.

Addition

See the Master of the Sentences in Book II, distinction 23; Augustine, Book VII of *The City of God*, chapter 30; and the *Enchiridion to Laurence*.

First Decade, Chapter Two

Ten questions concerning the immortality of the rational soul

Question One

Whether the rational soul is immortal and incorruptible

It is asked whether rational souls are immortal and incorruptible. It appears that the first answer should be negative.

For first, Solomon says in Ecclesiastes 3: "The destruction of human beings and of beasts is one, and the condition of each is equal." But beasts perish together in body and soul; therefore human beings do also.

Again, the Philosopher says in Book I of *On the Heavens*: "That which did not always exist cannot possess the power of existing always." But the soul did not always exist; therefore, and so forth.

Again, of things whose being is one, one cannot be corrupted without the other also being corrupted. But the being of body and soul in the composite is one, like that of matter and form. Therefore, and so forth.

Again, Alexander the Greek, as the Commentator recounts in Book III of *On the Soul*, and Albert in his book *On the Origin of the Soul*, said that the rational soul was generable and corruptible after the manner of other natural forms, through the most noble mixture of the primary qualities and the dissolution of that same mixture.

Again, Pliny says concerning souls in Book VII, chapter 55, of the *Natural History*: "It is easier and more certain for each person to trust himself and to take from the experience before birth a model of security."

But to the contrary is Aristotle in Book XII of the *Metaphysics*, where he says: "Every form is corrupted when that of which it is the form is corrupted, except the intellective soul." In Book I of *On the Soul* he says: "The intellect appears to be a certain substance and not to be corrupted." And Dionysius says in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*: "Human souls have from the divine goodness that they are intellectual and that they possess a substantial and incorruptible life."

For the solution of this question, leaving aside the theo...

...logians, who in this part could be suspected, the immortality of souls will be proved by natural arguments, by authorities of the gentiles, and by examples.

The first argument is as follows. Everything that is alien to all matter and corporeal corruption is immortal and everlasting. But every rational soul is of this kind. Therefore every rational soul is immortal. This argument appears in the first question of the first chapter.

The Philosopher proves the major premise in Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, where he shows that the corruption of things comes from their participation in matter, saying: "Matter is that through which a thing can be and not be," that is, can be corrupted and not corrupted. In Book I of the *Physics* he says: "Matter is the first subject for each of the beings, out of which something comes to be while it remains inherent."

For this reason the Philosopher concludes in Book I of *On the Heavens* that heaven is incorruptible, because it has neither matter nor a subject out of which it comes to be. Hence Averroes says in Book I of the *Physics*: "From this it will be declared that the celestial bodies have no matter at all, because they would then be generable and corruptible. For nothing other than prime matter is the cause of generation and corruption, on account of non-being being included in its substance."

Anaxagoras proves the minor premise when he says that the soul is immortal, unmixed, and impassible - namely, with a corruptive passion, not a perfective one. This argument belongs to Scotus in Book IV of the *Sentences*.

Second, the same point is proved as follows. No form is corrupted except either by the action of a contrary, by the corruption of its subject, or through the failure of its cause. It is corrupted by the action of a contrary as heat is destroyed through the action of cold; by the corruption of its subject as, when the eye is destroyed, its sight or visual power is destroyed; and through the failure of a cause as light fails in the air when the presence of the sun, which was its cause, fails.

But the soul cannot be corrupted by the corruption of a contrary, because it has nothing contrary to it, since through the possible intellect it is itself receptive of all contraries. Nor can it be corrupted through the corruption of its subject, since the human soul is a form that does not depend upon the body with respect...

...to its being. Nor can it be corrupted through the failure of its cause, because it has no cause except an eternal one, since it is created by God alone, as has been proved. Therefore the intellective soul can in no way be corrupted when the body has been corrupted. Thus Thomas, Book II of *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 78.

The Philosopher proves the same point third as follows. In Books I and V of the *Physics*, he says that every transmutation and alteration occurs between contrary termini; hence he says in Book I of the *Physics*: "All principles, therefore, make contraries," and so forth. The argument then proceeds as follows. If the soul were naturally to come to non-being through its essence, it would be alterable, since alteration precedes corruption. But it is not alterable, since the contrary qualities between which alteration occurs are inseparable accidents of prime matter and of elemental bodies. Hence the Commentator in Book II of the *Physics*, commentary 15, calls these qualities the essential accidents of matter. The soul is wholly alien to that matter, as the first argument proved. Therefore the conclusion is the same as above.

The same is proved fourth as follows. Aristotle in Books I and II of *On the Heavens* and Book III of *On the Soul* says that God and nature do nothing in vain. And in Book II of the *Physics* it is said: "It is vain when it does not come to be." Since, therefore, our two universal powers - namely, intellect and will - were produced to attain the first truth and the supreme good, and since these are not acquired here, as experience shows, because that which is temporal cannot make one truly blessed and happy, it will therefore be necessary either that these powers be in vain or that another life can be given in which we may attain our objects. The latter is impossible if immortal souls do not remain after this life.

Fifth, the conditions of that which receives and that which is received ought to be proportioned. But the universals received in the soul are immortal and incorruptible, according to Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore the intellective soul is also immortal and incorruptible.

Sixth, the same is proved as follows: if the soul were material, the intellect would not be reflexive upon itself, nor capable of knowing universals.

If it should be said that, although the soul is not corrupted *per se*, since it does not have matter, it is nevertheless corrupted accidentally upon the corruption of the body, its proximate subject, as other acci...

...dents and substantial or natural forms are, the answer is that a thing is said to be corrupted accidentally upon the corruption of another when it cannot exist without that other and depends upon it with respect to being and preservation, as is evident in accidents and natural forms.

The rational soul, however, can exist without the body, since it is separated from the body "as the perpetual from the corruptible," according to Book III of *On the Soul*. It alone among natural forms is both form and substance; and the body has a greater dependence upon the soul than conversely, since the soul is related to the body as its formal, efficient, and final cause, according to Book II of *On the Soul*.

The authorities of the philosophers and gentiles must now be set down.

First, Plato, concerning whom Augustine speaks as follows in Book IX of *The City of God*, chapter 9: "For Plato, when he was treating human souls, said: 'God himself made mortal bonds for those wretched souls.' He therefore judged that the very fact that human beings are mortal in body pertains to the mercy of God the Father, lest they be held forever in the misery of this life."

And Lactantius says in Book III of the *Divine Institutes*: "Many philosophers, reading the book which Plato wrote on immortality, killed themselves with their own hands, as though they would migrate into heaven after death."

Aristotle also says in Book III of *On the Soul*, concerning the agent intellect and the passive power, which is the possible intellect: "Nothing is yet manifest, but it appears to be another kind of soul because of its incorporeality; and this, above the genus of intellective things, seems capable of being separated from the other powers as the perpetual from the corruptible."

Again, he says in Book I of *On the Soul*: "Understanding and contemplating are corrupted when a certain interior thing - namely, the phantasm - is corrupted; but it is impossible for the intellect itself to be corrupted." He adds: "The intellect is something divine and impassible," namely, by a corruptive passion.

The Commentator also says in commentary 22 on Book III of *On the Soul*: "It is evident from Aristotle's words that certain parts of the soul are not abstracted from a subject; rather, they are generated and corrupted when it is corrupted. The intellect, however, is abstracted from its sub..."

"...ject and is neither generated nor corrupted with it. Hence the intelligences of heaven are simply abstracted from body, because they neither inform a body nor inhere in a body. Forms educed from the potency of matter, however, are simply joined to body, namely through inherence and through information, and therefore are corruptible. The intellective soul, however, holds a middle position, because in one way it is joined to the body, namely through information, and in another way it is withdrawn from it, namely through inherence."

This is good philosophy. For what else does the Philosopher wish to mean by "this is separated from that as the perpetual from the corruptible," except that when the body has been corrupted the soul remains incorruptible?

Again, Avicenna says in Book VI of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 7: "Our law, which Muhammad handed down, shows the perfection of the happiness and misery that are according to the body. But there is another promise which is apprehended by the intellect and which will be in the conjunction of the first and highest truth."

Algazel says in his treatise *On Natural Things*: "When the soul has been separated from the body, its adherence to the agent intelligence will endure, and it will delight in a delight whose being cannot be explained."

Albert the Great, disputing in Book I of *On the Soul* against those who maintained that the soul was corruptible, speaks as follows: "But that which appears to destroy this doubt is what has been asserted from the time of the ancient Trismegistus, and is now asserted by diviners and enchanters: namely, that spirits which they call angels or demons, and souls stripped of their bodies, move from place to place. We ourselves have experienced the truth of this in magical practices."

Cicero, in the *Dream of Scipio* and Book VI of *On the Republic*, introduces the elder Scipio addressing the younger and saying: "But so that you may be more eager, Africanus, to protect the republic, hold this to be so: for all who have preserved or enlarged their fatherland there is a certain and determined place in heaven, where the blessed enjoy an everlasting age."

And in the book *On Old Age* he introduces Socrates or Plato saying: "Why say more? Thus I persuade myself, thus I...

"...think. Since there is such great swiftness of minds, such great memory of things past and prudence concerning things future, so many arts, so great sciences, and so many inventions, the nature which contains these things cannot be mortal."

At the end of *On Old Age* he says: "I depart from life as from an inn, not as from a home; for nature has given us a lodging place, not a dwelling place. O glorious day, when I shall set out for that council and assembly of souls and depart from this crowd and filth! For I shall set out not only to those men of whom I spoke before, but also to my Cato, than whom no better or more excellent man was ever born. His body was cremated by me, whereas it was fitting, on the contrary, that mine should be cremated by him."

And Cyrus the Elder, when dying, says to his sons in Xenophon, as is evident above: "Do not suppose, my dearest sons, that when I have departed from you I shall never or nowhere exist. For even while I was with you, you did not see my soul; but from the deeds which I performed while I was in this body, you understood that it existed. Believe, therefore, that it is the same even if you see nothing. Nor indeed would honors to illustrious men remain after death if their souls accomplished nothing by which we might retain their memory for a longer time. I could never be persuaded that souls lived while they were in mortal bodies but died when they departed from them."

Herodotus says in Book V: "The Thracians practice the following concerning the births and deaths of their people. When a child has been born, its relatives sit around it and follow it with lamentation, recounting all the human calamities which it must endure now that it has entered life. But they commit a person who has fulfilled his fate to the earth amid play and

rejoicing, recounting that, freed from evils, he is in every felicity." Valerius sets down the same in Book II, rubric 1.

Again, Sallust in the *Catilinarian* introduces Cato and Caesar speaking concerning the punishments of separated souls. And Valerius says in Book II, rubric 1: "The custom of the Gauls approves the immortality of souls, for they hope that money lent will be repaid to them in the underworld."

Virgil in Book VI of the *Aeneid* says that the soul after separation is subject to justice and will receive after death according as it conducted itself in life, saying...

> *Therefore they are exercised by penalties and pay the punishments of ancient evils.*
> *Some are spread out empty, suspended before the winds; for others, beneath a vast abyss,*
> *The infected crime is washed away or burned out by fire.*
> *Each of us suffers his own Manes; thence through broad Elysium*
> *We are sent, and a few possess the joyful fields.*

Ovid also maintains the immortality of souls, especially in Book IX of the *Metamorphoses*, when he presents excellent men as having been deified, and when he introduces the death of Hercules there and says that Jupiter spoke as follows:

> *He will feel Vulcan as powerful only in the part derived from his mother.*
> *What he drew from me is eternal, exempt*
> *And immune from death, and conquerable by no flame.*

And Seneca in his first tragedy introduces Theseus returning from the underworld and addressing Amphitryon, saying:

> *Whoever is peacefully powerful and lord of life, let him preserve innocent and unstained hands. Let him rule himself and obey the hall of Dis after traversing long spaces for a long time. Happy are those who seek heaven, or happy is he who seeks the joyful places of the Elysian grove. A fixed place holds the guilty shut in, and, as report bears, savage punishment subdues the impious in perpetual waves.*

At the end of the work he says: "Souls are without death."

And Juvenal in Satire 2 warns that one must act well through fear of the underworld, where souls will be tormented perpetually after death, saying:

> *That there are any Manes and subterranean kingdoms,*
> *And Cocytus and black frogs in the Stygian abyss,*
> *And that so many thousands cross the ford together in one boat,*
> *Not even boys believe, except those not yet washed for a coin.*
> *But do you hold these things to be true.*

And he concludes below:

> *Alas, wretches, we are carried there; what more can arms do? - and so forth.*

Now let us add examples of philosophers, some of whom, believing souls to be immortal, killed themselves voluntarily. Lactantius adduces some of them in Book III, chapter 15, of the *Institutes*, saying: "Many of those who suspected that souls were eter..."

"...nal, as though they were about to migrate into heaven, laid hands upon themselves: Cleanthes, Elisippus, Zeno, and Empedocles, who cast himself into a burning cave of Etna on a stormy night so that, when he had suddenly disappeared, it might be believed that he had

gone to the gods. Among the Romans, Cato, after he had read Plato's book written on the eternity of souls, was driven by the philosopher's authority to the highest crime. Ambrachiades, after reading the same book, cast himself headlong from a high place. And Cliobrotus, in order to attain the immortality of which he had read in Plato's books, drove himself to death." Thus Lactantius there.

Because of this expected and believed immortality of souls, those ancient philosophers of great and excellent genius and the Romans of old attempted to receive the deaths of their people and the chances of nature with moderation and an even mind. For when the philosophers Telamon and Anaxagoras had lost their sons, they said that there should be no further mourning.

Pericles and Xenophon, followers of Socrates, acted as follows. The one, having lost two sons, delivered a discourse before the assembly while crowned. The other, while sacrificing, heard that his son had been killed in war and removed his crown; but afterwards, when he learned that his son had fallen while fighting bravely in the battle line, he took up again the crown which he had removed.

And Socrates, moved by the hope of immortality, sought no advocate for his capital trial. When he held the deadly cup in his hand, he uttered such words that anyone would have judged that he did not believe himself about to die, but about to exchange death for life.

And there is the saying of Solon the Wise in which he said that he wished his death to be free from the grief and lamentations of friends. Ennius was accustomed to tell his own people: "Let no one honor me with tears, nor make my funeral with weeping." For he wished to teach through the mouths of learned men that death, which is followed by immortality, is not to be mourned.

Hence also, among the Romans, Quintus Maximus, when carrying out the funeral of his consular son, shed no tears. Marcus Porcius Cato bore with dry eyes the death of his son, who had been designated praetor. Marcus Horatius Pulvillus, while dedicating the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, was turned aside from his purpose by the person announcing his son's death in no other respect than that he ordered the corpse to be carried...

...out. Lucius Paulus entered the city in triumph within seven days and between the funerals of two sons.

But why do I set forth examples of human beings? The swan is consecrated to Apollo because it appears to possess divination from him; foreseeing that there is nothing evil in death, it dies with song and pleasure.

Hence very many also maintain that we do not fear the slain bodies of many animals for this reason: in them nothing remains after death; but we fear dead human bodies because, they say, some divine thing - I know not what - lies hidden in human bodies.

Hence the canonists say at 24, question 1, chapter *Si habens*: "If one soul should perish by departing from the body without baptism, the death of innumerable bodies cannot be compared with this loss."

And the jurist, in the Code *On Most Holy Churches*, law *Sancimus nemini licere*, and in the Digest *On the Carbonian Edict*, law 1, says that counsel should be taken for the soul rather than for the body, because where there is the greater danger, provision must be made more cautiously.

But I ask: apart from the things which have been said by philosophers, orators, and poets - and more could be adduced - whence came so great an observance of laws among the ancients, whence the erection of so many temples and statues, whence so many costly funerals and so many acts of piety toward the gods? Certainly they all came from the immortality of souls, which was alone hoped for - indeed, held to be most certain.

For this reason Cicero, concluding the *Dream of Scipio*, said concerning the immortality of souls: "Indeed, those who have flown out from the bonds of bodies as from a prison truly live. But that which is called our life is death."

Now I shall adduce in excerpt from Herodian the Greek how the Romans, in order to display the immortality of souls, enrolled the shades of emperors among the gods after their funerals.

"It is the custom of the Romans," Herodian says, "to consecrate emperors in this manner and enroll them among the gods. They set forth in the royal vestibule, upon an ivory couch, a certain image most like the deceased, laid out in golden garments. On the left is the entire senate clothed in black garments; on the right, honorable..."

"...and eminent matrons dressed in plain garments. After seven days the noblest and choicest young men lift the couch upon their shoulders and carry it along the Sacred Way into the Forum, where Roman magistrates have been accustomed to lay down their authority.

"Around the couch there was a platform resembling stairs. Upon it, on one side, a chorus of boys and women sang hymns and poems concerning the deceased in a lamentable song. From there the couch was carried outside the city into the Campus Martius.

"Here there arose a certain structure, that is, a platform built in the form of a pavilion from the material of huge timbers, filled within with dry kindling, but ornamented outside with gold and various paintings. Above this platform was another, smaller in form but very similar in ornament; a third and fourth followed, each narrower than the one beneath it, and then another, until the highest one, which was the shortest of all, was reached. You could compare the form of this building to those towers which, standing high at night with a fire carried before them, direct ships into safe stations; the common people call them lighthouses.

"Therefore, when the couch had been raised into the second pavilion, the whole people and city gathered aromatic substances and incense of every kind - fruits, herbs, juices, everything fragrant - and always poured them out in heaps. Then the entire equestrian order rode around the building in a certain prescribed circuit and recurving Pyrrhic motion.

"Finally, the successor to the imperial power took a torch and applied it to the pavilion. Then the others set fire to it from every side, and all those things, filled as they were with dry kindling and aromatic substances, were immediately seized by the strong fire. It was also customary for an eagle to be released from the highest and smallest pavilion, as though from a certain pinnacle, at the same time as the fire was kindled beneath it. The eagle is believed to carry the soul of the prince himself into heaven. From that time onward the emperor is worshiped together with the other divinities." Thus he speaks.

Now the arguments are answered. To the first it is said that Solomon speaks there in the person of the foolish and the Epicureans, as Thomas says in Part I, question 75. And...

...the reply to the passage in Wisdom 2 is similar: "The impious said among themselves, thinking not rightly: 'Short and wearisome is the time of our life, and no one is known to have

returned from the dead, because we were born from nothing and after this we shall be as though we had not existed.'"

To the second argument it is said that the soul does not possess the power of existing always in the sense of being without beginning and without end; but it possesses the power of existing always in the sense of being without end only. The Philosopher takes the word in the first manner in Book I of *On the Heavens*. Hence Scotus says in Book IV that the adverb "always," when placed in the predicate, signifies a beginning and an end, but when placed on the side of the subject, signifies only an end.

To the third argument it must be said, as the Commentator says in Book III of *On the Soul*, that the intellect is not said to be a form in the same manner as other material and natural forms. For since the soul has absolute being, as its operation shows, it does not exist through the being of the composite as other material forms do; rather, the composite exists through the being of the soul. Therefore, when the body has been corrupted, the soul is not corrupted accidentally, as are other forms which exist only through the being of the composite. For this reason, when the soul is separated from the body, it indeed ceases to be a form, but it does not cease to be an essence, which does not belong to natural forms.

To the fourth argument Albert answers, in the place cited above in the objection, that Alexander alone among the Peripatetics degenerated from all the Peripatetics by saying that the rational soul perishes together with the body.

To the fifth, Pliny's own argument, the answer is to deny it as profane, or to say that he spoke those words by way of report and not by way of assertion.

Let us therefore conclude finally with the Church: when a human being dies and the soul is divided from the body, the dust returns to its earth and the spirit returns to the God who made it. Lucretius confirms this judgment when he says:

> *That which was formerly from earth returns backward to the same;*
> *But that which was sent from above, the gleaming temples of heaven receive again.*

Question Two

Whether the corrupted human body can rise, be vivified, and return numerically the same

It is asked whether this earthen vessel - the human body, capable of being perfected by the soul - after it has been corrupted and reduced to ashes, will rise again and be brought back to life.

In answering, it must be said that many philosophers who maintained the immortality of souls could in no way believe in the vivification of bodies and their resurrection as numerically the same, as Augustine says in Book XII of *The City of God*, chapter 4. They fortified themselves with arguments, authorities, and examples.

Their first argument is as follows. A natural agent acts only through motion or change. But an interrupted motion and change cannot return numerically the same, for the interruption of a motion and its repetition are incompatible with its continuity and unity, as is evident in the being of the generation of a human being and the being of that same human being when resurrected. Therefore its terminus cannot return numerically the same.

Scotus sets down this argument in Book IV, distinction 43. Master Giles of Rome also does so in his commentary on Book V of the *Physics*, where the Philosopher gives the example of health continued in the morning but interrupted at midday; he says that it is not numerically the same when restored in the evening.

The second argument proceeds as follows. A thing always acts through some form, for the principle of every operation is some form, according to Book I of *On the Heavens*. Fire acts through heat; an artisan, however, through the form in his mind. But a corrupted thing has lost that which could be the principle of action. It therefore cannot return: not from itself, since nothing can generate itself and lead itself from potency to act; nor from another, because the thing thus generated would be not only the same in species as the generator, but numerically the same. This argument is Saint Thomas's in Book IV of *Against the Gentiles*.

The third argument proceeds as follows. God cannot make past things not to have been past, for God is deprived of this alone, as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the *Ethics*, from the thought of Aga...

...thon: "To make unborn the things which have been done." Therefore God cannot raise corrupted, past, and dissolved bodies, because he would make not only past things not to have been past, but would make them present.

The same is now proved by authorities. First, it is said in Ecclesiastes 3: "The destruction of human beings and of beasts is one, and the condition of each is equal." But beasts will not rise; therefore human beings will not rise either.

And Job 14 says: "When a human being has fallen asleep, he will not rise until heaven is altered." But heaven will never be altered, since it is incorruptible. Therefore, and so forth.

The Philosopher in Book VIII of the *Metaphysics* denies that wine returned immediately from vinegar into wine is the same either numerically or in species, for first there must be a resolution into common matter.

And Avicenna says in Book III of his *Metaphysics* that what has been annihilated does not return. But the forms of human bodies are ultimately annihilated, because nothing of them remains except in prime matter. Therefore, and so forth.

Again, it is said in the *Post-Predicaments*: "There is no return from privation to habit." According to Scotus, this is understood of a privation following upon a form, not of one preceding a form.

And Pliny says in Book VII, chapter 55, of the *Natural History*: "The resurrection of bodies is a certain vanity, as is also the device concerning the preservation and revival of human bodies promised by Democritus, who did not himself return to life. And what madness it is that life and death should be repeated!" Thus he speaks.

The point is also evident from an example. Certain nations eat human flesh and are nourished by this food alone. Therefore this flesh will rise in the person whom it nourished and not in the person who was eaten. Therefore at least the resurrection of bodies will not be universal, as Christians say. Thus Thomas, Book IV of *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 18.

That certain nations eat human flesh is evident from Jerome *Against Jovinian*, who says: "Why should I speak of the other nations, when, as a young man, I myself saw in Gaul the Scots, a British people, eating human flesh? Although they find herds of swine, cattle, and

livestock throughout the forests, they are accustomed to cut off the buttocks of shepherds and the breasts of women and to regard these alone..."

"...as the delicacies of foods. And the Massagetae and Derbices regard those who die from illness as most wretched; but when their parents and relatives have come to old age, they slaughter and devour them, saying that it is more proper for them to be consumed by themselves than by worms." Thus Jerome.

But to the contrary stands Innocent III in chapter 1 of the decretal *On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith*, where he says: "All will rise with their own bodies which they now bear, so that all may receive according to their own works, whether those works were good or evil." The same is maintained in many other places of both Testaments and by the faithful sacred doctors.

For the answer it must be known that many among both the ancients and the moderns, Christians in name alone, fell away from the faith because they attended only to the principles of philosophy. Philosophy is founded upon the power of nature, which cannot restore numerically the same thing once it has been corrupted entirely.

For first, it is written in Acts 17 that when Paul preached the resurrection at Athens, certain Epicurean and Stoic philosophers said: "What does this sower of words and announcer of new demons intend?" And they led him to the Areopagus. When he again preached the resurrection before King Agrippa, Festus, the greatest philosopher, said with a loud voice: "Are you mad, Paul? Much learning has turned you to madness." This is in chapter 26 of that book.

The Sadducees also, who did not believe in the resurrection, entered the contest with Christ, setting forth the story of the woman who had seven husbands, Luke 20.

Similarly, Philetus and Hymenaeus denied the resurrection for the same reason, as Paul says in 2 Timothy 2. When the text of John 5 was brought against them - "The hour comes, and now is, when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live" - they answered that it was understood of the spiritual resurrection of souls in baptism, in faith and obedience. They said that we bring this resurrection about now when, in baptism, we renounce the devil and his pomps and adhere to Christ through faith.

But if it were argued against them as Paul argues in Corinthians 5, saying, "If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither did..."

"...Christ therefore rise," they answered that Christ, through a special grace which he alone possessed by reason of his divinity, raised himself from the dead, numerically the same and by his own power. His divinity was never separated from his body in the sepulcher, nor from his soul in limbo, nor from the blood which was then shed upon the cross and upon the earth and taken up again in the resurrection. This can belong to no one other than Christ. Therefore they concede resurrection in Christ but not in others.

When I said here that the divinity was never separated from the body, soul, and blood, this is to be understood according to the hypostatic union. It was indeed separated according to the integral union of the nature by which the soul is united to the body, as Saint Thomas explains in Part III, question 52.

Origen similarly, as Jerome adduces in his letter to Pammachius against John, bishop of Jerusalem, denied the resurrection of bodies on account of Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 15: "Flesh and blood will not possess the kingdom of God." For if, Origen says, the same bones,

flesh, blood, face, and members, and the particles of the entire body, are to rise on the final day, as simple persons and *philosarces* - that is, lovers of flesh - say, it follows that we shall have to eat, drink, digest, take wives, and procreate children; otherwise these powers would be there in vain.

Marcion, Apelles, Valentinus, and Manes likewise attributed salvation only to souls. They wholly denied the resurrection of the body, that is, of the flesh, conceding it to be only putative and phantastical. They say in vain that we shall rise according to the example of the Lord, since, according to them, the Lord himself also rose in a phantasm; and not only did his resurrection, but even his birth, appear putatively rather than actually occur.

John and Rufinus also say that when the soul, at God's command, has abandoned this foul and perishable little body, human bodies will return to the ancient substances of their matter: flesh into earth, breath into air, water into moisture, and heat into the ether. For each thing is resolved into those things from which it is composed, according to Book VI of the *Physics*. They say, however, that the same...

...bodies never return to their former species, nor can they be entirely the same as they were.

They offer the following example. If you pour a sextarius of milk or wine into the sea and then wish to separate again the wine or milk which you poured, you will not be able to do so, although the wine and milk which you poured have not perished. In the same way, they say that the substance of flesh and blood does not indeed perish in the original matters, but can never return to its former species.

Therefore, they say, our bodies will not then recover their former use, so that flesh, bones, blood, and members rise; so that we need a barber for our nails; so that lusts flow out; or so that the lower parts emit excrement. Instead, we shall have another, ethereal and special body. It will not be subject to touch, the eye will not see it, it will not be burdened by weight, and it will be changed according to the variety of places in which it is to be.

These are nearly all the errors of the heretics amid such great diversity concerning the resurrection of bodies. But now the true and Catholic teaching concerning the regeneration of bodies which have fallen into ashes must be set down from Sacred Scripture and the faithful doctors, and then the objections written above will be answered.

For clarity, the following universal conclusion is set down according to the theologians in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinctions 47 and 43: all human beings in the world - past, present, and future, good and evil, of whatever sect, state, condition, and age they may have been - will rise on the final day with their own bodies and will render an account of their own deeds.

This conclusion will be proved by arguments, authorities, and examples.

The first argument is taken from the condition of the rational soul. For a form which subsists *per se* and is ordained to beatitude is perfected through its own potency and through beatitude. But since the human soul is form and act, it has a relation to a potency, or to the body of which it is the act, according to Book II of *On the Soul*. Therefore it would be necessary to say that the soul, although immortal and incorruptible, remains forever imperfect. This must not be said, because not only does nature abhor the imperfect, but much more does the author of nature, by whose power perfect being is conferred upon every nature. Therefore...

...it is necessary to maintain, since each thing naturally tends toward its perfection, that through the resurrection the soul is again united to its own body, which it perfects.

This argument is confirmed insofar as the soul is ordained to beatitude. It is impossible for any thing to be frustrated of its end even according to nature, for neither God nor nature makes anything in vain, according to Book I of *On the Heavens* and Book II of *On the Soul*. But the rational soul is ordained to the attainment of perfect beatitude, which it cannot attain without the body, just as it cannot possess perfect being without it. Therefore, if we wish to preserve the perfection of the rational soul, it is necessary to maintain the resurrection of the body.

Because of this argument almost all the philosophers maintained that souls would return into some bodies, whether rational or irrational, as was adduced above. But Augustine in Book X of *The City of God* and Jerome say that it is not right that souls which have sinned in certain bodies should be tormented in others, nor does it belong to a just judge that some bodies should have poured out their blood for Christ and other bodies be crowned. Rather, the souls of the just will return to those bodies by whose use and ministry they acquired virtues and knowledge and were raised up toward God. The souls of the evil will return to those bodies with which and in which they sinned, as Augustine says in the place cited above.

The second argument is taken from just divine recompense. It belongs to divine justice to render to each person not only his deserts, but also to render them where and in that in which he merited or demerited. Although merit and sin are principally ascribed to the soul, insofar as free choice and grace - which are principally the cause of merit - consist in it, nevertheless a good or evil act is imputed to the human being alone. For actions belong to supposits, according to Book II of *On the Soul*. Therefore the whole human being is to be judged or rewarded. But a whole human being is said to exist when the essential parts, namely soul and body, are joined. Therefore, and so forth.

The fact that the soul precedes the body in the reward of paradise or the punishment of hell is because it also precedes the body in merit or sin. For the acts of the soul precede the acts of the body both in time and in worth, as Thomas says in Part I-II, question 7, article 1.

The third argument is taken from the nature of unnatural vio...

...lence. Violent things cannot be perpetual, according to Book I of *On the Heavens*. But the separation of the body from the soul is violent, because it is contrary to the natural inclination of the soul. For according to the Philosopher, the soul is naturally inclined to perfect the body with respect to first act, which is the act of the imperfect in relation to the perfect, though not with respect to second act, which is the act of the perfect in relation to some second perfection; for this second inclination is not violent, as Scotus says in Book IV. It follows, therefore, that this violence will at some time be ended, when the soul will again form the body.

From these points it can also be deduced that what fell will rise numerically the same. For it is necessary that the same thing arrive at the end for which it was made and ordained. But the whole human being was made and ordained for beatitude and the final end. Therefore it is necessary that the same whole human being, in soul and body, arrive at that end.

Again, that whose principles are numerically the same is itself numerically the same in its entirety. But in the resurrected person the principles are numerically the same, because the matter of bodies always remains numerically the same, and the soul is likewise the same

because it is incorruptible - at least according to those who maintain the unity of the substantial form. Therefore the same human being who fell will rise.

The authorities must now be set down. First, Plato, as Augustine reports in Book XIII, said that after the completed revolution of the outermost sphere, or starry heaven, which takes thirty-six thousand years - for in one hundred years the starry heaven is moved one degree - all the parts of the world will be brought back into being numerically the same, since the same effects follow from the same causes. Hence Plato was said to be going to lecture again and again at Athens, in the same schools and to the same students, after innumerable ages, just as before, at long intervals throughout innumerable ages, he had lectured in that same place and to those same students.

And Plotinus, as Augustine reports in Book XXII of *The City of God*, chapter 27, said: "Souls cannot be without bodies forever. Therefore, after any long period of time, they will return to bodies."

And Tertullian says in chapter 47 of the *Apologetic*: "It is therefore much more worthy of belief that a human being will return from a human being, each for each..."

"...so that the same quality of soul may be restored to the same condition, because the reason for restoration is the appointment of judgment. It is therefore necessary that the very same person who had existed be presented, so that he may receive from God the judgment of good or contrary merit." Thus he speaks.

Virgil also says in Book VI:

> *When all these have rolled the wheel through a thousand years,*
> *God summons them in a great host to the river Lethe,*
> *Forgetful, so that they may revisit the vault above*
> *And begin once more to wish to return to bodies.*

Again, Job says in chapter 19: "I know that my redeemer lives" - namely, with me through faith - "and on the final day I shall rise from the earth," and so forth. Concerning this passage Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus that, to be silent about the others, Job prophesies the resurrection of bodies in such a way that no one has written about it more manifestly or clearly than he.

Third, the same conclusion is commended by examples. Plants which appear dead in the winter revive in the spring as the sun approaches and are clothed with leaves, flowers, and fruits.

Lions are at first born as though deprived of life, but afterwards revive at the roaring of their parents. When a bear is born, it does not generate a living animal but a mass of generated flesh; the female, by licking it, brings it to the form of a true animal.

When the phoenix has reached old age after five hundred years, it constructs a nest or pyre from dry and aromatic woods together with other materials, and voluntarily casts itself into it when it has been kindled either by itself or by the heat of the sun. Once burned, it is reduced to ash, from which a little worm emerges and is afterwards transformed once more into the old phoenix. If the same soul which had been in the first phoenix were in this one, then the phoenix would be as though raised anew numerically the same.

The worms from which silk is made also lie dead throughout the year, but afterwards in spring they revive through the temperate heat of women or men.

The physician Aesculapius reports that once, when he had come upon two serpents fighting each other and one had killed the other, the surviving serpent brought a certain herb, placed it upon the mouth of the dead serpent, and revived it. Having noted the herb, Aesculapius raised three dead persons: namely, the son of King Minos, Hippolytus the son of Theseus, and another person. Hence Ovid says in Book XV of the *Metamorphoses*...

> *Nor would life have been restored except by the powerful medicine of Apollo's offspring,*
> *A life which afterwards, by strong herbs*
> *And Paeonian aid, he received while Dis was indignant.*

If, therefore, nature and art can give life, as is evident from the things said above, how much more will divine power be able again to form bodies which have been dissolved and reduced to ashes? It alone kills and gives life, leads down to the underworld and leads back, as the Psalm says.

Now we answer the arguments. To them all Scotus says in Book IV of the *Sentences* that, although works of nature which have been interrupted cannot return numerically the same through the motion and change of the agent, nevertheless through divine power - which does not act according to the order of natural generation - the entire human being in his wholeness can again be brought to life numerically the same.

Scotus adds, and rightly, that the impossibility of a return numerically the same does not arise from the things that have been made, since the same passive or obediential potency is present in them. It arises instead from the finite natural agent and from the mode of vivifying, since nature as an agent always operates through motion and change.

Thomas, however, together with Master Peter of Tarentaise, says in Book IV that the resurrection of bodies will be partly natural and partly miraculous. Three things concur in it. The first will be the reformation of the bodies; the second, the conjunction of souls and bodies; the third, the inseparability of that conjunction. The first of these is contrary to nature, that is, contrary to the course of nature, and is from God alone. The second is from nature, I say according to the terminus: not effectively, but dispositively. The third is above nature.

And therefore, since in the resurrection of bodies there is more of miracle than of nature, it is necessary to say simply that the resurrection is miraculous and not natural. It is called natural only in this respect: in that resurrection the gathering of the dust, the voice of the trumpet, and things of this kind occur in time - though an imperceptible time - through local motion and the ministry of angels. This will occur naturally. The reformation of the bodies and the conjunction of the essential parts, however, will occur in an instant and by divine power. Through this the answer to the arguments is evident.

Concerning the authorities of all the philosophers, it is said that they are under...

...stood with respect to natural agents of finite power and according to the order of natural generation, but not with respect to God, his power, and his potency, to which nothing is impossible.

Concerning Solomon it is said that he speaks there as the Preacher assuming the person of the foolish.

Concerning Job it is also said that after the judgment heaven will be altered with respect to its efficiency, influence, and motion, but not with respect to its substance.

Concerning the Philosopher and Avicenna it is said that they speak naturally and with respect to the finite power of nature itself.

But just as Pliny thought perversely about the immortality of souls, so he also held damnably that bodies do not rise.

To the example of those who were fed upon human flesh, Thomas replies in Book IV of *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 81, saying that if eaten flesh was necessary for completing the due quantity of the eater, or for the perfection of specifically human nature - for example, if it became organic members - it will then rise in the eater. But if the flesh belonged to the perfection of the individual, it will then rise in the one generated. Hence Adam's rib will rise in Eve, and seed will rise in the one generated and not in the generator.

But if someone was nourished upon human flesh alone, that which he drew from his generating parents will rise in the eater, and what is lacking will be supplied by the omnipotence of the Creator.

Hence Augustine says in Book XXII of *The City of God*: "Far be it that, for bodies to be raised and restored to life, the omnipotence of the Creator should be unable to recall all the things which any beast or fire has consumed, or which have collapsed into dust and ash, or have been dissolved into moisture or exhaled into the air. Far be it that any recess or secret place of nature should receive something withdrawn from our senses in such a way that it either escapes the knowledge of the Creator of all things or flees his power." Thus he speaks.

To what the Epicureans, Stoics, and Festus the philosopher said to the Apostle Paul in Acts, the answer is evident from the things said above. To the Sadducees Christ replied in Luke 20 that in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage.

To the other claim, that of Philetus and Hymenaeus, Thomas replies in Book IV of *Against the Genti...*

...les*, in the place cited above, that Christ foretold both resurrections. He foretold the spiritual resurrection when he said: "Amen, amen, I say to you, the hour comes, and now is, when the dead," and so forth. He foretold the bodily resurrection when he said: "The hour comes in which all who are in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God." Souls are not in tombs, but bodies are.

To the passage on which Origen relied, "Flesh and blood will not possess the kingdom of God," it is said that "flesh" is there taken for a person living carnally, who will not possess the kingdom of God, as Thomas says in his commentary on Paul.

And although the sensitive powers of glorified bodies will possess their act and object, as will be adduced below, it will not on that account be necessary for them to eat and drink; it is sufficient that they possess judgment concerning flavors. Nor will there be children there, because there will be no marriages there, as has been said.

What Marcion and Apelles say, that Christ rose in a phantasm, is false. For a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as Christ showed himself to possess in the final chapter of Luke.

As to what John and Rufinus say: we concede the resolution of bodies into those things from which they were composed. But their claim that those bodies cannot return numerically the same by the power of God must be denied.

Finally, as to what they say - that if the resurrection occurs, our former bodies will recover their use, insofar as it will be necessary for the humors, namely blood, choler, phlegm,

melancholy, sweat, urine, and seed, to rise; that it will also be necessary for lusts to flow out, nails to be cut, excrement to be emitted, and so forth - it is answered that in a human being there is a twofold humor.

One humor is superfluous to the body itself, such as sweat, urine, excrement, seed which is emitted through the act of generation, and milk through the act of the nutritive power. No humor of this kind will rise, because these humors do not belong to the perfection of the person rising.

Another humor is not superfluous to the individual himself but is ordained to perfection, such as blood and the other three humors. These will rise. For after the resurrection the individual parts of the body will be stabilized in their own forms, as is said in Book I of the *Sentences*.

Nails and hair, however, will rise not as things principally intended, but secondarily, insofar...

...as the soul uses them for the preservation of the principal members - namely, the feet, head, and hands.

Nor will it be necessary after the judgment to cut the nails, and so forth, because all these things now occur through the motion of the first mobile. That motion will then cease, not naturally, as some say, but by the divine will. Just as it is now moved through the influence of the intelligence which moves it, so at that time its motion will cease at God's command through the intelligence ceasing to move it.

Question Three

Whether the world is eternal, or whether it must at some time come to an end

It is asked, since according to the faith the resurrection of bodies will occur at the end of the world, whether it is true that the world must at some time come to an end.

In answer it is said that, just as philosophers have held opinions differing from the Catholic faith concerning the beginning of the world's duration, so they have also maintained various opinions concerning its end and terminus. For Aristotle - to pass over the others - according to what is imputed to him, what the commentators expound, and what his words hold forth, fell into this error: he posited that the world was created from nothing from eternity, would endure perpetually, and would continue into infinity, as is evident in the book *On the Nature of the Gods*. Master Albert acknowledges the same thing in his commentary on Book VIII of the *Physics*.

They say that Aristotle maintained the first part, concerning the eternity of the world *a parte ante*, for the following reasons. In Book I of the *Physics* they say that Aristotle posits nature to be ungenerated. And in Book I of *On the Heavens* he posits the world to be ungenerated. But ungenerated things have always existed. Therefore, according to Aristotle, the totality of things did not begin to exist.

Again, Aristotle argued as follows, as they say, in Book VIII of the *Physics*. Nothing begins anew to be moved unless through the mover or the movable thing now being disposed otherwise than before. But whatever is disposed otherwise now was moved before. Therefore, before every motion beginning anew there was some motion. Therefore motion always

existed, and therefore so did a movable thing, because motion does not exist except in a movable thing, according to Book III of the *Physics*.

And when it was brought against Aristotle…

…that, if the world existed from eternity, generation also existed from eternity, and thus infinitely many human beings preceded us; therefore infinitely many incorruptible souls and infinitely many revolutions of the sun preceded us while the world existed from eternity; therefore it will be necessary to posit an infinite in act and that it has happened that infinitely many things have been traversed, which are absurdities in philosophy; or else it will never happen that the present revolution is reached.

Again, in each revolution God could have created one stone. There will therefore be infinitely many stones remaining. And since these stones can be joined to one another, there will be an infinite in act not only in multitude, but also in magnitude.

Perhaps Aristotle would have answered these objections as follows. To the first argument he would have said that, with the eternity of the world posited, infinitely many souls do not exist in act, since unbelievers maintain the mortality of souls. Again, the Commentator and Algazel, in Book II of the *Metaphysics*, posited that it is not impossible for infinitely many things *per accidens* to exist in act. Even so the argument would not conclude, because in this way the soul would be a creature, as is supposed. It is impossible, however, for something generated to be eternal, because nothing is prior to the eternal. But every generated thing universally is preceded by some motion in duration and time; consequently, what is generated is generated at a determinate time, and thus there would not have been infinitely many souls in act.

To the second he would have said that there would not have been infinitely many revolutions, since there is one continuous illumination and one day, and consequently many in potency. The reason for the unity of the revolution, of the one day, and of the one illumination is the unity of the motion. But the fact that many days and many illuminations are spoken of arises on our part, because we judge illumination according to our hemisphere, where illumination appears at one time and not at another because of the varying interposition of an opaque body before the sun.

To the objection concerning the stones it must also be said that it has no force, because you posit one thing from which an impossibility follows. For you posit that continuous revolution, which is actually and really one, as divided and infinite, which is impossible, since it is divisible in potency. You posit, secondly…

…infinitely many days according to your imagination. Once this absurdity has been posited, it is necessary to concede what follows, because when one absurdity is granted, others follow.

Thomas, however, defending Aristotle in *On the Power of God*, question 3, article 10, says: Aristotle posited that the world had always existed, not from that consideration by which the procession of the universe is understood to be from God, but from that by which a particular agent begins to operate through motion. And because there is a motion before every motion, from this he posited the world to be eternal dialectically against Anaxagoras and Empedocles, as is evident in Book VIII of the *Physics*, and not demonstratively.

And in Part I, question 46, article 1, Thomas says: it cannot be proved demonstratively that the world has always existed. Nor are the arguments which Aristotle adduces for this demonstrative absolutely, but only in a qualified respect - namely, for contradicting the

arguments of the ancients who posited that the world began according to certain modes which are impossible in truth: either through a concourse of atoms, as Democritus said, or through fire, or through water, and so forth.

Thomas says that this is apparent from three things. First, because both in Book VIII of the *Physics* and in Book I of *On the Heavens*, Aristotle premises certain opinions - namely, those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato - against which he introduces contradictory arguments. Second, because wherever he speaks about this subject, he introduces testimonies of the ancients, which belongs not to one demonstrating but to one persuading probably. Third, because he expressly says in Book I of the *Topics* that there are certain dialectical problems for which we possess no arguments, such as whether the world is eternal.

In the same place Thomas replied to the two arguments brought against Aristotle in the opposing position. To the first he says that in Book I of the *Physics* Aristotle proves nature to be ungenerated for this reason: it does not have a subject from which it comes to be. And in Book I of *On the Heavens* he proves the heaven to be ungenerated because the heaven does not have a contrary...

...from which it might be generated. Hence it is evident that neither argument concludes anything except that matter and the heaven did not begin through generation and natural motion, by which generable and corruptible things begin, as a certain person posited especially concerning the heaven. But we say that both the aforesaid matter and the heaven were brought into being through creation.

To the other argument the same Thomas says that the first mover has always been disposed in the same manner, but the first movable thing has not always been disposed in the same manner, because it began to exist when previously it had not existed. This, however, did not occur through change, but through creation, which is not a change, since it presupposes nothing pre-existing, but expresses a certain relation to the creator as to the principle of its being.

And Bonaventure says in distinction 1 of Book II: certain moderns say that Aristotle did not intend to prove that the world absolutely did not begin, but that it did not begin through natural motion. But whatever Aristotle and the other philosophers thought concerning the eternity of the world is nothing to us Christians, who hold by faith, rather than by any demonstrative argument, that the world began in time. Hence an article of faith also says: "I believe in God the Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth." Articles of faith cannot be demonstrated, because faith concerns things which are not apparent, according to Hebrews 11.

That the world began can, however, be persuasively argued with probability as follows. God is related to the causation of all things as an artisan is related to what is fashioned. But the artisan is the cause of all things fashioned through his will. Therefore God is similarly the cause of things.

Now it is certain that the will is never necessitated to do or will anything except with respect to that thing toward which it is naturally inclined, or with respect to those things without which its end cannot be attained. But the end of the divine will is its own goodness, which does not depend upon another. Therefore it is not necessary for God to will anything outside himself, and consequently the production of creatures was not necessary either.

It was nevertheless fitting that the world itself should be produced in time, because through this the divine perfection is shown more fully. For since nothing can be the cause of itself, but everything which begins anew to exist acquires...

...being from another, from the fact that all creatures are posited as once not having existed, it is shown that they proceeded from some first principle, which is God. But if they had always existed, it would not have been so evident that they were created by God. It was therefore fitting that the world should have been created in time.

Augustine first testifies to this in Book XI of *The City of God*, chapter 4, saying that we believe no one more readily than God's prophet Moses concerning the fact that God made the world. Through him God spoke, saying: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Through him the Wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, spoke; she transfers herself into holy souls, constitutes friends of God and prophets, and without noise inwardly narrates her works. The angels of God, who always see the face of the Father, also speak to the prophets and announce his will to those to whom it ought to be announced.

And Gregory says in his *Homilies on Ezekiel*: "A certain prophecy concerns the past, as is that of Moses, who prophesied, saying: 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth.'" In this the newness of the world is handed down.

And John 17 says: "Father, glorify me with yourself with the glory which I had before the world was made."

And Macrobius says in Book II of *The Dream of Scipio* on this subject: "Who would not judge from this that the world itself began and that its age does not extend far back, when from this time beyond two thousand years backward there survives no Greek history of outstanding deeds? For before Ninus nothing was splendidly committed to books. If the world existed from the beginning - indeed, before the beginning - why, throughout the series of innumerable ages, was the culture which we now employ not invented? Why was the use of letters, by which alone eternity is sustained, not invented? All things of this kind appear to oppose eternity, since they cause us to think that, after a determinate beginning of the world, each individual thing gradually began." Thus he speaks.

Now it must be seen what philosophers thought concerning the end of the world, and what Christians according to the Catholic faith ought firmly to believe concerning it.

For this it must first be known that nearly all the philosophers, with the exception of Aristotle, as we have said, unanimously acknowledged a conflagration and an end of this world. Their opinions varied, however, concerning the manner of its end and terminus.

For Plato and Pythagoras posited that this elemental part of the world must be dissolved after thirty-six thousand years and then, after all its parts had been recovered, must be formed anew. They assign the reason for the thirty-six thousand years as follows. They say that every disposition of the heaven and of the celestial orbs is naturally completed in so great a time.

For the moon completes its course in one month; Mercury and Venus in a period shorter than one year; the sun completes its motion in one year; Mars in two years; Jupiter in twelve; and Saturn in thirty. The first mobile - that is, the crystalline or aqueous heaven, so called from its transparency - completes its circuit in twenty-four hours. But the starry heaven, that is, the firmament beneath the first mobile, completes its course in thirty-six thousand years. For it is moved one degree in one hundred years, as the astronomers say.

Plato and Pythagoras therefore say that the world will end when all the aforesaid celestial orbs complete their courses, beginning from that instant in which the firmament was created. This occurred at the vernal equinox, on Sunday, the eighteenth day before the Kalends of April, with the moon being full: 4,440 years before the founding of the City; 3,936 years before the Incarnation according to the Hebrews and Jerome; and 5,199 according to Bede.

And when, through a power infused into the substances of the heavens, all the parts of the heaven return again to their place of first creation, then, they say, all generable and corruptible things which have existed will return numerically the same through the power of the celestial bodies.

But Augustine refutes this opinion in Book XII of *The City of God*, chapter 13, saying: "The philosophers who maintain this think not what they know, but what they wish." They know that naturally there is no return from pure privation to habit, and therefore he concludes against them as follows: "Far be it from us that we believe these things. For just as Christ died for us once and, rising, dies no more, so after the resurrection we too shall always be with the Lord," in the manner in which we say what the sacred Psalm admonishes: "You, O Lord, will preserve us and will guard us from this generation forever."

Empedocles of Acragas and Anaxagoras said that through the friendship of the elements the world had been dissolved, and that through their conflict and discord it would be restored infinitely many times. The Philosopher refutes their opinion in Book VIII of the *Physics*.

Heraclitus, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the *Physics*, posited fire as the principle of the world; and so that the end might correspond to the beginning, he said that the world would be ended through the same fire, as is evident in Book III of the *Physics*. But just as he erred concerning the beginning of the world, so he also spoke badly concerning its end. For God created the world not from fire but from nothing; and it will be ended not with respect to its essential parts - namely, the heavens, the angels, and elemental substance - but with respect to some of its accidental parts, namely the individuals of the elemental species and the motion of the heavens, as is explained in the book *On the Heavens*.

Seneca, in a book of the *Natural Questions*, said according to the opinion of Empedocles that the earth would burn naturally when all the stars came together in the sign of Cancer - namely, in the month of June - through a concurrence of hot and dry things. He says likewise that the flood occurred in the time of Noah through a conjunction of the wet and cold planets, when all the stars came together in Capricorn in the month of September.

But Master Peter of Tarentaise and Richard, in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 48, say that the concurrence of wet and cold things was not the necessary cause of the flood in the time of Noah, but was indeed a congruous cause. Nor will the disposition toward fire or the concurrence of hot and dry things be the necessary cause of the end of the world, but it will be a congruous cause. For a violent dryness, naturally generated and congruous for producing fire at God's command for such an effect, will precede the purgation by the fire which is to purify the world itself at the end of the ages.

Aristotle, as we have just said above and as is imputed to him, said that the world would endure perpetually, for the reason by which in *On the Heavens and the World* he said that ungenerated and incorruptible are mutually convertible. But there is a contrary argument...

...because in Book XII of the *Metaphysics* he says that the first cause moves under the aspect of a thing loved and desired. This is as if he were saying that the intelligences which move the

heaven do so from the desire and love which they possess for obeying the first cause: just as they now obey in moving, so they will likewise obey when ceasing to move.

There were also others who committed the destruction of the world, although not to natural causes, to the divine will. Nevertheless, with bold presumption they attempted to assign it to definite and certain times. For Lactantius, in Book VII of the *Divine Institutes*, posited the consummation of the world after the completed sixth millennium. Others posited forty years; others, five hundred. Some posited as many years from the time of salvation as had elapsed before it. Some said that one thousand years could be completed from the Lord's ascension until the final advent.

Certain persons, presuming something here concerning the spirit of prophecy, such as Abbot Joachim, and certain more recent persons adhering to their calculations, foolishly expected the world to be completed before or around the end of six thousand years. The error of all these is very great, and their speech creeps like a cancer. Therefore Paul, writing to the Thessalonians, says to them: "Let no one seduce you in any way, as though the day of the Lord were imminent," and so forth.

Treating these words, Augustine says: "Of three persons speaking concerning the end of the world, the first says that the day of the Lord is near; the second, that it is far away; the third, 'I do not know; God knows.' The first errs more than the second. But the third, agreeing with Christ, is established in the way of truth."

Let us Christians, therefore, leave aside the furious disputants and the obstinate crowds of philosophers and heretics, and come to the theologians, the givers of simple truth, and to the Sacred Scriptures, written not by human industry but by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

First, let us say and confess that "the world passes away, and its concupiscence," 1 John 2, and that "heaven and earth will pass away," Luke 21, Mark 12, and Matthew 24; and that the end of the world will be an effect not of nature but of the Holy Spirit.

Second, let us say that the instrument of the conflagration...

...of the world will be a very great fire, generated neither from a natural concurrence of hot and dry things, as Seneca said, nor from a concurrence of upper and lower fires, as others said. Nor will that fire be kindled from the reflection of the sun's rays upon naturally solid terrestrial bodies, as occurs from the reflection of the sun toward a nearby concave mirror; nor from a release of the sphere of fire which is now restrained by the power of the heaven so that it does not flow forth.

Instead, that fire will be supernaturally caused by the will and power of God. Just as at the beginning of the world, in the time of Noah, he destroyed the age through a flood of waters in order to purge the heat of concupiscence and lust, so again he will destroy the human race and the world through fire in order to purge the coldness of malice and avarice opposed to charity. Thus the purgation of the world will occur through contraries.

Third, let us say that because, as we have said, the consummation of the world does not depend upon a natural cause but upon the divine will, the time of its end cannot be known with certainty. Therefore Christ, when questioned by his disciples concerning the time, said in Acts 1: "No one knows of that day and hour." And in Luke 12 he says: "Be ready, because at an hour which you do not think, the Son of Man will come." And Matthew 25 says: "You know neither the day nor the hour." And Mark 13: "See, watch, and pray, for you do not know when the time will be."

Hence Thomas, concluding in support of this position in *On the Power of God*, question 5, article 6, says: "Since the end of the world depends upon the pure will of God, it cannot be known by natural cognition. And since the world is to be ended when the number of the elect is complete, as Gregory says, the completion of which is a certain effect of divine predestination, it cannot be revealed except by Christ, through whom in a certain manner the predestination of the human race is fulfilled."

And Augustine, in Book XVIII of *The City of God*, chapter 13, says in support of this conclusion: "In vain, therefore, do we attempt to calculate and determine the years which remain for this age, since it is not ours to know this." And let Mark instruct us, saying: "Of that day and hour no one knows, nor do the angels of heaven." He who said, "It is not yours to know the times or moments which the Father has placed in his own power," releases from counting on their fingers the apostles and all the future doctors of the world who calculate concerning this matter, and orders them...

...to rest. Thus Augustine in the place cited above.

Question Four

Whether the world or any creature could have been produced from eternity

It is asked whether it is simply incompatible with the world, or with any creature, to have existed from eternity.

To this the answer is simply negative. The reason is that, if this were incompatible with a creature, it could be so only in one of two ways: either it would be necessary for the efficient cause to precede its effect, and thus the effect would not be coeternal with the efficient cause; or it would be necessary for the non-being of the effect to precede its being. But neither of these two modes can make it incompatible with a creature to exist from eternity, as I shall prove. Therefore, and so forth.

The first is proved as follows. No cause which produces its effect suddenly precedes its effect in duration. But God is an agent not through motion, but in an instant and suddenly. Therefore it is not necessary for him to precede his effect in duration. The major premise is evident in all sudden changes. For immediately at the presence of the sun, illumination is caused in the air in an instant; and as soon as fire begins to ascend upward, it heats. The minor premise is also self-evident. Therefore, and so forth.

In causes which do not act suddenly but through motion, however, it is necessary for the agent to precede its effect in duration, because the beginning of a motion always precedes its effect and end in duration.

Nor does the non-being of an effect necessarily precede its being in duration. For when something is said to be made from nothing, the preposition "from" does not designate a material cause, but only an order, as is manifest to one who investigates carefully.

Addition

The position of Saint Thomas consists in this, as is found in Part I, distinction 46, article 2: God could have produced the world from eternity, but this can never be proved demonstratively by anyone, either through an intrinsic middle term or through an extrinsic one. For this belongs to the will of God, and no reason can be had or known why he wills the world to exist from eternity rather than not to exist from eternity.

Scotus, however, in Book II, distinction 1, question 3, attacks the opinion of the Holy Doctor. Henry of Ghent, called here the Doctor of the Servants, agrees with Scotus. In *Quodlibet* I, question 7, and *Quodlibet* IX, question 17, he maintains the opposite of Saint Thomas's opinion - namely, that it includes a contradiction for something other than God to have existed without a beginning of duration, or to have existed from eternity - and adduces many arguments, although Augustine in Book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1, and Book X of *The City of God*, chapter 31, seems to think otherwise.

It is true that the world began: this is maintained by faith alone and cannot be known demonstratively, but it is most expedient to believe it.

Question Five

Whether the soul informs the body when a human being is dead

It is asked whether, when a human being is dying, the soul ceases successively to inform part after part of the body, or whether perhaps it ceases to inform all the parts simultaneously in the same instant.

To this the answer is affirmative: namely, when a human being is dying, the soul ceases successively to inform part after part. The reason is that the soul does not cease to inform the matter subject to it unless the disposition of that matter which it requires for its operations has been corrupted by nature beyond restoration. But corruption of a disposition of this kind is found to occur first in the parts more remote from the heart, in which is the source...

...of vital power. Therefore the proposition follows.

This conclusion is supported first by the fact that in a dying person the feet are found cold first, having been deprived of heat and spirits, then the hands, and so thereafter successively as far as the heart. It is supported, second, by that common saying of the philosophers that, among the members of the body, the heart lives first and dies last, Book II of *On Generation*, chapter 4.

If it is objected that the last deanimation of the human body ought proportionately to occur in the same manner as its first animation; but in the body's first animation the soul informs all the parts of the body simultaneously - for from the first instant of the animation of the embryo, the body begins, in every part in which it is accustomed to possess sensation, to perform vegetative functions and to sense, although imperfectly - therefore, similarly, in the final deanimation of the human body the soul must cease in some one instant to inform all the parts of the body simultaneously.

To this it is answered that the first animation and the final deanimation of the body are not alike. For the first animation of the body's parts is natural, and the disposition of matter so that it may be informed by the soul is intended by nature. But the separation and deanimation of the body's parts is not intended by nature *per se*, just as the induction of the indisposition upon which the soul's separation follows does not occur according to the order and judgment of nature. Therefore, and so forth.

Nevertheless, because of the things just said, it must be carefully understood that the progress of a human being's corruption, upon which the separation of the soul follows, proceeds in the contrary direction from the human being's progress toward life. For the progress toward life begins in a human being with the exercise of the operations of the vegetative soul in the embryo, secondly those of the sensitive soul, and thirdly those of the

intellective or rational soul, as the natural philosophers say. But the progress of corruption is contrary: first what the edition calls "common use" ceases, secondly the act of sensation, and thirdly the work of vegetation. These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Addition

The position of the philosophers also supports this: matter is the cause of corruption. From this it follows...

...that what is incorruptible is immaterial and simple, Book III of the *Metaphysics*, commentary 15.

Question Six

Whether, when the heart is dead, the soul informs the body

It is doubted whether it can happen that, when the heart is already dead, the soul might still inform some other part or another member of the body.

To this it is answered as follows. Since the fixed complexion of the other members of the body does not depend upon the heart, there seems to be no incompatibility in there still being, after the complexion of the heart has been corrupted, a fixed complexion in some other part of the body sufficient for the union of the soul with that part.

For just as it often happens that an eye is irrecoverably blind and yet the soul still informs the whole of its matter, so it also seems that the soul can inform some part of the body, even if that part were so unfortunate that the soul could not exercise vegetative operations in it. For a more perfect complexion seems to be required for exercising a vital operation than for the mere union of the soul itself with the body.

It is therefore compatible with the cessation of the operations of the vegetative and sensitive soul throughout the whole body that the soul should still adhere informatively to the body, and thus that the human being should not yet be dead through the dissolution of the informative union with the body.

Those, however, who say that as soon as an irreformable disposition of the body or one of its parts - whether of the heart or of another principal member without whose operation life cannot continue, as in the case of the operations of the vegetative soul - has been corrupted, the soul ceases just as quickly to inform the whole body, however the other members may be disposed: persons of this kind attend to the regular process of a human being toward death, or they attend only to that which for the most part is accustomed to happen in dying persons. For ordinarily in them the heart appears to die last.

From this conclusion or opinion the following corollary follows: a person who is held to be dead according to common estimation is not always dead simply...

...because the deanimation of the body does not always follow upon the cessation of sensation and of the heart's motion. Rather, it can happen that after that cessation the informative union of the soul with the body sometimes remains for a long time. Thus it can happen that a living human being is sometimes buried in the burial of the dead, as has been customary during times of plague.

It can also sometimes happen from some accidental cause that in a healthy human being breath, every motion, and sensation cease for a long time - for a day or thereabouts - so that the person appears entirely dead. Indeed, someone can be so disposed in natural matters

that, at some lamentation or perhaps contemplation, with the spirits drawn inward, he lies very like a dead person, as Saint Augustine relates in *The City of God* concerning a certain priest.

Therefore, unless a cause is present, one must not hasten or act precipitately in burying the dead, lest it happen that the living are buried. These things are from Henry of Hesse in the place cited above.

Addition

Averroes tells in this connection the story of a ram which walked after its head had been cut off, Book VII of the *Physics*, commentary 4. Although Galen denies this, Alexander nevertheless agrees in the final chapter of his *Paraphrase on the Soul*, where he maintains that after the heart has been removed from an animal, it can move and live, as can a tortoise and a chameleon; and, by an equal argument, after the head has been removed. He also says that the arguments concerning the principal seat of the soul - whether it consists in the heart or in the head - are common to both positions.

Question Seven

Toward what difference of position the soul departing from the body goes out

The doubt is toward what difference of position the soul departing from the body naturally goes out: upward or downward, toward the right or the left...

...forward or backward?

To this it is answered that, although the soul of anyone who dies, as soon as it ceases to inform the body and is left to its own natural powers, would go rather to the highest part of heaven, since it naturally seeks the higher places of the universe, nevertheless, according as it is led or drawn by good or evil angels, the fully purified souls of those who are to be saved are drawn directly upward, and the souls of those who are to be damned directly downward. The souls of those who are to be saved but are not fully purified go out directly from the right toward purgatory, and those of the damned from the left into hell. These things are from the same author in the place cited above.

Question Eight

Toward what termini the soul, having departed from the body, goes

It is asked toward what termini the soul departing from the body naturally goes: whether from light to darkness, or from darkness to joys.

To this it is answered that after the rational soul has ceased to inform the body, or after the dissolution of its union with the body, it can be understood to be transmuted from light to darkness, or from sadness to joy, in two ways: namely, either according to a transmutation with respect to intellect, or according to a transmutation with respect to affection.

If we speak in the first way, it is said that the Platonists posited the body as though it were a prison of the soul, impeding the perfect cognition which the soul according to itself, in its purity, is naturally fitted to possess. They say that the soul is not saddened by its separation from the body but rather rejoices, just as one who has been imprisoned rejoices when he is

freed from a prison grievous and dark to him, toward which, as they say, no appetite or inclination to return is left at all.

And on this one account the philosophers were very strongly turned away from the resurrection of the dead through the reunion of souls with bodies, because they believed that through it souls were impeded from their more perfect cognition.

Cicero appears to have followed these Platonists in the position of his book *On Old Age*, where he speaks as follows, introducing Cyrus the Elder addressing his sons at his death:

> *I could never be persuaded, my sons, that souls live while they are in mortal...*
>
> *...bodies and die when they have departed from them. Nor, indeed, that the mind is then unwise when it has escaped from an unwise body; but that when, freed from every admixture of the body, it has begun to be pure and whole, it is then wise.*

Adducing a persuasion for this, he says:

> *For you see that nothing is so like death as sleep, in which the minds of those sleeping especially declare their divinity. For when they are relaxed and free, they foresee many future things. From this it is understood what they will be like when they have released themselves from the bonds of the body.*

Thus he speaks.

The theologians, however, with regard to this transmutation of a soul separated from the body according to intellect, would say with the Platonists that the departure of souls from bodies, when they have been left to their natural powers, is as though a withdrawal from a region of darkness to a region of light, or as though a departure from shadow to a clearer light. This is not because they leave a body which impedes their cognition, but because there enters a mode of knowing belonging to separated intellects: not, indeed, a mode full in all respects, since the soul is the lowest species in the genus of intelligences, but a partial mode by which perhaps they know both themselves and the things surrounding them more clearly than they could know them in the body.

And I have said pointedly that souls stripped of their bodies do not possess the full mode of knowing of separated intellects, because if they possessed it, as soon as they were stripped they would know from their natural powers whether or not they were in charity. For every separated intelligence first reflects upon itself by intuitive vision.

Nor do the theologians concede that a soul stripped of its body lacks a natural inclination and appetite for reunion with its own body because it would again be impeded from perfect cognition, as the Platonists imagine. Rather, they say that in every soul stripped of its body there remains a natural desire for reunion with the body, because the soul is naturally a form and consequently is naturally determined and inclined to inform a subject proportioned to it.

Nor is it conceded that the soul is in the body as though in a prison, because the soul naturally determines it for itself as a habitation or most fitting organ. Nor is it conceded that the soul is impeded through the body, because the soul according to the character of its nature is perpetual, and from this it is natu...

...rally separated from the body. Therefore it is fitting that a special mode of naturally knowing itself and other things should correspond to that mode of its being. In this mode it will know many things more clearly *per accidens* than through the body; nevertheless, it is not said to be impeded by that imagination on account of the body, because naturally, insofar

as it is a form, it is determined to a mode of knowing through the body. Therefore, since a thing is not said to be impeded by that state toward which it naturally tends, the proposition follows. Let these things suffice concerning the transmutation of the soul stripped of its body according to intellect.

In the second way, however, we can speak of the transmutation of the soul stripped of its body according to affection: namely, whether immediately upon being stripped from the body it is transmuted to sadness or joy, punishment or delight.

To this it is answered that the souls of deceased wicked faithful persons, or of unbelieving philosophers, are immediately changed to sadness. The reason is that, since the sciences acquired in this life remain in the soul after death, the errors and false opinions by which persons of this kind were deceived in this life also remain in it.

Therefore, as soon as the soul is separated from the body, turning itself by clear vision upon itself, upon the body from which it has been separated, and upon the other things which surround it within a certain distance, it is certainly affected by many sighs and great sadnesses. For it does not find the things which it vainly hoped for; it does not find matters as it thought; it is not placed among its companion stars, happily playing, as it judged it would be; it does not ascend upward to the light of heaven, but sees itself, full of sorrow, dragged downward by dreadful demons to the darkness of hell.

The souls of heretics, Jews, and superstitious faithful persons see clearly that they foolishly and negligently deviated from saving virtue. The souls of those who gave themselves entirely to honors, delights, and joys of this kind, believing that the souls of human beings cease at death like those of beasts, see that they have entered an unknown region where things contrary to the honors of their former life meet them, where in place of temporal dominions they are sub...

...jected to the vilest demons, their mockeries and reproaches. Oh, by how great a sorrow and stupor are the souls of such persons disturbed!

But a faithful soul has in addition several special causes of grief. First, because it knows through faith that it is being led to the particular judgment, where it is to be judged either to paradise, to purgatory, or to hell, and it awaits that judgment in great perplexity.

Second, because it sees itself unworthily clothed before the eyes of Christ, lacking the habits of virtues and clothed in the habits of vices.

Third, the faithful soul blushes and is saddened from the recollection and remembrance of the sins and negligences which it committed while it administered the body.

It is saddened because it sees its most natural tabernacle, in which it had many delights or would have had them, and in which it had acquired or would have acquired the perfections of sciences and virtues, now rendered unfit for its habitation and abominably corrupted. It grieves because it is as though compelled to abandon the body and depart from it. It grieves like one who sees a house or garment most fittingly disposed for him being corrupted and defiled, so that he is compelled to depart from it or to cast it aside not without grief and groaning.

Finally, certain souls grieve and are saddened because of the punishments to which they are led in hell or purgatory. These, therefore, are the causes of the soul's sadness after death. From them it is evident what must be answered to this little question according to the

philosophers, the Platonists, and the theologians. These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Question Nine

Whether the particular judgment is conducted by Christ or by an angel

It is asked whether the particular judgment of the soul departing from the body is conducted by Christ corporeally, or by the guardian angels of souls.

To this it is answered that the judgment in which the soul is judged to punishment or joy after death is twofold. The first is particular, so called for four reasons.

First, because it is not universally of all. Second, because it is not of whole human beings, but only of their parts. Third, because in it the soul is judged with respect to the merits or demerits which are within it, or of which it according to itself was the cause or origin. Fourth, because it is not then condemned to the whole punishment of hell which the human being merited, but to a lesser punishment than it will have after the general judgment. Hence even the demons, as Augustine appears to maintain, do not now have punishments as great as they will have after the judgment.

And with regard to this particular judgment, certain persons say that Christ corporeally, according to his humanity, presides over each soul immediately as it departs, according to Acts 10: "He it is who was appointed judge of the living and the dead." And John 5: "The Father has given all judgment to the Son."

But it does not seem readily credible that Christ should corporeally descend from heaven as often as any human being dies throughout the whole world. For if it were so, then he would descend innumerable times to innumerable places of the lower world in every hour - indeed, in every particle of an hour - because innumerable human beings die within the same small interval throughout the whole world, especially when a pestilence similarly rages in diverse and most distant regions, as often happens.

For this reason it would also seem to follow that Christ would descend corporeally and circumscriptively many times simultaneously and at once to diverse places of the lower world. For it can indeed happen that the same numerical instant is the first instant of the non-being of a thousand human beings dying simultaneously in diverse places.

For this reason it appears more probable that Christ does not descend corporeally to the particular judgment of each soul, but is truthfully said to judge them through angels whom he sends to the dying, so that they may carry out the judgment with the proceedings and sentences entrusted to them by Christ, the principal judge, who alone fully knows the qualities of those to be judged.

The angel, therefore, according to the doctors, who is deputed to each soul and fre...

...quently or always stands by it, who knows the life, merits, and demerits of the person whom he guarded, and knows by virtue of his office when, how, and where the human being entrusted to him has died, is given by Christ and constituted judge of the soul which is to be separated from the body. He gathers it once separated and does not permit it to wander errantly here and there after death, but conducts it either to the joys of paradise, to the punishments of purgatory, or to those of hell.

In the common and universal judgment, however, Christ, descending corporeally from heaven, will preside as judge and will himself judge all judicially, because, as has been said, he it is who was appointed judge of the living and the dead - namely, in the common and universal judgment. These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Question Ten

Whether there is an interval between a human being's death and the particular judgment

It is asked whether there is some interval and space of time from the first instant of a human being's non-being until that person's particular judgment.

To this it is answered that, although with respect to all souls generally an interval of some length of time between the first instant of the human being's non-being and the soul's particular judgment is not to be conceded, nevertheless with respect to certain souls some interval and space before the judgment from the first instant of the human being's non-being can be conceded.

So it occurred in the case of that famous master, held to have lived a praiseworthy life, who died at Paris. During the funeral rites there, when all the doctors, masters, and scholars had assembled, as is the custom there, he raised himself upon the bier and said: "I have been called to judgment." Then on the next day he said: "I have been judged." And on the third he added by way of conclusion: "I have been condemned."

The conclusion of his judgment was therefore separated from the instant of his death by a space of three days or thereabouts, and from this, as is believed, the Carthusian Order had its origin. A similar thing is read concerning the soul of Saint Jerome in Augustine's letter to Cyril the bishop.

Accordingly, such an interval before the particular judgment is pos...

...ited fittingly. First, because although God can do all things instantaneously, nevertheless, so that the order and process fitting to his wisdom and justice may appear more clearly, he is accustomed rather to proceed in his works according to the mode and capacity or condition of the creature receiving, as appears in the first formation of the world, which was made in the space of six days. For the wisdom of God disposes all things sweetly, that is, it disposes them fittingly and becomingly in their own orders and intervals. Some interval therefore intervenes more fittingly.

Second, because after its separation from the body the soul enters a new state and mode of being belonging to separated substances. In that state it has never exercised its powers, nor has it experienced it. It therefore seems that the soul, separated, should also be left to its own powers for some time, so that it may know how far beyond its natural powers it must be supernaturally assisted, or has been assisted, in either of its states, so that it may attain, or might have attained, heavenly felicity.

The universal judgment, however, in which there will be an accusation of the soul to be judged by the demons, a defense by the good angels, and a comparison of sins and merits, with the whole heavenly court, all souls, and all angels present, will not fittingly be conducted entirely together in an instant, but with some interval of time. These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

First Decade, Chapter Three

Five questions concerning the places and receptacles of souls separated from bodies

Question One

How many places there are for souls released from the body

The single question of this third chapter is namely this: how many receptacles and places are there for souls released from bodies?

To this it is answered that, according to the theologians, after the death of Christ - through whom Abraham's bosom, that is, the limbo of the holy fathers, was despoiled and closed - the places in which souls separated from the body are received are four: namely, paradise, hell, purgatory, and limbo.

The reason for this fourfold number of places is that a soul departs from the body in four ways. First, a soul sometimes departs without any guilt, as is evident in the case of baptized children, martyrs, and perfect men who have built with gold, silver, and precious stones - that is, with love of God, love of Christ, and good operation. The place of such persons is paradise, in which the soul is made blessed, because there are the abundances of every good.

Second, a soul sometimes departs with actual and mortal guilt; and then its receptacle is hell, in which it is damned and in which there are the absence of grace, the punishment of loss, and the punishment of sense eternally.

Third, a soul departs with guilt and sufficient penitence; and then its receptacle is purgatory, in which it is purged. There is not the absence of grace there, as there is in hell, but there are the punishment of sense and the temporal punishment of loss.

Fourth, a soul sometimes departs with original...

...sin; then its receptacle is limbo, in which there are the absence of grace and the eternal punishment of loss, but not the punishment of sense. These things are from Master Peter of Taranto and Thomas, Book IV, distinction 31.

Question Two

Concerning the Empyrean Heaven, the receptacle of angels and blessed human beings

The second question under this third chapter concerns the Empyrean Heaven, the receptacle of angels and blessed human beings. Under it nine little questions are resolved, each of which will be examined below in its own order.

Subquestion One

Whether the Empyrean Heaven is found in truth

The first little question is whether the Empyrean Heaven, the receptacle of angels and blessed human beings, is found in truth.

To this it is answered that the existence of the Empyrean Heaven cannot be investigated by human reason. The reason for this is that whatever is investigated by human reason must

be subject to motion and sight. The Empyrean Heaven, however, is immovable and is not subject to sight, on account of which the natural philosophers deny the immovable Empyrean Heaven. Therefore, and so forth.

Again, a reward and the place of the reward ought to be made alike. But the blessedness and glory of the saints exceed human investigation, because "eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have the things that God has prepared for those who love him ascended into the heart of man," as Paul says in 1 Corinthians. Therefore, neither will the place fitting for blessedness be capable of being investigated naturally.

For this reason it is said in Proverbs 25: "The heaven above and the earth below, and the heart of kings is inscrutable." And it is said in Wisdom 9: "We assess with difficulty the things that are on earth, and we discover with labor the things that are before our eyes; but who will investigate the things that are in the heavens?"

And therefore the doctors say that the Empyrean Heaven is not found to have been established...

...except through the authorities of Strabo, Bede, and Basil. For Strabo and Bede say that the Empyrean Heaven, as soon as it was made, was filled with angels. And Basil says in Homily 2 of the *Hexaemeron*: "Just as the damned are driven into the outermost darkness, so recompense for worthy works is restored in that light which is outside the world, in which angels and the blessed obtain a dwelling of rest." Thomas, Part I, question 71, article 3; Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 2; and *Quodlibet* 6.

Subquestion Two

What the Empyrean Heaven is

The second little question is: what is the Empyrean Heaven?

To this it is answered that the Empyrean Heaven is an intellectual and spiritual body, immovable, at rest, and most luminous; the noblest among all simple bodies; most apt for the contemplation of glory; made at once and filled with angels; immediately surrounding all the movable heavens; adorned with varieties of rewards and with all delights; of inconceivable beauty and of an ineffable disposition in glory, as befits the court of the supreme king.

First, it is said that the Empyrean Heaven is a body, which can be argued as follows. The hope and intention of each person are aroused and strengthened by the inspection of some exemplar. In the future reward, however, we hope for spiritual and bodily glory. Therefore, just as we are aroused and strengthened in the hope of the soul's spiritual glory by the exemplar of the blessedness and glory of the blessed angels - begun from the beginning of the world - equality with whom is promised to us according to Matthew 22, "You will be like the angels of God in heaven," so in like manner we are aroused and strengthened in the hope of the glory of the body's incorruption and immutability by the inspection of the incorruption and immutability of the body...

...of the Empyrean Heaven created at the beginning of the world.

Second, it is called intellectual, not because it does not have natural matter, but because it is not subjected to our sight. It is also called a spiritual body because it is the place of blessed spirits and glorified human beings. It is also called *heaven* from hiding invisible things, and is called *empyrean* as though fiery within, from *pyr*, which is fire, because it agrees with fire in splendor, not in heat.

Third, it is called immovable, at rest, and most luminous. For since a thing is wholly determined from its end, and the end of this body is the habitation of the saints, its conditions must be understood according as befits the state of the blessed saints for whom it was created. And because they are in full participation of rest, eternity, and eternal light, such a body must therefore be immovable, at rest, incorruptible, and most luminous.

The Empyrean Heaven does not determine this light for itself by nature as a flame or fire does, but determines for itself a most limpid transparency, which it has from the splendor of the glorified body of Christ, just as the air here is illuminated by the sun. Hence it is also said in Revelation 21: "The city of God will not need the sun or the moon to shine in it, for the brightness of God will illuminate it, and its lamp is the Lamb."

Fourth, it is called the noblest among all simple bodies, because it is the highest of all bodily places.

Fifth, it is called most apt for the contemplation of glory. For just as the contemplation of God, in which consists the felicity of angels and of blessed human beings, elevates the intellect above all bodily things, so the Empyrean Heaven is more elevated among all bodily things and consequently is more apt for contemplation.

Sixth, it is called made at once and filled with angels, not because there are not many empty places there in which the blessed are and will be, but it is called filled according to our manner of speaking, according to which we call a city full of people when the dwellings of all the people in it are full.

Seventh, it is called that which surrounds imme...

...diately all the movable heavens: that is, the crystalline heaven, which is also called watery because of the likeness that it has to frozen water in transparency and solidity, which heaven the astrologers call the ninth sphere. It also surrounds the sidereal heaven, that is, the firmament in which the stars are, and the aerial heaven in which the birds are, divided into seven heavens of the seven planets: namely, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, and the Moon. In this Empyrean Heaven Paul, having been caught up, saw the secrets of God, that is, the divine essence, 2 Corinthians 12.

Eighth, it is called adorned with a variety of rewards. For there are the nine circular choirs of angels and many mansions of souls distinguished in merits and rewards.

Ninth, it is called full of all delights. For it is called paradise, as though a garden of delights; the rest is evident. Of this place it is said in Baruch 3: "O Israel, how great is the house of God, and immense is the place of his possession, great and having no end." Of this Moses says: "In the beginning God created heaven." And Paul says in Galatians 4: "But that Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our mother." And the Church sings: "Blessed city Jerusalem." And the Psalm says: "One thing have I asked of the Lord, and this I will seek," and so forth.

But for greater evidence concerning the things that were set down in the foregoing description of the Empyrean Heaven, it is argued first that the Empyrean Heaven is not a material and natural body, because a material and natural body is movable. Since nature is a principle of motion, matter and motion follow upon one another. But the aforesaid Empyrean body is immovable. Therefore, and so forth.

To this it is answered that not every natural thing is movable, but only that which is generable and corruptible, of which the Philosopher treats in Book II of the *Physics*. Nor is

every material thing movable. For the mathematician does not abstract from all matter, but only from sensible matter.

It is argued second against what was said, that the Empyrean Heaven is most luminous; because, if it were so, since the other heavens are transparent and diaphanous, such a heaven would appear to us on every side.

To this it is answered that, just as the brightness of Christ's body is suspended beneath the host so that it does not radiate, so...

...God has decreed that the radiations of the Empyrean Heaven into the lower heavens should be suspended. This is so that the whole circumference of heaven might not appear to us as one continuous light, because in that way we would not have the distinction of the stars of heaven or the distinction of day and night upon the earth, which is not expedient for the state of this life. But perhaps in the time of the age to come it will radiate on every side through the whole lower world, so that then no shadow or darkness will remain in the elements.

And even if it be granted that the light of the Empyrean Heaven is propagated through the lower heavens - whose entire power perhaps depends upon it - nevertheless it can be the case that, on account of the length of the distance, the rays of its brightness fail before they reach us, and therefore nothing of it appears to us.

Third, it is argued against what was said, that the Empyrean Heaven, having been created at once, was filled with angels; because if this were so, no space would have been unoccupied by an angel for the blessed.

Albert answers this in *On the Four Coeval Things*: the angels do not fill the Empyrean Heaven as a located thing fills a place, but they fill it according to the distinction of hierarchies, choirs, and mansions, of which there are many in the Father's house. These things are from Henry of Hesse and Thomas, Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 12.

Subquestion Three

What the spiritual dowry of the soul and of the blessed body in the Empyrean Heaven is

The third little question is: what is the spiritual dowry of the souls and bodies of the blessed in the Empyrean Heaven?

To this it is answered that the spiritual dowries of the souls and bodies of the blessed are named after the likeness of the bodily dowries of marriageable daughters. According to the civil laws, a dowry of bodily marriage is defined thus: a dowry is that which is given by the parents of the bride, by the parents of the man, to the daughter, so that she may marry more readily; when the bride is brought into the bridegroom's...

...house, so that the bride may be adorned from it, so that each may be delightfully united to the other, and so that provision may be made for the man from which he can sufficiently nourish the bride and the children; it is reserved inalienably for the bride when the marriage has been dissolved.

When it is said that the dowry is given by nature by the bride's parents, understand this generally. For it happens for two reasons that the bridegroom or the bridegroom's father assigns the dowry in place of the girl's father.

The first is on account of an excess of affection. For the bridegroom or the bridegroom's father, on account of the excessive love that he has for the bride, endows her. This happened in the case of Hamor, who wished to assign and increase the dowry that he ought to have received, on account of the vehement love of his son Shechem for Dinah, Jacob's daughter. Hence Hamor's representative said to Jacob and his sons: "My son Shechem has cleaved to your daughter; give her to him as a wife." And he adds: "Increase the dowry and ask for gifts; I will freely give what you ask," Genesis 34.

The second cause is on account of a crime committed: namely, as a punishment of the bridegroom who has corrupted and violated a virgin, so that he may assign from his own property to the virgin corrupted by him the dowry that the girl's father ought to have assigned. Thus it is said in Exodus 22: "If anyone seduces a virgin and sleeps with her, he shall endow her and take her as his wife."

It is said second that the dowry is given to the parents of the bridegroom or to the bridegroom, for the dowry ought to be in the possession of him who supports the burdens of marriage, as Bartolus says in the law *Si is qui*, and *Stichus*, section 1, Digest, *On the Law of Dowries*. Understand that the dowry is assigned to the bridegroom with respect to use or administration, but to the bride with respect to dominion and ownership.

It is said third, "to the daughter, so that she may marry more readily." For a daughter of anyone is not readily taken without a dowry, Digest, *Marriage Dissolved*, law 1.

It is said fourth, "when the bride is brought into the house," for in an inchoative marriage - namely, when the bride is betrothed - the dowries are promised to the bridegroom. But when the bride is introduced into the bridegroom's house, then the dowries are assigned to the bridegroom. Understand, however, that if a husband to whom a dowry has been promised does not receive the dowry, he can expel the wife from the house, as the gloss says in the *Authentics*, concerning those not choosing persons entering second...

...marriages, final section, collation 2. The contrary, however, is found in the chapter *Per vestras*, *On Donations between Husband and Wife*.

It is said fifth, "so that the bride may be adorned and decorated from it." Understand this according to her state and the custom of the country.

It is said sixth, "so that each may be delightfully united to the other." For a dowry is that through which the bride is delightfully joined to the man, and conversely.

It is said seventh, "and so that provision may be made for the man from which he can sufficiently," and so forth, as is evident in the law *Pro oneribus*, Code, *On the Law of Dowries*.

It is said eighth, "inalienably," and so forth. For a dowry is held to be the patrimony of women, as John Andrew says in *On the Competent Forum*, from *Ex tenore*; Digest, *On Minors under Twenty-five Years*, law *Denique*, section *Patrimonium*.

After the likeness, therefore, of bodily dowries of this kind, when the blessed are transferred into glory, certain gifts are divinely given to them for their adornment. These gifts and adornments are called spiritual dowries.

A spiritual dowry is defined thus: a dowry is a perpetual adornment of the soul and body, sufficient for life, unceasingly enduring in eternal blessedness.

For, first, just as a bodily dowry is given by the carnal father to the bride in dominion and to the bridegroom for use, so in the spiritual marriage of Christ and the soul, gifts and adornments that are spiritual beauties are given by the whole Trinity, which is the father of the bride - namely, of the soul, the Church. For a father is bound to endow a daughter contracting not only a carnal marriage but also a spiritual one, as Baldus says in the final law, Code, *On the Promise of Dowries*. They are given to Christ the bridegroom in the betrothal, and to the Church or its members - that is, to souls - in dominion and ownership.

And just as in carnal marriage dowries are given for the solace of the spouses and so that the burden of marriage may be lightened, so in the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, through spiritual dowries - that is, through the adornment and beauty of the soul - a certain spiritual joy is produced in the soul, principally from grace and glory, than which nothing is more delightful, and through which the soul is delightfully united to Christ the bridegroom. In this spiritual...

...marriage there are no burdens, as there are in bodily marriage, but the highest joy from consummated grace, or glory in heaven.

And just as in carnal marriage dowries are given to the bride in dominion and to the bridegroom for use, so in spiritual marriage adornments are given to the bridegroom for use - that is, insofar as they tend to the honor and glory of Christ - but to the bride, that is, to the soul or the Church, in dominion, insofar as they are adorned through them.

And just as in bodily marriage dowries are not given when the woman is betrothed, but when she is introduced into the house, so spiritual dowries are not given to souls so long as they are pilgrims away from the Lord, as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 5. But they are given when souls are transferred into glory, in which glory the souls are brought into the presence of the bridegroom.

These spiritual dowries are as much more worthy than bodily dowries as the soul is greater than the body. They consist in the interior goods of glory: "All the glory of the king's daughter is from within, clothed round with variety in golden fringes," the Psalm says. Bodily dowries, however, consist outwardly in the exterior goods of fortune.

Of this spiritual marriage, its dowries, and its spouses, it is said in Revelation 19: "Let us rejoice and exult, and let us give glory to him, because the marriage of the Lamb has come, and his wife has prepared herself; and it has been given to her that she should clothe herself in shining and white fine linen; for the fine linen is the justifications of the saints." These things are elicited from Thomas, Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49.

But here there is one doubt. For it was said above in the first section of the definition of temporal dowry that, if the bridegroom's father or the bridegroom should endow a marriageable girl, or the bridegroom, the bridegroom will in one manner be called the girl's abductor and violator. But since Christ the bridegroom bestows a dowry upon the bride, that is, the soul, according to Isaiah 41 - "He has clothed me with the garments of salvation, and like an adorned bride he has adorned me with his necklaces" - Christ will therefore, according to this, be the bridegroom who is the soul's abductor or violator.

To this a twofold answer is given. First, according to the canons, the bridegroom is then called an abductor of the girl...

...when the girl does not consent to the shameful act. But if the girl consents, the bridegroom will not be called an abductor or violator. In the *Decretals*, *On Abductors and Incendiaries*, chapter 1, with the gloss, the gloss there sets down a case in the terms, saying as follows:

"A certain knight, wishing to contract marriage with a certain girl, whose parents were unwilling to give her to him, finally, with the girl's consent, abducted her, contracted marriage with her, and knew her carnally. She afterward entered a monastery. The knight claimed her as his wife, because after carnal intercourse she could not enter a monastery without his permission. She said that she was not bound to adhere to him as to her husband, because he had abducted her, and an abductor cannot contract marriage with the abducted woman.

"To this the Pope answers that there was no abduction, since she herself consented; and after the marriage was contracted and consummated, she could not enter religious life against her husband's will, even though she had been abducted. Therefore, if this is established, she ought to be restored to him."

These are the literal words of the gloss there. Therefore, to the point at issue: since Christ receives as his bride the consenting soul, not in a most shameful act of the flesh but in faith and mercy, according to Hosea 1, "I have betrothed you to myself in faith, and in mercy and acts of compassion," and 2 Corinthians 10, "For I have betrothed you to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ," Christ the bridegroom is therefore not to be regarded as the soul's abductor.

Second, it is also said in answer to this that, although by the common law a dowry is given to the bridegroom by the bride or by someone in her name, nevertheless sometimes the reverse happens. This happens especially when the love of the bridegroom's father or of the bridegroom for the bride, who is poor, is great. Hence the bridegroom or his father endows her with a dowry which he declares that he has received from the bride, and he is content concerning the dowry.

And so in the present case, from the great love of God the Father and of his Son Jesus Christ for the faithful soul who is the bride, a dowry is given by the Father and by Christ the Son, and they are content, since it redounds to their honor and glory. These things are from the theologians and canonists.

Subquestion Four

How many dowries souls have in the Empyrean Heaven

The fourth little question is: how many dowries do souls existing in the Empyrean Heaven have?

To this it is answered that three dowries are assigned to blessed souls in heaven: namely, vision, comprehension, and delight. The reason for this is that a dowry is a certain adornment or disposition inhering in the soul, through which the soul is adorned for the operation in which perfect blessedness consists. Three things, however, are required for blessedness: namely, intuitive knowledge, intimate presence, and supreme complacency.

First, for the operation in which perfect blessedness consists, intuitive or clear knowledge is required; and this is vision, the soul's first dowry. Here note that the vision of God can be understood in two ways.

In one way, it can be understood as the very act of vision; and in this sense vision is not a dowry, but is blessedness itself. Of this vision it is said in John 13: "This is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent." And in Luke 10 it is said: "Blessed are the eyes that see the things that you see." This is not understood of the exterior eyes; otherwise the eyes of the scribes and Pharisees, who saw Christ bodily, would have been blessed. It is understood instead of the interior eyes of the mind, beholding the intelligible deity, of which the Apostle spoke in Ephesians 1: "May he give you the spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of him, the eyes of your heart enlightened." And Augustine says that vision is the whole substance of blessedness.

In another way, the vision of God can be understood as the very habit by which such an operation - namely, the vision of God - is elicited: that is, as the very brightness by which the soul is divinely illuminated for seeing God. In this sense vision is a dowry and the principle of blessedness, as Thomas says in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, article 2. Hence Richard says in Book IV...

...that the dowry of vision is a certain luminous habit in the intellect by which it is elevated to seeing God clearly. This dowry is in the intellective power of the soul and succeeds the theological virtue of faith, which will be emptied away when that which is perfect has come, 1 Corinthians 13.

Second, for blessedness, or for the operation in which perfect blessedness consists, intimate presence or apprehension is required. This is the soul's second dowry, comprehension, which is nothing other than having God in one's presence and holding him in himself. This comprehension follows from vision, for in the fatherland the God who is seen is not seen through a likeness but through his essence, and is made present within the one seeing. Thus the one seeing knows as much as he can know, and comprehends God according to the measure of the one seeing.

This comprehension succeeds and corresponds to hope, which will be emptied away there. For just as motion ceases when the form has been acquired, so hope ceases when that which was hoped for has been obtained. Since, therefore, in the fatherland there will be comprehension, possession, and secure possession of God - not indeed through grace as here, but through glory, which can no longer be lost through sin - then all hope will cease there.

In this manner this comprehension pertains, as some say, to memory. Richard defines it as the dowry of possession thus: "The dowry of comprehension is a perfect habit by which the will is perfectly secure concerning the perpetuation of the possession of God."

Third, for blessedness, or for the operation in which perfect blessedness consists, supreme complacency or delight is required. Fruition names it on the part of its completion, and it is the third dowry. For after a thing is comprehended and possessed, a certain love and delight concerning it follows. For upon union with, or vision of, that which is most fitting, there follows supreme delight concerning the thing seen and possessed. Since, therefore, in the fatherland we see and comprehend God, who is most fitting to our intellect, it follows that there will consequently be supreme delight there, in which our felicity is perfected. And Richard...

...defines this dowry thus in Book IV: "The dowry of fruition or delight is a perfect habit of charity by which the soul enjoys God completively and delights in him." This dowry succeeds charity and is in the will completively.

Of these three dowries Augustine said in the *Enchiridion*, and it is set down in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 1: "God made the rational creature so that it might understand the supreme good, in understanding might love it, in loving might possess it, and in possessing might enjoy it." And these things are elicited from Thomas in Books I and IV of the *Sentences* at the places cited above.

But perhaps you will argue that there are five dowries, because Boethius in Book III of *The Consolation* sets down five things pertaining to blessedness. These are sufficiency, which riches promise; joy, which pleasure promises; celebrity, which fame promises; security, which power promises; and reverence, which dignity promises.

It is answered and said that those five ought not to be called dowries, but certain conditions of blessedness. This is evident because in true blessedness there are all the things that are sought by human beings in temporal felicity. They pertain either to removal from evil, as security does; or to the attainment of a good that is fitting, as joy does, and of a good that is perfect, as sufficiency does; or to the manifestation of good, as celebrity does, insofar as the good of one person is within the knowledge of many, and as reverence does, insofar as some sign of that knowledge or good is exhibited. For reverence consists in the exhibition of honor, which is a testimony of virtue.

And so it is evident that there are only three dowries: namely, vision, comprehension, and delight or fruition. They correspond, as some say, to the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. For vision corresponds to faith; comprehension or possession to hope; and love or fruition, such as the blessed have in the fatherland, to charity. These things are from Thomas, writing on Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, article 5.

Subquestion Five

Concerning the four dowries of glorified bodies

It is asked how many dowries there are of bodies glorified in the Empyrean Heaven.

To this it is answered that, beyond the three aforesaid dowries of the soul, four dowries are also posited in the glorious body: namely, impassibility, subtlety, agility, and brightness.

The reason for this is that, just as the dowries of the soul are certain adornments and dispositions of the soul by which it is adorned and disposed so that it may be perfectly joined to God, so bodily dowries are certain adornments and dispositions by which the glorious body is perfectly subjected to the soul.

These four dowries are adapted to the four cardinal virtues, because bodily goods are the matter of the cardinal virtues: so that brightness, on account of cognition, corresponds to prudence; impassibility corresponds to justice, which is perpetual and immortal; agility corresponds to fortitude, from which it happens that nothing can resist the body; and subtlety corresponds to temperance, by which the body is attenuated. Thomas, Book IV, distinction 49.

The doctors derive the number of these four dowries of bodies from different things. For Saint Thomas derives their number from those things that the rational soul commonly confers upon the corruptible body in the present state. He says, on 1 Corinthians 15, that four things proceed from the incorruptible soul, and in a manner as much more perfect as the soul is more virtuous.

First, it gives bodily being to the body, for it is the act of the body, Book II of *On the Soul*. But then, when it is more virtuous - indeed, at the summit of the perfection of virtue - it will give being that is not bodily but spiritual; and this is the dowry called subtlety.

Second, this soul gives incorruption to the body, whence...

...we see that the stronger in nature human beings are, the less they suffer from heat and cold. When, therefore, the soul will then be most perfect, it will preserve the body wholly impassible; and this dowry is impassibility.

Third, this soul gives beauty and brightness to the body. For the sick and the dead, on account of the weakness of the soul's operation upon the body, become discolored; but when it will be at the summit of perfection, it will make the body most bright and most resplendent. This dowry is brightness.

Fourth, this soul gives motion to the body, and does so with as much greater ease as the soul's power over the body is stronger. Therefore, when it will be in its final perfection, it will give agility to the body; and this dowry is agility. These things are from Thomas at the place cited above.

Master Bonaventure, however, in Book IV, distinction 49, derives the reasons for the four dowries of the body from elsewhere: namely, from the four elements of which our body is composed. For because the elements are imperfect, our body has from them a fourfold defectibility.

First, our body has corruption and passibility from water, which is a humid and passible element; and to this corresponds the dowry that is impassibility.

Second, our body has obscurity from earth, because earth is an opaque element; and to this brightness corresponds.

Third, our body has activity from fire. For heat continually consumes, and therefore the human being continually needs the nourishment of foods, by which the body is made thick and gross. Against these will be the dowry of penetrability or subtlety.

Fourth, our body has weakness from air. For air is changed most easily and yields to anything that impels it, but then the body will be moved more easily through the dowry of agility.

The first dowry of the glorious body, therefore, is immortality or vigorous impassibility, through which the body, by the soul's power, will be preserved immune from every injury. The reason for this dowry is this: just as the soul will be perfectly subjected to God, so the human body and whatever is in it will be perfectly subjected to the rational soul, and...

...therefore in the glorious body there will not be able to be any change contrary to that disposition by which it will be perfected by the soul. Hence in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion will be able to proceed from the elemental qualities that would be contrary to the disposition of the soul, which intends to preserve the body perpetually.

For our bodies now, on account of the inequality, contrariety, strife, and conflict of the four elements of which they are composed, are finally corrupted and reduced to ashes. But on the day of judgment, in the blessed, every contrariety, strife, conflict, and inequality will be reduced to complete peace, concord, and equality.

Hence it is said in Revelation 7 and 22: "On that day there will no longer be death, nor mourning, nor crying, nor any pain, because the former things have passed away." And Paul says in 1 Corinthians 15: "For this corruptible thing must put on incorruption, and this mortal thing must put on immortality. But when this mortal thing has put on immortality, then the saying that is written will come to pass: Death has been swallowed up in victory."

And Augustine says to Dioscorus: "God made the soul with so powerful a virtue that its blessedness would overflow into the body, as fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption."

The second dowry of the glorious body is posited to be vigorous subtlety. For the nobler bodies are, the subtler they are; but glorious bodies are the noblest among all bodies; therefore they are the subtlest.

A thing is called subtle from the power of penetrating, Book II of *On Generation*. Hence an intellect is called subtle because it reaches by penetrating as far as the intrinsic principles and natural properties of a hidden thing. A person is said to have subtle sight because he can reach by sight to something exceedingly distant. And a body or sword is called subtle because it can penetrate and reach as far as the innermost parts of a thing.

On the day of judgment, however, glorious bodies, by the power of the soul's blessedness overflowing into the bodies, will be of such great active power that they will be able to penetrate whatever...

...higher and lower bodies there are, much more efficaciously than water, wine, fire, air, or wind. For water is penetrative because it is simple, but wine is much more so. For this reason water drunk with a little wine cools a healthy person more than if it were drunk alone, because wine makes it penetrate more efficaciously to places in the body to which water could not penetrate by itself, as Richard says in Book IV, distinction 49.

The bodies of the saints after the judgment, therefore, through the dowry of subtlety will penetrate the heavens without injuring or breaking them, just as light now penetrates glass. Lower bodies will yield to them, and they will almost pass through mountains and rocks without resistance or injury. Hence doors, walls, enclosures, and even iron chests will yield to them. The Psalm says: "In your name I will pass over a wall." And Gregory says in Book IV of the *Moralia*: "On the day of resurrection our body will be subtle through glory, perfect in spiritual power, but palpable through the power of nature."

The third dowry of the glorious body will be vigorous agility. For glorious bodies will not be heavy, because in the motion of glorious bodies there will not be any labor, but they will be agile, because the soul will then perfectly dominate the body. Therefore, through the dowry of agility, the body will be subjected to the soul with respect to its command concerning motion, so that without any labor it may suddenly be moved wherever it wills. Thus the human being with the body will be moved from place to place; indeed, as though in a moment, he will run wherever he wishes.

Great is the agility of running waters. Greater is that of flying birds. Greater is that of arrows. Greater is that of the sun. Greater is that of imagination, which goes suddenly where it wills. But above all these, greater will be the agility of glorious bodies.

Hence it is said in Isaiah 4: "They will run and will not labor; they will fly and will not fail." And in Wisdom 3 and Matthew 13: "The just will shine and will run about like sparks among the reeds."

But if it is argued, because it is written in 1 Thessalonians 4 that glorious bodies are said to be borne by angels and clouds, that therefore they will not be agile but heavy, it is answered that glori...

...ous bodies are not said to be borne by angels because they are heavy and on account of a defect of agility, as though their motion would then occur with labor and punishment and their bodies would thus not be subject to their perfect and blessed souls, as was said. Rather, glorious bodies are said to be borne by the aforesaid things to signify the reverence that will be rendered to glorious bodies both by angels and by all creatures.

The fourth dowry of the glorified body will be glorious brightness, of which it is said in Matthew 13: "The just will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father." According to the opinion of the doctors, this is to be understood not of the brightness of the sun according as it shines now, but according as it will be luminous after the day of judgment.

But according to the testimony of Isaiah 30: "On that day the light of the moon will be like the light of the sun, and the light of the sun will be sevenfold, like the light of seven days." It follows that the least among the saints will shine at least seven times more brightly than the sun now shines. And if this is true, one who will be twice as blessed will be fourteen times as luminous; and so by multiplying according to the degrees of the blessedness of the blessed up to the Virgin and Christ, how luminous, therefore, will his most holy body be?

On account, therefore, of the brightness both of the planets and of glorified bodies - one of which God could place in the position of the sun to illuminate the world at present - Thomas says in Book IV at the place cited above that on the day of judgment there will be night nowhere except at the center of the earth.

Of this brightness Job 23 says: "Gold or glass will not be equaled to it." And Paul says in Ephesians 3: "He will reform the body of our humility, configured to the body of his brightness."

Here, however, it must be noted that Christ did not have the dowry of brightness, just as he also did not have the other dowries. For neither the angels nor Christ had dowries. The angels did not, since they do not possess the character of the bride, who ought to have conformity of nature with the bridegroom. Nor did Christ have dowries, because a dowry is assigned to the bride and not to the bridegroom. Christ, however, is the bridegroom and not the bride, John 3. Therefore, and so forth.

Hence it ought not to be said...

...as Hugh of Saint Victor says, that Christ assumed four dowries: that of brightness in the Transfiguration; that of agility by walking upon the sea; that of subtlety by coming forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; and that of impassibility at the supper, when he gave his body to be eaten without its being divided. For the things that are named dowries are certain natural qualities. But Christ's brightness in the Transfiguration was miraculous, just as were his walking upon the waves of the sea, his being conceived without a man, his coming forth from the closed womb of the Virgin, and other things of this kind, as Thomas says in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 59, article 3.

But perhaps you will ask whether the brightness of a glorious body will be able to be seen naturally by a non-glorious eye. It is answered that it will, for the brightness of Christ's body, to which it will be assimilated, was seen by the non-glorious eyes of the disciples. And the

impious will see the brightness of the just, from which they will be tormented. Therefore the brightness of the bodies of the blessed will be able to be seen by non-glorious eyes.

Consequently the glory of the souls placed within glorified bodies will be seen, just as in glass the color of a body contained in a glass vessel is discerned. Hence Gregory says: "There the corpulence of the members will not hide each person's mind from the eyes of another, but the mind itself and even the harmony of the body will be manifest to bodily eyes. And thus the mind of each will then be visible to another, as it cannot now be visible to itself," and so forth.

But if it is asked whether that brightness will necessarily be seen, it is said that it will not. For in the glorious body there is the highest obedience to the soul; therefore it will be within the will and power of the soul whether the body is seen in its own brightness or not. It is like a little crow, which displays its brightness when it wishes, or not, as it pleases; and Christ disappeared from the eyes of the disciples at Emmaus when he wished, and when he wished they saw him and knew him. For this reason Augustine says in Book XIX of *The City of God*, chapter 27: "God will command the human being; the soul will command the body," and so forth.

These four...

...dowries Paul sets down in 1 Corinthians 15, saying: "Star differs from star in brightness, and so also the resurrection of the dead."

"It is sown" - namely, the corruptible body is buried - "in corruption" in the earth; "it will rise in incorruption," namely, immortal. Behold immortality or impassibility. It is called "sown," namely, while the dead person is buried. For the Apostle calls burying sowing. Just as grain is sown so that it may make fruit, so the body is sown and buried so that it may rise glorious with fruits.

The text continues: "An animal and gross material body is sown; a spiritual body will rise," namely, with respect to every command of the soul concerning motion, or because it will have the conditions of a spirit for penetrating everywhere without fracture. Behold the dowry of subtlety.

"It is sown in infirmity," that is, the body, weak and moved by the soul with difficulty, is buried, because "the corruptible body weighs down the soul," Wisdom 9. "It will rise in power," that is, in mobility according to the will of the soul and through the dowry of agility.

"It is sown" - that is, the body is buried, according to Ambrose - "in the ignobility of obscurity and deformity; it will rise in glory," that is, with brightness and beauty through the dowry of brightness.

Of these four dowries Augustine said in Book XXII of *The City of God*, chapter 20: "From our bodies will be absent all slowness, all deformity, all infirmity, and all corruption."

Then the saying in the final chapter of Proverbs will be verified: "All her household are clothed with double garments," namely, with the dowries of the soul and of the body. Then the saying in Revelation 6 will be verified: "White stoles were given to each of them, and they were told to rest yet a little time, until the number of their fellow servants should be fulfilled." And then the soul will say that saying of Isaiah 61: "The Lord has clothed me with garments of salvation, and like an adorned bride he has adorned me with his necklaces."

Subquestion Six

Whether the dowries of souls and bodies in heaven are identical with their blessedness

It is asked whether the dowries of souls and bodies in the Empyrean Heaven are identical with their blessedness.

To this it is answered negatively, by saying that a dowry differs from blessedness in five things: namely, in subject, in number, in the mode of possessing, in signification, and in term.

First, it differs in subject, because blessedness inheres in a human being according to that which is most excellent in him - namely, according to the intellect, as the Philosopher says in Book II of the *Ethics*. But a dowry also exists in the body.

Second, a dowry differs from blessedness in number, because blessedness is only one, but the dowries are several, as was evident above.

Third, it differs in the mode of possessing, because a dowry is given without merits, but blessedness is not given; it is rendered.

Fourth, it differs in signification, because a dowry is a certain adornment of the body and soul, that is, a certain beauty of the blessed person unceasingly enduring in eternal blessedness, as was said. But blessedness, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the soul, but something that proceeds from an adornment.

Fifth, it differs in term, that is, in the final end, because a dowry is ordered to delightful union. This is evident because a dowry is that through which the bride is delightfully joined to the bridegroom. But blessedness is not ordered to conjunction; rather, it is the very conjunction of the soul with Christ, which occurs through operation, that is, through the clear vision of God itself.

Hence the dowries are not blessedness itself, but are certain dispositions, qualities, or adornments from which the blessed are ordered to blessedness, so that the dowries are goods disposing them to conjunction with Christ through operation, that is, through immediate vision. These things are elicited from Thomas, Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, article 2.

Subquestion Seven

Whether anything else is necessarily required for true and perfect blessedness beyond the four aforesaid dowries

It is asked whether, beyond the aforesaid dowries, anything else is necessarily required for true and perfect blessedness in the Empyrean Heaven.

To this it is answered affirmatively, as follows. Beyond the dowries, three things are required: namely, an influx of divine grace, the radiance of the light of glory, and the clear evidence of the divine essence.

First, an influx of divine grace is required. This is proved by reason, authority, and likeness. For no created intellect, angelic or human, can by its natural power attain to that in which perfect blessedness consists. For God inhabits inaccessible light; and since we are created, we do not naturally attain to the uncreated and divine, but to the created and finite. Therefore we need divine grace.

For this reason Paul says in Romans 6: "The grace of God is eternal life"; that is, the life which is the vision of God and of Jesus Christ, whom the Father sent into the world, is from the grace of God. And in 1 Timothy 6: "God inhabits inaccessible light, whom no human being has seen." There the gloss says: "No human being approaches it from himself, but he to whom it is given by the gift of God; and the gift of God is his grace."

And Ambrose, on Luke, together with Augustine in the book *On Seeing God*, says: "It is not in our power to see God, but in his power to appear." And he adds: "Although seeing God is not in our power, nevertheless meriting grace, so that we may be able to see, is in our power."

It is also proved by likeness. For just as water, which is lower than fire, cannot be hot except through the higher fire, so a created intellect, naturally below God, cannot be borne upward to the divine essence except through the power of his grace. And just as heavy iron...

...cannot be drawn upward except by the power of a higher magnet, so the human intellect, heavy with respect to the essence of God, cannot be elevated except through his grace.

Second, the radiance of the light of glory is required, not indeed on the part of the divine essence, which of itself and without a medium is supremely intelligible, but on the part of our intellect, so that it may be habilitated, strengthened, and elevated.

First, so that it may be habilitated: for just as light is not received in a body unless the body is disposed through the diaphanous - that is, through transparency disposing the body for the reception of light - so our intellect does not receive this act, namely, seeing the divine essence, unless it is disposed through the light of glory.

Again, so that it may be strengthened: for our created and natural intellect is as weak in relation to the divine essence as the eye of a bat is in relation to the light of the sun, Book II of the *Metaphysics*. Therefore the Psalm says: "Clothed with light as with a garment."

Again, so that it may be elevated: for since the divine essence is infinitely distant from every created intellect, a created intellect would not be joined to it unless it were elevated to the vision of it through the light of glory. The light of glory does not have this power of elevating from its own power, since it also is a created thing, but from the power that it obtains from God for this purpose. Of this light it is said in the Psalm: "In your light we will see light."

Third, the clear evidence of the divine essence is required for perfect blessedness. For now God is known by us through creatures and through their image and traces. Hence Damascene says: "God did not leave us in complete ignorance of himself, but knowledge that God exists has been implanted by him in all."

But in the fatherland he must be known in a higher manner, namely, through glory; and in this manner the essence of God will be seen clearly, nor could it be otherwise.

First, because otherwise the desire of the saints would be frustrated, which cannot be. Their desire is that of Moses in Exodus 33: "Show me your glory," and that of Philip in John 33: "Show us the Father, and it is enough for us."

Again, the reward...

...consists in this: that God should be seen and known perfectly. But this cannot be unless he is seen through his essence. Therefore, and so forth. These things are from Thomas, Book III of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, and Alexander of Hales, Part III of the *Summa*.

Subquestion Eight

Whether the five senses of the glorified body will be made blessed

It is asked whether the five exterior senses in glorified bodies will be made blessed in the Empyrean Heaven.

To some it appears that a negative answer should be given, and first as follows. For if the five senses ought to be made blessed, this would occur through the actuation of each in relation to its own most fitting object, just as the intellective power is made blessed in the clear vision of its noblest object, which is the divine essence, and as the will is made blessed in love of the highest good.

If, therefore, the sensitive powers will finally be blessed, each of them will be perfectly actuated in relation to the noblest and most fitting object of which it is capable. But it does not appear what those objects will be, or could be, in which especially the three lower senses - namely, smell, taste, and touch - may be made blessed. For the sensible things in which those senses delight will not be in the heavenly kingdom, because there will not be a tempering between cold and heat there; there will be no thirst or hunger, no fragrances of spices, and no application of savory things. Rather, all will be like the angels of God, not eating, not drinking, and not occupied in generation, according to the Savior's words in Matthew 22 to the Sadducees, who held a carnal opinion concerning the state of future blessedness: "You err, knowing neither the Scriptures nor the power of God. For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but..."

..."will be like the angels of God in heaven." Therefore the five senses of glorified human beings will not be able to be made blessed.

But to the contrary is Augustine in the book *On the Perfection of Human Righteousness*, where he says that in the fullness of the charity of the fatherland that commandment will be fulfilled: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, your whole soul, and all your powers." This could not be unless the operation and use of all human powers and faculties were brought to rest in their objects in the fatherland, as Thomas explains in Book IV, distinction 44, article 6.

In answer to this doubt, it must be said that we can speak in two ways about the beatification of the exterior senses of a glorified human being: either with respect to their objects or with respect to their acts.

If we speak with respect to the objects, it is said that each power will have its own object. Sight will have as its object the body of Christ, which will be the most beautiful among all bodies and the most pleasing to see. Hence John 29: "I know that my Redeemer," and so forth, as far as "in my bosom."

Hearing will have as its object Christ forming a voice with natural organs. The Psalm says: "To my hearing you will give joy and gladness." This will occur in two ways: namely, by singing and by speaking.

Of speaking it is said in Canticles 5: "My soul melted when my beloved spoke," says the bride praising Christ the bridegroom.

Of singing it is found in the office of blessed Agnes, who says: "I love Christ, into whose bridal chamber I have entered, whose mother is a virgin, whose Father knows not a woman, whose instruments sing to me with melodious voices."

There will also be the song of the other saints. Of this it is said by the Church: "In the city of the Lord the instruments of the saints sound clearly without ceasing." And in the hymn for a dedication it is said: "That whole city, sacred and beloved by God, filled with melodies in praise and tuneful jubilation, with favor proclaims the triune and one God."

There will be the song of the angels there, but not bodily. Rather, as Chrysostom says, their song is the discourse of one thing after another concerning the attributes and other perfections of God. When they understand these things discursively, they rejoice and exult in know...

...ing, and, affirming, repeat concerning each one: "Holy, holy, holy."

Smell will have its own object, namely, the body of Christ, of which it is said in Canticles 1: "In the fragrance of your ointments" - that is, not of one simple spice, but as though in a mixture of all fragrances. "Therefore the maidens," that is, all elect creatures, and so forth.

Touch will have its own object, namely, the body of Christ and the flesh of the other saints.

Taste will have its own object: the sweetness of glorified bodies. The Psalm says: "Taste and see," and so forth.

But if we speak about the actuation of the senses - namely, whether they will truly smell, truly eat, truly touch, and so forth - it is said that concerning this there is a fivefold manner of speaking.

The first is that in glorified bodies the senses will be suspended from all actuation on account of the most vehement conversion of the intellect toward the beatific object. This occurs in vehement and profound contemplations, in which it happens that a human being is so caught up that every sense is so deprived of its powers that, even when objects are applied, they are not perceived. If, therefore, the passible contemplation of the way can do this, it appears *a fortiori* that the beatific contemplation that will be in the fatherland can produce a similar suspension of the senses. Nor does it appear why the senses ought there to be actuated by sensibles, where the intellect clearly beholds in the Word the species and differences of all sensibles.

The second manner of speaking is that the senses of the glorified body will not be deprived of their powers in the manner said above; indeed, there will be in them acts much more perfect than here. Nevertheless, some senses whose objects do not befit the heavenly region - such as smell, taste, and touch - will be there without actuation by their own proper objects. The other senses, whose objects befit the state of human beings so disposed or adorn that region, will there be actuated by their most fitting objects, as sight will be in the brightness of light, and perhaps hearing also.

The third manner of speaking is that in that heavenly region, however it may be by divine disposition, just as there will really be the most fit-

ting objects of all the senses, as was said, so there will also be actuations of all the senses with respect to their most fitting object. For it does not appear what would prevent glorified bodies from being of diverse colors, emitting fragrances, and sounding with the sweetest voices. The glorious body of Christ can also supply the objective influx of the objects of the five senses. There it supplies the object of sight, according to Revelation 21: "And that city needs neither sun nor moon to shine in it, for the brightness of God will illuminate it, and its lamp is the Lamb."

The fourth manner of speaking is that each of the senses will be most fittingly actuated, not indeed by the objective influxes of its proper objects, but the divine essence will supply such influxes, as can be done, since influencing objectively belongs to active power. Through this it appears that finally, for glorified human beings, God will be all in all.

Hence blessed Augustine says in the final chapter of Book XXII of *The City of God*: "What else is that which is said through the prophet, 'I will be their God,' except, 'I will be that from which they will be satisfied'? I will be whatever is honorably desired: life, health, power, abundance, glory, honor, peace, and every good." Thus he also understands what the Apostle says: "That he may be all in all," for he will be the end of all desires.

The fifth manner of speaking is commendable: namely, that the visual power will see not through the intellect, as the saints now do, but through the act of seeing, by admitting and receiving from the object, as the Philosopher says in *On Sense and the Sensible*. Then that saying of Luke 3 will be fulfilled: "All flesh will see the salvation of God," that is, Christ. And Isaiah 33: "They will see the king in his beauty, and their eyes will behold the land from afar." Hence neither difference of positions nor the height of bodies or mountains will be able to impede the vision of the eyes of the saints.

And Augustine says in Book XXII of *The City of God*: "It is harsh to say that the saints will then have such bodies that they cannot close and open their eyes when they wish. Rather, those bodily eyes will have their office, and the spirit will use them..."

..."through the spiritual body."

But it appears that, since glorious eyes will be most luminous in act, they will not be able to receive visible species from objects, and consequently there will not be an act of seeing there. An example is evident in a mirror that is placed directly beneath a ray of the sun. For the mirror then does not receive the species of a body set opposite it.

To this Saint Thomas answers in Book IV, distinction 44, that the intensity of light does not impede the reception of a species in the pupil, provided that the nature of the diaphanous remains. This is evident in the air, for the more it is illuminated, the more it is seen, unless there is a defect on the part of the one seeing. That a species is not produced in a mirror under a ray of the sun does not occur from the light, but from this: that the species in the mirror is produced through reflection, which does not happen in the pupil. Reflection, however, occurs only in an opaque medium; but the strength of the ray removes opacity from the mirror, and therefore the species does not result.

Second, the proper act of the ears will be there sensibly. For the ears of the bodies of the blessed will not be like those of idols, but will hear the real voices and praises of the Lord. Isaiah 51: "Gladness and joy will be found in it, thanksgiving and the voice of praise." And the Psalm says: "The exaltations of God are in their throats." There Augustine says that hearts and tongues will not suffice to praise God.

And Thomas says in Book IV, distinction...

...44 that there will be vocal praise in the fatherland. There will also be species of song there, not only those severed from an object, but also those of other animals through species infused by God. For there will not be nightingales and eternal animals singing so that voices and songs may flow presently from their mouths. Rather, songs of this kind will be infused from above.

Nor will there be a false judgment among the saints hearing them, as there is among the frenzied; instead, they will know from above that it is truly so. Canticles 2 speaks in this manner: "Flowers have appeared in our land; the voice of the turtledove," and so forth.

Laughter will also be heard there, as Thomas says in *Quodlibet* 19, according to Job 8: "Until your mouth is filled with laughter."

Third, there will be the proper sensible use and act of the smell of the nostrils, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 44, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be of the sweetest fragrance; otherwise they would be like idols. And otherwise the bones of the saints would emit more fragrance here than their bodies there.

This is also proved by reason. For if stench will ascend from the corpses of the bodies of the damned, as is said in Isaiah 24 and Revelation 14, so that the damned may be punished in stench according to the Psalm, "Fire, sulfur, and the spirit of storms are the portion of their cup," then fragrance will ascend from the bodies of the saints so that the saints also may be rewarded in fragrance.

But if it is argued that fragrance requires a mixture of hot, cold, humid, and dry things, which are contraries, and that where these exist it is necessary that there be corruption, but the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible, and therefore, and so forth, it is said in reply that the dowry of impassibility given to the saints makes them incorruptible, although they have true flesh compacted from the humid, dry, hot, and cold reduced to the best proportion. Hence their bodies are fit to be fragrant and most sweet.

Fourth, the taste of the saints will be actuated, not in nourishment, but, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 44, with respect to the judgment of flavors. Hence it is said in Job 6: "Who will be able to taste that which, when tasted, brings death?" This judgment of flavors will be, as Thomas says at the place cited above, through an alteration of the tongue by some conjoined moisture.

But if it is argued to the contrary that, if this is so, it would follow that saliva would be the essential reward of taste, a twofold answer is given.

In one way, taste will be brought into act through a spiritual or intentional alteration, without the taking of food and without mastication being performed upon the body of Christ and the bodies of the saints, by means of their flavor formally inhering in them. If these bodies had been chewed before glorification, they would have been naturally able by their flavor to alter taste itself.

Second, it is said that Thomas does not assert that saliva will alter the taste of the saints, but left it in doubt. Of the actuation of taste the Psalm says: "Taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and so forth.

Fifth, the sense of touch will be actuated. Hence in Thomas it is said: "Put in your finger," and so forth. Hence...

...the Lord Jesus said to Mary Magdalene, who wished to touch him: "Do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father," as though he were saying: "When I am there, you will touch me."

This is proved by reasons. First, because there the sense of touch will not be like that of idols. Second, because this sense will not be inferior to the other actuated senses. Third, because the whole human being must be made blessed and felicitous in Christ, which would

not be the case if touch were to fail in its action. Therefore all five senses will be made blessed.

Sight says: "I see the good things of the Lord in the land of the living." Hearing says: "I will hear what the Lord God speaks in me." Smell says: "We run in the fragrance of your ointments," and so forth. Taste says: "Taste and see that the Lord is sweet." Touch says: "His left hand is beneath my head, and his right hand will embrace me."

Which of these five manners will be that by which the lower powers and faculties will be made blessed more truly is not established for mortals. For this reason Augustine says in the final chapter of Book XXII of *The City of God*: "I do not dare rashly to define what I am unable to think."

Nevertheless, it ought to suffice mortals to know and believe this: "The things that eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have ascended into the heart of man, God has prepared for those who love him."

But perhaps someone will wisely continue to doubt concerning the acts of smell and hearing.

First, the sense of smell cannot be in its act unless some corruption has occurred, because an odor is not perceived without some smoky evaporation, which consists in a certain dissolution and corruption. After the resurrection, however, nothing will be corrupted, because the whole creation will be clothed with a certain power of incorruption. Therefore the sense of smell will not be in act there.

To this Thomas answers in Book IV, distinction 44, saying: some have posited that odor is nothing other than a certain smoky evaporation. But this position cannot be true. This is evident from the fact that vultures run to a corpse from the most remote places from the odor perceived; and it would not be possible for any evaporation to reach from a corpse to places so remote, even if the whole...

...thing were dissolved into vapor, especially since sensibles affect every part at an equal distance.

Hence odor sometimes alters the medium, and sometimes also the instrument, by a spiritual alteration, without any material alteration reaching the organ. But that some evaporation is required occurs because odor in bodies is dispersed in humidity. Hence dissolution must occur so that it may be perceived.

But in glorious bodies odor will be in its final perfection, suppressed in no way by humidity. Hence it will alter by a spiritual alteration, as the odor of a smoky evaporation does. And the sense of smell in the saints, because it will be impeded by no humidity, will recognize not only the excellences of odors - as does not now occur in us on account of the excessive humidity of the brain - but also the excessive differences of odors.

Second, there is doubt concerning the act of the sense of hearing: namely, whether there will be vocal praise in the Empyrean Heaven and whether voices will be formed there. It appears that there will not.

For every body in which a voice is formed, and through which motion occurs in a medium, must touch air, must be divisible, and must operate through density and rarity. But if there will be vocal praise in the Empyrean Heaven, as some say, and the saints will walk about

through it, as is said in Wisdom 3, "The just will shine and will run about like sparks among the reeds," then there will be air there, and condensation and rarefaction of air.

But wherever there are density and rarity, there are generation and corruption, since they are certain principles of corruption and generation. Therefore it is necessary to say either that there is no voice of praise there and no motion through a medium, or, if it is said that there is a voice of praise there, it will be necessary to say that air, condensation, and rarefaction are there, and consequently generation and corruption, and that two bodies can exist together. All these things are repugnant to the excellence of the Empyrean body.

To this Thomas answers in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 2, question 2, in reply to the fifth argument of the second little question, saying that the Empyrean Heaven is the place of angels, souls, and human beings. It is agreed, however, that there will not be vocal praise in the Empyrean Heaven from angels and disembodied...

...souls. But as to whether there will be vocal praise from human beings after the judgment, some say there will not, but only mental praise, which is more worthy, because there will not be respiration there, which voice requires, Book II of *On the Soul*.

Others say that there will be vocal praise there, so that nothing in the saints may be idle from divine praise, neither mind nor tongue.

As to how this can be, they say as follows. In the lung and vocal instruments there is naturally implanted air, just as animals also have implanted breath; and through that air the saints will be able to form voices. This appears fitting in one respect, because the expulsion or attraction of air is not necessary for the formation of a voice. Hence by breathing in or breathing out an animal cannot form a voice, Book II of *On the Soul*.

But in another respect it appears insufficient, because not only interior but also exterior air is required for a voice, by whose percussion and motion sound is carried.

For this reason it must be added and said that certain sensible things are conveyed to a sense only according to spiritual being, as the species of colors are. Others touch the organ according to their material being, as in taste and touch. Still others are conveyed in both ways, as the species of odors together with an admixture of smoky evaporation; nevertheless, sometimes the species extend beyond the smoky evaporation. It is similar with sound and motion. There, however, the species of sound is conveyed only according to spiritual being; hence there will not have to be motion in the medium, or percussion, or condensation.

Or it can be said that there will also be percussion of the Empyrean Heaven there. Nor does this redound to its ignobility, because it will be an instrument moved by a glorified tongue and the matter of a voice uttered in divine praise. Nor does it follow on this account that it is generable and corruptible, because rarity and density are said equivocally of that body and of those bodies. In this way the astrologers also posit that between two spheres which cannot be split there is some space filled with a divisible body, since in that space there is motion of the planets according...

...to the motion of the epicycle.

Again, by a miracle it can occur that two bodies are in the same place. This must occur at least while a glorious body is transferred up to the Empyrean Heaven through the intervening celestial body, which is not split.

What among these things is true is uncertain, because it is neither determined by faith nor proved by reason. These things are elicited from Thomas and Henry of Hesse.

Subquestion Nine

What and how many are the aureoles that are given to some of the blessed

It is asked what and how many are the aureoles - as it were, the paraphernal goods - of martyrs, confessors, and virgins in the Empyrean Heaven.

To this it is answered that an aureole is a certain accidental joy by which the blessed rejoice in the good works done by themselves, which they acquired through victory. For a crown is given to victors.

Concerning this aureole four things will be explained: namely, its essence, sufficiency, eminence, and correspondence.

The first is its essence, for it has been said that an aureole is a certain accidental joy. In explanation of this, it must be known that in the blessed there is a twofold joy: namely, essential and accidental.

The first reward or joy of the blessed is essential. It consists in the perfect conjunction of the soul with God through the vision and fruition of God, insofar as the soul is perfectly joined to God by seeing him, loving him, and enjoying him. This reward is called, by way of similitude, a golden crown for three reasons.

First, by reason of a sign, because a crown is the proper sign of royal dignity. But that essential reward which consists in the vision of God in some manner makes a human being a participant in divinity and, consequently, in royal dignity, as the Apostle says in Revelation 5: "You have made us a kingdom and priests for our God."

Second, this essential reward is called a crown by reason of the circle. For a...

...circular figure is the most perfect, because nothing can be added to it without being less than it. It signifies the essential reward and joy of the blessed, since no reward can be added without being less than it. This is evident because nothing is greater than the vision of God.

Third, the essential reward is called an aureole by reason of its material, or number, because, just as no metal is more precious than gold, so no other reward is greater and nobler than the vision of God, which is the essential reward of the saints.

That gold is more precious among metals is evident from its value and from reason. It is also evident because no defect appears in it, for neither of its parts is ill-tempered or imperfect, as Hermes the Egyptian says.

For all metals are made from sulfur, as though from the part and substance of paternal seed, and from quicksilver, as though from a mother and menstrual fluid. That menstrual fluid is coagulated into the substance of an embryo by the power of sulfur vigorously acting upon and burning it. These two - namely, sulfur and quicksilver - are brighter in gold and purified by the strongest washings, so that nothing of combustible oiliness, nor of aqueous moisture or phlegm, can evaporate any further. This is evident in a ring that encircles a finger without staining it, but not so in a silver ring or one made from other metals, which stain contiguous bodies to a greater or lesser extent, as Albert says in Book IV of *On Minerals*, chapter 7.

The second reward, or the second joy of the blessed in the fatherland, added to their essential reward - that is, to the divine vision - is accidental. It is called an *aureole* diminutively because this accidental reward is, as it were, very small in relation to the essential reward of the divine vision.

Concerning these golden crowns and aureoles, as concerning the first, essential reward and the accidental reward, it is said in Exodus 25: "Construct the ark from shittim wood" - which is incorruptible, as Josephus says - "and overlay it inside and outside with the purest gold," which signifies the essential reward. "And you shall make another little golden crown around it," which signifies the accidental reward.

Of the first crown...

...it is said in Ecclesiasticus 45: "A golden crown was upon his head, engraved with the sign of holiness." Of the second, the Church sings: "Daughters of Jerusalem, come and see the martyr with the crown," namely, of victory, which is given to him on the day of solemnity and gladness.

Second, concerning the aureole, its numerical sufficiency must be considered. For three aureoles are posited: namely, those of virgins, martyrs, and doctors or preachers.

This is proved as follows. A crown is given for a victory that is won with a certain struggle: "No one will be crowned unless he has competed lawfully," 2 Timothy 2. But there is a threefold kind of saints who fought manfully in the world and conquered: namely, virgins, martyrs, and preachers. Therefore there will be a threefold aureole, which will be given to the saints for victories and triumphs over the enemy.

The first aureole is owed to virgins for the good works done by them by reason of virginity. The reason for this is that a crown is given to victors, as is evident above; therefore, where there is a special character of victory, a special aureole is owed. But through virginity a man or woman obtains a singular and special victory over the flesh, against which the spirit wages war, as is evident from Galatians 5: "The spirit desires against the flesh, and conversely." Therefore a special accidental joy is owed and given to virginity, and this is called an aureole.

For evidence of this, it must be known that the aureole is owed only to those virgins who had the intention of preserving virginity perpetually, whether or not this intention was confirmed by a vow. Although that intention may at some time have been interrupted, nevertheless, if the integrity of the flesh remains and that intention is found at the end of life, the aureole is owed.

The reason for this is that, although virginity of the flesh cannot be repaired, virginity or corruption of the mind is repaired through penance and restored to the full. Therefore, if she finally remains wholly uncorrupted, she will have an aureole. For there is no doubt that such women will rejoice in the incorruption of the body.

But if corruption of the mind is followed by corruption of the flesh pro-

cured by some instrument or in some other manner, such a woman loses the aureole and ought humbly and modestly to abstain from consecration. Nevertheless, she is not rejected from consecration, because the Church judges only according to those things that appear in the external forum.

If, however, she lost the integrity of the flesh through violence, she does not lose the aureole. For the body is not corrupted unless the mind has been corrupted. Hence blessed

Lucy said: "If you cause me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be doubled for my crown" - not because she would have two aureoles, but because she would carry away a twofold reward: one for the virginity she preserved and the other for the injury she suffered. Indeed, if any woman, violently overpowered, should conceive, she nevertheless does not thereby lose the merit of virginity or the aureole.

But someone will say: if an aureole is owed to victory in a struggle, then where there is no struggle or victory, there is no aureole. But the Virgin Mary did not have a struggle of the flesh; therefore she did not have an aureole, which is false.

It is answered that the Virgin Mary has the aureole as the reward of virginity. Although she did not have an interior struggle of the flesh, she nevertheless had temptation from the enemy, who did not refrain even from tempting Christ.

The second aureole is owed to martyrs. The reason for this is that a special aureole is owed to a special victory, as is evident above; but the martyr has a special victory over the tyrant. Therefore, and so forth.

For evidence of this, it must be known that a victory is called great for a twofold reason. First, by reason of the penalty of death, which is the last of terrible things, Book III of the *Ethics*. Second, by reason of the most honorable cause, which cause is Christ. These two are considered in martyrdom, and principally the cause, because it is not the punishment but the cause that makes a martyr.

For this reason, one who dies for the confession of the faith, whether or not he is questioned about the faith by a persecutor, will obtain the aureole. Likewise, if someone defends the commonwealth from an attack by enemies who endeavor to corrupt the faith of Christ, and dies in such a defense, he will have the aureole. Likewise, if anyone receives a mortal wound for Christ and sur-

vives for some time, he is a martyr and does not lose the aureole, as is evident concerning blessed Cecilia.

But if he does not receive a mortal wound and nevertheless afterward dies from it, though not through his own negligence in treating it, he has the aureole. If he has received wounds that were not mortal, and after this dies while enduring imprisonment, he is a martyr and merits the aureole, as did blessed Marcellus.

If, however, affliction for Christ was not continued all the way to death, he will not be a martyr. This is evident concerning blessed Sylvester, who suffered many penalties for Christ; nevertheless, because he ended his life in peace, he was neither a martyr nor did he merit the aureole.

The third aureole is owed to doctors or preachers: namely, to those who preach and teach only those things which pertain to the salvation of souls.

The reason for this is that a special aureole is owed to a special victory. Therefore, just as through virginity and martyrdom someone has a special victory over the flesh and the world, and consequently a special aureole, so also, when someone repels the devil attacking through error not only from his own heart but also from the hearts of others, he merits an aureole.

The reason for this is that by such salutary teachings he conquers the devil as though by certain spiritual arms, concerning which it is said in 2 Corinthians 10: "The arms of our warfare are not carnal, but spiritual."

The aureole is not owed to prelates whose office it is to teach or preach unless they actually preach. The reason is that a crown is not owed to habitual struggle and victory, but to actual struggle and victory, according to that saying of 2 Timothy 2: "No one will be crowned unless he has competed lawfully." Therefore the aureole is owed to anyone who lawfully exercises this act, namely, the act of teaching or preaching.

Third, concerning the aureole, the preeminence of dignity must be considered. This can be considered from three aspects: namely, from the aspect of the struggle, its permanence, and its subject matter.

In the first way, that aureole is more excellent which is owed to the stronger struggle. In this manner the aureole of the martyrs excels the other aureoles, because there is a more difficult struggle there.

In the second way, the aureole can be considered from the aspect of permanence, and thus...

...the aureole of virgins excels the other aureoles, because the struggle of the flesh is more dangerous insofar as it is more lasting and presses upon us more nearly.

Third, the aureole can be considered from the aspect of the subject matter about which the struggle occurs, and thus the aureole of doctors and preachers is the most excellent among all. The reason for this is that the struggle of doctors or preachers concerns intelligible goods, whereas the other struggles - namely, those of virgins and martyrs - concern passions.

Although one aureole is greater than another in a certain respect, nevertheless, speaking simply, the aureole of the martyrs is the more excellent among them all. This is proved by reason, authority, and observance.

By reason, as follows. Where the struggle is more difficult and the victory greater, there the aureole is more excellent. But the struggle and victory of the martyrs is of this kind, as is evident above. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, it is proved by authority. Matthew 5: "Blessed are those who suffer persecution for justice," and so forth. The gloss says that all the other beatitudes are perfected in this one.

Third, it is proved by the observance of the Church. For in the commemoration of the saints, the Church places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins, in order to show the preeminence of the martyrs with respect to the doctors and virgins. All these things are from Thomas, Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, article 5.

Fourth, concerning the aureole, its correspondence must be considered: that is, to what part of the dowry the aureoles correspond.

It is answered that they correspond to paraphernal goods. Paraphernal goods are those things that a woman has outside or beyond the dowry from her parents and friends: Code, *On Agreements Concerning Dowry*, law *By This Law*; Digest, *On the Law of Dowry*, law *If I*, § *Of Dowry*; and the gloss on chapter *From the Letters*, *On Pledges*.

In these paraphernal goods the husband has no right of administration if the woman objects, unless she has handed those goods over to her husband, as in the final law of the Code, *De promi*. In that case the husband has their administration and can live with his wife from their fruits, as the text and Bartolus there say.

These things suffice concerning the first receptacle of separated souls: namely, the Empyrean Heaven.

Addition

Note from this that the crown of the aureole is not owed to angels, because there is no struggle in them, since they are immortal and incorruptible. Therefore they cannot suffer martyrdom; and since virginity is connatural to them, they cannot have the character of an excellent victory.

Indeed, it does not belong even to Christ, as Peter of Palude says in Book IV, distinction 41, because nothing is that to which it is similar.

Nevertheless, the distinction of Richard in Book IV, distinction 49, article 5, question 5, must be observed. For an aureole can be considered in two ways: either according to that which it is, or under the aspect by which it is given by a prince to a soldier.

In the first way, the threefold aureole exists most perfectly in Christ, because he was the most perfect virgin, the most perfect doctor, and because he endured death for the truth and glory of God.

In the second way, however, it is not owed to him, because Christ is the prince of the soldiers.

If you desire more concerning this subject, see Bonaventure on Book IV, distinction 33, article 2, question 3, and Robert Holcot on the Book of Wisdom.

Question Three

Concerning the second receptacle of separated souls, namely hell, containing under itself thirteen questions

Question One

Whether hell exists in truth

It is asked whether hell is found after death according to truth, or whether it is a fiction for terrifying laypeople and extorting temporal goods from them.

It appears that this little question should first be answered negatively, by the arguments of Plato and Origen.

First, by the reasonings of Plato, as Augustine says in Book XXI of *The City of God*, chapter 13, as follows. Every divine or legal punishment is applied for the sake of correction or of advancement toward virtue. But after the passing of this age, the demons and the damned will not repent of their sins through contemplation of eternal punishment, nor will they cease to sin; and the blessed, according to the common law, will not be able to advance further in good upon any occasion whatever. Therefore after this life neither hell nor its eternal punishments ought to be posited.

The major premise is evident through the Psalmist, who says: "When he slew them, they sought him; and they returned and came to him early in the morning." And again: "Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek your name, O Lord."

Isidore also says in Book V of the *Etymologies* - and it is placed in distinction 4, chapter *The Cause of the Establishment of Laws* - that the purpose of laws is to restrain human audacity and curb the capacity to do harm. And in the gloss on the Digest, *On Justice and Right*, law *Justice*:

> *The good hate to sin from love of virtue;*
> *the evil hate to sin from fear of punishment.*

The minor premise is proved through Gregory, Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 37 - and it is placed in chapter *As Each One Is*, distinction 25 - who says: "As each person departs from here, so he is presented at the final judgment."

This saying must be understood of souls departing in a state of damnation or salvation: namely, that...

...a mortal fault not erased here through penance or baptism is carried with such fault to judgment, never thereafter to be erased or remitted.

And it is said in Ecclesiastes 11: "If the tree falls toward the south or toward the north, in whatever place it falls, there it will always be." The tree is a human being. The north signifies hell and the south heaven.

And it is said in Ecclesiastes 9: "Whatever your hand is able to do, do it earnestly, because neither work, nor reason, nor knowledge will be among the dead, whither you hasten."

That the blessed also cannot advance in merit is evident because merit belongs to the state of the present life. Hence Paul said: "Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation." And Isaiah: "In an acceptable time I heard you, and on the day of salvation I helped you."

Second, Plato argues as follows. Certain philosophers and poets fabricated that hell was below, a most sorrowful place full of every kind of punishments and miseries, and that the souls of the lost would descend there to be punished without end.

They also fabricated the wrath and beneficence of gods and goddesses, not because they believed in their minds that it was truly so - since they held that no punishments would befall the wicked after death - but they invented this because of fear of tyrants: namely, so that tyrannical princes would be feared by their subjects, as Augustine says in Book VI of *The City of God*.

Likewise, in Book III of *The City of God*, Augustine says that in ancient times those who presided over cities fabricated many false things concerning the gods and places of punishment, judging that those things would be useful if they were believed by the people, in order to draw them back from vices and summon them to virtues.

Statius spoke for this opinion in the *Thebaid*, saying:

> *Fear first made gods in the world.*

And Cicero, in Book I of *On the Nature of the Gods*, says: "Certain persons said that the whole opinion concerning the immortal gods was devised by wise human beings for the sake of the commonwealth, so that religion might lead to duty those whom reason could not."

And Cicero says in Book III of the invectives against Catiline: "Thus, so that some fear might be set before the wicked in life, those ancients wished that certain punish-

ments had been established for the impious in the lower world."

Seneca sets forth the same thing in tragedy 6, meter 5. And the Platonists, as Augustine says in the place cited above, were accustomed to say that it was useful in cities for brave men to believe themselves born from the gods, even if this were false, so that with confidence in a divine lineage they might more boldly undertake great deeds.

Second, Origen argues for this side in a deadly and poisonous manner. He wills that all the damned, and even the demons, be saved at the end of the world through divine mercy, and consequently that hell not be found, at least after the universal judgment.

First, as follows. It is said in Wisdom 11: "You have mercy on all, O Lord, and you have hated none of the things you made." But the damned and the demons are also numbered among all things. Therefore God will have mercy on them also at the end of the world.

And it is said in Genesis 6: "My spirit will not remain in the human being forever, because he is flesh." But the spirit of God, as the gloss there says, is taken for indignation. The indignation of God and the punishment he inflicts appear to be the same. Therefore, if the spirit - that is, the indignation of God - will not remain in a human being forever, neither, similarly, will punishment.

Likewise, Psalm 35 says: "You will save human beings and beasts, O Lord." According to Origen, "human beings" means rational beings, and "beasts" means demons.

And again: "Will he in his wrath restrain his mercies?" as though to say, no. But the wrath of God is his punishment.

And Anselm says in the book *Why God Became Man*: "It is not just that God should allow the rational creature, which he made for blessedness, to perish altogether." But the damned are also among rational creatures. Therefore he will not allow them to perish eternally.

Likewise, God wills all human beings to be saved, as Paul says in 1 Timothy 2. But the will of God is so efficacious that it must be fulfilled entirely and no one can resist it in any manner, for "whatever he willed, he did in heaven and on earth," as the Psalm says. Therefore all human beings, even the damned, will be saved at least after the judgment, and consequently there will be no hell after the judgment.

But because certain carnal human beings, intoxicated with the goods of this age, follow this erroneous opinion of Pla-

to and Origen so that they can live more licentiously, gloriously, and voluptuously, I shall therefore prove briefly, by five reasons, by authorities, and by examples, that hell exists before and after the judgment.

First, by reason of divine perfection. For mercy and justice belong to God. "For all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth," says the Psalm; and elsewhere: "Power is yours, O Lord, and mercy; and you will render to each according to his works."

For if he were just without mercy, he would be cruel; and if merciful without justice, he would be foolish, as in chapter *Discipline*, distinction 45. Therefore Thomas says throughout Part I, question 21, that the mercy and justice of God are found in every work.

Mercy is indeed found with respect to the first root, as, for example, creation in all things; and in the human being, his creation and the end of his blessedness, which depends upon the goodness of the divine will alone.

Distributive justice is found insofar as he renders to each according to the nature and dignity of each, in this world or in the future. Therefore Dionysius says in chapter 8 of *The Divine Names*: "It is necessary to see in this that the true justice of God consists in his assigning to all their proper things according to the dignity of each existing thing and preserving the nature of each in its proper order and power."

Therefore, just as from mercy he will reward the good eternally in heaven, so from justice he will condemn the wicked perpetually in hell.

Second, it is proved by reason of the condition of opposites. For when one of two opposites or contraries is found in nature, the other is also found, Book I of the *Metaphysics* and Book II of *On the Heavens* - unless, however, one of them were infinite.

But according to the philosophers, there is found a place where there is an absence of all contrariety and a fullness of all beauty, transparency, and luminosity, as is evident concerning the nine movable heavens removed from all contrariety, Book I of *On the Heavens*. According to Plato's view, the souls of the good ascend to these heavens, to stars corresponding to them.

Or, according to the Greeks and Waldensians, there is found a place...

...and a certain region on the surface of the earth that is most temperate and most pleasing in all delights, loftier than all the earth, situated in the east and on the right side of heaven, which is nobler than the left, Book II of *On the Heavens*. This is called the terrestrial Paradise, the garden of delights, or the Paradise of pleasure, Genesis 2. According to the Greeks and Waldensians, the souls not fully purged ascend to this place until the day of judgment.

Or, according to Christian theologians, there is found a place of inconceivable beauty and of an indescribable disposition in glory, where there is every good without any evil, where there are unfailing light and the peace of God that surpasses every understanding. This is the Empyrean Heaven, immediately surrounding all nine movable heavens, in which place the souls of the saints rest and enjoy eternal joy and the divinity.

Therefore, from the opposite, there can be found and there ought to be some place or some subterranean region at the center, surrounding the middle of the world at the lowest point. This region is full of a certain fire and naturally dark, deprived of every influx of celestial light because the element of earth surrounding this region is simply opaque, altogether lacking transparency, without which light can nowhere be diffused or penetrate.

In this region there is every evil without any good, and all the contraries of those things that are in the heavenly bodies, in the terrestrial Paradise, or in the Empyrean Heaven. There the damned will be tormented forever and ever.

Third, it is proved by reason of honorable equity. For according to the canons and laws, in doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer path. In the *Decretals*, *On Homicide*, chapter *Upon Hearing*, and *On the Cleric Who Excommunicates*, chapter *That*, it is said that in doubtful matters the safer path is to be chosen. And in *On Betrothal*, chapter *The Young Man*, it is said: "In those things that are doubtful, we ought to hold what we judge to be more certain." And in *On Penance*, distinction 7, Augustine says in chapter *No One*, § *If Anyone*: "Hold what is certain and leave what is uncertain."

Hence Cicero says in Book I of *On Duties*: "They give a good precept who forbid one to do anything when one doubts whether it is just or unjust." And the jurist says in law *Always*, Digest, *On Rules of Law*: "In doubt, the more benign things are always to be pre-

ferred." He says the same in law *In Ambiguous Matters* of the same title.

Since, therefore, it is more benign, more honorable, and more consonant with reason to believe that the wicked who perpetrate evils here without fear, and are not chastised in this age, are punished elsewhere after death in hell, than to believe that those who always end their lives here in iniquity carry away advantage from the evils they have committed and are enriched with virtue after death, having always rejoiced in iniquity during life, as is said in *On Penance*, distinction 7 - therefore hell after death must certainly be posited for such persons.

For otherwise, from the uninterrupted prosperity here of wicked persons punished neither here nor elsewhere after death, it would be argued that God is unjust, unmerciful, improvident, and partial. To believe this about him would be more merciless, less benign, and less safe for those who believe in him.

Fourth, it is proved by reason of the divine threat. For God and Christ and the saints threaten evildoers with hell after death, according to Matthew 25: "These will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life"; and Job 21: "They hold the timbrel and harp and rejoice at the sound of the organ; they spend their days in good things and in a moment descend into hell."

But if you say that Christ threatened hell in order to terrify the wicked and convert them to good, not in order to inflict punishments, hear Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 37: "What if someone says, 'Christ threatened eternal punishment to sinners for this reason, so that he might restrain them from the perpetration of sins'? It is answered that, if what God threatened in order to correct from injustice is false, then what he promised in order to incite to justice is also false. But who, even though insane, would presume to say this? For if God threatened what he was not going to fulfill, then, while we wish to assert that he is merciful, we are compelled to proclaim that he is deceitful - which it is impious to say."

Thus Gregory. And Jerome writes to Pammachius and Oceanus concerning this as follows: "Do we think, brothers, that the prophets preach in jest, that the Apostles speak with laughter, that Christ threatens judgment childishly? But there are no jests where punishments inter-

vene. If they suffered in jest, let them be believed also to have spoken in jest. Isaiah is cut apart by a saw; Daniel is consigned to lions; Paul is beheaded by the sword; Peter is suspended on a cross after the Lord's example. All this was so that by their teaching they might recall us from sins."

Thus Jerome.

The fifth reason is from the condition of the universal world. For no particular community and no temporal dominion is without some place of justice, because justice is of the greatest perfection.

For God says in Exodus 22: "You shall not permit sorcerers to live upon the earth." Therefore in the whole kingdom of the world also, of which no one other than God is lord - because "the earth is the Lord's and its fullness" - some place of torments ought to be assigned where divine justice toward the reprobate may be shown. This place is called hell.

Second, the existence of hell is proved by authorities, and first by sacred Scripture. In Genesis 37 Jacob said to Reuben, when he had seen the tunic of his son Joseph stained with blood: "I will descend mourning to my son into hell." And in Numbers 16, Dathan and Abiron "descended alive into hell."

Virgil says in Book VI of the *Aeneid*:

> *Easy is the descent to Avernus;*
> *by night and by day the door of dark Dis lies open;*
> *but to recall one's step and escape to the upper air -*
> *this is the task, this the toil.*

And in the same place he also says:

> *Each of us suffers his own shades,*

and so forth.

Juvenal, in Book I, satire 2, says that there are certain shades, and so forth. And Seneca says in tragedy 1: "Whoever is placid," and so forth. See above in the question concerning the immortality of souls.

And Ovid says in Book IV of the *Metamorphoses*:

> *There is a descending road, gloomy with funereal yew;*
> *it leads through mute silences to the infernal abodes.*

And below:

> *The city, spacious enough for a thousand entrances,*
> *has gates open on every side.*

And Lactantius, in Book VI of the *Divine Institutes*, says concerning the lower world: "Zeno the Stoic taught that the abodes of the pious are separated from those of the impious; that the former inhabit quiet and delightful re-

gions, but that the latter pay penalties in dark places and in foul and dreadful chasms."

That hell exists is also proved from the manifold restoration of souls to bodies, so that they might make known the punishments and other things that they saw occur among the dead, as blessed Gregory truthfully relates in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 28. There at the beginning he says: "The heavenly goodness, from the great worthiness of its mercy, arranged that some persons should return suddenly to the body even after their departure, so that they might at least fear, once they had seen them, the torments of hell which they had not believed when they heard of them."

This is evident concerning Lazarus, who never laughed after he had been raised. Moreover, afterward he so chastised himself with fasts, vigils, and labors that, even if his tongue were silent, his manner of life declared that he had seen torments among the dead. Thus Gregory.

Now reply must be made to the three arguments of Plato set forth at the beginning of this little question.

To the first, it is said that it is erroneous to say with the philosophers that eternal punishments will be fruitless when the benefit of the punishments ceases, and that therefore they must be ended. It would perhaps follow in the same way that medicines are fruitless and

therefore must come to an end because the sick cannot be cured and the healthy cannot become ill.

For according to the irrefutable truth of the Catholic religion, the punishments of the damned will exist eternally for three reasons: namely, for the manifestation of God's justice; for the beauty of the universe through the comparison of the good and the wicked; and for the delight of the blessed, who see vengeance being most justly exacted upon those who unjustly glorified themselves in this life, according to the saying: "The just person will rejoice when he sees vengeance; he will wash his hands in the blood of the sinner."

To the second and third, however, it must be said that the philosophers and poets who fabricated that hell existed for the utility of the commonwealth, while not believing that hell existed in fact, deserved to be called not wise but foolish.

First, because fictions concerning punishments of this kind are unlawful according to the faith, just as they are doubtful. Second, because even according to natural reason, truth - which is a noble virtue pertaining to the intellect and to the regulation of affection - is not to be cast aside for just any advantage, since the honorable good is to be pre-

ferred to the useful good. But through that useful fiction, virtue, truth, and the honorable good were being cast aside for the sake of the commonwealth. Therefore it was not lawful to fabricate it, and so forth.

Nor is it the way of God or the process of reason that simple human beings should be recalled from sins and incited to virtues through deceptions, errors, or fictitious fables, as poets do. For those who used such means did not benefit human beings or the commonwealth, but harmed them exceedingly, as the outcome proved. For from this, in the course of time, execrable errors were rooted and confirmed among the gentile people; after Christ came, they could scarcely be extirpated, and only with great difficulty.

The fitting means of drawing human beings back from vices and inciting them to virtues are true teachings, apt rebukes, devout exhortations, promises of good things, and threats of punishments both of the present and the future age - punishments not fictitious, but most true, with all ambiguity removed. One who truly uses these means can deservedly be called wise.

As to the profane and heretical opinion of Origen in this matter, it is said first that the demons will never be saved. For, as Damascene says: "The fall is to angels what death is to human beings." But if human beings die in mortal sin, after death there is no redemption for them from hell. Therefore the angels also became similarly irrecoverable after the fall.

Therefore it was said in Matthew 25: "Go, accursed, into the eternal fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels." And it is said in Revelation 20: "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and sulfur, where the beast and the false prophets will be tormented day and night forever and ever." But in Scripture, "forever and ever" customarily signifies eternity. Therefore, and so forth.

That wicked human beings in this world who are afterward damned will never be saved is also evident by reason. For if all were saved at the end, it would follow that all could offend God at will and rejoice in the world, and that afterward, whether he willed it or not, God would save them. Thus they would pass from...

...delights to delights; they would enjoy present and future goods; here they would have a full belly, and there a full mind; they would be first in both ages; and thus, finally, on earth and in heaven, they would appear glorious. This is impossible, as Jerome says to Julian.

Reply is made to the authorities that Origen strained and faithlessly adduced for his false opinion.

To the first it is said that the distribution of "all" ought to be taken as an accommodated distribution according to this sense: namely, all those whom divine justice knows to be worthy of mercy. But the damned after death and the demons after the fall are irrecoverable.

Or it may be said that this distribution is understood for the classes of individuals and not for the individuals of the classes, as will be explained in reply to the last argument.

To the saying of Genesis 6, it is said that it is understood of the human being according to his race; hence indignation was taken away through the Passion of Christ.

To the saying of the Psalm, "Will God forget to have mercy, or will he restrain his mercies in his wrath?" it is said that this is understood of those who are vessels of mercy, because they are freed from misery not by their own merits but by God having mercy.

To the authority of Anselm it is said that it is understood of rational nature absolutely and simply, so that the sense is: it is not just for all of the nature of angels and of the nature of human beings universally to perish. But nothing prevents some of them from perishing and some from being saved.

To the saying of the Psalm, "You will save human beings and beasts, O Lord," reply is made by denying Origen's exposition.

To the last, Augustine replies by expounding the authority of the Apostle.

First, so that there may be an accommodated distribution according to this sense: God wills all human beings who are saved to be saved - not because there is no human being whom he does not will to be saved, but because no one is saved whom he does not will to be saved.

Second, it is expounded so that the distribution is for the classes of individuals and not for the individuals of the classes. According to this sense, God wills that some from what-

ever state of human beings be saved - males and females, Jews and gentiles, small and great - but not all from each state.

Although the authority of the Apostle can be drawn to these senses, nevertheless, because they do not follow from the force of the words, it must be explained otherwise according to Damascene, Book II, final chapter.

The divine will is divided into antecedent will and consequent will. By antecedent will God wills all human beings to be saved; by consequent will, however, he does not. And because the antecedent will is not always fulfilled, not all are saved.

To know what is called antecedent will in God and what is called consequent will, it must be noted that no diversity can be found in the divine will, since it is supremely simple. Nevertheless, by reason of the thing willed, nothing prevents it from being considered in diverse ways according to the diverse conditions of the things willed.

In the thing willed, according to the matter about which we now speak, two things must be considered: namely, that which is ordered, and its aids by which it is helped to attain the end to which it is ordered. According to each of these, the distinction of the will into antecedent and consequent can be taken.

For in that which is ordered to blessedness, nature and person must be considered. Therefore, with respect to nature, God wills all human beings to be saved, insofar as he gave to all a nature capable of and ordainable to blessedness.

With respect to the person, however, he does not will all human beings to be saved, for actions belong to the supposit and the person. And because many deviate from the ultimate end through their wicked actions, therefore, with respect to those things that belong to the person, God does not will all persons to be saved.

The first will of God is called antecedent and the second consequent, because a nature ordainable to the end ought to be considered prior to the actions of the person by which the end is attained or one deviates from it.

Second, this distinction of antecedent and consequent will can be taken with respect to the aids by...

...which a creature is helped.

For there are certain antecedent things, as it were certain common aids, which are given to all human beings so that they may be saved: namely, free choice, precepts, counsels, and things of this kind, by which all can be directed in those things that pertain to salvation.

Nevertheless, there are also certain special aids, such as grace, virtues, perseverance in good, and things of this kind, which are given to certain persons spiritually and singularly.

Therefore, because what is common precedes what is special in the order of nature, the divine will, insofar as it regards the common aids, is called antecedent will; but insofar as it regards the special aids, it is called consequent. In this way God wills all human beings to be saved by antecedent will, but not by consequent will.

The antecedent will is not always fulfilled, because it is not will simply, nor is the thing willed by antecedent will alone willed simply, but only in a certain respect. For the will concerning someone's salvation is a practical will, which necessarily regards the particular conditions of the supposits to whom the actions belong. The antecedent will does not do this, but the consequent will does.

Therefore, those things which God wills by antecedent will alone he does not will simply, and for that reason they need not be fulfilled.

These things are collected from Thomas, Part I, question 19, article 6, and Master Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Two

Where the place of hell is situated and positioned

It is asked whether hell is situated at the center of the earth, or where it is situated and positioned.

To this it is answered that the theological doctors do not establish with certainty where the place of hell is. For the Master of the *Sentences*, near the end of Book IV, distinction 45, says as follows: "What kind...

...of thing the eternal fire is, and in what part of the world or earth it will be, I think no human being knows, unless perhaps one to whom the divine Spirit has shown it."

And Augustine, in Book I of the *Retractations*, chapter 29, retracting what he had said in Book XII of *On Genesis*, speaks as follows: "It appears to me that I ought rather to have said that it is beneath the earth than to give a reason why it is believed to be beneath the earth."

And Gregory, when asked in Book IV of the *Dialogues* whether hell should be believed to be upon the earth or beneath it, says: "On this matter I do not dare to define rashly. For some think that hell is in a certain part of the earth, while others judge it to be beneath the earth." Thus Gregory.

Others say that hell is opposite the arid zone, which is between the equinoctial circle and the Arctic pole, in which place an excess of heat prevails. Or it is beneath one of the poles, where there is an excess of cold.

It can also be some region on the surface of the earth, beneath water or above the water in the manner of a great island, most intemperate, most troublesome, most horrible, and most deformed, which is called hell. With this conception agrees what certain persons dwelling in the extreme regions of the north beyond the Norwegians say: that there are many demons there, and that cries and horrible tumults are heard by the inhabitants of the islands.

But Master Peter of Tarentaise, Thomas, Richard, Master Bonaventure in Book IV, distinction 41, and Master Henry of Hesse on Genesis persuade us by three congruities that hell is at the center of the earth.

First, by reason of divine ordering, as follows. Since God is most wise, he established and ordered all things in their places according to the requirement of their natures. For it belongs to the wise person to order, Book I of the *Metaphysics*.

And Augustine says in Book XIX of *The City of God*, chapter 13, that order is "the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning its own place to each."

Therefore, just as he assigned to opposite natural and corporeal things diverse and opposite places corresponding to their proper na-

tures - for example, to light things a place above and at the circumference, and to heavy things a place below and at the center of the world - so he ought also to have established for spiritual things places fitting their natures.

Thus light, that is, spiritual, human beings, who fixed their hearts above the earth upon celestial and spiritual things, were to be established at the circumference of the whole world and at the summit of heaven. But heavy persons, weighed down by sins, who unduly fixed their hearts upon earthly goods on the earth, were to tend toward the middle of the whole and around the center of the world, and into the depth of hell.

Second, the same thing is proved by reason of assimilation. For place and that which is placed ought to be assimilated or proportioned, Book IV of the *Physics*.

Sinners have three conditions: distance, darkness, and coldness. For sin divides and distances the human being from God. Proverbs 15: "The Lord is far from the impious."

Sinners are dark: "For their wickedness has blinded them," Wisdom 2. Therefore they walk in darkness, and their ways are "darkness and a slippery place, and the angel of the Lord constraining them."

Sinners are cold through sin, which is called the poison of the soul by Augustine in the book *Eighty-Three Questions*. Poison, as Isidore says in Book I of the *Etymologies*, is most cold. Therefore the most remote, dark, and cold place is owed to them.

But hell, existing in the middle and at the center of the world, is supremely distant from heaven. It is naturally dark, deprived of every influx of celestial light, because the element of earth surrounding this region is simply opaque, altogether lacking transparency, without which light can never be diffused or penetrate.

It is naturally most cold; hence it is called Tartarus from trembling with cold, as Isidore says, because neither a ray of the sun penetrates there nor is the movement of air present.

Third, the same thing is proved by reason of opposition, as follows. Opposite places are accustomed to have opposite and contrary conditions and natures. But the terrestrial Paradise is a certain most temperate region on the surface of the earth, situated in the eastern region and on the right side of heaven. This region is most pleasing in all de-

lights. Therefore hell ought, from the opposite, to be posited in the lower parts of the earth: either in the inner or central parts of the sphere, or in superficial parts of the earth opposite the axis, which are called lower with respect to us. This region is most intemperate, most remote from heaven, and full of every trouble and contrariety.

Likewise, the terrestrial Paradise opposed to hell, as the doctors and historians say, has all things that are required for the goodness of a place, city, and region. For these are required: a fitting arrangement of mountains, the springing-up of fountains, the course of rivers, the nobility of plants, the pleasantness of animals, the goodness of influences, the regularity of breezes or winds, and the tempering of the elements.

Hence Damascene also says in Book II of the *Sentences*: "The terrestrial Paradise is situated in the east, loftier than all the earth, shining with temperate, very subtle, and very pure air, always flourishing with plants, filled with good fragrance, and full of all the most pleasing delights."

Therefore hell ought to have all things contrary to the terrestrial Paradise; and consequently, if Paradise is at the highest place, hell ought to be at the lowest place in the world.

Second, the same conclusion is proved by authorities.

Jonah 2 says: "You cast me into the deep, into the heart of the sea." There the gloss says that, just as the heart is in the middle and center of an animal, so hell is in the middle of the earth; and the middle of the earth is its center.

And Job 10: "Release me, therefore," and so forth.

And the Psalm says: "You have delivered me from the lower hell." There the gloss of Augustine says that there are two hells, an upper and a lower. The earthly habitation, where there are flesh and blood, decease and succession, mortality and mutability, is the upper hell. But from this earthly habitation and hell one goes to the lower hell.

Because of these two hells, the Son of God was sent everywhere to liberate: to one hell he was sent by being born, and to the other by dying. Thus Augustine.

And Isaiah 14: "Hell beneath was disturbed."

And Matthew 12: "Just as Jonah was in the belly of the whale for three days and three nights, so the Son of Man will be in the belly of the...

...earth for three days and three nights."

And Proverbs 9: "Her guests are in the depths of hell."

And it is said in Revelation 5 that when John had seen the book sealed with seven seals, he wept because he saw no one worthy to open it, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor beneath the earth. The book is sacred Scripture; opened means disclosed by Christ, who was from the tribe of Judah.

John indicates beings beneath the earth, as though there were some endowed with knowledge there: such as demons, the souls of the dead who were held wise here, the holy fathers, prophets, and many philosophers.

And in the gloss on causa 13, question 2, chapter *The Time*, at the word *hidden*, it is said: "Hell is beneath the earth, and heaven above."

Likewise, in causa 23, question 4, chapter *This Present Life*.

And Gregory, determining in Book IV what ought to be believed concerning the place of hell, says: "This strikes my mind: hell is called *infernus* because it lies lower."

Isidore says the same in Book IV of the *Etymologies*. Hence hell is also called Gehenna, from *geos*, which is "earth," and *hennos*, as though "the deep," because it is situated as though in the deep.

And Virgil, in Book VI, introduces Aeneas addressing Dido and saying:

> *Unhappy Dido, then the report that came to me was true:*
> *that you had died and sought your end by the sword.*
> *Alas, was I the cause of your death? By the stars I swear,*
> *and by the gods above, and by whatever faith is beneath the deepest earth,*
> *unwillingly, O queen, I withdrew from your shore.*

And Seneca in tragedy 5 introduces Theseus invoking: "By every law of the world, I pray you who rule the capacious kingdom, and you whom your mother Aetna sought in vain throughout her whole extent, that it may be permitted to speak with impunity of the laws hidden and covered by the earth."

And in the final tragedy, speaking of virtue, he says:

> *Renowned virtue is never borne to the Stygian shades.*
> *Live bravely; nor will cruel fates drag you*
> *through Lethean years. But when the final day*
> *has exacted its hours, glory will open a path to those above.*

The aforesaid truth can also be evident from examples in Gregory, Book IV of the *Moralia*, chapter 32, and from Saint Cyril to Augustine, in the passing of the blessed man.

These things are collected here from Book IV of the *Sentences* and from Henry.

Addition

It appears consonant with reason to me that the vilest place should correspond as a perpetual prison to unclean and most vile sinners. Such a place is at the middle of the earth, where, as though into a sewer, the dregs of the whole world are compelled to descend.

They say that many harmful qualities are there, and they have reported the distance to that place to be three thousand two hundred and forty-five miles. Pliny, however, in Book II, relates that a letter was found in the tomb of Dionysodorus the geometer, saying that he had arrived from the tomb at the middle of the earth and that the distance to that place was forty-two thousand stadia.

It is called *infernus* because nothing is lower than it. Others call it Tartarus, because it signifies impiety and cruelty, for there all act impiously.

Others call it Styx, which is interpreted as sadness. Others call it Erebus and Orcus. It is called Erebus because it is dark; for darkness is there both with respect to the absence of the divine vision and with respect to the absence of grace.

M. T. reported that this one was the son of Erebus and Night, of a degenerate spirit and an incorrupt will. It is called Orcus from the likeness of the sea beast called the orca, which is hostile to the whale.

The poets invented that the rule of the lower world was given to Pluto, son of Saturn, and said that his appearance was terrible. Hence Statius:

> *By chance, sitting in the midst, in the citadel of his unhappy kingdom,*
> *the ruler of Erebus was demanding from the peoples the crimes of their lives,*
> *pitying no human being and angry with all the shades.*

Virgil, however, in Book VI of the *Aeneid*, said that Rhadamanthus, the son of Jupiter, who was king of Lycia, an equitable man, and an executor of justice, examines the crimes of the guilty among the dead:

> *Cnossian Rhadamanthus holds these most harsh realms;*
> *he chastises, hears deceits, and compels each to confess*
> *what he…*

And in the same book Virgil described the evils that are in hell in these words:

> *And in the first jaws of Orcus, Grief,*

and so forth.

Question Three

Whether, elsewhere than at the center of the earth, places are found on the surface of the earth in which the souls of the damned undergo punishments

It is asked whether, elsewhere than at the center of the earth, places are found on the surface of the earth in which the souls of the damned undergo punishments.

To this it is answered thus: as Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, almighty God, for the correction of those living in this world, wished to show that in certain parts on the surface of the earth certain souls of the damned undergo punishments, so that the minds of

unbelievers, who do not believe that the torments of hell exist, may see the places of torments which they refuse to believe when they hear of them.

And in chapter 24 of the book cited above he adduces that a certain holy hermit who was dwelling on the island of Lipari in Sicily saw that the soul of King Theodoric was cast into the pot of Vulcan boiling there by Pope John and the patrician Symmachus, whom that king had killed before. And blessed Gregory rightly says there: "He appeared to be cast into the fire by those whom he had unjustly judged in this life."

Likewise, in chapter 3 he relates concerning a certain Roman, to whom, while he was laboring at the point of death, a ship appeared ready, by which he himself and a certain neighbor of his were to be brought to Sicily; immediately after this they died together. And, continuing, Gregory says: "What else can be understood from the fact that that dying man testified that he was to be led to Sicily, except that, beyond other places, in the islands of that land the pots of torments, belching fire, have opened? These, as those who know are accustomed to relate, with their bounds widened daily...

...grow, so that, as the end of the world draws near, to the extent that it is certain that more are gathered there to be burned, to that extent those same places of torments seem to be opened more widely." Thus Gregory.

From this account, however, it appears that by the pots of Vulcan are understood certain flame-vomiting pits, or certain caverns of the earth breathing forth a sulphurous flame.

Why, however, those pots are attributed to Vulcan is evident from Isidore in Book 22 of the *Etymologies*. He says that, according to the superstition of the gentiles, Vulcan is said to dwell in smiths' furnaces as though the God of fire, and fire is customarily understood figuratively through him. Indeed, on account of the many useful things that it confers upon the human being, enumerated there by Isidore, the gentiles established it as a god, naming it Vulcan, whom they say then to return when fire emits things like thunder and crackles with sparks.

And again Isidore says in Book XV that certain islands around Sicily are called Vulcanian because they themselves burn like Mount Etna, and that there are eight, whose names he sets down there. The first is Lipari, and so forth.

Etna, however, is a mountain breathing flames from burning sulphur, of which it is full. And Isidore says that that mountain has, on the side where Eurus and Africus blow, caverns full of sulphur which, agitated and moved by those winds, emit terrible flames. Thus it has been proclaimed by some that hell is there.

But the things said above concerning the situation of hell do not permit their opinion to stand. For not every place in which, or by which, a soul undergoes the punishment of damnation until the day of judgment is the principal place of hell. But there are certain particular places in which, for a reason known to God, certain souls of the damned undergo punishments until the day of judgment.

These things are from Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Four

What relation Purgatory, Limbo, and Abraham's bosom, or the bosom of the holy fathers, have beneath the earth to hell

It is asked what order and what relation beneath the earth the three penal places, namely Purgatory, Limbo, and...

...Abraham's bosom, or the bosom of the holy fathers, have to hell.

To this it is answered that there is a twofold opinion concerning the relation and order of the three penal places to hell.

The first is probable, namely that hell is the central region of the earth, and that every other region of the lower world surrounds it spherically, with respect to below and above, proportionally according to the differences of the inhabitants in unworthiness or dignity.

Thus, since according to the common opinion of the doctors there are four regions of the whole lower world - namely lower hell, the Limbo of children, Purgatory, and Abraham's bosom or the Limbo of the fathers - hell is the lowest central region. Immediately after it is the region of the children who died in original sin alone. Above this is the region for the purgation of souls, which is surrounded by the region called Abraham's bosom or the Limbo of the fathers.

The first two regions belong to the damned, but they differ with respect to punishment of sense and punishment of loss alone. The other two do not belong to the damned, but belong or belonged to those who are to be saved.

The other opinion concerning the order of the penal places in relation to hell is that these four regions do not surround one another spherically. This can occur in three ways.

In the first way, let us imagine a certain great pyramid of earth whose apex is the center of the world and whose base is the whole dry surface of the earth. Let us imagine that pyramid divided by transverse lines or surfaces into four regions separated from one another below and above, of which the lowest is hell and the others stand above it in the aforesaid order.

In the second way, these four regions can be related to one another after the manner of four spheres placed one above another, immediately or mediately, so that one is situated at the center of the world and the other three directly above it along one direction of celestial position.

In the third way, it can be that the three noncentral regions adjoin the central region at diverse differences of position - for example, one from the east, another from the west, and the third from the south, or conversely. Thus there are four conceptions concerning the configuration of the regions of the lower world. But the first is more probable and...

...more consonant with the sayings of the saints.

Nevertheless, whatever may be the constitution of the said regions, it seems that it should probably be posited that between Abraham's bosom and lower hell there is a certain intervening distance, as though impassable from every direction and obstructed by winding passages.

For it is said in Luke 16 that the rich banqueter, lifting up his eyes, saw Abraham from afar and Lazarus in his bosom, where a local distance seems to be denoted.

This is again evident from what is there read as spoken to Abraham: "And in all these things, between us and you, a great chasm has been established, so that those who wish to cross from here to you cannot, nor can they pass from there to here."

Taken literally, this seems to denote the interposition of an untraversable path, although the doctors expound it mystically.

That which is said in the person of uncreated Wisdom in Ecclesiasticus 24 also supports this opinion: "I will penetrate all the lower parts of the earth, and I will behold all who sleep, and I will enlighten all who hope in the Lord."

From all these things it follows that when the souls of the damned are led to hell at the center of the earth, to Lucifer abiding and bound there, they have to traverse all those subterranean regions. The souls that descend to the Limbo of children cross two, and those that go to Purgatory cross one; while crossing they see one another, speak to one another, and so forth.

And similarly, when souls are led from Purgatory into glory, freed from faults and punishments, perhaps for the confusion and increase of the punishments of the damned and of the demons, who hate the ascent of human beings into heaven, with God permitting they pass through the center of the world to their mansions in heaven.

These things are from Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Five

Which region of the penal places is greater

It is asked which is the greater region of the penal places.

To this it is answered that, if we wish...

...to consider the extent of the aforesaid regions, nothing occurs from which we can quantify them except the multitude of the inhabitants of each.

Therefore, on the supposition that every soul stripped of its body, like every spirit, determines for itself a certain corporeal space, the smallest of the aforesaid regions seems to have been Abraham's bosom. In it were all the saints of the Old Testament absolved from the punishment of Purgatory. They seem to have been few in comparison with those who were still held in Purgatory; these in turn were, and still are, few in comparison with those who are held in hell, and perhaps at times fewer than those who are held in the region of Limbo.

Consequently, I say from these things that the greatest of these regions is the region of lower hell. This can become apparent to anyone willing to consider attentively the number of those who are to be saved, the number of the damned, and the number of bodies to be assumed after the judgment.

For first, after the general resurrection the number of the good who are to be saved will perhaps not be smaller - indeed, perhaps it will be greater, as will be disputed elsewhere - than the multitude of damned human beings and demons. But the number of those who are to be saved will fill the Empyrean Heaven, which is far more capacious than all the space beneath the concavity of the lunar orb, indeed beneath the starry heaven, as is evident from the spheres of the heavens enclosing one another. Therefore the place of hell must be exceedingly spacious.

Second, this same thing is evident from the number of the damned. For now, over the course of more than six thousand four hundred and ninety-four years elapsed from the beginning of the world, the souls of the damned have descended to hell from all the regions of wayfarers, both faithful and unbelieving. If to them are added all the demons, who according to some are as many as the blessed angels, or more, and likewise the evil persons who exist at present and will exist in the future, who will die and be damned, then the multitude of the damned is exceedingly great, as is evident. Therefore the lower place of hell, wherever it may be, is of wondrous and astonishing magnitude and amplitude, and is greater...

...than all the other aforesaid regions.

Third, this same thing is especially evident from the number of bodies assumed by human beings after the general resurrection, which occupy circumscribed places. Therefore, because of the exceedingly great multitude of the damned, those who wish to quantify the place of hell speak in diverse ways.

For some say that although the number of the damned will be greater than the whole number of those who are to be saved, it will nevertheless not be necessary on this account that the space of hell be as spacious as that of Paradise. This is because hell has the character of a prison that confines and crushes, and not the character of a pleasant and unrestricted breadth; for a narrow place is given to the damned as punishment.

Hence it is said in the Psalm that the damned "have been placed in hell like sheep," animals that are packed very tightly together in sheepfolds.

Others say that the place of hell will extend spherically from the center of the earth and of the world toward the concavity of the lunar orb as far as will suffice for that multitude.

Others say that after the judgment the whole elemental region will be the place of hell, so that those who sinned in the elements of this world will be punished in them: the avaricious, namely, in earth; the lustful in water; the wrathful in fire; and the proud in air.

Others say that the center and hollow of the earth are more spacious than the part of the earth uncovered by the waters and inhabited by human beings. That part of the earth could never be filled completely over its surface by all human beings present, past, and future - granted that the world is to come to an end - so that not even its smallest part remained empty.

Others say, and more reasonably, that just as God from the beginning created the place of hell to detain and the instrument of fire by which the wicked would be punished there, so also from the beginning God in his providence provided for the capacity of the place: namely, that hell would be capable of receiving the damned locally and distinctly.

These things are from Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Six

Which region of the four penal places is more lasting

It is asked which region of the penal places is more lasting.

To this it is answered that of those four regions, the one belonging to the damned in hell, just as it is and will be immeasurably more extensive than the others, is likewise more lasting.

For the upper region, which is Abraham's bosom, perhaps first began to be inhabited at the death of righteous Abel, and it was depopulated immediately after the death of Christ. After this, the region of Purgatory began to be inhabited. It too was deprived of all its inhabitants by Christ when he descended to the lower world, as seems more probable to certain doctors. After that evacuation of Purgatory, that region again began to have inhabitants, and thereafter it will perhaps have them without interruption until the general resurrection of the dead.

But the whole region of hell, or of the damned alone, together with its unhappy inhabitants, will endure eternally, to be extended on high as regards the manifestation of divine justice through the distinct punishments of each, by a judgment of God hidden from us which will then be discerned by all.

These things are from Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Seven

How many mansions the infernal region has

It is asked how many prisons or mansions the infernal region has.

To this it is answered that the whole region of hell has seven prisons, or seems to have been divided into seven partial regions according to the seven mortal sins...

...or to be divided in this way after the judgment.

In support of this conception is blessed Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 26, where he says that whether the elect or the reprobate, those whose cause was common in deed are also led to common places; Christ's words satisfy us, even if examples should be lacking.

For Truth himself says of the elect in the Gospel: "In my Father's house there are many mansions." For if there were not unequal recompense in that eternal blessedness, one mansion rather than many would have had to be mentioned there. Therefore there are many mansions there, in which the distinct orders of the good rejoice together because of their fellowship of merits.

And the same Truth, Gregory says, announcing the day of the final judgment, says: "Then I will say to the reapers: Gather the tares, and bind them into bundles to be burned."

What, however, is it to bind the tares into bundles, except to join like with like in similar torments: the proud with the proud, the lustful with the lustful, the avaricious with the avaricious, the deceitful with the deceitful, and the unbelieving with the unbelieving? Therefore, when the angels assign those who are alike in fault to similar torments in penal places, they bind, as it were, bundles of tares to be burned. Thus Gregory.

Or it must be said that, just as after the consummation of the world diverse mansions or regions in hell will be ordered according to the hierarchies of the evil angels, so they will be ordered according to the differences in their states and faults.

Thus, namely, those evil angels who were, or who, if they had stood, would have been, from the Seraphim highest in heaven became the lowest when they fell. And those who would have been Cherubim, when they fell, were established in a choir above them, so that those who would have been from the lowest order of the angelic host will be placed in the highest place of hell.

Therefore, just as in heaven some human beings will be placed with each order of angels on account of conformity of merits, so proportionally in the hierarchies of hell, through conformity of demerits, human beings will be placed among the choirs of demons. Thus in the lowest place of the Seraphim of hell will be placed those who here feign that they burn with the love of God, as, for example, religious persons...

...and so forth, and who burn with the ambition of the devil.

In the choir of the Cherubim of hell will be placed those enlightened by knowledge, but not for themselves nor rightly for others.

In the choir of the Thrones of hell will be placed those who pretend to be poor and hoard wealth for a bishopric.

In the order of the Dominations of hell will be placed bad prelates, both spiritual and temporal, kings, dukes, and counts.

In the order of the Virtues of hell will be placed the sowers of tares, and so with each of the orders.

But if someone should object that according to Job 10 there is no order in hell, whereas here an order of seven prisons or of three hierarchies is posited, it is answered that Job means the order of intentions and operations, which are not in hell. For none of the damned has an intention or act duly ordered toward the end, which is God.

These things are drawn from Henry of Hesse on Genesis.

Question Eight

Whether the fire of hell is corporeal, similitudinary, or imaginary

It is asked whether the fire of hell is corporeal, similitudinary, or imaginary.

To this it is answered thus: Avicenna, in Book IX of his *Metaphysics*, denying the burning of bodies after the judgment because he does not admit the resurrection of the flesh, and seeing that a spirit cannot naturally suffer from corporeal fire, said for this reason that the fire of hell was not corporeal but imaginary. Thus the souls of the wicked after death are said to be burned by fire because they imagine that they are being tormented, apprehending fire under the aspect of something unsuitable.

And there he gives the example of a dreamer who, from the phantasmal apprehension of something unsuitable in sleep, is sometimes tormented more than he would have been by the presence of the same thing while awake. But this is false and erroneous, because imagination...

...is a certain power that uses a corporeal organ. Hence it cannot be that such imaginings occur in a soul separated from the body as they do in the soul of one who dreams.

Therefore he said that if that fire is not imaginary, it is certainly similitudinary. In this way souls are understood to burn in fire and to be afflicted spiritually by stenches, just as they are said to be gladdened - namely, to laugh or to be refreshed - things that are not understood to occur in any corporeal thing, but in the spirit alone.

And if someone should say, "Why, then, are the spiritual delights and punishments of the blessed and of the wicked demonstrated and depicted corporeally?" Avicenna answers that

spiritual sadness and delight are very little known, and human beings are moved better toward love or fear by corporeal things than by spiritual things.

But since this too is false, it must therefore be said that the fire of hell is a true corporeal fire and of the same species as that which we see. This is proved by reason and by authority.

First, by reason, thus: nothing corporeal can fittingly be applied to a body as punishment except something corporeal. But the punishment of the damned will not be only the punishment of loss and the privation of the divine vision, which corresponds to the aversion that existed in mortal sin; there will also be corporeal punishment of sense, which corresponds to conversion toward a changeable good. Corporeal punishment, however, is inflicted through bodies. Therefore the fire is corporeal.

Second, this is also proved by the authority of the Philosopher in Book I of the *Topics*, who says that every water is the same in species as every other water. Therefore, by the same reasoning, every fire is the same in species as every other fire.

Third, it is proved by the authority of Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues* and of Augustine, who say that the souls of the damned are afflicted by corporeal fire.

These things are from Thomas on the *Sentences*, distinction 44.

Others nevertheless say, as Scotus recounts in Book IV, that a certain supernatural disposition is given to spirits and souls because of the demerit of sin, and through it they are subjected to a corporeal agent so that they can suffer from it. Scotus, however, disproves this, and rightly.

Question Nine

Whether demons and spiritual souls can suffer and be tormented by infernal and corporeal fire

It is asked whether demons and separated spiritual souls can suffer and be tormented by corporeal infernal fire, and how.

To this it first seems that a negative answer should be given, from Augustine in Book XII *On Genesis*, chapter 42: "The agent ought to be nobler than the patient." Corporeal fire is not more excellent than a spirit.

Likewise, Aristotle says in Book I *On Generation* that a body does not act except through contact. But a body cannot touch a spirit, because those things touch one another whose outermost parts are together, according to Book V of the *Physics*. A spirit, however, is indivisible and does not have an outermost part.

Likewise, according to Book I *On Generation* and Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures*, only those things act upon and suffer from one another which share in matter. But the soul and corporeal fire do not share in matter, because corporeal and spiritual things do not have a common matter, according to Book XI of the *Metaphysics*.

Likewise, everything that suffers receives something from the agent. Therefore, if the soul should suffer from corporeal fire, it will receive something from it. But everything received in something exists there according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore fire will be received spiritually in the soul. But spiritual things received by the soul are perfections of the soul and not punishments. Therefore fire received in the soul will not be its punishment, but rather a perfection.

Likewise, a corporeal agent does not act upon remote things except by acting upon the intermediaries. But souls and demons are sometimes outside the place of hell, since they sometimes appear to human beings in this world, and yet they are not immune from punishment. Nevertheless, we see that not all the things intermediate between them and the fire of hell suffer from it. Therefore it seems that the souls of the damned do not suffer from the corporeal fire of hell.

The same is proved by authority...

...from Tertullian in the *Apology*, a book of defense, chapter 46, who says: "Therefore at the judgment bodies too will be presented again, because the soul alone cannot suffer anything without stable matter, that is, flesh; and all things ought to suffer from the judgment of God, souls not without flesh, because not without flesh did they merit, since they carried out all things within it." Thus he.

And Lactantius says in Book VII, chapter 21: "Since souls have in themselves nothing solid and tangible, they cannot suffer force from solid and corporeal things. But because they live in spirits alone, they are tractable by God alone, whose power and substance are spiritual. Yet the sacred writings teach us how the impious will undergo punishments; for because they contracted sins in bodies, they will again be clothed in flesh, so that in bodies they may pay the penalty." Thus he.

On the opposite side are the faith and Luke 16, speaking of the rich banqueter, of whom it is said that he was tormented by the fire of hell.

It seems that this question should be answered under this conclusion: a separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire and be tormented by it.

This is proved first by reason. The same account applies to separated souls as to demons. But demons suffer from corporeal fire, as is evident in Matthew 25: "Go, accursed ones, into the eternal fire that has been prepared for the devil and his angels." Therefore separated souls too can suffer from corporeal fire.

Likewise, punishment ought to correspond to fault. But through fault and depraved concupiscence the soul subjected itself to the body. Therefore it is also just that in punishment it be subjected through sufferings to a corporeal nature.

Hence Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues*: "If the devil and his angels, although they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by corporeal fire, what wonder is it if souls, before they receive their bodies, can be tormented by corporeal fire?" It is as though he said that it is no wonder.

It must therefore be held firmly that a separated soul can suffer, be afflicted, and be tormented by corporeal fire. But concerning the mode by which it can suffer, diverse persons have thought diverse things.

For some said that the soul suffers from the fire solely by seeing the fire. But this is false, because sight, as sight, is a perfection of the one seeing.

Others said that the soul suffers from the fire by imagining it as harmful to itself. But to hold this is heretical, because then the punishment of the fire of hell would not be real according to truth...

...but apparent and imaginary.

Others said that the soul suffers from the fire by being altered - for example, by receiving from the fire heat, burning heat, dryness, or scorching. This is false, because such sufferings are sufferings of a body and not of a spirit.

Therefore Thomas, explaining the matter in Book IV, distinction 44, says that although the fire of hell is truly a corporeal fire, it nevertheless does not afflict souls corporeally - that is, so as to burn them after the manner of a body - but spiritually. It does so in four ways: by detaining, impeding, subjugating, and acting as an enemy.

First, by detaining or binding, and this is granted to the fire supernaturally. For although a corporeal thing can delimit an incorporeal spirit in place, and a spirit can be united to a body as a mover to the mobile or as that which is located to a place - for a spiritual creature is delimited in place in this way, namely by existing and operating in one place and not in another, in the manner in which incorporeal things are said to be in place - nevertheless a corporeal thing, and consequently the fire of hell, cannot naturally and by its own power detain circumscriptively an incorporeal spirit delimited in place, bound in one place so that it cannot turn itself toward other places.

For that which is of lesser power, such as a body of fire, cannot by its own power bind or hold that which is of greater power, namely a spirit and a soul. But the fire of hell has the power to hold and bind a soul and evil spirits insofar as it is an instrument of vindicating divine justice, so that it holds the spirit and soul bound in a certain manner. In this respect that fire is truly harmful to a spirit.

This is evident from an example. For we see that, by the power of certain words and with God permitting it, demons are bound to certain bodies, are driven down, and thus suffer. Therefore much more will the soul be driven down, bound, and made to suffer by corporeal fire as the instrument of vindicating divine justice.

In the second way, corporeal fire inflicts punishment upon the soul by delaying it or impeding it from the execution of its own will. For a stone is said to suffer when it is prevented from tending downward, and a human being is said to suffer when he is detained or bound so that he cannot go where he wishes. Thus the fire of hell...

...as the instrument of divine justice, by delaying or impeding the soul from the execution of its own will - namely, so that the soul cannot operate where it wishes and according to what it wishes - is made exceedingly penal to the soul or spirit.

Thomas gives the example of blessed Augustine in Book XXI of *The City of God*, who says that just as the spiritual soul naturally conceives and receives the greatest love from conjunction with the body, so the soul bound to fire and detained by it conceives the greatest horror and pain from that detention.

Third, the fire of hell inflicts punishment upon the soul by subjugating it. For just as the soul or spirit is rewarded essentially by being joined to the superior God, so through being deprived of the divine vision it is joined and subjected to the lowest things, namely fire and the lowest and most abject place of the earth, and is constrained there. From this it is exceedingly afflicted, suffers, and is anguished.

Fourth, fire inflicts punishment upon souls and spirits by acting as an enemy. For when the soul sees and apprehends that harmful fire as an instrument of vindicating divine justice, and consequently as harmful and hostile to itself, it is afflicted and tormented by inward sadness. This is not because that fire harms the soul by the very fact that it is seen

intellectually, since nothing is contrary and saddening to the intellect insofar as something is understood by it. Rather, it becomes saddening insofar as it is seen as repugnant to the will.

These matters are touched upon by Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, and by Thomas in Book IV of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, chapter 90, in *Quodlibets* II and III, and in the disputed questions *On the Soul*, question 21.

Now a response is given to the arguments on the opposite side.

To the first it is answered that although a spiritual soul is more noble absolutely than the corporeal fire of hell, nevertheless insofar as that fire is an instrument of divine justice by whose power it operates, it can be said, and can be made, more noble than the soul itself.

To the second it is said that although there is no corporeal or physical contact between the soul and a body, there is nevertheless between them a certain spiritual contact and contact of power. Thus the mover of the heaven, although spiritual, touches the heaven with spiritual contact by moving it. It touches also in the manner in which one who saddens is said to touch, as is said in Book I *On the Heavens*. This mode suffices for action.

To the third it is answered by denying the consequence and saying that the Philosopher and Boethius speak of that action through which the patient is transformed...

...into the nature of the agent. The action of fire upon the soul, however, is not such an action.

To the fourth it is answered by denying the consequence. The reason is that the assumption is true of that which suffers from an agent by way of influx. But fire does not act upon the soul by way of influx, but by way of detaining, as has been said.

To the fifth it is answered that damned spirits are never now outside hell except by divine dispensation, either for the instruction or for the exercise of the elect. But wherever they may be outside hell, they nevertheless always see the fire of hell as prepared for them as punishment. Since that vision is immediately afflicting, as has been said, damned spirits are therefore afflicted by the fire of hell wherever they are, just as prisoners who are outside a prison are in a certain way afflicted by the prison when they see that they are condemned to it.

Hence, just as the glory of the elect is in no way diminished, either with respect to essential reward or with respect to accidental reward, even if some are outside the Empyrean Heaven - which in some way contributes to their glory - so the punishment of the damned is in no way diminished if any are placed outside hell for a time by divine dispensation.

And this is what the gloss says on James 3, "It sets on fire the wheel of birth": "Wherever the devil may be, whether beneath the air or beneath the earth, he carries with him the torments of his flames."

The objection proceeds, however, as if corporeal fire afflicted spirits immediately in the same way that it afflicts bodies.

The authorities are answered thus. First, in reply to Tertullian, it is denied that demons and souls without bodies cannot suffer from corporeal fire. For the power of God is so great that it can affect and chastise incorporeal things in whatever way he wills, either by himself or in fire, in a manner imperceptible and inexpressible to us.

And when it is said that souls merited nothing without the body and therefore ought to be tormented and punished in their own bodies, this is likewise denied. For, as has been said

according to the mind of Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, question 7, acts of the soul in merit or demerit precede the acts of bodies in two ways: with respect to time and with respect to value. With respect to time, the intention of doing good or doing evil is held before it is put...

...into execution; and all the goodness ascribed to the exterior acts of bodies previously had its origin and form from the will.

To the statement of Lactantius it is also answered by denying Lactantius on this point, just as he is also denied in his other errors.

Question Ten

Whether there is any difference between the fire of hell and that of this world

It is asked what difference there is between the fire of hell and the fire of this world.

To this it is answered that, although it is unknown to us in what matter the fire of hell exists - whether in its proper matter, as it is in its own sphere in which it does not shine, as the philosophers say; or in alien matter, namely terrestrial matter, as in coal, or aerial matter, as in flame; or ignited through violence, as is evident in iron; or ignited by nature from an intrinsic principle, as is evident in sulphur - nevertheless, in whatever matter the fire is found in hell, it is always of the same species as our fire, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, as Thomas says in Book IV in the place cited above.

Insofar as that fire is the instrument of divine justice, however, it differs in many respects from the fire that exists among us.

First, it differs because our fire naturally burns but does not detain. That fire binds and detains, as was said above.

Second, our fire is corruptible when its matter fails. The fire of hell is incorruptible because it exists in immortal matter, namely the soul and an unconsumable body, as will be said immediately below.

Third, our fire needs a kindler and is nourished by a kindler, because it is kindled violently. The fire of hell does not need a kindler, for "the breath of the Lord, like a torrent of sulphur, kindles it," as is said in Isaiah 30. Nor does the fire need wood, because God gave it such a nature.

Fourth, the fire among us gives delight by its light. The fire of hell shines little...

...and shines for the punishment of the damned, so that they may see the things that afflict them and from this may grieve. Hence the Psalm says: "The sinner will see and will be angry; with his teeth," and so forth.

Fifth, our fire does not by its proper power torture some more and others less. But the fire of hell will torment according to the measure of sin, so that in the mode of its action it follows the mode of the fault. This is evident in the fire of a furnace, which in its action is modified by the skill of the smith according as is fitting for the artisan's effect.

Hence Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues*: "The fire of Gehenna is indeed one, but it does not torment all sinners in one way. For each will experience as much punishment as his fault requires."

Sixth, the fire of this world has a natural burning heat that is not infinite in intensity, but the fire of hell has an incomparable burning heat in relation to this fire.

First, this is because of the infernal place, where it is enclosed and constricted.

Second, it is because of the contrary, namely the cold surrounding it. For from the proximity of one contrary, the other contrary is strengthened. This is evident in the dawn, which, from the proximity of the arrival of its contrary - namely, the heat of the solar rays - is made stronger in cold and is colder than the middle of the night. The philosophers call this opposition *antiperistasis*.

Third, the fire of hell also has a more intense burning heat than our fire insofar as it is the instrument of divine justice.

Hence, for this reason, it was said by Polycarp, after Augustine, in the *Life of Saint Sebastian*, that our fire and the fire of hell or Purgatory differ as painted fire and true fire.

Question Eleven

Whether the bodies of the damned, joined to their souls after the judgment, can subsist perpetually unconsumed in fire

It is asked whether the bodies of the damned, joined to their souls after the judgment, will be able to subsist perpetually unconsumed in fire.

To this it seems...

...at first that a negative answer should be given. For, as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the *Topics*, every suffering that occurs casts down a substance more, and, if continued, at last consumes it.

But after the judgment the human body joined to the soul is not incorruptible by nature, as the celestial bodies are; nor through grace, as was the body of the first parents; nor through glory, as is the body of Christ and will be the bodies of the elect after their resurrection. Therefore it follows that it will at last be destroyed and corrupted by the fire.

It is answered that, concerning this, some have said that the bodies of the damned are not consumed because that burning is intentional and not real.

For an understanding of their words, it must be noted that between the sense of touch and the other senses there is this difference. In the four senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell, there is no action except intentional action. For sound remains in the ear, and yet the sound does not really alter the ear. Similarly, in sight the species of color is received without the eye really becoming colored, and so with the other two senses.

In the sense of touch, however, both actions occur together, namely real and intentional action. For when an animal grows hot, heat remains really in the animal, and beyond this the soul conceives heat intentionally, as is found in Book II *On the Soul*. Nor could an animal really perceive the intention of heat unless it also received heat really.

Therefore those persons say that the bodies of the damned are not consumed by the fire because that fire acts upon them intentionally only, and not really. From this the corruption of their bodies is avoided, but their affliction is nevertheless not avoided, because pain is not a lesion but a sensation, that is, the sensitive perception of a lesion, according to Book II *On the Soul*.

But this is most false. For it would follow that someone felt a burning who in truth was not being burned. It would also follow that there was nothing there except the intention and imagination of excessive heat, and not the real burning of fire, as is apparent in the frenzied, to whom it seems that birds are flying in the air when nevertheless they are not flying. Thus that affliction would be apparent and not existent, which is heretical.

It must therefore be said that the action of heat upon the bodies...

...of the damned is real and intentional, as was said concerning the sense of touch. For those bodies will really be burned. They will not sleep or be carried away in contemplation while they are being burned, but will perceive the lesion and burning, and so much more profoundly insofar as that fire acts as an instrument of divine justice, which requires that punishment correspond to fault and be proportioned to fault, as is said in Revelation 18.

And when it is asked how they are burned continually but are not consumed or corrupted, it is answered and said that the principal and first cause of this is divine power and justice.

For divine justice separates one action from another when according to nature one cannot exist without the other. It separates corruption from continuous burning, although according to nature everything that is burned for a long time is corrupted. This was also done in the bush that Moses saw, Exodus 3, and in the fiery furnace of the three boys, Daniel 3.

Another reason, as though assisting, can be natural: namely, the cessation of the motion of the heaven. When it has ceased, no action or suffering pertaining to the transmutation of nature will be able to exist in bodies.

And thus it is said in reply to the doubt that the cause of the incorruption of the bodies is not nature, grace, or glory, but divine power and the order of his justice, to which the cessation of the motion of heaven will also be obedient.

The authority for this is Gregory on Job 20: "He will pay for all the things he did. He will be tormented and will not be extinguished; he will die and will always live; he will be ended and will remain without end. For one whose life was dead in fault must always live as one dead in punishment." Thus he.

As regards examples, it must be noted that there is no body that is not finally consumed by fire, although there are certain bodies that remain in fire for an hour or for a short time without lesion or corruption.

Hence Galen says that although a salamander can be in fire for some time, it nevertheless cannot finally continue there without corruption. The same is also evident of ebony.

Augustine, however, in Book XXI of *The City of God*, in order to explain how the bodies of the damned, though always burned and scorched, are never consumed, with the power of God operating...

...sets down certain things found in nature which continue incorruptibly beneath fire.

First, thyine woods are neither consumed by worms, nor corrupted in water, nor, as is said, burned in fire.

The precious stone called *Achades*, when placed in fire, remains impassible and incorruptible in the fire. Hence, once kindled, it is extinguished neither by rains nor by winds, and while burning it is never consumed. Hence it is said that at Athens there was a

shrine of Venus in which there were lamps made from the said stone, which were never extinguished by any intemperate weather.

Likewise, gold, however long it may be in fire, is neither harmed nor corrupted.

There is a certain kind of twig, Augustine says, like a certain root always burning and never coming to consumption.

The mountains of Etna in Sicily seethe with flames even to this day and continue intact.

In the legend of Saint Nicholas it is related concerning a certain fire that if you place your hand in it, you feel the affliction of its heat, but the hand does not suffer the corruption or destruction of burning.

The heart of a human being who has died by poison always withstands fire unconsumed, as the physicians say.

Charcoal is made imputrescible by the power of fire, so that it never putrefies in water.

Likewise, a brick, formerly soft and soluble, when baked in fire remains incorruptible in water perpetually.

Therefore, what nature attributes to the things said above, and what fire grants to charcoal and brick, much more can God give to the human body.

To the Philosopher's argument, however, it is said that it is understood of a purely natural cause.

These things are from Thomas in Book IV, distinction 44, Scotus in the same place, and John of Biblia of Bologna in the *Quodlibets*.

Question Twelve

Concerning the kinds of punishments that exist in hell

It is asked how many kinds of punishments are found in hell.

To this it is answered that among others there are eight punishments in hell: inextinguishable fire, the immortal worm, sorrowful weeping...

...palpable darkness, intolerable stench, inestimable gnashing, the horrible sight of demons, and the scourging of the body.

The first punishment is inextinguishable fire. For among the elements fire is especially active, according to Book IV of the *Metaphysics*. Hence it cannot be altered from its proper and natural quality so as to become cold, as water can become hot. Therefore fire is especially posited as the punishment of Gehenna, and it is inextinguishable because, just as fault in hell can never be expiated or remitted, so too the punishment of soul and body on the part of the fire can never be ended.

The second is the immortal worm, concerning which Isaiah 66 says: "Their worm will not die." This worm is not understood corporeally, because after the day of judgment, when the world has been renewed, no mixed body or animal will remain except only the human body. Rather, it is understood of the spiritual worm, that is, remorse of conscience. This remorse of conscience arises from the putrefaction of sin and afflicts the soul by punishing it, just as a corporeal worm arises from the putrefaction of wood and afflicts the body by punishing it. Thomas in Book IV, distinction 50.

The third punishment is sorrowful weeping. Matthew 22: "There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth."

Here it must be noted that in corporeal weeping there are two things. The first is the discharge of tears, and this will not exist after the day of judgment, because then, when the motion of the heaven has ceased, there will be no generation or alteration.

The second thing in corporeal weeping is disturbance of the head and eyes, and this will exist on the day of judgment, both in the soul and in the body. For the soul will be exceedingly afflicted, and the body will be altered by the soul's passion toward good, as in the blessed, or toward evil, as in the damned. Thomas in the place cited above.

The fourth punishment is palpable darkness. Matthew 22: "Bind his hands and feet and cast him into the darkness," and so forth.

For although hell, so far as it is in itself, is a dark place because it is situated in the middle of the earth, where there can be nothing except turbid and, as it were, smoky fire, nevertheless by divine dispensation there is some light there beneath a certain shadowiness. This suffices for seeing those things that can torment the soul and body. Hence hell is called "the land of misery and darkness" in Job...

...10. Thomas in the place cited above.

The fifth punishment there is inestimable gnashing. Matthew 22: "The gnashing of teeth," which will be corporeal there. For gnashing does not imply any discharge, as does the outpouring of tears. Peter of Tarentaise says this in Book IV, distinction 50.

Hence Gregory says: "They will be cast into the exterior darkness, so that there the teeth of those who here rejoiced in voracity may gnash."

The sixth is intolerable stench. Joel 2: "Its stench will ascend, and its putrefaction will ascend, because it acted proudly."

Here, however, stench is designated by the name of sulphur. Hence the Psalm says: "He will rain upon sinners snares, fire and sulphur, and the spirit of storms." For fire corresponds to the concupiscence and burning heat of sin; sulphur corresponds to the stench of pleasure; and the spirit of storms corresponds to the noise of the perpetration of sin.

The seventh is the horrible sight of demons. Here it must be noted that demons cannot appear to the damned in hell or Purgatory in their own nature and beauty. Rather, they appear in assumed bodies in some union, as it pleases God, with such and so great a deformity that those who see them in such an appearance are exceedingly terrified and saddened.

Hence there is so great a horror in their appearance that no one in this life, however holy, can see and tolerate it without the assistance of God, as is evident concerning the Blessed Virgin and will be said below in the final part of the Third Decade.

The eighth punishment is scourging. Proverbs 19: "Hammers striking the bodies of fools."

Here it must be noted that, since demons are incorporeal, they do not operate immediately upon a body distant from themselves through the motion of touch, but by using certain bodies. Hence, just as angels use for certain corporeal effects certain seeds in which there are certain natural powers, from which some effects are swiftly produced, as Augustine

says in Book III of *The City of God*, so demons also act when they operate something through the motion of touch.

These things are from Thomas, question 16 *On Spiritual Creatures*.

Concerning these eight kinds of punishments there are the following verses:

Worms and darkness, scourge, cold and fire,
the demon's sight, the confusion of crimes...

...grief.

To these punishments, blessed Augustine says in Book XXI of *The City of God*, chapter 11, there correspond eight kinds of penalties which Cicero sets down in *On the Laws*, by which evildoers are punished in the world: loss, bonds, slavery, blows, retaliation, disgrace, exile, and death.

Through loss in the world riches are taken away. Through bonds and slavery liberty is taken away. Through blows the soundness of the body is taken away. Retaliation is that through which anyone suffers what he did to another. Disgrace is that through which reputation is taken away. Exile is that through which one's homeland is taken away. Death is that through which life is taken away.

In hell, however, the punishment of loss corresponds to loss, that is, the privation of the divine vision, together with the privation of God's grace, glory, and mercy, not only in reality but also in hope.

Hence Isaiah 30 says: "There will not remain among its fragments a potsherd with which a little water may be drawn from the pit" - that is, from divine mercy - "or with which a little fire may be carried from the conflagration" - namely, from charity.

To the punishment of bonds corresponds the binding of the hands and feet: that is, because the hands cannot act well, nor can the feet and affections will well, as Gregory says.

To the punishment of blows correspond in hell the hammers of demons materially, as we have said, or spiritually, that is, through the word of Christ saying, "Go, accursed ones, into eternal fire."

To the punishment of retaliation corresponds the equality of punishments. Revelation 18: "As much as she glorified herself in delights, so much give her torment and grief." Blessed Thomas explains that the words "as much" and "so much" do not signify equality of quantity but of proportion.

To the punishment of disgrace corresponds in hell confusion before all the elect. Isaiah 13: "Faces burned," namely by the confusion of their countenance.

To the punishment of exile correspond blindness of heart and the death of damnation. Hence Gregory says: "By interior darkness we mean blindness of heart, but by exterior darkness the eternal death of damnation."

To the punishment of slavery corresponds the tribute of punishments. Lamentations 1: "The princess of the provinces has been made subject to tribute." For the damned are under the tribute of punishments. They always groan, yet never discharge it.

To the punishment of death corresponds the second death, that is, damnation without death: namely, the damnation of soul and body, perpetually and wherever they may be, without end.

There are also other punishments in hell, namely the passage from waters to fire. Job 24...

...says: "They will pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat."

This passage does not signify an alternation between the punishment of fire and the punishment of water, such that they sometimes suffer the punishment of water and sometimes suffer the punishment of fire, as occurs in this world. Rather, both punishments will be continuous, because their fault is perpetual there.

Hence Gregory says on this in the *Moralia* that the punishment of water is owed on account of fear that humbles wickedly, and the punishment of fire on account of love that inflames wickedly. Hence that passage does not signify order or alternation, but continuity and variety of punishments, on account of the variety and continuity of faults.

There also exists there a tenth punishment, namely death without death. Hence it is said in Revelation 9: "They will call upon death, and death will flee from them." This death will consist in the perpetual separation of the wicked from God and in their perpetual punishments of Gehenna and of the other penalties.

Hence Gregory says: "For the wretched there will be death without death, an end without end, a failing without failure. For death there always lives, the end always begins, and failure does not know how to fail."

These things are from Augustine in Books XI and XXI of *The City of God*, Gregory in Book IX of the *Moralia*, and Thomas on Job 10, "Dismiss me, therefore," and so forth.

Question Thirteen

Whether the suffrages of the living can lessen or shorten the punishment of hell

It is asked whether the punishment of hell can be lessened or shortened through the suffrages of the faithful living.

To this some answer that it can, wishing to revive ancient and forgotten positions. For, first, they argue thus. In 2 Maccabees 12 it is said that beneath the tunics of those who had been slain there were found coins of idols, from which the law forbids the Jews; and nevertheless it is afterward added that Judas, after a collection had been made, sent twelve thousand drachmas of silver to Jerusalem to be offered there for the sins of the...

...dead. It is agreed that they had sinned mortally by acting against the law, and that they had died in that sin, and consequently had been damned to hell. Therefore suffrages benefit those damned in hell.

Second, because Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*: "For those whom suffrages benefit, they benefit toward this end: that either there may be full remission, or that their damnation may be more tolerable." But only those who are in hell are called damned. Therefore suffrages benefit the damned existing in hell.

Third, Dionysius, at the end of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, says thus: "The prayers of the just, both in this life and more after death, operate only upon those who are worthy of sacred prayers." From this it seems possible to gather that suffrages benefit the dead more than the living. But they benefit the living who exist in mortal sin. For the Church prays for sinners, heretics, Jews, pagans, and so forth, that they may be converted. Therefore suffrages also avail the dead in mortal sin, whom it is certain to be damned in hell if they departed thus.

Fourth, because it is read in the *Lives of the Fathers*, and is also set down by Damascene in a certain sermon, that blessed Macarius found the head of a certain dead person on the road; and, after he had first prayed that he might know whose head it had been, it gave the response that it had belonged to a certain pagan priest who was damned in hell. Yet there he confessed that, through the prayer of Macarius, he and others were helped.

Fifth, as Damascene recounts in the same sermon, Gregory, pouring forth prayer for the emperor Trajan, heard a voice divinely brought to him: "I have heard your voice, and I grant pardon to Trajan." As Damascene says in the same place, all the East and West are witnesses to this event. But it is agreed that Trajan had been damned in hell, because he instituted the cruel killing of many martyrs, as Damascene says in the same place. Therefore suffrages benefit those existing in hell.

Sixth, because as the blessed stand in relation to glory, so the damned stand in relation to punishment. But, at least until the day of judgment, suffrages benefit the blessed toward an increase of glory. Therefore they could also benefit the damned toward a lessening of punishment.

The minor is proved, for in a certain collect it is said...

..."As they benefit your saints unto glory, so may they benefit us unto healing." Likewise, in the ancient books the sacred prayer concerning Saint Leo read thus: "Grant us, O Lord, that this offering may benefit the soul of your servant Leo," as is contained in the chapter *Cum Marthae, On the Celebration of Masses*.

Seventh, because, just as it is not repugnant to the state of beatitude that the accidental reward - which is joy concerning a good work - be increased until the day of judgment, so it ought not to be repugnant to the state of misery and final damnation that the accidental punishment - which is remorse of conscience, or grief concerning an evil work, insofar as it causes punishment - be diminished. But accidental joy increases for the blessed, because it is said in Luke 15 that there is joy among the angels of God over one sinner doing penance. Therefore the accidental punishment, or remorse of conscience, can also be lessened for the damned. Moreover, joy increases for the blessed through the suffrages themselves, as was advanced in the preceding argument. Therefore some grief is similarly decreased for the damned through the same things, and thus they will benefit them.

Eighth, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion* that when sacrifices of the altar, or of any alms whatsoever, are offered for all the baptized, they are acts of thanksgiving for the very good, propitiations for those who are not very bad, and no helps for the very bad dead, but consolations of whatever kind for the living. For those whom they benefit, they benefit toward this end: that either there may be full remission, or that their damnation may be more tolerable.

From these words the Master, in Book IV, distinction 45, and the text in the chapter *Cum Marthae, On the Celebration of Masses*, final section, draw the conclusion that sacrifices of the altar and so forth do not benefit the very bad, and likewise do not benefit the very good. Indeed, one who prays for a martyr does an injury to him, since he ought rather to have been commended by the martyr's prayers, as Augustine and the text in the same place say. But they benefit the moderately good toward expiation, and the moderately bad toward mitigation of punishment. Yet the moderately bad are damned. Therefore they benefit the damned.

The minor is explained, because by that fourfold distinction nothing else seems capable of being understood except that the very good are those who immediately after death...

...flew to heaven. The very bad are unbelievers who were never of the bosom of the Church, either in number or in merit. The moderately good are those who carry with them into Purgatory some sins, and for these the suffrages benefit toward release from punishment. The moderately bad are those who were in the faith and sacraments of the Church but departed in mortal sin; and for these the suffrages benefit toward mitigation, or so that their damnation may be more tolerable.

Ninth, the same is confirmed from another saying of Augustine which the Master of the Sentences adduces in Book IV, distinction 46, where he says: "It is asked concerning the very bad whether they too experience, through the mercy of God, some mitigation of punishment." And after the Master has argued that they do not, he adds the solution and says: "Augustine also, mocking those who contend that the punishments of the reprobate will have an end, so rejects their opinion and asserts that the reprobate are to be punished perpetually that he nevertheless does not deny that their punishments may be mitigated to some extent."

Tenth, the same is confirmed from a certain prayer or collect that is found in a missal, whose title or inscription is "A Prayer for One concerning Whose Soul There Is Doubt." By this, however, it does not intend to pray for one who is in Purgatory, because this inscription is singular. The same is also evident because in it it is said that, if they cannot obtain full pardon, they may at least obtain a diminution or refreshment.

In response to this little question, it must be said that there was formerly an opinion concerning the damned that suffrages benefit them, and this in two ways.

One way concerned time: namely, until the day of judgment. For they say that until the day of judgment the damned can be helped by the suffrages of the Church, but not afterward.

The other way concerned the persons detained in hell. For suffrages in no way benefit there the very bad who died without faith and the sacraments, since they were not of the bosom of the Church either in number or in merit. Others there, however, are not very bad: namely, those who were of the Church in number, possessed the faith and the sacraments, and performed some works good in kind, but died in mortal sin. They said that suffrages benefit such persons.

And these persons said that although the punishment of the damned...

...is infinite according to duration, it is nevertheless finite according to intensity.

But against this it is argued thus. What is finite can be consumed through continual subtraction, or be taken away entirely. Therefore, if the suffrages of the Church lessen punishment, they could be multiplied so much that nothing of the punishment would remain, but it would be taken away entirely. This is the error of Origen.

But the Praepositinus, in order to escape this unacceptable consequence of Origen, said that the suffrages for the damned can be multiplied so much that all punishment will be removed entirely from them - not absolutely, as Origen held, but for a time, namely until the day of judgment. For then their souls, joined again to their bodies, will be thrust down into hell without any hope of pardon.

But against this: an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause has been taken away or diminished. Yet fault is the cause of punishment in the genus of meritorious cause, and fault always remains unexpiated in the damned. Therefore their punishment can at no time be taken away entirely.

And therefore the Porrectani devised another manner, saying that in this manner the diminution of punishments through suffrages is like the division of a continuum. For although one line is finite, it can nevertheless be divided to infinity, and the division will never be completed, provided that the subtraction of parts is made according to the same proportion and not according to the same quantity: for example, if first one half is taken away, then half of the half, and thus to infinity.

And similarly they imagined that through the first suffrage some aliquot part of the punishment is diminished - for example, one half of the punishment - then through the second, half of the half, which is one eighth of the whole, and so onward to infinity. In this way the punishment will never be ended, but something of the punishment will always remain.

The gloss on the chapter *Tempus*, cause 23, question 2, pursues this opinion. But Thomas answers against it in two ways.

First, because an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause has been taken away or diminished, as has been said.

In another way he answers with ridicule, saying that this manner of speaking is defective, because infinite division, which belongs to continuous quantity, is transferred to...

...spiritual quantity. Hence, although a line, if divided into parts of the same proportion, can be divided to infinity, nevertheless, if punishment is divided in the aforesaid manner, it will not always be divided into punishments because of the same perceptibility. For flesh is not always divided into flesh, nor fire into fire, since there is a minimum of flesh, as is said in Book I of the *Physics*. It is said similarly concerning a minimum punishment, which would cause so little perceptibility that it would thus not be punishment, since punishment includes cognition and perception.

For this reason the Altissiodorensis spoke otherwise: namely, that suffrages benefit the damned not through a diminution or interruption of punishment, but through the strengthening of the sufferer. It is as if a person carries a heavy burden and his face is bathed with water: he is strengthened to carry it better, although the burden is not thereby made lighter in itself.

But Thomas contradicts this. For while the fault of the damned remains unchanged, the damned person cannot bear the punishment more lightly. The strengthening of the subject occurs only through the removal of passibility. Passibility, however, is according to the measure of fault. Therefore, if the fault is not diminished, consequently neither can the subject be strengthened.

For this reason others say that although their punishment is not diminished with respect to the fire, it is nevertheless diminished with respect to the worm and the remorse of conscience. For just as accidental joy - that is, joy concerning a good work - increases in the saints, so accidental punishment - that is, grief concerning an evil work - is diminished in the damned.

But against this: just as fire follows the fault of the damned, so too does the worm of conscience. Hence the reasoning ought to be similar concerning each.

Moreover, Albert says on the final chapter of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* that suffrages do not benefit the dead in hell either with respect to a diminution or interruption of punishment, or with respect to a diminution of the punishment of sense, as the preceding persons said. But, because by suffrages of this kind some matter of grief is taken away from them which could exist for them if they saw themselves so cast aside that no one had care for them, this matter is taken away...

...when suffrages are made for them. Albert says in the place cited above that this lessens punishment accidentally.

But Thomas contradicts this, because that cannot occur according to the common law. For, as Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*, what is especially true concerning the damned is that the souls of the dead are there where they do not see whatever things are done here or whatever things occur in this life. And thus they do not know when suffrages are made for them, unless perhaps this remedy were divinely granted to some damned persons beyond the common law. But this is altogether uncertain, and therefore must not be asserted.

But it might be said that Albert does not say that punishment is diminished. Rather, when he said only that it can be diminished in this manner, it is as if he were saying that this manner can be imagined.

Moreover, certain moderns wished to say that through the suffrages of the Church the fear which the damned possess is diminished. For they fear that many will be damned on their account, as is evident from the rich man who asked that Lazarus be sent to his brothers, lest they too should come into that place of torments. Fear, however, has punishment, just as hope has joy.

Therefore, since the damned can be freed from this fear through the suffrages of the Church when certain living persons are brought back to penance through the suffrages of the Church - persons whom the damned know to be saved, or not damned, although they had feared for them - therefore through those suffrages the damned will be freed from the punishment which they had from that fear.

But against this: this manner fails in two ways.

First, because it does not follow that, if until the day of judgment they do not see those persons in hell, they therefore know those persons not to be damned.

Next, even if it be granted that this follows and that they know it thus, they do not on that account obtain what they intended, because envy concerning the salvation of those persons can well equal, and indeed surpass, the punishment which they had from that fear. For that rich man, while he knew that some persons would not be damned, would have wished rather that his brothers were among them; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, he would have wished all his brothers to be damned, if this were possible, since the hatred of the damned is consummated. And thus, if they know that those whom they feared would be damned are saved, their punishment is not diminished but increased.

Therefore it must be concluded...

...with blessed Thomas that it must be said simply and absolutely that suffrages do not benefit the damned, either toward taking away punishment, toward diminishing it, toward alleviating it, or toward interrupting it.

This conclusion is proved by reasons and authorities.

The first reason is that of Saint Thomas in Book IV, distinction 21, as follows. Suffrages, or works of the living, are continued or applied to the dead through the bond of charity, according to John 17: "Father, I will that they may be one, as we also are one." But the damned are altogether outside charity. Therefore the works or suffrages of the living cannot be applied to them.

The major can be explained thus. In the work of suffrage there are two individuals: namely, the one making or performing the suffrages, and the one to whom the power of the suffrages must be applied. What one person does cannot be applied or continued to another except insofar as both are members of the same body, because in this way they are united and joined beneath one head.

Nor is it sufficient that they be united through faith; rather, they must also be united through charity. For a dead member receives neither influence from the head nor remedy or assistance from another member, although they may be continuous in quantity; rather, they must be continuous through form. This is like a dry branch that is continuous with the root or trunk through quantity, by which their extremities are one, but not through the form of a living thing. The damned, however, have been cut off from the Church irrevocably through the final sentence, and thus they are not members of the same body.

The second reason is as follows. Whoever have wholly arrived at the end of the way receive a recompense which cannot be diminished. For if it were diminished, they would not have received the end of their way. But the damned are absolutely outside the way. Therefore they receive punishment without diminution. Those, however, who are in Purgatory are in some manner wayfarers, and in some manner are not, as Thomas says.

The third reason is that of Durandus, as follows. Other things being equal, what someone does while living for himself ought to avail more for him...

...or what another does for him, than what a living person does for a dead person - or at least no less - since the living communicate with one another more than they do with the dead.

But what a living person in mortal sin does, when he does not repent of that sin or propose to repent, or what another does for him, avails him nothing at all toward a diminution of the punishment owed for such a sin, although it can avail so that such a person is disposed toward repentance. Therefore, all the more, what a living person does for the damned dead, who do not repent of their sins or propose to repent but are obstinate in them, does not benefit them toward any diminution of punishment. For this reason, he says, it would appear contrary to reason and justice that something of the punishment owed should be remitted in one who does not repent and perseveres in impenitence.

The fourth reason is as follows. The office of mercy and charity, or love, is owed to those who are our neighbors, as is evident from the Master of the Sentences in Book IV, distinction 28, and according to the parable of the Samaritan in Luke. But the damned are not our neighbors. Therefore the love of charity or mercy is not to be shown to them. For the love of charity is founded upon communion in eternal beatitude, from which they are immovably excluded.

The fifth reason is as follows. If the suffrages of the living could benefit the damned, it would follow that indulgences granted by a prelate could also benefit them in the manner in which they can benefit the dead in Purgatory. The consequent is false, and no one asserts it. Therefore the antecedent is also false; and the consequence is evident.

For although indulgences do not avail the dead as persons who can perform that through which an indulgence is conferred, they can nevertheless avail if something is done for them by the living, if this is contained in the form of the indulgence. For example: "If anyone visits this church, so much of the punishment of hell is diminished for his father." The consequent is false, because, as has been said, those existing in hell are not in charity, and therefore the satisfactions of others do not benefit them.

The authorities follow.

The first is Augustine, who says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*: "The suffrages of the living...

...do not benefit all, but only those who, while they lived, cooperated in order that these things might benefit them."

And in the *Enchiridion* he says: "These things benefit those who, when they lived, merited that these things could benefit them." And in the same place he says likewise: "Those who departed from the body without the faith that works through love and without its sacraments receive such offices from their living relatives in vain."

And in *The City of God* he says: "If I knew that my father was damned, I would no more pray for him than for the devil."

And Gregory says to Boniface, as is contained in cause 13, question 2, chapter *Pro obeuntibus*: "For the impious, although they were Christians, it will not be lawful to make such a thing - namely an offering and suffrages."

And in Book XXXIV of the *Moralia*, upon the words of Job, "He will esteem the abyss as growing old," he says: "The reason why prayer is not made after the day of judgment for human beings damned to eternal fire is the same as the present reason why prayer is not made for the devil and his angels, appointed to eternal punishment."

And Jerome, as is contained in the chapter *In praesenti*, cause 13, question 2, says: "In the present age we know that we can help one another either by prayers or by counsels. But when we have come before the tribunal of Christ, neither Job, Daniel, nor Noah will be able to petition for anyone; rather, each person will bear his own burden."

Here Gratian says: "This is to be understood concerning the impenitent, of whom the prophet says: 'He will not give God his propitiation, nor the price of the redemption of his soul, but he will labor and will live still unto the end.'" He is not speaking concerning those impenitent in this life, because it is lawful here to pray for them, but concerning the impenitent in the other world, because they died here impenitent.

And Chrysostom says in *On the Restoration of the Fallen*: "In hell there is never and nowhere any solace." Therefore there is no consolation, diminution, or alleviation of punishment.

And Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*: "The supreme priest does not pray for the unclean, because in this he would be turned away from the divine order"; and he is speaking concerning the damned.

And Albert, in his commentary upon this passage, says: "The opinion holding that suffrages benefit the damned is...

...contrary to the sayings and authorities of the doctors," and he alleges the aforesaid words of Augustine and Gregory.

And the gloss upon the final chapter of 1 John, on the words "There is a sin unto death," says: "A sin continued unto death is called a sin unto death. I say that one should not pray for him: that is, I teach and command that one should not pray."

The same is contained in cause 23, question 5, chapter *Placuit*, where prayers and commemorations are forbidden for those who kill themselves or who are punished for their crimes. Understand, according to the gloss, "unless they were contrite."

And in cause 13, question 2, final chapter, the same is said concerning anyone who is known to have died in mortal sin.

Likewise, in cause 23, question 5, chapter *Quicumque clericus*: "If any cleric dies in war, in a brawl, or in the games of the pagans, no request is to be made for him either in the offering or in prayer" - the gloss adds, "unless at the end he repents." Nevertheless he is not deprived of burial, says the gloss *Canina*.

The Church, however, would not prohibit prayer for these persons if our prayers could benefit them, because it would prohibit that which would be both good for them and meritorious for those praying. Therefore our prayers do not benefit them.

The same is also evident from the example of the rich man, who could not obtain from Abraham that the tip of Lazarus's finger be dipped in water so that his tongue might be cooled in hell.

From all these things it must be concluded that suffrages do not benefit the damned.

But if you say, "Father, let us suppose that suffrages are made for certain persons whom they cannot benefit: does the one offering suffrage sin?" I say that if we know with certainty that certain persons are such, then we act wrongly, because we act against the divine ordering and against the statute of the holy Church.

But if we are ignorant, and those persons are saved, then indeed the suffrages do not benefit them, but the saved person is in a certain way obliged to pray for the one offering suffrage. If, however, they are damned, our prayer and our alms will return into our own bosom, as the prophet says.

Now, in the third place, the arguments must be answered.

To the first, it is said that those offerings of the idols were not found among those dead persons in such a way that from them a sign could be taken that they carried those objects out of reverence for the idols. Rather...

...they had taken them as victors, because they were owed to them there by right of war; and thus they sinned venially through greed, wherefore they were not damned in hell, and so suffrages could benefit them.

Or it must be said, according to certain persons, that in the battle itself they saw danger threatening them and repented of the sin, according to the words of the Psalm: "When he slew them, they sought him," and so forth. And because this could probably be judged, the offering was therefore made for them.

To the second, it must be said that "damnation" is taken broadly there, namely for any punishment whatsoever, so that it includes the punishment of Purgatory. For someone is sometimes called damned or condemned to pay a certain monetary penalty or to endure some punishment, although such condemnation is not unto death.

And because the punishment of Purgatory is sometimes entirely expiated through the suffrages of the faithful, while at other times it is not entirely expiated but is diminished, Augustine therefore says in the same place that suffrages benefit either so that there may be full remission - that is, so that the punishment may be entirely taken away - or so that it may become more tolerable.

To the third, it must be said that, with respect to this, suffrages for the dead are more acceptable than suffrages for the living, because the dead person is more in need, since he cannot aid himself as the living person can. But with respect to the other matter the living person is in a better condition, because he can be transferred from the state of mortal fault into the state of grace and glory, which cannot be said concerning the dead. Therefore the reasoning concerning prayer for the dead and for the living is not the same.

Moreover, the suffrages of the living do not benefit other living persons by way of satisfaction if those for whom they are made are in mortal sin. Hence, since they cannot benefit the dead except by way of satisfaction - for they cannot do so by way of merit, because the dead have departed from the state of meriting, so that neither they themselves nor others can merit for them - it follows that they cannot benefit the dead in mortal sin either. By contrast, they benefit the living who exist in sin by way of congruous merit, so as dispositively to merit grace for them. Therefore the reasoning is not similar.

To the fourth, concerning Macarius, it must be said that this help was not such that their punishment was diminished...

...but consisted only in this, as is said in the same place: that, when Macarius prayed, it was granted that they might see one another in their torments. From this there could be no true joy, but only an imaginary joy, while what they desired was fulfilled - namely, to see others in punishments.

For the damned desire everyone to be damned. When this desire is fulfilled, they are said to rejoice with an imaginary joy, although yet greater grief increases for them. Demons are likewise said to rejoice when they draw human beings to sins and to hell, although through this their punishment is in no way diminished. Likewise, the joy of the angels is not diminished because they are said to suffer compassion for our evils.

To the fifth, concerning Trajan, it must be said that it can probably be judged that by the prayers of blessed Gregory he was miraculously recalled to life, and there obtained the grace through which he had remission of sins and, consequently, immunity from punishment. This is likewise apparent in many who were miraculously raised from the dead, several of whom are known to have been idolaters.

For concerning all such persons it must similarly be said that they had not been assigned to hell by final sentence, but only according to what their merits then required. According to the higher causes, however, by which it was foreseen that they were to be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.

Or it may be said, according to certain persons, that Trajan's soul was not absolved absolutely from liability to punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, namely until the day of judgment.

Nor does it follow that this occurs commonly through the suffrages of the Church, because some things happen according to the common law and other things are granted singularly to certain persons by privilege. As Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*: "The limits of human affairs are one thing; the divine signs of power are another."

What John the Deacon, who compiled the history of Gregory, thinks concerning this may be seen in Master Jacobus de Voragine, in the *Legends of the Saints*.

To the sixth, where the collect is introduced, it must be said that expressions of this sort are not to be understood as meaning that the saints advance in glory with respect to themselves through our celebrating their feasts. Rather, the matter benefits us, because we celebrate those feasts. Just as, from the fact that we know or praise God, his glory in us in a certain way increases - although nothing thereby accrues to God - so...

...we celebrate the saints' feasts not because it benefits them, but because it benefits us that we celebrate them.

Nevertheless, it must not be denied that the accidental joy of the saints increases at least extensively, because they rejoice concerning more things.

And in accordance with this is found in the ancient books the secret prayer concerning Saint Leo mentioned in the argument. This must be explained according to the things said in the chapter *Cum Marthae*, *On the Celebration of Masses*, third section.

To the seventh, which was a confirmation of the preceding argument, it is said that the case of the blessed and that of the damned are not similar. For the blessed communicate well with the living in charity, upon which the efficacy of suffrages is founded. But the damned in hell are excluded from such communion.

And again, although the blessed rejoice concerning the good things which the living do, and so some accidental glory increases for them, this is nevertheless not through any fruit of suffrage which they receive, but on account of the perfect charity which they possess; and therefore they rejoice concerning every good.

The argument also errs in the similarity which it adduces, because it ought rather to argue that, just as it is not repugnant to the state of beatitude that the accidental reward be increased until the day of judgment, so it is not repugnant to the state of the misery of damnation that accidental punishment be increased; and this is conceded. It is, however, incompatible with beatitude that glory be diminished, and thus incompatible with the state of misery that punishment be diminished.

To the eighth, it must be said that those who say that suffrages benefit the damned existing in hell explain Augustine's saying as was treated in the argument. It can, however, be said otherwise that those who possess many venial sins are called moderately bad, while those who possess few are called moderately good. The gloss on the aforesaid chapter *Cum Marthae* touches upon this meaning.

Or the moderately bad are those who committed mortal sins and died penitent, without at least complete satisfaction having been made for them. The moderately good are those who are to be expiated only from venial sins. And thus both groups are in Purgatory, so that...

...the very good are called those who are blessed in Paradise, and the very bad those who are damned in hell; the moderately good and likewise the moderately bad, however, are those who are in Purgatory to expiate their sins.

These latter are those who departed in grace with venial sin, or with a debt of punishment for mortal sins of which they repented before death. They are called moderately good to the extent that they fall short of the perfection of goodness, but moderately bad insofar as they fall short of perfect wickedness, which is mortal sin. Suffrages benefit them toward the mitigation of punishment and sometimes toward complete release, according to the difference in the quantity of their sins and of the suffrages.

Accordingly, although this distinction appears fourfold with respect to the words, it is nevertheless only threefold with respect to the reality, because the moderately good and the moderately bad are the same persons: namely, all those existing in Purgatory. Similarly, that which is moderately icy is also moderately cold, and that which is moderately white is also moderately black. Thus Durandus.

To the ninth, it is said that Augustine does not say that the punishment of the damned is at some time diminished or interrupted, but places those words beneath a disjunction. For the truth of a disjunction it is sufficient that one part be true, and thus it does not follow that those words which are placed for the other part of the disjunction are true. This is evident because Augustine says, "Or if he judges this," and so forth.

To the last, concerning that prayer, I say that it is not authentic, nor is it found in all missals, especially those according to the custom of the Roman Curia. And if anyone should find it in certain missals, the reason why it was admitted there is nevertheless unknown.

I say that the Church never intends to pray for anyone damned in hell, as is evident from the things said. The same is also evident from the inscription of the prayer, for it is called "A Prayer for One concerning Whose Soul There Is Doubt." If there is doubt, however, it is not firmly believed that the person is saved or damned, and so forth.

This little question is from Lord Dominicus Venetus, bishop of Brescia, formerly bishop...

...of Torcello.

And let these things suffice concerning the second receptacle, namely hell.

Question Four

Principal Question Four of Chapter Three: Concerning Purgatory, under which fifteen questions are resolved

Question One

Whether Purgatory is truly and really found in the center of the earth

It is asked whether the place of Purgatory is truly found in the center of the earth.

To this it first appears to certain persons that a negative answer should be given: namely, that it is not found.

The first argument is as follows. God, who is supremely merciful, is more disposed to reward good things than to punish evil things. But just as those who are in the state of charity do certain evil things which are not worthy of eternal punishment, so those who are in mortal

sin sometimes do certain things good in kind which are not worthy of eternal reward. Therefore, since those good things are not rewarded in the damned after this life, neither should those evil things be punished after this life.

Second, the argument is as follows. As charity stands in relation to eternal reward, so mortal sin stands in relation to eternal punishment. But those departing in mortal sin are immediately carried to eternal punishment. Therefore those departing in charity go immediately to reward, and thus no Purgatory remains for them...

...after this life.

Likewise, if Purgatory were to be posited after this life, it would especially be posited by reason of the expiation and purgation of sins: namely, of fault or of liability to punishment. But this cannot be, as is proved because Gregory says - and it is placed in distinction 25, chapter *Qualis* - "As anyone departs from here, so he is presented in judgment, because where the tree falls, there it will be," Ecclesiastes 11. Therefore, if anyone departs from this life with venial or mortal fault, he will possess such fault at the judgment and consequently will not be purged in Purgatory, because at the judgment Purgatory will no longer exist but will be closed. Therefore it would exist in vain.

Likewise, the gloss upon the words of 1 John 5, "There is a sin unto death," says that one who is not corrected in this life awaits pardon after death in vain, for no fault is purged after death.

Fifth, it is argued from the authority of Revelation 14, where it is said: "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, says the Spirit, let them rest from their labors." Therefore no purgatorial labor remains after this life for those who die in the Lord, nor for those who do not die in the Lord, because they cannot be purged. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this life.

But to the contrary is the text of Augustine in *On Penance*, distinction 7, chapter *Hic autem ignis*.

I answer that, concerning the truth and existence of Purgatory in the center of the earth after this life, there are, and have been, two profane and sacrilegious manners of speaking. A third, however, is established in the way of truth.

The first is that of the Hebrews, the Greeks, certain heretics called the Poor of Lyons in France, and also certain Waldensian peoples dwelling around the Rhine in Upper Germany. All these commonly hold that after this life no purgatorial place is found in the center of the earth, but they say that every dying person's soul is immediately carried and snatched either to the punishments of hell or to the glory of Paradise. In defense and support of their position they possess the arguments and the authority from Revelation advanced above at the beginning of the question.

But against the Jews is the text of 2 Maccabees 12, saying: "It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins." But prayer is not to be made for the dead who are in Paradise, as Thomas says in Book IV, because they lack nothing; nor, again, for those who are in hell, because they cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life there are some not yet absolved from sins who are capable of being absolved.

Such persons possess charity, without which there is no remission of sins, because "charity covers all offenses," Proverbs 10. Hence they do not come to eternal death, because "he who lives and believes in Christ will not die eternally," John 11. Nor will they be brought

into glory unless purified, because nothing unclean will come to it, Revelation, final chapter. Therefore after this life some place of purgation remains for persons of this kind who are contrite but not yet fully purified.

Likewise, against the Greeks is the Greek Gregory of Nyssa, who says thus concerning the truth of Purgatory: "If anyone who is Christ's friend, consenting to purify sins in this life, was less able to do so, after his passage from here he will be freed through the conflagration of purgatorial fire. We preach this, we preserve this doctrine of truth, and thus we believe."

But against the Poor of Lyons and the Waldensian peoples is the authority of the universal Church, which prays for the dead that they may be loosed from sins. This cannot be understood except of those who are in Purgatory. Moreover, whoever resists the authority of the Church incurs heresy, as is noted in cause 7, question 1, chapter *Denique*, and in the Extra, *On Heretics*, chapter *Firmissime*.

There is and has been a second profane manner of speaking concerning the existence of Purgatory in the center of the earth: that of the Indians, whom many who are Christians in name alone now follow. Unable to understand, and unwilling to believe, that pure spirits and separated souls are tormented by corporeal fire, they said, and say - as Thomas adduces on John, chapter 14, and in Book IV *Against the Gentiles* - that faithful persons who died in grace but were not fully purged do not descend into Purgatory...

...but are detained until the judgment in some place under the punishment of loss alone: perhaps in the terrestrial Paradise; or at the furthest boundaries of sea or dry land; or in the void above the circumference of the empyrean heaven; or beneath the convexity of the earth and the concavity of the empyrean heaven. Some say - although apocryphally, indeed erroneously - that all those liberated by Christ from the lower regions remained there until the day of the Lord's Ascension.

But when hell was treated above, it was very fully proved and shown that spiritual souls, both separated and in the body, and demons can, and in fact really do, suffer and are tormented by corporeal fire. Therefore, after these persons and the entire crowd of bad Christians have been rejected, spurned, and held in contempt, let us approach the third conclusion concerning Purgatory: the catholic, orthodox, and true conclusion.

It is this: a place of Purgatory is truly and really found in the center of the earth.

This conclusion will be proved by reasons, by authorities, by the authority of the Church militant, and by legal and civil propriety.

First, by reasons, as follows.

Let two just persons be taken. One of them has never sinned mortally, but only venially; the other has offended the Lord with many mortal sins. Let both die at the same time and contrite. It is then asked whether both ascend into heaven equally and at the same time, or not.

If it is said that they do, it follows that faith alone with contrition avails as much as faith with virtuous works. This would be contrary to the reason of divine distributive justice, by which to each person will be rendered according to his merits, and contrary to the distinction of degrees of beatitude.

But if it is conceded that they enter eternal life unequally - that is, one before the other - it is asked whether the one who enters Paradise second first descends to hell. If he does, then

what Christ said in John 5 is false: "Amen, amen, I say to you, that he who hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life and does not come into judgment, but passes from death to life."

If it is said that he does not descend to hell, then, since...

...he cannot ascend into Paradise because he is still impure, either he will never be changed from the impure state in which he is, or he will be purged for eternal life. Not the first; therefore the second. But he cannot be purged by his own works of satisfaction. Therefore he will be purged by punishments in Purgatory.

Second, if every sin is punished either by God or by a human being - because no evil is unpunished and no good is unrewarded, *On Penance*, distinction 7, final chapter - and persons are frequently converted at the end who were not punished for their evils in the present life, they must therefore be punished by God. They are not punished in the fire of hell, since they died in charity; therefore they are punished in the fire of Purgatory.

Third, if there were no punishment of Purgatory after this life, one who persists in wickedness until death would be as well off as one who never sinned. Therefore, from the example of such a person, no one would do penance in this life, but all would confess at the end alone when contrite. This would be erroneous, for "no one is endowed with virtue while rejoicing over iniquity," *On Penance*, distinction 7, chapter *Nullus*. Therefore it is necessary to confess that Purgatory exists.

Fourth, let Sortes, existing in charity, still have - for example - seven years of punishments imposed upon him by the just judgment of the Church to discharge. Then let it be supposed, as is possible, that after two years have elapsed he is suddenly and accidentally killed through no fault of his own. Since the soul was principally the cause of the sin for which Sortes was bound to make satisfaction, it would be contrary to reason for it not to suffer punishment after death for the remaining five years of penance. Nor can any reasonable cause be assigned why it should not suffer. Therefore a place must be posited where the soul of Sortes will be purged for those five years: not in Paradise, because that place is not a place of purgation; not in hell, because there the soul is not purged but damned; therefore in Purgatory.

Likewise it is argued thus. If, for example, Sortes and Plato commit one sin in which Sortes is first and principally culpable, and a penance is imposed upon them which they ought to perform together...

...just as they sinned together, then, if Plato dies before the completion of the penance, according to the judgment of reason Sortes would still possess punishment.

It is thus in the matter proposed concerning the punishment of sins committed by the soul and body, that is, by the whole human being, because sins are to be punished rationally. Although the body is now dead, the soul still exists: not in hell or in Paradise, as has been said; therefore in Purgatory.

Likewise, from that error it follows that every sin is mortal. For if no sin in which a person dies is remitted after death, and the soul is not purged from any sin through punishments after death, it follows that every fault - whether great or small - in which a person dies will endure perpetually.

Likewise, from that error it follows that it is possible for someone who will not rise before the judgment to die in charity with a light fault and not be saved. But this appears to be

exceedingly repugnant to apostolic and catholic teaching and to divine goodness. Therefore the position is false.

Likewise it is argued thus. Unless there were belief in Purgatory, in which human souls could after death make satisfaction for sins committed here, an occasion of despair would be given to those who were in sins throughout their whole life and finally obtain remission through some contrition which nevertheless does not suffice for plenary absolution from punishment and fault and from a part of the punishments.

Likewise, if there were no belief in the existence of Purgatory, in which sins are punished more gravely than in the tribunal of the present life, all that terror would be removed from all the faithful which causes those who have sinned more willingly to undertake present punishments and labors of satisfaction than to endure incomparably more grievous punishments in the future.

For belief in punishments to be most grievously inflicted in the future age for sins committed here is one of the greatest things which are accustomed to withdraw the good from evils and to move those who have sinned to do penance and make satisfaction in the present life.

Therefore let us believe firmly that, just as divine justice established from the beginning a place of infernal punishments in which the souls of the damned would be punished perpetually, so divine...

...goodness established a place of punishments in which the souls of certain persons who are to be saved might after death discharge the temporal punishments neglected here.

Now the authorities must be set down.

The first is 2 Maccabees 12, which is verified in the faith of the faithful of the Old Testament. For it is said there that if the souls of those who had died with piety and charity in wars for the people of God, or otherwise in charity, were overtaken by death while in certain sins or before they had discharged here the punishments for remitted sins, they then fall into punishments in which, while detained, they can be helped, alleviated, and liberated by the sacrifices and prayers of the living.

From this authority it follows that before the Passion of Christ the souls of all who died did not go to the punishments of damnation, nor did all go to the place of celestial beatitude. Rather, there was a certain middle place: not of light but of darkness, not of joy but of sorrow, in which souls were detained by reason of the punishment of loss or the punishment of sense until they paid, or payment was worthily made for them.

Concerning this place Job 10 said: "Dismiss me, therefore, that I may lament," and so forth. There, therefore, the ancients were detained in the punishment of loss which they incurred from original sin contracted in this life.

Therefore, if the Lord God, from the abundance of his goodness before the Passion of his Son Christ, did not cast into damnation the souls of the dead who were obligated to punishments, but mercifully detained in punishments those whose mortal sin had been remitted here with respect to fault until satisfaction was made, why should it not be believed that after the Passion of his Son - at the time when he opened the bosom of his mercy completely to Christians - he should both then and now defer certain temporal punishments of sense until after death, at least for venial sins, until they are expiated through punishments or relaxed through the merits of the living?

If this is so concerning venial sins to which temporal punishments are owed, why does divine goodness not defer certain temporal punishments of mortal sins remitted here, so that after death the punishments which were not discharged here may be discharged? No reason is apparent why divine mercy...

...in the time of full compassion ought to have been shortened and restricted beyond what it had done before the Passion, and so forth.

And thus the first authority is evident.

The second authority is from the words of Christ in Matthew 12, which Gregory adduces for this purpose in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 34: "If anyone speaks blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, it will be forgiven him neither in this age nor in the future."

In this sentence, Gregory says, it is given to be understood that certain faults can be relaxed in this age and certain others in the future. For that manner of speaking indicates that in each - that is, here and in the future - sins are customarily remitted, as appears in this similar statement.

For when we say, "This sin cannot be remitted here, nor at Rome, nor by a parish priest, nor by a bishop," we suppose that remission of sins is customarily made in both places or by both persons. For if it were not so, the manner of speaking would be exceedingly inept, as if it were said, "Such a sin will be remitted neither by a horse nor by an ass," or "neither in hell nor in the void outside heaven."

Therefore, since Christ was supremely wise and all his words possessed mysteries, it is not to be believed that he used a discourse of such ineptitude when he said concerning the sin against the Holy Spirit that it would be remitted neither in this age nor in the future.

Hence Bernard says in Sermon 66: "Let those who do not believe that purgatorial fire remains after death, but that the soul, as soon as it is loosed from the body, passes either to rest or to death, ask him who said that a certain sin is forgiven neither in this age nor in the future why he said this, if no future remission of sins remains." Thus he.

The third authority is Origen, speaking concerning the Egyptians submerged in the Red Sea. For, expounding upon Exodus the words "They sank like lead in the mighty waters," he says: "They were wholly leaden and possessed nothing of gold; therefore they were not to be purged through fire, but to be sunk into the deep." Thus he.

There he makes a difference between those who possess, together with lead, something of gold admixed in a greater or lesser degree, and those who possess nothing of gold but are wholly...

...leaden. Those who possess gold admixed with lead are purged, so that the lead may thus be taken away and the gold may remain, as in Purgatory. Those, however, who are wholly lead are not purged, because no gold would be found in them, but are sunk into the deep.

The fourth authority is Paul, saying in 1 Corinthians: "No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus. But if anyone builds upon this foundation, which is Christ or faith, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each will be manifest. For the day of the Lord will declare it, because it will be revealed in fire, and the fire will test the quality of each person's work." Thus he.

In the Scriptures "the day of the Lord" is more commonly taken for the day of final or particular judgment. Therefore the Apostle speaks concerning the affliction or purgation of

the souls who have built upon the foundation, and so forth, and says that the day of the Lord will declare it.

This day, however, cannot be understood of punishment after the final judgment.

First, because no one who is punished after that judgment will be saved through fire, but will burn eternally in fire.

Second, because the souls of many who then die in venial sins or under obligation to certain punishments will be blessed long before the day of final judgment. At that judgment, after reassuming their bodies, they will not return again to punishments, as though the whole human being were then to suffer the fire of purgation which the soul alone suffered before. For if this occurred, the soul would cease to be blessed, or would at least become less blessed than it was before, since it would again be punished in the body for sins for which the soul by itself had been punished long before.

It remains, therefore, that the Apostle speaks concerning purgatorial punishments which begin after death, from the particular judgment, in the souls of those departing either with venial faults or with obligations to mortal punishments by reason of mortal sins remitted here as regards fault but not sufficiently punished in this age.

And that this is the Apostle's intention he himself again indicates through what he...

...says: "He whose work built upon the foundation remains will receive a reward." In the Scriptures, the reward for good works done here is commonly understood to be that which is given to the separated soul after death and which is given to the whole human being after the final judgment.

Purgatory is also proved by the authorities of the philosophers and pagan poets.

First, Socrates is introduced in Plato's *Phaedo* as speaking thus: "When the dead have arrived at that place to which each person's daemon conducts him, first those who lived justly and piously, and those who lived otherwise, are judged there. If, therefore, each is found to have maintained the middle course in his life, mounting vehicles they arrive at the Acherusian marsh, and dwelling there they pay the punishments for their injuries. When they have been purified, they are absolved and receive the rewards worthy of the things rightly done." Thus he.

And Avicenna says in Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 7: "When the soul of an unwise person is separated from the body, it experiences great contrariety, not from an inseparable accident but from an extrinsic accident. An extrinsic accident, however, does not endure or remain. From this it follows that the punishment is not everlasting, but is removed little by little until the purified soul arrives at the felicity proper to it." Thus he.

And Virgil in Book VI: "Therefore they are exercised with punishments," and so forth. You have this above in the little question concerning the immortality of souls.

Dante also speaks concerning Purgatory at the beginning of the second *Comedy*, and Francis Petrarch in the last book of the sixth *Triumph*.

Third, the truth of Purgatory is proved by the authority of the universal Church of the faithful, which continually prays and offers sacrifices for the liberation of souls. Since the universal Church has possessed so many excellent and most learned men who died in this faith and shone with miracles in testimony of their holiness, its authority is greater and moves one more fully to belief than Sacred Scripture.

Thus Augustine says in the book *Against the Epistle of Fortunatus*: "I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me."

And he proves what he says from this: that the Church herself believed the Gospel on account of those preaching...

...the Gospel to her according to the form handed down to them by Christ, Mark, chapter 1.

It is as if he argued thus: that on account of which each thing is such is itself more so. But the Gospel is believed on account of the Church. Therefore the Church is to be believed more than the Gospel.

From this it appears that the Church's authority for belief is greater than the authority of Divine Scripture, since among the Scriptures the Gospel is the most excellent. This is true absolutely, Henry says, when the Church is taken together with her head, Christ, who commanded belief in the Gospel.

If the Church is also taken as she now exists militant on earth, it is again true, at least with respect to us, because we are moved more to believe those things which an entire community of rational and upright human beings believes than we would be moved by the bare reading of Scriptures narrating that the same things are to be believed.

But nevertheless observe that the infallibility of the Church depends both upon the Gospel and, indeed, upon the Holy Spirit: upon the Gospel with respect to knowledge, and upon the Holy Spirit with respect to assistance. The infallibility of the Gospel, however, is not from the Church but from the Holy Spirit, unless we wish to say that the truth of the Gospels - that is, the fact that these are the true Gospels - depends upon the Church; and this is most true.

Fourth, the truth of belief in Purgatory is proved from reasonable and salutary propriety. For if belief in Purgatory itself ceased, the memory of our departed parents, friends, and benefactors would cease; yet the frequent and continual remembrance of them is exceedingly salutary for wayfarers.

Likewise, if belief in Purgatory ceased, sacrifice for the dead, every prayer, every suffrage, and every alms for the souls of the dead would cease, although divine clemency has ordained that their souls can be helped from the goods which they left here.

Likewise, if belief in it ceased, all works of piety toward the poor for the souls of the dead would cease. This is not expedient for the faithful who are wayfarers, whom the mouth of the Savior exhorts to works of piety and mercy under the promise of a heavenly reward, as is evident in Matthew 25.

Now the arguments advanced at the beginning of the little question must be answered...

...by which the Greeks, Jews, and the others named above defend themselves.

To the first, Thomas answers in Book IV, saying that because God is merciful, he therefore has mercy upon those deserving mercy. But one who falls into mortal sin is constituted and immediately made an enemy of God, and therefore merits the loss of all the goods which he possessed from God. Hence he kills the good things previously done, and the things which he does in mortal sin he slays. For one departing in mortal sin, therefore, no reward remains after this life.

For one, however, who departs in charity, some punishment can remain after this life. For charity does not always destroy every evil which it finds, but only that which is contrary to it. Therefore the cases are not similar.

Lord Bonaventure, however, answers this in Book IV, distinction 20, as follows. Immediately to glorify one departing in charity is not similar to condemning one departing in mortal sin, because one who is in mortal sin has nothing which is worthy of life and is therefore supremely disposed toward eternal damnation; and on this account he is immediately damned according to retribution.

But one who is in charity can, since charity stands together with venial fault and liability to punishment, possess something worthy of punishment. And because according to the common tribunal glory cannot stand together with punishment, that debt must first be discharged through purgatorial punishment.

To the second, Bonaventure answers that the weight of charity possesses in itself something retarding it, for example some small fault or liability. But the weight of mortal sin possesses nothing elevating or retarding it. Therefore the cases are not similar.

To the third, it is answered that Gregory's saying must be understood concerning the quality in which one's state consists and which is not changed unless the state is changed. Grace or mortal fault is such a quality. For according to these qualities, as a person departs from the body, so he will appear in judgment.

It must not, however, be understood concerning that which does not change one's state, such as venial fault. For venial sins do not change a person's state, because they neither take away nor...

...diminish charity, according to which the quantity of the gravity of the soul's goodness is measured. And therefore, whether venial sins are remitted or committed, the soul remains such as it was before. These things are from Thomas, Bonaventure, Durandus, and the Archdeacon in his exposition of the text.

To the fourth, it is answered that the gloss speaks concerning mortal sin. Or it must be said that, although the fault is not corrected in itself in this life, it is nevertheless corrected in merit, because here the human being merited that there that punishment should be meritorious for him and toward obtaining pardon.

To the authority from Revelation, however, it is said that that authority speaks concerning the labor of operation for meriting, and not concerning the labor of suffering for purgation, as Thomas says in the place cited above.

And in conclusion, it is said to the Jews, Greeks, Poor of Lyons, and Waldensians that, since their sect and opinion possess no probability from the canonical Scriptures, from reasons, from authentic histories, from holy persons, from miracles, or from revelations, but only from the authority of present and past human beings of their sect - peasants, laypersons, the unlearned, and idiots - whereas our faith possesses such supports, they are therefore to be held in contempt and spurned as persons bewitched by the devil and blinded by their own presumption and pride.

To that position of the Jews and of John XXII it is also said that, since it maintains those things against the catholic faith without foundation or reason, at the devil's suggestion, it is deservedly rejected by the catholic doctors. They hold without doubt that the faithful who

depart in grace without having been fully purified are carried by the angels into Purgatory to be cleansed.

These things are from Henry of Hesse on Genesis and Lord John of Torquemada on distinction 25 in the Decretum, in the place cited above.

Addition

Although that most learned man treated this difficulty abundantly - namely, that after this life there is a place where souls are purged - against the errors of the ancients, it nevertheless seemed good to me to add to this question that modern heretics after Luther have erred from the womb concerning this and have spoken falsehoods.

And although Luther confesses in various places that he knows with certainty that Purgatory exists, and that it is lawful for someone to pray for the dead once, or at most twice, nevertheless all Lutherans as one deny it: Melanchthon, Calvin, and the Zwinglians, departing in this matter, as in many others, from the faith.

Against them all stand Chrysostom, Homily 69 to the people of Antioch; Augustine, Sermon 32 *On the Words of the Apostle*; Gregory of Nyssa; Athanasius; Damascene, *On Those Who Have Fallen Asleep in the Faith*; Origen, Homily 25 on Numbers; and Alcuin, Book III *On the Trinity*, to Charlemagne. They teach the truth of Purgatory and that the Apostles also taught that prayer and sacrifice are to be made for the dead.

The African Synod supports this, as found in Cyprian, Book I, Letter 9; Tertullian, *On the Exhortation to Chastity*; the Council of Florence; and the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 3, and session 25, chapter 3.

Question Two

Whether another place of Purgatory is found besides that which is in the center of the earth, where the souls of the moderately good are purged

It is asked whether, besides the principal Purgatory in the center of the earth, a place is also found upon the surface of the earth where the souls of the moderately good are purged.

To this Thomas and Bonaventure, in Book IV, distinction 21, answer affirmatively, saying that the place of Purgatory is twofold.

One place exists according to the common divine law, and thus it is...

...a lower place, joined as it were to hell, as was said above. For this reason the opinion of Hugh is not to be accepted. In Book II *On the Sacraments*, he denies that there is any determinate and common place of Purgatory in the center of the earth and says that individual souls suffer punishments especially in those places in which they committed their fault. For it is not probable, as Bonaventure says, that all the souls which sinned at Paris are punished at Paris.

Another place of Purgatory exists according to divine dispensation in certain open places upon the surface of the earth, to which souls are assigned for purgation. It was perhaps according to this latter manner that Hugh understood what he said above.

Hence Gregory, in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 4, says:

> *The superabundant bounty of divine goodness, generally seeking the salvation of human beings who do not seek it themselves, disposed that there should also be, upon the surface of the earth assigned for human habitation, certain open places of torments in which it would be established by many indications that after death the souls not only of the wicked but also of the moderately good are tormented.*

These are his words.

God specially ordained these particular places of Purgatory upon the surface of the earth, as Thomas says in the place cited above and Lord John of Torquemada says upon *On Penance*, distinction 7, chapter *Hic autem ignis*, for five reasons.

First, for the lighter punishment of souls. Thus, according to Gregory, it was revealed concerning certain souls that they were punished in a shadow. In Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 4, he relates that a certain Paschasius, a deacon of the Roman Church, was a man of such holy life that after his death a certain demoniac was healed by touching his bier. Nevertheless, long after his death, Paschasius's soul was found by a certain holy bishop in the baths - that is, in places where hot water boils up from the earth.

When the bishop asked it why it was there, it said that it was tormented in the heat of that water because, in the schismatic contention between Symmachus and Laurentius over which of them should be pope, Paschasius maintained Laurentius's side until his death, although Laurentius possessed no right to the papacy - though others say that it was because during his life he delighted in that place.

Second, for our instruction, so that we may recognize that great punishment is inflicted upon sinners after this life and thus desist from sins and turn ourselves to God. This was evident at Paris in the case of a pupil to whom his master appeared after death and revealed his damnation. When the pupil felt the master's burning in his own hand, he immediately turned to the Lord.

Third, on account of the fault's having been perpetrated in that place. This is evident from the man who performed penitential punishment, as though in Purgatory, in his own bath where he had sinned. By the merit of thirty Masses he flew up to heaven, as is said in Book IV of the *Dialogues*.

Fourth, on account of the prayer of some holy person. Thus it is read that Saint Patrick obtained for certain persons a Purgatory in a particular place beneath the earth.

Fifth, for the speedier liberation of souls, so that they may reveal their need to others, seek suffrages from them, and thus depart from their punishments more quickly. This is evident from a certain soul existing in a piece of ice which the fishermen of Blessed Theobald caught in the autumn and presented to the bishop. When, for the sake of cooling himself, he kept that ice beneath his feet, he distinctly heard a voice saying that within the ice there was a soul assigned to it as to a place of Purgatory. And when that soul sought suffrages from the bishop during the night, by the merit of thirty Masses it flew up to heaven.

The same is evident from the soul of a certain religious, which was assigned to the fortress of the town of Adriano in Apulia as to a place of Purgatory. Concerning that soul and its Purgatory there, a matter clearer than light was made manifest to the senses of me, the compiler of the present work, in the following manner.

For when, by reason of the office which I sometimes unworthily discharged, I was visiting the province of Apulia, it happened that I also turned aside to a certain little house of the

Order near Adriano, a town in the territory of Otranto in Apulia. When the brothers there, and a certain Gregory Spertus, had shown me much kindness by reason of my office, after dinner I was led to bed in the fortress. But after I had begun to sleep in the dead of night, I was awakened by a certain din...

...and crash. In the hall I perceived someone wandering about here and there and sounding terribly with the chains by which, as I suppose, he was burdened. While I spoke in order to wake the companion whom I had with me, he stood still. As soon as we became silent, he began again: at first he walked farther away with the din of his fetters more violently, and with a certain horrible crash and effort he broke through the doors which were before the bedchamber. Meanwhile, struck by enormous fear, we spoke together; he became still.

Then, when we had become silent, for a third time the chained wanderer roamed about for roughly two hours. At last, with the greatest crash, he entered the bedchamber in which we lay almost lifeless. He wandered about in it and opened the windows. Meanwhile we remained trembling; our voices stuck in our throats, and as fear increased, death seemed about to follow.

We saw the windows open. Wherever we turned ourselves there seemed to be no hope. Between fear and anger we suddenly leapt from the bed into the middle of the room. With the greatest violence, he broke the other door by which one descended to the prison of the condemned at the bottom of the tower, and rushed down step by step with a heavier din of arms and chains. Although nowhere seen, he filled everything with tumult.

Made cold and senseless, we lit a lamp and awaited the day without sleep. Meanwhile we examined all the windows and found them all shut fast, just as we had bolted them in the evening.

At dawn the brothers and Gregory, our hosts, returned to us and greeted us. But we, made almost mad and speechless, said in trembling and weary voices: “May almighty God have mercy upon you, fathers, and upon you, good George. You received us as guests into the fortress, ignorant of its shades and spirits, so that we nearly died.”

They laughed and said: “Pardon us, fathers. Yesterday evening we forgot to warn you that a certain shade and spirit wanders here in the fortress. It says that God has assigned this place to it as Purgatory for a thousand years because it committed many evils and caused the deaths of human beings here. Although we do not see it, we speak with it very often. Very often it discloses many things to us and collectively imparts very many benefits, asking only this from us: that we help it by our prayers so that the time fixed for it in this place by the Lord may be shortened by our prayers.”

Perhaps a similar event among the gentiles is related by Pliny the Younger in Book VII concerning a certain soul or apparition.

“At Athens,” he says, “there was a certain spacious and roomy house, but one notorious and deadly, which the philosopher Athenodorus rented for a small price. When evening began to approach, he ordered a bed to be made for himself in the first part of the house. He set out writing tablets, a stylus, and a lamp; sent all his servants into the inner rooms; and himself directed his mind, eyes, and hand to writing, lest an unoccupied mind should fashion for itself empty fears - a wandering apparition or phantom.

“But when the silence of night began, he heard iron struck and chains moved everywhere. The philosopher steadied his mind, stretched out his hand toward his ears, did not lift his

eyes, and did not lay down his stylus. Then the crash increased. The apparition approached; it was now heard in the light and within the threshold. He looked back. Immediately an apparition was visible: an old man wasted by emaciation and filth, with a long beard and bristling hair, wearing fetters upon his legs and chains upon his hands. It stood and beckoned with its finger like one calling.

“The philosopher, in reply, signaled with his hand that it should wait a little, and again bent over his wax tablets and stylus. The apparition rattled its chains over the head of the writer. He looked back again and saw it making the same sign as before. Without delay he lifted the lamp and followed it.

“It went with a slow step, as if heavy with fetters. But after it turned aside into the courtyard of the house, it suddenly sank down and deserted its companion. Left alone, Athenodorus gathered grasses and leaves and set them as a marker upon the place.

“On the following day the philosopher approached the magistrates and urged them to order that place to be dug up. They found bones inserted into and entangled with chains, which time and the earth had left bare and gnawed, the body having rotted away around the fetters. They were gathered and publicly buried. After the remains had been duly interred, the house was thereafter free of spirits.”

Question Three

That in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault, and every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin

It is asked whether in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault, and every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given.

For it is easier to sin than to rise again from sin. But those who exist in Purgatory cannot sin. Therefore they cannot rise again from sin.

Second, the argument is as follows. Actual fault is not destroyed except through contrition. But after this life there will be no contrition which is a meritorious act, because there will be neither merit nor demerit; for according to Damascene, death is to human beings what the fall was to the angels. Therefore after death no venial fault can be remitted in Purgatory.

Third, venial sin arises from the tinder of sin. But the tinder belongs to the composite, not to the soul in itself. Therefore, when the tinder is dissolved, venial sin is dissolved. But the tinder is dissolved in death. Therefore venial sin is dissolved in death, and not after death in Purgatory.

To the contrary stands Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, and his text is placed in the *Decretum*, distinction 25, chapter *Qualis*. He says that after this life certain faults are expiated in Purgatory. Augustine also says in the book *On True Penance* that certain light faults are remitted in the future.

By way of answer, two conclusions corresponding to the two parts of the question's title will be set down.

The first conclusion: in Purgatory some sins are remitted as to fault.

Albert the Great proves this conclusion as follows. Let the case be posited that someone exists in grace but has venial faults, and that in the final instant he is in this condition and dies with the intention of repeating venial sins - that is, without grieving over them. It is established that he will be saved, because...

...he is in grace, and venial sins do not take grace away. It is also established that a sin which remains in the will is not remitted. Therefore it seems necessary that it be remitted after death as to fault.

If perhaps you say that it is converted into mortal sin because of the intention to repeat it, and consequently because of the delay of his glory, which he appears impenitently to love, Durandus and Peter of Palude answer this in Book IV. If someone at death does not wish to repent of a venial sin, he need not on this account sin mortally, for a human being is no more bound to expiate a sin than he is to avoid venial sin. But one who exists without mortal sin is not necessarily bound to avoid venial sin; therefore neither is he bound to expiate it in this or that manner.

"And nevertheless," the objector says, "he wills the delay of glory."

Peter answers that it also does not follow from this that he sins mortally, because to will the delay of glory is not of itself mortal, since to will to be separated from a friend for a time is not contrary to friendship. Hence to desire a long life, on account of which one is delayed from the blessed life, is not for this reason mortal. For Hezekiah did not sin mortally when he wept for the addition of fifteen years.

For this reason it is said conclusively, with Gregory and Augustine in the places cited above, that venial fault in one who departs with grace is remitted after this life through purgatorial fire. For that punishment, being in some measure voluntary by virtue of grace, will have the power to expiate every fault which cannot stand together with glory. Otherwise, it could happen that someone died in charity with a venial fault which would never be remitted to him. Thus someone could die in charity who would never see God beatifically, which is repugnant to the disposition of divine law. Therefore the first conclusion is true.

But Lord Henry of Hesse asks here, more precisely, when in the future age the remission of light sins as to fault occurs: whether in the first instant of the human being's nonexistence, or at the end of the discharge of the punishment for each one of them. Hence, if by merit before death - as Gregory says - the soul is absolved from venial fault after death, why would this not happen in the first instant of the soul's separation from the body?

He answers...

...that every fault not remitted in this life is coeval with its punishment. Thus, if it is mortal, it will be coeval with its eternal punishment. If, however, it is venial, it will not be remitted until the whole temporal punishment has been discharged for it.

In this consists the difference between the punishments of sins in the present life and in the future age. In the present age, fault is first remitted, and afterward the punishment for it is discharged. But in the future age, fault is not remitted before the punishment owed for it is brought to an end. Gregory intends this in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 27.

The second conclusion: in Purgatory every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin is remitted.

This conclusion is proved as follows. The punishment of Purgatory is more grievous than any punishment of this world, Augustine says in distinction 25, in the following chapter. But through a satisfactory punishment which someone sustains in this life, he is expiated from the debt of punishment. Therefore, much more is he expiated through the punishment of Purgatory.

Likewise, the argument is as follows. Whoever is a debtor to some punishment is absolved from the debt by discharging the debt. But liability is nothing other than a debt of punishment. Therefore, through the fact that someone sustains punishment to the extent that he owes, he is absolved from liability. Therefore the punishment of Purgatory purges from liability.

Here it must be observed, according to Richard of Middleton in Book IV, that of the souls departing from their bodies in charity, some have discharged in this life the whole punishment owed by them. Since such souls possess nothing to be purged, they are not punished in Purgatory but, immediately upon being separated from their bodies, are admitted to the enjoyment of eternal life.

There are other souls which have not completed the whole punishment owed by them. It is consonant with divine justice that such souls be punished after this life - not, however, with eternal punishment, but with purgatorial punishment. For since they depart with charity, it is not consonant with divine justice for them to be punished eternally, because they are worthy of eternal life. And because they are still bound to some punishment of divine justice, it is consonant that they first sustain it before they receive the joy of eternal...

...life. For an obligation to any punishment cannot stand together with that joy, because nothing defiled can enter into it.

Hence it must be observed, according to Lord Henry of Hesse, that venial sins as to liability to punishment are remitted either in this world by the merit of certain works done here in grace - for example, because someone freely and, in part, from piety has forgiven those who sin against him. Hence Christ said in Luke 6: “Forgive, and you shall be forgiven”; and in Matthew 5: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” Or this occurs by praying earnestly for sinners so that they may be converted, as in the final chapter of James: “He who causes a sinner to be converted from the error of his way shall save his soul” - namely, the soul of the one converting and of the one converted - “from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins.”

Or venial sin is remitted in the future age as to fault and punishment, if it happens that a human being dies in some venial sins, by the merit of the grace which preceded them. Concerning this Gregory said in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 4: “It must be known that there no one will obtain even the least purgation unless, while still placed here in this life, he merits by good deeds that he should obtain it there,” and so forth.

The arguments made to the contrary are now answered.

To the first argument, it must be said first that the premise, “It is easier to sin than to rise again from sin,” is true as long as free choice is flexible toward either alternative. But when it is now confirmed in the good, as it is in those who are in Purgatory, it is impossible to sin. Yet it is easy to detest sin, since this is a good. In this detestation consists the ordering of the will and the remission of venial sin as to fault. These things are from Lord Bonaventure and Lord Durandus in Book IV.

To the second argument, it must be said, according to Saint Thomas, that the minor premise is denied. For we say that after this life there cannot be merit with respect to the essential reward, but there can indeed be merit with respect to some accidental reward, as long as the human being remains in the state of the way in some manner. Therefore in Purgatory an act can be meritorious with respect to the remission of venial fault.

To the third, it must be said that the consequence is denied.

For Lord Bonaventure says that, although when the tinder of sin has been taken away venial sin is taken away as regards the power to sin venially in the future, it is nevertheless not necessary that a venial sin previously perpetrated be taken away. For not every cause of introducing a thing is a cause of preserving it, as is evident in many examples.

When a knife has been destroyed, a wound cannot be inflicted; but when the knife is destroyed, it is not on that account necessary that the wound previously inflicted be healed.

Albert and Thomas agree upon Book IV.

Question Four

Whether the punishment of Purgatory exceeds every temporal punishment of this life

It is asked whether the punishment of Purgatory exceeds every temporal punishment of this life, and what and how many those punishments are.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given.

The first argument is as follows. The more passive something is, the more it is afflicted if it possesses a perception of injury. But the body is more passive than the separated soul, both because it possesses a contrariety toward the fire acting upon it and because it possesses matter receptive of the acting thing's quality, which cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the punishment which the body suffers in this world is greater than the punishment by which the soul is purged after this life.

Likewise, the punishment of Purgatory is directly ordained against venial sins. But the lightest punishment is owed to venial sins, since they are the lightest sins, if the measure of the blows is to accord with the measure of the offense. Therefore the punishment of Purgatory is the lightest punishment.

Third, a suffering in which the agent transforms and casts away from substance is greater than one in which it transforms but does not cast away. But the suffering of this life transforms and casts away, while the suffering of the other life transforms and does not cast away. Therefore the former punishment is greater than the latter.

To the contrary stands the text of *On Penance*, distinction 7, chapter *Hic ignis purgatorius*: “Although this purgatorial fire is not eternal, nevertheless it is grievous in a marvelous manner. It exceeds every punishment which anyone has ever experienced in this life.”

And Augustine says in a certain sermon: “One who has deferred the fruit of conversion into the other age will first be purged by the fire of purgation, which, although it is not eternal, nevertheless torments in a marvelous manner.”

I answer that it must be said that the punishment of Purgatory exceeds the greatest punishments of this life.

Thomas proves this conclusion with respect to both punishments in Purgatory. Here it must be known that in Purgatory there is a twofold punishment: namely, the punishment of loss, insofar as souls are delayed from the divine vision; and the punishment of sense, according to which they are punished by corporeal fire.

That the conclusion is true of the first punishment is argued as follows. The more something is desired, the more distressing is its absence. After this life the affection by which the highest good is desired is most intense in holy souls, both because the affection is not retarded by the bulk of the body and because the time for enjoying the highest good would now have arrived if something did not impede it. Therefore they grieve most greatly over the delay.

And, as Albert the Great adds, health and the delight of sense in this life possess no comparison with the highest good which makes the blessed happy. Therefore the removal of delightful things in this life will possess no comparison with the removal or deferral of delightful things in the other life. Thus the sadness of the other life is incomparably greater than any sadness in the present life.

For this reason Chrysostom said in a certain sermon: “Let us set before the eyes of the mind how great a grief it is to be excluded and cast out from the kingdom of God, because this itself appears more grievous than Gehenna.”

And Augustine says in a certain sermon: “To be alienated from the kingdom of God and to lack the multitude of its sweetness is so great a punishment that no torments which we know can be compared with it.”

With respect to the punishment of sense, however, the conclusion is proved as follows by Thomas's reasoning in the place cited above. Since pain is not injury but the perception of injury, as is said in Book II *On the Soul*, the more sensitive something is, the more it suffers. An example is found in parts rich in nerves, such as the fingers, legs, and so forth.

For the nerves are the instruments of the sense of touch, as is said in Book II *On the Soul*. But the soul is supremely sensitive, since it is the cause of every sensation. Therefore, when some injurious agent acts upon it, it injures the soul most greatly, and the more so, the more active the injurious thing is.

Among all the elements fire is the most active. For it cannot be cooled or moistened in the way that water can be heated, as was said. Therefore it injures the soul most greatly - not naturally, because a body does not naturally act upon a spirit, nor does the less noble act upon the more noble, but as an instrument of divine justice. Divine justice grants to one uniform fire that in a marvelous manner it should torment the souls of the dead differently according to the diversity of their sins.

First, it does so to purge certain light faults of venial sins which were not remitted in the present life.

Second, to discharge obligations to punishments for mortal or venial sins forgiven here as to fault, for which sufficient penance was not performed in this life.

Third, to purge souls from every quality of imperfection; from improper concepts and species of things; likewise from habits of vice and impressions of false opinions; from the

tinder of sin; and from other indispositions and deformities which souls separated from their bodies carry with them to the fire of Purgatory. Purged there by fire from all these things as from certain stains contracted here, the souls depart like gold gleaming from a furnace of fire, to be conducted to the heavenly kingdom.

The arguments must now be answered.

To the first, it must be said that a punishment is not judged greater or lesser according to the injury or suffering, but according to the perception of the suffering. Therefore, although the soul is less passive than the body, nevertheless, because it is more cognizant and sensitive to suffering, its pain is greater even if its suffering is less.

To the second, it must be said that the consequence is denied. The reason is that the bitterness of that punishment arises not only from the magnitude of the sin but also from the disposition of the person punished, because the same sin is punished more grievously there than here on account of the difference of forum. Thus a person of a better bodily constitution is punished more by the same blows than another, and nevertheless a judge who inflicts the same blows upon both acts justly.

To the third, the premise is denied. For, as Lord Bonaventure answers, the fire of hell, which burns and does not consume, punishes more grievously than another fire which does both.

These things are from Lord John of Torquemada upon the said distinction 7 of *On Penance*, chapter *Hic ignis*.

Addition

It must be conceded altogether - as the Master of the Sentences, Saint Bonaventure in Book IV, distinction 20, article 1, question 2, John Gerson in part III, treatise 3 *On Canticles*, and many other holy persons say - that the punishment of Purgatory is more grievous than every temporal punishment which the soul now sustains while joined to the flesh. For in a matter of this kind one must adhere to authority more than to reason, since this lies above nature and reason.

Nevertheless, together with their affliction the souls detained there possess consolation, as Gerson holds in the place cited: from the certain hope of beatitude, from the assistance of the universal Church, and from the pious suffrages of friends. Charity in them also rejoices in the truth of their correction. The same is found in Richard, Book IV, distinction 20, article 2, question 1.

Question Five

Whether purgatorial fire differs from the fire of hell

It must be inquired how the fire of Purgatory differs from the fire of hell.

To this it is answered that they differ in eight ways.

First, because the fire of hell, as certain persons say, is elemental fire in its own matter, as it exists in its own sphere, because it must afflict eternally. The fire of Purgatory is mixed and elemented in alien matter - namely, earthly matter, such as coal. For this reason it can in a qualified sense be called more afflictive, because it must purge temporally.

For although fire in its own sphere is simply hotter in itself than any mixed body, whether lead, glowing iron, or coal, nevertheless lead or glowing iron can be hotter accidentally, for three reasons which Avicenna sets down.

First, on the part of fire, which is exceedingly rarefied. For this reason portions of watery - that is, moist - and also cold air enter the fire itself and cool it, although accidentally.

Second, on the part of its active power. Because the parts of fire are very distant from one another on account of their rarity, not many parts act together in its action. But the parts of glowing iron are closely united because of their solidity, and therefore many parts act together in its action. Hence glowing iron acts more powerfully than fire, although fire is hotter of itself. Thus we see that many weak persons draw a ship more powerfully than one strong person.

Third, on the part of the sentient subject. Because of its tenuity fire is very mobile, and therefore it passes quickly and does not remain long upon the sense. But glowing iron is not very mobile because of its heaviness, and therefore it does not pass quickly but remains for a long time. Consequently, it acts upon the sense for longer and is felt more than fire, although fire is hotter of itself.

Second, they differ with respect to operation. For although the fire of Purgatory is eternal with respect to its substance, like the fire of hell, nevertheless it is temporal with respect to the effect of purgation, as Gregory says - or as Lord Bonaventure says in Book IV. Although it remains with respect to some act, namely, with respect to the ardor which it possesses for the burning of the reprobate, it nevertheless does not remain with respect to purgation.

The fire of hell hardens and discolors; the fire of Purgatory cooks thoroughly and ripens. The fire of hell makes strong and beautiful things weak and most ugly. The fire of Purgatory renders them stronger and more beautiful, just as gold and similar things are not made worse in fires but are purified and rendered more beautiful.

The fire of Purgatory is purgative. The fire of hell is exterminative.

Blessed Gregory supplies an example in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, saying that, just as under the same fire gold shines and straw smokes, so under the same fire in substance - namely, the fire of Purgatory and of hell - the elect person is purged and the damned person is destroyed.

Third, they differ in the intention of their end. The fire of Purgatory is principally ordained to this end: namely, to purge the remnants of sins. Therefore the punishment of Purgatory is called the punishment of fire, for things ordained to an end are fittingly named from their end.

But the fire of hell is ordained solely to affliction. It is therefore named by those names which among us are accustomed to afflict vehemently, such as fire, sulfur, the spirit of storms, and so forth, as Thomas says in Book IV.

Fourth, they differ in multiplicity, because in Purgatory there are only two punishments: namely, the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. In hell, however, there are not only the two aforesaid punishments but many others.

The reason is that, since the punishment of hell is ordained and devised solely for affliction, as is evident, in hell there is not only the punishment of sense and of loss, as in

Purgatory, but there are many others, so that from the multitude of punishments the damned may be afflicted in many ways.

Fifth, the fire of hell is obscure and dark beneath a certain shadowiness, so that the damned may see the things which afflict them and grieve. The Psalm says: "The sinner shall see and shall be angry," and so forth. But the fire of Purgatory is clear and radiant.

Sixth, the fire of hell afflicts and torments by reason of evil habits, vices, and false opinions contracted in the world. But the fire of Purgatory purges from all the aforesaid things.

Seventh, as the day of judgment approaches, the fire of hell will not increase in ardor, but the fire of Purgatory will increase in this manner with respect to those who ought to be purged there for a long time: so that its more intense heat may make up in intensity for as much as it will lose through the shortening of time. Thus Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 47, article 3.

Hence, in Quodlibet II, question 7, in the reply to the fourth argument, he says: "Those who will be found alive at the end of the world will possess little that can be burned away, having been purged by the tribulations which precede. It will also be possible that the bitterness of the punishment for a moment of time may compensate for the long duration of punishment in others."

Eighth, because the punishment of the fire of hell exceeds every punishment of this world in extension, but not in intensity and bitterness. The punishment of the fire of Purgatory, however, exceeds every punishment of this world in intensity and bitterness, but not in extension. Thus says Lord Dominicus of Venice, bishop of Brescia, otherwise called Torcellanus.

Although this solemn doctor is not to be followed in this matter, and his position should by no means be preached or solemnly celebrated, we say more safely and truly - with the permission of so great a man - that the punishment of hell is more bitter than every punishment of this world, both extensively and intensively and in every way, absolutely, formally, or simply. This stands especially because the punishment of Purgatory exceeds every present punishment, and nevertheless, according to Richard, the fire of hell and of Purgatory is the same.

Addition

It has appeared to many that the same fire burns those who exist in Purgatory and those who exist in hell, as Richard shows in Book IV, distinction 44, article 2, question 2, and Thomas of Strasbourg in the same distinction.

This also appears to be the intention of Blessed Gregory in the book of the *Dialogues*, where he says that the fire of hell and of Purgatory is the same, because just as under the same fire gold shines and straw smokes, so under the same fire the sinner is burned and the elect person is purged. This is true according to the common law.

Question Six

Whether the punishment which souls sustain in Purgatory is voluntarily assumed

It is asked whether so great a punishment of Purgatory is voluntarily assumed by those who are purged there.

To this it first appears that an affirmative answer should be given.

For those who exist in Purgatory possess an upright heart. But as Ambrose says, one who possesses an upright heart conforms his will to the divine will. The Lord wills that they be purged. Therefore they too will themselves to be purged.

Likewise, every wise person wills that without which his end cannot be attained, and every sick person wills that by which he is healed. But those existing in Purgatory are wise and sick. Therefore they will to be there so that glory may be acquired, and they will that punishment so that they may be healed.

If perhaps you say - as certain persons have perhaps said - that the perception of pain is so great that the whole exercise of reason is absorbed and they cannot deliberate about either the one thing or the other, it is said that this is false and contrary to what Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues*. For they would not know that they were to be liberated, nor would they seek the suffrages which they frequently seek, as is evident there concerning many persons.

It is argued to the contrary. No one seeks to be liberated from a punishment which he sustains voluntarily. But those who are in Purgatory seek to be liberated from it, as is evident in Book IV of the *Dialogues*. Therefore they do not sustain that punishment voluntarily.

It is answered according to Lord Bonaventure, who says that a punishment is called voluntary in three ways.

In one way, because it is assumed by a will which commands it, as is penitential punishment.

In another way, because it is sustained by a will which accepts it, as is the punishment of martyrs.

In a third way, there is a punishment which is sustained by a will which tolerates it - for example, a punishment which is present in suffering while its opposite is desired. Thus, when one who loves and desires health falls ill, he indeed sustains the punishment as inflicted by God as by a physician, and nevertheless strives to be liberated from it. In this latter respect it possesses the character of the voluntary only minimally.

In this manner the punishment of Purgatory is voluntary. For one who is to be purged there voluntarily sustains it for three reasons, as Peter of Palude says.

First, because they know it to be inflicted and willed by God. They therefore do not murmur, as good sons do not murmur against their father's scourges; rather, it pleases them to be afflicted for as long as it pleases God.

Second, because they know the scourges to have been justly imposed. Hence...

...because charity rejoices in truth, they will to suffer justly in this manner.

Third, because they know that they cannot be saved otherwise. Hence, from love of the good for which they hope, they will to be afflicted in this manner for its sake.

Albert and Thomas, however, say in Book IV that something is called voluntary in two ways.

In one way, by an absolute will. In this sense no punishment is voluntary, because the character of punishment consists in its being contrary to the will.

In another way, something is called voluntary by a conditional will, just as cauterization is voluntary for the sake of obtaining health. In this manner the punishment of Purgatory is called voluntary.

Through this the solution to the objections is evident. These things are from Lord John of Torquemada upon distinction 25, chapter *Qualis*.

Addition

The passage of Lord Bonaventure cited above is in Book IV, distinction 20, part 1, question 3.

Perhaps the author touched upon this difficulty because Lord Augustine, in Book XIV of *The City of God*, chapter 15, said what punishment is: the soul's disagreement with those things which happen to us against our will.

But as to the manner in which punishment is voluntary in the souls of the faithful being purged, see Gabriel Biel, Book IV, distinction 14, question 1, article 3, doubt 1.

Question Seven

Whether those detained in Purgatory can in any manner sin mortally or venially

It is doubted whether souls in Purgatory can sin mortally, or at least venially, through impatience or through some other act.

To this it is answered as follows. Since it has been shown that as a soul departs from the body, so it is presented in the particular judgment, if souls are separated from their bodies in charity they are so confirmed in that charity that they can no longer sin or fall away from it, because “where the tree has fallen, there it shall be,” Ecclesiastes 11.

This is the common opinion and the ordinance of God, who has disposed that every human being who dies finally outside charity is to be damned and that one who dies finally in charity is simply to be saved. Such souls cannot afterward be bent toward impatience in their punishments, sin mortally, contract a venial fault from any source, and thereby prolong their punishments.

For they do not possess the tinder from which venial sin is caused, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 21, question 1, article 1.

The steadfastness, immunity from precipitous fall, and impeccability of souls existing in Purgatory can also arise from the fact that, made certain of their beatitude, they tolerate the punishments which they know to have been inflicted upon and owed by them through the just and merciful judgment of God, with the greatest patience and thanksgiving.

These things are from Lord Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Addition

Examine the book *On the State of the Soul Departing in Charity*, upon the Offertory of the Mass for the Dead, printed at Bologna, where I have also recorded both this matter and many other things concerning souls existing in Purgatory.

Question Eight

That souls existing in Purgatory cannot merit

It is asked whether souls in Purgatory, by patiently enduring punishments or by some other act, can merit a speedier liberation.

To this it is answered as follows. Meritorious human action and salutary penance extend only to the time of the present life, after which nothing remains except either to receive punishments for sins or rewards for virtues.

Therefore, although souls in Purgatory, in accordance with their state, can act well and rightly and be piously disposed according to the charity which they possess, nevertheless through this they merit neither an increase of charity nor a diminution of punishment.

Their punishment can, however, be increased or prolonged - not because of sins committed in Purgatory, but because of the examples, things, causes, or, incidentally, doctrines which they left in the world when they died, if by the occasion of such things certain persons should have erred, fallen into vices by which they were damned, or diminished the honor of God.

Similarly, from good things left here by which certain persons should advance toward salvation, the punishment of the souls there decreases or is shortened.

It must therefore be said conclusively that, although souls existing in Purgatory are not yet at the terminus but are still in the way, far from obtaining final beatitude, and possess the use of reason together with freedom of will, nevertheless they cannot merit there, because meritorious human actions extend only to the time of the present life, as was said.

This must be held as the more probable position in this matter. These things are from John of Torquemada in the place cited above and Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Question Nine

Why the punishment of the damned always grows and is increased

It must be doubted why the punishment of the damned grows through their demeriting until the day of judgment, since they blaspheme out of impatience with their punishments, although, with respect to merit or demerit, they belong to the same state, way, and time as the souls being purged, which can merit or demerit no further either before or after the judgment.

To this it is answered as follows. This proceeds from the hidden disposition and right judgment of divine wisdom. Because the souls being purged tolerate their punishments with thanksgiving, divine wisdom assists their state so that they cannot demerit further or contract fault from any source.

The damned, however, and the souls terribly agitated by the punishments of hell, all hope of liberation having been taken away, restrain themselves by no natural virtue or equity. Blaspheming God incessantly, they perhaps merit that their punishments be increased

intensively, at least until the day of judgment, so that those who are in filth may become filthy still.

What happens after the judgment, however, God knows and the human being does not know.

These things are from Henry of Hesse.

But Thomas, in Book IV, distinction 50, question 6, says in the body of the question:

> *Some say that before the day of judgment both the blessed merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot be with respect to the essential reward or the principal punishment, since with respect to these both parties have arrived at the terminus. It can, however, be with respect to an accidental reward or a secondary punishment, which can be increased until the day of judgment. This occurs especially in demons or good angels, by whose ministry certain persons are drawn to salvation, from which the joy of the good angels grows, or to damnation, from which the punishment of demons grows.*

And immediately afterward, in replying to the first argument, he adds:

> *The souls of the damned, however, cannot demerit in any manner, because to have arrived at the summit of evils is the supreme disadvantage for them. Nor does it belong to the office of damned human beings to draw others toward damnation, as it belongs to the office of demons, by reason of which demons demerit with respect to secondary punishment.*

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above.

Question Ten

Why the soul alone suffers in Purgatory, although the whole human being commits sins

It is asked why the soul alone suffers purgatorial punishments for sins committed here by the whole human being, while the body discharges none of the punishments after the resurrection.

To this it is answered as follows. Unless the whole human being suffers purgatorial punishments in this life - namely, acts of contrition and penitential afflictions, by which the human being is purged from mortal fault and partly from the punishment to be discharged in the future, and sometimes from all of it - unless, I say, such punishments of the whole human being have preceded, the soul will be purged after death by infernal punishments.

Scripture intimates this allegorically, according to the doctors, in Genesis 3, where it is said that after the fall of the human being a flame was placed between the human being and Paradise. This allegorically intimates that after the fall of the human race no one can arrive at the heavenly Paradise unless he passes through fire.

This is either the fire of tribulation to be sustained in the present life, or the fire of purgation after death, if one has not sufficiently discharged in this life the punishments which one merited by sinning here.

Or, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 47, question 6, article 3, the good who will be alive on the day of judgment and in whom something to be purged will be found are purged

by both fires: namely, the fire of tribulation and that of Purgatory. Such persons will be purged suddenly by fire.

First, by the fire of tribulation: namely, the terrors and persecutions preceding the judgment.

Second, by the fire of Purgatory, whose place will then be taken by the fire of the conflagration. With respect to its natural power, this fire will act similarly upon the good and the wicked who are found alive, reducing the bodies of both to ashes. Insofar as it acts as an instrument...

...of divine justice, however, it will act upon different persons in different ways with respect to the perception of punishment.

For by the action of the fire the wicked will be reduced to ashes and tormented. The good in whom nothing is to be purged will be reduced to ashes but will feel no pain at all from the fire, just as the youths in the furnace did not, Daniel 3.

The good in whom something to be purged will be found will likewise be reduced to ashes, but they will feel more or less torment of pain from that fire according to the diversity of their merits.

And because these good persons, not yet fully purged, will sustain this punishment voluntarily while still alive, they will be purged more quickly than if they had sustained it in Purgatory. For a punishment voluntarily assumed in this life purges much more and more quickly than a punishment inflicted after death. This is evident in the brief punishment of the martyrs: if anything to be purged is found in them at the time of death, it is immediately removed by the sickle of suffering, as Augustine says.

From this it follows that the words of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3, “If anyone's work burns, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire,” could be understood of the fire of tribulation applied to us in this life, or of the purgatorial fire ordained after this life, or of both fires to be sustained on the day of judgment by the good who must then be purged.

From these things it follows that there are three Purgatories.

The first is in this world, in which human beings are purged by the fire of tribulation.

The second is beneath the earth, in which the souls of human beings who died in charity are purged when they were not sufficiently purged in the first Purgatory.

And the third will be above the earth with respect to the good who must be purged on the day of judgment.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above and Henry upon Genesis.

Question Eleven

Whether the souls of Purgatory are relieved by the works of the living

It is asked whether the souls of the dead in Purgatory are relieved and receive consolation from the works of the faithful living.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given.

The first argument is as follows. The law of Moses is not inferior to the law of Christ with respect to the charity of loving one's neighbors. For love of neighbor was in a commandment for them just as it is for us, as is evident concerning them in Deuteronomy 6 and concerning us in Matthew 22. But the law of Moses did not strive by prayers, alms, and sacrifices to relieve the miseries of souls which were then in Purgatory. Therefore neither ought we to do so.

Second, the Philosopher says in Book I of the *Ethics* that there cannot be a sharing of civil works between the living and the dead.

Third, Dionysius says in the final chapter of *The Celestial Hierarchy*:

> *If each person receives from divine justice the recompenses of those good and evil things which he accomplished in the present life, and those who sleep possess after this life the operations proper to them, how shall the supreme priest transfer one to another rest by some operation, beyond that person's dignity?*

These are his words.

Likewise, the Waldensians say that neither can the dead be helped in anything by the works of the living, nor the living by the prayers of the blessed. For they say that the commandment concerning love of neighbor ends in the present life. This was also the opinion of Vigilantius, against whom Blessed Jerome writes concerning this, as is said.

But to the contrary stands the practice of the Church militant, which prays for the departed and receives the pious works of the faithful for the dead. Taught by the Holy Spirit, the Church cannot err or proceed mendaciously.

For as Augustine says to Jerome, and as is found in distinction 90, chapter *Si ad scripturas*: “If dutiful falsehoods are admitted into the Holy Scriptures, what authority will remain to them?” - as though he were to say, none.

I answer that it must be said that the souls of the dead in Purgatory can be relieved by the pious works of the living. The living can make satisfaction for the departed through works accepted by God and can discharge satisfactory punishment for them.

This conclusion is proved in two ways: first on the part of the living, and second on the part of the departed.

First, on the part of the living, it is proved through the union of charity. For the charity of the mystical body never fails, 1 Corinthians 13. But the living are united to the dead in charity, and conversely. Therefore the dead can be helped through the living.

Likewise, it is proved through the intention of the living directed toward them. For the dead live in the memories of human beings, and therefore the intention of the living can be directed toward them. Nevertheless, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 45, the suffrages of the living must not be believed to avail the dead in such a way that their state is changed from misery into felicity, or conversely; rather, they avail toward a diminution of punishment or something of this kind which does not transform the state of the dead.

Likewise, the Apostle says in Galatians 6: “Bear one another's burdens.” But the burdens which are most of all to be borne are the spiritual burdens of the other life. Therefore it appears that the living can assume penances for the dead and make satisfaction.

The same is proved by a likeness in natural things. For we see in an animal body that one member exposes itself to sustain the injury of another, as is evident when the arm exposes

itself on behalf of the head. Therefore, if in the mystical body there is a connection by assimilation to a natural body, it appears that one member can carry another's burden and take it upon itself.

Likewise, we see in human affairs that it makes no difference to a creditor whether the principal debtor or another in his place repays the debt to the creditor. Since God is much more benign in receiving payment than an earthly human being, it appears...

...that he is content and it suffices for him if another makes satisfaction on behalf of the debtor.

Likewise, charity has more power before God than among human beings. But among human beings one person can, from love of another, discharge that person's debt. Therefore this can much more occur in divine judgment, provided that the person for whom the works are done and the one who does them are in charity, so that their works performed in charity may benefit.

Second, the preceding conclusion is proved on the part of the being of the departed. For after this life the dead remain as members joined to the Church militant of the living through the binding and connection of charity which remains after death in the souls of the departed. Therefore they can receive consolation from the works of the living.

Likewise, they can receive the suffrages of the living.

First, because there they discharge punishments only for sins contracted here.

Second, because they are still in the way, marked with the character of Christ.

Third, because they share with the faithful in faith, charity, and hope.

Fourth, because they leave among the living offspring, relatives, and friends to whom they left goods which they themselves acquired and which, when dying, they commanded to be distributed to the faithful for their salvation. On account of these benefits, the living remain obligated to the dead in such a way that, if after departure from this life the dead should fall anywhere into penal misery, the living would be bound to help them.

Reason dictates this, charity possesses it, and justice demands it.

Reason, I say, dictates that one who has received benefits from others ought not to be ungrateful to one's benefactors, but ought to repay their services and never abandon them wherever or from whatever cause they should fall into a state of misery.

Justice demands it. For since the living have entered into the labors of the dead and possess their fruits, it is just that they should come to their aid in necessity and piously offer suffrages for them.

Likewise, the breadth of charity commands the same thing. For the dominion of charity is so broad that no distance of places, nor variety or disparity of states, can prevent it from extending itself to all. Hence, if the charity of the blessed, who are most distant from us both by disparity of state and by remoteness...

...of their situation, extends itself to compassion for the miseries of the living, why would the charity of the living not extend itself to the miseries of the dead, who are far nearer and more similar to the states of the living?

Certain authorities must now be set down by which it is also shown that the souls of the departed in Purgatory can be relieved by the prayers and suffrages of the faithful living.

First, Damascene says in a certain sermon concerning suffrages for the dead:

> *The disciples of the Savior and the sacred Apostles, conscious of the mystery, decreed that in the dread and life-giving mysteries a remembrance should be made of those who had fallen asleep faithfully.*

And Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*:

> *The authority of the universal Church which is manifest in this custom is not small: that the commendation of the dead should also have its place among the prayers of the priest which are poured out to the Lord God at his altar.*

And Gregory says - as is placed in cause 13, question 2, chapter *Animae defunctorum*:

> *The souls of the departed are loosed in four ways: either by the offerings of priests, by the prayers of holy persons, by the alms of dear ones, or by the fasting of relatives.*

These are his words.

Finally, the arguments to the contrary must be answered.

To the first, the premise is denied. For even under the law of Moses the ancients strove by prayers, alms, and sacrifices to relieve the miseries of souls existing in Purgatory. For Judas Maccabaeus, in 2 Maccabees 12, sent twelve thousand silver drachmas to Jerusalem to be offered there for the sins of the dead.

It is nevertheless true that those of the old law did not pray for the dead as intensely as we do. The reason is that the law of the fullness of charity had not yet come, such as is the law of Christ. Just as it extends itself among the living even to enemies, so it must also extend itself to the dead detained in the punishments of Purgatory for sins committed here. Thus the justice of Christians abounds more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, Matthew 5.

To the second, it is said that although there cannot be between the living and the dead a sharing of civil and corporeal works...

...nevertheless there can be between them a sharing of spiritual works through charity toward God, to whom the spirits of the dead are alive.

To the third argument from Dionysius, it is answered that he sets down those words as though argumentatively. Thomas answers that argument as follows.

The operation of one person can benefit another in two ways: either by way of merit or by way of suffrage.

In the first way, no person's operation can benefit another toward attaining the state of glory. For the lot of glory is rendered according to the measure of the recipient, and consequently eternal life is given to no one for the merits of another.

Those who are in Purgatory have already been disposed toward eternal life and have merited it through their own merits, although in a certain manner they are delayed from ascending to it because satisfaction for their sins remains. Therefore, by way of suffrage, with respect to this delay and through the way of intercession and prayer, the dead can be helped by the living.

The reason is that the obtaining effected by prayer belongs to God's supreme liberality and freedom. Therefore it can extend itself to all those things which are subject to God's ordained power. These things are from Thomas in Book IV, distinction 45.

To the fourth, it is answered that the error of the Waldensians is condemned because it is altogether contrary to charity and to the perfection of the Christian religion.

First, it is condemned by the authority of the Christian people, which is more observant of law and more excellent than every people of the world, standing in relation to other peoples as light to darkness, gold to dross, and wine to dregs.

For its clergy, illustrious in every knowledge and teaching, has shone and shines in the world like the morning star. Its holy doctors, who have been praised for truth and holiness from age to age, urge prayer for the dead. While they themselves were among mortals, they sacrificed for the dead.

When the Waldensians say that the commandment concerning love of neighbor ends here, they lie. For Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine* that the commandment concerning love of God and neighbor begins on the way and is perfected in the homeland, where all the powers and movements of the soul are always directed in act and habit toward the love of God and neighbor.

Jerome answers the point of Vigilantius in a letter against him, saying:

> *You say in your little book: "While we live, we can pray for one another; but after we have died, no prayer of one person is to be heard for another, especially since the martyrs, begging for vengeance for their own blood, have not been able to obtain it." If the Apostles and martyrs, while still constituted in their bodies, can pray for others when they still ought to be solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so after their crowns and triumphs? One man, Moses, obtains pardon from God for six hundred thousand armed men; and Stephen, the imitator of the Lord and the first martyr in Christ, begs pardon for his persecutors. And after they have begun to be with Christ, will they possess less power? - and so forth.*

These things are from Henry of Hesse upon Genesis and Lord John of Torquemada upon *On Penance*, distinction 1, chapter *His auctoritatibus*.

Question Twelve

Whether the pope can remit, wholly or in part, the punishments of those who are in Purgatory

It is asked whether the pope, from the plenitude of the key of jurisdiction, can through indulgences remit wholly or in part the punishments of those who are actually in Purgatory.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given, and first as follows. No one can grant an indulgence except to one whom he can judge, as is said in *On Penance and Remission*, chapter *Quod autem*. For no one can judge anyone unless that person is of his forum. But those who are dead are not of the forum of the Church. Therefore the pope cannot act upon them.

And consequently the pope, with respect to that state of souls, does not have the power to loose wholly or in part the obligation to the punishment of Purgatory.

Likewise it is said in cause 24, question 2, canon *Legatur*, and below, section *His auctoritatibus*: "We can loose or bind the living, not the dead"; and in Matthew 16: "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."

But souls, once their bodies have been laid aside, immediately cease to be upon earth and of the forum of the Church militant. Therefore the pope does not have power over them.

To the contrary stands the practice of the Roman Pontiff, who must not be believed in this matter to wish to mock the faithful by granting indulgences for the departed which he could not grant.

I answer this question under two conclusions, in accordance with two opinions - namely, those of certain theologians and of certain canonists who think contrarily in this matter.

For virtually all the theologians, with whom certain canonists also agree, affirm that the indulgences of pontiffs avail not only the living but also the departed in Purgatory.

This conclusion is proved as follows. According to Master Alexander of Hales and Lord Bonaventure in Book III, God, the Father of mercies, provides for all according to his most orderly disposition and his most merciful loving-kindness. But the right ordering of charity, by which one can be helped by another, is required most of all concerning one who cannot help himself. Therefore, if God has provided for human beings in this world who need help that aid should be conferred through an indulgence of the Church, since those in Purgatory also need help and cannot help themselves, it appears that indulgences can especially benefit them.

For the explanation of this conclusion, it must be noted with Saint Thomas, in Book IV, distinction 45, that an indulgence can benefit someone in two ways: in one way principally, and in another way secondarily.

It benefits principally the one who receives the indulgence - namely, the person who does that for which it is given, as when someone visits the thresholds of the Apostles or does something of this kind. Hence, since the dead cannot do any of these things by themselves...

...indulgences cannot avail them directly.

Secondarily and indirectly, however, they benefit the person for whom someone performs that which is the cause of the indulgence. This can sometimes occur and sometimes cannot occur, according to the differing form of the indulgence.

For if the form of the indulgence is of this kind: "Whoever does this or that shall have such-and-such an indulgence," the one who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it does not belong to him to apply to anyone the intention of the Church through which the common suffrages upon which indulgences depend are communicated.

But if the indulgence is made under this form: "Whoever does this or that for himself, or for his father, or for any other person joined to him who is detained in Purgatory, shall have such-and-such an indulgence," such a person shall have the indulgence not only for himself while living but also for the dead person. For there is no reason why the Pontiff could transfer the common merits upon which indulgences rest to the living but not to the dead.

These are Thomas's words. From them it is manifestly evident that, indirectly and in the aforesaid manner, indulgences can benefit those existing in Purgatory if the form of the indulgence contains this in accordance with the intention of the giver.

He says pointedly, "in accordance with the intention of the giver," because, as Lord Peter of Palude says, certain persons say that solely from the intention of the person performing that for which the indulgence was given, the indulgence can be transferred to the person who is in Purgatory. This is not true unless the form used by the grantor contains this, because just as an indulgence does not extend beyond an amount not expressed, so neither does it thus pass beyond the person specified.

The intention of the dispenser therefore effects this, because, just as the goods of the living are communicated to them, so also is the treasure of the dead. Lord Archdeacon holds the same, who, upon cause 24, question 2, chapter 1, holds against the text that the pope can act beneath the earth insofar as the Church militant is concerned.

The one who dispenses indulgences to the departed, however, as Lord Pope Innocent says in chapter *Quod autem*, *On Penance and Remission*, is the pope alone.

And these theologians answer the arguments of the canonists which were made at the beginning of this little question.

To the first, they answer that those who are in Purgatory are in some manner upon earth. For Purgatory is in one manner a way and in another manner a terminus. It is a terminus with respect to confirmation, because they can sin no more. But with respect to correction or the purgation by which they are corrected or purged, they are on the way and in passage toward the homeland, as Master Alexander of Hales says.

To the second, it must be said that the Pontiff cannot act directly and principally upon those existing in Purgatory, but he can act secondarily and indirectly, as has been said.

To the third, it must be said, according to Albert upon Matthew 15, that those existing in Purgatory are in some respect upon earth because, while they lived, they merited that even after death indulgences could avail them toward a swifter liberation.

There is another famous opinion, held by certain canonists together with certain theologians, who say that pontifical indulgences do not avail the departed in Purgatory. For they say that, although the power of Christ's vicar is great and immense, it is nevertheless not infinite but finite, extending itself only to the forum of the Church militant. And therefore, since the dead have ceased to be of the forum of the Church militant, they conclude, as the more probable position, that the pope cannot by ordinary power mitigate wholly or in part their punishments in Purgatory, but can obtain this only by prayers and by the merits of a holy life, as can the rest of the faithful.

They prove this conclusion by several reasons.

First, as follows: no one can be bound by one who is not his judge, in *On Penance and Remission*, chapter *Quod autem*. But the pope is not the judge of the departed, cause 24, question 1, canon *Quodcumque ligaveris*. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, they argue as follows: an equal cannot have dominion over an equal…

…in *On Election*, chapter *Innotuit*; therefore, a fortiori, neither can an inferior have dominion over a superior. But the pope is inferior to God, although upon earth he represents God, in *On the Translation of a Bishop*, chapters *Inter corporalia* and *Quanto*. But God has assessed

for each soul its punishment in Purgatory. Revelation 18: "As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment and mourning give to her." Therefore such a soul cannot through the pope, who is inferior to God, be recalled from the sentence of God.

This is confirmed as follows. The pope is the Vicar of Christ, as is held in the aforesaid chapter *Quanto* and in chapter *Pastoralis*, at the end, *On a Matter Adjudged*. But a vicar cannot violate the law of his lord or act against his statute, as the lord jurists allege in law *Si hominem*, *Digest*, *On the Manumission of Vindicta*, and law *Formam*, *Code*, *On the Office of the Praetorian Prefect of the East*; and this is designated in chapter 2 and chapter *De his*, *On Majority and Obedience*, Book VI. Therefore the pope will not be able to act against the statute of God, who assesses punishment in Purgatory.

Likewise, they argue as follows: those who cannot do that which the indulgences express do not obtain the indulgences. But the dead cannot do it, because the bulls say, "To those who are truly penitent and have confessed," which the dead cannot do, just as they cannot receive the other sacraments. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, an indulgence is acquired by way of merit. But the dead are outside the state of meriting. Therefore, and so forth.

They also corroborate this opinion of theirs with the three arguments made at the beginning of this little question.

Lord Francis of Meyronnes, of the Order of Minors, defends this opinion in his lectures upon the Decretals, as does Lord Henry of Hesse, a German, master of Paris, of the Order of Preachers, in his lectures upon Genesis.

These are two famous opinions which are opposed to one another and which in some fashion weaken and diminish the jurisdiction or authority of pontiffs and delay the faithful from offering suffrages for the dead. Therefore, lest anyone from perplexity and doubt concerning them should restrict and confine the power of the Pontiff and turn the faithful away from suffrages for the dead...

...I shall, God assisting, first reconcile the theologians and jurists under a certain distinction made by theologians and jurists - always preserving Catholic and better judgment - and then I shall append how each of their opinions speaks truth and is opposed neither to the Pontiff nor to suffrages for the departed. From this, finally, the replies to the arguments of both sides can be elicited and obtained.

For this purpose it must be known and carefully noted that Lord Bonaventure, in Book IV, distinction 22, and Lord Alexander of Hales, in the *Summa*, say that an indulgence can be considered in two ways: in one way by way of suffrage and assistance, and in another way by way of judgment.

If indulgences are considered in the first way, they say that, since souls existing in Purgatory are found suitable and disposed to receive spiritual benefits by reason of the charity in which they exist, therefore, if anyone receives indulgences for the souls of his departed relatives and says, "Most sweet Jesus, the merit which I would have by visiting this church, I ask you through your mercy to grant to the soul of my father, or brother, or wife, or son," and so forth, for their suffrage and aid, nothing prevents the most loving God from granting this favor to the person praying, if he is in grace - provided that the indulgences were granted in this manner by the authorization of the Pontiff.

But if an indulgence is considered by way of judgment, which properly belongs to the nature of an indulgence, since an indulgence taken in this way signifies a certain commutation into a punishment voluntarily undertaken - something which cannot belong to the departed - it is manifest that indulgences in this sense do not avail the departed and cannot be received for them.

The lord canonists, however, distinguish in this way: certain things do not depend upon jurisdiction but upon some other charitable assistance, such as prayer, almsgiving, sacrifice, and things of this kind; and all such things can benefit the departed, namely by way of suffrage and assistance. In this the Pontiff has power, and in support of this are brought...

...all those texts in cause 24, question 2, canon 1; cause 13, question 2, chapters *Tempus* and *Animae*; *On Penance*, distinction 6, section 1; distinction 7, the final chapter; and cause 23, question 4, canon *Haec autem vita*.

For there is no reason why the Church could not dispense a treasure of this kind to the departed, especially since through the grace in which they exist they are still members of the mystical body. In support of this also are the comments in chapter *A nobis*, *On the Sentence of Excommunication*, by Lord John Andrew upon the words “upon earth,” and the comments by the same man in chapter *Quod autem*, *On Penance and Remission*, upon the words “not by his own judge.”

Certain other things, however, simply depend upon forum and jurisdiction, such as the granting of indulgences, which cannot be given except by the ordinaries of places - as by the pope, a legate *a latere*, an archbishop, or a bishop - as is evident in chapter *Accedentibus*, *On the Excesses of Prelates*. These cannot benefit the departed, namely by way of judgment, as has been said.

From these distinctions of the theologians and canonists, therefore, it is evident in my judgment how both opinions possess truth and how their arguments must be answered.

All these things have been gathered from Lord John of Torquemada upon the Decree in the place cited above, Henry of Hesse upon Genesis, and other theologians and pontifical jurists.

Addition

It is certain, and has never been doubted by Catholics, that the Supreme Roman Pontiff has power in Purgatory. I do not say only by way of suffrage, because this also is true, and he has so much more power as he possesses a greater plenitude throughout the whole world than other prelates. But beyond suffrage I say that the pope has jurisdiction in Purgatory, if the words of Christ spoken to Peter in Matthew 16 are rightly considered, especially as Blessed Augustine expounds them in the book of *Retractations*: “The gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” He intended nothing other than that...

...the gates of Purgatory shall not resist and shall not be closed. The successor of Peter shall possess presidency, jurisdiction, and authority in Purgatory; hence he shall be able to absolve and liberate.

The Gloss also expressly holds that the pope has authority in Purgatory. For after it declared that the Supreme Pontiff can loose a living person who is bound and bind a living person who is loosed, it reproved certain persons who, on the basis of the Council of Constantinople, said that the Pontiff has authority only over the living - as the author also reports in the body of the question - and says formally:

> *How, then, do certain persons presume to say that these words were spoken only of the living? Do they not know that the judgment of anathema is nothing other than separation?*

All doctors of the Church favor this truth. And in this present age very many from the mendicant orders have written against Luther, the heresiarch. Among them was Jerome of Lucca, General of the Servants, in his *Solutions to Martin Luther*; Michael of Florence, of the same Order, under the title *On the Quiddity, Dispenser, and Validity of Indulgences, and on the Power of the Pope*; see Ambrose Spiera of Treviso, in the book *On the Flowers of Wisdom*, sermon 34, consideration 2, first conclusion; and Christopher Marcello of Venice, Archbishop of Corcyra, *On the Authority of the Pontiff*, Book II, section 2.

Conclude resolutely that the theologians are truer and more pious than the canonists and that you ought rather to follow them.

Question Thirteen

Whether the pope, from the plenitude of his power, can bind or absolve one existing in Purgatory

It is asked whether the pope, from the plenitude of his judicial power, can bind or absolve one existing in Purgatory.

To this it first appears to certain persons that a negative answer should be given, and first as follows.

The pope can absolve those over whom he has jurisdiction. But the dead are not of his jurisdiction, according to Matthew 16: “Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth.” The Gloss says, “upon earth, not beneath the earth.” Therefore, and so forth.

Second, they argue as follows from chapter *Cum medicinalis*, *On the Sentence of Excommunication*, Book VI. Excommunication ought to be medicinal, but it cannot be medicinal for the dead. Therefore a dead person cannot be excommunicated.

Third, as is held in cause 24, question 2, section *His auctoritatibus*: “We can loose or bind the living, not the dead.” Therefore, and so forth.

To the contrary is the fact that those whose writings contain heresy, heretics, schismatics, those who appoint heretics as heirs, and those who voluntarily kill themselves are excommunicated after death, cause 24, question 2, chapter *Sane*.

I answer that it must be said that, with respect to excommunication properly so called - which is separation from any lawful communion and legitimate act, as it is defined in cause 11, question 3, chapter *Ad mensam*, section *Evidenter* - or insofar as it is called separation from the communion of the Church with respect to its fruit and the Church’s common suffrages, as the Master of the Sentences defines it in Book IV, distinction 18, a dead person cannot be excommunicated and consequently cannot be absolved.

This conclusion is evident from the reasons made at the beginning. It is also evident because excommunication belongs to the power of jurisdiction. For excommunication follows jurisdiction, in *On Election*, chapter *Transmissa*. But the dead have ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the prelates of the Church - though not absolutely under that of the pope, in the manner stated above. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, all those existing in Purgatory departed in charity acquired here, in which they will always persevere. Therefore, although they are not of the forum of the Church militant, they are nevertheless joined to the living by the indissoluble bond of charity. On account of this bond they can no longer be excluded from participation in the Church's common suffrages or separated from the assembly of the faithful. It follows, therefore, that, speaking properly of excommunication, no dead person can be excommunicated.

But if excommunication is taken for the pronouncement that someone was excommunicated - in order that prayer may not be made for him in the Church and that he may not have a common burial with the faithful - a dead person can indeed be excommunicated...

...and it is fitting that this be done.

First, this can be done because, if it is proved after someone's death that he was a heretic, it is fitting that he be pronounced separated from the communion of the Church.

Second, it is unfitting that the Church pray for such a person as it does for a faithful person. Therefore, lest the Church appear to share with such persons the prayers of the faithful, it is fitting that through a sentence it be made known to the faithful that prayer is not to be made for such a person.

From these things is evident the error of those who say that, if anyone who was justly excommunicated dies in excommunication, yet finally repents and dies in charity, he does not go to the common place of Purgatory but is cast out of their community into exterior places and does not experience the suffrages of the Church until he is absolved there where, for just causes, he was excommunicated. And for this reason such persons are sometimes absolved long afterward, because they carry with them into Purgatory the bond of excommunication justly incurred in this life.

But this is manifestly false. For if anyone was justly excommunicated and did not repent at death, since a just excommunication presupposes mortal sin, he will be damned. But if he finally repented, although it is not certain what has become of him, nevertheless after excommunication he never begins to lack in Purgatory the suffrages of the Church, by reason of the charity and grace in which he died, as is said in chapter *A nobis*, the second chapter *On the Sentence of Excommunication*.

But it is asked: if excommunication after death by the pope or the prelates of the Church does not deprive the excommunicated person of participation in and fellowship with the faithful, or of participation in suffrages, to what end are some persons excommunicated after death?

It is answered that such persons are excommunicated in detestation of the crime and for the terror of the living who remain. Hence in this respect such an excommunication is useful and medicinal, although not for those against whom it is issued, but for others who are terrified by this punishment and drawn back from evils.

Likewise, if such...

...an excommunication does not have an effect upon the souls of the dead, it nevertheless has an effect upon their bodies which have remained here. For by force of the excommunication those bodies ought not to be buried in sacred places, and if they have been buried there, they ought to be exhumed, as in chapter *Sacris*, *On Burials*. Consequently, the soul is deprived of that suffrage which would be made if the body were buried in a sacred place. Thus

excommunication at least negatively harms even souls departing in grace through contrition at the moment of death, as the case was framed above.

Likewise, such an excommunication is a declaration of the damnation of certain persons, so that it may be known that prayer is not to be made for them and that the suffrages of the Church do not benefit them.

But it is asked, second, if an excommunicated person, after completing an entirely sufficient penance, should die a sudden death before he was absolved, whether he is prevented from entering the Church triumphant until he is absolved by the authority of superiors and meanwhile remains in Purgatory.

It is answered: let those to whom the judgments of God are open judge and define this; they are hidden from me, Henry of Hesse says. Nevertheless, it may piously be believed that they are absolved by divine mercy, or perhaps by the intention of the universal Church. These matters are to be left to God's judgment.

Having seen these things, the reasons to the contrary must be answered.

To the first, it must be said that that reasoning proceeds concerning excommunication properly so called.

To the second, it is answered that the cited text is understood of excommunication issued against the living, who can rise from the death of sin to the state of grace, not of that which is issued against the dead. Hence the reason those dead persons are excommunicated is not that the excommunication should be a punishment or medicine for them, but for detestation of the crime and for the terror of others, who, seeing this terrible judgment of the Church, may be horrified at falling into like crimes.

To the third, it is answered that it too is understood of excommunication properly so called.

These things are from John of Torquemada upon cause 24, question 2, chapter *Quod autem*, and Lord Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Question Fourteen

Whether the pope can rescue from punishment all those existing in Purgatory

It is asked whether the pope, from the general plenitude of his judicial power, can empty all of Purgatory at once.

To this it first appears that an affirmative answer should be given, as follows. The pope upon earth is the Vicar of Christ, in *On the Translation of a Bishop*, chapter *Inter corporalia*, and chapter *Quanto*. Therefore he can do the things which Christ himself does.

But when Christ, in the resurrection, descended after his victory to Purgatory, by a singular grace he recompensed the residue of the punishments of those found being purged in Purgatory with the abundance of the merits of his newly completed Passion. He emptied Purgatory, leading all the souls from there with himself to heaven.

Just as the pope on the day of his election or coronation signs all petitions, and a newly crowned king, or one newly entering some city, frees all captives, so also the pope, who is Christ upon earth, can do the like and, if he wishes, empty all of Purgatory.

But to the contrary is the fact that an appropriate cause for granting indulgences is required in indulgences. Yet no appropriate cause can intervene for the pope to empty all of Purgatory at once, as Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 45. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer that it must be said that the pope, from the general plenitude of his judicial power, cannot empty all of Purgatory at once.

This conclusion is proved by a fourfold reason.

First, because, as is gathered from the foregoing, an indulgence cannot benefit the departed existing in Purgatory directly but indirectly, insofar as their friends can perform for them that for which the indulgence is ordained, provided that the form of the indulgence contains this. But it is clear that...

...not all those in Purgatory have persons of this kind in this life who can fulfill it here for them. Therefore, and so forth.

The second reason is that, for indulgences to avail, an appropriate cause for granting the indulgences is required, Thomas says in Book IV, distinction 45. But no such cause can intervene. Therefore, and so forth.

The third reason is that a minister in dispensing ought to imitate his principal lord. For otherwise, by dispensing indiscreetly, the principal lord would not approve the dispensation. But God of himself exercises mercy in such a way that he always wishes his justice to be feared. Much more, therefore, ought God's minister - that is, the pope - to dispense the goods of the Church and its treasure with discretion and moderation.

Hence, although temporal goods can by the pope not only be dispensed as a matter of right but even be dissipated as a matter of fact - though divine law would then declare that it ought to have been done otherwise - spiritual goods nevertheless cannot be dissipated or distributed contrary to divine acceptance.

Fourth, because every minister ought to imitate the manner of him whose ministry he exercises. But Christ, whose universal minister the Supreme Pontiff is, when descending to Purgatory did not lead all souls from there, as Thomas says in Part III, question 52, article 8, but only those who had completed their time of purgation.

For, as he says, the power of Christ's Passion did not have greater efficacy at the beginning, following the Passion and the victory over the infernal regions, than it has now. For his Passion does not have a temporal and transitory power but an everlasting one, according to Hebrews 10: "By one offering he has perfected forever those who are sanctified." But now, by the power of Christ's Passion, none are freed from Purgatory except those who have completed the time of their purgation. Therefore also then those who had not fulfilled the punishment and time of purgation were not liberated from Purgatory by Christ.

Concerning the argument to the contrary, which is from Blessed Vincent and Lord Henry of Hesse, it is said that it should be understood that Christ freed all from Purgatory by force of mercy, but not by force of justice. Vincent and Henry of Hesse understood it in this way.

These things are from Saint Thomas in the place cited above, Lord Bonaventure in Book IV, distinction 20, and Lord John of Torquemada upon the Decree in the place cited above.

Addition

I shall not pass over this untouched either. If someone should say with the heretics of this age: "If the keys extend to Purgatory, why does the pope not empty Purgatory? Why does he not rescue everyone from those punishments?" I say not only, with the author, that Christ is believed not to have done this in his descent to the infernal regions, much less ought the Pontiff, who acts in his place upon earth, to effect it; but also that, if the pope were to do this, it would be unfitting, since to vindicate all souls from the torments of Purgatory would be to take away the suffrages through which not only the souls of the departed are helped but the living also merit.

For the pope does two things. First, he gives indulgences for the dead, lest he be accused of impiety. Second, he provides the means by which not only they are loosed but we merit. Nevertheless, he does not liberate all, because not all have merited to be liberated, as Blessed Augustine teaches in the *Enchiridion* and as is held in cause 13, question 2, canon *Tempus*.

Question Fifteen

Whether, of two persons existing in Purgatory and deserving equal punishment, one can be liberated from there more quickly than the other

It is asked whether, if two persons existing in Purgatory are deserving of equal punishment, one can be liberated from there more quickly than the other.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given, and first as follows. However unequal the merits in heaven and hell may be, the rewards and torments there are nevertheless of equal duration. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, as it seems, it ought to be so with the punishment of Purgatory.

But to the contrary is the Apostle's similitude, which assigns the differences among venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. But it is certain that wood remains in the fire longer than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another, and one person is purged more quickly than another.

I answer that it must be said under one conclusion that in the fire of Purgatory one person is liberated more quickly or more slowly than another.

This conclusion is proved by reasons and by authority.

First, by reason of adhesion. For according to Saint Thomas, certain venial sins have greater adhesion than others insofar as the affection inclines more toward them and is fixed more firmly in them. But those things which have greater adhesion are purged more slowly. Therefore certain persons are tormented in Purgatory longer than others insofar as their affections were immersed more deeply in venial sins.

Second, by reason of aggravation. For in the forum of penance a graver punishment corresponds not only with respect to intensity but also with respect to duration, as is evident to one who inspects the canons in which penances are assessed according to the right judgment of the Church. But the right judgment of the Church is conformed to divine judgment. Therefore it will be similar before divine judgment: the person who offended more gravely and remained longer in fault will be punished by a more bitter and more lasting punishment.

Third, by reason of obligation, as follows. A soul is in Purgatory only to discharge the debt which it contracted from this life. But according as the debt is lesser or greater, it is discharged more quickly or more slowly. Therefore, according as the soul in Purgatory has a greater or lesser debt, it is purged more slowly or more quickly and borne into heaven.

Fourth, by reason of subjection. Hence the Master of the Sentences says in Book IV that the person for whom more suffrages are made is freed more quickly from the punishment of Purgatory, and Saint Thomas cites this in *Quodlibet* I, question 7, article 2.

Second, the conclusion is proved by authority, and first by Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, who says:

> *After this life it is not incredible that certain faithful persons are purged through a purgatorial fire and that, according as they loved perishable goods more or less, they are saved more slowly or more quickly, as though according to their modes of loving they will sustain the fire longer, like wood, or less, like hay, or least, like stubble.*

Again:

> *The person who offended more gravely is worthy to be punished by a more bitter punishment and by a longer delay from the homeland, divine justice bringing this about, which renders to all most fitting rewards for their merits.*

These are his words.

To the argument, however, the consequence is denied; and the reason is that the cases are not alike. For, as Saint Thomas says in Book IV, mortal sin, to which eternal torment is owed, and charity, to which the reward of Paradise is owed, are immovably rooted in their subject after this life. And therefore, with respect to the damned and the saved, the same perpetuity exists in both places.

It is otherwise, however, with the disposition of venial sin on account of which souls are punished in Purgatory, because this disposition is neither immovably rooted in them nor does it adhere equally in all. Therefore it is removed from some more quickly than from others.

John of Torquemada upon distinction 25 of the Decree, chapter *Qualis*.

Principal Question Five of Chapter Three

On the limbo of children dying with original sin alone, containing six Questions

Question One

Whether the bosom of Abraham differs from the limbo of children

Now it is asked how the limbo of the holy fathers, called the bosom of Abraham, differs from the limbo of children.

To this it is answered that the limbo of children and the limbo of the holy fathers differ with respect to four things.

First, with respect to the hope of eternal life, because children dying with original sin have no hope of the blessed life. But the fathers, in whom the light of faith and grace shone, had the hope of the blessed life.

Second, with respect to guilt, because guilt in the holy fathers had been expiated insofar as it was infective of the person; there nevertheless remained an impediment on the part of nature, for which full satisfaction had not been made, and therefore temporal punishment was owed to them. But for the children there is an impediment on the part both of nature and of the person, and therefore eternal punishment is owed to them.

Third, because the name “limbo of children” was never transferred to anything else, but after the death of Christ the name “limbo of the holy fathers,” or “bosom of Abraham,” was transferred to the name of the empyrean heaven. Hence now by “the bosom of Abraham” is understood the harbor and rest of the saints in heaven.

Fourth, with respect to the condition of the place and situation. For although it is probably believed that the place of both was the same, the repose of the blessed was nevertheless in a higher part than the limbo of children.

For, as was said above, at the center of the earth are four places positioned successively one beneath another. The first is the bosom or limbo of the perfect fathers. The second is Purgatory, or the place of those being purged. The third is the limbo of children. The last is the hell of the damned.

Concerning these four places it is said in the Apostles’ Creed, “He” - namely, Christ - “descended to those below,” or “to the lower places,” in the plural. Ecclesiasticus 24: “I shall penetrate all the lower parts of the earth, and I alone” - namely, in power and virtue, or with the human soul - “shall behold all who sleep” in hell and the limbo of children.

For none of them saw the divinity. They saw the apple - that is, the soul of Christ - but they did not see the fragrance of the apple - that is, his divinity; for then they would have been blessed.

And it follows: “And I shall illuminate all who hope in the Lord.” First, namely, in the limbo of the holy fathers, whom the soul visited together with the divinity and immediately made blessed. Likewise in Purgatory, by liberating all or some, as has been said: those whom the Liberator, seeing them personally, set among the blessed, but not the others.

These things are from Thomas in Book IV, distinction 46, and Blessed Vincent in his sermons.

Question Two

What punishment is owed to children dying in original sin

It is doubted with what punishment children who die without baptism and with original sin alone are punished in limbo.

To this it is answered that the fitting punishment of children who have died with original sin alone in limbo is the subtraction of grace and, consequently, the lack of the divine vision to which a human being is ordained through grace.

But perhaps you ask whether such children in limbo feel any sorrow or interior affliction from the lack of the divine vision.

It is answered that certain persons say regarding this that such children in limbo feel no interior affliction from the lack of the vision of God. They assign this reason: where there is no knowledge or thought of a good made for oneself, there is no affliction. But the souls of children dying with original sin alone are established in such great darkness of ignorance that they do not know that they were made for beatitude and do not think anything about beatitude. Therefore they say that those children suffer no affliction.

But this reasoning, Thomas says, is not valid.

First, because natural knowledge flourishes more vigorously in a separated soul than in a soul joined to the body here. Therefore, since there is no personal sin in those children, it is not owed to them that they should suffer any detriment in natural things, namely in natural knowledge.

Likewise, according to this position, those who are in hell would possess better knowledge with respect to the intellect than children in limbo. For those who are in hell are not in the darkness of ignorance of natural things, but according to those persons the children are; and thus the damned would possess better knowledge than the children. For there is no one, as Augustine says, who would not prefer to suffer pain with a sound mind rather than rejoice while insane.

And therefore another reason is assigned why children in limbo have no interior sorrow or affliction from the lack of the divine vision. It is this: a twofold knowledge of beatitude can be had, namely natural and supernatural.

The souls of infants in limbo do not lack the natural knowledge which is owed to a separated soul according to its nature. Indeed, their natural knowledge is increased when they enter upon the mode of knowing possessed by separated intellects. Therefore they naturally have great knowledge of God and creatures, greater than any philosopher in the world ever possessed.

For they know naturally that they were made for beatitude and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good, but not that such a good is the glory which the saints possess in heaven. That which is possessed through nature, however, is possessed without sorrow. From this aspect, therefore, the children in limbo do not grieve.

There is also another knowledge of beatitude which is possessed supernaturally and is planted in us here through faith. It concerns the glory and fruition of the saints in heaven, “which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it naturally ascended into the heart of man,” 1 Corinthians 2, and which God has revealed to us through…

…the Holy Spirit, Romans 1. This revelation is possessed through faith planted in us here in the sacraments or in repeated Christian acts.

But the children in limbo neither possessed faith concerning beatitude in act, nor received the sacraments of faith, nor possessed it through revelation. Therefore neither do they grieve over its absence. For no one grieves over that of which he does not know himself to be deprived, or over the loss of something which does not touch or pertain to him.

For a peasant or artisan does not grieve if after the king’s death he does not obtain or possess the kingdom, because he knows that it does not pertain to him. But the king’s son would indeed grieve and be displeased if he did not obtain it, because he knows that it belongs and is owed to him after his father’s death.

So it happens with the children existing in limbo. They do not grieve over the lack of the vision of God and the privation of the glory of the blessed, because they have not known these things and know that this glory does not pertain to them.

Nevertheless, because the children in limbo are not prevented from a perfect natural knowledge of the first cause, of God, and of other things by immersion in and affliction from the punishments of sense, fire, the worms of conscience, and demons, as occurs in the damned, therefore they possess some degree of delight from such a natural knowledge of God himself and of creatures. For everyone naturally delights in the knowledge of truth.

Hence in this delight the children praise God, the cause of causes of all the things naturally known by them, and after their bodies have been reassumed they will praise him. This does not and will not occur with the damned, because their worm lives and will not die, demons will never be absent from hell, and the fire there will not cease to burn for eternity.

These things are from Thomas in the disputed questions *On Evil* and in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 34, question 2; Saint Vincent in his sermons; Lord Henry of Hesse upon Genesis; and the Decrees, *On Consecration*, distinction 4, chapter *Firmissime*.

The opinion of certain sorceresses and foolish women, who say that the souls of children dying without baptism wander through the world until the day of judgment or afterward, is ridiculous...

...and supported by no Catholic foundation.

Addition

Biel writes many things concerning the punishments of children in Book II, distinction 33, the sole question; Paul Cortesius in Book IV, distinction 3; Saint Bonaventure in Book IV, distinction 45, article 1, question 1; and Thomas of Strasbourg in the same distinction in Book IV.

Question Three

That in the limbo of children there is neither punishment of sense nor are there demons

It is asked whether punishment of sense and demons are in the limbo of children.

To this it first appears that an affirmative answer should be given. For at least after the resurrection, children damned for original sin alone will be in the most foul flame of hell, to be filled with all the dregs of the world and of the elements, as Basil says. By these they will be painfully affected through the medium surrounding them, and thus they will suffer punishment of sense.

To this it is answered that this would indeed follow if the bodies of all the damned were then left to their natural properties and if the medium were prevented or suspended from its natural action in relation to no one. But this need not be so.

Likewise, nothing prevents the limbo of children from being the highest part of the infernal region, positioned beneath the elements.

Demons also are not there, since they are instruments for the punishment of sense, which is not there.

These things are from Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Question Four

Why Christ, descending to limbo, did not liberate all the children together with the holy fathers

It is doubted why Christ, descending into the limbo of children, did not draw out from there the children found in it.

To this it is answered that Christ, descending to the lower regions, did not liberate the children from limbo for this reason: Christ's descent to the lower regions had its effect only in those who were joined through faith and charity to the Passion of Christ, by whose power Christ's descent to the lower regions was liberative.

But the children who had died with original sin were in no way joined to Christ's Passion through faith and love. For they could not possess their own faith, since they had not possessed the use of free choice; nor had they been cleansed from original sin through the faith of their parents or through any sacrament of faith. And therefore Christ's descent to the lower regions did not liberate children of this kind from limbo.

For this reason the holy fathers were liberated from limbo and admitted to the grace of Paradise, and this through grace, without which no one can arrive at heaven, according to Romans 6:23: "The grace of God is eternal life." Since, therefore, children dying in original sin did not possess grace, they were not liberated from limbo by Christ.

Likewise, the Apostle says in Romans 3 that God set forth Christ as a propitiator through faith in his blood. But children who died with original sin alone were in no way participants in faith. Therefore they did not receive the fruit of Christ's propitiation so that they might be liberated by him from limbo, and so forth.

These things are Thomas's exact teaching in Part III, question 52, article 2.

Question Five

Indulgences do not avail children existing in limbo, nor should prayer be made for them

It is asked whether indulgences avail children existing in limbo and whether prayer should be made for them.

To this it is answered that, since the children in limbo are not members of Christ, nor will they be, since they were not incorporated into Christ through baptism and neither possess nor will possess sanctifying grace, therefore they are not capable of the grace of indulgences, nor should prayer be made for them.

The reason is that, on account of the defect of grace of which they are deprived through the sin of the first parent, since they are and will be in the state of no longer acquiring grace or eternal life, they consequently cannot deservedly be helped by prayers.

Hence Augustine says - and this is placed by the Master of the Sentences in Book IV, distinction 49, the final chapter - "The suffrages of the Church do not benefit the unbaptized, because they were never united to Christ."

These things are from the Master in Book IV and John of Torquemada upon *On Penance*.

Question Six

That all children dying without baptism will rise on the day of judgment

It is asked whether unbaptized children will rise on the day of judgment together with the others who are to rise.

To this it first appears that a negative answer should be given. For a person is brought to judgment so that his merits may there be examined. But the children in limbo, who died with original sin, or who died before perfect age, had no merits.

Therefore it is not necessary that they appear at the judgment.

Likewise, all who rise at the judgment will be either the elect and good on the right or the damned and evil on the left. But children who died with original sin are not simply evil or good and, consequently, are to be placed neither on the right nor on the left at the judgment. Therefore they will not rise at the judgment.

But to the contrary is the fact that what is universal comprehends all things. But that judgment is called universal. Therefore all will appear and will judge there.

I answer that it must be said that, since judicial power was conferred upon Christ as man as a reward for the humility which he displayed in the Passion, and since in his Passion he poured out his blood for all with respect to sufficiency - although it did not have its effect in all because of an impediment found in some - it will therefore be fitting that all human beings be gathered at the judgment to see his exaltation and the universal judicial power over all which he received from the Father, according to John 5: “The Father has given all judgment to the Son.” Hence it is said in Acts 10: “He is the one who has been appointed judge of the living and the dead.”

For this reason Thomas says in Book IV that all children dying without baptism in original sin, even without actual sin - whether they are the children of Christians, Jews, or gentiles, and whether they died in the womb or outside the womb - will rise like the other dead with whole bodies and at the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ, thirty years or thereabouts, according to Ephesians 4.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that at the judgment infants without baptism and children who died before perfect age will appear, not so that they may be judged to glory or to sensible punishment, but so that they may see the glory of the Judge and seek vengeance upon those who gave them occasion for the loss of glory and the divine vision.

To the second, it must be said that at the judgment such children will be neither on the right nor on the left, but lower down in the middle.

These things are from Thomas in Book IV, distinction 47, article 3, and Blessed Vincent in his sermons.

Principal Question Six of Chapter Three

On the Elysian Fields according to the opinion of the pagans

In this sole question concerning the Elysian Fields - the fifth abode of souls after death, namely of philosophers, poets, and Muhammadans - it is doubted where such a place of the Elysian Fields is and what delights are found there.

To this question it is briefly answered that the Elysian Fields - that is, the fields of delights - are in the midst of the lower regions, in which the pious souls of philosophers, poets, and Muhammadans rest after their separation from the body.

Hence Virgil, beyond the middle of Book VI, says concerning the Elysian Fields:

These things at last accomplished, the goddess's service fulfilled,
They came to joyful places and pleasant lawns,
The dwellings of fortunate groves and blessed seats.

And below he says:

Meanwhile Aeneas sees, in a withdrawn valley,
A secluded grove and thickets sounding with woods,
And Lethe, and peaceful homes, and so forth.

There Aeneas finds the soul of his father Anchises.

The philosophers said that Elysium was in forests or in the Fortunate Isles. Hence Horace in an *Epode*:

The all-wandering Ocean awaits us; let us seek
The blessed fields, the rich fields and islands,
Where every year the unplowed earth renders grain,
And the unpruned vine flowers without end.

Pliny also relates many things concerning these in Book VI of the *Natural History*. Sallust in the *Histories* said that these islands were renowned in the songs of Homer.

There were also those who wrote that Elysium was around the lunar circle, where the air is purer. Hence Virgil in Book VI: "In the fields of air," and so forth. Lucan says:

Whatever lies open between the courses of the moon,
Those possessed of gold, nor those buried with incense,
Do not arrive there.

In these Elysian Fields...

...as Lord William of Paris says, and as is placed in the *Alcoran* - that is, in the book of the laws of Muhammad - there are delights of bodily feasts, with angelic stewards and cupbearers. There are precious garments, the pleasantness of canopies, and the blandishments of women and of delights. There are rivers of milk, wine, and honey, every kind of delightful food, drink, odor, flavor, and sound, and every sweetness and softness of tangible things. Muhammad promises all these things to the observers of his law.

These things are from Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Addition

Certain persons report that there are nine abodes of souls among the lower regions, which John Ravisius enumerates. The last of these is the Elysian Field, the paradise of the ancients. Concerning it Homer says:

Heaven is my fatherland; Calliope is my mother.

He also described the Elysian Fields among the Greeks, as did Orpheus; from them our poet Virgil drew his description in Book VI.

These fields are also those Fortunate Isles, as Pliny reports in Book VI, chapter 32. Berosus comprehended both their number and their extent, asserting that they are situated in the southern Ocean near the setting of the sun.

In the first of them, whose name is Ombrior, there are no buildings, nor have there been any. Fennels rise there to the height of a tree; water is pressed from them - bitter from the black ones and pleasant to drink from the whiter ones. The mountain ridges are wet with pools.

They report that another island is called Junonia and that on it there is a small shrine built only of stone. A third, next to this, has the same name. Then comes Capraria, filled with great lizards.

In sight of these is Nivaria, cloudy, which received this name from its perpetual snow. Nearest to it is Canaria, full of dogs of enormous size. They abound plentifully in every kind of fruit and bird. They report that these islands also abound in palms bearing caryota dates, pine nuts, honey...

...and fish. And, as Pomponius writes in his final book, they abound in things born of their own accord more happily than other cultivated cities.

One of two springs is especially remarkable. Whoever tastes the one is dissolved in laughter unto death; the remedy is to drink from the other.

Moreover, they are so fertile, the seasons there are so free from envy, and conversation is so sweet that pagan error believed, on account of the fertility of the soil alone, that these islands were Paradise.

But although they erred in manner and place, they nevertheless acknowledge from these things that happiness and a certain blessed life are reserved for perfect men.

Hence Aristotle says in *On Heaven and the World*: “Outside heaven there is nothing; for in heaven are beings leading the best life.”

Add that the author relates all these things according to the opinion of the pagans. For they differ from the Catholic faith, but the author narrates them so that we may see the foolishness of the pagans.

Principal Question Seven of Chapter Three

On the terrestrial Paradise, containing four Questions

Question One

Whether the terrestrial Paradise is something corporeal or something spiritual

It is asked whether the terrestrial Paradise is a corporeal place upon earth or the figure of a spiritual reality.

To this, as Augustine reports in Book II *Upon Genesis*, and as does Epiphanius the Greek, Bishop of Cyprus, Origen and the Manichaeans first answer that the terrestrial Paradise is not a corporeal or real place upon earth, but a spiritual thing. Thus they understand the

terrestrial Paradise spiritually, just as Christ is called in the Scriptures a rock or the Lamb of God.

Christ plainly is not understood corporeally to be a rock when it is said in 1 Corinthians 10, "And the rock was Christ," nor was he said really to be a lamb when John the Baptist called him the Lamb of God, John 1, but spiritually, metaphorically, and morally.

Similarly, they say that when anything is said or written in the Scriptures concerning the terrestrial Paradise, it must be understood spiritually and allegorically, namely as spiritual beatitude, which is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods, as Boethius says, and not as some real and corporeal place, because, they say, no such place is found in the nature of things.

They proved this opinion of theirs by reasons.

First, certain persons at different times wandered throughout all the dry land, most diligently inquired into the boundaries and dispositions of all regions and places, and wrote concerning the particular regions and places of the world, yet made no mention of the terrestrial Paradise. Therefore the terrestrial Paradise does not appear to be a real place upon the dry land.

Likewise, they say, we see that if a gardener is absent from an orchard for some years, the garden's beauty will perish and its shrubs will grow old and fail. Since, therefore, the human being who cultivated the terrestrial Paradise was irreversibly expelled from it - and it is now more than six thousand four hundred and ninety years - the place and its beauty have perished and been laid waste.

Third, no place upon earth can reach as far as the lunar circle, since it is contrary to the nature of earth that it could be elevated so greatly in any of its parts, because beneath the lunar globe is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. But according to Bede, Paradise reaches as far as the lunar circle. Therefore no real place of this kind can be posited upon earth.

Likewise, Genesis 7 says that all the high mountains beneath the whole heaven were covered by the waters of the Flood, that the water was fifteen cubits higher than the mountains, and that all flesh which moved was consumed. Therefore it appears that that universal Flood, prolonged through an entire year and ten days, as is commonly held, destroyed and overturned that place, just as it altered the other places of the earth.

Likewise, such a place was made for the special habitation of human beings. Therefore, after the human being was irreversibly expelled from it…

…it ought successively to have perished.

Likewise, carnal and sensual pleasure impedes and obscures the intellect concerning the spiritual virtues in which human happiness principally consists. Therefore such a place of pure pleasure and complete convenience, which is called the terrestrial Paradise and would furnish the occasion for virtues not to be exercised, was not really created by God.

But to the contrary is the Scripture in Genesis 2, saying: "God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning, in which he placed the man whom he had formed."

I answer that it must be said that, as Augustine says in Book IV *Upon Genesis*, there are three general positions or opinions concerning Paradise. One is that of those who wished to understand Paradise only corporeally; another, that of those who understood it only

spiritually; and the third, that of those who take Paradise in both ways. Augustine acknowledges that this position pleases him more, and confirms it as follows.

If, he says, the things found written concerning Paradise are understood according to figure alone, by equal reasoning those things which are said there concerning Adam and Eve, the prohibition concerning the tree, and the transgression of the commandment will also have to be understood spiritually, which no one doubts is erroneous.

Similarly, if anyone wishes to understand the things said concerning Paradise in Scripture so literally that they signify nothing else, let him understand wisdom to be a certain corporeal tree, since it is said in Proverbs: "She is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her." Let him also say that Christ is properly a rock or stone, a sheep or lamb, or a lion - which is blasphemy.

Therefore the things said here and elsewhere in Sacred Scripture must not be taken literally as though they were posited and described to signify nothing else; nor must they be taken spiritually as though the events did not and had not happened. They must be taken in both ways, because this belongs properly to Divine Scripture - especially the Old Testament - in which not only words signify, but deeds preordained by the most wise...

...God are the most fitting figures of future and spiritual things. For, as the Apostle says, "All things happened to them in a figure" - that is, to the ancient worshipers of God before and under the Law. These are Augustine's words.

And in Book XIII of *The City of God*, chapter 21, speaking more clearly in conclusion upon this matter, he says:

> *Whatever things can suitably be said concerning understanding Paradise spiritually may be said without anyone forbidding them, provided nevertheless that the most faithful truth of that history, commended as a narration of events, is also believed. For the things said concerning Paradise in Scripture are proposed in the manner of a historical narration. In all things which Scripture thus hands down, however, the truth of the history must be held as the foundation, and spiritual expositions must be constructed upon it.*

These are his words.

Therefore it must be said conclusively that the Paradise described in Genesis 2 is a certain real place upon earth, concerning which Augustine says in Book XIII of *The City of God*, chapter 18:

> *Those first human beings were in a wooded and fruitful land which obtained the name of Paradise.*

It also figuratively signifies a threefold Paradise: the anagogical Paradise, that is, of the blessed; the allegorical, that is, of the Church militant, or of some private region or sunny and delightful place, as the poets invent tales concerning the Fortunate Isles and the gardens of the Hesperides; and the moral, that is, of the virtues in the soul.

Similarly, in the terrestrial Paradise the tree of life in its midst is taken first literally for a material tree whose fruit had the power of preserving life; spiritually, however, it signified Christ, the Wisdom of God, Proverbs 3, or the cross of Christ, Ezekiel 31.

The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was likewise a material tree there, so named on account of the event of future evils, as will be said in the following article. Spiritually, however, it could signify free choice, as certain persons hold.

The rock in the desert was likewise something material, yet spiritually signified Christ.

To the first argument of the Manichaeans, therefore, it is answered that that place of the terrestrial Paradise is separated from our habitation and is inaccessible…

…to us because of the obstacle of seas, mountains, deserts, or some region burning with heat, such as the region beneath the equinoctial circle. Therefore writers concerning the regions and places of the dry land which lies between the equinoctial circle and the Arctic pole made no mention of the region of the terrestrial Paradise. It consequently cannot be known by us except through revelation.

To the second, it must be said that, because of the earth's fecundity and the vitality of the influence in that region, new plants grow spontaneously from seeds without cultivation or gardener. Or perhaps the ministry of angels supplies the work of human beings there if anything in planting is necessary for the preservation of Paradise. Or perhaps Enoch, Elijah, and the others who are said to be there, as will be said below, perform in Paradise the things which Adam would have performed and in the manner in which he would have performed them.

To the third, it must be said that Bede's words are not to be understood as though the place of Paradise according to its position reaches as far as the sphere of fire or the concavity of the lunar orb, because this is not true. They must be understood parabolically, insofar as the region of Paradise appears even higher than all other high regions and mountains. Thus Damascene says in Book II that Paradise is a place positioned in the east, higher than all the earth.

Or it is said to reach the lunar globe because the temperateness and purity of the air of that region ascends as though to heaven; and because perhaps the whole air lying over that region is defended through the ministry of angels from clouds, winds, rains, and every disturbance, it is therefore said to reach heaven, as Isidore says.

The temperateness of that place is called perpetual, perhaps because on account of human sin it suffered no disorder either in its air as far as heaven or in the substance of its earth as far as the center. It still perseveres in that excellent disposition which it possessed before sin and would have possessed in the state of innocence, in memory of original integrity and so that it may appear how great were the things God arranged for human beings even upon earth if they had obeyed him, and how greatly…

…on account of their sin nature and the disposition of times and regions were made worse.

To the fourth, it must be said that, although the waters of the Flood ascended fifteen cubits above every mountain beneath the whole heaven, it does not follow from this that they also rushed into the region of Paradise. For it could have occurred by divine power that, although the waters of the Flood were higher than that region, they nevertheless did not enter Paradise, but that, while it remained dry, the water stood around it like a wall, just as the Red Sea stood around the children of Israel as they walked on dry ground through the midst of the sea.

To the fifth, the solution is evident from the solution to the third, in which it was said how God wished Paradise to be preserved until the consummation of the age, and secondly for the preservation of Enoch, Elijah, and others.

To the sixth, it is answered that the argument is true of excessive and disordered pleasure in a mortal and lascivious body, such as every human being now possesses. In an integral nature or one gloriously restored, however, it is not so. Rather, corporeal pleasure and delight according to every sense there neither absorbs nor depresses the intellect, but raises it to God and inflames it toward a greater perception of the Creator and his benefits.

These things are from Thomas in Part I, question 102, article 2, and in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 17, and from Lord Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Addition

Modern doctors, such as Augustinus Steuchus; Jacobus Naclantus, Bishop of Chioggia; and Hieronymus Quainus, a Paduan theologian of the Order of Servants, hold that this place was corporeal and was undoubtedly situated upon earth in Eden, namely the land of promise. But they hold that it does not exist at present; indeed, that it was destroyed and laid waste from the beginning, immediately after the sin or when the waters inundated the world…

…at the time of the universal Flood. Yet they assent to this matter no further than the matter itself permits, for they subscribe to truth and to the sense and determination of the Church.

Hieronymus Quainus presented this opinion in the Paduan Academy in this year 1574, when he commenced the Book of Genesis, with such eloquence and learning that he obtained no small reputation in this matter.

Question Two

Where the Paradise of pleasure is situated

It is asked in what part of the world or earth the terrestrial Paradise is situated.

To this all Catholic doctors answer uniformly that it is situated and positioned in the east. They prove this by reason and authorities.

First, by reason as follows. Place and that which is placed ought to be proportioned, according to Book IV of the *Physics*. But the first one who was to be placed in Paradise was to be the most worthy of all animals, formed by the hand of God, supreme among all theologians and philosophers, instituted king of the whole lower world, destined to dwell there for a long time according to animal life and afterward, once spiritual life had been attained, to be transferred into the empyrean heaven. Therefore a place proportioned to him ought to be singular, befitting his dignity and suitable for the preservation and perpetuation of human nature, in which there would be the disposition of magnificent glory, of most admirable power, and aptitude for celestial influences and contemplations.

Such, however, is the eastern part, which is the right side of heaven and is called such by Aristotle in Book II *On Heaven*. The right is nobler than the left, since motion begins from it, as is seen in a human being when he begins to move. Therefore, and so forth.

The first authority is that of the Hebrews according to the translation of the Seventy, who say: “And the Lord God planted a garden…

...in delights from the beginning" - not, the Gloss says, the beginning of time, but of place, that is, the east - "in which he placed the man whom he had formed."

Bede says: "Paradise is a most pleasant place, separated from our habitable region by a long tract of sea and land, so high that it reaches as far as the lunar globe."

And Damascene says in Book II: "The terrestrial Paradise, planted by the hands of God in Eden, is the storehouse of universal joy and exultation."

Although that region of Paradise situated in the east is naturally uninhabitable because of its heat, and, as the Philosopher says in the book of *Meteorology*, because it is beneath the equinoctial circle - as Thomas adduces in Part I, question 102, article 2, the fourth objection - nevertheless, whatever may be the case, the same Thomas says there that it must be believed that Paradise was established in a most temperate place, whether beneath the equinoctial circle or elsewhere.

And since the pleasantness of its situation, vegetation, rivers, influences, air, animals, and other things is required for the goodness of a region or country, as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the *Politics*, as was touched upon above when hell was being treated, in the second little question, therefore in the terrestrial Paradise the Lord produced from the soil - that is, from moistened earth - every tree beautiful to sight, that is, every tree beautiful in the color and form of its branches, flowers, fruits, and leaves, and pleasant for eating, so that they might provide human beings with spiritual delight and wholesome nourishment. For in the state of integral nature the human being would have possessed animal life, needing the most suitable foods for preserving health.

God produced and planted there a threefold kind of trees.

One kind was for the sustenance of life, by which that which was lost and dissolved from the substance of the human being through the action of natural heat dissolving moisture was restored. These were all the trees of Paradise except two, namely the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life.

Another kind was for the testing of obedience. It was not so named from its effect, as Josephus said in the book of *Antiquities* - namely, that the fruit of that tree had the power to accelerate and sharpen the use of reason...

...for discerning between good and evil - but it was so called from the event which followed. For through eating that tree, which had been prohibited by God, the human being knew by experience how great was the distance between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience toward the Lord God. For if the human being had not eaten of it, he would never have experienced the evil of penal misery but would have persisted eternally, without interruption, in the delight of pure good.

The Hebrews say that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, whose fruit our first parents ate, was a fig tree. For immediately after eating it their eyes were opened, and, recognizing that they were naked, they sewed together the leaves of the same tree, namely the fig, and made *perizomata* for themselves - that is, coverings around the loins. The word is derived from *peri*, which means "around," and *zoma*, which means "body."

The Master of the Scholastic History says that it was not without cause that they made coverings - that is, short breeches - from fig leaves, because if human flesh is rubbed with their sap, it immediately feels there an itching of pleasure. Therefore immediately after eating that fruit they felt the itching of pleasure.

The third tree in Paradise was the tree of life, for immortality. By eating it the power of natural heat was strengthened and the form of the first radical moisture was preserved, lest it be weakened by an admixture of something foreign.

Here we can observe that, since the power of the tree of life in Paradise, like that of other bodies, was finite, once consumed it could not give life for an infinite time but only for a certain time. If it had been eaten again, the eater would again have lived for many years, but not infinitely.

Hence what God says to the angels in Genesis 3 - "See lest Adam perhaps take of the tree of life and live forever" - must not be understood "forever" as though a total restoration of the radical moisture and perpetual life were bestowed through the tree of life. Rather, "forever" is taken for a long time, as it is taken in Exodus 21: "He shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall be his servant forever," that is, for the time of his life.

These things are from Dominicus Tolosanus.

Concerning this tree of life Hugh...

...of Saint Victor says:

> *Among the other gifts of God prepared for the pleasantness of human life, this marvel is also commemorated: that in Paradise there is a tree of life whose power is said to be so marvelous that, when taken at certain times, it could have preserved bodily life unharmed in the human being as long as the human being used it - not only from death but from every defect.*

Concerning this tree Augustine says in Book XIV of *The City of God*, chapter 26: "Food was present in Paradise lest the human being hunger, drink lest he thirst, and the tree of life lest old age dissolve him."

Lord Henry of Hesse nevertheless says here that, in addition to the tree of life, the goodness of nourishment, the suitability of the place, the singular industry or prudence by which the human being was governed there, and above all the gratuitous providence of God, by which every corruptive contrariety was removed, concurred toward the immortality of the human being in the state of innocence.

And because rivers and waters are also required for the pleasantness of a place, a river also sprang forth from the place of pleasure to irrigate Paradise, Genesis 2.

Concerning these rivers Basil says as follows in his *Hexaemeron*: the terrestrial Paradise is situated upon a certain very high mountain, from which waters flow down with such abundance and noise that they make those who live nearby deaf. Rushing down from the mountain of Paradise, they make a certain very great place of waters, from which, as from a certain very great spring, arise four great rivers, concerning which Genesis 2 speaks.

The name of one is Phison, which is interpreted "change of mouth." For according to the Master in the *Histories*, this river in its course has many variations according to different places. Afterward it was called the Ganges, from the land Gangaro. Havilah, which it surrounds, is a certain part of India which after the Flood became the possession of the descendants of Ham, concerning whom Genesis 10 and 1 Chronicles 1 speak. This country abounds in metals, spices, and gems, as Pliny says. Bdellium is a precious stone, and likewise onyx, which is so named...

...on account of its likeness to a human fingernail; for *onyx* in Greek is called *unguis* in Latin.

The name of the second river is Gihon, which surrounds the whole land of Ethiopia. Because of its nearness to the sun, that region blackens its inhabitants with heat, has very many peoples monstrous in countenance and appearance, and abounds in horrible beasts. The Ethiopians are named from Cush, the son of Ham, from whom they derived their origin. This Gihon is now called the Nile, as Augustine and Isidore say.

The name of the third river is Tigris. It is so called on account of the swiftness of its flow, because it appears to have the swiftest course among rivers, just as among animals the tiger is the swiftest animal. This river runs against the Assyrians. Syria is a part of Asia and is named from Asshur, the son of Shem, who first inhabited that region after the Flood. From the Assyrians, as Isidore says, first came the furnishing of purple garments and the use of perfumes and ointments, from which flowed the luxury of the Greeks and afterward of us all.

The name of the fourth river is Euphrates. According to the expositors it is the most abundant and most fruitful in gems and other goods. It flows through the midst of Babylon just as the Seine flows through Paris and the Tiber through Rome. It derived its name from abundance, for *Euphrata* is interpreted "fruit-bearing" in Hebrew.

Augustine says in Book VII *Upon Genesis* that antiquity changed the names of two of these rivers, namely Gihon, which is now called the Nile, and Phison, which is now called the Ganges, just as the Tiber was at first called the Albula. The other two rivers, namely the Tigris and Euphrates, did not change their names.

Although Sallust and Josephus, desiring to weaken Scripture, say that these four rivers appear in certain regions to be derived from outside Paradise - as the Tigris and Euphrates in Armenia, and so forth - Augustine answers this in Book VIII *Upon Genesis*: as has frequently been seen, great waters are absorbed into the earth and, after a long subterranean course, later emerge elsewhere, where they appear to arise.

Because, therefore, the place of the terrestrial Paradise is endowed with everything required for the pleasantness and goodness of a place and country, and is so greatly adorned with the things said above...

...Isidore says that the Hebrews call that place *Gan Eden*, that is, "garden of delights"; the Greeks, "garden of delights"; and the Latins, "paradise of pleasure."

But if someone, more curiously than usefully, should also ask how great the circumference of the terrestrial Paradise is, it is answered that no one can know this unless God wished to reveal it to him. For after the human being was made like to irrational beasts through sin and was cast out of Paradise, that place was made inaccessible.

For, as Genesis 3 says, after the sin God placed before Paradise Cherubim and a flaming and revolving sword to guard the way of the tree of life. Cherubim signifies the angelic guard; the flaming sword signifies the torrid zone. It is called revolving because the sun, through which the impenetrable heat is caused there, approaches us in summer and recedes in winter. Therefore no one after the sin has been able or will be able to approach that place.

Nevertheless, a certain John the Englishman says in the book which he entitled *On the Situation of the World* that the circumference of the terrestrial Paradise is equal to the circuits of three great islands - namely England, Sicily, and Sardinia - whose circuits total two thousand seven hundred miles: England is encircled by one thousand seven hundred miles, Sicily by seven hundred, and Sardinia by three hundred.

He could have known this through the operation of some spirit, from the motions of the stars, or from apparitions of stars.

These things are from Thomas, Henry, and those cited within the little question. But these are probable and weak arguments, and the matter need not be sought necessarily.

Addition

The reason is that this place is hidden and unknown to us, as Gabriel Biel attests. No cosmographer has found this place, nor does canonical Scripture certify and affirm its situation, although it says that Paradise is a temperate region in the southern part, beyond the table of the sun and both tropics. Its name is rendered from Greek into Latin as "garden"; in Hebrew it is *Eden*, which in our idiom is interpreted "delights."

See more fully the Angelic Doctor, II-II, question 84, article 3, and also Part I, question 102, article 2; Lord Bonaventure, Book II, distinction 17, in the literal doubts; Dionysius the Carthusian, Book II, distinction 17, question 5; Gabriel Biel, Book II, distinction 17, question 2; Paul Cortesius, Book II, distinction 5; Scotus, Book II, distinction 17; Isidore of Seville, Book XIV of the *Etymologies*, chapter 3; and Jacobus of Valencia at the end of his Exposition of Psalm 71.

Question Three

How many have been translated into the terrestrial Paradise

It is asked how many there are who have been translated into this garden of delights and Paradise of pleasure.

To this it is answered that the first translated into this place was our first parent Adam. As Josephus says, he was formed outside Paradise on the sixth day of the world, in the field of Damascus, from the slime of red earth, from which he derived the designation of his name. For *Adam* in Hebrew is interpreted "red earth." From there, almost in an instant, he was translated by God through the air into Paradise.

Hence Genesis 2 says, "Therefore God took the man" - namely, from the place of the field of Damascus in which he had formed him outside Paradise - "and transferred him into the Paradise of pleasure."

Others, however, say that Adam was formed around the middle of the habitable earth, which appears to be Jerusalem, as though it were the navel of the world: both because the second Adam, namely Christ, was to be born and to die there, and so that, in passing from the middle of the world to the furthest part of the east, where Paradise was, he might see and consider how many things God had made upon the surface of the earth, and how greatly the glory of the region of Paradise - which he had prepared especially...

...for the habitation of human beings - differed from the regions of beasts.

According to this consideration, the human being ought not to have been transferred in an instant from the place in which he was formed into Paradise, nor to have been conducted above through the air, but successively below over the earth, so that he might behold everything.

Afterward, having been tempted through Eve by the serpent, he was cast out from there, clothed in a tunic of skin. According to Dominicus Tolosanus, this was so that it might be shown to Adam that, just as skin is stripped from an animal that was first alive and afterward

dead, so the mortality of himself and his successors was drawn from parents who were first alive in the state of innocence and afterward dead through sin. These are his words.

And as all Christian doctors commonly say, and as Vincent sets down in Book I of the *History*, Adam and Eve transgressed upon the very day of their creation - that is, on Friday, the sixth day of the world - around midday; and a little afterward, around the ninth hour, or according to the Hebrews the tenth hour, they were cast out.

Hence, after the course of many years, the new man Christ, upon the same weekday and at the same sixth hour, was crucified and paid the debt of that same sin; and, expiring around the ninth hour, he reopened to the thief the entrance to Paradise.

From these things it is understood that Adam, the first human being, was formed outside Paradise so that he might understand from this that so excellent a place of delights was not owed to him according to the common course of nature, but came from a special gift of divine grace, just as did the immortality which the human being would have possessed in the state of innocence in the manner stated.

Eve, however, was formed in Paradise on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For likewise the children would have been born in Paradise on account of the dignity of the parents who had already been placed there. The Master of the *History*, however, says that Eve was made in Paradise so that by this the woman might be held more pleasing and more honorable.

The second translated into Paradise was Enoch, concerning whom Genesis 5 says: “Enoch walked with God and appeared no more, because the Lord took him.” For on account of the excellence of his virtue, the…

…Catholic doctors say, he was taken by God and placed in the terrestrial Paradise.

Concerning him Ecclesiasticus 44 also says: “Enoch pleased God and was translated into Paradise, that he might give wisdom to the nations.”

The third was Elijah, concerning whom the final chapter of Malachi says: “Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and dreadful day of the Lord comes, and he will turn the heart of the fathers to the sons.” Concerning the same one see Matthew 17 and 4 Kings 2, where it is said that Elijah ascended by a whirlwind into heaven.

This cannot be understood of the empyrean heaven, because no one entered there before the ascension of Christ. Therefore it must be understood of some heavenly place, or of a place having a heavenly disposition, such as the terrestrial Paradise, which Damascene in Book II called a divine region.

Again, since Scripture does not say that Enoch and Elijah are dead, we do not see where they may more fittingly be placed until the end of the age than in Paradise, nor where their animal life could more fittingly be preserved than from the fruit of the tree of life which is in the midst of Paradise.

All the Catholic doctors assign one and the same cause for the translation of these two into Paradise and their preservation there, saying that they are preserved there in life for this purpose: that, before the day of judgment, they may go forth from there against Antichrist, preach against him, and lead those who will then be unbelievers to the faith of Christ.

Thomas, however, upon Hebrews 11 assigns another reason as well, saying:

> *The reason why the death of Enoch and Elijah was delayed until the end of the world is that the doctrine of the Old Testament is ordered toward the promises of the New, in which the hope of life is promised to us: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near," Matthew 3. Therefore, after the Lord had given the sentence of death to Adam, he also wished to lead human beings into the hope of life. This he did in the fathers of each state, namely of nature, the Law, and grace: in the state of nature, in Enoch; in the state of the Law, in Elijah; in the state of grace, in Christ, through whom the effect of this promise is given to us, namely eternal life. Rising from the dead, he dies no more.*

Those two, however, who have long lived in Paradise, will die through Antichrist.

Lord Henry of...

...Hesse, adding others to these, speaks thus:

> *And perhaps not only Enoch and Elijah are preserved in Paradise to preach at the end against Antichrist, but also John the Evangelist and those who rose with Christ, came into the holy city, and appeared to many, concerning whom Matthew 27 speaks.*

But Henry pointedly says "perhaps," because Jerome says formally concerning John the Evangelist:

> *Some believe that perpetual resurrection has already been completed in those who rose with Christ; that the guardian of the Virgin rejoices with Christ in glorified flesh; and we do not doubt that this was also done concerning the Blessed Virgin.*

And Saint Thomas, in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 43, question 3, says: "It ought piously to be believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist that their resurrection was not delayed until the end of the world."

Moreover, the other brute animals were not created in Paradise, but were brought there by God's arrangement. The serpent, however, was brought there by the operation of the devil. These things are from Saint Thomas in the place cited above and from the others introduced within this little question.

Addition

Do not be disturbed that such holy human beings are delayed from attaining the fruition of eternal life. For the divine power is so great that it can make them blessed as much on earth as in heaven. The angels always see the face of the Father, although they work upon earth.

Although these matters do not belong to the substance of the faith, they must therefore be left to the judgment of the Church and to the secrets of God, especially since it is written: "No human being shall see me and live."

Question Four

Which region is more desirable: the east of the unbelievers, or the west of the Christians?

It must be investigated, according to those things in which the healthfulness of regions is considered, whether the eastern region, commonly belonging to...

...unbelievers, is more desirable and pleasing than the western regions, commonly belonging to Christians.

To this the easterners say that their country is more pleasing than the western and more desirable for habitation. They prove this with reasons.

First, as follows. As was touched upon before from the mind of the Philosopher in Book VI of the *Politics*, the seven things in which the healthfulness and nobility of countries are considered are found especially toward the eastern quarter, the right side of heaven, Scripture bearing witness from the things stated. Therefore, and so forth.

Those seven things are these:

1 The nobility of things that grow, namely metals, spices, and gems.

2 The healthfulness of springs and the fecundity of rivers for the generation of fish and the irrigation of adjacent lands.

3 A position more suitable in relation to the sun and a more propitious influence with respect to celestial influx.

4 An abundance of useful and noble animals suitable for human uses.

5 The pleasantness of the situation arising from mountains, forests, rivers, springs, and the sea.

6 A suitable abundance and healthfulness of provisions.

7 The temperateness of the air arising from a regular disposition of birds.

The easterners boast that they excel the westerners in these seven things, and they give a reason for their boasting. For, as Peter Comestor bears witness, on account of the benignity of the sun and the more healthful eastern celestial influence, certain islands nourish human beings most healthfully and into great old age; nor can they die upon those islands unless they are transferred to other islands.

There are also trees in India, as Alexander the Great writes to Aristotle, upon whose fruits the priests of the sun and moon - to which those trees are dedicated - feed, and from eating them the life of the priests is prolonged to three hundred years.

Second, this is proved in the same place from Sacred Scripture, through which God promises to the obedient the land of promise in Egypt toward the eastern quarter, which abounds in milk, honey, and waters, as is evident in Isaiah 1 and Deuteronomy 6.

But to the contrary is Pliny, who in the final book of the whole *Natural History* says: “In the whole world, and wherever the connected vault of heaven extends, Italy is the most beautiful in all things and deservedly obtains the principate of nature.”

I answer this doubt under two conclusions.

The first: in certain spices,...

...metals, fruits, and precious gems, the eastern region of the unbelievers excels the regions of the western Christians, and conversely.

This conclusion is evident from the things said above. God and nature made it so for two reasons.

First, for the mutual and friendly communication of regions and human beings with one another. This nourishes the affection and love toward which he also disposed things by causing one human being or country to need the things of another human being or another country, and conversely.

Second, this was done so that no human being or region, after considering its own excellences, should exalt itself and become proud as though it were more perfect than all others, altogether sufficient to itself, and in need of no one.

Therefore, just as there is rarely any human being who does not excel every other in some manifest or hidden good, and just as every other human being excels him in something, so the most wise God moderated and tempered the conditions of regions, so that almost every region abounds in something which another lacks or possesses in smaller measure.

On account of this and the other wonders of divine operation which the most wise God worked in the disposition of the earth, it is written: "Let the earth bless the Lord; let it praise and exalt him above all forever." That is, from the consideration of the best and most fitting disposition of the earth in its regions and rivers, in things that grow and in animals, and in its other goods, a human being ought to praise and exalt the Creator who disposed all things thus for the sake of the human being.

The second conclusion: the western regions of the Christians are simply far more desirable in those common things which belong to a suitable and excellent human manner of life for the preservation of a lawful and moral life. In temporal things they are more ordered, and in natural things more honorable, more temperate, and more healthful than the eastern regions of the unbelievers. Italy, Spain, France, and the western regions of the Christians surpass and excel the whole land of Havilah, India, and Judea in spiritual goods, in the most suitable corporeal goods, and in the most ordered and honorable practices.

This conclusion is proved by reason and authorities.

By reason, as follows. A country in which all the conditions of the best region concur in moderate and measured fashion is happier than one in which one or several - but not all - of these conditions concur. But Italy possesses this happiness, because whatever things make a region good concur in her moderately and...

...temperately, which does not occur in the others. Therefore it seems, without injury, that she should be preferred to the other eastern regions.

To this is added the authority of Virgil, who praises Italy in a long poem in Book I of the *Georgics*, and that of Pliny in Book XXXVII of the *Natural History*, final chapter, whose words are these:

> *In the whole world, and wherever the connected vault of heaven extends, Italy is the most beautiful in all things and deservedly obtains the principate of nature. She is the ruler and second parent of the world: in men, women, commanders, soldiers, servants, excellence of arts, and brilliance of talents; then in her position and healthfulness, the sky and its temperateness, easy access for all nations, coasts rich in harbors, and the benign blowing of the winds. For this last results from her position, which runs into the most useful part, midway between rising and setting. In abundance of waters, healthfulness of groves, the joints of her mountains, the harmlessness of wild animals, fertility of soil, and richness of pasture - whatever there is without which life ought not to be, nowhere is more excellent. Crops, wine, oil, fleeces, flax, garments, and young cattle: I observe that not even horses in the*

> *chariot races are preferred to any native ones. In metals of gold, silver, bronze, and iron, so long as it pleased her to work them, she yielded to none. And now, pregnant with these within herself, she pours forth various juices and the flavors of crops and fruits in place of every dowry. With the fabulous Indies excepted, I would indeed place Spain next, wherever it is surrounded by sea.*

And in Book III, chapter 5, he says concerning the city of Rome:

> *Rome, the nursling and also the parent of all lands, chosen by the divine will, which would make heaven itself brighter; gather together scattered empires; soften customs; draw into converse, through the fellowship of speech, the discordant and savage tongues of so many peoples; give humanity to the human being; and, in brief, become the one fatherland of all the nations in the whole world.*

And concerning the coast of Campania, now called the Kingdom of Naples, he says in the same place:

> *That happy and blessed pleasantness of Campania, in which there is every life-giving and perennial healthfulness and temperateness of the sky: such fertile fields, such sunny hills, such harmless uplands, such shady groves, such bountiful kinds of forests, so many mountain breezes, such fertility of crops, vines, and olives, such noble fleeces for the flocks, such fat necks upon bulls, such abundance of rivers and springs bathing the whole of it, so many seas and harbors; and with the bosom of its lands open everywhere to commerce, itself runs eagerly into the sea as though to aid mortals. Nor do I commemorate the talents and customs, the men, and the nations surpassed by language and hand. The Greeks themselves claimed for themselves a race from it, pouring forth their own glory most abundantly, by calling so great a part of it - that is, Apulia - Magna Graecia.*

These are his words. In what manner Spain, France, and the other western regions surpass the eastern ones, let those to whom the matter pertains see for themselves.

From these things the answer to the first argument of the easterners is evident.

To the second, it is answered that the goodness of the country of the Jews came from God and from nature, which obeys God, on account of the merits of the human beings inhabiting it, if they had been good imitators of divine things.

Hence Leviticus 26 says: “If you walk in my precepts, keep my commandments, and do them, I will give you rains,” and so forth. “But if not, I will give you the heaven above like iron,” and so forth.

Hence the Psalm says: “He turned rivers into a desert, and the outlets of waters into thirst,” and so forth. The history in 3 Kings 18 bears upon this.

From these things we can observe two matters.

First, the divination of astrologers who pronounce upon the abundance and sterility of places and years is vain and frivolous, since such matters vary according to the merits or demerits of human beings, which are not subject to the stars.

Second, the happiness, fecundity, and blessing of the ancient land of promise of the Jews was transferred through Christ to the western Christian people, and it will endure with us if we are good imitators, or if we are converted to him.

And these things are sufficient concerning the sixth receptacle, namely the terrestrial Paradise.

First Decade, Chapter Four

Containing Four Questions

Question One

Whether the dead can appear to the living

It is asked whether the souls of the deceased can leave their receptacles and appear to the living.

To this it seems at first that a negative answer must be given. For Job 7 says: “He who descends into hell shall not ascend.” And the Psalm calls the soul “a spirit going and not returning.” Likewise the Psalm says: “That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.” And Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*: “If the souls of the dead took part in the affairs of the living, my pious mother would never desert me for a single night, she who followed me over land and sea in order to live with me.”

I answer that it must be said that the souls’ departure from Paradise, hell, and so forth, and their leaving their receptacles, can be understood in two ways.

In one way, simply and perpetually, so that Paradise or hell is no longer their place and they do not return to it. Understood thus, let the first conclusion be that no one assigned there by an absolute definitive sentence will depart from there, because the reward and punishment of separated souls will never be ended, as is expressly gathered from Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 46. This is also argued in cause 12, question 2, chapter *Tempus*. Trajan is not an argument to the contrary, because he was not condemned by a final sentence - if, nevertheless, that history is true.

In another way it can be understood that they depart for a time; and then we speak either according to the order of nature or according to the order of divine providence.

If we speak in the first way, let the second conclusion be that, according to the natural course, separated souls assigned to their own...

...receptacle do not depart from it in order to appear to the living. This is evident both on the part of the souls, which are assigned to the fellowship of separated substances and not to the fellowship of human beings - hence the Philosopher also says in Book I of the *Ethics* that there can be no communication of civil works between the living and the dead - and on the part of the human beings to whom they appear, whose cognition occurs through sense and sensible things. For this reason the appearance of a separated soul to human beings is marvelous; indeed, it is to be numbered among divine miracles, as Blessed Thomas says in Part I, question 89, article 8, in the reply to the second argument.

But if we speak according to divine dispensation, let the third conclusion be that separated souls sometimes go forth from their receptacles and represent themselves to the sight of human beings.

Sometimes the souls of the saints go forth from heaven to aid those under siege, as is evident concerning Blessed Felix the Martyr, who appeared visibly to the citizens of Nola when they were being attacked by barbarians, as Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*.

Before the judgment, the damned also are sometimes permitted by divine permission to leave the receptacle of hell for a time and appear to the living, for the instruction, fear, and terror of the living. Thus Gregory gives the example in Book IV of the *Dialogues* concerning Pope Benedict and concerning the filthy shadow of the robber in the *Life of Blessed Martin*.

Yet this is the difference between the blessed and the damned, as Thomas says in Book IV: the blessed can appear when they will, by the power of glory and the gift of grace gratuitously given. The damned, however, cannot appear always or without divine permission and providence.

The reason is that, just as the saints while living in the flesh performed certain signs by the grace of God given to them which others lacking that grace could not perform, so some power is conferred by God upon the souls of the saints through the power of glory, by which they can appear miraculously to the living when they will.

Both the blessed and the damned can also appear in assumed bodies, in the habit which they formerly wore. Thus Blessed Augustine appeared to Brother Albert in pontifical habit, saying: "Thomas is equal to me in glory, excelling in virginal purity." And Bernard says concerning a certain cleric that he...

...appeared to Henry, Bishop of Orléans, clothed in a leaden cope heavier than the tower of Pigmane. This is also evident concerning Darsus, to whom Pope Benedict the Younger appeared in the form of a monstrous animal, in Book IV of the *Dialogues*.

The fourth conclusion: those who are in Purgatory are permitted to leave their receptacles and come to the living before their penance is completed, so that they may ask for suffrages. This is evident in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, where it is said concerning the soul of Paschasius, who appeared to Blessed Germanus in the baths.

The fifth conclusion: in the limbo of the saints, souls could by dispensation leave their receptacles in this manner, as is evident concerning Moses and Elijah in Matthew 17.

The sixth conclusion: children in limbo never go forth from there, both because they are at their terminus and because their departure would accomplish nothing.

The seventh conclusion: good angels frequently appear to us in the persons of souls, having assumed bodies suitable to them, just as a good angel appeared to Moses in the person of God; and the same is evident in many other apparitions.

The eighth conclusion: evil angels, for the purpose of the deceptions of enchanters, also leave their receptacles in assumed bodies and appear to the living. Thus, when Saul asked the pythoness to divine and to raise Samuel, it was not Samuel who appeared, because he was not roused from his rest, but some phantom and imaginary illusion produced by the machinations of the devil, which Scripture called Samuel, just as images are sometimes called by the names of the things they represent, 1 Kings 28.

These things are from Lord John of Torquemada, Cardinal, upon cause 13, question 2, chapter *Tempus*.

For greater evidence concerning the things said above, note here one thing: although the souls of the saints or of the damned are sometimes present in person where they appear, nevertheless it must not be believed that this always occurs. For sometimes apparitions of this kind, either during sleep or while awake, are made by the operation of good or evil

spirits, either for the instruction or the deception of the living. In the same way, living human beings also sometimes…

…appear to others and say many things to them in dreams, although it is certain that they are not present. These things are from Thomas in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 45, article 1, question 3, in the body of the question and in the replies to the arguments.

Blessed Antony shows how it can be known whether a spirit appearing is good or evil, speaking thus:

> *The discernment of good and evil spirits is not difficult. For if joy follows after fear, let us know that aid has come from the Lord, because the soul's security is the judgment of the majesty present. But if the fear that has been struck in remains, it is the enemy who is seen.*

Thomas, Part III of the *Summa*, question 30, article 3, in the reply to the third argument.

To the arguments to the contrary, it is said that they are understood according to the first conclusion, and that Augustine speaks according to the common course of nature.

Question Two

Whether the dead have sometimes appeared

It is asked whether it is discovered by Christian or Gentile proof that any spirits have actually appeared.

To this an affirmative answer is given. For among Christians it is read, first, that in the year of the Lord 1323, in a certain city of France, a certain William de Corvo died. For eight days after his death a certain lamentable, weak, horrible, and desolate voice was heard by many in his house.

His wife had been so terrified by this voice that she lay ill in bed and almost died. A message was sent to Brother John Gobi, prior of the convent of the Order of Preachers in that place, that, accompanied by some friars and citizens, they should prudently visit her.

Taking three fathers with him, therefore, and accompanied also by citizens, while no other friar or citizen knew, he reverently received the body of Christ into his breast and set out, intending to test whether that voice was something fabricated or an illusion of demons.

When…

…he had most diligently searched all the concealed places of the house suited to fabrications, lest he be deceived, he asked the wife in what place that voice was heard more by her. She answered: in the bed in which her husband had died.

They sat upon the dead man's bed and began there to recite the nine lessons of the dead together with the litany. At the end of the rogations, however, a certain shadow began to go before them toward the wife's bed, and it made a sound as though a broom were being drawn over the floor.

The wife, shaken and trembling, began to cry out: "Behold, behold, O fathers!" They, somewhat terrified, fell silent. But the prior admonished the wife to ask who it was. When she asked, it answered in a marvelous voice in the middle of the room that it was the soul of William de Corvo, her husband.

Then the prior, having put away every fear, approached nearer with his companions to where that voice was sounding. Fortifying himself with the sign of the cross, he asked the spirit whether it knew him and the companion friars. It answered that it did, naming each of them individually by name.

Then, while everyone present stood by and listened, the prior began to adjure it thus:

> *I adjure you, creature of God, by the infinite power of God, by his ineffable wisdom, by his inexpressible goodness, by the power of the most holy Trinity by which he created all things, by the mystery of the holy Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection, by the power of all the orders of the holy angels, and by everything which through God's power can bind you more: I constrain and bind you not to depart from this place until you have answered truthfully those things concerning which I shall question you.*

First he asked whether it was a good or an evil spirit, and it said that it was good.

Second, he asked whether souls finally passing over without any defect possessed beatitude immediately, and it assented.

Likewise, when asked who it was, it said that it was the soul of William de Corvo, which had to suffer a particular Purgatory there for two years on account of an offense against his mother, against whom he had sinned - an offense which is accounted most grave before God - unless, aided by...

...prayers, it should be freed.

The prior also asked whether a good or an evil angel had led him there. It said a good one. When asked which suffrages better bring help to the dead, it said Masses and the penitential Psalms.

After the prior had asked many things, however, the spirit said: "I ask you, father, not to torment me by questioning me further. Know, nevertheless, that because of the presence of the body of Christ which you hold in your breast, my punishment is lighter."

A certain doctor of laws among those present asked it what he carried upon himself. It replied in Latin, although before this it had been uneducated: "You carry beneath your belt the concealed Office of the Blessed Virgin"; and so it was.

When asked under what form it was speaking, it answered for all to hear: "Under the form of a dove." As a sign of the truth, at the hour of cockcrow that doctor found himself covered with white feathers.

It was also asked whether evil spirits encountered every person dying, and whether all knowledge is infused into souls stripped of their bodies. It answered yes to both.

When asked what punishment it suffered there in its lodging, it answered: the punishment of fire. Likewise, when asked whether it had another punishment, it answered: another in the common Purgatory. And when asked how it could suffer simultaneously in two distant places, it answered that by day it suffered fire in the common Purgatory and by night fire in the Purgatory of its house.

Ordered to sign itself with the sign of the cross, it answered that it did not have hands. Asked whether it heard, it answered that it did, but not through ears: rather, through the power of God.

Asked again how long it would have to remain in the Purgatory of its lodging, it answered, crying out in a very loud voice: “Pray for me with prayers, Masses, and the penitential Psalms until the feast of Easter, and then I shall be freed.”

When asked by his wife, however, how long he would have to remain in the common Purgatory, he answered with a wail: “Pray, and cause God to be entreated for me; and do not fear me, because I shall soon be freed.” Immediately he vanished and went out like a certain wind, which blew upon all who stood by after the fashion of a certain feeble breath. From that time nothing was heard there.

I, the compiler of the present little work, read this marvelous apparition in a certain...

...roll and truthful instrument sent to the Supreme Pontiff and the cardinals then residing at Avignon.

Pliny the Younger also writes in Book VII concerning apparitions of this kind as follows:

> *There was a freedman of mine who was not uneducated. His younger brother was resting with him in the same bed. He seemed to see a certain person sitting upon the bed, moving shears toward his head and even cutting the hair from the crown itself. When daylight came, he was found shorn around the crown, with the hairs lying there.*

Again, a boy, Pliny says in the same place, was sleeping in the school among several others. Two persons in white tunics came through the windows, sheared him as he lay there, and departed by the way they had come. Daylight likewise revealed this boy shorn and the hairs scattered around him.

Question Three

By which angels the soul is accompanied when it departs from the body, and whether it is immediately conducted to the place assigned to it

It is asked whether souls, immediately upon leaving the body, are accompanied by good or evil angels and are conducted by them without delay to the places assigned to them.

In answer to this, two conclusions are set down.

The first: after separation from the body, if there is no impediment - that is, if they possess nothing requiring purification, namely venial sin - the souls of the good immediately fly away and are conducted to heaven. The souls of the evil, however, are immediately conducted to hell after the manner of fire and stone: the former immediately ascends to its own sphere if there is no impediment, while a stone, when every obstacle has been removed, suddenly tends toward the center by its own weight. The contrary is heresy, as Thomas says in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, article 5, question 2.

This is also...

...proved by reason and authority.

First, it is proved by reason, through the topic of sufficient division, as follows. For if its reward is not rendered to the soul immediately after separation from the body, this can be for one of three reasons: either because the soul is not capable of it, because the reward is not owed to the soul, or because it is not owed immediately.

Not the first, because, since the soul is of an intellectual nature, it is capable of the blessed knowledge and vision of God, who is the principle of its being and whom the soul naturally desires to see. Human beings are also to be like the angels of God, Matthew 22, who always see God face to face. Therefore they immediately receive the reward.

Likewise, the reward is properly owed to the soul, for the whole principle of merit and demerit comes from the soul, because the body was only, as it were, an instrument.

Likewise, the wage ought immediately to be rendered to the hired laborer who merits it, according to Leviticus 19: "The work of your hired laborer shall not remain with you until morning." It belongs most especially to God to do this. Therefore the soul leaving the body immediately receives the reward.

This is also proved by authority, and first concerning the good. For Christ says to the thief in Luke 23, "Today you shall be with me in Paradise," placing the punctuation after "to you," as Chrysostom expounds it in one way. And Gregory says in the *Dialogues*: "As soon as the souls of the perfect just leave the confines of this flesh, they are received in the heavenly seats."

It is also proved concerning the evil. Job 21 says: "They spend their days in good things, and in a moment they descend into hell." "In a moment," that is, at the indivisible terminus of life. And Gregory says: "As each person departs from here, so he is presented at the judgment," distinction 25, chapter *Qualis*. Thomas, Book IV, distinction 45, question 2.

The second conclusion: souls that have left the body go, accompanied, to the receptacles assigned to them.

Saint Bonaventure proves this in Book IV, distinction 2, saying:

> *It must be believed that, at the soul's departure from the body, one or more good and evil spirits stand by. Then, when sentence has been given by God according to truth, if the soul is good, it is brought through the ministry of a good angel into heaven or into Purgatory until it is purified. After it has been purified, it is led out through his…*

…ministry. But if the sentence is unfavorable to the one judged, then it is conducted to hell through the ministry of demons.

This, however, as he says, is to be granted as probable and not asserted rashly. For Gregory says in Book IV of the *Dialogues* that the souls of the reprobate descend to hell by themselves.

These are Lord Bonaventure's words.

Question Four

Whether it is lawful to ask a dying person to reveal his state after death

It is asked whether it is lawful to ask a dying person to reveal his state after death.

To this it is answered that it is possible to inquire into someone's state after his death in three ways: with presumption, with doubt, or with humility and for the fulfillment of desire.

First, with presumption - for example, when someone proudly or presumptuously, trusting in his own ability, asks this. Such a person sins.

Second, with doubt - for example, when the one asking doubts concerning the future state. Such a person also sins.

Third, it is sought piously and humbly for the fulfillment of desire. In that case one who asks someone to appear to him after his death does not sin.

The reason is that, since all human beings desire by nature to know, to inquire for the fulfillment of a natural desire is not a sin. These things are from Thomas, Quodlibet II, question 2, in the body of the question and in the replies to the arguments.

Lord Henry of Hesse, however, answers that this is by no means lawful, because it savors of a certain culpable curiosity to wish to know the future state of dying persons. That state is more usefully unknown than known by the living, and ought rather to be conjectured from works than experienced. It ought to suffice us that God renders this to each person according to his works.

Hence it was said also to the rich man: “They have Moses and the prophets; let them believe them.” For this reason such appari-...

...tions seem to be believed deceptions and illusions of demons rather than indications of the true state of souls. Therefore trust ought not to be placed in such things.

These are his words. But you should follow Thomas, and yet not scorn Henry in this matter.

Fifth Principal Chapter of This First Decade

Containing Four Questions

Question One

Whether the damned can, by right reason, desire not to exist, in order to escape the miseries of hell and attain their absence

It is asked whether the souls of the damned can, by right and deliberative reason, desire not to exist for the sake of escaping and lacking the miseries and eternal punishments of hell.

To this it seems at first that an affirmative answer must be given. For Apocalypse 9 says that in those days human beings will desire to die; and chapter 6 of the same book says that the damned will say to the mountains, “Fall upon us.” And Christ says concerning Judas in Matthew that it would have been better for him not to have been born than to be perpetually damned.

I answer by saying that, concerning this matter, Scotus in Book IV, distinction 1, question 2, and in part Francis of Meyronnes in his *Conflatus*, distinction 40, say with Anselm in chapter 17 of the *Monologion* that the souls of the damned cannot by right reason desire not to exist in order to escape the miseries of hell and attain absence from infernal punishments.

They endeavor to prove this opinion of theirs with the following ten reasons and authorities.

First, as follows. According to right reason, no one ought to desire a greater evil for the sake of escaping a lesser evil. But the punishment of hell which is fled is a lesser and, as it were, particular evil in comparison with…

…nonexistence, which takes away every good because it takes away the whole nature. Therefore nonexistence is not to be desired according to right reason for the sake of lacking punishments.

Second, the flight from a greater perfection is not to be desired for the sake of obtaining a lesser perfection. But being is a greater perfection than joy arising from escape from punishments. For being, as Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, is the noblest among all divine participations. Therefore, and so forth.

Third, no one according to right reason can desire anything contrary to a natural inclination, which always intends what is better because it is regulated by the intelligence which does not err, namely God. But there is a natural appetite for being, as is evident in Book II *On Generation* and Book II *On the Soul*, and it was caused immediately by God in the rational creature. Therefore nonexistence cannot by right reason be desired for the sake of lacking punishments, especially also since eternal punishments accord with the divine will which inflicts them.

Fourth, no one can by right reason desire not to exist in order to flee what is just and good, because the punishment is positive and punitive. Therefore nonexistence cannot be desired in order that punishment may be avoided.

Fifth, every habit is better than its privation. But being is a habit, form, and perfection, while nonbeing is a privation. Therefore nonbeing cannot be desired so that we may be deprived of being itself.

Sixth, that which more persons - indeed, all persons - choose and desire is better, according to Book I of the *Ethics*. But all things desire being, and more choose it; nonbeing is the contrary. Therefore in punishments being is to be preferred above nonbeing.

Seventh, the more common a good is, the more divine and consequently the more desirable it is. But not to exist, in order that we may lack punishments, yields to the confusion of God through the absence of divine justice. Therefore it is better to exist.

Eighth, where there is no character of goodness, there is no character of what is better and consequently none of preference. But nonbeing possesses no character of goodness, since it is the privation of the whole nature. Therefore it ought not to be chosen or preferred for the sake of lacking the punishments of hell.

Ninth, the greater evil is more to be fled than the lesser evil. But to exist miserably in torments is a lesser evil than...

...not to exist, because the former posits being, while the latter takes away every good since it leaves nothing. Therefore miserable existence in torments is to be preferred to simple nonexistence.

Tenth, Francis of Meyronnes says in the place cited above that the things which God can do by absolute power will be able at some time to be done and brought into being, because absolute and ordained - or distinct - power are the same in God. Therefore it is better for the damned to be and to exist in torments than simply not to exist, because at least they are subject to this absolute power of God, which will be able at any time to be brought into being and act.

As they say, the authorities of Augustine support this opinion. In Book XI of *The City of God*, chapter 26, he says:

> *If immortality were given to even the most wretched person, by which not even his misery would die, he would surely exult for joy and would thus always choose to exist rather than not to exist at all. For by a certain natural force, being itself is so pleasing that for no other reason even those who are wretched do not wish to perish.*

These are his words.

And in the book *On Free Choice* he says: “Consider how great a good it is to exist, which both the blessed and the wretched desire. For it is a greater thing to be wretched than not to exist at all.”

There is the example of those who are in prisons, bound by chains and fetters, vexed by torments, and sick with many kinds of infirmities, who nevertheless prefer to exist thus rather than to die. And although they call for death with their mouth, they deny it in their heart. Similarly, decrepit old people, whom all diseases pursue, prefer to remain thus rather than to die.

And thus those of this school hold this as the truth and their position.

They answer the first two authorities of John in the Apocalypse by saying that, when the damned say those things, they desire not to exist by reason that is not right, just as a sinner deceived by an error of reason admits a greater evil after dismissing a lesser evil for the sake of some particular delight.

To the authority of Jesus Christ they say that it is understood with respect to the second birth outside the womb, not with respect to the first, which consists in the infusion of the rational soul...

...into an organized body.

There is another common manner of speaking belonging to Blessed Augustine in many places, which Saint Thomas follows in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 5, question 2. It holds that the damned can by right and deliberative reason wish - and do wish - for themselves not to exist, for the sake of lacking punishments.

Those of this school prove their intention by reasons and authorities, and answer the reasons of the school of Lord John Scotus introduced above.

First, as follows. Everything delightful is desirable; but the absence of evil is delightful, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the *Rhetoric*. Therefore it is desirable.

Second, that which does not include evil is desirable.

Third, it is better to be blessed than merely to exist. Therefore, by the topic of the proposition and its opposite, it is worse to be damned than not to exist.

Fourth, the misery and punishment of the damned exceeds every punishment and misery of this world, just as the glory of the blessed who comprehend exceeds all the glory and delight of wayfarers. But for the sake of avoiding the misery of this world, death is desirable to some. Therefore, much more strongly, according to deliberative reason, nonexistence is desirable to the damned for the sake of escaping eternal punishments.

The minor is proved. Ecclesiasticus 41 says: “O death, how good is your judgment to a human being in need, whose strength is diminished, who fails through age, who is anxious concerning all things, and who has lost wisdom.”

What Pliny says in Book VII of the *Natural History* also bears upon this by the topic from the lesser: “There have been many who judged it best not to be born, or to be abolished as quickly as possible.”

Similarly, Cicero in Book I of the *Tusculan Disputations* adduces the saying of the philosopher Silenus to Midas, king of the Lydians: “By far the best thing for a human being is not to be born; the next best is to die as soon as possible.” This is on account of the miseries of the world; how much more on account of eternal punishments.

Fifth, that which is not evil of itself is more desirable than an infinite evil. But nonbeing is not evil of itself. Hence the doctors say that the privation of the benefit of creation does not...

...yield to the detriment of the uncreated, because the uncreated incurs no punishment from this. Eternal punishment, however, is an infinite evil. Therefore by right reason nonexistence - which is not evil of itself - is more desirable than eternal punishment, which is an infinite evil.

In support of this side is the first authority of Augustine in the sermon *On Murmuring*, which begins “While you were dwelling in the desert,” where he says thus:

> *For it is better, my brothers, to lack being than to be tortured perpetually. For I do not know what it is not to exist; but to possess being and to be tortured perpetually - what else is this than always to possess death without death? Therefore, brothers,*

> *truly and without doubt I dare to say that it would be better not to exist than, while existing, to be tortured perpetually or afflicted eternally.*

These are his words.

And in the book *On the Misery of the Damned* he says: "O death, you are sweet to those to whom you were bitter. You alone are desired by those who vehemently hated you," and so forth.

And Jerome, upon the words of Matthew 26, "It would have been better for him if he had not been born," and so forth, is cited and set down by Saint Thomas in the *Catena Aurea* upon this passage: "For one hidden in the maternal womb, it is better not to exist than to exist for torments."

There are also the authorities of Apocalypse 9 and 6 set down at the beginning of the question.

Finally, there is the authority of Christ which concludes all things, also introduced at the beginning of the question: "It would have been better for him," and so forth. Here the Ordinary Gloss says: "Christ's word was spoken simply with respect to being in the womb and outside the womb."

In support of this side are the daily examples of those who kill themselves for the sake of lacking temporal punishments. Therefore, if what appears less likely is granted, what is more likely is granted; consequently no wise person will deny it concerning the eternal punishments of hell.

Now, however, in answering the reasons of the contrary school, it is said first, with a distinction in reply to the first nine arguments, that nonbeing can be considered in two ways.

In one way, in itself, and thus it can in no manner be desirable, since it possesses no character of good but is a pure privation of good. The nine arguments stated above proceed according to this way.

In another way, nonbeing can be considered...

...incidentally, insofar as it removes a penal or wretched life, and thus nonbeing assumes the character of good. For to lack evil is a certain good, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the *Ethics*.

It is customary here to distinguish whether the expression "incidentally" is taken on the side of the subject, namely, that someone incidentally desires not to exist. In that case nonbeing possesses the character of an object in itself, and thus this is not true, because being, which is the contrary of nonbeing, is objectively the natural appetite and inclination.

In another way, the expression "incidentally" is taken on the side of the predicate. The sense then is that someone desires not to exist, but incidentally, because nonbeing is not thus the object of the appetite in itself; rather, something else - namely, not to be wretched - is desired in itself, and nonbeing follows incidentally.

In this manner it is said and granted by the saints and by Thomas that it is better for the damned not to exist than to exist wretchedly. Hence, upon the words of Job 3 and Jeremiah 20, "Cursed be the day on which I was born," Jerome says formally that it is better for the damned not to exist than to exist badly; and in this sense the damned can choose nonexistence according to deliberative reason.

Blessed Vincent gives this example:

> *Which is better: that the king give you a castle, or not? Certainly it is better that it be given. But which would be better: to give a castle producing a return of one hundred ducats, together with an annual payment of two hundred, or not to give it? Certainly it would be better not to give or accept it.*

And so forth.

To the tenth argument of Francis of Meyronnes it is answered that the things which God can do by absolute power never occur merely as such, because it implies a contradiction that he should do something and that it should not be done ordinately. For all things which are from God are ordered, according to the Apostle. Thomas adduces this in Book I of the *Sentences*, distinction 48, question 1, final article.

To the authority of Augustine it is said that nonbeing is not desirable in itself, but incidentally insofar as it is the termination of misery. Hence, although being and living are naturally desired by all, they are nevertheless not desired by all who exist in sadness, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the *Ethics*.

The example concerning those imprisoned requires no answer, for it is rejected with the same facility with which it is approved.

If, nevertheless, you wish to sustain both opinions on account of such great men,...

...conclude that, absolutely and abstracting from punishment, nonexistence cannot be desired - and understand Scotus in this way - and that absolutely they cannot desire those punishments upon which being follows - and understand Saint Thomas in this way. But incidentally, by abstracting either one from its consequences, it both can and cannot be desired.

Question Two

Whether it is lawful to desire death

It is doubted how many are the respects under which death occurs as something to be desired under the character of good.

To this it is answered that death occurs as something to be desired under the character of good in four ways, and conversely it occurs as something to be fled under the character of evil in the same number of ways.

First, death occurs as something to be desired under the character of good insofar as it is considered as the privation of every misery and punishment which someone possesses here or fears he will possess. Under this consideration, some kill themselves on account of the miseries which they presently suffer; others do so lest they fall into the miseries which they see threatening close at hand.

In this manner Blessed Augustine says in Book I of *The City of God*, chapter 16, that certain Christian women, at the time of persecution, threw themselves naked into a river and died in that manner so that they might escape those who pursued their chastity. Certain persons thought that they ought to be venerated among the martyrs, concerning which Augustine wishes to define nothing rashly.

But certainly those wretched persons who kill themselves in this way have so corrupted the judgment of reason that, finding no way to be freed from the evil - sometimes a small one - which they suffer, they take refuge in nonbeing through death, inflicting it upon themselves as though it were a liberator from all evils. According to the truth, this is the invention, for the sake of a temporal evil, of the most cruel punishment of perpetual damnation. This is certain to those upon whom the truth of the Christian religion has shone, because, although the human being ceases to exist and to suffer here, nevertheless the soul remains, to be subjected to eternal torments...

...through this crime; and moreover after death in soul and body. Thus such persons do not escape the evil which they seek to escape, but fall into one much greater.

For this reason Lactantius said in Book VI, chapter 21, of the *Institutions*:

> *Nothing is more criminal than to offer one's head to death voluntarily. For if a murderer is wicked because he is an extinguisher of a human being, he who kills himself is bound by the same crime because he kills a human being; indeed, this deed must be judged even greater. Its punishment is subject to God alone. For just as we did not come into this life by our own will, so we must depart again from this dwelling of the body - which has been assigned to us to guard - at the command of the same one who brought us into this body to dwell for so long, until he orders us to be sent forth.*

These are his words.

Second, death occurs under the character of good insofar as death is the way to immortal life, which is better than the present life. For according to the common law, one who has once died will not die again, since all will rise to immortality.

I said "according to the common law" because, although according to that common law of nature it has been established for human beings to die once, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9, nevertheless many human beings have died so that they might once be raised from death to their former life, such as Lazarus and Trajan. But I have not yet read that anyone died three times.

Therefore no human being ever reaches or will reach immortal life except through the mediation of death. No one has been or ever will be transferred immediately from this life to another life of perpetual happiness or unhappiness. No one has ever descended alive into hell, just as no one who had not first died ever ascended into heaven.

Similarly, under this consideration, certain persons eager for immortality, deceived concerning the quality of the state of the future life, killed themselves. Cleombrotus, a disciple of Plato, did this in fact. Concerning him it is related, as Blessed Augustine says in Book I of *The City of God*, chapter 22, that, after reading Plato's book *On the Immortality of the Soul*, he threw himself headlong from a wall so that he might depart from this life to the one he believed to be better - and did wickedly. For Pythagoras forbids one to depart from the guard...

...and station of life without the command of the commander, that is, God, as Cicero says in the book *On Friendship*.

Third, death occurs under the character of good insofar as, for this or that cause, it shows someone who dies voluntarily to be just or renders him worthy of praise or reward.

Under this consideration, again, certain persons killed themselves. Among them was that Roman woman Lucretia, concerning whom Blessed Augustine says in Book I of *The City of God*, chapter 19, that, having been violated by Tarquin, she killed herself. For she was ashamed of another's turpitude committed in her, even though not with her; and the Roman woman, excessively eager for praise, feared that, if she lived, she would be thought to have suffered willingly what she suffered violently. Hence before the eyes of human beings, to whom she could not demonstrate her conscience, she thought that she must apply that punishment as a witness of her mind.

The following epitaph for Lucretia is said to have been composed by Ovid:

When chaste Lucretia pierced her breast with the sword
And a torrent of blood went forth, she said:
"Let witnesses go before me that I did not favor the tyrant:
Blood before my husband, my spirit before the gods."
How well, brought forth for me, may they speak after death,
The one among the shades, the other among those above.

Under this consideration, certain persons also have not feared to expose themselves to death for human praise, so that they might thus be proclaimed steadfast and brave: some in deeds of war, such as the Caesars and so forth; some in frivolous assertions, such as Jews, heretics, and other unbelievers.

Others, however, have intrepidly exposed themselves to death not in this manner for their own praise, but for the glory of God and their own eternal happiness, as did all the holy martyrs.

Fourth, death occurs under the character of good insofar as it removes useless and superfluous human beings, especially when it removes perverse human beings and troublers of the commonwealth, such as robbers, thieves, tyrants, and those like them. They are customarily removed from the midst of the living by those who preside civilly as judges, by the punishment of death established in human laws, just as under divine laws death was formerly...

...to be inflicted upon diverse kinds of wicked human beings, as is evident throughout the course of the Mosaic Law.

These things are from Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Addition

On how someone can undergo death with the intention of pleasing God, see Bonaventure, Book III, distinction 30, question 2, and Biel in the sermon on Saint Bartholomew.

But it is lawful for no one to lay hands upon himself. Therefore those who procured death for themselves are condemned, such as Laurentianus the Florentine, who, without any bodily discomfort and without an evident cause of disease, threw himself into a well, according to Caelius and Crinitus.

In the same manner Petrus Leonis, a man excellent in philosophy and of distinguished prudence, extinguished himself. So also did the emperor Galenus, whose genitals were gradually putrefying and who, out of weariness with life, opened his side with a sword, as Baptista Egnatius the Venetian bears witness. Very many others who brought death upon themselves are enumerated by Johannes Ravisius.

Question Three

Whether it is more desirable to desire not to exist than to sin

It is asked whether, according to right reason, it is more desirable for a faithful human being to desire not to exist than to sin mortally or venially.

To this Scotus, in the place cited above, answers that according to right reason it is more desirable and more choiceworthy for a human being to sin mortally and venially than not to exist.

First, because that which includes the lesser evil is more choiceworthy. But to sin mortally without fault does not take away every good, for it leaves nature; nonbeing, however, leaves nothing. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, because being is a nobler divine participation than being…

…without fault. Therefore the just person ought rather to choose to sin against God than not to exist.

But this opinion tends toward heresy. Saint Thomas therefore holds the contrary in Quodlibet I, saying that it is more choiceworthy for a just person to desire not to exist than to sin mortally.

The reason is that everyone is bound to flee that which is against God more than that which is against himself. For according to the order of charity, he is bound to love God more than himself. But fault is against God, while nonexistence is against himself. Therefore, and so forth.

And the same Thomas, in Quodlibet XI when speaking about lying, and in II-II, question 43, article 7, when speaking about scandal, and question 110, likewise when speaking about lying, appears to indicate concerning venial sin that the just person ought rather to choose death than to sin venially.

For although venial sin does not remove the grace of God through which salvation belongs to the human being, it nevertheless impedes the increase of charity and disposes one toward mortal sin, and thus tends toward the detriment of one's own salvation and toward offense against God. Therefore, according to right reason, it ought not to be preferred to the avoidance of offense against God and to one's own salvation.

The same is stated concerning this matter in the Decrees, distinction 13, chapter *Verum*.

All these things are from Thomas and Scotus in the places cited above.

Question Four

Whether one who is brave with political courage ought to flee the sin opposed to courage more than bodily death

It is asked whether one who is brave with political courage ought to flee the sin opposed to courage more than bodily death.

To this it seems at first that it must be answered that the brave person ought to flee bodily death more than the opposite of courage.

First, as follows. That for the sake of which each thing exists is itself more so, according to Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*. But by natural love everyone loves another for his own sake. For each person loves something insofar as it is good for himself. Therefore...

...by natural and political love everyone ought to love himself and his own life, which is lost through death, more than to avoid the sin opposed to courage.

Likewise, every agent acting naturally acts for its own preservation. Nature would not reflect upon itself if it tended toward something else more than toward itself. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, ordered charity begins from oneself, in law *Praeses*, the Code *On Servitudes and Water*, and *On Supplying the Negligence of Prelates*, chapter 1, Book VI; and distinction 42, chapter *Quiescamus*; *On Penance*, distinction 3, chapter *Sane*; and in chapter *Nisi de usu pallii*, according to the Gloss. Therefore all things ought to be placed after bodily life.

But to the contrary: the more common a good is, the more divine it is, according to Book I of the *Politics*. But the good of the commonwealth is more common - and consequently more divine - than the good of a particular person. Therefore we ought naturally to love its good above ourselves.

I answer that it must be said that every person who is virtuous through political courage and love of virtue ought to flee the sin opposed to virtue more than bodily death.

This conclusion is proved by reason, authority, and examples.

By reason, as follows. Every inclination of reason conforming to the inclination of nature which is neither corrupted nor vitiated is laudable and virtuous, or pertains to virtue. But the choice by which a virtuous and politically brave person chooses bodily death for the preservation of virtue or of the commonwealth, and flees harm to the commonwealth more than harm to his own bodily life, conforms to the inclination of integral nature. Therefore, and so forth.

The minor is proved by Saint Thomas in Part I, question 60, article 5, as follows:

> *In natural things, each thing which, according to nature, is the very thing which belongs to another is inclined more principally and more strongly toward that whose thing it is than toward itself. This natural inclination is demonstrated by those things which act naturally, because each thing is naturally acted upon in the way it is naturally fitted to be acted upon, according to Book II of the Physics. For we see naturally that a part exposes itself for the preservation of the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find an imitation of this kind in political virtues. For it belongs to a virtuous...*

...citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the whole commonwealth; and if the human being were a natural part of this city, this inclination would be natural to him.

And in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 19, question 1, article 3, explaining this matter more diffusely, he says:

> *Each person wishes most strongly that good to be preserved which is pleasing to him, because it is more conformable to the appetite informed by love; and this is his own good. Hence, according as the good of some thing is - or is judged to be - a greater good of the lover himself, the lover wishes this good to be preserved more in the beloved thing. The good of the lover himself, however, is found more where it is more*

> *perfect. Therefore, because every part is imperfect in itself but possesses perfection in its whole, by natural love the part tends more toward the preservation of its whole than toward its own preservation. Hence an animal naturally places its arm in the way to defend its head, upon which the safety of the whole depends. It follows from this that particular human beings also expose themselves to death for the preservation of the city of which they are parts.*

He states the same in II-II, question 26, article 3, saying:

> *Each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is manifested in action, for each part possesses a principal inclination toward common action for the utility of the whole. This appears in the political virtues, according to which citizens sometimes sustain the losses of their own property and persons for the common good.*

Second, the stated conclusion is proved by the authority of Augustine in Book V of *The City of God*, chapter 12, who says:

> *Therefore the ancient and earliest Romans, so far as their history teaches and commends them, although, like the other nations - with the one exception of the Hebrew people - they worshiped false gods and sacrificed victims not to God but to demons, were nevertheless eager for praise and liberal with money. They desired immense glory and honorable riches. They loved the former most ardently; for its sake they wished to live, and for its sake they did not doubt...*
>
> *...that they should also die. They suppressed their other desires through this one immense desire. Finally, because it seemed inglorious that their fatherland should serve, but glorious that it should rule and command, they first desired with every effort that it should be free, and afterward that it should be mistress.*

And so forth.

Third, it is proved by examples. For we read that certain Gentiles exposed themselves to death from love of friends, not because charity caused their neighbor to be loved more than their own life, but because a person loves the good of virtue in his neighbor more than a corporeal good, as Thomas says in the *Sentences*, distinction 19, question 1, article 5.

We also read that others loved the commonwealth more than parents, children, and brothers, and chose death before committing the opposite of some virtue, even without hope of eternal life.

To the first, it must be said that those who love a good commonwealth for their own sake love it with the corrupt love of vitiated concupiscence, and not with the love of virtue.

To the second, it must be said that nature reflects upon itself not only with respect to what is singular to it, but much more with respect to what is common. For each thing is inclined to preserve not only its own individual but also its species; and much more does each thing possess a natural inclination toward that which is simply the universal good.

To the third, it must be said that ordered charity begins from oneself, yet according to the right reason of virtue.

These things are from Thomas in the places cited above and Lord John Capreolus of Toulouse in Book IV.

First Decade, Chapter Six

Whether the dead know the things which are done among the living

It is asked whether separated souls know and understand those things which are done among us who are living.

At first it seems that an affirmative answer must...

...be given. For one who has care for some matter knows it. But the rich banqueter had care for his brothers, saying in Luke 16, “For I have five brothers.” Therefore he knew and understood what they were doing in the world.

It is answered that it must be said that cognition is threefold. One kind is certain and natural; the second is conjectural; the third is by revelation.

With respect to the first cognition, the first conclusion is that the dead do not know the things which are done here. This is proved by reason and authority.

First, by reason: natural cognition occurs through species abstracted from sensible things by the exterior and interior senses, as is evident. This, however, belongs only to a soul united to a body.

Second, the same is proved by authority through the words of Job 14: “Whether his sons shall have been noble or ignoble, he shall not understand.”

And Augustine says in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*: “The souls of the dead do not take part in the affairs of the living.”

Gregory says in Book XII of the *Morals*: “The dead do not know how the life of those living in the flesh after them is disposed, because the life of the spirit is far removed from the life of the flesh. And just as corporeal and incorporeal things are diverse genera, so they are distinct in cognition.”

Chapter *Fatendum*, cause 13, question 2, bears upon this.

The second conclusion: separated souls know conjecturally many of the things which occur among us. This is evident through the passage concerning the rich banqueter in Luke 16. For because the rich banqueter did not see his brothers in hell or in limbo with Abraham, he nevertheless conjectured that they were in the world.

The third conclusion: the souls of the departed who are in Purgatory and are not yet blessed know many of the things which are done here.

They know them in a first way through revelation by an equal or superior spirit - for example, by souls which pass to them from the world, or by good or evil angels descending to them daily.

In a second way, through the infusion of species by some superior spirit, either God or the angels, as is evident through Augustine in chapter *Fatendum*, cause 13, question 2.

In a third way, when it happens and is permitted to them that they come to us.

In a fourth way, through the accumulation or diminution of punishments, as Gregory says in the homily on the rich man.

In a fifth way, through recollection of previous things, and especially of sins committed, by remembering the sins which they performed. For if they did not possess memory of the sins committed in mortal life, they would not possess matter for giving thanks to God for his mercy.

Hence Gregory, upon the words "I shall sing the mercies of the Lord forever," says: "How does one sing of mercy forever who has not remembered past misery?"

And Algazel says in Book II of the *Metaphysics* that the separated soul recognizes that it conceived grief through ignorance if it was ignorant and evil, and perceives that it delighted in wisdom and knowledge if it was wise and good.

The fourth conclusion: the souls of the damned know many things which are done here.

First, they know them through the revelation of those newly passing to them. They also know them when it is permitted to them to come to us, and likewise through the revelation of good or evil angels.

They also know by remembering and recalling the evils which they performed and incurred, and the goods which they omitted and lost. Hence Abraham said: "Son, remember that you received good things in your life," Luke 16. And Augustine says in Book IX of the *Confessions*: "The dead possess memory of us."

They also consider the loss which they knowingly incurred, because they did not devote themselves to the service of their Creator.

They also know that they hate God, not insofar as God is the supreme good, but insofar as he is just and the bestower of punishments.

They also know God in thought not insofar as he is good, because such a thought would be delightful to them, but by thinking of God insofar as he is evil to them, and insofar as he punishes and afflicts them. This will be their greatest punishment. Thomas, Book IV, distinction 50.

The fifth conclusion: in the contemplation...

...of the divine essence, in which all things shine forth, the separated souls of the blessed know all things which pertain to the perfection of their intellect and to their beatitude.

Hence Gregory says in Book XII of the *Morals*: "Those who see the charity of God within are in no way to be believed ignorant of anything outside." And in the same place: "What is there that those who see him who sees all things do not see?"

But to the contrary, Augustine says thus in the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*: "The dead, even the saints, do not know what the living - even their own children - are doing." He proves this from the fact that he was not consoled by his deceased mother as he was when she lived. Nor is it probable that in the happier life she was made more cruel.

It is answered that Blessed Augustine speaks doubtfully, but Blessed Gregory assertively. Therefore Saint Thomas, agreeing more with Gregory than with Augustine and explaining Blessed Gregory, says that those who are blessed and see the essence of God know all things which pertain to the perfection of the intellect and to the perfection of the universe, but not other things.

These things are from Thomas, Part I, question 89, article 8, and Book III of the *Summa Against the Gentiles*, chapter 57.

To the argument concerning the rich banqueter, it is said that his cognition was conjectural or by revelation, but not natural.

The consequence can also be denied, for this does not hold: “The dead have care for the living; therefore they know their deeds.” For we who are living possess care for the dead by furnishing suffrages to them, and nevertheless we are ignorant of their state.

These things are from Lord John of Torquemada upon the *Decretum*.

First Decade, Chapter Seven

On the cognition of separated souls, concerning which four little questions will be resolved

Question One

Whether a separated soul knows itself, and how

It is asked whether separated souls, wherever they may be, know themselves, and concerning the manner in which they know themselves.

In answer to this, three things must be said.

First, separated souls, according to what the faith holds, know separated substances - that is, angels and demons - to whose society they are assigned. For it does not seem probable that the souls of the damned are ignorant of the demons to whose society they are assigned and who are said to be terrible in appearance to souls. And it is much less probable that the souls of the good are ignorant of the angels in whose society they rejoice.

Second, it must be said that separated souls, wherever they may be, know one another.

Gregory proves this from the Lord's words in Luke 16, around the middle of Book IV of the *Dialogues*, where he says that the good know the evil. For Abraham and Lazarus, who were good, knew the rich banqueter. If they had not known him when he was placed in torments, they would by no means have said that he had received his good things in his life.

Likewise, the evil know the good. For the rich man prays, saying by name: "Send Lazarus to dip the tip of his finger in water."

Likewise, the good know the good, for Abraham knew Lazarus.

Likewise, the evil know the evil. For the evil rich man would have known his evil brothers if they had descended into hell.

Likewise, the good know those whom they never saw in life. For Abraham knew Lazarus and the rich man, whom he had never seen in this life.

Third, something must be said concerning the manner in which souls know themselves.

To this it is said that, while the soul is united to the body, it understands through corporeal sensible things. For...

..."one who understands must contemplate phantasms," according to Book III *On the Soul*.

But when it is separated from the body, it understands not by turning toward phantasms. For the soul's act of understanding is corrupted when something interior is corrupted, namely through death, according to Book III *On the Soul*. Rather, it understands by turning toward those things which are simply intelligible, just as do other substances separated from a body.

Thus it understands those things outside itself which it never knew, not through innate species, through species which it then abstracts, through conserved species, through its own essence, or through the essence of the things understood, but through species participated from the influence of the divine majesty, of which the soul is made a participant just as are the other separated substances, although in an inferior manner.

Hence, when its turning toward the body ceases, the soul turns itself toward higher things, holding its gaze erect toward superior substances so that it may know from their influence.

And because it is common to every intelligible substance to know its own essence, and through the intuition of its own proper essence to know the essence of those things in which there is a likeness of itself, therefore the separated soul, by directly beholding its essence, perfectly knows other souls, since souls participate in the same manner of being because they are of the same species, and consequently possess the same manner of understanding.

It knows angels imperfectly, however, through the intuition of its own essence, since it is the lowest substance in the order of intelligible things.

Therefore it is sufficiently evident that separated souls know themselves through their own essences, perfectly and naturally; but they know angels imperfectly through likenesses divinely impressed upon them, because souls are by nature inferior to angels, as has been said.

Understand that the things we have said concern natural cognition, because the account of the cognition of glory is different.

These things are from Thomas, Part I, question 87, and the disputed questions *On the Soul*.

Question Two

Whether separated souls speak with one another

It is asked whether separated souls speak with one another, and how.

To this it is answered that speech is twofold, namely exterior and interior.

The first occurs by some sensible sign - for example, by voice or by a gesture with some member of the body, the tongue or a finger. Because these generally will not exist in separated souls until the day of judgment, exterior corporeal speech cannot exist in them until that time.

I said “generally” on account of Christ, the Virgin Mother, and John the Evangelist, who, already glorified in body and soul, are said to be in glory.

Interior speech, however - that is, mental speech, which is the manifestation of the interior word, namely a concept of the mind, through the command of the will - exists in souls.

For separated souls, wherever they are, can order their concepts through the command of the will so that they may make them known to another soul or to several souls. In the same manner in which a teacher, when he wills, orders his concepts in his mind so that he may afterward manifest them to his disciples by his voice, so the soul orders toward another the concepts which it retains in the mind and manifests them to that other through the command of the will.

After the day of judgment, however, souls and saints will speak vocally: through the vehicle of the interior word directed to hearing, namely by voice; and also through a vehicle directed to sight, by gesture. The saints will do so, namely, in praising God, and the damned, among other things, in cursing and blaspheming.

These things are from Thomas in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 44.

Question Three

Whether the soul retains after death the sciences and virtues acquired here, and whether the damned use them with delight

It is asked whether separated souls retain after death the sciences and virtues acquired here, and whether the damned use them with delight.

To this it is answered that science can be taken in two ways.

In the first way it is taken materially for the phantasms from which the intelligible species and science are abstracted. These phantasms possess a determinate organ in the head, namely its middle cell, and thus acquired science does not remain after death.

For the soul does not possess any organs or phantasms toward which it may turn itself in order to understand, because this manner of understanding is proper to the conjoined soul, bent down and inclined toward the body.

In this manner the Apostle's statement in 1 Corinthians 13, "Whether knowledge shall be destroyed," is understood, as is the statement of the Philosopher in the *Categories*, who says that knowledge is corrupted through a vehement alteration.

In the second way, science is taken for a habit left in the soul or in the possible intellect, which is a certain power of the soul in which all intelligible species are spiritually received. In this manner science remains in the separated soul.

And when it is asked whether the damned in hell use it with delight, because the Philosopher says in Book IV of the *Ethics* that philosophy possesses great delights, and Lactantius says in Book I of the *Divine Institutions*, "No food is sweeter to the soul than the cognition of truth," it is answered that, just as among the blessed there will be nothing which is not matter for joy toward their perfect beatitude, so among the damned there will be nothing which is not cause and matter...

...of sadness; nor will anything be lacking which can pertain to sadness, so that their misery may thus be consummated.

Therefore the damned will consider the evils which they performed, from which they are damned, and the destroyed goods which they lost, and they will be tormented by both.

Likewise, they will also be tormented by this: they will consider that the science and knowledge which they possessed concerning objects of speculation was imperfect, and that they lost the highest perfection of it which they could have attained.

And thus, although, as the Philosopher says, the consideration of science is delightful in itself by reason of the conformity and perfection of the higher part of the human being, it can nevertheless be a cause of sadness through some accident.

These things are from Thomas in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 50.

Question Four

On the vision of the damned before and after the judgment

It is asked whether the souls of the damned see God, the angels, the blessed, and their glory before and after the judgment.

To this it is answered as follows: until the day of judgment, the souls of the damned will see the souls of the blessed and their glory universally and not particularly. For they will see them in great and inestimable glory, but not in equal measure. This sight is by way of argumentation and cognition rather than vision.

It is as when poor persons outside the house of those feasting think about their delights, but do not know particularly what they eat.

They do not rejoice in a sight of this kind but are saddened, both on account of envy of another's happiness and on account of the absence of their own beatitude which they themselves lost. Concerning them Wisdom 5 says: "Seeing, they shall be troubled," and so forth.

After the judgment, however, their thought will be so deflected toward their own punishments that they will not be able to think about the glory of the saints.

These things are from the Master of the *Sentences* at the end of Book IV, distinction 50.

Saint Thomas, however, says that after the day of judgment the damned will be deprived altogether of the sight of the blessed.

Nevertheless, their punishment will not be diminished by this, but will be increased, because they will possess the memory of the glory of the blessed which they saw at the judgment or before the judgment, and this will be a torment to them.

But they will be afflicted still further in this: they will see that they are judged unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merited to possess.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above.

First Decade, Chapter Eight

On the perfection of the rational soul when rapt or placed in ecstasy, under which seven questions are resolved

Question One

Whether, if a soul is rapt or abstracted from the senses, it can by its own nature divine or know future things; under this question seven little questions are resolved, each of which will be explained below in its own order

It is asked whether divinations in rapt souls are in them by nature. To this it first seems that it must be answered that they are natural to rapt souls, which is proved by reason, authorities, and an example.

First, by reason, thus: the intellectual cognition of a human being is more efficacious than the cognition of brute animals. But certain animals naturally know certain future things, just as cawing crows signify that rain will soon come. Hence Virgil says in Book I of the *Georgics*:

> *And the hoarse crow calls the rain with importunate voice.*

Therefore, much more will a rapt soul be able naturally to know and divine future things.

For this there is the authority of Augustine, who says in Book XII of the *Confessions* that, when the human soul approaches death, it foreknows certain future things through the subtlety of its nature; and in Book XII of *On Genesis* he says that, insofar as the human soul is abstracted from the senses, it belongs to it to foresee future things. Hence it is commonly said that those who are dying, violently insane, sleeping, rapt, or frenzied sometimes divine future things.

Likewise Gregory, in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 25, says that the human soul itself, when about to depart from the body, through the subtlety of its nature divines and foresees certain future things. He sets down there the example of a certain monk named Gerontius, of his monastery in the city - the monastery of Saint Andrew, or of Saint Gregory - who, oppressed by a grave bodily infirmity, saw men clothed in white descending toward him and saying: “We have come for this purpose: that we may send certain brothers from Gregory’s monastery into military service - Saint Marcellus, Valentinianus, Angelus, and also Gerontius, who beholds us.” When he returned to himself, he disclosed this vision to those three, all of whom then began to die in the same order in which they had been named in the description.

But to the contrary is Ecclesiastes 8, which says: “Great is the affliction of man, because he is ignorant of past things, and he can know future things by no messenger.”

In answer it must be said that there are several ways of speaking about the divination of future things by a rational soul.

For the natural philosophers say that divinations of this kind sometimes occur through an impression of higher bodies. For it is manifest that higher bodies make an impression upon lower bodies. Hence, since the sensitive powers are acts of bodily organs, it follows that the phantasy is in some manner changed by the impression of celestial bodies. And because

celestial bodies are the causes of many future things, certain signs of some future things come to be in the imagination.

These signs, however, are perceived more by those sleeping at night than by those awake during the day. For, as the Philosopher says in the book *On Sleep and Waking*, the things which are...

...carried during the day are more greatly dissipated; for the air at night is more free from disturbance, because nights are quieter, and they produce perception in the body because of sleep, since small interior motions are perceived more by those sleeping than by those awake. These motions, indeed, produce the things from which future events are foreseen.

There is a second way of speaking about divination, belonging to Lord Albert in his commentary on the book *On Sleep and Waking*. He says that, just as the light of the rays of the stars, communicated to the elements, causes in the elements a certain active power directed toward many effects which the elements could not have produced by themselves - and thus the elements become instruments of the stars - so also the celestial intelligences, that is, the angels, when our organs have been purified, pour into them intrinsic powers by which things that occur at a distance, and future things, are very often foretold. This is accustomed to occur at dawn, when digestion has been completed and fumes do not ascend from the stomach to the brain.

There is also a third, common way of speaking about divination, belonging to theologians, who say that revelations and divinations of souls sometimes proceed from a natural disposition, sometimes from a manifestation by demons, and sometimes from divine revelation.

In the first way, when the soul approaches death itself, it sometimes foreknows certain future things through the subtlety of its nature. This must not be understood as though the soul by its own nature possessed some power of divination, for the natural mode of cognizing belonging to a conjoined soul is to receive cognition from the senses, and not to cognize future things while abstracted from the senses, as Thomas says in the First Part. But the soul is said to divine and foreknow future things in death because, when it is abstracted from the body and from the bodily senses, it is rendered more apt to perceive subtle motions and an influx either divine, or of separated substances, or of celestial bodies.

Second, revelations sometimes occur to human beings from the impression of celestial bodies, as was said above according to the philosophers.

Third, they occur from a manifestation by demons. For since the intellect of demons is higher in the order of nature than the human intellect, the demons know, even by their natural cognition, certain things which are remote from human cognition; and they can reveal such things to human beings, as will be said below in the Third Decade.

Certain revelations occur from divine inspiration, as is said in Daniel 2: “There is a God who reveals mysteries from heaven.” God, moreover, reveals his secrets to human beings, whether through himself or through his angels, in many ways: namely, through a dream, through a vision, through an oracle, through illumination of the mind, and through a transport of the mind.

In the first way, through a dream, something is revealed to us while we are sleeping, through the impression of imaginable forms; and that which is revealed is covered with figures and veiled in images, as when Jacob, while sleeping, saw the ladder in Genesis 28.

A vision occurs when, during wakefulness, something is revealed through the impression of imaginable forms, and the things occur in the order in which they appeared. Such was the vision of Isaiah, concerning which it is said in chapter 6 of the same book: “I saw the Lord sitting upon a high throne”; and such was Daniel’s vision concerning the weeks.

An oracle occurs when, in dreams, Christ, or an angel, a father or mother, or some saint or holy person openly announces whether something will occur or not occur, or that something must be avoided or done. Such was Joseph’s dream in Matthew 1 and the dream of Pharaoh’s butler. Oracles of this kind are accustomed to occur at dawn, when digestion has been completed and fumes do not ascend from the stomach to the brain.

These oracles do not require interpretation if they occur to learned persons, as was the case with Joseph, the husband of Mary, and with Lucianus, to whom Saint Gamaliel appeared. But if they occur to unlearned persons, they require a revelation, as did that dream of Pharaoh’s butler which Joseph interpreted.

And interpreters of dreams say that faith must be given to oracles, provided that they are not illusions of demons, which holy men, as Gregory says in the *Dialogues*, discern by an inward savor.

Illumination of the mind, as Isidore says in Book III of the *Etymologies*, is the fullness of the Holy Spirit, through which God revealed his secrets to the apostles, according to that statement of the Apostle: “But God has revealed them to us through the Holy Spirit”; and Acts 2: “They were all filled with the Holy Spirit.”

To certain persons, moreover, God reveals his secrets through a transport of the mind, that is, an ecstasy or rapture, as Peter saw the vessel let down from heaven with various animals in Acts 10. Such was the ecstasy - or, according to another translation, the sleep - of Adam, concerning which a fuller explanation will be given below.

Lastly, God reveals his secrets to certain persons through the expression of sensible signs: either through a bodily thing appearing outwardly, as God spoke to Moses through the cloud; or through a voice sounding outwardly, as it sounded to Abraham, saying, “Do not extend your hand over the boy,” in Genesis 22; or through a parable signifying mystically, that is, through a voice formed as though by a human being, together with the likeness of some thing, as Balaam says in Numbers 23, “Taking up his parable,” and so forth.

To Augustine and Gregory, who seem by reason, authorities, and an example to maintain that divinations are in the soul by nature, as was brought forward at the beginning of this little question, the answer is given with Thomas in the First Part: Augustine is speaking there not assertively, but by recounting the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul receives cognition of things according to participation in the Ideas, and that it receives this participation better when it is abstracted from the bodily senses, namely while sleeping or in death.

Gregory likewise does not understand divination to be in the soul by nature, but through revelation, as was said in the body of the question.

These things are from Thomas in the First Part, question 86, and from the authors brought forward within the little question.

Little Question Two of Question One

Whence ecstasy or a forceful rapture is caused

It is asked: whence is ecstasy or rapture caused in souls?

To this it is answered as follows. Because in ecstasies the inferior powers are lulled and the soul often suspends its administration of the body, it must therefore be known that in a human being there is a natural order and mutual connection of three powers: namely, the natural, the animal or sensitive, and the intellectual powers. In the common course, the natural power serves the animal power, and the animal or sensual power serves the intellectual power.

For we see that the natural power requires in its operations the heat and spirits which proceed originally from the heart and are diffused through all the organs of the senses. It is also manifest that, when those organs, interior and exterior, labor more, nature there diffuses more of those spirits to them. Thus it happens in one way that those organs, in an excess of actualization of the sensitive power, are pulled apart or ruptured.

And again, the natural spirits which the digestive power requires are consumed or fail because of the multitude of generations of sensitive spirits. From this it is evident how a vehement, fixed, and profound actualization of the interior sensitive power can lull the interior senses, and likewise weaken the natural powers, because of the connection of those powers.

From this first point follows a second, namely, that every vehement intellectual contemplation of spirits in which the phantasy, or the interior sensitive power, labors excessively enervates the natural powers, lulls the exterior senses, and often induces ecstasy or rapture.

But if, in a vehement and intense or excellent, purely intellectual contemplation, the sensitive powers did not labor, or the natural and animal powers possessed no dependence, or were not impeded, this would have to arise from something other than the connection just described.

These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Little Question Three of Question One

How many degrees there are of conversion into God through ecstatic contemplation

It is asked: how many degrees are there of ecstatic conversion into God, or of the contemplation of spiritual things?

To this it is answered that there are four.

The first is when, because of the most vehement intention and elevation of the intellectual power in that spiritual, pure, and most excellent contemplation of God, the soul suspends and leaves the body with respect to all the operations of the exterior and interior senses and the action of all the natural powers.

This first degree of ecstasy existed in Adam. Concerning it a certain gloss says that the sleep divinely sent upon him did not close his rational powers, but, when the senses of the body had been stopped up or lulled, it opened the eyes of his mind more clearly, so that he

could know what the wisdom of God, the craftsman of all things, was doing concerning him; what it had done in the past; and what it would do in the most distant future.

Blessed Paul ascended this first degree. He did not know whether his soul was animating the body, or whether, when the body had been left behind, it had been rapt into Paradise, or perhaps whether it was at the same time animating the body in one place and, together with this, was really in the empyrean heaven.

The second degree of ecstasy is that in which the soul leaves the body with respect to all interior and exterior sensual operations, although the natural operations are not suspended as in the first degree.

The third degree is that in which the soul, rapt into the contemplation of intelligible things, leaves the body only with respect to the act of the interior senses.

The fourth and lowest degree is when only the exterior senses are lulled through the intense actualization together of the interior sense and of the intellect and rational affection.

Richard of Saint Victor, in his book on contemplation, reduces the causes of these ecstasies to three kinds, saying: “From three causes, as it seems to me, persons are brought into an ecstasy of the mind: either it occurs from the greatness of exultation, so that the mind sometimes does not thus contain itself and, raised above itself, the inferior powers are lulled.”

Therefore, through the greatness of devotion, the soul is elevated in proportion as it is kindled and dissolved by divine love and by the fire of the desire of charity, so that it is raised like smoke.

Through the highest greatness of wonder, indeed, the soul is rapt into ecstasy when, suspended in wonder at the highest beauty or the divine majesty, it is struck by so vehement a savor that it is shaken entirely out of its own state.

Through the greatness of joy or delight, the soul is rapt when, intoxicated by that abundance of the sweetness of inward love, it entirely forgets what it is and what it was, and is suddenly transformed into a certain supramundane effect under a certain state of our felicity.

From these things it is evident that the soul, for the state of this life, can be elevated to so great an ecstasy of purely intellectual contemplation that the intellect does not employ the service of the phantastic interior or exterior sensitive power, while the inferior animal powers are lulled and the natural powers relaxed, as is evident in ecstatic wayfarers, namely in Adam in the state of integral nature, in the Apostle Paul, and in certain others.

This is evident because their intellect is separated from phantasms, none of which possesses so great an excellence that it can represent the divine essence. Nor does any created intellectual species possess it. Indeed, in that clear vision of God the mind is so rapt that for that time it perceives nothing else, neither sensible nor intelligible.

Hence such a vision so alienated Blessed Paul and so suspended the operation of his soul upon the body that he did not know whether the soul was even animating the body or was separated from it.

For these reasons Thomas says that it is impossible for a human being in the state of the way to see God clearly through his essence without abstraction from the senses, or without ecstasy, or without...

...a rapture in which the animal powers are lulled. Hence it is also said in Exodus: “Man shall not see me and live.”

From these things it is evident that, since Adam and Paul possessed the same first degree of ecstasy, they were therefore established as equal theologians intensively - though perhaps not extensively.

These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Little Question Four of Question One

Whether Plato and Aristotle could acquire as much concerning divine things as Adam and Paul when placed in ecstasy

It is asked whether Plato and Aristotle could naturally acquire as great a theology as Adam and Paul when placed in ecstasy.

To this some answer by way of opinion that Adam and Paul were not greater philosophers than Plato and Aristotle. These persons maintain that the intellect, while remaining in the body, can, without the assistance and operation of the sensitive or phantastic power, bring itself into the contemplation of purely intellectual science and actualize itself with respect to species and habits which it has previously understood.

They prove this first because the noble intellectual power does not seem, in being brought to its act, to depend more upon the interior sensitive power than the interior sensitive power itself depends upon the exterior senses. Yet without the operations of the exterior senses, the interior sense often goes forth into its own acts, as is manifest in dreams.

Likewise, it does not seem likely that this nobler intellectual nature was so inseparably bound by God the Creator to those corporeal powers of sense that, without their actualization, it could bring itself into no act of cognition; and that, through no exercise in cognizing and understanding, it could acquire within its own nature intelligible species and habits by which, when every actualization of the sensitive powers had been suspended, it could cognize something celestial or something else in a purely intellectual manner.

Likewise, in the state of integral nature or of innocence, such a mode of cognizing and of contemplating purely and intellectually seems certainly to have been possible, just as it will be in the state of the glorified body. In that state, perhaps, although the intellect will inform the body, it will nevertheless be assisted in no respect by sensitive cognitions, whether interior or exterior.

And therefore the connection of the intellectual power existing in the body with the sensitive powers is not essential or so necessary that, without them, the noble intellectual power is not naturally apt to actualize itself cognitively.

Likewise, if this were so, then a rational soul divested of the body would, in the common course, understand nothing and know nothing concerning all those things which it knew in the body. Nor could it actualize itself with respect to any intelligible things from habits and species acquired in the body, which appears to involve great imperfection.

These are the arguments of Lord Master Henry of Hesse which he brought forward while disputing on this matter at Paris.

To the contrary is the whole common school, which says that the quiddity of a material thing is the object of the intellect of a wayfarer. Experience also demonstrates that the phantasy labors when we operate or are occupied intellectually.

It is evident, therefore, that no mere philosopher who is a wayfarer can compare himself in theology with Paul and the first parent. Thus the answer to the little question is evident.

These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Addition

Scotus, acutely, in Book II, distinction 3, question 3, and Henry of Ghent - taken from the Order of Servants into the archpresbyterate - demonstrate the opposite. Henry holds that God is the first object of our intellect, since he is the most perfect among all cognizable things, and first with a primacy, namely, of perfection.

In my judgment, however, I see that the opinion of Saint Thomas, which the author Sibylla follows, is more suited to the intellect:

namely, that the object proportioned to us for understanding in the state of the present life is the quiddity of a material and sensible thing, as he says in the First Part, question 5, article 2.

For since cognition occurs according as the thing cognized is in the one cognizing, and the thing cognized is in the one cognizing according to the mode of the one cognizing, the cognition of each thing is therefore according to the mode of its nature.

Since, therefore, the intellect is in the body in this manner - because the intellective soul is the form of the body, yet with the qualification that it is not a power in a bodily organ - a human being will possess a mode of being that is in some manner material and immaterial, so that in some manner he understands materially and immaterially. He understands immaterially for no other reason than that he understands material things without individual conditions; for he does not cognize individuals quidditatively, because intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms.

Therefore the first and proportioned being which is offered to the intellect is that which is represented through intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms of sensible and material things. This, however, is the material object. I call it material because it is not represented to the intellect under the formal account of material quiddity, but rather under the account of being, which is the formal object.

But because this account of being does not move the intellect in the state of this life unless it is joined to a material quiddity, it follows that the intellect need not be able to cognize all things in every mode, even if being is its formal object. Rather, it must be able in some mode to cognize all things, that is, according as the present state and the condition of its nature permit, since the object ought to be proportioned to the power, and the lowest intellect ought to possess only the lowest intelligible thing as its object.

From this it is apparent how theology and a supernatural light are necessary.

In order that we may examine this matter by way of an Addition, it must first be observed that the philosophers anxiously ask the theologians why, since we cannot attain from purely natural resources to the theology which Christians profess, we nevertheless say that it is exceedingly necessary for human beings.

Saint Thomas answers them at once, in the very beginning of the First Part of the *Summa*, saying that this is so because the human being is ordered to God as to an end which exceeds the comprehension of reason, according to that statement of Isaiah 64: "Eye has not seen," and so forth.

But an end must be foreknown by human beings, who ought to order their intentions and actions toward the end. Hence it was necessary for salvation that certain things which exceed human reason be made known to the human being through divine revelation.

Scotus, however, is not pleased by an argument of this kind, because it presupposes that the human being is finally ordered to supernatural cognition, which has not yet been proved. Nor, if it had been proved, would this suffice, since it is not shown that natural cognition sufficiently disposes one for attaining supernatural cognition.

Therefore he answers in another manner, saying that a receptive power is compared either to the act which it receives or to the agent from which it receives it.

In the first way no supernaturality occurs, because if a power of this kind is naturally inclined toward that form, the form is called natural. If it is contrary to an inclination natural to the power, it is called violent. But if the power is inclined neither toward that form nor toward its opposite, it is called neutral.

When, however, the recipient is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, then the reception is called natural when the recipient is compared to an agent of such a kind as is naturally apt to impress the form upon the patient. But it is called supernatural reception when the recipient is compared to an agent of such a kind as is not naturally capable of impressing that form upon that patient.

Applying this to the matter proposed, Scotus says that if...

...the possible intellect is compared to actual knowledge in itself, no cognition is supernatural to it, because the possible intellect is perfected by any cognition and is naturally inclined toward any cognition.

But if the possible intellect is compared to the agent from which it receives cognition, the cognition is called supernatural: namely, that which is produced by an agent which is not naturally apt to move the possible intellect toward such cognition.

Hence, because, when the operation of the agent intellect and of the phantasms - from which natural cognition is impressed - has been posited, certain propositions nevertheless remain unknown to us although cognition of them is necessary for us, it is therefore necessary that knowledge of those propositions be handed down to us supernaturally. No one could discover it naturally and hand it down to others by teaching.

In these things consists the mode of speaking of the Subtle Doctor.

But in my judgment - unless the opinion of the Holy Doctor, or, to speak more correctly, his mode of speaking, is corroborated by Scotus - the mode of Scotus is not sufficient. For Scotus presupposes that cognition of certain propositions is necessary for us, although it cannot be produced by the operation of the agent intellect and of phantasms. From this he afterward infers that cognition of this kind must necessarily be handed down supernaturally; and the handing down of it is called revelation.

Therefore, if that which is presupposed were denied, no way of proving the intended conclusion would remain, unless it is said with Saint Thomas that cognition of this kind is

necessary because the human being is ordered to that which exceeds the comprehension of reason.

Although this is not proved by the Holy Doctor otherwise than by the authority of one of the prophets, it is nevertheless sufficiently evident that God, to whom all things are ordered, exceeds the comprehension of reason, since none of the philosophers, even with those who favor them, could perfectly cognize God from natural resources.

For Aristotle - to whom, in those things which pertain to nature, we cannot refuse credence without sin, since, as Macrobius says, not even nature herself resists his discoveries - ...

...did not sufficiently teach in what manner the nature of God exists, but flowed now in this direction, now in that, being unable to comprehend the nature of God.

And Plato, a divine man, says: "To discover the Begetter of the universe is as difficult as, once he has been discovered, it is impossible to proclaim him worthily." These words are in the *Timaeus*.

And in the books of the *Laws*, as Cicero reports, he does not think that one ought to inquire at all what God is.

The same Cicero says in Book I of *On the Nature of the Gods*: "You ask me what or of what kind God is. I shall employ Simonides as my authority." When the tyrant Hiero had asked Simonides this same question, Simonides requested one day for deliberation. When Hiero asked the same thing of him on the next day, he requested two days. When he repeatedly doubled the number of days, Hiero, wondering, asked why he did so. "Because," he said, "the longer I consider it, the more obscure the matter seems to me."

Moreover Pliny, a man most learned in every respect, in Book II of the *Natural History*, implies that God is nothing.

But what need is there of more, since those who asserted that God exists seem, when they wish to explain his nature, to describe a monster? From among them it is permissible to relate at least one, Zoroaster the Magus, who in the sacred book in which he collected Persian matters writes these words verbatim, as Eusebius testifies:

"God has the head of a hawk. He is the first of incorruptible things, everlasting, unbegotten, without parts, most like himself, the charioteer of all good things, expecting no gifts, the best, the most prudent, the father of right, thoroughly learned in justice without instruction, perfect by nature, wise, the sole inventor of the sacred nature."

Likewise Empedocles says: "God is an intelligible sphere whose center is everywhere but whose circumference is nowhere."

Although these things can be referred to a good sense, they nevertheless do not lack obscurity. Therefore the philosophers must confess that God exceeds the comprehension of reason, as the Angelic Doctor used to say.

Therefore I shall leave Thomas entirely for Scotus, whose mode is certainly of no little value for investigating supernatural cognition. Yet although it follows from the foregoing that we need...

...cognition of this kind, it has not nevertheless been proved that it is bestowed upon us.

Therefore, once its necessity has been presupposed, we can perhaps argue thus: if cognition of this kind is not bestowed upon us, we are ordered to God as to an end in vain. But we are not ordered in vain, because God and nature, as the Philosopher says, do nothing in vain. Therefore cognition of this kind is bestowed upon us.

This inference is sufficiently evident even to those who have merely knocked at the doors of dialectic. The premise is proved because there is no agent acting through cognition, such as a human being, which does not necessarily require a cognition of its own end - and indeed a distinct cognition.

For every agent acts for an end from an appetite for the end, and every agent *per se* acts for an end. Therefore every agent *per se*, in its own mode, desires the end. Consequently, just as an appetite for the end for which it ought to act is necessary to a natural agent, so an appetite for the end for which it ought to act is necessary to an agent through cognition - which also is an agent *per se*, from Book II of the *Physics*.

Scotus proves it thus in the prologue to the *Sentences*. His arguments, however, do not tend toward that toward which our argument tends. For he proves that supernatural cognition is necessary for us, but he does not prove that this cognition is bestowed upon us.

When its necessity has been presupposed, we hold that the human being, in acting through cognition, acts from an appetite for the end. An appetite of this kind, however, presupposes a distinct cognition if the end is distinctly desired. Therefore, if we are not ordered to God in vain, supernatural cognition is bestowed upon us.

That we are ordered to God is evident among theologians and philosophers. Therefore it remains that, in addition to natural teachings - that is, those which, as is commonly said, can be attained from purely natural resources - it is necessary that another teaching be handed down supernaturally if we wish finally to arrive at the best cognition of the ultimate end.

Nor is it astonishing if, through the light of the agent intellect which the soul now employs in understanding, a human being cannot naturally attain to any action which exceeds the nature of that light, as Henry...

...of Ghent, our Doctor, deduces in question 16 of the *Summa of Theology*. This does not satisfy Scotus, to whom everyone is displeasing, just as Scotus does not satisfy everyone, especially in the three arguments which he devised to prove this.

For although the intellect of a wayfarer is naturally capable, passively, of many truths, it is nevertheless not efficacious passively.

Passive capacity is the aptitude of the soul whereby it is capable of being the subject of another thing. This is also called receptive capacity, and it is infinite, because, as far as the aptitude for receiving is concerned, it is not repugnant to the soul that it be able to receive any number of instances of knowledge, however acquired, whether naturally or supernaturally.

Hence, if it should happen that some instances of knowledge are in the intellect in such a way that others cannot be in the intellect, this would not arise from a defect of the aptitude for receiving, because the intellect is merely passive in receiving; that is, it resists in no way. Nor, therefore, must it be said that this arises because several instances of knowledge cannot exist at the same time, since instances of knowledge do not occupy space as bodies do. Rather, it arises from some other cause.

Active capacity, however, is the aptitude of the soul whereby it is capable of producing something. This is also called productive capacity and is finite, because it is delimited.

Nor is this to demean nature. Indeed, it is for nature's dignity that it is naturally ordered to receive so eminent a perfection, which is not subject to the causality of a natural agent. Nor is nature ordered in vain, since it can naturally be disposed so that the potency is brought supernaturally into act. Nor does it lack necessary things, since the higher powers can possess from elsewhere what a natural agent cannot bestow.

Indeed, it is not inappropriate to say that nature lacks necessary things, taking "nature" as it is taken by Aristotle. Aristotle himself would have confessed this if he had not been ignorant that true felicity consists in intuitively cognizing God. But because he was ignorant of this, believing that no further cognition could be given beyond abstractive cognition concerning separated substances, he therefore spoke in this way and, consequently, could not...

...compare himself with Adam or Saint Paul in naturally knowing divine things.

For Adam was created in supernatural grace which makes one pleasing, as Augustine proves in *On Genesis*. Thus, beyond the natural habits of the intellect and will, he possessed hope and charity concerning Christ the future Savior, whom he foresaw in the prophetic spirit as one who would be incarnated.

Similarly Paul's intellect was elevated to such a degree that it arrived even at the vision of the divine essence. This elevation is indeed called rapture by reason of its violence, its terminus, and the higher nature through which it is elevated.

Not only Paul was elevated to this degree, as is said in 2 Corinthians 12, but it is also believed that John the Evangelist was elevated to it when he reclined upon the Lord's breast at the supper, and perhaps all the apostles on the day of holy Pentecost.

Little Question Five of Question One

Why revelations occur more often to women than to men

It is asked why revelations occur more often to women than to men.

To this it is answered that philosophers are accustomed to assign a threefold natural cause for this.

The first is taken from the quality of the complexion, because women naturally possess much of the humid. But when the humid has begun to be moved, it does not cease until it attains that toward which it was tending. From this it happens that women remain longer in their thoughts and imaginations than men.

Hence a man more quickly digests his conceptions or imaginations, on account of which fewer marvelous things appear to them. And because the humid - which, as has been said, abounds in women - is also highly receptive of figures and receives diverse figures, from this it follows that more and diverse marvelous things appear to women while they dream.

The second cause is taken from a defect of reason. For women, as is said in the *Politics*, possess an infirm rational power, whence they flourish less in reason and discretion in comparison with men. On this account, if any phantastic apparitions and marvelous visions occur to women, there is less reason contradicting them than in men.

The third cause is taken from an abundance of passion. For as the Philosopher says in the book *On Sleep and Waking*, those who are in the passions are moved by a slight likeness and believe that what appears is true. Hence, because passions abound in women, they immediately, upon a slight likeness or species, believe that which appears to them.

These things are from John of San Gimignano.

Little Question Six of Question One

Whether the prophecies of holy women should be received as true and preached

It is asked whether the prophecies and revelations of women who prophesy and are sometimes rapt, women truly devoted to Christ - such as Bridget, Catherine of Siena, and others like them - ought to be held as indubitably true and preached as things issued by the Holy Spirit.

To this it is answered simply that they ought neither to be held as indubitably true nor to be accepted or preached as things issued by the Holy Spirit.

One reason is that these and similar things can occur from human industry when it has been aroused and strengthened by the light of faith.

Another is that nothing prevents those women from sometimes having been deluded, because perhaps without fault they presumed to do those things which did not pertain to them. For according to the Apostle, women are not permitted to teach or preach.

Another is that an excessively fatigued phantasy can sometimes deceive them.

Another is that, if their books are carefully considered, there occur in their statements and modes of speaking some things less savory, less reasonable, or discordant with truth.

Another is that their prophecies and teachings seem superfluous, since whatever concerning such matters is necessary for salvation is possessed authentically from the Sacred Scriptures and the holy doctors.

Another is that it is certain that someone may be very holy and yet all his teaching may be from the human spirit.

Another is that it is not certain that those women were sent by God to teach or preach. For if God had wished to make use of their office in teaching and prophesying, he certainly would have made use of holier women in this work, such as Saint Elizabeth and others like her. It is certain that these women attempted nothing of this kind, but applied themselves solely to the perfection of the virtues, involving themselves in nothing irrelevant to their states.

It could nevertheless be that, in order to supply for the negligence of those ordained and to their greater confusion, God sometimes stirred up, and continues to stir up, certain little women as teachers and prophets, as is also apparent among seers of both sexes in the Hebrew people. Thus, on account of the novelty and rarity, the teachings of women may be read by those who have neglected to read the divine books and the divine Scriptures, and who desire to have their ears tickled by novelties of teachings and to turn toward the fables of poets.

Likewise, because of the negligence of the judges of Israel, God stirred up the spirit of the younger boy Daniel, lest the innocent blood of Susanna be shed, Daniel 12.

These things are from Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Little Question Seven of Question One

Whether the prophecies of the Sibyls, female magicians, and pythonesses were breathed upon by divine power; and why the Sibyls alone were permitted to prophesy concerning Christ

It is asked whether the prophecies of future things made by the Sibyls and by certain female magicians and pythonesses among the gentile people should be believed to have been revealed to them by the Holy Spirit; and why it was granted among the gentiles to the female Sibyls alone to prophesy concerning Christ, and to no other among the Babylonian seers, philosophers, or poets.

To this Augustine answers as follows in Book XXI of *The City of God*: whether the Sibyls were good or evil, it must be believed that those things which they foretold concerning Christ and other matters pertaining to human salvation were inspired by God. For it is not likely that the devil would reveal to human beings those things which he foreknew would occur for their salvation.

That this is true concerning the good Sibyls is evident from the interpretation of the name. For she is called "Sibylla" as though "the mind of God," because *syos* in Greek is called "God" in Latin, and *bellē* means "mind," as though she were the mind of God.

For, as Augustine in Book XVIII of *The City of God*, chapter 23, and Isidore in Book VIII of the *Etymologies* say, among the gentile people there were certain women, virgins or non-virgins, famous for cognition of hidden things concerning the future and other matters. Among the gentiles these women were consulted in doubtful events, as though, from the merit of a singular life, they possessed knowledge of the mind of God or of the gods, just as true prophets were consulted among the Hebrews.

Concerning them Augustine says in the place cited above that, just as formerly outside the people of Israel and earlier among the gentile people there were certain good and holy men specially illuminated and directed by God - among whom were Job, Cornelius, and others - so also there could then have been certain other holy and religious women specially illuminated by God concerning future things, Christ, and other matters.

Hence Augustine, speaking in the place cited above concerning the prophecy of one of those Sibyls, called the Erythraean or Cumaean Sibyl, says that...

...she has nothing in her whole poem which pertains to the worship of false gods, so that she appears deservedly to be counted in the number of those who pertain to the City of God.

Concerning evil women also - whether female magicians or diviners imbued with vain arts - it is likewise evident that certain of them who were more suitable could, through the gracious condescension of divine clemency, when certain occasions had been given, be specially illuminated by God concerning things to be done, in testimony to salutary future things.

Thus, when an occasion had been given, Balaam the soothsayer was illuminated. Although he was evil, he nevertheless uttered an illustrious prophecy concerning Christ, as is evident in Numbers 24. For the gift of prophecy extends not only to the good, but is common to the good and the evil, as are the other graces gratuitously given.

In other matters not pertaining to Christ, however, these divining female magicians could be illuminated by the devil, as were the superstitious wise men of Babylon.

But if someone were to ask why, among the gentiles, certain female prophets who prophesied concerning Christ were found only in the female sex, while none of the famous Babylonian seers skilled in the divinatory arts - whom the kings of the gentiles were accustomed to consult in doubtful matters, as is evident concerning Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar - or of the philosophers prophesied anything concerning Christ, the future judgment, the resurrection, and the other matters concerning which the Sibyls spoke, it is answered that only the person who has been instructed by God concerning these and similar secrets of God can render a reason for them.

Or perhaps it was done thus according to the custom of God, by which he often chooses the weak things of this world in order to confound the strong. The philosophers, or those who followed only the cognition which could be possessed by natural investigation concerning God and creatures, placed the obstacle of presumption and pride and did not merit to receive divine revelations from above.

It could nevertheless have been brought about secretly by God that even poets or certain philosophers fashioned or spoke certain things which God was going to do in the world for the general salvation of human beings, although those philosophers or poets did not look to matters of this kind...

...but to other things with which their intention was occupied, as happened in Caiaphas, Virgil, and others.

These things are from Lord Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Question Two

On bodily sleep, comprising three questions

Little Question One of Question Two

What bodily sleep is and whence it is caused

It is asked what bodily sleep is and whence it is caused.

To this it is answered that, according to the philosophers, sleep is the withdrawal inward of the vital and animal spirits, one of which is the vehicle of heat and the other the vehicle of a sensible species.

Or, as others say, sleep is a fixed suspension of the animal, that is, the sensitive, powers from their acts.

In the common course this occurs because the diffusion of spirits, or of another influence necessary for sensations, is impeded from the heart or brain. For as long as this influx is impeded, the sensitive powers cease and rest from their acts.

The said influx can be impeded, or fail to occur, for many causes and in many modes.

First, as Albert says, it can be impeded on the part of the body, as when a smoky evaporation ascending through the veins from the digestive members reaches the cold region of the brain. There the smoke, condensed by that cold and descending, constricts the nerves

and obstructs the other passages of the spirits to the organs of the exterior senses. Thus deprived of the spirits required for their actualization, those organs do not perceive exterior...

...objects.

Others state the same thing more clearly in this way. The said influx is impeded by smoke ascending from the digestive members to the heart, or to the place in the head - that is, the brain - where the nerves which convey the spirits converge, or where the natural spirits are sublimated into animal spirits.

That smoke can impede the said influx either by filling the nerves, by compressing them, or by constricting them when they have been reduced to coldness. Sleep can also come to be naturally on the part of the body without such smoke, because of some stoppage or another kind of obstruction of the interior passages.

Sleep is also caused on the part of the soul through a concurrence of heat and spirits toward the place of some injury which torments one vehemently within.

Sometimes it is caused by a defect of heat and spirits in their root. For when the spirits fail, it is necessary that the senses cease from their acts, as happens in the insane when instances of insanity occur from depletion, that is, weakness.

Sometimes it also occurs through a certain withdrawal or recalling of the spirits to the interior because of some interior passion, according to Luke 22 and Matthew 26: “Their eyes were heavy, and they slept because of sadness”; or because of another accident, as in syncope.

Sometimes sleep also occurs from vehement fatigue, attenuation, or continual contemplation, because of which things the interior powers require assistance, as is evident in rapture and ecstasy.

Sleep is also sometimes produced from outside, that is, from the sweetness of some melody through which the exterior senses fall away from their acts. On account of this, as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the *Politics*, melodies were performed in temples by which some persons were rapt.

Sometimes sleep is also produced from the vehemence of sudden terror, and sometimes from an injury outwardly inflicted upon the head or another member, as when a human being falls upon his head or draws out blood.

These things are from Albert the Great and Lord Henry of Hesse, *On Genesis*.

Little Question Two of Question Two

On universal and partial sleep

It is asked what universal and partial sleep are.

To this it is answered that sleep is called universal when the exterior senses together with the intellective power are lulled and rest.

Or universal sleep, according to Avicenna in the first book, chapter 3, *De subeth*, is the return of the animal spirit from the instruments of the senses and its motion toward its own principle, namely the brain. With this return, the instruments themselves are deprived of the outgoing operation in those instruments, except for those instruments which are necessary in order that life may remain. These are, as it were, instruments of the spirit, such as the lung, heart, arteries, and diaphragm.

Partial sleep, however, is threefold: either when the exterior and interior senses are lulled while the intellective power is awake; or when the exterior senses are bound while the interior senses are released from sleep, as is evident in those who walk by night while sleeping; or when the interior senses are bound while the exterior senses are released.

According to certain persons, the first of these is possible. They prove it thus: just as the interior sense can be awake when the exterior sense is bound by sleep, as will be evident below, so nothing seems to prevent an intellect which has been sufficiently habituated by habits and sensations from often being awake - that is, cognitively actualized with respect to intelligible things - while both sensitive powers are lulled.

But if it is said, according to the philosophers, that in order actually to understand it is necessary to contemplate phantasms, and therefore the intellect is actualized only consequently upon the actualization of the phantasy, it is answered that, if that common statement of the philosophers possesses truth, it is understood of the common course of human cognition and of the first...

...acquisition of intellectual knowledge.

Or it is true with respect to those intelligible things concerning which the intellect does not yet possess within itself sufficiently intrinsic habits and species according to which it can go forth into act without the assistance of the sensitive powers.

The case is otherwise, however, with an intellect thus habituated. In order to actualize itself, it is not necessary that it turn itself toward phantasms.

The person who said, "I sleep, and my heart is awake," appears to have experienced this intellectual wakefulness while the senses were bound by sleep. According to this opinion, the sleep of both kinds of senses cannot lull the intellect unless it is bare or insufficiently habituated.

The second condition - namely, the binding of the exterior senses while the interior senses are released from sleep - is also manifestly apparent in certain persons who rise and walk while sleeping at night without stumbling, and perform certain works of those who are awake. Namely, they speak, shout, dress themselves, climb trees, leave their houses for fields and woods, pursue their enemies and sometimes kill them, and return to their beds, as Albert says in his commentary upon the book *On Sleep and Waking*.

Third, some persons can also be awake according to the exterior sensitive power and asleep according to the interior, as I heard concerning one such person who actually perceived.

Such persons are also sometimes awake according to sense and at the same time according to the intellective power. The latter can perhaps be actualized in some manner upon the actualization of the exterior senses while the interior senses are suspended from every act.

Hence, if in a waking human being God were for a time to suspend every actualization of the interior senses without impeding the influx of power and spirits to the exterior senses, what would prevent the human being both from seeing sensitively and reasoning intellectually about the things seen, and thus sufficiently directing and guarding himself in walking or climbing?

These things are from Henry of Hesse in the place cited above.

Little Question Three of Question Two

Whence Adam's sleep was caused in the beginning

It is asked whence Adam's sleep was caused in the beginning, since none of the foregoing things which cause sleep existed: neither could a smoky evaporation of food have ascended to his head or heart, nor had he eaten of the fruits in Paradise before the formation of Eve. It is also asked what Adam saw in that sleep.

To this it is answered that Adam's sleep - or rapture, or ecstasy - was not from an angel, from heaven, from the smoke of food, or from fatigue, none of which existed in the state of innocence. Rather, it was sent by God as a fitting disposition for receiving divine revelations.

From this you see that even in performing supernatural things God uses natural things insofar as it suits the wisdom of God and the undertaking, although he could accomplish them absolutely without those things. For, as Augustine says, unless someone in a certain manner dies to this life, or has been turned away and alienated from the bodily senses, he is not raised up into a vision of God and of heavenly things.

In this rapture or ecstasy, the pious and most generous God showed great and marvelous things to the first human being, the origin of all posterity.

For Adam himself, placed in that ecstasy or transport of mind and elevated into that which exceeded the state of nature, as the gloss on Ephesians 5 says, was made the first prophet. For, awakened from sleep and looking upon the woman formed from himself, illuminated by divine revelation, he said in the Hebrew idiom: "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; therefore a man shall leave," and so forth.

He also entered into the sanctuary of God and understood the last things from the beginning. First, as the gloss says, it was revealed to him that from him would be born a human being who would be truly God; that by his death the human race would be redeemed; and that from his side, as he died upon the cross, the faithful Church would be formed.

He also understood that the world was to be destroyed by sin, although not by a sin of its own.

Then perhaps he understood the mystery of the Trinity, the creation of the world from nothing, and the destruction of that same world; and in that ecstasy he received a revelation of the fall of the angels.

He understood the sacrifices which were to exist as a remedy for original sin, although it was not revealed to him that that sin would exist in the future.

He understood that most excellent future life in which human beings, afterward living forever without nourishment, would abide in the clear vision of God if in this life they kept the commandments of God.

He was instructed in the natural and moral sciences. Then he also received an excellent supernatural theological cognition, so that he might impose names upon the first things and cognize the properties of things.

Hence he was constituted the first philosopher and the first theologian, perfect in each science according to the measure of the beginning of his state.

Thus Hugh, speaking in Book VI of *On the Sacraments* concerning the philosophy and theology of the first human being, says: "No one ought to doubt that the first human being

received, through the illumination of a simple divine inspiration, perfect cognition of all visible things which had been made with the human being and for the human being. For God reasonably bestowed upon him knowledge of those things which he made for his sake, and the governance, ordering, and providence of which he left to the human being himself. But if, for temporal life to be preserved and ordered among transitory things, he received so great a knowledge, much more ought he to have possessed a more excellent and abundant cognition of celestial and supernatural things for attaining eternal life."

Thus Paul, placed in ecstasy and a transport of mind, saw the secrets of God which it is not lawful for a human being to speak.

Likewise, in Orvieto in our own time, a certain woman of our Order of Preachers, a virgin of marvelous humility and devotion, used to suffer ecstasy whenever someone spoke devout and fervent words to her. When she was placed upon a bed as she began to be rapt, with her hands gradually raised and her feet arranged in the manner of the feet of the Crucified, she became so immovable that by no...

...force could her hands or arms be bent, or her feet themselves be separated in any degree.

Concerning the marvelous things and secrets which she perceived in the rapture itself, she sometimes revealed certain things to a few persons and with some difficulty.

These things are from Henry and John of San Gimignano.

Question Three

On dreams and the apparitions of dreams, containing six questions

Little Question One of Question Three

On the causes of dreams and their definition

It is asked what a dream is, and also whence dreams, or the phantastic apparitions of dreams, are caused.

To this it is answered as follows: a dream, according to the Philosopher in Book II of *On Sleep and Waking*, is a phantasm made by the motion of images from a sensible likeness in one sleeping insofar as he sleeps.

A dream, or a phantasm of this kind, can have its origin from several things, and thus dreams can have several causes. For in general the cause of dreams is twofold: namely, interior and exterior.

The first, interior cause is also twofold. For the first is mental or spiritual: namely, a thought or affection, insofar as those things occur to a human being's phantasy while he sleeps around which his thought and affection lingered while he was awake.

The second interior cause of dreams is a corporeal disposition. For from an interior disposition of the body, some motion conformable to such a disposition is formed in the phantasy. Thus it occurs to a human being in whom cold humors abound that he is in water or snow. And for this reason physicians say that attention must be given to dreams in order to cognize the interior dispositions of the body.

The second cause of dreams is exterior, and this is twofold. The first is spiritual. This is sometimes from God, who through the ministry of angels reveals certain things to human

beings in dreams, as was said above. Sometimes, however, through the operation of demons certain phantasms appear to those sleeping; from these, certain future things are sometimes revealed to those who have illicit pacts with the demons, as will be said below in the Third Decade.

The second exterior cause is corporeal: namely, a change of the imagination or phantasy, insofar as the imagination or phantasy of one sleeping is changed either by the surrounding air or, as astronomers say, by an impression of a celestial body, so that certain phantasms conformable to the disposition of the celestial bodies appear to the sleeper.

For understanding this, it must be noted that astronomers say that the heaven, or celestial bodies, acts upon dreams *per se*. For they very often say that human beings' dreams are conformable to the dispositions and configurations of the stars - so much so that, if the disposition of the heaven at the hour of the dream is known, an astrologer can state concerning what deed the dream occurred.

They also say that, just as when choler abounds in a human being, that human being dreams about hot and red things, and when phlegm abounds, about cold and watery things, as natural effects caused by a natural cause, so likewise the heaven can impart a cognition of the effects which it virtually contains, and consequently can make an impression upon sleepers *per se* so that they dream.

To these persons it is answered that, although the heaven can do something toward dreams, this is nevertheless not *per se*: namely, through the impression of a new species or of an interior cognition, whether sensual or intellectual. Rather, it is only *per accidens*, through some transformation of the body according to sensible qualities. For a heating influence cannot impress the species of heat upon the interior sense before it causes real heat which objectively moves the sense of touch.

And when it is said, according to the astronomers, that human beings' dreams have sometimes been found conformable to the dispositions and images of the stars - for example, Pisces, Cancer, and so forth - it is said that this reasoning has either never been verified by experience, or that the correspondence is by chance, or that someone practiced in matters of this kind will, after the dream - but not before it - find some concordance in the heaven with the thing, or things, about which he dreamed.

But blessed Augustine, in his literal commentary *On Genesis*, says: “This indeed could have occurred through the hidden deception of malignant spirits, who have been accustomed, by the propagation of the stars, thus to delude human beings intent upon such vanities, unto their damnation and the prognostication of error.”

And it is denied that the humor which is called melancholy or choler produces in a dreaming or frenzied human being species that are hot or moist, or species of goats or serpents, or the species of anything whatsoever that differ specifically from those humors, although such things are accustomed to appear to those persons.

The reason for the denial is that a natural cause cannot *per se* produce the species of its real effect in the sense or intellect before it produces that effect in real existence.

But if it is asked whence phantastic apparitions of this kind are caused in dreams, it is said that they occur from the irregularity of the motion of spirits and fumes, and of the interior parts of the organs in which sensation occurs and phantasms are conserved. These

phantasms are confused with one another by such motions and are monstrously conjoined. And in this manner such apparitions of dreams occur.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Little Question Two of Question Three

Whether good or evil spirits can send dreams to the living

It is doubted whether good and evil spirits can appear to the living and send dreams to them.

To this it is answered affirmatively; and let us speak first about good spirits.

First, then, clear dreams concerning certain things pertaining to the good of the living themselves or of others are sometimes introduced into the living by the kindness of good spirits.

Thus a clear dream was sent to Albert the Great about a boy's fall from a mill onto the riverbank at night, so that, because Albert was a bishop, he might thereby be moved with greater piety and compassion toward the boy's mother, who was to come to him in the morning lamenting the drowning of her son.

So also a dream was sent to Galen concerning the cure of a certain sick man suffering from a disease of the spleen. As Galen himself relates, when he had long been solicitous concerning that man's cure and had diligently sought remedies, he dreamed one night that he should draw blood from the vein which is between the little and ring fingers. He did this, and the man was healed.

If, then, divine goodness through good spirits thus directs human beings who do what lies within them toward those things which pertain to the health of bodies, far more surely will it through good spirits direct human beings duly solicitous about acquiring moral and spiritual goods for themselves or for others, and especially those who preside over others.

Thus King Solomon was specially directed through a dream concerning the good government of the people committed to him, as is contained in 3 Kings 3.

For this there is also the fact that Caiaphas, when he was the high priest of that year, prophesied, saying: “It is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, lest the whole nation perish.”

So also many things have frequently been shown through dreams even to unbelieving kings, as the future famine was shown to King Pharaoh in Genesis 41, and the future disposition of kingdoms, concerning which he was solicitous, to King Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 2.

And deservedly do angels direct and incline kings and princes through dreams toward the welfare of those whose care they bear. For certain angels - as will be said below in the Second Decade - preside over provinces and regions as governors, and consequently over the kings and princes of regions, by influencing them toward this or that, according as they know it to be expedient for the welfare of those committed to them.

From these things it appears that, among the dreams of others, the dreams of those who preside ought more especially to be noted as having a presage of future things. And therefore one of the philosophers said that credence ought to be given to a royal dream. For he knew that the welfare of peoples consists in their heads, that is, in those who preside over them.

Second, dreams are sometimes introduced into the living by evil spirits: either for deception, so that someone who is a prophet of the devil may be believed to be a prophet of God; or for confirmation of some error or superstition; or to impel and incite some vice, namely pride or lust; or so that through such clear visions and dreams they may exalt themselves as prophets or as persons familiar with God. For revelations easily cause exaltation.

The Apostle experienced this when he said: “There was given to me a thorn of the flesh, an angel of Satan, lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me.”

So also a dream was sent to Socrates by a certain demon familiar to him, so that he could interpret the dream concerning Plato, who was still a boy, which he had about a swan that the Athenians sacrifice to the goddess Venus whom they worship.

For on the preceding night, before Plato had been brought to Socrates by his father for the sake of instruction, Socrates saw in a dream sent by a familiar spirit a swan - namely, one which among the Athenians is dedicated to Venus - singing most sweetly and, while singing, flying upward from the earth as far as the heavens. After Plato had then been brought to him, Socrates said, “This is that swan which I saw singing so very sweetly in my sleep last night.”

So also dreams concerning certain effects were sent to some philosophers by demons attending them, so that afterward they might infer discursively from these effects that there were certain spirits more capable and subtler than themselves, and thus might be induced into superstition or error, or sometimes even into the truth, as is evident concerning the Platonists and Cicero, who adhered to the Catholic truth in certain matters.

These things are from Henry of Hesse.

Little Question Three of Question Three

Whether the dead can in dreams admonish the living toward good or draw them away from evil, and whether credence should be given to their admonitions

It is asked whether the spirits or souls of the dead can in dreams admonish the living toward good or draw them away from evil, and whether the admonitions of the dead are to be observed and carried out.

To this it is answered affirmatively. For dreams are sometimes sent to the living by spirits of the dead and by souls existing in Purgatory, who ask that prayers be offered for them, as is evident in Book IV of the *Dialogues*.

Sometimes they are also permitted to introduce dreams that are admonitory, or even provocative toward good, or that call persons back from certain sins.

But concerning the souls of the damned, I do not think that they are permitted to send dreams to the living, although nothing prevents the living from dreaming even about the damned. This sometimes occurs through the craft of demons, to the end that the damned may be believed to be saved, or that the prayers and alms of the living may be expended upon them in vain.

In whatever manner the matter may stand, however, dreams about the dead are not to be observed by the living as though those living persons were always admonished through such dreams to aid the dead with alms and prayers.

Little Question Four of Question Three

Whether the dreams of the insane and of fools have a presage of some truth

It is asked whether the dreams of the insane and of fools have a presage of some truth.

To this Albert, wishing to prove that the sending of dreams is not from spirits but from natural causes, answers affirmatively. He says that dreams having a presage are accustomed very often to occur to many insane and foolish persons.

But Lord Henry denies this, saying that he does not know where Albert read this or by what experience he learned it. For Henry himself never saw a fool prophesy or have a notable dream signifying future things. Indeed, because the phantastic power of fools is tumultuous with thoughts and passions, extremely distracted, restless, and confused, it is therefore extremely indisposed toward receiving revelations and dreams.

Little Question Five of Question Three

Why good spirits instruct human beings enigmatically and parabolically, and not clearly

It is doubted why good spirits do not instruct human beings clearly through dreams, but enigmatically and parabolically, since the end in the sending of dreams is the signification of certain things which it is expedient for human beings to know or foreknow.

Simonides the philosopher, wishing to answer this, said that it occurs because God envies mortals their knowledge of future things, and therefore sends human beings dreams about future things not clearly but under obscure coverings of figures.

But because in this he erred most greatly, it must be said that enigmatic and unclear dreams are sent to human beings for many causes.

First, it is so that human beings, terrified by obscure dreams, may recur to the Lord for their interpretation; or at least may ask that he will avert the impending evil; or so that some servant of God may be exalted for the salvation of many and God may be glorified, precisely as occurred in the cases of Joseph and Daniel.

Second, the obscurity of admonitions through dreams serves for exercise. For, once it is known that human beings are accustomed to be moved by God and by created spirits, good and evil, in various modes and by various affections, they may have occasion to act more circumspectly and to provide more cautiously, so that they may perhaps shut out impending evils, may endure them more lightly, or may receive coming goods more abundantly.

Third, the condition of the state of the present life can be a cause. This condition deserved to be distressed by manifold obscurity and perplexity when the first human being fell away from God through his own fault.

Hence blessed Gregory says in Book V of the *Moralia*: “Cast out from the joys of Paradise and punished with the penalty of blindness, we scarcely apprehend the channels of a whisper, and how thinly and hastily we ponder the marvelous works of God,” and so forth.

Fourth, it can proceed from merit or demerit, or from the indisposition or disposition of the recipient. On account of these things, God forewarns some persons through no sending of

dreams; some through ambiguous, unexpected passions of sadness or joy; and some through clear dreams or revelations.

These things are from Henry in the place cited above.

Little Question Six of Question Three

Whence it is that the influx of spirits upon human beings concerns sleep rather than wakefulness

It is doubted why the influx of spirits upon human beings concerns sleep rather or more commonly than wakefulness.

To this it is answered as follows: three distinct actualizations of the interior cognitive power require rest and tranquility of the mind, that is, of the soul - namely, revelation, contemplation, and the investigation of truth.

Since, therefore, sleep is a certain rest of the animal powers, the soul of one sleeping is consequently in a state more apt for revelations.

Hence, because a revelation sent to a human being by God or an angel through a dream is a certain interior address, it would occur in vain when the soul were so distracted, occupied with, or intent upon other things that it did not attend to the spirit addressing it, or did not impress the address upon its memory.

This is manifest also in exterior speech. For no wise person wishing to say something to someone addresses him at a time or place when, because of interior distraction or exterior disturbance, he cannot hear perfectly, or, if he hears, does not receive in his heart what is said.

And therefore the wise man said that speech is not to be poured out where there is no hearing. And in the same place: “Speech occurs in vain where there is no attention, or where there is no understanding of that which is said.”

Good spirits, therefore, since they are most wise and do not wish to address human beings in vain with either interior or exterior speech, reasonably attend at that time to the place, state, and disposition of the person who is to be addressed, so that their addresses may have effect, according to that which is said in Isaiah 55: “My word which shall go forth from my mouth shall not return to me empty.”

From these things it follows that revelation from God or the angels through dreams occurs at a time when the common sense is still bound, because at that time the soul is in complete rest, having no act, and consequently appears to be in a disposition most apt for receiving divine illumination.

These things are from Henry of Hesse in the place cited above.

Question Four

How many and who are those who divine well by dreaming

It is asked how many and who are those who dream well and divine by dreaming.

To this it is answered that three kinds of human beings dream well and divine: namely, the insane, friends, and melancholics.

First, the insane foresee well and divine concerning dreams. The reason for this is that such persons are not intent upon their own motions, and therefore apprehend and discern the motion of an extraneous passion which touches them. But the most prudent and best men are intent only upon wisdom, virtues, and other honorable things, on account of which they do not perceive dreams.

Second, I say that friends dream well and correctly, in accordance with the way matters turn out concerning their acquaintances and friends. The reason for this is that friends have greater solicitude for one another, and therefore have greater cognition of their images. Hence acquaintances and friends, especially when separated far from one another, are most solicitous for one another, hoping many things concerning one another and fearing many things concerning one another. For they especially know one another and perceive the motions made between them through the passions of hope, love, and fear.

And dreams concerning acquaintances and friends stand in this manner. For the motions in dreams concerning friends are more deeply rooted and more vehement than those concerning strangers. This can also be made evident by one example which Cicero relates in Book I...

...of *On Divination*.

He says there that two intimate companions and friends, Arcadians - that is, Greeks - journeying together, arrived at a certain city. One of them proceeded to the house of his friend, but the other turned aside to an inn.

The one who was in the house of his friend saw his companion in dreams, begging him to come to his aid, because unless he helped him he was to be slain by the innkeeper. Awakened by this vision, he rose from his bed and attempted to go to the inn where these things were taking place. But, returning to himself and making little of it as a vain dream, he returned to bed and fell asleep.

Then his companion appeared a second time through a dream and seemed to beg him more urgently than before to aid him. But this man, still paying no heed to the dream, fell asleep again.

His companion appeared to him a third time in sleep with a great complaint, saying that he had now been slain. He implored him that, since he had neglected to bring aid to his life, he should at least not deny him vengeance. He said that his slaughtered body was being carried outside the gate upon a cart, covered with dung, to be buried, so that the innkeeper's crime or wicked deed might be concealed.

Then the intimate friend, compelled by these persistent pleas, immediately ran with a magistrate to that gate very early in the morning. He intercepted the cart which his companion had shown him in his sleep, and brought the innkeeper to capital punishment.

Valerius Maximus relates this in Book I, in the chapter on dreams.

Third, melancholics forecast and conjecture dreams better than others. The reason for this is that in them there is a vehement impression of imaginations; and also because they attend less to their own motions and sleep less deeply, and therefore conjecture, divine, and foresee dreams to a greater degree.

Those, however, who determine and interpret dreams best and most skillfully are those who are moved subtly to inspect the likenesses of things. For example: just as it stands with

moving water, so it very often stands with dreams. Those, therefore, who, looking into moving water, see distorted and confused images are ready subtly to render the things figured or signified by them...

...because they know how to inspect the likenesses of the images or representations in relation to those things of which they are images, saying that this is the figure of a human being, this of a horse, and similar things.

So also in dreams, those looking upon distorted images are ready to determine the things figured or signified by them if they are moved subtly to inspect the likenesses of those images in relation to the things of which they are images.

These things are from blessed Thomas at the end of the third book *On Sleep and Waking*, and from Albert in his commentary there.

Question Five

Whether it is lawful to give credence to dreams

It is asked whether it is lawful to give credence to dreams.

It seems that the answer ought to be negative on account of the words written in Ecclesiasticus 34: “Dreams have caused many to err, and those hoping in them have fallen away.” And it is said in verse:

Heed not dreams, for dreams deceive many.

And Cato says:

Heed not dreams, for what the human mind desires,
While awake and hoping, it sees that very thing through sleep.

But to the contrary is the fact that an angel of the Lord appeared in dreams to Joseph, who gave credence to the dream, in Matthew 1.

I answer that it must be said, as Macrobius says concerning the *Dream of Scipio* - because in dreams Paulus <and> Scipio the Elder appeared to Scipio the son - that of all the things sleepers seem to themselves to see, there are five principal varieties and names. For it is either that which the Latins call a *dream*; or that which is rightly called a *vision*; or that which is named an *oracle*; or that which is called an *insomnium*; or...

...it is a *phantasm*, which Cicero, whenever he needed this name, called a *visum*.

Cicero says that the last two of these are judged unworthy of the care of interpretation, because they contain nothing of divination. For these two occur in the first three hours of the night, which are called the first watch of the night in Luke 12, and which are also called the dead of night in 3 Kings 3: “And rising in the silence of the dead of night,” concerning the harlots.

In these hours sleep is very dark and profound because of the dark and thick smoke released from the place of digestion, which obstructs and darkens the organs of the senses. Therefore at that time phantasms and motions made by the senses cannot appear truly.

And therefore to believe and give credence to dreams and apparitions, or revelations, made during those first three hours is vain and foolish. In this way the statements adduced at the beginning of the little question are understood.

A *dream*, however, occurs when, during sleep, something is revealed to us through the impression of imaginable forms, and that which is revealed is covered with figures and disclosed in images, as when Jacob, while sleeping, saw the ladder in Genesis 28.

A *vision* occurs when, during wakefulness, something is revealed through the impression of imaginable forms, and events come about in the same order in which they appeared. Such was the vision of Isaiah, who says, “I saw the Lord sitting upon a lofty throne,” and so forth, in Isaiah 6; and such was Daniel's vision concerning the weeks, which occurred in the same order in which he saw it.

An *oracle* occurs when, in dreams, a parent or some other good and grave person - such as God, Christ, an angel, the Virgin Mary, or some saint - openly announces that something will or will not occur, or that something must be avoided or done. If apparitions of this kind speak, the matter will occur as they say or as they show; and thus to believe is not a sin, especially if the person to whom the apparitions occur is good.

From these things it is evident that, according to Macrobius, the dream of Joseph concerning which Matthew speaks was an oracle. It occurred at dawn, when his stomach had completed digestion; and Joseph, a master of dreams, believed the angel and took Mary as his...

...pregnant wife.

But that which occurred to Pharaoh or Nebuchadnezzar was a dream and not an oracle, for Joseph interpreted for Pharaoh, and Daniel for Nebuchadnezzar.

Therefore to believe dreams and scrutinize phantasms which occur in the first three hours of the night is vain. Credence, however, ought to be given to dreams, visions, and oracles, especially if they appear more frequently, if the person to whom they appear is good, and if they are interpreted by some holy man.

Where, however, the person to whom dreams, visions, or oracles occur is not <in doubt> - as Paul was not, who said, “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain”; or as the mother of Augustine was not, concerning whom he says in the book of the *Confessions* that she knew how to distinguish between God revealing and her soul dreaming - then the person to whom a vision, dream, or oracle occurred would not need an interpreter.

These things are from Lord John de Biblia of Bologna in his *Quodlibets*.

Question Six

Whether it is a sin to foretell future things through dreams

It is asked whether it is a sin to foretell future things through dreams.

To this it is answered as follows: future things can be predicted through dreams in four ways.

First, this can occur from natural reasoning; and in this way all future things which have their effects in their causes can be cognized. To predict such things is lawful and is not divination, as is evident above in the first chapter concerning divination.

Second, future things can be predicted from a corporeal complexion or disposition, as physicians do. This is lawful and is not to divine.

Third, it can occur from a revelation of God, as Joseph and Daniel did in Genesis 40 and Daniel 2. Through divine revelation they saw presages of future things, and therefore they expounded the revelation made to them by God and narrated it to others.

Hence Joseph said to the two eunuchs who had...

...dreams and did not know their interpretations: “Does not interpretation belong to God? Tell me what you have seen,” in Genesis 40.

And in Daniel 2 it is said that the mystery was revealed by God through a vision. Hence it adds: “There is a God in heaven who reveals mysteries.”

Nevertheless, in no dreams, considered in themselves, ought faith and hope to be placed with certainty, unless it were certain to someone that something had been revealed for certain through dreams, or in dreams, by the Lord. Hence neither Joseph nor Daniel observed dreams by placing their hope in them. Rather, they expounded the things which were revealed to them by God through dreams, as is evident.

Fourth, future things can be predicted in dreams from the illusion and revelation of demons, with whom those persons have pacts: either express pacts, because they invoke them for this purpose, or tacit pacts, because divination of this kind extends itself to that to which it cannot extend itself. Such divination is illicit and superstitious.

Hence this is proved in Leviticus 19: “You shall not observe dreams”; and Deuteronomy 18: “Let there not be found among you one who observes dreams” - namely, one who either has a pact with a demon or places hope in dreams.

These things are from blessed Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 6.

Question Seven, and the Last of This Eighth Chapter

Containing two little questions

Little Question One of Question Seven

Why children and the insane sometimes predict future things

It is doubted why children and the insane sometimes predict future things.

To this it is answered as follows: because children and the insane have free choice bound, they act not properly voluntarily but naturally. Physical nature, however, is governed by the stars, which in a certain manner change...

...their phantasies, and thus they divine, as was said above in the explanation of the philosophers' opinion and as will be explained more clearly from the following response to the seventh inquiry.

Little Question Two of Question Seven

Why brute animals show future effects by certain motions

It is doubted why brute animals show future effects by certain motions.

To this it is answered as follows: brute animals have nothing above the phantasy which orders phantasms, as human beings have reason. And therefore the phantasy of brute

animals wholly follows the celestial impression. Consequently, certain future things, such as rain and things of that kind, can be shown more readily from the motions of animals of this kind than from the motions of human beings, who are moved by the counsel of reason.

Hence the Philosopher says in Book I of *On Sleep and Waking* that certain extremely imprudent persons are the most provident. For their intellective power is not affected by cares, but is as though deserted and empty of all things; and, moved according to the mover, it is led along.

These things are from Thomas in the First Part, in the question cited above.

Hence the Philosopher says in the book of the *Meteorology* that the song of frogs and the sharp bite of fleas or flies signify rain.

The first part is proved because damp weather is suitable to frogs existing in waters, and therefore they sing by natural inclination. Fleas and flies, on account of the moisture drawn up by the elevating power from which rain is generated, seek restorative nourishment more than usual.

And a rooster singing at an unaccustomed time, and asses rubbing their ears, signify future rain. The first part is proved because at that time, by the multitude of vapors extinguishing their former dryness, they are...

...stimulated. The second part is proved because itching is generated in them from the multitude of vapors.

Likewise, the raising of the heads of oxen and cows in fields and pastures, or their impulse to return to the farm, signifies future rain and storm. This is evident because, since their operations are from an infallible intelligence, they are therefore naturally inclined to cognize future harm.

The excessive eagerness of livestock eating in the fields is also a sign of future rain. This is evident because nature, which does not fail in necessary things, gave to these animals, which do not possess reason, a certain natural inclination by which they estimate that future harm is about to occur in the near term which will impede their nourishment. Therefore, as though knowing this, they seek food more eagerly than usual.

Concerning birds which also prognosticate future rain upon the earth, Virgil sang thus in a long poem in Book I of the *Georgics*:

> *When swift diving birds fly back from the midst of the sea,*
> *And bear their cry toward the shores; and when sea coots*
> *Play upon dry land, and the heron abandons the familiar marshes*
> *And flies above a lofty cloud.*

And below:

> *Or the cranes of the air have fled that storm*
> *Rising from the lowest valleys.*
> *Or a heifer, looking up at the sky, has caught the breezes with open nostrils.*
> *Or the twittering swallow has flown about the lake,*
> *And in the mud the frogs have sung their ancient complaint.*
> *More often the ant has carried her eggs out from her inner chambers,*
> *Wearing a narrow path upon the earth; and the vast rainbow drinks;*
> *And, withdrawing from the pasture in a great column,*
> *The army of crows has clamored with densely beating wings.*

And below:

> *Now the varied birds of the sea;*
> *Now to run into the waves.*

And you may see them exult in vain eagerness for washing. Then, namely, these are signs of future rain. The signs…

…of a coming storm he sang of above in the same book:

> *Immediately, when the winds are rising, either the waters of the sea*
> *Begin, stirred up, to swell, and on the rugged high*
> *Mountains a crash is heard; or the resounding shores far away*
> *Are thrown into confusion, and the murmur of the woods grows loud.*
> *Then the wave scarcely tempers itself for the curved keels.*

And let these things suffice concerning the eighth chapter of the First Decade.

First Decade, Chapter Nine

On the immunity and nobility of the intellect and will, powers of the soul, with respect to celestial bodies; under this chapter seven principal questions will be explained

Principal Question One

On the intellect and will with respect to celestial bodies, under which five little questions will be resolved

Little Question One of Principal Question One

Whether the powers of the rational soul are subjected to and necessitated by celestial bodies

It is asked whether the will and intellect, powers of the rational soul, are subjected to and necessitated by celestial bodies.

To this it first seems that the answer must be affirmative. For instruments move and change things through the power of the principal agent. But celestial bodies are instruments of spiritual substances and angels. Since these are superior to souls and their powers, they therefore impress something upon them and move them. Consequently, celestial bodies, as instruments, will have power over souls and their powers.

The minor premise is proved through Dionysius, who says in chapter 8 of *On the Divine Names*: "Divine wisdom joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second things." On precisely this basis, the Philosopher in Book XII of the *Metaphysics* assigned the number of angels according to the number of celestial motions.

Second, it is argued thus: that which through generation is subjected to celestial bodies is changed and necessitated by them, so that a celestial body is the cause of its acts. But the soul is subjected to celestial bodies through generation; therefore, it is changed and necessitated by them.

The minor premise is proved: the sun and a human being generate a human being, according to Book II of the *Physics*. They do not generate matter, because matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, according to Book I of the *Physics*. Therefore, they generate the form, which is the rational soul.

Third, it is proved that celestial bodies change the intellective power, thus: the operation of the human intellect is *per se* subjected to the motion of the heaven because the intellect is subjected to the phantasy. For "one who understands must contemplate phantasms," according to Book III *On the Soul*. But the phantasy is *per se* subjected to the motion of the heaven, as is every sensitive cognition, upon which every doctrine and every intellectual discipline depends, according to Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore, and so forth.

Fourth, it is proved that the will is subjected to the stars, thus: that which is causally and directly subjected to the higher motions is varied and altered from one disposition into another. But the will, according to what the Philosopher adduces in Books I and II *On the Soul* concerning the opinion of Empedocles and Democritus, is varied and altered according to the diverse dispositions of time, which is an affection of the motion of the heaven,

according to Book IV of the *Physics*. Therefore, the will is causally and directly subjected to celestial bodies.

This is also evident from experience. For many human beings, according to the dispositions of the times, are joyful and sad, benevolent and irascible. Therefore, and so forth.

But to the contrary is what Damascene says: celestial bodies are in no way the cause of human acts.

I answer that it must be said that celestial bodies are said to act upon effects in two ways: namely, *per se* and directly, or *per accidens* and indirectly.

In the first way, celestial bodies do not act upon the soul and its rational powers. For if they acted *per se* and directly upon the soul, it would follow that souls were produced through transmutation, like other natural things, as Democritus and Empedocles said, positing no difference between sense and intellect.

Not seeing the distinction between the acts and operations of intellect and sense, or between the sensitive and intellective appetites, they said that the intellect was an organic and material power which followed the transmutation of the body, just as sense does.

Consequently, they said that, because the transmutation of inferior bodies follows the transmutation of superior bodies, the soul also, and intellectual operation, would follow the motion of celestial bodies, according to that saying of Homer:

> *Such is the intellect among gods and earthly human beings*
> *As the Father of men and gods gives upon the day,*

that is, the Sun or Jupiter, whom they called the supreme God.

And thus they believed that the intellect, like sense, was generated by supercelestial bodies and, consequently, was acted upon and impressed by supercelestial bodies directly and *per se*.

Theologians reject this opinion, maintaining that the law and order of divine providence wills that each thing be moved immediately by the cause proximate to it. The proximate mover of the will, however, is the good shown by the intellect, because the object of appetite is the good, or the apparent good, by which it is moved, just as sight is moved by color.

Hence they say that it belongs to God alone to move the will immediately and actively, and to secondary agents to move it only persuasively; but it is not moved impressively by celestial bodies. For if this occurred, there would never be an evil choice in us, since nature, acting *per se* and directly, always acts and moves in an ordered manner.

The Philosopher also rejects the same opinion in Book IV of the *Metaphysics* and Books I and II *On the Soul*.

But if we speak about indirect and *per accidens* subjection, we say…

…that the soul and its rational appetitive and intellective powers are subjected to celestial bodies and their impressions. This is insofar as the intellect and will in some manner receive from the interior and exterior powers, which are bound to bodily organs and are subjected to celestial bodies.

For the operation of the intellect, and consequently of the will, can neither begin nor be completed without the concurrence of the corporeal powers, which are the imaginative, memorative, cogitative, sensitive powers, and so forth.

Hence, when the operations of these organic powers are impeded because of some indisposition of the body or of the organs which serve such powers, the operation of the intellect, and consequently of the will, is impeded, as is evident in the frenzied, the lethargic, the sick, and so forth.

Nevertheless, the intellect and will stand in different ways with regard to this subjection. For the intellect necessarily receives from the inferior apprehensive powers. Hence, when the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative power is disturbed, the act of the intellect is necessarily disturbed.

For this reason it is said that, although the operation of the intellect is not effected by the motion of the heaven, the motion of the heaven is nevertheless required in order that the operation of the intellect may occur. For the operation of the intellect cannot occur unless sense concurs, and sense cannot concur without the influence of the motion of the heaven. Moreover, by the power of the motion of the heaven, contrary dispositions which impede the operation of the intellect are often removed.

The will, however, is a more proximate cause than the intellect, although it does not of necessity follow the inclination of the inferior appetites, insofar as it lies within the power of the will to follow the inclination of the concupiscible and irascible powers. Hence the inferior powers reach the will less than they reach the intellect.

Nevertheless, the will itself is also subjected occasionally and indirectly to the higher motions, insofar as some occasion for our choices is furnished from them according to the impressions which they possess.

For when the air is disposed by the supercelestial bodies toward intense cold, we choose to be warmed at a fire. And through the power of the heavens certain motions of the passions also arise within us, through which we are made choleric and prone to anger. Sometimes also a certain dyscrasia is caused in our body by the heaven, through which we choose to take medicine.

To the first argument, therefore, it must be said that the spiritual substances which move celestial bodies do indeed act upon corporeal things through the mediation of celestial operations. But they act upon the human intellect immediately by illuminating it, while they cannot change the will except by way of persuasion.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 115, article 4.

To the second it is said that the sun generates a human being, but not the intellective soul. Rather, it generates another substantial form educed from the potency of matter, which is afterward corrupted when the intellective soul arrives from without.

To the third it must be said that the operation of the intellect depends indirectly and *per accidens* upon the phantasy and exterior senses, but not *per se* and directly, as was said.

Or sometimes it is answered by denying the premise, because if the operation of the intellect depends upon the phantasy, this is by the power of the agent intellect; and if the operation of the intellect which is doctrine or discipline depends upon sense, the heaven does not concur universally, but only the agent intellect.

To the fourth it must be said that such alteration exists by reason of the body, upon which the motion of the heaven directly makes an impression, and not by reason of the intellect or will. For no such motion is caused in the intellect or will, but only in the body.

Consequently, it is denied that any persons possess some moral habit from their birth. To the Philosopher, however, it is said that he understands some persons to be naturally disposed at birth, and naturally rendered apt, toward moral habits of justice, temperance, and things of this kind. This is conceded.

And these things suffice with respect to the principal question.

Addition to Little Question One

This question can be understood more subtly from Gerson in the little work which he entitled the *Trilogium of Theologized Astrology*; from Lord Bonaventure in Book II, distinction 2, article 3, question 2; and, after these authors, from Gabriel Biel in Book II, distinction 14, sole question.

And against the astrologers, who say many false things, celestial bodies can indeed incline the will, but not efficiently by producing the act of willing within it, nor can they impose necessity in any manner, since the will remains free because of its liberty.

For a human being conquers temptations not only through grace but also through the liberty of the will. Thus, as the excellent Laurence, doctor of the Order of Servants, asserts in Book II, distinction 25, question 3, collation, all human acts will always be from free choice, mediately or immediately, because through the command of the will the other powers are moved into their acts.

Hence comes that saying of Ptolemy: “The wise man will rule the stars.”

Little Question Two of Principal Question One

Whence it is that one person has a sharper or slower understanding than another

It is asked whether it is from the stars or from other accidental causes that one person has a sharper or slower understanding than another.

To this it is answered that it does not arise from some influential power impressed upon the human body by the stars at the time of birth that one human being has a sharper or slower understanding.

This is proved because the rational cognitive power is not directly subjected to the stars, as was said immediately above. Consequently, they cannot *per se* make an impression upon the intellect, although they can indeed do so *per accidens*.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Little Question Three of Principal Question One

Whether one person is inclined by the stars toward one science and another toward another science

It is asked whether one person is inclined by the stars or by other accidents toward one science and another toward another.

To this it is answered similarly that it does not arise from some celestial power at the time of birth that one person is naturally more apt for one science and another for another.

This is proved similarly, because celestial bodies cannot naturally and directly render us apt for the sciences, although they can indeed do so *per accidens*.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Little Question Four of Principal Question One

How many are the causes from which acuity of understanding toward diverse sciences arises

It is asked how many accidental causes there are from which acuity of understanding and an inclination toward diverse sciences arise.

To this it is answered that there are five.

First, this can arise from the passions toward which a human being is disposed and inclined by a natural complexion. For one impassioned toward the vice of avarice is more inclined toward lucrative sciences and labors more fervently in them than in other sciences. The same applies to those impassioned toward other vices or virtues.

Second, it can occur because the completion or constitution of one human being, from whatever source, is more conformable or proportioned to the objects or things and their dispositions which the said science considers than is the constitution of another human being. Thus that science or art is more delightful to him.

Third, it can occur from the fact that sometimes in one human being the imaginative power excels, in another the discursive power, in another the judicative power, and in another the memorative power. And thus, according to this, one human being is more capable in one science than in another.

Fourth, this can occur from the disposition of the inferior root. For we see that the sons of painters are for the most part more apt for painting because of a disposition contracted from their parents.

Fifth, it can occur from frequent meditation upon, or presentation of, such things. For one who from youth saw painting being done, or took pleasure in seeing pictures, is more inclined toward painting than toward another art.

This was also the cause why sheep of varied color were born to Jacob: namely, from the frequent inspection and imagination of the sheep drinking the water beneath which were rods of varied colors. But on this account do not refer the matter entirely to nature, but to divine disposition, in Genesis 30.

Therefore, diversity of understandings does not arise from some special power impressed at birth, nor must the variety of complexions of human bodies and of other various natural conditions always be sought from the heaven, but from the other five modes just recounted.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Addition to Little Question Four

Why some persons possess a subtler understanding while others possess a grosser one is, according to astrologers and especially Albumasar, because at the birth of some persons Mercury is in the house or exaltation of the Sun. Hence those who are born in this manner are endowed with understanding; but when Mercury is in the house of the Moon, grosser persons are born.

Indeed, know, according to Ptolemy in proposition 70, that those at whose birth the Moon does not aspect Mercury are insane, while those for whom the Moon aspects Mercury are wise...

...because the Moon pours in the natural powers, while Mercury pours in the rational powers. Hence, when the natural powers by which the body is governed have regard to reason, that person is born wise; but when they do not have regard to it, that person is born insane.

And when Mercury is retrograde, the person being born is rendered dull in mind and forgetful; but when Mercury is direct, he is rendered swift in understanding. The reason is that stars which are not impeded perform their natural operations, but the opposite occurs if they are impeded.

From these causes it frequently happens that astrologers prognosticate true things concerning the characters of human beings. It is not that these things necessarily occur in this manner if a human being wills, through the will, to follow the law of reason rather than the senses; rather, it is because he is prone to follow the sensitive appetite, upon which the stars make an impression.

But take note that, because of the influences of the stars, we call one person intelligent and another obtuse with respect to the senses, but not with respect to the soul, which is in no manner subject to those influences.

Little Question Five of Principal Question One

Who judges better concerning the goodness or depravity of the intellect, a physician or an astrologer

It is asked who judges better concerning the goodness and depravity of the intellect, a physician or an astrologer.

To this it is answered that an experienced physician judges better and more certainly concerning the goodness and depravity of an understanding than does an astrologer.

This is proved because the physician judges understandings from a proximate and nearby cause: namely, from the particular inferior root; or from the primary causes, namely, the qualities of the elements; or from secondary causes, namely, soft flesh, slender nails, a head shaped like a ship, and black hair.

In support of this is what Albert says in the book *On the Four Coevals*. He writes that softness and rarity of flesh - not that which arises from undigested humor and phlegm, as in women, which denotes poor touch and imprudence, but that which arises from subtle, foamy, airy moisture, well bounded and of temperate heat - attests goodness of mind.

For Plato says that the goodness of form is according to the merit of matter. And therefore the Philosopher says in Book II *On the Soul* that those who are soft in flesh are apt in mind.

And upon *Missus est*, Albert says that blackness of eyes and hair together with whiteness of skin indicate a warm complexion and a most excellent intellect.

Hence Galen says in the *Techne*: "Those composed of hot and dry qualities, if these do not abound, are perfect in their senses and most wakeful," that is, vigorous. For from heat flows swiftness in apprehending, and from dryness firmness in retaining.

For this reason it is said that, generally, softness of flesh, fineness of nails, thinness of hair, and smallness of the teeth and mouth attest gentleness and a good mind; and the opposite features attest the contrary. Sharp nails, strong and large teeth, and a cleft mouth denote ferocity and a depraved intellect.

An astronomer, however, argues and judges concerning understandings and matters of this kind from celestial bodies as from remote causes.

It is therefore concluded that judgment concerning the cognitive powers in a human being cannot be made well from the disposition of the stars at the hours of births, and that an experienced physician judges matters of this kind better from inferior causes than a superstitious astrologer does from the consideration of superior causes.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Principal Question Two of Chapter Nine

Why a diversity of customs - that is, of vices and virtues - appears among human beings in different regions

It is asked whether, from the impression of the celestial bodies, vices and virtues are caused as though proper to different regions, and a diversity of customs - that is, of vices and virtues - is caused among human beings.

It seems that the answer to this should be affirmative.

First, thus: foreknowledge of any future things cannot be received except from those things in which those future things exist in some manner, as in their causes. But foreknowledge of the customs of human beings and of human works is received from the impression of celestial bodies, as is evident in astronomers, who predict many things. Therefore.

Likewise, the Philosopher says in the book *On the Properties of the Elements* that kingdoms have been made empty at the conjunction of the two great planets, namely, Jupiter and Saturn. But this would not be so unless wars and disputes depended upon the stars. Therefore.

Likewise, it pertains to the order of the universe that everything which does not always conduct itself in the same manner be reduced to a cause which always conducts itself in the same manner. But acts dependent upon free choice are exceedingly varied and multiform. Therefore, they must be reduced to the uniform motions of the celestial bodies as to their principles.

And Ptolemy says in Book III of the *Quadripartitum* that the inhabitants of Asia Major are for the most part chaste and abstinent, and use the most chaste garments, because of the association and aspect of Saturn and Jupiter.

And Ambrose, in the book *Hexameron*, introduces an astronomer accustomed to say that, if anyone is born under the sign of Aries, he will be considered most outstanding in counsel; that Taurus, accustomed to the yoke, makes laborious and patient those whom it has beheld while they are being born; that he whose birth poisonous Scorpio embraced will be a striker and remover of poisons; that, if anyone is born under Aquarius, he will obtain the office of a fisherman; and that, if anyone is born under the sign of Libra, he will without doubt be a *trapezita*, or money-changer.

And Augustine, upon Psalm 63, introduces a mathematician accustomed to say that it is not his own will which makes an adulterer, but Venus; that it is not his own will which makes a murderer, but Mars; and that it is not the will which makes a just man, but Jupiter.

And Messahalla, in the book *On Reception*, answering someone who asks about obtaining a kingdom, says: “It is Saturn who grants him the kingdom.”

And Albumasar, in Book VI, distinction 33, establishes the Sun as lord of the Lord's day and lord of its first hour, then Venus as lord of the second hour, and so on, by proceeding in like manner through the planets, etc.

Therefore, from all these things it seems that the diversity of customs in us is caused by the impression of celestial bodies.

But to the contrary is the Philosopher in Book III of the *Ethics*, saying: “It is in our power to be good or evil.” And Seneca says to Lucilius: “He errs who thinks that vices are born with us. They have supervened; they have been introduced. Nature allies us to no vice. It begot us whole and free.”

I answer that certain curious persons who have investigated the characteristic vices and virtues of different regions and the customs of individual peoples answer this question in diverse ways.

First, astrologers answer this question according to their superstitions, saying that virtues and vices proper to different regions, and to the human beings of different regions, arise from the heaven. For, according to them, different stars and different parts of heaven have regard to, or are related to, different regions; and, according to their influences, human beings are naturally constituted or inclined in one region toward virtues and in others toward vices. How much this answer is worth - or, rather, how worthless it is - will be able to appear sufficiently in part from what has been said and from what is to be said.

Second, natural philosophers answer this question, and answer well, that this occurs from the disposition of the elements in their impressions and other conditions, and from the orientation of such things toward the east, north, south, or west.

Third, physicians answer - and answer well according to their considerations - that the contraction of diverse natural inclinations in those who are born in different regions can take its origin from a bad or good, sick or healthy, disposition of the air and waters, and especially from the disposition of things used as food and drink, because their continued use from childhood makes a great impression upon the natural constitution of human beings.

For no physician is ignorant of the fact that the diversification of food and drink, and their disposition in quality and quantity, greatly alter nature, change the complexion, and through this vary the things which follow complexion; rather, all physicians must presuppose it as a principle. Nor does any moral philosopher doubt that from the quality and quantity of food

and drink various passions are excited and various vices generated, such as gluttony, drunkenness, lust, anger, and other things which follow from these.

Therefore, in regions where delightful things pertaining to nourishment are found, the consequence is, for the most part, that carnal vices of this kind reign more extensively and that from them the roots of all vices flourish: idleness, blindness of mind, coarseness of understanding, ignorance, negligence, and similar things, from which all the perversity of human beings concerning virtues and vices is accustomed to arise.

So also regions which have a scarcity of things pertaining to the sustenance of life and an abundance of human beings generate certain other vices: namely, rapacity, covetousness, an eagerness to deceive, and things of this kind toward which a scarcity of things is accustomed to impel human beings.

Nevertheless, as a consequence, human beings in those regions are subtler, more prudent, and more ingenious than in the regions described before. For, just as poverty and want are subtle and ingenious, so, conversely, pleasure and abundance of things are coarse and gross, imprudent and foolish.

It follows, therefore, that regions in which there is a suitable mean of well-disposed provisions abound less in thistles, thorns, and sins. But regions in which a superfluous abundance of delightful nourishment can be had almost without labor are that illustrious valley full of the worst human beings, concerning which Genesis 13 says that, before the Lord overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, it was watered like the Paradise of the Lord and like Egypt for those coming to Segor.

Fourth, jurists, or prudent founders of human laws, answer the aforesaid doubt that, for the most part, the coarseness and bad customs of peoples or regions took their origin from an original lack of wise persons and reasonable laws. Hence certain regions or peoples had prudent men from the beginning, or at least received the laws of prudent men, in which they always remained. But certain others long remained without laws in barbarism, or in the barbarity of vices; these still possess and follow barbarous customs even now. Yet certain other peoples or regions were preoccupied from their origin by perverse laws or superstitious paternal traditions, in which they still remain, either wholly or in part. And this is the answer according to the jurists.

Fifth, Christian moral philosophers answer, saying that the condemned customs of human beings, their disordered life, their pretenses, and the varieties of their evil affections arise inclinatively from the heavens, but impressively from four roots.

The first is the tinder of sin, which is born together with us all as a punishment of original sin.

The second is a disordered complexion contracted from the disordered life of the parents, from which a vicious inclination is often accustomed to arise in the offspring; this inclination sometimes reveals itself in those conceived illegitimately.

The third root is the bad upbringing of the offspring and, after that upbringing, the person's own disordered government, by which he has voluntarily habituated himself badly.

The fourth root is the temptation of malignant spirits and their manifold, hidden suggestion of vices contrary to all the virtues.

Sixth, practical theologians answer that doubt, saying that sometimes one region, for causes known to God, is less regarded and defended by “gods” - that is, by God's saints and the good angels - and is more exposed to demons; wherever more power is permitted to these demons, there the populace is more corrupted by vices and errors.

Hence, even in certain cities or regions, more saints are venerated, or saints of greater power or greater merit before God; in some, lesser or less propitious saints are venerated; or similar saints are venerated more solemnly and devoutly in one region. On this account, the human beings of one region or city, through the aid of their saints, are more directed, defended, and assisted against the demons who kindle vices, while the human beings of another region are assisted less.

Again, just as it appears from Scripture, Daniel 10, that through God's kindness good angels preside over individual regions and cities no less than over individual human beings, so, through the disposition of the princes of the demons, evil angels of Lucifer are assigned to diverse vices - one to lust, another to avarice, another to pride - and preside over individual regions.

Hence a certain gloss upon John 11, as Alexander adduces it, says: “It is not to be thought that one spirit of fornication burns both the man who fornicates in Britain and the man who does so in India or other places, nor that there is one spirit which drives human beings to vices in different places. Rather, I think that there is one principal spirit of fornication and innumerable spirits who obey him in this office and solicit human beings to sins of this kind. Similarly, I judge that there is one prince of anger and innumerable demons of the same office under him, and the same must be said of the other sins.”

Therefore the Apostle speaks not of one principality, but of several, against which we have a continual struggle, battle, and wrestling.

Seventh, speculative theologians answer this by following Thomas and Bonaventure in a distinction of Book II of the *Sentences*. They say that the claim that human customs - that is, characteristic virtues and vices - and their future outcomes are caused by the stars can be understood in two ways: in one way, necessarily and sufficiently; in another way, dispositively or inclinatively and contingently.

If they are understood in the first manner, it must be denied that human customs are caused by the stars. For, since the motion of the celestial bodies is natural and necessary, the diversity of customs would be natural and necessary, and would not arise from free choice; then counsels would be vain, and there would be neither merits nor praises, as will be seen more fully below.

This also conflicts with the Christian religion, because it would remove reward and merit. It conflicts with sense, because we see those born from the same womb differ in their customs. Finally, it conflicts with the fact that we see and read that many persons were of a most dissolute life in the first years of adolescence and afterward, once their customs had been changed for the better, lived most honorably and splendidly. This can be seen in the examples which Valerius gives in Book VI, chapter 7, *On Change of Customs and Fortune*, concerning Scipio Africanus, Quintus Fabius Maximus, Quintus Catulus, Lucius Sulla, and Themistocles.

For this reason Solon the philosopher says exceedingly well: “No one, while he lives, can truly be called happy or wretched; for right up to the final day of fate we are subject to uncertain fortune and to continual change of customs.”

But if we speak in the second manner - namely, contingently, inclinatively, or dispositively - then it must be conceded that the customs of countries, the characteristic virtues and vices of human beings, and their future outcomes depend upon the celestial bodies and stars.

For the power of the celestial bodies operates toward the mixture and quality of the complexions of bodies.

But the varied disposition and complexion of bodies contribute much to the variation of the effects and customs of the soul. For the soul is changed, for the most part, in accordance with bodily complexions. The choleric are irascible, the phlegmatic sluggish, the sanguine kindly, and the melancholic envious.

Nevertheless, as we have said, this is spoken of dispositively, contingently, and very remotely, and not necessarily. For the soul rules the body, especially when it is aided by grace. Hence we see many choleric persons who are meek.

From these things, therefore, it is evident whence the characteristic vices of individual regions and cities arise, and whence it originally comes that in certain regions human beings are for the most part good and upright in heart, while in another they are of depraved and perverse customs.

To the first argument, therefore, the consequence is denied, because human acts are foreknown from the stars not sufficiently, but only conjecturally.

To the second, Lord Bonaventure says that the Philosopher attributes this to the stars according to a certain disposition toward such effects, which are readily generated from them. For, from the motion of some humor an affection can be excited in the soul which it is nevertheless not necessary for the soul to follow, since the soul can suppress it. But because many follow their passions, many are therefore subjected to the stars. Astronomers, however, can say few things concerning the wise.

To the third, Thomas answers in Book II of the *Sentences*, saying that such acts are reduced to the divine will.

But all the authorities adduced to the contrary are understood contingently and dispositively, not necessarily and sufficiently.

These things are from John of Torquemada, Cardinal, and Henry.

Principal Question Three of Chapter Nine

On fate: whether the rational soul, with respect to the will and its acts, is subjected and necessitated by fate

Under this principal question seven little questions will be resolved.

Little Question One of Principal Question Three

On fate according to the poets

It is asked what fate is according to the poets.

To this it is answered that fate is the immovable and determined series of secondary causes itself, and the order of future things which, under divine disposition, necessitates human affairs.

Hence Ovid, speaking of Paris in the *Epistles*, says:

Your own fates draw you, nor can you abandon what you have begun.
Do not draw back your spirit; your fates draw you.

Thus Homer spoke in two verses which Cicero rendered into Latin:

Such are the minds of human beings as Father Jupiter himself,
with his light, surveyed the fruit-bearing lands.

And from this root certain ancient poets invented certain fatal Ideas, which they called the sisters known as the Parcae, by contrariety, because they spare no one. These were three, as Plato says: namely, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. They said that the first carried the distaff, the second drew the thread, and the third cut it. Hence the verse:

Clotho carries the distaff;
Lachesis draws;
Atropos harrows.

The first carries future contingent things. The second draws them forward so that they are placed in the present. The third dispatches them into the past. The first gives life to things; the second prolongs it; the third breaks it.

From this flowed that false opinion of country people and old women who say that those fatal goddesses were accustomed to appear to human beings, giving them infallible answers and promises. But all these things are fictions and fabrications of demons who, under the image of these three sisters, mocked superstitious human beings, who then sowed this darnel of false credulity.

Therefore, leaving aside the poets, who offer nothing certain concerning their fate, let us come to the philosophers and astrologers.

Little Question Two of Principal Question Three

What fate is, and what must be ascribed to fate

It is doubted what fate is according to the philosophers, Stoics, and astrologers, and what the philosophers, astrologers, and Stoics themselves ascribe to fate.

To this it is answered that the philosophers first define fate thus: Fate is the disposition, order, or series of secondary causes - that is, of the stars and planets - and the influence of the heavens when each person is born or conceived, decreeing laws and necessities for all inferior effects with respect to the good or evil things which befall human beings.

And Hermes Trismegistus and Apuleius define fate thus: Fate is a certain inflection of secondary causes dependent upon the providence of the first cause.

Ptolemy and the astronomers, however, define it thus: Fate is a certain binding together of causes, drawing its power and effect from the motions of the stars.

And Seneca says: Fate is a certain necessity of all things and actions which no thing can sever, dependent upon the disposition of Jupiter and the most worthy counsel of the gods.

Democritus and Epicurus, however, say: Fate is a certain celestial virtue and force, existing in the motions of the celestial bodies and in their movements, containing under itself and necessarily connecting all the effects which occur below the sphere of active and passive things - that is, below the Moon.

And Chrysippus the Stoic, as Aulus Gellius reports in Book VI of the *Attic Nights*, says: "Fate is a certain everlasting and unavoidable series and chain of things, rolling itself and entangling itself through the eternal orders of consequence of which it is fitted and linked."

The aforesaid philosophers, astrologers, and Stoics ascribe to this disposition of secondary causes and influence of the heavens, which they call fate, all natural and voluntary effects; all inclinations toward vices or virtues; all passions and desires of souls; future events of good or bad fortune; and the thoughts and temptations of human beings. They do so according to the error of Empedocles, who says - as the Philosopher recounts in Book II *On the Soul* - that the wills and minds in human beings are such as the father of living beings and of the gods, that is, the Sun or Jupiter, sends into them during the day.

They affirm that all these things come about and are disposed immovably and necessarily by fate, even apart from the wills of God and human beings, maintaining that nothing lies within the power of our free choice.

These things are from Albert and Henry.

Little Question Three of Principal Question Three

How, according to some, all things are subjected to fate

It is asked how the aforesaid philosophers, astrologers, and Stoics prove that all things are subjected to and necessitated by fate.

To this it is answered that they prove this opinion of theirs by reason, authorities, and examples.

First, by reason, thus: when a sufficient cause has been posited, the effect follows of necessity. But fate and the series of secondary causes are the sufficient cause of all natural and voluntary effects below the Moon. Therefore, all things proceed from it of necessity.

The major premise is known, and they prove the minor through Boethius, who says in Book IV of the *Consolation*:

> *The series of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements with one another, and transforms them by alternate transmutation. The same series renews all things which are born and die through the similar advances of offspring and seeds. It also constrains the acts and fortunes of human beings by an indissoluble connection of causes.*

These are his words.

Hence Seneca said in the tragedies: "The mortal race is ruled by the fates." And again in the same place: "Whatever we mortals suffer, whatever we do, comes from on high." And in *On Consolation*: "We cannot change the fates. They stand harsh and inexorable."

And Damascene says in Book II of the *Sentences*: "The celestial bodies constitute habits, complexions, and dispositions in us."

And Ptolemy the astronomer says in Book III of the *Quadripartitum*: "The Sun has the power of killing and preserving." And in the same place he says: "The celestial bodies compel a human being to sin and to do well."

And many poets have said the same thing. For Lucan says in Book VI:

Fate drives all things headlong;
intervening diseases do not divide
life and death.

And Ovid, in Book I of the *Tristia*:

No reason has strength to conquer fate.

And Juvenal says in Book III:

The fates will give kingdoms to slaves and triumphs to captives.

And again in his final book:

For an hour of kindly fate has greater power
than if a letter of Venus should commend us to Mars.

And the Samian mother, that is, Cybele, mother of the gods, is called Samian from the island of Samos, where she was worshiped. And in Satire VII, which begins "Both hope and reason," he says:

For it makes a difference what stars receive you
as you are just beginning to utter your first cries
and are still red from your mother.

And Quintus Curtius says in Book V: "Let those mock, of course, who have been persuaded that human affairs are rolled and driven by chance and at random. For my part, I would believe that, by an eternal constitution and a chain of hidden causes determined long before, each thing runs through its own order by an immutable law."

And Pliny says in Book I of the *Natural History*: "Individual stars have been assigned to us: bright ones to the rich, lesser ones to the poor, and obscure ones to the deceased, and, according to the lot of each, shining for mortals unto their offices."

And Quintilian says in the book of *Declamations*: "By fate we live, grow sick, recover, and die. What do you accomplish, medicine, except that no one despair while beside you?"

Hence it is also said in a certain epitaph:

Refrain, I beg you, from pouring forth sad laments; I have lived.
No longer hour was in my fates.

And in another epitaph it is said:

Alas, born unhappy under an adverse star,
falling headlong from his horse, he died before his day.

This is also evident from examples. For Cicero, in the book *On the Nature of the Gods*, adduces the example of two brothers who, since they had been born together, afterward also began to grow sick together; their illness began to grow worse in the same manner, and they were cured by the same medicine. Concerning them Posidonius the astronomer says…

…that these things happened to them equally and uniformly because they had the same constitution of the stars at conception and birth.

The example is also evident in a son of Lord John of Lignano in the time of Pope Martin. For this Lord John, a most learned jurisconsult and most celebrated astronomer, foresaw from the nativity that a certain son of his was to be affixed to a cross. Being unwilling to come

to the aid of fate's natal disposition, he caused his son to be initiated into sacred orders and to be excellently instructed in the liberal disciplines. But not even in this manner could the son escape the force of what fate had decreed.

For when the Bolognese homeland sent him as legate to Martin, the Supreme Pontiff, to arrange peace, he secretly betrayed his homeland to the pontiff, more to its destruction than its advantage. When this became known to the lords after his return, they affixed him to a gallows at night. When his father saw him hanging at daybreak, he lamented and said: “Alas, my son, you were unable to overcome your most unhappy fate either by the human supports of letters or by divine ministries.”

From these sayings of foolish philosophers and astronomers, therefore, many conclude and say that all things are moved and governed by fate, and that no one can turn aside from or pass beyond the ranks of the fates.

From this also it is that certain astronomers thrust themselves forward to judge the future outcomes of human beings: the life and death of kings; the peace and wars of peoples; the riches and poverty of human beings; the fertility and sterility of wives; the abundance and famine of harvests; and the honors and indignities of prelates - very often predicting true things, or rather prophesying them.

But because their teachings are of the greatest importance and concern attending to the state of human life, they will therefore have to be cited and adduced in the following article, and refuted by us, lest we too be deceived, impelled by the authority of human beings who think themselves wise and have been found foolish.

Little Question Four of Principal Question Three

That there are three execrable dogmas concerning fate

It is asked how many sacrilegious dogmas of the philosophers there are concerning fate, and how they are condemned by Catholic doctors.

To this it is answered that there are three execrable dogmas of the philosophers who speak about fate.

The first is that they say fate is the celestial aspect and disposition of the stars which, simply and of itself, necessitates all effects below the Moon, with all providence of God entirely excluded. They defend themselves by a saying of Augustine in Book V of *The City of God*, where he says that fate is a certain order and disposition of secondary causes for producing effects among these corruptible and generable things, apart from the wills of God and human beings.

This dogma is proved false by reason and authority.

By reason, thus, according to Thomas in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 63: It is impossible for things which do not know an end to operate for the sake of an end and to arrive at it in an orderly manner unless they are moved and regulated by something which possesses knowledge of the end, as is evident in the case of an arrow. But all natural bodies, planets, and stars operate for the sake of an end, and move and attain the end, although they do not recognize it. Therefore, it is necessary that their entire operation be directed by something which orders and regulates it. This is what we call divine providence.

For this reason Wisdom 14 says: “But your providence, O Father, governs all things from the beginning”; and Wisdom 8: “It reaches mightily from end to end and disposes all things sweetly”; and Wisdom 11: “There is no other God than you, who have care for all”; and in Hebrews: “Upholding all things by the word of his power.”

In support of this is what Augustine says in Book III *On the Trinity*, chapter 4:

> *Nothing occurs visibly in this world which is not commanded or permitted from the inner, invisible, and intelligible court of the Supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions, in this exceedingly vast and immeasurable commonwealth of the whole creation.*

And Lactantius says in Book III, chapter 21:

> *For who does not perceive that this world, composed according to such marvelous reason, is governed by some providence, since there is nothing which can subsist without any regulation? A house without an inhabitant falls apart. A ship without a pilot goes to the bottom. A body abandoned by the soul dissolves. Still less should we think that this entire mass could either have been constructed without an artisan or have stood so long without a ruler.*

And he says in Book I:

> *For no one is so coarse and so savage in his customs that, when raising his eyes to heaven, even though he does not know by whose providence all this which is seen is governed, he nevertheless does not understand in some manner, from the motion, magnitude, beauty, usefulness, and tempering of the things themselves, that some providence exists; nor can it occur that what consists by marvelous reason was not established by some greater counsel.*

Therefore, from these things the falsity of the philosophers and astronomers is evident with respect to the first dogma. To the saying of Augustine which they adduced, however, it is said that Augustine adduces it in the person of the Stoics.

The second perverse dogma of the astronomers is that they say that all things which are subjected to fate occur necessarily and immovably. They prove this thus: when any sufficient cause has been posited, it is necessary that the effect follow immovably. But the celestial bodies, with their motions and dispositions, are the sufficient cause of their effects. Therefore, it is necessary that the effects follow immovably and of necessity.

Hence Boethius also says that fate is an immovable disposition inhering in movable things.

But this too is proved false.

First, with respect to human affairs. For human acts are not subjected to the action of celestial bodies, as will be proved below. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent a voluntary action from impeding an effect of the celestial bodies…

…not only in a human being, but also in other things to which human operation extends.

Second, their position is false with respect to all things which occur *per accidens*, because that which is *per accidens* is not properly a being, nor is it one. But every natural action is terminated at some one thing. Therefore, it is impossible for something which is *per accidens* to be the *per se* effect of any natural principle. For no nature would bring it about that one who intends to dig a grave finds a treasure.

And thus, since a celestial body acts after the manner of a natural principle, because it follows a natural motion, it follows that it is impossible for any active power of a celestial body to be the active cause of those things which occur here *per accidens*.

Hence the Philosopher says in Book VII of the *Metaphysics* that it is not necessary for an effect to be posited whenever any cause whatsoever has been posited. For there are certain causes which are ordered toward their effects not of necessity, but as occurs in most cases; these sometimes fail in the lesser number of cases because of the corruption or impediment of some principle, as when nature produces a monster or a human being with seven fingers. According to the Philosopher in Book II of the *Physics*, these things occur by chance and fortune.

The Philosopher also says in the book *On Sleep and Waking* that celestial bodies do not always produce their effects in these inferior inanimate things because of contrary dispositions which impede them. For signs of rains and winds frequently arise, he says, although the rains and winds do not occur because of stronger contrary dispositions.

It follows, therefore, that neither voluntary effects nor all the natural effects which are directly subjected to fate occur necessarily and immovably.

To their argument, however, it is said that celestial bodies, or fate, are the cause of inferior effects by means of particular movable causes which can fail in the lesser number of cases and are therefore movable *per accidens*. For each thing is received in another according to the manner of the recipient. Just as the celestial powers...

...are found to be necessary in themselves, so in inferior movable effects they are received movably and contingently.

And because everything multiform, varied, fortuitous, *per accidens*, and movable must be reduced to some uniform and *per se* principle, chance events of this kind, which are movable in relation to the celestial bodies and secondary causes, nevertheless acquire a certain immovability and necessity through their relation to the first principle by which they are ordered - that is, to the divine intellect and its providence. This is not, indeed, an absolute necessity, but a conditional one, according as we say that this conditional proposition is true or necessary: “If God foreknew it, it will occur.”

Hence, after Boethius had said that the series of fate is movable, a little later he adds: “Since it proceeds from the immovable beginnings of divine providence, it too must be immutable.” See Thomas, Part I, questions 115 and 116, throughout.

To the saying of Boethius that fate is an immovable disposition inhering in movable things, however, it is answered that the disposition of secondary causes which Boethius calls fate can be considered in two ways.

In one way, it can be considered according to itself and in the secondary causes themselves; and thus fate is movable, just as the movable or voluntary things subjected to fate are also movable.

But if fate, or the disposition of secondary causes, is understood through its relation to the first divine principle by which they are ordered, then fate is indeed immovable. Boethius understands fate in this manner, namely, insofar as it is referred to the will and power of God. For although all creatures are in themselves mutable in some manner, nevertheless, insofar as they are referred to God's providence, they acquire a certain immutability.

This second dogma is also proved perverse from the inadmissible consequences which would follow from it. For if we concede that fate introduces necessity among human beings, it follows, first, that Moses speaks falsely in the work of the fourth day when, after enumerating the two great lights and the stars, he added: "And God saw that it was good" - supply: the governance of the stars.

For if it came about from fate and the stars that this person is a robber, that one avaricious, another lustful, and another a drunkard, this would not be good, but exceedingly evil. If the courses of the heavens and stars produced these things, they would not direct human beings toward their proper end by illuminating the earth, but would turn them away from their proper end.

It follows that the Lord God, who gave such power and influence to the stars, would have given human beings a great occasion for departing from those things which the Christian faith proposes for belief.

It follows, second, that it is not necessary for anyone to pray to or worship God.

It follows that there is no sin, for fate removes the freedom of the will by which every sin is committed, cause 15, question 1, at the beginning.

It follows that God is the cause of all sins, because whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused, as Proclus says.

It follows that God contradicts himself, for he commands good things and compels human beings toward evil things.

It follows also that human beings are punished unjustly. For no one sins in that which he cannot avoid.

It follows that rewards are given to the good without justice, for the will is the cause of merit.

It follows that no judgment concerning the deeds of human beings is left to God.

It follows that theology, the arts, moral philosophy, and medicine would be in vain. For what need is there to teach, write, counsel, heal, and so forth, if all things occur from the necessity of fate?

And if temptations are excited in human beings by astral influences at different times of the year according to the diversity of their births, then temptations to sin do not arise from demons and the tinder of sin, as the Christian faith professes.

And, to state the matter in summary, if we concede that all things occur by fate and that all things proceed from it necessarily and immovably, all human life would be overturned. For rebukes, praises, censures, and exhortations would be offered superfluously.

Considering these things, Blessed Augustine says in Book V of *The City of God*, chapter 1:

> *Those who think that the stars possess such power delivered to them by God do a great injury to heaven, in whose most illustrious senate, as it were, and most splendid court they suppose that the commission of crimes is decreed - crimes such that, if some earthly city had decreed them, it ought to have been overthrown by decree of the human race.*

And the same author says in Book II of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*: "With impious perversity, in evil deeds which are most rightly to be censured, they thrust forward the author

of the stars as the one to be accused, rather than the human being who committed the crimes," etc.

And Ambrose, in the book *Hexameron*, says in condemnation of this unspeakable error concerning fatal necessity:

> *How has the Lord either proposed rewards to the good or punishments to the wicked, if the necessity of fate - the course of the stars - shapes the discipline and conduct of human beings? If our acts and deeds are referred to natal necessity and not to instruction in morals, why have laws been established and why also have statutes been promulgated, by which either punishments are decreed for the wicked or security is conferred upon the innocent? Why is pardon not granted to the guilty, since, as they themselves say, they transgressed not by their own will but from necessity? Why does the farmer labor and not wait to carry unlabored fruits into the receptacles of his granaries by the privilege of his necessity, if he was so born that riches or resources should flow to him? In vain does the merchant trouble the perilous sea, when a treasure of riches can, as they say, fall to him while idle through his natal lot. Why all the solicitude of human beings concerning gain, every application to business, every labor, and every occupation, if human affairs proceed not from the will but by fatal necessity? For where there is fixed necessity, there industry is without honor and solicitude is indeed foolish.*

These are his words.

Therefore, in order that we may avoid all the inadmissible consequences adduced and all these pernicious errors, let us confess neither that all things are subjected to fate nor that all things are immovably necessitated by it.

The third perverse dogma of the philosophers and astronomers concerning fate is that they say that all things come about and are subjected to fate. They proved this by the reasons, authorities, and examples adduced above in the present third little question. But the sixth little question below will resolve and make manifest the falsity of the philosophers' aforesaid dogma. Boethius likewise...

...confounds them in Book IV of the *Consolation*, saying: "Certain things which are placed under God's providence transcend the series of fate." What things there are which transcend fate and are not subjected to it will appear from the following seventh question.

Little Question Five of Principal Question Three

That not all things are necessitated by fate

It is asked how theologians demonstrate that not all things are subjected to fate, nor are individual things necessitated by it.

To this it is answered that theologians prove this by reasons, authorities, and examples, speaking and understanding this concerning human and voluntary acts.

The first reason is as follows. Divine providence disposes the universe in such an order that inferior things are governed through superior things and less noble things through more noble things, as Augustine says in Book III *On the Trinity*.

In a human being, however, there are two things, soul and body. The body, which is now passible and mortal, is inferior to a celestial body. Therefore, it is subjected to a celestial body *per se* and directly, and the celestial body makes an impression upon it, just as the body was

formed and complexioned by its power. Hence the Philosopher says in Book II of the *Physics*: "The Sun and a human being generate a human being," that is, the influence of the stars and planets together with a human being.

And Augustine says in Book V of *The City of God*: "It cannot be said to be altogether absurd that certain influences of the stars have force with respect only to differences of bodies."

And Dionysius says in chapter 4 of *The Divine Names*: "The light of the Sun contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them toward life itself, and nourishes, augments, and perfects them."

But the soul, since it is assimilated to God because each is a spirit - and an effect is nobler to the degree that it is more assimilated to its cause, according to Books II and IV of the *Metaphysics* - is not...

...subjected *per se* and directly to the heavens, planets, and bodies, as has been said, since the soul itself is nobler than all of them. Therefore, the soul is not subjected to fate, nor will it be good or evil from fate and the celestial bodies, but from itself and its free will. See Thomas, Book III *Against the Gentiles*.

The second reason is as follows. If two movers make impressions upon the same moved thing, and one is more powerful, more noble, and more immediate, it will also be more efficacious in making an impression. But our body is subject to two movers, namely, the celestial bodies and the rational soul. The rational soul is nobler than the celestial body itself, more powerful, and more immediate; therefore, it will be more efficacious in making an impression.

The soul, therefore, will be more capable of affecting and making an impression upon its own body than the celestial bodies are with respect to works expressed in the body. Hence, however greatly Mars might move the body toward disturbance and anger by moving the blood, a well-ordered soul will nevertheless be more capable of producing temperance of the blood and quiet, so that joy and meekness may belong to it.

The third reason is as follows. If fate and the celestial bodies were directly the causes of human choices and acts, it would follow that a human being would be driven toward his passions by natural instinct, just as the other animals are, in which there are only powers of the soul bound to bodily organs. For that which occurs in these inferior things from the impression of celestial bodies is carried out naturally. And thus it would follow that a human being would not possess free choice but would have determined actions, just as other natural things do.

All these things are manifestly false and contrary to human conduct. Therefore, it is evident from these things that human and voluntary acts are not subjected to fate and the celestial bodies.

Authorities must now be set forth. First is Damascene, who says in Book II of the *Sentences*: "The celestial bodies are in no way the cause of our acts, for we, having been made by the Creator with free choice, are also lords of our acts..."

And Gregory of Nyssa says: "The Egyptians say that fate can be changed by certain sacrifices."

And Moses says in Deuteronomy 4: “Lest you see the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of heaven and, deceived by error, adore and worship them, which the Lord God created for service to all the peoples which are under heaven.” Note: for service, and not for dominion.

And Ambrose says in the *Hexameron*: “Some have attempted to express the qualities of nativities - what sort each person who has been born will be in the future - although this is not only vain and useless for those seeking it, but impossible for those promising it.”

And the same author, in Book II of the *Hexameron*, demonstrates by an argument from the greater that the heaven and celestial bodies concur in the generation of animals and plants as a universal agent which excites and invigorates the generative powers of seeds and animals in the elemental region. He speaks thus: “Let the inept discourse of the astronomers fall silent. Let all know that the Sun is not the author of things which are born, but that God's clemency loosens the earth and God's indulgence causes fruits to break forth.”

And in Book IV he introduces nature speaking about the Sun: “The Sun is indeed good in service, not in rule; a good helper of my fecundity, but not its creator; a good fashioner of my effects and nourisher of my fruits, but not their author.”

And Gregory says in the homily for Epiphany: “Far be it from the hearts of the faithful that they should say fate is anything, for the Creator alone, who created the life of human beings, administers it.”

And Ptolemy says in the *Almagest*: “A wise human being will rule the stars.” And at the beginning of the *Centiloquium* he says: “The wise soul of a physician will rule the stars.” For a physician endeavors to dry bodies when a celestial body moves them toward moisture.

And Bugufarus the Wise, in his commentary upon Ptolemy's *Centiloquium*, says: “A wise human being both assists and impedes a celestial effect through the power of the wisdom which is in him.”

And Abraham Avenezra, the Chaldaean astrologer, says:

> *For if anyone raises prayers and cries to heaven,*
> *he will be able to conquer his fate.*

And Virgil says in Book I of the *Georgics*:

> *Intelligence and prudence in affairs are greater than fate.*

And Quintilian says in Declamation IV: “Fate is conquered if you resist; it conquers if you despise it.”

Hear how gloriously Chrysippus the Stoic concludes on this side, as Aulus Gellius adduces him in the *Attic Nights*. He says:

> *By fate, he says, according to a certain principal reason, all generated things come about. Nevertheless, innate dispositions themselves possess something of their own. An example: If you throw a cylindrical stone, its beginning is from us, but that stone nevertheless rolls headlong, not because you bring this about, but because its own manner and the rollability of its form so possess it. Thus the order, reason, and mobility of fate move the kinds themselves and the principles of causes. The impulses of our counsels and minds, however, are from us.*

Therefore, in Homer Jupiter rightly complained about mortals, saying:

Alas, how mortals condemn the divinities of heaven!
They say that evils come through us, although they themselves,
through a senseless mind, have sufferings beyond fate.

These are his words.

Now the same thing will be proved by examples.

Plato, judged by a physiognomist to be a corrupter of young men, answered that the inclination of the stars is conquered by wisdom. For the stars signify a thief or adulterer, but they do not make a thief or adulterer.

Two twins were born, namely Jacob and Esau, Genesis 25, the one after the other in such a way that the later held the heel of the former. And yet in life they were diverse in customs, unlike in acts, and dissimilar in the love of their parents.

Within one expanse of heaven the son of a king and the son of a countryman are born, yet they are diverse in all things. A male and a female are born under Mars: she plies the distaff; he triumphs with the sword.

If Posidonius the astronomer should say to these things that the cause of the diversity of these persons at birth was the tiny interval of time which the twins possessed while they were being born...

...Augustine answers this in Book V of *The City of God*, saying: "It is remarkable that so small a portion of the heaven, which passed by, should have had so much force in producing the diversity of the wills, acts, customs, and fortunes of twins - or of those who are not twins - being born."

To this Nigidius the astronomer answers in turn that the rapidity of the heaven is so great that, even if one of the twins were born quickly after the other, it would nevertheless cause a very great interval in heaven. He gives the example of a wheel running with the greatest speed and marked twice with ink as though it were standing still in one place: after the motion ceases, those two points of ink will be found to be very far apart.

From this caused distance and the rapidity of the heaven, Nigidius says, arises the diversity of customs and outcomes in twins and in persons who are not twins but were born at the same time.

Augustine also answers this by saying that this fabrication is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned by that same method. For if, with respect to those born at the same time, so much difference occurs in heaven from so small a portion of the same constellation that it cannot be comprehended, why did the inheritance fall to one of the twins, namely Jacob, but not to the other, namely Esau? How, therefore, were astronomers able to judge concerning persons who are not twins and who have different constellations, when sometimes the greatest portion of the heaven has passed by with respect to them? All these things are from Blessed Augustine in the place cited above.

From these things the foolishness is evident of those who choose an hour for marrying, who await a particular time for lying with their wives, and who restrain women, if they can, lest they give birth before a particular time. Thus Nectanebus the astronomer, when lying with Olympias, the mother of Alexander, forbade her when she was near childbirth to give birth to the boy before an hour which he had observed, as is read in the history of Alexander the Great.

I myself knew a certain most learned prelate who awaited with an astrolabe the hour of his departure for his bishopric. When at last, because he trusted the stars, he had taken lodging on the first evening in a stable, he was killed by a stone from above while visiting the horses...

Another man, having chosen from the stars the hour for taking a wife, found her with an adulterer after a year had passed.

Hence Saint Ambrose writes in the book *Hexameron*:

> *How many persons do we see who, rescued from crimes and sins, have been converted to a better state? The holy Apostles were redeemed and gathered from among sinners not, indeed, by the hour of their nativity, but the advent of Christ sanctified them and the hour of the Lord's Passion redeemed them from death. That robber, condemned to capital punishment and crucified with the Lord, passed to the joys of Paradise not by benefit of his nativity, but by confession of faith. It was not the power of his nativity which cast Jonah into the sea, but the offense of disregarding a divine command. An angel of Christ, not a series of stars, freed Peter from prison. Paul, struck by a viper and troubled by shipwreck, was preserved not by the remedies of nativity, but by the merit of devotion. But what do we say concerning those who, after they had died, rose again through the prayers of the Apostles? Was it their own necessity or apostolic grace which raised them again? And what need was there for them to commit themselves to fasts, prayers, and dangers, if they could obtain what they wished by the benefit of necessity?*

These are his words.

Do the stars determine and revoke a determination? Do they possess a will?

Therefore, it is better that in all things we honor God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit - to whom is honor and glory, as Peter the Apostle said - by whose providence and our free will we do whatever good or evil things we do, than that, by following the sacrilegious foolishness of the astronomers, we deny the will by which we sin, invent a necessity in which we defend our transgressions, and falsely claim that we have from the stars, without cause, those ruined customs through which we are detested on earth by human beings.

Little Question Six of Principal Question Three

The response of theologians to those who think badly concerning fate

It is asked how theologians respond to the reasons, authorities, and examples of the philosophers who thought badly concerning fate in Little Question Three above.

To this it is answered that theologians resolve the subtleties, authorities, and examples of the philosophers as follows.

First, to the argument placed at the beginning, they say that celestial bodies are the cause of inferior effects by means of inferior particular causes which can fail in the lesser number of cases, as has been said.

And to the proof of the minor premise they say that all those things which Boethius touches upon there are understood to be done by God through secondary causes and are therefore contained under the series of fate. But the same account does not apply to all other things, as Thomas says in Part I, question 116, article 4, reply to the first.

To the authorities of the philosophers, astronomers, orators, and poets, they respond by denying them if those authors take fate for the connection of secondary causes without divine providence, for secondary causes do nothing except by the power of the first cause.

Damascene and Ptolemy, however, understand that celestial bodies constitute bodily habits and complexions in us inclinatively, not necessarily.

To the example of the two twin brothers, Hippocrates answers by saying that this occurred because, according as the parents were disposed in body while they lay together, so the beginnings of those conceived could have been formed. Then the same disposition of air and place - that is, of the house - similar nourishment, and the course of waters, which possess very great power for bodies to be conceived well or badly, as medicine attests...

...and also the same excitations could have fashioned such similar bodies that they were likewise moved toward becoming ill at one time by the same causes.

These things are from Augustine.

To the example of Lord John of Lignano, it is also said that he could not conquer fate because, for the sake of ruling, he did not reasonably repress his passion for ruling temporally or spiritually.

To the claim that astronomers very often predict true things, Augustine answers that this happens by chance, by art, or by the hidden prompting of spirits which are not good, whose concern it is to introduce and confirm false and harmful opinions concerning astral fates in human minds.

Little Question Seven of Principal Question Three

What fate is according to theologians, and whether it is to be conceded

It is asked what fate is according to theologians; what things they subject or do not subject to fate; in what sense Christians can admit fate in a Catholic manner; and in what respects, according to them, fate differs from the providence of God.

To this it is answered as follows.

First, to the first point, it is said that fate according to theologians is a disposition inhering in movable things, through which divine providence binds each thing to its own orders.

Or thus: Fate is the ordering or series of secondary causes toward producing their effects among these inferior things, according to the dependence which they have upon God.

This ordering of secondary causes toward producing their effects can be considered in two ways.

In one way, insofar as it is united in the prospect of the divine mind which orders and distributes all things by places, times, motion, and forms; and thus it is called the divine will or divine providence.

In another way, insofar as the same ordering, arranged and...

...applied to times, exists in the mediating causes ordained by God for producing their proper effects according to the dependence which they have upon God; and thus it is called fate.

It is therefore evident that God's will or providence itself can be called fate causally. But the disposition itself of secondary causes toward their effects, dependent upon God, is called fate essentially.

This disposition of secondary causes is called *fatum* from *fari*, "to speak," as though it were the utterance of divine providence, as Thomas says in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 93, and in Book I of the *Sentences*, distinction 39. For God speaks through fate by his providence, just as a human being speaks the conceptions of his heart through words, and just as an artisan manifests through the effect of a work the form which he has conceived concerning the thing to be made.

And just as an artisan leads to effect through temporal orders that which he has foreseen individually and mentally, so God through his providence simply disposes the things to be done, and through fate administers them multiply and temporally.

Three things can be gathered from these matters.

First, what things are subjected to fate and what things are not. For, since fate according to theologians is the ordering of secondary causes toward effects foreseen by God, it follows that only those things which are subjected to secondary causes are subjected to fate.

But if there are any things which are done immediately by God, since they are not subjected to secondary causes, neither are they subjected to fate. Such are the creation of the first things - namely, the four coevals: the angels, celestial bodies, time, and the matter of the four elements; the first supposits of all species, which were produced in the beginning; the glorification of spiritual substances; the justification of the impious; and souls, which are always created anew.

For all these things have emanated immediately from God and are created by him, and they could not and cannot be produced in another manner. Therefore, they are not subjected to fate, for those things which are done and disposed by a superior cause are not changed by an inferior cause.

For this reason Boethius says in the place cited above that those things which are nearest to the first divinity, fixed immovably, entirely transcend the fatal order of mutability. But those things which are remote...

...from the first cause are subjected to so many more bonds of fate and are so much more movable as they are more remote from the first cause. The example is evident in Boethius from the center of a circle and its circumference.

Thus, therefore, those things which have been and are done by God are subjected to him alone. But other particular and natural effects are subjected to the motion of the elements, the motion of the celestial bodies, the motion of the first movable, and finally the providence of the first immovable cause, from which all things possess whatever firmness they have and without which nothing remains in its own state. For when the first is removed, the things which follow are removed.

Second, it is gathered from the preceding how faithful Christians can concede that fate exists. For if fate is understood as the disposition of the stars under which someone is conceived or born, necessitating all inferior effects apart from the wills of God and human beings, then we must deny with Gregory that fate exists, when he says: "Far be it from the hearts of the faithful that they should say fate is anything."

But if fate is understood as the disposition of secondary causes and the ordering of human acts through their relation to God and his providence, as ordered and foretold or uttered through him, then we can posit fate. Nevertheless, the holy doctors refused to use even this name because of those who twisted the name against the position of the faithful.

Hence Augustine says in Book V of *The City of God*, chapter 1: “If anyone attributes human affairs to fate because he calls God's will or power itself by the name of fate, let him retain his opinion and correct his language.” These are his words.

Third, the difference between providence and fate is gathered from what has been said. For the disposition of things to be brought to completion, governed, and preserved in the prospect of the divine mind is called providence. But that same disposition in the mediating causes ordained by God for producing certain effects, and unfolded in times, is called fate.

They also differ because both necessary and contingent things are subjected to divine providence; indeed, fate itself is subjected to providence. But only movable things are subjected to fate.

They also differ...

...because divine providence, since it is the divine reason itself established in the highest prince of all things, as Boethius says, is in God, while fate exists only in secondary causes.

They also differ because things existing in God after the manner of divine providence are there united and simply one; but insofar as they are under fate, they are several and divided, and are called several fates, in which manner it is said by the poet: “Your fates draw you.”

They also differ because divine providence is called fate causally, insofar as the fatal ordering depends upon and descends from the ordering of divine providence. But the disposition of secondary causes itself, in itself, is called fate essentially.

Finally, they differ because divine providence is immovable and remains stable while causing all things to be moved. Fate, however, since it exists in movable things, is movable.

And let these things suffice for Principal Question Three concerning fate.

Principal Question Four of Chapter Nine

On fortune: whether voluntary acts and chance events are necessitated by it

Under this principal question five little questions will be resolved.

Little Question One of Principal Question Four

What fortune is according to the poets, how it is depicted, and what things are subjected to it

It is asked what fortune is according to the poets and gentiles; how they depict it; what they ascribe to it; and in what respects they think badly concerning fortune.

To this, beginning from a higher point, it is answered that the ancient philosophers and poets spoke in various ways concerning inferior effects and chance events which occur without order.

For Epicurus, together with Democritus, ascribed chance effects and human events to no determinate superior cause, but to chance; and chance, as Burley testifies in Book V of the *Physics*, is found properly in inanimate, irrational, and natural things.

Others, however, endeavored to reduce not only fortuitous and contingent effects but also human choices and acts to a certain superior cause necessitating all things. They called that cause fate, concerning which more was said above.

There were also certain third philosophers - gentiles and poets - who endeavored to reduce fortuitous events, choices, and human acts to a certain cause or intelligence hidden from the human intellect, which they called the goddess Fortune.

And they depicted her thus.

For they fashioned a single idol or maiden, whom they named a goddess from the universality of her causation. They depicted her blind, because she measures past, present, and future things; for they said that, while all were ignorant, good and evil things came from her. They depicted her two-faced, white in front for misfortunes, hairy in front because good fortunes assist at a suitable time, but bald behind because she harms at an unsuitable time.

They depicted her sitting upon a wheel, that is, distributing all things changeably, and they believed that she turned that wheel; for fortune does not know how to rest, as Seneca says.

They said that she was the happiness and unhappiness of human beings, and that she directed human beings immediately - that is, without the providence of God - to choose advantageously or disadvantageously. They held that she impressed upon the intellect and will of a human being hope or cognition of her effects. They set her over all distributions of good and evil things, over all good fortunes and misfortunes.

In their person Solomon said in Ecclesiastes 9: “I turned myself to another matter and saw under the sun that neither is the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to craftsmen, but time and chance are in all things.”

And Seneca says in his *Epistles*: “Fortune rules human affairs with no order, and scatters gifts with a blind hand, fostering the worse.”

And Juvenal says:

> *We make you, Fortune, a goddess and place you in heaven.*

And Sallust says in the *Catilinarian*: “Fortune assuredly rules in every matter. According to her whim, not according to the truth, she celebrates and obscures all things.”

And Plutarch, in the book *On the Remedy for Anger*, said in the person of Euripides: “God rules great things, but he has left our small things in the hands of fortune.”

And Juvenal again:

> *If fortune wills, you will become a consul from a rhetor;*
> *if this same fortune wills, you will become a rhetor from a consul.*

Evander, addressing Aeneas in Book VIII of the *Aeneid*, complained of her, saying:

> *Me, driven from my fatherland and following the furthest reaches of the sea,*
> *omnipotent Fortune and inevitable fate*
> *placed in these regions.*

And Seneca said in his first tragedy: "O Fortune, envious of brave men, how unequally you divide rewards among the good."

When Caesar saw King Pharnaces fleeing from the face of Pompey, he said of her, as Quintus Curtius reports: "Who denies that even exceptional glory is more often a benefit of fortune than of virtue?"

And Cicero says in Book II of *On Duties*: "Great is the power of fortune in either direction: who is ignorant of the prosperous or adverse circumstances which come from it?"

And Julius Celsus said: "Fortune is more efficacious than virtue."

But certainly all these err.

First, because they hold that fortune impresses something upon the intellect and will of a human being. We rejected this a little above, showing that it is impossible for celestial bodies to act directly upon the human intellect by impressing a species or cognition of their effects. Thomas also proves this in rejecting it in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 8.

Second, they err because they say that this fortune makes human beings fortunate and unfortunate. That this is false is evident as follows.

For, properly speaking, to make someone fortunate is to move someone, or to impress something upon him, toward choosing something for an end, so that he may obtain a good accidentally joined to some choice.

Celestial bodies, or fortune, cannot move and direct a human being through the influx of any sensory or intellectual apprehension, or of any appetite, toward choosing some future thing such that some accidental and unexpected event, good or evil, occurs to him. Therefore, they cannot make him fortunate or unfortunate.

The minor premise is proved. For it is proper to nature to tend toward one thing in the majority of cases. But that toward which someone is inclined and the chance event which is joined to that choice are not one thing in themselves, since they have no mutual order or agreement. For that someone should be instigated to go to a spectacle and should find his debtor there, or that he should be inclined from birth to dig a grave and should find a treasure, are not one thing except accidentally.

It follows, therefore, that this goddess or intelligence does not make someone fortunate or unfortunate.

Nor can a human being have from fortune or from celestial bodies that he always, or in the majority of cases, chooses those things to which certain advantages or disadvantages are accidentally joined. For, if this were so, he would always, or in the majority of cases, be made fortunate or unfortunate.

It follows, therefore, that the gentile poets and the others who are not true philosophers speak falsely when they posit an intelligence, some divine numen, or a star, as has been said.

For this reason Augustine deservedly refutes the aforesaid opinion concerning fortune in Book IV of *The City of God*, chapter 18, saying:

> *You call Fortune a good goddess, evidently because she receives a temple, has merited an altar, and sacred gifts are paid to her. How, therefore, is she a goddess if she is sometimes good and sometimes evil? Or perhaps, when she is evil, she is not a goddess, but is suddenly changed into a malignant demon. How, moreover, is she good, when without any examination of merits she happens fortuitously to good and evil human beings? And why is she worshiped when she is so blind, running indiscriminately into any persons whatsoever, that she very often passes by her own worshipers and clings to her own despisers?*
>
> *Or, if her worshipers accomplish anything, so that they are seen and loved by her, she now follows merits and does not come fortuitously. Where, therefore, is that definition of fortune?*

These are his words. From them the refutation is evident of the gentile poets and of those who are philosophers only in name, who affirm nothing certain or true concerning fortune.

Little Question Two of Principal Question Four

What fortune is according to philosophers and theologians

It is asked what fortune is according to philosophers and theologians.

To this it is answered that Aristotle in Book II of the *Physics*, and Thomas in his commentary there, define it thus: "Fortune is an accidental cause in those things which are done according to purpose in the minority of cases."

In this definition three things are touched upon which pertain to the nature of fortune.

The first is that fortune is an accidental cause. Hence, although the name of fortune is sometimes popularly transferred to the effect, so that we say, "Such a fortune happens to such a person," when some effect of prosperity or adversity happens to someone, nevertheless the name *fortune* does not signify this.

Rather, that which is the cause of that prosperous effect is properly called fortune. Therefore, it is said that fortune is not a cause of the effect in itself, but accidentally. For an accidental effect which is joined to a cause in itself, and which lies outside the account of the cause in itself and outside the account of the agent, is a fortuitous effect and is from an accidental cause, which is called fortune.

For example, the descent of a stone is in itself, and the going of a human being to the forum, if he has purposed this, also happens to be in itself. But that, while he is going to the forum, a stone happens to descend and break his head is accidental.

Thus this effect - the breaking of the head - arises from the concurrence of two causes. And although each of them exists in itself, nevertheless their concurrence for producing such an effect, which is the breaking of the head, must be accidental and from fortune.

The second thing which pertains to the nature of fortune is that fortune is a cause of those things which happen in the minority of cases.

This is evident through an example. If someone goes to the forum for some other thing and brings back from there money which he did not intend to bring back, then the bringing back of the money, whose cause was the arrival at the forum, occurs neither from necessity nor always. It therefore occurs in the minority of cases, because it happens only in fewer cases.

The third thing which pertains to the nature of fortune is that fortune is not a cause of those things which are done by nature, but of those things which are done according to purpose and by intellect.

That it is not from nature is evident, because nature operates either always or frequently and in a similar manner. Fortune, however, operates in fewer cases and dissimilarly.

Likewise, neither an inanimate thing, nor a child, nor a beast acts from fortune, since they do not act voluntarily as though possessing free choice. Hence neither good fortune nor misfortune can happen to these except by way of likeness.

Thus someone said that the stones from which altars are made are well-fortuned, because honor and reverence are shown to them while the stones joined to them are trampled underfoot. This is said by likeness to human beings, among whom those who are honored are called fortunate.

Hence good fortune is when some great good happens to someone beyond his intention. Misfortune, however, is when some great evil follows someone beyond his intention.

But if some curious person should ask here whether these things which are fortuitous accidentally and by chance are subjected to divine providence, it is answered that they are, yet not casually, contingently, and fortuitously, but providentially, preordainedly, certainly, and necessarily.

To understand this, Avicenna says that everything which happens can be compared with a twofold cause, namely a universal cause and a particular cause.

In relation to the universal cause, nothing happens fortuitously or by chance; for “nothing happens on earth without a cause,” namely, a cause in itself, as is said in Job 5. But it does so in relation to a particular cause.

The reason for this is that, since a universal cause has a more universal end than a particular cause, something certainly falls under the intention of the first cause, which is universal, although it lies outside the intention of the second cause.

Thus, in relation to the first cause, which is most universal, nothing happens casually or fortuitously. Nevertheless, in relation to inferior causes, many things happen and can happen casually and fortuitously, and this in greater and lesser degree.

Thomas in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, and Lord Bonaventure in Book III of the *Sentences*, distinction 37, declare the same thing and say thus: Although something may be casual or fortuitous with respect to nature, a particular agent, or a created intellect, nevertheless nothing is casual or fortuitous with respect to the providence of God, by whom all things have been foreseen and preordained.

For example, if a lord sends one of his servants to some place to which he had then also sent another servant, the first being ignorant of this, the servants' meeting with one another lies outside the intention of each servant sent, but not outside the intention of the one sending them. Hence, although such a meeting is fortuitous with respect to the servants, it is not so with respect to the lord, with respect to whom it is preordained and foreseen.

Thus, therefore, I speak of contingent things in this world. With respect to secondary causes they occur fortuitously and contingently; nevertheless, with respect to the first universal cause, namely God, from whom nothing can be withdrawn, nothing fortuitous or

casual happens. Rather, all things follow providentially, in an ordered manner, and necessarily.

I say likewise concerning the good fortunes or misfortunes of human beings which happen to a human being by comparison with secondary causes - that is, with respect to the heavens, angels, and other secondary causes. By comparison with God, however, nothing can happen, since nothing is casual or unforeseen for him, and since...

...all things fall under his providence and under his certain foreknowledge, intention, and ordering.

These things are from theologians and philosophers.

Little Question Three of Principal Question Four

What things make a human being well or badly fortuned

It is asked how many and what are the things which make human beings fortunate and unfortunate.

Thomas responds to this in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapters 90 and 92, where he says in substance that, since the human being is ordered according to the body under celestial bodies, according to the intellect under angels, and according to the will under God, a good according to fortune can happen to him in three ways: namely, from heaven, from an angel, and from God.

For the fact that the will of some human being is instigated to dig, or that he is caused to dig where he finds a treasure, proceeds from no human power. Rather, this occurs either because he is disposed by heaven, because he is illuminated by an angel, or because he is inclined by God.

This causality exists differently in these three.

First, heaven leads a human being to choose something whose reason he himself does not know, whence he is made fortunate by means of a certain passion which it impresses upon the body.

Second, a good or evil angel disposes a human being to choose something whose reason he does not know, whence he is made fortunate. It does so not by impressing some passion, as heaven does, but by illuminating him by means of a certain intelligible consideration, prompting him to choose or to know something which it is good to do. For it belongs to the intellect of an angel to order many things to one, although not by illuminating concerning the end why it is good to be done.

Third, God inclines the will of a human being toward choosing something whose reason he does not know, whence he is made fortunate. And he is properly said to make a human being fortunate, because he alone clearly beholds and simultaneously foresees all things, their relations, intentions, and motions, and consequently the accidental conjunctions and encounters of all things. This can naturally belong to no other created cause.

Therefore God alone can properly and efficaciously make a human being fortunate, but the heavens, a human being, or an angel cannot, since they do not behold or foresee all the things aforesaid.

Augustine speaks of these three things which make a human being fortunate in Book V of *The City of God*, saying: "Fortune is a hidden cause proceeding from God, heaven, or any spirits whatsoever."

Nicholas of Lyra agrees with this opinion of Augustine at the beginning of his work upon the Psalter. He says that the motion of one who is well or badly fortuned is from God, insofar as God moves our will toward choosing something whose reason it does not know; or from a natural cause, namely from the influence of the celestial sphere; or from the intelligence of the mover; or from both together. It is from the good or evil spirits themselves; from heaven by the mediation of a certain passion which it impresses upon our bodies; and from angels insofar as they illuminate our intellect, or disorder it if they are evil. These are his words.

In this manner fortune is properly called divine providence itself, which those who curse fortune blaspheme.

For a clearer understanding of these matters, however, five things must be noted here.

The first noteworthy point is that, since someone is properly said to be made well or badly fortuned when he is directed by superior causes toward effectively choosing, executing, doing, or omitting something to which some unexpected event, good or evil, is accidentally joined for him, the heavens, angels, and God are therefore said in different ways to make a human being well or badly fortuned.

For the heavens are said to make someone well fortuned in a common sense, insofar as they impress some passion upon the body through which the will is inclined to execute something which it does not know, whence a good happens to it.

Angels, however, are said more properly than the heavens to make someone well fortuned when they illuminate or instigate the intellect, whence the will is afterward inclined to execute something which it does not know, whence a good happens to it.

But someone is said most properly to be made well fortuned when his will is inclined by God, he is illuminated by angels, and he is inclined by the heavens to execute something which he does not know, whence a good happens to him.

And conversely, someone is said in a common sense to be made badly fortuned when his will is inclined, wills, and consequently does things contrary to those toward which heaven moves him.

He is said more properly to be made badly fortuned when his will and choice are inclined and he does things contrary to those toward which heaven inclines and an angel instigates him. For a human being does not always choose that toward which an angel intends and a celestial body inclines him.

Therefore, although divine providence never ceases in any matter, an angel is nevertheless sometimes said to fail in the guardianship of human beings, insofar as a human being can fail to choose that toward which the angel moves him, according to Jeremiah 51: "We have cared for Babylon, and she has not been healed. Let us abandon her."

But someone is said most properly to be made badly fortuned when his will, from a fixed intention, strives after and does things contrary to those toward which heaven inclines, an angel instigates, and God moves him. Thus it is written concerning a certain man in Jeremiah 22: "Write that man as sterile, a man who shall not prosper in his days."

The second noteworthy point is that God and the angels, for various reasons, make good and evil human beings fortunate and unfortunate.

For they sometimes make the good unfortunate as punishment for some fault or foolishness, or for the exercise of virtue, namely prudence, patience, and so forth. They sometimes make the evil fortunate in order to draw them back from evil or to reward them for good things done in sin, and so forth.

Therefore, in all things we ought to give thanks to God.

The third noteworthy point is that a human being is said to be fortunate or unfortunate with respect to corporeal goods, not spiritual ones.

The reason for this is that a human being is then said to be well or badly fortuned when some good or evil happens to him beyond his intention, as is evident above. Spiritual goods or evils, however, cannot occur beyond intention, since they consist in choice. Therefore, and so forth.

The fourth noteworthy point is that God's kindness toward human beings is great in this respect: he not only joins good things to them through the common course of nature and also manifestly in a supernatural manner, but also secretly, by way of making them fortunate, multiplying good things unexpectedly and removing evil things.

The fifth noteworthy point is that, since neither a human being nor an angel can, according to the common law, foresee all evil things and foreknow all accidental and unexpected causes, but God alone can, and since fortune or misfortune is an accidental cause, and so forth, we ought therefore to commit ourselves to God in all chance dangers which happen to us, so that he may preserve us from them.

Augustine speaks of these chance dangers in Book XXII of *The City of God*, chapter 22, saying: “But because of childish punishments,” and so forth. See his long statement there.

These things, however, are from theologians and philosophers.

Little Question Four of Principal Question Four

On the conditions of fortune

It is asked how many conditions of fortune there are.

To this it is answered that, although its conditions are many, nevertheless there are nine principal ones.

The first of them is that fortune impels a human being without any reasoning proper to the fortunate human being.

This is evident because those impulses which the well-fortuned follow are without reason. It is evident because, if some well-fortuned person is asked why he follows such an impulse, he will not know how to give a reason. Rather, he will say, “I do this because my heart thus dictates to me.” And thus, in place of a reason, he will assign the pleasure of his will and the dictate of his heart, saying, “Thus it pleases me, and thus my heart dictates.”

The second condition of fortune is that it exceeds and surpasses the prudence of wise human beings.

The reason for this is that such persons - namely, the well-fortuned - must receive that divine instinct which surpasses every sense and every intellect.

Hence all human prudence can effect absolutely nothing concerning good or evil fortune.

The third condition of fortune is that it favors the simple and foolish more than the wise.

This is proved in two ways: by reason and by example.

By reason thus: that person is more fortunate who follows divine instinct more. But simple persons, having put reason aside and not being devoted to external actions, perceive and follow interior instincts and divine impulses more than do the wise, who follow reason. Therefore.

Second, the same is evident by example. For just as the blind, after losing their eyes, remember more and retain what is remembered more firmly, so simple persons, having put reason aside, follow divine instincts more. For a sense directed toward several things is less attentive to each individual thing.

Hence we see foolish persons more frequently victorious in battles, fortunate in games of dice, and experiencing many instances of good fortune. For this reason there exists a proverb expressed as though it were a proven saying: “For Fortune, provided there is little sense, that is enough.” And again: “Where there is fortune, there is weakness of intellect.”

The fourth condition of fortune is that fortune is mixed. Hence in this life no one is found so happy and fortunate that he is not badly fortuned in some respect.

Hence Augustine, assigning a reason for this in Sermon 19 upon Matthew, says: “God therefore mingles bitternesses with earthly felicities, so that some felicity may be sought whose sweetness is not deceptive. Run through all those who have been called happy.”

The fifth condition of fortune is that it is equitable and just, because good persons frequently seem to be unfortunate.

Hence Gregory says in Book XV of the *Moralia*: “The prosperity of the present life is not a witness of innocence, because many return to perennial life through scourges, while very many are led to endless punishments without scourges.”

And Gregory says again in a certain homily: “The prosperity of the present life is sometimes given so that it may summon someone to a better life, and sometimes so that it may condemn him more fully for eternity.”

Therefore, no one ought to rejoice over a well-fortuned sinner.

Hence Augustine says upon a Psalm: “Let no one congratulate a human being because he prospers in his life, when his sins lack an avenger and have a praiser. This is the greater wrath of the Lord. For the sinner has provoked the Lord so that he does not suffer the scourge of correction here.”

The sixth condition is that fortune has a defect of truth. For we believe many things to be fortunate which are not, and conversely.

Therefore, we ought to consider good or evil fortune diligently.

Hence Augustine says in *On the Words of the Lord*: “It belongs to great virtue to wrestle with felicity. It belongs to great felicity not to be conquered by felicity.”

The seventh condition is that fortune itself is unstable. For the good fortune of this world lasts a short time.

Hence Innocent says in his book *On the Utility of the Human Condition*: "Suddenly, when it is not suspected, misfortune happens, calamity rushes in, and death - which no one escapes - intercepts."

Hence Seneca says in Epistle IV: "Fortune has advanced no one so far that she does not threaten him as much as she had promised. Do not trust this tranquility; in a moment the sea is overturned, and on the same day ships are swallowed where they had played."

Hence Boethius, reciting the words of Fortune, says: "We play this continual game; we turn the wheel in a revolving circuit; we delight to change the lowest things into the highest and the highest into the lowest."

The eighth condition is blindness.

Hence the pagans depicted fortune as blind, because, running indiscriminately into any persons whatsoever without any examination of merits, she comes to the good and the evil.

She is not, however, called blind because she herself is blind, but because she very often makes those whom she embraces blind.

Hence Livy says: "It rarely happens that good fortune and a good mind are given to human beings at the same time."

And Boethius says:

Fortune makes the one whom she fosters blind and foolish.

And Juvenal says in Book II:

For common sense is almost rare in her.

And Tully says in *On Friendship*: "Fortune has blinded many ignorant persons to no moderate degree."

The contrary of this happens to a prudent person.

Hence Seneca says: "The instability of fortune does not shake the mind of a prudent person."

For a virtuous person is neither raised up by good fortune, because there is no exterior good which he values greatly, nor cast down by evil fortune, because he is saddened by no misfortune so greatly that he turns aside from the path of reason, as the Philosopher says concerning the magnanimous person in Book IV of the *Ethics*.

The ninth condition of fortune is that it is never perfect. For that to which nothing is lacking is called perfect.

But no one in this life is so fortunate that something is not lacking to him, that what he possesses suffices for him, and that he does not have infinite bitternesses together with his felicity.

Hence Boethius says in Book II of *The Consolation*: "With how many bitternesses the sweetness of human felicity is sprinkled! Even if it seems delightful to the one enjoying it, nevertheless it cannot be kept from departing when it wishes."

These things are from theologians and philosophers.

Little Question Five of Principal Question Four

Whether a physician, farmer, gambler, and soldier are made fortunate by the stars in their actions

It is asked whether physicians, gamblers, soldiers, and farmers are made fortunate by the stars in their works.

It seems at first that this question should be answered affirmatively, as follows.

For, just as we see that certain inanimate or natural bodies acquire from celestial bodies and their impressions certain occult powers and singular efficacies, in addition to those which follow upon the active and passive qualities of the elements - as a magnet has the ability to draw iron from the power of a celestial body, and certain stones and herbs have other occult powers from heaven - so nothing prevents some human being from possessing, through the impression of a celestial body, some singular efficacy for accomplishing certain corporeal things prosperously which another does not possess, as does a physician in healing, or a farmer or soldier.

In response it must be said that Avicenna, Lord Henry of Hesse, and Saint Thomas in Book III *Against the Gentiles* answer this question in different ways.

For Avicenna says that a physician, farmer, gambler, soldier, and so forth do not prosper beyond other human beings in their works because of some impression of the heavens in their nativities.

Rather, this can arise from the strong imagination of a human being, which works great efficacies and marvelous effects not only in the human being but also in exterior matter, as is evident from the fascination exercised by old women, as will be said in the Third Decade.

Avicenna therefore says that, just as the number chosen upon the dice comes more quickly to a gambler who possesses a stronger and more vehement imagination concerning some desired number than to another who does not possess so strong an imagination, so also a physician, soldier, and farmer who imagine more strongly and strive more vehemently toward the desired effects will operate more powerfully and better than other physicians, farmers, and soldiers who do not strive so vehemently toward similar effects.

But this is not valid, because the aforesaid position of Avicenna concerning the imaginative power acting upon interior or exterior matter is rejected as vain and fantastical by philosophers as well as theologians. It has a foundation neither in reason nor in experience, as Saint Thomas adduces in Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 103, and in Part I, question 116, as will be proved below in the ninth chapter of the Third Decade.

Another is the opinion of Lord Master Henry of Hesse upon Genesis, who holds against Thomas. He says that it cannot come to human beings from any disposition of heaven that they perform the things which they intend more profitably than other human beings.

This is evident, he says, because one power acting naturally always tends toward the same effect in a similar circumstance.

But we see that a soldier, physician, farmer, or gambler does not always tend toward the same effect in a similar circumstance. Therefore.

For example, if there were some occult natural power in the lot in a game of dice, it could not occur without the thing toward which the lot had been inclined by the heavens happening

always or frequently. For if a celestial power in the lot turns the dice to seven pips, it will always move them in that manner, whether the gambler chooses seven or any other number. This, however, seems to be false and contrary to experience. Therefore.

The same must be said concerning a physician, farmer, and soldier.

If he is asked whence this prosperity in gaming occurs, Henry would say that it sometimes proceeds from God, so that someone may perform some exercise more prosperously than others.

Hence Sacred Scripture also attributes things of this kind to God's direction, as is evident in Genesis 30, in the rearing and mating of Laban's animals under Jacob's care, and in Genesis 39, where the prosperity of Potiphar's affairs in the hands of Joseph is attributed to God and not to natal fate.

In a game of dice or in similar affairs, however, someone can be made fortunate only by good or evil spirits. Through hidden cooperation they can accomplish this either by moving the dice in the air or by moving them in the hand of the person throwing them, so that whatever one person chooses upon the dice always happens for him and not for another.

Lord Henry says similarly concerning physicians that, all other things being equal on the part of the art of medicine and on the part of experience of the sick person, the application of medicines, and conduct, one physician is no more or less healing than another, except perhaps accidentally.

This would occur insofar as one physician might possess a certain corrupt, contagious, and pestiferous complexion which infects sick persons through sight, touch, or breath, just as the basilisk infects through sight and an unclean woman infects a mirror. Conversely, one should think the same concerning the complexion of a healthy, cheerful, lively, and salubrious physician who, all other things being equal, benefits a sick person more than another physician who is sickly, and so forth.

Likewise, a devout physician who in his practice has recourse by night to Jesus Christ, asking to be directed toward the health of the sick person whom he has in his care, benefits that sick person more than another who, all other things being equal, trusts only in his art while despising Christ, as is evident among devout physicians and among Jews practicing medicine.

He says the same concerning a soldier and a countryman. If they are believed to possess from the heavens, all other things being equal, that one fights more fortunately than another and that grain sown by the hand of one countryman comes forth better than grain similarly sown in the same field and at the same time by another countryman, this is superstitious, and these persons seem to act according to fatal superstition.

Again, he says that this position could give unbelieving and fantastical persons an occasion to think that Christ was born in such a way that he acquired from heaven a certain marvelous healing power, naturally healing through himself all whom he touched or saw, just as the basilisk kills.

The aforesaid author adds that those who hold the affirmative answer to the question to be true embrace that superstitious opinion concerning astrological images: that fixed natural things receive such impressions from the stars. Indeed, it would be believed that artificial things, such as images fabricated under certain configurations of the stars, receive impressions from the stars. This opinion, as he says, is most vain.

The aforesaid Henry also answers Thomas concerning the magnet, saying that the magnet does not possess a power of attracting iron accidentally superimposed upon it by heaven. Rather, it possesses this as a second quality derived from the whole species and consequent upon its specific complexion, just as occurs with the powers of herbs, stones, and seeds. These powers have not been superinfused by celestial bodies but are entirely consequent upon their specific complexions and forms.

Saint Thomas, however, holds that, just as natural bodies obtain certain occult powers consequent upon their species through the impression of celestial bodies...

...so also certain human beings, through the impression of the heavens in their nativities, obtain certain occult powers by which they prosperously and effectively accomplish beyond other human beings the things which they intend.

He maintains this in Book III *Against the Gentiles* and also in Part II-II, question 96, article 2, where it is said that, although natural bodies obtain some occult power from celestial bodies, as has been said, images formed by astronomers possess no power from celestial bodies.

But if they appear to possess any power, it is from the operation of demons. A sign of this, he says, is that certain characters which naturally effect nothing must be inscribed upon them.

There he also establishes a difference between astronomical and necromantic images. In necromantic images there are explicit invocations, illusions, and explicit pacts with demons. In astronomical images, however, there are tacit pacts through the signs of certain figures or characters.

Therefore, both kinds of images are condemned in the Decrees, cause 26, question 2, chapter *Illos*.

Which of these opinions - namely, that of Saint Thomas or that of Lord Henry - should be held is not for one of my measure and ignorance to judge.

Greater assent should be given to Lord Thomas, both because he is holier and because his doctrine is more approved. I, however, would hold the path from which fewer inconveniences would follow.

These things are from the authorities introduced within this little question.

Principal Question Five of Chapter Nine

On the divinatory practice of future effects from the stars and from images, or from congregations of stars in heaven

Under this principal question three little questions will be resolved.

Little Question One of Principal Question Five

Whether God placed in the firmament images of animals and of the species of the inferior world

It is asked whether God, from the beginning, placed the stars in the starry heaven - that is, the firmament - according to certain forms or images of the animals and species of the inferior world.

It seems at first that this question should be answered affirmatively. For Sacred Scripture makes express mention of certain clusters of stars which God constituted and disposed in heaven at the beginning. Therefore, the antecedent is proved.

For the Lord says in Job 38: “Will you be able to join the shining stars, the Pleiades, or will you be able to disperse the circuit of Arcturus? Do you know the order of heaven, and will you place its reason upon the earth?”

And Job himself says concerning God in chapter 9: “Who alone stretches out the heavens and walks upon the waves of the sea; who makes Arcturus, Orion, the Hyades, and the interior regions of the south; who does great and incomprehensible and marvelous things.”

And again, Amos 5: “You who turn judgment into wormwood and abandon justice upon the earth: who make Arcturus and Orion.”

Therefore, it can be held from Sacred Scripture that God constituted from the stars the aforesaid images of which all astronomers make mention.

For Arcturus is an image of a she-bear situated around the Arctic pole, in which seven more noble stars form, as it were, a wagon possessing a shaft.

Likewise, the stars which are called the Hyades and Pleiades are in heaven in a certain image, according to the astrologers.

Likewise, Orion is an image of a terrible armed man holding a sword, who is also called bold. As is evident from the table of fixed stars which is placed in the seventh distinction of the *Almagest*, the figure of Orion comprises twenty-eight stars and is situated in a remarkable part of heaven before the footsteps of the Bull...

...as Isidore says in Book III.

The astronomers say that God also placed forty-eight other images in heaven, of all of which Sacred Scripture makes no mention: namely, twelve in the Zodiac - Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, and so forth - and thirty-six outside the Zodiac.

Among these thirty-six images is the image of a winding dragon situated around the Arctic pole. According to Ptolemy, there are thirty-three stars in this image. Around that dragon are two images of she-bears, namely the lesser and the greater.

Likewise, among those images is the image of Perseus, that is, the image of a man carrying the head Algol, that is, the devil.

Again, there is the image of a man on fire or encircled by flames. There is the image of a dancer, the image of a juggler, images of two faces, images of serpents, scorpions, dogs, a wolf, a hare, and a stag; the image of Pegasus, a winged horse; the image of Hydra; and the image of a centaur whose anterior part is that of a human being and posterior part that of a

horse. And so concerning other monstrous forms of this kind, as can and customarily does appear in the pictures of astronomers, and so forth.

But the contrary is established because Scripture says in Genesis 2: “Therefore the heavens and the earth were completed, and all their adornment.”

But what adornment and perfection would heaven possess if it consisted of chimerical monstrosities and images fashioned not by God but by the devil?

In response it must be said that, just as the tortuous, deceitful dragon and prince of this world once filled the earth with various monstrous images of idols by suggesting that some god presided over every kind of thing, so, with God's permission, he attempted to fill God's most beautiful and glorious work - namely heaven, which God constituted as an object of religious contemplation for mortals - with images in which he himself was accustomed to appear, and to make it a mirror of superstitious divination.

For if the Lord God had placed the forms and images of animals in heaven so that some fixed face should correspond to earthly animals, from which they depended, individuals were formed and preserved, and they received their countenances, then, just as he placed in heaven the images...

...of fierce and vile beasts and of useless chimeras, much more would he have placed there the images of gentle and useful animals and of certain virtuous human beings.

But we see in heaven no image of a dove, but of a stag; not of a lamb, but of a goat; not of the cross and of the Crucified, nor of a priest, but of a juggler.

Therefore, was almighty God more solicitous for the preservation of fierce animals, frogs, and useless serpents than of gentle animals which serve human beings in many ways? It is therefore false that such images among the stars of heaven were formed by God.

Likewise, if the Lord God subjected every species of generable and corruptible things to its own image in heaven, where is the image of the vine? Where is the image of a fruit-bearing tree? Where is the image of wheat and of the other species especially necessary for human use?

Isidore therefore spoke well in the final chapter of Book III of the *Etymologies*. After he had interpreted the foreign names of the aforesaid images, he adds:

> *Observations of other signs, or the other superstitious things which join themselves to the cognition of the stars, are without doubt contrary to our faith. They ought therefore to be unknown to Christians, so that they do not even appear to have been written. But some, enticed by the beauty and brightness of the stars, fell with blinded minds into the fall of the stars, so that through harmful computations - which are called mathematical arts - they endeavor to be able very often to foreknow the outcomes of things. Not only the doctors of the Christian religion, but also Plato, Aristotle, and others among the gentiles, moved by truth, condemned them with one judgment, saying that confusion of things is generated from such persuasion rather than that it benefits human felicity in any way.*

These are his words.

From this statement of Isidore three things are obtained.

First, many superstitious things have been joined to the consideration of the stars.

Second, conjecture concerning future things tends rather toward the confusion of human affairs than toward their direction. Hence it is superstitious to consider from the stars dreams and the thoughts of human beings.

Third, true and accomplished philosophers, diligent investigators of things, hold from their own principles that this business is superstitious.

Hence Isidore adds concerning Plato and Aristotle: “And although they were not devoted to heavenly wisdom, nevertheless, through testimony to the truth, they rightly exposed their errors.”

These are his words.

The response to the objections placed at the beginning of the little question will be evident in the final part of Little Question Three.

These things are from Henry in the place cited above.

Little Question Two of Principal Question Five

Whether images can in some manner be transferred superstitiously into heaven

It is asked whether such images could have been transferred into heaven in some reasonable manner and not vainly and superstitiously.

Or thus: whether such images were transferred and attributed to the stars in heaven in some reasonable and non-superstitious manner.

To this it is answered that five causes are found for the transference of such images into heaven.

The first cause is assigned by the poets. For the poets fashion the Ram in heaven in honor of Jupiter, whom they say had the horns of a ram upon his head.

They likewise place the Bull in heaven in honor of Jupiter, because, according to the fable, he was changed into a bull when he carried Europa across.

They also established Castor and Pollux after death among the best-known signs, as the sign Gemini; the Lion in honor of Hercules, who killed it most valiantly in Greece; and Capricorn on account of a certain goat, the nurse of Jupiter.

And so concerning the fables of others, as is evident in the book on the forty-eight images of heaven.

Idolaters and gentiles, however, transferred images of this kind into heaven by reason of the honor or praise of certain virtuous human beings, or of animals on account of certain notable deeds or singular benefits which they performed in the inferior world. Because of these things they transferred human beings among the gods or goddesses…

…and animals among the stars of heaven, as Isidore says in Book VIII of the *Etymologies*.

Hence also, as William of Paris relates, the superstition of the gentiles believed that upright and strenuous human beings in this life ascended after death to the beings above, into certain sidereal dwellings or corresponding stars, while evil persons descended to the infernal regions.

Therefore, when they looked upon the brightly starred heaven, they asked: “Where is the dwelling of Hercules? In what star does Hector live? Where does this or that person live?” and so forth.

For this reason the stars were distributed by the gentile poets and idolaters according to the aforesaid images in honor and deification of famous human beings, whom they call their gods.

This manner of transference is entirely vain and superstitious.

The second manner of transferring specifically the aforesaid twelve images of the Zodiac among the stars could have been for expressing by way of likeness the state of the Sun or a property of the air or season which happens for the most part when the Sun is in this or that part of the Zodiac.

For example, they could have placed Cancer in the fourth part of the twelve signs of the Zodiac because, when the Sun comes to that sign in the month of July, it goes backward in the manner of a crab and makes the days shorter; for this animal directs its movement toward either side.

Likewise, they could have called the sixth of the twelve parts of the Zodiac Virgo, because in those days during which the Sun runs through it, the earth, exhausted by the heat of the Sun, bears nothing.

The following part can be called Libra because, when the Sun is at the beginning of that part, there is equality of day and night.

They could have called the final parts of the Zodiac Aquarius and Pisces because, when the Sun is there in wintertime, rains occur more frequently; and so concerning similar cases.

Nevertheless, according to this manner, the nature commonly attributed to the twelve signs cannot be derived.

The reason is that otherwise that part which is called Cancer ought to be called hot and dry, because when the Sun is there the air is such for the most part. Yet the same sign, with respect to inhabitants beneath the pole, beneath the equinoctial, or in another part beyond the equinoctial, would possess...

...one complexion or another with respect to this or that region.

Therefore, proceeding really and physically, the natures of the signs or twelve parts of the Zodiac, if any nature is found in them, must be derived from the fixed stars which are in them and alongside them on either side toward the south and north.

Nevertheless, however this may be, this manner of transferring the signs is not superstitious unless it is extended farther than it ought to be. This would occur, for example, if someone believed that, because a person was born with Cancer in the ascendant, he would be a backward and duplicitous human being in his customs. Every such claim would be superstitious.

The third cause or original occasion for transferring such images among the stars could have been a certain conformity in the position of the stars in particular aggregations. Thus even now country people call one cluster of stars a wagon and another a hen with her chicks. This is not superstitious.

The fourth cause of a transference of this kind could have been that the ancient philosophers, considering certain congregations of stars, inferred from the observation of effects that a particular cluster of stars possessed a particular nature and property.

For example, it was experienced that someone who had the image of an ape in the ascendant when he was born acquired a face similar to that animal.

But this is false.

For I take, by way of example, the assemblage of stars which is called the Bear and, in Greek, *arctos*, and I argue thus.

It is naturally impossible for the nature of that cluster of stars to be known. Therefore, the proposition is established.

The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved because the given nature of a fixed star cannot be known except from some aspect of a planet existing in the same degree of the Zodiac with it. But this can in no way be known. Therefore.

The reason is that every passage of a semicircle between the poles of the Zodiac through the degree of a star comprises several fixed stars, and it cannot be known to which of them the aforesaid effect belonged. Therefore.

The fifth and final cause of this superstition could have been that spirit of error whose greatest care, according to Blessed Augustine, is to introduce harmful opinions among human beings, especially concerning astral fates: namely, that these or those configurations of the stars are causes or signs of such future effects.

He suggested that so many configurations, so many aspects, so many relations, so many images, so many positions, so many dispositions, and so many variations of the stars should be observed in that beautiful work of God, heaven, that scarcely any effect - even a chance effect - can newly happen without its trace afterward being able, as it were, to be found there.

From this it is easy for astrologers afterward to reduce and color the effects which happen to the stars, as though those effects had shone forth from them. But they can predict nothing certain before the event.

This cunning rival of human salvation, the devil, who in earlier times suggested to lost human beings various divinatory arts - such as geomancy, magic, and necromancy - also suggested to human beings this practice of divination from the stars.

He perceived that such a divinatory art could be rendered more plausible than the aforesaid arts, because human beings commonly experience that the stars act in many ways upon these inferior things.

It is therefore very dangerous to involve oneself in that practice or art of judgments, especially according to the traditions of the ancients, who occupied themselves with the stars not as investigators of truth but as diviners from the stars.

These things are from Lord Henry of Hesse upon Genesis.

Little Question Three of Principal Question Five

Whether a certain divinatory practice concerning future events can be obtained from the stars and images

It is asked whether human beings can possess from the stars and such images some certain and divinatory practice concerning effects and future events.

It seems at first that they can, because the species of generable things are eternal and fixed, although individuals ebb and flow.

It follows consequently that some fixed face in heaven corresponds to each species of such things, from which it depends and is preserved, and that its individuals are formed and receive their countenances from it, as even the Philosopher seems to intimate in Book II *On Generation*.

Likewise, Ptolemy says in proposition 9 of the *Centiloquium*: “The faces of this lower world are subjected to celestial faces.”

Likewise, we see that the power of some image, which the individuals of species obey, can be stably impressed upon some elemental matter fashioned artificially.

For a certain image of a scorpion was found which had been formed by a certain astronomer at the time when the image of Scorpio flourished in heaven, and it cured human beings bitten by a scorpion.

Likewise, the astrologer Haly Abenragel, in Book IV, which concerns natural things, chapter 1, relates concerning a certain son of a king who was born with Libra in the ascendant and several planets above it, namely Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury.

For this reason astrologers were summoned. Among them Haly at last said that, if the boy passed beyond the third day, there would be a great marvel concerning him and it would be possible for that boy to utter some prophecy.

And it happened that, before twenty-four hours had passed, that boy sat up and began to speak, saying: “I have been unhappily born to announce the destruction of the nation of Almazar and to indicate the transfer of the kingdom of Azdexit to foreigners.”

Having said this, he fell and died. Therefore.

Likewise, it has been experienced that a boy born with the Bear in the ascendant or in the first house of the hemisphere acquired a countenance and physiognomy like that of a she-bear. And so he would have acquired the face of an ape if the image of the celestial ape had been ascending, and according to this manner in other cases.

Likewise, Master Lawrence of Perugia, a barber, teaches from the inspection of images in a book which he published that future events of this kind can be known. Therefore.

But to the contrary is Isidore in Book III of the *Etymologies*, who says that the business of the images of heaven is superstitious.

And under the title *On Mathematicians*, the civil laws judge that superstitious mathematicians are to be expelled entirely from political communities, and so do the saints.

Pope Sixtus V, through letters patent in the year of the Lord 1586, decreed that such persons were to be expelled and punished as corrupters of morals and of the Christian religion, subjecting them to censures and penalties, both ecclesiastical and secular.

Their arguments are answered as follows.

First, in answer to the first argument, the consequence is denied. The reason for the denial is that species of things are perpetuated through the generative power implanted by the Creator in corruptible things when they were first created, and likewise through the natural instinct and inclination which we see to be present in all animals to generate something like themselves. Thus the Sun and stars contain these inferior things virtually, not figuratively.

To the second, concerning Ptolemy's proposition, it is said that, if he understood that every terrestrial species so depends upon some corresponding celestial image that, when that image flourishes above, the species flourishes below; that, when it makes something fortunate above, it makes it fortunate below; and that it can establish and impress upon some artificially fashioned elemental matter a power which the individuals of that species obey - I say that he spoke while deceived by the fame of the opinion which then flourished concerning such images.

To the point concerning the fashioned image of a scorpion, it is said that the effect of curing a scorpion's bite did not come from the intrinsic power of the image in heaven. Rather, it could have arisen in many other ways through accidental things concurring in the cured arms-bearer and in those similarly injured.

For it is also said in the same place that the image was inscribed upon a certain precious stone, from which such a power could have arisen.

Likewise, it is said there that the ancients carved celestial faces in a stone and mixed with it other things necessary for this purpose.

Again, it is also said there: if the ring had such a power from the celestial Scorpion, how then did it cure scorpion poisoning and not rather increase the danger by conforming itself to the nature of that species of venom?

From these things the response to the third argument is evident.

To the fourth it is said that, since it lies beyond the power of the natural course for a boy of twenty-four hours to sit up, speak, and prophesy concerning future things, it is clearly apparent that this effect was not from the stars but rather from demons, who offered themselves there to mock credulous persons - various and superstitious human beings who would believe that the origin of prophets came from the action of the stars and not from a special gift of God.

The response to the fifth was given above under the fourth cause for transferring the images.

To the point concerning Master Lawrence, who recently made a book concerning fortune, it is said that it is scorned by the learned with the same ease with which it is approved by fools.

For, just as the alcocoden and ylech - which are not planets but places from which the years and lifespans of those born are sought - were invented by the Chaldaeans and Arabs for the deception of human beings, so also the casting of dice or the first fruits of the novenary fortune of the planets possess no property.

And when it is said that Sacred Scripture often speaks of those images - for example, of Arcturus, Orion, and so forth - it is answered that it does not follow that God constituted such images at the beginning so that human beings might attribute the effects of superstitions and vanities to them.

Rather, he did so that, upon seeing the figures of such images, they might praise God, their maker, in all his holy and marvelous works.

Principal Question Six of Chapter Nine

Whether astrologers can judge truly concerning the length and brevity of the lives of those born from inspection of the ylech and alcocoden in the degrees of the Zodiac

It is asked whether astrologers, from inspection of the ylech and alcocoden - that is, from the places of the planets or the degrees of the Zodiac - can judge truly concerning the length and brevity of the lives of those born.

To this the astrologers answer affirmatively, saying that the stars are causes of living longer, while attempting to measure the life of each human being through the disposition of the planets in the figure of heaven at the hour of the nativity of the given person.

They attempt to demonstrate it in this manner.

For they establish one of the planets or degrees of the Zodiac, which they call the *ylech* in the Arabic language and which they choose according to a certain method described by Ptolemy...

...Alcabitius, Haly Abenragel in Book IV, chapter 3 of his work, and other authorities on astrology.

Then, once the ylech has been chosen, they choose for the person born the *alcocoden*, that is, the giver of years. This is that planet which has the greater strength and dignity in the degree of the ylech.

And from these two paths they affirm or presume that they can know how many days or years one born at such an hour ought to survive.

The first path consists in considering how many years, or how much time, the alcocoden gives to the person born.

Hence three different quantities of years are attributed to each planet - namely, greater, middle, and lesser years - as is evident from Alcabitius and Guido Bonatti of Forlì.

Therefore, as they say, if the alcocoden is in the angles and is fortunate and strong, it gives its greater years to the person born. If it is in the succedent houses and is less strong or well disposed, it gives its middle years to the person born. But if it is in the cadent houses, it gives its lesser years to the person born, which they call *frindarii*.

Or, if any of the beneficent planets - such as Jupiter, Venus, and the Sun - regards the alcocoden by a trine or sextile aspect, it will add its own lesser years to it.

But if any of the malevolent planets, such as Saturn and Mars, regards the same alcocoden with a square or opposite radiation, it will diminish it by its own lesser years, as is evident in Book IV of Haly, chapter 6.

The second path by which those astrologers attempt to learn the quantity of the life of the person born consists in considering after how many years the ylech will come by direction to the place of a killing planet, such as Mars or Saturn, or to the dragon's tail. That planet is

called the killer of life. Therefore, the farther it is distant from the degree of the ylech, the longer the person will live.

It will indeed be distant by equinoctial degrees discovered through a certain difficult calculation, which is called a *direction*, or *athazir* in Arabic. Each of these degrees is customarily taken to give one year. This calculation is set forth in Book IV of Haly, chapter 7; it is also described by Alcabitius and in other books of astrologers.

But to the contrary: these two paths, or modes, of determining the years of those born and their progress toward death from a higher root...

...are overturned by the causes adduced by Lord Henry upon Genesis and by Lord Nicholas of Lyra upon Genesis, chapter 5, for the longevity of the ancients from a lower root.

Moreover, although it can be established by many arguments of theologians that those modes are frivolous and superstitious, and were introduced of old not through experimental observation but through the suggestion of the devil, nevertheless, in this matter the same point is especially established from the ineffable truth of divine history.

For the divine histories assert that human beings at one time lived more than nine hundred years, at another time eight hundred, and at another seven hundred, as is evident from the course of the Book of Genesis.

But it is established from the traditions of astrological superstition that no planet constituted as the alcocoden in any figure of heaven can give so many years of life to those born.

The reason is that the greater years of no planet extend beyond one hundred and twenty years. If the lesser years of six planets were added to these by reason of beneficent aspects - something which nevertheless can scarcely or never happen in heaven - the result would be two hundred and fifty years, or thereabouts. No more than these can be given from heaven to any person born on the part of the alcocoden.

And again, as regards the second mode, which, as evidence of its superstition, frequently conflicts with the first mode: it is certain that the killing planet cannot be distant from the ylech at the hour of the nativity by three hundred and sixty degrees. Rather, it must necessarily be distant from the ylech by less than this. Consequently, the extent of a human life from that root cannot exceed three hundred and sixty years, or thereabouts.

They might, indeed, say that no beneficent aspect of the fortunate planets can free the person born from the killer. But this does not avail: first, because in antiquity the common period of human life was the number of years prescribed above; second, because the years of the alcocoden cannot correspond to the degrees of direction.

Therefore, those paths appear false and superstitious from the aforesaid truth of Scripture, by which it is established that many lived for a very long time beyond the years which heaven, even doubling its grant through the two paths, can give to those born.

Therefore, let some superstitious person say what figures of heaven those who lived nine hundred or eight hundred years possessed, and he will be able to discover nothing except that his practice is vain and superstitious in every respect.

Again, let some such person say why, in four thousand years or thereabouts, no one has been born, nor will anyone ever be born, under any figure of heaven similar to the figures of the nativities of the ancients who lived for so many years.

I say likewise with respect to those things which concern length of life, and none of the astronomers will be able to say anything on this subject which possesses any appearance of truth among true philosophers.

These things are Henry of Hesse's upon Genesis.

Principal Question Seven of Chapter Nine

That no astrologer can predict and judge certain things concerning future events

It is asked, in view of what has been said concerning celestial bodies, images, fate, fortune, the ylech, and the alcocoden, whether astrologers can form a certain judgment concerning future events solely by attending to the state of all acting secondary causes.

And it seems that they can, through an argument from the authority of Master Guido Bonatti of Forlì, who says at the beginning of his great book on the judgments of the stars: astronomers judge future events from the stars. And although the stars are innumerable, nevertheless the astronomer himself makes use of them all, since he makes use of the twelve signs under which nearly all the stars are comprised. For this reason he says that more is known about heaven through astrology than about God through theology.

To this it is answered very briefly, without an expenditure of arguments: no.

The reason is that, in order that a certain judgment *a priori* be made from causal signs, three things are required.

First, the power and state of those signs, with respect to one another or in themselves, must be sufficiently known.

Second, the manner in which such signs or causes are applied to determinate matter must be known beforehand.

Third, the disposition of that matter or patient - whether apt or inapt with respect to the action or influence of such causes or such active power - must be known beforehand.

For example, although a physician knows that a certain medicine is laxative so far as it is concerned, and knows in addition when and how it is applied to Socrates, he still does not thereby know that such an effect, or perhaps its contrary, will follow, if he does not know how the body of Socrates is constituted in its accidental and radical complexion, or intrinsically disposed.

And the case of the astrologer is much more strongly so. For although he knows that, for example, a conjunction of the Sun and Moon is accustomed to produce rain, nevertheless he cannot predict with certainty whether it will rain at a future conjunction - and this for many reasons.

First, because the nature of the planets and of the fixed stars is not sufficiently established: why, in one conjunction and another, different stars are regarded circularly by the conjoined luminaries distinctly according to the three aspects.

Second, because the manner in which that conjunction or its power is applied cannot be known beforehand, nor where it is applied to a greater, better, or worse degree.

Third, even if it were well known to which region it was applied, nevertheless the astrologer would not know whether that region was at that time disposed to the contrary by some accidental mode.

For we see rain occur by the power of one conjunction in one region which at that time is disposed to it accidentally, whether by reason of its location, winds, or complexion; and at that time it does not rain in other regions not so disposed, because the power of such a conjunction is not sufficient to produce rain there.

Ptolemy speaks to this effect in propositions 5 and 17 of the *Centiloquium*.

And again, even supposing it to be known that the power of a conjunction made in such a sign is directed toward such a region, and that it raises from it vapors sufficient for rain, it nevertheless does not follow that it therefore rains there. For clouds or vapors raised from the sea or from one region are sometimes carried by the winds to another region...

...where there will be rain. And thus there cannot be certainty in this judgment.

Therefore, if an astronomer cannot give or form a certain judgment concerning the most natural and most common effects of the conjunction or opposition of the two great luminaries of heaven - whose nature and influence are the most manifest among all the stars - what and how great is the temerity of wishing to give judgments from other stars, whose natures are known most insufficiently, concerning future effects not only in the elements but also in the powers of the mind and in human moral acts?

Add, moreover, that since divination, prognostication, or the judgment of astrologers concerning future effects in the world, as they admit, depends upon the dispositions, actions, and properties of the fixed and wandering stars, and since no mortal knows their dispositions, actions, and properties, it follows that no sufficiently qualified astrologer can predict and judge certain things concerning future events.

And let us speak of each point.

First, who knows the properties and number of the fixed stars? Certainly, he who knows their names, which are imposed from their properties. And since God alone knows the multitude of the stars and calls them all by name, therefore - and so forth.

For astronomers, as is evident from Part VII of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, discovered only 1,022 stars, or places of stars.

And just as there are great and noble stars around the Arctic Pole, so perhaps there are nobler ones around the Antarctic Pole, which is hidden from us, because that part is on the right side of heaven above, which is nobler than the left according to Aristotle. Yet none of those stars is included in that number of 1,022.

The reason is that no one ever saw the stars around the Antarctic Pole, unless perhaps Adam did while he was in the state of innocence. It therefore follows that none of the astronomers can judge with certainty.

Furthermore, who knows why God placed so many fixed stars in the one orb of the eighth sphere, which contains and surrounds the orb of the highest planet, or in what order he placed them: whether they all stand at equal distances from the center of the world, or otherwise?

Whether one stands near the convex surface of that orb, another near its concave surface, and another in the middle of its thickness? Whether they are at equal distances from one another, so that, if they all appeared, they would seem to stand at equal distances from one another?

Or whether they are equal in magnitude according to the truth, although one appears greater than another, as if it were situated lower in the same sphere?

And again, whether their position constitutes certain images - namely, Aries, Taurus, and so forth? And again, whether all the fixed stars are equal?

Therefore, since all these matters concerning the fixed stars are doubtful to mortals, it follows that certain and indubitable knowledge of principles and effects cannot be had from doubtful and poorly known principles.

Likewise, none of the astronomers is yet certain concerning the number of the planets, or wandering or erratic stars, which are said to be seven.

For just as the star Mercury rarely departs so far from the Sun that it can be seen, so perhaps there are some wandering stars or planets which always move invisibly to us beneath the rays of the Sun.

Who, moreover, properly knows the position of the planets? For Ptolemy places the Sun in the middle of the planets, but Geber, the Chaldaean astrologer, says that it is immediately above the Moon.

And although it can also be sufficiently established that the Moon is the lowest of the planets, because it eclipses the Sun, and although there are also some slight congruities and persuasions that Saturn is the highest of the planets and Jupiter immediately beneath it - namely, from slowness of motion and things of this kind - nevertheless no way can sufficiently establish in common the order of position among the planets, which are the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn: which is above or below another.

Likewise, many doubts remain concerning the movements of the stars around the subterranean Antarctic Pole. On account of this Albategnius said that there can still be some movement in the stars and orbs which no human being has experienced or will experience, as is evident concerning the star which appeared to the three Magi at the time of Christ's nativity.

From all these things it is apparent that astronomers, who in their judgments trust in the positional order of the planets in their epicycles and eccentric circles, from which they derive their judgments in many cases, cannot give a certain and valid judgment concerning future events, whether natural or voluntary.

This is especially so because in such judgments it is necessary to have regard for the fixed stars, which seem nobler and higher and consequently very powerful with respect to inferior things. Yet, as is clear and was said above, neither are their influences yet established, nor has their number been comprehended, nor can the property of their congregations be known.

Therefore, from all the things which have been said in this ninth chapter, it is sufficiently and clearly apparent how very rarely - and perhaps from a true cause - the lords of astronomy can judge future effects from the stars.

Nor does that reed staff, the support of the ignorance of certain astronomers, protect them when they say indiscriminately of anything which they find among the ancients: “It was experienced thus.”

For Hippocrates, the philosopher most deeply concerned with nature, says: “Life is short, but art long; time is acute, experiment fallacious, judgment difficult.”

Therefore, if it pleases certain kings and princes sometimes to have astronomers, let them keep them and have them for amusement and for instruction in certain universal matters concerning the celestial bodies. But let them in no way trust their judgments in things to be done particularly for themselves or for the commonwealth, abandoning the counsel of prudent men.

The reason is that, although some curious conjectural art concerning future events from the stars can be discovered, nevertheless, on account of the causes stated and many others, it cannot extend to so great a certainty that it can benefit with certainty a particular human being or the commonwealth.

Nor have governors of commonwealths who have been accustomed to trust such persons ever prospered, as can be gathered from ancient histories and many examples.

Now to that vain and superstitious assertion of Guido of Forlì, who says that, although an astrologer does not know the places and influences of all the stars, he nevertheless makes use of them all because he makes use of the twelve signs, under which nearly all the stars are comprised.

It must be answered that, if he takes “sign” for a twelfth part of the Zodiac, he speaks falsely.

But if he takes it for a twelfth part of the starry heaven, which falls between two semicircles meeting at the poles of the Zodiac, I say that this confused use of all the stars in no way suffices for judgments concerning future things. For from those stars which fall in that twelfth part of heaven, a given twelfth part of the Zodiac is said to be of such or such a nature.

But for judgments so particular as Guido himself presumes to give, it is necessary to know whether all the fixed stars regarding from every side some planet situated, for example, in the first degree of Aries would assist or impede it in its action. This cannot be known unless the natures and properties of each of the stars are known, which is impossible for mortals, as was clearly shown above.

And to his statement that more is known about heaven through astrology than about God through theology, it is answered that it is true that more is known about false and superstitious opinions concerning heaven, introduced from every quarter by astrologers, than perhaps can be known by human means concerning true conclusions about the Lord God, revealed by the Holy Spirit for salvation.

These things are Henry of Hesse's upon Genesis. Let what has been said above concerning the ninth chapter suffice.

Addition

The Lord God revealed concerning divine things only as much as was necessary for our salvation, according to the saying: “These things have been written so that you may believe and, believing, may be saved.” But astrologers have spoken many vain and superfluous - indeed, false - things.

Chapter Ten and Last Principal Chapter of This First Decade

Concerning the Beatitude of the Rational Soul

Around this subject six little questions will be resolved, each of which will be set forth below in its order.

Question One of Chapter Ten

In the act of which of the soul's powers its beatitude consists

It is asked: in the act of which of the soul's powers does its beatitude consist?

To this it is answered that there have been three opinions concerning this question.

The first is that of the school of the Reverend Scotist Fathers of the Order of Minors. The second is that of certain moderns. The third is that of Saint Thomas and all the doctors of the common school.

But before the opinions are recited, it must be known that, when it is asked in the act of which of those powers beatitude consists, the question is not whether the ultimate beatifying end, considered as a thing, is in an act of the intellect or of the will. No one has ever maintained this, since the ultimate end, considered as a thing, is the divine essence and not something created.

Rather, the meaning of the question is: through which act of those powers is that end - which beatifies objectively and simply effectively - reached?

Thus, once the title of the question has first been understood, I say that the Scotist school holds that beatitude consists in an act of the will.

This is proved first as follows. Beatitude is the highest good. But the good, as such, is the object of the will. Therefore, beatitude is more properly the object of the will.

Likewise, that which is better in beatitude is more principal within it. But with respect to the object of beatitude, it is better to love than to know: both because love proceeds from the most perfect habit of charity; because it unites more, since love is a unitive power according to Dionysius; and because, according to Hugh of Saint Victor, love is more penetrating, since love enters where knowledge stands outside. Therefore, beatitude consists more principally in an act of the will.

Likewise, according to Boethius, beatitude is “the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” Therefore, every good which pertains to beatitude, since it falls within its perfection...

...belongs to its being.

Likewise, delight, which is of the essence of beatitude, pertains to the will. Therefore.

The antecedent is proved. That without which beatitude is not desirable is of the essence of beatitude. But without delight beatitude is not desirable, as is evident in Book VIII of the

Ethics, where the Commentator says that no one would sustain the good itself if sadness were present in it. And he says again that the good itself is nothing other than felicity. Therefore.

Likewise, Augustine says that beatitude is joy concerning the truth. But there joy is principally expressed in the abstract. Therefore.

Likewise, beatitude must be placed in that act which God requires more from us. But God requires more from us that he be loved than that he be known. Therefore, the creature ought to desire this more and to rest in it more. But that in which the creature rests more pertains more essentially to beatitude. Therefore.

Likewise, it is more perfect to love God than to know him. This is proved because many knew him and nevertheless did not love him, as did the philosophers who, although they knew God, did not glorify him as God, as Paul says in the first chapter of Romans.

Likewise, beatitude must be placed in that act through which we are united more closely with God. But through an act of the will we are united more closely with God. Therefore.

The minor premise is evident because some things which are understood are not pleasing, and therefore union with them does not occur, but aversion does. Nothing, however, is loved unless it is pleasing.

Likewise, the order of Seraphim is above that of Cherubim. *Seraphim* is interpreted as "conflagration," and *Cherubim* as "fullness of knowledge." It follows, therefore, that love is better than knowledge.

Likewise, the reward ought to consist in that power in which merit consists, as justice requires. But merit consists in an act of the will. Therefore.

Likewise, the nobler operation must be attributed to the noblest power. But the will is a nobler power than the intellect.

This is proved because that which possesses the character of moving and commanding is nobler than that which possesses the character of being moved and obeying.

Finally, and twelfth, it is argued as follows. With respect to things which are below the soul, an act of love is less perfect than an act of cognition. But with respect to those things which are above it, it is more perfect.

The reason for this is that things exist in the soul in a higher mode than they do in themselves. But the will is moved toward things according as they exist in themselves.

Therefore, when through love the will is joined to things which are below it, it becomes in a certain manner lower than itself. But when it is joined to those things which are above it, it is elevated above itself.

Conversely, when things which are below the soul are in the intellect, they possess there a nobler being than they possess in themselves. But things which are above the soul possess a less noble being in the created intellect than they possess in themselves.

Since, therefore, God is the object of beatitude and, with respect to him, the act of love is nobler than the act of cognition, beatitude will consequently be in the act of love, which is an act of the will, and not of the intellect.

The second opinion is that which says that beatitude consists essentially in the acts of both powers.

For according to these men, fruition includes within its formal definition a twofold act, namely an act of the will and one of the intellect. For fruition is the final delight and rest which is possessed concerning the ultimate end attained through the intellect.

And because felicity consists principally in fruition, and fruition itself is more principally in the will than in the intellect - as Saint Thomas also says in Book I of the *Sentences* - it therefore follows, according to these men, that felicity consists principally in the will and not in the intellect.

But this opinion is false.

It is proved because one and the same act cannot exist in both the intellectual and the affective part.

And when it is said that fruition is the final delight in the ultimate end attained through the intellect, and that felicity consists principally in fruition, and so forth, it is answered that fruition can be understood in two ways.

In one way, formally, and thus it is an act of the will.

In another way, radically and originally - that is, according to that which is necessarily presupposed by fruition and which fruition immediately follows, just as a passion follows its proper subject. In this manner I say that fruition follows an act of the intellect.

And in the first manner felicity does not exist in fruition...

...except as in the proper passion of felicity. But in the second manner felicity is essentially in an act of the intellect, so that, if it were granted by an impossibility that someone had attained the ultimate end through an act of the intellect, he would immediately be essentially happy even if fruition in that end did not follow.

It must therefore be denied that two acts exist in fruition formally understood. Rather, there is one act, which is not felicity essentially, but completively, with the completion of perfection in the second mode and not in the first.

It is customarily said scholastically that to enjoy initiatively, objectively, and effectively is through an act of the intellect. And in this manner we enjoy God alone.

Formally, however, we enjoy created beatitude. Electively, we enjoy charity as the habit eliciting the act of fruition. Instrumentally, we enjoy the power whose act fruition is. Completively, however, fruition is in the will.

There is also a third opinion - which, with the leave of others, I would call the more common opinion of Saint Thomas - which holds that the object of beatitude, namely God, is attained first and principally through an act of the intellect.

This is proved first as follows.

In every motion, the movable thing, so long as it is in motion, is imperfect, because motion is the act of that which is imperfect, according to Book III of the *Physics*. And when it is at the terminus, it possesses the perfection toward which it tended through motion, as is evident in every motion, but more plainly in local motion.

But the time of faith is like a certain motion; hence the faithful are called wayfarers in the fifth chapter of Second Corinthians: “We walk by faith.” Therefore, this time is imperfect, and it lasts until God is attained through his essence.

But he is first attained through vision, because vision itself is the terminus of the motion of faith. Therefore, beatitude consists in vision.

If it is said that vision does not terminate the motion of faith, it would follow that one seeing God would be a wayfarer.

If it is also said that it is true that beatitude is at the terminus of motion, but that this is on account of love, which terminates the motion of faith just as vision does because it exists with vision in the same instant, this does not avail. For although vision and love exist together in time and duration...

...nevertheless vision is prior to love by nature, and they are two really different acts. Hence, if vision did not terminate the motion of faith, it would follow that one seeing, insofar as he is seeing, would be a wayfarer.

And this argument, in my judgment, demonstrates that beatitude consists in an act of the intellect.

Likewise, the proposition is proved secondly as follows.

Desire is perfected when the desired thing is possessed, not because it is loved - whether by preceding love, which concerns a thing not yet possessed, or by subsequent love, which concerns a thing already possessed.

Thus, when someone desires money, his desire is made perfect when he has acquired it. From this it is evident that perfection lies in possessing and in no manner in loving, whether the love precedes or follows.

But God is possessed by the blessed through an act of vision and not through an act of love. Hence Augustine says in Book I of the *Soliloquies*: “To see God is the same as to possess him.” Therefore, desire is perfected in possessing.

Third, as follows. If beatitude consists in an act of love, since the love of the way and of the fatherland is the same - because charity never fails - it follows that one who is in charity is blessed, even though he loves less now than he will then. In the same way, one who is less or more white is white.

If it is said that beatitude does not consist in love simply, but in as great a love as is the love of the fatherland, to the contrary: someone on the way possesses a greater love than someone in the fatherland. Therefore, that person is blessed.

Likewise, beatitude must be placed more in that state from which there is a change of state than in that from which there is no change of state. But the change of state is in vision and not in love, because love there and here is of the same kind, but vision is not. Therefore.

Likewise, merit is ordered toward reward. But merit consists in love. Therefore, the reward ought not to be placed in love, for this would be nothing other than to say that we love in order that we may love, which would seem absurd.

For we do not love, in any kind of love, in order that we may love, but rather in order that we may be loved.

But because beatitude consists in one's own act...

...and not in another person's act, we therefore do not love even in order that we may be loved. Since, therefore, we do not love in order that we may be loved as for the sake of a reward, it remains that we love in order that we may see. Therefore, the final reward is vision.

Further, the reward when attained is loved. Therefore, if beatitude is placed in an act of love, it follows that love is loved, which is said incongruously.

But if it is said that the vision of God is loved immediately, no one would admit that this was said incongruously. Therefore, it must be said that beatitude consists essentially in vision, but in love secondarily and outside its essence.

For love and delight of this kind are accidents which perfect beatitude, just as beauty perfects youth.

Nor should anyone say: because vision precedes love, love is therefore nobler, since it adds some goodness to vision. For according to this reasoning delight would be still better, since it adds its own goodness to each of them, and yet beatitude is not placed in delight.

Likewise, it is proved that the blessed person is joined to God in no manner through an act of the will.

For there are three operations of the will and no more: to desire, to love, and to delight.

It is established, however, that the desired object is not joined to desire through desiring, because desire properly concerns that which one does not possess.

Nor is it joined through delighting, because delight is caused by conjunction and presupposes it.

Nor is it joined through loving, because love concerns that which is possessed just as it concerns that which is not possessed. Hence, since love is of the same kind before the thing is possessed and after the thing is possessed, if conjunction does not occur through it before possession, neither does it occur through it after possession. Rather, love follows the conjunction which must occur through an act of the intellect.

This position is also evident through John, chapter 17, who says: “And this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. I have glorified you upon the earth; I have completed the work which you gave me to do,” and so forth.

And in Luke, chapter 10, it is said: “Blessed are the eyes which see the things that you see.”

And Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, at the reference printed as “17”: “Vision is the whole reward.”

And in the *Enchiridion*, at the place cited, it is said: “Full vision is the highest...

...felicity.”

The position is elicited from Thomas, Book III *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 59; the First Part, question 12, articles 1, 2, and 3; and the Master of the *Sentences*, with many other doctors, in Book IV, distinction 49.

Now, however, let us answer the arguments of the lords and Reverend Scotist Fathers.

To the first, Thomas replies in the First Part, question 26, article 2, reply to the second objection, saying that, although beatitude, insofar as it is a good, is the object of the will, nevertheless the object is understood prior to the act of the power.

Thus, according to the mode of understanding, divine beatitude is prior to the act of the will resting in it, and this prior beatitude can be nothing except an act of the intellect. Hence this beatitude is considered in the act of the intellect. Thus he.

To the second it is said that the love of the fatherland is not as good as cognition, although here on the way the reverse is true. For on the way God is loved immediately and seen mediately, and therefore love is better. But in the fatherland the reverse is true, because he is seen immediately and loved through the mediation of a habit, and therefore vision is worthier.

The reason is that here the intellect is borne toward God through an inferior likeness, but the will is borne toward God himself according as he is in himself, since it belongs to the will to be inclined toward a thing as it is in itself.

And when it is said that love penetrates within, and so forth, I say that this authority is understood concerning the love and cognition of the way, where cognition in general is the principle of desiring, and therefore desire commands that the matter be searched more profoundly. But it is not so in the fatherland.

To the third it must be said that Boethius intends there to give the common account of beatitude, according to which the Philosopher says that beatitude is a sufficient good - that is, one which, when possessed, brings possession of every good.

To the fourth it is said that the inference does not follow: “That is not desirable without beauty; therefore beauty is of its essence.”

The reason is that something is desirable insofar as it is essentially good, but beauty or delight is superadded accidentally. Therefore, through the former it is good simply and a being without qualification; through the latter it is good and a being in a qualified respect.

To the fifth it is said that beatitude is not essentially in joy but by concomitance, because supreme joy follows upon the truth known. From this it should rather be concluded...

...that the contrary is true, because it is evident from the authority that joy presupposes truth known by the intellect.

To the sixth it is said that on the way the act of love is required more because it is more suited to meriting. It is not so in the fatherland, because the intellect is more suited to seeing.

To the seventh it is answered by making a distinction: either in moving or in attaining. I say, therefore, that loving God is more perfect in moving, but knowing him is more perfect in attaining.

To the eighth it is said, by denying the major premise, that it is not incongruous that we should be united more through something and yet not be beatified through it.

Thus delight adds something beyond vision, yet it is outside the essence of beatitude. In this manner we are united more through delight, but we are nevertheless not beatified through it.

And when it is said that the intellect does not unite because we understand things which are not pleasing to us, it is said that, whether they are pleasing or not, the intellect is nevertheless made one with the intelligible object.

To the ninth it is said that, if beatitude were placed in an act of love, every blessed person would have to be in that act; therefore, all the angels would be called Seraphim, which is false.

To the tenth, the major premise is denied. For the desire for the sweetness of wine is in the appetite, and nevertheless its sweetness is perceived in the taste.

And if it is said that divine justice requires this, it must be said that, where there are diverse persons, this has truth. But it must not be understood of diverse powers rooted in one essence, because all are rooted in one essence. Moreover, the power does not merit; rather, the composite does.

To the eleventh it is said that the will is nobler with respect to the command of the act, but the intellect is nobler with respect to the specification and determination of the object.

To the twelfth it is said that on the way love is nobler than cognition, but in the fatherland the reverse is true.

The reason is that on the way we do not know God through his essence, and therefore God exists in our intellect in a lower mode than he exists in himself. But in the fatherland God is known through his essence by the intellect, so that there his essence is both the principle of understanding and the object. And since the intellect is nobler than the will, therefore...

...and so forth.

And thus it is evident what must be held concerning the question.

These things are from the theologians.

Addition

See Lord Thomas in the *First Part of the Second Part*, question 3, article 4. From him you have that beatitude consists essentially in an act of the intellect, and in an act of the will as in a certain extrinsic perfection.

It appears also from this that his final statements increase the difficulty for some. Hence the doctors hold various and diverse opinions, such as Giles in Book I, Richard in Book IV, Brulifer, and Lord Bonaventure.

Some - such as our Ambrose Spiera of Treviso - reconcile the Holy Doctor with Scotus by saying that fruition is initiatively on the part of the intellect, but completively on the part of the will, because those things which are prior in cognition are posterior in perfection, from Book XII of the *Metaphysics*.

But you should hold, if it pleases you - for it is the common opinion - that the total account of beatitude consists in the intellect, but that it consists in the will as in something supervening and adorning it.

In this the Blessed Thomas and the Philosopher are followed: the latter says in Book X of the *Ethics* that felicity consists in contemplation; and John, chapter 17, says, “This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God” - though not as Thomas of Strasbourg expounds and glosses it.

Question Two of Chapter Ten

Whether one person is more blessed than another in heaven

It is asked whether in the fatherland - that is, in the empyrean heaven - one soul is more blessed than another.

To this it is answered that two things are included in the account of beatitude: namely, the ultimate end itself, which is the highest good, God; and the attainment or fruition of that good.

It is said that, with respect to the highest good itself, God, who is the object and cause of beatitude, one beatitude cannot be greater than another, nor one soul more blessed than another, because there is only one highest good, namely God, through the fruition of whom human beings are blessed.

Hence, on the part of the thing seen, namely God, there is equality in beatitude, for God offers himself equally to all. The unity of the denarius given to the laborers demonstrates this parity and equality, in Matthew, chapter 20.

But with respect to the attainment and fruition of the highest good itself, namely God, it is said that one person will see more clearly and perfectly than another, and will be more blessed.

This is proved by reasons, authorities, and examples.

The first reason is taken from a clearer light.

For in the fatherland the blessed will see God in the light of glory, which is the principle of divine vision, according to the saying of the Psalm: “In your light we shall see light.” Therefore, those who will be more perfectly illuminated by that light will see the essence of God more perfectly.

The second reason is taken from more sublime virtue.

For virtue is a certain disposition for receiving the measure of glory. But some surpass others in charity, which is the principle and cause of meriting. Therefore, such persons will see God more perfectly.

Hence Augustine, in Homily 4 upon John - which is also placed in *On Penance*, distinction 2 - says as follows: “Not the number of works, nor the length of times, but greater charity and a better will increase merit. For he who preserves charity in his conduct possesses what is manifest and what is hidden in the divine books.” Thus he.

The third reason is taken from the nearer order of angels.

For human beings are to be assumed into the orders of the angels, as is said in Luke, chapter 20. But the higher angels see God more clearly than the lower, as is evident through Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy*. Therefore, some human beings will see God more clearly than others.

See Thomas in the *First Part of the Second Part*, question 5; Book III *Against the Gentiles*; and the disputed questions *On Truth*, question 8.

Secondly, this is proved by the authority of the Apostle in First Corinthians, chapter 15, who says: “There is one brightness of the Sun, another brightness of the Moon, and another brightness of the stars; for star differs from star in brightness.”

This authority is expounded by Augustine as follows...

...For just as those celestial bodies - the Sun, Moon, and stars - although they are of one nature, are nevertheless of diverse brightness, so human beings, although they are of one nature, will nevertheless be of dissimilar glory in the resurrection.

The second authority is John, chapter 14: “In my Father's house are many mansions.”

Expounding this authority, Blessed Augustine says in the book *On Holy Virginity*: “Because eternal life itself will be equal alike for all the saints, one denarius, which is the reward of all, is attributed to all. But because in that eternal life the distinct lights of merits will shine, there are many mansions with the Father. Thus, with respect to the denarius, one will not live longer than another in an unequal eternity; but in the many mansions one will be honored more brightly than another.”

The third authority is that of the Apostle in First Corinthians, chapter 3, who says: “Each one will receive his own reward according to his labor.”

Expounding this authority, Saint Thomas says in the same place: “The reward of the saints will be common to all and proper to each. It will be common to all because that which all will see and that which all will enjoy is the same, namely God. It will be proper to each because one will see more clearly than another and will enjoy more fully according to the measure determined for him.”

Hence also in Daniel, chapter 12, the learned are compared to the brightness of the firmament, and those who instruct many unto justice are compared to the stars.

Thirdly, this is proved by examples.

For just as through the light of the agent intellect the possible intellect is made capable of knowing natural intelligible things, so through the superadded light of glory it is made capable of seeing the divine essence.

But through a greater efficacy of the agent intellect the possible intellect can know more things. Therefore, through the efficacy of a greater light of glory, the divine essence will be capable of being known more perfectly.

The second example is as follows.

As proximity operates in corporeal things, so it operates in spiritual things. But among corporeal things, the nearer a body is to fire or to the Sun, the hotter and brighter it is. So it happens among spiritual things: the nearer and more closely joined a spirit is to God...

...the more clearly, perfectly, and fervently it will see God and love God.

The third example is as follows.

The brightness of the body will indicate the brightness of the mind, for the brightness of the body will overflow from the brightness of the mind. But some will possess more brightness of body than others, according to the saying of Daniel, chapter 12: “The learned will be as the brightness of the firmament, and those who instruct human beings unto justice will be as the stars.” Therefore, the aforesaid persons will see God more clearly.

These things are from Raynerius.

Question Three of Chapter Ten

Whether a less good but more learned soul is more worthy in heaven than a better but less learned soul

It is asked whether a less good but more learned soul in the fatherland is more worthy than a better but less learned soul.

To this it is answered that, in fact, the more learned but less good soul is more excellent in heaven than the less learned but better soul.

Nevertheless, this will be almost nothing in comparison with the other prerogatives which the better but unlearned will possess by enjoying the divine essence better and more clearly.

And thus you should say that the more learned will be more blessed in a qualified respect, but the holier will be more blessed absolutely, as will be evident below.

Question Four of Chapter Ten

That the person who possessed a more intense degree of charity in this life is more blessed in heaven

It is asked whether one who possessed a more intense degree of charity, without acts of martyrdom, teaching, and virginity, is more blessed than one who was adorned with the aforesaid acts but possessed a less intense degree of charity.

To this it is answered that, since essential beatitude is possessed according to charity and its degree, one who possessed a more intense degree of charity will be more blessed than every person who loved less, even if the latter possessed acts of martyrdom, virginity, and teaching.

Hence Blessed Francis and Blessed Mary Magdalene in the fatherland are, as is believed, more blessed and enjoy the divine essence more perfectly than many other saints adorned with aureoles, because perhaps the former possessed a higher degree of charity and loved God more ardently than the latter, who were endowed with the aureoles which are owed to acts of virginity, teaching, and martyrdom.

And Blessed Dominic, our leader and father, is perhaps more blessed absolutely than some martyrs because he loved God more.

Hence, although some holy martyr, in the accidental reward and particular joy possessed in the fatherland from the act of martyrdom, can surpass Dominic, Dominic himself will nevertheless surpass that martyr in charity, to which the essential reward of beatitude is owed. Yet Blessed Dominic too is adorned in the kingdom of heaven with the golden crown of essential beatitude and also with the aureoles of virginity and teaching.

These things are Thomas's in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 49, and in the *Quodlibetal Questions*.

Question Five of Chapter Ten

How many names the soul obtains

It is asked by how many names the rational soul is named in the Scriptures.

To this it is answered as follows: according to its diverse offices, the soul obtains a variety of names.

For it is called *soul* insofar as it communicates life to the body. Hence it is said in Genesis, chapter 2: “Man was made into a living soul” - that is, one giving life to the body.

The principle or first source of life is the vegetative soul, whose works are to use nourishment, to generate, and to grow. Therefore, the rational soul, insofar as a soul gives life and consequently the other works of life to the body, is called *soul*.

But it is called *spirit* insofar as it gives the body an immaterial, intellectual, and immortal power.

Therefore, in the present state the rational soul is called *soul* insofar as it communicates life and the consequent works of life to the body. But after the judgment and the general resurrection...

...it will be called *spirit*, insofar as it will communicate immortality to the body with respect to all who are to be saved and damned, but impassibility, glory, and power with respect to the good, whose bodies will be spiritual and adorned with the endowments of bodies. For the elect alone, and not the damned, will possess the endowments of bodies.

The soul is also called *spirit* insofar as it breathes.

The soul is called *animus* while it wills. It is *mind* while it knows. It is *memory* while it recollects. It is *reason* while it judges rightly. It is *sense* while it senses something.

For from this the soul is called *sense* in place of those things which it senses, whence also it received the name *sententia*.

See Thomas in the First Part, question 97, article 3; Isidore in Book XII of the *Etymologies*; and Thomas again in the disputed questions *On the Soul*, question 12, article 2.

Question Six of Chapter Ten

Why the soul does not rule the body invincibly

It is doubted why, in the microcosm - that is, the small world which is called the human being - the soul, which is its more powerful and nobler part, does not govern and rule the body invincibly and irresistibly, just as in the macrocosm - that is, in the greater and wider world, which the philosophers called the great animal - the higher, more powerful, and subtler bodies govern these lower and weaker bodies irresistibly by a certain natural order.

To this the theologians, Aristotle, and the astronomers answer in different ways.

For the theologians say that this disobedience of the body toward the soul arose from sin.

For they say that in the state of innocence the body was subject to the soul irresistibly, which would also have happened in all of us if Adam had not sinned. But after sin and in

fallen nature, the natural and animal powers resist the soul, because we all sinned in Adam and through him lost the gratuitous gift of original justice.

On account of this Ambrose says - and it is placed in the Gloss upon Romans, chapter 7 - "It was properly done that the inferior part of one who did not obey his superior should not obey him. It was most justly done that, because reason withdrew itself from God, the lower powers should rebel and withdraw themselves from reason."

On account of this Paul chastised his body and reduced it to servitude.

Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the first human being are nevertheless excepted from this disobedience.

For Christ was such in act and habit that none of his powers ever in any way wandered or declined from their lawful acts and dispositions, nor did he contract original sin producing any tinder which would cause nature to wander.

But although the Blessed Virgin Mary did not attain that primordial degree of purity of nature, nevertheless in her the tinder was so repressed by the fullness of grace that in her the lower powers obeyed the higher, and the higher powers obeyed God, more perfectly and firmly than they did in the first human beings before the fall.

The reason is that in the Virgin herself obedience of this kind occurred by the power of the grace of perfection - that is, sanctifying grace. But in the first parents obedience occurred by the power of original justice, which is held to have been only a certain grace freely given. Therefore.

There was therefore in those two mortals of different sexes a reduction of the powers of each to the rule of justice without error and deviation, so that they might be complete examples to the other mortals, to be looked upon continually for the correction and rectification of their fallen powers.

The Philosopher, however, says in Book I of the *Politics* that the soul does not fail to rule the body irresistibly merely because we sinned in Adam, but because the soul naturally rules the body by a twofold lordship or governance - namely, political and despotic.

For, on account of the proximity of this part to reason, it rules the sensual appetitive part - that is, the concupiscible and irascible powers - by a political or royal lordship. But it rules the sensitive and exterior part and its organs by a despotic and servile lordship.

That governance by which someone rules slaves who have no power in themselves to resist the command of the one giving orders is called despotic governance.

For slaves possess no right of their own, as is contained in the *Authenticum*, "The Oath Which Is Furnished by Those Who Are Admitted to an Administration," collation 2, and in 22, question 5, chapter *On the Form*.

But that governance by which someone rules free persons who, although they are subjected to the rule of the one presiding, nevertheless possess something of their own by which they can resist the command of the one giving orders - for kings reign according to laws and statutes - is called political and royal governance.

Therefore, according to the Philosopher, the soul rules the exterior senses and their organs by a despotic lordship. For the exterior senses and the organs of the senses cannot resist the command of the soul in any respect, but are moved immediately at the command of the will.

But it rules sensuality itself - that is, the concupiscible and irascible powers - politically. Therefore, sensuality itself resists the command of reason, as Romans, chapter 7, said: “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.”

These things are Thomas's in the disputed questions *On Truth*, question 25, and in the First Part, question 81, article 3.

The astrologers, however, answer this in another manner, saying that the reason why the soul does not rule the body by a despotic lordship is that in the present life the body is, as it were, in its own house, while the soul is in another's house. Therefore, “the flesh lusts against the spirit,” in Galatians, chapter 5.

But in heaven after the resurrection, where the spirit will be as though in its own house, the flesh itself will be totally subjected to that spirit as to something more powerful.

And therefore the body is now called animal, but then it will be called spiritual, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter 15.

The astronomers give an example of the body's dominion over the soul in this world, and conversely of the soul's dominion in heaven, from the planets of heaven. For they say that every planet of heaven is stronger in its own house than in another's. The houses of the planets are the signs of heaven.

For Albumasar says that the proper houses of Saturn are Capricorn and Aquarius; the houses of Jupiter, Pisces and Sagittarius; the houses of Mars, Aries and Scorpio; the houses of Venus, Libra and Taurus; the houses of Mercury, Virgo and Gemini; the house of the Sun, Leo; and the house of the Moon, Cancer.

And it is evident that the Sun in Leo, which is its proper house, is stronger than it is in another sign.

The case of the soul and the body is similar.

And let these things which have been said concerning the First Decade suffice.

Second Decade

Chapter One of the Second Decade

Containing five questions concerning the being and essence of the angels who guard souls

Question One of the Second Decade

Whether demons are found in the nature of things

It is asked whether angels - who in Latin are called *messengers*, or in Hebrew are said to be derived from *a*, which means "without," and *geos*, "earth," as if they were "without earth" - exist and are found according to the truth of the matter.

To this it is answered that, as Aristotle says in Book IV of the *Physics*, the ancient philosophers did not believe there to be any incorporeal substances, but thought that all beings were corporeal.

The reason was, as was said above in the first question of the First Decade, that they did not know how to distinguish between sense and intellect.

The Sadducees also fell into this error, saying that there is neither spirit, nor angel, nor separated soul.

But the existence of angels is proved by reason, authority, and examples.

By reason, as follows.

For the perfection of the world requires that every grade of creatures be found. A spirit united to a body is found, as in a human being. And a body...

...separated from a spirit is found, as in a stone. Therefore, a spirit separated from a body must be found, as is an angel.

The reason for this is that something is found composed of two things, and one of those two, which is less perfect, is found by itself, as a body without a spirit. Therefore, the other, which is more perfect, must be found by itself, as a spirit without a body, which is an angel.

See Thomas, Book II *Against the Gentiles*, chapter 48.

Secondly, this is proved by authority.

First, by the Philosopher in Book I *On the Soul*, who says that outside heaven there is neither time, nor place, nor void, but that there are beings there which are impassible and unalterable, the best beings, living throughout the whole of eternity.

And Avicenna in the *Metaphysics* holds that there are intelligences, that one is the creator of another, and that they emanate in a certain order from the first being.

Thirdly, this is proved by examples.

First, in Tobit, chapter 5: "A good angel of God will be assigned to him."

And Isaiah, chapter 33: "At the voice of the angel the peoples fled," and so forth.

See, if you please, other examples of the existence of angels in sacred and Roman writings, where you will find the things above proved.

These things are from the theologians and philosophers.

Question Two of the Second Decade

What the spirits whom we call angels are

It is asked: what are the spirits whom we call angels?

To this Damascene replies in Book II of the *Sentences*, chapter 3, saying: “An angel is an intellectual substance, always movable, free in choice, incorporeal, ministering to God, receiving immortality by grace and not by nature, the species and limit of whose substance he alone who is its creator knows.”

It is called a *substance*, yet one composed not of matter and form but of being and essence.

It is called *intellectual* because, without discourse and ratiocination, it understands through species of things which are innate...

...and not through comparison, as human beings do by reasoning and by acquiring species through the senses, phantasms, and images.

It is *movable* by nature, intelligence, and will.

By nature, because every created thing is capable of being turned into nothing.

By intelligence, because an angel in understanding has a succession of one thing after another.

By will, because it does not will this and that simultaneously, but one thing after another.

It is called *always* movable because, before confirmation and afterward, it possesses the aforesaid mobility.

Or it is called *always movable* because it is always actually understanding and is not sometimes in potency, as we are, as Thomas says in the First Part, question 50, article 1.

It is *free in choice*, not toward good and evil, but in the free election of that which it wills.

It is *incorporeal* in relation to us, because in relation to the simplicity of God an angel is, as it were, corporeal. Yet it is not so corporeal that it is circumscribed by place as bodies are; rather, it is contained definitively in its own place. God, however, is contained in no proper place either circumscriptively or definitively, but is everywhere and fills heaven and earth.

It is *ministering to God*, understood broadly, in whatever manner: whether by assisting, or by ministering or serving in some other way.

It is *receiving immortality*, and so forth, insofar as it is preserved in being by a gratuitous gift and not by nature. For it too, like all things, would tend into nothing unless the hand of the Omnipotent contained it and all things.

These things are from Albert the Great in the book *On the Four Coevals*, the fourth coeval.

Addition

It could have been described more briefly by saying: “An angel is an incorporeal intellectual creature.”

Nevertheless, since those clauses express and declare the final cause, operation, and duration of angels, they do not appear superfluous.

It is defined in another way by Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*, which Alexander of Hales observed in Part II, question 20, member 3, article 2.

But the clause *substance* must be noted. The author also marks it when he says "yet one composed not of matter and form," in order to exclude the error of Plato and of his disciple Apuleius, who maintained that the intelligences - which Plato in the *Timaeus* calls cacodaemons and calodaemons - were bodies or possessed a body, as Lord Augustine explains more fully in Book VIII of *The City of God*.

For Plato said that those intelligences were aerial bodies, rational in mind, passive in soul, and eternal in duration. Blessed Augustine himself seems at one time to have held this opinion, as is evident in the little book *On the Divination of Demons*.

This, however, Lord Thomas denies in Book II of his writing upon the *Sentences*, distinction 3, question 1, where he says that angels possess no matter at all, and in the First Part, question 50, article 1.

Likewise Dionysius says in chapter 4 of *The Divine Names*: "The first creatures are understood to be immaterial just as they are incorporeal."

For although the intellect receives, it nevertheless does not receive as matter does, but receives the forms of things according to spiritual and intelligible being.

Therefore, incorporeal substances do not possess spiritual matter, as Avicebron said in the book *The Fount of Life*, nor that matter which Augustine seems to have maintained in the book *On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture* upon the beginning of Genesis against the Manichaean.

Alexander of Hales also appears to have maintained it in the First Part of the *Summa*; Bonaventure in Book II, distinction 3, questions 1, 2, and 3; and Scotus in the same place.

Nevertheless, an angel is not altogether simple, but is composed of *that which is* and *that by which it is*, according to Boethius, because it possesses something after the manner of potency and something after the manner of act.

Essence is indeed, as it were, potency and *that which is*, insofar as it participates in being from God.

But being, which is the first act of essence, is *that by which it is*, so that a created intellectual substance will not be first act or unlimited.

Hence it does not know all things through its own essence but through superadded likenesses; nor does it understand through species received from things, but through species naturally connate with it, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 55, articles 1 and 2.

Question Three of Chapter One of the Second Decade

Concerning the number of angels

It is asked: how many are the celestial spirits whom we call angels?

To this Aristotle answers in one way, Plato in another, and the theologians in another.

For according to Aristotle in Book XII of the *Metaphysics*, immaterial substances exist in a certain determinate number: namely, in the number of the courses and motions of the orbs and celestial bodies.

But the motions of the orbs, as he says he has sufficiently proved, are fifty-five. Therefore, there are as many angels.

But because the Philosopher says that this is reasonable and probable, and not necessary, for that reason - as Thomas says in his commentary upon Book XII of the *Metaphysics* - such a necessary determination, namely of the motions of the orbs and courses of the celestial bodies, and consequently of the angels, must be left to those stronger and more powerful than Aristotle himself, namely the astronomers.

Plato, however, as Aristotle charges him, established the number of separated substances according to the number of species of sensible things. For he held that separated substances were the species of sensible things.

How these two opinions can possess truth may be seen in Thomas, First Part, question 50, article 3.

But the theologians say that the number of angels is exceedingly great, which they prove in two ways: by reason and by authorities.

First, by reason as follows.

For the number of angels who stood, or remained in heaven, was greater than the number of those who fell, as the Master of the *Sentences* says in Book II, distinction 6.

The reason for this is that among angels good exists in the greater number, because they are of an intellectual nature, whereas evil among angels exists in the smaller number.

Among human beings, however, the opposite is true: namely, evil exists in the greater number and good in the smaller, both because of the corruption of nature from original sin and because sensible things are better known to us, as a result of which human beings follow sense more than intellect. Therefore.

This reasoning is confirmed because each soul has from its nativity - as will be said below - a good angel for guardianship and an evil one for exercise.

But the number of human beings living at the same time is exceedingly great. It follows, therefore, that the guardian angels exist in an exceedingly great number, one unknown to us, and are perhaps more numerous than all the evil and damned angels together.

Secondly, this is proved by authorities.

First, Dionysius says in chapter 9 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*: “There are many blessed armies of the supernal minds, exceeding the infirm and constricted commensuration of our material numbers.”

And in the same place Dionysius adduces Daniel, chapter 7, saying: “Thousands of thousands ministered to him,” and so forth.

And the Psalm says: “The chariot of God is ten thousands, manifold thousands of those rejoicing,” and so forth.

And Revelation, chapter 5: “I heard the voice of many angels around the throne, and of the living creatures and elders, and their number was thousands of thousands.”

Likewise, Second Chronicles, chapter 32: “Do not fear, for many more are with us than with him.”

And Job, chapter 25: “Is there any number to his armies?”

See Thomas, Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 6, and Book I of the *Sentences*, distinction 40.

Question Four of Chapter One of the Second Decade

Concerning the beginning of the angels

It is asked: when were the angels created?

To this it is answered that Gregory Nazianzen, a Greek whose authority is so great in Christian teaching that no one has ever presumed to bring a calumny against his statements - as Damascene testifies - acknowledges that before the corporeal creature God, whose conceiving is producing, produced or created the angels.

For he said that movers ought to precede movable things. But angels move the heavens and corporeal things. Therefore, they preceded the heavens and every corporeal creature.

Jerome was of this opinion. In his commentary upon the Epistle to Titus he says: “Six thousand years of our time have not yet been completed; and how many times and how many origins of ages must we think there were in which the angels, thrones, dominations, and the other orders of angels served God?”

Augustine, however, whom Bede and the other Latins follow, says in *The City of God* and upon Genesis: “God, who in his work has no need of a succession of times, produced the corporeal and spiritual creature simultaneously.”

The corporeal creature, namely, not according to individuals, which are generated through a succession of times, but according to nature and species.

For since angels are a certain nobler part of the universe, and a part separated from the whole cannot be perfect, the angels were therefore produced by God simultaneously with the corporeal creature.

But if anyone should think it unworthy that the doctors of the Church - namely Jerome and Augustine - held contrary opinions concerning the time of the creation of the angels, let him hear Thomas in the disputed questions *On Power*, question 9, article 5, saying:

“The Catholic doctors, agreeing in that which belongs to the faith - that is, that nothing except God exists from eternity - are found to have said varying things, at least with respect to the surface of their words, in matters which are not of the necessity of faith and concerning which it was lawful for them, as it is for us, to hold different opinions supported by reasons. Nevertheless, one must adhere to one opinion in such a way that we do not judge the other erroneous.”

And to the point that Gregory the Greek, or the Theologian, together with Jerome, said that movers precede movable things, Augustine and the others answer that movers do not precede movable things in duration, but in dignity, as is evident concerning the soul and in Thomas at the place cited above and in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 2.

Addition

See Epiphanius of Samosata and Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, in the book *On Various Questions*.

And although you may find a difference between the Greek and Latin doctors, you can nevertheless hold with the Latins that Lord Jerome spoke according to the Greek opinion - which is tolerable - and thus that the angels were created first in dignity or nature.

And according to the Greeks, say that God created all things simultaneously by eternal preordination or in the power of prime matter.

Question Five of Chapter One of the Second Decade

Where the angels were created

It is asked: where were the angels created?

To this Strabo replies upon the words of Genesis, chapter 1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”:

“By *heaven*,” he says, “Scripture here calls not the visible firmament but the empyrean - that is, the fiery or intellectual heaven, so called not from burning heat but from splendor - which, as soon as it was made, was filled with angels.”

This is confirmed by the following reason.

For the noblest place, and the one especially deputed to contemplation, is most fitting for the noblest substances, which eternally contemplate God.

But the empyrean heaven is the noblest place among all corporeal places and is deputed to the contemplation of angels and souls.

For it is said in Matthew, chapter 18: “Their angels in heaven always see the face of the Father” - that is, they contemplate it. Therefore, such a place is most fitting for angels.

Concerning its location and disposition Ambrose speaks as follows in the *Hexaemeron*:

“Who can so readily be an estimator of the divine work that he could investigate the height of God's wisdom in this work, or know what figure is more suitable for that supernal city Jerusalem: whether round, pyramidal, or hexagonal?

“For there are certain buildings which are round inside and square outside, and conversely.

“And we say this so that certain persons may take notice, examine their opinions, and cease to measure so great a work of God by the contemplation of human operation and of our own capability.”

See Thomas, Book II of the *Sentences*, at the place cited above, and Henry.

Addition

Athanasius of Alexandria writes as follows concerning this matter:

“Human nature will be able to assert with certainty neither whence nor where they were made, except this only: that they were brought from non-being into being.”

Nevertheless, Augustine's opinion is considered plausible: namely, that they were created in the upper part of the air from that most subtle air and were afterward admitted into heaven, just as Adam was created outside his place and was afterward brought into it.

But take notice that Augustine speaks according to our manner of understanding rather than according to what the nature of the thing merits.

Chapter Two of the Second Decade

Sole Question

Whether free choice is found in God, in angels, in the blessed, in demons, in the damned, and in wayfarers

It is asked whether free choice is in angels and the blessed, in demons and the damned, as also in wayfarers and in God himself.

And it seems, first, that it is not in angels and the blessed, because it pertains to freedom of choice that someone can choose good and evil. But election does not pertain to them, since election is a pre-counseled appetite, according to Book IV of the *Ethics*. Counsel, moreover, is a certain inquiry and discursive process, according to Book IV of the *Ethics*; and this does not befit angels, since they are intellectual beings, nor the blessed, who see all things in the Word. Therefore, [election does not pertain to them].

Likewise, election concerns those things which conduce to the attainment of the end. But the angels and the blessed have now attained the end, namely God. Therefore, election is lacking in them and, consequently, freedom of choice.

That it is likewise not in demons and the damned is proved. For the obstinate have a will fixed only in evil and not free toward either alternative. But demons and the damned are obstinate, according to that saying of the Psalm: "The pride of those who hate you rises continually," which is expounded of demons. Therefore, [free choice is not in them].

Likewise, it belongs to the nature of free choice to be able to be bent and borne toward opposed and diverse things. But neither God, nor the blessed, nor the damned can be borne toward diverse things. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, [free choice is] not in human wayfarers, because it belongs to the nature of freedom to be able to do what one wills. But a human being cannot do what he wills, according to that saying in Romans, chapter 7: "For the good which I will, this I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do." Therefore, [free choice is not in human wayfarers].

That it is also not in God is proved, because free choice can be bent toward either part, namely toward good and evil, as the Master of the *Sentences* says in Book II, distinction 25, saying:

"Free choice is a faculty of reason and will by which, through voluntary and spontaneous appetite, someone can be borne toward those things which he judges, or is capable of judging, to be good or evil."

But God cannot be bent toward evil. In *On Penance*, distinction 3, chapter *Inter haec*, first, where it is said: "Not to sin belongs to God alone; to amend belongs to the wise."

To the contrary: God lacks no perfection simply. But free choice is a certain perfection simply. For the poet says:

> *Freedom is not rightly sold for all the gold;*
> *This heavenly good surpasses the riches of the world.*

Therefore, [free choice is in God].

Likewise, an angel, according to Damascene in Book II, is "an intellectual substance, always movable, free in choice." Therefore, [free choice is in an angel].

Likewise, the blessed do not lose the dignity of nature, because grace perfects nature. But freedom pertains to the dignity of human nature.

Likewise, demons have not lost their nature, nor have the damned. But freedom of choice also pertains to intellectual nature. Therefore, [it is in them].

Likewise, human beings have free choice through that saying of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 15: "God from the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel." The Gloss says: "That is, in free choice." Therefore, free choice is in all the aforesaid.

I respond that it must be said that many have fallen into various opinions and heresies through ignorance of how freedom of choice stands in relation to good and evil.

For Origen, as Augustine relates in Book XXI of *The City of God*, maintained that, on account of the freedom of choice which it possesses, the will of every creature can be bent toward good and evil, with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of its union with the Word.

And from this he said that the saints can fall and pay penalties after the limits of a certain time and after long courses of time; that justice will be opened both to demons and to damned human beings, and they will be saved. Indeed, as the Master relates in the *Scholastic History*, the same Origen said in the book *Peri Archon* that Christ must yet suffer in the air for demons, just as he suffered on earth for human beings.

But this opinion, says Thomas in the First Part, question 64, article 2, takes away from the holy angels and human beings the truth of beatitude, which posits everlasting stability, whence it is also named eternal life.

It also conflicts with the authority of Sacred Scripture, which pronounces that demons and evil human beings are to be sent into eternal punishment, but that good spirits are to be transferred [to eternal life].

Concerning Christ it is also said: "Christ, rising from the dead, now dies no more; death shall have no dominion over him," and so forth.

Whence Augustine says in the place cited above:

"But not undeservedly did the Church condemn Origen, because, although he seemed merciful in this - that he believed the devil and his angels and damned human beings, after the limits of a certain time, were to be rescued from those torments and associated with the holy angels - he also admitted, by doing so, that the saints would have true miseries, in which they paid penalties, and false beatitudes, in which they would not possess the true and secure - that is, certain without fear - and everlasting joy of the good."

These are his words.

And when he said that, by reason of freedom of choice, the will of every creature could be bent toward good and toward evil, it is answered that this had truth in the good angels before the confirmation of their will in good; in the evil angels before the obstination of their will in evil; and in human beings before death, because death does for human beings what the fall did for angels, as Damascene says. See Thomas in the place cited above, and in the First of the Second Part, question 79, article 3, and in the Third Part, question 76, article 1.

Concerning the soul of Christ, however, what Origen says is true, because that soul, insofar as it was a wayfarer, was filled with such great grace that it could not sin; nor could it sin insofar as it was a comprehensor, because in this respect it was joined to the end and, consequently, could act only according to an order toward the end.

Whence Christ could in no way sin: neither insofar as he was God, nor insofar as he was a wayfarer, nor insofar as he was a comprehensor.

Others, accepting the definition of free choice which the Master adduces in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 25, and rejecting the things it says - that "free choice," and so forth, as I adduced above in the objection - say that free choice is not in God.

And since angels and the blessed are also confirmed in good and, consequently, cannot be borne toward evil; and likewise, since the evil damned are obstinate in evil and cannot be borne toward good, they concluded from this that freedom of choice is in none of these, but only in human wayfarers.

But let them hear Augustine in Book XXII of *The City of God*, speaking of God: "Certainly God himself - surely because he cannot sin, is it therefore to be denied that he has free choice?" As if he were to say: No.

Concerning angels and the others, see, in the place above, the arguments for the affirmative part that they possess freedom of choice.

There is a third manner of speaking, true and catholic: that free choice is in God and in all the others mentioned above, with the exception of brute animals.

The first part is proved. All things possessing intellect and will, in which there is some action for the sake of an end known and determined by themselves, possess free choice. But God and all the aforesaid possess some action for the sake of an end known and determined by themselves. Therefore, they all possess free choice.

The major premise is proved. For free choice, according to Augustine - and as it is set down by the Master in the text of Book II of the *Sentences* in the place cited above - is a faculty, that is, a power, of reason and will: of will as regards election, which is in free will; and of reason as regards counsel, which is in reason, for that which is not foreknown is not rightly chosen.

Therefore, the Philosopher says in Book III of the *Ethics* that election is a habit of something pre-counseled. Election, moreover, concerns those things which we desire for the sake of a known and determined end.

But God by natural necessity wills his own beatitude as the end which he cannot fail to will, and to which he has ordered the diverse orders of things, for "the Lord has made all things for himself." Yet he is not borne toward one thing among his effects in such a way that, considered in himself, he could not be borne toward another. Therefore, free choice is in him.

Similarly, angels, human beings, the damned, the blessed, and wayfarers, considered in their pure natural powers, have an end naturally set before them, namely beatitude, which they naturally desire; nor can they will misery, as Augustine says in Book VIII of *On the Trinity*. To attain this beatitude they were able, and are able, to order diverse things by choosing those which conduce to the end. Therefore, free choice is similarly in them.

But brute animals, because they do not have an end determined for themselves by themselves, but by God and by nature, and consequently do not perfectly know the end or

possess a free election of their acts for the sake of the end, therefore do not possess free choice.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that free choice is in the aforesaid in different ways.

For in God freedom exists generally and supremely, insofar as free choice is the power of freely choosing what one wills without any turnability or flexibility toward evil.

In the others, however, free choice exists specifically and as contracted to creatures; and thus in them free choice signifies the power of freely choosing the things willed, together with a turnability and flexibility, according to their natural condition, toward evil and good.

And for this reason it is said in the text that free choice is found in one way in God and in another way in others.

But if it should be said: According to you, all except God possess free choice contracted toward evil and good. Since, therefore, the good angels and the blessed cannot be bent toward evil, and the evil and the damned cannot be turned toward good, free choice is therefore not in them.

It is answered that this is not by reason of their nature, which remained integral in all the blessed and the damned according to Dionysius. Rather, in the blessed it is by reason of their perfect conjunction with the highest good, God; and in the damned it is on account of their guilt and malice, which incline them toward evil and render them obstinate because of the condition of that state, in which there is no redemption.

In wayfarers, however, free choice exists simply, because they can merit and demerit, since they are neither joined to God through consummated grace nor turned away from God through obstinate guilt.

To the first argument to the contrary, therefore, it is answered that the Philosopher speaks of election insofar as it belongs to a human being. See the First Part, question 59, article 3.

To the second it must be said that election is twofold. One election is ordered toward the end, and this ceases when the end is possessed; thus now someone chooses to will to believe the articles [of faith], but this ceases in the fatherland. Another election is conjoined to the end, and this does not cease when the end arrives, but remains with the end. See Thomas in Book II of the *Sentences*.

To the third, concerning demons and the damned, it is answered that this is not by reason of nature, but by reason of the state in which they have been turned away from God unchangeably.

But if you desire to know the cause of the unchangeable obstination of demons and the damned, and of the firmness of the blessed and the angels, see Thomas, First Part, question 64, article 3, in the body of the article, and Book IV of the *Summa Against the Gentiles*, chapters 92, 93, and 94.

To the fourth it is said that the diverse and opposed things toward which free choice can be bent can be considered in three ways.

In one way, according to the difference of the things which are chosen for the sake of the end; and this diversity belongs to free choice in itself. According to this, free choice belongs to God, angels, and human beings, as was said above.

There is another diversity according to the difference between good and evil, which does not belong to free choice except accidentally, insofar as free choice is found in a nature capable of defect.

For since the will of itself is ordered toward good as toward its proper object, its tending toward evil can happen only because evil is apprehended under the aspect of good. This pertains to a defect of the intellect or reason, from which, together with the will, free choice is caused.

But it does not pertain to the nature of any power that it fail in its act, just as it does not pertain to the nature of the visual power that someone see obscurely.

And therefore nothing prevents there being found a free choice which tends toward good in such a way that it can in no way tend toward evil: as in God by nature, and in good angels and human beings by the perfection of grace.

There is a third diversity, which is considered according to the difference of change into which free choice can enter. This does not consist in the fact that at different times it wills diverse things; for God himself also wills that diverse things come to be according as is fitting for diverse times and persons.

Rather, a change of free choice consists in this: that someone, concerning the same thing and for the same time, does not will what he previously willed. And this diversity likewise does not belong in itself to the nature of free choice, but occurs according to the condition of a mutable nature.

For it does not belong to the nature of the visual power that it see in diverse ways, but this happens from the diverse disposition of the one seeing, whose eye is sometimes clear and sometimes disturbed.

And similarly, the mutability or diversity of free choice does not belong to its nature, but occurs to it insofar as it is in a mutable nature, as in us.

Thomas states all these things in the disputed questions *On Demons*, question 5. If they are well considered, they empty out all the things that could be said for and against in this matter.

To the fifth, concerning human wayfarers, it is answered that this occurs by reason of the sensitive appetite, which, although it obeys reason, can nevertheless in some respect resist it by desiring against that which reason dictates.

This, therefore, is the good which a human being does not do when he wills it: namely, not to desire against reason, as Augustine says there. See Thomas, First Part, question 83, article 1.

To the sixth, concerning God, it is answered that it does not pertain to the nature of free choice that someone stand indeterminately toward evil and good.

The reason for this is that free choice is of itself ordered toward good, since good is the object of the will; nor does it tend toward evil except on account of some defect, by which evil is apprehended as good, since election, which is the proper act of the will, is only of a true good or of an apparent good.

And therefore, where free choice is most perfect, it cannot be borne toward evil.

And when it is said that free choice has a relation to opposites, it is answered that this can be understood in three ways.

First, because it can will good and evil; and in this way it does not belong to God, because it implies defectibility.

Second, in such a way that it first wills something and afterward does not will it; and this likewise does not befit God, because it implies mutability.

Third, because it can will this and can not will it; and this befits God.

These things are from Thomas in the questions *On Truth*, question 24.

Chapter Three of the Second Decade

On the office of angels toward human beings, concerning which four little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Three of the Second Decade

Whether angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings

It is asked whether angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings.

To this it is answered affirmatively, and it is proved in four ways: namely, by the authority of Sacred Scripture, by an attribute of God, by utility, and by similitude.

First, it is proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture, because upon that saying of Isaiah, chapter 62, "Upon your walls I have appointed guardians," and so forth, the Gloss says that the guardians of human beings are angels.

And Psalm 90 says: "God has commanded his angels concerning you, that they guard you in all your ways." Upon this saying Bernard speaks as follows:

"O how much reverence ought this word to instill in you, how much devotion it ought to bring, and how much confidence it ought to confer: reverence on account of their presence, devotion on account of their benevolence, and confidence on account of their guardianship.

"Therefore, walk cautiously where the angels are. Thus has God commanded them: that they guard you in all your ways.

"In every lodging, in every corner, have reverence before your angel; nor dare to do in his presence what you would not dare to do in mine."

Concerning this guardianship, hear also Jerome upon that saying of Matthew, chapter 18, "Their angels always see the face of the Father," and so forth. He says: "Great is the dignity of souls, that each should have an angel delegated to its guardianship from the beginning of its birth."

Likewise Origen, upon the Book of Numbers, says:

"There is present to each of us, even to the least who are in the Church of God, a good angel, an angel of God, who rules, who admonishes, who governs, who daily sees the face of the Father who is in heaven in order that our deeds may be corrected and mercies entreated."

Likewise Bernard, in a sermon on the angels, says: "You are gracious, O Lord, who are not content with the frailty of our walls, but place angelic guardianship over human beings themselves."

And the same author, upon that saying of the Psalm, "What is man, that you are mindful of him?" says:

"What is man, that you have made yourself known to him? You have given your Son, you have sent your Spirit, you also promise your countenance; and, lest anything be lacking, you

also send those blessed spirits into ministry for the sake of those who are to receive the inheritance of salvation."

Second, this same thing is proved from an attribute of God, namely from God's mercy, as follows. God is more inclined to show mercy than to punish. But God gave demons to human beings for their exercise, as is found in the last chapter of Ephesians: "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of darkness," and so forth. Therefore, it is seen that much more, or with much greater reason, he gave angels for the guardianship of human beings.

Third, this same thing is proved from utility, for by the fact that angels are deputed by God to the guardianship of human beings, three goods are especially manifested.

First, God's goodness toward us is declared, by his giving us creatures so noble as angels.

Second, the charity of the angels is disclosed, since from the beginning of our birth until death they bear so continual a solicitude for our guardianship.

Third, the need or necessity of our nature is relieved. For since we have an evil angel for our exercise and possess a frail nature, we need great support and aid.

Fourth, this same thing is proved by a twofold similitude.

First, by a natural similitude: just as the higher bodies rule these lower ones, and everything movable is reduced to something immovable, so the higher spirits rule the lower ones, and variable human counsel is directed by invariable angelic counsel.

Second, this same thing is proved by the Apostle's similitude. For the Apostle in 1 Corinthians, chapter 13, compares the state of human beings insofar as they are on the way to the state of childhood.

The reason is that, just as a boy, so long as he is small and prone to fall, needs to be led by the hand with respect to his body until he arrives at the perfect age in which he is strong and sufficient for himself, so with respect to the soul a human being, so long as he is weak and prone to a spiritual fall, needs a spiritual guardian until he arrives at the perfect age, namely that of the other life.

And this guardian is an angel, whose guardianship a human being always needs so long as he is in this life.

For this reason everyone ought every day to say as follows concerning the angel guarding him:

> *Angel, who by heavenly power are my guardian,*
> *Save, defend, and govern me, who have been entrusted to you.*

This is said together with the verse and prayer of the angels. These things are from the theologians and Rainerius.

Question Two of Chapter Three of the Second Decade

Whether the guardian angels of souls, when sent, enjoy their happiness in heaven

It is asked how angels are said to be sent for the guardianship of human beings, or for another operation, when they are always in heaven seeing the face of the Father, according to Matthew, chapter 18.

To this it is answered as follows: a new sending of angels for the guardianship of a human being is for an angel to acquire a new place, a new mode, and a new *where*; to be limited and bound anew; to guard; to exercise the office of a guardian; and to procure that human being's salvation, especially by illuminating him, appearing, performing miracles, or instructing the human being in some other similar manner.

And this sending posits mutability in the angel, in contrast to the sending of the divine persons to us. They are said to be sent not as though by acquiring a new place or a new *where*, because they are everywhere, since they are one God. Rather, they are said to be sent anew insofar as they produce a new effect in creatures without mutability in themselves, and acquire a new mode according to which they had not previously existed: as the Son through the assumption of flesh, and the Holy Spirit through a new sanctification.

Therefore, the angels sent to us are said always to be in heaven seeing the face of the Father, not because they are always in heaven locally. Rather, they are said always to be in heaven through fruition, because wherever they are, they never cease to enjoy God and to see God, since to enjoy is an act of the will.

Whence Gregory says in the book of the *Moralia*: “The angels go forth outwardly in such a way that they are not deprived of the joys of inward contemplation.”

Nor does their withdrawal from the empyrean heaven introduce any indignity or diminish their glory.

Thus also demons, although they are not actually bound in the place of hell, are nevertheless said, wherever they go, to carry the fire of Gehenna with them, as is said in the Gloss upon chapter 3 of James, as will be stated below in the Third Decade.

These things are from theological works and Rainerius.

Addition

Take notice, however, that angels are said to be in a place not circumscriptively but definitively.

Question Three of Chapter Three of the Second Decade

To which hierarchy of angels it belongs to guard human beings

It is asked whether it belongs to the angels of all three hierarchies to guard human beings.

To this it is answered negatively, for not all the angels of the three hierarchies are sent into ministry.

For in Daniel, chapter 7, it is set down that thousands of thousands of angels ministered to God, and ten times a hundred thousand stood before him, after the similitude of those who serve some king. We see that some of these hear the king's commands immediately and never withdraw from his sight, while announcing the king's commands to others so that they may execute them in the administration of cities; and those to whom such an announcement is made are said to be sent.

In this way, some angels are said always to stand before God, because they receive the secrets of the divine ministries immediately from God; others, however, are said to be sent, namely those who are instructed concerning the secrets by those who stand before him.

And because not all have power, according to Dionysius, to behold the divine secrets immediately in the divine essence itself, but only the superior angels, to whom it is proper to be illuminated immediately by God, therefore only the superior angels of the four orders are said always to stand before him and not to be sent, according to Thomas, First Part, question 112, article 4, in the body of the article.

And those whom he says receive the divine illuminations immediately and perfectly from God, and cooperate with God in the illumination and leading of others toward God, are properly said to stand before him.

And concerning those who stand before him, that saying of Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy* is understood: “Those superior ranks never withdraw from the innermost things, because they have nothing that pertains to the employment of an exterior office.”

But the others, belonging to the five lower orders, are said to be sent outwardly into ministry in order to perform diverse ministries concerning us or some corporeal creature. These things can be known from the names that signify the properties of the angels.

For angels and archangels are named from announcing, while virtues and powers are named with reference to some act of a prince. And it also belongs, as Gregory says, to exist as the first among other agents.

And on account of these things Gregory says in Book XII of the *Moralia* that there are more angels who minister than who stand before God.

For this reason the philosophers also posited two kinds of movers of the spheres. Some of these possess participated and determinate conditions, and Avicenna calls these ministering angels. Others he calls separated beings, which they name intelligences, in which there are simple and universal forms; and the same Avicenna calls these assisting angels.

Nor does that saying of Isaiah, chapter 6, constitute an objection, where it is said that one of the seraphim flew to Isaiah, because he was not one of the seraphim, but one of the lesser angels exercising the office of the seraphim.

And when the Apostle says in Hebrews, chapter 1, “All are ministering spirits, sent into ministry,” it is said that sending is twofold: exterior and interior.

Exterior sending occurs when they really descend to us to furnish some ministry concerning corporeal things of this sort; and according to this sending, not all are sent, but only the five orders, as has been said.

The other is interior sending, which is nothing other than a certain illumination from a superior angel to an inferior one, which takes place for our sake; and in this way all are said to be sent.

These things are from Thomas and from the theologians.

Question Four of Chapter Three of the Second Decade

That, notwithstanding divine governance, the guardianship of angels also ought to be given

It is doubted why human beings need the guardianship of the weaker angels when the guardianship of the stronger God is always present to them.

To this it is answered as follows: according to the nature of divine providence, this is found in all things - that movable and variable things are always moved through immovable things - because, as the Philosopher teaches, every motion proceeds naturally from something immovable.

Whence we see that the lower bodies are ruled by the higher bodies, in which there is less change and motion; and thus corporeal things are moved and ruled by incorporeal things, namely by spiritual substances.

Whence also the terms and probable propositions of a certain question are strengthened by immovable and invariable things, namely principles known through themselves, and are reduced to them.

But it is manifest that in things to be done human beings can fail in many ways both from the due end and from the manner of acting. And therefore, in order that a human being might more fittingly arrive at his end, it was necessary that through some angel, as one more perfect than himself, he should be withdrawn from evil and advanced in good; and this we call the guardianship of angels.

But as regards the motivating objection, when it is said that there is no need for the guardianship of a weaker angel when the most mighty God is present, “who shall neither slumber nor sleep, guarding Israel,” it must be said that two things are required for acting well.

First, that the will be inclined toward good. Second, that suitable means be possessed for accomplishing the good.

As regards the first, God guards a human being immediately by infusing grace into him together with the virtues.

But as regards the second, God guards a human being by instructing him through angels as intermediaries.

For example: just as among craftsmen one cause disposes something for a form, and another cause introduces the form - as fire disposes something for the form of a knife by softening the iron, the hammer by spreading out the iron, and the craftsman, as principal agent, introduces the form of the knife - so it is the office of angels to prepare human beings

for grace and glory through illuminations and things of this sort which operate instrumentally concerning us.

But it belongs to God, as principal agent and guardian, to give the final perfection: namely, grace joining us to consummated grace and to the final end, namely glory.

These things are from Thomas, Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, question 1, article 1, in the two arguments to the contrary, in the body of the question, and in the solutions of the first and second arguments; and Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 40, article 1.

Chapter Four of the Second Decade

On the attendance of angels upon human beings, concerning which four little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Four of the Second Decade

To whom the guardianship of angels is necessary

It is asked: to which human beings are angels deputed for guardianship?

To this it is answered as follows. Since the guardianship of angels is a certain execution of divine providence, and it is proper to divine providence to confer those things which advance beings toward the end and to remove those things which impede them from the end, angels are therefore deputed to the guardianship of those human beings who can be advanced in good and prevented from evil.

Whence angels were deputed to the guardianship neither of separated souls, nor of good or evil angels, nor of Christ.

First, separated souls do not have angels deputed to their guardianship. The reason for this is that a soul separated from the body can possess none of the aforesaid things, because it can neither be advanced in good nor be prevented from evil.

Similarly, angels are not deputed to the guardianship of good or evil angels. The reason is that the blessed angels, from the fact that they have attained the final end of glory, are confirmed in good and therefore are incapable of sin; but the evil angels, from the fact that they are obstinate in evil, are incapable of repentance.

Similarly, Christ did not have an angel deputed to his guardianship. I prove this by a threefold reason.

The first is that the soul of Christ, which was superior to all the angels, was illuminated immediately by the Word united to it.

The second reason is that he was a true comprehensor; whence his good could not be impeded, nor could he be advanced in good.

The third reason is that guardianship has regard to need or defect. But Christ had no defect of guilt or punishment. Therefore, and so forth.

Nevertheless, an angel is said to have strengthened Christ in the Passion, according to Luke, chapter 22, not by guarding him or impressing something upon Christ, but by revering him and rejoicing with him in his fortitude, just as a human being is naturally comforted in tribulation by the presence of friends.

And therefore, speaking first in general, the guardianship of angels is deputed to all human beings from the infusion of the rational soul, after they are ordered toward the end of salvation, until death, because throughout all that time anyone can be impeded from good and advanced in good, fall into evil and rise again from evil.

But when such a way - namely, that of the present life - or such a time is ended, the guardianship of angels will not be necessary, as is evident in the blessed and the damned.

Second, speaking in particular, the first parents had an angel deputed to their guardianship. The reason is that, although rectitude of nature was present in the first parents, nevertheless that rectitude was not inflexible but turnable toward either part, namely toward good and toward evil; nor, if it is turned toward one, is it immediately confirmed in it. Indeed, it can immediately fall. Therefore, and so forth.

Or it is said otherwise: although in Adam there was no danger from any rebellion of the flesh inciting him toward evil, there was nevertheless danger in the power of sinning through the demon attacking him. And similarly, his cognition was weaker than an angel's; and therefore he needed the protection and aid of a guardian angel.

Second, children in the maternal womb have angels deputed to their guardianship, through whom the impediments which demons can inflict upon such children are prevented.

But perhaps you will ask which angel children existing in the maternal womb have deputed to their guardianship: their own angel, or their mother's?

It is answered that, so long as a child is in the maternal womb, he is not totally separated from his mother but, through a certain connection, is in some manner something of the mother, just as fruit hanging on a tree is something of the tree.

And therefore it can probably be said that the same angel who is the mother's guardian guards the offspring existing in the mother's womb. But at birth, when the child is separated from the mother, an angel is deputed to his guardianship.

Whence Jerome, expounding that saying of Matthew, chapter 18, “Their angels in heaven,” and so forth, says:

“Great is the dignity of souls, that each should have an angel delegated to its guardianship from the beginning of its birth.”

Third, even Antichrist will have angels for his guardianship. The reason is that a common law ought not to be changed on account of one person; and in this his punishment will appear more just, because he did not receive, as he ought, so many benefits provided for human nature.

Nor, nevertheless, will the guardianship be entirely without fruit, because, although he will not be converted to good, he will nevertheless desist from many evils, having been drawn back by his guardian angel. Whence, however greatly he may be obstinate in evil, he will nevertheless obtain this effect from the angels through their guardianship.

These things are from Thomas, Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, and First Part, question 113, article 4; and Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 40, article 4, in the body of the question.

Question Two of Chapter Four of the Second Decade

That one or several angels can be assigned to the guardianship of human beings

It is asked whether one or several angels are assigned to each individual human being for guardianship.

To this it is answered that an angel is given to each individual human being for guardianship, because, since the guardianship of angels is for obtaining advancement toward the end and for removing those things which impede the attainment of the end, the guardianship of angels is therefore owed to all those who have not yet attained their final end. All human wayfarers are of this sort.

And if it should be said, as the Master of the *Sentences* says in Book II, distinction 11: How is it possible for an angel to be deputed to every rational soul, when past, present, and future souls are more numerous than the angels deputed to guardianship?

The Master answers there that at no time are there as many human beings simultaneously existing in actuality as there are good angels. Therefore, one of the angels for each human being is sufficient. For when one human being dies, the angel given to his guardianship is assigned to another who succeeds him.

And although, as Thomas says in the First Part, question 113, article 2, one angel is deputed to each human being insofar as each is a particular person, it is nevertheless not unfitting that several angels be deputed to some human being according to the dignity of his prelacy and some grace of God participated by him, as is evident in the Supreme Pontiff, in cardinals possessing the key of jurisdiction, in prelates, and in princes.

All these things are from Thomas in the First Part, and from the theological doctors upon Book II of the *Sentences*, distinctions 10 and 11.

Question Three of Chapter Four of the Second Decade

Why a guardian angel is assigned to a human being

It is asked: for what reason are angels assigned to the guardianship of human beings?

To this it is answered as follows. Angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings for four causes.

The first is that they may be advanced and make progress in the good of grace.

The second is that they may not fall into the evil of guilt.

The third is that, if they fall, they may afterward rise again from the evil of guilt.

The fourth is that, if they do not rise again from the evil of guilt, they may not fall so often.

For no wayfarer, insofar as he is a wayfarer, lacks the mercy of God which consists in giving an angel to a human being as guardian for the aforesaid causes.

Take notice, however, that just as it belongs to divine providence to prevent evils in such a way that the condition of nature is nevertheless preserved, so also does this belong to the guardianship of angels, which is an execution of divine providence.

For it does not belong to angels, in guarding human beings, to compel them toward virtue and draw them back from vices, because in this way freedom of choice and the basis of merit would perish.

See Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 40, article 4, question 4.

Question Four of Chapter Four of the Second Decade

On the beginning and end of the guardianship of angels

It is asked: in what state does the guardianship of angels begin, and at what time is it ended?

To this it is answered as follows. The guardianship of angels begins immediately when the creature is born by the first birth, namely outside the womb.

The reason is that guardianship ought to be applied when danger to the salvation of the soul is feared.

But after the creature is born, danger to the salvation of the soul is feared, because, as the Psalm says, “In the way in which I walked, they hid a snare for me”; and then the world, the flesh, and the demons begin to stir up new battles.

Before the creature leaves the womb, however, guardianship is not given, because then, since such children are still something of the mother, they are guarded by the mother's angel, as has been said.

This guardianship endures inclusively until death, because after death they do not need guardianship.

For if they are in the fatherland, they no longer fear being endangered. Isaiah, chapter 60, says: “Your sun shall no more set, and your moon shall not decrease, because the Lord will be for you an everlasting light, and the days of your mourning shall be completed.”

If they are in hell, they do not fear being endangered, because the fear which they feared has come upon them.

Nor [do they need guardianship] in purgatory, since they are outside the limit of meriting and demeriting and cannot recoil from grace itself.

Thus guardianship is given on the way and not after the course is completed.

See Thomas, First Part, question 113, and the Master of the *Sentences*, distinction 11.

Chapter Five of the Second Decade

On the cessation of guardianship and the increase and decrease of the joy of angels, concerning which three little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Five of the Second Decade

Whether the guardianship of angels is sometimes withdrawn from a human being

It is asked whether angels desert the human beings to whose guardianship they are deputed, on account of foreknowledge or their obstination.

To this it seems, first, that one must answer affirmatively, through that saying of Damascene: “When angels are here with us, they are not in heaven.” But they are sometimes in heaven. Therefore, they sometimes abandon us.

I respond that there is a twofold notable response to this question.

The first is that of Saint Thomas, who says that, since the guardianship of angels is a certain execution of divine providence, just as divine providence provides for diverse beings more and less according to their condition, but nevertheless does not totally abandon a human being, because he would be reduced to nothing, so the guardianship of angels is said to abandon a human being in a qualified respect or according to some effect, insofar as it does not prevent all harmful things; or because it exposes him to tribulations; or because, by the just judgment of God, it does not draw him back from some sin; or because it does not so efficaciously advance him in good or protect him from evils, as the deserts of human beings require.

In this manner that saying of Jeremiah, chapter 51, is understood in the person of the angels: “We have cared for Babylon, and she has not been healed. Let us abandon her.”

And also that saying of Isaiah, chapter 5: “I will take away its hedge” - that is, the guardianship of angels - “and it will be for plunder.”

Nevertheless, an angel never so abandons the human being whom he guards that some effect of guardianship does not follow, insofar as he prevents some evil and advances him toward some good.

This is proved by reason as follows. Good angels are more inclined to aid a human being than evil angels are to infest him. But evil angels never cease from infesting, according to that saying of 1 Peter, chapter 5: “Your adversary the devil, like a roaring lion, always goes about seeking someone to devour.” Therefore, neither do the good angels ever cease from guarding.

The second response is that of Saint Bonaventure in Book II, distinction 11, who says that, with respect to a human being, the guardianship of angels is twofold.

One is on the part of the body, which consists in repelling the enemy, lest he oppress bodies. The other is on the part of the spirit, lest the malignant spirit pervert it.

As regards the first, they never abandon a human being until the end of life, because they do not permit him to be oppressed or killed by a demon unless the sentence of divine judgment should otherwise demand it, as is evident concerning Sarah's husbands in Tobit, chapter 7.

As regards the guardianship of the spirit, however, it is said by some that when angels perceive a human being's obstination, they withdraw themselves from his guardianship, because the angel's illumination of him would be fruitless.

But because this response seems cruel, the same doctor therefore says in that place that the guardianship of angels is either with respect to a good to be preserved, acquired, or increased, or with respect to an evil to be abandoned, avoided, or diminished.

As regards the first good acts, angels abandon the obstinate, because their act would be fruitless. But they do not abandon them as regards the act concerning evil, because they always draw a human being back lest he slip into something worse.

For the worse anyone is, the more inclined he is toward evil; and the more inclined he is, the more he needs one who draws him back.

And he always possesses this guardianship, because even one who is still obstinate, so long as he enjoys mortal breath, can be converted; and consequently one must not totally despair of his salvation, following the example of a physician, who abandons no one unless he totally despairs of that person's health.

Through these things the answer to the question is evident.

But as regards the motivating argument to the contrary, it is said that although an angel sometimes leaves a human being with respect to place - namely, when the angel is locally in heaven - he nevertheless never leaves him with respect to the effect of guardianship, because even when he is in heaven he knows what is being done concerning the human being.

Nor does he need a delay of time for local motion, but can immediately be present.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 113, and Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, article 4, and Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*.

Question Two of Chapter Five of the Second Decade

That angels receive accidental joy from the salvation of those whom they guard

It is asked whether the joy of the guardian angel increases from the salvation of the one guarded.

To this it is answered as follows. The reward of angels is twofold, namely essential and accidental.

As regards the essential reward, the joy of angels does not increase from the salvation of the one guarded. For they do not become more blessed - so that, namely, they see, love, or fear God more - on account of the salvation of the one guarded.

The reason for this is that, since the angels are established in beatitude, they cannot make progress in beatitude.

Nevertheless, their joy increases accidentally, insofar as extensively they rejoice over more things and have obtained more goods.

Whence it is customarily said formally that they do not rejoice because they have obtained greater goods, but because they have obtained more goods, so that the word *greater* is referred to the essential reward, and *more* to the accidental reward.

Whence, upon that saying of Luke, chapter 15, "There will be joy before the angels of God over one sinner doing penance," the Glosses say that the angels deservedly rejoice over the salvation of the sinner guarded.

First, because they see the fruit of their guardianship concerning the human being, just as a physician does concerning a sick person.

Second, because they see the number of the seats left behind by those who fell from among them being filled.

Third, because they see that they have such a companion in praising God.

Whence, upon that saying of Job, chapter 38, "Where were you when the morning stars praised me together?" the Gloss says: "That is, the angelic nature," and [continues], "and all the sons of God rejoiced."

These things are from Thomas and Bonaventure.

Question Three of Chapter Five of the Second Decade

That they have no sadness over the damnation of the one guarded

It is asked whether angels are afflicted and grieve over the evils and the damnation of those guarded.

To this it is answered as follows. Angels take neither a loss of their glory, nor groaning, nor sadness from the evils and the damnation of the one guarded.

This is proved by a threefold reason: namely, by reason of immunity, happiness, and conformity.

First, by reason of immunity from guilt, as follows. Sadness is a certain punishment. But punishment exists only in one in whom sin is present, was present, or could have been present.

But in the good angels sin was not present, is not present, and cannot be present. Therefore, sadness cannot be present in them.

Second, this same thing is proved by reason of happiness in the fatherland, as follows. Angels are in perfect happiness. But perfect happiness - such as is the happiness of the fatherland - does not admit any misery together with itself, because, just as it includes every good, so it excludes every evil.

But all sadness pertains to misery and is to be fled, according to the Philosopher in Book II of the *Ethics*. Therefore, the blessed angels cannot be sad.

Third, this same thing is proved by reason of conformity to the supreme rule, which is God, as follows. The will of the blessed is perfectly conformed and joined to the divine will.

But guilt exists from the divine will permissively, and punishment effectively. Therefore, whatever exists is willed by God; and just as it is willed by God, so it is willed by the blessed angels.

Whence, just as there is nothing over which God grieves, so there is nothing over which the angels grieve.

Whence they are saddened neither over the sins of human beings, since these are willed by God indirectly, namely permissively, nor over the punishment of the damned, since it is willed by God directly, namely effectively.

But in both cases they rejoice over the just permission and punishment, on account of the conformity which they possess with divine justice. For this reason we say that the saints do not suffer with the damned, but indeed rejoice over their punishments.

And if it should be said, “They rejoice over the good things of the one guarded; therefore, they are saddened over his evil things,” the consequence is denied, because rejoicing follows their nature, but being saddened does not.

And if it is also sometimes found in Scripture that they are saddened and weep - as is said in Isaiah, chapter 33, “The angels of peace will weep bitterly” - and in the *Lives of the Fathers* it is read concerning a certain angel who followed a certain monk when he consented to a sin, striking his hands together and weeping, and afterward, when the monk had been converted, approached him laughing and rejoicing, all these things must be understood metaphorically and accepted according to a certain similitude of operations, not according to weakness of affections.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 113, article 7; Bonaventure, Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 11; Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 42, article 2; and Richard, Book II, distinction 12, question 3.

Chapter Six of the Second Decade

On the vigilance and solicitude of angels concerning the salvation of human beings, concerning which three little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Six of the Second Decade

That angels are more solicitous for the salvation of human beings than demons are for their destruction

It is asked whether good angels are more solicitous for a human being than malignant spirits are against that same human being.

To this it seems, first, that it must be answered that good angels are not more solicitous to aid human beings than demons are to harm them.

For commonly human beings are found to be more ardent toward carnal things than toward spiritual things. And more human beings are found to be seized in their own manner and possessed by demons toward evil than to be seized and possessed by good angels toward good. Therefore, [good angels are not more solicitous].

I respond that it must be said that good angels are more solicitous for a human being and can do more for him than evil angels can against that same human being.

This is proved by reason and authority. By reason it is proved in three ways: namely, by reason of superiority, diffusion, and consequence.

First, by reason of superiority. For a good angel who is inferior in the order of nature presides over demons who are even superior in the order of nature.

The reason is that the power of divine justice, to which good angels adhere, is more powerful than the natural power of angels.

Whence also among human beings “the spiritual man judges all things,” as is said in 1 Corinthians, chapter 2; and the Philosopher says in the book of the *Ethics* that the virtuous person is the rule and measure of all human acts. See Thomas, First Part, question 109, article 4, reply to the third objection.

Second, by reason of diffusion. For it belongs to the nature of good to diffuse itself into a similar good, and it belongs to the nature of evil to diffuse evil into a similar evil.

But a habit, which is a good, is more powerful than a privation, which is an evil. Therefore, [the good angels are more powerful].

Third, by reason of consequence. For he is more solicitous concerning guardianship who obtains a good from guardianship than he who obtains a punishment from guardianship.

But good angels obtain a certain accidental joy from the guardianship of good human beings, while evil angels obtain a greater accidental punishment from the sin of evil human beings. Therefore, [the good angels are more solicitous].

For this reason the Psalm says concerning the good angels: “Bless the Lord, all his angels, mighty in power, doing or executing the word of God” concerning every creature, and especially concerning human beings, whose guardianship is principally entrusted to them.

From these things it is evident that good spirits can operate more powerfully, more perfectly, and more fully toward good concerning those guarded than evil spirits can operate toward evil against the good.

An evil spirit can indeed seize any human being, inspire him, and in some manner glide into him, so that through him the spirit may work and announce marvelous things and cause him to know hidden things. It can alter his body and his interior and exterior senses, and introduce inclinations, passions, thoughts, and impulses, as will be said in the Third Decade.

But good spirits can act in the good much more perfectly, more powerfully, and more fully.

For good spirits can glide into the good, excite and seize them, illuminate them concerning the secrets of God, and inflame them marvelously toward the love of God, as is evident in many holy men, in Dominic and Francis.

And good angels can likewise do concerning human bodies the same things which evil spirits are accustomed to do, and do them much more perfectly.

For the devil cannot inflame a human being so ardently toward some vice that a good angel cannot kindle someone more ardently toward the desirable things of the virtues.

The devil cannot make someone so proud that an angel of God cannot make someone more humble.

And, briefly, evil angels cannot impel human beings toward evils so strongly that good angels cannot lead those same human beings toward contrary things more strongly and perfectly.

But as regards the motivating argument to the contrary, it is said that more carnal than spiritual human beings are commonly found because more follow the sensual things which demons counsel than the spiritual things shown by good angels.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Two of Chapter Six of the Second Decade

Why angels permit human beings to be vexed by demons

It is asked why angels, who are more friendly to human beings and stronger than demons - as was concluded immediately above - permit and have permitted human beings and holy men sometimes to be vexed and overcome by demons, especially since the loss of the one guarded is ascribed to the negligence of the guardian.

Whence it is said to a certain person in 3 Kings, chapter 20: “Guard this man, because if he slips away, your life shall be for his life.”

To this it is answered as follows. In guarding human beings, angels do not act as much as they know and can, but as much as is permitted to them by God, the first guardian, according to the order of his providence and justice, and as much as we acquiesce in their counsels.

Whence, if we admitted their counsels and permitted them to act according to the utmost of their power toward the illumination and justification of human beings and the repulsion of demons, they certainly could in a short time summon however perverse and evil human beings to the knowledge of truth and kindle them toward the love of virtue.

Therefore, it does not arise from negligence on the part of the angels, nor must it be imputed to them, that so many human beings committed to their care perish or are vexed, since no negligence properly so called falls within angels.

Indeed, so great is the care of angels for human beings that they do not entirely abandon even those who are most obstinate; if they abandoned them, malignant spirits would immediately precipitate them into death.

But this occurs, first, because we repel them when we do not acquiesce in their counsels, since they cannot act beyond the capacity of our choice.

Second, because they act concerning us with all their powers only to the extent permitted to them by the order of divine justice and providence.

Third, because, since angels are not subject to the running state of this world, being confirmed in good, they cannot act and strive to the extreme with all their powers for wayfarers belonging to another state and nature.

But as regards the motivating argument to the contrary, Origen, upon that saying of Numbers, chapter 25, "Israel was initiated to Beelphegor," says: "A good angel presides over human beings, who will be blamed for their offenses and brought into judgment, and will be praised for things well done."

But this is false, because good angels will in no way be blamed or brought into judgment, unless perhaps it is understood that they will be brought into judgment not for their condemnation on account of some negligence committed concerning human beings, but in order to manifest that the wicked were damned through their own malice and not through the fault of their guardians.

It could also be said that Origen understood by *angels*, allegorically, prelates and priests, from whom the souls of their subjects will be required in judgment.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Three of Chapter Six of the Second Decade

That the fear of falling away from God through sin is not in angels or in the blessed

It is asked whether the good angels fear falling away from God through sin.

To this it is answered as follows. In angels and the blessed there is no fear of falling from beatitude or of being separated from God, because in the fatherland servile fear, or the fear of punishment, will in no way exist, on account of the security of eternal beatitude.

Nevertheless, filial fear will indeed be present there. This fear concerns the evil which consists in not being subject to God, which is indeed naturally possible for a human being on account of the natural flexibility of his free choice, but is made impossible for him on account of the perfection of glory.

Whence on the way the evil is altogether possible; but in the fatherland it is possible on the part of nature and impossible on the part of glory.

And when an argument to the contrary is made through that saying of Job, chapter 26, "The pillars of heaven tremble and are afraid at his nod," canonized in *On Consecration*, distinction 1, chapter *Hi duo solummodo hymni*, it is answered that the pillars of heaven - that is, the angels - are afraid either with filial fear or in contemplation of God, who is incomprehensible to them and exists above them.

These things are from Lord Johannes, Cardinal of Saint Sixtus, upon the aforesaid chapter *Hi duo solummodo hymni*.

Chapter Seven of the Second Decade

On the power and efficacy of angels, concerning which three little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Seven of the Second Decade

How angels can alter the interior and exterior powers of human beings

It is asked whether angels can alter the interior and exterior powers of human beings.

To this it is answered as follows. By their power over corporeal matter and by their influence upon human beings, angels can alter, and sometimes do alter, their powers: they incline the sense, move the affection, and illuminate the intellect.

First, they can alter either sense - namely the interior and the exterior - in two ways.

First, either by forming some sensible thing anew or by placing before the sense something formed by nature.

Second, by moving the spirits and humors within.

Thus it is read in Genesis, chapter 19, that the angels who overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah struck the Sodomites with blindness or *acrisia*, so that they could not enter the door of the house.

And a similar thing is read in Book IV of Kings, chapter 6, concerning the Syrians whom Elisha led into Samaria.

These things are from Blessed Thomas, First Part of the *Summa*, question 111, article 4.

Second, angels can alter the rational appetite of a human being, namely the will.

Here take notice that a human being's will can be altered in two ways: from within and from without.

First, from within; and in this way God alone can alter a human being's will.

The reason is that, since to will is to incline the will toward the thing willed, just as a natural inclination comes only from God, who gives nature, so a voluntary inclination comes only from him who causes the will, namely God.

Whence Proverbs, chapter 21, says: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and wherever he wills, he will turn it.”

The Gloss says: “The heart - that is, the will - of the king is in the hand, that is, in the power, not of himself but of God. And wherever he wills, he will turn it: either toward hardness or toward gentleness, toward good or toward evil.”

Second, a human being's will can be altered from without. And in this way an angel can alter the will - that is, allure or incline it - in two ways.

In one way, by showing or presenting an object exteriorly.

In another way, by stirring up the sensitive appetite interiorly toward some passion, for example toward anger or concupiscence.

From these two things a human being's will is inclined toward willing something. Nevertheless, the human will is not compelled or necessitated by these two things, because the will always remains free to consent to the exterior persuasion or the interior affection.

These things are from Blessed Thomas, First Part, question 111, article 2, in the body of the question.

Third, angels can illuminate a human being's intellect insofar as they teach human beings intelligible truth by similitudes of sensible things, according to that saying of Dionysius in chapter 1 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*: “It is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us otherwise than by being enveloped round about with a variety of sacred veils.”

This is also proved by the similitude of a mirror. For Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names* that angels and souls are spiritual mirrors.

Whence, just as when one material mirror is placed before another material mirror, the appearances represented in one are generated and represented in the other, so it can be that a spiritual mirror - namely, an angel - places itself before a soul; and thus the appearances which it receives from God it pours into the soul and illuminates the intellect for knowing divine things and having good thoughts.

Alexander places this example in the Second Part of the *Summa*, question 39.

But perhaps you will ask and say: concerning what things does an angel illuminate a human being's intellect?

It is answered: concerning four things, namely things to be thought, known, believed, and done.

First, concerning things to be thought - not, indeed, by principally sending in or producing good thoughts, because in this manner good thoughts are attributed to the superior principle, namely God; but by procuring them, insofar as good thoughts are procured through the ministry of angels, according as good angels illuminate, make capable, or excite the intellect to have good thoughts, by inwardly infusing or strengthening good phantasms, or by removing all impediments.

Second, good angels illuminate a human being's intellect concerning things to be known. For through good angels a human being is aided and illuminated so that from creatures he may arrive more perfectly at divine cognition.

Third, good angels illuminate concerning things to be believed, insofar as divine things are principally revealed to human beings through good angels, and faith is thus caused in them.

Fourth, they illuminate concerning things to be done, for from the fact that they illuminate concerning faith and things to be believed, they operate toward the operation of faith.

These things are from Blessed Thomas, First Part, question 111, article 1.

Question Two of Chapter Seven of the Second Decade

Whether angels can consecrate the body of Christ

It is asked whether angels can consecrate the body of Christ.

To this it is answered negatively.

The reason is that the office of consecrating belongs to a human priest and not to an angel, according to that saying of Luke, chapter 22: “Take and divide among yourselves.”

The Gloss there says: “Take, you human priests, and divide and give.” Therefore, and so forth.

But it is asked why Christ did not give this power to angels.

It is answered that the power of dispensing the sacraments flows from Christ the head into members who possess the same human nature as Christ. But angels are not human members with Christ.

And when it is said by Gregory in the Easter homily, and is set down in the chapter *Quod sit*, *On Consecration*, distinction 2, that angels are present at the celebration of this sacrament, it is answered that angels are said to be present at the ministry of the Mass not by confecting, but by praying that our offerings may be acceptable to God.

These things are from Lord Alexander of Hales and Johannes de Turrecremata in the place cited above.

Question Three of Chapter Seven of the Second Decade

Whether an angel, having assumed the appearance of a priest, can baptize or absolve

It is asked whether a good or evil angel, appearing in the appearance of a human priest, can baptize or absolve.

To this it is answered as follows. It is fitting neither for a good angel nor for an evil one to baptize.

This is proved first concerning a good angel according to that saying of Hebrews, chapter 5: “In those things which pertain to God a pontiff taken from among human beings is appointed for human beings.”

But good or evil angels are not human beings. Therefore, neither can they be ministers of the sacraments.

An evil angel can in no way baptize. The reason is that, since evil angels are most perverse, they would in no way intend to procure the salvation of the person baptized, which is spiritual regeneration. Rather, they would act with an intention to deceive, since they are spirits of falsehood.

But intention is especially required for the efficacy of baptism.

Whence, because an evil angel would not agree with the Church in intention, although he immersed someone, he would nevertheless not baptize, even if he possessed the due form of words.

I say similarly concerning absolution from sins. For someone would not be absolved if an evil angel appeared in the form of a human priest, as is evident in the *Lives of the Fathers*.

Nevertheless, those baptized by good angels, if their goodness were certain, ought not to be rebaptized.

The reason is that, just as God has not so bound his power to the sacraments that he cannot confer the effect of the sacraments without the sacraments, so also he has not so bound his power to the ministers of the Church that he cannot grant to good angels the power of ministering in the sacraments.

And because good angels are messengers of truth, if some sacrament were ministered by them, it would have to be held valid, for it would be certain that this occurred by the will of God, just as certain churches are said to have been consecrated by the ministry of angels.

And when it is argued that to baptize is a hierarchical action according to Dionysius, being a certain purification, while angels exercise hierarchical actions upon us because they purify and illuminate, and therefore can also baptize, it is answered by denying the consequence.

For angels execute those hierarchical operations invisibly, not with corporeal instruments. Therefore, the cases are not similar.

These things are from Lord Johannes de Turrecremata, Cardinal, upon the chapter *Romanus*, *On Consecration*, distinction 4.

Addition

If a good angel baptized and the person were truly baptized, this would be from the absolute power of God, not from his ordinary power.

Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

On the power of angels with respect to local distance, concerning which five little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

Whether one angel understands another

It is asked how one angel understands another.

To this it is answered as follows. As Augustine says upon Genesis, those things which existed from eternity in the Word of God flowed from him in two ways.

In one way, into the angelic intellect.

In another way, so that they might subsist in themselves and in their proper natures.

And the reasons of things proceeded into the angelic intellect through the fact that God impressed upon the angelic mind likenesses of things, both spiritual and corporeal, which he afterwards produced in natural being.

Since, therefore, every cognition is according to likenesses of the things cognized in the knower, and every angel has impressed likenesses of all spiritual and corporeal things, one angel is then said to understand another when he turns himself toward the likeness of that other which he has impressed upon him.

Similarly, angels are also then said to understand other things when they cognize them in their proper nature through species of the things innate in them. And this is called evening cognition in them, in distinction from morning cognition in them.

These things are from theological writings.

Addition

See Thomas Aquinas, First Part, question 56, article 1; Richard, Book II, distinction 9, question 3.

Question Two of Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

On morning and evening cognition in angels

It is asked what morning and evening cognition are in angels.

To this Augustine answers as follows in Book III *Upon Genesis*, Book XI of *The City of God*, and *To Orosius*.

Evening cognition in angels is the cognition of created things in their proper genus and in their proper natures, through species and likenesses impressed upon and innate in the angels themselves.

And such cognition of created things in their proper natures and proper being is therefore called evening and *a posteriori* cognition in angels, because every creature, when compared with God, who is light through his essence, is as a certain evening and darkness.

Morning cognition, however, is the cognition of created things by angels in the Word - that is, in the divine essence - when they cognize them through the reasons of things, or through the Ideas which are in the Word as in a mirror *a priori* and as in the principle of their emanation.

And because the cognition of things in the Word is more perfect than cognition in their proper nature, the first cognition of angels is therefore called morning cognition, and the second evening cognition.

For example, according to Augustine - because he expounds the works of the six days not insofar as they convey successions of times, but insofar as they express the cognition of an angel, the cause having been related to the six kinds of things created in order - the angels, insofar as they knew the light which had been produced and divided from the darkness in its proper genus, that is, by intuitively beholding the created light in itself and in its own being, are said to have evening cognition.

But insofar as the angels cognized the same light in the Word and in the divine essence, their cognition is said to be morning cognition; and this, according to Augustine, is called one day.

Then, insofar as they cognized the firmament and the divisions of the waters from one another intuitively in their proper genus, it is called evening cognition.

But insofar as they cognized the firmament and the divisions of the waters from one another in the Word, their cognition is said to be morning cognition; and this, according to Augustine, is called the second day. And so successively concerning each of the works of the six days.

These things are from the theologians.

Question Three of Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

On the speech of angels among themselves

It is asked how one angel speaks with another.

To this it is answered as follows. Speech is nothing other than the manifestation of something lying hidden in the heart. Whence speech properly occurs by reason of the communication of hidden things.

It is evident, however, that an intelligible object exists in the intellect in three ways.

First, habitually, or in the hidden place of memory, as Augustine says.

Second, as actually considered or conceived.

Third, as referred to another outside oneself.

Now, through the command of the will, when the mind turns itself to consider actually what it possesses habitually, someone speaks to himself; and then he is said to form the word of the heart.

But when, through the command of the will, the concept of the mind is ordered toward another - for example, toward doing something or toward manifesting it to another - then he is said to form the word of the mouth.

In us, however, the interior concept of the mind is enclosed by a twofold obstacle.

First, by the will itself, which can retain the concept of the intellect enclosed within; and thus no one can see the mind of another except God alone.

Second, the mind of one human being is enclosed from another human being through the grossness of the body. Whence, even when the will orders the concept of the mind toward manifesting it to another, it is not immediately cognized by the other; rather, it must go out through the gate of the tongue and show outside what sort we are within.

An angel, however, does not have this second obstacle, because he is incorporeal.

Therefore, when the angelic mind, through the command of the will, turns itself to consider actually what it previously possessed habitually, it is then said to speak to itself.

But when it orders its concept toward manifesting it to another angel, it then speaks to him; and thus its power of ordering its concepts toward manifesting them to another is called its tongue.

Speech, however, differs from illumination in two ways.

First, because illumination is said properly in angels concerning those things which a superior angel apprehends in the light of the divine essence and which an inferior angel does not see from himself. Speech, however, concerns motions of free choice which one angel does not see in another.

Second, because illumination occurs through the fact that the light of the intellect of an inferior angel is strengthened more powerfully by the light of a superior angel for the cognition of certain things. But speech occurs through the fact that certain things previously hidden are set before him as things to be cognized, without a strengthening of the light.

These things are from Thomas and the theologians.

Question Four of Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

How a spirit can address a human being

It is asked in how many ways some spirit can address a human being.

To this it is answered as follows. A spirit can speak intelligibly to a human being, or to an angel, in four ways.

First, by an exterior, idiomatic voice formed either by itself in a medium, or by the tongue of an assumed body, or by the tongue of some animal body into which it has so glided that, through the use of that body's organs, it can speak through the body itself. And in this way the devil spoke to the Lady Eve, as will be said below.

Second, by way of an actualization of the imagination in this or that order, and this only according to a phantasmal utterance of spoken words or writings in a given language.

Third, by way of an actualization of the imagination according to phantasms of sensible things.

In these two ways the imagination can be actualized through the stirring and alteration of phantasms and through their varied presentation and application to the interior sense, because corporeal things obey created spirits, both good and evil, with respect to local motion.

From these two ways just mentioned, a spirit can speak to a human being even by interior speech apart from exterior speech.

Fourth, a spirit can speak to a human being through an immediate influx of species or acts into the intellective or sensitive power. And this fourth way is possible only for the uncreated Spirit in the common and natural course.

These things are from Henry upon Genesis.

Question Five of Chapter Eight of the Second Decade

Whether local distance impedes the speech of angels to one another

It is asked whether local distance impedes the speech of angels to one another.

To this it is answered negatively, because in everything which is abstracted from place and time and from here and now, distance of place and diversity of time do nothing at all and produce no effect.

But the speech of an angel, which consists in an intellectual operation, is abstracted from place and time and from here and now. Therefore, distance of place does nothing with respect to it.

But if it is argued to the contrary that it is said in Isaiah, chapter 6, that the angels cried one to another, and this cry appears to have been on account of obstructing local distance, it is answered as follows.

An angel is said to cry insofar as he turns himself toward another in order to show himself so that the other may apprehend him, or in order to show the magnitude of the thing which is said or the magnitude of its effect.

Thus Gregory says in Book II of the *Moralia*: “The less anyone cries, the less he desires.”

All these things are from Thomas, First Part, question 107, and the doctors upon Book II of the *Sentences*.

Chapter Nine of the Second Decade

On the power and sagacious resistance of angels, concerning which three little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Nine of the Second Decade

On the threefold conflict of angels

It is asked how many kinds of battle and conflict there are among angels.

To this it is answered that there is said to be a threefold conflict or resistance among angels, because a good angel is said to resist an evil angel, an evil angel is said to resist a good angel, and a good angel is said to resist a good angel.

First, a good angel resists an evil angel when he restrains the latter's power of harming.

Whence it is said in Revelation, chapter 20, that a good angel bound the devil - that is, impeded his power - so that he might not tempt as greatly as he wishes to tempt, that is, even unto a fall.

Here take notice that the devil's power is bound principally by God, and instrumentally by an angel and by a human being, insofar as angels and holy human beings, in the power of God, have constrained and expelled a demon.

Second, an evil angel resists a good angel when the evil one endeavors to impede what the good angel intends to do, but does not prevail, as is said in Revelation, chapter 12: “The dragon fought with Michael and his angels, and they did not prevail, neither was their place found any more in heaven.”

Third, a good angel is said to resist a good angel, as is said in Daniel, chapter 10, where the angel Michael, prince of the Jews, speaking of another angel, the prince of the Persians, says thus: “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me for twenty-one days.”

Gregory, expounding these words in the *Moralia*, says that both angels were good and nevertheless had conflict and discord with one another. This conflict does not oppose the unity and charity which exist among good angels.

Whence it must be understood in this way.

It happens that different merits are found in different nations, according to the diversity of which it appears that one nation ought to be subject to another or to be freed from its dominion.

So it was then among the Jews, because Daniel's prayer, so far as it was in itself, merited the liberation of the people; but the sins of the people, and also the benefit which the Jews produced in the kingdom of the Persians while the knowledge of God was diffused through them, stood to the contrary.

Therefore, the conflict which existed among such good angels was nothing other than a different presentation of merits, concerning which each angel consulted the divine will.

For the angel who presided over the Jews alleged the repentance of the Jews and the injustice of the people who detained them, and therefore he sought their liberation.

On the contrary, the angel of the king of the Persians said that divine worship and the name of God were being made public through the Jews and that it was therefore fitting for them to remain in that country. And thus, so far as it was in him, he alleged that the people of the Jews ought not to be liberated.

This contrary allegation of merits, therefore, was the conflict of the angels.

And because the angels did not immediately cognize what the divine will ordained concerning the things to be done, one angel is said to have resisted the other for as long a time as God himself delayed revealing the liberation of the Jews to the angel who presided over them, or for as much time as God delayed revealing to Daniel the liberation or a revelation of this kind.

These things are from Thomas upon Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, question 2, article 5.

Question Two of Chapter Nine of the Second Decade

Whether the conflict of the angels with the dragon was real and corporeal

It is asked whether the conflict of the angels about which it is written in Revelation, chapter 12, that Michael fought with the dragon, and so forth, was real and corporeal or intentional and mental.

To this it is answered that it was real, but not corporeal.

For the understanding of this, it must be known that in us, besides the kinds of wars which pertain to exterior executive power, we also experience certain kinds of wars pertaining to certain immanent and interior operations.

The first, namely, is between the sensitive and intellective appetites, for those two appetites are inclined toward opposites. For the flesh desires against the spirit, and conversely.

The second conflict is between the intellect and the will, as when reason judges that something ought to be done and the will refuses.

The third is between the will and the will of different persons, not of one person toward himself.

The fourth is between intellect and intellect, from contrary opinions through opposed reasons.

Therefore, the war of the angels, according to the foregoing, was threefold, corresponding to the three things which are found in their intellectual nature, namely reason, will, and faculty.

For through reason the elect and the reprobate thought contrary things.

Through will they were affected toward contrary things.

Through faculty, however, they strove toward opposed things.

For the elect angels thought submissively concerning God, grace, and his glory, and were affected toward and strove after those things. The evil angels did the contrary.

And thus one must also understand the altercation of Michael with the devil concerning the finding of the body of Moses, about which it is written in the Epistle of Jude, chapter 1, and in cause 24, question 3, chapter *Si igitur*.

These things are from Francis of Meyronnes upon Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 6.

Addition

If you desire more, see Raphael Maffei in his exposition of the Canonical Epistle of Saint Jude the Apostle.

Question Three of Chapter Nine of the Second Decade

On the cause of the conflict of Michael with the dragon

It is asked concerning what, and over what matter, the conflict of Michael with the dragon occurred.

To this it is answered as follows.

Lucifer, who was more excellent in being than the others, as is evident in Daniel under the type of the most proud kings of the earth, said in his heart, in an inconceivable exaltation of pride: “I am God. I sit upon a throne. I am from myself, without beginning” - denying that anyone greater than himself had made him.

And consequently he aspired to ascend into heaven so that he might possess dominion over heaven; he aspired to ascend above the height of the clouds so that he might be adored as God by all the angels.

And, having taken counsel within himself, he said: “I am full of wisdom. I shall persuade all the angels, so that without contradiction they will believe me when I say, ‘I am God; I am from myself.’”

And he preached to them without delay of time, as is contained in Daniel, where it says: “He sent forth his ends unto all the signs of the region,” that is, he poured forth the utterances of his wisdom to all the multitudes of the angels so that they might obey him.

But the Lord God, who does not permit a creature to be tempted beyond that which it is able to bear, raised up one of the archangels who steadfastly said: “You are not God, but there is another more excellent, who created you and all of us.”

And for this reason he was called Michael, which is interpreted, “Who is like our God?” He is reported, in resisting Lucifer, to have said: “Why, therefore, do you say, ‘I am God’? For who can be God like our God?” and similar things.

And then a conflict occurred in heaven, as is said in Revelation, chapter 12, because Michael fought with the dragon.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Chapter Ten of the Second Decade

On the assumption of human beings into the choirs of angels, concerning which the two little questions noted immediately below will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Ten of the Second Decade

Whether human beings after their death are assumed into the company of the angels

It is asked whether human beings after death are assumed into the company of the angels.

To this it seems at first that one must answer negatively.

The reason is that the nature of a human being is more distant from the nature of the angels than the nature of one angel is from the nature of another. But an angel of an inferior nature cannot attain to the order of a superior nature. Therefore, it appears that human beings are not assumed into the orders of the angels, nor can they be assumed into them.

To the contrary is Matthew, chapter 22, where it is said by Christ: “They shall be like the angels of God in heaven.”

And the Church sings: “The choirs of angels rejoice, our companions and fellow citizens.”

I respond that it must be said that there have been three opinions concerning this.

For a certain Greek commentator, Bishop Eustratius, says in his commentary upon Book VI of Aristotle's *Ethics* that no one can aspire to so perfect a state of his soul that he may attain to the operation of separated intellects or of separated intellectual substances, such as the angels are.

And according to this it must be said that there will be one tenth order of human beings who are assumed into glory, lower than the nine orders of angels.

But this opinion is contrary to the sayings of the saints and also appears to savor of heresy, since even the Blessed Virgin has been exalted above the choirs of angels, as the Church maintains and as is set down in chapter *Pronunciandum*, *On Consecration*, distinction 2.

And Augustine says in Book XII, chapter 1 of *The City of God* that there will not be two societies, one of human beings and one of angels, but one.

Another opinion is that certain human beings are assumed into the orders of angels, while others will form one tenth order, so that the similitude of the tenth lost drachma set down in Luke, chapter 15, may be fulfilled.

But these human beings are assigned in different ways.

Some say that virgins alone are assumed into the orders of angels, because virginity is akin to the angels, as Jerome says.

Others, however, say that the elect constitute the tenth order.

But this also does not appear true, because many who are not virgins, such as Peter and Mary Magdalene, are more eminent even than many virgins.

Whence others say that the perfect are assumed into the orders of angels, but those who are imperfect in merits will complete the tenth order.

But since there will be one Church and hierarchy from all human beings and angels, it is not probable that the number of orders which befits the celestial hierarchy - distinguished into three triads so that the very number of the orders may express a vestige of the uncreated Trinity - should be increased through human beings.

And when it is said in chapter *Hi duo solummodo hymni*, *On Consecration*, distinction 1, "that if a tenth order of them," and so forth, it must be understood thus: that which fell among the angels will be restored from human beings, for so many of the angels fell that a tenth order could be made from them.

Similarly, when the Master of the *Sentences*, in Book II, distinction 9, bears witness from Scripture - whose truth is greater than every perspicacity of human ingenuity, as Augustine says - which says that a tenth order must be restored from human beings, Albert responds that *tenth order* must not be taken there by reason of number but by reason of degree in glory or grace.

There is a third position, which is more consonant with the doctrine of the saints and which is more pleasing to the doctrine of the theologians, especially to Saint Thomas, Albert the Great, and Lord Ulric: that all the elect are assumed into the orders of angels - some, namely, into the superior orders, some into the inferior, and some into the intermediate - according to the diversity of their merits, but Blessed Mary above them all.

This position is evident from the Gloss upon that saying of the Psalm, "You shall appoint them princes," and so forth, which says: "He chose the poor so that he might exalt them to the orders of heaven, which are from human beings and angels."

Likewise, the Gloss upon that saying of Deuteronomy, chapter 11, "Every place upon which your foot shall tread," and so forth, says there: "If I shall be able to conquer the devil, if I shall merit that God crush him beneath my feet, consequently I shall have his place in heaven."

Likewise Dionysius says in chapter 1 of *The Divine Names*: "Human beings shall obtain the glory of angels."

Likewise Gregory, in the homily on the hundred sheep, of which Luke, chapter 15, speaks, says that human beings will be transferred into different orders of angels according to the diversity of their merits.

And in the homily on the distinction of the angels Gregory says: "The distinct modes of life of individual human beings correspond to <the individual orders>, and they are assigned to their lot or order through similarity of mode of life. For there are many who comprehend small things," and so forth.

But if it is asked whether as many human beings are assumed as the angels who fell, or as those who remained, or more, or fewer, I respond and say that he alone knows this to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in the happiness above, and this is God.

But to the reason to the contrary and to the authority of Eustratius it is answered that the assumption of human beings into the orders of angels can be understood in three ways: either on the part of nature, or of grace, or of efficacy.

First, on the part of nature. And thus no one can be assumed into the orders of angels, both because natural action in a human being can never attain to equality with the angels - for no human intellect according to its form can attain to cognizing God as the angels do - and because the natures, namely angelic and human, will always remain distinct.

Second, assumption into the orders of angels can be understood on the part of grace. And then I say that one can be assumed not only into the orders but above the orders of angels, as is evident concerning the Blessed Virgin, who, because she possessed more grace, has been exalted above all the choirs of angels.

Third, assumption into the orders of angels can be understood on the part of efficacy. And then I say that, although an inferior angel cannot merit to arrive at the glory of a superior angel, a human being nevertheless can do so, because the merit of a human being is more efficacious than the merit of angels.

This is proved by four reasons.

The first is on account of God's liberality, which, notwithstanding the infirmity of human nature, wishes to give as much to a human being as to an angel.

The second reason is on account of difficulty, which is the occasion of greater effort and consequently of greater merit.

The third reason is on account of the length of time in which a human being can advance from virtue to virtue and from good to better, since he is a wayfarer for a longer time than an angel.

The fourth reason is on account of the infinity of the grace and merit of Christ, from which our merits possess efficacy. And therefore human beings can, through the power of the merit of Christ, which is infinite, be transferred into a degree of a higher nature more readily than even an angel can.

These things are from Thomas upon Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 9; chapter *Hi duo hymni*, *On Consecration*, distinction 1; and Lord Johannes de Turrecremata.

Question Two of Chapter Ten of the Second Decade

Whether the Blessed Virgin was assumed above the choirs of angels

It is asked whether the Virgin Mary was assumed above the choirs of angels.

To this it seems at first that one must answer negatively.

The reason is that above the choirs and thrones of angels there is nothing except the throne of the Most Holy Trinity, which is the Deity itself, or God. But she was not placed upon that throne, because in this way she would have been equal in deity and glory to the three persons.

Certain persons say in response to this question that the Virgin Mary is said to have been exalted above the choirs of angels because she was placed in the first place of the last superior choir of the Seraphim, from which Lucifer fell.

But this does not hold, because, if it were so, she would not be said to have been exalted above the choirs of angels but to have been placed within their thrones.

Therefore, it must be said that she was assumed and placed above all the choirs.

This is proved by reasons, authorities, and figures.

The first reason is Saint Thomas's, in Opuscule 8, who says: "The Virgin Mary exceeded all the angels in three things, namely in fullness of grace, in familiarity with God, and in purity." Therefore, she ought also to exceed them in place.

Likewise Albert, upon *Missus est*, proves the same thing thus.

The Blessed Virgin is more distant from a Seraph in dignity and glory than a Seraph is from a Cherub. But on account of excellence of dignity a Seraph is ordered above a Cherub by one order. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin will be above a Seraph by at least one order.

Likewise a lady is more distant from a servant than one servant is from another servant. But a Seraph, a servant, is so related to a Cherub, a servant, that he surpasses him by one order. Therefore the queen and lady surpasses those servants and, consequently, all the choirs of angels.

Likewise John of Biblia of Bologna, in *Quodlibet* 19, proves the proposition thus.

Grace and glory are commensurate, for the measure of glory is according to the measure of grace. But Blessed Mary precedes every intellectual creature in grace. Therefore, she is preferred before all in glory, since it was said to her: "Hail, full of grace."

Likewise merit and reward correspond to one another according to equality. But merit consists in charity, and she herself loved God more than any angel. Therefore, and so forth.

The same thing is contained in chapter *Pronunciandum*, *On Consecration*, distinction 3, and in the Archdeacon there.

The same is also proved by authorities, and first by the authority of the Church as she sings: "You have been exalted, holy Mother of God, above the choirs of angels unto the celestial kingdoms."

Likewise the Psalm says: "The queen stood at your right hand in gilded clothing, surrounded with variety."

The Gloss says: "She stood," that is, she stood above the choirs of angels, nearer to him. "The queen at your right hand," that is, near your Deity. "In gilded clothing," that is, of wisdom for acting as advocate for human beings. "Surrounded with variety," namely, of merits and virtues.

Likewise Augustine says: "But concerning you, O Virgin, what shall I, poor in talent, say, when whatever I shall say is less than your praise? If I call you heaven, you are greater," and so forth.

And he concludes: "If I call you the Lady of angels, you are also approved in every respect."

If, therefore, she is their lady, she is above them.

And Jerome says: “This is the illustrious day upon which she merited to be exalted above the choirs of angels and to arrive beyond what was permitted to the nature of our humanity. Here substance is not taken away, but greatness of glory is shown. Here Christ entered on our behalf as pontiff forever into the palace of heaven,” and so forth.

It is proved third by figures.

First, in 3 Kings, chapter 2, where it is set down that the throne of Bathsheba, Solomon's mother, was placed beside the throne of the king, and the mother sat at the right hand of the son.

Likewise in 3 Kings, chapter 11, the Lord said through Ahijah the prophet to Jeroboam: “I shall take you; you shall reign over all things which your soul desires; and you shall be king over Israel.”

And thus the truth of this question is evident.

But to the argument to the contrary it must be said that the Virgin Mary is not said to have been exalted above the choirs of angels as if she had been made equal in deity to the three persons, but because, below the divine persons, no pure creature participates more than the Blessed Virgin in the Lord's grace, glory, and divine essential reward.

Let us therefore cry out to her, groaning and weeping in this valley of tears and saying: “Draw us after you into the choirs of angels, and aid us so that we may run into the fragrance of your ointments, O Virgin, our advocate.”

Addition

The opinion of the Chaldeans was that human nature has no form and no determinate image, and that therefore it passed now into a beast, now into a devil, and now into an angel.

But Saint Paul has left it written better in 2 Corinthians, chapter 3, that human nature can pass into God: “For we are transformed into the same image, from glory unto glory.”

For this reason the Blessed Virgin ascended into that lot, so that she could deservedly climb above all the angels, from the gift of the grace with which she was filled above the others.

For if Christ her Son, even with respect to his humanity, obtained principality and kingship not only over human beings but also over angels and all creatures - as Paul says in Hebrews, chapter 1 - what wonder is it if his mother also ascended?

Indeed, it must be believed that she ascended with her body, perhaps when it had put on incorruption and immortality and had been wholly changed into a spiritual condition.

Whence, just as Peter, speaking concerning Christ, says that God raised him up after loosing the pains of hell, because it was impossible for him to be held by it, since he was immaculate, so also we can and ought rightly to say concerning his pure and immaculate mother.

Nor must it be believed that what was granted to many was denied to the Virgin.

She was therefore assumed into heaven, established above the choirs of angels as advocate of all sinners, in concord with the Son who came to call and to save sinners, and procuring eternal life for all.

Third Decade

Chapter One of the Third Decade

Containing six questions concerning the truth and existence of evil angels

Question One of Chapter One of the Third Decade

Whether evil angels, who are called cacodaemons, truly exist in the nature of things

It is asked whether cacodaemons - that is, evil angels - are found according to the truth of the matter, or whether they are a fiction of faithful theologians and Christians.

To this it seems at first that one must answer negatively, because, if they existed, they would be found to have been created by God in the book of Genesis. But there is no mention there of either evil or good angels. Therefore, they were not created and consequently do not exist in the world, in hell, or in this our darkened air.

Likewise Aristotle and the Peripatetics maintained that demons do not exist, and they said that the things which we attribute to demons proceed from the power of the celestial bodies and of certain natural things, namely stones and herbs.

Besides, we see that the moon, according to certain increases of its light, vexes human beings, who are called lunatics in Matthew, chapters 10 and 17.

Necromancers also observe the constellations for their works when they pretend to invoke demons. Therefore, those things do not proceed from demons as is said, but from the celestial bodies.

I respond that it must be said that there have been three opinions concerning the variety and existence of demons.

The first was that of Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him. They did not maintain that demons exist, but said that the things which we are accustomed to attribute to demons proceed from the power of celestial bodies, of the planets, and of certain other things.

Whence Augustine says in Book X of *The City of God* that it seemed to Porphyry, an Egyptian Peripatetic and necromancer, that by certain herbs, stones, animals, sounds, and certain voices, configurations, and figures, and by observed motions of the stars in the revolution of heaven, powers of the stars suitable for executing various effects are fashioned upon earth by human beings.

But Augustine says that this appears manifestly false, because certain operations of demons are found which can in no way proceed from any natural cause - for example, that someone seized by a demon speaks an unknown language and recites verses and authorities which he never knew.

And many other works of demons are found, both in persons seized and in the necromantic arts - for example, the speech and motion of statues - which can in no way proceed except from some intellect.

On account of this, certain other philosophers were compelled to maintain that demons exist, but not those whom we call demons; rather, they maintained them to be the souls of human beings, as Plotinus said and as Augustine relates in Book IX of *The City of God*.

They said that from human souls of this kind are made *lares*, that is, household spirits, if the souls were of good merit.

But if they were souls of evil merit, they become *larvae*, that is, foul and terrifying spirits.

If, however, it is uncertain whether they were of good or evil merit, they become *dii manes*.

Believing this, many of the augurs killed boys so that they might have their souls as cooperators and helpers in their works.

But Chrysostom rejects this pernicious doctrine upon that saying of Matthew, "The demons came out of the tombs," saying: "It has no reason that one incorporeal power can be transmuted into another substance, namely a soul into the substance of a demon."

Nor is it reasonable that a soul separated from the body should wander here. For the souls of the just are in the hand of God, while those which belong to sinners are immediately led away from here.

There were thirdly those who, on account of the erroneous opinion just set down, maintained, as Augustine relates in Book VIII of *The City of God*, that there is a threefold division of all living beings in which there is a rational soul: into gods, human beings, and demons.

They said that the gods possess celestial bodies, demons aerial bodies, and human beings earthly bodies.

Whence Plato, beneath the intellectual substances altogether separated from body, placed these three orders of substances united to bodies.

And although these third philosophers spoke truly in saying that human beings possess earthly bodies, as we experience, they thought falsely concerning the animation of the celestial bodies, since Aristotle denies that celestial bodies are animated, as Boethius says.

Nevertheless, compelled by the truth, they spoke truly in maintaining that demons exist, although demons do not naturally possess an aerial body, as they maintained and as will be proved in the following doubt.

All these things are set down by Thomas in the disputed questions concerning demons, question 1.

Lord William of Paris also says in the book *On the Universe*, Part IV, question 9, that among the cacodaemons there are also certain delirious ones, as it were fools, who, because the quality of their sins requires this in punishment, begin to rage and become delirious through the intrinsic passions of vices - namely anger, hatred, pride, fear, sorrow, and things of this kind - which can grow so greatly in some spirit.

Thus such a spirit judges things as foolishly and ridiculously as a foolish human being who, with respect to the ratiocinative power, can be so perverted, disturbed, and alienated that he will err concerning the second and third operations of the intellect.

And the same thing can occur in demons and in damned souls.

These are his words formally.

But besides the things which have just been said, the existence and truth of evil spirits or demons can be demonstrated conjointly: first, by authorities from Scripture and the gentiles; second, by inductions; and third, by an example.

First, by the authority of the Old and New Testaments.

For in Genesis, chapter 3, it is said that at the time when Adam and Eve were naked in Paradise, there was a creature of another rational species besides the human being.

Whence it is said: "But the serpent was more cunning than all the living beings of the earth which the Lord God had made on the fifth and sixth days."

This serpent, indeed, spoke to Eve not by its own nature, but by a certain intellectual nature adventitiously present in the serpent. And this rational creature besides the human being is said to have been the devil.

Likewise in Job, chapter 20, it is said: "Horrors shall go and come upon him; all the demons of hidden darkness are in his eyes."

And in chapter 16 it is said: "My enemy has beheld me with terrible eyes; they have opened their mouths upon me and, reproaching me, have struck my cheek; they have been filled with my punishments."

And in Wisdom, chapter 11, it is said: "Because certain persons, wandering in error, worshiped many serpents and superfluous beasts, you sent upon them a multitude of many animals in vengeance, so that they might know that by the things through which anyone sins, by these also is he tormented."

And Matthew, chapter 25, says: "Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels."

And Job, chapter 41, metaphorically describing the form of a demon, says: "His sneezing is the splendor of fire, and his eyes are like the eyelids of the dawn. From his mouth lamps proceed, like torches of kindled fire. From his nostrils smoke proceeds like that of a kindled and boiling pot. His breath makes coals burn, and a flame goes forth from his mouth. Strength shall dwell in his neck, and destitution shall precede his face," and so forth. See the whole chapter.

Augustine also relates in Book VIII of *The City of God* that Apuleius the Platonist writes in the book *On the God of Socrates* that Socrates had a certain familiar demon which was solicitous concerning him, so that he would desist from acting when that which he wished to do was going to turn out unsuccessfully.

He likewise maintained that demons are intermediaries between human beings and the gods, carrying the prayers of human beings to the gods and bringing back to human beings the benefits which had been obtained.

And Plato says in the *Timaeus*: "To give an account of the invisible divine powers which are called demons is a greater work than the ingenuity of a human being can sustain."

And Xenophon, in Book I *On the Death of Socrates*, says to the Athenians: "Indeed, even now, while I prepare my defense, the daemonic sign opposes me."

And Lactantius in Book II of the *Institutes* and Augustine in Book X, chapter 24 of *The City of God* write many things concerning their existence.

But besides the things which have been said from the testimonies of the Scriptures, that there exist certain evil and perverse rational substances besides the human being and that they wander in this world can be made evident and established from five inductions.

First, from revelations or inspirations of hidden things which are often made to human beings, and which we have also learned to have occurred by the most certain report; these could not be accounted for from the order and influx of superior and inferior corporeal causes.

Second, from responses or oracles and from other marvelous effects which appeared around idols, through which demons persuaded human beings - even great and wise men, such as the Romans and others - that they ought to be worshiped. These effects also cannot reasonably be reduced either to superior or inferior causes belonging to the natural course.

Third, from the works or effects of the magical arts, among which there are certain marvelous effects produced by means of words - not from the intrinsic power of the words or characters, nor from the proper power of the intellect of the human being uttering the words, as can be demonstrated clearly and easily from the principles of right philosophy and the liberal arts.

It remains, therefore, that such effects occur through the operation of some intellect or intellectual nature to which the intelligible words, including those of necromancers, are referred, and toward which signs, characters, or seals of the firmness of dominion are formed.

Fourth, from the acts of possessed persons and revelations of hidden things.

Fifth, from sudden transformations of things, such as staffs into serpents and things of this kind, which the magicians of Pharaoh performed.

All these things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Third, the same thing will be demonstrated by an example.

For the Reverend Lord Royal Abbot of Salerno, a man of upright life and great judgment and a most faithful confidential ambassador of King Ferdinand, related to me that, at the time when the Venetians brought a most grievous war against the Duke of Ferrara, Alfonso of Aragon, the undefeated Duke of Calabria, was then at Milan.

A discussion concerning spirits was being held there among illustrious men. The Abbot happened then to be present in that assembly, and they held diverse opinions concerning the matter.

The Abbot said that the Duke asserted that what was said concerning spirits was neither empty nor fictitious.

For when he was staying at Croton, a city of Calabria, and sought some relaxation after his royal cares, it was announced that a woman there was being grievously afflicted by spirits.

He ordered her to be brought to him.

When the Duke began to address her, she responded to nothing and moved nothing, as though she were lifeless.

When he had observed this, he took from his bosom some little cases - which are called *crepundia* - within which lay hidden a piece of the wood of the Cross, an Agnus Dei, and a certain waxen cross consecrated by the holy Friar John of Capistrano of the Order of Minors. He secretly placed them upon the arm of that woman.

Then she cried out violently and began to contort her mouth and eyes in marvelous ways.

The Duke commanded her to say why she cried out so, and she replied that he should remove that which he had placed upon her.

Then, when the Duke asked what it was that she ordered to be removed, she answered that in those little cases which he had secretly placed upon her there were the wood of the Cross, an Agnus Dei, and a waxen cross consecrated by her most hostile enemy.

When the Duke removed these things, she again became as one lifeless.

At this point the Venetian consul arrived to speak with the Duke concerning serious affairs, and therefore she was led out at the Duke's command.

When darkness followed and the Duke had retired to bed, suddenly all things seemed to resound with noise. Seized by fear, the Duke ordered certain persons to be called to him, and with them he spent the night wakefully until dawn.

On the following day he again ordered this woman to be summoned.

When she perceived that the Duke was attempting the same things which he had performed the previous day, she asked whether he had been terrified during the preceding night.

When the Duke had rebuked her as an infernal spirit hostile to mortals and at the same time asked whether she had been the one who had made noise throughout the bedchamber and disturbed his sleep, she nodded while smiling.

When he asked where she had been hidden, she replied: “At the very top of the great canopy which stands beside your bed. And if the sacred objects which you carry hidden in the little cases had not restrained me, I would immediately have carried you off with our hands and hurled you headlong from the bed.”

“Indeed, know that I caught every word which you exchanged yesterday with the Venetian consul.”

But the Duke, as though this could by no means have occurred, said, after the witnesses had been removed, “Speak.”

She expounded the whole matter just as it had occurred, no differently than if she had been present, without changing even the order of a word.

The astonished Duke, after these things, believed with correspondingly greater firmness that malignant spirits move about, just as greatly as he had ever doubted it before.

Now let us respond to the reasons to the contrary.

To the first it must be said, first, that Augustine said in Book XI of *The City of God* that the angels are omitted from that first creation of things, but they are signified by the name of heaven or also by the name of light.

The reason that they were either omitted or signified by the names of corporeal things is that Moses was speaking to an uncultivated people which could not yet comprehend an incorporeal nature. If it had been expressly stated to them that there were certain things above every corporeal nature, this would have been for them an occasion of idolatry, toward which they were inclined and from which Moses principally intended to recall them.

To the second, with due reverence we deny Aristotle; and where he maintains something contrary to the faith, we deny him altogether.

And we say that, although the lunar body in its increase or decrease can perhaps vex human beings in some manner, it cannot do so with such great vexation as we sometimes see in persons seized by demons. Rather, demons cause that vehement vexation.

And they do this especially during the increase or decrease of the moon for a twofold reason.

First, expressly in order to defame a creature of God, namely the moon, as Jerome and Chrysostom say.

Second, because, since they cannot operate except by means of natural powers, as will be declared, the demons themselves consider in their works the aptitudes of bodies for their intended effects.

It is evident, however, that the brain is the most humid of all the parts of the body, as Aristotle says, and it is therefore especially subject to the operation of the moon, which by its property has the power to move moisture.

But the animal powers are perfected in the brain, and therefore demons, according to certain increases of the moon, disturb a human being's imagination when they consider the brain disposed for this.

To the third it must be said that necromancers truly, and not fictitiously, invoke demons under certain constellations; and demons respond and come for two reasons.

First, so that they may lead human beings into this error, that they should believe some divinity to be in the stars.

Second, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal nature is more disposed toward the effects for which they are summoned.

As for the fact that demons are also allured and summoned by certain herbs, stones, and so forth, as Augustine relates from the opinion of Porphyry - not, however, the Porphyry who published the *Predicables* - Augustine responds to this in Book XXI of *The City of God*.

He says that demons are allured by things of this kind not as animals are by foods - for example, a sheep by a green branch - but as spirits are by signs, insofar as these things are offered to them as a sign of divine honor, for which they are exceedingly greedy.

All these things are from Thomas in the place cited above and in the First Part, question 115, and from Henry upon Genesis.

Question Two of Chapter One of the Third Decade

What demons are

It is asked what those beings which we call demons are.

To this Augustine responds upon Genesis, reporting the opinion of the Platonists; and it is set down in the *Decretum*, chapter *Sciendum*, cause 26, question 3.

He describes evil angels thus: “Demons are animals in genus, most beautiful in nature, rational in mind, passive in soul, aerial in body, and eternal in duration.”

He says *in genus*, namely in the genus of nature and the predicamental category of substance.

They are *most beautiful in nature*, for with respect to the substance of their nature they are not more base than the good angels.

They are *passive in soul*, with passions, according to the Platonists, of the appetites of sensuality, namely the concupiscible and the irascible.

They are *aerial in body* insofar as they were created from subtler matter, as the Gloss upon the *Decretum* says in the place cited above, so that it may be understood that they understand more subtly and swiftly than human beings.

They are *eternal in duration*, namely through grace and not through nature.

Likewise Augustine in *The City of God* also describes them thus: “Demons are spirits most greedy to harm, altogether alien from justice, swollen with pride, livid with envy, and crafty in deceit. They indeed inhabit this air because, cast down from the sublimity of the higher heaven, they have by merit been condemned irreversibly in a place fitting to them as in a prison.”

And evil angels are called *diaboli*, from *dia*, which is “two,” and *bolus*, which is “morsel,” as if desiring two morsels, namely those of souls and bodies, as is said in the Ordinary Gloss upon chapter *Firmiter*, *On the Supreme Trinity*.

Diabolus is also said in Hebrew as if “flowing downward.” In Greek it is said to mean “accuser”; in Latin, “evil angel,” as Isidore says in Book VIII of the *Etymologies*.

He is also called *Satan*, as if “adversary,” and *demon*, as if one skilled in things.

These things are from the authorities cited above.

Addition

He says: “Demons are animals in genus.”

For Hermes Trismegistus, all the Academics, and many of our more ancient doctors assert that angels are corporeal and animate.

For Saint Basil says: “Angels possess bodies like certain fine, aerial, and pure spirits.”

Certainly an angel could not be moved from place to place unless it possessed a body, since local motion belongs to a body alone.

But as far as the title of the question is concerned, we have from Porphyry and Proclus that there is a twofold genus of evil demons.

For one is the genus of souls or of substantial and intellectual demons; the other, however, is the genus of material powers, such as the animal appetites which always oppose the spirit.

And Michael Psellus, following the thought of Plato, Porphyry, and Proclus, reduces them to four principal genera, namely the earthly, watery, aerial, and fiery.

For the earthly oppose us through the flesh; the watery through blood mixed with phlegm; the aerial through the spirit of pride; and the fiery through inflamed anger.

But take good notice in the chapter cited above that Augustine is reporting the opinion of others rather than stating what he himself thought concerning certain things which are said about spirits.

Such is the statement that they were created from subtler matter, for it is a moral discourse.

They are also eternal by nature *a parte post*, unless he wishes to say that they are eternal through that general grace by which all things are preserved in being, or through grace in view of their demerits when speaking of demons; for they rendered themselves unworthy of existence.

Question Three of Chapter One of the Third Decade

Whether the fall of the demons was possible

It is asked whether the fall and lapse of the angels from the beginning of the world - as Christians say - was possible.

To this it is answered as follows.

Certain heretics and philosophers are accustomed to attack Christian doctrine upon this point concerning the fall of the angels, saying that the original fall, from the beginning of the world, of angels who were perfect in essentials and accidentals was not possible.

For they say first that from the beginning the angels themselves possessed a most clear cognition concerning God and the due relation of every creature to God, short of the ultimate beatific cognition. They knew indubitably that God was to be loved more than themselves, that he alone was to be obeyed and thanked, and that the worship of *latria* was to be exhibited to him. Therefore, the evil of fault could not have existed in them.

Likewise they argue secondly thus.

With no cause existing in the angels for turning away from the rectitude of their first state, no fall or sin could have occurred in them.

But in so great a felicity there could have occurred to them no doubt, obscurity, or difficulty concerning the things which they ought to do, omit, or possess; nor could there have been in them any error in the universal or in the particular, or any impediment or thing drawing them back which would lead the angels away from a right and due relation to their Creator.

Indeed, everything which was within and outside the angels inclined and impelled the rational appetite of the angels toward God. Therefore, they could not sin.

Likewise, thirdly, thus.

Since the will is a power moved of itself, it is necessary that every elected act of it be conformed to some judgment of reason.

Therefore, where reason or intellectual judgment is always incapable of being bent, as it was in the angels, there the volitional power could not be bent or sin. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, fourthly, thus.

If Lucifer sinned, the act by which he first sinned had to be an election of free will. Therefore, it was conformed to some judgment of reason.

If that judgment was right, he did not sin, because a good tree cannot produce evil fruits.

But if it was erroneous, then an error of the intellect preceded voluntary fault, which everyone shrinks from admitting.

Likewise, fifthly, thus.

Blessed Augustine says in Book XI, chapter 12 of *The City of God*: "From the beginning all the angels were of equal felicity, as many as stood, until those who are now evil fell."

Therefore, they were equal in virtues. Therefore, if one possessed perseverance, all also possessed it, because otherwise they would not have been equally happy.

Likewise, sixthly.

The will can attain or execute nothing without the assistance and direction of reason. But reason does not consent to evil; rather, it always resists evil and murmurs against it, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the *Ethics*, that "reason always entreats for the best things."

How, therefore, could the angels sin and become so evil? How could rational natures of angels so perfect and noble, and of so great virtue, wisdom, and knowledge, called happy and blessed from the beginning, have fallen and lapsed? Therefore, and so forth.

But to the contrary, Job, chapter 4, says: "In his angels he found depravity."

In answering this doubt, four things must first be noted, and afterward a response will be made to the arguments.

The first notable point is that every angel and every rational creature, if considered in its nature alone, can sin; and if it belongs to any creature that it cannot sin, it possesses this from the gift of grace, not from the condition of nature.

The reason for this is that to sin is nothing other than to decline from the rectitude which an act ought to possess, or to fail in acting, whether sin be taken in natural, artificial, or moral matters.

But it happens that only that act cannot decline from rectitude whose rule is the very power of the agent.

For if the hand of an artisan were itself the rule of cutting, the artisan could never cut wood except rightly. But if the rectitude of the cutting comes from another rule, it happens that the cutting is right or not right.

The divine will alone, however, is the rule of its own act, because it is not ordered toward a superior end.

But the will of every creature possesses rectitude in its act only insofar as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimate end belongs - just as every will of an inferior ought to be regulated according to the will of a superior, as the will of a soldier according to the will of the commander of the army.

Thus, therefore, sin cannot exist in the divine will alone; but in the will of every creature sin can exist according to the condition of its nature.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 63, article 1, in the body of the question.

The second notable point is that there neither is nor can be any intellectual creature capable of God which, while contradictorily free, is simply impeccable - that is, which can in no way sin.

This is easily evident, because God can obligatorily command any such creature to do something which it would be in the creature's power to fulfill or not to fulfill, while the obligation to the contrary remains.

For there can be no rational creature to whose essential nature it belongs to be blessed. Therefore, every such creature can be placed in the state of the way and left to its free choice under the common influence. Therefore, every such creature can sin.

The third notable point is that there cannot be any rational creature which is essentially or naturally evil or perverse.

This is proved thus.

Let A be such a rational creature which is essentially evil. Then I ask whether A is naturally apt to act or conduct itself conformably to the condition of its nature, or not.

If the first is granted, then it can conduct itself well and rightly, and consequently its being is not essentially perverse.

But if it is said that it always acts and desires in a manner disconformed to reason and to the condition of its nature, it follows that it conducts itself violently.

And thus it can then conduct itself naturally - that is, conformably to the condition of its nature - and so it can again conduct itself well and rightly, and also badly and perversely.

From these two notable points, namely the second and third, it follows that every rational nature which was made evil was made evil contingently and accidentally - that is, by its own power and free choice. For, as was said, none is naturally evil.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

The fourth notable point is that the evil of fault, or mortal sin, can exist in an act of free choice in two ways.

In one way, from the fact that something evil is elected, as a human being sins by electing adultery, which in itself is evil.

And such a sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error; otherwise that which is evil would not be elected as good.

The adulterer, indeed, errs in the particular by electing the pleasure of this disordered act as some good to be done now, on account of the inclination of passion or habit, even if he does not err in the universal but holds a true judgment concerning it.

Sin could not exist in an angel in this way, because in angels there is no ignorance and there are in them no passions by which reason or intellect is bound.

In another way, one can sin through free choice by electing something which in itself is good, but not with the order of the due measure or rule.

Thus the defect inducing sin exists only on the part of the election, which does not possess the due order, and not on the part of the thing elected - as if someone elected to pray without attending to the order instituted by the Church.

And a sin of this kind does not presuppose ignorance, but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered.

In this way an angel sinned by turning himself through free choice toward his proper good without order toward the rule of the divine will.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above, in the reply to the fourth argument.

But as for the arguments to the contrary, the response to the first two is evident from the notable points.

To the third it is said that the will can be actuated electively, or electively desire something, without the intellect having previously judged that such a thing was to be desired, or was to be desired in such a manner, and assented to it.

For otherwise every act by which the will sins would have to be preceded by an error of the intellect, which is false and held to be erroneous.

For all the theological doctors maintain that in the angels and in the first human beings the evil of the intellect followed the evil of the will, and not conversely.

To the fourth it is said that the elective act by which an angel first sinned proceeded from a will which was previously good - not because the preceding rectitude or justice of the will moved it toward those things, but because the freedom of choice, by abusing the power conferred upon it from the beginning, went beyond the due course.

And to the argument alleged for this, that a good tree cannot, and so forth, it is answered that this is understood in the composite sense: that it does not stand simultaneously that the will is good and produces evil acts, although it stands well that a good and just will can elect badly and perversely.

To the fifth argument, the consequence must be denied, because when Augustine says that all the angels were of equal felicity, it is understood with respect to their present justice, or with respect to the perfections which they then possessed in the habits of knowledge and virtue.

To the sixth it is said as to the third.

It is therefore clear from all these things that those who seek the first root or cognition of the occasion of the sin of the angels will find neither their ignorance, as if they had sinned against the Son, nor an impotence of virtues, as if they had sinned against the Father.

Rather, they will find a power of free choice capable of either, namely good and evil, through which, solely by the absence of the consideration of those things which they ought instead to have considered, they sinned irreversibly unto evil against the Holy Spirit.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Take notice concerning this chapter that the author very frequently calls the angels *rational*, for he uses *reason* for *intellect*; they are in fact intellectual beings.

Question Four of Chapter One of the Third Decade

On the interval between the creation and the fall of the angels

It is asked how much time after their creation the demons fell.

To this it is answered that different persons have thought different things concerning the interval between the creation and the fall of the angels.

For Lord Henry of Assia, upon Genesis, reporting an opinion which follows Origen, sets down three things concerning the interval before the fall of the angels.

The first is that not all the angels were made evil before the sin of the human being, although some angel sinned before the human being.

The second is that, although each angel sinned in an instant, nevertheless not all sinned in the same instant, but successively.

The third is that before the demons fell, they were for some time just and good, praising God, according to that saying of Ezekiel, chapter 28: “You walked perfect in your ways from the day of your creation until iniquity was found in you.”

Walking, however, is a continuous motion requiring some interval.

Job, chapter 38, also appears to intimate this when it says: “Where were you when the morning stars praised me together and all the sons of God rejoiced?” - that is, the good and evil angels.

What Origen says upon Genesis also supports this: that the ancient serpent did not immediately walk upon its breast and belly.

There is another, second opinion concerning the interval before the fall of the angels, that of Lord Landulfus in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 4. He places four intervals from the creation to the fall of the angels.

The first is that in which the angels were created perfect in natural things, in original justice, without grace making them pleasing, during which interval they could not proceed into the use of free choice.

The second is the interval in which the good turned themselves toward God and the evil toward their own natural goods, loving themselves most ardently.

Therefore, during this interval the good received grace. The evil, however, placed an obstacle and impediment before it by turning themselves toward natural goods, and therefore they did not receive grace.

The third interval is that in which the evil performed various sins, tempting the good; and during this interval there was a conflict in heaven, Revelation, chapter 12, about which it was said above in the Second Decade. The good performed many good things and resisted manfully.

The fourth interval is that in which the good received the best rewards and the evil punishments.

And this Lord Landulfus places some interval between the creation and fall of the angels, because he imagines that during the first interval the demons were good with the other angels, according to that saying of Genesis, chapter 1: “God saw all the things which he had made, and they were very good.”

In the second interval they placed an obstacle and impediment before grace making them pleasing.

In the third, recoiling from God, they sinned and fell.

The fourth interval is that in which the good were rewarded and the evil punished.

And Landulfus himself distinguishes these four intervals by small coexistences of time and from the distinction of the states and operations or variations of the angels themselves.

Lord Bonaventure and Lord John Scotus in the same place also hold this opinion.

There is also a third, more probable opinion of Saint Thomas, more consonant with the sayings of the saints. He says that immediately after the first instant of his creation the angel sinned.

For just as the good angels were confirmed in grace in the second instant of their creation, so the evil angels in the second instant of their creation fell, obstinate in fault.

And just as the good angels in the second instant, through one meritorious act of adherence to God, were confirmed in grace and merited beatitude, so the evil angels in the second instant, through one demeritorious act of nonadherence to God, merited eternal punishment, confirmed in fault.

But if it is said by Scotus against Thomas that between any two instants there falls an intervening time, according to Book VI of the *Physics*, while you place one instant in which the devil sinned after the instant in which he was created, and therefore there was some interval between the creation of the angel and his fall, as Landulfus maintains above, Thomas responds to this in the First Part, question 63, article 6, reply to the fourth objection.

He says that the statement that there is an intervening time between any two instants has truth insofar as time is continuous, as is proved in Book VI of the *Physics*.

But in the angels, who are not subjects of celestial motion, time is taken according to the succession itself of operations of the intellect or even of effects.

Therefore, in the first manner an interval falls between two instants; in the second manner, by no means.

These things are from Thomas and Henry cited within this little question.

Question Five of Chapter One of the Third Decade

Whether the evil angels fell into hell

It is asked into what place the fallen angels fell.

To this it is answered that we can consider three things in demons, namely their intellectual nature, mortal fault, and our utility.

First, considering intellectual nature in the demons, since natural light - that is, intellectual power - remained in them, heaven is suited to their operation, that is, contemplation. And therefore both the good and the evil were created in the empyrean heaven, which is congruent with contemplation, as was evident above.

Second, considering mortal fault in the demons, since their nature was disordered and darkened through fault, hell is due to them as punishment and for darkness; it is a dark, penal, and afflictive place.

Third, considering our utility, the air is due to the demons - not with respect to its highest or lowest part, but with respect to its middle part.

The reason is that the air which is in the middle region possesses three conditions on account of which the middle air befits them.

For the air is luminous or splendid, dark, and near to us.

First, the air is luminous, and therefore through the nature of light it befits their intellectual nature.

Second, the air is dark, and thus it befits their mortal fault.

Third, the air is near to us, and thus it befits our utility. For it belongs to the order of divine wisdom that our good, namely that of our exercise and consequently of our merit while we resist their temptations, is elicited from their evils.

These things are from the theologians and Rainerius.

Addition

For I think that, although the angels did not fall into the place of hell, they nevertheless possess infernal punishment, although it is not complete, namely with respect only to the accidentals.

For they are like Samson's foxes, always carrying fire with them.

Concerning the fact that their punishment is afterward increased accidentally, see Richard in Book II, distinction 6, question 1.

Question Six of Chapter One of the Third Decade

How many angels fell from heaven

It is asked how many angels there were who fell from heaven.

To this it appears that fewer were those who fell than those who remained.

This is proved by reason and by authorities.

First, by reason.

For sin is contrary to natural inclination. But those things which occur contrary to nature happen in the fewer number of cases, while nature attains its effect either always or in the greater number of cases.

Second, it is proved by authorities, and first by the authority of Elisha in Book IV of Kings, chapter 6, who said to his servant: “There are more with us than with them.” This is expounded concerning the good and evil angels.

And in Revelation, chapter 12, it is said that the dragon drew with him the third part of the stars - that is, the third part from the nine choirs of angels.

Certain persons nevertheless say that so many fell that a tenth order could have been made from them.

But if someone curiously wishes to know the determinate number of the good and evil angels from their legions, let him seek acute arithmeticians and abacists.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 63, article 9.

Chapter Two of the Third Decade

On the simplicity of demons, concerning which five little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Two of the Third Decade

Whether demons possess bodies naturally united to them as form to matter

It is asked whether demons possess bodies naturally united to them as form to matter.

To this many persons respond in different ways.

For certain persons say first that the Lord God, for the punishment and confusion of the sinning angels, lowered and inclined their natures and made them the substantial forms of some deformed body, such as those of frogs or serpents, and so forth.

And thus, in the time of the first human beings, there could have been certain corporeal demons composed of essential parts. In this way they would have been the formal or essential part of some body, and so would have possessed bodies naturally united to themselves.

But if this was done, it was done absolutely by the omnipotence of God and from the obediential potency of the evil angels, not naturally.

For, speaking naturally, an incorporeal intellectual nature cannot be united to a corporeal nature in the manner of a form or of a vivifying soul, because the nature of each demon is a rational substance personally subsisting in itself, possessing no natural or proximate aptitude for adhering to another or for constituting something with another, although demons possess obediential potency, as has been said.

There were others, secondly, who said that, although good and evil angels do not possess bodies naturally united to themselves which are compacted from bones, nerves, and flesh, as we commonly see perfect animals to possess - for Christ said that a spirit does not possess flesh and bones - nevertheless they possess aerial bodies naturally united to themselves.

And they prove this with three arguments.

First, through Augustine, who says in Book II *On Genesis* that it is a good of the spirit of a rational creature that it lives and that it vivifies a body, whether an aerial body, as does the spirit of the devil or of demons, or an earthly body, as does the soul of a human being. But a body which it vivifies is naturally united to the spirit vivifying it. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise, in chapter *Sciendum*, cause 26, question 3, it is said that demons are animals in genus, passible in mind, aerial in body, and eternal in duration, as was said immediately above.

Likewise Augustine says in Book XXI of *The City of God*: “Demons also possess certain bodies, as it has seemed to learned human beings, made from this thick and humid air whose impulse is perceived when the wind blows.” Therefore, and so forth.

But that this cannot be so is proved because, since air is a homogeneous body and similar in the whole and in its parts, it is necessary that, if some parts of the air are held to be

animate, the whole air should similarly be animate. This plainly appears false, because no operation of life is detected in the whole air, either through motion or through anything else.

And therefore we say that demons do not possess aerial bodies naturally united to themselves so that one thing simply and in itself should be made from them. For such an aerial body joined to a demon would not live, since it would not be formally vivified by the demon.

Nor would a demon be joined to such a body as a formal part, since a demon, as has been said, possesses in itself the integral nature of its species.

This is confirmed because angels and demons are of a simpler nature and essence than the soul. But the soul is simple, not composed of matter and form, although it is composed of act and potency, or of that by which it is and that which it is. Therefore angels are of a nature much more simple and subtle.

But to the three arguments it is said that Augustine speaks there according to the opinion of Apuleius and of the Platonists, whose imitator he was, and adduces those things by reporting them, not by asserting them.

There were others, thirdly, who said that angels and demons neither possess bodies naturally united to themselves nor can assume them or have assumed them. Rather, all the things which are read in the divine Scriptures concerning apparitions of angels occurred in a prophetic vision, that is, according to the imagination.

But this manifestly appears false and is repugnant to the intention of Scripture.

For Scripture sometimes introduces angels appearing so that they are commonly seen by human beings, as were the angels who were seen by Abraham and by his whole household, and by Lot and the citizens of Sodom. Likewise, the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by everyone.

In such a vision, however, nothing is seen unless it is a body placed outside the one seeing, while those things which are seen in an imaginary vision are seen solely in the imagination of the one seeing.

Therefore, since angels and demons appear, yet are not corporeal and do not possess bodies naturally united to themselves, it follows that there is some other manner in which good and evil angels are said to be corporeal and to be united to bodies.

It must therefore be said, fourthly, according to the theologians, that angels assume bodies and are united to those bodies, although not as form to matter, because in that way they would make one thing in itself and the body thus assumed would live.

Nor are they united to bodies as a mover to a movable thing, as the intelligences are united to the heavens and the orbs, or as a sailor to a ship, because the orbs do not represent the properties of the intelligences or angels moving them, nor does a ship teach the properties of the sailor.

Rather, angels are said to be joined and united to assumed bodies as to movable things formed in this way by the angels through divine power, so that they are suitable for representing the intelligible properties of the angels.

For example, they assume a human body with hands so that they may represent that they are able and know how to operate; with a mouth, because they can manifest concepts; with eyes...

...because they see the natures of things in the Word or in themselves, and so forth.

And they assume bodies not on account of their own need, but on account of us.

The good angels do so in order that, by conversing familiarly with human beings, they may demonstrate the intelligible society which they expect to have with them in the future life, and in order that they may advance human beings toward the good in diverse ways.

Demons, however, do so in order that they may appear to human beings in assumed bodies, tempting them in diverse ways and placing many impediments before them.

These things are from Thomas in the disputed questions concerning demons, Lord Bonaventure in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 8, and Lord Johannes de Turrecremata, Cardinal, upon the *Decretum* in the place cited above. See Richard in Book II, distinction 8, questions 2, 3, and 4.

Question Two of Chapter Two of the Third Decade

Whether among demons there is generation through seed, as among human beings and perfect animals

It is asked whether among demons there is generation from the male and female sex through seed, as among human beings and perfect animals.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively.

For it is said in Genesis, chapter 3: “I shall place enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed.” But generation occurs from seed. Therefore, and so forth.

Likewise Jesus said to the Pharisees in John, chapter 8: “When he speaks a lie, he speaks from his own, because he is a liar and its father.” But no one is father of another according to the flesh except through true seed. Therefore, and so forth.

In response it must be said that Avicenna in Book VI of his *Metaphysics* held that from the first principle, that is, from God, only one thing in number proceeded immediately, namely one first intelligence or supreme angel.

And from this first intelligence a second proceeded, and from the second a third, and so on as far as the lowest, from which he held that souls are produced or were produced.

And in some measure this also appears in support of this opinion: just as God instituted the whole human race of rational creatures so that all should have their origin from one Adam - in order that among human beings there should be a greater bond of love, a greater union, and a stronger relation to the one who is simply first, from whom all things proceeded - so likewise, by the same reasoning, all the angels would appear rather to have had their origin from one first angel, namely Lucifer, and thus angels would have been produced by angels.

But the theologians reject this, denying that a creature can create and denying that the causes for the production of the angels from one first angel were similar to that for all human beings from one Adam.

This is so both because angels do not remain in the state of life in the same manner as human beings, and because kinship could not have been contracted among them, since there can be no substantial communication among them like that which exists in the generation of a human being, and because the angels did not have to merit beatitude through continued association as human beings do.

Aristotle also would deny that one separate intelligence can produce another through intellect and will, although the cabalists concede this, foolishly and without foundation.

Others imagined generation among demons in another way. Saying that demons are aerial animals, as has been said, they therefore also affirm that among them there is in its own manner a male and female sex, as among human beings and perfect animals. They say that demons generate young demons as human beings generate children.

In support of this is the fact that deceived gentility once worshiped not only gods but also many goddesses, some of whom were called mothers of gods and goddesses, such as Cybele and Samia. The poets also fabricated many things concerning the weddings and marriages of gods and goddesses, and concerning their debaucheries and adulteries, as is evident from their books.

But to this it must be answered that in none of these ways did that Lucifer, the supreme demon, possess or have the capacity to possess any seed or generation.

And it is said conclusively that a demon, through the assumption of any body whatsoever, could not generate a human being from a woman in such a way that the human being would truly be his son. For in that case the demon would have to be in itself and truly a corporeal animal, from whose substance a seminal severance would be made; but such a severance cannot be made from the substance of a spirit. Therefore, and so forth.

And I pointedly say "in such a way that he would be his son," because, as is reported, a demon has sometimes procured the generation of a human being from a woman without the customary concurrence of a man, as they say of a certain Merlin born in England.

Hence Augustine also says thus in Book XV of *The City of God*, chapter 23:

> *And because there is a most frequent report, and many confirm that either they themselves have experienced, or have heard from those who had experienced and whose trustworthiness is not to be doubted, that Silvans and Fauns, whom the common people call incubi, have often been wicked toward women, and have desired and accomplished intercourse with them…*

After certain intervening words he adds:

> *I do not dare rashly to define anything here concerning whether certain spirits are embodied in an aerial element - for even this element, when stirred by a fan, is perceived by bodily sense and touch - and can also suffer this lust, so that, in whatever way they can, they mingle sensibly with women.*

These are his words.

Some say that giants were born in this way.

In whatever manner the matter may therefore be stated, it must be maintained that natural children have never been born, nor could have been born, from a woman and a demon.

To the argument from Genesis it is said that *seed* is taken in three ways.

In one way it is taken materially and literally, and in this way the text of Genesis is not understood.

In another way it is taken for those who fell on his occasion and were made demons.

In a third way it is taken for the tinder of original sin, which he sowed in all those who were to be born and first in the nature of the human being who first fell - the tinder and tares which the enemy, the man, oversowed in the field of God, that is, in the nature of fallen humanity.

To the second argument it is said that the Manichaeans took occasion from that word of the Savior to posit generation of demons through seed, and did so badly. For the relative pronoun “its” refers not to the demon but to the lie - as though Jesus were saying that the devil is a liar and its father, that is, the father of the lie - as Thomas expounds upon John.

Addition

Although a demon can be made an incubus and a succubus, receive male seed, transfuse it into a woman’s womb, and cause a child to be generated in the woman, nevertheless it is consonant with reason that this ought rather to be placed in doubt than that either position should be asserted. For Saint Augustine also appears to speak doubtfully.

Nevertheless, if you desire more things, see the *Malleus Maleficarum*.

Question Three of Chapter Two of the Third Decade

That demons assume bodies from the nature of an element

It is asked why demons, when they assume bodies, assume none but aerial bodies.

To this it is answered that angels do not assume bodies from earth or water because they would not suddenly disappear, nor again from fire because a fiery body would burn the adjoining things which it touched.

Rather, they assume bodies from air, condensing it by divine power as much as is necessary for the formation of the body to be assumed.

And although air, while remaining in its rarity, does not retain a figure or color, nevertheless, when it is condensed, it can be figured and colored, as is evident in clouds.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 51, article 2, and Richard in Book II, distinction 8, question 3.

Question Four of Chapter Two of the Third Decade

What operations of life a demon exercises in an assumed body

It is asked whether demons exercise true operations of life in assumed bodies.

To this it is answered that those operations which belong to a living body insofar as it is living - that is, insofar as it is animated by a form which is a part of the composite - do not belong to good or evil angels in bodies assumed by them.

For, as we have said, the bodies assumed by them do not live, since those spirits are not united to such bodies as forms.

Therefore, since seeing, sensing, eating, hearing, generating, and things of this kind belong to a body insofar as it is living, they do not properly belong to angels in bodies assumed by them, except by way of likeness.

Hence they do not see through the eyes; rather, their cognitive power is signified through the eyes.

Nor are they properly said to eat, because eating properly imports the taking of food which can be converted into the substance of the one eating through the digestion of the food descending to the stomach. This does not belong to a body assumed by an angel, since it is not of such a nature that nourishment can be converted into it.

For this reason the angel said to Tobias in Tobias, chapter 12: "When I was with you, I indeed appeared to eat and drink with you, but I use invisible food and drink which cannot be seen by human beings."

And one must speak in the same way concerning the other operations, the powers of the other senses, and the powers of the bodies assumed by angels.

Nor does generation belong to them in such a way that someone is born from them as though from intercourse and their own seed.

Nevertheless, generation can be completed through the act of an evil angel alone, insofar as demons could become succubi to a man and receive seed, then incubi to a woman, and thus place human seed in a suitable location and complete generation in this way. We read that this was done in the case of the giants before and after the Flood, and Augustine adduces it in Book XV of *The City of God*, chapter 23.

Nevertheless, children born in this way will not be called children of demons, but of those from whom the seed had been elicited.

And if it is said that angels speak, as is evident in many places of Sacred Scripture, while speech is an operation of a living thing, since it is made through a voice, which is sound brought forth from the mouth of an animal, according to Book II *On the Soul*, it is answered that angels do not speak through assumed bodies.

Rather, they effect something similar to speech insofar as they form in the air sounds similar to human voices, as is evident in a gnat and a mosquito.

If it is likewise said that they are moved and walk - which are operations of life according to Book II *On the Soul*, as is evident when they went with the younger Tobias and with Abraham - it is said that they were not moved properly.

For that motion was not joined to the angelic mover as to a form. Rather, they were said to be moved accidentally at the motion of the bodies, just as movers are moved in movable things - for example, a sailor at the motion of the ship.

Those operations, however, which belong to a movable body insofar as it is movable - such as to move, to impel, to divide, and things of this kind - belong to them in themselves, since corporeal nature obeys them at will with respect to corporeal motion, as will be said below.

All these things are from the doctors in Book II of the *Sentences* and Thomas in the First Part, question 51.

Question Five of Chapter Two of the Third Decade

That a demon transformed into an angel cannot be adored without sin, even by one who is ignorant

It is asked whether the devil, transforming himself into an angel of light or appearing in the appearance of Christ, can be adored as an angel or as Christ without sin.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively.

For ignorance of fact, when diligence has been applied, excuses from sin. But since this person is ignorant of what has happened and applies diligence, it appears that he does not sin by adoring the devil as Christ.

In response it must be said that Satan, transformed into an angel of light or appearing in the appearance of Christ, must not be believed to be Christ and cannot be adored without sin. Therefore he must in no way be adored; and if someone were ignorant, ignorance would not excuse him from sin.

The reason for this is threefold.

The first is that everyone has been forewarned through Sacred Scripture that the angel of darkness transforms himself into an angel of light, as is said in Second Corinthians, chapter 11, and in Matthew, chapter 24: “Many will come in my name,” and so forth.

And therefore he is bound to examine the matter and not to adore immediately.

The second reason is that he possesses the remedy of prayer.

Hence, if he were to pray to God with his whole heart that God reveal the truth to him, God would not permit him to be deceived.

For in this case that saying of John, chapter 15, is understood: “Whatever you ask the Father in my name, he will give you” - that is, as Blessed Augustine expounds, “whatever you ask which pertains to salvation, he will give you.”

It is therefore evident from this that the one who adores does not apply all the diligence which he ought to apply.

The third reason is that he could easily avoid the danger by adding a condition in this way: “I adore you if you are Christ.”

These things are from Alexander in Part III of the *Summa*, question 16, article 4.

Chapter Three of the Third Decade

On the power of demons, concerning which six little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

Whether demons can enter the bodies of human beings and animals

It is asked whether demons can enter the bodies of human beings and of other animals.

To this it first appears that one must respond negatively.

For two created spirits cannot be in one and the same place and coexist exactly in the same space, for they would coexist in the same site, which is contrary to philosophy.

But the soul is in every part of the body, since according to the argument it is whole in the whole and whole in every part. Therefore a demon cannot enter the bodies of animals or of human beings.

Furthermore, if demons could enter the bodies of animals or human beings, they would be united to them in the manner of a vivifying form. But it was proved above that an incorporeal intellectual nature, formally subsisting in itself, cannot be united to a corporeal nature in the manner of a form. Therefore, and so forth.

To this question it is answered that both good and evil angels can enter and move the bodies of animals, and there exercise acts of a rational or irrational soul, because corporeal nature obeys good and evil angels at will with respect to local motion.

For, as Dionysius says in chapter 7 of *The Divine Names*, divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second things.

From this it is evident that an inferior nature at its highest point is touched by a superior nature.

Corporeal nature is beneath spiritual nature, and therefore at its highest point it is joined to the superior spiritual nature.

Now, among all corporeal motions, local motion is the higher and more perfect, as is proved in Book VIII of the *Physics*.

The reason is that through local motion itself a movable thing is not in potency toward anything intrinsic to the thing. Therefore every corporeal nature is naturally apt to be moved and touched immediately by an intellectual nature with respect to local motion, as though moved by it.

Hence the philosophers also held that the highest bodies are moved locally by spiritual substances.

Hence we see that the soul moves the body first and principally by local motion.

And because a good or evil angel operates where it is, it can therefore be within natural bodies and consequently within human bodies, insofar as angels enter into them and move them.

To the first argument it must be said that it is not incongruous for two created spirits to be in the same body if one is there not as in a place but as form in matter, as the soul is in the body, while the other is there as in a place definitively, not circumscriptively, as we shall say concerning good or evil angels which have entered bodies.

To the second argument it is answered that, so far as the present purpose is concerned, a spiritual nature can conceivably enter and be united to a corporeal nature in two ways.

In one way, it can do so in the manner of a form or of a vivifying soul. In this way neither a good angel nor a demon can enter, be united to, or go within natural bodies, whether those of irrational or rational animals.

The reason is, as we have said, that the nature of each angel is a rational substance personally and completely subsisting in itself...

...and consequently is a person, in whose power it does not lie to depersonalize itself. Therefore it cannot be a part of a composite.

In a second way, a created spirit can enter and be united to a natural body, whether irrational or rational, not formally but coexistentially. It does so in such a manner that it exercises in that body all its corporeal powers pertaining to local motion, insofar as it also moves the organs of a rational or irrational animal toward exterior acts similar to the acts of a rational or irrational soul.

And in this way any good or evil angel can do so, as is evident concerning the good angel in the speech of Balaam's ass in Numbers, chapter 22, and concerning the evil angel in the speech of the serpent to Lady Eve in Genesis, chapter 3, and concerning both in many other places of Sacred Scripture.

These things are from Saint Thomas and Henry of Assia.

Take note that, when the author says that a demon can exercise acts of life, whether of a rational or irrational soul, you should not understand that it can operate directly upon the intellect and will, because only corporeal things obey angels and demons, but indirectly - namely, upon the body which is also informed by the rational soul.

Question Two of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

Whether a demon can enter the whole body or some part of it

It is asked whether demons, when they enter bodies, enter the whole body or some part of the body, such as a finger or the muscles.

To this little question, on account of what was said immediately above in reply to the first argument, some say that when, with God permitting, a demon enters the bodies of human beings by besieging them, it does not enter the body of the animal or any part of it, such as a finger or a muscle.

For in that case two created spirits would be in the same place, which in the common course of things - as they say, and rightly - cannot be. For neither two good angels, nor two evil angels, nor a human spirit and the devil can coexist...

...exactly in the same space or site.

Rather, a demon is said to enter some inanimate humor in a human being or in another animal, whether blood, bile, urine, or the dregs of the entrails.

But if it is said against these persons, “How can a spirit which does not coexist with the body, organs, or muscles of an animal supply or exercise the local motions of the organs or parts within the body?”, it is answered that one can conceive in two ways that a spirit can move a body to which it is not united informatively.

In one way, this occurs through the motion in itself and in its own right of the spirit which is joined or adheres firmly to the corporeal movable thing through some species of union.

For example, if the human spirit or soul, while its union with the body persisted, were moved in itself, the body would also have to follow it. This would occur by reason of the soul’s informative union with the body, as perhaps will occur in the motions of glorified bodies.

The second manner of conceiving how a spirit moves a body is toward local motion through an intrinsic action of its own, by apprehension from the command of the will.

Therefore, just as the human spirit immediately and in itself moves certain parts of the body locally toward an intrinsic action of its own through apprehension and the consequent free will, at the command of the will, so also good and evil spirits themselves can move the body and its parts immediately at the command of their wills, so that the spirit coexists there locally, as they do when they enter some humor in a human being, as was said above.

Whatever may be the case concerning several evil spirits or several good spirits, or concerning a good and an evil spirit in the same animate or rational body, nevertheless there ought to be no doubt that many evil spirits can enter one human body simultaneously.

This is evident in Mark, chapter 5, concerning the demon who was called Legion; concerning the malignant spirit with the brute spirit in the serpent, of which Scripture says in Genesis, chapter 3, “But the serpent was more cunning,” and so forth; and concerning the good spirit with a brute spirit...

...as is evident in Balaam’s ass.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Three of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

Whether a demon can move bodies by the command of the will alone

It is asked whether demons can move bodies without approximation, by the command of the will alone.

To this it is answered thus: since corporeal nature, as has been said, stands in obediential relation under the ordinary influx of God - especially, as Augustine says, with respect to local

motion - in relation to the command of the free will of angels, there is no doubt that good or evil angelic spirits can move the body, organs, and muscles with which they are united coexistentially through their essence.

Hence the philosophers conceive that unless an intelligence really coexisted with an orb or a part of it, it could not move that orb.

But the doubt here is whether good and evil angels can move bodies through intellect and the command of the will without such approximation.

For, if so, it follows that a demon existing far outside a human body could move that body and its parts locally at pleasure. Indeed, while remaining in hell, it could equally disturb or move by its command the animal spirits in the human imagination, which in no way appears to have been conceded to good or evil angelic spirits.

To this it is answered that, although corporeal nature obeys the command of spirits with respect to local motion, this must nevertheless occur with a limitation to some determinate union or presence of those spirits to the bodies which they wish to move.

Beyond this, it is necessary to concede that they possess the power of immediately introducing alterative qualities - namely heat, cold...

...moisture, and dryness - and likewise qualities which cause local motion, such as impetus, impulse, and other motive qualities.

In this way all the effects of spirits which they produce and have produced in the transmutations of corporeal things are fittingly accounted for through those qualities.

For how otherwise would they raise storms so suddenly, as is related in Job, chapter 1?

How would they produce marvelous apparitions and marvelous transmutations of things?

How would they cast a stone from a distance except by the command of the will, causing motion in the stone through impetus or impulse?

This is evident in the flint stone of marvelous spherical form which the devil cast over the head of the holy Father Dominic while he was praying in Santa Sabina in the city. But, because God prevented it, the stone did not touch the saint; the stone hangs there as a memorial.

How could a spirit be united to some body in such a way that the body would be moved accidentally with the exceedingly swift motion of the angel?

To the doubt it is therefore said that a demon can move bodies and souls, not without qualification, but with a limitation to some determinate union or presence of the spirits themselves, as has been said.

All these things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Four of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

That a demon cannot enter the soul

It is asked whether demons can enter the souls of human beings.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively, through that saying of John, chapter 13, where it is related that after the morsel of bread was offered by Christ to Judas, Satan entered into him.

And in John, chapter 13: “The devil put it into the heart that Judas should betray Christ.”

In response it must be said that Satan’s entering Judas or another human being can be understood in two ways.

In one way, he enters the human body, as in those who are bodily vexed by a demon.

In this manner, as we said a little before, the conclusion is that a demon can enter a human being through its essence. For, on account of the subtlety of its nature, a demon can penetrate bodies without any obstacle and, moreover, molest and disturb them, as is clearly evident in the Gospels concerning those whom Christ drove out from bodies in Matthew, chapter 9, and Luke, chapter 8.

In another way, it can be understood that the devil enters the mind in such a manner that the devil enters the mind through his essence. In this manner the conclusion is that the devil cannot enter the mind of a human being; only God can do so.

The reason is that, since the rational soul is simple and incorporeal, it does not possess dimensions of quantity such that something could be said to be in it as though contained beneath its dimensions. Therefore nothing can be in it except that which gives it being and which is in it through its own power.

I say, therefore, that God alone, who brought the soul into being, is in the soul through his power.

But where the power of God is, there is the essence of God, since in God power and essence are the same.

Therefore God alone is in the soul through his essence, and he alone transfers himself into it through grace.

To the argument it is said that the devil is said to have entered the heart or mind of Judas or of a human being through the affection or effect of malice - insofar, namely, as a human being seduced by him follows him in perpetrating the evil which he suggests. In this manner he is said to have entered the heart of Judas.

Hence Nicholas of Lyra says upon that passage of Luke, chapter 22, “Satan entered Judas”: that is, he entered the soul not through an entering-in, because this is proper to God, but through an effect - namely, by suggesting to him the sale of Christ.

And Albert says upon Luke: “After the morsel Satan entered Judas,” that is, in order to possess him more fully - not, however, because he entered his mind or soul, but because, through suggestion, he found in him a place for his malice.

These things are from Thomas in the *Quodlibets* and upon John; chapter *Sicut Iudas*, *On Consecration*, distinction 2; and Lord Johannes de Turrecremata, Cardinal, in his exposition of the Gospels.

Addition

Although demons can enter human bodies unless they are prohibited by God, nevertheless they cannot enter souls, either immediately by themselves or even through angels as intermediaries, nor can they penetrate the highest or innermost part of the soul.

Thus Saint Augustine writes in chapter 50 of *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*.

And Bede, upon that saying of Acts, chapter 5, "Ananias, why has Satan tempted your heart?", says: "Not indeed entering into him and into his sense, nor entering the approach to the heart, since this power belongs to God alone, but only moving his heart."

Question Five of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

Whether the spirit of a damned human being can enter the body of another human being

It is asked whether the spirit of a damned human being can enter the body of another human being.

To this it is answered simply in the negative.

First, because if this had been conceded to them, they would surely lie in wait for embryos in their mothers' wombs in order to unite themselves constitutively to them, so as to possess at least sensual consolations and delights.

Second, because it belongs to rational souls to inform bodies and to perfect them with a certain natural delight, not to vex them.

Third, because by the law and order of nature souls do not depart from the places assigned to them in their passage. For the soul is "a spirit going and not returning," as in Psalm 77.

But those who hold otherwise must be accused - indeed, condemned in this matter together with Pythagoras, who abstained from all animals, believing that the souls of human beings were in some of them, as was said above in the First Decade.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

But take note that the author does not on this account deny that, with God permitting, they may appear and delude people, also disturbing the living.

Question Six of Chapter Three of the Third Decade

That one must not believe a possessed person who says that he is the spirit of someone deceased

It is asked whether a possessed person is to be believed when he says that he is the soul or spirit of someone deceased.

To this it is answered that in no way are possessed persons who say that they are the souls of the dead to be believed, as has occurred rather often at Rome in Saint Peter's at the iron-bound Column of Solomon.

For such beings are truly demons, who frequently pretend that they are souls of the dead in order to confirm the error of the gentiles, who believed this, as Augustine adduces concerning Hermes in Book X of *The City of God*, and as Chrysostom says upon Matthew.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 117, article 4, reply to the second objection.

And if they sometimes say certain true things which those damned souls whom they claim to be did during life, faith is not to be placed in them.

For such beings are not the souls of those persons but demons, and perhaps those very demons whom the souls possessed during life as their inciters and for their exercise, dwelling in the higher murky air. For in the common course such demons are accustomed to vex the bodies of human beings.

Or they are other demons which learned the things they reveal from the demons that tempted and conquered those souls during life.

These things are from the theologians and from those cited above.

Addition

Perhaps the spirits which say to a possessed person that they are the soul of some man or woman are, as the author also says, either the spirits which once used to tempt those persons, or spirits so mingled with those evil tempting spirits that they have been made one and the same.

Thus Christ intimates concerning the soul of Judas when he says: "One of you is a devil," on account of a certain union, as it were, arising from sin.

For just as Christ united the Church to himself through faith and the sacraments in a mystical unity, so the devil unites the evil to himself through sin.

Souls therefore do not transmigrate from bodies into bodies, as Plotinus appears to think. Rather, these things are mere fictions of the gentiles and poets.

Eusebius also says certain things concerning them in Book IV of *The Preparation for the Gospel*, chapter 11.

Chapter Four of the Third Decade

On the power of demons with respect to natural effects, concerning which three little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Four of the Third Decade

Whether a demon can produce a natural effect without seed

It is asked whether demons by their own power, without seeds, can immediately produce some natural effect in matter, such as the form of a worm or serpent.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively.

For whenever certain causes are ordered to one another according to prior and posterior, the first cause influences the thing caused more than the second cause does; and when the influence of the second cause has been removed, the influence of the first cause still remains.

But the power of inferior natural agents, the motion of the heaven, and the influence of an intelligence or separated substance are subordinated in such a way that the heaven is moved by the power of the influence of the separated substance, while these inferior agents act by the power of the heaven.

Therefore, when the operation of the heaven and the action of these inferior natural agents have been removed...

...a form can still be introduced into matter by a separated substance and intelligence. And thus demons and angels will be able to produce a true effect without seminal reasons.

In response it must be said that a twofold error is found concerning this matter.

For there were certain gentiles who believed demons to be gods and believed that they operated in these inferior things by way of creation. But the Master refutes this error in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 7.

There was another error, that of Avicenna, who held that all the forms which are introduced into matter proceed from a giver intelligence.

Thus he held that natural agents did nothing other than dispose matter toward the intelligence.

They set down the example of the rational soul informing the body: in response to a conception of the soul the body is moved immediately, or toward lust at the apprehension of a beloved woman, or toward falling from the imagination of an exterior fall.

Therefore demons and angels will be able much more powerfully and immediately to produce natural effects without seeds.

But this opinion, like the preceding one, is erroneous.

The reason is that, since becoming is the way to being, becoming properly belongs to that to which being belongs. Therefore, the introduction of a form into matter will belong to that from which the whole composite has being and is created.

But the whole composite is created immediately by God alone. Mediately, however, a form is not introduced into matter except by something like itself, through motion and transmutation, because every agent produces something like itself.

A natural agent is composed of matter and form. Therefore neither demons nor good angels can by their own power immediately produce a substantial or accidental form.

To the first argument it must be said that, although a principal agent influences an effect more than a secondary agent does, it nevertheless does not follow that it can always produce the principal effect without an instrument, just as a craftsman cannot produce a chest without an axe.

Therefore, since these effects and substantial forms are naturally apt to be produced by a natural agent through motion, or through creation as by God, a separated substance or demon cannot...

...produce them immediately.

Nor is the example concerning the soul which Avicenna sets down valid, because the soul is not only a mover but also a form, and the motion of the sensitive appetite is also subject to the command of reason.

These things are elicited from Thomas in Book II of the *Sentences* and from the commentators there.

Question Two of Chapter Four of the Third Decade

On the miracles of Pharaoh's magicians and of necromancers

It is asked: if demons cannot by their own power immediately produce a true natural effect, as was said above, how did the magicians produce frogs before Pharaoh, and how have necromancers produced many animals through the power of demons?

To this Augustine responds in Book III *On the Trinity*, saying that, since corporeal nature obeys good and evil angels at will with respect to corporeal motion, as was said above, demons can therefore also make all transmutations of corporeal things which can be made through any natural powers.

Therefore, since serpents, frogs, lice, fleas, and effects of this kind can be produced through transmutations and motion of corporeal things - as we see, because they can arise through putrefaction and through sweat - demons, since they are most wise and learned, produce certain natural effects of this kind by applying seeds which they know to exist in the elements of the world, or in plants and animals, and so forth.

For they know how to join determinate active things to determinate passive things, from which conjunction some natural effect follows, just as was done in the generation of a human being through a succubus and an incubus, as has been said...

...and will be said below.

Hence, when demons and magicians or necromancers appear to produce certain effects immediately by their own power, this is not true. Rather, they produce all things through the mediation of seminal reasons and active and passive powers.

And since demons are exceedingly swift agents, their works therefore appear to us as though they were miracles, as will be said.

But if it is argued to the contrary that demons also produce many effects without seeds - for example, conjunctions and divisions of stones, as is evident in idols - it is answered that there are three genera of effects.

One is a new effect without the introduction of any form, but produced either through the division of parts from a whole, as an idol is made through carving, or through the conjunction of things with one another, as a wall is made through the conjunction of stones. Such an effect can be made by a demon.

Another is an effect which does not occur without the introduction of a form, such as a lion or a worm. A demon cannot form this effect immediately by its own power, except by applying the appropriate active things to the appropriate passive things.

Another is an effect which does not occur without the introduction of a substantial form, but over which a natural agent has no power, such as the transmutation of matter from form into form, so that a human body is changed into a bestial body, or the raising of a dead person. Over these a good or evil angel has no power except through some illusion, as will be said.

These things are from Thomas in the questions concerning demons and Johannes de Blibia of Bologna in the *Quodlibets*.

Addition

A demon can transmute material things according to place or into an artificial form, but not immediately into a natural form.

Hence the Commentator upon Book VII of the *Metaphysics* says: “It is impossible for separated forms to transmute matter.”

Therefore, if certain marvels are done through magical arts - by applying active causes to passive ones, since magicians know the constellations of the stars and the powers of inferior bodies - they are all great...

...falsehoods.

But they appear marvelous because those things which nature is accustomed to accomplish over a longer time and in a more customary manner are accomplished in the briefest time and in an unaccustomed manner.

See Augustine, Book III *On the Trinity*, chapter 8.

It also supports this that, at the end of Book IV of the *Meteorology*, Aristotle demonstrates that alchemists cannot truly transmute the species of metals.

Question Three of Chapter Four of the Third Decade

Whether, from the teaching of demons, a human being can form a true human body through the operation of natural powers alone

It is asked: since demons can, by applying active things to passive things, form a human body similar to an embryo, as was said above, can they teach this art and power of coagulating human bodies to necromancers devoted to them, as is affirmed by certain persons concerning Albert the Great and Virgil?

To this it is answered simply in the negative: a human being cannot, from the teaching of demons, acquire the art of forming a true human body through the operation of natural powers alone, without the demons' cooperation, so that he might make anew the body of a young man or boy, as they report that Virgil, deceived by the devil, attempted to do.

For how could a human being make by art a heterogeneous body so tender as the rational soul requires, when he cannot make by art a coarse and, in comparison with the human being, ignoble homogeneous body, such as gold or silver?

But if it is said that Albert the Great formed by art and solely through the operation of natural powers the head of a speaking human being, this is denied.

And it is said that, if indeed it existed, it existed through the hidden operation of demons; and for that reason Thomas, then his disciple, broke it, as is reported.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Chapter Five of the Third Decade

On the attacks upon human beings by demons, concerning which four little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Five of the Third Decade

Whether demons attack human beings

It is asked whether it is true that demons attack human beings.

To this it first appears that one must respond negatively. For demons do nothing unless permitted by God. But since God is the author of justice, he ought not to permit a battle between those whose condition is unequal; otherwise he would be unjust or would give occasion for harm to the human being. But the human being and the demon are of unequal condition, since human beings are weak and ignorant, whereas demons are powerful and crafty. Therefore demons do not attack human beings.

To this question they respond that human beings are attacked by demons in four ways.

First, from without, through the presentation or persuasion of an external object.

Second, from within, through the excitation of the passions of the sensitive part.

Third, through an alteration of the phantasy or imaginative power.

Fourth, through an indirect excitation of the cognitive power.

First, demons attack human beings from without through the presentation of an external object. For Lucifer, with his satellites - the most crafty at deceiving, the most powerful at harming, and the crooked enemy of the human race - knows that he cannot directly and intrinsically alter or move the human will, nor insert thoughts into it, since God alone is its cause.

He also knows that human souls are inclined according to the dispositions of their bodies, and that the actualization of the interior spiritual powers of the soul - namely, intelligence, memory, and will - takes place according to the...

...alteration of the exterior senses. And since he knows that nothing good or evil can come from without into the spirit dwelling within the human being except through the five exterior senses, which are like the five windows of the soul's tabernacle, he therefore secretly arranges, insofar as God permits him, to set before the five senses of the human beings whom he waylays some sensible thing as an external object, either one formed by nature or one newly formed, as he does when he assumes a body. Or he does it by using a presented object persuasively, as he did with Lady Eve concerning the apple.

He also arranges for certain outward configurations of things - ugly, horrible, flattering, prosperous, or adverse - to occur, so that by a precipitate apprehension and alteration a human being may be moved or affected in this way or that.

Sometimes too, with God permitting it, he bends human eyes toward objects of this sort, fixes human ears upon vain and shameful speech, and makes human beings attend to these things more tenaciously and retain them more firmly in memory, so that afterward they may thereby be distracted from the memory of divine things.

The devil also creeps in, as Augustine says in the book *Eighty-Three Questions*: "This evil creeps through all the sensory entrances; for it gives itself to shapes, accommodates itself to colors, subjects itself to odors, and infuses itself into flavors." For sometimes the devil causes human beings to take greater delight in the objects of the senses than their natural delight warrants.

At other times he causes human beings to take disordered pleasure in them - that is, more than is fitting, or not toward a good and due end.

The devil also operates in those objects by intensifying and amplifying their natural power to impress upon and inflame the beholder more effectively. For just as an evil spirit can make a rod appear to be a serpent in magical illusions, so he can make a tasteless liquid appear most flavorful; and he can make the ugliest face of a woman appear most pleasing to a foolish lover. Thus it can truly be said: "The devil lies hidden beneath the appearance of this thing."

Sometimes too the devil brings it about that human beings become attached to and take delight...

...in certain birds, dogs, or cats, either in the manner just described or through the demons' entry and incursion into those animals, so that the demons may thereby join themselves more intimately to human beings and finally destroy them. Thus it is said that in Austria a man had a raven full of a demon, which performed and spoke marvelous things. Perhaps something similar occurs in the marvelous horses of those illusionists who wander through the world.

Second, human beings are attacked by demons from within through the excitation of the passions of the sensitive part - that is, of the concupiscible and irascible powers - and especially by means of those passions which are more vehement and more easily excited, such as love, anger, lust, and gluttony.

For these four sins are the most powerful and suitable means for inducing blindness of mind, heaviness of body, the idle sluggishness of every power, insipidity, spiritual drowsiness, weariness, negligence, acedia, and sloth in divine things. For these reasons demons attack human beings especially through them.

How they excite the passions, and especially the four aforesaid sins, is explained thus. Since it was said above that corporeal nature is obedient to good and evil angels with respect to local motion, it follows that those things which can be caused through the local motion of certain bodies are subject to the natural power of good and evil angels. They can therefore move all corporeal things and alter them unless divinely prohibited.

Consequently, by moving, altering, and inflaming at will those humors from which wanton love, anger, gluttony, and lust are materially caused - such as bile, blood, the itching of the flesh, and so forth - they will thus excite those passions and sins. Likewise, by inwardly altering certain humors - melancholy and the like - they will alter the act of the nutritive and appetitive power, so that a human being may thus hunger or not be hungry.

Examples of all these things are evident in the *Lives of the Fathers*.

Third, human beings are attacked from within by demons through an alteration of the phantasy or imaginative power arising from the local motion of corporeal spirits and humors. This is proved in two ways: by reason...

...and by an explanation.

First, by reason. According to the Philosopher in the book *On Sleep and Waking*, just as, when a great quantity of blood descends to the sensitive principle - that is, to the brain or heart of a sleeping animal - motions, that is, impressions, phantasms, and species left behind by the motions of sensible things and preserved in the sensory spirits, also descend; and just as, when these move the sensitive principle - that is, the heart or brain - dreams, visions, and imaginary apparitions are then caused in those who sleep, while, when the motion of such spirits is strong, they also cause certain apparitions in those who are awake, as is evident in the frenzied; so too, by the power of good and evil angels - to whom, as has been said, the humors of the blood and all corporeal things are obedient with respect to local motion - the impressions, phantasms, and species left behind in the phantasy by the motions of sensible things can be moved in the phantasy or imaginative power so that they touch the sensitive principle, that is, the heart or brain. Imaginary or phantastic apparitions will then occur, sometimes with alienation from the corporeal senses in dreams and sometimes without such alienation.

Second, the same thing is proved by an explanation. Our intellect is related to the phantasy or phantasms as the eye of the body is related to the letters of a book. In a book, according as letters are combined together, diverse meanings are represented to the eye. So too, in the book of the phantasy there are letters and likenesses of whatever things in the world have been apprehended through sense. For from the moment someone sees a thing, he already has its species or likeness in the phantasy; and according as those likenesses are combined together in the phantasy, so they are received by the intellect.

This is evident in a book in which all the letters of the alphabet are found: if these letters, D-E-U-S, are combined together, the eye will read *Deus*.

When, therefore, the cunning enemy, the devil, wishes to induce us to diverse thoughts - for example, he wishes to tempt you concerning lust - what will he do? He will excite in your phantasy the likeness of a woman whom you once saw; he will excite the likeness...

...of some immodest member, or of a naked woman and the like, and of persons shamefully coupling. The intellect, however, cannot avoid seeing likenesses of this sort, because it is like a bright mirror in which it cannot happen that the things present there do not shine forth. This often happens while a human being prays or occupies himself with divine things.

Yet however much these images are presented to us by the art of demons, they are not imputed to us as sin unless we consent. For just as doubt concerning the faith which possesses a pertinacious deliberation and complacency of mind makes a heretic, whereas doubt concerning the faith which proceeds from a scruple of conscience - which is punishment rather than fault, since it frequently occurs against the will - does not cause an unbeliever or make a heretic, as Johannes Andreae says in the *Novella* upon the words “One doubtful in the faith is an unbeliever,” in the *Extra*, *On Heretics*, chapter 1; so in the three aforesaid extrinsic modes of diabolical attack, sin is not committed unless the will consents.

Fourth, the devil tempts human beings through an indirect excitation of the cognitive power. For demons cannot insert evil thoughts into the will by inwardly causing them, because the use of the cognitive power is subject not to the demon but to God and the will.

Nevertheless, a demon is called an inciter of evil cognitions in *On Penance*, distinction 2, chapter *Si enim*, insofar as he incites someone to think evil things or to desire things thought of. He does this in two ways: either after the manner of one persuading or after the manner of one agitating the passions. In accordance with these two modes Damascene is to be

understood when he says in Book II that “all malice and unclean passions have been devised and invented by demons.”

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis; from the Decrees, cause 26, question 5, chapters *Episcopi* and *Nec mirum*; and from Thomas, First Part, questions 51 and 3.

To the argument made at the beginning of the little question, however, it is said that, although the condition of the human being and of the demon in the arena and the battle is unequal, recompense is nevertheless supplied on the human side.

First, through the aid of divine grace. For “God is faithful,” as the Apostle says, and “does not permit us to be tempted beyond what we are able”...

...to bear.

Second, through the aid of good angels, concerning which it is said in the Psalm, from “With a shield he will surround you” as far as “He has commanded his angels concerning you.”

These things are from the theologians and Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Two of Chapter Five of the Third Decade

How, and in how many ways, a demon deludes a human being’s senses

It is asked how, and in how many ways, demons delude the human senses.

Master Bonaventure responds in Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction 8, saying that demons mock the human senses in three ways.

First, by showing as present what is not present.

Second, by showing a thing otherwise than it is.

Third, by hiding what is present.

They do the first by offering species. They do the second by varying the sense or the object. They do the third by furnishing an impediment.

The first can be understood thus. When phantasms existing within are offered with a powerful presentation to the interior power, or the interior power attends strongly to them, the likeness of a thing then appears to be the truth. This is manifest by nature. For to a frenzied person, because a smoky vapor has risen to the brain from a slight external occasion, it appears that he sees or hears many things which are not present to him.

Likewise, through a strong turning of the attention a phantasm appears to be the truth, as Augustine illustrates in the book *On the Trinity*: a certain man thought about the image of a certain woman with such concentration that it appeared to him that he coupled carnally with her even while awake. In this manner a demon can make diverse things appear to a human being.

Second, demons can delude the...

...senses by showing a thing otherwise than it is. This can occur naturally because of some variation on the part of the organ, as when a humor of the blood or a fiery vapor descends to

the eyes and it appears to a human being that the things outside are red; or because of some variation on the part of the object, as sometimes, through the placement of a candle or the arrangement of pieces of straw, they appear by a natural operation to be serpents.

Something similar occurs through certain powers of some mineral things, as is evident in a mirror of steel and in a concave mirror. Since this mode is not hidden from demons and they are swift ministers, they too can produce such things by illusion.

In the third way, demons can delude the senses by hiding what is present. For a thing which is present can escape our sense in two ways: either because the power of the sense and faculty is impeded from reaching the sensible thing, or because the sensible species is impeded from reaching the sense.

In both ways it can be brought about by the power of a demon that the sense does not perceive what is at hand. Through this power a demon is said to be able to render a human being invisible, although it is certain that he cannot truly do so.

Thus a response is given to the gloss of Rabanus upon Exodus 7, on the passage "Pharaoh's magicians did," and so forth: "The magicians deceived the eyes of the spectators by diabolical fictions, so that things remaining in their own species appeared to be other things."

The same response is given to what is related in the *Itinerary of Clement*, where Nicetas, narrating Simon's illusions to Peter, says: "We saw dogs sing and images walk"; to the companions of Ulysses who were turned into beasts by that great and most renowned Circe; to the companions of Diomedes who were turned into birds, concerning whom Book XVIII of *The City of God*, chapter 16, treats; and to the woman brought to the holy father Macarius who appeared to her husband and to those bringing her to be a mare, but to Macarius to be a woman.

It is said, therefore, that all these things were done by the art of demons. When demons do these things, they do not give a new species or newly remove one. Rather, they present the species which was already in the phantasy so vividly and swiftly to the interior...

...power of the phantasy and imagination that the human being believes he is looking upon a true exterior sensible thing.

But if it is said from the Philosopher that a particular sense does not err concerning its proper object, it is answered that this is true by its nature, provided, however, that the media remain sound - namely, the disposition of the organ, the medium, and the object.

All these things are from the author cited above and Master Johannes de Turrecremata upon the chapter *Episcopi*, cause 26, question 5.

Question Three of Chapter Five of the Third Decade

On the many ways by which a demon deceives human beings

It is asked whether demons deceive human beings in any ways besides those already described.

To this it is answered that, in addition to the modes adduced above, the devil also strives to deceive human beings in two other ways.

First, through the deception of apparent truth or apparent good.

Second, through the illusion of dreams.

First, through the deception of apparent truth or good. For although demons are most mendacious, they nevertheless avoid lying to those who consult them, so that by speaking in this manner with virtue as a covering they may conceal their iniquity and engender the opinion that, as though they were gods, they do not lie; and so that at the end they may oppress more grievously those who believe them.

For since they are excellent logicians, they know how to deceive human beings by reasoning fallaciously through all thirteen fallacies of the Philosopher.

Thus a demon deceived the first woman by syllogizing through the fallacy of equivocation upon the word "you will die." For God had said, "On whatever day you eat, you will die," namely, by spiritual and eternal death. And the demon said, "You will by no means die," namely, by temporal death at that time.

In this manner a certain confined demon deceitfully...

...deceived King Manfred in Apulia. When Manfred was preparing himself for war against Charles, king of France, he consulted his own confined demon as to what would happen to him in his war. The demon responded: "No, no: the Frenchman will overcome the Apulian." For even now it is customary, when someone wishes to deny something emphatically, to repeat the negation twice.

Therefore Manfred, believing that he would be victorious, went to war and was overcome by Charles. For two negations make one affirmation.

In the same way a demon deceived another man who consulted it concerning the arrival of his enemies. According to the demon's answer, he believed that they would come to him peaceably in order to negotiate peace. For the demon had said to him, "Your enemies will indeed come to you *suaviter*." In this the demon deceived by the fallacy of equivocation, since the consultant understood *suaviter* as "kindly," but the devil as "swiftly."

Another man also consulted Apollo, as Valerius says, as to whether, if he went to his enemies, he would be captured or would return. Apollo responded: "You will go you will return not you will die in war." He was deceived through the fallacy of composition, because the demon placed the stop at "not," while the consultant placed it at "you will return."

Hence sometimes the words of the devil must be interpreted by their contrary. I learned from my reverend lord Gonzalo Fernández de Heredia, archbishop of Tarragona and now Governor of the City, a man of illustrious blood, of most proven prudence of mind and life, that the following was done through a man's dexterity and marvelous quickness of intellect.

In the year of Christ 1473, on the sixteenth day before the Kalends of October, Master Francisco de Toledo - later datary to Pope Sixtus IV and thereafter bishop of Coria - was sent as an envoy by the Duke of Milan to the Genoese. When affairs had meanwhile turned to war, he was detained and ordered not to write anything to the duke unless it had first been examined by them.

But with the exceedingly keen ingenuity which he possessed, perceiving the things that could occur on either side, he had agreed beforehand with the duke that his letters should be read by the latter backward and in Hebrew order.

After obtaining permission to write and showing the letters to the senate, he sent the letter below, which, if read backward, displayed to the duke the entire disposition and condition of the Genoese.

> *Postergatis assertionibus asserentium aliter. Istos alit bonitas, atque fides, nec invidia inflammat eosdem, quidam ordinatis tramitibus se gubernant, nec separant voluntates eorum: Nempe praeteritae quaestionis, memoria cumulata non diffidunt, sed confidunt ad invicem: Nulla fortuna adversari debet eis, sed diu nec pauco tempore durare debent, quod clarissime constat auditu profecto susceperunt benevolo voto legationem meam, nec nomen domini mei mittentis oderunt, quieta amoenitate non cupida sub rapina vivere delectatos. Unde viderunt me usibus claris, et placidis non facto aliquo tumultu omnium terrigenarum, et forensium esse praesentata causa requisitionis meae pariter, et adventus, et cetera.*

"The assertions of those who assert otherwise having been set aside: goodness and faith nourish these men, and envy does not inflame those same men. Certain persons govern themselves along ordered paths, and do not divide their wills. Indeed, because the accumulated memory of the preceding question remains, they do not distrust but trust one another. No fortune ought to oppose them; rather, they ought to endure for a long time and not for a short time. This is most clearly evident by report. They certainly received my embassy with a benevolent wish, and they do not hate the name of my lord who sent me, being delighted to live in tranquil pleasantness, not covetously under plunder. Hence they saw that, by clear and peaceful usages and with no disturbance made, the cause of my request and likewise of my arrival had been presented to all the natives and foreigners," and so forth.

A similar verse is the following, which, when pronounced straightforwardly, befits Abel, but when pronounced obliquely, Cain:

> *"I shall give a fat sacrifice, nor shall I sacrifice a lean one."*

Demons, therefore, do not deceive openly or lie plainly. Rather, they deceive beneath the cloak of truth and goodness: either through syllogistic fallacies, through external objects presented to the senses, through various false apparitions, prophecies, phantastic revelations, and addresses, or through falsigraphic - that is, falsely written - persuasions, by altering, as we have said, the phantastic or imaginative power.

Because of the multiple modes of deception and fallacy, and because of the powers of these malign spirits, Scripture says in Genesis 3: "But the serpent was more crafty" - that is, according to another translation, "wiser" - "than all the living creatures of the earth which God had created."

And Christ calls the devil "a strong man armed" in Luke 11.

And Job 41 says: "There is no power upon earth that may be compared with him."

And cause 16, question 2, chapter *Visis*, says...

..."The devil has a thousand modes and arts of harming."

And Paul says in Ephesians 6: "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."

And Revelation 12 says: “Woe to the earth and the sea, because the devil has descended to you, having great wrath,” that is, power.

Second, the devil also deceives through the illusion of dreams. For sometimes, through the operation of demons, certain phantasies appear to those who sleep, in which certain things are revealed to them.

Sometimes, indeed, these are certain true things, whether concerning spiritual things - as Augustine relates in Book XVIII of *The City of God*, where a certain philosopher expounded certain Platonic teachings to a man in dreams, which Augustine says was done through the operation of demons - or concerning present or future corporeal things, especially to those with whom demons have illicit pacts. To these they sometimes reveal things of which they themselves are the causes, and sometimes things whose signs they know beforehand but which are nevertheless hidden from human beings.

At other times they send false and deceptive dreams. This is evident from Gregory in Book IV of the *Dialogues*, chapter 50, where he says that, when a certain man paid close attention to dreams, the devil promised him through a dream long spans of life. When he had indirectly gathered much money for the expenses of a long life, he was deceived by the demon and suddenly died, leaving his ill-gotten money untouched.

This is likewise evident in the account found in the *Lives of the Fathers* concerning a man who, when he heard the miracles of Moses, began to prefer Moses to Christ. When the devil appeared at night, he saw in a dream Christ in the choir of human beings, clothed in black garments, and Moses in the choir of angels, clothed in white garments. Because of this dream the man departed from the faith; but afterward, having been enlightened, he understood the fallacy and returned to Christ.

Therefore all such revelations and responses in dreams are not to be desired but execrated and disbelieved.

First, because they frequently reveal false things, since the devil himself is “a liar and the father of the lie.”

Second, because, even granted that he sometimes reveals true things, he nevertheless always intends the destruction...

...of human beings. He therefore very often says true things in order to accustom human beings to believe him, and so intends to lead them to something harmful to human salvation.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Addition

Because the demon is perverse by nature, crafty, and wicked, he always abuses against us a craftiness which we cannot explain, since he has a thousand arts of harming. Pope Leo, gathering together these acts of craftiness in a sermon, says: “The ancient enemy does not cease,” and so forth.

Question Four of Chapter Five of the Third Decade

Why God permits human beings to be tempted by demons

It is asked why God permits human beings to be waylaid by demons.

To this it is answered thus. Since divine providence has ordained evils toward good and procures the good of inferior beings through superior ones, and since the angels themselves are intermediaries between God and human beings, the good of human beings is procured through angels. This is done in two ways.

In one way, directly, insofar as a human being is led back toward good and withdrawn from evil; and this is done through good angels.

In another way, indirectly, when someone is withdrawn from evil and advanced toward good through an attack by a contrary. Evil angels assigned to human beings for their exercise have the charge of effecting this procurement, with God permitting it.

These things are from Thomas in the questions concerning demons and in the First Part, question 115.

Addition

God therefore permits human beings to be pursued and attacked so that those who love him may be made manifest and those devoted to pleasures may be rejected. For if no adversary opposed them, the noble soldiers of the king would not be proved.

Chapter Six of the Third Decade

On the temptation of human beings by demons, concerning which six little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

Whether tempting human beings is the proper office of demons

It is asked whether tempting human beings is the proper office of demons.

To this it first appears that one must respond negatively. For it is written in Genesis 22 that God tempted Abraham concerning the sacrifice of his son. Likewise, the world and the flesh tempt a human being, and a human being tempts God, another human being, and himself. Therefore tempting is not the proper office of demons.

To this question it is answered that temptation has a twofold end.

The first is the proximate end - namely, knowledge or experience concerning someone whom we tempt. For the proper intention of anyone who tempts is to wish to know something concerning the person tempted.

There is also a further and different end, good or evil, which is sometimes sought from the knowledge acquired.

It is good when someone tempts in order to know something concerning the knowledge or virtue of another, so that he may advance him to dignities.

It is evil when someone tempts in order to know something concerning another so that he may deceive or overthrow him. This is properly called temptation when...

...we desire to know something concerning someone so that we may deceive or overthrow him.

Because this belongs properly to the devil, who tempts so that he may deceive us, the devil is therefore called “the tempter” by a certain antonomasia, according to 1 Thessalonians 3: “Lest perhaps he who tempts should have tempted you.” The gloss says: “That is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt.”

With respect to the good end, however - namely, that one may do good to another - God, a good angel, and true friends tempt.

But if we speak with respect to the proximate end of temptation - namely, wishing to know something concerning someone - this occurs in two ways.

Either the one tempting wishes others to know, and thus God is said to tempt in order that he may know - that is, in order that he may cause others to know - as is said in Deuteronomy 13: “The Lord your God tempts you, so that it may be manifest whether you love him.” In this way he tempted Abraham, so that he might show Abraham’s obedience to the world; Tobias and Job, so that he might show their patience; and Philip, so that he might show the smallness of his faith, John 6.

Or the one tempting tempts in order that he himself may know. Thus a human being sometimes tempts God, desiring, as though uncertain, to experience God’s virtue, power,

truth, and goodness. So Judas Maccabeus, entering battle with a few men against Bacchides, who was fortified by many troops, tempted the divine power and was slain, 1 Maccabees 9.

And Emperor Henry tempted the wisdom of God when he suspected his wife, a virgin and saint, of adultery and compelled her to walk with bare feet over glowing iron; and, being innocent, she escaped unharmed, as is evident in the chronicles.

Others tempt the clemency of God who ask that their sins be forgiven them while retaining injuries against others. Those who thus tempt God sin most gravely, since they act against the virtue of religion, whose office is to think most excellently and with certainty concerning the excellence of God.

Thus it is clear how tempting is attributed to diverse persons in diverse ways. God tempts in order to cause knowledge; a human being tempts in order to know and advance someone; the devil tempts in order to know and deceive; an evil human being tempts in order to exist as a cooperator of the devil; and the world and the flesh tempt by supplying material to the devil.

Since, however, to tempt properly is to receive an...

...experience and knowledge concerning someone in order to deceive him - which belongs most properly to the devil and to those who cooperate with him - it is therefore said that tempting belongs by a certain excellence to evil angels and to their cooperators.

Through these things the solution to the doubt is evident.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 114, and the Second Part of the Second Part, question 97.

Question Two of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

Why demons tempt human beings

It is asked what the temptation of demons intends.

To this it is answered that demonic temptation, or craftiness against a human being, labors toward five things.

First, to corrupt saving faith by errors and superstitions.

Second, to preserve the human being in them.

Third, to induce a way contrary to the virtues.

Fourth, to confirm the human being in his iniquities, so that he may thereby perish and be damned in the end.

Fifth, so that the human being may suffer sickness and affliction and may thereby become angry and offend God, as is contained in the gloss upon chapter *Potest fieri*, *On Penance*, distinction 1.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Three of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

How many and who are the tempters of human beings

It is asked how many and who are those who tempt and waylay human beings.

To this it is answered that three things are required for the perfect account of a tempter.

The first is that through the temptation something doubtful be made manifest to those who are ignorant.

The second is that this be intended by the one who tempts.

The third is that the tempter wish to receive knowledge of this matter as though it were unknown to him.

By reason of the first two conditions, tempting belongs to God, as is evident in Abraham. For through the sacrifice of his son the obedience and faith of Abraham were made manifest, and God intended this manifestation.

The third condition, however, was absent there, because through that temptation God did not receive knowledge which he did not previously possess.

There is another temptation in which only one of the aforesaid things is preserved - namely, the manifestation of the person tempted. In this way the flesh, the world, and the devil are said to tempt, because in them the virtue or weakness of the person who is tempted is manifestly known, just as the virtue of a soldier is known in battle.

Hence an attack upon the very virtue of the mind, by whomsoever it is made, is called a temptation.

This attack occurs in two ways.

In one way it comes from an intrinsic principle, and thus the flesh tempts.

In the other way it comes from an extrinsic principle, and this occurs in two ways. For the exterior principle either attacks after the manner of an object, and thus there is an attack from the world, by whose things hearts are enticed to sin; or that principle attacks after the manner of an agent drawing someone toward sin, whether by persuading, terrifying, or flattering. In this way temptation is said to come from the devil and from his members, evil human beings.

Thus it is evident how tempting belongs in diverse ways to God, the flesh, the world, the devil, and evil human beings.

These things are from the theologians.

Question Four of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

Whether temptations are to be desired

It is asked whether being tempted by the devil and by the other tempters already described is to be desired.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For James 1 says: “My brethren, account it all joy…

…when you fall into diverse temptations.”

Likewise, that in which someone’s virtue is manifested is to be desired. But a human being’s virtue is manifested in temptations, and there virtue in a certain way flowers again. Therefore temptations are to be desired.

But to the contrary is Christ, who teaches us in the Lord’s Prayer to pray that temptation may be removed from us, saying: “And lead us not into temptation.”

Likewise, Matthew 26 says: “Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation.”

And 1 Corinthians 10 says: “Let no temptation apprehend you except a human one,” that is, a venial one, because human life is not lived without it.

To this it is answered that, since nothing is desired for its own sake except that which has the character of a good and an end, and since temptation does not properly possess the character of a good and an end, it ought not properly and for its own sake to be desired.

But temptation can be ordained toward an end, and this can possess the character of a good.

Something is ordained toward an end in two ways.

In one way, *per se*: namely, that which of itself tends to lead to the end. Thus well-prepared medicine, when applied to a well-disposed subject, tends of itself and *per se* to lead to health.

In the other way, accidentally: namely, that which of itself tends to lead to an end other than the one intended, but nevertheless, through another concurrent cause, tends to lead to the intended end. Thus someone might eat poison in order to die, and it might consequently happen that he is healed.

Therefore, since temptation *per se* is ordained toward the destruction of the human being and is not ordained toward salvation except accidentally - namely, through the fact that it is conquered with the aid of divine grace - being tempted is therefore not simply to be desired. It is to be desired accidentally, however: namely, to be tempted and at the same time to conquer with divine aid.

Nevertheless, because victory is exceedingly doubtful on account of human frailty, temptation is more safely and better fled than sought.

In reply to the first argument, it is said that James did not exhort them to joy concerning temptations, but to patience through which temptations are conquered. Nor does patience shine forth unless victory is presupposed.

The reply to the second is evident…

…in the body of the question.

These things are from the theologians.

Addition

The demon tempted the woman rather than the man because a woman is easier to bring to consent. Since she is of weaker virtue, he therefore obtained victory more easily.

He approached in the form of a serpent not only because, among demonic animals, the serpent is the one most suited to the devil himself, but also so that we might know that, just as we can hope for nothing good from a serpent, so from the devil we can receive nothing but foulness, destruction of the soul, and evil of many kinds.

But the reason God permitted him no other animal than the serpent was so that the human being might disdain to believe so deformed an animal more than God, and so that after the fall he might have a greater occasion for accusing himself because, contrary to the most manifest word of God, he had believed so vile and abject a little animal.

Furthermore, it was so that even in this way the demon's nature might become known to us.

He tempted, however, by vocal speech because, as Saint Jerome says in a prologue, "The act of a living voice possesses I know not what hidden energy."

And just as a demon uses possessed persons and, by moving their tongue, makes them speak so that they say this or that which they themselves nevertheless do not know, so he used the serpent as an instrument, guiding its tongue and making it speak.

Saint Augustine agrees with this in Book II *On Genesis*, when he says that the serpent could be called the wisest of all beasts not by its own irrational soul but now by an alien spirit, that is, a diabolical one.

Question Five of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

Why the demon, having attacked the woman Eve, tempted her in the form of a serpent and by vocal speech

It is asked why the demon did not tempt Lady Eve by an interior suggestion but by vocal speech, and why he did so in the form of a serpent rather than that of the other reptiles or animals.

To this it is answered that, although with God permitting it the devil could have tempted the human being through interior suggestion and phantastic persuasion, he was nevertheless permitted to tempt only through the persuasion and exterior appearance of vocal speech. Thus he disclosed through the tongue the hidden condition of his malice and presented himself manifestly and fittingly to the first parents.

He wished to appear and speak in the form of a serpent rather than that of the other reptiles or animals because, among every genus of venomous serpents, as Albert says in Book XXI *On Animals*, the serpent is craftier and more cunning. Scripture also says: "But the serpent was craftier" - that is, more prudent - "than the other living creatures of the earth."

The devil also added to the prudence and malice of the serpent, because, as Augustine says in Book XI *On Genesis*, the devil filled that serpent and mingled his own spirit with it.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Six of Chapter Six of the Third Decade

That Hebrew speech was the first language, and after the judgment will be the last language

It is asked in what language the demon addressed the first parents, what the first language was, what the last language among the blessed and the damned after the judgment will be, and in what language God spoke with the first parents in the terrestrial Paradise.

To this it is answered that the demon spoke to the first parents in an exterior Hebrew idiomatic voice, formed by the tongue of the serpent's animal body.

God first gratuitously gave this Hebrew language to the first parents; and from the beginning he impressed it upon the good...

...and evil angels who were to speak and instruct in the state of innocence, and upon the human beings who were to converse familiarly with them.

In this language Adam imposed names upon the animals. For it is certain, as Jerome says, that all the names which are read in Genesis from the beginning as far as the division of languages are Hebrew names.

In this language too God, walking in a subject creature in Paradise, addressed the first parents; and there they spoke in an exterior tongue with God and the devil.

The blessed and the damned will also use this language after the judgment, although the blessed will be able to speak with one another in all languages, but the damned will not.

Jerome together with Origen also says that it was proved by experience that an infant who had been shut away and, by a law imposed upon the nurse, had not been taught, burst forth with his first word in the Hebrew language: *Lehem*, that is, bread, and *yain*, that is, wine.

Herodotus, however, says in Book II that a Trojan infant, newborn and shut away and instructed by no one, spontaneously burst forth with his first word in the Trojan language: *artos*, that is, bread, and *ynos*, that is, wine.

These things are from Henry and the authors cited above.

Chapter Seven of the Third Decade

On the power and condition of the demons themselves, concerning which four little questions will be elucidated

Question One of Chapter Seven of the Third Decade

Whether demons know future things

It is asked whether demons know future things.

To this it is answered that there is a threefold genus of future things.

Certain future things have a determinate and infallible cause, as do those which concern the motion of the superior bodies, in which there is determination and the removal of every impediment.

Concerning such things the first conclusion is that demons know future things of this kind in their causes. Such are the things which occur concerning the motion of the heaven, as risings, settings, eclipses, and conjunctions of the luminaries. They know all these things much better through the innate species of their causes than astronomers know them through art.

The second genus of future things consists of those which have a determinate cause, but one which is nevertheless sometimes fallible, as are those things which occur according to inferior nature.

Such a thing has a determinate cause because the intention of nature moves determinately toward one thing. It is nevertheless fallible because a manifold impediment can occur. For example, a sown field, if the soil is fertile and the disposition of the superior bodies is good, will bring forth abundant fruit.

Concerning such things the second conclusion is that demons know future things not with complete certainty but by conjectural cognition.

In this way an astrologer predicts certain future things which follow in these inferior things from the motions of the heaven, but which can nevertheless be impeded because of a defect in the inferior causes.

Cognition of such things approaches certainty to the degree that more causes concurring toward one effect are known, and to the degree that the power of the cause is known better. Hence, because demons are most subtle, they know such things better.

The third genus of future things consists of those which have an indeterminate and fallible cause, as are those things said to be open to either alternative. Such are the things which depend upon our will, which is indeterminate because it can move toward opposites, and is also fallible because many things can occur even to someone willing to accomplish something.

Concerning such things the third conclusion is that demons do not know them, but God alone does.

Demons can divine and foretell future things of the first kind with certainty; those of the second kind, not with certainty; those of the third kind, in no way. God alone knows these, together with anyone to whom God wills to reveal them. From the...

...usurpation of his act, those who devote themselves to foretelling future things are called diviners.

The fourth conclusion, as a corollary, is that although demons know future things in the first way, faith is nevertheless not to be placed in them when they reveal them, because their intention is to deceive. If they sometimes say true things, they do this so that they may accustom human beings to believe them in other matters.

Faith is therefore not to be placed in their divinations.

These things are from Thomas, Bonaventure, and Master Johannes the Cardinal upon chapter *Sciendum*, cause 26, question 3.

But if it is asked how demons sometimes know present things, revealing what kings are doing now, and so forth, it is answered that demons are not moved locally in order to acquire some cognition, although they are indeed moved in order to operate something in a place.

Therefore, just as a demon does not need motion in order to know, neither does he require a delay of time for local motion. He can therefore immediately be present by applying himself and can reveal the matter, just as our soul also passes instantly in thought from Gaul to Syria.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 113.

Question Two of Chapter Seven of the Third Decade

Whether demons know the thoughts of human beings

It is asked whether demons know the thoughts of human beings.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For, as Gregory says in the *Moralia*, the intellects of the blessed when they rise again, directing themselves simultaneously into the intellect of each of the other blessed, will penetrate their consciences.

But those who rise again will be like the angels, Matthew 22. Therefore good and evil angels can do this in like manner.

In response it must be said that a human being's thought can be known in two ways.

In one way, indirectly - that is, in its effect. In this way not only human beings...

...and good angels, but demons also can know the thoughts of hearts; and good angels and demons know them the more subtly, the more hidden the effects of this kind are.

A thought is sometimes known not only through some exterior act or effect, such as speech or operation, but also through certain signs of the face and a change of countenance, or through certain signs of the body, which is moved in diverse ways according to the diversity of affections.

For Ecclesiasticus 13 says: "The heart of a human being changes his face."

And Juvenal says in Book III: “You may detect the torments of the mind lying hidden in the face of the sick.”

And Ovid says in *The Art of Love*: “Often the silent countenance has voice and words.”

In this way human beings too know the thoughts of hearts, but good and evil angels do so the more easily, the more subtly they discern hidden corporeal alterations.

Physicians too know certain affections through the pulse - for example, that a human being is sorrowful or is in love.

Master Bonaventure calls this cognition conjectural. According to this indirect or conjectural cognition, or cognition in the effect, one must understand Augustine’s statement in Book XXII *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* that angels know our thoughts even against our will.

Likewise, in the book *On the Divination of Demons*, he says: “Demons learn with complete facility the dispositions of human beings, not only those uttered by voice but also those conceived in thought, when certain signs are expressed in the body from the mind.” Thus he.

In the other way, thoughts can be known directly, insofar as they exist in the will. Concerning this the second conclusion is that neither demons, nor angels, nor human beings know thoughts, but God alone.

This is proved first thus. Angels and demons naturally know from impressed and innate species. The human will, however, agrees with no thing from which its likeness can be elicited. Therefore neither wills, nor the affections of wills, nor thoughts insofar as they exist in the intellect can be known directly by a human being or by good or evil angels, but only by God, to whom alone...

...the human will is subject and who alone can operate in it, since he is its principal object and ultimate end.

For this reason it is said in Jeremiah 17: “The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable; who shall know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart and prove the reins.”

And 1 Corinthians 2 says: “For who among human beings knows the things of a human being except the spirit of the human being which is in him?”

Ambrose expounds these words thus: “Who among human beings knows the wills and secrets of the heart except the spirit of the human being which is in him?” - that is, except that person’s own mind and not another’s. For it is manifest that our thoughts are known by no one except our own mind, which he here calls the spirit.

“So too, the things which are of God” - that is, the secrets and hidden things of God - “no one can know except the Spirit of God which is in him.” This is an argument from the lesser.

And Augustine says in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*: “It is certain that the devil does not see our interior thoughts.”

What Master Bonaventure says also supports this. Just as God gave to the will of a rational creature dominion or choice, over which no power presides except the divine power, so to its cognitive power he gave the secret of conscience, whose secrets and depths no one penetrates except divine wisdom.

Therefore no creature, whether human or angelic, can know the secrets of a human conscience except through signs, through conjectures, through a revelation of God, or through the disclosure and declaration of the human being.

These things are from Thomas in the questions *On Truth* and in the First Part, question 57; from Master Bonaventure; and from Master Johannes de Turrecremata upon chapter *Quodam loco*, cause 25, question 3.

Master Hervaeus, however, together with Master Johannes Scotus, says that demons know our thoughts with respect to the subject, the object, and the affection toward which they incline, but not with respect to the end.

For example, they know what we are thinking, but they do not know toward what end. They know that you are thinking about a woman, but they do not know whether it is toward pleasure or toward another end.

To Gregory's argument it must be said that in the resurrection, on account of the brightness and subtlety of their bodies, their minds will be penetrated with respect to the quantity of grace and glory, but not with respect to the thoughts of their hearts.

The same is said of good and evil angels from now until the day of judgment.

These things are from the authorities adduced above.

Question Three of Chapter Seven of the Third Decade

Whether demons can perform miracles

It is asked whether demons can perform miracles.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For Augustine says in the book *Eighty-Three Questions*: "Very often, through magical arts and those of demons, miracles are performed similar to those performed through the servants of God," as is evident from Valerius Maximus, Book I, under the heading *On Miracles*.

Likewise, the raising of the dead is a miracle. But the devil performed the raising of Samuel through the medium of the pythoness, as is evident in 1 Kings 28.

It is answered that, if a miracle is taken properly, insofar as it is something arduous and unusual, beyond the faculty of the whole of created nature and appearing beyond the expectation of the one who wonders, as Augustine says, demons cannot perform miracles in this sense, nor can any creature, but God alone.

But if a miracle is taken commonly for that which exceeds human faculty and consideration, demons can in this sense perform miracles. These would more truly be called marvels, insofar as human beings marvel at the things thus done because they exceed their faculty and cognition.

Although the works of demons which appear to us to be miracles do not attain to the true account of a miracle, they are nevertheless sometimes true things. Thus Pharaoh's magicians, through the power of demons, made true serpents and frogs; and fire fell from heaven upon Job's household and flocks, and so forth. These were works of Satan and were not phantasms, as Augustine says in Book XX of *The City of God*.

To the first argument it is said that those things are properly called marvels and not miracles.

To the second it is said that the pythoness did not see Samuel, but the devil in the appearance and likeness of Samuel, whom the pythoness believed to be Samuel. Therefore the raising was not true but phantastic.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 110, and Johannes de Turrecremata, cause 25, question 3, chapter *Quodam loco*.

Question Four of Chapter Seven of the Third Decade

Whether women said to ride at night with Diana are a demonic illusion

It is asked whether what is said concerning women who ride at night with Diana or with Herodias, the wife of Philip, exists thus in reality or is an illusion of demons.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For it is related concerning the archbishop of Besançon that the devil carried him as far as Rome.

Something similar is said concerning Albert the Great, who was brought by a demon from Cologne to Rome in order to engage in a disputation.

And concerning a good angel it is written in Daniel 14 that he carried Habakkuk from Judea to Babylon by the crown of his head, so that he might carry a meal to Daniel.

It is answered that the things said concerning Diana and Herodias are false.

First, because Diana, a goddess of the pagans, is found neither in this world nor in another; nor is Herodias in the world with whom they say they ride. For God does not permit such a woman, who caused John the Baptist to be killed, to depart from hell in order to ride.

Likewise, it is false that they say they ride upon certain beasts. For in so brief a time those beasts could not really and corporeally traverse such great expanses of lands, walk so silently, and not be seen to eat.

This is therefore…

…an illusion of demons. When they have subjugated the mind of any woman through false credulity, they immediately transform themselves into diverse appearances and likenesses of persons and, holding her mind captive, delude her in many ways in dreams, now showing sad things, now joyful things, now known persons, and now unknown persons.

And although the unbelieving woman suffers this in spirit alone, it is also permitted that this occur not only in the mind but in the body.

To the arguments on the opposite side it is said that a demon can carry bodies and human beings, as is evident in Christ the Lord, who was carried by the devil onto a high mountain and above the pinnacle of the temple, as is related in Matthew 4. It is likewise evident sometimes concerning women carried by the art of demons to their lovers or adulterers.

But the demon cannot bring about those things concerning Diana and Herodias, nor is the case similar; therefore the consequence must be denied.

These things are from Johannes the Cardinal, cause 25, question 3, in the chapter cited above.

Add, unless perhaps you should wish to say that a demon acts under the name of those women in order to deceive the human race more greatly.

Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

On the power and weakness of demons, concerning which five little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

Whether demons can be compelled by some natural art to give oracles to human beings

It is asked whether demons can be compelled by a human being, through some natural art already discovered or capable of being discovered - through a combination of words, characters, or the natural powers of things - to enter some place, such as a vial or a stone image, to remain fixed there, and to give responses to those who consult them.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For by experience, the mother of the sciences, we have...

...learned and heard that certain persons had, and still have, demons enclosed in vials and statues, as in the time of the idols and of idolaters, and that demons constrained by those same persons gave responses to those who sought them.

To elucidate this question they set down six conclusions.

The first, which is the negative part of the question, is true.

It is proved because, if an equal does not prevail over an equal, much less can an inferior prevail over a superior or a weaker over a more powerful being. But every human being is naturally inferior to and weaker than all angels and demons. Indeed, according to Christ's saying, "He who is lesser among the angels is greater than every human being." Therefore a human being will not be able to compel or constrain demons to enter and remain fixed somewhere.

For this reason Job 41 says: "There is no power upon earth which may be compared with him," that is, with the devil.

Likewise, if a human being cannot by any art - whether of words, characters, herbs, or stones - compel another human being to enter some determinate place and remain there immovably until he is given leave, even though the human being is a rational animal directly subject according to his composition and natural condition to the celestial bodies and the elements and to their accidents - namely, influences, impressions, alterations, and transmutations - then much less will a human being be able to compel the devil, who according to his composition is not directly subject to the celestial bodies, their influences, or their accidents.

The second conclusion is this. If there is, or ever was, among human beings an art of compelling demons or evil spirits by words, characters, or any other things, they did not receive that art from demons.

This conclusion is proved thus. It is not probable that most proud demons would wish to teach human beings a means by which they themselves could be reduced to servitude under

human beings, captured, imprisoned, enclosed, or expelled at a human being's pleasure, whenever and wherever human beings wished.

The third conclusion is this. If demons are sometimes compelled or constrained to enter or depart through words, characters, and so forth, this is done either by the supreme God or by good angels. Or perhaps inferior demons are compelled to this or that by superior and more powerful demons.

Or certainly demons sometimes pretend to be compelled to things of this kind through human beings, although they come spontaneously and willingly so that they may more easily crush those who believe. For, as Augustine says, demons furnish a benefit for no other reason than so that those who believe them may secretly perish in the end.

The fourth conclusion is this. If there is, or ever was, among human beings some art of constraining or compelling demons through exorcisms, a combination, or the application of any other things, that art was and is only ministerial with respect to God or good spirits.

Thus it is efficacious from a secret divine covenant: whenever such a human being pronounces such an exorcism in such a manner and with such an intention, or employs such ceremonies, the malign spirits are constrained or compelled by God himself or by his angels authoritatively, while the exorcist exists only as a minister in his own manner.

The fifth conclusion is this. In the Christian religion, it is superstitious to believe that there is some art of constraining demons or that some exorcism possesses an inherent efficacy for expelling or constraining them.

This is proved because neither in the primitive Church nor in the modern churches is any proper and determinate exorcism for expelling demons from possessed human beings or constraining them found except apocryphally and doubtfully.

Indeed, the Savior said in Matthew 17: "This kind" - namely, of demons - "is not cast out except by prayer and fasting."

It has nevertheless been granted to certain persons - and was granted particularly through their devotion and prayers, which God hears - that such persons, through invocation of the names of God and the saints, constrain and expel demons.

I do not intend by this to derogate from the proper customs and rites of the Holy Roman Church, which permits, and everywhere employs, certain approved exorcisms and adjurations to expel demons - not artfully or superstitiously, but by supplication and authoritatively.

The sixth conclusion is this. The art of enclosing demons in images or vials, of which Hermes spoke, is not properly an art but a certain constitution, decree, or tacit or express pact between lost human beings and demons most covetous of divine honor.

It is effective if a human being possesses a firm faith that...

...they are real, or are gods who ought to be worshiped with divine honor and who have power to benefit and harm human beings; and if, with such faith, a human being makes some image of a human being or of any animal and consecrates it with such words, characters or figures, fumigations, anointings, and so forth.

Then, without doubt, once such a consecration is complete, some spirit will enter that image and will give responses from it to deceived human beings who consult it.

Demons revealed this institution and decree to certain lost human beings through inspiration or in some other manner whatsoever, so that human beings would believe they had discovered such an art.

Thus these persons, having abandoned the law of God, believed and observed those laws of demons. By a just judgment they were, and are, forsaken and become servants of the devil, so that he may hold them in his service and entice others through them. Very often he performs for the wishes of such servants of his whatever they desire.

Therefore Augustine spoke well in Book XXI of *The City of God*, chapter 6: “In order that demons may be enticed by human beings to inhabit some place, they first seduce them by most crafty cunning, either by inspiring hidden poison into their hearts or by appearing in deceitful friendships; and they make their few disciples the teachers of a great many. For it could not at first have been learned, unless they taught it, what each demon desires, what he abhors, or by what divine name he is aided or compelled.” Thus he.

Master Henry concludes: You do not, therefore, compel him necromantically or magically, nor do you hold him in chains, as you suppose. But hold this as certain: he pretends that he is captured so that he may capture you; that he is bound so that he may bind you; that he is subjected to your command so that he may subject you to himself; and that he is enclosed by you so that you may finally be enclosed for him. He pretends that he is bound by your art to a stone or an image so that he may lead you, bound by the cords of sins, to hell.

Through these things the reply to the first argument is evident.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Addition

You have more in Eusebius, Book V of *The Preparation for the Gospel*, chapter 8, where he treats how demons are compelled by human beings. See also chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the same book.

Question Two of Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

How demons can be expelled from possessed bodies

It is asked whether demons can be expelled from possessed bodies by the power of melody, stones, or herbs.

To this it first appears that one must respond affirmatively. For it is said in 1 Kings 16 that, when David took up the psaltery and played before Saul, the devil ceased from vexing him.

Likewise, it is said in Guido’s *Music* that there are certain demons which cannot endure melody.

Likewise, Josephus says in *The Jewish War* that, when Titus was besieging Jerusalem, there was a certain man in his army who expelled demons from possessed bodies by means of the stone of a ring.

Likewise, in Tobit 6 the angel Raphael said concerning the liver of the fish placed upon coals that its smoke drives away every genus of demons, whether from a man or from a woman.

And Solomon is said to have made exorcisms from herbs for expelling demons.

In response to this question, three conclusions are set down according to the determinations of Master Nicholas de Lyra upon 1 Kings 16.

The first conclusion is this. Neither melody, nor herbs, nor the power of any stone, nor the substance of a sensible thing can by natural power act upon a demon in a way by which he can be compelled to anything, and consequently cannot expel him from possessed bodies or exclude him from his...

...vexation.

This conclusion is proved thus. No separated spirit can naturally suffer from a body. This is evident because the agent is more excellent than the patient, as Augustine and the Philosopher say in *On the Soul*. But a demon is a separated spirit. It follows, therefore, that no sensible thing or corporeal power can act directly or indirectly upon demons, and therefore cannot compel them to anything.

Master Henry of Ghent, the Servite, also sets down this conclusion in the *Quodlibets*, speaking thus: "There is no power in stones or herbs which can compel a demon or put him to flight in any way, although a demon may be able to pretend that he is compelled through herbs, stones, or incantations. None of these things could do this unless God supernaturally implanted in them a power of this kind, just as he implanted it in the sacraments and sacramentals."

The second conclusion is this. Divine power can act upon demons immediately or mediately - for example, through good angels, saints, or good human beings - and compel them to perform something.

The conclusion is evident. Since divine power is superior to them, and every other power is subject to it, it can act upon them immediately or through good angels, saints, or good human beings.

Hence the seventy-two disciples returned with joy to Christ, saying: "Lord, even the demons are subject to us in your name," Luke 10.

The third conclusion is this. Melody or some sensible thing can mitigate the vexation, so that those afflicted by demons may bear it more lightly through those sensible things. It does this, however, not by acting upon the demon, but upon the person vexed by the demon.

This is proved because every cause of limited power can produce a more intense or less intense effect in matter which is more or less disposed, for "actions occur in a disposed patient," Book II *On the Soul*.

A demon, however, possesses limited power. He therefore produces a more intense or less intense vexation in a human being according to the diversity of those disposed toward that vexation, or toward that which the demon intends to induce by vexing them.

For example, if a person is...

...disposed toward a melancholic passion, the demon can induce it more easily in that human being than in one who possesses a contrary disposition.

This is because demons cannot transmute corporeal matter according to their will; rather, they do this by means of corporeal active and passive things. In their actions, therefore, when

demons afflict human beings, they sometimes take account of the disposition of the corporeal matter.

Hence certain persons are called lunatics, Matthew 4 and 16, who according to the varying disposition of the moon are afflicted by demons with divine permission.

The moon, however, has dominion over the moist and consequently over the brain, which is more apt to receive the action of a demon at one time than at another according to the varying motion of the moon.

Thus herbs, melodies, or other sensible things can greatly alter the disposition of bodies and consequently the motions of the sensitive part.

This is evident concerning herbs, some of which incline human beings toward sadness and some toward joy.

It is also evident concerning harmony in Book IV of the *Politics*, where the Philosopher maintains that diverse harmonies provoke diverse passions in a human being.

And Boethius says in *On Music* that music has power to cure or alleviate certain illnesses.

Thus it is evident that herbs or harmonies can sometimes cause in a human being a disposition contrary to the vexation with which a demon strives to vex him. Consequently, it is evident that through such sensible things a disposition can be caused in the human body through which it is less subjected to the action of demons, and thus the affliction caused by him is diminished and alleviated.

Likewise, that which diminishes the perception of an affliction also diminishes and alleviates the affliction. Melody diminishes the perception of an affliction because it draws the attention of the mind to itself, and thus it can alleviate an affliction caused in a human being by a demon.

It cannot, however, expel the demon who inflicts the affliction, as has been said.

To the first argument it is said that through the natural power of melody Saul could bear the vexation of the devil more lightly. But through it the demon did not withdraw; rather, he withdrew through...

...divine power immediately, or through holy angels, because of the merit of David, who played divine praises upon the lyre and sang for Saul's salvation.

Something similar is related concerning Elisha in 4 Kings 3.

To the second it is said that demons withdraw at melody either because of the holiness of the one playing, as was said concerning David, or because of his wickedness - for example, if it is done so that through it reverence due to God may be attributed to demons. Demons covet such reverence, and thus they withdraw not under compulsion but voluntarily, so that they may hold such human beings in error and in their servitude, which they desire above all.

To the third it is likewise said that the man in Titus's army expelled demons by magical art - that is, through tacit or express pacts entered into with demons. They pretend to be expelled through these so that they may hold human beings in error.

The smoke of the fish's liver likewise did not expel the demon. Rather, the merit of Tobias's prayer, which was signified through the odor of the smoke, and the power of the holy angel Raphael did so.

And if Solomon made exorcisms during the time when he possessed the Spirit of God, demons were thus repelled by divine power. If, however, he made them during the time of his idolatry, the demons were repelled by magical art, as has been said.

These things are from Johannes de Turrecremata, *On Penance*, distinction 1, chapter *Voluissent*, section *Denique ut perspicue*.

Question Three of Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

Whether fascination is a natural or diabolical work

It is asked whether the fascination of infants and boys by old sorceresses is a natural or diabolical work.

To this it is answered thus. Avicenna held that the cause of fascination was perhaps the powerful imagination of the soul.

For just as someone walking upon a beam placed high up falls easily because through fear he imagines a fall; and just as, merely at the soul's apprehension, the...

...body grows warm, as is evident in the lustful and the angry, or is chilled, as in the fearful; and just as the body is sometimes also altered by a powerful apprehension into some sickness, such as fever or leprosy; so too the soul of an old woman, vehemently affected toward malevolence, impresses harm upon someone, especially upon a boy who, because of the tenderness of his body, is most susceptible to impressions.

According to Avicenna, it follows from this that corporeal matter would obey a spiritual substance at will.

But since it was said above that corporeal matter obeys a spiritual substance only with respect to local motion, and obeys God alone at will, it is therefore better to say that the fascination of boys arises from the powerful imagination of the old woman's soul altering the spirits of the conjoined body. This alteration of the spirits occurs especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits come.

The eyes then infect the continuous air as far as a determinate space. In this manner, if mirrors are new and clean, they contract a certain impurity from the gaze of a menstruating woman, as Aristotle says in the book *On Sleep and Waking*.

Thus, when the soul of an old woman has been moved vehemently toward malevolence, her gaze is made poisonous and harmful in the manner just described, especially to boys, who possess a tender body and easily receive an impression.

It is also possible that, with God permitting it, the malice of demons cooperates in this, since old sorceresses have some covenant with them.

These things are from Thomas, Book II of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, chapter 103, and the First Part, question 117, article 3, reply to the second argument.

Question Four of Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

Whether preservation in the bodies of the dead is a work of God, nature, or the devil

It is asked whether apparitions and marvelous deeds which sometimes appear concerning the bodies...

...of the dead - such as the preservation of bodies after death from reduction to ashes; the growth of nails, beard, and hair in the dead; or the issuing of blood from the body of a murdered person in the presence of the killer - are to be attributed to a divine miracle, to nature, or to a demon.

In response, Augustine says in Book XXI of *The City of God* that apparitions and the production of marvels ought generally to be reduced to four causes: to God, to angels, to demons, and to holy human beings or their spirits. They can also sometimes be effected through demoniacal human beings, such as magicians, and sometimes through deceitful human subtlety.

Master Henry of Assia, however, responds to this little question thus.

It is most difficult to give true causes for individual marvelous and unusual things. For if, according to the Poet, the person who was able to know the causes of things which appear naturally was called fortunate, certainly the person who knows how to discern the efficient and final causes of those things which appear and have appeared above nature can be called most fortunate.

For the same marvelous and unusual things concerning the bodies of the dead, he says, can be procured through the subtlety of demons and the craftiness of perverse human beings.

Thus blessed Augustine in Book XIV of *The City of God* relates concerning a certain man who, whenever he wished, made himself in every respect most like a dead man, and sometimes most like a blind, dropsical, or lame person.

Sometimes too, certain marvels concerning the bodies of the dead can be reduced to natural causes.

Thus, in response to the preservation of bodies from putrefaction after death, some say that the power of the place, or the power of an ointment or of some thing placed upon the body, can be the cause of the preservation of bodies from reduction to ashes.

The cause of nails, beard, and hair appearing to grow in a dead person can be natural - namely, the complexion of the dying person, in whose matter some imperfect form from the genus of vegetative living things can be induced after death; or because the flesh contracts, the nails appear more prominently, on account of which some believe that they grow.

Others, however, attribute the fact that a dead body remains unputrefied to a divine miracle. For God sometimes preserves the bodies of saints incorrupt...

...as testimony to their singular holiness and to the innocence and integrity of their minds and bodies. Thus their bodies remain removed from putrefaction, reduction to ashes, and the gnawing or corrosion of worms, just as while they lived they remained whole from the corruption of the flesh.

This is evident concerning the one of whom it is written: “You will not permit your holy one to see corruption.”

Sometimes too the bodies of certain persons are preserved incorrupt by God because such persons died under excommunication. For, as certain persons report, the bodies of the excommunicated do not putrefy.

They set down the example of Charles, king of Hungary, who was killed many years ago and excommunicated by Urban VI. They say that he therefore still remains whole, so that this may be some sort of argument that the man who excommunicated him was a true pope. Thus the iniquity of the deceased is made apparent, and preservation from the corrosion of worms is shown to be a greater harm.

Sometimes too the bodies of evil persons are preserved incorrupt through the subtlety of demons for the sake of deception, so that it may be believed that this occurs through the merit of the lives of such persons; that the evils which they did may thus be approved as good; and that the credulous multitude may thereby be induced to invoke them.

Thus it has been seen concerning certain evil dead persons that, with the devil operating at their invocation or at the touch of their bodies, the blind were illuminated, the lame walked, the deaf heard, the sick were freed from various illnesses, and even the dead were raised.

For, as was said, these and similar things can be effected and procured either really by a divine miracle or sophistically.

Nevertheless, all bodies preserved for any causes whatsoever from reduction to ashes will be dissolved into ashes before the final resurrection, so that the universal sentence of God inflicted upon Adam and all his posterity may be fulfilled, which says: “In the sweat of your face you will eat your bread, and you will return to dust,” Genesis 3.

But as for the shedding of blood in the presence of the killer, concerning which the Philosopher writes in the book *On the Mixture of the Elements*, although some superstitiously say that this occurs through a deception introduced by a human being or a demon, nevertheless, if it…

…happens always or for the most part, it appears that it should be ascribed rather to a divine miracle for the horror and detestation of sin than that some explanation should be sought elsewhere. This is evident in Genesis 4 concerning the blood of Abel, gushing and boiling before God in vengeance upon the murderer.

These things are from Master Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Five of Chapter Eight of the Third Decade

From what the reason is to be taken that certain marvels are from the devil and not from God

It is asked: since marvelous apparitions can occur from good and evil causes, as was said immediately above, from what is the distinction of these from those to be taken?

Augustine responds in Book XXI of *The City of God*, saying that miracles which are effected by God - whether through the merits of saints, through human beings still constituted in the body, through angels, or in other ways - are altogether incomprehensible to mortals.

Therefore, in matters of this sort, the distinction is sometimes so difficult that it cannot adequately be obtained from consideration of the circumstances of place, time, opportunity, modes of acting, the quality of the doers, and the end.

From this, however, he assumes that marvelous and unusual things which are effected through the first three causes concerning the dead, or otherwise, tend toward the honor of God and the salvation of human beings. The other things, which are effected through the last three causes, bring destruction upon those who attend to such things without prudent discernment of spirits.

Hence Augustine says in the book cited above, chapter 10: “Demons perform miracles so that they may be believed to be gods. Holy angels and human beings, however, perform them so that God may be praised.”

These things are from Master Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

On divination, commerce, and invocation of demons, concerning which sixteen little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether anyone can predict future things through invocation of demons without sin

It is asked whether anyone can predict future things through invocation of demons without sin.

It is answered that future things can be predicted and known in three ways.

In one way, naturally, from causes which act in most cases and frequently; knowledge of such things is not divination but foreknowledge. Hence the rising of the sun tomorrow, or when a physician predicts future health and an astronomer a future eclipse or rain, is not prediction by divination but foreknowledge from necessary causes or causes acting frequently.

In a second way, future things can be known by a revelation of God; in this way too foreknowledge of future things is not divination. Hence, if anyone announces future contingents when God reveals them, he then does not divine - that is, he does not make what is divine, but rather receives what is divine.

In a third way, future things can be known through a demon's indication, and divination concerns these things. For, as Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, divination is the usurpation of foreknowing future things from a certain pestilential association of human beings and demons. To use divination in this third way is unlawful and always a mortal sin.

This is proved by authorities and arguments.

First, by the authority of Deuteronomy 18, which says: "Let there be no one who consults pythonic spirits or diviners." Pythonic spirits are so called from Pythian Apollo, who was said to be the author of divining, as Isidore says.

Therefore it is said in cause 26, question 5, chapter *Qui divinationes*: "Those who seek divinations shall lie under the rule for five years according to the established degrees of penance."

Second, the same thing is proved by four arguments.

First, from the character of the manner, thus. The person who usurps in an undue manner what belongs to God, when God does not reveal it, sins mortally. Diviners do this, pretending themselves to be filled with divinity but conjecturing future things for human beings by a certain fraudulent cunning. Therefore they sin mortally.

Second, from the character of the assistance, thus. If anyone assumes the assistance of demons in order to know or do something, he sins gravely. But every divination arises from the operation of demons, either because demons are expressly invoked to manifest future things or because demons interpose themselves in vain inquiries into future things so that they may entangle human minds in vanity. Therefore every divination is a grave sin.

Third, from the character of the pact, thus. If anyone makes use of a tacit or express pact with demons, he sins gravely - that is, mortally. But divination is of this kind, because diviners either offer sacrifice to a demon or assume the assistance of demons. Therefore it is a mortal sin.

But if it is argued to the contrary thus: what Christ performed and did is neither unlawful nor mortal sin. But he himself asked the demon what his name was, and it replied, “Legion, and we are many,” as is found in Mark 5 and Luke 8. Therefore anyone may lawfully consult demons.

To this Thomas responds in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 1, saying that it is one thing to ask something of a demon and another thing to invoke a demon.

The first - namely, to ask something of a demon who presents himself spontaneously - is sometimes lawful for one’s own usefulness or that of others, especially when the demon can be compelled by divine power to speak true things, as is evident concerning Christ above and concerning blessed Martin and other saints.

The second, however - namely, to invoke a demon in order to acquire from him knowledge of hidden things - is never lawful.

Hence it is never lawful, for the sake of some bodily or temporal utility - for example, the finding of lost things, which the devil knows and knows who found - to inquire of him or to use his assistance in matters of this kind.

The reason is that no temporal utility can be compared with the loss of spiritual salvation which threatens from inquiry into hidden things through invocation of demons.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above, Johannes de Turrecremata, cause 26, question 5, chapter *Nec mirum*, and Raynerius under the title *On Divination*.

Question Two of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

How many genera and species of divinations there are in which demons are invoked

It is asked how many genera and species of divinations there are in which demons are invoked.

It is answered that there are three genera or modes of divination in general.

The first genus is that which occurs through the express or manifest invocation of demons.

The second is that which occurs without express invocation of demons, through consideration alone of the disposition or motion of some thing.

The third occurs without express invocation of demons, through one’s own operation - that is, when we do something so that something hidden may be revealed and manifested to us.

The first genus of divination pertains to necromancers. This genus contains under itself five species or modes.

The first species is called a *prestigium*, through which, by the operation of demons, the imagination and eyes of human beings are deceived and deluded so that they do not see what is true but believe what is not true. Thus it happened in the case of the woman who appeared to everyone as a mare, but who appeared as a woman to Saint Macarius when the illusion was dissolved by the power of his holiness, as was said above.

The second species is called divination through dreams - for example, when demons are expressly invoked for this purpose in waking life, and express or manifest pacts are made with them while awake; afterward, in dreams, foreknowledge of some future events is caused in human beings through the revelation of demons.

The third species is called necromancy, in which, by certain prayers and with blood employed, the dead appear to be raised, to divine, and to respond to questions. It is called *necromancy* from the Greek *nekros*, in Latin "dead," and *manteia*, that is, "divination," as is evident among those who...

...divine with the tongues of a dead ass.

The fourth species is called divination through a python - that is, a ventriloquist, or a pythoness, that is, a female ventriloquist - through whom future things are foretold by means of living human beings, as is evident in those who are seized and in 1 Kings 28 concerning Samuel.

The fifth species occurs through certain figures or signs which appear in inanimate things. These figures or signs appear in some terrestrial body - for example, in earth, water, fire, polished iron, or polished stone.

If it occurs in earth, it is called geomancy, from Greek *ge*, in Latin "earth," and *manteia*, which is "divination," as is evident among those who make divinations with the tongues and limbs of suspended human beings.

If it occurs in the air, it is called acromancy, as is evident among those who mark animals so that they may not be eaten by wolves, or who divine betrayal from a great wind.

If it occurs in water, it is called hydromancy, from Greek *hydor*, in Latin "water," and *manteia*, which is "divination," as is evident among those who divine thefts with a glass vessel full of water or with a urinal.

If it occurs in fire, it is called pyromancy, from Greek *pyr*, in Latin "fire," and *manteia*, as is evident among those who divine through green wood sparkling in a fire, or among those who refuse to lend fire to neighbors on certain days of a week, month, or year.

If it occurs in the viscera, membranes, or intestines of animals sacrificed on altars of demons, it is called haruspicy, and those who practice such things are called haruspices or soothsayers.

If, through the craft of women, certain bindings are made for someone's harm or benefit - as with a rooster's comb, a frog, or an image of wax - it is called sorcery.

The second genus of divination contains two species or modes.

The first species occurs through consideration alone of the disposition, position, and movement of the stars. This mode pertains to astrologers. If they use consideration of the stars to foreknow future things and the conditions of births from the celestial bodies naturally, their divination will not be unlawful or superstitious.

But if they use consideration of the stars to foreknow future causal or fortuitous events, or even to know the works of human beings with certainty, which proceeds from a vain and...

...false opinion, their divination will thus be unlawful, because then the operation of a demon interposes and mingles itself so as to entangle human minds in vanity and falsehood, as Thomas says in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 3.

The second mode or species of divination occurs through consideration of the motion or calls of birds or of any animals whatsoever, or through the sneezes of human beings; such a practice is called augury. Augury is said to take its name from the chattering of birds, just as auspicy takes its name from the inspection of birds, the first of which pertains to the ears and the second to the eyes.

Auspicium occurred in the case of Romulus and Remus. One of them, Romulus, named the city of Rome that he had founded after himself because he, the victor, had seen twelve vultures, whereas Remus had seen six.

An omen from chattering occurred in the case of an old woman who, upon hearing a cuckoo sing five times in the morning on the first day of May, believed that she would take a handsome young man as her husband.

The third genus of divination occurs through consideration of the things which result from certain acts that human beings perform deliberately in order to inquire into something hidden - when we do something so that something hidden may be manifested to us. This genus is called divination by lots and contains three species under itself.

The first species is called chiromancy, that is, divination of the hand. For from consideration of the lines of the hand, divination is made concerning hidden future things.

The second species is called spatulamancy, from certain figures appearing in the shoulder blades of some animal.

The third species is called geomancy. This is done in order to inquire into something hidden by the drawing of points; by considering figures which arise from molten lead cast into water; from certain written or unwritten slips placed in a hidden place, when it is observed who takes which slip; from the casting of dice, to see who casts more points; or when it is observed what meets a person opening a book.

All these bear the name of lots and are superstitious and unlawful, because association with demons is exercised in them. These things are from Thomas in the place cited above and Raynerius of Pisa of the Order of Preachers; see also cause 26, question 3, chapter *Igitur*.

Question Three of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to use natural things in order to acquire bodily health

It is asked whether it is lawful to use natural things in order to acquire bodily health.

It is answered that, if natural things are applied to effects for which they are believed to possess a natural power, it is neither superstitious nor unlawful.

But if certain other things are added - for example, some signs, characters, names, or any other observances which manifestly possess no natural efficacy - it will be superstitious and unlawful.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above, article 2.

Question Four of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether signs applied to natural things operate naturally to produce certain effects

It is asked whether figures, signs, or characters can be applied to natural things in order to produce certain effects.

It is answered negatively. The reason is that, since such characters, figures, or signs naturally effect nothing, because a figure is not the principle of any natural action, such figures or images have their effect from the operation of demons.

Hence it is always unlawful to make them, because in such things express or tacit pacts with demons are present. Therefore practices of this kind are condemned in cause 26, question 2, chapter *Illos*, and by Thomas in the place cited above, in the reply to the second argument.

Question Five of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to observe certain signs in order to foreknow future good or bad fortunes

It is asked whether it is lawful to observe certain signs in order to foreknow some future good or bad fortunes, such as illnesses, states of health, or things of this kind, as physicians do.

It is answered that, if anyone considers a presage of future things from a cause which appears expressly through signs, it will not be unlawful.

For example, a servant may fear a beating when he sees his master's anger. Similarly, if such a thing could occur, someone might fear harm to another's child from a fascinating eye. In a similar manner, the causes of illnesses are known from certain signs.

Therefore physicians lawfully observe such signs, from which they can lawfully judge concerning health or illness, death or life.

These things are from Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 96, article 3.

Question Six of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether observation of a time for doing something is lawful

It is asked whether it is lawful to observe times for doing something.

The response is given through two doctors.

The first is Lord Peter of Tarentaise, afterward Pope Innocent V, in Book IV of his commentary on the *Sentences*, distinction 23, article 4, who says that the observation of times is threefold.

One kind is superstitious or impious, as in those who observe the time of acts which are subject to free choice and begin actions under such a sign of the heavens. Persons of this kind are reproved in Isaiah 47: "Let the augurs of the heavens stand and save you, those who contemplated the stars and calculated the months."

Another is an observation of shrewdness and foresight in those who observe the quality of the time in order to obtain an abundance of things and exclude want. This is neither reproved nor praised. Ecclesiasticus 33: "Why does day surpass day, and again light surpass light, and year surpass year? By the sun."

Another observation of times is one of piety and devotion in good Christians who...

...observe feast days, on which they judge that more time should be devoted to God than on other days because of the benefits especially conferred on that day or feast. The Apostle says in Romans 14: "One distinguishes one day from another."

The second doctor is Lord Alexander of Hales in the Second Part of the *Summa*, question 3, article 9, who says that some things occur by a natural course and some by a voluntary course.

Therefore, in the first way, to observe a time for doing something which is caused by the natural constitution of the elements and of the time is not a sin. Hence physicians, in healing illnesses and administering medicines, consider the motions of the higher bodies. Those who do not do this either are ignorant of the motions of the celestial bodies or are to be judged apothecaries, not physicians.

To observe a time, however, in matters subject to free choice is a sin. Hence the Gloss on the Apostle's words in Galatians 4, "You observe days and months and seasons and years," blames those who follow constellations, saying: "I shall conduct business this month because this star governs the month. I shall not plant a vineyard this year because it is a leap year."

These things are from the authors cited.

Question Seven of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is a sin to investigate stolen things by inspection of an astrolabe and by judgment of the stars

It is asked whether it is a sin to investigate things secretly taken away by inspection of an astrolabe and by judgment of the stars.

It is answered that it is not a sin to investigate certain things which properly follow upon a change in the stars - for example, heat and cold, rain and dryness.

To judge, however, concerning things which are subject to free choice and are not subject to the law of the stars is a grave sin, because an invocation of demons intervenes in such matters.

These things are from Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 92, article 5, question 3.

Question Eight of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether, besides the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, it is lawful to recite charms or use other observances when gathering herbs

It is asked whether it is lawful, when gathering herbs or for any illness whatsoever, to recite certain charms or place certain writings upon human beings or animals besides the Creed and the Lord's Prayer.

It is answered that it is not lawful to place anything upon human beings and animals besides the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. If, however, anything superstitious is added, it is a grave sin.

Hence it is said in the Decretals, cause 26, question 5, chapter *Non liceat Christianis*: "Nor, when gathering herbs which are medicinal, is it lawful to attend to any observances or incantations, unless only with the Creed or the Lord's Prayer, so that the creator of all things - namely, God alone - may be honored."

Second, this same point is proved through what is said in the title *On Sortilege*, chapter *Ex tuarum tenore*. It says there that a certain priest went with someone to a private place, not with the intention of invoking a demon, but so that by inspection of an astrolabe he might recover property stolen from a certain church. Although he proposed to do this from good zeal and simplicity, his sin was nevertheless most grave.

These things are from Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 96, article 4, and Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 52, article 6.

Question Nine of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to hang divine words around the neck

It is asked whether it is lawful to hang divine words around the neck.

It is answered that it is not, for...

...two reasons.

The first is that, since the Gospel is read and heard daily in church, if the words of God do not profit in the ear, how can they save when placed around necks?

The second reason is that the power of the Gospel is in understanding and not in figures. Therefore, when placed in the heart, its words profit more than when suspended around the neck.

Here note that in all suspended writings four things must be guarded against and attended to.

The first is what is written or uttered. If it is something pertaining to the invocation of demons, it is manifestly superstitious and unlawful.

Second, one must beware if it contains unknown names, lest something unlawful lie hidden beneath them. Hence Chrysostom says upon Matthew that, after the example of the Pharisees who magnified their fringes, many now invent, write, and allege certain Hebrew names which seem fearful to those who do not understand them.

Third, one must see and beware lest it contain any falsehood, because then its effect could not be expected from God, who is not a witness of falsehood.

Fourth, one must also beware lest any vain things be contained with the sacred words - for example, any characters besides the sign of the cross.

These things are from blessed Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 96, article 4.

Question Ten of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to keep relics of saints with oneself

It is asked whether it is lawful to carry relics of saints and keep them in any manner whatsoever.

It is answered that the same reasoning applies to relics of saints as to the Gospel or divine words: if such things are carried from confidence in God and in the saints whose relics they are, it is not unlawful.

But if some other vain thing were attended to in this connection - for example, that the vessel be triangular, or anything of this kind which pertains to irreverence toward God and the saints - it is superstitious and unlawful, as Thomas says in the place cited immediately above, in the reply to the third argument.

Question Eleven of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to charm serpents or another genus of animals

It is asked whether it is lawful to charm serpents or heal animals by incantations.

It is answered that, if in incantations of serpents or any animals whatsoever regard is had only for sacred words and divine power, it will not be unlawful.

But for the most part such incantations contain unlawful observances and obtain their effect through demons, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument of a demon for deceiving a human being.

These things are from Thomas in the place cited above, in the reply to the third argument.

Question Twelve of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to use red-hot iron or boiling water for the investigation of something hidden

It is asked whether it is lawful to arrange a judgment of red-hot iron or boiling water for the investigation of someone's hidden sin.

It is answered that it is not, and this for three reasons.

The first is that it is ordained for judging hidden matters which are reserved for divine judgment.

The second reason is that in such practices a miracle is expected, which is not free from tempting God.

The third reason is that it is condemned by canon law.

Hence, in cause 2, question 5, chapter *Consuluisti*, in a decree of Pope Stephen V, it is said: "The sacred canons do not judge that an examination by red-hot iron or boiling water and a confession should be extorted from anyone; and what has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers ought not to be presumed by a superstitious invention. For offenses made public through a voluntary confession or through the...

...approval of witnesses have been committed to our governance for judgment, with the fear of God held before our eyes. Hidden and unknown matters, however, must be left to him who alone knows the hearts of the children of human beings."

For the same reasons, the judgment of duels also appears to be prohibited, as Thomas says in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 8.

Addition

It must be noted that Nicholas de Lyra, upon 1 Kings 17, on the occasion of the duel or conflict of David with the Philistine, draws the conclusion that in some case a duel can be lawful. He asserts that this is according to the mind of Saint Thomas, which is nevertheless false; therefore he is rightly reproved by Paul of Burgos, a most learned man.

This holds unless we wish to say that, when it is said that a duel can occur in some case without mortal sin, the statement is made from the position of those who judge or give counsel, where such an ordeal is freely carried out not through their incitement or counsel, but as regards the one issuing and the one accepting the challenge.

But let everyone - and especially princes - know that the use of duels is altogether prohibited by a decree of the sacred Council of Trent, Session 25, chapter 19.

Question Thirteen of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is lawful to use the notory art for acquiring sciences

It is asked whether, for the acquisition of the sciences, it is lawful to employ the observances of the notory art.

It is answered that there are four ways of attaining, apparently or really, singular excellence in the sciences.

The first is through divine illumination. Luke 21: “For I shall give you a mouth and wisdom.” And 1 Corinthians 12: “To another, indeed, through the Spirit, the word of wisdom,” and so forth. At the end of the same passage it is added: “But one and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one as he wills.”

The second way is through regular human...

...instruction - that is, either by discovering something oneself or by learning from another.

The third way is through the singular assistance and influence of a demon, which is accustomed to inspire certain persons marvelously.

The fourth way is through the superstitious notory art, deceitfully fashioned by demons. To practice this art is unlawful.

This is proved first because the notory art uses certain things which of themselves do not possess the power to cause knowledge, such as the inspection of certain figures, signs, and words. The notory art uses these signs and words not as causes but as signs - not as signs divinely instituted, such as sacramental signs, but as signs pertaining to certain pacts made with demons.

The notory art also uses certain singular observances, charms, and unknown prayers established through a pact with demons.

Likewise, to acquire knowledge of future things with the assistance of demons is a sin because of the association entered into with them, and this occurs in the matter of the notory art.

This art is called *notory* as though through it all things become known.

With God permitting it, however, the devil is sometimes accustomed through this notory art to make certain persons singularly excellent, or apparently so, in all or some sciences, and astonishing to all or some who are learned in the human manner.

But what is this for, unless that such persons may finally perish from pride, and that through various modes of persuasion they may lead others to the destruction of damnation by their false authority, possessing value in reputation and glory?

These things are from Henry of Assia and Thomas in the place cited above.

Therefore penalties are assessed against such sorcerers and diviners in one way according to the civil laws and in another according to the canons.

According to the laws, sorcerers and diviners ought to be beheaded and burned, in the Code, title *On Malefactors*, laws *Nullus*, *Nemo*, and *Culpa*.

According to the canons, however, if the crime is hidden, a penance of forty days is imposed, as in the Extra, title and chapter cited. If the sin is notorious, communion ought to be denied to the offender, in *On Consecration*, distinction 2, chapter *Pro dilectione*.

If he is a cleric, he is to be deposed. If he is a layman and does not wish...

...to bear the penalty, he is to be excommunicated, if he is criminally accused.

Concerning laypersons it must also be said that, if they are slaves, they are to be chastised with blows; if they are free, they are to be imprisoned, cause 26, question 5, chapter *Contra idolorum*.

Bishops ought to cast such persons out of their parishes and can disgracefully shear them - that is, cut their clothes in front and behind and shear their hair. They are also to be considered infamous.

These things are from Johannes Teutonicus of the Order of Preachers in the *Summa of Confessors*, Book I, title 11, and Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 52, article 5.

Question Fourteen of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether illusions and divinations of demons are to be believed when the effect occurs

It is asked whether illusions and divinations of demons are to be believed when the event occurs.

It is answered that they are not. The reason is that a demon's intention is to deceive, and demons do this especially in divinations. For they sometimes speak true things so that human beings may become accustomed to believing them in other matters, in which they afterward deceive them.

Likewise, God alone can know future things, or someone who receives that knowledge from him as from the eternal mirror, as is the case with angels and holy prophets. But demons do not receive it by this way.

And although, because of the great experience which they possess, demons know many things from natural signs, and although the capacity of their intellect is great, it does not follow on this account that faith should be shown to them concerning the certainty of future events, since their knowledge of future things is only conjectural and fallible.

Therefore, just as faith is not to be shown to human beings of whom it is presumed that they have always been accustomed to speak falsehoods, so faith is not to be given to demons because of their will continually to deceive and the darkness of their intellect arising from sin.

These things are from Johannes de Turrecremata, cause 26, question 5, chapter *Nec mirum*.

Question Fifteen of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Whether it is evil to use lots

It is asked whether it is lawful to use the judgment of lots in order to obtain and know some hidden event - for example, concerning the election of prelates, the manifestation of hidden sins, and the acquisition of temporal dignities.

It is answered first concerning the election of prelates by saying that it is not lawful to use a divisory lot.

This is proved by two arguments.

The first is that such elections ought to be made through invocation and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not by the outcome of lots.

The second is that, because of the malice of human beings, there can be danger to souls in the use of lots. Therefore, lest frauds be committed in elections of prelates, they ought to be made not by lot but through invocation and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and by the choice of votes.

But to the contrary: things which are found in the Scriptures to have been done by saints do not appear to be unlawful. Yet in both the Old and the New Testament, saints are found to have used lots.

This is evident. For in 1 Kings 14 it is read that Saul detected by lot that his son Jonathan had eaten honey. In Jonah 1, Jonah was cast into the sea by lot. In Luke 1 it is also read that Zacharias went out by lot to set incense. In Acts 1 it is likewise read that Matthias was chosen by lot by the apostles as a prelate - that is, as an apostle.

Therefore it appears that in ecclesiastical elections of prelates it is lawful to use lots.

It is answered that until the truth should come into public view, lots were permitted in the Old Testament, both in punishments and in elections and in matters which were ordained.

Hence Bede says upon Acts of the Apostles 1: “Here Matthias is chosen by lot, lest he depart from the law in which the high priest was sought by lot, when the true priest was to be sought. Hence, until the truth should come, the figure had to be exercised,” and for...

...this reason the election of Matthias was made by lot before Pentecost, on which the Holy Spirit was given.

For the truth had not yet been made altogether public, because the fullness of the Holy Spirit had not yet been poured out upon the Church. The seven deacons afterward were appointed not by lot but by the election of the disciples.

Hence Jerome, in the Gloss upon the words cited from Jonah 1, says that when Jonah the fugitive was detected by lot and Matthias was chosen by lot, this was not done by the power of uncertain lots but by the will of God, who governed them.

Therefore we ought not to use lots according to this example, because the privileges of a few cannot make a common law.

Similarly, Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar knew future things through the judgment of dreams; nevertheless, dreams are not therefore to be believed everywhere.

Second, in the manifestation of hidden sins it is not lawful to use the judgment of lots through a duel or through a judgment of red-hot iron and boiling water. This is both because such a practice is ordained for judging hidden matters which are preserved or reserved for divine judgment, and because the judgment of lots was not sanctioned by divine authority.

Hence it is said in cause 2, question 4, chapter *Consuluisti*, in the decree of Pope Stephen, that the sacred canons do not judge that an examination by red-hot iron or boiling water and a confession should be extorted from anyone; and that what has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers ought not to be presumed by a superstitious invention.

For offenses made public through voluntary confession or the approval of witnesses have been committed to our governance for judgment, with the fear of God held before our eyes. Hidden and unknown matters, however, must be left to him who alone knows the hearts of the children of human beings.

The same reasoning also appears to apply to the law of duels, except that it more fully participates in the common character of lots insofar as a miraculous effect is not expected there, unless perhaps when the champions are very unequal in strength or skill.

These things are from Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 95, article 8.

As for the acquisition of temporal dignities, the defense of churches, and the distribution of alms, it is said that, if necessity...

...is pressing, it is lawful with due reverence to implore divine assistance through lots.

First, concerning the acquisition of dignities: for in those matters which are ordained for the disposition of earthly affairs, human beings often use lots. Hence, as a figure of this, David is read in 1 Kings 17 to have entered into single combat with the Philistine, which participates more fully in the character of lots than in the judgment of red-hot iron or boiling water, as is evident above.

Second, it is lawful to use lots in the governance or defense of churches.

For when a certain city was besieged and the clergy doubted who ought to flee and who to remain, Augustine responded in a letter to Honoratus, speaking thus: “If there is a dispute among the ministers of God about which of them should remain in a time of persecution, lest all should flee, and which of them should flee, lest the Church be deserted by the death of all, if this dispute cannot be settled otherwise, it appears to me that those who remain and those who flee should be chosen by lot.”

Third, it is lawful to use lots in the distribution of alms.

Hence Augustine says in Book I of *On Christian Doctrine*: “If you had something in abundance which ought to be given to one who did not have it, and it could not be given to two; if two persons met you, neither of whom surpassed the other in need or in some necessity in relation to you, you would do nothing more just than choose by lot the one to whom that which could not be given to both should be given.”

These things are from Thomas, Second Part of the Second Part, question 96, article 8.

The reason why it is lawful to use lots in these three acts just described is to settle human doubts and contradictions. Hence it is said in Proverbs 18: “The lot suppresses contradictions.”

These things are from Raynerius of Pisa.

Addition

It is certain that casting lots is not evil in itself, but it can be done evilly if we abuse it. This occurs when, without necessity or from mere curiosity to know hidden and future things, we cast lots to the tempting of God, or otherwise from some superstition.

Joshua, leader of the people, used a lot to investigate who was that sacrilegious man who had secretly stolen from the things under the ban at Jericho. But this is not therefore to be drawn into an example, so that we too should use lots if some hidden crime has been committed and should commit to fortune the task of disclosing the author of the deed with certainty. For Joshua did not do this by his own rashness, but at God's command, because God wished to reveal the thief by this means.

The apostles also used lots in choosing Matthias. Nevertheless, pastors of the Church ought not to be appointed by lot, because the apostles committed to God the judgment between those two, each of whom was fit for the office, since they did not know which of them ought to be preferred to the other, lest they be thought respecters of persons.

The sailors too, according to the rite of the gentiles, used lots with vain superstition. Although they found the truth they sought concerning Jonah, this did not occur because God favored their superstition, but so that he might fulfill what he wished to be done concerning Jonah, just as he tempered the lots of the king of the Chaldeans to his own glory.

There are some who dispute many things concerning this matter. If, however, you desire more and a resolved treatment, see Cardinal Cajetan in the *Summa on Sins*.

Question Sixteen of Chapter Nine of the Third Decade

Why sortileges, divinations, and incantations abound more among women than among men

It is asked why the three sins - namely, sortileges, divinations, incantations, and things of this kind - abound more among women than among men.

It is answered that the case was one way with the teaching of God and another with the teaching of the devil, because the teaching of God descended from God into Christ, from Christ into man, and from man into woman.

The Apostle touches upon this order in 1 Corinthians 11, saying: "The head of every man is Christ, the head of the woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God."

In contrast, it was so in the teaching...

...of the devil, because the devil himself first poured it into the woman, who possessed less sense and discretion of spirit, and through the woman into the man. Therefore the aforementioned sins are found more readily and frequently in the female sex than in the male.

These things are from Alexander, Second Part of the *Summa*, question 53, *On Sortilege*, article 6.

Addition

These things have place in women rather than in men because unbelief, ambition, and lust appear chiefly to reign in them, as the author of the *Hammer of Witches* proves in Part I, question 6, and because they burn more fiercely to fulfill their depraved desires.

Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

On the permitted and continual warfare of demons against human beings, concerning which six little questions will be resolved

Question One of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

Whether evil spirits or evil human beings have greater power over human beings

It is asked to whom greater power over human beings has been granted: to evil spirits or to evil human beings.

It is answered that greater power has been permitted to evil human beings over good and evil human beings than has been permitted to demons over the same.

This conclusion is proved by arguments.

First, thus. Experience has taught and teaches that God has permitted, and still permits, tyrants and other wicked human beings at their pleasure to afflict and trouble good and excellent human beings with martyrdom, and finally to kill them whenever and however they wished. In the common course, this has not been permitted in the same manner to demons over human beings. Otherwise, as soon as they perceived anyone to be...

...in mortal sin, they would kill him, knowing that human beings who die in mortal guilt are damned.

Second, thus. A human being can better guard and defend himself against a human enemy than against a demonic enemy, since the former is a visible enemy and the latter an invisible one. For this reason, it is reasonable that not so much power has been permitted to demons over human beings as to human beings over the same.

Third, because a demon is a more dangerous enemy to a human being than is a human being. For a demon principally desires to take away the goods of the soul - namely, spiritual and moral goods - without which beatitude cannot be attained. A human enemy, however, for the most part seeks to take away the goods of fortune or of nature. Therefore human enemies are less to be feared than demons, because, although they can kill the body, they nevertheless cannot kill the soul as demons can.

Fourth, thus. With regard to the present state of the world, or the course of this time and the things which are under it, God so administers free and nonfree things that he permits them to possess their own motions, as Augustine says. Demons, however, are not subject to the current state of this world, since they are damned. Therefore they cannot exercise every effort against human beings of another state, whereas human beings may lawfully strive against them to the utmost of their powers, since both are of the same state.

These things are from Henry upon Genesis.

Question Two of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

Whether greater power to afflict the good is given to a natural agent or to a free human being

It is asked to whom greater power to afflict the good has been granted: to a natural agent or to a free human being.

It is answered: to a freely acting human being subject to the state of the way.

For just human beings are frequently read to have been exposed by the impious to natural agents, such as fire, water, poison, and beasts, and nevertheless not to have been harmed, as is evident in many ways from the histories...

...of the saints. For, with God permitting it and impeding the action of free agents, many human beings and martyrs could not be killed by various kinds of torments; and nevertheless all perished through the action of the sword by a free agent.

These things are from the author cited above.

Question Three of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

Why the afflictive action of natural agents was sometimes permitted by God and sometimes impeded when applied by free agents

It is asked why the afflictive action of natural agents applied by free agents was sometimes permitted by God and sometimes impeded, whereas the action of the sword always obtained its effect in everyone and was never impeded.

It is answered thus.

The afflictive action of natural agents was sometimes permitted because of the sin of the person who was harmed, or of the person through whose impiety innocent persons were applied to fire, beasts, the sea, and so forth; or because the impious were not worthy to be admonished by a miracle; or because it was just that their malice should be permitted to be completed, and that the merit of martyrdom should thus increase in those afflicted.

At other times the action of such things was prohibited, first so that the sufferers might appear to be true servants of God, whom all nature obeys. Nature was instituted not to harm the innocent but to assist them.

Second, so that it might also thus be shown that innocent nature, insofar as it is of itself, does not harm an innocent human being.

But three causes are assigned for why the action of a sword brandished by the impious was never prohibited.

The first is that the sword is the ordinary and principal instrument of the execution of judicial power for punishing criminal human beings, as is found in the Digest, title *On the Jurisdiction of All Judges*, law *Imperium*. God, from whom all power comes, always determined that the execution of this power should be carried out rather than impeded.

Second, the sword was never prohibited by God because its prohibition through a miracle would not have been received as such, but would have been imputed to the assailant's choice, as though he were pretending that he could not...

...strike.

Third, because among the gentiles there was a certain famous superstition that magicians were accustomed, through the operation of demons, to make swords unable to cut. Therefore it was reasonable that the action of a sword should not be prohibited by God, lest those against whom it had been brandished be held suspected of superstitions.

These things are from Henry of Assia upon Genesis.

Question Four of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

How many species of demons there are which torment human beings before and after the judgment

It is asked how many species of demons there are which torment human beings before and after the judgment.

It is answered thus: until the day of judgment there are two species of demons which torment human beings and lie in wait for them.

For some are bound in the midst of this air of ours, which is dark and gloomy. They have been prepared to minister for our exercise until the day of judgment by tempting us - yet not beyond what we are able to bear.

They willingly remain with us in this middle region of the air. This is evident because they are frequently read to have asked Christ that they not be sent into hell.

They do not do this as though their punishment were in some respect diminished while they are around us. For, as has been said, wherever demons go, they carry hell and the fire in which they always burn with them - not materially and by a corporeal action, such as heating, drying, and so forth, because in that case they would burn up everything around us, but by spiritual action and motion.

Rather, they prefer to be here with us than in hell because they judge it penal to be in hell, where they can act against us more rarely, ineffectively, and remotely than while they remain near us in this air.

Other demons are bound in hell in order before the judgment to torment souls alone, but after the judgment to torment the composite - that is, the soul and the body - in the manner stated above in the First Decade, Chapter Three, Little Question Five.

Other and third demons are in purgatory. They stand there before the souls, mocking and insulting them concerning their punishments, as Thomas says in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 21, question 5.

They nevertheless possess no power to...

...torment the souls there, since in the present life those souls were their conquerors.

Albert, however, in Book IV assigns reasons why demons do not torment souls in purgatory.

First, because those who sinned venially only did not give consent to the devil; rather, they habitually consented to God. Therefore they are said to be subjected to God alone and to his justice, not to the devil as torturer.

Second, he proves the same thing thus. As we see in political communities, one person punishes a son and another a thief or enemy. So it ought also to be in divine matters, because our justice is modeled upon God. A father is set over a son, but a commissioner is set over an enemy. Therefore, since those who are in purgatory are children of God, God the Father ought to punish them and not a demon.

Nor are they punished by good angels, because it is not plausible that good angels should afflict their fellow citizens so vehemently. Rather, they visit and comfort them.

Lord Peter of Palude says that, if it is objected that a good angel injured Jacob by touching the sinew of his thigh, which immediately withered, Genesis 32, it is said that this was for restraining concupiscence and not for grave affliction, as Lord Bonaventure says in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 2.

And because this exercise by demons both in purgatory and in the gloomy air around us, as well as the ministry of good angels, will be ended on the day of judgment, all the evil spirits of purgatory and the gloomy air will after the day of judgment be thrust into hell with evil and damned human beings, but the good will be in paradise with their angels.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 65, article 5, reply to the third, and the question cited below.

Question Five of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

On the causes why demons tempt human beings

It is asked what causes there are for demons thus to tempt, torment, and lie in wait for human beings.

It is answered that there is a fivefold cause why demons lie in wait for human beings.

The first is their malice, because, since...

...they hold God in hatred, from their malice they seek to turn human beings away from the service of God as much as they can.

Just as one who is hostile to and hates someone seeks to turn that person's subjects away from his obedience and reverence, so demons from malice seek to turn God's servants away from his service, and especially the holier and better ones.

Hence Jerome says to Eustochium: "The devil does not seek unbelieving human beings, nor those who are outside and whose flesh the king cooks in a pot. He hastens to snatch Ahasuerus from the Church of Christ. According to Habakkuk, his foods are choice. He desires to overthrow Job, and after devouring Judas he seeks permission to sift the apostles."

And in Job, chapter 40: "His food is choice, and he trusts that the Jordan will flow into his mouth" - that is, that he may devour those cleansed by baptism. Baptism had its origin in the Jordan, and therefore the baptized are signified by the Jordan.

The second cause is their pride with respect to divine power, which they endeavor to usurp. Just as God has good angels ministering to and attending him in determinate offices

for the salvation of human beings, so demons, in attacking, wish to appear to have determinate ministers for themselves to attack human beings.

Therefore it is said near the end of Job: “He is king over all the children of pride.”

There is an example in the *Lives of the Fathers* concerning Satan, who was seen by a certain person to demand an account from his attendants - demons of an inferior rank - concerning the evils to which they had induced those tempted by them. He greatly commended and honored the one who had at last led a certain holy man dwelling in the desert, whom he had tempted for many years, to a fall through lust.

The third cause is envy. For demons, envying the salvation of human beings, strive to impede their progress through temptations.

Hence it is said in Wisdom 2: “But through the envy of the devil death entered into the world.”

And in cause 16, question 2, chapter *Visis*, it is said concerning the devil that he grieves greatly and blushes that human beings, constant though made from clay...

...matter, retain on earth the charity which he was unable to have - that is, to preserve - in heaven, and because they ought to ascend there whence he descended.

Therefore Augustine says in *The City of God*: “Juno does not seem to have envied the Romans as greatly as demons envy the whole human race the eternal seats.”

And although demons know that their punishment is increased by the damnation of evil human beings whom they tempt from envy, just as the glory of angels increases from their incitement of human beings toward good, they nevertheless do not on this account cease to tempt human beings.

They are like the envious man of whom it is related that he asked for one of his eyes to be torn out so that both eyes might be torn out from his neighbor, whom he envied.

For it is said concerning a certain king that he promised two persons - an envious man and a greedy man - that he would do whatever they asked, but in such a way that the one who asked later would receive double.

When each delayed asking - the one moved by desire to possess a double good, and the other lest his companion possess more than he himself - the king finally ordered the envious man to ask first. He asked that one of his own eyes be torn out so that his companion might lose both. For he did not wish to ask for anything good, lest his companion possess double.

Thus demons tempt human beings from envy, although they are not ignorant that their own punishment will increase in the future from the damnation of human beings.

The fourth cause is the justice of God, which uses them as instruments and ministers for punishing human beings. Thus in this world a lying spirit was sent to punish Ahab, king of Israel, as is said at the end of 3 Kings; and in hell God uses them in the same manner for justice.

The fifth cause is the sloth of human beings, because they have lost their weapons.

For in Part IV of the *Lives of the Fathers* it is set down that, when a certain old man asked an old abbot why human beings and monks were vexed by demons, the old man answered:

“Because they have lost their weapons” - that is, the virtues: penance, humility, obedience, and poverty.

These things are from Thomas, First Part, question 114, article 1, and Lord Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, in the First Part of his *Summa*.

Addition

Since someone can also ask here why demons procure our evils...

...with harm to themselves, it appears to me that three things must be said.

First, because it is a consolation to the wretched to have companions in their punishments.

Second, because they are led by such great envy that they do not see what they are doing and do not take good counsel for themselves.

Third, because they have been made so evil a tree that they cannot produce anything except evil fruits.

Question Six of Chapter Ten of the Third Decade

Whether demons always appear to everyone who is dying

It is asked whether demons always appear to everyone who is dying.

To this it first appears that one must respond negatively.

For they would appear to the dying either according to the form of their incorporeal substance or in assumed bodies.

If in the first manner, they would not be seen, for a bodily eye does not see absolute spiritual things. There must be proportion and conformity between the visible object and the one seeing.

But if they appeared in assumed bodies, they would be seen by everyone. Yet a demon in an assumed body is not seen by everyone, as is evident in 1 Kings 28 concerning the pythoness and the devil in the form of Samuel, an old man clothed in a cloak. The pythoness saw him, but Saul and his two servants did not see him, although they heard him.

Therefore demons can in no way be seen by the dying.

To this difficulty it is answered that, according to the common law, demons appear to everyone who is dying.

This conclusion is proved by an argument, authorities, and examples.

The argument is thus, from Thomas, First Part, question 113, and Book I of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, article 4, and Bonaventure in the same place.

The devil is no less inclined and persistent in destroying and deceiving a human being than a good angel is in assisting and guarding him. But the good angel does not cease assisting a human being and persuading him toward good through the end of death inclusively - appearing to him, standing by, assisting, and persuading him toward good - as is evident in 4 Kings 6 concerning the king of Syria and the king of Israel; in the *Lives of the Fathers* concerning Abbot Moses and Abbot Isidore; and from...

…Gregory in the homily for the twentieth Sunday of the Trinity and in his *Dialogues*. Therefore a bad angel acts similarly.

Second, it is proved by authorities.

First, on Genesis 3, "You will lie in wait for his heel," the Ordinary Gloss says: "That is, the end of a human being's life."

And in Ecclesiasticus 39 it is said: "There are spirits which were created for vengeance, and in their fury they strengthened their torments, and in the time of consummation they will pour out their power," and so forth. Saint Vincent and Hugh the Cardinal gloss this concerning evil angels appearing at death.

And upon the words of Psalm 55, "They will watch my heel," it is said that by the heel, which is the end and lowest extremity of a human being, the end of life is understood. The malign spirit especially watches this and lies in wait for it, knowing that a final fall is damnation for the one who dies in it.

Gregory also says in Book I of the *Moralia*, chapter 7: "When our enemy does not strike at the beginning of an action and does not kill in the course of the action, he then stretches out harsher snares at the end; and he then lies in wait all the more solicitously, the more he considers that only the end remains to him for deceiving." Hence also the Psalm: "The iniquity of my heel will surround me." Thus he.

Gregory likewise says upon Luke 19, "Your enemies will surround you with a rampart," that the devil comes at the end to the good and the evil, and even came to Christ dying on the cross.

But he came to Christ and found nothing. John 14: "For the prince of this world comes, and in me he has nothing." For because he saw him to be a mortal human being, he believed that he would find something of his own in him. But he who entered the world without sin departed from the corruption of the world without any sin.

The devil also comes to the good and finds that something of his own has been in them, but nevertheless he cannot seize them because Christ paid their debt.

He also comes to the reprobate, finds many things of his own, and drags them down to Tartarus. Thus Gregory.

And the Gloss upon the words of Psalm 9, "He lies in wait like a lion in his den," says that the Psalmist speaks of Antichrist at the end of the world or of the devil at the end of life.

Gregory likewise says upon Luke 19 that malign spirits press the soul from every side when they recount to it not only the iniquities of deed but also those of speech…

…and thought, so that the soul which previously expanded itself in crime may at the end be constricted concerning all things in retribution.

And he again says that the devil brings more grievous temptations the more he sees the sinner approaching his end. Thus he.

The same thing is also evident from examples.

First, in the life of Saint Martin, to whom the devil appeared as he was dying. Seeing him, Martin said: "Why do you stand here, bloody beast?"

And the Blessed Virgin Mary asked Christ that demons not meet her on the day of her death, although this is apocryphal.

And in the *Passing of Blessed Jerome*, Cyril relates to Augustine concerning Eusebius, a disciple of blessed Jerome, who at the end of his life cried to the brothers standing by: "O brothers, assist me lest I perish! Do you not see the ranks of demons which hasten to vanquish me and lead me to Tartarus?"

And, to conclude in this matter with a summary concerning the snares of the devil's insatiable murderousness against a human being, it must be known that, after his fall at the beginning, when Lucifer knew that he had irrevocably lost the heavenly seats, he was touched inwardly by the pain of envy lest it should happen that a human being ascend to the place from which he himself had been cast out.

He began to rage against the human being with the whole spirit of malignity, so that he moves against him with all his powers not only in death but also in life and after death.

In life he first began to rage against the first parents when, beneath the covering of the slippery serpent, he secretly deceived the woman and through her caused the man to sin, when he represented God as a liar and envious, saying: "You shall by no means die. For God knows that, at whatever hour you eat from the tree of life, you will be like gods."

Then too, by the hiss of his venom, he inflamed and infected with the goads of the flesh the bodies of the first parents and our bodies, which were radically present in them; thereafter he corrupted the origin of all posterity by a thousand modes of harm and a thousand modes of death.

Moreover, he does not cease to vex human beings in death. For he watches their heel and sits in hiding like a lion in his den so that he may devour anyone and kill the innocent.

Indeed, even after death he rages against human...

...bodies.

For it is reported by Pythagoras, afterward by Ovid and Isidore, that by nature, by the art of a demon, or perhaps because of the enmity which - Scripture bearing witness - was placed by God between the serpent and the seed of human beings, a serpent is generated from the marrow of a dead human being which is in the seat of Venus and in the spine. After devouring the brain, it exits through the eyes, intending to feed upon the remaining part of the body.

To the argument made at the beginning of the question, a twofold response is given.

First, the apparitions of demons to the dying are imaginary. For demons, by moving the humors and the blood, form certain images representing themselves. What is seen imaginatively, however, appears only to those to whom the vision is made, as is evident in the prophets. Therefore it can be so also in apparitions of demons.

Second, it is said that demons and good angels have a power over bodies assumed by them similar to that which the souls of the blessed have over their own glorified bodies. It will be in the power of those souls that their bodies be seen or not seen, by one or by many, at a small or great distance, so that every action of the body will be in the power of the soul. Otherwise, the glorified body would not be an instrument supremely obedient to the principal agent - namely, the soul.

We therefore say similarly concerning demons and good angels: it is in their power to appear in assumed bodies or not, to one or to many, from a distance or nearby.

These things are drawn from Thomas in Book IV of the *Sentences*, distinction 44, question 2.

This is also evident concerning a good angel in Daniel 10 and concerning the glorified Christ who appeared to Paul. Paul saw him, but the men who accompanied him stood astonished, hearing a voice but seeing no one, Acts 9.

Let us therefore pray to the most holy Trinity, the blessed Virgin Mother of God, and our father, namely Saint Dominic, that when the hour of our departure to the Father comes - "when Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a barbarous people" - Christ may meet us; that a host of angels may accompany our departure; that the enemies who meet us may find nothing deadly in us; but that Abraham's bosom may receive us. Amen.

Addition

How harsh the devil's temptation is at a human being's death, and how greatly he opposes us after our departure from this life, is evident from what the holy Apostle Jude wrote in his canonical Epistle, when Michael the Archangel disputed with the devil concerning the body of Moses.

For Michael the Archangel is said to have presided over the burial of Moses. The devil would not allow this, but brought a charge against Moses because he had killed the Egyptian and consequently belonged to the devil; nor did he wish to permit Moses's burial to be honored so greatly.

This example signifies the rendering of accounts which is owed to each person after departure from the body.

For the devil, knowing that he possesses no further time to deceive a human being beyond the limit of life, reserves all the poison of his malice in his tail - that is, at the end - as was said figuratively to the serpent: "You will lie in wait for his heel" - that is, for the soul, whose heel is the limit of life.

And frequently, before the soul departs from the body, he begins to torment obstinate sinners whom he knows will be enslaved with him in hell.

End.

Register and Colophon

Register

A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T V X Y Z.

Aa Bb Cc Dd Ee Ff Gg Hh Ii Kk Ll Mm Nn.

The table stands separately.

All are gatherings of four sheets.

Praise be to God.

Alphabetical Index

Of the memorable matters and opinions which are contained here and there in this book

A

- The agate stone remains in fire without injury. 137.
- The action of heat upon the bodies of the damned is real and intentional. 136.
- A meritorious act in Purgatory. 179.
- A proper act exists in its proper potency and matter. 6.
- Adam is interpreted as "red earth." 237.
- Adam's soul existed before his body, perfect in species. 7.
- What mystery Adam understood when he slept in that first sleep. 301.
- No philosopher could compare himself in knowledge with Adam and Paul. 285.
- Why the demon tempted the woman rather than Adam. 527.
- Adam was created in grace which makes one pleasing. 292.
- The three conditions of the air. 495.
- The demons fell in the air for a threefold cause. 485.
- The agility of the glorified body is described. 78.
- Albert's opinion concerning the suffrages of the Church which profit the dead. 146.
- The Chaldeans invented the alcocoden and the ylech for the deception of human beings. 386.
- Alchemists cannot truly transmute the species of metals. 509.
- Alexander degenerated from the Peripatetics. 29.
- A thing is ordered to an end in two ways. 526.
- Ambrose's golden discourse, that the stars do not liberate a human being. 354.
- Angels were created in the Empyrean Heaven. 418.
- The crown of the aureole is not owed to angels. 100.
- When the angels were created. 417.
- Angels neither suffer pain nor...

  ...grieve. 443.
- Angels are not human members with Christ. 450.
- Good angels obtain a certain accidental joy from the guardianship of good human beings. 444.
- The care of angels for human beings is so great that they never abandon them, even when they are most obstinate. 445.

- Angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings. 426.
- What each person ought to say every day to his guardian angel. 428.
- Certain temples were consecrated by the ministry of angels. 451.
- An angel understands another angel when he turns himself toward the likeness of that angel which he has impressed upon him. 452.
- Angels assume bodies united to themselves as movable things formed in this way by divine power. 489.
- Angels can alter both senses, the interior and the exterior. 447.
- Angels can alter the will. 448.
- Angels illuminate the intellect of a human being concerning four things. 449.
- An evil angel cannot baptize. 450.
- Angels cannot consecrate the body of Christ. 449.
- The brief intervals of the angels between creation and the fall. 483.
- The angel sinned after the first instant of his creation. 484.
- Angels did not possess the four dowries of the glorified body. 79.
- Angels are deputed to the guardianship of human beings for four causes. 437.
- One of the angels is sufficient for each individual human being. 436.
- An angel begins to guard when the creature is born. 437.
- And they are given until death. 438.
- When the guardianship of angels is withdrawn from a human being. 440.
- The reward of angels is twofold. 441.
- An angel, and any creature, can sin. 479.
- Angels are corporeal and animate. 477.
- How one good angel resists another good angel. 458.
- An angel operates where he is. 497.
- When an angel fails in the guardianship of human beings. 368.
- How an angel is defined. 412.
- The definition of an angel from Dionysius. 413.
- Angels lack matter. 414.
- The simplicity of angels. Ibid.
- The cognition of an angel is through species naturally connate with it. 414.
- The number of angels. 415.
- According to its diverse offices, the soul obtains a variety of names. 407.
- Why the body is disobedient to the soul. 407.
- The soul rules the body in two ways. 409.

- When stripped from the body, the soul does not possess the full mode of knowing of separated intellects. 56.
- The soul naturally desires to be reunited with the body. Ibid.
- It is affected with sadness if it is evil, but with joy if it is good. Ibid.
- What causes of sorrow it has. 58.
- A more learned soul in heaven is more excellent than a less learned but better soul; nevertheless, it does not enjoy the divine essence better. 406.
- Philosophers maintain that souls will at some time return into bodies. 35.
- Merit and sin are principally ascribed to the soul. 35.
- It is most difficult to know what the soul is. 2.
- When a human being is dying, the soul ceases successively to inform the body. 51.
- It is not of the essence of God. 4.
- It was not created with the angels. 4.
- What the soul truly is. 3, 18.
- The human soul is not a part of the great soul of the world. 2.
- The soul of the world is not God, as Parmenides said. 2.
- The soul is created immediately by God. 12, 13.
- Plato thought that demons were the souls of human beings. 13.
- Souls were not created from the beginning among the other intelligences, nor all at once. 14.
- An animal can live even after its heart has been removed. 54.
- The soul departing from the body naturally tends upward. 55.
- Why the soul of a male is infused into the body after forty days, and not after eighty as in the body of a female. 14.
- A soul is found upon the earth to be purged. 170.
- The soul cannot be educed from the potency of matter. 9, 12.
- It is the act of a physical, organic body. 10.
- The souls of those being purged possess consolation from many things together with their affliction. 183.
- The immortality of the soul is proved in many ways. 20.
- Souls existing in Purgatory are assisted by the works of the living. 194.
- The souls of the dead do not take part in the affairs of the living. 268.
- The abodes of souls in the lower regions. 224.
- A separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire. 129.
- That souls in Purgatory can be assisted by the suffrages of the living is proved by the authorities of the saints. 197.
- Why the soul is not rendered its reward after separation from the body. 252.
- A sleeping soul is more fitted for revelations. 310.

- Souls follow bodies. 336. When bodies exercise dominion. 340.
- The soul of Christ is full of grace. 421.
- The human soul is the lowest species in the genus of intelligences. 56.
- Why the soul goes to Purgatory. 213.
- The soul is in the blood, that is, it coexists with the blood. 213.
- How separated souls know themselves. 272.
- Plato's revolution of years. 36.
- Antichrist will have an angel for his guardianship. 435.
- A marvelous apparition in favor of Purgatory. 173.
- How an apparition of spirits is known, whether it is good or evil. 248.
- The marvelous apparition of William de Corvo. Ibid., and 242.
- Water drunk with a little wine cools a healthy person more than when drunk alone. 78.
- Aristotle maintained that demons do not exist. 469.
- The articles of faith cannot be demonstrated. 44.
- What Arcturus is. 377.
- When an astrologer truly predicts concerning the morals of human beings. 328.
- An astrologer cannot make certain predictions and judgments sufficiently concerning future things. 390.
- The scope of astrology. 389.
- Why astrology is uncertain. 390.
- The divination of astrologers concerning the abundance and fertility of a year is frivolous. 243.
- The stars are the cause of inferior effects through particular inferior causes as intermediaries. 355.
- The stars are causes of longer life according to astronomers. 386.
- Whether credence should be given to judgments of the stars...

  ...393.
- The opinion of astronomers concerning dreams. 304.
- The stars signify, but do not cause. 352.
- The opinion of Augustine and Thomas concerning the willing of the damned. 257.
- Avicenna's error concerning fire. 126.
- The three aureoles. 98, 96.
- What an aureole is. 96, 94.
- To whom the aureole is owed. 97.

B

- One baptized by a good angel is not bound to be rebaptized. 451.
- Bede's opinion concerning the terrestrial Paradise. 225.
- Bdellium, a precious stone. 234.
- A spiritual war is waged among the angels, but not a corporeal one. 459.
- The many kinds of wars. Ibid.
- The vision of the blessed. 270.
- Beatitude consists in an act of the will according to Scotus. 395.
- What beatitude is. 395.
- The blessed sometimes appear to the living, and how. 246.
- The object of beatitude according to Saint Thomas. 398.
- Three dowries are assigned to the blessed in heaven. 72.
- Beatitude requires three things. 62.
- Who are the very good and the very evil. 143.
- The good of human beings is procured through angels. 522.
- A good operation requires two things. 432.

C

- The Elysian Fields are in the midst of the lower regions, according to the pagans. 223.
- The praise of Campania. 243.
- The opinion of the canonists concerning indulgences for those who are in Purgatory. 202.
- The case of a certain person caught up, declared by the pope. 70.
- A marvelous case of a woman vexed by a demon. 473.
- The case in Apulia. 171.
- The fall of the evil angels was possible. 481.
- Flesh is taken for a human being living carnally. 40.
- Some feed upon human flesh. 31, 39.
- Celestial bodies are not the cause of human acts. 328.
- Celestial bodies render a human being suited to the sciences only accidentally. 326.
- The existence of the Empyrean Heaven cannot be investigated by human reason. 64.
- The Empyrean Heaven is proved by the authorities...

  ...of the saints. 64.
- What it is. Ibid.
- How, immediately after it was made, it was filled with angels. 65.
- The crystalline heaven. 60.
- The aerial heaven divided into seven heavens. 66.

- The Empyrean Heaven is not a material body. 66.
- Nothing in the world can compel demons except divine power. 539.
- The felicity of the Empyrean Heaven. Ibid.
- The Empyrean Heaven, the place of the angels. 418.
- The better charity is, the more it increases merit. 404.
- The more intense charity is, the more blessed it makes a human being in heaven. 407.
- The efficacy of charity. 195, 196.
- The commandment of charity will be fulfilled in the fatherland. 88, 86.
- How charity begins from itself. 26.
- Why Christ threatened eternal punishment for sins. 106.
- In Christ there is a threefold aureole. 100.
- Christ did not have an angel deputed to his guardianship. 434.
- How Christ was comforted by an angel in his Passion. 434.
- Christ could not sin. 422.
- Christ, descending to the lower regions, did not liberate the children, because they did not possess the grace of faith. 220.
- Christ, prince of soldiers. 100.
- The Christian people are more excellent than every nation. 198.
- Christ possessed dowries. 69.
- Christ's brightness in the Transfiguration was miraculous. 80.
- Christ's body did not possess the four dowries. 79.
- The brightness of the glorified body can be seen by a nonglorified eye. 80.
- Cleombrotus brought about his own death. 261.
- The clergy, the praise of Christians. 198.
- Cicero's opinion. 56.
- Why the swan is consecrated to Apollo. 26.
- The swan is consecrated to Venus. 307.
- Morning and evening cognition in the angels. 453.
- Cognition occurs according as the thing cognized is in the knower. 286.
- How the soul knows itself. 271.
- Cognition is threefold. 268.
- The choleric are irascible. 336.
- The council of jurists and theologians concerning indulgences. 204.
- The fourfold degree of conversion into God, or of contemplation. 282.
- The heart lives first and dies last. 54.

- The heart of a human being who has died from poison always withstands fire without being consumed. 137.
- Why the bodies of the damned are never consumed by fire. 136.
- A corrupted body can be vivified by divine power. 35.
- The body, the prison of the soul. 37.
- The conditions of the glorified body. 83, 81.
- Aristotle denies that the celestial bodies are animate. 470.
- How celestial bodies can act upon the virtues and vices of human beings. 336.
- The cause of corruption is matter. 53.
- Corruption of the mind is repaired through penance. 98, 96.
- The opinion concerning the creation of the first human being. 237.
- Venial fault is remitted through the fire of Purgatory. 175.
- Every fault not remitted in this life is coeval with its punishment. 354.
- How the guardians of souls are always in heaven. 429.
- Why a species is not produced in a mirror under a ray of the sun. 91, 89.

D

- The passage of the damned. 121.
- The number of the damned is greater than that of the saved. 123.
- The damned cannot by right reason desire not to exist. 254.
- All things are sadness to the damned. 274.
- What a demon can do in the generation of a human being. 493, 494.
- The bodies of demons are made from condensed air. 493.
- And they do not properly exercise the works of life. 494.
- A demon can be within natural bodies. 497.
- Nevertheless, it cannot penetrate the whole body, nor any part of it. 498.
- A demon cannot possess seed. 491.
- The operation of demons. 139.
- That demons exist is proved in three ways. 472.
- The demon familiar to Socrates. 310.
- Demons, swift ministers. 516.
- The nature of a demon. 521.
- A demon ought not to be adored, even if it transforms itself into an angel of light. 495.
- There is a twofold kind of evil demons. 477.
- Invoked demons answer and come for two reasons. 476.

- The definition of demons and their various names. 476.
- What it is to sin. 477, 480.
- How a demon entered into Judas. 501.
- What God is. 289.
- It is declared how God wills all human beings to be saved. 111.
- The antecedent and consequent will of God. Ibid.
- God has fixed the punishment of each soul in Purgatory. 203.
- The foreknowledge of God does not impose necessity. 16.
- How God reveals his secrets. 280.
- God created three kinds of living spirit. 6.
- God cooperates toward that which is the good of nature, but not toward the deformity of an act. 15.
- No human being can see him by his own power. 85, 83.
- It belongs to God alone actively to move the will. 322.
- In the formation of Adam's body, God first formed the body and afterward breathed the soul into it. 20.
- Why God permits human beings to be attacked. 522.
- Why, after the sin of the first parents, God made a leathern girdle for them. 233.
- Mothers of the gods. 491.
- The right side is nobler than the left. 231.
- The power of the devil: by what bonds it is bound. 457.
- The devil, father of lies. 520.
- The difference between the sense of touch and the other senses. 135.
- The difference between astronomical and necromantic images. 376.
- The intervening distance between Abraham's bosom and hell. 121.
- A prohibited divinatory practice. 383.
- Those who are accustomed frequently to divine. 277.
- How divinations are made, and the threefold manner of speaking. 277.
- The pain of the soul is greater than that of the body. 182.
- Dominicus Venetus, bishop of Brescia, wrote concerning the suffrages of the Church. 156.
- The gift of prophecy is common to the good and the evil. 296.
- A dowry differs from beatitude in five respects. 82.
- It is a disposition toward beatitude itself. Ibid.
- Beyond the dowries three things are required. 85, 83.
- Why a dowry is assigned to the bridegroom, and in what manner to the bride...

...68.

- What a spiritual dowry is. 69.
- What a dowry is. 67.
- And why it is given. 68.
- According to the theologians, the dowries in heaven correspond to the three virtues. 74.
- The four dowries in the glorified body are adapted to the cardinal virtues.

E

- The three kinds of effects. 508.
- The effusion of the blood of a murdered human being in the presence of the murderer is to be ascribed to a divine miracle and not to superstition. 546.
- The embryo, and what occurs in it. 13.
- Beings leading the best life. 412.
- Enoch was translated into Paradise. 238.
- The translation of Enoch and Elijah into Paradise. 239.
- A letter concerning the location of hell, found in the tomb of Dionysodorus. 117.
- The error of the Indians concerning Purgatory. 158.
- The error of certain persons concerning the resurrection of Christ. 33.
- The error of the Sadducees. 411.
- What excommunication is. 207.
- Why certain persons are excommunicated after death. 208.
- Who are to be excommunicated after death. 207.
- Examples of Gentiles showing the immortality of the soul. 23, 24.
- Examples for showing that the practice of the divinatory art concerning future events is certain. 384.
- The ecstasy of a certain devout woman. 302.
- Why the demon appeared to Eve in the form of a serpent. 527.
- Eve was formed in the terrestrial Paradise. 238.
- What good fortune and misfortune are. 364.

F

- Fate can be considered in two ways. 346.
- The incongruities arising from the admission of fate. 347.
- The poetic definition of fate. 338.
- Its philosophical definition. 339.

- To entrust all things to the fates is not so much uncertain as rash. 349.
- What things are subjected to fate and what things are not. 357.
- It is read that no fool ever prophesied. 309.
- The felicity and fertility of the earth are given according to the merits of human beings…

  …244.
- Felicity consists in contemplation. 403.
- It is initiatively in the intellect, but completively in the will. 403.
- No one is happy in this life. 370.
- A figure is not the principle of any natural action. 553.
- The fabrications of poets and Gentiles. 505.
- What the flame placed between the human being and the terrestrial Paradise after the fall signifies. 192.
- The origin and names of the rivers of the Paradise of pleasure. 234.
- Fortune as a good goddess, and why she is evil. 362.
- It is an accidental cause. 363.
- The six Fortunate Islands. 224.
- The principal conditions of Fortune are nine. 369.
- Where there is more Fortune, there is less wisdom. 370.
- A strong imagination causes a fall. 544.
- The depiction of Fortune. 360.
- What Fortune is. 362.
- Separated forms cannot transmute matter. 508.
- The opinion of Francis of Meyronnes concerning indulgences. 203.
- Fruition is taken in two ways. 397.
- Future things can be known in three ways. 548.

G

- The joy of angels follows their nature. 442.
- There is a threefold kind of saints. 98, 96.
- The withdrawal of grace is the privation of the divine vision in the Limbo of children. 216.
- The opinion of William of Paris. 381.
- How taste exists in heaven. 92, 90.

H

- How Emperor Henry tempted God. 523.

- The opinion of Henry of Ghent concerning the production of the world from eternity. 51.
- The opinion of Henry of Ghent concerning the object of our intellect. 285.
- What things make a person a heretic. 514.
- The heresy of the Poor of Lyons and of the Waldensians. 158.
- A human being is master of his own acts. 348.
- When a human being is said to be well or badly fortuned...

  ...368.
- How a human being is ordered according to the stars, according to the angels, and according to God. 366.
- It is not repugnant that some space and interval be granted between a human being's death and his particular judgment. 60.
- The number of human beings. 416.
- Human beings are attacked by demons in four ways. 510.
- Humor in a human being is twofold. 40.

I

- Ignorance does not excuse from sin for a threefold cause. 405.
- The fire of hell afflicts souls in four ways. 130.
- It is an instrument of divine justice. 131.
- As regards the nature of fire, it is the same in species as our fire, in whatever matter it may be found. 133.
- It differs, however, from our fire insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice. 134.
- The fire of hell differs from the fire of Purgatory in eight ways. 184.
- The same fire burns those existing in Purgatory and in hell. 186.
- The fire of hell is corporeal. 127.
- Fire is supremely active. 190.
- Why images are transferred into heaven. 380.
- What a strong imagination effects. 373.
- What imagination is. 130.
- Natural inclination is toward the universal good absolutely. 367.
- The trees of India. 351.
- How indulgences profit the departed. 149.
- Indulgences avail for the living and the dead. 180. They profit in two ways there. 204.
- The granting of indulgences depends upon forum and jurisdiction. 205.
- Indulgences do not profit the unbaptized. 221.
- For indulgences to be valid, a fitting cause is required. 211.

- Hell is the largest region. 122.
- Hell is explained by many names. 117.
- Hell is on the surface of the earth, according to the testimony of Saint Gregory. 118.
- After the judgment, the whole elemental region will be hell. 123. And it will be eternal. 124. It has seven prisons. 125.
- Hell is in the center of the earth. 114.
- The existence of hell is proved by five reasons. 104.
- Acuteness of intellect arises from five things. 326.
- The case of John of Lignano concerning fate. 342.
- Italy is the most excellent of all regions. 243.
- The capacity of the intellect is twofold. 291.
- Avicenna's chain of intelligences. 490.
- The intelligible exists in the intellect in three ways. 454.
- Many questions put to a certain dead person. 50.
- The judgment of souls after death is twofold. 58.
- In the particular judgment Christ judges through angels. 59.
- Jupiter and Venus are beneficent. 387.

L

- The opinion of Laurentius Opimus concerning human freedom. 325.
- Laurentius the Florentine cast himself into a well. 263.
- Vocal praise will exist in the fatherland. 89, 91, 95.
- The laws judge that mathematicians are to be expelled from political communities. 384.
- Free choice is bound in children and the insane. 317.
- What free choice is. 420.
- It exists in angels and in God. 420.
- In whom free choice is found. 421.
- There are three kinds of trees in Paradise. 232.
- The Limbo of children and that of the holy fathers differ in four ways. 215.
- The power of demons is limited. 503.
- There is difficulty among the doctors concerning where hell is. 113.
- How exterior speech occurs. 273.
- Corporeal speech does not exist in a separated soul. 273.
- What mental speech is, and how it exists in a separated soul.
- Speech differs from illumination in two ways. 455.

- The speech of spirits can occur in four ways. 455.
- Local distance does not impede the speech of angels. 456.
- Lucretia's epitaph, which is ascribed to Ovid. 262.
- The light of glory is necessary for beatitude. 86, 85.
- The Moon makes a human being of duller intellect. 327.

M

- The example of Macarius. 153.
- Whence the power of the magnet arises...

  ...375.
- The evil of fault belongs to an act of free choice in two ways. 481.
- The opinion of the Manichaeans concerning the terrestrial Paradise. 225.
- The resurrection of the Virgin Mary and of John the Apostle was not delayed until the end of the world. 240.
- The Virgin Mary has an aureole as the reward of virginity. 97.
- The Virgin Mary was assumed into heaven with her body. 467.
- Matrimony is a medicinal good. 16.
- The Virgin Mary surpassed all the angels in three things. 465.
- How the Virgin Mary was placed above all the choirs of angels. 465.
- The Virgin Mary is near the deity. 466.
- Not everyone who suffers for Christ is a martyr. 98.
- Spiritual matrimony between Christ and the soul. 69.
- Evildoers are punished by eight kinds of punishments in this world. 140.
- Evil things have their place among things, and why they were created. 18.
- A physician judges the goodness or depravity of an intellect more certainly than an astrologer. 328.
- The observation of physicians in judging illnesses. 554.
- One cannot heal without astrology. 330.
- A physician should observe the course of the Moon. 331.
- Why the medicinal art does not possess perfection. 331.
- A physician receives his knowledge from causes very remote. 329.
- Melancholics are livid. 338.
- It is better to be than not to be. 258.
- The reward of the saints is common to all and proper to each. 405.
- Accidental merit can exist after this life. 179.

- Diversity of merits transfers human beings into different orders of angels. 463.
- Human merit is more efficacious than angelic merit. Ibid.
- Merit consists in charity. 466.
- Many apparitions of the dead are recounted. 247.
- Mercury makes a human being endowed with intellect. 327.
- What illumination of the mind is. 279.
- A marvelous example concerning the soul of King Theodoric. 118.
- A miracle is understood in two ways. 534.
- Mount Etna in Sicily. 108, 119.
- Why the reason of miracles is incomprehensible. 547.
- All metals are from sulfur…

  …95, 97.
- The manner in which the soul knows. 271.
- The manner of receiving indulgences for the departed. 204.
- Many writers concerning indulgences are enumerated. 206.
- A person is not always dead who by common estimation is held to be dead. 54.
- The dead are not to be buried hastily. 54.
- A dead person cannot be excommunicated or absolved. 207.
- The dead know many of the things that are done here. 268.
- Death presents itself in four ways as something to be desired under the aspect of good. 260.
- The dead cannot appear to the living. 246.
- It is not lawful to inquire into the state of the dying. 253.
- The dead in Purgatory are members of the Church Militant. 196.
- Many have brought death upon themselves. 262, 263.
- How movers do not precede movable things. 417.
- Women abound in passions. 293.
- Women are not permitted to teach or preach. 293.
- That the world began must be held by faith alone. 43.
- It was fitting for the world to be produced in time. 44.
- What the perfection of the world requires. 411.
- That the world always existed cannot be proved demonstratively. 43.

N

- Human nature can pass into God. 467.
- Nature is governed by the stars. 317.

- Whence arises the diversity of those born under the same stars. 353.
- Nature does not fail in necessities. 295.
- The power of the divine nature does not really differ from its essence. 3.
- The folly of Nectanebus the astronomer. 355.
- No one grieves concerning that of which he does not know himself to be deprived. 218.
- Nothing new was made by God which had not in some manner preceded in the works of the six days. 6.
- The nobility and healthfulness of a country are considered with respect to seven things. 241.
- Non-being is considered in two ways. 259.
- No one is happy in this life. 370.

O

- The object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. 285.
- What odor is. 93, 90.
- Where all things were created together. 418.
- Every planet is stronger in its own house than in another's. 410.
- The operation of one avails another in two ways. 198.
- The opinion of sorceresses concerning children dying without baptism is rejected. 218.
- The opinion of Origen concerning the terrestrial Paradise. 225.
- What an oracle is. 279.
- Prayer is not made for the unclean, 150, nor for those who kill themselves, 151.
- The effects of prayer. 199.
- How the Carthusian Order began. 60.
- How the tenth order in heaven is to be understood. 462.
- The excellence of the east. 241.
- Origen's error concerning hell. 103.
- Origen's error concerning the origin of the soul. 4.

P

- The pope can by right dispense all the goods of the Church. 211.
- The pope cannot dissipate spiritual things. 211.
- If the pope liberated everyone from the punishments of Purgatory, he would act unfittingly. 212.
- The pope does two things for those established in Purgatory. 212.
- The pope cannot empty all Purgatory. 210.
- The pope has jurisdiction in Purgatory. 205.

- There are three Fates. 338.
- The office of the Fates. Ibid.
- Little children in Limbo can possess a twofold cognition concerning beatitude. 217.
- Which country is happier. 242.
- What names the terrestrial Paradise obtains. 236.
- Its circumference is described. 236.
- How it is interpreted. 237.
- Three opinions concerning the terrestrial Paradise. 227.
- What Paradise is. 228.
- The terrestrial Paradise is opposed to hell. 115.
- Paul's elevation. 292.
- Paul's ecstasy of mind. 302.
- Punishment can be voluntary in three ways. 187.
- Eight kinds of the punishments of hell. 138.
- The punishments of the damned grow until the day of judgment. 191.
- The punishment of Purgatory exceeds the greatest punishments of this life, 181, and is twofold. Ibid.
- What the perfect is. 371.
- Those existing in Purgatory cannot sin. 159. Nor can they...

  ...merit. 190.
- How venial sins are remitted here and how they are remitted in the future age. 179.
- Philosophers hold various opinions concerning the terminus and end of the world. 41.
- Examples of philosophers demonstrating that the soul is immortal. 26.
- The fictions of philosophers concerning hell. 102.
- What philosophers thought concerning the end of the world. 45.
- Philosophy possesses great delights. 274.
- Three different quantities of years are attributed to each planet. 387.
- Plato's opinion concerning the immortality of the soul. 22.
- Plato's opinion concerning demons. 470.
- Many things signify that rain will occur. 16.
- Absolute and ordained power are the same in God. 256.
- In the fatherland the visual power will see through an act of seeing, by admitting and receiving from the object. 88, 90; 90, 88.
- The powers of the soul really differ from its essence. 3.
- The reward of the angels. 441.

- The image of Perseus in heaven. 378.
- Whence prosperity in play arises. 374.
- The gift of prophecy is common to the good and the evil. 296.
- The preposition *ex* designates order alone, not a material cause. 50.
- The difference between providence and fate. 358.
- All things are governed by the providence of God. 349, 354, 365.
- All children, whoever they may have been, will rise at the judgment with their bodies at the perfect age. 222.
- Children in the maternal womb have a guardian angel. 435.
- The conflict of angels is threefold. 457.
- Purgatory is in one manner a way and in another manner a terminus. 202.
- And it is above the earth. Ibid.
- One person is purged more quickly than another. 193.
- There are three Purgatories. Ibid.
- The passage of Paul to the Corinthians concerning Purgatory is expounded. Ibid.
- The place of Purgatory is twofold. 169.
- The sins which are found principally in women. 566.
- Patrick's Purgatory. 171.
- Purgatory is truly found in the center of the earth. 159.
- The Hebrews and certain Greeks denied Purgatory. 157.
- One person in Purgatory can be liberated...

  ...more quickly or more slowly than another. 213.
- In Purgatory some sins are remitted as regards fault. 174.
- If Purgatory did not exist, sinners would be given an occasion for despair. 161.
- Purgatory is proved. 162, 166.
- In Purgatory every liability to punishment owed for venial and mortal sin is remitted. 176.
- The punishment of Purgatory is more severe than every punishment in the world. 176.
- The reward and punishment of separated souls never end. 245.

Q

- Four coeval things were created together. 8.
- Four places are in the center of the earth. 215.
- Four kinds of evil demons. 478.
- Four defects of the body arising from the four elements. 76.
- Four places of separated souls. 63.

- Four roots of all vices. 334.
- What Catholics must believe concerning the end of the world. 48.
- To ask something of a demon is not to invoke a demon. 549.

R

- Raphael Maffei's opinion concerning the object of our intellect. 286.
- Raphael Maffei expounded the canonical epistle of Saint Jude the Apostle. 460.
- It is difficult to render causes for individual marvels and unusual things. 545.
- Reason imitates nature. 265.
- The regions of Purgatory, Limbo, and the bosom of Abraham do not surround one another circularly. 120.
- Kingdoms destroyed on account of a conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn. 331.
- How natural things come to life again. 39.
- Plato's renewal at the thirty-six-thousandth year. 38.
- The resurrection of bodies is partly natural and partly truly miraculous. 38.
- The Catholic opinion concerning the resurrection of the body. 34.
- The same one in number who fell will rise. 36.
- Rome, the nursling of all lands. 243.
- The commendation of the ancient Romans. 266.
- Revelations are made more frequently to women...

  ...for three causes. 292.

S

- How much the intercessions of the saints avail for living well. 335.
- For whom the sacrifices of the altar are offered, and for whom they are not. 143.
- Sanguine persons are beneficent. 336.
- When it is lawful to carry the relics of the saints with oneself. 557.
- Blood is the seat of the soul. 9.
- When blood fails, the operations of the soul fail. 11.
- Whether health continued in the morning, interrupted at midday, and restored in the evening is the same. 30.
- Saturn and Mars are malevolent. 387.
- Science can be understood in two ways. 274.
- Scotus's opinion whether it is preferable to desire not to exist rather than to sin. 263.
- Saint Thomas's opinion concerning the same matter. Ibid.

- Scotus's opinion concerning the necessity of theology. 287.
- Scotus's excellent disproof concerning infernal fire. 127.
- There are nine seats of souls in the lower regions. 224.
- Seed is understood in three ways. 492.
- How the adverb "always" is to be understood. 29.
- The exterior senses of the glorified body will be beatified in the fatherland in Christ. 88, 86.
- The senses of a human being are deceived in three ways. 515, 517.
- How Sibyl is interpreted. 295.
- The opinion of Simonides concerning God. 310.
- Various stars assigned to different human beings. 342.
- Whence Syria is named. 235.
- The demon pretends himself to have been captured so that he may capture the human being. 530.
- Faith is not to be placed in dreams concerning the dead. 308.
- How practitioners of sortilege are to be punished. 560.
- Dreams concerning the dead are sometimes sent toward a good end. 308.
- Enigmatic and unclear dreams arise from many causes. 310.
- The definition of sleep according to the philosophers. 297, 303.
- How it is caused. Ibid.
- Universal sleep. 300.
- Partial sleep is threefold. Ibid.
- Adam's sleep was sent by God. 301.
- Three kinds of human beings dream and divine well. 312.
- Those who interpret dreams best and most skillfully. 312.
- The difference among dreams, visions, and oracles. 315.
- It happens in four ways that future things are predicted through dreams. 316.
- Dreams are introduced into the living in two ways. 306.
- Galen's dream. Ibid.
- How the saints used lots. 562, 565.
- The cause of dreams is twofold in general. 303.
- A dream was sent to Socrates. 307.
- A spirit can move bodies in two ways. 499, 501.
- When the bridegroom is the abductor of the girl. 72.
- The living can inquire into the state of someone after death. 253.
- The star which appeared to the three Magi, and its motion. 393.

- According to the opinion of Saint Thomas, the suffrages of the Church do not profit the departed absolutely. 148.
- Suffrages profit the damned in two ways. 144.
- Concerning the superstition of images in heaven. 380.
- The pride of the devil was the cause why Michael fought with the dragon. 460.
- To inspect an astrolabe is superstitious and a sin. 556.
- Solomon performed exorcisms. 543.
- The saints used lots. 562.
- Lots engender dangers. Ibid.
- Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar knew future things through dreams. 563.
- Matthias the Apostle was chosen by lot. 562.

T

- There is an intermediate time between two instants insofar as time is continuous. 485.
- Palpable darkness. 138.
- Theology is necessary. 286, 290.
- Why theology cannot be acquired from natural things. 287.
- The theologians' response concerning fate. 355.
- The theologians' definition of fate. 356.
- Thomas concerning the Most Holy Trinity. 464.
- Thomas's opinion as to why theology is necessary. 288.
- Fear cannot exist in the fatherland. 446.
- The Tiber was first called the Albula. 235.
- Trajan's soul was not deputed to hell by a final sentence. 245.
- How Trajan was recalled to life by the prayers of Blessed Gregory. 153.
- The definition of fate by Trismegistus and Apuleius. 39.
- The threefold cause why the demon procures our evils to his own harm. 573.
- The kind of future things is threefold. 530.
- The kind of signs in the Paradise of Pleasure is threefold. 232.
- Three things are required for perfect temptation. 523.
- Separate forms cannot transmute matter. 508.
- Christ's miraculous Transfiguration. 80.
- The limit of human life is called the heel. 577.
- It is lawful to use lots in three ways. 564.
- Four things must be guarded against in suspending divine words from the neck. 557.

- Four things are to be attended to, lest someone incur superstition. 557.
- The observation of times is threefold. 554.
- When observing a time is not a sin. 554.
- The observation of time is sometimes one of piety. 554.
- Times ought to be observed in cases of illness. 555.

V

- The heresy of the Waldensians. 194.
- Knowledge of truth is delightful to all. 218.
- The immortal worm. 138.
- A victory is called great for a twofold reason. 97.
- The false opinion of Vigilantius. 194.
- The rational cognitive power is not subject to the stars. 325.
- The damned now see the glory of the blessed universally; after the judgment, they will not be able to think about it there. 275.
- The order and connection of the natural power in a human being. 281.
- Virginity of the flesh cannot be repaired. 98, 96.
- Virginity is connatural to an angel. 462.
- What a vision is. 279.
- The vision of God is twofold. 72.
- Violence cannot be perpetual. 36.
- Whence the diversity of vices and virtues arises. 382.
- Wine is more penetrating than water. 78.
- Wine returned from vinegar into wine is not the same wine. 33.
- When it is lawful to use natural things for healing. 553.
- Each thing is moved by the cause proximate to it. 322.
- The demon used the Hebrew tongue when tempting the first parents. 528.
- The human will always remains free. 325.
- Something is called voluntary in two ways. 188.
- The three operations of the will. 400.
- The use of duels is altogether prohibited. 559.
- The living can make satisfaction to God for the dead. 195.
- The corporeal eye cannot see spiritual things. 573.
- The error of the Waldensians. 158.
- Where there is more fortune, there is less wisdom. 370.

- How the stars can act in the virtues and vices of human beings. 336.
- The swan is consecrated to Venus. 307.
- The prayers of the saints avail toward living well. 335.
- Praise of the ancient Romans. 266.
- How natural things can be vivified. 37.
- One person in Purgatory can be liberated more quickly than another. 213.
- An imaginary vision appears only to those to whom the vision is made. 576.
- Paul's vision. 576.
- Old women who practice sortilege. 543.
- Valerius Maximus's account concerning miracles. 534.
- Vulcan is the god of fire. 119.

X

- Christ is the prince of soldiers. 100.
- Christ was comforted by an angel in his Passion. 434.
- Christ did not have an angel deputed to guard him. 434.
- Christ had the threefold aureole. 100.
- Why Christ threatened sinners with eternal punishment. 106.
- Christ could not sin. 422.
- How Christ had the dowries of a glorified body. 79.
- Christ, descending to the lower regions, did not liberate the children, and why. 220.

Z

- The signs of the Zodiac. 381.