Commentaries and Disputations on Genesis

Benedict Pererius (Benito Pereira), S.J.

Tomus Primus

English translation — this volume covers PDF pages 6–858
Page markers refer to the original PDF page numbers.

— p. 6 (PDF) —

BENEDICT PERERIUS OF VALENCIA, OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS: THE FIRST VOLUME OF COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS ON GENESIS: containing the history of Moses from the beginning of the world up to the Noachic flood, explained in seven books. Four Indices are added: one of the questions; a second of those things that pertain to moral doctrine and the use of preachers; the third of the passages of Sacred Scripture; the fourth general and alphabetical. Fourth edition, much more corrected than heretofore. LYONS, at the press of Horatius Cardon, 1599. With privilege.

The true title page (PDF 6), fully legible. It gives the author's full name -- Benedictus Pererius Valentinus (Benedict Pererius of Valencia, S.J.) -- and states that this 'Prior tomus' explains 'the history of Moses from the beginning of the world to the Noachic flood, in seven books' (i.e. Genesis 1-5), with four appended indices. The imprint dates THIS copy to the FOURTH edition: Lyons, at the press of Horatius Cardon (Horace Cardon), 1599 ('Quarta editio, multo quam antehac emendatior' = 'fourth edition, much more corrected than before'), which matches the colophon on PDF 857. The leaf also bears the printer's fleur-de-lys device flanked by two putti, and later ownership marks of the Jesuit College of Alcala / Biblioteca Complutense (dated 1705). PDF 7 is the blank verso of this title leaf (only faint bleed-through of the title shows). PDF 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are scan artifacts (Google-Books cover; the vellum binding; a library ownership stamp; a flyleaf marked 'Revisado 1968'; and a blank) and are not part of the book.

— p. 8 (PDF) —

TO HENRY CAETANI, CARDINAL OF THE HOLY ROMAN CHURCH AND MOST EMINENT CHAMBERLAIN, BENEDICT PERERIUS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS SENDS GREETING.

The dedicatory epistle. The dedicatee is Enrico Caetani (Henry Caetani, 1550-1599), Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church and Camerlengo (Chamberlain, 'Camerarius'). Abbreviations: 'S. R. E.' = Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae ('of the Holy Roman Church'); 'S. D.' = Salutem Dicit ('sends greeting').

As I often ponder and wonder, most eminent Cardinal Henry Caetani, what the reason may be why the doctrine of Sacred Letters has today so few lovers and followers -- though it is in the highest degree lovable and most to be sought after by Christian men -- various answers are wont to occur to me; but one above the rest, by which most people (not sufficiently prudent appraisers of things) seem to be kept away from this noble and divine study. For there are many who, by a great error of judgment -- reckoning that the study of this discipline will be for them either inglorious, or unfruitful, or even devoid of human pleasure and delight -- flee from it, since they are confident they will carry off from it no reward for their labor, or a very small one.

Opening of the dedication (the ornamental initial is 'Q'): Pererius laments that few pursue the study of Scripture, deterred by the false notion that it brings neither glory, profit, nor pleasure. Continues on the next page (catchword 'fidunt').

— p. 9 (PDF) —

are confident. For of all studies there are, as it were, three enticements: Honor, Profit, and Pleasure; by these indeed we are drawn to take up the good arts and disciplines. And where none of these is present and apparent, thither no one, or very few, apply mind and effort; but where these are seen to be great and of remarkable appearance, thither very many are borne with the most ardent zeal and the keenest exertion of body and mind. Doubtless the arts that are adorned and commended by these as by endowments are sought after and cultivated by very many; those that lack them are, as undowered and unadorned, abandoned and despised. But honor and profit are sharper and stronger to attract men's minds than pleasure, if it be dissociated and separated from them. For how few would you find who, having set aside more profitable and more honorable studies, captivated by the sweetness of knowing and contemplating truth alone, would be willing to wear away his whole age and consume his life in that study? You see, I think, most illustrious Henry, whence so pernicious and so widespread an error, among those who neglect Sacred studies, has raised its head. To

refute this error by arguments is very easy for anyone not unlearned; but to pluck it out utterly from men's minds, and to lead them over to the love and cultivation of the heavenly writers, is a work not so much of my ability, or of any theologian's, as of the wisdom, kindness, and munificence of the great princes of the Church. For the rest are moved and governed not so much by the authority and command of those who are eminent in the commonwealth, as much more by their example and beneficence: they regard the judgments and sentiments of those men, and the inclinations of their wills toward this or that -- what they most praise and love, what

Pererius names the three 'enticements' of study -- Honor, Profit, Pleasure -- and argues that Scripture-study is neglected because it seems to offer none. To reverse this needs not argument but the patronage and example of the Church's great princes, whom others imitate. Continues on the next page (catchword 'quid').

— p. 10 (PDF) —

they hold in esteem and honor, what in delights and pleasures; and whither those men incline, thither the rest lean; finally, they strive to direct and accommodate all their counsels and pursuits to the esteem and will of those men. How great, then, do we think would be, at all times, the yield of men zealous for and learned in divine Scripture, if in those on whose favor and beneficence the rest depend, and through whom they hope their own wishes can be fulfilled, there stood out some singular zeal and regard for this heavenly doctrine, and an especial goodwill and liberality toward those who occupy themselves in handling it excellently and illustrating it by their writings, to their own praise and the benefit of many? Wherefore I the more admire, most distinguished Caetani, the excellence of your talent, and the remarkable goodness of a nature most inclined to all that is best. For when, scarcely past your youth, by the will of your elders and at the same time by the example of the most noble men who, resting on the knowledge of the Civil law alone, attained great honors and did great things in this city, you had given yourself wholly to the mastering of the discipline of law, you chose to devote to it so much study and effort, and made such progress, as

could be of help and ornament to a man of the first nobility, destined to handle gloriously the most splendid offices of the Christian commonwealth. And this was the reason why, since you were bending your whole heart first to learning jurisprudence, and afterward to exercising it in the greatest affairs and in the discharge of public offices, it was not permitted you to take up the doctrine of Theology or of Sacred Letters. But with what desire and ardor of mind [you would have embraced] those stu-

Rulers set the fashion that others follow; so the Church's patronage would multiply Scripture-scholars. Pererius praises Caetani's early devotion to the Civil law (which left him no leisure for theology), undertaken by the will of his elders and the example of nobles who rose through legal learning. Continues on the next page (catchword 'dia').

— p. 11 (PDF) —

those studies (had your private or public affairs so allowed), there is that one argument, neither slight nor obscure: that you cherish and love exceedingly the men famous and excellent in these letters, and are wont to praise the brilliant works of their genius with generous speech, and to count them, as the choicer part of your furnishings, among the things dearest and most precious to you. Nay, me too -- in whom you discerned not indeed an express image of this discipline, but yet some shadow and semblance of it -- you have deemed worthy of such goodwill and favor that you let no occasion of deserving well of me slip by. Since therefore at this time I was about to publish the first part of my Commentaries on the book of Moses which is entitled Genesis, I did not have to hesitate long in doubtful deliberation to which prince above all this gift, such as it is, should be offered: for it was owed to you by your own merit. To you, namely, to whom I owe the most, both in my own name and in that of our Society, which you have embraced with such zeal that you seem to love it not only, as many do, by the judgment and prompting of the mind, but even by a certain natural propensity and impulse. There will survive (I truly believe) many illustrious and lasting monuments of your name and your deeds. For the felicity of your fortune will be celebrated in the speech of many -- that

you were born of an illustrious family, most renowned by the splendor of a supreme Pontificate, of eight Cardinals, and of four Patriarchs, and flourishing in many kinships and friendships of the first nobility and power; and that, in the very flower of your age, you were co-opted by a most wise Pontiff into the supreme senate of the Church, to the immense joy of men; and soon after [were adorned]

A further proof of Caetani's love of learning is his esteem for scholars -- and his kindness to Pererius himself. Hence Pererius dedicates this first volume of his Genesis commentary to him as most deserving, and as a patron of the Society of Jesus. He recounts Caetani's illustrious house (a Pope, eight Cardinals, four Patriarchs) and his early elevation to the College of Cardinals. Continues on the next page (catchword 'tum').

— p. 12 (PDF) —

with the most noble legation of Bologna; and in a short time increased with so many honors and benefices, one upon another, that you could scarcely have expected more even from your uncle Cardinal Nicholas, had he been at that height. This too will be proclaimed, to the immense glory of your virtue: that you administered the legation of Bologna with so excellent a tempering of severity and affability, of graciousness and justice, that it is uncertain whether you brought more joy to the most prudent Pontiff -- who won great praise for judgment and prudence in choosing you for that office -- or more glory to yourself, who held a province slippery toward luxury and pleasure with a celebrated reputation for continence and integrity; or, finally, more joy and admiration to the people of Bologna, rejoicing in their own good and at the same time marveling that you so maintained the gravity of supreme power as to escape all envy and arrogance: nor did (what belongs to rare prudence and virtue) either your affability diminish your authority, or your severity your being loved; and though you did nothing for the sake of favor, yet all that you did was pleasing. Whence it came about that Sixtus V, Supreme Pontiff -- a most keen searcher-out and appraiser of the excellent arts and virtues of men -- did not suffer so great a virtue of your soul (daily, that is, growing more distinguished in the

conduct of public affairs, and equal to any office and dignity however great) to be long confined by the boundaries of Bologna: but, recalling you to Rome (to the grief of the Bolognese no less than the congratulation of the City), imposed on you the most weighty office of the Chamberlainship, requiring, together with the highest authority and power in the Roman curia, a singular innocence and moderation of mind and prudence; and one scarcely [to be entrusted] except to a Prince, or by reason of [kinship]

Caetani's cursus honorum: the legation of Bologna (governed with a praised balance of severity and mildness), rapid promotions rivaling his uncle Cardinal Nicholas Caetani, and his recall to Rome by Pope Sixtus V to the great office of Camerlengo (Chamberlain of the Holy Roman Church). Continues on the next page (catchword 'pro').

— p. 13 (PDF) —

usually entrusted to those most closely joined by kinship, or at least by goodwill and fidelity. But that magnificent and costly piety of yours toward the most holy churches -- now disfigured by age and nearly collapsed -- shown not to court fame and glory, but to preserve the ancient religion of sacred places by splendidly restoring and setting them in order, will at no time lack the praises men owe it. Of these (as I have said) and your other titles to praise, many in this age will speak and write, nor, while your fame survives and is bright for every age, will posterity be silent. For me -- no eloquent panegyrist, and scarcely curious about matters other than my own studies -- it will be enough, by dedicating these lucubrations to your most ample name, to make known to all how much you are wont to impart to us and to our studies (that is, to Sacred Letters) of goodwill, favor, and dignity; and in turn, how much of love, reverence, and veneration we feel we owe to you, and gladly proclaim. THE AUTHOR.

Praise of Caetani's costly restoration of ancient churches; the dedication closes with Pererius professing the reverence he and the cause of Sacred Letters owe their patron. Signed 'AVCTOR' (The Author). End of the dedicatory epistle.

— p. 14 (PDF) —

THE AUTHOR OF THE WORK TO THE READER.

The author's preface to the reader, following the dedication.

We have judged that our Commentaries on the book of Moses which is entitled Genesis can conveniently be divided into two parts: of which this former part, which now comes into the light, contains the history of Moses from the beginning of the world up to the Noachic flood, explained in seven books. The latter part of the Commentaries -- which we are at this time working on, and which, already for the most part completed, we shall soon bring before the public (if God aids our undertaking and our efforts) -- will comprise the remaining history woven by Moses from the flood to the end of that book. But if anything, in these Commentaries or in my other writings, whether already published or hereafter (God favoring) to be published, shall seem, to those who can judge the doctrine of Sacred Letters knowledgeably, prudently, and sincerely, to deserve a clearer explanation, or even correction, I for my part profess myself most ready to interpret it more distinctly, or in any way to change and correct it, whatever it may be, and as the need shall require. And if it should not fall to me to do this while I live, I earnestly desire and ask that it be done after my death by those whose office and care it shall be. For I am fully persuaded, and it is deeply fixed in my mind and senses, that all fame of talent and judgment, and all praise of erudition and eloquence, must be set after not only truth, but also piety and the spiritual edification of the good. For if blessed Paul said, with so great an asseveration, that which is in the eighth chapter of the former Epistle which he wrote to the Corinthians -- 'If food scandalizes my brother, I will never eat flesh, lest I scandalize my brother' -- although to eat flesh was neither in itself anything but good and lawful, nor could anyone justly be offended by it: how much more must it be brought about by a Catholic and religious writer, with the utmost caution and every foresight of mind, that he put forth in his writings nothing that may incur the just offense and reproof of those who think and judge rightly; and if perchance anything shall have given offense, whether through imprudence

or through the weakness of the human mind, that, as soon as he has noticed it -- either by himself or at the warning of others -- he correct it promptly and gladly.

Pererius's preface. He announces the two-part plan of the whole work: this first volume (seven books) covers the history from the creation to the Noachic flood (Genesis 1-5); a second part, nearly finished, will cover the rest of Genesis (the flood to the end of the book). He then professes his readiness to be corrected in anything found wanting, ranking all fame of learning below truth, piety, and the edification of the faithful -- citing St. Paul's resolve (1 Corinthians 8:13) never to eat meat rather than scandalize a brother.

— p. 15 (PDF) —

TABLE OF THE BOOKS OF THIS WORK.

The overview table of contents: the titles of the seven books composing this first volume. A detailed, question-by-question index of each book follows (PDF 16-41).

THE FIRST BOOK: On the Works of the Six Days, apart from man. THE SECOND: On the Heavens and the stars, and on Astrological Divination. THE THIRD: On the terrestrial Paradise. THE FOURTH: On the Creation of the first human beings. THE FIFTH: On the happy state of the first human beings before sin, or on the state of Innocence. THE SIXTH: On the temptation and the punishment of the first human beings. THE SEVENTH: On Cain and Abel, and the fixed line of Adam's descent down to the flood.

The titles of the seven books of this volume, corresponding exactly to the seven 'IN GENESIM, LIB. I-VII' running-heads of the commentary. Together they cover Genesis chapters 1-5 (creation through the antediluvian patriarchs).

— p. 16 (PDF) —

INDEX OF THE DISPUTATIONS AND QUESTIONS EXPLAINED IN THE SEVERAL BOOKS OF THESE COMMENTARIES. [Rebuilt as a functional index for this edition: the page numbers below point to the PDF pages of our edition. The original printed 'folio' number is given first, then our page: PDF page = original folio + 41. A few folio

numbers were misprinted in the original (e.g. entry 84 printed '185' for 155) or omitted; these are corrected here from the surrounding sequence and from our own verified page-headings.]

The detailed, question-by-question index of the seven books (original PDF 16-41), here rebuilt so that its references work within THIS edition. Mapping: our PDF page = original folio + 41 (verified throughout, e.g. 'Work of the First Day' = fol. 68 = p. 109; 'Why Moses did not expound the creation of the Angels' = fol. 194 = p. 235). Section letters (a/b/c/d) in the original refer to quarters of a printed page and are omitted here; the PDF page is the navigation unit.

IN THE FIRST BOOK, which is on the works of the six days. (General questions.)

Book 1 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. I' in the commentary (our p. 42 onward). The book opens with 28 general questions, then proceeds day by day.

1. On the dignity, usefulness, and antiquity of the teaching of Moses, and on the creation of the World. (p. 43-44) · 2. Why Moses handed down the doctrine of the creation of the World not by arguing but by simply narrating. (p. 43) · 3. On the antiquity of Moses and his pre-eminence in every kind of learning. (p. 47, 51) · 4. Whether the Sacred books were all burned by the Chaldeans, and marvelously restored by Ezra. (p. 50-51) · 5. Whether we now have the five books of Moses exactly such as they were written by him. (p. 54) · 6. Whence Moses received the doctrine of the generation of the World. (p. 57) · 7. At what time this book of Genesis was written by Moses. (p. 57-58) · 8. On four rules very useful for the right interpretation of this teaching of Moses. (p. 63) · 9. Whether Moses's account of the creation of the World is historical, and to be taken as the words sound. (p. 62, 64) · 10. Whether, in explaining this doctrine, one must have recourse to miracles and to the absolute power of God. (p. 65) · 11. That nothing is handed down, either by Moses here or in the other books of divine Scripture, that contradicts the true reasonings and experiments of the Philosophers. (p. 66) · 12. Whether, in treating this Mosaic doctrine, account should be taken of what the sages of the Gentiles

likewise handed down. (p. 67) · 13. Disputation: whether the World was eternal. (p. 69) · 14. Disputation against the Egyptians and Chaldeans on the antiquity of the World. (p. 72-75) · 15. Whence arises the variety and difficulty in reckoning the years from the beginning of the World to the coming of our Lord. (p. 77) · 16. That in God there is the power of creating from nothing, contrary to what the ancient Philosophers thought. (p. 78) · 17. Disputation: why Moses joined the plural noun Elohim with the singular verb Bara, and whether he meant thereby to hint at the mystery of the Holy Trinity. (p. 81) · 18. Whether by 'Heaven and Earth' one should understand the Angels and prime matter, as Augustine holds. (p. 85) · 19. Disputation against Steuco of Gubbio concerning a certain light which he thinks is called by the name of the empyrean Heaven. (p. 86) · 20. Disputation on the empyrean Heaven -- what it is, why it was made, and whether it was signified by Moses under the name of Heaven. (p. 88, 92) · 21. What is to be understood by the word 'earth.' (p. 91, 94) · 22. Whether Moses indicated the creation of all four elements. (p. 95) · 23. That the chief of what the Philosophers and Mathematicians have truly handed down about the Earth is taught in Sacred Letters. (p. 96-97) · 24. Whether, according to divine Scripture, the Earth is founded upon the waters. (p. 98) · 25. Whether it is against Scripture that the circuit of the Earth has been ascertained and known to men. (p. 99) · 26. Disputation on the abyss, and on those first shadows of the world, with Basil and Theodoret. (p. 101-102) · 27. Who was that Spirit of the Lord that was borne over the waters. (p. 104) · 28. Whether what Moses hands down about the earth void and empty, about darkness and the abyss and the Spirit of God, was known to the sages of the Gentiles. (p. 107-108)

Book 1, general questions 1-28. Page references are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 17 (PDF) —

IN THE FIRST BOOK (continued): On the work of the first, second, and third days.

Continuation of the Book 1 index, questions 29-63, grouped by the works of the first three days.

On the work of the first day. 29. On the excellence of light. (p. 109) · 30. Whether that first light is to be understood as bodily or spiritual. (p. 111) · 31. Whether that light was the element of fire, as Damascene signifies. (p. 114) · 32. Whether it was the perfected light of the Sun, as Catharinus thought. (p. 115) · 33. Whether it was some luminous cloud, as most theologians held. (p. 116-117) · 34. Whether it was light itself existing of itself without matter or subject, as Basil seems to signify. (p. 117) · 35. Whether it was the light of the sun, but imperfect, afterward completed and perfected on the fourth day. (folio omitted in the original; ~p. 120) · 36. Whether in the first three days that light made the alternation of day and night by the extension and retraction of its rays, as Basil signifies. (p. 122) · 37. In what place of the heaven that light was created. (p. 123) · 38. How long the world was dark before light was created. (p. 124-125) · 39. Why Moses said that there was made 'evening and morning, one day,' and not 'the first day.' (p. 128-129) · 40. Why Moses named evening before morning. (p. 126) · 41. That the first day of the world was the one afterward called the Lord's Day, ennobled with many notable prerogatives. (p. 129) · The work of the second day. 42. What is to be understood by the word 'Firmament' -- whether a heaven compacted of water (as Josephus, Theodoret, Bede and others held) or of air (as Basil thought), or something else. (p. 130 ff.) · 43. Whether the waters placed above the heavens are to be understood spiritually or bodily -- a disputation with Origen. (p. 139) · 44. Whether above the starry heavens there are true and natural waters, as many Fathers held. (p. 139 ff.) · 45. Whether the stars need any cooling or nourishment, for the tempering of their heat or for food. (p. 143-144) · 46. Whether by the supercelestial waters the Crystalline heaven should be understood. (p. 144 ff.) · 47. Whether by the celestial waters one should understand none other than the waters of rain, generated in the air. (p. 146) · On the work of the third day. 48. How all the water, which first covered the whole earth, could on the third day be gathered into one place and part

of the earth. (p. 151) · 49. Whether the distinction of mountains and valleys existed in the earth before the flood. (p. 153) · 50. Whether the sea is higher than the land. (p. 154) · 51. Whether water forms a globe distinct from the globe of the earth -- a disputation against Paul of Burgos. (p. 157) · 52. Whether the Red Sea is higher than the land of Egypt. (p. 155) · 53. Whether the Caspian Sea is connected with the northern Ocean. (p. 160) · 54. Whether the northern land was first uncovered of the waters as being higher, and the southern land later as being lower and more depressed. (p. 161) · 55. Whether on the third day the plants were actually produced, or only causally and potentially, as Augustine holds. (p. 163) · 56. Whether the earth concurred in the first generation of plants only passively, or also efficiently. (p. 164) · 57. Whether at the beginning of the World the rose was produced without thorns, as Basil signifies. (p. 165) · 58. Why many things were created by God not only useless to man, but even harmful. (p. 165 ff.) · 59. Why Moses did not expound the generation of the metals. (p. 166) · 60. Why God did not likewise bless the plants, as he blessed the animals. (p. 167) · [At what time of year the World was founded by God.] 61. The opinion of Gerard Mercator, thinking the World was created in the month of July, is examined. (p. 168) · 62. Whether the World was founded in springtime. (p. 168 ff.) · 63. Whether the World was founded in the season of Autumn. (p. 171 ff.)

Book 1, questions 29-63 (works of days 1-3, and the season of creation). Entry 35's folio was omitted in the original index; its page is estimated from the sequence (34 = p. 117, 36 = p. 122). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 18 (PDF) —

IN THE FIRST BOOK (continued): On the work of the fourth, fifth, and sixth days.

Conclusion of the Book 1 index, questions 64-108, grouped by the works of the last three days.

On the work of the fourth day. 64. Whether truly on the fourth day the stars were first created, and how they were made in the Heaven. (p. 178) · 65.

Why God willed to create the stars after the plants. (p. 178-179) · 66. Why they were created before the generation of animals. (p. 179) · 67. On what day of March the Sun was created. (p. 181) · 68. Whether the Moon was created at the new moon or at the full moon. (p. 181) · 69. How great is the magnitude of the Sun. (p. 182) · 70. Whether all the stars borrow their light from the sun. (p. 182) · 71. Why the Moon is called a great luminary, although (Mercury alone excepted) it is the smallest of all the heavenly bodies. (p. 183 ff.) · 72. Why Moses made no mention of the other five planets. (p. 184) · On the work of the fifth day. 73. Whether fish lack memory, as Basil signifies. (p. 185) · 74. Whether the generation of water-creatures is more numerous and more manifold than that of land-creatures. (p. 187) · 75. Why fish are called 'creeping things.' (p. 187) · 76. What kind of fish is that here called 'Cete' (the sea-monsters/whales). (p. 187) · 77. On the enormous size of fishes. (p. 188) · 78. What it means that God blessed the fishes. (p. 189) · 79. Whether fishes were created from water only passively, or also actively. (p. 189) · 80. Disputation: whether at the beginning of the world the birds were created by God from water, like the fishes. (p. 190) · 81. On the manifold likeness and kinship of nature between fishes and birds. (p. 192) · 82. Whether birds that reproduce the human voice and speech should on that account be reckoned to surpass all land animals in dignity of nature. (p. 193) · On the work of the sixth day. 83. Why God did not bless the land animals, as he did the water animals. (p. 195) · 84. What the Philosophers thought about the first generation of animals. (p. 196; the original misprints the folio as '185' for 155) · 85. Whether in the first generation of animals there were made the animals that arise from putrid matter. (p. 196) · 86. How the world is truly called a 'Universe' and 'perfect.' (p. 197) · 87. Disputation: whether the generation of animals from the union and mixture of animals of different species is against nature, and whether it existed at the beginning of the World, as Rupert holds. (p. 197-198) · 88. Why the land animals and man were created on the same day. (p. 199 ff.) · 89. Whether in the element of Fire any kind of animal is generated and lives. (p. 199) · 90. On the excellence

of things insofar as they make up the Universe. (p. 200) · 91. On the five ways in which all things can be understood to be 'in the World.' (p. 206) · 92. From what things the excellence of the governance by which God rules the World may be clearly known. (p. 207) · 93. On the threefold kind of evils that are in the World, and that contribute to its perfection. (p. 209) · 94. On the twofold end for which the World was created. (p. 210) · 95. On the three things to be considered in the structure of the World. (p. 211) · 96. Whether the World could have been made better than it is. (p. 212) · 97. That man is the greatest part of the perfection of the Universe. (p. 213) · 98. What it means in Scripture that God 'rests.' (p. 215) · 99. How God rested from working on the seventh day, since he always works in the World. (p. 215) · 100. On the dignity of the seventh day. (p. 218, 221) · 101. Whether the observance of the seventh day was enjoined on man from the beginning of the World. (p. 219) · 102. What was that spring which, as Moses narrates, at the beginning of the World rose from the earth and watered the whole of it. (p. 222) · 103. Whether the whole World was created together in an instant, or successively through the intervals of six days. (p. 225) · 104. Why God did not create the whole World at once, and why in neither more nor fewer days than six. (p. 232) · 105. Whether the World, as it was created in six days, is likewise to last only six thousand years, as many have thought. (p. 232) · 106. Why Moses did not expound the creation of the Angels. (p. 235) · 107. Whether the Angels were created long before the bodily world. (p. 237) · 108. Whether it is not only true, but also to be held as a certain dogma of the Catholic faith, that the Angels were created together with the bodily world. (p. 238 ff.)

Book 1, questions 64-108 (works of days 4-6), concluding the first book's index. Cross-checks confirm the mapping: e.g. q. 106 'Why Moses did not expound the creation of the Angels' = fol. 194 = p. 235, matching our disputation heading there. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 19 (PDF) —

IN THE SECOND BOOK, which is on the Heavens and the Stars, and on Astrological Divination. (On the Heavens and the Stars.)

Book 2 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. II' in the commentary. This first part (questions 1-28) treats the heavens and stars; the second part (29-73) is the great disputation against astrological divination. References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

1. Why the sacred Writers said little about the Heavens and the stars. (p. 241) · 2. What the Philosophers and Theologians of the Gentiles thought about the nature of the Heavens. (p. 243-244) · 3. Whether, according to Scripture, the Heaven is corruptible. (p. 244) · 4. Whether the Heaven is to be destroyed, according to the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians. (p. 244-245) · 5. Whether all the elements will perish at the consummation of the age. (p. 246) · 6. Whether this World is to be destroyed wholly and in its substance. (p. 248) · 7. Whether the Heaven is intrinsically corruptible or incorruptible. (p. 249) · 8. How the Heavens and the World are to be changed and renewed after the day of Judgment. (p. 250) · 9. Whether after the day of Judgment there will be composite bodies in the world, such as plants and animals. (p. 251) · 10. Whether after the day of Judgment the World, lacking composite bodies, will be perfect and can be called a 'Universe.' (p. 251) · 11. Whether, according to Scripture, the Heaven is round. (p. 253) · 12. How many Heavens there are according to divine Scripture. (p. 255) · 13. Whether the Heavens, according to Philosophy and Scripture, are moved by themselves or by the Angels. (p. 257 ff.) · 14. Whether the motion of the Heaven will cease after the day of Judgment. (p. 259-260) · 15. Whether the Heaven has an intrinsic and natural propensity to circular motion, such that without it it would be imperfect. (p. 261) · 16. Whether the proper motions of all the Heavens are to be completed before the day of Judgment. (p. 262) · 17. Whether the Heavens and stars are animate according to the Philosophers. (p. 262) · 18. Whether the Heavens are animate according to the Fathers and theologians. (p. 262-263) · 19. Whether, according to Theological and Philosophical doctrine, the Heavens should be judged animate. (p. 263) · 20. Whether, if the Heavens were animate, they ought to be worshipped by men. (p. 265) · 21. Whether according to Aristotle the Heavens are truly animate. (p. 266) · 22. Whether the stars of the eighth Heaven are innumerable, and whether on this the

Mathematicians disagree with Scripture and the Fathers. (p. 268) · 23. Whether according to Jerome the Sun is animate. (p. 269-270) · 24. Whether, according to Scripture, the stars are immobile, or are moved through the Heaven as fish through water and birds through the air. (p. 271) · 25. Whether the opinion of those who make the Heaven immobile and the stars moved through it should be approved, or can even be defended. (p. 273) · 26. Whether the stars are of a fiery nature and truly hot, according to Sacred Letters and the Fathers and Philosophers. (p. 274) · 27. Whether the stars need any cooling or nourishment, as many have said. (p. 275-276) · 28. How the Sun heats, since it is not properly hot, and whether it heats by motion or only by the reflection of its rays. (p. 277)

Book 2, questions 1-28 (on the heavens and stars). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 20 (PDF) —

IN THE SECOND BOOK (continued): In the Disputation on Astrological Divination.

The disputation against judicial astrology (Book 2, questions 29-73). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

29. What it was that God said of the lights of heaven, 'And let them be for signs,' etc. (p. 278) · 30. That Astrological divination is condemned in divine Scripture, and by the Church, and by theological reasons. (p. 280-281) · 31. On the vanity of the oracles of Apollo. (~p. 281; the original misprints the folio as '164') · 32. From what causes it happens that the demon, in foretelling the future, is often deceived. (p. 281-282) · 33. That the truth and firmness of the Christian religion cannot stand and cohere with the truth of judicial Astrology. (p. 282) · 34. That in [several] ways the observation of the stars is liable to sin. (p. 284) · 35. How severely these judicial Astrologers were once dealt with in the Church. (p. 280, 284) · 36. On the false and impious sayings and opinions of the Astrologers. (p. 286) · 37. That judicial Astrologers are ignorant of the heavenly things. (p. 287) · 38. Disputation against the antiquity of the observations of these

Astrologers. (p. 288) · 39. On the new star that was seen in recent years. (p. 290) · 40. How difficult it is to note exactly the aspect of the heavenly bodies at each man's birth. (p. 290-291) · 41. It is proved by eight arguments that the Astrologers cannot, by their art and science, foreknow and foretell future contingents. (p. 292) · 42. That, besides the celestial causes, knowledge of the particular causes is necessary for foreknowing their effects. (p. 292 ff.) · 43. On the similar birth, and dissimilar fortunes, of twins. (p. 293) · 44. The most beautiful disputation of Bardesanes against the Astrologers. (p. 295) · 45. Whether it is easier to divine what a good man will do, or a wicked man. (p. 298) · 46. How vain and futile is the Astrologers' prediction about someone, that he will be supreme Pontiff. (p. 299; the original misprints the folio as '558') · 47. That there can be no science or art of this Astrology. (p. 300) · 48. The vanity and falsity of many Astrological predictions. (p. 301) · 49. The errors of the Astrologers in Chronology. (p. 301-302) · 50. That judicial Astrology has in every age been despised and condemned by prudent and wise men. (p. 303-304) · 51. To what kind of men the Astrological predictions are pleasing, which St. Ambrose compares to spiders' webs. (p. 306) · 52. Disputation against the three foundations of judicial Astrology. (p. 306) · 53. Disputation on the 'influences' -- whether they are to be admitted. (p. 307) · 54. Whether there is more weight, for divining, in the conception or in the birth of a man. (p. 309)

Book 2, questions 29-54 (the astrological-divination disputation, first part). References are to this edition (original folio + 41). Two folio misprints in the original are corrected here (entry 31 '164', entry 46 '558').

— p. 21 (PDF) —

IN THE SECOND BOOK (continued): On Astrological Divination (second part).

Conclusion of the astrology disputation (Book 2, questions 55-73). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

55. Whether the natal stars of each man can be the certain causes of all that is to befall that man. (p. 308-309) · 56. On the vanity of the Astrologers, extending their divination even to cities, not only to individual men. (p. 310) · 57. Why the Astrologers do not, as about men, so also prophesy from the observation of the stars about plants and other living things. (p. 310) · 58. On the antiquity of this Astrology among the Egyptians and Chaldeans. (p. 311) · 59. Whether the stars, if they are not causes, are at least certain signs of all future things. (~p. 312) · 60. Whether according to Augustine the stars are signs of all human affairs. (p. 313) · 61. On the nature and variety of signs. (p. 313 ff.) · 62. Whether comets are signs of human affairs. (p. 315) · 63. Whether those who make the stars signs of future things thereby necessarily also introduce and establish Fate. (p. 315) · 64. On the ancient manner of writing among the Hebrews. (p. 316) · 65. On the four causes for which it sometimes happens that Astrologers predict truly. (p. 317) · 66. That men are sometimes moved by the instinct of demons to divine. (p. 317-318) · 67. In how many ways the demon is wont to foreshow the future. (p. 318) · 68. In how many ways, and how gravely, they sin who use the services of demons or of these Astrologers to divine. (p. 319) · 69. That Astrologers of this sort are generally wicked and depraved. (p. 319) · 70. On the use of lots among the ancients to divine the future. (p. 319-320) · 71. That, by God's permission, those too eager to know the future are ensnared in the toils of demons, and entangled in various and pernicious errors. (p. 320) · 72. That many divine the future more from prudence and experience of human affairs than from the astrological art. (p. 321) · 73. That the excessive credulity and fickleness of those who consult Astrologers sometimes brings it about that their predictions come true. (p. 321)

Book 2, questions 55-73, concluding the second book's index (the astrology disputation). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 22 (PDF) —

IN THE THIRD BOOK, which is on Paradise. (On the place of Paradise; On the tree of life.)

Book 3 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. III' in the commentary. Questions 1-23 treat the terrestrial Paradise and its location; 24-38 the tree of life. References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

1. How perplexed and difficult to explain is the teaching of Moses about Paradise. (p. 322) · 2. On the word 'Paradise,' and its twofold meaning in Sacred Letters. (p. 324-325) · 3. On the word 'Eden' -- whether it is a proper name of a place, and of which. (p. 326) · 4. Whether Paradise was planted in the East. (p. 328) · 5. On the ancient custom of praying with the face turned to the East. (p. 329) · 6. What region is called 'Eastern' in the Scriptures. (p. 329) · 7. Whether that Paradise was some bodily and earthly place. (p. 330) · 8. Whether at the beginning of the World the whole globe of the earth was called Paradise. (p. 332) · 9. What that terrestrial Paradise was like, according to Basil, Ephraem, Isidore, Damascene, Rupert. (p. 333) · 10. Whether that Paradise was beyond the Ocean. (p. 336) · 11. Whether Paradise was of such height as to reach up to the orb of the Moon, or to the highest region of the air. (p. 337) · 12. On the height of the mountains Olympus, Athos, and Atlas. (p. 337) · 13. Whether the waters of the flood reached Paradise. (p. 338) · 14. Whether Paradise was under the equator. (p. 339) · 15. On the size and extent of Paradise. (p. 340) · 16. Whether in the state of innocence men would have dwelt outside Paradise. (p. 340) · 17. Whether Paradise was founded in vain, since it was of almost no use to man. (p. 341) · 18. Why the place of Paradise has at no time yet been found. (p. 342) · 19. Whether that Paradise still exists. (p. 343) · 20. Whether Enoch and Elijah are in that paradise. (p. 345-346) · 21. On the incredible pleasantness of that paradise. (p. 349-350) · 22. Whether within paradise there were unfruitful trees. (p. 350) · 23. Whether there were animals in it. (p. 351) · [On the tree of life.] 24. Why in Hebrew it is called the 'tree of lives.' (p. 352) · 25. How it was in the midst of Paradise. (p. 353) · 26. Whether the tree of life was a natural and earthly tree. (p. 354) · 27.

Whether the tree of life was of the same species as, and similar to, some of our trees. (p. 356-357) · 28. Whether there was only one in Paradise, or many. (p. 357) · 29. Why it was called the tree of life. (p. 357) · 30. Whether that tree had the power of making man immortal, or only of prolonging life for a very long time. (p. 359) · 31. On the causes of the dissolution and death of living things. (p. 360) · 32. How God, in the state of innocence, would have preserved man from death. (p. 360) · 33. How long men would have lived on earth in the state of innocence. (p. 362) · 34. Whether that power of the tree of life was natural or supernatural. (p. 362) · 35. On the three kinds of trees that were in Paradise, from St. Bonaventure. (p. 363) · 36. Whether the sages of the Gentiles had any knowledge of that tree of life. (p. 365) · 37. Whether Aristotle's argument in the third book of the Metaphysics against the nectar and ambrosia of the gods holds equally against the tree of life. (p. 366) · 38. Whether Adam, while he was in Paradise, ate the fruit of the tree of life. (p. 366)

Book 3, questions 1-38 (the place of Paradise; the tree of life). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 23 (PDF) —

IN THE THIRD BOOK (continued): On the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; On the rivers of Paradise.

Conclusion of Book 3 (questions 39-58): the tree of knowledge, and the four rivers of Paradise. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

On the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 39. Whether it was a bodily tree, and whether there was only one in number. (p. 366-367) · 40. Whether that tree was a fig, as it seemed to many. (p. 367-368) · 41. Whether it was an apple tree. (p. 368) · 42. Whether it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from the effect of knowledge and prudence which it afforded to the one eating. (p. 368-369) · 43. Whether it was so named from the outcome, as the common opinion of the doctors holds. (p. 369-370) · 44. Whether it received that name from the lie and deceit of the serpent. (p.

371) · On the rivers of Paradise. 45. What was that river watering Paradise, and how it watered it. (p. 372) · 46. Where that river was divided into four other rivers. (p. 373) · 47. Whether all waters receive from that river of Paradise the sweetness by which they are drinkable for man, as Rupert handed down. (p. 373-374) · 48. Whether that river called Phison is the Ganges. (p. 374-376) · 49. On the origin and course of the Ganges. (p. 375) · 50. What was that river Phison. (p. 377) · 51. What is the land of Havilah. (p. 377) · 52. What region is Ophir. (p. 378-379) · 53. On Bdellium, the Onyx, the Carbuncle, the Prasine; on Bedolach and Soham. (p. 380-381) · 54. Whether the river Gehon is the Nile, as most are persuaded. (p. 380-381) · 55. On the twofold Ethiopia, Eastern and Western. (p. 381) · 56. Whether the Gehon washed Judaea, as some held. (p. 382) · 57. On the name, origin, course, and outlet of the Tigris and Euphrates. (p. 383-384) · 58. Whether the source and origin of both rivers is the same. (p. 384-386)

Book 3, questions 39-58, concluding the third book's index (tree of knowledge; the four rivers). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 24 (PDF) —

IN THE FOURTH BOOK, which is on the creation of the first human beings.

Book 4 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IV' in the commentary. It opens with questions on the prerogatives and creation of the first man (1-13), then two disputations: on the image of God (14-25) and on man's dominion over the animals (26-34). References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

1. On the ten remarkable prerogatives of the first man. (p. 388) · 2. What were the most beautiful garments of the first man, with which he was adorned by God, according to Bernard. (p. 391) · 3. Why God is introduced as though deliberating at the creation of the first man. (p. 396) · 4. Disputation against the Jews: that in those words, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' the mystery of the Holy Trinity was indicated. (p. 397) · 5. That the phrase 'Let us make man' cannot be understood of God

speaking with the Angels. (p. 399) · 6. In what places Scripture has God, speaking of himself, use the plural number. (p. 401) · 7. On the etymology of the word 'man' according to the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin tongues. (p. 401) · 8. Whether, when it is said 'Let us make man,' by the word 'man' is to be understood the idea of man (as Philo held), or only the inner man (as Basil and Ambrose thought). (p. 403 ff.) · 9. Whether, when it is said 'to our image and likeness,' something different is signified by the word 'image' than by 'likeness.' (p. 405) · 10. Whether the 'image' pertains to man's natural gifts, and the 'likeness' to the supernatural. (p. 406) · 11. Whether by 'image' all men are signified, but by 'likeness' only the predestined are designated, as Rupert thinks. (p. 407 ff.) · 12. Whether the phrase 'to our image' denotes the Son of God -- either as he is the eternal Word of God, or as he was one day to assume human nature. (p. 410-411) · 13. Whether God, putting on the appearance and likeness of a man, uttered those words and created man, as Steuco of Gubbio and Oleaster thought. (p. 412-413)

Book 4, questions 1-13 (prerogatives of the first man; the 'Let us make man' passage). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

First Disputation: on the image of God to which man was created.

Book 4, first disputation (questions 14-25). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

14. In what thing chiefly the nature of the image of God in man consists. (p. 413) · 15. Why Epiphanius and Theodoret labored so greatly in expounding the nature of the image. (p. 414) · 16. In what things Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Augustine, Damascene, Bede, Origen, Faustinus, and the Master of the Sentences place the nature of the image. (p. 414-416) · 17. That the nature of the image is twofold -- one principal, the other less principal -- and that the principal consists in having an intelligent nature, of which nature there are six individual properties. (p. 417) · 18. Whether the image of God is more perfect in the World than in man. (p. 418) · 19. Whether an Angel was made more perfectly to the

image of God than man. (p. 419-420) · 20. Whether woman was made to the image of God. (p. 421) · 21. Whether the image of God is only in the soul of man, or also in the body. (p. 422) · 22. Whether some distinction should be drawn between being 'the image of God' and being 'to the image of God.' (p. 424-425) · 23. Whether the image of God was blotted out in man on account of sin. (p. 426) · 24. Whether in things lacking reason there is also an image of God, and what the distinction is between 'image' and 'vestige.' (p. 427) · 25. A moral digression, in which are set forth the seven causes why God willed to make man to his own image. (p. 428-429)

Book 4, first disputation (image of God), questions 14-25. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 25 (PDF) —

IN THE FOURTH BOOK (continued): Second Disputation (on dominion over the animals); Third Disputation (on the formation of the human body from the clay of the earth).

Book 4 continues (questions 26-46). The second disputation is on man's dominion over animals; the third, on the formation of the human body. References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

[Second Disputation: on the dominion God gave man over the animals.] 26. Why fish are mentioned by Moses in the first place as subjected to man's dominion. (p. 431-432) · 27. Whether God subjected the sea-monsters and whales to man's dominion -- disputed against Theodoret, who denies it. (p. 432) · 28. Whether it was fitting that animals be subjected to man's dominion. (p. 433-434) · 29. That the right of dominion over the animals remained with man even after sin. (p. 434) · 30. How the fierce and savage animals were, before sin, subject and obedient to man. (p. 435-436) · 31. How, after sin, man's dominion over the animals was diminished. (p. 437) · 32. Whether in the state of innocence some men would have ruled over others. (p. 438) · 33. On the dominion of the man over the woman in the state of innocence. (p. 439) · 34. A beautiful moral digression on man's

headship and dominion over the animals. (p. 440) · [Third Disputation: on the formation of the human body from the clay of the earth.] 35. Why God willed to repair the fall of the Angels through men created from the dust of the earth. (p. 444-445) · 36. Whether man's origin from the earth was known also to the sages of the Gentiles. (p. 445) · 37. How it is to be understood that man was formed from the earth, and whether in that formation anything of a heavenly nature was mixed in. (p. 445-446) · 38. Whether the human body is answerable and suited to the dignity of the rational soul. (p. 447) · 39. Why the human body was made [as it is]. (p. 448-449) · 40. Whether man surpasses all animals in the excellence of the interior and exterior senses. (p. 449) · 41. On the excellence of the body's temperament. (p. 449) · 42. That no one can justly complain on account of the nakedness and weakness of the body (a most beautiful saying of Seneca and Lactantius). (p. 451-452) · 43. Whether the Angels concurred in the procreation of man. (p. 453) · 44. Whether Adam was created perfect as to age and as to the size of his body. (p. 454) · 45. Whether Adam was a huge giant, as John Lucidus thought. (p. 456) · 46. Whether the body of man was formed earlier in time than the soul was infused into it. (p. 457-458)

Book 4, questions 26-46 (dominion over animals; formation of the body). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 26 (PDF) —

IN THE FOURTH BOOK (continued): Fourth Disputation (on the creation of the rational soul); On Adam placed in Paradise; Fifth Disputation (on the precept of not eating from the tree of knowledge).

Book 4 continues (questions 47-70): the creation and infusion of the rational soul; Adam's placement in Paradise; and the precept forbidding the tree of knowledge. References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

[Fourth Disputation: on the creation of the rational soul and its infusion into the body.] 47. Why the creation of the rational soul is intimated by the word 'in-breathing,' and why God is said to have breathed it into the face of

man. (p. 459-460) · 48. Why the soul is called the 'breath of life,' or (as in the Hebrew) the 'breath of lives.' (p. 461) · 49. How Cajetan proves from this passage that there is only one soul in man. (p. 462) · 50. Whether Adam's soul was created before his body. (p. 463) · 51. Why, since the rational soul exists after the body, it does not likewise exist before the body. (p. 466) · 52. Whether from this passage of Moses the immortality of our soul can be demonstrated. (p. 467) · 53. What argument seemed to the Platonists the strongest of all for proving the immortality of our soul. (p. 468) · 54. Whether the rational soul is immortal by its own nature, or only by God's will and grace. (p. 469) · 55. Whether from the teaching of Moses it can be gathered that the rational soul is the essential form of man, and one in each man. (p. 470) · 56. Whether, besides the rational soul, two other souls (sensitive and vegetative) are to be posited in man, and whether this is repugnant to Scripture or the doctrine of the Fathers. (p. 471) · [On Adam placed in Paradise.] 57. Why Adam was created not within Paradise, but outside it. (p. 473) · 58. Whether Eve was created in Paradise, and why. (p. 474) · 59. Whether man's work in Paradise would have been laborious, or superfluous. (p. 476) · 60. On the pleasure, usefulness, and antiquity of agriculture. (p. 477) · 61. In what way Paradise was to be kept by Adam. (p. 478; the original misprints the folio as '417') · [Fifth Disputation: on the precept forbidding to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, given to Adam.] 62. Whether a precept of eating from the other trees was given to Adam, as St. Thomas signifies. (p. 479-480) · 63. Whether in the state of innocence men would have hungered and thirsted. (p. 481) · 64. Whether that precept not to eat from the tree of knowledge was given to Adam alone, or also to Eve. (p. 482) · 65. Why God imposed on Adam that law of not eating from that tree. (p. 484-485) · 66. Whether the natural law alone would have sufficed to test Adam's obedience; and on the great good of the virtue of obedience. (p. 487) · 67. Whether that precept given to Adam was difficult or easy to observe, and whence the ease or difficulty of a law is known. (p. 488-489) · 68. Why God enjoined on Adam that precept which he knew he would not observe. (p. 490) · 69. Whether the reasoning

of God and of men is the same in prohibiting and impeding future evils. (p. 491) · 70. Whether God promised Adam some reward if he did not eat from that tree. (p. 492-493)

Book 4, questions 47-70 (rational soul; Adam in Paradise; the precept). References are to this edition (original folio + 41). Entry 61's folio is misprinted '417' in the original (corrected to 437 from the sequence).

— p. 27 (PDF) —

IN THE FOURTH BOOK (continued): Sixth Disputation (on the penalty of death); On the creation of Eve and on marriage; On the propagation of the human race in the state of innocence.

Conclusion of Book 4 (questions 71-114): the death-penalty threatened to Adam; the creation of Eve and marriage; and the propagation of mankind in the state of innocence. References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original folio + 41).

[Sixth Disputation: on the penalty of death which God threatened to Adam.] 71. How it is to be understood that Adam was to die on the very day he ate from the forbidden tree, since after eating it he lived more than nine hundred years. (p. 494-495) · 72. Whether the death God threatened to Adam was the death only of the soul, or of the body, or of both. (p. 497) · 73. Whether death is natural to man or against nature; and if it is natural, how it is a penalty of sin. (p. 499) · 74. Why he threatened no other evils besides death. (p. 500) · 75. Why he did not threaten the penalties of Hell. (p. 501) · [On the creation of Eve and on marriage.] 76. Disputation on the words 'It is not good for man to be alone' -- whether these words show that to abstain from marriage is not good. (p. 502-503) · 77. What help the woman affords the man. (p. 503, 505) · 78. Whether woman is generated per se or per accidens. (p. 507) · 79. Whether Eve was formed on the sixth day or the seventh, and whether within Paradise or outside. (p. 507-508) · 80. Whether the deep sleep that seized Adam was a sleep or an ecstasy. (p. 509) · 81. Why God willed Eve to be formed from the sleeping Adam. (p. 510-511) · 82. How a rib could be drawn from Adam without his pain. (p.

511) · 83. Why, as Adam was from earth, Eve was likewise not formed from earth, but from the man. (p. 512) · 84. Whether, because Eve was formed from Adam, the marriage of the two would therefore be naturally indecent and unlawful. (p. 514) · 85. Why Eve was made from the side and rib of Adam. (p. 515-516) · 86. Whether the body of Eve was formed from that rib by its rarefaction, or by the addition of other matter. (p. 516-517) · 87. Whether that rib drawn from Adam for the formation of Eve was superfluous to Adam, or one of the ribs necessary to his completeness. (p. 518) · 88. That Eve was formed not from the bare rib, but also from the flesh of Adam. (p. 520) · 89. Why Eve is said to have been 'built' from Adam. (p. 521) · 90. Why Moses does not mention the creation of the woman's soul. (p. 522) · 91. What it means that Eve, as she was created, was 'led' to Adam. (p. 523) · 92. Why God first created only one woman. (p. 524) · 93. Disputation against Cajetan: that Moses's account of the procreation of Eve is not figurative or parabolic, but plainly historical. (p. 525 ff.) · 94. That the naming of 'woman' from 'man' is seen properly in the Hebrew tongue alone. (p. 530) · 95. On the indissoluble bond of wife and husband. (p. 530) · 96. For what reasons husband and wife are called 'one flesh.' (p. 532) · [On the propagation of the human race in the state of innocence.] 97. Disputation on the future propagation of the human race in the state of innocence -- whether, namely, it would have been carried out by carnal generation. (p. 534 ff.) · 98. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been an equal number of males and females. (p. 538) · 99. Since a female is generated through a defect of the male power, how in the state of innocence females could have been generated. (p. 538) · 100. How much the diversity of the wind, or a vehement imagination at the time of intercourse or conception, avails to vary the offspring. (p. 540) · 101. Whether then the integrity of the female would, in conceiving by the man, have been violated. (p. 541) · 102. What things concur to constitute the perfect nature of virginity. (p. 548) · 103. Disputation on the words 'Increase and multiply,' against the heretics of our time: whether by these words all men are commanded to use marriage and to devote themselves to

the generation of offspring. (p. 545 ff.) · 104. Whether in those words any precept of entering marriage is contained, or not. (p. 546) · 105. That the trees were created at the beginning of the world with their fruits already ripe. (p. 547) · 106. How great, in the state of innocence, would have been the frugality of men in diet. (p. 548) · 107. Whether before sin there was no unfruitful plant, or one useless to man for food (as Bede thought), at least in Paradise where man was to dwell. (p. 548-549) · 108. Whether in the state of innocence the eating of flesh would have been in use among men. (p. 549-550) · 109. Why God assigned to the first men food but not also drink. (p. 551) · 110. Whether in the state of innocence men would have cultivated and practiced the liberal arts. (p. 550) · 111. A proclamation of divine providence toward the animals, especially toward the ravens. (p. 551) · 112. Whether the animals that are now carnivorous fed on flesh at the beginning of the world and up to the flood. (p. 552-553) · 113. On the manifold use of clothing, and whence it comes that to some the nakedness of the body is not shameful. (p. 556) · 114. That Plato handed down things similar to Moses about the nakedness of men and their frugality under the reign of Saturn. (p. 557)

Book 4, questions 71-114, concluding the fourth book's index (death-penalty; creation of Eve and marriage; propagation in the state of innocence). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 28 (PDF) —

IN THE FIFTH BOOK, which is on the state of innocence.

Book 5 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. V' in the commentary. After a brief introduction (1-2), it treats the excellences of the state of innocence in four disputations: the knowledge of Adam (3-29), sanctifying grace (30-43), original justice (44-62), and bodily immortality (63-70). References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original index folio + 41).

1. From what things it may be judged how great was the excellence of the state of innocence. (p. 558) · 2. The excellent opinions of Augustine, Gregory, and Damascene on the felicity of that state. (p. 560-561)

Book 5, introduction. The excellence of that state was chiefly comprised in seven things (fol. 521 -> p. 562). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

On the first excellence of the state of innocence, that is, on the knowledge of Adam.

Book 5, first disputation (Adam's knowledge), questions 3-29. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

3. Whether it is established from divine Scripture that Adam was created endowed with knowledge. (p. 563) · 4. Whether all the animals were really brought to Adam, or whether this was done only through some intellectual vision, as Cajetan thinks. (p. 564-565) · 5. Why the animals were brought to Adam. (p. 565-566) · 6. On the imposition of the names that Adam gave the animals. (p. 566) · 7. On the Hebrew tongue, which Adam received from God. (p. 566) · 8. At what time Adam imposed names on the animals. (p. 567) · 9. Whether, as soon as Adam was created, he had knowledge of all things. (p. 568) · 10. Whether Adam's knowledge of natural things differed in kind from the knowledge we have. (p. 569) · 11. How great Adam's knowledge was, and whether he had knowledge of the heavenly bodies and the elements; disputed against Cajetan. (p. 571) · 12. Of what things Adam did not have knowledge infused by the Lord. (p. 571-572) · 13. Whether Adam would have advanced in knowledge, and how. (p. 572) · 14. Whether Adam was wiser than all mortals. (p. 574-575) · 15. On the various causes by which knowledge is lost, and whether these would have occurred in the state of innocence. (p. 575) · 16. The remarkable account of the forgetting of all his learning that befell Albert the Great. (p. 576) · 17. Whether Adam was wiser than Solomon. (p. 576-577)

Book 5, first disputation, questions 3-17. The folio for q. 16 is misprinted '525' in the original index (corrected to 535) and q. 17 '555 & 556' (corrected to 535-536), reconciled to the surrounding sequence. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

Disputation on the knowledge of supernatural things.

Book 5, sub-disputation on Adam's supernatural knowledge, questions 18-29. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

18. Whether Adam was created with faith in supernatural things. (p. 578) · 19. Whether Adam had knowledge of the supernatural last end, and of the means simply necessary for attaining that end. (p. 578) · 20. Whether he knew of the fall of the Angels. (p. 578) · 21. Whether he knew the mystery of the most holy Trinity distinctly and explicitly. (p. 579) · 22. Whether he knew of the future incarnation of the Son of God. (p. 579) · 23. Whether Adam knew God by some more sublime knowledge than knowledge through faith. (p. 580) · 24. Whether he knew God in a dark manner (in aenigmate). (p. 580) · 25. On the fourfold manner of knowing God. (p. 582) · 26. That in two ways the knowledge of divine things which Adam had was more excellent than that of other men. (p. 583) · 27. On the excellence of the contemplation of God and of divine things which Adam had in the state of innocence. (p. 583) · 28. Whether, had the state of innocence remained, Adam's descendants would have had innate knowledge of natural things. (p. 584-585) · 29. On the ten causes for which men in the state of innocence would have acquired all the branches of learning both more easily and more perfectly than we. (p. 585 ff.)

Book 5, first disputation (supernatural knowledge), questions 18-29. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 29 (PDF) —

IN THE FIFTH BOOK (continued): Disputation on the second excellence of the state of innocence, that is, on sanctifying grace.

Book 5, second disputation (sanctifying grace), questions 30-43. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

30. Whether Adam was in grace before the fall. (p. 586-587) · 31. Whether he was created with sanctifying grace. (p. 587-588) · 32. Whether Adam was created not only with the habit of grace, but also with its affection and use. (p. 592) · 33. Whether, the state of innocence standing, man could

have committed any venial sin. (p. 592-593) · 34. Whence Adam had it that in the state of innocence he could commit no venial sin. (p. 595) · 35. Whether in the state of innocence all would have been born with the grace of God. (p. 595) · 36. Whether, had Adam not sinned, his descendants would have been born confirmed in grace. (p. 598 ff.) · 37. On the fourfold effect of original justice. (p. 600) · 38. Whether in the state of innocence more grace would have been given to men than is given them in the state of the Gospel law. (p. 602) · 39. Whether, had Adam not sinned and had the Son of God not been incarnate, more grace would then have been given to men than is given now in the state of the Gospel law. (p. 602) · 40. Whether in the state of innocence, had Christ been incarnate but immortal and impassible, more grace would have been given to men than is given now on account of the passion and death of Christ. (p. 605) · 41. Whether freely given grace (gratia gratis data) would have been greater in the state of innocence than it is now in the state of the Gospel law. (p. 605) · 42. Whether in the state of innocence he who had the least grace would nonetheless have had far more than very many now have in the state of the Gospel law. (p. 606) · 43. Whether in the state of innocence infants would have had more grace than the regenerate now receive through the Baptism of Christ. (p. 606)

Book 5, second disputation (sanctifying grace), questions 30-43. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

Disputation on the third excellence of the state of innocence, that is, on original justice.

Book 5, third disputation (original justice), questions 44-62. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

44. On the six states of human nature, and their difference among themselves. (p. 608) · 45. On the five admirable effects of original justice. (p. 609) · 46. Whether original justice was a certain natural rectitude of the human will, as Henry [of Ghent] held. (p. 610) · 47. What original justice

was, and whether it was some single habit. (p. 611) · 48. Whether original justice placed in the will a habit of natural charity toward God as the natural last end. (p. 613) · 49. Whether original justice sufficed to perfect the sensitive appetite without its own moral or infused habits. (p. 613) · 50. Whether original justice not only subjected the appetite to reason, but also perfected it so that it would never be stirred apart from the judgment and will of reason. (p. 613) · 51. Whence it came about that all the affections and movements of the sensitive appetite were entirely in the power of reason. (p. 614) · 52. Whether man in the state of innocence would have been wholly without the passions of the sensitive appetite. (p. 615) · 53. On the special assistance of God in the state of innocence, which afforded man six goods. (p. 615-616) · 54. Why it is called 'original,' and whether it was also in the Angels. (p. 616) · 55. Whether original justice was a natural or a supernatural gift of God. (p. 617) · 56. In what part or power of the soul, as in a subject, original justice resided: and whether it was in the essence of the soul, as St. Thomas holds. (p. 617-618) · 57. Whether it was in the will, as Bonaventure and Scotus hold. (p. 618) · 58. Whether it was in the sensitive appetite, as Durandus thought. (p. 618) · 59. Whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace, and whether it was inseparable from it. (p. 619 ff.) · 60. Whether Eve, as soon as she ate the forbidden fruit, lost original justice. (p. 621) · 61. Whether, if after Eve's sin Adam had not sinned, their descendants would have been born with original justice. (p. 621) · 62. Whether it can be proved from sacred Scripture that man was created with original justice. (p. 623)

Book 5, third disputation (original justice), questions 44-62. The folio for q. 59 is misprinted '548' in the original index (corrected to 578) to fit the sequence. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 30 (PDF) —

IN THE FIFTH BOOK (continued): Disputation on the fourth excellence of the state of innocence, that is, on the immortality of the body.

Book 5, fourth disputation (bodily immortality), questions 63-70, concluding the fifth book's index. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

63. In how many ways something is said to be immortal in Scripture. (p. 627) · 64. What kind of immortality Adam had before sin. (p. 628) · 65. From what things death is wont to befall man, and how God had fortified the first man against all those things. (p. 628) · 66. Whether the body of Adam, had he not sinned, would have been immortal through some power inhering in it, whether natural or supernatural. (p. 630) · 67. Whether Adam before sin was more truly said to be immortal or mortal. (p. 633) · 68. Whether the gift of immortality conferred on Adam pertained to the natural integrity and perfection of human nature. (p. 634-635) · 69. Whether the joining of a mortal body with an immortal soul is contrary to nature, and disordered, and as it were monstrous. (p. 638) · 70. Whether the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is according to man's nature, or contrary to his nature. (p. 639)

Book 5, fourth disputation (bodily immortality), questions 63-70. The folio for q. 63 is misprinted '506' in the original index (corrected to 586) to fit the sequence. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 31 (PDF) —

IN THE SIXTH BOOK, which is on the temptation of the serpent and the fall and punishment of the first human beings.

Book 6 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VI' in the commentary. It is arranged in seven disputations: on the serpent that tempted Eve (1-37), on the sin of Eve (38-50), on the gravity of the first sin (51-71), on the garments of skin (72-76), on how long they dwelt in Paradise (77-82), and on the Cherubim and flaming sword (83-88). References below are to this edition (our PDF page = original index folio + 41).

Disputation on the serpent that tempted Eve.

Book 6, first disputation (the serpent), questions 1-37. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

1. Whether that serpent naturally had the faculty of speech, as some have thought. (p. 643) · 2. Whether by God's permission the faculty of speech was given to that serpent for a time. (p. 646) · 3. Whether it was a true serpent, or the devil under the image of a serpent. (p. 647) · 4. Whether Moses's narrative about that serpent is historical, or only parabolic, as Cajetan supposed. (p. 647) · 5. Whether both a true serpent and the devil within the serpent came together at once to tempt Eve. (p. 649-650) · 6. Why serpents rather than other animals are affected and moved by incantations. (p. 650) · 7. The marvels of the serpent of Aesculapius, and of another that was a favorite of the Emperor Tiberius. (p. 650) · 8. Whether the saying that the serpent was more crafty than all the beasts of the earth should be understood of the true serpent, or of the devil. (p. 652) · 9. Whether the serpent really is the most crafty of all living things, and on the twofold kind of craftiness in which the serpent excels. (p. 654) · 10. How Eve did not shudder at the serpent's approach, and whether that serpent had a maiden's face. (p. 655) · 11. Of what kind of serpents that serpent was, and whether it was a Basilisk, as Steuco of Gubbio thought. (p. 656) · 12. Why Eve was not astounded on hearing the serpent conversing with her. (p. 657-658) · 13. Whether the serpent that tempted Eve was outside Paradise or within. (p. 658) · 14. Whether Eve at that time did not know for certain whether the serpent could naturally speak or not. (p. 649) · 15. That demons were once accustomed among the Gentiles to speak in human fashion through animals and inanimate things, which Cyril demonstrates by many examples. (p. 650) · 16. Whether all ignorance was contrary to the perfection of the state of innocence. (p. 651) · 17. Whether the curse with which God struck the serpent should be referred to the true serpent, or to the devil. (p. 652) · 18. On the four causes why God cursed the serpent though it had itself done no wrong. (p. 652-653) · 19. Why God did not expressly curse the devil, who had been the chief author of that deceit and mischief. (p. 653) · 20. Whether that curse under the name of the serpent should be referred entirely to the devil alone, as most have thought. (p. 654) · 21. What it means that the devil goes upon his breast and upon his

belly. (p. 655) · 22. What it is for the devil to eat earth all the days of his life. (p. 655) · 23. What that seed of the woman is, and the seed of the serpent. (p. 656) · 24. What it is for the serpent to lie in wait for the woman's heel. (p. 656) · 25. What it is to crush the head of the serpent, that is, of the devil. (p. 657) · 26. Whether from this point the coming of Christ began to be proclaimed to the world, and Adam began to believe in Christ as the redeemer of the world. (p. 657) · 27. In what way the curse of the serpent was a penalty and punishment to the true serpent. (p. 659) · 28. Why the demon tempted man through a serpent rather than through any other animal. (p. 661) · 29. Why Moses made no express mention of the devil. (p. 663) · 30. Why Eve said that the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil had been forbidden her by God, when God had only forbidden the eating of it. (p. 665) · 31. Why Eve said hesitantly, 'Lest perhaps we die,' when God had said absolutely, 'On whatever day you eat, you shall die.' (p. 666-667) · 32. That Eve perverted God's words in three ways, just as Scripture is also corrupted by heretics. (p. 667) · 33. With how great artifice the demon tempted Eve, and is wont to tempt men. (p. 668) · 34. How the serpent's speech was ambiguous and sophistical, and how it is the prince of sophists. (p. 670) · 35. By what steps the devil rolls man down into the greatest crimes. (p. 673) · 36. How great the evils that arise from careless custody of the eyes. (p. 673) · 37. The excellent opinion of St. Gregory on the custody of the eyes. (p. 674)

Book 6, first disputation (the serpent), questions 1-37. Some folios in this stretch are re-treatments of earlier folios (the index passes twice over the serpent chapter); q. 20 is misprinted '713' in the original index (corrected to 613). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 32 (PDF) —

IN THE SIXTH BOOK (continued): Disputation on the sin of Eve.

Book 6, second disputation (the sin of Eve), questions 38-50. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

38. That Eve did not sin before her encounter with the serpent. (p. 675) · 39. That the first sin of Eve was pride. (p. 676) · 40. A notable opinion of St. Augustine, that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open sin, so that, becoming displeased with themselves, they may come to their senses. (p. 677) · 41. Eight sins of Eve are noted. (p. 677-678) · 42. How Eve could believe the serpent's so incredible promises. (p. 678) · 43. Why the devil tempted Eve rather than Adam. (p. 678) · 44. Whether Eve reported the serpent's promises to Adam. (p. 679) · 45. By what things Adam was led to comply with Eve's request. (p. 679) · 46. Whether Adam sought likeness and equality with God. (p. 681) · 47. Whether it can truly be said that Adam was deceived, whether by the serpent or by Eve. (p. 681-682) · 48. That Adam's mind was corrupted and depraved in eight ways. (p. 685) · 49. Three notable opinions on the sin of pride, of Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard. (p. 685-686) · 50. Whether, if Adam had at once humbly confessed his sin to God, he would have been cast out of Paradise. (p. 689)

Book 6, second disputation (the sin of Eve), questions 38-50. q. 40 is misprinted '536' in the original index (corrected to 636, anchor-verified against our p. 677). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

Disputation on the gravity of the sin of the first human beings.

Book 6, third disputation (gravity of the first sin), questions 51-71. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

51. How the sin of the first human beings both was and was not the gravest of all. (p. 690) · 52. Whose sin was graver, Adam's or Eve's. (p. 692) · 53. Whether the first human beings sinned by the sin of idolatry, or of avarice. (p. 692 ff.) · 54. Whether Eve's sin was slight, as Cajetan says. (p. 693) · 55. How it is to be understood that the eyes of those first human beings were opened after the sin. (p. 694) · 56. Why the first human beings were naked in Paradise. (p. 697) · 57. Why after the sin they wished to cover themselves with fig-leaves. (p. 698) · 58. On the care of covering the private parts among all peoples. (p. 700) · 59. What that voice of God was which Adam first heard, and why he wished to hide himself from the face

of God. (p. 705-706) · 60. In what manner God spoke with Adam, Eve, and the serpent, and a lucid disputation on the various modes God has used in speaking either to men or to Angels. (p. 707-708) · 61. How detestable is the excusing of a sin committed, with the excellent opinion of Augustine and Gregory. (p. 712) · 62. A notable opinion of Rupert on the woman's power against the serpent. (p. 717) · 63. How the multiplication of conception, which was to be in the state of innocence, became after the sin a penalty of the woman. (p. 717) · 64. Four causes why the multiplication of offspring is a penalty of the woman. (p. 717) · 65. The discomforts of women while they carry the womb. (p. 717 ff.) · 66. On the bitterness of a woman's pains in childbirth. (p. 721) · 67. How it could come about that in the state of innocence a woman would give birth without pain. (p. 722) · 68. How it was a penalty of the woman to be under the power of the man. (p. 723) · 69. Whether according to the Catholic faith one ought to hold that, had Adam not sinned, he would not have died, and that death befell man on account of Adam's sin. (p. 725) · 70. That it was most useful to man, after the sin, to be liable to death and bodily miseries. (p. 726) · 71. A disputation on the etymology of the name of Eve, and how Adam imposed that name on his wife, and whether he imposed it through mad pride of soul and contempt of the divine sentence, as Rupert supposed. (p. 728-729)

Book 6, third disputation (gravity of the first sin), questions 51-71 (q. 71 opens a disputation on the etymology of Eve's name). References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 33 (PDF) —

IN THE SIXTH BOOK (continued): Disputation on the garments of skin, with which Adam was clothed by God.

Book 6, fourth disputation (the garments of skin), questions 72-76. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

72. Whether what is said of the garments of skin is to be taken historically, or figuratively. (p. 729) · 73. Whence and how those garments were made. (p. 730) · 74. On the most ancient use of garments made of skins among

men. (p. 731) · 75. On the eight causes why God willed the first human beings, after the sin, to be clothed with garments of skin. (p. 732-733) · 76. A disputation upon those words, 'Behold, Adam has become as one of us.' (p. 734)

Book 6, fourth disputation (garments of skin), questions 72-76. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

Disputation on how long the first human beings dwelt in Paradise.

Book 6, fifth disputation (time spent in Paradise), questions 77-82. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

77. Whether Adam was cast out of Paradise on the same day on which he was created. (p. 736) · 78. An elegant analogy between the things that befell Adam and Christ our Lord. (p. 737) · 79. Whether Adam was in Paradise more than one day. (p. 738) · 80. Whether Adam was in Paradise a long time. (p. 739) · 81. Whether he was in Paradise only for eight days. (p. 740) · 82. Whether what Rupert handed down is true, that the power of the Tree of Life was unknown both to the devil and to Adam. (p. 741)

Book 6, fifth disputation (time in Paradise), questions 77-82. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

Disputation on the Cherubim and the flaming and turning sword placed before the entrance of Paradise.

Book 6, sixth disputation (the Cherubim and flaming sword), questions 83-88, concluding the sixth book's index. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

83. Whether this narrative of Moses is historical, or figurative and mystical. (p. 743) · 84. Whether by those words about the Cherubim and the flaming sword the location of Paradise beneath the equator and the torrid Zone is signified. (p. 743) · 85. Whether a vast abundance of fire surrounding Paradise on every side is signified. (p. 745) · 86. Whether a purgatorial fire is denoted, as Ambrose and Rupert hold. (p. 745) · 87. What the word 'Cherubim' signifies according to Theodoret. (p. 750-751) ·

88. What is the true and genuine sense and interpretation of those words of Moses about the Cherubim and the flaming and turning sword. (p. 751-752)

Book 6, sixth disputation (the Cherubim and flaming sword), questions 83-88, concluding Book 6. References are to this edition (original folio + 41).

— p. 34 (PDF) —

IN THE SEVENTH BOOK, which is on Cain and Abel.

Book 7 = 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII' in the commentary (Genesis 4-5, from Cain and Abel to the flood). IMPORTANT: the original index's folio numbers for Book 7 are internally inconsistent and misprinted -- the printed foliation drifted in the final gatherings of the volume (elsewhere our PDF page = folio + 41, but here that rule breaks down, and some entries are non-monotonic). The page references below were therefore re-derived by matching each entry to the place where this edition's translated text actually treats it; the original folio is retained for reference. Book 7 runs: the Cain and Abel narrative (1-46, including embedded disputations), the chronology from Adam to the flood (47-55), and the translation and writings of Enoch (56-69).

1. On the two cities, the one of God, the other of the devil -- an excellent disputation. (p. 764-765) · 2. On the holiness and antiquity of the Hebrew tongue. (p. 766) · 3. That the first human beings, while they were in Paradise, were virgins. (p. 767) · 4. Whether Cain was the firstborn of Adam, and in what year of Adam's age Cain and also Abel were begotten by him. (p. 768) · 5. Whence Abel knew that sacrifice was to be offered to God. (p. 772) · 6. In praise of the pastoral art. (p. 770) · 7. Why Scripture nowhere records that Adam and Isaac sacrificed to God. (p. 772) · 8. Why Abel offered the firstborn and the fat. (p. 772) · 9. What it means that God had respect to the gifts of Abel, and by what sign Cain knew it. (p. 773) · 10. How great is God's equity in judging. (p. 774) · 11. On the freedom of the human will. (p. 776) · 12. What that means which God said to Cain according to the Septuagint translation: 'Hast thou not sinned if thou offer rightly, but rightly dost not divide?' (p. 780) · 13. The altercation between Cain and Abel according to the Jerusalem Targum. (p. 783) · 14. By what kind of death Abel was slain by Cain. (p. 784) · 15. The four kinds of sins

that cry out to God. (p. 785) · 16. A most beautiful allegorical interpretation by Rupert of Abel's death and of the punishment Cain paid for it, applied to the death of Christ and to the evils with which the Jews were afflicted on its account. (p. 788) · 17. A disputation on those words of Cain, 'My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.' (p. 789) · 18. Whether by these words Cain confessed his sin -- a confession exact indeed, but useless because it was too late, as Chrysostom seems to signify. (p. 791) · 19. What it signifies in Scripture for God to show or to hide his face from someone. (p. 792) · 20. What sort of fear the wicked have on account of the sins they have committed, from Ambrose and Bernard. (p. 793) · 21. A disputation on those words, 'Everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold.' (p. 794) · 22. On the seven sins of Cain. (p. 789) · 23. Why God so long deferred the death of Cain. (p. 790) · 24. What it signifies that Cain went out from the face of the Lord. (p. 798) · 25. An excellent lesson and opinion of Ambrose on not envying the prosperity of the wicked, nor bewailing the calamity of the good in this life. (p. 792-793)

Book 7, Cain and Abel narrative, questions 1-25. Page references re-derived from this edition's text (see the book note above); the original folios are non-monotonic here (e.g. qq. 22-25).

— p. 35 (PDF) —

IN THE SEVENTH BOOK (continued): On Cain, Lamech, Seth, and Enos; then the disputations on the length of life and whether Adam is saved.

Book 7, questions 26-46. Page references re-derived from this edition's text. References marked below correspond to the disputations on longevity (40-44) and on Adam's salvation (45-46).

26. Whether, when Cain built the city of Henoch, there were only three, or five, human beings on earth. (p. 800) · 27. The falsehoods of the Gentiles concerning the antiquity of cities. (p. 801) · 28. Why Cain built that city. (p. 802) · 29. On the first cause of building cities. (p. 802) · 30. A moral lesson: why Cain, an impious and wicked man, was the first of all mortals to build a city. (p. 803) · 31. A disputation on those words, 'Sevenfold

vengeance shall be taken for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times sevenfold.' (p. 804) · 32. Whether Cain was slain by Lamech. (p. 806) · 33. The three grades of men -- the Innocent, the Penitent, and the Impenitent -- of whom Abel, Lamech, and Cain were the examples. (p. 808) · 34. When Abel was slain, and whether before Abel's murder Adam had other sons besides Cain and Abel. (p. 811) · 35. Why Scripture says that Seth was begotten to the image and likeness of Adam. (p. 815) · 36. The praise of Seth from Josephus and Suidas. (p. 812) · 37. Whether Enos was the first of all to begin to invoke the name of the Lord. (p. 813) · 38. Whether it is true that Adam in a certain manner lived a longer life on earth than Methuselah. (p. 816) · 39. When Adam died. (p. 816)

Book 7, Cain/Lamech/Seth/Enos narrative, questions 26-39. Page references re-derived from this edition's text.

Disputation on the longevity of the ancient men before the flood.

Book 7, disputation on longevity, questions 40-44. References are to this edition.

40. To what extent the life of man can naturally be prolonged. (p. 817) · 41. Whether those years, as many as Scripture records that men lived before the flood, were equal to our years. (p. 818) · 42. On the seven causes for which those ancient men lived so long a life. (p. 819) · 43. Why no one of men before the flood reached the thousandth year. (p. 821) · 44. Why Moses appended to each of the generations that clause, 'And he died.' (p. 822)

Book 7, disputation on longevity, questions 40-44. References are to this edition.

Disputation whether Adam is saved.

Book 7, disputation on Adam's salvation, questions 45-46. References are to this edition.

45. A disputation whether Adam is saved. (p. 823) · 46. Whether Adam was buried on Mount Calvary. (p. 824)

Book 7, disputation on Adam's salvation, questions 45-46. References are to this edition.

— p. 36 (PDF) —

IN THE SEVENTH BOOK (continued): Disputation on the chronology which Scripture hands down from Adam to the flood (Genesis chapter 5).

Book 7, disputation on chronology, questions 47-55. Page references re-derived from this edition's text (the original folios here are non-monotonic).

47. How many years passed from the creation of Adam to the flood. (p. 825) · 48. In the aforesaid reckoning of years, what agrees and what differs between the Hebrew Scripture and the translation of the Septuagint interpreters. (p. 827) · 49. Whether in the aforesaid reckoning of years one should stand rather by the Hebrew Scripture than by the interpretation of the Septuagint. (p. 829) · 50. In what way the aforesaid computation of years was corrupted and depraved in the translation of the Septuagint interpreters. (p. 831) · 51. In the chronology of the fathers and of the sons succeeding the fathers, which years of the fathers are to be recorded and which passed over in silence. (p. 826) · 52. Since Adam is said, when he had begotten Seth, to have been a hundred and thirty years old, how that last year in which he begot a son is to be taken -- whether imperfect and, as is commonly said, current, or already completed, or exceeding by some months. (p. 825) · 53. Whether, in the generations from Adam to the flood recorded by Moses, any was passed over by him. (p. 833) · 54. On the great variety of the codices of the Septuagint interpreters in the reckoning of years from Adam to Abraham. (p. 832) · 55. Whether the sons who are mentioned as begotten before the flood were all firstborn. (p. 833)

Book 7, disputation on chronology, questions 47-55. Page references re-derived from this edition's text.

Disputation on the translation and the writings of Enoch.

Book 7, disputation on Enoch, questions 56-69, concluding the seventh book and the entire index. Page references re-derived from this edition's text.

56. Whether Enoch is now dead, or even now lives on earth. (p. 835) · 57. Whether Enoch is at some time going to die. (p. 837) · 58. Into what place Enoch was translated. (p. 839) · 59. Why God translated Enoch in this way. (p. 840) · 60. Whether Enoch, after he was translated, saw the essence of God. (p. 842) · 61. On Moses and Paul, whether they saw the essence of God. (p. 843) · 62. Whether Enoch, if he is in the state of meriting, will surpass all the Saints in the multitude and magnitude of his merits. (p. 845) · 63. Whether Enoch wrote any book. (p. 846) · 64. Why the book written by Enoch was not counted among the Canonical books. (p. 847) · 65. Whence Jude drew the prophecy of Enoch which he cites. (p. 848) · 66. Whether the terrestrial Paradise remained unharmed and untouched by the flood. (p. 851) · 67. Whether Enoch is in the terrestrial Paradise. (p. 849) · 68. Whether the multitude and authority of the Doctors who say that Enoch is in the terrestrial Paradise from which Adam was cast out makes that opinion plainly certain and renders the contrary rash. (p. 855) · 69. What is to be observed concerning new opinions, even if they are highly probable and plausible. (p. 857)

Book 7, disputation on Enoch, questions 56-69, concluding the index. Page references re-derived from this edition's text. This closes the four-index front matter of the volume.

— p. 37 (PDF) —

INDEX OF THE THINGS IN THESE COMMENTARIES WHICH PERTAIN TO MORAL DOCTRINE AND CAN BE OF USE TO PREACHERS.

This is the second of the volume's four indices (a homiletic 'reader's guide,' arranged book by book, pointing to material useful for preaching). Its page references are the original printed page numbers; here they are converted to this edition's pages (our PDF page = original printed page + 41 for Books 1-6; Book 7 references are content-matched, since the volume's final gatherings are mis-foliated).

From the First Book.

Moral index, Book 1.

How beautifully it is shown in what way the works of God are perfect. (pp. 79-80) · On the excellence of light and its remarkable properties, as it is accommodated in Sacred Scripture to express divine things. (pp. 109-110) · On the dignity and excellences of the Lord's Day. (pp. 128-129) · A moral explanation of the divine works that were made by God in those first six days of the world. (p. 202 ff.)

Moral index, Book 1. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

From the Second Book.

Moral index, Book 2.

A disputation against judicial Astrologers. (p. 278 ff.) This disputation will find frequent and manifold use in public sermons for refuting the vanity, impiety, frauds, and lies of those Astrologers and of those who put faith in them: from it one learns what a demon can foreknow and foretell of future contingents and what it cannot; whence it comes about that the predictions of such men are sometimes true; how great and manifold a sin it is to devote effort to that vanity; how severely those who practiced star-divination were once punished in the Church; how in every age these Astrologers have been despised and derided by wise and prudent men; and why God allows some to be caught and entangled in errors of this kind. These and very many other things, useful to treat in public sermons, can be drawn from this disputation.

Moral index, Book 2. Reference is to this edition (original printed page + 41).

From the Third Book.

Moral index, Book 3.

Many things can be culled and adapted for the use of preachers: concerning the pleasantness and felicity of that place of Paradise, from the most beautiful descriptions of that place which the Fathers handed down; likewise many things concerning the tree of life, and the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil -- which the prudent reader will select and set aside for his own future use in public sermons. (Paradise's pleasantness: p. 324 ff.; the tree of life: p. 352 ff.)

Moral index, Book 3 (the earthly Paradise, Genesis 2). The original printed page was truncated in the source; located by content in this edition.

From the Fourth Book.

Moral index, Book 4.

Very many of the things disputed in the first part concerning the image of God can be of great use to preachers, especially for lucidly treating that Gospel, Matthew 22, 'Whose image and superscription is this?' (on the image of God: p. 413 ff.) · The digression setting out the seven causes why God willed to make man to his own image is wholly moral. (p. 428) · That whole disputation on man's dominion over the animals, treated from p. 391 to 401, will in many places be of use to preachers, as also the following disputation on the formation of the human body. (p. 432-442) · On the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. (p. 486-488) · The disputation on the penalty of death which God threatened to Adam if he ate the forbidden fruit, which begins on p. 453. (p. 494) · The following disputation on the procreation of Eve from Adam, beginning on p. 461, contains much that can be usefully adapted to popular sermons. (p. 502) · Two disputations against heretics: one on those words, 'It is not good for man to be alone' -- whether it is lawful to abstain from marriage (p. 462); the other on those words, 'Increase and multiply' -- whether it is commanded that every man devote himself to begetting offspring (p. 502); where a preacher, discoursing in praise of celibacy or virginity, would find ample material and occasion to digress against heretics. (p. 503; p. 543) · For continence and frugality in food it will help to read what is disputed about the eating of flesh, which was not to be in the state of innocence. (p. 548-550) · The wonderful providence of God toward the animals, and especially toward stags. (p. 552)

Moral index, Book 4. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

— p. 38 (PDF) —

From the Fifth Book.

Moral index, Book 5.

The marvels of the felicity of the first human beings in the state of innocence, which they lost by sinning both for themselves and for us. (p. 558 ff.) · The disputation on the grace of God with which Adam was created, and which his descendants would have had in the state of innocence, and on the comparison of the grace that would have been given in the state of innocence with that which is given under the law of the Gospel, will be of help and ornament to preachers for treating many things learnedly and usefully. (p. 586 ff.) · Likewise the following disputation on original justice, especially as regards its effects and the special assistance of God which it afforded man in the state of innocence, and as regards that question, whether the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is natural to man or a penalty of sin. (p. 608 ff.)

Moral index, Book 5. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

From the Sixth Book.

Moral index, Book 6. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

The whole explanation of the curse of the serpent, treated from p. 611 to 620, is moral: for instance, what it signifies that the devil goes upon his breast and belly, eats earth all the days of his life, lies in wait for the woman's heel, and that the woman crushes the serpent's head. (p. 652-661) · By what steps the devil rolls man down into the greatest crimes. (p. 673) · How great the evils that arise from careless custody of the eyes. (p. 673) · The excellent opinion of St. Gregory on the custody of the eyes. (p. 674) · On the evil of pride, and that according to Augustine it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and shameful sin. (p. 676-677) · On the eight

sins that Eve committed. (p. 677) · Three notable opinions on the sin of pride, of Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard. (p. 685-686) · The disputation on the gravity of the sin of the first human beings, treated on p. 644, is in great part moral. (p. 685) · What it is for a sinner's eyes to be opened after sin. (p. 696) · What it is that a sinner should wish to cover his shame with fig-leaves. (p. 698) · Why before sin the human beings were naked. (p. 697) · Why God, to rebuke the sin of the first human beings, came to them after midday or toward evening. (p. 702-703) · The five bitter and pestilent fruits of sin. (p. 704) · A beautiful moral interpretation of those words the Lord spoke, 'Adam, where are you?' (p. 706) · How detestable is the excusing of a sin committed, with the excellent opinion of Augustine and Gregory. (p. 712) · How profitable it is to confess one's sins distinctly and humbly to him to whom one ought. (p. 713) · The moral interpretation of Basil: why God set enmities between man and the serpent. (p. 714) · The three modes of diabolical temptation. (p. 715) · How Christ alone perfectly waged the enmity with the serpent, according to Rupert. (p. 715) · That it was most useful to man, after sin, to be liable to death and bodily miseries. (p. 726) · On the eight causes why God willed the first human beings, after sin, to be clothed with garments of skin. (p. 733) · An elegant analogy between the things that befell Adam and Christ our Lord. (p. 737) · What, according to allegory, the Cherubim and the flaming sword before Paradise signify. (p. 743) · On the purgatorial fire, the excellent opinion of Ambrose and Rupert. (p. 745)

Moral index, Book 6. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

— p. 39 (PDF) —

From the Seventh Book.

Moral index, Book 7. Because the volume's final gatherings are mis-foliated, these page references were content-matched to this edition's text (they do not follow the +41 rule).

On the freedom of the human will. (p. 776) · Why Cain killed his brother Abel in the field, the allegorical interpretation of Ambrose. (p. 783-784) ·

The excellent opinion of Ambrose on the voluntary confession of sins. (p. 784) · The four kinds of sins that cry out to God. (p. 785) · Of Abel's murder and of the punishment Cain paid for it, the most beautiful allegorical interpretation of Rupert, applied to the death of Christ and to the evils with which the Jews were afflicted on its account. (p. 788) · What sort of fear the wicked have on account of the sins committed by them, from Ambrose and Bernard. (p. 793) · Why God so long deferred the death of Cain. (p. 790) · The excellent lesson and opinion of Ambrose on not envying the prosperity of the wicked, nor bewailing the calamity of the good in this life. (p. 792-793) · A moral lesson: why Cain, an impious and wicked man, was the first of all mortals to build a city. (p. 803) · The three grades of men -- the Innocent, the Penitent, and the Impenitent -- of whom Abel, Lamech, and Cain were the examples. (p. 808)

Moral index, Book 7, concluding this second index. Page references content-matched to this edition.

— p. 40 (PDF) —

INDEX OF THE PASSAGES OF SACRED SCRIPTURE WHICH ARE EXPLAINED SOMEWHAT MORE SUBTLY AND ACCURATELY IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

This is the third of the volume's four indices: a list of biblical passages (beyond Genesis 1-5 itself) that Pererius treats in the course of the work, with the page where each is discussed. Page references are the original printed page numbers, converted here to this edition's pages (our PDF page = original printed page + 41 for Books 1-6; Book 7 references are content-matched, since the volume's final gatherings are mis-foliated). This first part covers the Old Testament, from Genesis through Ecclesiastes.

From Genesis and the Pentateuch, and the historical books.

Scripture index: Old Testament narrative/legal books.

Genesis ch. 7: The waters violently overflowed, and filled everything on the face of the earth, and prevailed exceedingly upon the earth, and all the high mountains under the whole heaven were covered: the water was fifteen cubits higher than the mountains it had covered. (p. 844) · Genesis

ch. 36: This is that Ana who found hot waters in the wilderness, while he was feeding the asses of Sebeon his father. (p. 197-198) · Leviticus ch. 19: You shall not make your cattle to breed with beasts of another kind. (p. 197-198) · Joshua ch. 14: The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-arbe: Adam, the greatest, was laid there among the Anakim. (p. 456-457) · 4 Kings ch. 3: I will give you a wise and understanding heart, so that there has been no one like you before you, nor shall arise after you. (p. 576-577)

Scripture index. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

From the books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes.

Scripture index: Old Testament poetic/wisdom books (mostly creation and cosmology passages).

Job ch. 38: Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing from the womb? (p. 159) · Job ch. 40: Behold Behemoth, whom I made with you: he shall eat hay like an ox. (p. 231) · From Psalm 23: For he has founded it upon the seas, and prepared it upon the rivers. (p. 98-99) · From Psalm 32: Gathering together the waters of the sea as in a vessel, laying up the depths in his storehouses. (p. 159) · From Psalm 103: Stretching out the heaven like a skin. (p. 186); The waters shall stand above the mountains. (p. 158); You have set a bound which they shall not pass over, nor shall they return to cover the earth. (p. 158) · From Psalm 135: Who made the heavens in understanding. (p. 264); Who established the earth above the waters. (p. 98-99) · From Proverbs ch. 8: When he compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters that they should not pass their limits. (p. 159) · From Ecclesiastes ch. 7: Only this I have found, that God made man upright, and he has entangled himself with an infinity of questions. (p. 590 and 626)

Scripture index, wisdom books. References are to this edition (original printed page + 41).

— p. 41 (PDF) —

From the books of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.

Scripture index (continued): remaining Old Testament books. Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Enoch passages of Ecclesiasticus 44 include Book 7 references, content-matched to this edition.

From Wisdom ch. 11: Your almighty hand, O Lord, created the world out of unseen matter. (p. 95) · From Ecclesiasticus ch. 1: The sand of the sea, and the drops of rain, and the days of the world, who has numbered? (p. 76); The height of heaven, and the breadth of the earth, and the depth of the abyss, who has measured? (p. 100) · Ecclesiasticus ch. 17: God created man of the earth, and made him after his own image, and turned him again... and clothed him with strength (virtue). (p. 589) · Ecclesiasticus ch. 18: He that lives forever created all things together. (p. 230) · Ecclesiasticus ch. 39: At the word of the Lord the water stood as a heap, and at the speech of his mouth as vessels holding waters. (p. 159) · Ecclesiasticus ch. 44: Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise. (p. 345); Enoch pleased God and was translated, that he might give repentance to the nations. (p. 839); Enoch pleased God and was translated into Paradise. (p. 849) · From Isaiah ch. 34: The heavens shall be folded together like a book. (p. 313 and 315) · From Jeremiah ch. 2: And now what have you to do in the way of Egypt, to drink troubled water? or, as the Septuagint has it, to drink the water of Gehon. (p. 380) · From Jeremiah ch. 5: Will you then not fear me, says the Lord? I have set the sand a bound for the sea, an everlasting ordinance which it shall not pass. (p. 159)

Scripture index (continued). Books 1-6 references are original printed page + 41; the Ecclesiasticus 44 Enoch references (p. 839, 849) are content-matched (Book 7).

From the New Testament.

Scripture index (conclusion): New Testament passages. The Matthew, Hebrews, and Jude references fall in Book 7 and are content-matched to this edition.

From Matthew ch. 18: Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus said to him, I say not to you till seven times, but till seventy times seven. (p. 804) · From Luke ch. 23: This day you shall be with me in Paradise. (p. 347) · From the Epistle to the

Romans ch. 7: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? (p. 625) · From the First Epistle to Timothy ch. 2: And Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression. (p. 681) · From the Epistle to the Hebrews ch. 11: By faith Abel offered to God a greater sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained testimony that he was just, God giving testimony to his gifts: and by it he being dead yet speaks. (p. 772) · From the Second Epistle of Peter ch. 3: The heavens shall pass away with great violence, and the elements shall be melted with heat, and the earth and the works that are in it shall be burned up. (p. 246) · From the Catholic Epistle of Jude the Apostle: Now of these Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied, saying, Behold the Lord comes with thousands of his saints, to execute judgment against all, etc. (p. 846 ff.)

Scripture index, New Testament, concluding the third index. Book 7 references (Matthew, Hebrews, Jude) content-matched to this edition. After this index the commentary itself begins (p. 42).

— p. 42 (PDF) · printed p. 1 —

Preface to Benedict Pererius's Books of Commentaries on Genesis.

We undertake to expound the Book of Genesis, in which the first beginnings of the nascent world are recounted, and the first structure of this universe, together with the arrangement and adornment of all its parts, is described — a task assuredly arduous and beset with difficulty at every turn; one that, just as it is painted with none of the rhetoricians' colors and is neither rouged nor made showy with any of the cosmetics of human eloquence, so too is filled with a manifold learning accessible to few. But since the renown and nobility of books rests and is appraised chiefly upon two things — the subject matter and the dignity of the author — both qualities are seen, in this book, to be especially illustrious and outstanding. For the foremost subject of this volume is the world, whose new arising and, as it were, birthdays, on which it was brought forth by God, are celebrated at the very opening of the book by Moses. And what is there,

among the things established by God, greater than the world in mass, more admirable in variety, more magnificent in appearance, more elegant in adornment, more lovely in beauty, mightier in strength, more secure for its safety and endurance,

Marginal gloss: "Moses' teaching about the world, how useful" (Doctrina Mosis de mundo, quam utilis). The sentence continues onto printed p. 2. Catchword: decentissimo.

— p. 43 (PDF) · printed p. 2 —

with a more fitting order of all its parts, and more graceful in a certain marvelous harmony, as it were, and concord among them, fuller in the abundance of all good things, more perfect in its completion? In short, when I have said "the world," I have said all things. For what can be either named or imagined, whether the greatest or the least, that is not embraced by the word "world" just as it is by the world's own compass? And indeed, if we run over in thought all the works of God, we shall find nothing more abstruse than the nature of the world to investigate, nothing more difficult to discover, nothing more delightful to come to know, and, finally, nothing more useful to teach.

I say "more useful": for take but the one thing that Moses most truly taught at the beginning of this book — that by faith the world may be known and held to have been made by God out of nothing, from some beginning of time. It is beyond belief how great a usefulness flowers and overflows from this one truth, for imparting the knowledge of God to mortals and for strengthening it in their minds. For whoever has been persuaded that the world — which through all eternity had been nothing, and was generated from no matter and by a new origin at a fixed time — to him it will surely be no trouble to be persuaded that God exists, and is one, and is the efficient, preserving, governing, knowing, and provident cause of all things; that He is mighty with infinite power and might; that He was led to fashion the world by no necessity of nature, but by His own will and goodness alone; that He suffices wholly unto Himself for all things; that He

is blessed of Himself and by Himself alone, and needs nothing outside Himself — no support, increase, or fellowship — to preserve His own happiness. Behold, then: with one fixed first principle laid down and granted — namely the new making of the world, which we have learned from Moses — the door and entryway, as it were, being thrown open, how easy is the entrance upon the knowledge of divine things, and how long a progress may be made!

But why did Moses (for someone may ask this), concerning this origin of the world

Sentence continues on printed p. 3.

— p. 44 (PDF) · printed p. 3 —

and its construction, deliver a teaching whose unfolding is most difficult, and which nonetheless was not going to win the belief and assent of its varied readers — handing it down by simple narrative alone and a bare exposition of the facts, and choosing not to fortify and confirm it with any defenses, as it were, of argumentation, nor with any props of reasoning? For my part, I can offer six reasons, ones that ought to be especially approved by discerning judges of such matters.

Marginal gloss: "Why Moses related the origin of the world without arguing, but as though narrating."

First, this teaching of Moses is plainly historical, recounting distinctly and clearly how this world was fashioned by God. For this reason, in delivering that teaching Moses had to play and fulfill the part not of a philosopher but of a historian. Now history, by its very nature, calls for a faithful record of things done, but requires no reasonings or arguments at all.

First of the six reasons.

Second, since this teaching is not human — for it was not procured by men's diligence and industry and study, but is divine, and was disclosed to

Moses by a singular gift of God — it was surely most fitting that it rest on the authority of God alone, by whom it was delivered, and whose trustworthiness is far weightier than the whole mass of arguments; and that it not be propped up and sustained by the feeble little reasonings or conjectures of human understanding.

Second reason.

Next, it is the view of St. Thomas — nor does it displease me — that the new creation of the world cannot be established by firm and necessary reasonings, but is held by faith alone, received and known by us; a view that St. Paul seems to support, whose words in the Epistle written to the Hebrews, ch. 11, are these: "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that from things invisible visible things might come to be." Certainly — which is beyond dispute among all — that the world was made when it was made, and not earlier or later, and with that order of parts and span of time in which Moses relates it to have been completed by God: no one [can establish this] not merely by certain reasoning

Third reason. Marginal citation: St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 46, art. 2. Quotation is Hebrews 11:3 (Vulgate). Sentence continues on the next page.

— p. 45 (PDF) · printed p. 4 —

...could not merely grasp it by certain reasoning, but could not even attain it by conjecture or touch upon it by any surmise. Besides, this teaching was written and handed down to the Hebrew people — rude, that is, and unlearned, incapable of philosophical argumentation, and wholly persuaded that all the sayings and writings of Moses had proceeded from God, with whom they saw him converse so often and familiarly, and by whose power they saw him work so many and so remarkable miracles. Add to this that it was so done, I judge, by the supreme design of God, most provident for our benefit — namely, that a richer field and material for meriting well in God's sight might be afforded us, by diligently exercising

the virtue of faith, and by believing His words without any doubt and with the deepest submission and reverence of mind. For if among the disciples of Pythagoras the preconceived opinion of the master carried such weight that "he himself said it" was enough for them to believe, how much more ought the authority of God — declaring and teaching the hidden things of heaven through His prophets — to stand in the place of all reasonings?

Fourth and fifth of the six reasons (the count is not numbered in the margin here). Marginal gloss: "the field of God['s favor]."

Finally, by this manner of writing and teaching it was assuredly accomplished that the pride and obstinacy of certain men — minds more eager for contention than for truth, and rivals of that old Academy's fickleness and instability — should be checked and held in restraint. For there are many (so great is the vanity and perversity of the human mind), there are, I say, many bold and reckless enough to hold any opinion whatever, who wish to seem sharp and eloquent in assailing the truth, and who, by contradicting everyone and acquiescing in no reasonings however refined, suppose that their name will thereby be most ennobled and their memory prolonged for many ages; who reckon the highest praise and glory of talent and learning to lie in stripping light from what is clear, strength from what is firm, credit from what is certain, authority from what is ancient, and worth from what is new. Nor indeed could this...

Sixth reason. Sentence continues onto printed p. 5.

— p. 46 (PDF) · printed p. 5 —

...could this either simplicity, or rather (for so it is, if it be truly weighed) gravity of Moses' speaking and writing have rightly displeased any of the philosophers? For their very chief, and, as they themselves call him, the god of philosophy, Plato — how much in the Timaeus, concerning this very generation of the world and the first procreation of all things, did he leave fortified by no supports of argument, but merely set forth and explained simply, in bare discourse alone?

We have spoken of the subject matter of this book and of the method of treating it that Moses employed — which we thought would suffice for the present. It follows that we should also speak, as was proposed in the second place, of the author. If the name and glory of its author adorns and ennobles each book, then surely it is a great praise of this book that Moses is its author — a man, indeed, by as much more worthy of all praise as he is greater than all praising — so that for this reason I have judged it better in this place to pass over his praises in silence than to have them sullied and stained, treated thinly and meagerly through the fault of the one praising. And besides, it seems a mark of greater reverence to venerate in silence, rather than to express, what cannot be worthily praised — especially since it not rarely happens that things whose true greatness cannot be told appear, if they are told, to be less than they are, to those who measure the magnitude of things by the ability of the speaker.

Marginal glosses: "The praise of Moses"; "The antiquity of Moses."

But to be silent for now about all else concerning Moses, this at least must not be passed over at present: that to those who consider the age of this man, the antiquity of this work at once presents itself and, as it were, shines forth — whence there accrues to it very much not only of commendation but also of veneration. For if Greece has no writing more ancient than the poems of Homer (as Josephus affirms in the first book Against Apion), who does not see how great is the praise of this book's antiquity, whose author Moses preceded Homer by five hundred years...

Marginal gloss: "Homer's poetry is older than all Greek writing." Sentence continues onto printed p. 6.

— p. 47 (PDF) · printed p. 6 —

...preceded Homer? Eupolemus has recorded (as Eusebius reports in the tenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel) that Moses was the first of all to deliver letters to the Jews; that the Phoenicians received them from the Jews; and that Cadmus carried them over from the Phoenicians to the

Greeks. That Moses was far earlier than Cadmus will not be obscure to those who review the ancient histories and annals. Yet that saying of Eupolemus — that letters were first delivered to the Hebrew nation by Moses — Augustine does not approve, in book 18 of the City of God, ch. 39: rather, he holds that Hebrew letters, like the Hebrew language, existed before Moses. Let Augustine's view be the more probable, on the authority of Josephus: for in the first book of the Jewish Antiquities he writes that the descendants of Seth, before that universal flood of the world, having themselves discovered the knowledge of heavenly things, left it inscribed and recorded in letters upon two columns — one of stone, the other of brick — lest it should ever perish by any mischance. But the antiquity of Moses (for let us pursue what we set out to say) can easily be appreciated from comparison with other writers, even the wise, who among other nations have been reckoned the most ancient.

Marginal citations: Eusebius, Praep. Evang. bk. 10; "Whether Moses delivered letters to the Hebrews"; Josephus, Antiquities bk. 1, ch. 3.

Socrates, certainly — from whom, as from a parent, so many families of noble philosophers were sown — is agreed to have lived after the latest of our prophets, Zechariah, Haggai, and Malachi. And those Seven Sages, whose chief, Thales, was the first to begin philosophizing in Greece, flourished long after those prophets who are called the greater, and more than four hundred years after Solomon. From which it appears and stands clear that, when wisdom was already, as it were, growing grey among the people of God, the cradle of philosophy had scarcely yet appeared among the Greeks. And indeed Moses preceded not only the ancient pagan poets and theologians — Orpheus, Linus, and Musaeus, far older than Homer and Hesiod — but even Mercury, the chief and inventor of philosophy among the Egyptians...

Marginal glosses: "Socrates later than the latest of the Prophets"; "The Seven Sages." Sentence continues onto printed p. 7.

— p. 48 (PDF) · printed p. 7 —

...even Mercury, the chief and inventor of philosophy among the Egyptians. For, as Augustine teaches in the place I cited just above, the Mercury who invented the surname "Trismegistus" was the grandson of the elder Mercury, whose maternal grandfather Atlas the astrologer, contemporary of Prometheus, flourished at the very time at which Moses lived. What more? Those who have carefully and subtly compared the histories and chronology of the Greeks with the history of the divine Scriptures have most truly observed and reported that Moses was a contemporary of Cecrops, the first king of the Athenians. And whatever memorable and marvelous things are related by the Greeks — whether of famous men, or of heroes, or even of their own gods, whether handed down in histories or celebrated in fabulous miracles — all these, it is clear, came into being after Cecrops. For after Cecrops came the flood of Deucalion, the conflagration of Phaethon, the rape of Proserpina and of Europa, the mysteries of Ceres, and the birth of Apollo. After Cecrops, Cadmus founded Thebes and was the first to deliver to the Greeks the letters received from the Phoenicians; Dionysus, or Father Liber, subdued the Indians and mastered the East; Minos gave to the Cretans laws made famous by the praises of writers; Aesculapius excelled in the glory of medicine and even attained divine honors. After Cecrops are celebrated the victory of Perseus, the deeds of Theseus, and the labors of Hercules; and the poets from whom the theology of the Greeks flowed forth — Amphion, Linus, Orpheus, and Musaeus — flourished. I shall be no longer. Forty years after Cecrops the Trojan War was waged, and Homer was at least a hundred years later than that.

Marginal glosses: "Mercury Trismegistus later than Moses"; "Moses a contemporary of Cecrops, and more ancient than many."

From these things it is plain that Moses, who was contemporary with Cecrops, was the first theologian, philosopher, poet, and historian of all those whose writings now survive, or whose name is recorded in the

writings of the Gentiles. And that he was a most excellent theologian is understood most plainly from three things.

Marginal gloss: "Moses was a theologian, philosopher, poet, and historian."

— p. 49 (PDF) · printed p. 8 —

First, because he held most frequent and most familiar and intimate conversations with God, accustomed to speak with Him as a friend with a friend, and to speak from His mouth, and to learn His most secret counsels. Next, because he showed us what manner of being we ought to deem God to be: namely, one, best, greatest, almighty, founder and ruler of the world, and most knowing and most provident administrator of all things. Last, because he taught the Hebrew people with what piety and religion and with what ceremonies God was to be duly worshiped and venerated, and likewise by what expiatory victims and sacrifices one might appease the wrath of God, draw forth His mercy, summon His aid, and at last obtain pardon for crimes.

The three proofs that Moses was a most excellent theologian.

Now how outstanding a philosopher Moses was can be in doubt to no one who has read even this one book; for this book contains the most difficult and most noble part of philosophy — I mean that which concerns the world and man — described and explained by him as truly as it is gravely and marvelously. And all these things Moses set down in written records — not invented by himself, not received from men, not tracked out by the traces and guidance of nature, but disclosed and made known to him by God Himself indicating and teaching. The excellence of his poetic merit is openly declared by two of his most elegant songs or canticles, which are read in the book of Exodus and of Deuteronomy — to say nothing of the fact that no small part of the book of Job was composed by him in a most beautiful metrical form. Indeed, that most weighty authority Jerome affirms that eleven of the Psalms are by Moses, namely those numbered in the book of Psalms from the eighty-eighth to the hundredth. What remains

is history, whose first virtue and chief praise is truth — which is so great in the history of Moses that concerning the truth of not even a single word of all his writings...

Marginal citations: Exod. 15; Deut. 32; Jerome, Letter 139 (to Cyprian). Sentence continues onto printed p. 9.

— p. 50 (PDF) · printed p. 9 —

...it is permitted to be in any doubt. Moreover, he surpassed the other historians in this, that he wrote a history of the longest span of time: for he wove it continuously, taken up from the very beginning of the world, over 2,500 years. But concerning the antiquity of Moses and the excellence of his virtues, there will be given us both another place more suitable for proclaiming it, and another time for speaking, less narrow and confined.

Marginal gloss: "...of his virtues."

But I fear that perhaps at this point the thought may steal upon the reader that Moses is not the author of this book, but Ezra. For there is an old report and opinion — confirmed by the authority of Irenaeus (bk. 3, ch. 25), Tertullian (in the book On Women's Dress), Clement of Alexandria (bk. 1 of the Stromata), Eusebius (in the Chronicles), the blessed Jerome (in the book against Helvidius), and other noble writers — that at the time when Jerusalem was captured and utterly overthrown by the Chaldeans, the books of Moses, like all the rest of the Old Testament, were also burned, but that afterward, by a divine favor and miracle of memory, these same books were renewed by Ezra and restored to their former integrity; whence it comes about that of the sacred books which we now have, not Moses but Ezra ought to be reckoned the writer and author.

Marginal gloss: "Whether Ezra renewed the [sacred] books."

But this has no difficulty in it: for since Ezra did not make or compose new sacred books, but restored and made whole again the earlier ones, just as they had been, in exactly the same sentences and words, for this reason he

ought to be regarded and called not the author of the sacred books, but only their repairer and restorer. And yet, were it not that the authority of so many weighty men stood in the way, it would be easier to contradict than to assent to that widespread and ancient opinion that the sacred books were, to the very last one, all destroyed in the Chaldean fire and restored many years afterward by Ezra. I shall state in this place (for it will not, I think, prove tiresome to the reader) by what reasons the credibility of this opinion seems, if not wholly to be shaken and overthrown from its foundations, yet to be not a little lessened and weakened. And first, indeed...

Marginal gloss: "That not all the sacred books were burned by the Chaldeans." Sentence continues onto printed p. 10.

— p. 51 (PDF) · printed p. 10 —

...first, indeed, it must in no way be doubted that there were a very great many copies of the books of Moses and of the rest of divine Scripture among the Jews, but especially in the keeping of the priests, of whom there were many thousands among that people; for to these a careful and constant reading of the divine volumes — and especially of Moses — was wholly necessary, both for duly discharging the priestly offices, and for teaching the people, and for fittingly deciding and settling their suits and controversies according to the divine law. That there were very many copies of the divine volumes is established, moreover, by this argument: that in the first book of Maccabees, ch. 1, it is written that, by command of King Antiochus, all the sacred books, wherever they were found among any of the Hebrews, were torn up and burned; they were therefore many and widely scattered, and yet, for all that king's diligence, it did not come about that all the books perished. For after that time (we read in the same book, ch. 3) the Jews came to Mespha (Mizpah), and there fasted, and, with their garments rent, put on sackcloth, and spread open the books of the Law. Moreover, some years later Jonathan, in the letter he wrote to the Spartans, says: “We, though we needed none of these things, having for our comfort the holy books that are in our hands,” and so forth. And indeed, if

all the volumes of divine Scripture had then been burned by Antiochus, whence would the sacred books have come that existed in the time of our Lord and of the Apostles? Or will someone invent yet another Ezra, by whom they were a second time restored? And if, in the time of the Maccabees — when, by order of King Antiochus, who held all Judaea oppressed under a most cruel tyranny, the sacred books were sought out with the utmost diligence and tracked down by every trace, and were burned wherever they were found among anyone — many were nonetheless saved from that burning: how much less credible is it that they were all burned by the Chaldeans? since the Chaldeans neither burned any books, nor sought to burn...

First argument against the Ezra-redaction theory. Inline scripture: 1 Macc. 1 (Antiochus' burning of the books), 1 Macc. 3:46–48 (the fast at Mizpah, the rending of garments and spreading open of the books of the Law), 1 Macc. 12:9 (Jonathan's letter to the Spartans). Re-verified word-by-word against a 300-dpi rasterization. Sentence continues onto printed p. 11.

— p. 52 (PDF) · printed p. 11 —

...sought to burn [them] — does Scripture anywhere attest it? Nay rather: since all the things that the Chaldeans, when Jerusalem was taken, either burned or destroyed or carried off to Babylon are recorded distinctly and in detail in the fourth book of Kings, in the second of Paralipomenon (Chronicles), and in Jeremiah — yet of the sacred books being burned at that time no mention whatever is anywhere made in the sacred writings. But it would not have been passed over in silence, had it happened, just as the burning of the sacred volumes that took place in the time of the Maccabees is narrated expressly and plainly in their books. Add to this that it is not credible that Jeremiah — who, by leave of the king of Babylon, rescued and preserved from that Chaldean destruction and burning of the city and Temple the ark, the altar of incense, and the tabernacle (as is written in the second book of Maccabees) — would not, with no less zeal and care, and certainly with less labor and difficulty, have preserved the divine books, lest they all utterly perish. What of it? That it is no small sign

that the sacred books were not set ablaze and lost by the Chaldeans in that burning of the city and Temple: that some seventy years after that time, and more than eighty years before Ezra, Daniel makes mention of the books of Jeremiah and of Moses as being then safe and entire; and that Josephus too, in the eleventh book of the Jewish Antiquities, relates that King Cyrus — in order to grant the Jews their liberty and the power of rebuilding the Temple — was moved to it when the book of Isaiah was shown him by the Jews (or, as Theodoret reports, by Daniel himself), in which the prophet had by name promised him, in [God's] own words, that most ample empire; therefore at the time of Cyrus — that is, so many years after the Chaldean burning, and before Ezra — the book of Isaiah was intact. I shall not make this long: the aforesaid authors and followers of this opinion confirm it by no testimony of Scripture, by no [firm] reason...

Verified word-by-word against a 300-dpi rasterization. Key readings: 'urbis et templi excidio' (the city, not 'orbis'/world); 'altare incensi' = the altar of incense (cf. 2 Macc. 2:4–5, where Jeremiah hides the tabernacle, ark, and altar of incense); 'integer liber Isaiae.' Marginal citations: 4 Kings (2 Kings) 25, 2 Paralipomenon (2 Chron.) 36, Jeremiah 52; 2 Macc. 2; Daniel 9; Josephus, Antiquities bk. 11; Theodoret (de fide, bk. 1), Isaiah 45. Sentence continues onto printed p. 12.

— p. 53 (PDF) · printed p. 12 —

...by no firm or even probable conjecture do they confirm it. There is, to be sure, in the fourth book of Ezra, ch. 14, some matter or other, from which perhaps they have drawn that opinion: for Ezra is brought in supplicating God that, because his law had been burned, the Holy Spirit might be imparted to him for renewing it; and after this it is added that this petition of Ezra was granted by God. But this is an empty and futile argument: for who does not know that that book is apocryphal, and that it has no credit or authority among the Hebrews any more than among Christians? And besides, in that passage Ezra is not dealing with the restoration of the divine volumes, but with the writing of other books — those, namely, which would contain a certain inner and more hidden mystical understanding of the books of Moses and of sacred matters, which some

think to be that which is commonly called the Cabbalistic [doctrine]. For in that very book it is related that Ezra in forty days wrote two hundred and four books, of which he disclosed and published to the public one hundred and thirty-four, but the last seventy he was forbidden by God's command to bring before the public. From which one may understand that what is recorded in that passage about the books written by Ezra in no way pertains to the restoration of the divine volumes of which we are now speaking. Nor will I leave aside that Athanasius did not understand any such restoration of divine Scripture to have been accomplished by Ezra by so great a miracle; for, treating of the books of Ezra in his Synopsis, he writes thus: “This too is related of Ezra: that, when the sacred books were perishing through the people's neglect and the long captivity, he — being an industrious man, a most diligent reader, and most devoted to the true and the right — kept all those books by him, and afterward brought them forth for common use, and thus preserved them, rescued, in a manner, from destruction.” These things I have said about this opinion, not with the authority [of one passing judgment...]

Verified word-by-word against a 300-dpi rasterization. Key corrections from the earlier reading: 'Dei iussu esse prohibitum' (forbidden by God's command, not 'Deus illum prohibuit'); 'verique ac recti studiosissimus' (most devoted to the true and the right). Inline: 4 Ezra (2 Esdras) 14 — the 204 books, 134 published and 70 kept secret; Athanasius, Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae. The closing sentence runs over onto printed p. 13.

— p. 54 (PDF) · printed p. 13 —

[...These things I have said about this opinion, not with the author]ity of one passing judgment, but with the freedom of one disputing; for I have not so much wished to oppose an inveterate and received opinion, as to point out, in the manner of those who dispute, what in it may seem either obscure, or doubtful, or little in accord with the divine writings, or, finally, neither easy to believe nor readily to be proved.

Continues the sentence carried over from printed p. 12; closes the Ezra digression.

Whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch entirely such as it now is.

Marginal rubric marking a new disputed question, which runs from here onto printed p. 14.

This too may be brought into dispute in this place: whether the books of Moses, such as we now have them of old, were entirely written by him [Moses], so that nothing is contained in them which did not proceed from Moses and was committed by him to writing. That the books of the Pentateuch, as they now are, were not written thus by Moses, some gather from this argument: that in ch. 21 of the book of Numbers the Book of the Wars of the Lord is cited, and likewise Proverbs and Songs, which there is no doubt were written after Moses' times; for in that place the authors of those proverbs and songs are called in Hebrew Moschelim — that is, if you render word for word into Latin, “Parable-makers” or “Proverb-makers”: namely, those who used figured diction, made up of parables and proverbs, both in speaking and in writing. From which one may understand that they were ingenious and elegant writers. For mâchâl, among the Hebrews, is a witty, acute, and elegant manner of speaking and writing. Doubtless these men wrote the most notable and memorable affairs of the people of God, partly in bound discourse (verse), partly in loose (prose).

Corrected reading: 'tales omnino sint AB EO scripti' — i.e. whether the books were written entirely BY HIM (Moses), not 'a Deo' (by God), as a 220-dpi reading had it. The disputed question is the completeness of Mosaic authorship. The objection rests on Num. 21 and the Hebrew term mâchâl / Moschelim ('makers of parables/proverbs'). Verified against a 300-dpi rasterization.

So others judge. I, for my part, am led to believe that the greatest part of the Pentateuch is Moses' own — both by the agreeing authority of all, and also because I find in the sacred books (Exod. 17 and 24, and Deut. 31) that Moses left many things in writing. Nor is it a slight argument for this that our Lord said to the Jews (John 5): "If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of me. But if you do not believe his writings, how will you believe my words?" And...

Pererius's own position: most of the Pentateuch is genuinely Mosaic. Marginal gloss: "The author's opinion." Inline scripture: Exod. 17 & 24; Deut. 31; John 5:46–47. Verified against a 220-dpi rasterization. The sentence runs over onto printed p. 14 ("Et apud Ioannem cap. primo…").

— p. 55 (PDF) · printed p. 14 —

And in John, ch. 1, Philip said to Nathanael: "We have found him of whom Moses in the Law, and the Prophets, wrote — Jesus, the son of Joseph, from Nazareth." I also approve the view of those who think that this Pentateuch was, long after Moses' time — with clauses of words and sentences inserted in various places — as it were patched up and rendered more explicit, and better arranged for maintaining the continuity of the narrative. This too is most like the truth: that in the Synagogue, in those ancient times, there were Journals and Annals, in which memorable sacred matters, useful for the propagation of sacred teaching, were written in a continuous series by those who in every age were distinguished for the praise of learning and piety. That many of the things now in the sacred books were taken from their writings — though handed down more briefly, more distinctly, and brought into better order — is strongly argued by the fact that in the divine books other books are often cited, in which the same matters were related more fully, books which have all perished.

Continues the disputation begun on printed p. 13 (whether Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch): "Et apud Ioannem…" links straight from the John 5 quotation ending p. 13. Pererius grants that the Pentateuch was later editorially expanded while holding that its substance is Mosaic. Inline scripture: John 1:45.

Such was the Book of the Wars of the Lord, named in the twenty-first chapter of the book of Numbers; likewise the Book of the Just (Jasher), mentioned in the book of Joshua, ch. 10, and in the second book of Kings (2 Samuel), ch. 1. There are also mentioned, in the third book of Kings (1 Kings), chs. 11 and 14, the Book of the Words of the Days of Solomon, and the book of the Acts of Israel and of the Kings of Judah; likewise the deeds of David recorded by the prophets Samuel, Nathan, and Gad; and that notable work concerning all that was done during David's reign, both in the

land of Israel and in all the kingdoms of other nations, of which writings mention is made in the closing words of the first book of Paralipomenon (1 Chronicles). Besides these: the books of the Words of Nathan; the book of Ahijah the Shilonite; the vision of Iddo against Jeroboam, in the second Paralipomenon (2 Chron.), ch. 9; and also the discourses of Hozai concerning the affairs of King Manasseh, in the second Paralipo[menon]...

Pererius's catalogue of lost books cited within Scripture. Sentence continues onto printed p. 15. Citations as given: Num. 21; Josh. 10; 2 Kings (2 Sam.) 1; 3 Kings (1 Kings) 11 & 14; 1 Paralipomenon (1 Chron., closing verses); 2 Paralipomenon (2 Chron.) 9.

— p. 56 (PDF) · printed p. 15 —

...[Paralipo]menon ch. 33; the book also of the Days of the priesthood of John Hyrcanus is mentioned at the end of the first book of Maccabees. Why say more? The author of the latter book of Maccabees, in the second chapter of his book, confesses that he compressed into one volume the deeds of Judas Maccabaeus that had been more amply and minutely set forth in five books by Jason of Cyrene. But as to why writings of this sort were not placed on the roll of the divine Scriptures — although other books by the same authors are held canonical and sacred, and not a few things in the divine writings are drawn from such writings — Augustine, wishing to find some cause, writes thus in ch. 38 of book 18 of the City of God:

Marginal glosses: "Why writings of this sort were not received into the number of the sacred Scriptures"; "The opinion of St. Augustine." Citations: 1 Macc. 16 (end); 2 Macc. 2.

"I confess that the cause of this is hidden from me, except that I think that even those men, to whom the Holy Spirit revealed the things that ought to be of religious authority, were able to write some things as men, by historical diligence, and others as Prophets, by divine inspiration; and that these were so kept distinct that the former should be judged to be attributed to the men themselves, but the latter to God speaking through them; and thus the former pertained to the richness of knowledge, the latter to the authority of religion, in which authority

the canon is guarded." Thus far Augustine.

Quotation from Augustine, City of God 18.38.

It remains that we disclose, in the last part of this preface: whence Moses received this teaching about the creation of the world — comprehensible by no human reasoning — and at what time he committed it to letters and writings. The things that Moses wrote about the fashioning of the world he could have known in two ways: partly from God, being enlightened by the prophetic light — by which light the most hidden things, exceeding all the power and grasp of human understanding, whether present, future, or past, are plainly discerned — and partly taught and instructed by his fore[fathers]...

Marginal gloss: "Whence Moses received this teaching of the world's generation." Sentence continues onto printed p. 16.

— p. 57 (PDF) · printed p. 16 —

...by his forefathers, through the most faithful tradition of their descendants, by which the teaching of such matters had, from Adam onward, been transmitted as it were from hand to hand and brought down all the way to Moses. For the things that Moses wrote in this book he could have learned from the sons or grandsons of the Patriarch Joseph: for between the death of Joseph and the birth of Moses there intervened no more than sixty-four years. And Joseph could have known the same things from his father Jacob; he from Isaac, who learned them from Abraham; and Abraham, in turn, Shem and Noah could have taught — for Noah lived fifty-eight years after the birth of Abraham himself, and Shem survived Abraham by thirty-three years. Noah, moreover, could have received this very teaching from his grandfather Methuselah, who reached the six-hundredth year of Noah; and since Methuselah lived two hundred and forty-three years together with Adam, he could many times both have seen Adam present and heard him speak, and have been instructed by him in very many things concerning matters divine.

Marginal gloss: "The tradition of the Mosaic teaching from Adam down to Moses." Pererius's chain of transmission: Adam → Methuselah → Noah → Shem → Abraham → Isaac → Jacob → Joseph → Moses.

It is clear, therefore, that the things contained in this volume were ascertained and grasped by Moses both by divine and by human reasoning — and each indeed most true and most certain, yet the former lending divine credit and authority to this writing — to which, of course, nothing false could underlie, and which it would be lawful for no one to gainsay or to disbelieve. But at what time did Moses write this book? Namely, after the departure that freed the Hebrews from Egypt. This was Eusebius's view, and he indicated it not obscurely in book 7 of the Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 2. Of the same matter I have a twofold conjecture, and one, I think, not improbable. The one conjecture is that Moses, a fugitive from Egypt, spent forty years in the land of Midian, where, taking charge of pasturing his father-in-law's flock, by leisure and solitude — two [aids] most opportune for meditating and writ[ing]...

Marginal glosses: "At what time Genesis was written by Moses"; "Exod. 2 & 3." Eusebius, Praep. Evang. bk. 7, ch. 2. Sentence continues onto printed p. 17.

— p. 58 (PDF) · printed p. 17 —

...most opportune, he was wondrously drawn to handle divine matters in his mind and to set them down in letters. The other conjecture is that the writing of this book could at that time have contributed very much to consoling and raising up the spirits of the Hebrews, who were then held oppressed by the long and most grievous servitude of the Egyptians. For this book set before the eyes of those who had been the chiefs and fathers of the Hebrew people their outstanding virtues, their illustrious deeds, and above all, in adversity, the greatness and constancy of their unconquered spirit; namely, the Jews, by such notable examples of their ancestors' patience and trust in divine aid (which, they read, those ancestors had often experienced in utterly desperate circumstances), could be greatly sustained and refreshed in that bitterness and calamity of their own times.

This book also represented to their minds the magnificent oracles and promises of God, and especially that which had been foretold to Abraham: that after the birth of his son Isaac his descendants would be afflicted by a laborious sojourn of four hundred years and a most harsh servitude, but that after the elapsing of that time all would be marvelously delivered, and would obtain possession of the promised and longed-for land of the Canaanites — and the end of that time was now close at hand. By these arguments, then, it comes about that the opinion of Eusebius seems to me, at least, the more inclined toward the likeness of truth. For thus writes Eusebius in the place I cited a little above:

Marginal gloss: "Gen. 15" (the prophecy of the 400 years of affliction).

"First among the Hebrews, that excellent Theologian Moses left writings; who by divine [inspiration], before he laid down laws, impressed upon the minds of men the lives of the ancestors; and thus, having exhorted them by the rewards of the good and the punishments of the impious to embrace virtue and flee impiety, he at last set the Law before them. He judged also that, lest perhaps the Jews should find the most difficult precepts of the Law [too hard]..."

Quotation from Eusebius, Praep. Evang. (continues onto printed p. 18).

— p. 59 (PDF) · printed p. 18 —

"...[should find the precepts of the Law too hard] and so recoil from them, the examples of the ancients should be set forth, that it might be plain to all that the ancestors of the Jews had lived most excellently relying on reason alone, without the commands of laws; and that therefore it would not be difficult for them to imitate those ancestors, if they desired to obtain from God like rewards." Thus Eusebius.

End of the Eusebius quotation.

But Theodoret, in question 1 of those questions he wrote on Genesis, and Tostatus on Genesis ch. 13, question 132, are of the opinion that this book

was written by Moses after the Law had been given to the Hebrews — namely, at the time when Moses was in the wilderness with the Hebrews, of whom he was the leader. Bede too may be placed in the same opinion. This view can be supported by two arguments. For Moses, in the second chapter of this book, says that God, because on the seventh day He rested from all the works He had made in the fashioning of the world, therefore blessed that day and sanctified it; and this blessing and sanctification is surely nothing other than the cessation from all servile labor and work, which began to be in use among the Jews after the Law was given them by God. From which it is understood that, when Moses wrote this, he undoubtedly had in view the time of the Law already promulgated — the very time at which he was writing this book.

Marginal gloss: "The opinion of Theodoret and Tostatus." First of the two supporting arguments (the Sabbath rest).

Again, in the seventh chapter of the book of Genesis, Noah, at God's command, brought into the ark seven of the clean animals, but two of the unclean; and the distinction of clean and unclean animals was made known and established for the Hebrews by the Law. Since, therefore, those seven animals were of the kind later declared clean by the Law, and the two of the number that the Law showed to be unclean, Moses — with regard to the time at which he was writing the book of Genesis (namely after the Law had been given to the Hebrews, at which time the distinction of clean and unclean animals was very well known to them) — rightly called those seven clea[n]...

Marginal gloss: "Lev. 11 & Deut. 14" (the law of clean and unclean animals). Second supporting argument. Sentence continues onto printed p. 19.

— p. 60 (PDF) · printed p. 19 —

...[those seven] clean, the two unclean — namely, by the figure of anticipation (prolepsis), one frequent enough in the sacred writings. And by this twofold reasoning the opinion of Theodoret, Bede, and Tostatus is

confirmed; yet neither is really a very firm reason, and each can easily be refuted. For it will be said that many things which were established by the Mosaic Law were also, before the Law, in custom and use among upright and religious men — not, indeed, sanctioned by any law or precept of God, but derived from the tradition of the ancestors, whether from Adam himself or at least from his descendant Enos (in whose time the name of the Lord is said to have begun to be invoked). Whence it comes about that, long before the Mosaic Law, we read in the sacred writings that there were in use the building of altars and oblations, certain rites of sacrifices, vows likewise and tithes, abstinence too from blood and from what is strangled, and also the raising up of seed for a brother who had died without children. Wherefore, among the number of these, the observance of the Sabbath too, and the distinction of clean and unclean animals, could have existed; and on that account, although each of these opinions is probable, yet the former — which, as I said, pleased Eusebius — seems to me the more probable.

Marginal glosses: "Many things which were in use before the Law in the worship of the ancient Patriarchs"; "Gen. 4" (Enos and the invoking of the Lord's name). Pererius rebuts the Theodoret/Bede/Tostatus dating.

But we, having prefaced these few things, let us now set about explaining the fashioning of the world, accomplished by God in six days — which Moses described as truly as he did most briefly — and in the treatment of that matter let us spend this first volume of these commentaries.

Closing sentence of the Praefatio. The next page begins the section headed HISTORIA MOSIS (the Vulgate text of Genesis 1–2).

— p. 61 (PDF) · printed p. 20 —

The History of Moses, which is explained in this first volume of the commentaries.

Section title. What follows on pp. 20–21 is the Vulgate text of Genesis 1–2 reproduced as the lemma for the commentary.

From the first chapter of Genesis.

In the beginning God created heaven and earth. And the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters. And God said: Let there be light. And there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good; and he divided the light from the darkness. And he called the light Day, and the darkness Night; and there was evening and morning, one day.

Genesis 1:1–5 (Vulgate). The first day.

God also said: Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament from those that were above the firmament. And it was so. And God called the firmament Heaven; and there was evening and morning, a second day.

Genesis 1:6–8. The second day.

And God said: Let the waters that are under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear. And it was so done. And God called the dry land Earth, and the gatherings of the waters he called Seas. And God saw that it was good, and said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, both such as may bear seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth. And it was so done. And the earth brought forth the green herb, both such as beareth seed according to its kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having each its own seed according to its species. And God saw that it was good. And there was evening and morning, a third day.

Genesis 1:9–13. The third day.

And God said: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night, and let them be...

Genesis 1:14a. The fourth day begins; the sentence continues onto printed p. 21.

— p. 62 (PDF) · printed p. 21 —

...for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years, to shine in the firmament of heaven and to give light upon the earth. And it was so done. And God made two great lights: a greater light to rule the day, and a lesser light to rule the night; and the stars. And he set them in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth, and to rule the day and the night, and to divide the light and the darkness. And God saw that it was good. And there was evening and morning, a fourth day.

Genesis 1:14b–19. The fourth day.

God also said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven. And God created the great whales, and every living and moving creature which the waters brought forth, according to their kinds, and every winged fowl according to its kind. And God saw that it was good, and he blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea; and let the birds be multiplied upon the earth. And there was evening and morning, a fifth day.

Genesis 1:20–23. The fifth day.

God also said: Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth according to their kinds. And it was so done. And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds, and cattle, and every thing that creepeth on the earth after its kind. And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And there was evening and morning, the sixth day.

Genesis 1:24–25, 31. NOTE: this printed Historia excerpt OMITS the creation of man (Gen 1:26–30); the text jumps from the beasts straight to "And God saw all the things… very good." Reproduced exactly as printed.

From the second chapter of Genesis.

So the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the furniture of them. And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done. And he blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because in it he had ceased from all his work which God created and made. These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprang up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew; for the Lord God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to till the earth; but a spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface of the earth.

Genesis 2:1–6 (Vulgate). The catchword "TRA-" leads to the four interpretive rules on printed p. 22.

— p. 63 (PDF) · printed p. 22 —

Four rules are here set down, by which it may easily be judged — among the various interpretations of authors who explain this teaching of Moses on the generation of the world — which interpretation is true or false, and which is more or less probable.

Heading of the prefatory canons of interpretation.

There is described by Moses, at the opening of this book, the origin and fashioning of this corporeal and visible world, and it is shown how it was, part by part, founded, arranged, and adorned by God over six days. Of this Mosaic description and narration there are, among writers both of ancient and of recent memory, interpretations so many and so discordant that it can scarcely be told — some of them false, several scarcely probable, and certain ones slippery and headlong toward shameful error. Wherefore, that the reader may (so far as may be) guard against all errors, and keep to a sure and compendious way of investigating and finding the truth, I shall here append a few brief rules, by which he may be able to examine and judge which interpretation is good or bad, which agrees with or departs from the purpose and the words of Moses, and, among the many not to be

rejected, which is more or less to be approved.

FIRST RULE. The teaching of Moses which is handed down concerning the creation of the world is plainly historical.

Marginal gloss: "The narration of Moses is historical, and to be interpreted according to the historical sense" (cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, bk. 8, ch. 1).

For Moses narrates that the world was made by God from some fixed beginning of time, and that it was not founded all at once in a point of time, but fashioned part by part over the span of six days. The Blessed Augustine confirms this rule at the beginning of the eighth book of On Genesis according to the Letter, writing thus:

"The narration of Moses in the book of Genesis is not a kind of speech about figured things, as in the Song of Songs, but is an account of things wholly done, as in the books of Kingdoms (Kings) and others of that sort. But because in these the things spoken of are such as the most familiar use of human life knows, they are without difficulty — indeed most readily — taken at first according to the letter. In the book of Genesis, however, because the things spoken of are such as do not occur to those who observe the accustomed course of nature, on that account so[me...]"

Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 8.1. The quotation continues onto printed p. 23.

— p. 64 (PDF) · printed p. 23 —

"...on that account some are unwilling to have these things understood literally, but [hold them] figuratively spoken, and they think that the properly historical narration of this book begins from that place where, sent away from Paradise, Adam and Eve came together and begot offspring — as though, forsooth, it were familiar to us either that they lived so many years, or that Henoch was translated, or that the aged and barren Sara bore a son, and the like." Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (On Genesis according to the Letter 8.1). Running head from here on: COMM. IN GENESIM, LIB. I.

From these things it is clearly understood that, if the narration of Moses is historical, it follows that it must be taken in the proper and commonly used signification of its words. For if Moses wrote historically, he undoubtedly wished to teach what his words, taken in their proper sense, declare. Wherefore the interpretation of those is most to be praised and approved who diligently take care to interpret whatever is handed down by Moses in this place just as the words themselves sound and present themselves. And as witness and approver of this I shall call up Augustine, who, in ch. 2 of the eighth book of On Genesis according to the Letter — partly correcting what he had written on Genesis in his two books Against the Manichees (because in them he had followed not the historical but the figurative and mystical kind of interpretation), partly showing that in those books which he was writing later (more mature in age and in learning, and more practiced in the study of the sacred letters) it would be his heart's care to follow, so far as he could, the exposition that adheres to the [literal] sense of the words — writes in this manner:

Marginal gloss: "The literal sense is the genuine, proper sense of Moses."

> *"I wrote two books on Genesis against the Manichees in the recent time of my conversion; and because it did not then occur to me how all things might be taken in their proper sense, I explained, with what brevity and clearness I could, what those things signified figuratively which I could not find [a way to take] according to the letter — yet mindful of what I most wished (though I could not achieve it): that all should at the outset be understood not figuratively but properly; and not altogether despairing that they could be so understood, I set down this very thing in the second book of the first part (that is, in ch. 2) thus: 'Whoever shall wish to take all the things said by Moses according to the letter, and to understand them no otherwise than the letter sounds, and does so without any injury to the faith, is not only*

not to be grudged this, but is to be held an excellent and most praiseworthy interpreter.' This I said then. But now, because the Lord has willed that, gazing upon and considering these things more diligently, I should judge — not in vain, as I think — that it can even by me be demonstrated that these things were spoken by Moses according to the proper, and not the allegorical, manner of speech, just as we wished to show above, so let us also scrutinize what follows concerning Paradise." Thus far Augustine.

Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter 8.2, quoting his own earlier On Genesis against the Manichees.

But there is nothing that more strongly confirms and more brilliantly illustrates this rule than what Basil writes to this effect, reproving Origen (though suppressing his name). For he, in the third Homily on Genesis, when he had recalled Origen's opinion — understanding by the supercelestial waters the good Angels, and by the sublunary waters the evil Spirits — adds what follows:

Marginal gloss: "Basil's opinion much to be observed."

"And indeed these men (he says), under the pretext of an anagogical sense and a more sublime understanding, transfer everything into allegories; but we, casting aside these interpretations as being like dreams and old wives' tales, by the name of water understand real water, and the other things likewise."

Basil, Homilies on the Hexaemeron (3rd homily), against Origen's allegorizing of the waters.

And at the opening of the ninth Homily on Genesis he says similar things...

Sentence continues onto printed p. 24 (Basil again on the literal sense as the genuine, proper sense of Moses' words).

— p. 65 (PDF) · printed p. 24 —

...he says, and things even somewhat more striking. "I know," he says, "the laws of allegories — though not invented by me, yet elaborated by others — I hold them: for those who do not accept the common meanings of Scripture take water not as water, but as some other nature, and twist 'fish' and 'herb' and the rest to whatever seems good to them; just as the interpreters of dreams, who, looking to what they have set before themselves, are wont to invent interpretations of dreams. But I, when I hear 'hay,' understand hay; and 'plant,' and 'fish,' and 'wild beast,' and 'beast of burden' — I take them all as they are said." Thus Basil.

Conclusion of the Basil quotation (9th Homily on Genesis) begun at the foot of printed p. 23.

And Bede, on the Hexaemeron, expounding the words "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth," says: "It must be carefully observed that each one so devote his effort to the allegorical senses as not, by allegorizing, to abandon the plain trustworthiness of the history." This censure, surely most true, seems also in some way to touch Augustine; since he often carries over the words of Moses which properly signify corporeal things — such as Heaven, light, darkness, day, night, morning, and evening — from their proper signification to the exposition and understanding of spiritual things, as though they ought to be taken figuratively.

Quotations from Bede (on the Hexaemeron) and a gentle reservation about Augustine's allegorizing.

I add this one thing, as a closing clause to this rule: if the things Moses hands down in this place are to be taken not historically and properly, but figuratively and allegorically, the result will be that from Moses we shall have either no teaching at all, or at any rate no stable, settled, and certain teaching about the origin and making of the world — whereas the teaching which the Catholic Church holds on this matter, and which she has set among the articles of faith, she has received chiefly from this book of Moses. For the mystical and allegorical sense, besides not being

sufficiently apt and firm for teaching or proving anything, is also varied, manifold, and uncertain, set in as great a variety as is the cleverness and fertility of men's wit in devising such senses.

SECOND RULE. In treating and explaining this teaching of Moses, one must not resort without cause to miracles and to the absolute power of God.

Marginal gloss: "One must not flee to miracles and God's absolute power without necessary cause."

...as some do, ignorantly and ineptly, who, when they cannot render a fit and probable reason for their opinion, flee to miracles and God's omnipotence as to a sanctuary. For in the first construction of all things and the fashioning of the world, one must by no means look at what God could simply and absolutely have done, but at what it was consonant with his wisdom for him to have done, and what the natural force, disposition, and fittingness of the things themselves requires. This rule, as sufficiently evident in itself and probable to anyone of sound mind, I shall confirm by no other than the single testimony of Augustine: for he, at the beginning of the second book of On Genesis according to the Letter, disputing about the waters that are above the firmament, teaches that those who deny (on the allegorical reading) that there can be [real] waters there are not to be refuted and as it were rebuked by appeal to miracles and the omnipotence of God. For he says thus:

Marginal citation: Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, bk. 2, ch. 2.

"Nor ought anyone to refute these men in such a way as to say that, according to the omnipotence of God, to whom all things are possible, we must believe that the waters above the heavens are such as those upon the earth. For now [the question] is how God established the natures of things, according to his Scriptures..."

Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 2.2. The quotation continues onto printed p. 25.

"...this it befits us to inquire, and not what he may will to work in them or from them as a miracle of his omnipotence."

End of the Augustine quotation, completing the SECOND rule.

THIRD RULE. One must beware lest a man, with respect to an opinion he has once come to love and embrace, not only hold it tenaciously and defend it stubbornly, but even contend that it is so properly the meaning of Scripture that he cries out that any other opinion — whether opposed to his or merely different from it — is contrary to Scripture.

Marginal gloss: "The obstinate defense of one's own opinion is to be shunned."

For they deserve ill of Scripture who wish to cramp and confine within the narrowness of their own opinion and wit that which of itself lies most widely open and is capable of various opinions and interpretations. Let such men listen to Augustine, writing thus in ch. 18 of the first book of On Genesis according to the Letter:

"If some obscure and difficult passage of Scripture can admit various opinions and expositions while the Catholic faith is kept safe, none of them is to be held so rashly and obstinately as though it were the proper meaning of Scripture, that, if perhaps the truth, more diligently examined, rightly overturns it, we fall with it — fighting not for the meaning of Scripture but for our own, in such a way that we want our own to be Scripture's; whereas we ought rather to want that to be our own which is found to be Scripture's."

Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 1.18.

FOURTH RULE. This too must be carefully guarded against and altogether avoided: that in treating the teaching of Moses we should not affirm and assert as our view anything that conflicts with manifest

experience and with the reasonings of philosophy or of the other disciplines.

Marginal gloss: "What is handed down in the sacred writings cannot be contrary to the true findings of the natural disciplines."

For since everything true always agrees with what is true, the truth of the sacred writings cannot be contrary to the true reasonings and findings of the human disciplines. This Augustine saw acutely, and wished to warn us of it: for in that same book which I cited just now, ch. 21, he writes in this manner:

"This must be held without doubt: that whatever the wise of this world have been able truly to demonstrate about the nature of things, we should show is not contrary to our Scriptures; but whatever they teach in their books that is contrary to the sacred writings, we should believe, without any hesitation, to be utterly false, and, in whatever way we can, should also show it to be so; and so should hold the faith of our Lord, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom, that we be neither seduced by the loquacity of a false philosophy, nor terrified by the superstition of a feigned religion."

Augustine, On Genesis ad litteram 1.21.

If we test and weigh by this rule certain opinions of certain interpreters, we shall plainly understand that they must be rejected and cast aside. For example: Origen, Lactantius, Procopius of Gaza, Chrysostom, and certain others hold, on the basis of Scripture, that heaven is not round but immobile; that the stars move through the heaven as fish through water and birds through air; that there are no Antipodes; that the water of the sea is in many places higher and loftier even than the earth and its mountains. Yet that all these are false is now established by manifest observations and by necessary reasonings.

Pererius's examples of patristic opinions overturned by demonstrated natural science.

Here I shall set down a most weighty opinion of Augustine on the matter; he writes thus in Letter 7 to Marcellinus: "If a reasoning is brought against the authority of the divine Scriptures, however acute it be, it is deceived by mere plausibility; for it cannot be true. Again, if against a manifest and certain reasoning the authority of the holy [Scriptures] is, as it were, set up..."

Marginal gloss: "St. Augustine's view, to be observed." Augustine, Letter (Ep. to Marcellinus). The quotation continues onto printed p. 26.

— p. 67 (PDF) · printed p. 26 —

"...the authority of the Scriptures [is set up against it], he who does this does not understand, and sets against the truth not the meaning of Scripture (which he was unable to penetrate) but rather his own; and opposes not what he finds in it, but what he finds in himself as though on its behalf." Thus Augustine.

End of the Augustine (Letter to Marcellinus) quotation.

But just as some are most hostile to philosophy and the good disciplines, and think them of no profit to the study of the sacred letters but rather a great hindrance and harm, so on the contrary there are others so insane in their love and so stupid in their admiration of the ancient poets and philosophers that they reckon all their sayings to be oracles, and contend that whatever Moses briefly taught in this book of Genesis was known to those men too, and not obscurely — indeed more fully explained and more elegantly handled. And so they try, subtly and minutely, to accommodate the opinions of Moses to confirming and recommending the doctrines of those men, and the sayings of those men to illustrating and adorning the teaching of Moses.

Marginal gloss: "The sayings of Moses must not be twisted to the opinions of poets and philosophers."

I am indeed not unaware that it seemed to many of the Fathers and doctors of the Church, in former times, that the ancient pagan poets and

philosophers watered their own gardens from the springs of Moses — that is, transferred very many things from his writings into their own books — which they afterward, whether to conceal the theft or because they did not well understand them, disfigured and contaminated by mixing in fables and errors. Yet I (for I will say freely what I think) have never approved the over-curious zeal and diligence of those who in any way drag and twist the opinions of Moses toward the doctrines or even the fables of philosophers and poets — as of Orpheus, Homer, Mercury Trismegistus, Pythagoras, Plato, and even Aristotle. This seems to me, certainly, very alien and unbecoming to the dignity and majesty of divine Scripture: for it darkens its heavenly splendor, stains its purity, profanes and pollutes its sanctity, and lessens not a little the credit of its divinity.

And for this reason Agostino Steuco of Gubbio (Augustinus Eugubinus) is less approved by many, in his Cosmopoeia and in his books On Perennial Philosophy. Into this same offense and censure of good and learned men fell also Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who, at the age of twenty-three, composed the Heptaplus on the first chapter of Genesis, in which he worked out seven new expositions of Moses' teaching on the works of the six days — attempted by none of the earlier writers, but first thought out, discovered, elaborated, and perfected by himself. But that book has, to be sure, the appearance of a prodigious genius and of an erudition admirable at that age; for interpreting and understanding the teaching of Moses, however, it is of little use.

Marginal gloss: "A critical remark on Pico della Mirandola."

Sixtus of Siena relates, in the fourth book of his Holy Library (Bibliotheca Sancta), that when he was at Rome he asked Aloysius Lippomanus — who had then recently published a Catena on Genesis — why, among so many other writers and interpreters of the book of Genesis whom he had cited in that Catena, he had made no mention of Mirandola; and that Lippomanus answered that, in compiling the Catena, he had chosen the commentaries

and interpretations of those who seem[ed] to have wished to explain the words and meaning of Moses by their expositions...

Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca Sancta bk. 4. Marginal gloss: "Why Lippomanus inserted nothing about Pico in his Catena." Sentence continues onto printed p. 27.

— p. 68 (PDF) · printed p. 27 —

...seemed [to have wished to explain Moses]. But because he had observed that Pico labored at this one thing — to express and adorn, with Mosaic sayings and sentences, the inventions and dogmas of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the other philosophers, or rather his own thoughts — he [Lippomanus] had decided that no account of that man was to be taken in his own work. Yet that man was nonetheless great and admirable for every age; and had a longer life befallen him, then, just as he stirred the greatest admiration and expectation of himself among all, so assuredly he would have brought to himself immortal glory, and to Italy its highest ornament and distinction, and to all the best studies and disciplines an immense usefulness. I do not wish, by gathering more rules — since the aforesaid can suffice — to weary the reader.

Therefore (to conclude this section at last): when many and various interpretations of Moses' teaching present themselves to the reader, let him judge that one more probable and better than the rest which is more accommodated and agreeable to the purpose and design of Moses; which clings more to the sense of the words and better preserves the proper signification and use of the terms; which is plainer and easier to understand even for not very learned men; which agrees with Scripture's customary way of speaking, and does not foist upon Moses turns of phrase unusual in the sacred letters; which is conveniently drawn from other places of Scripture where the same matters are treated and the same teaching is handed down; which does not resort without cause to miracles and the omnipotence of God; which hands down nothing alien and discordant from the wisdom of God and the piety of our faith; which has nothing repugnant

to the manifest findings and reasonings handed down in philosophy and the other human disciplines; which is such that through it the whole teaching of Moses appears to hold together well and to cohere beautifully in all its parts; and lastly, which is not suspect, whether on account of novelty, or because it shrinks from the interpretation and judgment of the Fathers, from ancient tradition, and from the common sense of the Church and of the Christian people.

Marginal gloss: "Epilogue of the foregoing disputation." This recapitulates the marks of the best interpretation, summing up the four rules.

On which point Cajetan greatly offends learned and pious men, in that, at the beginning of his Commentaries on Genesis, he prefaces these words:

> *"If at any time some sense should occur that is consonant with the text, although foreign to the torrent of the Doctors, let the Reader show himself a fair judge, and let no one detest it on this ground, that it is discordant with the ancient doctors: for God did not bind the exposition of Scripture to the senses of the ancient doctors — otherwise the hope of expounding Scripture would be taken from us, except by transferring (as they say) from one leaf to another." Thus Cajetan.*

Cajetan (Cardinal Tommaso de Vio), preface to his Commentaries on Genesis. The proverb "de lidio in quinternum" = merely copying from one page/quire to another.

And what he announced he carried out boldly and in full measure: for which reason, too, in his exposition of this book he fell into a number of errors — and grave ones at that.

Marginal gloss: "A bold opinion of Cajetan, deserving correction." This closes the section of interpretive rules; the verse-by-verse commentary on "In principio" begins on printed p. 28.

— p. 69 (PDF) · printed p. 28 —

In the beginning.

The scripture lemma. The verse-by-verse commentary on Genesis begins here.

This may be interpreted in many and various ways, but, in my judgment, more aptly and better in two. First, so that "In the beginning" means "before all else": just as a man about to build a house first and before all else lays a good foundation beneath, so God, in fashioning the world, first and before all else founded Heaven and earth, as the two chief parts of the world, which necessarily precede the rest in the order of nature. In this sense the expression is used more than once in Scripture, as in David, Psalm 101[102]: "In the beginning, O Lord, thou didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands"; and in Solomon, Proverbs 8: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything."

First interpretation of "In principio": "before all else." Scripture: Ps. 102:25; Prov. 8:22.

In the other way, this phrase "in the beginning" means "from some beginning of time," so as to signify that the world did not always exist, and that God brought it about that the world — which from eternity had been nothing — should suddenly, namely when it pleased him, first begin to be. And certainly this interpretation has pleased not only many writers of the first rank in learning and distinction, but also both the Synagogue of old and the Church afterward understood and approved, from this passage of Moses, that the generation of the world was new and from some beginning of time. And although I most fully approve both interpretations, I have nonetheless proposed to myself to treat the latter more closely for the present.

Second interpretation: "from some beginning of time" — i.e. the world is not eternal. This is the one Pererius will develop.

From which Basil observed that two things are drawn: one, that from this teaching of Moses it is clearly understood that the world is not eternal, but at some time had the beginning of its origin; the other, that the antiquity of the world is also known, so that a method can be undertaken of finding how far the world's beginning is distant from our own age, by reckoning

back, as it were, all the years of its lifetime. In both the heathen strayed from the truth: for some held that the world is everlasting; others thought that it did indeed once begin, yet imagined very many myriads of years and almost countless ages elapsed since. I have resolved in this place to demolish both errors from the foundations, applying, as it were, several engines of reasoning; and first I shall set about overthrowing the former.

Marginal citation: Basil, Homily 1 on the Hexaemeron. Pererius names the two errors he will refute: (1) the world is eternal; (2) it began but countless ages ago.

There was not at all times one and the same opinion among all philosophers and nations about the origin of the world. Some acknowledged the world's arising and origin; others reckoned that, just as the world is now seen to be, such it had been throughout an eternal span of past time. For this reason Aristotle, in the first book of the Topics, made the question "whether the world is eternal or not" a dialectical problem — one that can be debated and disputed with probability on either side, both because of the authorities holding contrary views and because of the probability of the contrary reasonings. Nevertheless the defenders of eternity were very few, if they be compared with its assailants.

Marginal citation: Aristotle, Topics bk. 1, ch. 1.

— p. 70 (PDF) · printed p. 29 —

For that the world did not always exist was — except for one philosopher, Aristotle, and one nation, the Chaldeans — the harmonious opinion of nearly all: approved not only by the assent of the wise, but also by the unlearned, as it were by a certain tacit sense and judgment of nature. This universal consensus (so great is the evidence of the matter) not even Aristotle, who tried most strenuously to resist this opinion, could deny; for he, in bk. 1 of On the Heavens, text 102, says: "All men generate the world" [i.e. give it a coming-to-be]. And yet, as he himself teaches at the beginning of the first book of the Topics, "What seems so to all, or to most, or to the wise, is to be reckoned probable."

Marginal gloss: "It is proved that the world did not always exist." Citations: Aristotle, On the Heavens bk. 1 (text 102); Topics bk. 1, ch. 1.

Nor indeed is it for nothing that all agreed in this opinion: for so great a consensus of men — what else is it than the clearest voice of nature? what else than a certain natural notion and sense of the truth, impressed by God upon the souls and minds of men, and a most certain proof of it, whose credit not even Aristotle, however much he might wish, could weaken?

Indeed, these celebrated sayings are Aristotle's own and are reported as among the foremost: "What is present in all, or in most, is according to nature; what is besides these is to be reckoned contrary to nature." For he often employs this, both in the books of the Physics and in the books On the Heavens. And in the book On Divination through Dreams he says thus: "What all, or very many, perceive or say is not to be thought false." And in the seventh book of the Ethics he commends the verses of a certain poet, which, rendered into Latin, have this sense:

Marginal chapter citations: ch. 1; ch. 13 (for the Aristotelian references).

> *Not utterly does that report perish, which throughout the world / a multitude of men celebrates.*

The verses Aristotle commends in Nicomachean Ethics 7 (the saying attributed to Hesiod).

Finally, there is that very clear passage in the same author, in the tenth book of the Ethics: "What seems so to all," he says, "that we affirm to be; but he who takes away this credence will not say anything much more probable."

Marginal citation: ch. 2 (Nicomachean Ethics bk. 10).

And it is a great argument for the truth of this view about the new construction of the world, that it avails very much for implanting, fostering, and confirming in men's minds the knowledge, worship, and religion of the true God. For if anyone has been persuaded that the world — which

through all eternity had been nothing — was founded by God from some beginning of time, he will at once and without difficulty be persuaded also that God exists, and is one, and is the knowing, preserving, and governing cause of all things, and is mighty with infinite power; that he was led to fashion the world by no necessity of nature, but only by his own will and goodness; and that he is blessed of himself and by himself alone, and needs nothing outside himself, neither support nor fellowship, to preserve his own happiness. All these things so aptly hang and are linked from that first point, that whoever has granted it cannot deny them; whereas, on the contrary, those who make the world eternal either deny the things we have said about God, or at any rate cannot prove them so evidently and readily.

Marginal gloss: "To believe the world was founded by God is a great aid toward worshiping God." Pererius re-uses, nearly verbatim, the argument from the Praefatio (printed p. 2).

Nor should we here pass over, as worthless, what Pliny — quite unawares, and forgetful of his own opinion — noted as though [an argument]...

Sentence continues onto printed p. 30. Marginal gloss (begins here, completed on next page): "Pliny, even against his own opinion, bore witness to a new beginning of the world."

— p. 71 (PDF) · printed p. 30 —

...as an argument why we should believe that the world neither existed from infinite time nor will endure to infinite time, he noted in ch. 16 of book 7: "On the whole," he says, "it is observed that for the entire race of mortals the stature grows less from day to day, and that few are taller than their fathers — as though the conflagration toward whose turn the present age now inclines were consuming the fertility of the seeds." The author of the fourth book of Ezra treated the same argument in ch. 5 of his book.

Marginal gloss: "Pliny, even against his own opinion, bore witness to a new beginning of the world." Pliny, Natural History 7.16; 4 Ezra (2 Esdras) 5.

But now these men are entangled in many difficulties, from which they can scarcely, or not even scarcely, extricate themselves: for, even on the

authority of Aristotle (who acted as the censor and judge of nature), those pronouncements of the philosophers are most true — that one infinite is not greater than another infinite; that nothing can be infinite either in magnitude or in number; that the infinite can in no way be traversed; and finally that the infinite cannot be comprehended by reason and understanding. But the things contrary to these Aristotle judges to be not only false, but also "irrational and impossible" (■λογα κα■ ■δ■νατα). And yet all these must necessarily be admitted, and swallowed even against their will, by those who stubbornly defend the eternity of the world.

Marginal gloss: "In what difficulties the defenders of the world's eternity entangle themselves." The Greek ■λογα κα■ ■δ■νατα = "irrational and impossible."

But let us set these aside — the things drawn from the deeper philosophy — and leave them to be disputed more subtly by the scholastic philosophers and theologians; in treating which philosophically we ourselves also spent the whole fifteenth book of that work which we published in earlier years On Philosophy. Let us therefore bring our discourse down into a freer and more open field, and say things that can be proved even to the common people: let us shake out the whole memory of antiquity, and investigate not only the records but even the first beginnings of the most ancient things, and by this means show most plainly that the world is not eternal.

Pererius refers to bk. 15 of his earlier philosophical work (his De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis), and turns from metaphysical to historical arguments.

All the memory of ancient things — whatever survives among the Gentiles, whether in writings, or in letters and the shapes of letters, or in the monuments of any other things whatever — is found to be more recent not only than the beginning of the world which sacred Scripture hands down, but even than the flood of Noah. Pliny indeed, in ch. 56 of book 7, carefully pursues and diligently gathers the first inventors of all the arts and disciplines and of all things devised for the uses of human life; and to those

who consider their dates one by one it becomes manifest that not only was the world not eternal, but that its origin is not even very ancient. And in truth, if the world were eternal, how could it come about that there is among any nation no memory of anything that existed in the world before six thousand years ago? The force and probability of this reasoning Lucretius too, a weighty and learned poet, both perceived in his mind and set forth in the fifth book in these verses:

Marginal gloss: "From the inventors of the arts it is gathered that the world is not eternal." Pliny, Natural History 7.56 (on the first inventors).

Besides, if there was no birth-origin / of lands and sky, and they were always eternal, / why have not other poets sung of other deeds also, / beyond the Theban war and the destruction of Troy? / Whither have so many deeds of men so often fallen away? Nor anywhere...

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 5.324–328. The quotation continues onto printed p. 31.

— p. 72 (PDF) · printed p. 31 —

...do they flourish, set in eternal monuments of fame? But, as I think, the universe possesses newness, and the nature of the world is recent, nor did its beginnings start long ago.

Conclusion of the Lucretius quotation (On the Nature of Things 5.328–331).

Berosus is thought to have written the most ancient history of the Chaldeans, yet even he (as Josephus reports in the first book Against Apion) took his beginning from the flood. Trogus Pompeius, tracing back as far as possible the origin of the matters he committed to history, began to write from King Ninus, who, one thousand nine hundred years after the founding of the world, established the first monarchy that existed in the world, that of the Assyrians. Eusebius, in book 9 of the Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 4, and book 10, ch. 3, gathers many things bearing on this argument: among others he relates that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in the book he published on chronology, affirms that the affairs of Argos, which

began from Inachus, are the oldest of all Greek matters; that Acusilaus likewise, in the Phoronis, and other Greek writers, proclaim Phoroneus the most ancient of mortals; and that Marcus Varro too, that most rigorous appraiser of antiquity, acknowledges in his history nothing older than the flood of Ogyges.

Marginal gloss: "How it is established that the most ancient things among the nations are more recent than the flood of Noah." Citations: Josephus, Against Apion 1; Trogus Pompeius (via Justin); Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 9.4 & 10.3; Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Acusilaus.

And yet Inachus and Phoroneus and Ogyges were of the same age in which the Patriarch Jacob lived. Nor must this be left out: that all those things which are related by the Greeks about famous men and heroes and their own gods, whether handed down in true histories or celebrated as fabulous miracles, came after Cecrops (the contemporary of Moses). Why say more? Belus — from whom, as many have held, flowed and took its origin all worship of idols — was the father of Ninus, king of the Assyrians, in whose time we understand Abraham to have been born. Therefore whatever is held most ancient among the nations is far later than the flood of Noah.

Pererius's synchronisms (Inachus/Phoroneus/Ogyges = age of Jacob; Cecrops = age of Moses; Belus/Ninus = age of Abraham) echo the Praefatio.

It does not escape me how, in former times, Plato in the Timaeus and the Atlanticus (Critias), Aristotle in the first book of the Meteorologica, and Theophrastus too (as Philo reports in the book he entitled "That the World is Incorruptible" — if indeed Philo was the author of that book) tried to meet this argument of ours: namely, that on account of the frequent and vast floods and conflagrations, which must occur in various regions of the earth at intervals far apart but yet fixed and set, the use, knowledge, and memory of other things perished together with the peoples themselves; and that those same arts and disciplines, and the opinions and inventions of men, have fallen and revived an infinite number of times in the vicissitude of time.

The objection from periodic cataclysms: Plato, Timaeus & Critias; Aristotle, Meteorologica 1; Theophrastus (via ps.-Philo, On the Eternity of the World). A marginal cross-reference abbreviation here is too abraded to read with confidence.

But this was said by them rashly and without any probable reason. For since there can be no general destruction of all men, nor any simultaneous ruin of all lands (as they themselves hold), surely the remnants of the renown of the most ancient men of one nation would have been preserved intact at least among some other nation, and by this means would have reached our knowledge too. For Aristotle as well, in book 12 of First Philosophy (the Metaphysics), affirms that certain remnants of ancient philosophy persisted down to his own age. But against the former error of the Gentiles, who supposed [the world to be eternal]...

Citation: Aristotle, Metaphysics ("First Philosophy") bk. 12. Sentence continues onto printed p. 32.

— p. 73 (PDF) · printed p. 32 —

...[against those who supposed] the world to be eternal, let this much suffice for us to have disputed at present, as it were in passing. Since, therefore, we have shown that the world did not always exist, it follows that we should speak of its origin and antiquity: for the sacred writings have disclosed not only the first beginnings of the world, but also how much time has run from the world's origin to the present day, and how great is the elapsed age of the human race, and have handed down a way and method of inquiring and finding this out. In which matter it can scarcely be told how wandering, inconstant, erring, and utterly blind the heathen world has been at all times.

Closes the disputation against eternity (begun p. 31) and opens the question of the world's age.

Marcus Varro — chief of the Roman senate of the wise, proclaimed such by almost all votes — when he had divided the whole age of the world (as Censorinus reports) into three periods, designated the first as that which preceded the first cataclysm; the second, that which runs from the cataclysm to the beginning of the Olympiads; the third, that which had

passed from the first Olympiad to his own age. And this last he holds to be confirmed by a subtle computation of times and known by a definite number of years; the middle one to be held not by exact reckoning but known by sufficiently probable conjectures; but the first wholly escapes our understanding. For if the world is eternal, that time, as boundless and immense, is incomprehensible to mortals; but if the world had a beginning, it is nonetheless of immense difficulty to determine subtly and precisely the number of years of that time.

Marginal gloss: "What Varro thought about the origin of the world." Varro's three ages (via Censorinus, De die natali): the obscure (pre-cataclysm), the mythical (to the first Olympiad), and the historical.

But let us hear the monstrous tales of the Egyptians and Chaldeans on this matter. Egypt was always the parent, nurse, and mistress of prodigious lies; and she, to lend credit to the incredible antiquity she boasted, invented countless ages of the world. For she said (as Diodorus, Pomponius Mela, and Laertius reported) that, since the time the Egyptians have existed, the stars have turned their courses four times and the sun has set twice where it now rises; and that the kings of the Egyptians, partly gods and partly men, reigned in Egypt above seventy thousand years down to the last king, Ptolemy the father of Cleopatra; and that, after Egypt grasped the science of the stars, more than a hundred thousand years are counted. Pliny too, in book 35, ch. 13, relates that the Egyptians were wont to boast that the art of painting flourished six thousand years in Egypt before it passed over into Greece.

Marginal gloss: "The lies of the Egyptians about the antiquity of the world." Citations: Diodorus Siculus; Pomponius Mela; Diogenes Laertius; Pliny, Natural History 35.13.

O marvelous license of trifling and lying! Evidently these men thought they could lie the more freely and shamelessly, the harder they believed their lies could be refuted. But it is well that the lies they tell about their own antiquity are confuted by other, better-known lies of their own. Alexander the Great wrote a letter to his mother Olympias — a letter mentioned by

Cyprian in his book On Idolatry and by Augustine in book 12 of the City of God, ch. 10 — in which it was written thus: that a certain Egyptian priest had told Alexander that, in the sacred writings and annals of the Egyptians, the periods of all the kingdoms were sub[tly recorded]...

Marginal gloss: "Alexander the Great's letter to Olympias." Citations: Cyprian (ps.-Cyprian), De idololatria; Augustine, City of God 12.10. Sentence continues onto printed p. 33.

— p. 74 (PDF) · printed p. 33 —

...subtly recorded; and that in them it was handed down that the kingdom of the Assyrians had exceeded five thousand years, while the empire of the Persians and Macedonians was bounded by more than eight thousand years. That these are false is established by the consensus of all writers, Greek and Latin alike. For those who extended the kingdom of the Assyrians to the utmost set it at no more than one thousand three hundred and sixty years, from the first king Ninus to the last king Sardanapalus; the duration of the Macedonian kingdom down to Alexander's death did not exceed five hundred years; and the monarchy of the Persians, from its first founder Cyrus to Alexander its destroyer, is found to have stood less than two hundred and forty years.

The Egyptian priest's inflated figures, refuted by the consensus of historians. Figures: Assyria ~1,360 yrs (Ninus to Sardanapalus); Macedon <500; Persia <240 (Cyrus to Alexander).

Therefore, just as the things the Egyptians report about foreign kingdoms are "true," so it is fitting to believe equally "true" the trifles they tell about their own antiquity. To despise their vanity, the judgment and verdict of Varro alone ought to suffice. For he, in that noble history of his, reported (as Augustine recalls in book 18, ch. 40, of the City of God) that the Egyptians first learned letters, with Isis as their teacher, a little more than two thousand years before his own age — although there was an old opinion, held by this same Varro, by Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Solinus, and Censorinus, that the ancient Egyptians used years shorter than ours, that is, of three months or even of one month. "In Egypt," says Censorinus, "the

most ancient year is reported to have been of two months; afterward it was made of four months by King Piso; and most recently it was extended to thirteen months and five days."

Marginal glosses: "Varro on the origin of letters among the Egyptians"; "What sort the years were among the ancient Egyptians." Citations: Augustine, City of God 18.40; Censorinus, De die natali. The short "years" deflate the huge Egyptian counts.

Diodorus also narrates that, since it had been handed down by the ancients that the early kings reigned individually for more than one thousand two hundred years, and so great a sum found no credence, it was held as certain by most that lunar courses, the solar year not yet fully discovered, then made up their "years." For which reason what is reported of so many thousands of years, whether by the Egyptians or by the Chaldeans, is not incredible. Nor will I pass over here another conjecture of certain men, by no means unlearned or improbable: that the Egyptians and Chaldeans, being most given to the study of astral science, computed the revolution of each planet as a "year" — so that in thirty solar years they count one year of Saturn, more than two of Jupiter, fifteen of Mars, about thirty of Mercury and as many of Venus, but of the Moon about three hundred and sixty; and thus in the span of thirty solar years they reckoned together more than four hundred "years" of the various planets.

Two ways of deflating the inflated counts: short lunar "years," and "planetary years." Citation: Diodorus Siculus.

I come to the ravings of the Chaldeans. They boasted that they possessed the science of the stars and of celestial things, acquired and confirmed by no less than four hundred and seventy thousand years of observations and experiments. O futile men, prodigal of lies! And indeed there fits them nicely what someone said: "He who has once crossed the bounds of modesty ought to be thoroughly and actively shameless." Thus I think these Chaldeans, since lying pleased them, chose to lie without measure and beyond belief. And yet Por[phyry]...

Marginal gloss: "The empty boasting of the Chaldeans about the antiquity of their nation and art is derided." 470,000 years. The cited maxim is attributed in the margin to a "letter to Lucilius" — the attribution is doubtful and printed as is. Sentence continues onto printed p. 34.

— p. 75 (PDF) · printed p. 34 —

...Porphyry is the authority (as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola records in book 11 of the work he composed, acutely and learnedly, against the Astrologers) that Callisthenes — disciple and kinsman of Aristotle and a companion in the wars of Alexander the Great — when he had sifted and curiously examined at Babylon all the secrets and records of the Chaldeans, found that the observations of celestial things, which were the most ancient of all, were not more than one thousand nine hundred years old. Hipparchus too and Ptolemy, the first masters of astral wisdom, trace the antiquity of astronomical observations no higher than the times of Nebuchadnezzar, king of the Chaldeans (made notorious by the calamities of the Jews), who began to reign around the thirty-first Olympiad.

Marginal gloss: "Porphyry on the antiquity of astronomical observations among the Chaldeans." Via Pico, Disputationes adversus astrologiam, bk. 11. The oldest Chaldean records: ~1,900 years.

But someone will say that Pliny, in book 30, on the testimony of Eudoxus and Aristotle, confirms that Zoroaster, the reputed father of Astronomy, lived six thousand years before the death of Plato. But Diodorus Siculus, Justinus, and other grave and approved writers openly refute this lie; for they make Zoroaster a contemporary of King Ninus, by whom he was both defeated in war and despoiled of his kingdom; and from Ninus to the death of Plato a little more than one thousand seven hundred years are reckoned. In the same case is what Pliny narrates in book 6 to be in the records of the Indians: that from Father Liber (who first brought arms into India) to Alexander the Great there were one hundred and fifty-three kings of the Indians, over six thousand four hundred and two years, with three months added besides.

Marginal glosses: "The falsehood of Eudoxus and Aristotle, as Pliny reports it, about the antiquity of Zoroaster, inventor of the magic art"; "That what Pliny records about the antiquity of the kings of

India is fabulous." Citations: Pliny, NH 30 and 6; Diodorus; Justinus.

For it has been observed by the most skilled and diligent chronographers that, after the death of Moses (while Joshua, leader of the Hebrews, was waging war most successfully against the Canaanites), India was subdued by Father Liber, and that from that time to Alexander the Great only one thousand one hundred and seventy years are reckoned. Like these are those fictions of Plato in the Timaeus: that a certain Egyptian priest told Solon that Athens had been founded nine thousand years before Solon's age, and that all the more notable affairs of that whole stretch of time were subtly recorded in the sacred books of the Egyptians. Did it then profit so great a philosopher to trifle in the weightiest of all his dialogues, and to contaminate a most beautiful disputation about the world with old wives' tales and lies? Could it have escaped Plato — what was reported by many writers of Greece — that Cecrops was the first founder of Athens, who preceded Solon's age by scarcely a thousand years?

Marginal gloss: "The fictions of the Egyptians narrated in Plato's Timaeus." Liber/Dionysus' Indian conquest dated ~1,170 years before Alexander; the Timaeus' 9,000-year Athens refuted by the synchronism Cecrops ≈ Moses.

But these and other fancies of that kind are to be hissed off the stage with laughter and contempt for Greek vanity, rather than refuted with arguments. These things, then, I wished to dispute briefly for the present against two errors of the Gentiles, wholly contrary to the teaching of Moses handed down in this place — the one about the eternity of the World, the other about its excessive antiquity — so that it might be plain to all, not only that the world is not eternal, but also that, since from its origin to the present day no more than five thousand six hundred years have passed,...

Pererius's conclusion: ≤5,600 years from creation to the present. Sentence continues onto printed p. 35.

— p. 76 (PDF) · printed p. 35 —

...there is nonetheless among the Gentiles no memory of this matter, nor was there ever any, that (setting aside fabulous tales) truly exceeds an antiquity of four thousand years — that is, the time of the flood of Noah. Whence one may understand that, since the history of the sacred letters faithfully and truly comprehends in writing the deeds done in the world over the one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years before the flood of Noah, sacred Scripture surpasses all the writings and monuments of all nations in antiquity, as in other things.

Marginal gloss: "The antiquity of divine Scripture." 1,656 years from creation to the Flood (the standard Hebrew-text reckoning).

But there is some difficulty in what we taught a little above, on the authority of the blessed Basil — that the number of years from the beginning of the world to the present day can be ascertained and known by us. For at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiasticus it is written thus: "The sand of the sea, and the drops of rain, and the days of the world (the ages) — who has numbered them?" By which words it is doubly signified that the years of the world are incomprehensible to mortals: first, because that interrogative "Who?" very often in the sacred writings has the force of denial, and means the same as "no one" (examples are everywhere obvious, as in the Song of Moses: "Who is like thee among the mighty, O Lord?"; and in the Psalms: "What man is he that shall live and not see death?"; and in Job: "Who has resisted God and had peace?"); and second, because the same reckoning is drawn for the three things here set down: but the first two — "the sand of the sea and the drop of rain" — cannot be known by any man in their number; therefore neither can the third thing adjoined, "the days of the ages," be known to us.

Marginal glosses: "A passage in ch. 1 of Ecclesiasticus is examined"; "Exod. 15"; "Ps. 88"; "Job 9." The objection is Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 1:2.

This difficulty is variously resolved, and I shall here briefly set out the variety. Some answer that the days of the ages cannot be known by man —

that is, by human reason — yet can be known through the revelation of God, expressed in the sacred writings and handed down to us. Nicholas of Lyra, expounding that passage and meeting this difficulty, says that the years of the world are known by a certain probable reckoning, yet not with infallible certitude.

Two of the resolutions: (1) known only by revelation; (2) Nicholas of Lyra — known probably, not infallibly.

For writers, sacred and profane alike, describe times variously and reckon the years in which someone either lived or reigned: some record only whole, completed years, and are silent about the begun ones; others not only count the begun years, but reckon them even as whole; and there are also those who compute whole years as whole and begun years as begun, which is the most refined method of chronography. For example: if someone lived or reigned forty years and seven months, one person will say that he reigned precisely forty years; another, forty-one years, counting those seven months as one year; while others, using a subtle computation, will say that he reigned forty years and seven months besides.

The chronographers' differing conventions for counting partial years — a source of discrepancy.

And, to say at greater length and more distinctly what I have stated briefly: it must be observed that there are four things which make the reckoning of the years from the beginning of the world so varied and discrepant — and, on that account, doubtful and uncertain — that Sixtus of Siena, in the fifth book of the Holy Library...

Marginal gloss: "From four causes arise the variety and discrepancy of the computation." Citation: Sixtus of Siena, Bibliotheca Sancta bk. 5. The four causes follow on printed p. 36.

— p. 77 (PDF) · printed p. 36 —

...[Sixtus of Siena, in the fifth book of the Holy Library, has] collected nearly thirty reckonings of the years from the world's origin to the coming of our Lord — all discrepant among themselves, yet handed down by good

authors. And indeed, had he wished to pursue them all, he could have listed up to fifty. The first doubt, then, is raised by that great variety and discrepancy of chronology from the beginning of the world to the birth of Abraham, which we find in the Hebrew books and in our Latin ones, and in the Greek codices of the Seventy Translators (LXX): for whereas in the former that period contains only one thousand nine hundred and forty-eight years, in the latter it contains three thousand three hundred and fourteen — namely, one thousand four hundred and sixty-eight years more than the former. But about this variety of chronology we shall dispute carefully and accurately below, in the seventh book of these commentaries.

Marginal gloss: "[the reckonings] of the years from the beginning of the world to the coming of our Lord." The first cause of discrepancy: Hebrew/Latin vs. LXX from Creation to Abraham (1,948 vs. 3,314). NOTE: the printed figures do not perfectly reconcile — 1,948 + 1,468 = 3,416, not 3,314 — likely a printer's slip (the LXX total is conventionally ~3,416). Reproduced as printed.

Next, many, following the Seventy Translators and the blessed Luke, interpose between Arphaxad and Shelah (Sale) the generation of Cainan — that is, thirty years; and so from the flood to the birth of Abraham they count three hundred and twenty-two years; but most of all, following the Hebrew and Latin books, in which the generation of Cainan is omitted, set that whole time at only two hundred and ninety-two years. Besides, the reckoning of certain periods is not sufficiently clear, nor agreed by all: for example, whether Abraham was born in the seventieth year of Terah (which is the opinion of almost everyone, and which Moses himself seems to indicate in the eleventh chapter of Genesis), or whether he was born in Terah's hundred and thirtieth year, which from other passages of Scripture certain not undistinguished authors argue with sufficient probability.

Marginal citation: Luke 3 (the genealogy that includes Cainan). Second and third causes of discrepancy: the Cainan generation (322 vs. 292 yrs from Flood to Abraham), and the disputed year of Terah at Abraham's birth (70 vs. 130).

The reckoning of times, too, from the death of Moses to David is perplexed and obscure. Likewise, as to the seventy years of the Babylonian captivity

— whence they took their beginning and where they had their end — there is great controversy. Finally, the periods that elapsed from the liberation of the Babylonian captivity to the coming and birth of our Lord are not handed down in the sacred writings, but must be sought from the profane histories and chronicles of the heathen; which, however, are not of one kind, nor of equal trustworthiness and authority: for some follow approved and trustworthy sources, others fictitious and lying ones — such as the annals of Giovanni Nanni of Viterbo (Annius Viterbiensis), got up and falsely colored under the specious titles of Berosus, Metasthenes, Manetho, and Philo, which imposed upon many of our own age — otherwise learned men, but not skilled in literary antiquity.

The fourth cause: post-captivity dates rest on profane sources, some of them outright forgeries — Pererius names the notorious fabrications of Annius of Viterbo (pseudo-Berosus, etc.).

There remains the last reply to the difficulty posed at the outset: for the author of the book of Ecclesiasticus does not say "Who has numbered the years of the age?" but "the days of the age": therefore he speaks not of years, but of days. And it makes a very great difference [which of the two we speak of]: for just as writers, sacred and profane alike, are wont to record the years diligently in chronology, so they forbear to reckon the small counts of days, which are either lacking to complete a year or remain over when it is completed.

First resolution of the Ecclus. 1:2 objection: it speaks of "days," not "years" — and chronology counts years, not the leftover days. ("de quibus loquamur" is supplied; the printed text reads "de viris," evidently a slip.)

— p. 78 (PDF) · printed p. 37 —

And that the matter may be clearer, let us set down one example. Adam is said to have begotten Seth when he was a hundred and thirty years old, and to have died at nine hundred and thirty years of age. Are we to think we must necessarily believe that he begot Seth on the very day on which Adam had precisely completed his hundred and thirtieth year, or that he died on

the very day on which he completed his nine hundred and thirtieth? Therefore the number of years of the world can be held, but not of the days. Or, if this interpretation does not satisfy someone — on the ground that the word "day" here is put not properly for a day (as distinguished from year and month), but, in the manner of the sacred writings, for "time" — we shall say that the phrase "days of the age" is said not of the days or times elapsed from the world's origin until now, but of those to come, up to the end of the world and the day of Judgment; which time is undoubtedly quite unknown to mortals, as we shall discuss at length at the very end of this book.

Marginal gloss: "...thus no reckoning of days is had." The Adam/Seth example, then a second resolution: "days of the age" = future times, up to Judgment Day.

He created.

New scripture lemma (Gen. 1:1, the verb).

This Hebrew word ■■■ (Bara), which is in this place — not the Greek ■πο■ησεν which the Seventy Translators use, nor the Latin "He created" — properly signifies only the production of a thing from nothing, to denote which alone the scholastic philosophers and theologians are wont to apply the name of "creation" and the verb "to create." Certainly the divine Scripture uses that word indiscriminately for any production whatever; for Moses, a little below, employs this very verb "to create" where he treats of the generation of the other things and of man — things which, it is agreed, were not founded from nothing.

On the verb bara / ■πο■ησεν / creavit: "create" strictly means production from nothing, but Scripture uses it loosely for any making.

The blessed Jerome, in his Commentaries on those words of Paul in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians — "For we are his workmanship, created in CHRIST JESUS unto good works" — noted that the words "founding" and "creation" are generally fitted to great and

exceptional works: for we say that the city of Rome was founded by Romulus; and Virgil, "So vast a labor it was to found the Roman race." And Moses says that "in the beginning God created heaven and earth." But whatever be the proper notion and signification of this word, certainly the operation of God by which he made heaven and earth was truly a production from nothing.

Citations: Jerome on Eph. 2:10; Virgil, Aeneid 1.33. Marginal gloss: "What is to be thought about the production of things from nothing."

For whether we understand by "heaven and earth" (as many prefer) the celestial and elemental body itself, or (as it seemed to others) unformed matter and the Angelic nature, it must be admitted that those things were founded from nothing — either because they are the first of all things founded, or because they are of such a kind that they cannot be made from matter. And although it was a true, and almost universal, decree of all the philosophers that "from nothing nothing can be made," and even Plato, who made God the world's craftsman, held that the world was [made] from eternal and ungener[ated] matter...

Marginal citation: Plato, Timaeus. Sentence continues onto printed p. 38.

— p. 79 (PDF) · printed p. 38 —

...[that the world] was made by God from eternal and ungenerated matter; we, however, instructed by the sacred writings (which surely can no more lie than God their author) and taught the truth, deem nothing eternal except God, and hold for certain that whatever exists which is not God was made from some beginning of time — either from nothing, or from some other thing which itself was made from nothing. For we find this written and attested both elsewhere and clearly in the seventh chapter of the latter book of Maccabees: for that mother of the seven martyr sons, herself an eightfold martyr, thus addresses one of her sons: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them, and understand that God made them out of nothing," and the rest.

Citation: 2 Maccabees 7 (the mother of the seven martyrs); her words are 2 Macc. 7:28.

That matter is not eternal and ungenerated, Tertullian disputes copiously against the heretic Hermogenes, as does Lactantius in book 2 of the Divine Institutes, ch. 8. And Eusebius, in book 7 of the Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 8, recounts at length the arguments of Philo, Dionysius, and Maximus on the matter. We too, in the fifth book of our work which we published On Philosophy, both confirmed by many arguments that this manner of producing things from nothing is possible for God, and dissolved the contrary arguments of the philosophers.

Citations: Tertullian, Against Hermogenes; Lactantius, Div. Inst. 2.8; Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 7.8; Pererius's own De communibus … principiis, bk. 5.

Basil, from the fact that Moses writes that God made heaven and earth and the whole world, thinks it could be concluded that several other worlds could have been made by him: for just as a craftsman, by the same art and power by which he makes one work, can also make several others of the same kind, so God, by the same power and art by which he made the world, could have founded — and indeed still could found — several worlds. But Aristotle meets this argument in the first book On the Heavens, text 94, affirming that the reason why there cannot be several worlds arises not from a defect of the craftsman's art or power, nor from the nature of the worldly form (which, being material, is also multipliable), but from a defect of matter: since this one world has embraced all matter in itself, no matter has been left over from which another world could be fashioned.

Marginal gloss: "Basil argues that more worlds than one could have been created by God." Citation: Aristotle, On the Heavens 1 (text 94).

Nevertheless, Aristotle in this argument of his takes as certain the very thing we deny — namely, that this world and its matter were not founded by God from nothing: for if he himself had believed this, it would not have been incredible to him that God could make both another matter and another world from nothing. Basil will also observe that by those words

"GOD made heaven and earth" it is openly declared that the world was truly and properly made by God — that is, by God's design and free will, and not by any necessity of nature.

Marginal gloss (begins here): "That the world was made by God by no necessity, but freely."

Concerning the making of the world, moreover, there were of old various opinions of the philosophers and various errors. The Epicureans said that the world came into being by a fortuitous cohesion and aggregation of atoms; Strato of Lampsacus acknowledged no builder of the world, but held that the world, by its own nature, force, and power, was such from all etern[ity] as it now is...

Marginal gloss: "The various opinions of the philosophers about the making of the world." Sentence continues onto printed p. 39 (the survey: Epicureans, Strato, Peripatetics, Plato, Anaxagoras).

— p. 80 (PDF) · printed p. 39 —

...[Strato] thought [the world] was such from all eternity. The Peripatetics held that the world proceeded from God by necessity of nature, just as a shadow arises from an illuminated body, a ray from the Sun, and an image in a mirror. Plato teaches clearly and plainly enough in the Timaeus that the world was made by God — which Eusebius (in the eleventh book of the Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 15) thinks Plato took from this passage of Moses. But Plato soon defiled this truth by sprinkling it with the stain of error: for he said that Heaven was made by God, but not the earth and the other elements; and that God was the maker only of immortal things, but committed the making of the other, mortal things to the secondary gods.

Citation: Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 11.15. The Peripatetic "emanation by necessity" and Plato's restriction (God makes only the immortal; the demiurge-gods make the rest).

Anaxagoras, however (the first of all the Philosophers, as Aristotle attests in the first book of the Metaphysics, and Plato in the Theaetetus), made Mind (intellect) the efficient cause of all things — which, fitly composing the things that were uncomposed and disordered and bringing them into

order, made this greatest and most adorned world.

Marginal citation: Aristotle, Metaphysics bk. 1 (ch. 4, or pt. 2 ch. 2). Anaxagoras' Nous as the ordering cause.

It is well known what Pliny relates in the preface of his work: that the most noble ancient artists of painting and sculpture inscribed their works — even those most finished ones, at which posterity never tires of marveling — with a tentative title, thus: "APELLES WAS MAKING [this]," or "POLYCLETUS," but not "MADE"; insinuating thereby that the works were begun and not entirely perfected, and that whatever might be found wanting in them they would indeed have corrected, had they not been cut off by death. Only three works are found inscribed outright "HE MADE," as if in them the supreme confidence of his art had pleased the artist; yet all these were exposed to great human envy — cautiously and prudently inscribed thus, indeed, by men, whose lot it is not to be free from every fault.

Marginal gloss: "A notable saying of Pliny." Citation: Pliny, Natural History, preface (the FACIEBAT vs. FECIT convention).

But of God, whose works are perfect and exquisite according to all his wishes, and to which no one can add or take away anything, it was not fitting to say "God WAS MAKING the world," but "He MADE [it]" — namely, as a work complete in all its parts, absolute and consummate in all its measures, and approved by the judgment of the Maker himself, whose wisdom is infinite. "For God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good."

Marginal citations: Deut. 32; Ps. 110; Gen. 1. The analogy: artists wrote "was making" out of modesty; God's work is called "made" (perfect). Quotation: Gen. 1:31.

Rupert (of Deutz), in the first book On the Trinity and his works, ch. 4, poses the question why in the creation of the other things the voice and command of God is employed — that is, "He said" and "Let there be" — but not in the creation of Heaven and earth: for why did God not say "Let

there be heaven," and it was made, as he said "Let there be light," and light was made? The author (whoever he was) of the fourth book of Ezra, in ch. 6, recalling this very history of Moses about the creation of the world, says that God said "Let there be Heaven, and Let there be earth," and they were made; but this plainly disagrees with the narration of Moses. Rupert answers the question he has posed in three ways; I shall subjoin his words. "First," he says, "since the very beginning, in which all things were made, is..."

Marginal gloss: "Rupert's [question]: why God did not say 'let there be heaven, and let there be earth,' as he said of the other things." Citations: Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate et operibus eius, bk. 1, ch. 4; 4 Ezra (2 Esdras) 6. Rupert's threefold answer begins on printed p. 40.

— p. 81 (PDF) · printed p. 40 —

...[since the very beginning, in which all things were made,] is the Word of God, it would have been superfluous — and even unfitting — to say "In the beginning God said." Next, the imperative verb "Let there be" presupposes something to which a command may be given or a precept set; but the making of heaven and earth — since they themselves were founded from nothing — had nothing preceding it toward which God's voice and command might be directed. Finally, Moses wished to speak thus lest anyone should suspect that God indeed designed and perfected the species and forms of all things, but that Hyle — that is, the prime matter from which all things were made — was not made by God, but was always coeternal with God. Therefore it was said in the way in which it ought to have been said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert of Deutz's threefold answer (begun on printed p. 39) to why Gen. 1:1 lacks the "He said / Let there be" formula. "Hyle" = Greek hyl■, prime matter.

But his opinion — in saying that the voice and command of God are not referred and directed to nothing, but to that which is — I fear may not sufficiently agree with the teaching of Paul, who, in the fourth chapter of

the Epistle to the Romans, speaking of God, says: "He calls the things that are not, as though they were." And David, in Psalm 32 [33]: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established." And in Psalm 148: "Praise the Lord, all his Angels; praise him, all his hosts," etc., "for he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." Therefore, for David, both the heavens and all the Angels were created by the word and command of God — namely, from nothing. See in what way the blessed Augustine poses and resolves this very question in the first book of On Genesis according to the Letter.

Pererius's reservation about Rupert: it sits ill with Rom. 4:17, Ps. 33:6, and Ps. 148:2–5. Marginal citation: "ch. 3 & 4" (the Psalms cited).

God.

New scripture lemma (the subject of Gen. 1:1, Hebrew Elohim).

In Hebrew it is ■■■■■ (Elohim), in the plural number: which word in Scripture is attributed not only to God, but also to Angels, to Judges, and to Princes; for it properly signifies those who, on account of the great authority and power — and especially of punishing and avenging — which they have, are to others fearsome and terrible.

On Elohim as a plural form applied also to angels, judges, and rulers.

Now it may seem strange that, since the word "Elohim" is of the plural number, Moses joined that word with ■■■ ("Bara"), which is of the singular number — just as if in Latin one were to say "Gods created." The wonder is increased by the fact that the noun Elohim has a singular, Eloha, and is found in Scripture in Job, chapter twelve, there: "He called upon God, and he will hear him"; and in chapter thirty-six, in those words "I have yet something to speak on God's behalf"; and in Habakkuk, chapter one, "This his strength is of his God"; and in the same prophet, chapter three, "God will come from the South."

Marginal gloss: "The question why Moses spoke thus, 'Gods created.'" The singular Eloha attested in Job 12 & 36 and Habakkuk 1 & 3.

Wherefore Cajetan, in his Commentary on this passage, said ignorantly that the name Elohim among the Hebrews lacks a singular. If, then, Elohim has the singular Eloha, why did Moses say ■■■■■ ■■■ ("Elohim bara"), joining a plural with a singular, and not rather "Eloha bara" — especially since elsewhere Elohim is not rarely found in the sacred writings joined with a verb of the plural number, as in Genesis 30 [35:7], where we read "God appeared to him," in Hebrew it is "Gods appeared to him"; and in chapter 20 of the same book [20:13], where the Latin version has "God brought me out of my father's house," in the Hebrew Codex it is "Gods brought me out." Therefore it does have a singular, and often...

Pererius corrects Cajetan (Elohim does have a singular). Hebrew plural-verb constructions cited from Gen. 35:7 and 20:13. Sentence continues onto printed p. 41.

— p. 82 (PDF) · printed p. 41 —

...is often joined with a verb of the plural number. Wherefore no slight cause of doubting and inquiring presents itself to us: why Moses, in this place, against the rules of grammar, coupled a noun of the plural number with a verb of the singular number. This doubt and wonder many truly pious and learned men remove, saying that the reason was that Moses — abundantly forelearned by God in the chief mysteries of our faith — wished, at the very opening of his Scripture, to lay down beforehand, as it were, certain seeds of the Christian doctrine which we hold concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity. For by the plural noun ■■■■■ (Elohim) he insinuated the multitude of the divine persons, and by the singular verb ■■■ (Bara) the unity of the divine essence. So thought the Master (Peter Lombard) in book 2 of the Sentences, dist. 1, whom absolutely all the Scholastic Theologians have followed; with whom agree Paul of Burgos, Nicholas of Lyra, Pietro Galatino, Agostino Steuco of Gubbio, Ambrosius Catharinus, and very many others.

Marginal gloss: "Authors who hold that the mystery of the Trinity was here insinuated by Moses." The Trinitarian reading of plural Elohim + singular Bara (Peter Lombard, Sentences 2.1, and his followers).

But Catharinus, both here and in book 4 of his Animadversions on Cajetan's writings, bitterly attacks him as not thinking piously enough about the mystery of the Holy Trinity, because in his commentary on this passage he denied that the joining of a plural noun with a singular verb was employed by Moses to signify the mystery of the Trinity, and [denied] that from this manner of Moses' speaking Christians can argue, against the Jews, that there are many divine persons in one essence. But if this is a crime, it is surely not the peculiar crime of Cajetan alone, but one shared with other most learned and more ancient men. For a hundred years before Cajetan, Tostatus held the same, and left it written in his commentary on this passage; and in a certain Treatise of his which he published on the Trinity, he fought most fiercely for the same view against Nicholas of Lyra.

Marginal gloss: "Catharinus's animadversion against Cajetan — but not a just one." Pererius defends Cajetan: the non-Trinitarian reading was held earlier by Tostatus too.

And indeed it could be proved by many — and by no means invalid — reasons that no mystery lies hidden in this manner of Moses' speaking. In the first place, the Master of the Sentences was the very first of all to hold that in this passage of Moses the mystery of the Trinity is rightly signified; but we may justly wonder that none of the earlier writers — at least Origen and Jerome, most skilled in Hebrew and most curious and observant of all the Hebrew words of Scripture (and especially of those that serve to confirm or illustrate the mysteries of our faith) — caught any scent of a mystery being contained in this place.

Pererius leans toward the skeptical view: that Peter Lombard was the first to find the Trinity here, and the Hebrew-expert Fathers (Origen, Jerome) did not.

Next, that discrepancy between Elohim, of the plural number, and Bara, of the singular number, holds no mystery, but an idiom of the Hebrew tongue, in which such discrepancies are frequent: for example, in Isaiah 19 we read "I will deliver Egypt into the hand of cruel lords"; in Hebrew it is "of a hard, or strong, lords." And in Joshua, the last chapter [24:19], it is written "You shall not be able to serve God, for he is a holy Lord"; in Hebrew it reads "For he is a holy Gods." Nor is this discrepancy found only when Scripture speaks of God, but also...

Marginal gloss: "It is shown to be false that by the name Elohim three divine persons are understood." Pererius's grammatical explanation: plural noun + singular verb/adjective is a Hebrew idiom (Isa. 19:4; Josh. 24:19). Sentence continues onto printed p. 42.

— p. 83 (PDF) · printed p. 42 —

...also when it speaks of other things: as in Genesis 42, where we read "The lord of the land spoke to us harshly," the Hebrew codices have "The lords of the land said to us"; in Exodus too, chapter twenty, it stands thus, "You shall not have strange gods," for which in Hebrew it is "There shall not be to you strange gods"; and in chapter 21 the Latin version has "But if his master give him a wife," whereas in Hebrew it is "If his masters give him a wife." From these it is plain that the aforesaid discrepancy of singular and plural number holds no mystery, since it is customary in Hebrew whether the discourse is about God or about other things.

Continuing the grammatical case (from p. 41): the plural-noun idiom occurs of non-divine subjects too — Gen. 42:30 (the plural "lords" of one man, Joseph), Exod. 20:3, Exod. 21:4.

Besides, if Moses had wished by such an expression to indicate the mystery of the Trinity, he would surely have spoken quite improperly: for it is not fitting to say of the divine persons that they are "Gods"; otherwise it could even be said that there are many Gods, or three Gods — which, however, is condemned both in Scripture and in the Athanasian Creed. Nor, by the judgment of theologians, would one speak rightly who said "The divine persons, or the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, created [singular] the world,"

but one must say "created [plural]": just as it is not rightly said "the Father and the Son breathes the Holy Spirit," but "breathe."

First reason against the Trinitarian reading: it would imply "Gods," condemned by the Athanasian Creed.

Moreover, if this manner of speaking had been strange and unusual in the Hebrew tongue, it would have struck the Hebrews as new and astonishing; wherefore the Rabbis would have devised something about it, and would not have suppressed in such silence a matter of such moment, full of mystery and wonder. And if for that reason Moses joined the plural noun Elohim with the singular verb Bara, to denote the plurality of the divine persons together with the unity of the divine essence, why, elsewhere speaking of God (as in Genesis 20 and 35, passages we mentioned a little above), did he join the noun Elohim with verbs of the plural number? For thus both the multitude of the divine persons and a diversity of the divine nature would seem to be signified. And it would surely not have been well advised, given the rudeness and slowness of the Jews and their proneness to idolatry: for from this they would have taken occasion to suppose that there are many Gods.

Further reasons: the Rabbis' silence; the inconsistency with Elohim + plural verb elsewhere; the danger of suggesting polytheism to the Jews.

These things I have argued not in order to reprehend the pious and learned men who strove to draw the mystery of the Trinity even from this place, nor to condemn their religious zeal and diligence, nor to lead the reader away from that opinion; but in order to restrain Catharinus's excessive eagerness in reprehending Cajetan, and indeed to mitigate his excessive harshness and bitterness, and to clear and vindicate, from the suspicion which Catharinus undeservedly stirred up against him, a man who thinks rightly about the mysteries of our faith and has deserved most excellently of Theology.

Pererius's stated aim: not to deny the Trinitarian reading, but to defend Cajetan against Catharinus's harshness.

But let us return to the contemplation of that word "God," which here is named first of all in Scripture — although the serpent is read to have been the first of all to utter that name, who, tempting Eve, said "Why has God commanded you," etc. From this place it appears that it can truly be said that the doctrine of Christians begins where [the wisdom of the Gentiles] ends...

Marginal citation: Genesis 3 (the serpent's words to Eve, Gen. 3:1). Sentence continues onto printed p. 43.

— p. 84 (PDF) · printed p. 43 —

...the wisdom of the Gentiles ends: and this [where Christian doctrine begins] is the knowledge of God, in the investigation and perception of which the greatest minds of every age have toiled and sweated with the keenest zeal and incredible diligence. Does someone long to know who architected and built this world? Behold, Moses at the opening of his volume settles it in a single word, saying "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth"; as if he said: Let no one think the world consists of itself and by its own power; let no one imagine that it came to be by chance and accident; for it could not have been made otherwise than by some most wise craftsman, with supreme design and reason — and this craftsman is God.

Christian doctrine begins (with the knowledge of God) where pagan wisdom leaves off; Gen. 1:1 settles the question of the world's maker in one word.

For if those who beheld that famous sphere of Archimedes or of Posidonius, ennobled by the praise of many — in which the revolutions of all the celestial orbs, as they occur in the heaven, were likewise all perfectly represented in one [device] — could not doubt that that work had been perfected by a supreme genius and excellent learning, how much less is it permitted to us, contemplating heaven, earth, and the whole world, to

doubt that the designer and maker of this work was God! Rightly, therefore, does Scripture say in a certain place "He who created all things is God"; and Paul, speaking of God, says "From him, and through him, and in him are all things"; and John, "All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing."

The argument from design — the planetary sphere (orrery) of Archimedes/Posidonius (cf. Cicero, De natura deorum 2). Marginal citations: Heb. 3 (3:4); Rom. 11 (11:36); John 1 (1:3).

But indeed, when God is said to have made the world, it is sufficiently shown that God alone was its founder, and that there were not many who together contributed their labors and strength to fashioning it. For toward removing this opinion [of many makers] it avails that God says through Isaiah, chapter forty-four: "I am the Lord, who make all things, who stretch out the Heavens alone, who establish the earth, and there is none with me."

God alone the maker — against polytheism. Isaiah 44:24.

Moreover, although the fabric of the world is so great that no mortal's understanding can comprehend it, yet in comparison with God it is nothing. For if the earth, set beside the Heaven, holds the place of a point, at how much should the world be valued when compared with God? In comparison with God the globe of the earth is called "the tipping of a balance and a drop of the morning dew," in chapter 9 of the book of Wisdom. Therefore God did not exhaust his power in making the world, but, it being founded, his force and power remained nonetheless whole and effective for founding other worlds: for the world is not an effect adequate to its cause — that is, though it be the greatest [of things], yet it is not commensurate with the power of God.

The world is nothing compared with God (Wisdom 11:22–23, cited by Pererius as "ch. 9" — likely a slip or a variant chapter division); hence God's power was not exhausted and could make other worlds.

Now Scripture is wont to proclaim and magnify God especially by this notable [title]: that he made Heaven and earth. So Abraham, in Genesis 14:

"I lift up my hand to the Lord God most high, the possessor of Heaven and earth"; and there too Melchizedek: "Blessed be Abraham by the most high God, who created Heaven and earth"; and David: "Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made heaven and earth"; the prophet Jonah too, when the sailors questioned him, answered: "I am a Hebrew, and I fear the Lord God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land. And the men feared with a great fear," etc. And Jeremiah, in chapter 10, wishes us to distinguish the true God from false gods by this mark: "Thus shall you say to them: Let the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth perish from the earth, and from under [the heaven]."

Marginal citations: "God is frequently proclaimed in Scripture under that title — that he was the Creator of heaven and earth"; Ps. 123 (124):8; Jonah 1:9–10. Also Gen. 14:22–23 (Abraham and Melchizedek) and Jer. 10:11. Sentence continues onto printed p. 44.

— p. 85 (PDF) · printed p. 44 —

...are [under] heaven. And in chapter 32 [Jeremiah], from the fact that God made Heaven and earth, he concludes that nothing can be difficult for him: "Lord God, behold thou hast made Heaven and earth by thy great power and by thy outstretched arm: no word shall be difficult for thee." Nor indeed did God found the world and then desert it, handing it over to others to be preserved and governed — as parents commit the children born of them to others to be nourished and brought up; for he himself perpetually rules and preserves what he founded. And just as the world could not be made by any other than God, so neither can it be preserved or governed by any other. Hear Job, who in chapter 34 says thus: "Whom did he appoint as another over the earth? or whom did he set over the world which he made?" And Paul: "Who upholds all things by the word of his power." And the author of the book of Wisdom: "How could anything endure unless thou hadst willed it? or what was not called by thee be preserved?" Which David too pursues at greater length in that psalm, when he says: "All things wait upon thee, that thou give them food in due season," and the rest that follows.

Marginal gloss: "That the world was both created by God alone, and is preserved and governed [by him alone]." Citations: Jer. 32:17; Job 34:13; Heb. 1:3; Wisdom 11:25–26; Ps. 103 (104):27.

Heaven and earth.

New scripture lemma. Pererius will give four interpretations of it.

I observe that there are four nobler interpretations of these words. The first interpretation is that Moses by these words did not wish to teach that Heaven and earth were founded before the first day, nor to relate their making in this place, but wished by the name of "Heaven and earth" to signify this whole corporeal world (as is often done in the sacred writings); so that Moses' intent was, briefly and summarily, to set before the eyes, as it were, the whole fabric of the world, and then through six days to explain it part by part, narrating one by one what was made by God on each day — as if someone were to say, "This architect built this huge and magnificent palace, and first indeed laid a most deep and firm foundation, compacted of great firm stones, then raised up most ample and lofty walls," and should then set forth one by one the other parts of that palace skillfully designed by him. This interpretation pleases Chrysostom especially; it is also mentioned, and not disapproved, by Augustine in chapter 3 of the second book against the Manichees, and in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 33. But Basil, in the third homily on Genesis, says it was handed down by the ancients, yet is not approved by him.

Marginal glosses: "Four interpretations"; "The opinion of Chrysostom." The first reading: "heaven and earth" = the whole world named summarily, then unfolded over six days.

And indeed neither do I much approve it: for the connection and continuation of Moses' words seems to reject it. For when Moses had said "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth," he adds "but the earth was void and empty": in which sentence that copulative particle "but" shows that [the creation of heaven and earth] was set down just before the creation of the earth [i.e., as a real prior act, not a mere summary]. And surely David seems to indicate not obscurely that Moses by these words

relates the creation of Heaven and earth, in Psalm 101 [102], who, looking to this very passage of Moses, says: "In the beginning thou, O Lord, didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands."

Pererius rejects the first interpretation: the "but" of v. 2 and Ps. 102:25 show v. 1 reports a real act of creation, not a summary.

— p. 86 (PDF) · printed p. 45 —

The second interpretation is Augustine's, in book twelve of the Confessions, chapter seven: for he interprets "heaven" as the Angelic nature, and "earth" as the unformed matter of all bodies; so that in the beginning God founded two things, as the two extremes of the whole created being — the one highest and near to God, which is the Angel; the other lowest and near to nothing, which is prime matter. But that this interpretation is not the literal one is manifestly established by this argument: that this teaching and narration of Moses is wholly historical (as we taught above, when we laid down certain rules). And if it is historical, undoubtedly his words are to be taken properly, not figuratively; and what is more beyond the proper and customary signification of words, or more outside the common usage of speaking, than to call the Angelic nature by the name of "heaven," and unformed matter by the word "earth"?

Marginal gloss: "The opinion of Augustine." The second reading (Confessions 12.7): heaven = the angels, earth = prime matter — rejected as non-literal.

But if the words of Moses are wrested from their proper signification to a figurative and mystical one, then — since such mystical significations and interpretations are quite various and manifold — we could surely draw from this passage no stable and certain teaching and judgment of Moses concerning the creation of the world.

The same objection raised earlier against allegorizing this passage (cf. the first interpretive rule, p. 24).

The third interpretation is of the same Augustine, who, in the earlier volume on Genesis against the Manichees, thinks that by both "heaven" and "earth" is signified prime matter — of which indeed all bodies consist, but first and principally heaven and earth, so that for that reason it was named by Moses with their names. But, that this opinion of Augustine may be understood more plainly, I shall here subjoin his own words, which are in the seventh chapter of his book:

Marginal gloss: "Another opinion of the same Augustine." The third reading (De Genesi contra Manichaeos): both words = prime matter.

"That unformed matter, which God made from nothing, was first called heaven and earth: not because it already was this, but because it could be this; for heaven too is written to have been made afterward. Just as, if, considering the seed of a tree, we should say that there are in it roots and trunk and branches and fruits and leaves — not because they already are, but because they are to come to be from it. By this kind of speech the Lord too speaks, when he says: 'I will no longer call you servants, for the servant knows not what his Lord does; but you I have called friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you' — not because it had already been done, but because it most certainly was to be. For a little after he says to them: 'I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.' Why, then, had he said 'All things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you,' except because he knew that he was going to do this?" Thus Augustine.

Quotation from Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos (the seed analogy and John 15:15). Marginal citation: John 15.

But this exposition can be refuted by the same arguments by which the one just confuted by us [was refuted]. Moreover, it seems too harsh and unusual that prime matter should be called by the name of heaven and earth

on the ground that these bodies were to be formed from it: for by equal reasoning it could also be called water, and air, and fire, and any of the other bodies. Nor is it credible that Moses, writing these things for the rude and unlearned Hebrews, wished to teach them prime matter — which scarcely men sufficiently learned and acu[te]...

Pererius rejects the third interpretation too (prime matter could equally be named any element; Moses would not teach so subtle a notion to the unlearned Hebrews). Sentence continues onto printed p. 46.

— p. 87 (PDF) · printed p. 46 —

...and acute philosophers could comprehend by their understanding. It also seems far from reason that divine Scripture — which so often proclaims and magnifies God because he created heaven and earth (which it undoubtedly took from this passage of Moses) — should have wished to signify that God made prime matter: for since prime matter is the lowest and basest of all things founded by God, [Scripture] would not have thought that God was to be so often and so greatly praised and proclaimed on account of its creation.

Final reason against the third (prime-matter) interpretation, carried over from printed p. 45.

The fourth interpretation is widespread among the theologians, for it has now for nine hundred years been received and approved by most of them. In it were Bede, Alcuin, Rabanus (Maurus), the Master of the Sentences (Peter Lombard), and the Scholastic theologians who follow in his footsteps; likewise Nicholas of Lyra, and the Master of the Scholastic History (Peter Comestor), Tostatus too, and Catharinus. Their common opinion is that by the name of "Heaven" in this place is to be understood only the Empyrean heaven, in many respects most different from the other heavens.

Marginal gloss: "The common opinion of the theologians: that here by the word 'heaven' the Empyrean heaven is signified." The fourth (and standard scholastic) reading.

But concerning this empyrean heaven, I think it not amiss to touch upon and refute in passing the opinion of Agostino Steuco of Gubbio (Eugubinus) — an opinion not only false, but even utterly absurd and greatly abhorrent to Christian teaching. For he, in his Cosmopoeia, among certain other paradoxes, handed down this too (and repeated it in the treatise he made On Incorporeal Natures): that the empyrean heaven is something eternal and uncreated — that is, that it is a certain light and brightness emanating from the essence of God, in which God is, and to the participation and enjoyment of which both the good Angels and just men are admitted.

Marginal gloss: "The novel and absurd opinion of Eugubinus about the empyrean heaven is exploded." Agostino Steuco, Cosmopoeia and De perenni philosophia / on incorporeal natures.

"For this," he says, "is that eternal light and brightness of God, which in Scripture is so often promised to just men as the reward of their labors": of which he thinks is to be understood what David sings of God in Psalm 103, "Clothed with light as with a garment"; and Paul's words, "Who dwells in light inaccessible"; and the Lord's words in John, "Glorify thou me, Father, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." A certain specimen of this light was given in the Transfiguration of our Lord, and in the bush of Moses, and in his face, shining beyond human gaze from the converse and intimacy he had with God.

Steuco's supporting texts. Marginal citations: 1 Tim. 6 (6:16); John 17 (17:5); Matt. 17 (Transfiguration); Exod. 3 (the burning bush); Exod. 34 (Moses' shining face). Also Ps. 103 (104):2.

Eugubinus confirms this opinion by the testimony of Basil, who in the second homily on Genesis says that he thinks there was, before the construction of this corporeal world, a certain ineffable light and brightness, in which the Angels dwelt, and which is often promised to just men in divine Scripture. He thinks that Homer too saw this, as if through a mist, when he called the seat and dwelling of the Gods "Olympus," that is, wholly shining and resplendent. And this was the opinion of Eugubinus:

which I judge must not so much be refuted as utterly exploded and execrated, and, if it could be done, buried in everlasting oblivion. For whose mind...

Steuco invokes Basil (Hexaemeron, hom. 2) and Homer's "Olympus." Pererius's vehement condemnation begins; the sentence continues onto printed p. 47.

— p. 88 (PDF) · printed p. 47 —

...[whose] mind would not shudder to hear that there is something which is not God, yet coeternal with God himself and uncreated? What more contrary to Scripture could be said? — Scripture, whose are those illustrious sayings in so many places: "All things were made through him"; and "He who created all things is God"; and again "He created that all things might be"; and, in Paul, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians, and in the Creed, "God is proclaimed and declared the founder of all things visible and invisible." But I can scarcely conceive what Eugubinus's mind was about that empyrean Heaven of his, what his understanding, what his thought. He says it is a certain light and brightness: but what sort of light is this? Is it a solitary accident, cohering by itself? But this is repugnant to the nature of an accident, nor can it come to be without a miracle.

Marginal citations: John 1 (1:3); Heb. 3 (3:4); Wisdom 1 (1:14); also Col. 1:16 and the Nicene Creed. Pererius begins dismantling Steuco's "light" philosophically: is it an accident?

Or will he say it is a substance? But which? a corporeal one? But what sort of corporeal nature will it be, and of what kind of bodies? Was there, then, some body before the construction of this world? Or an incorporeal one? Then it will be some spirit and an intelligent nature. Moreover, if that light emanates from the nature and majesty of the Deity, it will doubtless emanate by necessity of nature — that is, as great as is the power of the Divinity: therefore it will be infinite; than which what more absurd and incredible could be said? In short, wherever Eugubinus turns, he will be entangled and ensnared in a thousand snares, nor will he be able to

extricate himself by any reasoning.

The dilemma: accident, corporeal substance, or incorporeal? And if it emanates by necessity, it would be infinite — absurd.

But indeed someone will say that Eugubinus put forth this opinion of his modestly enough, for he submitted it to the judgment and censure of the Church, prepared, if it be condemned by the Church, to condemn it himself. That, indeed, is right: but how much better it would have been not to publish so perverse and impious a dogma, than to leave it in his writings with a correction of this sort, which gives a not very cautious and learned reader occasion to err? And so it could truly have been said to Eugubinus what Cato cleverly said to a certain man: "Why," he says, "have you preferred to beg pardon for a fault, rather than to be free of it?"

Pererius grants Steuco's submission to the Church, but faults the publishing of the error. The Cato quip.

But that supercelestial light and brightness, in which God is said to be, and which all the blessed fully enjoy, is either God himself — whose ineffable comeliness, beauty, and power of illuminating and gladdening the minds both of men and of Angels is expressed by the likeness and name of light; or it is the eternal life promised to just men, which, because it has in itself the clearest knowledge of God joined with the highest joy and gladness, is rightly named "light"; or it is the brightness with which the empyrean heaven marvelously shines on every side, founded together with the heaven itself. From which it becomes clear that, on account of the aforesaid sayings of Scripture cited by Eugubinus, it is not only absurd but even ridiculous to think that the empyrean heaven is a certain light coeternal with God and wholly uncreated, naturally emanating from the nature and majesty of God.

Marginal gloss: "What the inaccessible light is, which God is said to inhabit." Pererius's orthodox alternatives for the "inaccessible light."

But, leaving aside Eugubinus's fiction, let us see what sort the aforesaid theologians wish the empyrean heaven to be — which they think is signified in this place by Moses by the word "heaven." They affirm that it is the highest body of the whole world...

Marginal gloss: "What the empyrean heaven is according to the theologians." Turning to the positive scholastic account. Sentence continues onto printed p. 48.

— p. 89 (PDF) · printed p. 48 —

...the highest and most ample body, utterly immobile and impassible, wholly shining — not with a dense light that pours forth rays and is visible to mortal eyes, but with such a light as is said to be in the element of fire, which lies above the air, beneath the orb of the moon. Moreover, they say the empyrean Heaven was created from the beginning, full and adorned and distinguished with the nine orders of Angels, and decorated and illumined with the brightness and majesty of Divine power beyond what can be said or even thought. Here God opens his essence to be most clearly seen by the blessed minds; hither fly the souls of the just, freed from the body and stained by no spot of sin; here, finally, after the resurrection, all the just will dwell together with their bodies.

The scholastic description of the empyrean: the highest, immobile, luminous body; created full of the nine angelic orders; the abode of God's vision and of the blessed.

They think also that this Heaven is signified by Scripture, as often as it says "the Heaven of Heaven" or "the Heavens of Heavens": as when David says "The heaven of heaven [is] for the Lord," and "Praise the Lord, you heavens of heavens"; and Moses, "Behold, the heaven is the Lord's, and the heaven of heaven." And this Heaven, Damascene (in the second book of On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 6) thinks is that third Heaven to which Paul (2 Cor. 12) says he was caught up: so that by the first Heaven is understood the aerial, by the second all that is starry, and by the third the empyrean itself — which in Scripture is also called "the land of the living" and "the region of the living." For David said "My portion is in the land of the

living," and "I will please the Lord in the region of the living"; nay, it is even called simply "the earth/land," for the Lord said "Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the earth."

Marginal citations: Ps. 113 (115):16; Ps. 148:4; Deut. 10:14; Ps. 141 (142):6; Ps. 114 (116):9; Matt. 5:4(5). John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.6; 2 Cor. 12:2.

Both because, as among the elements the earth alone is immobile, so among the Heavens [the immobile one is] the empyrean; and because, just as the earth is now the dwelling of men living the mortal life, so after the resurrection the empyrean Heaven will be the seat of the just, who will pass the blessed life for eternity.

Two reasons the empyrean is also called "earth/land": its immobility, and its being the eternal dwelling of the just.

Now that Moses in this place, by the name of "Heaven," wished to hand down the creation of the empyrean Heaven, they confirm by three arguments. The first argument is drawn from Scripture itself, which in this narration of Moses distinguishes "Heaven" from the firmament and the waters above the firmament made on the second day, and from the sun and moon and the other stars founded on the fourth day. Since, therefore, by the firmament is understood the eighth sphere, by the waters placed above the firmament the ninth Heaven (which they call the crystalline), and by the sun and moon and stars the seven orbs of the planets — it remains that by the "heaven" made in the beginning nothing else can be understood than the empyrean heaven; and since Scripture so often proclaims this Heaven (as we said above), it is not credible that its creation was passed over by Moses, but, since it is the first of all, it was handed down in the first place too.

Marginal gloss: "By what reasons it is here shown that by 'heaven' the empyrean is signified." First argument: by elimination among the spheres (8th = firmament, 9th = crystalline = waters above, 7 planetary orbs).

The second argument is drawn from a certain fitness and congruity: for if God, for the sake of the state of mortal man and for the uses and conveniences of this brief life, founded so many Heavens that are whirled about in restless revolution, how much more fitting was it to make some Heaven that would suit the state of man after the resurrection — [a state in which man], in soul...

Second argument (fitness): if God made the revolving heavens for mortal life, all the more a resting heaven for the risen. Sentence continues onto printed p. 49.

— p. 90 (PDF) · printed p. 49 —

...[man] living, in soul and body together, the blessed and immortal life, [would have] a most fitting dwelling? If someone should ask what need there was for the empyrean Heaven to be created at the beginning of the world, whose use was not to be until after the consummation of the age: they answer that it had to be created from the beginning, both because it is an incorruptible body, and all incorruptible bodies were made from the beginning; and because such a Heaven was founded for the state of the glory of the just. Now a twofold glory is awaited, the one spiritual, the other corporeal — [consisting] not only in the glorification of the human body, but also in the renovation of the whole world, as Paul teaches in the eighth chapter of the Epistle he wrote to the Romans.

Why the empyrean was made at the start though used only at the end: incorruptible bodies are made from the beginning, and it is for the glory-state of the just. Rom. 8:19–21.

And at the beginning of the world the spiritual glory was begun in the holy and blessed Angels, equality with whom is promised to the just in the Gospel: wherefore it was fitting that the corporeal glory too should be begun from the beginning in some body, which would be, as it were, the exemplar of that glory which the whole corporeal creation awaits after the resurrection of the just. See St. Thomas, part 1, question 66, article 3.

Marginal citations: Matt. 22 (22:30); Luke 20 (20:36) — the just made equal to the angels. Aquinas, Summa I, q. 66, a. 3.

The third argument rests on the authority of ancient and noble writers who held this same view; and, to pass over in silence those I named above, certainly nine hundred years ago Bede, first of all, in clear and eloquent words, hands down this understanding and interpretation of this Mosaic passage in his Hexameron — a brief but truly golden booklet, which in former years was falsely published under the name and title of Junilius Africanus, although by certain arguments it is established that its author was Bede. In that booklet, then, Bede near the beginning writes thus:

Marginal gloss: "Bede's Hexameron falsely ascribed to Junilius." Third argument: from authority.

"The Heaven which Moses writes that God made in the beginning is that higher Heaven, which, set apart from all the whirling state of this world, remains ever at rest in the presence of the divine glory. For concerning our Heaven, in which are placed the lights necessary for this age, Scripture in what follows declares how and when it was made: that higher Heaven, then — which is inaccessible to the sight of all mortals — was not created empty and void, as the earth was, which in its first creation produced none of the green sprouts or of the living animals; because, doubtless, when created it was at once filled with its inhabitants, that is, with the most blessed hosts of the Angels." Thus Bede, in which place he also cites the blessed Jerome as a supporter of this opinion.

Quotation from Bede's Hexameron (the higher heaven created already full of angels).

Moreover, Basil is cited for the same opinion, who in the second and third homilies on Genesis affirms that the Heaven made in the beginning is different from the firmament that was made on the second day: for that [first heaven] is the supreme one, above which is the ineffable light, in which both the Angels and the blessed souls of men dwell. Theodoret writes some similar things in his Questions on Genesis, questions 11 and 14. And in Lippomanus's Catena is placed the opinion of Diodore, Bishop of Tarsus (whom they report to have been Chrysostom's teacher); he says

that in this place, by the name of "Heaven," no heaven that is [visible] to the eyes of mortals is to be understood...

Further authorities: Basil (Hexaemeron hom. 2–3), Theodoret (Questions on Genesis 11 & 14), Diodore of Tarsus (via Lippomanus's Catena). Sentence continues onto printed p. 50.

— p. 91 (PDF) · printed p. 50 —

...[any heaven that is] visible to the eyes of mortals, but a certain higher and more divine one, which in Scripture is called "the Heaven of Heaven." And Damascene, in the second book of On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 6, writing almost the same about this heaven, says it is the supreme boundary of the world, the seat of the Angels, and more sublime than all the starry Heaven — which in the sacred writings is called "the Heaven of Heaven," and by Paul "the Third Heaven." He adds besides that this Heaven was known to the wise of this world and recorded in memory: for it is called by them ■ναστρον (anastron), that is, "starless" — they making the things proper to Moses their own dogmas.

Continuing Diodore of Tarsus / the authorities (from p. 49). John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.6; the third heaven of 2 Cor. 12. The Greek ■ναστρον = "starless."

Indeed, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in his Heptaplus, ch. 1 of the second exposition, names two Hebrew sages — Abraham the Spaniard, a distinguished Astrologer, and Isaac, noble in Philosophy — both of whom handed down [the doctrine of] the empyrean Heaven: and Isaac thought that this orb was adumbrated by Ezekiel through the "sapphire" in the likeness of a throne, so that the color of sapphire declares the splendor of light, and the likeness of a throne the stability and immobility of that Heaven. What, then, the aforesaid writers thought is to be understood by "Heaven" in this place has been sufficiently expounded.

Marginal gloss: "The empyrean heaven was known to the philosophers." Pico, Heptaplus; the Hebrew sages "Abraham Hispanus" (Abraham ibn Ezra) and Isaac; Ezekiel 1 & 10 (the sapphire throne).

But by the name of "earth" they think prime matter is signified by Moses — either wholly unformed (as the blessed Augustine seems to have held, as we said a little above, and among the scholastics, on the second [book] of the Sentences, Marsilius [of Inghen] and Gabriel [Biel]); or not indeed wholly unformed, but having only a certain general form of body, like a corpulent mass, which occupied and filled all that void within the compass of the empyrean Heaven; and from the beginning it was a corpulent mass, rude and unsorted, out of which afterward all bodies, both celestial and sublunary, were composed and formed.

Marginal gloss: "What the theologians think is signified by the word 'earth.'" The earth = prime matter, either wholly unformed or with a general bodily form.

Now they think that the rudeness and formlessness of such matter was adumbrated by Moses in three ways: first, by the name of "earth," because, as earth lies beneath all the other elements and is the place of all compound things, so matter is subject to all the forms which are generated, as it were, from its womb, and are contained in its bosom and lap. Next, it is insinuated by the word "water," when it is said "the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters": because, just as water is most formable and shapeable in any way, so matter is tractable and flexible by any agent, and can easily be procured and accommodated to receive any form whatever. Finally, it is signified by the word "Abyss," in those words "And darkness was over the face of the abyss." For the word "Abyss" signifies a certain depth impenetrable to sight; and the nature of this matter is not unlike it, for it is not comprehensible in itself, but (on Plato's authority) is known only by a spurious and adulterate notion. Aristotle, however, holds that the knowledge of it is grasped by analogy to the matter of artificial things. This opinion Nicholas of Lyra mentions, and Tostatus approves, and [...] it is attributed...

Three adumbrations of formless matter — "earth," "water," "abyss." Marginal citations: Gen. 1:2; Plato, Timaeus. Sentence continues onto printed p. 51.

— p. 92 (PDF) · printed p. 51 —

...it is attributed to Bede, [Walafrid] Strabo, and Hugh [of St. Victor], but wrongly. Moreover, they confirm this opinion also by the testimony of Scripture, which in the eleventh chapter of the book of Wisdom relates that God made the world "from unseen matter" — or (as it is in the Greek codices, and as Augustine is wont to use it) "from formless matter." "If the world," they say, "was founded from formless matter, it is most fitting that its matter was founded before other things in the beginning, and that its making was handed down by Moses in the first place."

The earth = matter view (mis)attributed to Bede, Strabo, Hugh; supported by Wisdom 11:18 ("materia invisa / informis").

And very akin and most similar to this opinion is what Philastrius, Bishop of Brescia, teaches in his catalogue of heresies: for he charges with heresy those who say that Moses, by the name of the "earth" created in the beginning, wished to signify this our elemental earth — whereas by Moses some other "earth" is signified, which is, as it were, the matrix of all things, which in Scripture is called Hyle, that is, invisible and uncomposed matter, which was made by God in the beginning; but this earth of ours was made afterward, and founded upon the water, as David said "Who established the earth above the waters." But that earth which is the matrix of all things is immense, containing both water and earth by its own power. Thus Philastrius.

Marginal gloss: "Philastrius's remarkable opinion about prime matter." Philastrius of Brescia, Diversarum hereseon liber; Hyle = Greek hyl■ (matter); Ps. 135 (136):6 (cited in the margin as Ps. 139).

But that by the name of "earth" formless matter — created first and before other things by God — is not to be understood, St. Thomas, in the first part, question sixty-six, article one, argues in this way: by "prime matter created of itself before all other things," these men either truly understand prime matter bare of all form — but since such matter is being in pure potency,

receiving the whole existence by which it [exists] from form, it cannot be created or exist without form (for it would be brought about that it should be in act without any act, and exist without any existence); or by "formless matter" they understand not prime matter, but matter endowed only with a certain general form of body — but the blessed Thomas contends that such was not produced by God at the beginning of the world.

Marginal gloss: "St. Thomas's argument that formless matter was not created of itself — whether it is sound." Aquinas, Summa I, q. 66, a. 1.

For the subject of substantial generation is being in potency, and not "this something," as Aristotle teaches in the fifth book of the Physics; nor in one composite can there be more than a single substantial form, wherefore from that corporeal matter no other body could have been formed and generated. But these arguments of the blessed Thomas many learned men (whose opinion I gladly subscribe to) judge weak: for nothing prevents — nay, perhaps it is even necessary — that in certain bodies there be several substantial forms; nor is prime matter the proximate subject of generation, except of the elements: for in the generation of compounds, the elements themselves fill the place of the proximate matter and subject, just as seed in the generation of animals. Nor is it probable that prime matter receives from forms the existence by which it is actual in the world, but rather that it, being of itself ingenerable and incorruptible, has also an existence suited to its own nature — lest, since it puts on and off forms a thousand times daily, it be necessary for it a thousand times daily also [to lose and reacquire] its exi[stence]...

Pererius sides with those who reject Aquinas's arguments (allowing plurality of substantial forms and matter's own existence). Aristotle, Physics 5. Sentence continues onto printed p. 52.

— p. 93 (PDF) · printed p. 52 —

...lose its own existence and acquire it anew: than which nothing more improbable can be said. But this controversy we have treated, in the fifth book of our work On Philosophy, with a long and careful disputation.

Closes the digression on prime matter's existence; cross-reference to Pererius's own De communibus … principiis, bk. 5.

The reader expects, I think, that I should briefly disclose what I myself think about this fourth interpretation, so widespread, approved by so many, and hitherto so fully and diligently expounded by us. For my part, I partly agree and partly disagree with the authors of that opinion: I agree that there is an empyrean Heaven, much as it is described by them, and that it was made at the beginning of the world, and perhaps in this place was comprehended by Moses under the name of "heaven."

Marginal gloss: "The author's opinion: what ought to be understood by the 'heaven' created in the beginning." Pererius begins his own qualified position.

Yet I cannot be brought to believe that such a heaven was, by the ancient and pagan Philosophers, not only perceived by knowledge but even recorded in writings: for the nature of that heaven not only escapes man's senses, but also exceeds human reason; since it can become known to us neither by motion, nor by light, nor by any proper effect and emanation — and by these three ways alone did the gentile Philosophers investigate and ascertain the nature of the Heaven. For that heaven called ■ναστρον (starless), posited by the ancients, was not the empyrean (as Damascene thought), but the ninth heaven, first detected by Ptolemy, of such slowness in motion that in a hundred years it completes no more than a single degree.

Marginal gloss: "It is proved that the empyrean heaven was not known to the Gentiles." Pererius: the ancients' "starless heaven" was the ninth (precessing) sphere of Ptolemy (1° per century), not the empyrean.

But I do not agree with these men that by the name of "heaven" in this place only the empyrean heaven is signified: for the design and purpose of Moses in handing down this teaching was assuredly this — to open to the Hebrews the origin and beginnings, and the builder and maker, of all corporeal things, which they both beheld and at whose magnitude, beauty,

power, and efficacy they greatly marveled; and to teach them that these things are not gods, nor worthy of divine worship and honor, but are the works of the true God, which, since they had been nothing from eternity, were at some time first made from nothing by God: so that by this reasoning he might both lead the Hebrews away from the error of the Gentiles, who worship and venerate such things as gods, and, through the sight and contemplation of these things, rouse and raise their minds to the knowledge, love, and worship of the one God, the founder of all.

Pererius's key argument: Moses' aim was to teach the Hebrews about the visible world (to wean them from idolatry); so "heaven" should not mean only the (invisible) empyrean.

But to this design and purpose of Moses it was very alien and discordant to hand down to the Hebrews, right at the beginning of his history, the empyrean heaven — which is not only unknown to human senses, but was also incomprehensible to human reason, even to the wisest Philosophers. Moreover, St. Jerome, in the Epistle one hundred thirty-nine, to Cyprian, writes that Moses in the book of Genesis expounded only the creation of visible things. Then David, emulating Moses, expressed this opinion of his — "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth" — in almost the same words in Psalm 101 [102], saying: "In the beginning, O Lord, thou didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands"; but that David did not understand by "heaven" [the empyrean]...

Marginal gloss: "Moses expounded to the Hebrews only the creation of visible things." Jerome, Letter 139 (to Cyprian); Ps. 102:25. Sentence continues onto printed p. 53.

— p. 94 (PDF) · printed p. 53 —

...that David [did not understand] by "heaven" only the empyrean, the words immediately following clearly declare; for he subjoined about the heavens: "They shall perish, but thou remainest; and all of them shall grow old like a garment. And as a vesture thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed." But these things can in no way fit the empyrean heaven, inasmuch as, according to the Theologians, it is wholly impassible and

immutable, and is in no way to be renewed and changed after the consummation of the age. Basil also supports this opinion, for in the second homily on Genesis he says that the Heaven made in the beginning was, like the earth, made at first uncomposed and unadorned, but afterward was decorated with light, and marvelously distinguished and adorned with the Sun, Moon, and all the stars. From which it is understood that the Heaven made in the beginning seemed to Basil to be that which afterward was illumined with light and stars — which cannot be said of the empyrean Heaven.

Ps. 102:26–27 (the heavens perish and grow old — not the immutable empyrean); Basil, Hexaemeron hom. 2 (the heaven made first is the one later adorned with sun, moon, stars).

I therefore think that by the name of "heaven" in this place is to be understood the whole celestial body, embracing all the orbs: so that in the beginning God created the substance and number of all the heavens, yet without light, motion, and the distinction of the stars; but afterward he gave them light, and to each heaven its own motion, and kindled in them the stars, mighty with great force and power to act. And so the celestial body was made perfect from the beginning, as regards substance, number, order or arrangement, magnitude, figure, and finally the density and rarity of its parts; but afterward many things were added to them on the first and fourth days — that is, to each orb its motor Angel, its proper motion, the beauty of light, and the distinction of the stars, and finally the singular and wondrous force and power of acting of each heaven.

Marginal gloss: "What is to be understood by 'heaven' here, according to the author." Pererius's own view: "heaven" = the whole celestial body (all the orbs), created in substance at first and completed on days 1 and 4.

And this will be both easier to understand and readier to believe after the work of the second day has been expounded: for then we shall show that by the "firmament" cannot be understood either the eighth sphere alone, or it together with the seven planetary orbs subject to it; nor that by the "waters placed above the firmament" the ninth Heaven, commonly called the

crystalline, ought to be understood.

A forward reference to his treatment of the second day (the firmament and the waters above it).

Furthermore, by the name of "Earth" I interpret and understand what the name itself presents and signifies — truly, I say, the element of earth: for since this teaching of Moses (as we have often said) is historical, his words are to be taken properly, not figuratively or allegorically; for it was chiefly for this reason that Tertullian greatly reproved Hermogenes, because what Moses calls "earth void and empty," he (depraving the proper notions of the words) said was prime matter.

Marginal glosses: "What ought to be understood by 'earth' here, according to the author"; "Hermogenes is rightly reprehended by Tertullian." Pererius's view: "earth" = the literal element. Tertullian, Against Hermogenes.

And no otherwise than we do, Basil, Ambrose, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Bede in the Hexameron — and, finally, as many Greek and Latin writers before Augustine as I remember having read — interpreted [it] by the name of "earth." And indeed great credence is added to this opinion by the fact that Moses uses this same name "earth," in narrating the work of the third and sixth days, for the true element of earth (as all confess); nor...

The Fathers (Basil, Ambrose, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Bede) and all pre-Augustine writers take "earth" literally; Moses uses the same word literally on days 3 and 6. Sentence continues onto printed p. 54.

— p. 95 (PDF) · printed p. 54 —

...[Moses uses this same word "earth"] for the true element of earth; nor is it likely that within so small a space he used the name "earth" so ambiguously and obscurely — that is, first for formless matter, then for the element of earth. Besides, that the earth was made at the beginning of the world David declared, when he said "In the beginning, O Lord, thou didst found the earth"; and for that Latin word "In the beginning," the Hebrew has a word properly signifying "first and before other things." But if the

earth was not made in the beginning, when, then, was it made, or where is its making narrated by Moses? They answer that it was made on the third day: but on that day we read that God said, not that the earth should be made, but that the dry land should appear — that is, that what was overwhelmed by waters should stand out, and, being dried, should become a suitable seat and place of generation and habitation, both of plants and of living things.

Marginal citation: Ps. 101 (102):26. Defending the literal "earth": on day 3 only the dry land appeared; the earth itself was made in the beginning.

Furthermore, it is not credible that water was produced before the earth; yet we read that before the third day the upper waters were separated from the lower, and even before the first day we hear Moses saying "the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters." Finally, it is most harsh, and a thing the mind shrinks from believing, that Moses by all those words — "The earth was void and empty, and darkness was over the face of the abyss, and the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters" — wished to insinuate to us nothing but prime matter. And that opinion drawn from the book of Wisdom, "God created the world from unseen or formless matter," I think is to be understood as Bede interprets it in the Hexameron: for he says there is signified that unsorted and unadorned heap of bodies — namely of heaven, earth, and water — founded at the beginning of the world before other things; for this is called "matter," because from these, or in these, bodies were made all the things that afterward, over the six days, are recorded to have been made.

Marginal gloss: "A passage of the book of Wisdom, ch. 11, is explained." Wisdom 11:18 reinterpreted (per Bede): "formless matter" = the rough heap of heaven/earth/water, not prime matter.

And it is called "unseen" or "formless" matter, because such bodies were made at the beginning without light, and without that comeliness, beauty, and adornment which they afterward received. So too the interlinear Gloss expounds those words; and St. Paul intimates this very thing, in Hebrews

11, when he said: "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that from things invisible the visible should come to be" — he calls "invisible" the heaven, earth, and water, as they were from the beginning before the first day. And that the word "earth" is to be taken in this place as we have said is the view of Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and all the Greeks, and of Bede in the Hexameron, and of Hugh [of St. Victor] in his Annotations on the Hexameron and at the beginning of the first book On the Sacraments.

Heb. 11:3; the interlinear Gloss; the Fathers (Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, the Greeks, Bede, Hugh of St. Victor) for the literal "earth."

And although Moses in this place makes explicit mention of only two elements — namely earth and water — silently passing over the other two, nevertheless that all four elements were made at the same time is the view of Basil (homily 2), and of Damascene (book 2, ch. 5), and likewise Bede in the Hexameron. Indeed Basil — and Bede following him — says: "Even now one may see the other three elements contained in manifold ways within the earth: for fire lurks within the earth (the perpetual belching of flames and fires, as from Mount Etna and other places), and of many..."

Marginal gloss: "Why Moses made mention only of earth and water, and not of the construction of air and fire." Basil (Hexaemeron hom. 2), John Damascene (De fide orthodoxa 2.5), Bede. Sentence continues onto printed p. 55.

— p. 96 (PDF) · printed p. 55 —

...[and] the eruption from the earth of many waters boiling with fiery heat sufficiently indicates it. How much air the earth holds within its bowels, frequent earthquakes — caused by the spirit (wind) stirred and conflicting within — are tokens, to say nothing of the inner caverns and caves of the earth filled with much air. And how great a force of water is contained in the inner embrace of the earth, the perennial springs of fountains and the origins of rivers, and also the digging of wells, plainly show. Wherefore let it be no wonder to anyone that Moses comprehended the other elements too

under the name of "earth." Although there are those who think that air was not obscurely indicated by Moses in those words "the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters," so that the "Spirit" is nothing but agitated air.

The other elements lurk within the earth: fire (volcanoes), air (earthquakes, caverns), water (springs). Some read the "Spirit over the waters" as air.

But that the element of fire was passed over by Moses — who would wonder, who knows that not a few, and not undistinguished, Philosophers doubted whether there is any element of fire above the air, beneath the globe of the Moon, and some even boldly denied it? Nor is it improbable, as certain weighty authors have handed down, that Moses, writing for a rude people, expounded only two elements, earth and water, because these alone fall under sight, and from them the other bodies are both manifestly and for the most part composed, and abide in them as in their natural place.

Fire omitted because even philosophers doubted the existence of elemental fire below the moon; Moses gives the two visible elements.

Aristotle, in the second book On the Heavens, text 17, from the fact that the heaven is turned around in eternal revolution, argues that it needed some immobile center — not indeed a Mathematical one, but a Physical one — about which the heaven might revolve; and that this can be nothing other than the earth; and the earth being posited, the other elements too must necessarily be posited. For nature does not bear one contrary without the other, lest, if there be only one, it draw all things to itself and convert them into itself alone; but it makes both contraries, so that by the mutual contention of the two their force may be tempered and moderated: wherefore if earth is the heaviest and lowest body, fire too will be the lightest of bodies, seeking the highest place; and if these be the extremes, the other two, which are intermediate, must necessarily not be lacking — especially since, according to active qualities, water is contrary to fire, and earth to air. By almost the same reasoning Plato philosophizes, in the Timaeus, about the necessity of the four elements.

Aristotle, On the Heavens 2 (text 17): the revolving heaven needs an immobile physical center (= earth); the four elements are necessary (cf. Plato, Timaeus).

But it is here to be understood that whatever the Astrologers or Philosophers (with great glory to their name) have subtly and learnedly handed down about the earth — these things, either all or at least the chief, are found handed down in Sacred Scripture many ages before. And first, that the earth was made by God in its own natural place, where it now is, ought not to be called into doubt: for it must be thought that God so made all things as best suited their natures, and made nothing in a violent state and against its nature; but it is against the nature of the earth, and violent to it, to be outside its natural place. Nor indeed could so great a mass of earth be held outside its natural place, except miraculously, as if suspended. And this Scripture plainly teaches us:...

Marginal glosses: "Most of what the Philosophers and Mathematicians truly handed down about the earth was recorded in the sacred writings many ages before"; "That the earth was made by God in its natural place." Sentence continues onto printed p. 56.

— p. 97 (PDF) · printed p. 56 —

...for in Psalm 118 [119] it says thus, "Thou hast founded the earth, and it abideth." Both words indeed — "to found" and "to abide" — argue that the earth was made by God in its natural place; for outside it, it would neither truly be said to be founded, nor could it have abided. For the same reason too, when Scripture treats of the creation of the earth, in one place it says it was created and formed by God, in another founded and made firm or stable, doubtless indicating that it was made in its place, outside which it could neither be well founded nor made firm. To this also belongs that elegant description of the founding of the earth which Job, in chapter 38, sets forth metaphorically, taken from the building of some huge and magnificent palace: "Where wast thou," he says, "when I laid the foundations of the earth? Who determined its measurements, if thou knowest? or who stretched the line upon it? upon what are its bases made fast? or who laid its cornerstone?"

Ps. 118 (119):90; Job 38:4–6 — the earth founded in its place.

That the earth is immobile, Aristotle proves with the best arguments in book 2 On the Heavens, text 90. But this very thing, seven hundred years before Aristotle, we find handed down in the sacred writings. For David said in Psalm 92 [93], "God has made firm the globe of the earth, which shall not be moved"; and in Psalm 103 [104], "Thou hast founded the earth upon its stability; it shall not be inclined for ever and ever"; and Solomon at the beginning of Ecclesiastes, "But the earth stands for ever"; and in the first book of Paralipomenon, ch. 16, "God founded the immovable globe." And David describes this same immobility of the earth metaphorically in Psalm 74 [75], when he brings in God saying of the earth, "I have made firm its columns," by that likeness declaring the natural heaviness of the earth, by which, placed in the middle of the world, it remains firm and immobile.

Marginal gloss: "That the earth is immobile, Aristotle proved, and long before him David sang." Aristotle, On the Heavens 2 (text 90); Ps. 93:1; Ps. 104:5; Eccles. 1:4; 1 Chron. 16:30; Ps. 75:4.

But indeed someone will perhaps object to us what is written in Job, ch. 9, of God: "Who removed the mountains, who moves the earth out of its place." But this is resolved: for in that place Scripture speaks not of the motion of the whole element of earth, but of some of its parts, such as is wont to happen in an earthquake, in which the earth, shaken and made to tremble by the spirit (wind) shut up within, is moved.

Marginal gloss: "A passage of Job, ch. 9, is explained." Job 9:5–6 — about earthquakes (partial motion), not the whole earth.

That the earth is placed in the middle place of the world (which they call the center) both the Mathematicians teach and Aristotle confirms in book 2 On the Heavens, text 98; and it was handed down long before in Scripture. For among the Philosophers, "up" and "down" are so arranged in the world (which is round) that they put "up" in the heaven of the moon, but "down" at the center of the world: for the center, in comparison with the whole

circumference, is the lowest place, and farthest distant on all sides from the circumference. But divine Scripture, as it assigns "up" to heaven, so attaches "down" to the earth, whereby it indicates that the earth is placed at the center of the world. For Solomon, Proverbs 25, says "Heaven above, and the earth beneath"; and Moses, in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, writes thus, "The Lord himself is God in Heaven above and on the earth beneath"; David too, when in Psalm 102 [103] he wished to express a certain greatest distance, said "according to the height of Heaven from the earth," etc. But there would not be the greatest distance between Heaven and earth, unless the earth were placed in the middle place of the world...

Marginal gloss: "That the earth is placed at the center of the world." Aristotle, On the Heavens 2 (text 98); Prov. 25:3; Deut. 4:39; Ps. 102 (103):11. Sentence continues onto printed p. 57.

— p. 98 (PDF) · printed p. 57 —

...[unless the earth were placed in the middle]. Finally, that the earth is spherical has been demonstrated by many arguments by the Mathematicians, and by Aristotle in book 2 On the Heavens, text 104; which sacred Scripture too indicates not obscurely, since it so often calls [it] "the orb (globe) of the earth": for that word "Orbis" shows that the earth is round, and gathered into the figure of a globe. The same is also understood from those words in Isaiah, ch. 40, "Who sits upon the circle of the earth," or, as the Hebrew reading has, "Who sits upon the globe of the earth"; but the Seventy [LXX] rendered, "Who holds the circle of the earth." From which it is clear that the opinions of certain ancients about the figure of the earth were futile and fabricated: for Anaximander said it was column-shaped, Anaximenes like a table, Leucippus like a drum, Democritus like a disc.

Marginal gloss: "That the earth is round." Aristotle, On the Heavens 2 (text 104); Isa. 40:22; the discredited shapes (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Leucippus, Democritus).

Furthermore, some of old wondered, and today still wonder, upon what the earth, founded and made firm, stands unmoved through so long an age: for

they cannot bring themselves to believe that so great a mass and weight of earth, propped and made firm by nothing, can be held as if suspended, lest, inclining to some side, it be moved. Wherefore some thought that no other reason for this could be given than the omnipotence of God, miraculously sustaining the mass of the earth thus. Aristotle, in book 2 On the Heavens, text 78, records six or seven opinions of the ancients about the cause of the earth's firmness and stability, of which the most ancient is the opinion of Thales — that the earth was founded upon the waters, and is sustained as resting and floating upon the waters: which Seneca too rejects and confutes, in book 6 of the Natural Questions, ch. 6.

Marginal gloss: "The question: on what foundation the earth remains always immobile." Aristotle, On the Heavens 2 (text 78); Thales (earth floats on water); Seneca, Natural Questions 6.6.

For, to pass over many arguments, surely what is asked about the earth can, with a weightier reason, be asked about the water — upon what it is propped and sustained, since it too is a heavy body: nay rather, since earth is heavier than water, it is more consonant with reason that water be sustained by earth than earth by water; a thing made manifestly and certainly credible by the fact that, beneath any water, earth settles as its foundation. And since in simple and uniform bodies the reasoning of any one particle and of the whole element is the same, if the element of earth were to remain upon water, then all the parts of earth too would remain upon water — which, however, when thrown into water, we see not to float upon the waters, but to sink to the bottom.

Pererius's refutation of Thales: water cannot bear the heavier earth, and parts of earth sink rather than float.

Yet divine Scripture seems to favor and support the opinion of Thales, for in more than one place it says the earth is upon the waters. For in chapter 20 of Exodus it stands thus: "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor any likeness that is in Heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, nor of those things that are in the waters under the earth." But David teaches

this more clearly in Psalm 23 [24], "For he," he says, "has founded it" (namely the globe of the earth) "upon the seas, and has prepared it upon the rivers"; and in Psalm 135 [136], "Who established the earth above the waters." This opinion the author of the fourth book of Ezra follows, in the last chapter, and Justin Martyr, in his response to the Questions of the Orthodox, answering question 130. Finally, these words seem to indicate this...

Marginal gloss: "Whether according to divine Scripture the earth is upon the waters." Exod. 20:4; Ps. 23 (24):2; Ps. 135 (136):6; 4 Ezra; ps.-Justin, Questions to the Orthodox. Sentence continues onto printed p. 58.

— p. 99 (PDF) · printed p. 58 —

...[Finally, these words of Peter seem to indicate this], in the third chapter of his latter Epistle: "The heavens were before, and the earth standing out of water and through water, by the word of God." But neither these, nor any other objections that can be raised, ought to lead us away from the true opinion: for it must be held for certain that nothing is handed down in the sacred writings which is contrary to manifest experience and true reasonings. And by necessary arguments it is shown that the earth cannot naturally be upon the water; while to say that the earth is sustained upon the waters miraculously by God is [the part] of a man who, to defend his fabricated opinion, foolishly invents anything whatever, and rashly abuses the omnipotence of God when there is no need and it is least fitting.

2 Peter 3:5 ("the earth standing out of water"). Pererius: appealing to a miracle to save the literal "earth on water" is a foolish abuse of God's omnipotence.

But that the cause of the stability and firmness of the earth is its natural heaviness — which, since it is supreme, by its own inclination and weight seeks the lowest place of the world, that is, the center, in which, being placed, it naturally rests, and from which it cannot be drawn except by force — both right reason shows and true philosophy demonstrates. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the earth, since it is at the center,

remains unmoved: nay rather, it would be a vast miracle if it were moved anywhere else; for wherever it were carried outside the center, it would necessarily ascend, since every place in the circle that is outside the center is higher than the center. And David wished to signify this same thing, when he said in Psalm 103 [104], "Thou hast founded the earth upon its stability; it shall not be inclined for ever and ever" — calling "stability" that supreme weight of heaviness by which it comes about that the earth remains unmoved at the center. To this also looks that passage of Job, ch. 26, "Who hangs the earth upon nothing," that is, upon no foundation or support: for the earth, placed at the center, needs no other foundation by which it may be propped and sustained.

The earth's stability = its gravity drawing it to the center; Ps. 104:5; Job 26:7 ("hangs the earth upon nothing").

Nor indeed does what Scripture says — that the earth was founded upon water — oppose this truth: for it is variously expounded. For some refer it to that first state of the earth, when at the beginning of the world it was created by God covered with waters, so that "upon water" means the same as "in water" (which the Greek reading rejects); and Euthymius assigns this interpretation to Basil, in explaining the twenty-third psalm, where he says that Chrysostom took those words of David simply, thinking that the earth really was founded upon the waters, so that by that miracle God's omnipotence might shine the more clearly. But Euthymius himself thinks that David's words are to be understood not of the whole element of water or earth, but of those waters, whether of the sea or of rivers, which run their courses through subterranean passages: for it is agreed among all that certain great rivers glide beneath the earth at long intervals and afterward emerge into the open.

Marginal gloss: "A passage of David is explained, which is in Psalm 23." Reconciling "earth upon water" (Ps. 24:2): Basil/Euthymius/Chrysostom; the subterranean rivers.

Yet more like the truth is the opinion of those who, [taking] "the earth was made upon the waters," interpret that the earth was made higher, loftier, and more eminent than the waters. For since the Hebrew language lacks comparatives, to express their force it uses the particle "above" (super), "prae," and others similar. So David, "[sweeter] than honey to my mouth"; and "[more to be desired] than gold and much precious stone"...

Marginal citations: Ps. 118 (119):103 ("sweeter than honey"); Ps. 18 (19):11 ("more than gold and precious stone"). Pererius's preferred reading: "upon the waters" = a Hebrew comparative, "higher than the waters." Sentence continues onto printed p. 59.

— p. 100 (PDF) · printed p. 59 —

...[more to be desired] than gold and much precious stone. There remains one question to be briefly dispatched: whether the opinion of the Philosophers and Mathematicians — who affirm that the circumference and magnitude of the whole earth has been ascertained and comprehended by them by a sure method — is repugnant to divine Scripture, which at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiasticus says thus, "The breadth of the earth and the depth of the abyss, who has measured?" (as if to say, no one); and God says in Job, ch. 38, "Hast thou considered the breadth of the earth?" From these two passages it seems it can be drawn that what the Mathematicians and philosophers claim is incomprehensible to man. But it must be answered that there is no repugnance: for by the aforesaid words of Scripture is signified not impossibility, but rarity and difficulty.

Marginal gloss: "A passage of Ecclesiasticus, about the knowledge of the breadth or circumference of the earth, is examined." Ecclus. 1:3; Job 38:18.

For that interrogative "Who" (as Jerome well noted) sometimes signifies in the sacred writings rarity and difficulty (as in that saying of Solomon, "Who can say, My heart is clean?", or in that other of his, "A valiant woman, who shall find?"); but sometimes it simply denies and denotes impossibility (for example, "Who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid him?", or "Who has resisted God and had peace?", or "What man is

he that shall live and not see death?"). Or it can be answered that Scripture speaks of the breadth of the earth not simply, but only of that which is outside the waters and is inhabitable, whose extent is still unknown to mortals, new lands and nations being discovered daily; or Scripture treats of the breadth of the earth alone, while the Mathematicians' reasonings hold for the whole globe, which is formed of earth and water together; or, finally, Scripture speaks of the exact and infallible knowledge of the earth's extent, which the Mathematicians do not hand down.

Marginal citations: Prov. 20:9; Prov. 31:10; Rom. 11:35; Job 9:4; Ps. 88 (89):49. The interrogative "Who" = difficulty, not impossibility; several harmonizations.

For it is not agreed among all how much space of earth corresponds to one degree of the celestial circle; whence various opinions of philosophers and Mathematicians about the dimension of the earth's circumference have arisen. For according to the Mathematicians, whom Aristotle followed in book 2 On the Heavens, the circumference of the earth contained four hundred thousand stadia, that is fifty thousand Italian miles; according to Hipparchus (on Pliny's testimony), thirty-four thousand six hundred and twenty-five miles; according to Eratosthenes (as Macrobius relates in [his commentary on] the Dream of Scipio), thirty-one thousand five hundred miles; according to Ptolemy, twenty-two thousand five hundred (which opinion Basil too mentions in the ninth homily on the Hexameron); according to Alfraganus and very many Sages (as he himself says), twenty thousand four hundred miles; according to Fernel, twenty-four thousand five hundred and fourteen; according to more recent men (not only those skilled in Astronomy, but also those who have sailed almost the whole Ocean), nineteen thousand and eighty miles.

Marginal glosses: "The variety of opinions about the magnitude of the earth's circumference"; "Aristotle, On the Heavens, bk. 2, text 112." The discordant estimates (400,000 stadia ≈ 50,000 mi; Hipparchus 34,625; Eratosthenes 31,500; Ptolemy 22,500; Alfraganus 20,400; Fernel 24,514; recent navigators ~19,080).

But this great magnitude of the earth, if it be compared with the eighth sphere (in which are the fixed stars), is said to hold the place of a point: for the circumference of the eighth heaven contains the circumference of the globe which is [formed] of earth...

The earth a mere point compared with the firmament. Sentence continues onto printed p. 60.

— p. 101 (PDF) · printed p. 60 —

...which consists of earth and water, twenty-two thousand six hundred and twelve times and even more: so that it is manifest to those who reckon how great is the smallness of the earth, if it be compared with the empyrean Heaven, supreme of all.

The eighth heaven's circumference is some 22,612 times the earth-globe's — hence the earth is tiny against the empyrean.

Verse 2. But the earth was void and empty, and darkness was over the face of the abyss.

New scripture lemma (Gen. 1:2a).

In Hebrew there are two words, ■■■ ■■■■ (Tohu Vabohu), which the translators have variously rendered, both into Greek and into Latin. Our Latin translator rendered "void and empty"; Pagninus, "desolate and void"; others, "untilled and empty"; the Septuagint, "invisible and uncomposed"; Aquila, "vanity and nothing"; Symmachus, "idle and unsorted"; Theodotion, "empty and nothingness"; the Paraphrase of Onkelos has, word for word, "desolate and void"; but [the Targum of] Jonathan, "empty of men and beasts." Those skilled in the Hebrew tongue teach that the word ■■■ (Tohu) properly signifies "vain" or "vanity" — namely, that which does not attain the end for whose sake it was made: by this word, in 1 Kings (1 Samuel) ch. 12, the idols are called [vain], when it is said "Turn not aside after vain things, which shall not profit you nor deliver you, for they are vain," where the word Tohu is set twice. And the word ■■■ (Bohu) properly signifies "empty, void, and nothing," also "hidden and

obscure"; whence some think the Italian word "Buio" (which means dark and shadowy) is derived.

Marginal gloss: "What it is that the earth was void and empty." The translations of Tohu wa-Bohu (Vulgate, Pagninus, LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Onkelos, ps.-Jonathan) and the Hebrew sense (Tohu = vanity, cf. 1 Sam. 12:21; Bohu = void/obscure).

By these words Moses sets before our eyes what the state of the earth was at the beginning of the world: for it was without light, without any adornment and beauty, empty of men, animals, and plants; not distinguished into mountains, valleys, plains, and hills; not eminent and standing out above the waters, but on every side most deeply covered with waters; finally, such that it could truly be called "invisible and formless matter" (for so it is called in the book of Wisdom, ch. 11, when it is said that "the hand of God made the world from unseen or formless matter"). Cajetan thinks that at that time the earth was pure, in that it had in itself no mixed body; but since it was then wholly confounded and drenched with waters, it could not have the supreme dryness which is, as it were, the distinguishing mark of the element earth: so that, although it was pure in respect of substance, yet in respect of qualities it could not be pure.

The earth's state in Gen. 1:2 = without light/adornment, undifferentiated, water-covered (cf. Wisdom 11:18); Cajetan's "pure earth" qualified by Pererius.

But that sentence, "And darkness was over the face of the abyss": Pagninus rendered "Darkness was on the surface of the gulf." And the Hebrew word ■■■ (Choshech), which our [Latin] translator rendered in the plural "darkness," can also be rendered in Latin "obscurity," keeping the same singular number. For that "Over the face," in Hebrew it is ■■ ■■■ (Al-pene), signifying in the plural "surfaces": whereby it is denoted, as Cajetan says, that the whole water on every side (that is, both toward our hemisphere and toward the opposite) was dark and shadowy, for as yet no light...

The Hebrew of "darkness over the face of the abyss" — Choshech (darkness/obscurity), Al-pene (over the surfaces); the whole water dark on both hemispheres. Sentence continues onto printed p. 61.

— p. 102 (PDF) · printed p. 61 —

...[for as yet no light] had been created by God. But ■■■■ (Tehom), in Hebrew, properly signifies a gulf, an abyss, and a great depth of waters. Basil defines the abyss thus: "An abyss," he says, "is a copious water, to whose bottom one cannot easily penetrate downward." Augustine, on Psalm 41 [42]: "An abyss," he says, "is a depth impenetrable and incomprehensible; and it is commonly said of waters, for there is height where there is a depth that cannot be penetrated to the bottom; and hence, by a similitude drawn from this, Scripture calls the judgments of God 'a great abyss,' as being incomprehensible to human reason and understanding."

Marginal glosses: "What the abyss is"; "Basil, hom. 2 on the Hexaemeron"; "Ps. 55." Tehom = abyss/great depth (Basil; Augustine on Ps. 42:8).

That there was then a vast magnitude of waters is not to be doubted: Cajetan indeed certainly thinks that there was then a greater force and abundance of waters than at the time of the flood, at which time the water exceeded all the mountains of the earth by fifteen cubits. But at the beginning of the world the height of the waters was so great that a line drawn from the circumference of the earth to the outermost circumference of the water was far greater than a line drawn from the center of the earth to its surface (which, however, is the semidiameter of the earth, containing in length at the least about three thousand miles). And Cajetan would have it seem no wonder to anyone: for the higher an element is, the larger it is in all its dimensions; nay, he even thinks that the water then was tenfold larger than the earth, because such is the natural proportion of water to earth.

Marginal glosses: "How great was the force of waters at the beginning of the world"; "Gen. 7" (the flood, 15 cubits above the mountains). Earth's radius ≈ 3,000 miles; Cajetan: the primordial water tenfold the earth.

But Bede, not content even with this height of water, affirms in his Hexameron that all that space of the world which was contained between the empyrean and the earth was full of water — that is (as I interpret it) of a certain humid and watery matter, and as it were nebulous, not equally dense or rare, but such as could, more densely compacted, be turned into elemental water, and, more rarefied, thin out into air, and from which, concreted by a wondrous method, even the celestial orbs might be formed.

Bede: the whole space between empyrean and earth full of a nebulous humid matter — convertible into water, air, and even the heavenly orbs.

But concerning the primeval darkness of the world there is a memorable, and truly paradoxical, thing that Basil and Theodoret hand down in this place. For they say that, above the first heaven, there was made by God — before this corporeal and visible world — a certain inaccessible light, in which the Angels dwelt, founded many ages before the construction of this world. But when the heaven was then created, since it is a continuous and solid body, it darkened and overshadowed all the things that were made within its compass, namely by its interposition obstructing [the light], so that that supreme light could not illuminate the earth and water; and this they think is the cause why, the heaven being created, there was darkness over the earth and water. They seem to have been led to this speculation by hatred of the trifles of the Manichees, who assert that darkness is a certain eternal substance, and a principle of things no less than light. And that things similar to what Basil and Theodoret hand down about the first darkness were wont to be taught by the blessed Peter too, Bede confirms in his Hexameron, by the authority and testimony of Clement of Rome.

Marginal gloss: "The remarkable opinion of Basil and Theodoret about the primeval darkness of the world — this opinion is refuted [next page]." The pre-mundane inaccessible light blocked by the opaque created heaven (against the Manichees); Bede cites ps.-Clement. Pererius refutes it on printed p. 62.

— p. 103 (PDF) · printed p. 62 —

But surely, if these men felt and meant to signify what their words present on the surface, it is difficult to approve their opinion. For that supercelestial light was either only spiritual or corporeal: if only spiritual, then certainly, even had there been no obstruction from the heaven, it could no more have illuminated the earth and water; nor could the heaven, which is a body, obstruct the spiritual power of that light; nor, since Moses here doubtless treats of corporeal darkness, could such darkness arise from the privation of that spiritual light. But if that light was corporeal, it could not cohere and subsist by itself, but had to inhere in some body: wherefore there would have been some body created by God before heaven and earth — which is opposed both to Moses in this place, and to David in Psalm 101 [102], who say "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth."

Refutation of the Basil/Theodoret darkness theory (from p. 61): a spiritual light wouldn't light up bodies and couldn't be blocked; a corporeal light would imply a body before heaven and earth (against Gen. 1:1 and Ps. 102).

That at the beginning of the world there was darkness and obscurity before the light, Paul too taught us, when in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews he says "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that from things invisible the visible should come to be"; and in the fourth chapter of the latter Epistle to the Corinthians, "God," he says, "who commanded light to shine out of darkness." Therefore from the beginning the earth was covered round with waters, and as it were clothed about. Wherefore David, in Psalm 103 [104], speaking of the earth, says "The deep, like a garment, is its clothing"; and Job, in chapter 38, describing the origin of the waters, "Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing from the womb? when I made a cloud its garment, and wrapped it in mist as in the swaddling-bands of infancy?"

Pererius's own view: darkness preceded light (Heb. 11:3; 2 Cor. 4:6); the earth was covered with water (Ps. 104:6; Job 38:8–9).

And the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters.

New scripture lemma (Gen. 1:2c). Marginal gloss: "Ibidem" (the same place).

Pagninus rendered, "The Spirit of the Lord was blowing on the surface of the waters." The Paraphrase of Onkelos has, "A spirit from the face of God was blowing over the faces of the waters." But [the Targum of] Jonathan, "A spirit, or wind, of mercies — or of grace — was blowing over the faces of the waters." For in Hebrew there is a plural noun "Faces," which both our [Latin] translator and the Septuagint omitted. Of the Hebrew word ■■■ (Ruah), which is rendered in Latin "Spirit," there is a fourfold signification often used in the sacred writings: either for air or wind, or for the Holy Spirit, or for an incorporeal nature (so it is said "God is a Spirit," and "an Angel"), or (as I shall show a little below) for a certain force and impulse and motion and efficacy.

Marginal gloss: "Variant reading." The translations (Pagninus, Onkelos, ps.-Jonathan) and the fourfold sense of Ruah.

The verb ■■■■■ (Merachepheth), that is "was borne," the Septuagint rendered "was borne over" (for this translation of theirs is often cited by Augustine); and others, "moved itself," or "stirred," or "fluttered"; others, "was breathing" or "was blowing." Jerome, in the Hebrew Questions on Genesis, affirms that the aforesaid Hebrew verb properly signifies "to brood" or "to cherish/warm," by the likeness of birds, which warm and quicken their eggs by their own heat; from which he thinks it is clearly [understood]...

Marginal gloss: "The fourfold meaning of the word 'Spirit.'" The verb Merachepheth = "to brood" (Jerome) — the basis for the Holy-Spirit reading. Sentence continues onto printed p. 63.

— p. 104 (PDF) · printed p. 63 —

...clearly understood that Moses in this place, by "the Spirit of the Lord," signifies not air or wind, but the Holy Spirit, who is called the spirit that vivifies, fosters, and perfects all things. Basil says that in this place he received the same interpretation of the Hebrew verb from a certain Syrian, a great man — doubtless meaning his own Ephraem [the Syrian], his

contemporary and very close friend. The same notion and interpretation of the Hebrew verb Diodore, Bishop of Tarsus, especially approves.

The verb's brooding sense supports "Spirit of the Lord" = Holy Spirit (Jerome, Basil via Ephraem, Diodore of Tarsus).

But before I expound the interpretations of the Fathers, I would like to explode the novel and astonishing exposition of Cajetan, which no one (as far as I know), of the ancients or even of the more recent, has so much as touched by surmise. Cajetan thinks that by these words are metaphorically signified the Angels, who move the Heavens (and especially the primum mobile) with the greatest speed: so that "the Spirit of God" signifies an Angel (so frequently so called in Scripture, for David said "Who makes his Angels spirits"); "upon the waters" signifies the Heavens, for in Hebrew too they are called ■■■■ (Schamaim), a word derived from "waters," and the crystalline Heaven (which Cajetan thinks is the primum mobile), since it is wholly diaphanous and translucent, is rightly named by the name of "water"; and that particle "Super" (above) denotes the excellence of the Angel above the Heaven which it moves, for it is not contained by it or dependent on it, but rather is supereminent over it and presides over it.

Marginal gloss: "Cajetan's novel interpretation." Cajetan: "Spirit of God" = the angels moving the heavens (Ps. 104:4 "who makes his angels spirits").

"Was borne," or (as the Hebrew verb properly sounds) "was fluttering" or "was brooding," shows what the motion of the Heaven is which is caused by the Angel: for if we read "was fluttering," the supreme speed of its motion is declared; but if we read "was brooding," its vital force and efficacy is shown, for the celestial motion (as Aristotle hands down at the beginning of the eighth book of the Physics) is, as it were, the life of sublunary things, since through it (as he also teaches in the first book On the Heavens) God imparts to all things being and life, to some more clearly, to others more obscurely. And this is Cajetan's interpretation.

Cajetan's reading of "was borne" as the angel-driven motion of the heaven (Aristotle, Physics 8; On the Heavens 1).

That this is most harsh, wholly forced and violent, and least congruent with the purpose and words of Moses himself, anyone can see for himself, so that it needs no refutation from us. Certainly, before light was made, what need was there of the revolution of the Heaven? For the motion of the heaven occurs only for dispensing light. Next, that "heavens" should be signified by the name of "waters" is too figurative a locution, and unusual in Scripture, and not befitting the historical narration of Moses. It is also absurd to make Moses, within so small a space, use the word "waters" so ambiguously — first for the heaven, then, in narrating the work of the second, third, and fifth days, for the true element of water. But let us dismiss Cajetan, and call the interpretations of others to judgment and examination.

Marginal gloss: "Cajetan's interpretation is refuted." Pererius's objections: no need of heaven's motion before light; "waters = heavens" too figurative; Moses wouldn't use "waters" so ambiguously.

Tertullian, in the book he wrote against Hermogenes, contends that by "the Spirit of the Lord" in this place is signified not God, but wind. This interpretation is especially approved by Theodoret, who...

The first interpretation (Spirit = wind): Tertullian (Against Hermogenes), Theodoret. Sentence continues onto printed p. 64.

— p. 105 (PDF) · printed p. 64 —

...who, in question 8 on Genesis, thinks that Moses by these words hinted at the element of air, just as he had handed down the element of earth and water. And that "was borne," he says, demonstrates the natural mobility and agitation of the air or wind itself, or the natural position of the air, which is on every side to be supereminent over the waters, surrounding them. And it is called "the Spirit of God," either because it had been sent in by God (for there were not then natural causes exciting wind), or because that wind was very strong and vehement: for it is the custom of Scripture,

when it wishes to signify some notable and outstanding thing, to add to it the name of God — as it is said "the Mountain of God," "the Cedar of God," "the War of God or of the Lord," "the City of God." This exposition Basil mentions in this place, and Diodore (as cited in the Catena), nor do they disapprove it, although they put it after the one concerning the Holy Spirit.

Marginal gloss: "The first opinion, of Tertullian and Theodoret, who say that by 'the Spirit' is understood air." "Of God" as a Hebrew superlative (Mountain of God, etc.).

Since, therefore, this interpretation was especially approved by Tertullian and Theodoret, and not condemned by Basil and Diodore and other most weighty men, there was surely no reason why Catharinus should reject and condemn it so severely — not only as false, but as insufficiently pious. For what some say — that although the word "Spirit" is sometimes put in Scripture for "wind," yet it is never taken for "wind" with the addition of "of God" or "of the Lord," but only for the Holy Spirit — Theodoret proves false by a manifest example from Psalm 147 of David, where it stands thus, "His wind shall blow, and the waters shall flow": for it signifies that, a wind being sent in by God, the waters frozen by cold melt and flow away.

Pererius defends the wind-reading against Catharinus: "Spirit of God" can mean wind (Ps. 147:18).

He could have proved the same by very many other testimonies of Scripture: such as that of Exodus 15, "Thy wind blew, and the sea covered them"; and in the Canticle of the Three Children, "Bless the Lord, rain and dew; bless the Lord, every wind (spirit) of God"; and in Job, ch. 27, "As long as breath remains in me, and the breath (spirit) of God in my nostrils, my lips shall not speak iniquity"; and in Isaiah, ch. 30, "Its nourishment is fire and much wood: the breath of the Lord, like a torrent of brimstone, kindling it"; and ch. 40, "The hay is withered, and the flower is fallen, because the wind (spirit) of the Lord has blown upon it."

Further proofs that "spirit of God/the Lord" = wind/breath: Exod. 15:10; Dan. 3:64–65 (Canticle of the Three Children); Job 27:3; Isa. 30:33; Isa. 40:7.

Now the approvers of this interpretation think that Moses in this place made mention of the spirit — that is, of air or wind — because he wished to indicate that all the elements were founded by God at the beginning, namely earth, water, and air; for about fire, whether it is some element placed in a separate place of the world, there is great dispute even now among the philosophers. And indeed the first two are manifest even to the common people, by sight and touch; the third, by touch and hearing; but the fourth (that is, fire, which is above the air, next beneath the orb of the moon) is known by no sense. And therefore perhaps God created the air with motion and agitation, so that by this means its creation might become known to all, since the unlearned common people do not perceive air except by its motion. Others think mention was made of the spirit — namely, wind — because God was soon to use its ministry to separate the water from the earth, or at least to dry the earth, which, the waters being segregated, had remained muddy and miry.

Why "air/wind": to complete the manifest elements (earth, water, air; fire being disputed); air is known only by its motion; the wind also for drying the land. Sentence continues onto printed p. 65.

— p. 106 (PDF) · printed p. 65 —

The second interpretation, that of nearly all the Fathers (both Greek and Latin), is that by "the Spirit of God" in this place is signified, either solely or chiefly and principally, the Holy Spirit: which opinion the Catholic Church has followed in the blessing of the fonts, in which it sings thus of the Holy Spirit, "Thou wast borne over the waters, about to [sanctify] them"; and again, "God, whose Spirit was borne over the waters at the very beginnings of the world, that even then the nature of the waters might conceive the power of sanctification."

Marginal gloss: "The second interpretation, approved by almost all the Fathers and Theologians, which by 'Spirit' in this place understands the Holy Spirit." The font-blessing liturgy (Easter Vigil).

This interpretation especially pleased the Fathers, both because by it the sacrament of spiritual regeneration (which is done through water and the

Holy Spirit — in sign and proof of which, when our Lord was baptized in the Jordan, above the waters of the Jordan, the Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove) is shown to have been prefigured in the first origin of the world and of man, in which the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters; and especially because by it the mystery of the Trinity is made manifest and known at the very beginning of the world and of divine Scripture: for that "In the beginning" denotes the Son; that "God created" indicates God the Father; and this "The Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters" demonstrates the Holy Spirit.

Marginal glosses: "John 3"; "Matt. 3"; "Mention is made of the Trinity at the beginning of the world." Baptism prefigured (Matt. 3:16); the Trinity in Gen. 1:1–2.

Certainly it can in no way be denied that the Holy Spirit is in the sacred writings frequently called the author of creating the heavens and the earth, and of fostering, vivifying, and preserving all things. For David sang, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the spirit of his mouth"; and in another place, "Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created, and thou shalt renew the face of the earth"; and Job says, "The Spirit of the Lord adorned the heavens"; and in the book of Wisdom many excellent things are proclaimed of the Spirit of God.

Marginal citations: Ps. 32 (33):6; Ps. 103 (104):30; Job 26:13; Wisdom 1 & 7. The Holy Spirit as creator/quickener.

But what does that word "was borne" — or (as Augustine reads) "was borne over the waters" — mean? Basil says that "was borne" is nothing other than that it fostered and vivified the waters, preparing them for the fertility soon to come. Augustine says that "was borne over" signifies that God is superior to the things he founded, and was impelled to fashion the world by no necessity and by need of nothing, but only by his own goodness and kindness: for he who works because of need is subjected to his own works rather than borne above them. Bede, in the Hexameron, says thus, "The Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters, not in corporeal

places, but by the excellence of power, because whatever he had begun, thereafter to be formed and perfected, lay subject to the will of the Creator." Tostatus interprets thus: "The will and mind of God the maker was borne over the waters, as if pondering and designing in his mind whatever he had determined to make from the waters — after the likeness of a human craftsman looking at and considering the material set before him, [to see] how from it he might fashion a work after the likeness of that form which he holds conceived and shaped in his mind."

The senses of "was borne (over)": Basil (fostered/quickened the waters), Augustine (God's superiority and freedom), Bede (excellence of power), Tostatus (the maker's mind designing).

The third interpretation is that by "the Spirit of the Lord" is signified neither wind, nor the Holy Spirit, but a certain force and impulse, and a vital efficacy full of fertility, impressed upon the waters by God. For it is frequent in Scripture that by "the Spirit of God" is signified a sudden [force]...

Marginal gloss: "The third interpretation, of Chrysostom." Spirit = a God-given vital, fecundating power in the waters. Sentence continues onto printed p. 66.

— p. 107 (PDF) · printed p. 66 —

...[that by 'the Spirit of God' is signified] a certain sudden force and extraordinary motion of God for doing something great and outstanding. Thus we read that the spirit of the Lord rushed upon Samson, and he tore apart the lion; and upon Saul, and he cut the ox to pieces; upon Elisha too, and he straightway began to prophesy. In this signification also the spirit of God is said to have lifted up Elijah into heaven, and to have caught away Philip; and in Daniel, ch. 14, the Angel of the Lord is said to have seized Habakkuk by the crown of his head, and carried him by the hair of his head, and set him in Babylon over the lions' den, "in the impulse of his spirit." And so Moses wished to teach at the beginning that the force and efficacy of God was present in the waters, so that it might be understood that whatever is afterward narrated to have been made from the waters at

God's command in a moment of time, was not made by the native faculty and power of the waters, but by the supernatural power of God, who was present in those waters.

The third interpretation (Spirit = a sudden divine force), continued from p. 65, with biblical examples: Judg. 14 (Samson), 1 Sam. 11 (Saul), 2 Kings 2 (Elijah), Acts 8 (Philip), Bel & the Dragon (Dan. 14, Habakkuk). (The printed "in veritate eius" is corrected here to "in vertice eius," the crown of his head.)

Just as, also, when Samson is said — the spirit of God rushing upon him — to have torn apart the lion, it is signified that Samson did this not by natural strength and his own powers, but by a certain wondrous power then implanted in him by God. This exposition alone Chrysostom embraces, in the third homily on Genesis. But Augustine, in the unfinished book on Genesis, ch. 4, says that by "the Spirit of God" three things can be understood: either the Holy Spirit, or wind or air, or a certain vital creature by which the whole visible world is moved and held together.

Chrysostom alone holds the "divine force" reading (hom. 3 on Genesis); Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 4) lists three options.

And these are the three nobler — and indeed also the more probable — interpretations of this passage; of which is the best, I leave to be judged at the reader's discretion. To me, certainly, the first and third, according to the literal sense — just as the second, according to the mystical sense — are most approved. Perhaps it will seem a wonder to someone why Moses, just as [he taught] God to be the creator of the earth, did not also openly teach [him to be the creator] of the water. We answer (what Augustine hands down in book 11 of the City of God, last chapter) that Moses sufficiently insinuated it. For when he had said "In the beginning God created the earth," he next declared what sort it was created — namely, void and empty, and on every side covered with dark waters: by which words it is implicitly taught that the earth was created together with the water, for water ought not to have been created before heaven and earth.

Marginal gloss: "The author's judgment. Why Moses did not mention the creation of water here." Pererius's verdict (1st & 3rd literal, 2nd mystical); water's creation is implied (Augustine, City of God 11, last ch.).

But Moses openly handed down the creation of the earth alone, because by its name he wished water too to be comprehended, since from both elements one globe and, as it were, one body is formed. Nay, water seems to have been made for the sake of the earth — not insofar as the earth is a simple element (for so it is baser than water), but insofar as it is the seat and, as it were, the mother of all living things. That God is the maker and founder of all the waters is handed down most explicitly in many places of the sacred writings: as in chapter 20 [of Exodus], and in the Apocalypse, ch. 14, and in the book of Judith, ch. 9, it stands thus, "God of the heavens, and creator of the waters, and Lord of every creature."

"Earth" comprehends water (one globe); water made for the earth as the seat of life. Exod. 20:11; Rev. 14:7; Judith 9:17(12).

— p. 108 (PDF) · printed p. 67 —

I will not pass over in silence — though I shall touch it briefly — what has been observed and reported by certain not incurious appraisers of ancient things: that many of the things here handed down by Moses are found very similar in the monuments of the ancient poets, theologians, and philosophers; and since Moses preceded them all by many ages, it becomes credible that those things were drawn from the Mosaic springs. Moses hands down that at the beginning of the world there was earth void and empty, and likewise darkness and abyss, the Spirit of the Lord and the waters: all of which, every one, Mercury Trismegistus expressed in the Pimander. For he says thus, "There was infinite darkness in the abyss, and water, and a fine intelligible spirit, which by divine power were in the very Chaos."

Marginal gloss: "That the ancient Sages of the Gentiles handed down many things similar to this teaching of Moses." Hermes Trismegistus, Poimandres.

Plato, expounding in the Timaeus how God set about to fashion the world, says, "Whatever was — not tranquil and quiet, but immoderately agitated and, as it were, fluctuating — that he took up, and brought from disorder to order." That Plato received this opinion from this passage of Moses, Justin Martyr is the authority, in the latter Apology for the Christians. Anaxagoras held that all things were at first confused and unsorted, and then Mind came, which, by distinguishing and separating them, made the world. Hesiod (as Aristotle relates in the first book of the Metaphysics, the fourth book of the Physics, and in the booklet entitled Against Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias) said that first of all there was Chaos, then the most ample earth came into being. And Aristotle indeed thinks that God made Chaos as a receptacle and place for the bodies to be generated; but in that booklet I mentioned, he says that Hesiod understood by "Chaos" nothing, and from nothing made heaven and earth.

Pagan parallels: Plato (Timaeus, via Justin Martyr); Anaxagoras (Nous); Hesiod (Chaos), with Aristotle's reports.

Ovid, at the beginning of the first book of the Metamorphoses, following the opinion of Hesiod and Anaxagoras about the world's origin, writes thus: "There was one face of nature in the whole world, which they called Chaos — a rude and unsorted mass, nothing but inert weight, and the discordant seeds of things not well joined, heaped together in the same place."

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.5–9.

Eugubinus (Steuco), in his Cosmopoeia, noted that the ancient sages of Greece called the matter of all things ■λη (hyl■), the word slightly changed from ■λ■ς (ilys), which means mud and slime: and indeed the matter from which nearly all things were founded, according to Moses, was muddy and slimy earth — that is, earth confused and mingled with waters. Furthermore, that night or darkness preceded the creation of the world, besides Mercury [Trismegistus] and Hesiod, Thales of Miletus too held: for

when asked which was earlier, night or day, he answered that night was earlier. Aristotle also testifies that the most ancient theologians made three principles of the world: Chaos, Night, and Ocean. Homer certainly made Ocean and Thetis the first parents of the gods, and brings in the gods swearing by the Stygian water, as by the most ancient and most honored thing of all. And Thales, the first of philosophers in Greece, made water the principle of all things.

Further parallels: Steuco on hyl■/ilys (matter as mud); the priority of night (Thales); the three principles (Chaos, Night, Ocean); Homer's Ocean & Thetis; Thales' water. Sentence continues onto printed p. 68.

— p. 109 (PDF) · printed p. 68 —

But what Moses says about the spirit of God moving and preparing the waters for the procreation of things is the doctrine of the Stoics, who assert that all things in the world are procreated, ruled, and held together by one divine Spirit. The same thing Virgil expressed in those most elegant verses:

The Stoic world-spirit, paralleled with the "Spirit of God moving over the waters."

"In the beginning, a Spirit within nourishes the Heaven and the lands, and the watery plains, the shining globe of the Moon and the Titanian stars; and Mind, infused through the members, stirs the whole mass, and mingles itself with the great body."

Virgil, Aeneid 6.724–727 (marginal citation).

This spirit Hesiod perhaps called "Love," which he also made the principle of the world; but Plato, the soul of the world. Finally, that water pertains to the generation and origin of the world was the opinion of the Stoics, which Seneca, in the third book of the Natural Questions, ch. 13, elegantly expressed in these words: "Water," he says, "Thales [holds] is the most powerful element; he thinks this was first, and that from it all things arose. But we too are either in the same opinion as he, or in the last [opposite] one. For we say that it is fire which seizes the world and converts all things

into itself; that this, fading away, subsides, and that nothing else is left in the nature of things, the fire being extinguished, than moisture; that in this lies hidden the appearance of the world to come. Thus fire is the world's end, moisture its beginning." Thus far Seneca. But these things, now said by us in passing and hastily gathered, ought to suffice for those who do not at all pursue what is foreign to the purpose.

Marginal gloss: "The opinion of the Stoics, as reported by Seneca." Hesiod's Eros, Plato's world-soul, and the Stoic/Thalean water-origin (Seneca, Natural Questions 3.13).

The Work of the First Day.

Major section heading: the commentary turns from the pre-creation state (vv. 1–2) to the first day.

Verse 3. God said, Let there be light: And there was light.

New scripture lemma (Gen. 1:3).

The first bodies of the world having been made — unsorted, however, and dark — light, before all else, was on the first day created by God, fitly indeed and wisely. For light is the first active quality of the first body, that is, of the heaven — not, however, confined within the heaven, but poured out upon all corporeal things. Light is the general and principal instrument of the celestial causes, by which all the power of the stars and all their influence and effect is conveyed to us, and by which alone whatever comes to be in this world of ours from the heaven is brought about. And that mass of the elements and heavens was dark, confused, and empty: on the first day, light being created, the darkness was removed; on the second and third days, the confusion was removed from the waters and the earth; on the remaining days, the heaven was filled with stars, the air with birds, the water with fishes, the earth with living creatures. Add to this that, since Heaven and earth had been created unadorned, it was fitting that Heaven be adorned first, whose adornment is twofold — motion and light; but light is the more principal, for motion is for the sake of light.

Why light was made first: it is the active quality of the heavens and the instrument of celestial causes; the structure of the six days (separating, then filling); the heaven adorned first with light (and motion). Sentence continues onto printed p. 69.

— p. 110 (PDF) · printed p. 69 —

And although on this first day light and motion were given to the Heaven — to the first mobile Heaven — yet express mention is made of light alone, because this is of itself known to the senses, even to the common people; but motion only to the learned, and through light: although, when this light is said to have made the vicissitude of day and night, of morning and evening, its motion is sufficiently indicated, without which that vicissitude cannot exist. Nor is light only the adornment of colors, but also of all bodies: through light (as Basil, Bede, and Damascene say) all things become conspicuous and manifest — not only that they may be seen, but that they may also be seen with pleasure; for through it the variety, beauty, and loveliness of all things appears.

Light alone named (motion is implied by the day/night cycle); light makes all things visible and beautiful (Basil, Bede, John Damascene).

"In the beginning" (says Damascene, in the second book of On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 7) "God made light, that is, on the first day, the beauty and adornment of all visible creation: for take away light, and all things will remain unknown in darkness, unable to show their proper comeliness." And this one reason why light was created the Author of the fourth book of Ezra gives, in ch. 6, where, recalling this very history of Moses about the creation of light, he says thus, "Then thou didst command that a shining light be brought forth from thy treasures, that thy work might appear."

Marginal gloss: "Why Moses recorded that God made light at the beginning." John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.7; 4 Ezra (2 Esdras) 6:40.

This precedence of place in describing the work of the six days the excellence of light also merited: for nothing among corporeal things is more excellent than it; and of the things that fall under sight, there is

nothing either more pleasant to behold, or more gladdening to cheer the spirits, or more convenient for use, or more powerful and fruitful in effect, or more beautiful for the world's adornment, or more apt for perceiving the knowledge of all things (especially of the celestial ones), or finally more suited for expressing and representing spiritual and divine things. Whence it came about that, both in the sacred writings and by those who have treated of divine matters, the name and likeness of light is very often used to explain sacred things. Read Dionysius, in chapter 4 of the first part of his book On the Divine Names, and chapter 15 of the book On the Celestial Hierarchy, in which are reckoned up some thirty-four properties of light and fire, wondrously congruent with God and divine things.

An encomium of light — why it deserved first place; its use as an image of the divine (ps.-Dionysius, Divine Names 4; Celestial Hierarchy 15).

Furthermore, since the construction of the world was to be continued through six days, and at last completed on the sixth day, who does not see that light had to be created on the first day, without which neither the account, nor the distinction, nor the vicissitude of days and nights can stand? For these reasons, then, it was fitting that light be made on the first day. Wherefore, just as for one designing a magnificent house (for I shall use Ambrose's simile) the first care is the light — namely, that the house may receive it as conveniently and abundantly as possible — so God, for this most ample and beautiful palace of the world that he was building, before all else most providently provided light, as was needful. See in Hugh [of St. Victor], in the first book On the Sacraments, part 1, chapter 7, a certain other reason why God wished to begin the works of the six days from the creation of light — a beautiful reason, indeed, but tropological (moral) rather than historical; wherefore we, for the sake of brevity, in this place...

Light first so that the day/night reckoning could stand; Ambrose's "house" simile (the world as a palace); a reference to Hugh of St. Victor's moral reason. Sentence continues onto printed p. 70.

— p. 111 (PDF) · printed p. 70 —

...we have, for a particular reason, passed over in silence.

Completes the sentence begun on printed p. 69 (regarding the moral reason that Hugh of St. Victor adds for why light was made first, which Pererius says he deliberately omits).

But why is God introduced by Moses as creating light by saying, “God said, Let there be light: And there was light”? I answer that in the Hebrew idiom “to say” means the same as to command, to decree, to ordain, and to will effectually that something should come to be; so too the word of God signifies his command, his decree, and his effectual will. He said, therefore, “Let there be light” — that is, he commanded, ordained, and effectually willed that light should come to be; and then God is introduced as producing light by his word and command alone, so that his incomparable authority and power over all things might appear, both over those that exist and those that do not. For he himself, as Paul says to the Romans, “calls the things that are not as though they were,” and all things obey him.

Marginal gloss: “What that ‘God said’ etc. signifies.” Romans 4:17.

Furthermore, [Moses speaks thus] so that it may be known with how great speed and ease God is able to accomplish whatever he wills: for it is infinitely easier for God to make whatever pleases him than it is for a man to express it in words or to frame it in thought. Rightly, then, Paul says in the first chapter to the Hebrews that God “upholds all things by the word of his power.” Besides, that it may be plain how powerful and effectual God’s will is: “All things whatsoever he willed,” says David, “he made in Heaven and on earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps”; and in the book of Wisdom it is written of God, “It is in thy power, whensoever thou wilt, to be able”; and in the Apocalypse, “Thou, O Lord, hast created all things, and for thy will they were and have been created.”

Marginal refs: Hebrews 1:3; Psalm 134 (135):6; Wisdom 11:23 (Vg.); Apocalypse (Revelation) 4:11.

To this is added, that it may be understood that God is not like a natural agent, producing his work by some necessity and without knowledge, but that he founded light and the whole world by reason, deliberation, and free will: for to speak and to command belong only to those who bring both reason and deliberation to their acting.

Marginal gloss: "God is not a natural agent."

Lastly, [Moses speaks thus] so that the second person of the most holy Trinity, who is the eternal Word, may thereby be intimated: for if God made light and the world by speaking, then he made them through his Word; so that it was most truly said by David, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established," and by John, "All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing"; in the book of Wisdom too, chapter nine, it stands thus, "Thou, O God, who hast made all things by thy Word."

Marginal gloss: "The eternal Word is here intimated." Psalm 32 (33):6; John 1:3; Wisdom 9:1.

Theodoret, in his book of Questions on Genesis, sets this down as the ninth question: To whom did God say "Let there be light"? And he answers thus: "God did not command some other to create, but he calls the things that are not: so that here the command is the will itself. For all things whatsoever he willed," says David, "God has made. And if in creating he used a kind of voice, it is certain that this was done not for the sake of the inanimate elements, but for the sake of the invisible powers [the angels], that they might know that, at his command, the things that are not come to subsist." So Theodoret.

Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 9. Marginal refs: Psalm 134 (135):6 (David); Romans 4:17.

To this creation of light after darkness Paul looked when, in the fourth chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, he says, "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness," etc.; and in Hebrews 11, "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God,

that from invisible things visible things might be made."

2 Corinthians 4:6; Hebrews 11:3.

But there is an old and weighty controversy among the theologians as to what sort that light was which was created on the first day: whether it was spiritual or corporeal. For since in Scripture God is called light, and is said to dwell in light inacces[sible]...

Marginal gloss: "Question: What the first light was." 1 Timothy 6:16 ("light inaccessible"). Sentence continues onto printed p. 71.

— p. 112 (PDF) · printed p. 71 —

...inaccessible; and since Christ said to the Apostles, "You are the light of the world," and Paul wrote to the faithful, "You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord"; there is no doubt that in these passages the name of light is to be understood spiritually.

Completes the sentence from printed p. 70. Marginal gloss: "spiritual or corporeal." Marginal refs: 1 Timothy 6:16; Matthew 5:14 ("You are the light of the world"); Ephesians (margin cites "Eph. 2," but the quotation "now light in the Lord" is Eph. 5:8).

First, then, let us see what Augustine thought on this matter. In book 11 of the City of God, chapter seven, he leaves it in doubt whether that light was corporeal or spiritual; for he writes thus: "What that light is, and by what alternating motion, and what kind of evening and morning it made, is remote from our senses, and cannot be understood by us as it really is. For either it is some corporeal light, whether in the upper parts of the world far from our sight, or in the region from which the Sun was afterward kindled; or by the name of light is signified the holy city in the holy Angels and blessed Spirits. Yet there comes to be an evening of this day, and in some measure a morning, since the knowledge of the creature, compared with the knowledge of the Creator, in a manner grows toward evening; and again it grows light and morning comes, when that knowledge too is referred to the praise and love of the Creator; nor does it sink into night, where the

creature is not abandoned by the leaving off of the love of the Creator. For the knowledge of the creature in itself is, so to speak, more faded than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made."

Marginal gloss: "Augustine's opinion." Augustine, City of God, bk. 11, ch. 7.

These things Augustine said in that place hesitantly. But a little further on, in the ninth chapter of the same book, he judges it more probable that by the name of "heaven," which was created in the beginning, Moses signified the angelic nature; and that by the name of the "light" created on the first day is intimated the confirmation and consummation of the Angels in grace; and that by the division of light and darkness is indicated the separation of the evil Angels from the fellowship of the good. To prove this, Augustine argues in this way: "Moses," he says, "[wrote] that in the beginning Heaven and earth were created; therefore before this nothing was created. The same Moses afterward wrote that God rested on the seventh day from all the works which he had made. Now that the Angels are works of God it is impious to doubt, since both in the Hymn of the Three Children and in Psalm 148 it is written, 'Praise God all his Angels, praise him all his hosts,' and afterward it is added, 'For he spoke and they were made, he commanded and they were created.' From these things it is concluded that the Angels were made within some one of those six days. And indeed that they were made before the fourth day, on which all the stars were founded, is clear from those words of the Lord in Job, chapter 38, according to the translation of the Seventy: 'When the stars were made, my Angels praised me with a loud voice.' Nor is it to be thought that they were made on the third or second day: for it is plain what was made on those days — namely, on the third day the water was separated from the land, and the land brought forth herbs and plants; and on the second day was made the firmament, dividing the waters that are above the firmament from those that are below it. It remains, therefore, that the creation of the Angels, if it is to be referred to the work of these days, belongs to the work

of the first day, on which light was made." These are Augustine's words there.

Augustine, City of God, bk. 11, ch. 9. Marginal refs: Daniel 3 (the Hymn of the Three Children); Psalm 148:2, 5; Job 38:7 (Septuagint).

And he confirms the same in the first book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis, chapter three, and in the twelfth book of the Confessions, chapters nine and sixteen. Eucherius hands down this very same thing in his commentary on this passage. But Rupert, in the first book On the Trinity and Its Works, chapter 10, not only holds this view but even [tries] to prove it by argument...

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 1.3; Confessions 12.9 and 12.16; Eucherius of Lyon; Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius, bk. 1, ch. 10. Sentence continues onto printed p. 72.

— p. 113 (PDF) · printed p. 72 —

...he tries to prove that that light was not corporeal: "It was not fitting," he says, "that the first work of God should be more ignoble than the rest; but if that light was corporeal, what else was it than a kind of accidental illumination of the air? For since all the stars were afterward formed on the fourth day, that light must then have lasted no longer than the first three days, and, once the sun and the other stars were made, have vanished entirely. But who would bring himself to believe that, in the building of the world, the first work of God was the most ignoble — destined to last a mere three days, made only to be presently abolished?" So Rupert.

Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate, bk. 1, ch. 10.

Nevertheless, the common opinion of almost all the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, and of nearly all the theologians, is that that light was corporeal and sensible: indeed Bede and the Master of the Sentences [Peter Lombard] approved this opinion, though otherwise most zealous and keen defenders of Augustine's teaching. The Church too seems to have embraced the same in the hymn that is sung at Vespers on the Lord's Day, in which she praises

God for the creation of the first-born light in this manner:

Marginal gloss: "The common opinion." Bede; Peter Lombard (Master of the Sentences). The hymn is "Lucis Creator optime" (Sunday Vespers).

O best Creator of the light, / bringing forth the light of days, / with the first beginnings of new light / preparing the world's origin; / who biddest that the day be called / when morning is joined to evening.

The hymn "Lucis Creator optime" (attributed to Gregory the Great), sung at Sunday Vespers. (The 220/300-dpi image confirms "Primordiis lucis novae," correcting the OCR's "incis.")

Saint Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 13, refutes the aforesaid opinion of Augustine by several arguments, which are by no means weak. First, he says, before the creation of that light Moses says there was darkness upon the face of the deep — beyond doubt corporeal darkness; and since light was created on the first day for the expulsion of it, it must needs have been corporeal. Next, by that light the first three days were marked off, which preceded the creation of the sun and the stars; but those three days were sensible, no less surely than the remaining three after the sun was made: therefore that first light too was corporeal and sensible. Besides, it is plain enough that Augustine's interpretation in no way cleaves to and agrees with the meaning of Moses' words, and is not, as they say, literal, but pertains to a mystical and allegorical sense; inasmuch as he uses those words "light," "darkness," "day," "evening," and "morning" transferred from their proper and customary signification to a figurative and mystical one — whereas it has more than once been said above and pressed home that this narrative of Moses is historical, and for that reason is to be interpreted according to the proper and common signification and use of the words. Add to these this argument: if on the first day both the Angels were made, and the good separated from the evil, the former glorified and the latter damned, it would follow that at one and the same instant, with no interval intervening, the Angels were made, and that some of them fell and others stood firm, and

that the former were damned and the latter beatified — especially since Augustine holds that the things here narrated as done through six days were all done together in one single moment of time.

Marginal glosses: “Bonaventure refutes Augustine’s opinion”; “The solution of Augustine’s arguments.” Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2, dist. 13.

To the contrary arguments it is easy to reply. For although [the Angels are works of God]...

Begins Pererius’s reply to the arguments for an angelic/spiritual light. Sentence continues onto printed p. 73.

— p. 114 (PDF) · printed p. 73 —

...although the Angels are works of God, yet their creation is not here recorded by Moses, for many and sufficiently fitting reasons that we shall bring forward below, when we treat separately and properly of the creation of the Angels. And God is said to have rested on the seventh day from all his works — namely, from the works of the sensible world expounded above, and whose making had been distinctly recounted. That “heaven was created in the beginning” signifies that it was newly made, and from some beginning of time; or that it was made before all other things — not indeed absolutely, but before all the things that are recorded as founded thereafter through the six days. Nor indeed was the first light, as Rupert supposes, merely an accidental illumination of the air, nor did it vanish after three days. But this will presently be treated properly and accurately.

Continues the reply to the arguments for an angelic light. Genesis 2:2 (God’s rest on the seventh day).

Hugh, in the first book On the Sacraments, part 1, chapter ten, holds that the Angels were created together with Heaven and earth; and that through that interval, in which the earth was void, empty, and dark, up to the creation of light, they were on the way to meriting or demeriting. On the first day, when light was made and divided from the darkness, the good Angels were confirmed in good, while the evil were hardened in evil and

separated from the good; and thus what took place in the sensible world was an image of what was taking place in the intelligible world. This imagining and conjecture of Hugh's pleases and commends itself to me in a high degree. See Giles [of Rome] on the Hexaëmeron, chapter 16 of the first part.

Marginal gloss: "What Hugh thought concerning the interval that came between the creation of the Angels and their glorification or damnation." Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, bk. 1, pt. 1, ch. 10; Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), Hexaëmeron, pt. 1, ch. 16.

Damascene seems to have thought that that light was the element of fire; for he writes thus in the seventh chapter of the second book On the Orthodox Faith: "Fire, one of the four elements, is the lightest of the rest and the swiftest to dart upward, burning and illuminating, made on the first day by the Maker of things: for the divine Scripture says, 'And God said, Let there be light: And there was light'; for fire is nothing else than light, as some say." Thus far Damascene. His opinion, lest it seem false, must be interpreted thus: that by the name of fire he meant to signify every luminous body, pouring forth light of itself and producing heat. Plato indeed in the Timaeus, and Aristotle in the books of the Topics, make three species of fire: for they say that there is a certain celestial fire, which is the light of the stars, giving more light than heat; that a second is the aerial fire, such as flame, giving light and heat alike; and that a third is the earthy and dense fire, such as a coal, or iron glowing and kindled, which gives little light but burns vehemently. Hugh signifies the same in his annotations on Genesis, chapter six. And this seems to be taken from Gregory of Nyssa in his homily on the Hexaëmeron, where he says that the fire which lay hidden in the earth, by the power of God, leapt forth and flew up to the highest border of the world, and from there imparted brightness and light to the world. But indeed the light made on the first day remained afterward and remains even now, whereas the world is not now illuminated by the light of fire: rather, since the element of fire surrounds the whole earth and water and air on every side, the whole [orb]...

Marginal glosses: “[The first light =] fire”; “Plato and Aristotle make three species of fire.” John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.7; Plato, Timaeus; Aristotle, Topics; Hugh of St. Victor; Gregory of Nyssa, In Hexaëmeron. Sentence continues onto printed p. 74 (“the whole orb...”).

— p. 115 (PDF) · printed p. 74 —

...it would always illuminate the whole orb, and would never at any time allow there to be darkness, and there would be no alternation of day and night; and since fire does not give light in its own place, this would not have come about according to nature, nor without a miracle. It is beside the point here to raise the question whether light is a body or not, whether it is a substantial form or an accidental one — questions that Blessed Thomas treats learnedly in the First Part, question sixty-seven. Bonaventure, on the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, article two, question two, holds that the light which inheres in a luminous body is its substantial form, while the brightness and illumination that flow and are diffused from it to other bodies is an accident. But Saint Thomas rightly refutes that opinion in the First Part, question sixty-three, article three, as does Scotus on the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen.

Completes the sentence from printed p. 73 (against Damascene's view that the first light was the element of fire: elemental fire, lying above, would light the whole world always, leaving no night). Marginal gloss: “Bonaventure's opinion that light is the substantial form of the heavenly bodies, which St. Thomas and Scotus refute.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qq. 67 & 63; Bonaventure, Sent. II, d. 13; Duns Scotus, Sent. II, d. 13.

Nor should what Theodoret hands down in his Questions on Genesis, question seven, be passed over in silence: for he seems to think that light is a kind of substance subsisting of itself. His words run thus: “Light is a substance, and subsists: and when it sets it rises again, and when it has gone away it returns. For just as our body is a substance, while the shadow it casts is an accident, not a substance, so light is a substance, but darkness by no means.” But without doubt Theodoret meant by the name of “substance” nothing else than a solid thing — what in the schools of the Philosophers and Theologians is called a positive real being (ens reale

positivum); for he opposes light to darkness, which he denies to be a substance, that is, any existing thing, but merely a bare privation of light. But it is now time to inquire what that first light actually was.

Marginal gloss: “How Theodoret's saying that light is a substance and a subsisting thing is to be interpreted.” Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 7.

Ambrosius Catharinus, in his commentary on this passage, affirms that the light created on the first day was none other than the light of the sun, as perfect as it is now: and that a great proof of its perfection and beauty is that God himself approved it by his own judgment and verdict. “For God saw,” says Scripture, “the Light, that it was good.” And since there is no other light distinguishing nights and days except the light of the sun, nor were the latter three days of a different condition than the first three, but the reckoning and origin of all those six days is alike: reason itself surely compels us to judge that the light of the first day was none other than that of the Sun. And so Catharinus holds that on the first day the sun was made with its sphere, and along with it the six remaining spheres of the planets, and that on the same day the prime mobile was at once founded — which he supposes to be the ninth Heaven; for the Sun produces day and night not by its own motion, but as it is whirled round by the motion and sweep of the prime mobile. On that first day too he judges that the earth was made, since by its opacity it constitutes days and nights, as Plato teaches in the Timaeus. And then too he supposes that air and fire were created, inasmuch as they are intermediate bodies through which the heavenly lights are transmitted to the earth. So that almost the whole visible world, according to [the parts they call integral]...

Marginal gloss: “Whether the light created on the first day was the perfect light of the sun, as Catharinus holds.” Ambrosius Catharinus (Lancellotto Politi); Genesis 1:4; Plato, Timaeus. Sentence continues onto printed p. 75.

— p. 116 (PDF) · printed p. 75 —

...according to the parts they call integral — that is, the heavens and the elements, except the firmament or eighth sphere founded on the second day — was fashioned by God on the first day. Why then does Moses record the creation of the sun and moon and all the stars on the fourth day? He answers that in truth the sun and the rest of the planets were made on the first day; but because the fixed stars were founded on the fourth day, Moses then, by way of recapitulation, made mention of the more notable heavenly bodies, so as to display at the same time the adornment of the heaven complete and finished in every respect. And this is the opinion of Catharinus.

Completes Catharinus's reconstruction (all the heavens and elements, save the firmament, made on day one; day four is a recapitulation).

But this opinion seems to me, for many reasons, to deserve rejection, and to be not unlike a fiction. For we have plainly learned, on Moses' own narration, that earth and water were made before the first day and before the creation of light, in obscurity and darkness: “In the beginning,” he says, “God created heaven and earth: but the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters.” For Catharinus's interpretation of “earth and water” as prime matter we have refuted above. Next, what kind of thing is it to say that God made at once the prime mobile and the seven spheres of the planets, leaving an intervening space wholly empty, in which on the following day the firmament or eighth heaven was to be formed? For nature abhors a vacuum, and the good arrangement of the world's parts and the continuous series and connection of all bodies shrinks from it. Besides, how could the sun, with so great an empty interval set between the first heaven and the spheres of the planets, be moved by the motion of the prime mobile? For the sun produces days and nights not by its own motion, but as it is whirled round by the sweep of the first heaven: for mover and moved must be together; nor could the motion of the prime mobile reach the sphere of the sun across so great a void — namely, the whole space

occupied by the eighth sphere. And what of the fact that divine Scripture in plain words teaches that the principal work of the fourth day was the creation of the sun and moon? For God is introduced as using, on the fourth day in fashioning the sun and moon, the very same words he had used in the making of other things on the three preceding days.

Marginal gloss: “Catharinus is refuted.” Genesis 1:1–2. The “nature abhors a vacuum” principle and the requirement that mover and moved be contiguous (Aristotelian physics).

But let us pursue the opinions of others. Bede in his Hexaëmeron, Hugh of St. Victor in the first book On the Sacraments, the Master of the Sentences in book 2 and Bonaventure on the same place, and several other scholastics — Nicholas of Lyra too, and Tostatus in their commentaries on this passage of Genesis — judge that that first light was not the sun, but a certain luminous body, like a dense and shining cloud in the upper part of the world (namely, in the region where the Sun was afterward placed), which, revolving in a circle about the denser portion of matter that enclosed the middle place of the world, produced the alternations of days and nights. But that light was exceedingly thin, faint, and imperfect: such, indeed, as Bede says, as is the light of the sun at dawn, before the Sun appears above our horizon — having no power to give heat, much less to give life. From that [luminous body]...

The “luminous cloud” view. Bede, In Hexaëmeron; Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis 1; Peter Lombard, Sent. II, with Bonaventure; Nicholas of Lyra; Alfonso Tostado (Tostatus). Sentence continues onto printed p. 76.

— p. 117 (PDF) · printed p. 76 —

...luminous body the Sun was afterward formed on the fourth day, by the addition of an ampler and more excellent light. Blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question sixty-seven, the last article, argues that this opinion is false in this way: “Either that luminous cloud vanished once the sun was made — but it is not credible that the first work of God perished at once, especially while the works of the other days remained; or it stayed separate

and self-cohering — but this does not appear, and once the sun was made that cloud would have been plainly superfluous; or it stayed joined and cohering to the sun — but what need had the sun of that adjunction, having of itself so great a store of light, sufficient to illuminate the world perfectly? It remains, then, to say (and indeed the authors of this opinion do hold it) that the sun was formed out of that cloud." But Thomas judges this very absurd: for since the Sun is an incorruptible body, its matter could not have existed under another form; otherwise that matter would be capable of many forms, and therefore in a potency of contradiction; and that whatever is in such a potency is in no way incorruptible Aristotle confirms in many places. Yet his opponents would not much fear this argument of Thomas's, but would very easily repel it: for they would answer that that luminous cloud was not of elemental, but of celestial matter, which became the Sun not through a substantial change, but through a different condensation and configuration of that matter, and the accession of a richer, nobler, and more efficacious light.

Marginal gloss: "St. Thomas's argument against the aforesaid authors." Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 67, a. 4. The objectors reply that the cloud was celestial matter (hence the sun's incorruptibility is preserved).

Basil, in his sixth homily on Genesis, hands down that on the first day light was created of itself and immaterial; but that on the fourth day the body of the sun was made as its vehicle, into which it was set and impressed. But it will perhaps be more agreeable to the reader to learn Basil's own words: "On the first day," he says, "the very nature of light was produced; but on the fourth day the body of the sun was founded, to be a vehicle for that first-born light. For just as fire and a lamp are different things and not the same — fire possessing the power of illuminating, while a lamp is made for this purpose, to furnish a measured light to those in need — so too for that purest, sincere, and immaterial light the luminaries have now been built up, as a vehicle. For just as the Apostle asserts that certain men were lights in the world, while meanwhile there is another, the true light of the world, by

participation in which the saints became lights of souls, whom they instructed, drawing them out of the darkness of ignorance: in the same way too, even now, after the creation of that most sparkling light, He flooded with its light this sun, which the Maker himself created, to illuminate the compass of the world. And let it seem to no one incredible or repugnant to faith, what I have said — namely, that splendor is one thing distinct from light, and the body underlying light and subject to it another. For all composite things are wont to be divided by us thus: into the receiving essence itself, and into the quality that befalls it. As, then, these are diverse in nature — whiteness, I mean, and the whitened body — so too the things we have just spoken of do indeed differ, yet are united by the power of the Creator. Therefore do not tell me that these things cannot come to pass, that light should be separated from the body of the Sun. For I do not say that the separation of light from the Sun's body is possible for me and for you; but I judge it must be asserted that the things which, by the sole activity of the mind...

Marginal gloss: “The remarkable opinion of Basil.” Basil of Caesarea, Hexaëmeron, homily 6.
Marginal ref: Philippians 2:15 (“lights in the world”). The Basil quotation continues onto printed p. 77.

— p. 118 (PDF) · printed p. 77 —

...activity and thought can be set apart from one another, can, in actual fact, be sundered by the power of the Creator of both natures. For you yourself are by no means able to separate the burning power of fire from its splendor; yet God, wishing to make his servant more attentive to himself, sent upon him, by that wonderful spectacle, a fire in the bush acting by its splendor alone, but holding its capacity to blaze and burn idle — as the Psalmist too testifies, saying, ‘The voice of the Lord that divideth the flame of fire.’ Whence by a certain hidden teaching he instructs us that, when rewards shall be rendered to us for the things we have done in life, the nature of fire will be apportioned in this way: light will assuredly fall to the just for a perpetual and most pleasant enjoyment, while, on the other side,

the burning power will be assigned separately to those condemned to punishment. Besides, from the behavior of the Moon we can find confirmation of the things we have set down in our question. For the Moon, failing in eclipse and undergoing diminutions, is not consumed in its whole body, but, laying aside and again taking up the light that had accrued to it, exhibits to us the appearance of increase and decrease. And indeed that the Moon's body is not consumed when it is in eclipse, the things we observe are a clear proof. For you may, in clear air freed from all mist, when above all the Moon is curved into horns, behold the dark part of it, lacking light, circumscribed by just so great a curvature of its orb as the full splendor covers when it rounds into a circle: so that, while the dark side (a rival of the air) is referred by sight to that part which shines, the whole entire orb is plainly seen. And do not allege to me that the Moon's light is adventitious because it is indeed diminished when it is moved toward the sun, and grows when it departs from it: for this is not what is presently proposed for our inquiry, but that other thing — that the Moon's body is one thing, and the light by which it shines another.” Thus far Saint Basil.

Conclusion of the Basil quotation (Hexaëmeron, hom. 6). Marginal refs: Exodus 3 (the burning bush); Psalm 28 (29):7 (“the voice of the Lord that divideth the flame of fire”); 2 Corinthians 5. Marginal gloss: “Basil's opinion is weighed.”

Now if he meant (as he seems to profess) that light, which is an accident, separated from all matter, was created by God on the first day, he assuredly introduces a very great miracle, and one never wrought elsewhere except in the single Sacrament of the Eucharist: but in the first making, institution, and ordering of things to have recourse to miracles — especially when there is no need of them at all — neither pleases Augustine nor commends itself to me. But if Basil supposed that that first light was made in some matter, which was afterward added to the Sun, or out of which the Sun was formed, then he does not disagree with the opinion of Bede set out a little above. Something similar to Basil's view, or rather the same, Gregory Nazianzen signifies in his Oration on the New Lord's Day [Low Sunday].

Pererius's verdict on Basil: an accident subsisting without a subject would be a miracle paralleled only in the Eucharist, and such recourse to miracle is gratuitous. Augustine; Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 44 (on New Sunday).

Theodoret, in his Questions on Genesis, questions fourteen and sixteen, teaches that on the first day there was made one universal, most splendid light, which, gathered all together, neither the sight of men nor of animals could have endured; for which reason, on the fourth day, it was distributed into the Sun and the Moon and the other stars, so as to be both better suited to the eyes of animals and more serviceable for the generation and conservation of sublunary things. But if all the Heavens had already been created from the beginning, how could that light, one in number, be inserted into so many and so diverse Heavens? For one numerical accident cannot be transferred from one subject into others, since an accident depends entirely on its subject; nor could it be explained what sort of [change]...

Marginal gloss: “Theodoret's opinion.” Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, qq. 14 & 16 (one splendid light on day one, dispersed into the heavenly bodies on day four). Sentence continues onto printed p. 78 (the objection about transferring one accident among many subjects).

— p. 119 (PDF) · printed p. 78 —

...that change, transference, and distribution of light; nor must we have recourse to the omnipotence of God and to miracles, to which, in the creation of the world — when God founded the natures of things and established their natural order and laws — no place should be given, as we proved above at the beginning of this commentary, in the second rule, out of blessed Augustine. To these things I will add the opinion of Augustine from the eleventh chapter of the first book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis — though in that place Augustine speaks more hesitantly than he decides anything by assertion. He writes in this manner: “Why, then, was the sun made for the rule of the day, to shine upon the earth, if that light made on the first day had sufficed for making the day, by which it was even called day? Or did that earlier light illuminate the upper regions far

from the earth, so that it could not be perceived on earth — and so the sun had to be made, through which the day might appear in the lower parts of the world? It can also be said that the brightness of the day was increased once the sun was added, so that it may be believed that, by that [first] light, the day shone less brightly than it now does." So Augustine.

Completes the objection to Theodoret (how could one numerical accident be transferred among many heavens?), and the principle that miracles are not to be invoked in the natural order of creation (cf. the second interpretive rule, from Augustine). Then Augustine's own hesitant view, De Genesi ad litteram 1.11. Marginal gloss: "Miracles are not to be admitted in the creation of the world."

For my part, beyond all the rest I approve the opinion of those who hold that that first light was none other than the light of the sun, but that on the first day it was made, as it were, unformed and imperfect, while on the fourth day it was finished and consummated: and I embrace this opinion with the readier assent because I see that it pleased Dionysius the Areopagite. For he writes thus in the fourth chapter of the first part of his book On the Divine Names: "Light is the measure and number of the hours, the days, and of all the passing time. For it is that very light (although it was then unformed, as the divine Moses too says) which first distinguished and defined the Trinity of our days." Saint Thomas followed Dionysius, in the First Part, question sixty-seven, article four, and question seventy, article one; and Dionysius the Carthusian, on the first chapter of Genesis, article nine.

Pererius's own preferred view: the first light was the sun's, created unformed (informis) on day one and perfected on day four. Marginal gloss: "The opinion most approved by the author of all: that the first light was the sun's, but imperfect." Ps.-Dionysius, Divine Names 4; Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 67, a. 4 & q. 70, a. 1; Denys the Carthusian.

Now in this opinion we must teach and prove two things: both that that light was the light of the sun, and that nevertheless it was imperfect for the first three days, while on the fourth day its completion and perfection accrued to it. I will dispatch both briefly. That that first light was the same as the light of the sun is gathered by no doubtful arguments. For in the

beginning God created Heaven and earth and water in an imperfect and unadorned state; then through the six days he arranged, adorned, and filled those same bodies, as it were, with their own inhabitants. But reason and the order of nature demanded that he should first adorn the Heaven, as the noblest and chief body of the world: and the adornment of the Heaven is either solely or chiefly light; therefore that first light was celestial. Nor could any other light but a celestial one have accomplished, without a miracle, what Moses relates that first light accomplished: for if it had not been a celestial light, it would surely have been either the element of fire, or a luminous cloud, or some other of the things refuted a little before; therefore it was without doubt celestial. But what other light than the sun's could have been the adornment of the Heaven, and could have been [approved] by God's verdict as good and beautiful...

The two theses to prove, and the first argument that the light was celestial (hence the sun's). Marginal gloss: “It is proved that the first light was the same as the light of the sun.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 79.

— p. 120 (PDF) · printed p. 79 —

...approved as beautiful? Moreover, since the Sun was to be the first and most general cause of the generation and conservation of all sublunary things, it was fitting that its light, on which its power and efficacy depend, be created on the first day. Again, the name of “light” used absolutely usually designates the light of the sun, which, on account of its abundance, beauty, and efficacy, is wont to be called simply “light”: for very often divine Scripture uses the name of light for the light of the sun, as in Isaiah, chapter sixty: “The Sun,” it says, “shall no more be to thee for light by day.” For “for light” in Hebrew is ■■■■ (Laor), that is, “for light”; for the light made on the first day is here too called ■■■ (Or). And Jeremiah, chapter four: “I beheld the earth, and lo, it was void and empty; and the heavens, and there was no light in them.” And not only in the sacred writings, but also in Latin and common speech it is frequent to put “light” simply for the light of the sun, or for the day that comes from the sun: thus

we say, “by today's light,” and “it has not yet grown light.”

Further arguments that “light” absolutely = the sun's light. Isaiah 60:19; Jeremiah 4:23. Hebrew: ■■■■ (la-■or, “for light”), ■■■ (■or, “light”).

Besides, the office of separating light from darkness and of distinguishing day and night, which is here attributed to the first-born light, is afterward assigned, on the fourth day, to the sun — so that no one may doubt that that first light was none other than the sun's. For that first light remained afterward, like the other works of God made in those six days; therefore the power and effect of that light remained and remains even now — to drive darkness from the world, to distinguish day and night, to make evening and morning; but these very things the sun's light now does; therefore it did them then too. And with this opinion the name of this first day, used by the most ancient custom of the nations and worn smooth by use, wonderfully agrees: for it was called the Day of the Sun [Sunday]. Since the seventh day from this one, on which God rested from his works, was named by the pagans the day of Saturn, and by the Jews the Sabbath — so that this first day was perhaps called the day of the sun because it was adorned and ennobled by the creation of the sun.

The day/night office given to both the first light and (on day four) the sun; the first light persisted. The “dies Solis” (Sunday) etymology: the seventh day from it is Saturn's day / the Sabbath. Marginal gloss: “Why Sunday (dies Solis) was of old called the Lord's day.”

Finally, those who make the light something other than the sun's are held entangled and ensnared by many and well-nigh inexplicable difficulties: whether they say that that light vanished after the first three days, or that the sun was formed out of it; for either way one says it, no few nor slight inconveniences follow, of which this opinion of ours suffers none. Nor should it seem strange to anyone why Moses did not call the light of the first day by the name of the sun: for not even on the fourth day is the proper name of the Sun set down — which in Hebrew is ■■■ (Semesh) — but it is called by the word “luminary”; for God is said to have made two great luminaries, which in Hebrew are called ■■■■ (Maor), a word derived

from “light,” which in Hebrew is said ■■■ (Or), as if they were so called because they contain and furnish light. And Moses preferred to call it “light” and “luminary” rather than to name it “Sun”: both to indicate that the end and use of the sun is to shine and illuminate the earth; and that it might be understood that all the power, beauty, and efficacy the sun has, and the primacy of dignity it holds among the heavenly stars, accrue to it from light.

Difficulties of the rival views; and why Moses names not the “sun” (Hebrew ■■■ Semesh) but “luminary” (■■■■ Maor, from ■■■ Or, “light”) — to show that all the sun's power and dignity derive from light.

— p. 121 (PDF) · printed p. 80 —

It follows next that we should teach what sort, and how great, the accession was that was made on the fourth day. This accession blessed Thomas briefly sets out in the First Part, question sixty-seven, article four, more or less in this way: “It must be said, according to Dionysius, that that first light was the light of the Sun; for then the Sun already existed in its substance, possessing an unformed light — that is, a light which had the power of illuminating in general: but afterward, on the fourth day, there was given to it a special and determinate power directed to particular effects.” And further on, in question seventy, article one, repeating the same, he says: “On the first day light was produced according to the common nature of light; but on the fourth day a determinate power was bestowed on the luminaries for determinate effects, according as we see the ray of the Sun to have some effects, and the ray of the Moon others, and so of the rest. And on account of this determination of power, Dionysius said, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names, that the light of the sun, which in the beginning was unformed, was on the fourth day formed.” These are Saint Thomas's words.

Marginal gloss: “What sort of accession was made to the sun's light on the fourth day.” Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 67, a. 4 & q. 70, a. 1; Ps.-Dionysius, Divine Names 4.

To these things it could be added that on the fourth day there accrued to the sun the magnitude, figure, and beauty it had afterward: for not on the first day was the globe of the sun kindled through and through, but only in part; whereas on the fourth day the whole was filled with most splendid light. Likewise [there accrued to it] its peculiar powers and influences, a greater store of light too, and the application to it of its own proper mover, which by the sun's own motion would whirl it round. Besides, [there accrued] the most numerous retinue of the other stars and planets, whose motions, as the Astronomers hand down, seem to be arranged and directed according to the motion of the sun. On the fourth day the Sun began to give signs and to furnish presages of coming weather and natural effects; then began the fourfold variation of the year — that is, of Winter, Spring, Summer, Autumn; then began the dissimilarity and inequality of days (for the first three days had been wholly equal and uniform); then at last came the dependence of the Moon on the Sun: for, according to the Moon's varying approach to or departure from the Sun, its light is variously changed; and the varying concurrence and conjunction of the Sun with the other planets begets varied influences and effects. But on this question let enough have been said.

Pererius's additions to Aquinas: what else accrued on day 4 — the sun's full magnitude/figure/light, its proper mover, its retinue of stars, weather-signs, the four seasons, the inequality of days, and the Moon's dependence on the Sun. (Closes the question of the first light.)

— p. 122 (PDF) · printed p. 81 —

And he divided the light from the darkness; and he called the light Day, and the darkness Night.

Genesis 1:4–5 (the lemma for this section).

Two questions arise in this place. The first question is by what means that first light, through that whole three days, distinctly made day and night. Basil and Damascene hold that this was done not by the motion of that light in a circle about the earth, as it now happens by the motion of the sun, but

by the emission and contraction of its rays — not indeed by any natural power and faculty of that light, but by the omnipotence of God: just as some think happened in Egypt when, the ninth plague being sent, for three whole days the light of the sun was not seen by the Egyptians, wherever in Egypt they were, while it nonetheless shone most brightly for the Hebrews, who were in the land of Goshen, and for other men dwelling outside Egypt. The words of Basil in his second homily on Genesis run thus: “Then (that is, in that first three days) night succeeded in turn to the departing day, not indeed according to the motion of the sun, but as that first-born light diffused its splendor and again contracted itself, and that by a measure defined by God.” And Damascene, in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter seven, writes thus: “In the first three days, by the pouring forth and contraction of the light, by divine command day and night came to be.”

First question: how the first light made day/night over the three days. Basil & Damascene: by God-willed emission/contraction of rays (compared to the plague of darkness, Exodus 10). Marginal glosses: “How the distinction and alternation of day and night was made in the first three days”; “The opinion of Basil and Damascene, which is refuted by Augustine.” Basil, Hexaëmeron, hom. 2; John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.7; Exodus 10:21–23.

This opinion Augustine reports, yet does not approve, in the first book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis, in whose eleventh chapter he says thus: “It is not to be believed that that first light was extinguished, so that nocturnal darkness might succeed, and again rekindled, so that morning might come, before this was performed by the office of the sun, which the same Scripture testifies began to be done from the fourth day.” So there. But further on, in the sixteenth chapter of the same book, he writes this: “No example occurs to us by which we can prove that emission and contraction of light, whereby the alternations of day and night came to be.” Thus far Augustine. Bede, moreover, refutes the aforesaid opinion of Basil in his Hexaëmeron as contrary to Scripture — inasmuch as Scripture in this place teaches that that light made not only day and night, but also morning and evening: but if day were made by the emission of rays, and night by the

contraction of the same, then surely there would not have been evening and morning, which necessarily involve the increase and diminution of light owing to the motion of the illuminating body, but there would at once have been both a most clear day and a wholly dark night. Blessed Thomas, in the place just cited, refutes the same opinion by this argument: that that first light could not have done what Basil asserts without a very great miracle; and in the first institution of nature and the ordering of all things one must not have recourse to miracles, especially when another way — both easier and more agreeable to nature, and on that account more probable — can be found, by which that light could have made day and night, morning and evening. For that way of Basil's is altogether extraordi[nary]...

Augustine reports but rejects the Basil/Damascene view (De Genesi ad litteram 1.11 & 1.16); Bede refutes it as contrary to Scripture (which speaks of morning and evening, implying real increase/decrease of light by a moving body); Aquinas refutes it as requiring a needless miracle. Marginal gloss: "In the first institution of nature one must not have recourse to miracles." Sentence continues onto printed p. 82 ("...extraordinary...").

— p. 123 (PDF) · printed p. 82 —

...ordinary, and was never afterward in use. But Bede, and whoever supposed that light to have been a certain cloud shining far and wide, after the likeness of that pillar which for forty years was a guide and leader of the journey to the Hebrews in the desert — by day bearing the appearance of cloud, by night of fire — hold that that cloud was, in that first three days, carried round by an Angel about that rude and undigested mass of earth and water, or, as others prefer, about the unformed corporeal matter, which by its thickness and density, occupying the middle place of the world, was fit to shade and overshadow, whence arose the distinction of nights and days in that three-day span. But for us, and for all who judge that light to have been none other than the Sun's — which, not yet having its own proper motion, was rolled from east to west by the sweep of the first heaven alone, traversing the whole orb in twenty-four hours and making days and nights wholly equal and uniform — it is easy to show how that light produced day

and night, morning and evening: namely, not otherwise than we now see it do.

Completes the refutation of Basil's emission/contraction view (the mode was extra-ordinary, never repeated). The second view (Bede and others): a far-shining cloud, like the pillar of cloud/fire in the desert (Exodus 13), wheeled by an angel about the dark central mass. Pererius's own answer: the first light was the sun's, carried by the prime mobile's rapture, making equal 24-hour days. Marginal glosses: "The second opinion, of Bede and others"; "Exod. 13."

The later question is: in what place of the heaven was that light when it first appeared — in the east, or rather at the meridian [noon], or in the west? Saint Bonaventure, on the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, article one, question two, records two opinions on the matter. The first he assigns to Bede: that that light was created at the meridian. Both because that light first made evening, then morning, as Scripture says (it tended, therefore, from the meridian toward the west before it either went to the east, or from the east went to the meridian); and also because, since God's works are perfect, it must be thought that the light was so created by God that it could at once illuminate the world perfectly — and this happens rather at the meridian than at the rising. But although any point of the heaven in which the Sun is, with respect to the different parts of the earth, is east and west and meridian, and makes evening and morning: nevertheless, with respect to that land where the formed man was to dwell, and where Paradise was to be, and the first dwelling of men even after sin, that light is said to have been at the meridian when it first appeared, created upon the earth.

The second question: where in the heaven the first light first appeared. Marginal glosses: "In what place of the heaven the first light was when it first appeared"; "The first opinion, which Bonaventure assigns to Bede." Bonaventure, Sent. II, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.

If you object that from the meridian to the next following morning there is not a span of twenty-four hours, and therefore that the first day was not whole — which Scripture plainly shows it to have been, saying, "And there was evening and morning, one day" — the defenders of this opinion

answer that those six hours preceding the creation of light, measured by the motion and agitation of the water and the spirit (during which time that dark constitution of the world lasted), are to be added to the first day. For those six hours occupied just as much time as the sun would have consumed from rising to the meridian; for those first days were equinoctial, whose artificial days are of twelve hours, and the nights consist of just as many. Since, then, from the meridian to the following morning there were eighteen hours — six, namely, [from the meridian to sunset]...

Objection (a noon start gives less than 24 hours) and the reply: add the six dark "hours" before the light to the first day; the days were equinoctial (12-hour artificial day, 12-hour night). Genesis 1:5. Sentence continues onto printed p. 83.

— p. 124 (PDF) · printed p. 83 —

...namely, from the meridian to sunset, and from sunset to morning twelve, which the night contained — if you add six other hours of darkness, you will find the full number of twenty-four hours. But it seems to tell against this opinion that Moses says that light made evening and morning, and in this way completed one whole day; whereas in those first six hours of darkness before the creation of light there was neither evening nor morning (for each of these denotes light, though imperfect — that is, either increasing or decreasing). Again, the first day was without doubt like the other following days, and in like manner had morning and evening — for the reckoning of all six days is alike, and in recording them all Moses uses the same words; but the authors of the aforesaid opinion must say that the first day was most unlike the others. Nor does Bede really seem to have held this opinion, since in his Hexaëmeron he plainly indicates that the light was created in the east, and made a whole artificial day of twelve hours and a natural one of twenty-four. Bede was followed by Hugh, in the first book On the Sacraments, part one, chapter twenty-nine, and by the Master of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, in the second book. Giles [of Rome], however, in the first part of his Hexaëmeron, chapter 16, affirms that the first light was created at the meridian, and therefore made evening

before morning.

Completes the hour-count and the objections to the meridian (noon) view; notes that Bede actually placed the light in the east (followed by Hugh and Lombard), while Giles of Rome placed it at the meridian.

The other opinion Bonaventure attributes to Hugh of St. Victor, in the book On the Sacraments, and prefers it; from it Cajetan does not here dissent. These men hold that that light first appeared in the East and, a complete revolution of the whole heaven being made, returned to the same point from which it had begun to move, and so made one whole natural day. For between the creation of heaven and earth and the first day — that is, the formation of light — no interval of time elapsed, but only a distinction of origin and of the order of nature. For this was the opinion of blessed Augustine, for whom the unformed matter, shadowed forth by the words “earth and water,” was prior to its own formation only in origin. And this opinion is confirmed by a twofold testimony of Scripture: for in the second chapter of Genesis it stands thus, “These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day when the Lord God made heaven and earth.” Therefore heaven and earth were not made before the first day. The same is seen more clearly in chapters 20 and 31 of Exodus, in which places it is delivered in plain words that God made heaven and earth in six days, and all things either from them or in them. From which it appears that heaven and earth were founded not before the first day, but within some one of those six days. And that this is the sense and understanding of the Church too seems able to be gathered from two hymns, of which one is sung in the morning prayers of the Lord's Day, the other at the Vespers of the same day, publicly in the churches. In the former you have thus:

The other opinion (Hugh, preferred by Bonaventure; Cajetan concurs): the light appeared in the East and made one whole natural day by a complete revolution — heaven/earth being prior to the light only in nature, not in time (Augustine's view). Scriptural proofs: Genesis 2:4; Exodus 20:11 & 31:17. Marginal gloss: “The opinion of Hugh, Bonaventure, and Cajetan.”

On the first of all the days, on which the world stands founded, etc.

The Sunday Matins hymn “Primo dierum omnium” (attributed to Gregory the Great). The text then adds “In hoc autem [hymno] sic est:” (“and in the other [the Vespers hymn] it stands thus:”), introducing the Vespers hymn quoted at the top of printed p. 84.

— p. 125 (PDF) · printed p. 84 —

With the first beginnings of new light, preparing the world's origin.

Lines from the Sunday Vespers hymn “Lucis Creator optime” (cf. printed p. 72), cited as Church testimony that the world's origin involved a “beginning of new light” — i.e., that heaven and earth preceded the light.

Nevertheless Bede, in his book On the Six Ages of the World, affirms that before the beginning of the six days the highest heaven, the earth, and the water were created; and Basil indicates the same plainly enough in his second homily on Genesis; and Paul shows this very thing when, in the second [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter 4, he says, “God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness”; and in Hebrews 11, “By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made”; and in the book of Wisdom, chapter 11, it is delivered that God made the world out of unseen matter, or, as it is in Greek, out of unformed matter. Blessed Jerome, in his eighty-third epistle to Oceanus, hands down this very thing in plain words: “The raw world,” he says, “with the sun not yet glowing red, nor the moon pale, nor the stars twinkling, was oppressing the unordered and invisible matter with the vastness of the deeps and with shapeless darkness. The Spirit of God alone, after the manner of a charioteer, was borne over the waters, and was bringing the nascent world to birth in the figure of baptism. Between heaven and earth a firmament is built up in the middle; and, according to the etymology of the Hebrew tongue, ‘Heaven’ — that is, ■■■■ (Samaim) — takes its name from the waters; and the waters that are above the heavens are set apart for the praises of God.” So Jerome.

Authorities that heaven/earth/water preceded the six days: Bede (De sex aetatibus mundi); Basil (hom. 2); 2 Corinthians 4:6; Hebrews 11:3; Wisdom 11:18 (creation “ex materia informi”); and Jerome, Epistle 83 (al. 69) to Oceanus. Hebrew ■■■■ (shamayim, “heaven”), here etymologized

from “waters” (mayim). Marginal glosses: “That God made heaven and earth before the beginning of the six days”; “Ps. 148.”

And this too the narrative of Moses plainly declares, who said just before, “And darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters”: for if the world was founded together with the light itself, there never was darkness upon the face of the deep, nor could the world truly be said to have been made luminous out of a dark and unformed [state]. For it is frivolous to say that air and water were called dark before the creation of light because they had no light of themselves: for by that reasoning air too, when it is most luminous with noon light, could simply be called dark, because not even then does it have light of itself. Nor does historical speech — since it is popular and worn smooth by common use — when it says that something was prior, signify a priority of origin or of nature, but of time.

Moses's own narrative (darkness over the deep) implies a real dark interval before light. Pererius's argument that historical/popular speech, in calling one thing “prior,” means temporal priority — supporting a genuine time-interval (against reading it as priority of nature only). Marginal gloss: “That the world was dark for some while before light was created.” Genesis 1:2.

Moreover, if before the creation of light the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters, that motion of air or wind over the waters could only have taken place in time. Blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question sixty-six, article one, attributes this opinion to Basil, Chrysostom, and Ambrose; and in the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, he says it is more consonant with the text of Scripture. And it is indeed the opinion of all the Greeks. Hugh, in the first book On the Sacraments, part one, chapters 6 and 9, says that the creation of heaven and earth was prior in the order of time to the creation of light: “and since it was not prior by only one instant — because two instants cannot be immediate [to each other] — and each creation, both of heaven and earth and of light, was made in an instant, it must have been prior in time”; indeed he himself, in chapter nine, says that before the creation of light there was time, yet not day or night. And the

Master, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, has not only an opinion similar to Hugh's, but even a similar wording. Wherefore blessed Bonaventure does not rightly attribute to Hugh the censure of those who place no order of time between the creation of the Heaven and of the light, but [only of nature]...

Further argument for a real temporal interval: the Spirit's motion over the waters requires time. Aquinas (ST I, q. 66, a. 1; Sent. II, d. 13) ascribes this to Basil, Chrysostom, Ambrose, and all the Greeks, as more consonant with Scripture; Hugh (De sacramentis 1.1.6 & 9) and Peter Lombard agree. Marginal gloss begins: "A criticism of Bonaventure [for misreading Hugh]." Sentence continues onto printed p. 85.

— p. 126 (PDF) · printed p. 85 —

...but only of nature, he [Bonaventure] attributes to Hugh: for although Hugh, in the aforesaid place, says that no delay or postponement intervened, yet he did not use these words according to the subtlety of the natural philosophers (for whom no time can be without delay), but followed the common usage of speech, by which what is done most swiftly is said to be done without delay. And so Hugh denies that there was a delay, meaning that the time before the creation of light was as brief as possible. Nor does it tell against this opinion that a little above was adduced from the second chapter of Genesis, "In the day when the Lord God made heaven and earth": for there "day" is put for "time," as often happens in Scripture; for it is added, "And every plant of the field," which nevertheless was produced not on the first day with heaven and earth, but on the third day. And what is said in chapters 20 and 31 of Exodus — that God made heaven and earth and all that is in them in six days — is not contrary to this opinion: for that span of time before the first day is reckoned among the six days, because it was as brief as possible, and was a continuous operation of God; nor indeed were more natural days consumed than six. And although before the first day the Heaven and the elements were made according to their substance, yet they were not perfect and wholly completed except in the space of those six days: for then was given

to them their adornment, complement, and perfection. But how long that dark state of the world lasted — that is, whether more or less than a single day usually contains — neither is it ascertained by me, nor, I suppose, by any mortal, save one to whom it was divinely revealed.

Defends Hugh: his “no delay” is popular speech for “very brief,” not the physicists' strict sense. Reconciles Gen 2:4 (“day” = time) and Exodus 20:11 & 31:17 (the brief pre-first-day interval is counted among the six). The length of the dark interval is unknown to any mortal. Marginal glosses: “The Exodus passage is weighed”; “Gen. 2.”

And there was evening and morning, one day. — Verse 5.

Genesis 1:5b, the lemma for the following section.

In Hebrew it stands thus: “And there was evening, and there was morning, one day.” In Chaldee [Aramaic] it is in the genitive, “of the first day.” But indeed it begets a question that Moses, in defining the first day, names evening before morning, although in reality morning precedes evening. Catharinus holds that the sun was so created by God that it began to shine in the other hemisphere, which is opposite to this one of ours: for in this one of ours both the first man was made, and after his sin the human race first dwelt, and the Hebrews, to whom Moses wrote this book; wherefore, by comparison with this our hemisphere, the sun made night before day. But this is like a fiction: for no reason can be given why the sun should have begun to shine in that hemisphere rather than in this of ours; rather, it is much more probable that it was so done that it might first light up the land in which man was to dwell. And what of the fact that not even thus does Catharinus remove the difficulty proposed — why evening is named before morning? For Catharinus only shows that in our hemisphere night was prior to day, not that evening was prior to morning, unless he should wish to call the night “evening.” Tostatus in this place, and Eugubi[nus]...

Begins the question of why Moses names evening before morning. Hebrew text and the Aramaic (Chaldee) genitive “of the first day.” Catharinus's hemisphere theory (the sun first shone in the opposite hemisphere) is rejected as a fiction that anyway fails to explain evening-before-morning. Marginal gloss: “Why, in the making of the days, evening is mentioned before morning.” Ambrosius

Catharinus; Tostatus. Sentence continues onto printed p. 86 (Eugubinus = Agostino Steuco of Gubbio).

— p. 127 (PDF) · printed p. 86 —

...Eugubinus [Agostino Steuco of Gubbio] in his Cosmopoeia hold that evening was put first because by this name Moses meant to signify that time of darkness in which the world was before the creation of light; which time, in Tostatus's judgment, was just as long as the span of twelve equinoctial hours, in which, because there was no light, it is therefore called “evening.” And the time that passed from the beginning of the created light to its setting was likewise twelve hours: so that, from the time when God created heaven and earth up to the setting of the first light over that horizon over which it first began to shine, twenty-four hours elapsed — that is, one whole natural day. But Tostatus greatly abuses the word “evening” for “night,” since in Scripture “evening” does not simply signify the darkness and obscurity of night, but the diminished light of the sun as it sinks toward setting — that is, the last three hours of the artificial day, or the twilight between sunset and the darkness of night. And this is the genuine and proper notion and signification of the Hebrew word which in Latin is rendered “evening”: for it is called ■■■ (Hereb), from the verb Harab, which properly means “to bind,” as if evening were the binding of day and night; just as the Hebrews call morning ■■■ (Boquer), from the verb Bachar, that is “to discern or seek out,” because in the morning things begin to be discerned.

Completes the Steuco/Tostatus view (evening first = the dark pre-light time, making a 24-hour day), then Pererius's critique: Tostatus misuses “evening” for “night.” Hebrew etymologies: ■■■ (■erev, “evening,” linked to the root meaning “to bind/mix”); ■■■ (boqer, “morning,” linked to the root meaning “to discern/search”). Tostatus = Alfonso Tostado; Steuco of Gubbio, Cosmopoeia.

Blessed Jerome, on the second chapter of Jonah, seems to gather from this place that among the Hebrews the beginning of the day was of old the evening; that the night belonged not to the preceding but to the following day; and that the whole natural day was wont to be reckoned from evening

to the next following evening. And that this was observed by the Jews in celebrating their festivals is not in doubt, since in Leviticus chapter 23 this command was given by God: “From evening,” he says, “to evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.” So it is almost certain (and, if it were now in question, could be proved by many examples of Scripture and many arguments) that among the Jews there were of old three kinds of days in use: namely the legal day, from evening to evening; the natural day, from sunrise to sunrise; and the common day, from midnight to midnight. Hugh, in the first book On the Sacraments, part one, chapter 9, and the Master, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 13, say that the first day did not have a dawn and morning (which is the boundary of the preceding night), but was at once clear light, and therefore that of that day the evening was earlier and the morning later. But against this tells the fact that Moses, in enumerating the other days, speaks in the same way as in this first, saying, “And there was evening and morning, the second day, the third,” and so on likewise: that, therefore, was not something singular and proper to the first day. Others hold that that light was created at the meridian, and therefore had no morning but at once made evening; but this opinion we refuted a little above, in explaining the immediately preceding question, and in that case the evening and morning of that first day would surely not have made one whole natural day, for from the meridian to the following morning there are only eighteen hours, since [those days were equinoctial]...

Jerome (on Jonah 2) on the Hebrew day beginning at evening; Leviticus 23:32. The three Jewish day-types (legal/natural/common). Hugh and Lombard's view (no dawn on day one) is countered by the uniform wording of all six days; the meridian view is recalled as already refuted. Marginal glosses: “The Hebrews' day began at evening”; “Among the Jews the day was threefold.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 87.

— p. 128 (PDF) · printed p. 87 —

...for those days were equinoctial. To me, more probable than all the rest seems Basil's interpretation, which Ambrose too in this place, and

Chrysostom in his third and fifth homilies on Genesis, and Augustine in the first book On Genesis against the Manichees, chapter ten, and in the unfinished book on Genesis, chapter seven, and Hugh in his annotations on Genesis, chapter six, and very many others thereafter, have followed. The words of Basil, from which his opinion is plainly understood, in the second homily on Genesis run thus: “That he might give precedence, in the order of creation, to the day, he first records the end of the day itself, which is evening; then he appends the end of the night, which is morning, so that it may thus be established that the artificial day was prior to the night. For that earlier state of the world — namely, before the first-born light arose — was not called night, but darkness. For ‘night’ is that portion of time which stands distinctly and in relation to day; which, being the successor of the day, acquired this new name. And so there was evening, and there was morning” — by these words plainly signifying day and night together. Yet he did not embrace both under the appellation of day and night, but assigned the whole appellation to the more excellent [the day].

Pererius's own preferred view: Basil's interpretation (also Ambrose, Chrysostom homm. 3 & 5, Augustine De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.10 and the unfinished Genesis commentary ch. 7, Hugh). Marginal glosses: “The author's opinion, which is that of Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, and Hugh”; “At the world's beginning, day preceded night.” Basil, Hexaëmeron, hom. 2.

Basil adds that here the days are counted, but not the nights, because it is the custom of Scripture, in measuring out times, to take account of the days only, the nights being passed over — just as, in counting people, it numbers the men without the women; and he tries to prove this by several testimonies of Scripture. Yet Scripture refutes that opinion in not a few places: for Jonah, as is delivered in his book, chapter two, and is recorded by Christ the Lord in the Gospel, is said to have been in the belly of the whale three days and three nights; and in Deuteronomy, chapter nine, we read that Moses twice fasted forty days and forty nights, which is also reported of Christ our Lord in the Gospel.

Basil's claim that Scripture counts days, not nights (like counting men without women); Pererius's qualification, citing Jonah 2 (cf. Matt. 12:40) and Moses' / Christ's forty-day-and-night fasts (Deut. 9; Matt. 4). Marginal refs: Matt. 12; Matt. 4.

But no mention of night is made here because the six natural days passed in the building and completion of the world are being described; and natural days consist of an artificial day and a night — although Moses sufficiently indicated the artificial day and night too when, a little before, he said that God divided the light from the darkness, and called the light Day, but the darkness Night. But however these things stand, let us certainly think most true the reason brought by Basil why Moses defined the day from evening to morning: for by “evening” he aptly signified the artificial day completed (for its boundary is evening), and by “morning” the night fully passed (for the end and proof of a finished night is the morning itself).

Why night is not separately mentioned (the six are natural days, day-plus-night); Basil's reason endorsed: evening marks the completed artificial day, morning the completed night. Marginal gloss: “Why Moses mentioned evening before morning.”

Furthermore, some argue with fair probability from this place that of old, among the Jews and the other most ancient nations (with whom the Jews had intercourse and dealings), the day was customarily reckoned from sunrise to the next following sunrise — although among various nations the reckoning and use of days was various. Pliny [certainly]...

Marginal gloss: “The various reckonings among various nations for beginning the day.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 88 (Pliny's catalogue).

— p. 129 (PDF) · printed p. 88 —

...Pliny certainly, in the second book, chapter 77 (to say nothing of Gellius in the third book, chapter 2; Censorinus in the book On the Birthday of the Romans; and Isidore, who borrowed from these, in the fifth book of the Etymologies, chapter 3), relates: “The Babylonians and Chaldeans observed the day between two sunrises; the Athenians between two sunsets; the Umbrians from noon to noon; the common crowd from light to

darkness; the Roman priests, and those who defined the civil day, and likewise the Egyptians and Hipparchus, and indeed all the Astronomers, from midnight to midnight.” So he. The Church, in her ecclesiastical offices and in celebrating feast days, reckons the day, after the manner of the Jews, from evening to evening; but in keeping fasts, from midnight to midnight, and in performing the sacrifice of the Mass.

Pliny's catalogue of how different peoples reckon the day (Natural History 2.77; cf. Aulus Gellius 3.2; Censorinus, De die natali; Isidore, Etymologies 5.30/3). The Church's twofold usage (evening-to-evening for feasts; midnight-to-midnight for fasts).

But why did Moses call this day on which light was made “one day,” and not “the first”? For he says thus, “And there was evening and morning, one day,” although both reason and the consistency of the narrative demanded that it be called the first day? For thereafter, in recording the other six days, he called them the second day, the third, the fourth, and so on up to the seventh. Basil says that Moses spoke thus to show how great the span of one natural day is — namely, how much it embraces, the artificial day and the night together. Or perhaps it was called “one” and not “first,” on Basil's authority again, because that day was afterward to be named the Lord's Day, and on it was to be accomplished the resurrection of the dead which the faithful await, and the future attainment of our consummated happiness, in which there will be one perpetual day without the alternation of night, as John relates in the Apocalypse. But this seems to me more credible: that Moses said “one” for “first,” by the Hebrew idiom which Daniel used at the beginning of his ninth chapter: “In the one,” he says, “year of King Darius,” that is, the first, as he himself soon declares. And in the Gospel the Lord Jesus is said to have risen “on the one [day] of the Sabbath,” that is, on the first day after the Sabbath.

Why “one day” (dies unus) and not “first day.” Basil's reasons (to show the measure of a natural day; or because it would become the Lord's Day, prefiguring the eternal day, Apoc. 21); Pererius prefers the Hebrew idiom “one” for “first” (Daniel 9:1; “una Sabbati,” John 20:1). Marginal glosses: “Why that first day was called ‘one day’”; refs Apoc. 21, John 20.

And that this day on which light was created was the day of the sun, afterward called the Lord's Day on account of the Lord's resurrection, is plainly established by this argument: that the seventh day next from it, on which God is said to have rested and to have sanctified that day, was without doubt the day of the Sabbath. For this is evidently concluded from chapters 20 and 31 of the book of Exodus, where the Hebrews are commanded to observe the Sabbath day most religiously, because on that day God had rested from the work of creating the world which he had accomplished in six days, and on that account had sanctified that day. Furthermore, many things which befell on this day at various times — most notable and memorable — greatly ennobled and illustrated it, and rendered it to be cultivated and venerated by all the faithful with singular honor and special religious devotion. Of these, Blessed Leo relates some in Epistle 81 to Dioscorus, chapter 1, and Augustine records not a few in Sermon 154 on the Season, and others have reported other things besides; which, if they be gathered and comprised under some number, are about as many [as follow].

The first day was the “day of the sun,” later the Lord's Day (Dominica) because of the Resurrection — proven by the Sabbath being the seventh from it (Exodus 20:11; 31:17). Marginal glosses: “That the first day of the world was the one later called the Lord's Day”; “The praise of the Lord's Day.” Leo, Ep. 81 to Dioscorus; Augustine, Sermon 154.

First, this was the first day of the world, on which light was made. Second, on this day the Hebrews crossed the Red Sea with dry feet. Third, on the same day manna first rained from heaven in the desert. Fourth, [Christ...]

The catalogue of marvels of the Lord's Day begins (items 1–3). Marginal gloss: “How many and how great the miracles wrought on the Lord's Day.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 89.

— p. 130 (PDF) · printed p. 89 —

Fourth, Christ, as some think, was born at the beginning of this day. Fifth, he was baptized in the Jordan. Sixth, he worked his first miracle at the wedding, turning water into wine. Seventh, when five loaves and two

fishes had been multiplied, five thousand people were fed. Eighth, our Lord rose from the dead. Ninth, on the eighth day after the resurrection, the Lord Jesus entered to the disciples through closed doors and gave them the Holy Spirit and the power of remitting sins. Tenth, he commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel throughout the whole world and to baptize men in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Eleventh, on this day fell the day of Pentecost, on which the Holy Spirit descended upon Christ's disciples. Twelfth, on this Lord's Day John had those wonderful visions and revelations which he left written in the Apocalypse, as he himself testifies in the first chapter of his book. Thirteenth, on this day is believed the future resurrection of our bodies, the consummation of our happiness, and the renewal of the whole world. These are the marks and adornments of that first day, by which that day is wonderfully ennobled and adorned. In the Epistle of Bede On the Celebration of Easter, or On the Vernal Equinox, certain decrees of the Synod of Caesarea in Palestine are mentioned — which Bishop Theophilus convened by the mandate of Pope Victor — among which are handed down five or six sanctifications of the Lord's Day, but mostly contained and mentioned in the above.

The catalogue of marvels of the Lord's Day completed (items 4–13: Christ's birth, baptism, Cana, the feeding of the 5,000, the Resurrection, the appearance to the disciples and gift of the Spirit, the missionary mandate, Pentecost, John's Apocalypse, and the future general resurrection). Bede, Epistle on Easter / the vernal equinox; the Synod of Caesarea under Bishop Theophilus and Pope Victor.

The Work of the Second Day.

Section heading (centered) introducing the commentary on the second day of creation.

And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. — Verse 6.

Genesis 1:6, the lemma for the section on the second day.

This place has two questions exceedingly difficult, and in the judgment of some inexplicable, but in my opinion by no means yet sufficiently

explained. The first question is what Moses meant to signify by the name of “firmament”; the second question is what sort of waters must be understood, which Moses says were placed above the firmament. On these questions we will set out, briefly indeed yet carefully and accurately, both the judgment of others and our own opinion. Very many, both of the ancients and of the moderns, have held that by the name of “firmament” in this place is signified a true celestial body — namely, either the eighth sphere in which the fixed stars are, or some composite of the eight heavens, the eighth namely and the seven lower ones: so that by the word “firmament” are signified all the Heavens, shining with stars, whether many or one only. Thus [Augustine]...

Opens the two great questions of the second day: (1) what “firmament” means; (2) what the “waters above the firmament” are. The first opinion: “firmament” = a real celestial body — the eighth sphere of the fixed stars, or all the heavens together. Marginal gloss: “What the word ‘firmament’ signifies; the first opinion.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 90.

— p. 131 (PDF) · printed p. 90 —

And it was so called “heaven” (they say) because it is solid and of firm, compact matter; wherefore the Seventy Translators here rendered it in Greek στερ■ωμα (stereoma), that is, “solid,” or, as the Latin translator, imitating the Septuagint, rendered it, “Firmament.” Velleius, in Cicero's first book On the Nature of the Gods, says that solid and firm bodies were called by Epicurus στερ■ωμα, on account of their firmness. And this name was rightly imposed on the heaven, as on what the divine writings teach to be most solid: for Job, in chapter thirty-seven, affirms that the Heavens are “poured out as of most solid bronze”; and in another place he says, “Until the heaven be worn away”; Homer too called the Heaven iron and brazen; indeed Aristotle, in the first book of the Meteorology, says that the motion of the sun is the motion of a solid body, by which the air is worn and rarefied and heat is generated — explaining which passage, Alexander of Aphrodisias notes that from it one clearly understands that the bodies of the sun and the other stars are solid. Basil too, in the third

homily on Genesis, hands down that Scripture is wont, by the name of "stereoma" or firmament, to signify bodies strong in vigor and solidity and powerful to resist; thus it is said in the psalms, "The Lord is my firmament and my refuge." External writers too call "stereoma" a body consisting not merely of the bare three dimensions, as is the Mathematical [body], but dense and full and able to resist. So that here στερ■ωμα signifies a solid and firm body, namely one fit to coerce and contain the waters, which are of their own nature slippery and dissipable. Theodoret, in the eleventh question on Genesis, says, "It was called a firmament for this reason, because it was congealed out of water — which before was fluid and liquefiable — most vehemently thickened and most strongly hardened."

The first opinion (firmament = a solid celestial body): the etymology of στερ■ωμα/firmamentum as "solid." Cicero, De natura deorum 1 (Velleius/Epicurus); Job 37:18; Job 14:12 ("donec atteratur caelum"); Homer (iron/brazen heaven); Aristotle, Meteorology 1, with Alexander of Aphrodisias; Basil, Hexaëmeron hom. 3; Psalm 17(18):3; Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 11. Marginal glosses: "Why Scripture calls the heaven by the name of firmament"; "Job 14"; "Psalm 17."

Very many of the ancients also think that the firmament was congealed out of water heavily frozen and hardened into the likeness of crystal. This Josephus hands down in the first chapter of the first book of the Jewish Antiquities; for he says that the firmament was packed about with ice, and fitly tempered, by its moist nature, for the watering of the earth by dew. The same was the opinion of Theodoret in the eleventh question on Genesis, and likewise of Gennadius and Severian, as they are cited on this place in the Catena, with whom Bede agrees in his Hexaëmeron. And Bede was followed by the Master of the Sentences, in the second book, distinction 14; by the Master of the Scholastic History, book 1, chapter 4; by Hugh, in the book of Annotations on Genesis, chapter six; and by other writers neither few nor slight. But let me here set down Bede's words: "In the midst of the waters," he says, "it is established that the starry Heaven was made firm, and nothing forbids it to be believed made out of the waters: for since we know how great is the firmness, and what the transparency and purity, of crystal stone — which it is certain was

produced from the congealing of waters — what stands in the way of believing that the same ordainer of natures solidified into the firmament of Heaven a substance of waters?" This very thing Bede afterward confirms by the words of Blessed Peter recorded by Blessed Clement in the second book of the Recognitions, by which he teaches that the whole interior space of the world, enclosed within the compass of the highest Heaven, was from the beginning full of waters; and the water which was in the middle of that space, as if frozen solid by ice and [compacted]...

The "crystal from frozen water" version of the firmament: Josephus, Ant. 1.1; Theodoret q. 11; Gennadius and Severian (in the Catena); Bede (Hexaëmeron), followed by Peter Lombard (Sent. II, d. 14), Peter Comestor (Historia scholastica 1.4), and Hugh. Bede's appeal to crystal, and to Peter's words in the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions (bk. 2). Marginal gloss: "Clement of Rome." Sentence continues onto printed p. 91.

— p. 132 (PDF) · printed p. 91 —

...and compacted and solidified in the manner of Crystal, made the firmament, which God called Heaven." So Bede. This opinion, however, not only did not please Basil, but he himself derided it, saying it was too childish and too much the mark of a simple mind to suppose that the Heaven was congealed out of water. What, then, is Basil's opinion? Moved by those words of Isaiah which are in the fifty-first chapter, according to the translation of the Seventy Translators, "The heaven was made firm like smoke," Basil judges that the firmament was forged out of a certain thin matter, such as the aerial, yet vehemently densified and packed together. With Basil in this too, as in most things, Ambrose agrees. And these are the things handed down by the ancients concerning the firmament and its matter. In our own memory Catharinus, in his commentaries on Genesis, interpreted the firmament as the eighth sphere, supposing it so called because in it all the fixed stars are fixed and firm, and do not wander about with various motions, nor are ever dissociated among themselves, but preserve the same spaces among themselves for all time.

Completes Bede's crystal view; then Basil's derision of it and his own view (the firmament forged of thin aerial matter densely packed — Isaiah 51:6 LXX, "like smoke"), with Ambrose agreeing. Catharinus's view: firmament = the eighth sphere of the fixed stars. Marginal glosses: "Basil, hom. 3 on Genesis"; "Ambrose, in the Hexaëmeron."

But I think I can show clearly enough that by the name of "firmament" in this place no true celestial body is signified — neither some one heaven, nor jointly many heavens. And, to refute Catharinus first: the firmament cannot here be taken for the eighth Heaven, for there is no reason why the name of firmament should have been imposed on the eighth sphere rather than on any of the rest, nor why God should have properly called the eighth sphere "heaven," since that name applies equally to all the other spheres. And Scripture is wont to use the word "heaven" in only two ways: either for every Celestial body, or for the air — that is, the whole space which lies open everywhere between heaven and earth. Next, Moses, a little below, in recounting the work of the fourth day, says that God made the sun and moon, which he calls two great luminaries, and placed them in the firmament: but that the Sun and Moon are not in the eighth Heaven is manifest to everyone. Besides, Catharinus cannot explain how the eighth heaven is in the midst of the waters, bounding the upper waters from the lower: for, granting what he himself wants — that by the upper waters is signified the ninth heaven, called by many the crystalline — by what reasoning will the eighth Heaven truly be said to divide the lower and earthly waters from the upper, and to be, as it were, a kind of middle boundary set between both? Since between the earthly waters and the eighth Heaven, by an almost immense interval, two elements, of air and fire, are interposed, and above them the seven spheres of the planets. Unless perhaps Catharinus should wish to use the refuge of those who fable that by the lower waters is to be understood the sphere of Saturn, rightly called by the name of waters on account of its most cold power and potency; but how cold a fiction and how weak a refuge this is, we shall show a little below. Nor indeed is any other Heaven, or any combination and collection of many heavens, signified here by the name of firmament.

For we have taught above that all the Heavens, according to their substance, were founded before the first day. Again, there is no heaven which can truly be said to be in the midst of the waters and to divide the lower waters from the upper...

Pererius's own thesis: "firmament" here does NOT mean a real celestial body. Against Catharinus: no reason to single out the eighth sphere; Scripture uses "heaven" only for a celestial body or for the air; the sun/moon (day four) are placed in the firmament but are not in the eighth heaven; the eighth heaven cannot be "in the midst of the waters" (two elements and seven planetary spheres lie between it and earthly waters); the "Saturn = lower waters" fable to be refuted below; all heavens were created before day one. Marginal glosses: "The author's opinion on the firmament"; "'Heaven' in Scripture is taken in two ways." Sentence continues onto printed p. 92.

— p. 133 (PDF) · printed p. 92 —

...the upper: for the last heaven, in which is the Moon, is distant by a very long space from the earthly waters, with the two most ample elements of air and fire interposed; nor indeed above any celestial sphere are there, or can there be, any true and natural waters, as we shall soon show. And what of the fact that Moses, below, in recounting the work of the fifth day, says that birds fly in the firmament, or above the firmament — which fits no heaven? For what the Latin version has in that place, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl over the earth under the firmament of heaven," in Hebrew is, word for word, "And let the fowl fly upon the surface, or over the face of, the firmament of Heaven — or rather, of the extension of heaven"; while the Seventy translators have κατ■ τ■ στερ■ωμα το■ ο■ρανο■, that is in Latin, "along the firmament," or "in the firmament of Heaven."

Continues the argument: no heaven is "in the midst of the waters"; the last (lunar) heaven is far from earthly waters, and there are no true waters above any celestial sphere. The "birds fly in/along the firmament" of day five (Genesis 1:20) fits no heaven; the Hebrew and LXX (κατ■ τ■ στερ■ωμα το■ ο■ρανο■) given. Marginal refs: Acts 2; Eccles. 1.

One should read what Bede writes on this, expounding the work of the fifth day, in those Commentaries on Genesis which were lately published falsely

under the name of Junilius the African; for he says thus: “As for what is said, ‘And the fowl over the earth under the firmament of Heaven,’ nothing stands against the reason of truth, since indeed — though by an immense interjacent space — the birds that fly over the earth nonetheless fly under the starry Heaven: just as we men too, placed on the earth, are truly and rightly said to be set under the Heaven and the Sun, Scripture attesting it, which says, ‘There were dwelling in Jerusalem Jews out of every nation that is under Heaven.’ And, ‘What more has a man of all his labor, by which he labors under the sun?’ Indeed, according to another translation, it troubles some that it is said, ‘And the flying things flying along the firmament,’ that is, beside the firmament of Heaven. But it must be understood that the birds are said to fly along the firmament of Heaven for this reason — because by this name the aether too is indicated, that is, that upper space of air which, from this turbulent and dark place in which the birds fly, reaches up to the stars, and is not undeservedly believed to be wholly tranquil and full of light. For the seven wandering stars too, which are said to be borne wandering in this aetherial space, Scripture afterward said to be in the firmament of Heaven; and therefore the birds are rightly said to fly along the firmament of Heaven, because, as I said, these turbulent spaces of air which sustain the flight of birds are neighbors to the aether. Nor is it to be wondered at if the aether be named the firmament of Heaven, since the air is called Heaven, as we taught above.” So Bede.

Bede's exposition (in the Genesis commentary lately misascribed to Junilius Africanus): birds fly “under/along the firmament” because the aether (the upper air, reaching to the stars) is itself called the firmament of Heaven — just as men are said to live “under heaven” (Acts 2:5) and “under the sun” (Eccles. 1:3).

What, then, is our opinion concerning the firmament? We judge that the true signification of “firmament,” and the genuine and proper meaning of these words of Moses, is to be drawn out from the Hebrew word which is in this place. What the Latin translator renders “firmament,” and the Seventy translators rendered in Greek στερ■ωμα, in Hebrew is ■■■■ (Rachiach), a word which properly signifies an extension, from the verb

■■■ (Racha), which is to expand or to extend: for in this signification it is very often used in the Sacred writings, as one may observe in Isaiah forty-two, and Psalms 133 and 136, and Jeremiah 10, and in other places, in which there is a Hebrew word signifying “to extend,” which nevertheless the Latin translator, imitating the Septuagint, frequently expressed by the verb “to make firm.” Furthermore, it must be known that extension can come about in four ways: either by dilation, as a mass of gold is dilated and spread out into very thin and very broad sheets...

Pererius's positive thesis begins: the meaning is to be drawn from the Hebrew ■■■■ (raqia), from the verb ■■■ (raqa) = “to spread/extend out” — used thus in Isaiah 42:5; Psalms 133(136):6 & 136(135):6; Jeremiah 10:12. The Vulgate's “firmamentum” (after LXX στερ■ωμα) obscures this. Marginal glosses: “The author's opinion, what is signified here by the word ‘firmament’”; “The fourfold mode of extension.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 93.

— p. 134 (PDF) · printed p. 93 —

...spread out and extended; or by rarefaction, as water, heated with fire set under it, is extended into a larger mass; or by natural growth, as an animal is extended from small into a greater magnitude according to all the body's dimensions; or finally by a certain expansion and unfolding — namely, when what was rolled up and folded together is unrolled, unfolded, and extended, as is wont to happen with hangings, curtains, and tents. And it is in this last way that the Hebrew name ■■■■ (Rachiach) is taken in the present case, namely for a kind of expansion and extension; for David too, in the hundred-and-third Psalm, used it in that sense, saying, “Stretching out the Heaven like a skin” (or, as the Hebrew sounds word for word, “Like a curtain or tent”); and Isaiah, chapter 40, says that God “stretches out the Heaven like a curtain, or a very thin cloth, and like a tent to dwell in.” Lippomanus indeed, in the Catena on Genesis on this place, hands down that the verb ■■■ (Racha), whence the name ■■■■ (Rachiach) is derived, besides the frequent and common signification of expanding or extending, sometimes also signifies to stabilize and make firm. But neither does he himself bring any example of such a signification, nor do those

especially learned in Hebrew acknowledge such a use of this verb. Those who treat Mathematics in Hebrew call solids by the name ■■■■ (Rachiach), but they do this not so much by keeping the proper signification of the Hebrew word, as by imitating the Seventy Translators, who rendered the Hebrew word ■■■■ (Rachiach) into Greek as στερ■ωμα.

The four modes of extension (dilation, rarefaction, growth, unrolling); ■■■■ here = the fourth (unrolling/spreading), confirmed by Psalm 103(104):2 and Isaiah 40:22 (heaven stretched like a curtain/tent). Against Lippomanus (Luigi Lippomano), who claimed ■■■ can mean "to make firm": no example exists, and Hebraists don't recognize it; the "solid" sense only imitates the LXX στερ■ωμα. *Marginal gloss: "Aloysius Lippomanus."*

We, therefore, judge that by the name of "firmament" in this place Moses signifies that whole space which is expanded and diffused around the earth up to the stars — namely, as far as the keenness of the eyes can reach in every direction. The highest part of this space the heavens and the stars hold; the lowest part, the element of fire and of air. And Moses sometimes speaks of the firmament with respect to the highest part, as when he says that the stars are placed in the firmament; sometimes with respect to the lower part, as when he says that birds fly in the firmament, and that the firmament divides the upper waters from the lower. Similarly in Scripture the name of "heaven" is put now for the starry, now for the aerial. And it must be understood that this whole space, which is poured out between the earth and the Heaven of the Moon, was full of a certain watery and nebulous matter, such as the air is wont to be when, poured close over the earth, it is overspread and packed with many and dense vapors and thick clouds. And this I do not bring forth from my own sense, nor frame it by my own discretion, but draw it out from manifest places of Scripture. For in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-four, Divine Wisdom, recounting what she herself did in the making of the world, says, "I made that in the Heavens there should rise a light that fails not, and like a cloud I covered all the earth." And in Job 38 the Lord says thus: "Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing from the womb, when I made

a cloud its garment, and wrapped it in darkness as in the swaddling-bands of infancy...”

Pererius's own definition: “firmament” = the whole expanded space around the earth up to the stars (as far as eyesight reaches) — its top held by heavens/stars, its bottom by fire and air; Moses uses it now of the upper part (stars set in it), now of the lower (birds fly in it; it divides the waters). This whole sublunar space was full of watery/nebulous matter (vapor-laden air). Scriptural support: Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 24:5–6; Job 38:8–9. Marginal gloss: “What Moses signified by the name of firmament.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 94 (“...I wrapped it...”).

— p. 135 (PDF) · printed p. 94 —

...I wrapped it?” Now we see that nebulous and (so to speak) vaporous matter is converted into air most easily and most swiftly: for just as air is readily condensed into cloud and vapor, so in turn vapor is dissolved into air with great ease and speed. And so the thinner and lighter part of that nebulous matter, on this second day, was changed into air, and into that which is said to be above the air, fire — whether by the power and efficacy of the first light, most burning and most powerful to act, as Eugubinus [Steuco] thinks; or, what is more credible, by the infinite power and might of God alone: for so swift and sudden a generation of the two elements, fire and air, does not seem able to have come about by the natural power of light. But the remaining lower part of that nebulous matter — coarser, colder, and heavier — settled around the earth: which afterward, on the third day, being still more condensed and reduced to the proper condition of the element of water, was separated from the earth, and, lest it cover it again, gathered into a place prepared for it.

Completes the Job 38 quotation, then Pererius's physics of day two: the thinner part of the vapor-matter becomes air and fire (by God's power rather than light's nature, against Steuco); the coarser part settles as water, separated from the earth on day three. Marginal gloss: “Augustinus Eugubinus [Steuco], in the Cosmopoeia.”

Nevertheless, since we said above that it is more likely true that all the elements were made together with all the Heavens according to their substance, it must rather be said that on this day air was made not

according to its substance, but was made a certain middle boundary separating the rain-waters from the earthly waters, and was made the natural place for the generation of such upper waters: so that on this day there was made the distinction of the element of water into aerial and terrestrial waters, while on the third day there was made, in some measure, the distinction of water from earth. Therefore on the second day air was made, not simply, but so that it might have the character of a firmament and the office of dividing the waters from the waters. Nor is it necessary that on this day vapors and clouds were raised on high, and waters generated in the middle region of the air, since Moses says below, in the second chapter, that when paradise was already founded, “it had not yet rained upon the earth”; but on this day the air was designated and destined to be the natural place of the waters, and to divide the waters from the waters.

Refinement: since all elements were made in substance before day one, day two's work is rather that air was constituted as the dividing boundary and natural place of the upper (rain) waters — not that clouds were actually raised then (Gen 2:5, “it had not yet rained”). Marginal gloss: “What was properly made on the second day.”

But, to return to the matter in hand, that by “firmament” must here be understood the expanded space between heaven and earth is plain from many arguments. First: the refutation of those who attributed the name of firmament to a celestial body is a confirmation of this our opinion; for if the firmament does not signify some celestial body, then beyond doubt it can signify nothing other than what we say. Next, the Hebrew name ■■■■ (Rachiach) wonderfully fits this our interpretation, since, as we said, it signifies extension and expansion. Then the firmament was called by God “Heaven” — in Hebrew ■■■■ (Shammaim), as if you would say “waters there”: for ■■ (Sham) means “there,” and ■■■ (Maim) means “waters”; and this fits beautifully with the air, in whose upper region there is an immense and perennial generation of waters, by rains that water and make fruitful the earth. Besides, that the firmament is “in the midst of the waters,” dividing the upper waters [from the lower]...

Pererius's arguments that firmament = the expanded space (air): the refutation of the celestial-body view; the Hebrew ■■■■ (raqia, "extension"); the etymology of ■■■■ (shamayim, "heaven") as šam ("there") + mayim ("waters") = "waters there," fitting the rain-bearing air. Marginal gloss: "By firmament is properly understood the space between Heaven and earth." Sentence continues onto printed p. 95.

— p. 136 (PDF) · printed p. 95 —

...waters from the lower, can truly and fitly be applied to no body except the air. Besides, what Moses said, in expounding the work of the fifth day, that the birds fly on the surface of the firmament of Heaven, according to our interpretation of the firmament has both a true sense and one most easy to understand. Lastly, in the sacred writings the air is frequently called heaven: hence "the birds of heaven"; and, to bring about the flood, "the cataracts of Heaven were opened," Genesis seven; and David, "Who covers heaven with clouds," Psalm one hundred forty-six; Zechariah, "The heavens shall give their dew," Zechariah eight; our Lord said in the Gospel, Matthew sixteen, "A lowering and red sky"; Moses in Deuteronomy threatens the Jews that, if they violate the law of God, the Heaven above them shall be brazen, Deuteronomy twenty-eight; Elijah is said to have shut up the Heaven for three years that it might not rain, Third Kings nineteen; finally Blessed Peter, at the end of his second Epistle, teaches that the same Heavens which once perished by the flood will, on the day of judgment, perish also by fire.

Further confirmation that "firmament" = air: birds fly in it (day five); and Scripture often calls the air "heaven" — Genesis 7:11; Psalm 146(147):8; Zechariah 8:12; Matthew 16:3; Deuteronomy 28:23; 1 (3) Kings 17 (cf. Luke 4:25, James 5:17); 2 Peter 3:6–7.

Nor indeed was this opinion which we have set forth concerning the firmament first thought out and invented by us; for so long before us Saint Jerome understood and taught it, in the eighty-third Epistle which he wrote to Oceanus: "Between Heaven," he says, "and earth a firmament is built up in the middle; and according to the Etymology of the Hebrew tongue, Heaven — that is, ■■■■ (Shamaim) — takes its name from the waters."

The same interpretation Augustine also intimates in the unfinished book On Genesis according to the Letter: for in the twelfth chapter he writes thus, explaining this very passage of Genesis which we now treat: “In this place,” he says, “when the firmament is called heaven, it must be understood that all this aetherial structure is meant, which contains all things in its substance, under which thrives the serenity of pure and tranquil air, under which likewise that turbulent and stormy air is tossed about.”

The view is not new: Jerome, Ep. 83 (to Oceanus); Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, ch. 12 (the firmament = the whole aetherial frame, under which the calm upper and stormy lower air lie).

This opinion too, the same Augustine — already before him reported by others — in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter four, greatly approves and praises. The same, among the most probable views, Blessed Thomas commends in the First Part, question sixty-eight; indeed, if one attends to his manner of speaking, he himself seems more inclined to it. Durandus, moreover, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction fourteen, prefers it to the rest. And Rupert held the same in the first book On the Trinity and Its Works, chapter twenty-two, writing thus: “The firmament is not something solid or hard, as is commonly supposed, but is air extended, and so rarefied that, although it can be seen, it can nonetheless more rightly be called spirit than body — Ecclesiastes attesting it (Ecclesiastes one, when he speaks of the luminaries that are visibly borne in it), ‘The spirit goes forth surveying all things round about, and returns to its circuits.’ This, therefore, since it is not solid, yet neither so corporeal as this lower part of the air, was nevertheless from another cause [called by Scripture]...”

More authorities for the “firmament = air/space” view: Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.4; Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 68; Durandus, Sent. II, d. 14; Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate, bk. 1, ch. 22 (firmament = extended, rarefied air, “rather spirit than body,” citing Ecclesiastes 1:6). Sentence continues onto printed p. 96.

— p. 137 (PDF) · printed p. 96 —

...Scripture named it ‘firmament,’ namely because it divides the waters from the waters.” So Rupert. There is no need to mention Augustinus Eugubinus [Steuco], who, as is plain to all, treats this interpretation at length in the Cosmopoeia and defends it pugnaciously and stubbornly. Cajetan too, on the strength of the signification of the Hebrew word which we just now set forth, affirms that by the name of “firmament” in this place is signified the expansion which is between heaven and earth, by which is comprehended the extension both of the air and of the fire and of all the visible heavens.

Completes Rupert; notes Steuco (Cosmopoeia) and Cajetan as defenders of the same reading (firmament = the expansion between heaven and earth, including air, fire, and the visible heavens). Marginal gloss: “Cajetan, on Genesis.”

But two things seem to tell against this opinion: for both the Latin name “firmament,” which is in the Latin and common translation, and the Greek word στερ■ωμα which the Seventy Translators used, by no means fit the air — a body very thin and unstable, and tossed by perpetual agitation. And Moses, a little below, where he relates the work of the fourth day, affirms that the sun and moon and all the stars are placed in the firmament: but that the sun and moon and stars are not in that space which the air occupies and fills, no one will deny. But that these objections against our opinion are invalid, their very easy solution will show. The first is solved thus: it is called “firmament” not because it is a most solid body, but because it is an interstice and a boundary set between the upper and lower waters — a boundary, I say, most firm and immutable; for nature always brings it about that the upper waters are generated in the higher air and thence flow down to the earth, while the lower waters have their place beneath the air. That this signification of “firmament” is not a fabrication, but well agreeing with the word, I will summon as witness Blessed Augustine, who in the second book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 10, writes thus: “Nor does the name ‘firmament’ compel us to think that the heaven stands still: for one may understand ‘firmament’ not on account of

standing, but on account of firmness, or on account of the impassable boundary of the upper and lower waters.” Rupert hands down the same, in the place we set down a little above.

The two objections (στερ■ωμα/firmament suits a solid, not air; the sun/moon/stars are placed “in the firmament” on day four). Solution to the first: “firmament” names not a most-solid body but a firm, immutable boundary between the waters (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.10; Rupert). Marginal glosses: “Two objections”; “Solution of the objections.”

The latter objection can be refuted in many ways. I do not answer, as some answer, that Moses used the word “firmament” in one way on the second day and in another on the fourth — there, namely, for the air, but here for a celestial body: for it is scarcely credible that Moses, within so brief an interval, used the same word so variously and ambiguously, which would without doubt have brought no small obscurity upon his narrative. Nor will I say, as some have reported, that on the second day it is called precisely “firmament,” but on the fourth with an addition, that is, “In the firmament of heaven,” so that this variation — being varied in both places — might indicate the signification of this word: for this is too weak, since “In the firmament of heaven” is said, in the Hebrew manner, for what is “in the firmament which is heaven,” or which above, on the second day, was called by God “heaven.” Nor are there lacking those who, when the stars are said to be placed “in the firmament of heaven,” interpret that “In the firmament of heaven” as “Above the firmament.” Certainly those who by “firmament”...

Refuting weak solutions to the second objection: that Moses used “firmament” differently on days two and four (implausibly ambiguous); or that the bare word vs. “in the firmament of heaven” signals a shift (weak — it is just Hebrew idiom for “in the firmament which is heaven”); or that “in the firmament of heaven” means “above the firmament.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 97.

— p. 138 (PDF) · printed p. 97 —

...understand the eighth heaven, are also forced to expound that “In the firmament of heaven” as “Under the firmament of heaven.” For the sun and moon and the other planets are not placed in the eighth heaven, but below it

accomplish their courses and circuits. That solution, therefore, is more probable: either that they are said to be placed in the firmament of heaven because, through the firmament itself — that is, the air — they are exposed and visible to the eyes of men (for according as this aerial space is more or less serene and pure, so do they display their splendor and beauty to mortals more clearly or more dimly); or rather, that Moses, by the Hebrew word ■■■■ (Rachiach), signified indiscriminately the whole space and extension from the earth up to the highest stars — namely, as far as the keenness of the eyes can reach in every direction; for neither by the judgment of sense nor by the estimation of the common people is the space in which the stars revolve separated from that in which the air and fire are. And so Moses lowered and accommodated his narrative to the opinion and sense of the common people, who think that the sun, moon, and stars wander through this space (or, as the crowd supposes, void) and accomplish their motions; for Moses did this very thing again below, when, in recounting the work of the fourth day, following the opinion of the crowd and the judgment of sense, he called the moon a great luminary, so that he seems to make it, after the sun, the greatest of the stars — whereas in truth, as the Mathematicians teach by sure arguments, it is in magnitude inferior to very many stars. Therefore in the firmament, with respect to its highest part, the stars are placed; and in the firmament likewise, with respect to its lower part which the air occupies, are the waters which are treated of in this place. And so Saint Thomas solves this very objection, in the First Part, question thirty, article one. And let it trouble no one that it is read in Scripture, “And the waters that are above the heavens”: as though, because it is said in the plural “above the heavens,” it could not therefore be understood of the air; for it is so said according to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, in which the noun “heaven” lacks a singular and is said only in the plural, ■■■■ (Sammaim), that is “heavens,” like Athenae, Syracusae, Venetiae.

The preferred solution: the stars are said to be “in the firmament” either because seen through it (the air), or because ■■■■ covers the whole space from earth to the stars, indistinct to the senses —

Moses accommodating the common view (cf. calling the moon a "great luminary," though astronomically smaller than many stars). Thus stars belong to the firmament's upper part, the waters to its lower (air) part. "Waters above the heavens" (Ps. 148:4) is just the Hebrew plural ■■■■ (shamayim), like the plural-only Latin place-names Athenae/Syracusae/Venetiae. (Aquinas ref printed "q. 30"; the relevant questions are ST I qq. 68 & 70.) Marginal ref: Ps. 148.

The first question, concerning the firmament of heaven, being dispatched, we undertake to treat the other — even more perplexed and contentious — concerning the waters placed above the firmament. What sort those waters were seemed most difficult to explain to those who were persuaded that by the name of "firmament" in this place the starry heaven was signified; wherefore they handed down many interpretations of those waters, and some men gave interpretations not only different from, but even contrary to, those of others. I will begin with Origen, to whom — because perhaps it seemed incredible that above the starry heavens there should be true waters — it seemed good not to take the name of those waters properly, but to interpret it figuratively and mystically. For he (as Epiphanius relates in his letter to John of Jerusalem, and Jerome in his letter to Pammachius), in his writings on Genesis, expounding this passage, interpreted by the upper waters the blessed [Angels]...

Begins the second great question: what the "waters above the firmament" are — hardest for those holding firmament = the starry heaven. The first interpretation, Origen's: figurative/mystical — the upper waters = the blessed Angels (reported by Epiphanius, Ep. to John of Jerusalem, and Jerome, Ep. to Pammachius). Marginal glosses: "What sort the waters placed above the firmament are"; "Origen's opinion, that by the waters placed above heaven the angels are understood." Sentence continues onto printed p. 98.

— p. 139 (PDF) · printed p. 98 —

...the blessed angels, whom he says are also signified by David under the name of waters, when he said, "And let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord"; while by the lower waters he expounded the evil Angels, cast down from heaven into this turbulent and dark air. This interpretation Epiphanius and Jerome condemn in the places cited above, and Epiphanius also refutes it by this argument, that the waters

placed above the firmament are those which Moses, below in chapter seven, writes to have come down, with the cataracts of heaven opened, to cause the flood. Basil, in the third homily on Genesis, mentions this exposition — yet with Origen's name suppressed — and rejects it as a dream and an old wives' tale; and rightly so. For, besides that it corrupts the historical narrative of Moses concerning real waters, by twisting it too violently and ineptly to intellectual and spiritual waters, it is also plainly confuted by two testimonies of Scripture: one is in Psalm 103, where it stands, “Stretching out the heaven like a skin, who coverest the higher parts thereof with waters,” or, as it is word-for-word in the Hebrew, “Who roofest and beamest its upper parts” — which by no means fits angelic Spirits; the other is in Psalm 148 and in the Canticle of the Three Children, where, when all the works of God are summoned to praise God, in the first place are mentioned the Angels and the heavenly powers, but afterward “the waters that are above the heavens”: from which one may understand that those supercelestial waters are distinct from the Angels. And Rupert used this testimony of Scripture to refute that opinion, in the first book On the Works of the Most Holy Trinity, chapter twenty-three. Augustine left written something similar to Origen's opinion, in the twenty-third book of the Confessions, chapter 32: for he says that the firmament is placed between the upper spiritual waters and the lower corporeal ones. But he himself afterward, in the second book of the Retractations, chapter six, revoked and corrected this, as having been said inconsiderately in so obscure a matter.

Completes Origen's figurative reading (upper waters = the good Angels [Ps. 148:4], lower waters = the fallen ones), refuted by Epiphanius, Jerome, and Basil (who dismisses it as an old wives' tale), and by Pererius: it corrupts the literal sense, and Scripture (Ps. 104:2–3 Heb.; Ps. 148 & the Canticle of Dan. 3) distinguishes the upper waters FROM the angels. Rupert, De Trinitate bk. 1, ch. 23. (“libro vigesimotertio Confessionum” — a printer's slip: the Confessions have 13 books; the passage is bk. 13, ch. 32; Augustine retracts it at Retractations 2.6.) Marginal glosses: “Ps. 148”; “Origen is refuted by Epiphanius, Jerome, Basil, and the author”; “Dan. 3.”

Another is the opinion of many — approved and ennobled by the consent of men outstanding in the praise both of antiquity and of learning and holiness — that there are true and natural waters above the starry heaven: for the waters which Moses called by their proper name and simply "waters" must without doubt be understood as true waters. But I will name those to whom this opinion was pleasing. Justin Martyr, answering the ninety-third question of the orthodox, says that the back of heaven is covered with waters, according to that text, "Who coverest its higher parts with waters": and that the use of those waters is twofold; one, to soften and temper, by their cooling, the immense heat of so many and so great stars, lest all things be utterly consumed; the other, that by their weight the back of heaven may be pressed and weighed down, and not be tossed this way and that, shaken by the frequent and violent impulse of the winds. Two most learned of the Jews, Philo and Josephus, have reported nearly the same. And Basil, in the third homily on Genesis, argues at length, in careful and accurate discourse, concerning the use and necessity of these supercelestial waters: "For when God," he says, "had scattered far and wide an almost infinite force of fiery heat [for its manifold and necessary uses]..."

The second opinion: that there are real, natural waters above the starry heaven (Justin Martyr, Responsiones ad orthodoxos q. 93; Philo; Josephus; Basil, Hexaëmeron hom. 3; and others named below). Their proposed purpose: to temper the heat of the stars (Ps. 104:3). Marginal glosses: "Ps. 103"; "The second opinion — of Justin Martyr, Philo, Josephus, Basil, Theodoret, Gennadius, Ambrose — that there are true waters above heaven." Sentence (Basil's quotation) continues onto printed p. 99.

— p. 140 (PDF) · printed p. 99 —

...heat — on account of its manifold uses, necessary for very many things — in many ways, both in heaven and below heaven, and since fire is by its own nature most voracious and most prolific of itself, growing wondrously from the smallest beginnings, lest for that cause the safety and soundness of the universe should be endangered, he set over against it, both below and above heaven, a very great force of waters, so that, the great heat of the

fires being tempered by their cooling, it should not only not harm the world, but even profit it very much.” So, in substance, Basil. The same is handed down by Theodoret, in the eleventh question on Genesis, and likewise by Gennadius and Severian, as they are cited in this place in the Catena. And Ambrose, in the second book on the Hexaëmeron, chapter two, also sets down two indications and arguments of this matter: one, that sometimes a huge force of water, descending suddenly from heaven with great violence, dissolves into such rains that rivers and lakes are suddenly filled, and even the seas themselves overflow; the other, that we frequently behold the Sun as if wet and dewy — namely, on account of the nourishment of waters drawn up to temper its heat.

Basil's argument (Hexaëmeron hom. 3): God set waters above and below heaven to temper the heat of the fires; shared by Theodoret (q. 11), Gennadius, and Severian (in the Catena). Ambrose (Hexaëmeron 2.2) adds two signs: sudden torrential rains, and the Sun appearing “wet” as if drawing up water to cool itself.

Bede, in his book On the Nature of Things, says that to some it seemed that the waters above heaven were placed there by God so that, by their immense quantity hurled down from the heavens upon the earth, the general flood of the whole world — which was at some time to come about by the will and decree of God — might be brought about; but that to himself it seems more probable that those waters were provided for the cooling and tempering of the heat of the stars. The aforesaid opinion Tostatus attributes to a certain solemn doctor, on the seventh chapter of Genesis: but that it is false is established by a twofold argument. First, because, in order for those waters to flow down to the earth to cause the flood, it would have been necessary that all the heavens be ruptured, so that a descent might lie open for those waters, and again that the same heavens be closed up. Second, because either that whole water would have flowed down, and so the whole place which it occupied would have remained empty; or only a part would have flowed down, and the remaining part would be in vain, since there will be no more a general flood, as God promised, Genesis 9.

Bede (De natura rerum) reports, but rejects, the view that the supercelestial waters were stored for the Flood, preferring the "tempering the stars' heat" reason; Tostatus ascribes the Flood-view to "a certain solemn doctor." Pererius refutes it: it would require the heavens to be ruptured and resealed, and (since no more general flood, Gen. 9:11) any unused remainder would be pointless. Marginal gloss: "That the supercelestial waters were not reserved for the general flood."

Nor are there lacking those who think that this too is the sense of the Church, because in the hymn which is publicly sung in the churches at the Vespers of the second weekday [Monday] it stands thus:

Introduces the Monday-Vespers hymn "Immense caeli conditor," cited as supposed Church testimony for waters set above to temper the celestial fires.

O boundless Founder of the heaven, who, that things mingled might not be confounded, dividing the floods of water, gavest the heaven as a boundary; establishing a place for the heavenly [waters] and at the same time for the earth's streams, that the wave might temper the flames, lest [the waters] dissolve the earth's soil.

The hymn "Immense caeli conditor" (Monday Vespers; attributed to Gregory the Great), printed in two columns on the page — read across as the eight lines given here.

To persuade of the same, they bring forward this argument drawn from analogy, which Augustine touches on in the eleventh book of the City of God, the last chapter: just as in the microcosm — that is, in man — above the heart, which is of fiery nature, is placed the brain, which is most cold, so in the great world, above the celestial fires, the waters are placed. The same [Augustine], in the second book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 5, and in the unfinished book on Genesis, chapter eight, reports that certain of the faithful wished to prove that there are waters above heaven by the argument from Saturn: which, since it is carried with a greater rapidity than the other planets by the motion of the prime mobile (for in an equal time it travels round a far greater space)...

Two further supports for the supercelestial waters: the microcosm analogy (cold brain above the fiery heart, per Augustine, City of God 11, last ch.); and the "Saturn" argument (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.5 & the unfinished commentary ch. 8) — Saturn sweeps the largest circuit, so should be

hottest. Marginal gloss: “Nor [were the supercelestial waters reserved] for tempering the stars' heat raised by their motion.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 100.

— p. 141 (PDF) · printed p. 100 —

...it travels round, it ought also to conceive a greater heat and to be more burning; whereas the Astronomers teach that Saturn is most cold — and of this great coldness there can surely be no other cause than the nearness of the supercelestial waters. But this is frivolous: for the eighth heaven is nearer to those waters than the sphere of Saturn, and is intermediate between this and them; and so the fixed stars which are in it, the nearer they are to those waters, the more fully they ought to feel and share their coldness — which is plainly false, by the argument of the single star Sirius, or the Dog-star, which is notable for its excess of heat and infamous among all nations. Blessed Augustine, in the place just cited, when he had disputed much about waters of this kind — by what reasoning they can be above heaven — at last adds this, as it were a conclusion of the dispute: “But in whatever way, and of whatever kind, the waters there may be, let us by no means doubt that they are there: for the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the capacity of human wit.” Read what Augustine writes to the same effect in book 11 of the City of God, the last chapter.

Pererius refutes the Saturn argument: the eighth heaven (with its fixed stars) lies nearer the waters than Saturn does, yet contains the scorching Dog-star (Sirius) — so coldness can't come from the waters' nearness. Augustine's deferential conclusion (City of God 11, last ch.): however they are there, Scripture's authority surpasses human reason.

It is objected against this opinion that the slippery and flowing nature of water cannot rest upon the outermost surface of heaven, which is most perfectly round and smooth. Basil solves this: although the concave surface of Heaven is round, it does not at once follow as a consequence and necessity that the convex surface of Heaven is also round — as is to be seen in vaults and arched places. Bede, in the Hexaëmeron, answers thus: “It is no less easy for almighty God to hold waters above the starry Heaven — whether liquid, or congealed and compacted in the manner of crystal —

than (what He does daily) to hold waters suspended in the upper air, whence comes so great a downpour of rains; which Job declares of God, as a kind of miracle, in chapter twenty-six, ‘Who binds the waters in his clouds, that they break not out all together downward.’ For He it is who made the waves of the Red Sea and of the Jordan, raised on high and made firm in the likeness of walls, to stand still.” But of Bede it should be asked whether he thought the waters are above heaven naturally or miraculously. If he should say it is a miracle, it would easily be rejected on Augustine's principle, who does not approve, in rendering the reason of things done in the first institution and ordering of things, to have recourse to the omnipotence of God and to miracles. But if he should say the waters are there naturally, it could be refuted more easily, since the natural place of water is below the air and nearest to the earth.

Objection: water can't rest on heaven's round outer surface. Replies: Basil (the convex face need not be round, like a vault's outside); Bede (God holds waters above as he holds clouds aloft — Job 26:8 — and made the Red Sea/Jordan stand like walls). But Pererius presses the dilemma: if miraculously, rejected (no miracles in creation, per Augustine); if naturally, refuted (water's natural place is low). Marginal glosses: “How water, of itself slippery and flowing, can rest above heaven”; “Basil, Hexaëmeron hom. 3.”

Nor does the argument from vapors that are in the upper air help him; for those, although they are water in substance, do not however have the properties of natural water — coldness, I mean, density, and weight — but, rarefied by heat and made light, are carried to the upper places; yet as soon as they are changed into true water, they cannot remain in a lofty place, but are borne down to the lowest by their natural weight. And although vapors can be carried up to the higher regions of the air, for the causes I have said, they can nonetheless be raised neither to the highest region of the air, nor to the place of fire — much less above the eighth Heaven. Blessed Augustine, in the second book [on Genesis according to the Letter]...

The vapor argument fails: vapors are water in substance but lack water's properties (cold, density, weight), being heat-rarefied; once they revert to true water they fall, and can never rise even to the upper air or fire-region, let alone above the eighth heaven. Sentence continues onto printed p. 101.

— p. 142 (PDF) · printed p. 101 —

...in the second book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter four, and in the Dialogue of Sixty-five Questions, question twenty-seven, argues that it is not to be thought incredible that water should be carried up and be above heaven: “For we see,” he says, “every day water rarefied into vapor lifted to the upper parts of the air, which, if it were rarefied still more and more, would seek even loftier places. Since, then, the Natural Philosophers teach that every body can be rarefied and divided to infinity, it will also be able to become infinitely lighter and to be raised to any height of places whatsoever: wherefore it does not seem impossible that water can be attenuated so far as to be fit to be moved even above Heaven.” These are Augustine's words.

Augustine's rarefaction argument for water above heaven (De Genesi ad litteram 2.4; and the pseudo-Augustinian Dialogus quaestionum LXV, q. 27): vapor rises; bodies can be rarefied to infinity, so water could be made light enough to rise above heaven. Marginal gloss: “Augustine's opinion and argument about the supercelestial waters is examined.”

But neither is his opinion probable, nor is the argument valid. For it cannot come about that water be so attenuated that it can be carried above Heaven: first, on account of the solidity and continuity of the heaven, which affords passage to nothing; then, on account of the region of fire spread over the air, which would utterly consume all force of such vapors; next, because the natural terminus of the things that are borne upward is the nearest extremity of the Moon's sphere — for fire, the lightest of all bodies, seeks no places beyond. Further, although every body, by the Mathematical reckoning (whereby it is thought of as separated from all natural matter), is said to be able to be rarefied and divided to infinity, yet that this really happen is in no natural body possible: for of all things consisting of nature there is a fixed limit, set by nature, both of smallness and largeness and of density and rarity; wherefore water cannot subsist at any rarity whatsoever, but if it be attenuated more than its nature bears, it is straightway turned into air, and this, rarefied too much, is changed into fire.

Pererius refutes Augustine: water cannot rise above heaven (heaven's solidity bars passage; the fire-region would consume the vapor; up-borne things stop at the Moon's sphere); and infinite rarefaction holds only mathematically — every natural body has fixed limits, and over-rarefied water turns to air, then fire.

But, to cut it short, I will refute this opinion about waters placed above the stars universally. In no way is it credible that there is true and natural water above Heaven: for, since water is a body heavier and coarser and more ignoble than air, it would surely be against the natural order of things and against the good disposition of the universe that so great a force of waters — certainly far greater than all the earthly waters — should be placed not only above the air, but even above the eight celestial spheres. For both reason teaches and experience confirms that the natural place of water is below the air and nearest above the earth: for we see that water does not rest in the air, and that the water which is generated in the upper air from clouds is at once cast down by its own inclination and weight; wherefore, if water were above Heaven, it could not be denied that it is there against its nature and by violence; but nothing violent is perpetual; nor is it credible that God — who, at the world's beginning, ordered all the things he powerfully founded also wisely and suitably to the nature of each thing — placed so great a quantity of waters, against their natural inclination and impetus, above the Heavens. If nature, as Aristotle often affirms, does nothing in vain, how much less would God, the most wise Maker of all nature, have placed so great a force of waters above heaven in vain, and for so many thousands of years [held them] there by violence...

Pererius's decisive argument: true water above the heavens would be against the natural order (water's place is low, near earth, as experience shows), hence violent and unnatural — but nothing violent is perpetual, and God orders each thing to its nature and does nothing in vain (Aristotle). Marginal glosses: “It is proved that there are no true waters above heaven”; “God and nature do nothing in vain.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 102.

— p. 143 (PDF) · printed p. 102 —

...held them there by violence — especially since no sufficiently fitting and probable use of those waters can be devised. For as to what some say, that

there was need of their cooling to mitigate and moderate the heat of the stars, this would by no means be approved by the Peripatetics: for that the stars are not hot and fiery Aristotle demonstrated in the second book On the Heaven and the first book of the Meteorology, and we shall show it in another book, which we have written on the heavens and the stars and will append to this. But let us grant that they are hot and fiery: yet how much better would it have been, from the beginning, not to give each star more heat than would be useful for the conservation of the world, than to lavish immoderate heat on the stars, for the correcting and tempering of which there should afterward be need of so violent a remedy of waters. And indeed, if that water by cooling lessens the heat of the stars, that could not happen without alteration: for the remission of one contrary, on Aristotle's authority, does not come about except by the admixture of its contrary; wherefore the stars would be perpetually altered and in a manner corrupted, and surely some notable variation would have arisen in them — which, however, not even the slightest, since the founding of the world, has yet been able to be detected. And since the stars do not give heat except by light, in order that their heating power be remitted it would be necessary that the force and quantity of light be likewise diminished — which light, however, all admit to have been the same and invariable through every age. Furthermore, between contraries there is mutual conflict and, as the Philosophers say, action and reaction: wherefore that water too, repressing the force of heat, would in turn grow hot by the burning of the stars, and waste away, and at last perish; and its perishing would frustrate and make void God's first counsel and purpose, and would leave the place of the corrupted water empty and void — or something newly generated would be substituted in its place, or the perishing of the waters would contribute to the increase of the stars, and some notable accession would be made to the stars. Since these things are plainly contrary to reason, to the senses, and to the observations of learned men, the premises from which they necessarily follow are also wholly to be repudiated and rejected.

Completes the refutation: no good use can be devised for supercelestial waters as a coolant. The stars aren't fiery (Aristotle, De Caelo 2; Meteor. 1; and Pererius's own forthcoming book on the heavens); even if hot, the remedy is gratuitous and self-defeating (cooling = alteration → corruption/variation never observed; light is invariable; action/reaction would make the water itself perish). Marginal gloss: "That the stars do not need cooling to temper their heat."

Others, convinced (I suppose) by these arguments, think that those waters were provided to beat back the heat of the elemental fire set beneath the sphere of the moon — which, since it is most ample in mass and most efficacious in power, would, unless it were thus repressed, destroy and consume all things. But this is futile: for neither does that fire, since it is in the rarest and thinnest matter, have a great power of heating; and for repressing it, however great it be, both the most cold middle region of the air and the immense quantity of earthly waters abundantly suffice; nor indeed could that supercelestial water transmit its cold to the element of fire, for it would be hindered by the interposition of the eight celestial spheres, which, since they are incorruptible, are capable neither of cold nor of any of the other qualities that have power to corrupt. But a certain one argues thus: since there are in the sublunary world two principal qualities having power to act, Heat and Cold, there must be in the heavens [some causes that produce and preserve] them...

Another version: the waters repress the elemental fire below the moon — refuted (that fire is feeble; the cold mid-air and earthly seas suffice; supercelestial cold can't cross the eight incorruptible orbs). Then a further argument begins (heat and cold need celestial causes). Marginal gloss: "That [the waters] were not provided either to beat back the heat of the elemental fire." Sentence continues onto printed p. 103.

— p. 144 (PDF) · printed p. 103 —

...there must be some causes that produce and preserve them. As, therefore, the star-bearing Heavens generate and maintain heat by the light of the stars, so reason persuades that there is some watery Heaven, by whose power cold may be produced and preserved. But this is a weak argument: for neither could that heaven transmit the force of cold to sublunary things through so many intervening spheres; and the Astronomers attribute the

power of cooling to the stars too, as to Saturn; and many besides refer this to the various faculties of the influences which they assign to the heavens. Finally, it is the opinion of the Peripatetics that the Heaven produces both heat and cold by light, yet in a different manner — heat by itself, but cold by accident; for the presence of light produces heat, but its absence cold: for wherever the light of the Sun reaches either not at all or only thinly, there we perceive cold to thrive and be strengthened.

Completes and rebuts the "watery heaven as cause of cold" argument: cold can't cross so many spheres; astronomers already credit stars (e.g. Saturn) and the planetary "influences" with cooling; and for the Peripatetics the heaven makes cold only per accidens, by the absence of light.

There are others who interpret those waters far otherwise, whose interpretations and opinions, that I may fulfill my purpose and promise and satisfy the reader, I ought not to pass over in silence. Blessed Augustine, in the first book on Genesis against the Manichees, chapter 11, interprets by the waters matter; by the firmament, the star-bearing heaven, which divides between the matter of invisible and supercelestial things and the matter of inferior and sublunary bodies: and that those invisible waters are said to be above Heaven not so much by spatial distances as by dignity of nature. So he. But, lest he should seem to say this by assertion and for certain, he immediately adds: "Although nothing is to be rashly affirmed about this matter: for it is obscure and remote from the senses of men." It is well that Augustine held this hesitantly, for it is not probable: for, besides that to make Angels concrete out of matter abhors greatly from the teaching long since approved by the Theologians, the interpretation itself is also wholly figurative and mystical, not cleaving to the meaning of Moses' words, and twisted too violently.

Augustine's reading (De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.11): waters = matter; firmament = the star-bearing heaven dividing the matter of invisible/supercelestial things from that of sublunary bodies; the "invisible waters above heaven" distinguished by dignity, not place. Augustine adds the caveat that nothing is to be rashly affirmed; Pererius judges it improbable (it makes angels material, and is wholly figurative).

There is another opinion of many Theologians, especially to be weighed and judged in this place. It pleases many that by the upper waters is to be understood the ninth Heaven, called by them the Crystalline and supposed to be the prime mobile; while by the firmament they interpret either the eighth sphere alone, or it together with the seven planetary spheres beneath it. This opinion, beyond the rest, is approved by St. Bonaventure on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, and by Giles, in the second part of the work he writes on the Hexaëmeron, chapter 14 and following, and by not a few other scholastic Theologians; to whom must be added Nicholas of Lyra, Tostatus, Cajetan, and Catharinus. And they think the ninth Heaven was called by Moses by the name of waters because it has a great likeness and agreement with water. But what that agreement and likeness is — since Bonaventure expounds it more carefully and clearly than the rest — let us hear him: on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, article 1, he philosophizes in this manner: “In elemental water there are three properties: transparency, coldness, and weight. In transparency the ninth heaven formally agrees with true and natural water; in weight it in no way agrees; in coldness it partly agrees and partly not at all: formally indeed it does not agree, because it is not actually cold, but virtually and effectively it most of all [agrees]...”

The major scholastic opinion: the upper waters = the ninth (Crystalline) heaven, the supposed prime mobile; the firmament = the eighth sphere (alone or with the seven planetary spheres). Held by Bonaventure (Sent. II, d. 14), Giles of Rome (Hexaëmeron, pt. 2, ch. 14ff.), Nicholas of Lyra, Tostatus, Cajetan, Catharinus. Bonaventure's rationale (three water-properties: transparency, cold, weight). Marginal gloss: “The opinion of many, that the supercelestial waters are the ninth heaven, commonly called the Crystalline.” Sentence (Bonaventure's quotation) continues onto printed p. 104.

— p. 145 (PDF) · printed p. 104 —

...most of all agrees: for it has likewise a power of cooling, as water has. Wherefore, since the ninth heaven has two of the properties of water, it is not ineptly called by the name of waters.” So he. But it is not difficult to refute that opinion by many and strong arguments. First, according to these men one must admit that Moses, in a very brief narrative, varied the

signification of this word “Water” three times: for when he first said, “And the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters,” these expound by the waters prime matter or a kind of bulky mass; but when he afterward adds, “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters,” by the upper waters they interpret the ninth heaven; and when Moses said, in the third place, “Let the waters that are under heaven be gathered into one place,” these judge that by the name of waters the true element of water is to be understood. Who then — even if he does not see too keenly — does not see that this interpretation is both far from the truth, and makes Moses' narrative faulty and liable to censure, in that it makes him, within a very small interval, by varying the signification of the same word three times, speak too ambiguously and obscurely in a matter so serious and grave? But let us attack this opinion of the Crystalline heaven at close quarters, with the engines of its own [refuting] arguments.

Completes Bonaventure and opens the refutation: this reading forces Moses to use “water” in three different senses within a few lines (prime matter; the ninth heaven; the element water) — making his grave narrative needlessly ambiguous. Marginal gloss: “The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and it is shown that the ninth heaven (called the Crystalline) is not the waters placed above heaven.”

And first, the purpose and design of Moses, who wrote this history for rude Hebrews not capable of the doctrine of invisible things, was assuredly this (as we have more than once remarked before): to recount the origin and first beginnings of this corporeal and visible world, and the creation of all the things which in this world lie open to human senses. But the ninth heaven is utterly invisible, and not only not manifest to the common people, but even unknown to the most learned of the Philosophers and Astrologers down to the times of Hipparchus or Ptolemy. Next, if the ninth heaven, because it is transparent or has a power of cooling, is on that account called water, then by the same reasoning the sphere of Saturn ought to be called water — since the whole of it, except the star Saturn, is pellucid, while the star itself is judged by the Astrologers to be most cold. Further, it is a most absurd manner of speaking, and too far removed from the common usage of speech, to call anything simply “water” that has

either transparency or a cooling power similar to water's: for thus we could call glass, and opium, and lettuce “water.”

Refutation continued: Moses wrote of the visible world for rude Hebrews, but the ninth heaven was invisible and unknown until Hipparchus/Ptolemy; the same logic would make Saturn's (transparent, cold) sphere “water”; and calling a thing “water” for mere transparency or a cooling power would make glass, opium, and lettuce “water” too.

This too is strange: by what reasoning it was ascertained and clearly seen by these men that the ninth heaven is diaphanous and like crystal, since they could not have come to the knowledge of that matter either by the aid of the senses, or by any resources of wit, or by the testimony or warning of any of the noble Philosophers. Surely this was a peculiar invention of those who, since they were persuaded that those waters are above the stars, ingeniously devised that Crystalline heaven in order to avoid the heavier difficulties. But who, I beseech you, of mortals knows whether that ninth heaven is wholly pellucid and transparent throughout, or not? What of the fact that these men think [that ninth heaven to be the prime mobile]...

Refutation continued: there is no way they could know the ninth heaven is crystal-clear (no sense, wit, or authority reaches it) — it was simply invented to escape the difficulties of waters above the stars; and no one even knows whether it is wholly transparent. Sentence continues onto printed p. 105.

— p. 146 (PDF) · printed p. 105 —

...that ninth heaven to be the prime mobile — almost in contradiction to the Mathematicians who lived some three hundred years ago, who say they have ascertained by sure observations that there is another heaven above the ninth, which is truly the prime mobile. Wherefore there are two heavens above the firmament, both mobile and starless: why not transparent too, so that both alike might be called by the name of waters? And as for what Bonaventure adds on his own — that the ninth heaven is rightly named water, although it is not actually cold, because it is strong in a natural power of cooling: this can be proved by no experiment or conjecture, much less by sure reasoning; for since the cooling of the ninth Heaven has been detected by no argument from it, nor indeed can be

detected by anyone, it sufficiently appears that it deserves no belief and is wholly improbable.

Refutation continued: they make the ninth heaven the prime mobile, against the astronomers (~300 years before) who posited a tenth above it as the true prime mobile — so there are two starless, mobile (and presumably transparent) heavens above the firmament. And Bonaventure's claim that the ninth heaven has a natural cooling power is unverifiable and improbable. Marginal gloss: continues from p. 104.

For what things, or by what means, does that Heaven cool? Is it the stars? But Bonaventure denies that they are formally hot — whence it follows that they neither need cooling nor can be affected by it. Or is that cooling exercised not in the Heavens, but in the things that are below the heavens? But first it must be explained by what force and quality the heaven cools, since it is not actually cold. For it stands fixed for Aristotle and the Peripatetics that the Heaven acts upon sublunary things in no other way than by motion and light. Further, that cooling power, since it must pass through the element of fire, would either be wholly corrupted by the fire, or the fire itself would be corrupted by it. It would also have to be that all the loftier places are colder — namely, the nearer they receive that cooling power. And since that heaven is uniform and is wholly moved in a like manner, it would cool all things in a like and equal manner too, which would be very harmful: that this is false experience demonstrates. And these are the things handed down by others concerning the supercelestial waters.

Final blows against the crystalline-heaven view: it cools neither the (non-hot) stars nor sublunary things in any explicable way (heaven acts only by motion and light, per Aristotle); a cooling power crossing the fire would be destroyed; higher places would all be colder; and a uniform heaven would cool everything equally — contrary to experience. This closes the survey of others' opinions.

It remains that we open up and dispatch in few words (for, the opinions of others being refuted, this one thing is left) our own opinion — not indeed first discovered by us, yet approved by us beyond the rest. Its explanation and proof will be the easier and readier because, a little above, when we

treated of the firmament, we showed clearly enough that by the name of firmament in this place Moses meant to signify not the starry heaven, but the aerial space which is diffused on every side around the earth and expanded up to the stars. We therefore judge that the waters which are above the firmament are none other than those which are generated in the upper air, which the philosophers call the middle region of the air. For if the firmament, in this place, is the aerial space which lies open between the earth and the stars, then without doubt it is fitting to interpret the waters which are above the firmament as none other than those which are begotten in the upper part of the air: for thither the vapors raised from earth and waters by the power of the sun are condensed and gathered into clouds, from which the rains, generated, flow down so abundantly and conveniently to water and make fruitful the earth, sometimes with such quantity and force that there seem to be there huge lakes and rivers — nay, even [seas]...

Pererius's own view: since the firmament is the aerial expanse (not the starry heaven), the "waters above the firmament" are simply those generated in the upper air (the philosophers' "middle region") — vapors raised by the sun, condensed into clouds, falling as the rains that water the earth. Marginal gloss: "The author's opinion on the waters that are above the Heavens." Sentence continues onto printed p. 106.

— p. 147 (PDF) · printed p. 106 —

...even seas. Wherefore, that the flood might come about, Scripture relates that the cataracts of heaven were unbarred — by which are signified the densest rains, hurled down with the greatest force and crash. To understanding this pertains what Aristotle hands down in the first book of the Meteorology, third section, chapter one: that between Heaven and earth there is borne through the air a certain huge river, ascending upward and descending downward in perpetual alternation. His words run thus: "One must understand this as a kind of river flowing in a circle, upward and downward, common to air and water: for when the sun is near, the river of vapor flows upward; but when it is far off, the water flows downward. And

he wishes this to happen perennially, in due order. Wherefore, if the ancients spoke obscurely of Ocean, perhaps indeed they meant this river flowing in a circle around the earth." Thus far Aristotle. Similar are the things Solomon teaches in Proverbs 8, when he says, "When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when he made firm the ether above, and balanced the fountains of waters." For that word "ether," in Hebrew it is ■■■■■ (Shechachim), which properly signifies clouds; wherefore the Seventy rendered it in Greek τ■ ■νω ν■φη, that is, the upper mists or clouds. So that what follows, "And he balanced the fountains of waters," is not to be taken of the springs that gush from the earth, but rather of the celestial fountains, which indeed pour out water from the clouds upon the earth. And God is said to have balanced the fountains of waters because, in the high air, he suspends the clouds, from which, as from fountains, he pours out the rains — not without measure, but as if by weighing and with measure, lest a profusion of such waters either too sparing or too lavish should harm the lands. To this looks that passage in Job, chapter twenty-six, "Who binds the waters in his clouds, that they break not out all together downward."

Completes the picture of the rain-bearing upper air (sometimes seeming like lakes/seas, whence the flood's "cataracts"). Aristotle's image of a circular "river" of vapor/water between heaven and earth (Meteorology 1.3, identified with the ancients' "Ocean"); Proverbs 8:27–28 (Hebrew ■■■■■ she■aqim = "clouds," LXX τ■ ■νω ν■φη); the "fountains" are the clouds, balanced and measured by God (Job 26:8). Marginal glosses: "A notable saying of Aristotle"; "The passage of Solomon in Proverbs ch. 8 is explained."

We are therefore content that on the second day the firmament was made — that is, that from that nebulous and watery matter which filled the inner space, when further rarefied, air was made, and, if there is anything above the air, fire. For so many have judged. But it is more likely true, as we said above, that all four elements were made together in the beginning along with the heavens; and that on this second day this space, spread most amply on every side above the earth — which in Hebrew is called ■■■■ (Rachiah), in Greek στερ■ωμα, in Latin firmamentum — according to its

lower part, which the air holds, was made the natural place for the generation of rain-waters, and a most firm and immutable interstice between the celestial (that is, aerial) waters and the terrestrial. This too becomes probable to us, that the middle region of the air, in which the perennial generation of such waters takes place, was then made actually cold — namely, that by its cold it might assist the condensation and congealing of clouds, and from these the production of rains. Unless perhaps someone think that that middle tract of the air is cold of itself, on account of its remoteness, both below and above, from all heat: which, although the Stoics would readily grant — for whom the air is by its own nature cold — must yet be denied against Aristotle, who makes the air by its nature hot and moist. Furthermore, concerning these supercelestial waters, which are above the air (often called “heaven” in Scripture), very many [passages of Scripture]...

Pererius's account of the second day: not the making of air's substance (all four elements were made at the beginning) but the constituting of the firmament's lower part (air) as the natural place of rain-waters and the firm boundary between aerial and terrestrial waters; the middle air-region made actually cold to aid cloud/rain formation (against the Stoics, who hold air cold by nature; with Aristotle, who makes it hot and moist). Marginal gloss: “The middle region of the air was made actually cold at the world's beginning.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 107.

— p. 148 (PDF) · printed p. 107 —

...very many passages of Scripture are most conveniently understood: as when God is said to forbid rains from Heaven, to give rain from Heaven, or to hold it back in heaven, or to shut heaven that it rain not, and again to open it that it rain; when heaven is called rainy or dry; when he is said to cover the higher parts of heaven with waters, or to cover heaven with clouds; and when it is said, that the flood might come, that God opened the cataracts of heaven. In Malachi, chapter three, the Lord says, “If I do not open to you the cataracts of heaven, and pour out for you a blessing even to abundance.” In Jeremiah, chapter ten: “At his voice God gives a multitude of waters in heaven, and raises the mists from the ends of the earth; he makes lightnings into rain, and brings the wind out of his treasures.” The

same statement is set down again by him afterward, in chapter fifty-one.

Scriptural confirmation that "heaven" here = the rain-bearing air: God giving/withholding rain, covering heaven with clouds, opening its "cataracts" for the flood (1/3 Kings 18; Ps. 103/104; Ps. 146/147; Gen. 8); Malachi 3:10; Jeremiah 10:13 (= 51:16). Marginal glosses: "3 Kings 18; Ps. 103; Ps. 146; Gen. 8."

It must not be unknown here that Scripture is wont to proclaim two things, as a kind of great miracle, to declare the omnipotence of God: one is, that God holds the immense mass and weight of the earth suspended over nothing, as Job says in chapter twenty-six, "Who hangs the earth upon nothing," and Isaiah in chapter forty, "He weighs the mass of the earth with three fingers"; the other is, that above heaven — that is, in the high air — he holds in check an infinite force of waters, by whose excessive retention or profusion he could easily destroy the whole globe of the lands. To this looked Job, chapter twenty-six, when he said, "Who binds the waters in his clouds, that they break not out all together downward," and chapter twelve, "If he hold back the waters, all things shall be dried up; and if he send them forth, they shall overturn the earth." And Pliny, in the thirty-first book, chapter one, says, "What is more wonderful than waters standing in the Heaven?"

Two "miracles" by which Scripture proclaims God's omnipotence: hanging the earth on nothing (Job 26:7; Isa. 40:12), and holding the vast waters aloft in the air (Job 26:8; 12:15; Pliny, Natural History 31.1). Marginal gloss: "The two things Scripture is wont to mention to declare God's omnipotence."

These sublime and celestial waters, therefore, since they are manifest and admirable to the common people, it is highly credible that Moses meant to denote in this place; and for the same reason both David, in Psalm one hundred forty-eight, and also those three Hebrew youths, in that Hymn which they sang, untouched, to God amid the very globes of the Babylonian fire, invited these waters to praise God — that is, by the contemplation and admiration of such waters they stirred men to proclaim and celebrate the praises of the Divine power. This opinion concerning the supercelestial waters Augustine greatly commends, in the eleventh book on

Genesis according to the Letter, chapter four, writing thus: “This diligence and consideration I judge most worthy of praise: for what I have said is neither against the faith, and can be believed on a ready proof.” That Blessed Epiphanius was of this opinion can be supposed, since he, in the Epistle which he wrote to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and which was translated into Latin by Jerome, affirms that the waters which are above the heavens were those by whose flowing down upon the earth, the cataracts of heaven being opened, the Noachic flood was caused: but that those waters descended not from the ninth Heaven, but from the air, is certain. Finally, a great confirmation of this our opinion is the refutation, which we set down above, of all those who placed these waters above the celestial spheres. For if they are not above the stars, they can be understood to be nowhere else than above the air...

Moses (and David, Ps. 148:4, and the Three Children, Dan. 3:60) summon these visible, wondrous waters to God's praise. Augustine commends the view (De Genesi ad litteram 11.4); Epiphanius (Ep. to John of Jerusalem, tr. Jerome) makes the supercelestial waters the source of the Flood — which descended from the air, not the ninth heaven. The earlier refutations confirm: if not above the stars, then above the air. Sentence continues onto printed p. 108.

— p. 149 (PDF) · printed p. 108 —

...And although there were some waters above the stars, yet, because those would be most remote from men not only in sense but even in understanding, and notable by no sign or effect, I for my part think that Moses would have passed them over in silence in this place — just as also concerning the Angels he suppressed in silence many things which he could have taught, for the same reason, having undertaken only the description and explanation of this corporeal and visible world, and of those things which fall under the senses of men, or which can be most readily and easily known from the things that are perceived by the senses.

Even granting some waters above the stars, Moses would have passed them over (as he did much about the angels), since his subject is the visible, sensible world.

But there are four things that can be objected to this opinion. The first is that in Psalm 148 it stands thus, “Praise God, you heavens of heavens, and let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord”: by “heavens of heavens,” doubtless, according to the Hebrew idiom, are understood the noblest and most excellent heavens — that is, the starry — which are distinguished by this name from the air; for although Scripture sometimes calls the air “heaven,” it calls it heaven precisely, but never “heaven of heaven” or “heavens of heavens.” Wherefore, when David next adds, “And let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord,” it must surely be taken of the heavens which he had just before called the heavens of heavens. From this place, then, it becomes plain that there are waters above the starry heavens. The second is that in the Hymn of the Three Children all the works of God are recorded, not in disorder, but in such an order that one descends from the highest through the middle to the lowest: in the first place are set the Angels, in the second the heavens, in the third the waters that are above the heavens, in the fourth the sun, moon, and stars; since, therefore, the supercelestial waters are reckoned immediately after the Angels and the heavens, and before all the stars, it is manifest that those waters are placed above the stars. The third is that in the same hymn the waters which are above the heaven, and those which are generated in the upper air, are mentioned distinctly and separately: for before the sun and moon and stars it records the waters that are above the heavens, and somewhat below it enumerates dew, snow, hail, frost, and finally clouds and rains — all of which pertain to the waters that are begotten in the middle region of the air; who, then, does not plainly see that divine Scripture here makes some waters that are above heaven, and others that are generated in the air? The fourth is that the Church, in that hymn which we adduced a little above for the confirmation of the second opinion, not obscurely signifies that the waters are placed above heaven to cool and temper the heat of the stars — which those words indicate, “That the wave may temper the flames, lest [the waters] dissolve the earth's soil.”

The four objections to Pererius's view: (1) Ps. 148:4 places the waters above the "heavens of heavens" (= the starry heavens, never the air); (2) the Canticle of the Three Children (Dan. 3) lists them, in descending order, after angels/heavens but before the stars; (3) the same hymn lists the supercelestial waters separately from dew/snow/hail/clouds/rain (the mid-air waters); (4) the Church's hymn ("Immense caeli conditor") sets them above heaven to temper the stars' heat. Marginal gloss: "Four objections are resolved. What the 'heavens of heavens' are."

But to refute these there is need of neither a laborious nor a long discourse. The first is solved thus: Let us grant that by "heavens of heavens" are signified the starry heavens, or rather the empyrean heaven, which is in some singular way the seat of God (certainly it is the dwelling of all the blessed, both Angels and men); we deny, nevertheless, that when it is added ["And the waters that are above the heavens"]...

Begins the reply to objection 1: granting "heavens of heavens" = the starry (or empyrean) heaven, Pererius will deny that the appended "waters above the heavens" refers to those heavens. Sentence continues onto printed p. 109.

— p. 150 (PDF) · printed p. 109 —

..."And the waters that are above the heavens," David was speaking of the aforesaid heavens, but only of the aerial ones: for he did not say, "And the waters that are above the Heavens of Heavens," but said precisely, "Which are above the Heavens." Nor let it move anyone that Scripture says in the plural that the waters are above the Heavens, as though this did not befit the air: for this is said by the custom of the Hebrew tongue, as we taught before, in which "heaven" lacks a singular — just as among the Latins Athenae, Syracusae, Venetiae.

Reply to objection 1 completed: David said "above the Heavens," not "above the Heavens of Heavens" — so the aerial heavens are meant; the plural "Heavens" is merely the Hebrew idiom (heaven has no singular), like the plural-only Latin Athenae/Syracusae/Venetiae.

To the second it must be answered in this way: that that argument drawn from the disposition and order in which the works of God are numbered in that hymn is futile; for if there the supercelestial waters are placed before the stars, in Psalm one hundred forty-eight the same waters are mentioned

after the stars. Moreover, in the same Hymn of the Three Children, dew, frost, snow, ice, and cold are recounted earlier, but day and night, light and darkness later — whereas these, if that order had been kept, ought to have been placed first. Euthymius certainly, expounding that Canticle, advises that the creatures are recounted in it in no order, since the earth, which was made together with the heavens before all else, is mentioned after many other things.

Reply to objections 2 & 3: the hymn's order proves nothing — Ps. 148 reverses it (waters after the stars), and the hymn itself is disordered (dew/frost before day/night; the earth, made first, listed late). Euthymius (Zigabenus) notes the Canticle recounts creatures in no order.

The third is to be dissolved thus: Scripture wished first to name universally and in common the waters that are generated in the high air, saying, “And the waters that are above the heavens,” and then to recount one by one, as it were, all the species of such waters — as are hail, snow, and the rest: which manner of narrating and teaching is frequent in the sacred writings.

Reply to objection 3 (developed): the hymn first names the upper-air waters in general (“waters above the heavens”), then their species (hail, snow, etc.) one by one — a common scriptural manner.

Let this be the solution of the fourth: the Church in that hymn speaks of the waters that come to be in the aerial heaven; and by these she says the heat and burning of the stars is tempered — not indeed the heat which is in the stars themselves, but that heat which befalls the earth from the stars. For unless the earth were frequently watered, cooled, and made fruitful by rains, dew, frost, snow, and clouds, without doubt, too much dried up and scorched by the heat of the stars — and most of all of the sun — it would become wholly sterile; and this is plainly signified by those words, “That the wave may temper the flames, lest [the waters] dissolve the earth's soil.”

Reply to objection 4: the Church's hymn speaks of the aerial (rain) waters, which temper not the stars' own heat but the heat the stars cast upon the earth — without which watering the earth would be scorched sterile.

But now it is time that we should at last, in this place, bring to an end this disputation concerning the supercelestial waters — which, on account of its great obscurity and the variety of opinions, it was necessary to draw out longer than we should have wished.

Closes the disputation on the supercelestial waters, and with it the commentary on the work of the second day. (The section on the third day, “Opus Tertii Diei,” begins on printed p. 110 / PDF 151.)

— p. 151 (PDF) · printed p. 110 —

The Work of the Third Day.

Section heading (centered) introducing the commentary on the third day of creation.

God said: Let the waters that are under the Heaven be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear. And it was so done. And God called the dry land Earth, and the gatherings of the waters he called Seas. — Verse 9.

Genesis 1:9–10, the lemma for the section on the third day.

The author of the fourth book of Esdras, in chapter six, teaches that on this third day the waters were gathered into the seventh part of the earth, while the remaining six parts of the earth, bared and dried of the waters, were assigned to the production of plants and to the uses of animals: which, if it were true, would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the earth is much larger than the water. Basil, in the fourth homily on the Hexaëmeron, hands down that by this command of God there was implanted in the waters a natural force and propensity to flow down to the sloping and lowest places. Ambrose, following Basil, as is his wont, writes to the same effect thus: “From that time, therefore, water runs; springs glide into rivers, lakes are drawn off into seas: the water goes before itself, presses on, and follows: there is one channel, one body.” So Ambrose. But since such a force of tending downward is no less natural to water than its coldness and weight, it must surely have been engendered in it as soon as the water was created. But perhaps Basil and Ambrose meant nothing other than that on the third

day the water first unfolded and exerted the power, which from the beginning it had held hidden, of sliding down to the lower and more depressed places.

Opening views on the third day: 4 Ezra (2 Esdras) 6:42 (waters gathered into a seventh of the earth — implying earth > water); Basil (Hexaëmeron hom. 4) and Ambrose, that the command gave water its downward tendency — which Pererius corrects (that tendency is natural, born with the water; they mean only that on day three it first exercised it). Marginal gloss: "Whether water is less than earth."

Many, and not of the common sort, think that on this third day the earth was created: for by the earth, which Moses says was created in the beginning, they interpret not the element of earth, but a certain unformed matter. This opinion seems to have pleased Augustine in the first book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter thirteen, and in the first book on Genesis against the Manichees, chapter twelve, and in the unfinished book on Genesis, chapter ten; it pleased also the Master of the Sentences, and Hugh of St. Victor in the first book On the Sacraments, and Blessed Bonaventure (where he also holds that water was created on this day); and Tostatus, in this place, says it is the common opinion that on this day the four elements were created according to their proper forms and affections. But this opinion we refuted above. And indeed Moses' own words refute it: for on this third day God did not say, "Let earth be made," as he had said before of light and the firmament, but said only, "Let the dry land appear" — that is, the earth, which be[fore was submerged]...

The view that earth (= elemental earth, or the four elements) was created on day three, reading the "earth" of v. 1 as unformed matter (Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. 1.13; c. Manich. 1.12; imperf. 10; Lombard; Hugh; Bonaventure; Tostatus). Pererius rejects it (already refuted): Moses says not "Let earth be made" but "Let the dry land appear." Marginal gloss: "Who think the earth was founded on the third day." Sentence continues onto printed p. 111.

— p. 152 (PDF) · printed p. 111 —

...before was submerged and covered by the waters, and which, according to the natural disposition of the elements, ought to have been beneath the waters, is nonetheless, for the sake of living things, bared of the waters and

dried, and stands out above the waters. Basil holds that all the water which was in the earth, whether outside or within, was utterly separated from it. “Not only,” he says, “did the overflowing waters then flow down from the surface of the earth, but whatever waters were mingled throughout the whole depth of the earth went out, obeying the inexorable commands of God.” But let no one think that Basil is speaking also of the watery moisture by which the earth holds together, as if by glue, and without which it would dissolve into the finest dust. Philo says that whatever water was then salt — bound to be harmful to the fertility of the earth — flowed together into one place on the third day, the sweet moisture being left in the earth, both as a glue for the cementing of the earth (lest it be scattered into dust), and for the benefit of plants and animals. But since before the third day that whole body of water was of one nature, and endowed in every part with like qualities, it could not have had some parts salt and others sweet.

Completes the point: the dry land “appears” (it was already submerged earth). Basil — all water, surface and internal, withdrew (but not, Pererius notes, the binding moisture). Philo (De mundi opificio) — the salt (sterile) water gathered off, sweet moisture left as the earth's “glue.” Pererius objects: before day three the water was uniform, so it could not have had salt and sweet parts. Marginal gloss: “Philo, in the book On the Making of the World.”

But a question arises here: if before the third day the water covered the whole earth on every side, by what means could it, on the third day, be gathered wholly into one place of the earth? This question is solved in many ways, of which Augustine, in the first book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter twelve, and Bede in the Hexaëmeron, hand down the first two, and afterward almost everyone followed these. First, it can be said that the water was before rarer and thinner, and, in the manner of nebulous matter, covered the earth; but afterward, much compressed and condensed, it needed a smaller place and receptacle. Next, it can be answered that then the earth subsided deeply in many parts, and in very many others, raised on high, swelled up, and that great concavities of the earth and deep valleys and lofty mountains were made, which places were the receptacles of those waters; for before the third day the earth was

equally compacted and globed into a sphere. One must therefore consider that, when God said “Let the waters be gathered into one place,” there were made, by God's power, very many parts of the earth, quite depressed and concave, into which so great a mass of that water could flow together and be received. To this understanding the Hebrew word ■■■ (Kava) conduces, which here stands for the Latin verb “Let them be gathered”; for it properly signifies a chasm and a deep, concave place — whence perhaps it came about that the Latins too, imitating the Hebrews, called such places “cava” [hollows]. And to me indeed it seems that David wonderfully declared what I have taught, in Psalm one hundred three: for that the water was from the beginning poured out on every side over the earth he showed by these words, “The deep, like a garment, is its clothing; above the mountains the waters shall stand”; that is, in the beginning the earth was, as it were, clad and covered by waters of such height that they could exceed the loftiness of any mountains whatever. Then, expressing the divine command by which it was said “Let the waters [be gathered into one place]”...

The question — how the all-covering water gathered into one place — with the first two solutions (Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. 1.12; Bede): the water was rarefied, then condensed to need less room; and the earth subsided/swelled to make valleys and mountains as basins. The Hebrew ■■■ (qavah, “to gather”) properly means a chasm/hollow (Pererius's pun on Latin cava). Psalm 103(104):6: the deep once clothed the earth above the mountains. Marginal glosses: “The question, how the water that first covered the whole earth was, on the third day, reduced to one place”; “The passage of Psalm 103 is explained.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 112.

— p. 153 (PDF) · printed p. 112 —

...the waters into one place,” expressing the incredible force and efficacy [of the command], he adds, “At thy rebuke they shall flee; at the voice of thy thunder they shall be afraid.” Then he subjoins by what means God prepared a place and receptacle capable of so great a mass of water, where the waters, shut up as in a kind of prison, might be confined, lest they should again overwhelm and cover the whole earth: “The mountains,” he says, “ascend, and the plains descend, into the place which thou hast

founded for them: thou hast set a bound which they shall not pass, nor shall they return to cover the earth.” Similar is what Aristotle hands down in the first book of the Meteorology, that one globular body is formed of water and earth, and that the whole element of water is contained in the concavities of the earth itself.

Continues Psalm 103(104):7–9 (the waters flee at God's rebuke; mountains rise, plains sink; a bound is set). Aristotle (Meteorology 1): earth and water form one globe, the water held in earth's hollows.

From which one may understand that the opinion of certain men is false, who think the earth before the flood was wholly and evenly round, with no inequality of higher and lower places, but that after the flood this distinction of mountains and valleys which we see in the earth arose. But how, before the flood, was the Ocean held back, lest, poured out, it should inundate the earth? Is it not a manifest refutation of this opinion that, below in the seventh chapter of this book, it is written that “the waters of the flood overtopped all the mountains of the earth by fifteen cubits”? If from the beginning of the world there were no mountains, why does Scripture call them “the eternal mountains”? Why, in Solomon, Proverbs 8, did divine Wisdom, to show her antiquity, say that she existed before the mountains were settled in their heavy mass? And what of the fact that the inequality of the earth's parts, and the distinction of mountains and valleys, wonderfully contributes to the beauty, adornment, and convenience of the earth — in respect of its being the parent of plants and the dwelling of living things? It contributes also to the healthfulness of the air, to fertility, to the ripening of fruits, to breaking the assaults of the sea, and to restraining the fury of the winds. Finally, it conduces to the generation of springs and rivers, which mostly have their origin from the mountains. Wherefore David sings in harmony, “Who sendest forth springs in the valleys: between the midst of the mountains the waters shall pass.” But if the earth were evenly round on every side, rivers could not break forth from it and run down to various and far-off places: for water cannot flow down unless the place of its origin is either higher than, or at least equal to, the place whence it bursts forth; for

water rises only to the height of its origin. And if the earth were wholly spherical, since the water must break forth from a subterranean place and rise from there, it could surely never burst outward, but that the place of its origin would always be lower than the place of its gushing and eruption.

Refutes the view that the earth was perfectly round (no mountains) before the Flood: the Flood overtopped mountains by 15 cubits (Gen. 7:20); Scripture calls them "eternal" (Ps. 75/76) and prior to Wisdom's settling (Prov. 8:25); mountains serve beauty, climate, fruits, breakwaters, wind-breaks, and the springs/rivers (Ps. 104:10) which need higher ground to flow from. Marginal glosses: "Whether the distinction of mountains and valleys existed before the flood"; "Ps. 75; Ps. 103."

Rupert beautifully declares this very thing, in the first book On the Trinity and Its Works, chapter thirty-four. "What need was there," he says, "for the same dry land — that is, the earth — that the mountains should ascend and the plains descend into the place which thou hast founded for them? Here, plainly, this must be known: that if the earth lay everywhere level, no lighter a storm of winds would reign in it than upon the sea. For even now, in those places that lack mountains (namely, most of all in Libya), a storm, no less than on the open sea, is wont to throw into confusion any caught abroad in it, both [those on foot and those sitting on horseback]..."

Begins Rupert's praise (De Trinitate, bk. 1, ch. 34) of the making of mountains and valleys: without mountains, wind-storms would rage over the land as on the sea (e.g. in Libya). Sentence continues onto printed p. 113.

— p. 154 (PDF) · printed p. 113 —

...both those on foot and those sitting on horseback. For where, over level and bare places, a rising wind has stirred up the sand from the ground, it, driven with great force, fills the mouths and eyes, and so hinders progress and walking that in no sea does a greater shipwreck come about. What if no mountains had anywhere risen, if the whole earth had sunk into a plain? If, where the winds are permitted to run only a little, they gather such force in a short space, what could they do if they had no barrier in the whole world? Therefore neither ought this to have been wanting to the praises of the magnificent God, that the mountains ascend and the plains descend into the

place which he founded for them: founded, I say, namely so that neither the mountains, once bidden to ascend, should descend, nor the plains, once depressed, should rise up. When thus the founder of the earth drove away the deep, which was like a garment, its clothing, by the same power he poured out abroad a fitting supply of waters. For the waters did not so flee at his rebuke and gather into one place, that this [dry land], appearing, should thus be cast forth from the womb of the deep like an abortion; but, drawing the waters unceasingly into all its veins, it sucks the deep's abundant breast, and receives the early and the late rain from heaven, which ascends through the clouds and falls again. It is nourished within by the sweetening waters, watered without from the waters above it; likewise springs gush, streams flow. Praising which likewise, the Psalmist says, “Who sendest forth springs in the valleys: between the midst of the mountains the waters shall pass.” And so also Ecclesiastes, considering the origin of the flowing waters, says, “All the rivers enter into the sea, and the sea does not overflow. Why? Namely, because nothing flows in thither except what is taken from it again in the aforesaid ways.” So Rupert.

Completes Rupert's passage: mountains as wind-breaks (Libya's sandstorms), founded immovably; the dry land draws up the deep's waters and the rains (Ps. 104:10), so the rivers run to the sea without its overflowing (Eccles. 1:7). Marginal glosses: “Ps. 103; Eccles. 1.”

Hugh too, in the first book On the Sacraments, part one, chapters 6 and 21, judges that the earth was made from the beginning with all the cavities and beds which were thereafter to be the receptacles of the waters; but it is more probable that the elements were founded from the beginning according to their natural constitution befitting them, as they are parts of the universe — that is, that they were of spherical figure, and one contained by another. In a third way it can be answered to the question set down above, that the water, which before was poured around the whole earth, was on the third day so compressed into one place that, raised to the greatest height, it swelled up exceedingly high. This answer is handed down, and most of all approved, by Basil, Ambrose, and Catharinus on this

place, and by blessed Thomas in the First Part, question sixty-nine, and by Dionysius the Carthusian. Nevertheless this third answer, given to the foregoing question, has a grave and arduous question, treated among the learned men of our time not without zeal and care: Whether the sea — which is the gathering of the waters made by God on the third day — is higher than the earth is? Which question it has seemed to us neither to be passed over in silence, nor to be treated carelessly and inaccurately, especially since it is in good part engaged in the treatment and explanation of the divine writings. There have been many — and, foremost, grave and noble Theologians, both of the ancients and of the moderns — who held an admirable opinion concerning the site of the sea and water, appointed to it by God when he said to the waters, “Let the water be gathered into one place, and let the dry land appear”...

Hugh's view (earth made with all its basins) yielded to the more probable one (the elements made spherical, one within another). The third answer to the gathering-question — the water was heaped up to a great height on day three (Basil, Ambrose, Catharinus, Aquinas ST I q. 69, Denys the Carthusian) — leads to the famous controverted question: is the sea higher than the earth? Marginal glosses: “Hugh of St. Victor”; “Whether the sea is higher than the earth.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 114.

— p. 155 (PDF) · printed p. 114 —

...an opinion: for they think that the water of the sea is much higher than the earth is, and that it is held back by God's command alone, lest, flowing down to the lower places to which it naturally inclines, it should cover and overwhelm the whole earth. For these men hold it persuaded and certain to themselves that the mass of water is far greater than the earth, since it is a higher and nobler element, which according to the natural order ought to enfold and contain the whole globe of the earth; and that it is a rarer and thinner body, and therefore greater in bulk; and that it is found by manifest experiment that from a little earth much more water is generated; indeed, some have thought — and Aristotle indicated, in the second book On Generation and Corruption — that water is ten times larger than earth. If, then, the water is far greater than the earth, since it is contained within the

hollow and deep parts of the earth, it must — not being greater in extension — be greater in height and elevation. But let us set out both the authors and the supports of this opinion.

The opinion that the sea is higher than the earth, held back only by God's command. Its premise: water is far bigger than earth (a superior, rarer element; from a little earth much water is generated; Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 2, says water is ten times earth) — so, confined to earth's hollows, it must stand higher. Pererius will give its authors and proofs (then refute it).

Basil, in the fourth homily on the Hexaëmeron, confirms that the sea is higher than the earth by the argument of the Red Sea, with which Sesostris, king of Egypt, and Darius, king of the Persians, attempted to join the Egyptian sea: “Which,” he says, “they surely would not have attempted, unless they had ascertained that the Red Sea was higher than the land of Egypt.” But in the recounting of this history Basil seems to have slipped in memory, or an error to have crept into his writings from elsewhere: for Pliny relates, in the sixth book, chapter twenty-nine, that those kings wished to join not the Egyptian sea, but the river Nile, with the Red Sea, and desisted from the undertaking out of fear of inundation, the Red Sea being found higher by three cubits than the land of Egypt; or rather because they feared lest, the Nile water being let into the sea — which alone furnishes the Egyptians their drink — it should be spoiled. Aristotle too hints at this at the end of the first book of the Meteorology. Strabo, in the seventeenth book, narrating the same history, says: “That work was nearly completed, yet was abandoned by Darius the First, persuaded by a false opinion; for he was persuaded that the Red Sea was higher than Egypt, whence, if the intervening Isthmus were cut through, Egypt would be overwhelmed by the sea; the Ptolemaic kings, however, cutting it, made a closed channel [Euripus], so that, when they wished, they might sail into the outer sea, and again return without danger.” So Strabo. Wherefore that the Red Sea is higher than the land of Egypt is established to be false, both by the authority of Strabo and by the experiment made by the kings of Egypt; although, even granting it, what these men intend is still not effected: for it could happen that the Red Sea was not higher than the land

immediately continuous and adjacent to it, but than a more remote land which bordered more on Egypt. Nevertheless Basil is agreed with by blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question sixty-nine, article one, and by Catharinus, in his Commentary on this place of Genesis.

Basil's proof (Hexaëmeron hom. 4): Sesostris and Darius wouldn't have tried to join the Red Sea unless it were higher than Egypt. Pererius corrects this from Pliny (6.29 — they meant to join the Nile, and feared inundation / spoiling the Nile water), Aristotle (Meteor. 1, end), and Strabo (17 — Darius abandoned it on a false belief; the Ptolemies built a lock-canal). So it is false, and anyway proves nothing. Yet Aquinas (ST I q. 69, a. 1) and Catharinus side with Basil.

And that opinion is confirmed by certain testi[monies] of Scripture...

Introduces the scriptural testimonies adduced for the "sea is higher than the earth" view. Sentence continues onto printed p. 115.

— p. 156 (PDF) · printed p. 115 —

...testimonies. The first testimony is David's, in Psalm one hundred three: "Above the mountains," he says, "the waters shall stand," that is, the water will be higher and loftier than any mountains of the earth. The second is the same author's, in Psalm thirty-two: "Gathering the waters of the sea as in a vessel," or, as it is in the Hebrew, "Gathering the waters of the Sea as a heap or pile." Like which is that in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-nine: "At his word the water stood like a heap"; and that in the Prayer of King Manasses: "Thou hast bound the sea by the word of thy command, and hast shut up the deep, and sealed it by thy praiseworthy and terrible name." The third is that from Psalm sixty-eight: "I am come into the depth of the sea," from which it is understood that the sea is higher in comparison with the earth. They also argue that this is most agreeable to the sacred writings in this way: Wherever Scripture speaks of the situation of the sea, it magnifies and proclaims, as a kind of miracle and a most clear argument of God's omnipotence, that the sea does not pour itself out over the lands and cover and overwhelm them all; which surely would be no wonder, if the sea were not higher than the earth. And this is made clearer by the very words of Scripture set down. Jeremiah, chapter five: "Will you

not then fear me?" says the Lord. "Who set the sand a bound to the sea, an everlasting precept which it shall not pass; and they shall be moved and shall not prevail, and its waves shall swell and shall not pass over it." Proverbs 8: "He set," it says, "a law for the waters, that they should not pass their bounds." In Psalm one hundred three: "Thou hast set a bound which they shall not pass, nor shall they return to cover the earth." But more brilliantly Job, chapter thirty-eight: "Who," says the Lord, "shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing from the womb? I surrounded it with my bounds, and set a bar and doors, and said: Thus far shalt thou come, and shalt go no further, and here shalt thou break thy swelling waves."

The scriptural testimonies for the sea standing higher than the earth: Ps. 103(104):6; Ps. 32(33):7 (Heb. "as a heap"); Sir. 39:22 (al. 39:17); the Prayer of Manasses; Ps. 68(69):2(?); and the "bounds set to the sea" passages (Jer. 5:22; Prov. 8:29; Ps. 104:9; Job 38:8–11) — read as miracles only if the sea is higher. Marginal glosses: "The testimonies of Scripture by which water seems to be proved higher than earth"; "2 Paralipomenon [Chronicles], at the end" (the Prayer of Manasses).

But on the contrary Cajetan, agreeing with the Philosophers and Astrologers (and who would not agree with those who teach things so clear, ascertained, and certain?), laughing at this opinion on this place of Genesis, says: "If anyone doubts that the earth which appears outside the waters is higher than the waters, he needs not so much reasoning as the application of his senses: for we see that the motion of water always takes place toward the lower place, and the rivers run down through the land into the sea; and if it were higher than the land, it would surely flow down necessarily into it, as into a lower and humbler place; for to say that the sea is held by God's omnipotence lest it flow down upon the land is foolish and the mark of childish ignorance, to posit so great and so perpetual a miracle without cause." Scripture too seems to refute that opinion, since it says that those who seek the sea from the land "descend," as in Psalm 106: "They that go down to the sea in ships." Certainly without a great miracle the water — which by its own nature is heavier than air, and is fluid and slippery — cannot so stand that its parts higher than the earth do not fall

down to it, as the parts of the earth eminent above the air can stand (namely, on account of the firmness of its parts and their solid connection among themselves). And what of the fact that the water is round, and that one globe is formed of water and earth, is proved by both physical and Mathematical arguments evi[dently]...

Cajetan (with the natural philosophers and astronomers) ridicules the view: sense shows water always flows downward (rivers run down to the sea), so to keep the sea up by a perpetual causeless miracle is childish; Scripture says men "go down" to the sea (Ps. 106/107:23). Water, fluid and heavier than air, cannot stand higher than earth without a miracle; and water + earth form one round globe (provable physically and mathematically). Marginal gloss: "Cajetan refutes the aforesaid opinion, and rightly." Sentence continues onto printed p. 116.

— p. 157 (PDF) · printed p. 116 —

...dently? This too daily experience demonstrates. For if the sea were higher than the earth, with an equal force and impulse of winds or oars, the same ship would be borne much more swiftly when heading toward the harbor or shore than when departing from the harbor or shore: for in departing from the shore it would ascend, and, struggling up a steep and rising slope, would have a more difficult progress; whereas, on the contrary, approaching the shore, as though descending a slippery incline, it would be borne along with great speed and force; indeed, the more the ship departed from the harbor, the better it would be seen by those who are in the harbor or on the shore, inasmuch as it would be ascending more and more always into a higher place: which, however, happens contrariwise.

A further proof from daily experience: if the sea were higher than the land, a ship would sail faster inbound than outbound, and would grow more (not less) visible as it left harbor — both contrary to fact.

In order to avoid these difficulties, Paul of Burgos fell into another opinion even more absurd. For thus he writes, in his first addition to the postil of Nicholas of Lyra on this place of Genesis, that at the beginning of the world the element of water was created by God poured around and concentric with the earth; but afterward, on the third day, for the benefit

and use of plants and living things, the water was so separated from the earth that the water made its own globe, distinct from the globe of the earth, and having a center other than the earth and the center of the world: not indeed so that the globe of water was wholly outside the globe of earth, but so that it intersected it in some part. By how great an interval the center of the earth and the center of the water are distant from each other, he says cannot be comprehended by any sure and ascertained reckoning; but it can be supposed, by probable conjecture, that the center of the water is the same as the center of the eccentric orb of the moon — because the water, as is established by many arguments and experiments, follows the motion of the moon, especially in the ebb and flow. Burgos adds that the water, made at the beginning of the world, since it was concentric with the earth, had then a natural force and propensity of tending to the center of the earth and of the world; but that the same water, afterward on the third day separated from the earth, having laid aside its former propensity, received another far different, by which it naturally inclines not to the center of the earth and the world, but to the center of that globe which the water made its own when separated from the lands — to which center all the waters, wherever they are, from that time until now, have their natural propensity and motion.

Paul of Burgos's alternative (in his Additiones to Lyra): the water forms its own globe with a center distinct from the earth's/world's (conjecturally the center of the moon's eccentric, since tides follow the moon), only partly intersecting the earth-globe; and on day three the water exchanged its natural pull toward the world-center for a pull toward its own globe's center. Marginal gloss: "The absurd opinion of Paul of Burgos."

Burgos greatly praises and exalts this device of his; which, however, if anyone consider it attentively, he will recognize to be an empty and futile fabrication. In the first place, the chief foundation and support both of this opinion and of the one we treated just before is that the water is far greater than the earth: which is false — and, on the contrary, that the earth is much greater than the water — Alexander Piccolomini shows by manifest and firm reasons in the book he published in the Italian tongue, On the Quantity of Earth and Water; and the same Julius Scaliger demonstrated briefly, but

acutely and learnedly, in the work of Exoteric Exercitations, which he wro[te]...

Refutation of Burgos begins: both his view and the previous one rest on water > earth, which is false — earth is much bigger, as Alessandro Piccolomini (Della grandezza della terra et dell'acqua) and Julius Caesar Scaliger (Exotericae exercitationes, against Cardano) show. Marginal glosses: "Burgos is refuted"; "Who have taught that earth is greater than water." Sentence continues onto printed p. 117.

— p. 158 (PDF) · printed p. 117 —

...wrote against Cardano, in the thirty-ninth exercitation. These authors being indicated, lest, by treating matters foreign to our purpose, we be longer than we wish to be, we will refrain from rehearsing their arguments. But these men seem neither to care much for philosophy nor to make much of the Mathematicians — by whom, however, it is concluded by no doubtful reasons that of water and earth one globe is made, whose center of gravity and of magnitude is the same as the center of the earth and of the world, into which all the weights, both of earth and of water, fallen from on high, are borne directly. But it is argument enough for the refutation of those opinions that their authors can defend them, and extricate themselves, in no other way than by fleeing to miracles — which Philosophers and Theologians judge are not to be introduced and admitted without great reason and necessity, but especially in the creation of the world and in the first institution and ordering of all things, in which it is most agreeable to reason to believe that God founded, disposed, and placed all things suitably to their several natures. Against these men, too, that statement of blessed Augustine, in the seventh book, chapter 30, of the City of God, has much force: "So," says Augustine, "does God administer all the things he created, that he also lets them exercise and perform their own motions." And now, what kind of thing is that which Burgos said — that the water before the third day had a different natural propensity and motion, and a different center, than it had after the third day, when it was separated from the earth? For from this it would necessarily follow that the water before

the third day was different in species from the water after the third day. For if the center is different, the motion different, and the natural propensity different, it is also necessary that the gravity of each water was different, and its nature different. But why do we argue this superfluously by reasonings, when it is plain by the sure judgment of the senses and by manifest experiments? For it is established that the weights of the earth, and likewise of the water too, when dropped from above, are borne directly and perpendicularly to the earth and to the center of the world.

Refutation completed: the mathematicians prove earth and water make one globe with a single center of gravity (= the world's center), toward which all weights fall perpendicularly. These authors can only defend their views by needless miracles — disallowed in creation (Augustine, City of God 7.30: God lets created things exercise their own motions). And Burgos's view absurdly makes the water change its nature/species on day three. Marginal gloss: "Miracles are not to be resorted to rashly."

But next let us teach how the testimonies of Scripture, set down above for the confirmation of that opinion, are to be interpreted and taken. The first testimony was that one, "Above the mountains the waters shall stand," which surely does not help their cause: for it is expounded in various ways. Some think David is speaking of the situation of the water when, at the beginning of the world, it covered the earth on every side higher than is the height of the mountains. Nor does it stand in the way that it is said in the future, "shall stand": for so it is said for "stood" or "were standing," after the manner of the Hebrews, who are wont to use the future for the perfect or imperfect past. Others think that by those words are described the stormy waves of the sea, which, when some great tempest has arisen, seem to swell up and be raised above the height of the mountains — as David says in psalm 106, "They mount up to the heavens, and they go down to the depths." Nor are there lacking those who think those words look to the ori[gin]...

Pererius begins re-interpreting the scriptural proofs. "Above the mountains the waters shall stand" (Ps. 104:6) doesn't prove the sea is higher: it may describe the primeval all-covering water (the future "shall stand" = a Hebrew past), or the storm-tossed waves that seem to rise above the mountains (Ps. 107:26). Marginal gloss: "The passage of Psalm 103 is explained." Sentence continues onto printed

p. 118.

— p. 159 (PDF) · printed p. 118 —

...the source and welling-up of many springs and lakes, which are found on the highest ridges of the loftiest mountains. That saying of David could likewise be understood of the rain-waters, which are generated above the mountains in the middle region of the air. The second testimony, drawn from Psalm 32, and from chapter 39 of Ecclesiasticus, and from the Prayer of King Manasses, profits these men's cause not at all. For in those places Scripture does not designate the natural situation of the sea and the waters, but describes two most celebrated miracles, of which the one happened earlier in the Red Sea, the other later (forty years afterward, namely) in the river Jordan, the waters being raised on high and standing still, so that a safe and easy passage might lie open for the Hebrews. For David sings of like miracles in Psalm 77. It can also be understood of the sea-water, which is so shut up and confined by God in those its receptacles, as one shuts up a little water in a wineskin. Nor do those words of David in psalm 68, “I am come into the depth of the sea,” tell against us: for that by “the depth of the sea” in that place is signified its profundity, the preceding and following words demonstrate. For thus it is there: “I am stuck fast in the mire of the deep, and there is no sure standing. I am come into the depth of the sea, and the tempest has overwhelmed me. Rescue me out of the mire, that I sink not. Deliver me out of the deep waters. Let not the tempest of water drown me, nor the deep swallow me up.” Furthermore, that Scripture says the waters are confined by God's command, and held back lest they overflow the earth, does not argue that they are higher than the earth and are miraculously restrained lest they flow down to overwhelm it; but indicates that the waters were so created by God and placed in such places that they cannot go out to cover the earth.

Pererius finishes re-reading the “sea is higher” proof-texts: Ps. 104:6–10 may mean mountain-springs or rain; Ps. 33:7, Sir. 39, the Prayer of Manasses describe the Red Sea and Jordan miracles (cf. Ps. 77/78), or water shut up “as in a wineskin”; Ps. 69:3 “depth of the sea” = its

profundity (from the context); and the "bounds set to the sea" mean only that God placed the waters so they cannot escape — not that they stand higher, miraculously held. Marginal glosses: "The passage of Psalm 32 and Ecclesiasticus 39"; "The passage of Psalm 68"; "The aforesaid passage of Jeremiah ch. 5 and Job 38 is explained."

Therefore, because God implanted in the waters a force and propensity to remain in the lower places; because God made in the earth depressed and concave places and provided them to be receptacles of the waters; because God on the third day separated the water from the earth and forced it into the aforesaid places; because God set and opposed against the waters the great obstacles of crags, mountains, and shores, and so shut them in, as it were by a kind of rampart, that they cannot flow out from their place to inundate the earth: for all these causes God is said to have given a command to the waters, that they should not go out from their place. And the natural forces and faculties of things, by which each operates suitably to its nature — since they are implanted in them by God, the author of all nature, that they may operate according to them — are wont to be called in Scripture the laws and commands of God; wherefore Job says that God commands the sun to rise and set, and has prescribed for the light the way by which it proceeds. But on this question what has hitherto been disputed may suffice.

The sense of "God's command to the waters": God gave them their downward tendency, made the basins, gathered them on day three, and walled them in — these are why Scripture calls the bounds a "command." A thing's natural powers ARE God's "laws/commands" (Job 9:7 — God bids the sun rise and set). Marginal gloss: "Job 9."

Let us return to the first question set down above: how the water, which before covered the earth on every side, and was therefore much greater than the earth itself, could be forced into one place of the earth. We set out three ways of answering, but rejected and threw out the third. There are still two other ways, very probable, either of which, joined with [the second set out above]...

Returns to the original question (how the all-covering water gathered into one place): of the three earlier answers the third was rejected; two more probable ways remain, to be joined with the second.

Marginal gloss: “How the water that first covered the whole earth was, on the third day, forced into one part of the earth.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 119.

— p. 160 (PDF) · printed p. 119 —

...with the second set out above, renders the matter plain and easy both to understand and to believe. For it can be said that the water before had a density naturally suited to it, just as it had both its situation and its figure; but that on the third day it was, for the greatest part, more condensed, and so could be contained in a smaller place. This opinion is given credence by the sea itself, which is the element of water, and which is denser and coarser than any other water; and so the density which the water now naturally generated has — as that of springs, rivers, rains — is the density which naturally belongs to water, which is less than the density of the sea. This too could be answered: although the water was before greater than the earth in extension and circumference, because it enfolded it, yet it was much less in height or depth: for the height of the earth, from the center to the surface, was much greater than the height of the water, from the surface of the earth to its outermost surface. For it is likely that God created and extended over the earth just so much water as could afterward be conveniently contained in the receptacles of the earth. One may take a conjecture from the air, which remained in the same way as it had been created; whose height, however, from the earth to the extreme of the third region, does not reach sixty miles, as the Mathematicians prove, both from the reckoning of the twilights and from the height of things appearing in the supreme region of the air — whereas the height of the earth, from the center to the circumference, which is its semidiameter, contains 3,500 miles.

The two probable answers (with the second): (a) the water was condensed on day three, so it took less room (the sea is denser than other water); (b) though the water exceeded the earth in extent/circumference, it was far less in depth — God made only as much water as the basins could hold (the air's height is < 60 miles, the earth's semidiameter 3,500). Marginal gloss: “The thickness of the earth is greater than that of water or air.”

This too is brought into doubt: how it is true, what Moses says in this place, that all the waters were gathered into one place — since we see the places of the waters to be so diverse and so far apart, in so many seas, rivers, lakes, and marshes, that some seem joined by no communication among themselves. To this the answer is brief and ready: that “Into one place” means nothing other than a place separated from the habitable land — that is, that the waters flowed together, each into its own place. Basil does not think that what is said, that the waters were gathered into one place, is to be understood of any gathering whatever of waters, but only of the greatest, which is called the sea: and it is established that all the seas are joined with the Ocean, and therefore have one place. For as each of the other elements has its own place, so does water — and this is the place in which is the sea or the Ocean. And just as, for the uses and conveniences of men, many parts both of air and of fire, separated from their element, are contained outside its place in various places of the earth — and yet this does not prevent it being most truly said that these elements have one proper and natural place — so it is fitting to think also concerning the waters. This opinion, before Basil, was also Aristotle's, in the second book of the Meteorology. And that all the seas are continuous with the Ocean is beyond controversy, except the Caspian Sea, about which there is not sufficient agreement among writers: for Strabo, Pliny, Dionysius On the Situation [of the World]...

How “one place” is true despite scattered seas/lakes: it means “separated from the habitable land,” each flowing to its own place (Basil — only the greatest gathering, the sea, is meant; all seas join the Ocean and so share one place, as each element has one place though parts are dispersed; also Aristotle, Meteor. 2). The exception is the Caspian. Marginal glosses: “How all the waters were gathered into one place”; “How Basil explains this place”; “Whether the Caspian Sea is continuous with the Arctic Ocean.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 120.

— p. 161 (PDF) · printed p. 120 —

...of the World, and Basil in this place think that the Caspian Sea shares its waters with the Arctic Ocean; but on the contrary Herodotus in his Clio, Aristotle in the second book of the Meteorology, Ptolemy in his

Geography, and others — grave writers among the foremost — judge that the Caspian Sea is closed in on every side by shores, and receives its water not from the Ocean, but from very many and very great rivers flowing into it; and that it unloads itself of water, sent out through hidden channels under the earth, into the Euxine [Black] Sea. Nor does the saltness of the Caspian Sea tell against this opinion — such as the Lake of Gennesareth too has in Palestine, having no manifest communication of waters with the Syrian Sea. But the reader curious about such matters, if he please, may read what Julius Scaliger wrote on the Caspian Sea against Cardano, in the fifty-first exercitation. But Bede says that Moses' saying about the waters gathered into one place pertains to all waters, wherever they are, although they seem to have diverse beds and origins: for either they are seas, whose origin from the Ocean is manifest, or, through hidden passages of the earth, they draw their first origin from the sea and at last return into it — as Solomon plainly teaches at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiastes. But this opinion of Bede's has a grave adversary, Aristotle, who in the second book of the Meteorology stoutly contradicts it. Julius Scaliger most keenly defends Solomon's opinion, in the forty-sixth exercitation, against Cardano. And Titelmann, explaining that passage of Ecclesiastes, tries, not unlearnedly, to reconcile and harmonize Solomon's saying with Aristotle's teaching. But the knowledge and judgment of this question let us leave to the Christian philosophers.

The Caspian Sea debate: Strabo, Pliny, Dionysius Periegetes, and Basil say it joins the Arctic Ocean; Herodotus, Aristotle (Meteor. 2), Ptolemy say it is land-locked, fed by rivers and draining underground to the Black Sea (its saltness no objection — cf. the Sea of Galilee). On whether all waters spring from and return to the sea: Bede (and Solomon, Eccles. 1:7) say yes; Aristotle denies it; Scaliger defends Solomon, Titelmann reconciles them. Marginal gloss: “Whether all waters proceed from the Ocean.” (Pererius leaves the question to the Christian philosophers.)

Now indeed, concerning what follows in Moses' narrative, “And let the dry land appear,” what Augustinus Eugubinus [Steuco] reported in his Cosmopoeia is not to be left among things passed over. Steuco holds that the whole earth was not uncovered and bared of the waters at once, but

little by little and part by part; and that the Northern part of the earth — that, I mean, which lies between the Arctic and the Equinoctial circle — appeared out of the waters and was dried first: both because it is the better and nobler part of the habitable earth (as that in which Paradise was, and the first man was founded and placed, and the human race propagated, and which from that time until now has always flourished most — for in this tract of lands it is established that the most powerful empires, the brightest human intellects, and the monuments of great deeds have been); and also because this northern part of the earth is much higher than the southern, and on that account emerged and stood forth from the waters first: which that poet elegantly sang:

Steuco's notable view on "let the dry land appear": the earth was uncovered gradually, the northern hemisphere first — both as the nobler part (Paradise, the first man, the great empires and minds) and because it is higher than the south, so emerged first. Marginal glosses: "The notable opinion of Eugubinus [Steuco]"; "Virgil, Georgics bk. 1."

As the world rises steeply toward Scythia and the Rhipaean heights, so it sinks, sloping down, toward Libya and the south winds.

Virgil, Georgics 1.240–241 — cited for the earth being higher in the north, lower in the south.

Aristotle too confirms this at the beginning of the second book of the Meteorology, whose words there are these: "Just as, in a particular region, the rivers appear to flow from the high places, so also, of the whole earth, the flow is [greatest] from the higher places, which are toward the Bear [the north]..."

Aristotle (Meteorology 2, opening): rivers flow down from high ground, and earth's greatest flow comes from the north — evidence the northern lands are higher. Sentence continues onto printed p. 121.

— p. 162 (PDF) · printed p. 121 —

...the flow is greatest. And of this — that the lands which are toward the Bear are high land — there is also this sign: that many of the ancient Meteorologists were persuaded that the Sun is not carried under the earth,

but around the earth and this region; and that it is obscured and makes night, because the land toward the Bear is high.” Thus far Aristotle. But Pliny puts another argument for the same matter: that water passes out of the Pontus [Black Sea] into the other seas, but never flows back into the Pontus; for thus he writes in the ninety-seventh chapter of the second book: “The Pontus always passes outward into the Propontis; inward into the Pontus the sea never flows back.” And in the fourth book, chapter thirteen, he says: “The opinion of many is not to be omitted, before we depart from the Pontus, who thought that all the inner seas are born from that head [the Pontus], not from the Strait of Cadiz — by no improbable argument: since the tide, always flowing out of the Pontus, never flows back.”

Completes Aristotle (the ancient view that the sun goes around, not under, the high northern earth) and adds Pliny (Natural History 2.97; 4.13): the Black Sea always flows outward, never back — taken as proof the north stands higher and that the inner seas originate there.

But I return to Steuco: he was led into that opinion because he had persuaded himself that that separation of the waters and the drying of the earth was done not by the singular omnipotence of God suddenly, but by the natural power of the Sun, then most burning and most potent to attenuate and dry — which, however, the faith of all the Theologians, man by man, rejects. For that these first works of God's six days were done immediately by God, and each on its day in a moment of time, no Theologian denies. And that the Sun at the beginning of the world was more burning and more powerful to act than it was afterward, as Steuco thinks, would surely move the Philosophers to laughter — to whom it is an admitted point that the force and faculty of the Sun (since it is incorruptible and impassible) can in no respect be remitted and lessened, or strained and increased.

Steuco's motive (drying done by the sun's natural heat, not God's sudden omnipotence) is rejected: all theologians hold the six days' works were done immediately by God in a moment; and the philosophers laugh at the idea that the (incorruptible, impassible) sun was hotter at the beginning than now.

Tostatus holds that the earth was dried by a certain vehemently burning wind, which God then sent, and which Moses indicated above when he said, “The Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters.” For by a like means the earth was dried after the flood, as is delivered below in chapter eight; and likewise that the bottom of the Red Sea, where the passage was to be for the Hebrews, was dried, is written in Exodus, chapter fourteen, in these words: “When Moses had stretched out his hand over the sea, the Lord took it away, a vehement and burning wind blowing all night, and turned it into dry land, and the water was divided.” But this opinion of his Tostatus will prove, unless I am mistaken, to few: for it seems incredible that there could be any wind such and so great that it could, in so brief a time — or, to speak more truly, in a moment of time — so dry the whole face of the earth, deeply soaked and bemired, that it became able to bring forth plants and animals. And as for what Procopius of Gaza says in this place — and Augustine does not deny, in the sixteenth book of the City of God, chapter nine — that the other part of the earth opposite to this of ours, which the Antipodes are said to inhabit, is wholly overwhelmed with waters, and therefore uninhabitable (as if the water, which before covered the whole earth, were forced and gathered thither): that this is false, has in our time been plainly ascertained by the navigations of the Spaniards: for that land [is both...]...

Tostatus's view (the earth dried by a burning wind — “the Spirit of the Lord,” cf. the post-Flood drying, Gen. 8, and the Red Sea, Exod. 14:21) is rejected as incredible: no wind could dry the soaked earth in a moment so it could bear life. And the old idea (Procopius of Gaza; not denied by Augustine, City of God 16.9) that the opposite (Antipodean) hemisphere is wholly water-covered and uninhabitable is now shown false by the Spanish voyages. Marginal gloss: “What Procopius and Augustine think about the Antipodes.” Sentence continues onto printed p. 122.

— p. 163 (PDF) · printed p. 122 —

...and it had before been inhabited by natives, and is now inhabited in various places by the Spaniards.

Completes the refutation (from p. 121) of the idea that the Antipodean hemisphere is wholly under water: the New World was already peopled and is now settled by the Spaniards.

Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may make seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth, etc. — Verse 11.

Genesis 1:11, the lemma for the section on the creation of plants on the third day.

Blessed Augustine, in the fifth book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter four, judges that by this command of God the plants were not actually produced from the earth, but only causally: for God then implanted in the earth the natural force and power of generating and bringing forth all the species of plants. He supports this opinion by this argument: that below, in the second chapter, Moses says that God on this third day produced every plant of the field before it sprang up in the earth, and every herb of the region before it sprouted — wherefore, before the plants actually arose from the earth, Moses testifies that they were made in the earth, namely only causally and virtually; for on this third day the earth received from God the natural power of bringing forth of itself all kinds of plants. But this interpretation of Augustine's is very hard, and distorts the words of Moses, who clearly and openly narrates that on this third day God both commanded that the earth should bring forth all the kinds of herbs and trees, and that the earth at once brought them forth, obeying the divine commands. “The earth,” he says, “brought forth the green herb, and such as maketh seed after its kind, and the tree making fruit and having each one its seed according to its species.” And indeed Moses speaks of the creation of plants in the same way as of the creation of light, the firmament, the stars, and the animals; nor can it be denied that there were perfect trees in Paradise, since Moses plainly hands this down in the second chapter. And truly, for the food of man and of the animals, there was need of herbs and the fruits of herbs. But those words which Augustine cites from the second chapter, “Before it sprang up in the earth,” signify that that first production of plants was not natural, nor made in the usual order and manner of other

productions. The sense, therefore, is: before the herb arose in the earth (namely, in the natural way, as it now arises), in that first production it was produced in a certain singular way by God.

Augustine's "causal" reading (De Genesi ad litteram 5.4): on day three the plants were made only virtually, the earth receiving the power to generate them (Gen. 2:5, "before it sprang up"). Pererius rejects it as forced: Moses says the earth at once brought them forth (like the other days' works; Paradise had real trees, Gen. 2; man/beasts needed food); "before it sprang up" means only that this first production was non-natural and singular. Marginal gloss: "Whether the plants were actually produced on the third day."

And from those words, "Let the earth produce or bring forth the green herb, and such as maketh seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind," etc., it appears that all the species of herbs and trees were made in a perfect state, having, namely, seed from which others could be generated: for each thing is then perfect when it can generate its like, as it is in Aristotle, in the fourth book of the Meteorology. And by this means God provided for the mortal condition of plants, so that what by themselves [they could not]...

All species were made perfect — i.e. seed-bearing, able to generate their like (Aristotle, Meteor. 4) — so that, being mortal as individuals, the species might be perpetuated by generation. Marginal gloss: "All things were created in a perfect state." Sentence continues onto printed p. 123.

— p. 164 (PDF) · printed p. 123 —

...could not [obtain] by themselves, they might obtain — the immortality of the species and a kind of eternity, denied to the individuals — through the generation and propagation of some from others. Nor does it matter where the plants have their seed — that is, whether in the root, or in the stalk, or in the fruit. Nor can it be in doubt that those first herbs and trees, each in its own kind, were most perfect and most sweet to the taste, and most suited to the food of man: both on account of the supreme goodness of the new-born earth, and because, created immediately by God (whose works that are so made are perfect), they could not but be excellent — certainly far better than any procreated afterward by natural power and means. This first generation of trees, made without the labor and cultivation of men, does

not seem to have escaped the poets: for one of them said:

The species gain a kind of immortality by reproduction; the first plants (no matter where seeded) were the most perfect and palatable — created directly by God from the new, supremely good earth. The poets knew of this effortless first growth. Marginal gloss: "That the first plants of the world were all most perfect."

> *The earth too, exempt [from toil] and untouched by the hoe, and wounded by no plowshares, of itself gave all things.*

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.101–102 (of the Golden Age) — cited for the earth's spontaneous first yield; Lucretius (bk. 5) is said to have a like sentiment.

So Ovid, in the first book of the Metamorphoses, whose like sentiment Lucretius pursues in the fifth book. The question is whether to that first generation of herbs and trees the earth concurred only passively, or also actively — yet by a power received supernaturally from God; and this latter seems to Cajetan more probable. For, he says, those words of Moses denote it, "Let the earth produce." And so the earth, by a natural power implanted in it, produced those plants — yet was aided by the supernatural help of God, so that it could produce them both in a perfect state and in an instant, which naturally it could have generated only in parts and over certain spaces of time. Cajetan's words are these: "Not only is the outward fullness of the earth signified, but also the manner of the fullness, by saying 'And the earth brought forth': for by this it is manifestly signified that the earth itself generated the plants, that we may understand that God produced the plants not immediately, but mediately, through the earth — yet not in time, but by divine power: in the same instant the earth received the productive power, and the production with the effect produced; so that whatever plants the earth would have produced naturally in the space of one year or of many years (as different plants require for their perfection), the earth then produced by divine power in an instant; for we believe that all things were produced in a perfect state, as it is established that man was produced not an infant but perfect, and in the earthly Paradise it is established that there were trees with fruits from the beginning — as a sign

of which it is not written ‘the earth grew green,’ but ‘the earth brought forth.’” So he.

The question whether the earth concurred passively only, or actively (by a God-given power). Cajetan holds the latter: the earth, divinely aided, brought forth the plants perfect and instantaneous (what nature would take years to do). Marginal glosses: “Whether the earth concurred to the first generation of plants only passively and materially, or also efficiently”; “Augustine, bk. 5, On Genesis according to the Letter.”

But this Tostatus utterly denies, in this place, and Saint Thomas, in the First Part, question seventy, article one, writing thus: “In the first institution of things, the active principle was the Word of God, which from elemental matter produced the animals — either actually, according to other holy men, or virtually, according to Augustine: not that water or earth has in itself the power of producing all animals, as Avicenna posited, but because this very fact, that from elemental matter, by the power of seed or of the stars, animals can be produced, is from a power first given to the elements.” Thus far Saint Thomas. And indeed it seems incredible that the earth should be capable of so great a power, that by any power inhering in it it could suddenly bring forth of itself [perfect trees of every kind]...

Tostatus and Aquinas (ST I, q. 70, a. 1) deny that the earth had an active power: the active principle was the Word of God; the elements have only a derived power (against Avicenna, who gave the elements a power to produce all animals). Sentence continues onto printed p. 124.

— p. 165 (PDF) · printed p. 124 —

...perfect trees of every kind, and all the species of land animals, which Scripture confirms were generated from the earth on the sixth day: although this perhaps would not seem so impossible, or even improbable, to those Theologians who think that any creature, taken up by God as an instrument, can concur actively to the creation of anything whatever, even of a spiritual, even of a supernatural thing — but this nevertheless cannot happen without a very great miracle of God, which, in the first creation of things, should not be admitted without the greatest cause and necessity. But that phrase, “Let the earth bring forth,” or “The earth brought forth,”

signifies nothing other than the material causality of the earth and its concurrence to the generation of plants; for below, in the second chapter, God is said to have produced every tree out of the ground. For the woman too, who according to Aristotle concurs only passively and materially to the generation of man, is nonetheless said to generate and procreate the man. And now too the earth is said to bring forth and beget plants, although the earth is hardly properly their generatrix, but rather the seed of each plant is; therefore that phrase “Let the earth bring forth the herb” has the same force as “Let there be brought forth out of the earth, and in the earth, the green herb.”

Pererius's verdict: it is incredible the earth could of itself bring forth all perfect trees and animals; an instrumental active power would need a great miracle, not to be assumed in creation. “The earth brought forth” means only the earth's material causality (cf. Gen. 2:9; the woman is said to “generate” though she concurs only passively, per Aristotle) — it = “let the green herb be brought forth out of and in the earth.”

Basil hands down, in this place, that the rose was then made without any thorns, for these grew on to the rose after the sin of man, for his punishment; and Basil would say this much more of the herbs noxious and lethal to man. Nor does Augustine dissent from Basil: for in the first book on Genesis against the Manichees, chapter thirteen, he says thus: “Through man's sin the earth was cursed, that it should bear thorns — not that the earth itself should feel the thorns (or, as others read, the punishments), since it is without sense, but that it might ever set before men's eyes the guilt of human sin, by which they might be admonished to turn away at length from sins and turn to God's commands. And the venomous herbs were created for the punishment or for the exercise of mortals; and all this on account of sin, because we were made mortal after sin.” So Augustine. But who would believe that the rose was made without thorns before sin? For God founded things such as they are according to their nature; nor did Adam's sin change the properties and conditions of things — since not even those things which are true according to the nature of man did his sin in any way alter. And that the rose is born among thorns follows from the

natural constitution and generation of the rose. Wherefore, before Adam's sin there were thorns and thistles, and herbs noxious and lethal to man; but they would not have been a punishment to him if he had not sinned, and the earth which he cultivated for his sustenance would have brought forth nothing unfruitful, much less pernicious, to him: for man would have been so disposed in mind and body that he could most easily discern and beware of all such things deadly to him.

Basil (and Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.13) say thorns and poisons arose only after the Fall, as punishment. Pererius disagrees: Adam's sin did not change things' natures; thorns, thistles, and lethal herbs existed before the Fall — they simply would not have harmed unfallen man (who would have discerned and avoided them, and whose cultivated earth would yield nothing harmful). Marginal gloss: "Basil, hom. 5 on the Hexaëmeron, thinks the rose was generated without thorns before man's sin."

But someone will ask: If all things were founded for the use of man, were so many kinds of herbs and trees deadly to man therefore created in vain? Basil, Ambrose, and Theodoret answer that, although such things are indeed noxious to man as food, they are nonetheless most useful to many of the animals, which are for man's sake. For indeed [one may see the bearded flocks often grow fat on hemlock]...

The objection: if all is for man, why deadly plants? Answer (Basil, Ambrose, Theodoret): they nourish the animals, which serve man. Marginal gloss: "Why many things were created which seem not only useless to man but even harmful — Basil hom. 6, Ambrose Hexaëmeron bk. 3, Theodoret on Genesis." Sentence continues onto printed p. 125.

— p. 166 (PDF) · printed p. 125 —

For indeed one may often see the bearded flocks grow fat on hemlock, which to man is a sharp poison.

Lucretius, De rerum natura 5.899–900 — cited to show that plants deadly to man nourish beasts.

as Lucretius says in the fifth book. Next, although these things contribute nothing to man for food, they yet profit very much for the sake of medicine, for they wondrously help to drive off the various kinds of

diseases that besiege human life: which Basil and Ambrose confirm in this place, and Pliny in many places by the clearest examples. Wherefore Augustine retracted and amended what he had thought in the first book against the Manichees, having afterward searched it out more maturely and accurately, in the third book on Genesis according to the Letter, chapter eighteen, where he judges the opinion which we hand down to be more probable. To confirm which it can be added that the species of such things make for the completion and perfection of the world: for (as Aristotle witnesses) the species of things are like numbers; wherefore, without these, the series and connection of the species would be greatly interrupted and cut off — which surely ought to seem no less absurd than there being a vacuum in the world. What more? Though all else were lacking, these things would yet greatly conduce to man's perception of Natural Philosophy, and especially of the science of the planets. And the ignorance — or, to speak properly, the insanity — of those who, because they themselves are ignorant of the use of certain things, judge them to have been founded wholly uselessly and superfluously, Augustine refutes, in the first book on Genesis against the Manichees, chapter sixteen, by a certain elegant simile.

Harmful plants serve as medicine (Basil, Ambrose, Pliny); Augustine retracted his earlier view (De Genesi ad litteram 3.18), preferring this. Pererius adds: such species complete the world's order (species are "like numbers," Aristotle — a gap would be as absurd as a vacuum), and aid natural science and astronomy. Those who call things useless merely because they don't know their use Augustine refutes (c. Manich. 1.16).

But someone may ask of us why Moses did not disclose in this place the generation of metals and (as they call them) minerals, which much more truly have their origin from the earth than do plants. Let him receive this answer from us: that for many causes the generation of those things was passed over. First, because the generation of those things, since it takes place within the bowels of the earth, is to the common people hidden and unknown, nor is the difference of those things from earth and stones manifest to everyone. Next, because they do not make a different kind and

grade of natural Being — different, I mean, from the elements: for there are four grades of natural Being, namely Corporeal Being, Living Being, Sentient Being, and Intelligent Being; but that the making of such bodies, like that of all the rest, is from God, Scripture plainly teaches both elsewhere and in the book of Job. The reader, therefore, must be admonished of this — which, once said in this place, ought to be understood likewise in very many others — that Moses undertook to recount in this place not all, but the works of God manifest to all, and most illustrious and noble; wherefore, as he was silent about the generation of springs, rivers, lakes, mountains, valleys, plains, and hills, so about the making of metals and fossil things he said not a word.

Why Moses omits metals/minerals: their underground generation is hidden and ill-distinguished from stones; and they add no new grade of natural Being (the four grades: corporeal, living, sentient, intelligent — that all bodies are from God is taught in Job). The general rule: Moses narrates only the manifest, noble works (as he omits springs, rivers, mountains, so metals). Marginal glosses: "Why Moses did not expound the generation of metals and minerals"; "The four grades of natural Being."

This too is wont to be brought into question: why God, as he blessed the animals created by him, saying, "Increase and multiply," did not likewise bless the plants. Theodoret sets down this doubt in the seventeenth question on Genesis, and solves it in this man[ner]...

Begins the question why God blessed the animals ("increase and multiply," Gen. 1:22) but not the plants. Theodoret raises it (Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 17). Marginal gloss: "Why God, as he blessed the animals, did not likewise bless the plants." Sentence continues onto printed p. 126.

— p. 167 (PDF) · printed p. 126 —

...[At creation] God by his own will at once filled the whole earth with meadows, crops, and herbs and trees of every other kind, but the other living creatures he created in pairs. Hence he rightly bestowed a blessing upon them, that by multiplying they might fill, some the seas, marshes, and rivers, some the air, and others the land.

Continuation (from p. 125) of Theodoret's solution to the question why the animals, but not the plants, received the blessing 'increase and multiply': because plants the earth itself reproduces, whereas

animals were made only in pairs and so needed the power to propagate. The italicized words are Theodoret's.

If perhaps this solution of Theodoret does not satisfy someone, because it takes for granted that only two animals of each species were first made by God, which is either uncertain or even false: let him have this answer from us, that God blessed the living creatures in the proper sense, and gave them the precept of multiplying, because their generation occurs in a manner involving knowledge and appetite, and through the mingling and union of animals of different sex, which never happens in plants. And so that phrase 'God blessed them' signifies that he implanted in them the power and faculty of generating their like and propagating the species; while that phrase 'Increase' signifies that God appointed fixed times and fixed laws and natural modes, by which the animals, by natural instinct and impulse, are roused and come together for the generation and multiplication of their like.

Pererius's own explanation, distinguishing the force of 'God blessed them' (the implanted generative faculty) from 'Increase and multiply' (the natural laws governing reproduction).

But the reasoning that I have stated too tersely and compressedly I wish the reader to know set forth more fully and elegantly in the words of Rupert. For Rupert, in book one of On the Trinity and his Works, chapter fifty-two, when he had set forth at length this very question—why God set the precept of growing and multiplying upon the animals, but not likewise upon the plants—afterward resolved it in this manner.

Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius, bk. 1, ch. 52.

“The green herbs,” he says, “or the fruit-bearing tree, the same earth which sprouts or produces them also multiplies, and itself supplies them with seed, and receives them when they fall, even if the hand of a sower should happen to be wanting; and therefore, for a posterity to be multiplied, the soil in which they are itself suffices. But for the creeping or flying things, if there had been no appetite, they would not

have grown or been multiplied, and their kind would not have endured. Since therefore they had received the beginning of their existence, it was necessary, by the command of the same Creator, that a natural love or appetite be implanted in them to the very marrow, so that the male, ardent to inject the seed, and the female no less eager to receive it; this the blessing conferred upon them, and for this reason it was necessary: for thence the creeping things grew and were multiplied, and filled the waters of the sea, and the birds were multiplied out of them. To this end, the great power of this blessing holds these living creatures in the bond of love." Thus far from Rupert.

Quotation from Rupert, De Trinitate 1.52, fuller explanation of why the blessing of fertility was given to animals (which require sexual appetite to propagate) and not to plants (which the earth itself reproduces).

— p. 168 (PDF) · printed p. 127 —

DISPUTATION: Whether the world was created in springtime.

Section heading. The disputation surveys the competing opinions on the season of the world's creation—July (Gerard Mercator), versus the common view of spring/March.

Many think that the world was made in springtime, forming their conjecture both from other considerations and especially from this, that Moses here relates that on the third day the earth, at God's command, sprouted the green herb: and the sprouting of green and flowering herbs belongs to the spring season. This question, since it is most beautiful for knowledge, and highly controverted and pulled apart into opposing opinions, and not foreign to our purpose, we have judged should be treated here for the present.

The opening 'M' is a large decorated initial (Multi).

A certain industrious compiler of Annals within our own memory hands down that it seems to him most probable that the world was made in the month of July. And he argues this from sacred Scripture in the following way: The beginning of the year in the time of Noah was about the month of July, while the Sun was passing through the sign of Leo; therefore at that time was also the beginning of the world. For it is quite credible that those ancient men down to Noah were accustomed to begin the year from that time at which, by the tradition of their forefathers traced down from Adam, they knew the world had been founded; for it was very fitting that the same time should be the beginning of the year which had been the origin of the world.

Marginal gloss: 'Gerardus Mercator, in the opening of his Chronology, is of the opinion that the world was created in the month of July.' Refers to Gerard Mercator's Chronologia (1569).

That in Noah's time the beginning of the year was the month of July, this author conjectures from what is related below in the eighth chapter of Genesis, that the dove, on the twenty-fourth day of the eleventh month, returning to Noah, brought a little olive branch with green leaves: for from this it is understood that the time was then spring, in which trees are wont to bud and grow green; at which time it was also fitting that the flood should cease, namely so that a new summer might furnish new produce and fruits for the sustaining of men and the other living creatures.

Refers to Genesis 8:11, the dove returning to the ark with an olive leaf.

But that this sprouting of the olive in the flood took place while the Sun was traversing the sign of Gemini is shown by natural reasoning. For Pliny, in book twenty-six, chapter twenty-five, says that the olive, together with the vine, buds and conceives at the rising of the Pleiades, that is, six days before the Ides of May—the Sun occupying the twenty-fifth, or, as it should truly be read, the fifteenth degree of Taurus—but flowers at the solstice. And Pliny says this with respect to his own Roman climate, which is shared also by Mount Gordyaeus in Armenia, on which the ark is said to

have settled as the waters subsided. The same time, therefore, suited the sprouting of the olive on Mount Gordyaeus, had not the inundation of the waters, keeping the whole earth deeply buried for so long, stood in the way: which caused the budding of the trees to occur not at its proper time, but somewhat later. Yet that budding could not be deferred until the solstice, on account of the fruits and food necessary for the life of the animals, none of which had been stored up and preserved in that year. Wherefore by the sign of Gemini, which...

Pliny, Natural History 26.25 (on the olive budding at the rising of the Pleiades). 'Virgiliae' is the Latin name for the Pleiades. Mount Gordyaeus = the mountains of Ararat/Gordyene in Armenia. Pererius notes a textual variant in Pliny ('fifteenth' vs. 'twenty-fifth' degree of Taurus). The sentence continues onto p. 128.

— p. 169 (PDF) · printed p. 128 —

...[the sign of Gemini], which lies between Taurus and Cancer, that eleventh month must have corresponded, but the twelfth to Cancer, and therefore the first month of the following year was that in which the Sun was passing through the sign of Leo, that is, about the month of July. Thus he argues. He also lends support to his opinion by the argument of the Egyptians, who, as Solinus reports in chapter 35, judged the birthday of the world to be when the Sun enters the beginning of Leo: whence the Egyptians took this Solinus does not tell us; but it is likely they learned it from the Hebrews, who often and for long dwelt among the Egyptians.

Solinus, Collectanea rerum memorabilium, ch. 35. Conclusion of Mercator's argument that the world began in July (Sun in Leo). The opening word completes 'Geminorum' from p. 127.

Nevertheless I believe that this opinion will be approved by few: for I do not recall that anyone has yet referred the origins of the world to anything but an equinox, either the vernal or the autumnal. But what the Egyptians in Solinus's time thought about the birthday of the world need not greatly concern us: certainly Josephus, a weighty author, said in book 1 of the Jewish Antiquities that the most ancient Egyptians, in the time of Moses,

were accustomed to begin the year from the month of September; nay more, Cicero in book two of On the Nature of the Gods, and Lactantius in book one of the Divine Institutes, chapter 6, have recorded that Mercury, who delivered laws and letters to Egypt, was called by the Egyptians in their own tongue Thoth, from whom the first month of the year among them, corresponding to our September, took its name. Further, Pliny in book sixteen, chapter 20, hands down that the leaves of the olive never fall, and never lose their color: what then prevents the olive, whose little branch the dove brought, from having retained the greenness of its leaves under the waters at the time of the flood? For since for seven days before, the dove had found nowhere to rest, how is it credible that within a space of not more than seven days the olive could put forth leaves and grow green? for, submerged beneath the deepest waters, it could not exercise the power of budding and putting forth leaves.

Marginal gloss: 'Mercator is refuted.' Pererius's rebuttal of Mercator. Cites Josephus, Antiquities 1; Cicero, De natura deorum 2; Lactantius, Divinae institutiones 1.6 (on Mercury = Thoth, eponym of September); and Pliny, Natural History 16.20 (the olive is evergreen, so the green leaf is no proof of spring).

Finally, the author of that opinion takes for certain what is highly doubtful, or even false: for he posits, as undoubted by the consent of all, that the months which Moses lists in the eighth chapter of Genesis—the first, second, seventh, tenth, eleventh—were months of the year, whereas not a few think they are to be counted not from the beginning of the year, but from the beginning of the flood; while others, into whose opinion we are about to go, hold that they are to be reckoned not from the beginning of the year or of the flood, but from the beginning of the six-hundredth year of Noah's life. But, having rejected this opinion, let us weigh the others, which are more probable.

Final objection to Mercator: the months of Genesis 8 are disputed as to their reckoning (from the year's start, the flood's start, or Noah's 600th year).

There is another opinion, accepted not only by the astrologers and poets, but confirmed also by the consensus of all the ecclesiastical writers and theologians, that the world was founded in springtime. This Virgil sang in book 2 of the Georgics:

Marginal gloss: 'The common opinion, that the world was created in springtime.'

> *I could not believe that other days shone at the first origin of the nascent world, or that it kept another course: it was spring then, spring the great Orb was keeping, and the East winds spared their wintry blasts.*

Virgil, Georgics 2.336–339.

— p. 170 (PDF) · printed p. 129 —

This too is one, and not the least, of the many reasons on account of which the astrologers judge the sign of Aries to be the beginning and head of the rest of the signs of the Zodiac, and to hold the chief place.

The continuation of the Virgil quotation ('Haec...') flows into Pererius's own remark on why Aries heads the Zodiac—because the world began in spring.

But I come to our own writers, that is, the ecclesiastical writers and theologians. Eusebius, in his Universal History (a work which Jerome lists among his others in the book On Ecclesiastical Writers, of which some fragments survive even today), affirms that the world was founded on the twenty-fifth day of March, the day on which Christ our Lord rose again. Athanasius, answering the seventeenth question of Antiochus, hands down the same as Eusebius, and very many others confirm the same: such as Cyril of Jerusalem in Catechesis 14, Pope Leo in his ninth sermon on the Passion of the Lord, Gregory Nazianzen in his oration on the New Lord's Day, Isidore in book 5 of the Etymologies, in the chapter On Seasons, Damascene in book two of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter seven, Strabus and Rabanus on the 12th chapter of Exodus—they say that the world was created on the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, that is, on the eighteenth

day of March: this the Interlinear Gloss too has, on the 35th chapter of Genesis: and finally Bede records the same in many places, as in the book On the Reckoning of Time, chapter 28, and in his little commentary on the Hexameron he says that the sun, created on the fourth day, consecrated the vernal equinox by its rising; and in the Synod of Palestine, gathered by the command of Pope Victor under Theophilus, Bishop of Caesarea, it was declared by the consent of all that the world was made in springtime, and moreover that on the 10th of the Kalends of April, the day on which our Lord was crucified, Adam was created by God. And Bede mentions this synod and decree at the beginning of his book On the Six Ages of the World, but recounts the decrees of that Synod more fully in the Epistle he wrote on the celebration of Easter, or on the vernal equinox. The same Bede, in the book On the Reckoning of Time, chapter 40, teaches that the Sun was created on the 12th of the Kalends of April, that is, the 21st of March, and that the first day on which light was made was the 15th of the Kalends of April, that is, the eighteenth day of March.

Marginal gloss: 'At what time the Christians judge the world to have been created.' A catalogue of patristic and medieval authorities for a March creation: Eusebius (March 25, = the Resurrection date), Athanasius (Quaestiones ad Antiochum), Cyril of Jerusalem, Pope Leo I, Gregory Nazianzen, Isidore (Etymologies 5), John Damascene (De fide orthodoxa 2.7), Walafrid Strabo and Rabanus Maurus, the Interlinear Gloss, and Bede (De temporum ratione 28 and 40; In Hexameron). 15 Kal. April = March 18 (creation of light); 12 Kal. April = March 21 (creation of the sun, vernal equinox); 10 Kal. April = March 23 (Adam's creation / the Crucifixion); March 25 = the Resurrection. The Synod of Palestine under Theophilus of Caesarea and Pope Victor concerned the dating of Easter.

Blessed Ambrose, in chapter 4 of book 1 on the Hexameron, strives to persuade by this reasoning that the beginning of the world was in springtime, namely that the earth at God's command brought forth the green herb, which is wont to happen at no other time than spring. But since Ambrose treats this argument most eloquently, I shall here set down a few of his words, which will doubtless not be unpleasing to the reader:

Marginal gloss: 'Ambrose's opinion on the time of the world's founding. Exodus 12.' Ambrose, Hexameron 1.4.

“In this beginning,” he says, “of the months, in which by God's command the Jews celebrated the Passover, God made heaven and earth, because the origin of the world had fittingly to be taken from there: when there was a vernal mildness suited to all things. Whence the year too expressed the image of the nascent world, so that after the wintry frosts and the gloom of winter a brighter-than-usual splendor of the spring season might shine forth. The first rising of the world therefore gave the form of its fruitfulness to the courses of the years; so that by that law the successions of the years might arise, and at the beginning of each year the earth might produce new sproutings of seeds, as the Lord God had first said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb of grass, sowing its seed after its kind and after its likeness, and the fruit-bearing tree...”

Quotation from Ambrose, Hexameron 1.4. The marginal gloss 'Genes. 1' marks the embedded citation of Genesis 1:11 ('Germinet terra herbam...'). The quotation continues onto p. 130 (the catchword is 'fructife[rum]'). 'In hoc principio mensium...' alludes to Exodus 12:2 (the month of Passover as the beginning of months).

— p. 171 (PDF) · printed p. 130 —

“...the fruit-bearing tree making fruit, etc. In which both the perpetual divine providence of [God's] moderation and the swiftness of the sprouting earth vote, as it were, for the springtime estimate. For although at any time it was within God's power to command, and within nature's to obey, so that amid wintry frosts and the hoarfrosts of winter the earth, sprouting at the fostering of the heavenly command, might bring forth its offspring, yet it was not in keeping with the eternal disposition that the fields, bound stiff by rigid frost, should suddenly relax into green fruits, and that flowering things should be mingled with bristling hoarfrosts. Therefore, that Scripture might show the times of spring at the constitution of the world, it says: This month shall be to you the beginning of months: it is the first to you among the months of the year—calling the first month the spring

season. For it was fitting that the beginning of the year should be the beginning of generation, and that generation itself should be fostered by gentler breezes; for the tender beginnings of things can neither endure the hardship of harsher cold, nor sustain the injury of scorching heat.” Thus Ambrose.

Continuation (from p. 129) and close of the Ambrose, Hexameron 1.4 quotation; it completes the embedded Genesis 1:11 citation ('...lignum fructiferum...'). The marginal references key the embedded scriptural allusions: 'Exod. 12' (Exodus 12:2, 'This month shall be to you the beginning of months'), 'Exod. 40', 'Exod. 13', and 'Luc. 1' (Luke 1, the Annunciation).

Theodoret writes things similar, yet not to be passed over in silence, in his seventy-second question on Exodus: for when he had proposed this difficulty—Why did God order the tabernacle to be set up on the first day of the month?—he resolved it with these words:

Theodoret of Cyrus, Quaestiones in Exodum, q. 72 (on Exodus 40:2, the tabernacle erected on the first day of the first month).

“Because at about the same season God founded his creatures, a fact to which the budding of the trees bears witness: Let the earth, he says, bring forth the green herb, etc. For at the beginning of spring the meadows are wont to flower, the crops conceive their seed, the trees put forth their fruit. For the same reason God also, at about the same time, freed the people of Israel from the bondage of the Egyptians, and the Archangel Gabriel brought to the holy Virgin Mary the glad tidings of the wondrous birth. At the same time, too, Christ the Lord underwent his saving Passion. Not without reason, therefore, did the Lord of all order the tabernacle to be set up on the first day of the first month, both because it represented the figure of the whole world, and that the people might prepare themselves for the feast of the Passover, which the Law commanded the Jews to celebrate first.” Thus he.

Quotation from Theodoret, Quaestiones in Exodum q. 72. Marginal gloss: 'And so [these things] were done at the beginning of spring.' The embedded 'Germinet terra herbam virentem' is Genesis 1:11.

The Master of the Scholastic History, in his History of the book of Genesis, affirms that it is a doctrine of the Church that the world was created in March. Moreover those whom this opinion pleased add these arguments: that the spring season is the most beautiful and pleasant of the whole year, and the most apt of all for the generation, growth, and preservation of all things, but especially of living things. For it is temperately warm and moist, which are the two qualities most agreeable to the generation and life both of plants and of animals; then too the sign of Aries flourishes, which the astrologers call masculine, fertile, favorable, and beneficent, and most opportune for the beginnings of things; then, while the earth buds, the herbs grow green, the trees blossom, and the living creatures as it were revive, the world, in a manner being reborn, declares not obscurely that at this same season it was first founded by God. On the contrary, autumn, since it is cold and dry, is more suited to the corruption than to the generation of things, and therefore then the leaves fall, and all things, stripped of their greenness and vigor, gradually wither and are borne toward destruction. This too adds credence to this opinion, that it is quite credible that the first Adam, and the second, who is Christ the Lord, were at the same season...

Marginal gloss: 'The advantages of spring.' The 'Master of the Scholastic History' is Peter Comestor (Historia Scholastica). The argument from the astrological character of Aries and from the contrast with autumn. Sentence continues onto p. 131.

— p. 172 (PDF) · printed p. 131 —

...formed, and at the same season both the world was founded and was repaired by Christ. For it is established that the second Adam, that is, Christ, was conceived in springtime, and at the same season, through his death, restored the world.

Completes the argument from p. 130: the parallel between the creation of Adam, the conception of Christ, and the Redemption, all assigned to spring.

The third opinion is that the beginning of the world was in autumn, so that the first month from the founding of the world was the lunar month nearest the autumnal equinox—the month which the Hebrews, by a Chaldean word, call Tishri, which word in Chaldean means 'beginning,' so that even by its very name this month seems sufficiently to prove that it ought to be reckoned the beginning of the year. This opinion very many and most learned of the Hebrews hold to be true and certain, and Nicholas of Lyra strongly approves it on the 7th chapter of the book of Genesis, and Tostatus on the first chapter of the same book, in the twenty-first question, in which it is plain enough from what he writes in the first book of the Antiquities that Josephus held it. It also makes for it that Jerome, in his commentary on the first chapter of Ezekiel, says that among all the Orientals the first month of the year was October: for Tishri, though it begins in September, very often runs over into October. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, although in chapter six of the seventh book Against the Astrologers he writes that it is still undiscovered, and cannot be sufficiently explained, at what time of year the world was made, nevertheless inclines his own opinion toward those who believe it was made in autumn. Tostatus, in the first part of his Defensorium, chapter fourteen, has left in writing that the experts among the Hebrews judged the world to have been created on the 25th day of September, and Adam to have been formed on the last day of September; but that the first day of October, which was a Sabbath day, was the beginning of the first year and the first month. For they hold that the prior six days are to be referred to the preceding year, which they make up out of those six days.

Marginal glosses: 'The opinion of others, that the world was founded in autumn'; and 'Nearly all the Hebrews think the world was founded in autumn.' Cites Nicholas of Lyra (on Gen 7), Tostatus (Abulensis, on Gen 1, q.21, and Defensorium pt.1 ch.14), Josephus (Antiquities 1), Jerome (on Ezekiel 1), and Pico della Mirandola (Disputationes adversus astrologos 7.6). Tishri = the Hebrew month of the autumnal new year (Rosh Hashanah).

Furthermore: just as this third opinion is inferior to the second both in the number and in the gravity and dignity of its authorities, so in the number

and weight of its arguments it seems firmer and more excellent. In the first place, God sufficiently indicated this when by a new law he ordained that, on account of the memory of his singular benefit by which he had freed the Hebrews from the bondage of the Egyptians, Nisan—which falls in the spring season—should thenceforth be reckoned the first month of the year among the Hebrews, as is related in the twelfth chapter of Exodus; from which one may understand that before that time Nisan was not the first month of the year for the Hebrews: for what need was there, by a new precept, so solemnly to command the Jews what they had of their own accord always observed before? Surely, just as he ordered the Sabbath to be kept because on the seventh day he had rested from the contriving and fabricating of the world, so, had the world been founded in the month of Nisan, he would have ordered that month to be kept in memory of the founding of the world. I shall here set down the words of Josephus, which avail much to illustrate and prove this, transcribed from the first book of the Jewish Antiquities:

Marginal gloss: 'The arguments that confirm this opinion.' Pererius's lead-in: that the divine command (Exodus 12:2) making Nisan the first month was a novelty implies it had not been first before—pointing to an autumn new year originally. The Josephus quotation follows.

“The devastation of the flood occurred,” he says, ...

Opening of the Josephus quotation (Antiquities 1); the catchword at the foot of p. 131 is 'anno', and the sentence continues onto p. 132.

— p. 173 (PDF) · printed p. 132 —

“...in the six-hundredth year of Noah's life, in the second month, which is called Dius by the Macedonians, and by the Hebrews Marsonane (Marheshvan), which corresponds partly to October and partly to November—for thus the Egyptians divided the year. But Moses appointed Nisan, which is Xanthicus to the Macedonians, as the first month in his calendar, because through it he had led the Hebrews out of Egypt: and the same he made the beginning of all things pertaining

to divine worship; otherwise, as regards the marketing of goods for sale, and the rest of the year's arrangement, he changed nothing of the ancient usage." Thus Josephus.

Quotation from Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 1 (the flood began in the second month, an autumn month = Marheshvan/Bul). 'Dius', 'Marsonane', 'Xanthicus' are Macedonian/Hebrew month-names. Josephus's point: Moses made Nisan first only for sacred reckoning, leaving the civil (autumn) year unchanged.

From his words two things worth noting, which bear on the present question, become plain to us. The first is that the Hebrews, before they left Egypt, were accustomed to begin the year from autumn; and of this custom, kept unbroken from Adam down to Moses, no other origin and cause is to be supposed than that those ancient men were persuaded that the world had begun in the autumn season. The second is that the flood began in the second month of the year, that is, in mid-autumn: and who would not be led in his mind to believe that, from Adam down to Noah, the beginning of the year was the same time which had been the origin of the world?

Two inferences from Josephus: (1) the pre-Mosaic Hebrew year began in autumn, traced to a tradition of an autumn creation; (2) the flood began in mid-autumn.

Although there are not lacking those who would reply to what we said in the first place from Josephus, that the Hebrews, before Jacob's descent into Egypt, were accustomed to begin the year from springtime—at which, namely, the world had been founded; but afterward, being mingled with the Egyptians and consorting with them for two hundred and fifteen years, they embraced, along with their other institutions, this one too concerning the beginning of the year and the arrangement of the months: wherefore, having gone out from Egypt, they were commanded by God's precept to resume their first custom regarding the beginning of the year and the arrangement of the months, and thenceforth to keep it perpetually.

Marginal gloss: 'The argument from Scripture taken for this opinion is resolved.' The counter-reply: the original Hebrew (spring) year was lost during the 215 years in Egypt and restored at the Exodus—so Exodus 12 is a restoration, not a novelty.

But that the origins of the world were in autumn, and that from there the beginning of the year is rightly taken, seems able to be shown evidently from Scripture. For in the twenty-third chapter of Exodus the Hebrews are commanded to celebrate the solemnity of Tabernacles—which was held in the seventh month, that is, in autumn—'at the going out of the year.' For thus we read there: Thou shalt also keep the solemnity, at the going out of the year, when thou hast gathered all thy fruits out of the field. And in the thirty-fourth chapter of the same book, God commands the same solemnity to be held 'when the season of the year returns, [and] all things are stored up.' From which two passages of Scripture it is sufficiently clear that the going-out and the return of the year were in autumn: wherefore at that season especially was the world made. Besides, that autumn is the end of the preceding year, if we consider the order of nature and of the generation of natural things, is plain even by the judgment of the senses; for then the fruits are plucked from the trees, the leaves fall, the crops are reaped, and the produce is stored: the grapes are gathered, and the wine is made by pressing them. And that autumn is also the beginning of the following year is manifest, since at that time the sowing takes place, and the earth, conceiving the seeds entrusted to it and made pregnant with them, brings forth roots—which in a certain manner corresponds to the conception and generation of animals in the womb: wherefore the season of autumn...

Marginal gloss: 'How autumn should be called both the going-out and the beginning of the year.' Cites Exodus 23:16 ('in exitu anni') and Exodus 34:22 on the Feast of Tabernacles/Ingathering at year's end. Sentence continues onto p. 133.

— p. 174 (PDF) · printed p. 133 —

...the season of autumn suits the conception and generation of things, and on that account is more fitting for the beginnings of the world. But the season of spring corresponds rather to the adolescence and youth of the world itself. Moreover, although in the handling of sacred matters and the celebration of festivals Moses had set the beginning of the year at springtime, yet it was not observed in all respects: for in the celebration of

the seventh year, in which rest was given to the land, and of the fiftieth year, which was the Jubilee, the beginning of the year had necessarily to be taken and reckoned from autumn; otherwise, if it had been taken from springtime, it would certainly have been necessary that the crops and produce of the sixth year, which in the month of Nisan were not ripe for harvest in Palestine, should utterly perish—which is contrary to divine Scripture, in which God promises that, on account of the rest of the seventh year, he will give a threefold yield of crops, namely for the sixth, seventh, and eighth year.

Marginal gloss: 'Levit. 25.' Argument that the sabbatical and Jubilee years (Leviticus 25) presuppose an autumn-reckoned year, since God's promise of a triple harvest (Lev 25:21) requires the agricultural year to begin in autumn.

To these things is added that it is certain that before the flood the times were numbered from the beginning of the world, and that the beginning of the year began from that time at which the origin of the world had been. It is also most like the truth that the flood began either in the middle or at the end of autumn; and since it lasted one hundred and fifty days, that is, five months, it occupied the whole winter. For although the Noachic flood could not have been brought about by the forces of nature alone, yet it must be believed that God, in bringing it about, made use of a fitting weather and an opportune time of year. Now we read in the 7th chapter of the book of Genesis that the flood began to come on the seventeenth day of the second month, that is, about November: therefore before the flood, the first month and the beginning of the year had been in autumn, namely at that time at which the world had been created by God: for if the year had then had its beginning in springtime, the flood would have begun about the month of May, and would have lasted the whole summer—at a season, that is, most alien and contrary to rains and inundations of waters.

Marginal gloss: 'That before the flood the beginning of the year was in autumn, and that the world was then created.' Cites Genesis 7:11 (the flood began on the 17th day of the second month). The argument from the season of the flood (autumn–winter, fit for rains) back to an autumn creation.

Finally, those in whose minds this opinion has settled think that it can be concluded even by this one argument that the world was made in autumn: that at the beginning of the world, as other things, so also the trees were produced in a perfect state, that is, with their fruits already ripe and perfect and fit for eating; for there was straightway need of such for the food of the living creatures and of men, since before the flood men's sustenance was not from the eating of flesh, but only of herbs and fruits. This too sacred Scripture plainly teaches, not only because it relates that on the third day, at God's command, the earth brought forth the fruit tree making fruit after its kind, but also because it teaches that God said to the first men, newly created: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all the trees that have in themselves the seed of their own kind, that they may be unto you for food; and to all the living creatures of the earth: And again he commanded the man, saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat, but of the tree...

Marginal glosses: 'Before the flood men were not accustomed to eat flesh'; 'Genes. 1'; 'Genes. 2'. The final argument: the trees were created with ripe fruit (autumn), since men's pre-flood diet was vegetarian. Embedded citations: Genesis 1:29 ('Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam...') and Genesis 2:16 ('Ex omni ligno paradisi comede...'). The quotation breaks at 'de ligno au[tem]...' and continues onto p. 134 (catchword 'gno au').

— p. 175 (PDF) · printed p. 134 —

...but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat. Eve too, to the serpent insidiously and malignantly asking, Why hath God commanded you, that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise? answered: Of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise we do eat: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise, God hath commanded us that we should not eat. And a little further Moses adds: The woman therefore saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. Of paradise too, when Moses spoke, he said: The Lord God brought forth from the ground every tree fair to behold, and sweet to eat. What more? The

works of God are perfect, but especially those which are done by him immediately and miraculously; and trees are then at last reckoned perfect when they have ripe fruits, fit for eating. But if at the beginning of the world the trees had ripe fruits, then surely it must be believed that the world was made not in spring but in autumn, for the ripening of fruits happens not in spring, but in autumn; for although in certain regions, namely the warmer ones, fruits ripen more quickly, yet in the earthly paradise, whose climate was most temperate, they could not ripen so early, that is, in springtime.

Completion (from p. 133) of the chain of scriptural quotations: Genesis 2:17 ('...the tree of knowledge'), Genesis 3:1–3 (the serpent and Eve), Genesis 3:6 ('Vidit igitur mulier'), and Genesis 2:9 ('Produxit Dominus Deus de humo'). Marginal glosses: 'Ibid.' (Gen 3) and 'Genes. 2'. The autumn-party's argument: trees were created with ripe fruit, and fruit ripens in autumn, not spring.

But this dart, although it seems exceedingly powerful, those who most pugnaciously defend the second opinion try to repel in various ways: for some reply that in the earthly Paradise there were also two fruitings of the trees each year, and two yields of produce, namely in spring and in autumn—just as others have recorded concerning India (Pliny), concerning the island of Taprobane (Solinus), and concerning the lands lying under the equator and between the two Tropics. But this is easily refuted: for that the earthly Paradise was not between the two Tropics, but on the near side of the Tropic of Cancer, that is, in Mesopotamia, or not far from that region, we shall prove below in the third book, which is about Paradise, with many and unquestionable arguments. Although, to refute that answer, there is argument enough in this: that not only the trees of Paradise were produced with ripe fruits, but also those that were outside Paradise; for it is to be understood of the whole earth, what God said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may make seed, and the fruit tree. Outside Paradise too there were animals, very many of which feed and are nourished on the fruits of trees; man also, who was to stay in Paradise but a very short time, unless the trees outside Paradise had borne ripe fruits, could not have sustained his life.

Marginal glosses: 'A reply to the preceding argument, and the refutation of that reply'; and 'Genes. 1'. First reply (twice-yearly fruiting in Paradise, citing Pliny on India, Solinus on Taprobane/Ceylon, and the equatorial/tropical lands) and Pererius's refutation (Paradise lay in Mesopotamia, not the tropics; and the fruit-bearing applied to the whole earth, Gen 1:11).

Others reply that the trees were created in springtime at the beginning of the world with ripe fruits, not by the faculty of nature, but by the supernatural power of God; and that, those fruits being plucked and removed, others were produced the following autumn according to the natural order, and by the natural force and power of the trees. But this is by no means probable, for fruits do not fall, or are not plucked, except after ripening: for they fall on account of cold that dries up and parches the glutinous humor...

Marginal gloss: 'Another reply, and the refutation of the same.' Second reply (miraculous spring fruit, then natural autumn fruit) begins; the refutation continues onto p. 135.

— p. 176 (PDF) · printed p. 135 —

...the glutinous and tenacious humor by which the leaves and fruits cling to the tree and hang from it: but this does not happen in springtime. Add, moreover, that the fruits to be ripened in autumn are prepared in the trees throughout almost the whole year: for through the winter the trees are filled with the generative and fruit-bearing moisture; in spring they send forth first leaves and flowers, as it were heralds and sureties of the coming fruit; in the summer season the fruits sprout, grow green, and increase, so that in autumn they attain ripeness and perfection. Wherefore, if in the spring season, together with the world, the trees had been produced laden with ripe fruits, it would surely have been necessary that the fruits should at once fall from the trees, to make room for the fruits to be ripened in autumn—which is foreign and repugnant to reason.

Completes the refutation of the second reply: the year-long natural cycle of fruit-formation argues against ripe fruit appearing in spring.

Others reply that the trees were produced with ripe fruits in springtime, namely miraculously and by the supernatural power of God; but that the following autumn there were no fruits on the trees, nor from then until the next autumn. But this is most disorderly, and least agrees with the beginnings of the world and with the power of nature, then most potent and most fertile for acting: to say nothing of the fact that throughout that whole year and a half neither the animals nor men could conveniently lead and preserve their life without fruits. Nor shall I be silent about another reply of certain men. Some say that in Paradise there were diverse kinds of fruits, and that some were to come forth in spring, others in autumn; nay, that there would be fruits in Paradise at any time of the year whatsoever. But we have taught above that not only the trees of Paradise, but also those that were outside Paradise—namely for the eating of all the living creatures and the sustenance of man, who was soon to be banished from Paradise—had to be produced with ripe fruits.

Marginal gloss: 'Yet another reply, with its refutation.' Third and fourth replies (miraculous spring fruit then a barren year; and diverse/year-round fruit in Paradise) and their refutations.

The last reply is, perhaps, more probable than the earlier ones: that in the first contriving of all things, because God so willed—and so it was fitting to be done—the trees were made in springtime with ripe fruits, and that God preserved them on the trees until the following autumn; but that thenceforth their generation and propagation took place by natural power, order, and manner, just as it now happens; or else that he did not preserve the fruits on the trees for so long a time, but the following autumn produced them miraculously, as he had done at first. It seems, therefore, that those who hold the world to have been founded in springtime must necessarily admit, besides the miracle of the first creation of the trees with ripe fruits, this further miracle also: either in producing other fruits the following autumn, or in preserving those first fruits on the trees until the following autumn. Unless we say that, outside Paradise, the trees which do not naturally bear ripe fruits before autumn were not then created with ripe

fruits, lest it be necessary to multiply miracles. Whence, then, outside Paradise, was there at that time food for man and the living creatures until autumn, for five...

Marginal gloss: 'Another reply, most approved by the author.' The fifth and (to Pererius) most probable reply, with the dilemma it forces on the spring-party (a second miracle either way). Sentence continues onto p. 136.

— p. 177 (PDF) · printed p. 136 —

...for five months, food for man and the living creatures? Partly from herbs, whose power to nourish before the flood was wondrous, and wondrous their wholesomeness and sweetness; partly from the fruits of trees which do fruit in spring, especially in warm and moist places, as in Mesopotamia, where man is believed first to have dwelt.

Completes the question from p. 135: the pre-flood diet of herbs and early-fruiting trees supplied food during the months before autumn.

But I wish here to advise the reader that, although in that tract of land in one part of which Paradise was founded, and where the first habitation of man was to be, the trees were produced with ripe fruits—because the time there was suitable and agreeable to the ripening of fruits—yet it was not in all places of the earth that the trees were made with ripe fruits: because that very time, with respect to certain parts of the earth, was midwinter, or the beginning of summer, at which time fruits can neither be produced nor preserved naturally. But God so produced things that they might thenceforth, through natural causes, both preserve themselves and generate others like themselves in their own time and manner. For if, where the fruits are ripe in autumn, there in spring, or midwinter, they had been produced ripe, they would doubtless have been created outside the time naturally agreeable to the ripening of fruits; and therefore they could neither have been preserved naturally, nor, in the following autumn, when according to the natural order they ought to be generated, could they have been naturally generated. For, as we indicated above, the ripeness of fruits

that is to come in autumn must be prepared throughout the whole year: since in winter it is prepared in the roots and within the tree itself, by drawing up and gathering the sap and the matter of the future offspring, as it were forming it in the womb; in spring it is prepared in the leaves and flowers; in summer the fruit is generated and gradually ripens, until in autumn it becomes perfectly ripe and fit for the eating of living creatures.

Marginal gloss: 'That at the beginning of the world the same season was not in all parts of the earth.' Pererius's resolution: trees were created ripe only where the season fitted; elsewhere with leaves/flowers, or bare—each region according to its own time.

It must therefore be thought that God made the trees on this third day perfect everywhere on earth as to substance and magnitude—which is the natural limit of growth—and likewise as to their faculties; but where there was then a time suitable for fruits, there he made them with fruits, elsewhere with leaves only or with flowers; in some places, where it was then winter, bare of fruits, flowers, and leaves: that is, the trees were then produced by God just as the season of each region required.

Conclusion of the spring-vs-autumn disputation: the trees were created in whatever state suited each region's season. Marginal gloss: 'God did not create all trees together with fruits everywhere.'

— p. 178 (PDF) · printed p. 137 —

THE WORK OF THE FOURTH DAY.

Section heading for the Fourth Day: the creation of the sun, moon, and stars (Genesis 1:14ff.).

And God said: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, etc. And God made two great lights. — Verse 14.

The scripture lemma for the Fourth Day, Genesis 1:14 and 1:16.

Catharinus, Eugubinus, and others who thought that the stars were created by God before this fourth day, the narrative of Moses in this place manifestly refutes: for thus it says, God said, Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, and it was so done: And God made two great lights,

and the evening and the morning were the fourth day. Surely, since Moses speaks of the creation of the stars in the same way as of the making of the other works which are narrated as done on the remaining five days, then, if the creation of the stars was made before the fourth day, but is recorded on that day, as these men say, by way of recapitulation, it might in like manner be supposed that the works of the other days were done before those days, and only commemorated on those days by way of recapitulation. And truly, if the stars were created before, why was their creation not described earlier by Moses, namely in its own place and time? Finally, all the Fathers contradict these men—the Fathers whom the Church has followed, which, in the hymn that is sung at Vespers on the fourth weekday, praises God for the creation of the stars made by him on the fourth day:

Marginal gloss: 'That all the stars were created on the fourth day is proved against Catharinus and Eugubinus.' Catharinus = Ambrosius Catharinus Politi; Eugubinus = Agostino Steuco of Gubbio. Pererius refutes their view (that the stars were made earlier and only 'recapitulated' on day four). The decorated initial begins 'Catharinum'. The hymn for Wednesday Vespers follows.

Most holy God of heaven, who paintest the shining center of the sky with fiery brightness, increasing it with comely light. Thou who, on the fourth day appointing the flaming wheel of the sun, dost order the course of the moon and the wandering courses of the stars, that thou mightest set for the nights, and as a boundary-line for [day's] parting, a most well-known sign for the beginnings of the months. So far there.

The Ambrosian hymn 'Caeli Deus sanctissime', sung at Wednesday (feria quarta) Vespers, celebrating the creation of the heavenly lights on the fourth day. 'Haec ibi' = 'thus far the passage there' (Pererius's tag closing the quotation).

Let us see, then, in what way the stars were made on this fourth day. For the stars are nothing other than the denser parts of the Heaven which have light and transmit it. But the heavens were created in the beginning, as we have taught above, perfect as to substance, the number of the orbs, magnitude, figure, and the density of some parts and the rarity of others: it necessarily follows that the stars, as to their matter—which is none other

than the substance of the Heaven—and as to figure, magnitude, and density, were made from the beginning. What, then, was lacking to them? Form, namely, which principally gives to a thing both its being and its name. And the form of a star is light itself, which on this fourth day was given to them, God filling those denser parts of the Heaven with dense light; there was given to them besides a proper motion, for the Moon is moved by one motion, Mercury by another, and likewise the stars by another: since indeed before this fourth...

Marginal glosses: 'What the stars are' and 'In what manner the stars were established, as regards light and motion.' Pererius's doctrine: the stars are the denser parts of the heavenly substance, made in substance/figure/magnitude at the first creation, but receiving their form (light) and proper motion on the fourth day. Sentence continues onto p. 138 ('...ante hunc quartum [diem]...').

— p. 179 (PDF) · printed p. 138 —

...before this fourth day, the heavens were moved in common by no other than the one motion of the first heaven; in the third place, there was given to the stars the force and power of producing various and wonderful effects, arising from the proper motion and the light of each star. Hieronymus Vielmius, in the twentieth lecture on the Hexameron, judges that on this day the parts of the Heaven that were to become stars were condensed by God, whereas before they were all uniformly rare. But he did not notice—a man otherwise learned in Theology and Philosophy—that, since the Heaven is incorruptible, its matter can in no way be varied as to magnitude, figure, density, and rarity. He says this was done by the omnipotence of God. But he needlessly drags in miracles, since without them the matter can be explained not only equally well, but even more conveniently. Although he cannot escape this difficulty: that, the Heaven being condensed in many of its parts—especially the eighth—it was necessarily made smaller than it had been before; wherefore between it and the ninth Heaven much empty space would be left, and with that interposed it could not be that the eighth Heaven and the other lower [orbs] should share in the motion of the ninth Heaven and the Primum Mobile—unless

he should imagine that, as much as some parts of the Heaven were condensed, just so much were others at the same time rarefied: which is to multiply miracles without cause.

Marginal gloss: 'Vielmius is refuted.' Completes (from p. 137) Pererius's account of the stars receiving form (light), proper motion, and causal power on day 4. He rejects Girolamo Vielmi's view (Lecture 20 on the Hexameron) that the star-parts were condensed at the fourth day, since the incorruptible heaven's matter cannot change density.

But someone will say: on the first day the light of the Sun was created, as we taught above, and even then the heavens had certain denser parts: how then did the Sun not at that time illumine them with its light, and so make them to be stars? To this it must be answered that the light of the first day was very thin, and, as Bede says, similar to the light of dawn; and therefore it could not, by filling those dense parts of the Heaven with light, make stars—although it is not certain (nay, to most learned men it seems false) that the other stars shine not by their own proper light, but only by a borrowed light and one mutuated from the Sun. But of what kind, and how manifold, was the increase of the Sun's light made on this fourth day, on account of which the Sun is truly said to have been created on this day, we showed above, when we expounded the work of the first day.

Marginal gloss: 'An objection, and the reply to it.' Why the first-day light did not already make stars: it was thin, dawn-like (Bede). Pererius doubts that the stars shine only by borrowed solar light.

Moreover, since the stars—both because they are of an incorruptible nature, and because they are the causes of all sublunary things—are prior to the plants both in the order of nature and in eminence of dignity: why did God establish them after the plants? Philo, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret (both here and in the third book of the Remedy for Greek Maladies, which is on the Demons), and finally Bede on the Hexameron, reply thus: that light and plants were created before the Sun and the stars, lest men should think that the Sun is the first and entire cause of light and of plants—seeing that now both light flows from the Sun, and the generation and perfection of plants depends on its light and motion—and

thence should snatch an occasion for idolatry. For God foresaw that there would be those who, beholding the beauty of the Sun, the Moon, and the other stars, and esteeming the so many and so great benefits which the human race perpetually and abundantly receives from them, would worship and venerate those stars as gods. Wherefore in the contriving of the world he was unwilling to create these first of all, so that, when men recalled in memory, and when...

Marginal gloss: 'Why the stars were created after the plants.' The Fathers' answer: light and plants precede the sun/stars to forestall idolatry (lest the sun be thought the source of light and life). Cites Philo, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret (Quaest. in Gen. and Graecarum affectionum curatio bk. 3), Bede. Sentence continues onto p. 139.

— p. 180 (PDF) · printed p. 139 —

...when they pondered in their mind the beginnings of the world, in which both light and plants were before the stars, they might understand that the things which now seem to depend on those stars depend by far most of all on God; and that honor and worship must be rendered, and thanks given, not to the stars on account of the benefits which they receive from them, but to God. For that not only the Gentiles, but the Jews too, lapsed into this kind of error, is sufficiently indicated by the frequent and very grave reproofs in the Prophets, of the Jews who worshipped the rising Sun, and sacrificed to the Moon as to the Queen of Heaven, and venerated all the host of Heaven. And Moses, forewarning and forearming the Hebrews against this error, admonishes them in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, lest, deceived by error on account of the beauty of the Sun, the Moon, and all the stars, they should adore and worship the things which God created for the service of all the nations that are under Heaven. But Job, rejoicing and as it were glorying that he had always been pure and free from this crime of impiety, says thus in the thirty-first chapter: If I beheld the Sun when it shined, and the Moon going in brightness, and my heart in secret rejoiced, and I kissed my hand with my mouth: which is a very great iniquity, and a denial against the most high God. Plato too, in the Cratylus,

teaches that the stars were the first gods, esteemed and worshipped by the ancients.

Marginal gloss: 'That the Jews of old often lapsed into the error of worshipping the stars as gods.' Cites Deuteronomy 4:19 and Job 31:26–28 against star-worship; Plato, Cratylus (the heavenly bodies as the first gods of the ancients).

It is worthwhile to set down the words of Saint Pope Leo bearing on the same view, from his homilies on the Nativity, which run thus. 'Far be it,' he says in the second homily,

Marginal gloss: 'The stars are devoid of all divinity.' Lead-in to two quotations from Leo the Great's Nativity sermons.

'...from Christian minds be all impious superstition and monstrous falsehood: the temporal things are beyond all measure distant from the eternal, the corporeal from the incorporeal, the subject from the ruler; and although these have a wondrous beauty, yet they have no godhead to be adored. That power therefore, that is the wisdom, that is the majesty to be worshipped, which created the universe of the world out of nothing, and by its omnipotent reason produced the earthly and the heavenly substance into the forms and measures that it willed. Let the Sun and the Moon and the stars be useful to those who use them, let them be beautiful to those who behold them: but in such a way that thanks for them be referred to their author, and that God be adored who founded them, not the creature which serves.'

Quotation from Leo the Great, Sermon on the Nativity (the 'second homily'). The stars are creatures devoid of divinity; worship is owed to the Creator alone.

And in the 7th homily Leo speaks thus:

Lead-in to the second Leo quotation (the seventh Nativity sermon, against astrology and sun-worship).

'There are added also those who falsely make the whole condition of human life depend on the effects of the stars, and say that what

belongs either to the divine will or to ours belongs to inflexible gods—which, however, that they may do more cumulative harm, they promise can be changed, if supplication be made to the stars that oppose. Whence the fabrication itself is destroyed by its own reasoning: for if the predicted things do not stand fast, the fates are not to be feared; if they do stand fast, the stars are not to be venerated. From such practices, too, that impiety is engendered, that the Sun, rising at the onset of the daily light, is adored by certain more foolish persons from the higher places: which some Christians even think they do so religiously that, before they come to the basilica of the blessed Apostle Peter, dedicated to the one living and true God, having climbed the steps by which one ascends to the platform of the upper court, they turn their bodies and face back toward the rising Sun, and with bent necks bow themselves in honor of the shining orb—which we greatly grieve and lament is done, partly by the fault of ignorance, partly by the spirit of paganism. For although some perhaps venerate rather the Creator of the beautiful light than the light itself, which is a creature,...'

Quotation from Leo the Great, Sermon on the Nativity (the 'seventh homily' = Sermo 27). Against astral fatalism and against the sun-worship practiced even by Christians on the steps of St. Peter's. The quotation continues onto p. 140.

— p. 181 (PDF) · printed p. 140 —

'...yet one must abstain from this very appearance of such an observance, which, when he who has abandoned the worship of the gods finds it among us, will he not retain with himself this part of his old opinion as probable, which he sees to be common to Christians and to the impious?' Thus Leo.

Conclusion (from p. 139) of the Leo quotation (Sermo 27): even well-meant sun-bowing must be shunned, lest the converted pagan think his old star-worship vindicated.

But why did God create the stars before the animals? Theodoret, in question 16 on Genesis, replies that the animals, having the sense of sight, could not bear the excellence and superabundance of that first light; but after that light was distributed into so many stars made on the fourth day, it rendered a splendor tolerable to the eyes of living creatures; whereas the kind of plants is wholly devoid of all sense. Others reply that the three latter days pertained to the adornment and completion of the world; wherefore it was fitting that the first of all the bodies of the world, which is the Heaven, should before the others be completed and adorned with stars on this fourth day. But why did God especially choose to create all the stars on the fourth day? 'To declare,' says Philo, 'the singular excellence and dignity of this work, by the symbol of the number four': whose virtues and praises others too treat subtly, and Philo pursues in a good long discourse.

Marginal glosses: 'Why the stars were created before the animals, according to Theodoret'; and 'Philo, in the book On the Making of the World.' Theodoret (Quaest. in Gen. 16): the first light was too strong for animal eyes; Philo, De opificio mundi: the symbolism of the number four.

But what became of that light which was created on the first day—whether it vanished when the Sun was created; or was impressed upon the Sun, as Basil and Damascene hold; or was distributed and dispersed into all the stars that were made on the fourth day, as Theodoret holds; or whether that light was a certain shining cloud, out of which afterward, on the fourth day, the Sun was formed, as seemed to Bede, Hugh, the Master of the Sentences, and very many others; or whether, on the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite, that light was none other than the light of the Sun, but at first unformed and imperfect, which on this fourth day was more perfectly formed and completed—we treated above, diligently and clearly enough, in expounding the work of the first day.

Marginal gloss: 'According to Bede, the Sun was created on the 21st day of March.' A survey of opinions on the fate of the first-day light: Basil & John Damascene (impressed on the sun), Theodoret (dispersed into the stars), Bede/Hugh of St Victor/Peter Lombard (a shining cloud from which the sun was formed), Dionysius the Areopagite (the unformed solar light later perfected).

Bede hands down, in the Hexameron, and more fully in the book On the Reckoning of Time, that on this fourth day—which was the day of Mercury (Wednesday) and the twelfth of the Kalends of April, that is, the twenty-first of March—the Sun, by its rising, entering the fourth degree of Aries, consecrated the first vernal equinox; wherefore the first day of the world was the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, that is, the eighteenth day of March. To these things Bede adds that the Moon was created at full moon, which is quite credible, that it was made by God in a perfect state, which is that of the full moon; for it was not fitting that the first Moon be created imperfect, especially since Moses says that God made the Moon to rule the night, that is, to illumine the night: but except at the time of full moon, the Moon does not fully and perfectly illumine the night. On the contrary, others contend that the light of the Moon, when it first rose, was imperfect, namely such as it is wont to have at the new moon: for since the Moon by its course marks off the months, it was fitting that the beginning of the first month be made from the first [new] Moon; but if it had been created at full moon, that would have been not the first, but the fifteenth day of the first month. Augustine, in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter...

Marginal gloss: 'Whether the Moon was created at full moon or at new moon.' Bede (De temporum ratione): the Sun made 21 March (entering Aries, the vernal equinox), the world's first day being 18 March; and the Moon created full. The opposing view: the Moon created new (so the first month begins from it). Sentence continues onto p. 141 (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.15).

— p. 182 (PDF) · printed p. 141 —

...according to the Letter, chapter fifteen, dares neither to affirm nor to reject either of these assertively, because neither opinion rests either on necessary reasons or on manifest testimonies of Scripture. Justin Martyr, in answering the 60th of the Questions of the Orthodox—why, after light was created on the first day, the stars were established on the fourth day?—replies in such a way that either his opinion is false, or it is necessary that that passage be notably corrupted and depraved.

Completes the citation of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.15 (he leaves the full/new-moon question open), and adds Justin Martyr, Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 60 (whose answer Pererius finds either false or textually corrupt).

Moreover, since Scripture in this place teaches that God made two great lights—I mean the Sun and the Moon—it will not be foreign to our purpose to discuss the magnitude of those bodies, so far as suffices to illustrate this passage. Concerning the magnitude of the Sun there were once various opinions of the Philosophers, which Plutarch reports in the book On the Doctrines of the Philosophers, chapter twenty-one. Anaximander made the body of the Sun equal to the earth, but the orb in which it is carried round twenty-seven times greater than the earth; Anaxagoras said it was larger than the Peloponnese; Heraclitus, a foot in breadth; Epicurus, either that it is just as great as it appears (an opinion which Laertius also fastens on Heraclitus), or a little greater or smaller. But its vast magnitude, accurately ascertained by the necessary reasonings of the Mathematicians, is agreed among all who are not utterly rude and unskilled in learning. First: its magnitude is understood from its comparison with the earth, whose entire globe—of land and water together—it exceeds one hundred and sixty-six times. Then the same is made plain by its comparison with the other bodies: for of the stars which the astrologers call of the first magnitude (and they count only fifteen of them in the eighth Heaven), each contains the magnitude of the earth not more than one hundred and seven times. By how much it is greater than the Moon can scarcely be believed: for the Mathematicians profess to have found, by demonstrations leaving no room for doubt, that it is greater than she six thousand five hundred and thirty-nine times over. This too gives an indication of how great a store of light the Sun has: that it alone, by its presence, makes the brightest day, all the darkness of night being utterly scattered and removed—which not even the conjoined light of all the other stars present at once can do, since they can dispel the darkness of the night not wholly, but only in some part. Add, too, that the Sun by its presence dims and hides the brightness of the other stars.

Marginal gloss: 'How great is the magnitude of the sun; the various opinions of the philosophers.' Cites Plutarch, De placitis philosophorum (the locus on the sun's size is bk. 2, ch. 20–21; the printed 'libri undecimi'/'eleventh book' is an error): Anaximander (sun = earth, orbit 27× earth), Anaxagoras (larger than the Peloponnese), Heraclitus (a foot wide), Epicurus (as it appears), with Diogenes Laertius. Pererius's own figures: sun = 166× the earth-and-water globe; first-magnitude stars = 107× the earth; sun = 6,539× the Moon.

Learned men are in doubt whether the Sun is the fount of all heavenly light, and whether all the stars owe to it all the light they have. For so it seemed to Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Bede, and not a few of the astrologers and theologians. Pliny, certainly, in the sixth chapter of the second book, says that the Sun lends out its light to the other stars on interest. For since it is agreed that the nature of all the stars is similar, and their account the same, and since it is manifest that the Moon receives its light from the Sun, it must be supposed that the rest of the stars do likewise: for in this way, from [their] roundness...

Marginal gloss: 'Whether all the stars receive their light from the Sun.' The view of Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Bede, and others, that the Sun is the source of all stellar light; Pliny (Natural History 2.6, 'the Sun lends light to the stars at interest'). Sentence continues onto p. 142 (catchword 'ditate').

— p. 183 (PDF) · printed p. 142 —

...from the roundness of the moon Aristotle argues that all the stars are round, in the second book of On the Heavens, text 59. Hugh, in the book of Annotations on Genesis, chapter 6, says: 'The Sun alone has its own light, and is itself made of fire; but all the rest of the stars, made of airy matter, shine back rather than shine.' But this is by no means approved by philosophers of finer judgment, nor indeed can it be persuaded by any sufficiently probable argument. For the case of the moon and of the other stars is not the same, nor that of the roundness of a star and of its reception of light; nor is it likely that that immense dance of heavenly fires in the eighth heaven—a heaven, namely, far nobler than the orb of the sun—shining with wondrous beauty, borrows and begs all its light from the sun. Especially since it seems agreeable to reason that those stars, which

seem to have powers and effects far different, should also have a dissimilar mode of light.

Completes (from p. 141) the question whether all stars borrow the sun's light. Cites Aristotle, De caelo 2 (text 59, on the roundness of stars) and Hugh of St Victor (Annotations on Genesis, ch. 6). Pererius rejects the view that the fixed stars merely reflect solar light.

Blessed Augustine, in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 16, says that it is manifestly known from divine Scripture that the brightness of the stars is unequal, the Apostle saying in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 15: One is the brightness of the sun, another of the moon, and another of the stars; and star differs from star in brightness. But whether the stars receive their light from the sun or not cannot be gathered and established from the sacred writings. Augustine soon adds: that it has seemed to some that certain stars in the heaven are larger than the sun; which, however, is false, as is plain not only by mathematical reasons, but also in the book of Ecclesiasticus sacred Scripture argues: What, it says, is brighter than the sun? Moreover it is established by this reasoning that the sun is the greatest of the stars, because we experience that the preservation, governance, and every kind of change of this our world depend more on the one sun than on all the other stars together. But concerning the excellence of the sun, and its manifold and wondrous force and power in its places, Dionysius philosophizes divinely in the book On the Divine Names, chapter 1, part 4.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.16, citing 1 Corinthians 15:41 (the disparate brightness of sun, moon, stars) and Ecclesiasticus 17:30 / 42:16 ('What is brighter than the sun?'). Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus 4 (the sun as image of the Good).

But since Moses in this place calls the Sun and the Moon two great lights, someone might perhaps suppose that, after the Sun, the Moon is the greatest of the other stars. Basil indeed, in expounding this passage of Genesis, teaches in plain words that, after the sun, the greatest star of heaven is the Moon. And the same Augustine, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 16, gathers from Scripture itself, which

here calls the sun and the moon great lights. 'Certainly,' he says, 'let them concede at least this to our eyes, that those two bodies manifestly shine more than the rest upon the earth, and that the day does not grow bright except by the light of the Sun, nor does the night, with so many stars shining, shine as it does if the Moon be absent—just as it is illumined by her presence.' But the Mathematicians teach that it is otherwise, among whom it is established that all the fixed stars notable and conspicuous to sight, which are numbered one thousand and twenty-two, are far larger than the Moon: seeing that she is thirty-nine times smaller than the earth, whose mass, however, the aforesaid stars exceed eighteen times; and of the planets, except the one Mercury, the rest are larger than the Moon. And so, as the Sun is the greatest of all the stars, so Mercury is the smallest, and after him the Moon. Why then is the Moon, [larger] than the rest of the stars...

Marginal gloss: 'Whether the Moon is, after the sun, the greatest of all the stars.' Basil (Hexameron, on this passage) and Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 2.16) place the moon second to the sun, but the astronomers reckon otherwise: the 1,022 notable fixed stars exceed the earth 18×, while the moon is 39× smaller than the earth—so the moon is in fact the smallest star but for Mercury. Sentence continues onto p. 143.

— p. 184 (PDF) · printed p. 143 —

...larger than the rest of the stars, and seem to us almost equal to the sun? Doubtless because it is the nearest and most neighboring to the earth; wherefore both the vast distance of the others from the earth, and the very near nearness of the Moon to us, make so great a dissimilarity of appearance. But if the Moon, except for Mercury alone, is really the smallest of all the stars, someone will ask why divine Scripture calls it a great light. Is it because it is reckoned larger than the rest by the judgment of the eyes and the estimation of the common people? Or is it called a great light on account of that for the sake of which God established it—namely, to illumine the night?—for in this it surpasses the other stars. Or because its forces and effects in the elements, metals, plants, living creatures, and the

human body are more notable and conspicuous than those of the other stars (I except the one Sun)? Or finally, in that which is to serve for times, signs, days, months, and years, does the Moon, after the sun, excel the rest of the stars? especially among the Jews, who sought from the Moon the distinction not only of the months but also of the years, and the reckoning of the feast days, which they kept at various seasons of the year: as is set forth in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 43, in these words: The moon is in all things in its season, a declaration of times, and a sign of the world (or: of the age). From the moon is the sign of the feast day, a light that is diminished at its completion.

Marginal gloss: 'Why the Moon, though in truth nearly the smallest of all the stars (except for the sun [i.e., the smallest but for the sun's exception]), seems the greatest, and is called a great light by Moses.' The moon appears great only by nearness; it is called 'great' for its role in lighting the night and governing times. Cites Ecclesiasticus 43:6–8.

But why does Moses make mention here of the sun and the moon, but not likewise of the other five planets? Is it because in commemorating the Sun and the Moon he wished the others to be understood? Or because he comprehended them under the one general word 'stars'? Or rather, because their proper motion, effects, use, and difference from the other stars is known only to learned men, did he therefore forbear to enumerate them here? Certainly, of those five, mention is made in Scripture of Lucifer alone, which is the star of Venus, in Isaiah and in Job. Many things might here be disputed about the stars, things truly excellent and most worthy to be known and recorded; many things too about the divination which is sought from the stars, which some have wished to prop up and adorn by the authority of Moses, who relates in this place that God made the stars to be for times, days, and years, and for signs—namely, for foreknowing and foretelling future things. But these matters, because they ought neither to be cramped into a narrow space, nor said in passing, but treated with subtlety and care, will be more conveniently set forth separately in another book, which will follow next after this, in which we shall treat most fully of the heavens and the stars.

Marginal glosses: 'Why, of the seven planets, Moses here mentions only two, that is, the sun and the moon'; and 'Isaiah 14. Job 38.' Why Moses names only sun and moon; only Venus (Lucifer) is named elsewhere (Isaiah 14:12; Job 38:32). Pererius defers astrology to a later book (his treatise on the heavens). Cites Genesis 1:14 ('the stars for times, days, years, and signs'). This closes the commentary on the Fourth Day.

— p. 185 (PDF) · printed p. 144 —

THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY.

Section heading for the Fifth Day: the creation of the water-creatures and birds (Genesis 1:20ff.).

God also said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven. And God created the great whales, and so forth. — Verse 20.

The scripture lemma for the Fifth Day, Genesis 1:20–21.

In the first three days God distinguished the world, that is, the three primary bodies: the heaven, the water, and the earth. For on the first day, light being made, he distinguished day from night, light from darkness; on the second day, by the firmament, he separated the heavenly waters from the earthly waters; on the third day he sundered the water from the earth—for the plants then produced are reckoned as parts of the earth, seeing that, fixed by their roots in the earth, they arise, are nourished, and grow from it. But in the remaining three days the same three bodies their founder God both adorned and filled with various kinds of things, keeping exactly the same order: for on the fourth day he decorated and completed the heaven with stars, on the fifth the water with fishes, on the sixth day the earth with land animals. And for this reason the water-creatures were created before the land-creatures, although in the order of generation nature is wont to send the more imperfect things first.

Marginal gloss: 'In the first three days the three primary bodies were created; in the three following they were adorned.' The structural parallel: days 1–3 distinguish heaven/water/earth, days 4–6 adorn each in turn. The decorated initial begins 'Primis'.

Now the fishes are, as a whole kind, more imperfect than the land animals—not indeed because the fishes lack memory, as Basil says in his eighth homily on Genesis, for this Augustine rightly refutes in the third book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter eight, since experience teaches the contrary, and by the reasoning whereby it is proved that whatever animals have been given local motion, by which the necessities of living are sought and procured, to these memory was necessary, lest their motion be carried on wandering and uncertain. The fishes, then, are more imperfect, as is plain from many arguments: for that the temperament of their body is much more imperfect, an indication is the scanty nourishment which fishes afford; wherefore even to those fasting and intent on the maceration of the body, to whom the eating of land animals is forbidden, the eating of fish is nevertheless allowed. In fishes, too, the shaping and arrangement of the members is more obscure. Next, fishes have all their senses, both interior and exterior, feeble and imperfect, since they live in water, which is a grosser body than air. Besides, fishes can never be tamed by man, nor do they allow themselves to be handled by him, nor can they be taught anything, nor are they capable of human familiarity and society—I except a few, such as the Dolphin, of whose...

Marginal glosses: 'Basil, who says that fish lack memory: refuted by St. Augustine'; and 'Why fish are permitted to those who fast.' Cites Basil, Hexameron homily 8, and Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.8 (fish do have memory, since local motion requires it). Arguments for the imperfection of fish (poor temperament, scanty nourishment, dull senses, untamable). Sentence continues onto p. 145.

— p. 186 (PDF) · printed p. 145 —

...docility and love toward men, and society and familiarity with men, marvels are told, both by others and especially by Pliny in the ninth book, chapter eight, and by Plutarch in the book in which he disputes whether there is reason in brutes, and whether there is more reason in the water-creatures than in the land-creatures.

Completes (from p. 144) the exception of the Dolphin to the rule that fish cannot be tamed. Cites Pliny, Natural History 9.8 (on dolphins), and Plutarch, De sollertia animalium (Whether land or sea

animals are cleverer).

Cajetan proves that fishes are more imperfect than land animals by this argument: that the whole kind of fishes is oviparous, and in no part viviparous, whereas of the land animals very many are viviparous. But that this is false Basil demonstrates in his seventh homily, making two kinds of viviparous fishes, namely the Cartilaginous and the cetaceans, such as dolphins and the sea-calf (seal). Pliny, in the ninth book, chapter thirteen, speaking of fishes, says: 'Those which are clothed with hair bring forth a living animal, as the saw-fish, the whale, the seal.' And in chapter 51 of the same book: 'The torpedo,' he says, 'is found having eighty young: it brings forth within itself very soft eggs, transferring them to another place of the womb, and there hatching them. In like manner all those which we have called cartilaginous.' So it happens that fishes alone both bring forth a living animal and conceive eggs.

Marginal glosses: 'Cajetan on Genesis'; and 'Philo in the book On the Making of the World.' Cajetan's argument (all fish oviparous) is refuted by Basil (Hexameron homily 7) and Pliny (Natural History 9.13 and 9.51, on cartilaginous fish and the torpedo/electric ray): some fish are viviparous.

Philo hands down that the creation of animals began on the fifth day for this reason: that an animal is an animal on account of sense; and that there are five senses, which number agrees with the fifth day, on which animals began to be created. But the reasoning is frivolous, for an animal, in order to be an animal, does not need five senses, but touch alone; and since certain animals are endowed with this one alone, they lack the other senses; and besides the five external senses, there are other interior senses in the perfect animals.

Philo, De opificio mundi (the five senses correspond to the fifth day). Pererius rejects the numerological argument: touch alone constitutes an animal, and there are also interior senses.

Saint Augustine, in book 3 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 4, thinks that on this fifth day the fishes were not created in act, but only causally and potentially—that is, that power was then given to the waters to

procreate fishes in their own time. But this by no means agrees with the narrative of Moses, who says that the water brought forth on the fifth day all the kinds of fishes, and speaks here no otherwise than above concerning the production of light, the firmament, and the stars. Add that, if the fishes—especially the perfect ones—are not now created in act by God, they could never afterward have been generated by nature, since they can be naturally generated only from their like. But God, after these six days, lets the nature of each thing, founded by himself, naturally preserve and propagate itself; for from the mode of producing things immediately by God, through his own omnipotence, God rested on the seventh day.

Marginal gloss: 'According to Augustine, on the fifth day the fish were not created in act.' Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.4 (the 'causal' creation). Pererius objects: the fish were made actually, like the works of the other days, else they could not propagate.

But what is read in this place according to the Latin reading—Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature—has greater emphasis in the Hebrew. For the word is ■■■ (sharatz), signifying not any production whatever, but production in the greatest plenty, fruitfulness, and abundance, like a kind of welling-up and bubbling-forth: so that from this very thing may be proved the commonly bruited opinion, and confirmed by the wise, that the generation of fishes is far more fruitful and copious than that of the other animals—of which a sufficiently manifest sign is the vast quantity of eggs which is found in fishes...

The Hebrew verb ■■■ (sharatz, 'to teem, swarm'; transliterated 'Saras' by Pererius) in Genesis 1:20 conveys teeming abundance, not mere production—evidence of the extraordinary fecundity of fish. Sentence continues onto p. 146 (catchword 'venitur', completing 'invenitur').

— p. 187 (PDF) · printed p. 146 —

...is found, from which one may understand that the multitude and variety of fishes is greater than of other animals. This Aristotle too attests, in book 3 On the Generation of Animals, chapter 11, in these words: Hence it also comes about that the things which are begotten in moisture are more

manifold than those that are begotten on land, for moisture has a nature more apt for fashioning and forming than the earth. In agreement with this Pliny writes, in chapter 2 of book 9: for when he had said that the things which are in the waters are both more and greater than the land-creatures, he adds: The cause, he says, is evident—the exuberance of moisture; many monstrous things too are found there, the seeds and first principles being entangled and rolled together within themselves now this way now that, now by blast, now by wave: so that the common opinion proves true, that whatever is born in any part of nature is also in the sea, and besides many things which are nowhere else. Thus Pliny, with which agree the things David sang in Psalm 103: This great and spacious sea by the hands [of the Lord]; there are creeping things without number.

Completes (from p. 145) the argument for the fecundity of fish. Cites Aristotle, De generatione animalium 3.11; Pliny, Natural History 9.2; and Psalm 103 (104):25–26 ('this great and spacious sea... creeping things without number').

But why did the Latin Translator call the fishes 'creeping things,' since that seems to suit only land-creatures? Without doubt he followed the Seventy Translators, who in Greek rendered it τ■ ■ρπετ■, that is, in Latin 'Reptilia' (creeping things). But Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 15, distinguishes 'creeping thing' thus. Every animal, he says, that moves, either moves by impelling itself forward—and this it does either by feet, and is a walker, or by wings, and is a flyer; or it moves itself by drawing itself outward, and this can happen in four ways: either by drawing itself by the force of the mouth, as worms; or by the force of the ribs and belly, as serpents; or by the force of little fins, as fishes; or finally they are said to creep not properly, as lizards and newts, which, although they have feet, have them small, and lift themselves little from the ground, and apply a great part of the body to the earth while they move: wherefore these too are said to creep. See Hugh in the book of Annotations on Genesis, chapter 7, where he makes three kinds of creeping things. The fishes, therefore, because they likewise in a certain way move in the

waters, as those which are truly creeping things do on land, are for that reason called 'creeping things' by the Latin Translator and the Seventy, although the Hebrew word does not properly signify this.

Marginal gloss: 'Why the fishes are called creeping things.' The Septuagint's τ■ ■ρπετ■ ('creeping things') for Genesis 1:20. Cites Bonaventure (Sentences 2, dist. 15) on the kinds of motion, and Hugh of St Victor (Annotations on Genesis, ch. 7).

But concerning that phrase, God created the great whales, it must be known that for 'whales' the Hebrew has ■■■■■■■ (ha-tanninim), which word signifies dragons; and by the same name both land dragons and sea dragons are called. Nor do the whales and the greatest fishes seem to be anything else in the waters than the dragons and serpents on land. We find elsewhere in Scripture huge fishes named dragons, as in Psalm one hundred forty-eight: Dragons, and all you deeps; and in Isaiah twenty-seven it is said: He shall slay the whale that is in the sea—by which is signified him who widely held the empire of the sea; and in Ezekiel thirty-two, speaking of Pharaoh King of Egypt: Thou art likened, he says, to the dragon that is in the sea; and in chapter twenty-nine, Behold, I come against thee, Pharaoh king of Egypt, thou great dragon, that liest in the midst of thy rivers, etc. Not, therefore, by 'whales' is some one species of fish understood, but all fishes of larger form and vaster body. And Moses made mention especially of the dragons, or whales, to remove the error of those who thought (so Cajetan holds) that such anima[ls]...

Marginal glosses: 'What kind of fish the whales are'; and 'Cajetan on Genesis.' The Hebrew ■■■■■■■ (ha-tanninim, 'the dragons/sea-monsters') for the 'cete grandia' of Genesis 1:21. Scriptural parallels: Psalm 148:7; Isaiah 27:1; Ezekiel 32:2 and 29:3 (Pharaoh as the great dragon). Sentence continues onto p. 147.

— p. 188 (PDF) · printed p. 147 —

...such animals were not made from the counsel and purpose of God, but by accident, as from a necessity of matter; or, so that, if you know God to be the creator of the huge beasts of the sea, it may be much more easily believed [that he is creator] of the rest, the smaller ones.

Completes (from p. 146) Cajetan's account of why Moses names the great whales: to refute those who held the monsters arose by chance, and to make God's creatorship of lesser things the more credible.

But someone will ask, why did Moses not, as among the water-creatures, so likewise among the plants and land animals, make mention of certain species properly and by name? Some reply that there are not found in the others, as in the fishes, things which have so prodigious and scarcely credible a mass of body. For whales, as Basil and Theodoret say, when they raise their backs above the waters, present the appearance of a huge island. Pliny, in the ninth book, chapter thirty, writes: that the whales of the Indian sea are four acres in size; the saw-fishes two hundred cubits; the eels in the Ganges three hundred feet. And in the thirty-second book, chapter one, he cites Juba king of Mauretania, who in the volumes written to Caius Caesar, son of Augustus, hands down that sea-beasts six hundred feet long and three hundred and sixty wide enter an Arabian river. But that trees of no less height are found is plain from what Pliny writes in the sixteenth book, chapter 40, and from what both Strabo and Pliny have recorded about the Indian trees. Certainly in the ninth book, chapters 12, 13, 14, Pliny writes wonderful things about the size of dragons and serpents: he says the Indian dragons are of so great a size that they easily embrace the largest elephants in their coils and bind them with the knot of their fold; the Ethiopian [serpents] are twenty cubits; and he confirms, on the testimony of Megasthenes, that the Indian serpents are wont to grow to such size that they swallow stags and the like. Famous is the serpent at the river Bagrada, a hundred and twenty feet long, stormed like some town by the commander Regulus with ballistas and engines. A marvel indeed seems what Aelian reports in the fifteenth book of the History of Animals, chapter twenty-one.

Marginal gloss: 'The enormous size of certain fish.' Why Moses names sea-monsters but not particular land species: nothing on land matches the bulk. Cites Basil and Theodoret (whales like islands); Pliny, Natural History 9.30 (whales 4 acres, saw-fish 200 cubits, Ganges eels 300 ft), 32.1 (Juba's sea-beasts), 16.40 (tall trees), 9.12–14 (Indian/Ethiopian dragons and serpents, Megasthenes; the serpent of the Bagrada killed by Regulus). Strabo on Indian trees. Aelian, De natura animalium 15.21 follows.

“Alexander,” he says, “when among the Indians he found very many other animals, found also a dragon, which, because the Indians thought it sacred in a certain cave and worshipped it with the utmost devotion, they therefore besought Alexander with prayers not to make an assault upon it; and this indeed he granted. But the dragon, when it perceived the din of the army (being an animal endowed with a most keen and most acute sense both of hearing and of sight), with a very great hiss and mighty blast issuing forth, terrified and threw all into confusion; it was reckoned to be seventy cubits long—for it did not appear to them whole, but only its head jutted out from the cave; its eyes are said to have reached the size of a great Macedonian shield.” Thus far Aelian.

Quotation from Aelian, De natura animalium 15.21: the giant sacred dragon of India spared by Alexander, seventy cubits long, with eyes the size of a Macedonian shield.

Things not unlike these Olaus Magnus relates, in the forty-fourth chapter of the twenty-first book of his History of the Northern Peoples. Nonetheless, that the animals in the waters are larger than those on land both the history of the ancients attests and experience today confirms, and the abundance of watery matter, and its aptitude for extension to any degree, so persuades.

Olaus Magnus, Historia de gentibus septentrionalibus 21.44 (the sea-monsters of the North).

— p. 189 (PDF) · printed p. 148 —

Now to declare so great a mass and multiplication of fishes, God is said in a special way to have blessed the fishes, saying, Increase and multiply; and 'blessing' in Hebrew is called ■■■ (barakh), a word by which plenty and abundance are designated—namely to indicate the well-nigh infinite multitude and variety of fishes. The Hebrews, however, say that God blessed the water-creatures and not the land-creatures for this reason: that among the latter was the serpent soon to be cursed. Origen thinks that the word Increase pertains to the growth of the body, but the word Multiply to the enlargement of the multitude, which comes about by propagation. But

not rightly; for in place of Increase the Hebrew has ■■■ (peru), that is, 'be fruitful'—for the offspring of an animal is such as is the fruit of a tree.

Marginal gloss: 'What it means that God blessed the fishes.' The Hebrew ■■■ (barakh, 'to bless') connotes abundance; the Hebrews' reason for blessing sea-creatures not land-creatures (the serpent). Pererius corrects Origen: the Hebrew of Genesis 1:22 is ■■■ (peru, 'be fruitful'), not 'grow in body.'

Concerning the various kinds of fishes, and the marvels that are found in this kind of animal, let the reader consult Pliny, books 9 and 32, and also Isidore, in the twelfth book of the Etymologies, chapter 6, in which place the species of all aquatic creatures, one hundred and forty-four, are handed down according to Pliny—although Pliny himself, in book 9, chapter 14, says that the species of fishes are 74, besides those covered with shells, of which there are thirty species. But these men speak of the fishes known in their own time and to themselves only. The author of the fourth book of Esdras, chapter 6, hands down some fable or other about two fishes created by God, the one he calls Enoch, the other Leviathan. Certainly Scripture, both in Isaiah and in Job, calls a fish of huge bulk and wondrous size Leviathan; for the Seventy Translators too, in those places, rendered it in Greek 'cete' (whale).

Cites Pliny (NH 9, 32) and Isidore (Etymologies 12.6, the 144 species; Pliny NH 9.14 reckons 74 fish + 30 crustaceans); 4 Esdras 6:49–52 (the two creatures—here oddly named 'Enoch' and Leviathan; the standard text has Behemoth and Leviathan); and Leviathan in Isaiah 27:1 and Job 40–41 (rendered 'cete' by the Septuagint).

Furthermore, as to what Moses says, that the fishes were produced from the waters, it may be asked how this is to be understood: whether it signifies that the fishes were produced from the waters as from matter, or as from an efficient cause; but in neither way does it seem to be true. For fishes, since they are perfect mixtures, do not consist of water alone, but of the four elements; nor in them does water surpass the rest, but earth, as Aristotle hands down in the second book On Generation and Corruption, text fifty-one. Nor will water truly be called the maker and procreator of fishes; since there are many kinds of fish which are generated only from seed, and

only from others like themselves according to species. But to this it must be answered that the fishes are said by Moses to have been produced from the waters as from matter—not because they are wont, or even can, be generated naturally from water alone, but because in them water predominates, not indeed as to gravity, but as to humidity and coldness, and by reason of the temperament of fishes, which is plainly watery; and because water is the natural place of their habitation, generation, and preservation, outside which they can neither be born, nor be well, nor exercise their natural actions, nor preserve their life. But those first fishes were generated immediately by God from the matter of water alone, with the forms and qualities of the other elements added, however, to that matter.

Marginal gloss: 'In what way the fish are said to be produced from water.' Pererius's resolution: water is neither sole matter nor efficient cause; fish are 'from the waters' as matter because water predominates in their watery temperament and is their natural element. Cites Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione 2 (text 51).

— p. 190 (PDF) · printed p. 149 —

Moreover, it contains a vast and not easily explicable difficulty, that the Latin translator in this place, following without doubt the Seventy Translators, has thus: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature of living soul and the flying thing over the earth under the firmament of heaven—by which words it seems to be signified that on this fifth day, as the fishes, so also the birds were made from the same element of water. And so nearly all the ecclesiastical writers, both ancient and more recent, think, and so interpret this passage. But Rupert, in the first book On the Works of the Trinity, chapter fifty, against this sense of the words of Moses—which he himself approves—objects this: that if the birds had been produced from the waters in like manner as the fishes, they ought likewise, as the fishes, to dwell in the waters, whereas all of them dwell either in the air or on the earth. To this he replies thus: that the birds were not produced from the dense matter of water, such as is that which is

properly called water, but from a thinner and as it were cloudy water; so that by 'water' in this place is to be understood not only what is commonly and properly called water, that is, a liquid and fluid body, but also a thinner water, such as is vapor or cloud.

Marginal gloss: 'A disputation, whether the birds were created from water.' Genesis 1:20 seems to derive birds, like fish, from the water. Rupert of Deutz (De operibus Trinitatis, bk. 1, ch. 50) objects but resolves it: birds came from a 'thinner, cloudy water' (vapor/cloud).

The same Augustine hands down, in the third book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter three; for he says that by the word 'water' is to be understood the air nearest the earth, in which the birds fly, which is wholly watery, both on account of the vapors lifted on high from the earth and the waters through the air, and on account of the so frequent fall of rains upon the earth. Whatever therefore of waters, says Augustine, is either fluidly billowy and flowing, or vaporously rarefied and suspended—so that the former appears assigned to the creeping things of living souls, the latter to the flying things—each, however, is reckoned of a humid nature. Thus Augustine. The same is intimated by Blessed Thomas, in the first part, question seventy-one, article one.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.3 (the lower air as 'watery,' assigning fish to liquid water and birds to vaporous water); both belong to 'humid nature.' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 71, a. 1.

Eugubinus, in the Cosmopoeia, judges that both birds and fishes had their first origin from elemental water, from which he thinks the air too was first produced. But although the first making of birds came from the waters, the generation and propagation of them which followed thereafter is not from the waters, but each from its own seeds and first principles. Yet that even now very many birds dwell in the waters, and are generated because of the waters, is an argument of the first origin and production of birds from the waters. This too Jerome intimates in the eighty-third Epistle, which he wrote to Oceanus, in these words: First, what lives comes forth from the waters, and raises the winged faithful from earth to heaven. In this opinion

also Saint Ambrose seems to have been, the author of that hymn which is sung at Vespers on the fifth weekday (Thursday):

Agostino Steuco of Gubbio (Eugubinus), Cosmopoeia (birds and fish from elemental water). Jerome, Epistle 83 (to Oceanus). Lead-in to the Ambrosian hymn for Thursday Vespers.

God of great power, who, the race that has its origin from the waters, partly dost send back to the deep, partly dost raise into the air: thrusting the one sunk down into the waters, allotting the other borne up to the skies; so that, though brought forth from one stock, they may take to themselves diverse places.

The Ambrosian hymn 'Magnae Deus potentiae' (here 'Magna Deus potentia'), sung at Thursday (feria quinta) Vespers, on the creatures brought forth from the waters and divided between sea and sky—fitting the Fifth Day.

— p. 191 (PDF) · printed p. 150 —

From this common doctrine and opinion, however, Cajetan and Catharinus and Jerome Vielmi (in the twenty-second lecture on the Hexameron) departed—and not indeed unskilfully or rashly, since both in the Hebrew text and in the Chaldee paraphrase the passage stands much otherwise here than in the Latin version, and a far different sense is rendered. The Hebrew, if rendered into Latin word for word, sounds thus: Let the water make to creep the creeping thing of living soul, and let the flying thing fly over the earth over the face of the expanse of heaven. The Chaldee paraphrase has thus: Let the water make to move the creeping thing of living soul, and let the bird fly over the earth alongside the face of the expanse of the heavens. Hence it appears that Moses in this place does not hand down that the birds were produced from the waters; nay rather, that they were made from the earth he himself teaches in the plainest words in chapter 2 of this book, in which, both in Hebrew and in Chaldee, in Greek and in Latin, it reads thus: The Lord God therefore, having formed out of the ground all the animals of the earth, and all the fowls of the air, brought them to Adam—and what follows: from which it is clear that the birds, like the land animals, were

generated from the earth.

Marginal gloss: 'That the birds were created not from the waters, but from the earth.' Cajetan, Ambrosius Catharinus, and Girolamo Vielmi (Lecture 22) read Genesis 1:20 as 'let the birds fly,' not 'let the waters bring forth birds'; and Genesis 2:19 ('formed out of the ground... the fowls of the air') confirms birds came from earth.

Saint Augustine, in the first chapter of the ninth book On Genesis according to the Letter, attempts in two ways to answer this testimony of Scripture. First he says that the phrase 'out of the ground' pertains only to the land animals, not to the birds. But the conjunction 'and' stands in the way, showing that 'out of the ground' is to be understood conjointly of both the land animals and the birds. Then he says that by the name 'earth' is sometimes signified in Scripture, together with the earth, the water itself as well; but this too he does not prove well, as is plain to one who considers the testimonies he brings forward; nor, even were it so, would it help his opinion. For he himself holds that the birds were generated from the cloudy and vaporous air, which is nowhere signified by the word 'earth,' as is the water which glides through the earth and is contained in it, making one body with it.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 9.1, twice tries to reconcile Gen 2:19 with birds-from-water; Pererius finds both attempts inadequate.

And indeed, in the other works of God—namely in the stars, the fishes, the land animals, and in man himself—there is seen a certain great agreement between the thing produced and the element from which, or in which, it is said to have been produced: as between the stars and the heaven, between the fishes and the water, between the land animals and the earth. But between birds and water there is no agreement, for birds are neither generated nor live in the waters, nor is the temperament of their body watery, but earthy, or rather airy. And this too gains credence from the fact that, as Moses here relates, God commanded the birds to be multiplied not in the waters like the fishes, but upon the earth; and Scripture likewise calls birds the fowls not of the water, but of the heaven, that is, of the air.

Besides, it is the opinion of the theologians that in these three latter days there were created by God, in each single element, the things by which that element is adorned and filled; but the birds adorn and fill not the water but the air, so that they ought rather to have been created from the air than from the water. Wherefore, that the Latin translation too may express this opinion, which is most true, when it says here: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature of living soul, and the flying thing over the earth—in that phrase, 'And the flying thing,' it is not to be understood that 'Let the waters bring forth' is repeated, as most...

Marginal glosses: 'A great agreement between the thing produced and the element from which it is produced'; and 'The opinion of the Theologians about the things created in the three last days.' The argument from fitness: birds belong to the air, not the water. Sentence continues onto p. 151.

— p. 192 (PDF) · printed p. 151 —

...most have supposed, but the word 'Let it fly' must be supplied, as the Hebrew and Chaldee reading has it. For if that word 'Let it bring forth' were repeated and understood, the sense would surely be rendered absurd: for how would the water bring forth birds over the earth, which rises above the waters? and to what end should the waters bring forth birds under the firmament of heaven? Are not the fishes too, and the other living creatures, under the firmament of heaven? But if the word 'Let it fly,' which is in the Hebrew, is understood, the sense is most correct and most plain.

Completes (from p. 150) the grammatical point: Genesis 1:20's 'et volatile super terram' requires the verb 'let it fly' (from the Hebrew), not a repeated 'let the waters bring forth.'

Nevertheless, from these there arise two doubts. One is: if the birds were not produced from the waters like the fishes, why did Moses, in narrating the production of the water-creatures, make mention of the flying things? The other is: why did Moses not here expressly say that the birds were produced from the earth, as the fishes from the waters? But the first doubt is explained in this manner. The birds were made on the same day as the fishes, as Moses clearly teaches when he says: God created the great

whales, and every living and moving creature, which the waters brought forth according to their kinds, and every winged fowl according to its kind. For if the birds had been made not on the fifth day but on the sixth, there would have been no reason why on the fifth day Moses should make mention of the birds before their creation—especially since on the sixth day no word is said about the creation of the birds, nor would it have been fitting for it to be wholly passed over by Moses.

Marginal gloss: 'Two objections.' First doubt: why mention birds in the fifth-day narrative? Answer: because birds were in fact made on the fifth day (Genesis 1:21). Sixth day says nothing of birds.

Next, there is a great likeness and a great kinship between birds and fishes. Whether you regard the natural place of each, that is, water and air: for both are bodies transparent, humid, and easily stirred, which readily yield; and the air, too, is full of watery moisture, and most readily changeable into water. Or whether you consider the bodily conformation of each kind of animal, in both there is lightness and agility: there is a great likeness between the fins of fishes and the wings of birds, between the scales of the former and the feathers of the latter; both lack ears, and perform the office of ears through certain passages; they have no bladder, lest it should hinder flight, nor breasts, nor milk, as Aristotle hands down in the second book On the Parts of Animals, chapter 12, and book 3, chapter 8, and book 3 of the History of Animals, chapter 20. And many kinds of birds are aquatic, such as swans, geese, coots, divers, cranes, ducks, halcyons (or, according to Varro, alcedones, kingfishers), which mostly dwell in the waters. Finally, whether you regard the manner of motion of each: for such as is the swimming of fishes in the waters, such is the flight of birds in the air, so that it may not unaptly be said that fishes are aquatic birds, and birds are aerial fishes. Each animal too directs its journey and course by the tail, and from this it is believed that men learned the art of navigation. Certainly Pliny, book 10, chapter 10, says that the kites taught the art of steering, by the bendings of their tail, nature showing in the sky what was needed in the deep. For these reasons, then, Moses joined the production of fishes and

birds in his narrative.

Marginal gloss: 'The manifold likeness and analogy between fishes and birds.' The kinship of fish and birds (their elements, bodies, lack of ears/bladder/milk, aquatic birds, mode of motion). Cites Aristotle (De partibus animalium 2.12, 3.8; Historia animalium 3.20), Varro (alcedones), and Pliny (NH 10.10, the kite teaching steering).

But the second doubt is met thus: Moses was indeed silent in this place that the birds were made from the earth; but this he plainly...

Opening of the answer to the second objection (why Moses did not here say birds were from earth); continues onto p. 152.

— p. 193 (PDF) · printed p. 152 —

...he plainly taught below, in the second chapter. Why he was silent here can scarcely be reached by any conjecture, not even by divining. Perhaps he was unwilling to make mention of the production of animals from the earth before the sixth day, on which, namely, the principal production of animals from the earth was made; for on that day the land animals were created, far more excellent than the aquatic and the flying ones; and on the same day man was made, the prince of all animals. I know indeed that there have not been wanting weighty authors to whom it has seemed that in the kind of birds there are found some nobler and more perfect than all the land animals—of the sort that render human voices, and indeed human speech itself, so expressly, distinctly, and truly that they seem to speak after the manner of men, such as the blackbirds, magpies, and most of all the parrots. But that I should not assent to these, many things make: and indeed more wonderful and prodigious arguments of greater wit, cleverness, and teachableness have been recorded in writing concerning dogs, foxes, horses, apes, and elephants, and are today confirmed by sure experiments.

Marginal gloss: 'Whether the birds that render human voice and speech excel all the land animals in dignity of nature.' Why Moses was silent: perhaps to reserve earth-born animals for the sixth day. Pererius denies that speaking birds (blackbirds, magpies, parrots) are nobler than land beasts (dogs, foxes, horses, apes, elephants).

Or Moses wished to disclose the origin and matter of those animals which adorn, fill, and inhabit that element from which, or in which, they were made (since in these three latter days Moses, as the theologians generally teach, treats of the adorning and the filling, or completion, of the elements): as the Stars [adorn] the Heaven, the fishes the water, the land animals the earth itself; but the flying things, although they are procreated on the earth and from the earth, and there take their food and rest, yet, since they delight to dwell in the air and to carry on their movements there, seem to pertain rather to the adornment and completion of the air than of the earth.

A second reason for Moses's silence about earth-born birds: birds adorn the air, so they are listed with the fifth-day water-creatures, not the sixth-day earth animals.

But it is worthwhile to defend the former opinion, on account of the authority of the Fathers and the consensus of almost all the theologians, by no means to be despised. Let us say, then, that the birds were made from water in like manner as the fishes, because there is a great kinship and likeness between birds and fishes, as we showed a little above, and because the other animals seem to dwell in that element from which they were first produced by God—as the fishes in water, the stars in heaven, the land animals on the earth; but birds mostly dwell in the air. For this reason it must be thought, as we taught above from Augustine, Rupert, and Blessed Thomas, that the birds were made not from the dense water which glides through the earth and is contained in the earth itself, but from water rarefied into vapors and formed into clouds, which ascends to and occupies the lower region of the air in which the birds fly. And to that testimony of Scripture adduced from chapter 2 of Genesis—The Lord God therefore, having formed out of the ground all the animals of the earth and all the fowls of the air, brought them to Adam—it must be answered that the conjunction 'and' does not repeat that particle 'out of the ground,' so that the sense be: having formed out of the ground both the land animals and the flying things; but it repeats that passive participle 'having formed,' so that this be the sense of Moses: having formed out of the ground the land

animals, and having formed also the flying things, that is, after...

Marginal gloss: 'The author defends the common opinion and interpretation of the Fathers, on the generation of the birds from the waters.' Pererius, deferring to the Fathers, defends birds-from-water (but from vaporous, cloud-forming water, per Augustine/Rupert/Aquinas) and re-parses Gen 2:19. Sentence continues onto p. 153.

— p. 194 (PDF) · printed p. 153 —

...after God had created these two kinds of animals, he brought them to Adam.

Completes (from p. 152) the re-parsing of Genesis 2:19, closing the disputation on whether birds were created from water.

THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY.

Section heading for the Sixth Day: the creation of the land animals and of man (Genesis 1:24ff.).

God also said: Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth according to their kinds. — Verse 24.

The scripture lemma for the Sixth Day, Genesis 1:24.

On this sixth and last day Moses narrates two works made by God: namely the land animals and man. But concerning the creation of man, and his happy state before sin, since that matter contains a teaching especially noble and memorable, we shall treat properly and separately in two other books, that is, the fourth and the fifth. Now let us briefly expound what Moses hands down about the creation of the land animals, since they do not require a long explanation. In the first place, certain interpreters have noted that it is not without purpose that Moses so distinguished the water-creatures from the land-creatures, that the former he called 'the creeping thing of living soul,' but the latter he called precisely and simply 'living soul': namely, he wished to show that the soul and life are far more perfect in the land animals than in the fishes.

The decorated initial begins 'Hoc.' Pererius defers the creation of man to books 4 and 5 of his work. Genesis 1:24 calls the land animals simply 'living soul,' marking their superiority to fish ('creeping thing of living soul').

And it is also probable, as Cajetan says, that by the fact that Moses says God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature, it is sufficiently indicated that every sentient soul, of however perfect an animal (man always excepted), is produced from the elemental mixture, in which earth holds the chief place. But Porphyry and the Pythagoreans, who handed down that the souls of all animals are, as to their substance, neither mortal nor unlike our own souls, are clearly seen to have been involved in a great error. But that phrase, 'Let the earth bring forth,' does not denote that an active and effective power of producing animals either was in the earth at the first production of animals, or would afterward be in their propagation; for it is not credible that the earth is capable of so great a power that it could of itself generate animals of any kind whatever. It denotes, therefore, only the matter from which the animals were afterward made by the omnipotent power of God; it denotes also that the earth is the natural place of such animals, in which, namely, they are generated, nourished, and preserved. And so some who know Hebrew think that the phrase 'Let the earth bring forth' is set down, by a Hebrew idiom, for what is 'Let them be brought forth from the earth,' or 'Let them be brought forth in the earth.' For if they were produced from the earth as from matter, they could not be produced by the same as efficient cause; for matter and the efficient cause, in one and the same number...

Marginal gloss: 'Cajetan on Genesis.' The land animals are from earth as their matter (in which earth predominates), not as an active cause—God is the maker. Pererius condemns the Pythagorean/Porphyrian error (animal souls immortal and like ours, i.e. transmigration). Sentence continues onto p. 154 ('...in idem numero [non conveniunt]').

— p. 195 (PDF) · printed p. 154 —

...cannot coincide in one and the same individual. Nor is any earth whatever designated, but only that which on the third day, the waters being

separated, was commanded to stand out above them, for the benefit of the plants and the living creatures. Nor indeed did the earth then produce, nor can it now produce, animals of every kind whatsoever; but different animals can be generated and preserved only in different places of the earth.

Completes (from p. 153) the point that 'let the earth bring forth' denotes earth as matter, not as efficient cause (matter and efficient cause cannot be the same individual). Different regions yield different animals.

Now Moses here distinguishes three kinds of land animals, that is: cattle, by which name are comprehended all the more domestic and familiar to man, such as dogs, horses, oxen; then beasts, which word signifies the wild and savage animals, scarcely tolerant of human rule, such as lions, panthers, tigers; finally creeping things, in which are contained both those that have no feet, such as serpents, and those that have feet, but very short and small, by which they move with the body little raised from the earth, such as ants and lizards. But because in none of these kinds do deer, hares, and goats seem to be comprehended, the Seventy Translators for that reason placed, besides the aforesaid, 'four-footed beasts.' Plato, in the Statesman, makes only two kinds of land animals, the wild and the tame; but Aristotle, in the first book of the History of Animals, distinguishes the animals into three: for some are perpetually tame, others perpetually wild, but some are of so flexible a nature toward both of these that they can easily be both tamed and made wild.

Marginal gloss: 'The three kinds of land animals.' The three Genesis kinds—iumenta (cattle), bestiae (wild beasts), reptilia (creeping things)—plus the Septuagint's 'four-footed beasts.' Plato, Statesman (two kinds); Aristotle, Historia animalium 1 (three kinds).

But why was that blessing of God, 'Increase and multiply,' not bestowed on the land animals likewise as on the aquatic ones? The Hebrews reply that the blessing was not given to the land animals because among them was the serpent, soon to seduce man, and on that account to be cursed by God. But the answer of others is more probable: that Moses wished what he had said

about the blessing of the fishes to be understood also of the land animals; and not only in this, but in other matters too, from what is recorded by Moses in some one kind, like things in the others, which for brevity's sake are not stated, ought to be understood. But to man the blessing had to be assigned properly and separately, because in man there is a certain proper and singular manner of generation and multiplication—namely not only to preserve the species, but especially to fill up the number of the elect; and lest anyone should think that in the office of begetting there can be no sin of man. For although the function of generating is wholly natural in the other animals, yet in man it is partly natural and partly voluntary; and what in the others is capable of neither vice nor virtue, in man can be turned to either praise or blame. But the blessing did not suit the plants, because they have no sense and no affection for propagating offspring. Read what both Augustine wrote to this effect in the third book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter thirteen, and Bede in the Hexameron.

Marginal gloss: 'Why God did not bless the land animals.' Why no explicit blessing of the land animals (it is understood from the fish-blessing); but man is blessed separately because human generation is partly voluntary, capable of merit or sin, and serves to fill the number of the elect. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.13; Bede.

Furthermore, whatever philosophers judged that the world was made from some beginning of time handed down variously the efficient cause of the first animals. Plato indeed, in the Timaeus, [says that] the fashioning of the animals...

Marginal gloss: 'The various opinions of the philosophers on the efficient cause of the first generation of animals.' Begins a survey of pagan views (Plato, Epicurus, Avicenna); continues onto p. 155.

— p. 196 (PDF) · printed p. 155 —

...the fashioning of the animals was, he says, entrusted by the first and highest God to the secondary gods, by whom he seems to understand the stars, or the demons who dwell in the air and have dominion over the perishable and mortal things. Epicurus thought that all the animals at the

beginning of the world were made from the earth, on account of the surpassing goodness of the nascent earth and the efficacy of the new stars, God contributing nothing to their making; which opinion Lucretius treats in most elegant verses in the fifth book. Nor should this seem a wonder to anyone, as these men say, since even now we know that from the earth, soaked by rains and warmed by the heat of the sun, various living creatures are begotten, as in those places of Egypt where the standing waters of the Nile have remained. Read what Diodorus Siculus copiously writes to this effect, in the first chapter of the first book. Avicenna held that all animals, of whatever kind, not only could at the beginning, but even now can, be generated from the earth—an opinion into which he was perhaps led by not sufficiently understanding the words of Moses which are in this place, 'Let the earth bring forth the living creature.' But it is agreed among the philosophers of better repute that Avicenna's opinion is false, against which we too have disputed copiously in the eighth book of our work On Philosophy.

Plato, Timaeus (the demiurge entrusting the animals to 'secondary gods'); Epicurus and Lucretius (book 5, animals from earth); spontaneous generation along the Nile; Diodorus Siculus 1.1; Avicenna (animals generable from earth even now—rejected). Pererius's own De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis, bk. 8.

Blessed Augustine, in the third book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter fourteen, poses this question: Whether at the beginning of the world, when God created the land animals, he also made those which are generated from putrefying matter—whether of earth, or of water, or of plants, or of fruits, or from the decay of carcasses and the corruption of dead animals. To which he answers: that those which are generated from dead animals seem absurd to have been made in the first creation of animals—for then there was no dead or corrupted animal; but those which are generated from the fault and corruption of other things, if they be said to have been made then, there is nothing absurd. The same Blessed Thomas holds and hands down, in the first part, question seventy-two.

Marginal glosses: 'A question, whether at the beginning of the world there were created the animals that are generated from putrid matter'; and 'Augustine's opinion is refuted on two counts.' Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.14, on spontaneously-generated creatures; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 72.

But this answer of Augustine could be disproved on two counts: both because the manner of corruption of plants and of animals is one, so that equally and alike either both, or neither, could have existed in that first origin of the world; and also because such first animals were not made from putrid or corrupted matter, but were produced immediately by God, in the manner of the other land animals, from the earth, thereafter to be propagated and multiplied through secondary causes and from their own matters, as their nature requires. For just as the perfect animals, which are procreated only from seed and from animals like themselves, were in that first making of things produced both immediately by God and from the earth, so those which, according to nature, come to be in no other way than from putrid matter, were then, by the immense power of God, founded from the earth. Certainly Basil, in the seventh homily on Genesis, plainly teaches that such imperfect animals, which have their origin from putrefying matter, were at the beginning...

Pererius's two objections to Augustine: the corruption of plants and animals is on a par; and the spontaneously-generated creatures were made directly by God from the earth (like the rest), not from putrid matter. Basil, Hexameron homily 7, follows; continues onto p. 156.

— p. 197 (PDF) · printed p. 156 —

...brought forth by God at the beginning of the world, in nearly these words: For not only in the sea or the rivers will the more perfect fishes be generated at God's command, but also in muddy and marshy places: for indeed the frogs, [gnats?], and the very midges were emerging from the lake-mud itself. Thus Basil.

Quotation from Basil, Hexameron homily 7 (on the spontaneous emergence of lesser creatures—frogs, gnats, midges—from marshy mud at creation). The middle word 'muliones' is an uncertain reading in the original (some small marsh-creature).

Although it may also be said that those species of animals were then not produced in act, but only causally and potentially: for God sowed the more perfect species of living creatures, namely those which can be generated only from other animals, from which afterward, whether living or dead, the other more imperfect ones might be procreated by the power of natural causes. Nor is it an obstacle that God is said to have made the world perfect and consummate, and therefore lacking no species of animals: for the world is not called perfect, nor named 'universe,' because no species of things in any way possible is wanting to it—otherwise it would not be perfect even now, nay, it could never be; since no one learned in the principles and decrees of Theology will deny that there are far more species of things than now exist, and that, whatever be produced, God can produce more others, and then others without any end. Likewise it is agreed among all that many species, in different ages—whether of plants, or animals, or metals, or liquids, or condiments and medicines—have come into existence, and today come forth, whether by the natural mingling of diverse animals or other things, or by the cleverness and art of men. This, however, seems able to be said with assurance: that the animals which are begotten from some corruption or distemper of the human body, and always cling within it not without the trouble and offense of man, did not then exist; for we judge their generation would be very foreign and unbecoming to that most happy state of man.

Marginal gloss: 'In what way the world is called perfect, or named universe.' An alternative: the imperfect creatures were made causally. The world is not 'perfect' by containing every possible species (God can always make more); new species arise over the ages; but parasites of the human body did not exist in man's happy (pre-Fall) state.

Rupert, in the first book On the Trinity and his Works, chapter fifty-seven, hands down that the animals which are generated from the coupling of diverse species—such as the mule from a mare and an ass, the 'tityrus' from a he-goat and a ewe, the leopard from a lioness and a pard, the lynx from a wolf and a hind—come to be against nature, and that their generation is adulterous; wherefore such animals were not made by God at the

beginnings of the world. As an argument for this he adduces that God in Leviticus, chapter 19, forbids the generation of such animals to be procured by men, as an abominable thing; for thus he commands: Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind. Thou shalt not sow thy field with diverse seed. And the same he confirms in Deuteronomy, chapter 22, and there is added: Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together; thou shalt not be clothed with a garment that is woven of wool and linen.

Marginal glosses: 'Rupert's opinion is weighed, that the animals generated from the mixture of diverse species of animals are against nature'; and 'That animals procreated from diverse seeds were not produced at the beginning of the world.' Rupert, De sancta Trinitate 1.57, on hybrids (mule, 'tityrus,' leopard, lynx) as unnatural, citing the prohibitions of Leviticus 19:19 and Deuteronomy 22:9–11.

That these animals were not produced by God at the beginning of the world, and did not exist until many ages afterward, is indicated by this: that the first of mortals, Anah (as is related in the thirty-sixth chapter of Genesis), was the author of the generation of the mule from a mare and an ass; for when he was pasturing in the desert the herds of mares and asses, he caused the mares to be mingled with the asses, and thence the mules to be generated. For where the Latin translator renders, 'This is the Anah who found the hot waters in the wilderness,' the He-...

Genesis 36:24 (Anah, who 'found' the hot springs—or, per the rabbis, invented mules—in the desert). The Vulgate's 'aquas calidas' (hot waters) is contrasted with the Hebrew reading below. Sentence continues onto p. 157.

— p. 198 (PDF) · printed p. 157 —

...the experts in Hebrew say that the Hebrew word ■■■■ (yemim), which is there, signifies not seas or waters, but mules; and that our translator perhaps read, instead of yemim, yamim, which signifies seas. This interpretation is supported by the Chaldee Paraphrase, which in that very place has thus: This is the Anah who found the mighty ones in the desert—by 'the mighty ones' signifying the mules, a most robust animal

and most strong for bearing burdens. The Hebrews write that Anah was a 'mamzer,' that is, a bastard born of a condemned union—namely the son of his own brother Zibeon, who, having mingled with his own mother, begot this Anah, his son and at once his brother: so that it is no wonder that he who was brought forth from so degenerate and vicious a generation should also have procured the adulterous generation of animals.

The Hebrew ■■■■■■■■ / ■■■■ (yemim) in Genesis 36:24, of uncertain meaning: the rabbis read it as 'mules' (the Targum: 'the mighty ones'), whereas the Vulgate read yamim ('seas/hot waters'). The Hebrews call Anah a mamzer (bastard) born of Zibeon's incest—fittingly the inventor of hybrid breeding.

But in truth my opinion is far different: for I hold that this kind of generation of animals is natural, since nearly all the things that come together to bring it about are natural—that is, the matter from which they are generated, the efficient cause, the place, the time, the appetite, the natural agreement between males and females, and finally the nobility of such animals, which are either equal or close to the most perfect. But they object that their generation is forbidden and condemned by the Divine law. But the genuine and proper meaning and understanding of that Divine precept Blessed Thomas hands down in the First of the Second part, question 102, article six, and expounds it in nearly these words:

Marginal glosses: 'The author's opinion on the generation of animals from the mixture of diverse species'; and 'The passage of Leviticus chapter 19 and Deuteronomy 22 is explained.' Pererius (against Rupert) holds hybrid generation is natural; the Levitical prohibition is explained via Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 102, a. 6 (quoted next).

Concerning the coupling of animals of diverse species, a threefold literal reason can be given. One indeed, for the detestation of the idolatry of the Egyptians, who used diverse minglings of animals and plants and other things in the service of the planets, which according to their diverse conjunctions have diverse effects, and over diverse species of things. The second reason is, to exclude intercourse contrary to nature. The third reason is, to take away universally the

occasion of concupiscence: for animals of diverse species are not easily mingled with one another unless this be procured by men, and at the sight of the coupling of animals a motion of concupiscence is stirred up in man; whence also in the traditions of the Jews, as Rabbi Moses reports, it is commanded that men avert their eyes from animals coupling. There was also a figurative reason for that precept: that cattle—that is, common men—should not couple, that is, have fellowship and intercourse, with animals of another kind, that is, with Jews, Heretics, Pagans, lest, namely, by their intercourse and familiarity, they be drawn also to their vices and errors. Thus St. Thomas.

Quotation from Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 102, a. 6: the threefold literal sense of the Levitical ban on hybridizing (against Egyptian astral idolatry, against unnatural intercourse, against occasion of lust), plus the figurative sense. 'Rabbi Moses' = Maimonides.

But Cajetan, in his commentary on that passage of Leviticus, writes in this manner: It is plain that by this precept of God the generation of mules and mares is not forbidden, both because the use of such animals is read of among the Hebrews—as is clear from 2 Samuel 13 and 18, and 1 Kings 1 and 18, and Ezra 2, and in Isaiah 66—and especially because Blessed Paul reckons it absurd that God should make a law for oxen. Therefore this precept must be understood in one of two senses, either superstitiously or parabolically. Superstitiously indeed, so that it be understood that the imitation of the superstitions of the gentiles is forbidden—as, just as in the Gospel it is said, When you pray, do not speak much, as the heathens do, so...

Marginal references: '1 Corinthians 9' (Paul: 'Doth God care for oxen?', 1 Cor 9:9) and 'Matthew 6' (Matt 6:7, on praying like the heathens). Cajetan on Leviticus 19:19: the precept does not literally ban mule-breeding (since Hebrews used mules—2 Sam, 1 Kings, Ezra, Isaiah), but is to be read superstitiously (against pagan rites) or parabolically. Sentence continues onto p. 158 (catchword 'hic in').

— p. 199 (PDF) · printed p. 158 —

...here it be understood that the mingling of animals of diverse species is forbidden, not absolutely, but after the manner of the gentiles. But if the discourse is parabolic, like that other one, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn, the reason of such a parable is ready at hand: for by that similitude it is forbidden that a man wholly abstain from novelties beyond reason; for the mingling of animals begets a new animal contrary to nature, and of neither species. Thus far Cajetan.

Completes (from p. 157) Cajetan's exposition of the Levitical hybrid-ban: read either as forbidding pagan-style mingling, or parabolically (like 'thou shalt not muzzle the ox,' Deut 25:4 / 1 Cor 9:9), against unreasonable novelties.

Furthermore, that argument from the thirty-sixth chapter of Genesis, by which Anah is signified to have been the author of the generation of mules, is very easily dissolved: both because, even granting that reading and interpretation, it does not at once follow that mules were not produced by God at the beginning of the world, or that they nowhere existed before Anah, but [only] that he was the inventor of this kind of mingling and generation of animals in that region and among that people. And that there were various opinions, even long ago and before Jerome, about the true sense and interpretation of that passage, is clear from what Jerome writes in his book On the Hebrew Traditions on Genesis; for, treating this passage, he writes thus:

Marginal gloss: 'The passage of Genesis chapter 36 is unraveled.' Pererius dismisses the Anah argument; even granting it, it shows only that Anah invented hybrid-breeding locally. Jerome, Liber de quaestionibus hebraicis in Genesim (on Gen 36:24), is quoted next.

“Many and various things are disputed among the Hebrews about this little chapter; for among the Greeks and our own writers there is silence about it. Some think that Iamim means 'seas'; for 'seas' are written with the same letters as this passage is now written. And they hold that he, while pasturing his father's asses in the desert, found gatherings of waters, which by the idiom of the Hebrew tongue are called 'seas'; namely that he found a pool, the discovery of which is a

difficult thing in the wilderness. Some think that by this word are signified 'hot waters,' according to the neighborhood of the Punic tongue, which borders on the Hebrew. There are those who suppose that wild asses (onagers) were here admitted to the she-asses, and that he discovered this kind of coupling, so that from them might be born the swiftest asses, which are called Iamim. Most think that he was the first to cause the herds of mares in the desert to be mounted by asses, so that from them the new animals, the mules, contrary to nature, might be born." Thus Jerome.

Quotation from Jerome, Liber de quaestionibus hebraicis in Genesim, on Genesis 36:24: a survey of the disputed meanings of the Hebrew word—'seas/pools of water,' 'hot waters' (from Punic), swift wild-ass crossbreeds ('Iamim'), or 'mules.'

— p. 200 (PDF) · printed p. 159 —

But Jerome Oleaster, professing a great knowledge of the Hebrew tongue, contends that by that word ■■■■ (yemim) is denoted a vein of salt water, which there, after the manner of the sacred writings, is called a 'sea'; so that, because such a find was a novelty up to that age, especially in the desert, therefore the author of it, Anah, became memorable by that name. And Oleaster affirms that the word ■■■■ (yemim) nowhere in Scripture signifies mules. It is therefore manifest that from that passage of Scripture it is weakly proved that the generation of such animals is either against nature, or did not exist at that first origin of the world. But why were both man and the land animals created on the same day? Is it because both pertain to the completion and adornment of the earth?—for the seat and dwelling of both is on the earth. Or because the land animals are more like to man, and more excellent than the rest? Or because they are more domestic and familiar to us, and more capable of and partaking in human society and discipline? Or finally because they are more in the use and benefit of men?—for we use them for food, for clothing, for carriage, for the guarding of ourselves and of our...

Marginal gloss: 'Why on the same day the land animals and man were created.' Jerome Oleaster (Jerónimo de Azambuja), a Hebraist, reads ■■■■ (yemim) as a salt-water spring, denying it means 'mules.' Then: why land animals and man share the sixth day (both belong to the earth; the beasts are nearest, tamest, and most useful to man). Sentence continues onto p. 159's lower text.

...goods, for hunting, for the waging of wars, for medicine and the remedies of diseases, and finally for manifold delight and pleasure.

Completes the catalogue of the uses of land animals to man.

Finally, there is an old question, not to be left wholly untouched in this place: whether any animals were made in the element of fire, as in earth and in water. For that there is some kind of animal in fire, as there are many in earth, in the waters, and in the air, both reason itself persuades, and the order of nature and the perfect disposition of all its parts demands, and experience proves. For since fire is in many respects more excellent than the other elements, it seems agreeable that, if these are full of animals, it should not be empty of every kind of living creature. And this Aristotle seems to intimate, when in the third book On the Generation of Animals, chapter 11, he writes thus:

Marginal gloss: 'A question, whether some kind of animal is generated and lives in the element of fire.' The old question of fire-dwelling creatures; Aristotle, De generatione animalium 3.11, is quoted next.

"Each single element is the seat and dwelling of certain things which are born and live in it: for one would set down plants as inhabitants of the earth; the aquatic kind of animals, of the water; the walking kind, of the air. A fourth kind is not to be sought in these places, although the order [of nature] requires that something should belong to fire, for that is reckoned the fourth body. But fire seems never to have a form of its own, but in another body; for what is set on fire seems to be either air, or smoke, or earth. But this kind is to be sought near the Moon, for she seems to attain to that fourth distance; but of these things elsewhere." Thus Aristotle.

Quotation from Aristotle, De generatione animalium 3.11: each element houses its own creatures (earth-plants, water-fish, air-walkers); a 'fourth kind' belonging to fire is to be sought near the Moon (the sphere of fire).

It has been handed down by the ancients, and commonly bruited, that there are certain animals which are begotten in fire, and which, removed a little farther from it, at once perish; which account Aristotle both approved and related, in the fifth book of the History of Animals, chapter nineteen, in these words:

Lead-in to Aristotle, Historia animalium 5.19, on the fire-born creatures of the Cyprus furnaces.

> *“In the island of Cyprus, in the copper-smelting furnaces, where the chalcite stone, heaped in, is burned for several days, little winged creatures are born in the midst of the fire, a little larger than big flies, which leap and walk through the fire; and this kind also dies when it is removed from the fire.” That there are some bodies of animals which are not consumed by it, the Salamander is a clear proof; which, as they say, walking through the fire, puts it out.*

Quotation from Aristotle, Historia animalium 5.19: the winged fire-creatures of the Cyprus copper furnaces (the 'pyrausta'), and the salamander said to quench fire.

Pliny relates similar things in the twelfth book, chapter thirty-six. Balbus, in Cicero's second book On the Nature of the Gods, confirms by the testimony of Aristotle that there are animals in fire; and he speaks thus:

Pliny, Natural History 12.36; lead-in to the quotation from Cicero, De natura deorum 2 (the Stoic Balbus, citing Aristotle).

> *“Since therefore the origin of some living creatures is in earth, of others in water, of others in air, it seems absurd to Aristotle that in that part which is most apt for generating animals, no animal should be thought to be generated. But the stars hold the aethereal place: which, since it is most rarefied and is always in motion and vigor, it is necessary that whatever animal is generated in it be both of the*

> *keenest sense and of the swiftest mobility; wherefore, since the stars are generated in the aether, it is agreeable that there be in them sense and intelligence.”*

Quotation from Cicero, De natura deorum 2 (Balbus, paraphrasing Aristotle): the aether being most apt for life, the stars generated there must be sentient and intelligent.

But Balbus in that place takes the name 'fire' in the widest sense, so as to comprehend also the stars, which the Stoics—whose cause Balbus there pleads—held to be fiery. Nor does Ovid write differently in the first book of the Metamorphoses:

Balbus's 'fire' includes the (Stoic) fiery stars. Lead-in to Ovid, Metamorphoses 1, quoted on p. 160.

— p. 201 (PDF) · printed p. 160 —

> *And lest any region should be bereft of its own living creatures, the stars and the forms of the gods possess the celestial floor; the waters fell to be inhabited by the gleaming fishes; the earth received the wild beasts; the moving air, the birds.*

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.72–75: each region of the world is given its own inhabitants—stars (and gods) the heaven, fish the waters, beasts the earth, birds the air.

But that any animal should be generated and live in fire, whoever shall weigh with a little more attentive mind both the force of fire and the nature of an animal will find it cannot be. For so great is the force and efficacy of fire that it must, of necessity, either at once or gradually finish off and consume whatever animal it has seized; especially since an animal cannot subsist without touch, which, since it consists in the temperament of the primary qualities, must necessarily be corrupted and dissolved by any excessive quality, but most of all by heat. Certainly Aristotle, in the second book On the Generation of Animals, chapter three, and likewise in the fourth book of the Meteorology, in the first chapter of the second part, and in the second book On Generation and Corruption, text twenty-one, hands down most affirmatively that no animal can be generated from fire or live

in fire. For the creatures said to be 'in fire' are procreated, on account of the very cold constitution of their body, in the hottest places and because of the fires, and do not withdraw far from there without perishing.

Pererius's refutation: fire destroys any animal (which cannot subsist without the sense of touch, dissolved by excessive heat). Cites Aristotle, De generatione animalium 2.3, Meteorologica 4.1, and De generatione et corruptione 2 (text 21): no animal lives in fire; the 'fire-creatures' are merely very cold-bodied animals drawn to hot places.

But how much cold is in such animals is plain even from the single instance of the salamander, which comes forth only in heavy rains and fails in clear weather; whose chill is so great that it extinguishes fire by its touch, in no other way than ice does: with its milky ooze, which it vomits from its mouth, whatever part of the human body is touched, all the hairs fall off, and that which is touched changes its color to a white blotch (vitiligo)—so Pliny writes in the tenth book, chapter sixty-seven. For the opinion of the ancients, commonly received, that the salamander lives in the midst of fires, Galen refutes in the third book On the Temperaments, and Dioscorides in book 2, chapter fifty-six; explaining which passage, Mattioli, in his Commentaries on Dioscorides, affirms that he found that same opinion false—many salamanders, for the sake of testing and experiment, having been cast into the fire and quickly consumed. But as for what Aristotle said, that animals dwell even in the element of fire, he said this indeed according to the opinion of the ancients, who held the heaven to consist of a fiery nature, and the stars that dwell in it to be living and intelligent.

Marginal gloss: 'The nature of the salamander is described.' The salamander's extreme cold (Pliny, NH 10.67). The vulgar belief that it lives in fire is refuted by Galen (De temperamentis 3), Dioscorides (2.56), and Mattioli (who burned many salamanders to test it). Aristotle spoke of fire-animals only following the ancient view that the heaven and stars are living fire. This closes the digression on fire-creatures.

— p. 202 (PDF) · printed p. 161 —

A MORAL EXPOSITION of the divine works which were made by God in the first six days.

Section heading: the moral/allegorical (tropological) exposition of the six days of creation, applied to the justification of the soul, following Hugh of St Victor.

On this matter Hugh of St Victor disputes acutely and learnedly enough, in the first book On the Sacraments, part one, chapter thirteen and following; we shall here briefly touch on the things which seem more to the purpose and are more notable. In the first place, then, just as the first state of the world—shapeless, disordered, and dark—signified the state of man remaining in sin, so the state of the world, arranged, adorned, and decorated by those most beautiful works of the six days, signified the state of the just man, translated from sin to the grace of God. On the first day light was created, and day distinguished from night: and the first thing too that is created in man in his justification is the intellectual light—either of faith, if he was an unbeliever, or, if he is a believer, a certain singular illumination of mind, by which he truly knows and esteems the foulness, misery, and danger of his state, and what is the highest good to be followed by him, and likewise what is the true evil to be fled by him, lest he be of the number of those whom God threatens through Isaiah, chapter 5: Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light, and light for darkness.

The decorated initial begins 'Hac.' Following Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis 1, pt. 1, ch. 13ff., the six days are read tropologically as the soul's justification: the dark formless world = man in sin; the adorned world = the justified soul. Day 1's light = the intellectual light of faith/illumination. Cites Isaiah 5:20.

Hugh noted that the light created on the first day signifies the right intention of the mind, which whoever wishes to act well ought to have: and this ought to precede every work and every action of ours, and this the Lord in the Gospel called the eye and the light: If thy eye, he says, be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome; and a little after, If then the light that is in thee be darkness, the darkness itself, how great shall it be? Nor

did God say only that the light was good, but he also judged each single work which he made in the light to be good; since, for acting well, as Hugh says, there is need of a twofold goodness and rectitude: one of the light itself, that is, of the intention; the other of the work itself, that it be good in itself. For a man can, with a good intention, do an evil work—as if one should steal in order to give alms; and on the contrary do a good work, but with an evil intention—as to bestow alms for the sake of vainglory.

Marginal reference: 'Matth. 6' (Matthew 6:22–23, the eye as the lamp of the body). The first-day light = right intention, which must precede every action; good action needs both a good intention and a good work in itself.

On the second day the just man is perfected according to his affection, as on the first day according to his intellect. For on the second day the water which before covered and overwhelmed the earth on every side was divided into the heavenly and the earthly water, the firmament being interposed. And the water, according to the tropological sense, signifies the desire, love, and appetite of man: but in the sinner every appetite, both rational and sensitive, is occupied around the earth, that is, in the love and desire...

Day 2 = the perfecting of the affection. The waters divided by the firmament signify man's desire/love being separated: in the sinner all appetite clings to earthly things. Sentence continues onto p. 162 (catchword 'cupi[ditate]').

— p. 203 (PDF) · printed p. 162 —

...is plainly fixed in the desire of earthly things. But when the sinner is justified, there comes a division of love: for the just man, as by the senses he desires earthly things, so by the spirit desires heavenly things; whence arises that inward and perpetual strife and conflict between the flesh and the spirit, of which Paul speaks to the Galatians 5: The flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc., so that you do not the things that you would. And to the Romans 7: I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man—this is the heavenly water: But I see another law in my members,

fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin—this is the earthly water; and he adds: Therefore I myself with the mind serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin. But the firmament interposed between those two waters is the vigor of reason illumined by God, the fear of the divine law and of the divine judgment, which do not allow those two waters—that is, those two loves—to be mingled and confounded with one another.

Completes (from p. 161) the tropological reading of Day 2: the divided waters = the sinner's earthly vs. the just man's heavenly love; the firmament = enlightened reason / fear of God keeping them apart. Cites Galatians 5:17 and Romans 7:22–25.

On the third day two things were perfected. For the water that overwhelmed the earth was so gathered into one place that the earth remained partly lying beneath the waters, partly standing out above them. Likewise too in the justified man, the carnal concupiscence which before overwhelmed him and held him oppressed under its dominion is so separated by the grace of God that the just man partly lies beneath the concupiscences—namely as to the sensation of them, and the first motions and titillations, which scarcely anyone living a mortal life can escape—and partly stands out above them, namely as to consent and deliberate enjoyment; and he not only resists the concupiscences, but also compels the flesh to serve the spirit, keeping that precept of Paul: Let not sin reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof (Romans 6); and that other of the same to the Galatians 5: They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences. Nor indeed was the earth on that third day only uncovered and dried from the waters, but it brought forth of itself all the kinds of plants and herbs. Likewise too the soul of the just man, separated and purged from earthly vices and desires, brings forth good and holy works, even corporal ones, which are accomplished through the members of the body—such as the works of corporal mercy and the offices of the virtues which are occupied in ruling and moderating the appetite, both the concupiscible and the irascible: such as Temperance and

Fortitude. And so there is fulfilled in the just man what Paul wrote to the Romans, chapter six, saying: As you have yielded your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now yield your members to serve justice unto sanctification.

Day 3: the gathered waters / dry land = concupiscence subdued, the soul partly above its first motions and bringing forth good works (Temperance, Fortitude). Cites Romans 6:12, Galatians 5:24, Romans 6:19.

On the fourth day the stars are created and set in the heaven; and in the just man, as by the grace of justification the soul is purged of concupiscences, so by the same grace the highest part of man—namely the mind and the will—is illumined, adorned, and decorated by the supernatural gifts of God, which do for our soul spiritually what the stars do bodily for the heaven itself; and the Sun, indeed, I would call to our soul...

Day 4: the stars set in heaven = the supernatural gifts adorning the mind and will. Sentence continues onto p. 163 (the Sun = charity).

— p. 204 (PDF) · printed p. 163 —

...charity: for just as the sun is the greatest of all the stars, and imparts light to the rest, so charity is directed toward all the other virtues. The Moon, which was made for the solace of the night and the remedy of darkness, signifies hope, which in arduous and adverse matters strengthens and sustains a man. Faith is signified by the star of Venus, which we call Lucifer or Hesperus: for as Lucifer runs before the rising of the sun and remains after its setting, so faith can remain both before the rising of charity and after its setting. The four other Planets denote the four moral virtues—not human, but divinely infused; and not those which are in the sensitive part, but those which are in the rational part. The star of Saturn [denotes] temperance, of Jupiter justice, of Mars fortitude, of Mercury prudence. Innumerable other stars which are in the eighth heaven denote the innumerable gifts and singular helps of God, and the frequent illuminations and inspirations by which God from time to time moves and

advances a man, frees him from evil, and confirms him in good.

Day 4 continued: Sun = charity, Moon = hope, Venus/Lucifer = faith; the four planets (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury) = the four divinely-infused cardinal virtues (temperance, justice, fortitude, prudence); the fixed stars = God's countless gifts and inspirations.

On the remaining three days were generated three kinds of animals—fishes, birds, and land animals—by which are figured three kinds, or three grades, of the just who are in the Church of Christ. Some are most imperfect, living a worldly life, entangled in secular business and cares, like indeed the fishes which pass their life sunk in the waters. Yet these, because they have sense, motion, and life—that is, right faith, sincere charity, and good works—are God's animals. Others are like the land animals, who, although they live in the world, yet lead a life not secular but spiritual, surpassing the rest by the excellence of their virtues and the abundance of their excellent works—just as the land animals excel the fishes in the perfection of sense, life, and motion. Finally there are some men of the most absolute virtue and holiness, who, despising earthly things and casting away all the cares and thoughts of worldly matters, have dedicated themselves wholly to the worship, service, and ministry of God, like birds flying up to the heights; whose conversation, namely, is in heaven, and whose mind and soul is occupied perpetually in the meditation of divine things. After the other living creatures, in the last place, man was created, to the image of God. For the just man must persevere so long in breaking his desires, calming his perturbations, and bridling his appetites, and finally in cultivating and practicing the offices of all the virtues, until he becomes wholly rational and intellectual; and the image of God, which he had deformed and obscured by his crimes, may be reformed and renewed to the likeness of him with which God had created him from the beginning.

Days 5–6: fish/birds/land-animals = the three grades of the just (worldly believers, spiritual-in-the-world, contemplatives whose 'conversation is in heaven,' cf. Phil 3:20); man last, made in God's image—the soul to be reformed to God's likeness. This closes the MORALIS EXPLANATIO.

— p. 205 (PDF) · printed p. 164 —

And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. — Verse 31.

The scripture lemma, Genesis 1:31.

These words of Moses call us to treat two questions which they themselves beget. First it must be inquired why, when the works of the foregoing six days were made, it was said of each one separately, God saw that it was good; but when the fabric of all things was consummated, it is said of them all, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. For this variation of expression, and this increase of the phrase, indicates that there lies hidden in these words something worthy to be known and observed. It must therefore be known that the things created by God can be considered in two ways: either each single one in itself and properly, or commonly and conjointly with the rest—namely as they all make up and consummate the world, or as they pertain to the uses and conveniences of men, or as they are referred to the expressing, and in a manner representing to mortals, the immense power, goodness, and wisdom of God, the maker of all. Let us explain both considerations briefly:

Marginal gloss: 'A twofold consideration of the things created by God.' The decorated initial begins 'Verba.' The two questions raised by Gen 1:31: why 'good' of each work, but 'very good' of the whole. Things may be considered singly, or as a whole (the universe / their use to man / as showing God's power, goodness, wisdom).

In any thing whatever, if it be considered in itself, a twofold goodness is discerned: one substantial, the other accidental. The former, while the nature and species of the thing remains, can neither be increased nor diminished at all; for the quiddities of all things, on the authority of Aristotle, are like numbers, of which, any unit being added or subtracted, the species is at once changed. The other is accidental goodness, which, the nature of the thing remaining whole and entire, can in some measure be varied. And this we can distinguish into three. Let the first be called the

goodness of state: for any thing whatever that is generable and corruptible—especially those which are of the number of living things—is at first in an imperfect state, but gradually, and as it were through certain degrees, proceeds to a more perfect state. The signs of the perfect state are two: namely the end and natural limit of growth—for natural increase gradually advances and brings the thing to the perfect measure of body, suited to the perfect state of the living thing; which being attained, the growth of living things ceases. This too is a sign of the perfect state, if the thing can produce another thing like itself. For so it pleased Aristotle, in the fourth book of the Meteorology, to define and determine the nature of the perfect living thing—namely when it is fit and able to generate its like. The other accidental goodness is occupied in the properties and accidents of the thing, if the things that naturally suit each thing be each perfect in its kind. The third...

Marginal gloss: 'The twofold goodness of any thing.' The two goodnesses: substantial (fixed, like numbers—Aristotle) and accidental (variable), the latter threefold: (1) goodness of state (the perfect state shown by full growth and the power to generate one's like—Aristotle, Meteorologica 4); (2) goodness of properties. Sentence continues onto p. 165.

— p. 206 (PDF) · printed p. 165 —

...third [goodness] is placed in the proper operation of each thing, by which each attains its ultimate end; which, if it be perfect, both argues and makes the thing whose operation it is to be perfect. According to these three goodnesses, God at the beginning of the world made all things not only good, but even best: for he founded them in a perfect state, and with all their accidents and properties perfect; finally such that they were thoroughly fit for performing and fulfilling perfectly all their actions and functions.

Marginal gloss: 'How at the beginning of the world all things were created very good by God.' The third accidental goodness = perfect operation. By all three goodnesses, God made all things not merely good but best, in a perfect state.

In the other way, as we said, all things can be considered in common, namely in this respect, that from their combination and connection there is made this whole of all things which we call the world. And this whole of things received from God so notable and surpassing a goodness and beauty that, by comparison with it, the proper goodness of any single thing can be esteemed very small and of almost no moment. But what are the things which declare this goodness of the whole of things? Many indeed, and those excellent. In the first place, this is shown by the great variety of things which are contained in the world, so great that we can survey and comprehend it not only not by the senses, but not even by the mind and thought. For if you turn your mind to the things that are in the world, you will find some incorporeal, such as the Angels; others corporeal; and a third kind set between these, the race of men. Again, the variety of the Angels is distinguished into nine orders; and, if the opinion of Blessed Thomas is true, since the Angels are almost innumerable, not even two can be of one species. Of bodies, some are beyond generation and decay, as the heavens and the stars, whose variety and beauty we admire without any satiety; but those which are bounded within the orbit of the Moon, bodies capable of generation and decay, are of three kinds: the inanimate, the living, and besides these, those endowed with sense and motion. Furthermore, who could gather up all the variety that is in men—in form and face, in gait, in voice, in talent, in tongue, in pursuits, in manners, laws, institutions, and religions?

Marginal glosses: 'That for many causes this whole universe of the world's things is wonderful'; and 'St. Thomas, first part, q. 50, art. 4.' The first ground of the universe's goodness: its immense variety—incorporeal (angels, each a distinct species per Aquinas, ST I q.50 a.4), incorruptible bodies (heavens, stars), corruptible bodies (inanimate, living, sentient), and the endless variety among men.

To this variety is joined, as a companion, the chief ornament and adornment of the world: order, and the most fitting and most beautiful disposition of all things. If the world lacked this, then, the more vast it was in mass, and the fuller and more manifold, the more deformed indeed it would be in appearance, the more hindered in motion, the more powerless

to effect, the weaker in its self-protection, and the feebler as to duration. And the order of the world is discerned in this: that all its parts hold and keep a place fit and agreeable to themselves; that, according to the measure of the nobility and dignity of things, some things are lower, others higher, some midway between these, and some are acted upon, preserved, and ruled by others. This order Aristotle so highly esteemed that, in the last book of the Metaphysics, the twelfth, he placed the greatest and supreme good of the Universe in its order and disposition.

Marginal gloss: 'The beauty and order of the world.' The second ground: the order and disposition of the world (without which mere size would be deformity). Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, located the supreme good of the universe in its order.

The third good of the world is its fullness and the universality of things; for the world contains all things in its embrace, and on that account is called the Universe. But here it must be noted that 'all things are in the world' can be understood in five ways: First, according to the general grades of things, which are four—to be, to live, to sense, and to understand; then according to all the genera of each of these grades, and the subaltern species; next, that there is nothing anywhere, and nothing has been made...

Marginal gloss: 'That all things being in the world can be understood in five ways.' The third ground: the world's plenitude (whence 'Universe'). The four general grades of being: to be / to live / to sense / to understand. Sentence continues onto p. 166 (catchword 'sit').

— p. 207 (PDF) · printed p. 166 —

...made by God which is not contained in the world and does not in some way pertain to the world; fourthly, according to the lowest species of things; and finally, according to the individuals of each species. In the first three ways it must be understood that all things are in the world, but not in the last two; for many lowest species, in the process and lapse of time, which had not existed at the beginning of the world, afterward came into existence, either from the mingling of diverse species or by the skill and industry of men; and today, and in the ages to follow, many others, which

did not exist before, will arise. But the totality of the individuals of each species cannot exist all at once in the world; yet it will exist through intervals of time: for some will be born of others, and as the earlier pass away through death, the later will succeed by new generation.

Completes (from p. 165) the 'five ways all things are in the world': new lowest species and successive individuals are not all present at once but unfold over time. The first three senses hold fully; the last two only successively.

The fourth good of the Universe is the wondrous commingling and connection of all its parts among themselves, so close not only as to quantity—that there be nowhere anything void and empty—but also in the series and connection of the natural species, namely that there be no interruption; for that would be uglier and more foreign to the excellence of the world than the interpolation and disjunction of the bodies themselves with an intervening void. The fifth good is the natural agreement of some things with others, and likewise the natural discord and repugnance among others, which the Greeks call sympatheiai and antipatheiai (sympathies and antipathies); the contemplation of which things is, to the wise, a matter of the highest admiration and insatiable delight: why, namely, the magnet draws iron, but not likewise a stone or wood; whence arose so great an enmity between the vine and the cabbage; how it can come about that a fish but a foot and a half long, the Remora, clinging to the keel of a ship however great and driven at the swiftest course, restrains all its force and impetus and renders it motionless?—and a thousand other prodigies of things and marvels of nature. The sixth good is the beauty of the world, blossoming from the wondrous proportion of all things, both among themselves and with the world itself, having itself no otherwise than the beauty of the human body, which exists from the harmonious and seemly composition and proportion of all the members.

The 4th–6th goods of the universe: the close connection of parts (no void, no break in the series of species); the sympathies and antipathies (Greek συμπαθε■ας/■ντιπαθε■ας — magnet & iron, vine & cabbage, the remora stopping a ship); and beauty from proportion (like the human body).

The seventh good is the most excellent administration, moderation, and ruling of the world, than which there is nothing more wonderful and pleasant to contemplate; and the excellence of this governance is clearly discerned from many things. First, indeed, that God provided for the smallest and meanest things no less amply and abundantly than for the greatest and noblest, and most wisely and most liberally furnished whatever was either necessary or opportune for preserving the life of each and attaining its end. Then, all things are signs that they are held and moved by the providence of the supreme Maker—whatever, endowed with no sense or cognition, tend directly by fixed ways, and without any error (save very rarely) attain their end, just as though they perfectly knew both their actions and their ends. This too is shown...

Marginal gloss: 'The excellence of the divine government of the world, from what things it is clearly known.' The 7th good = the world's administration. Signs of it: God's care for the meanest things, and the unerring goal-directedness of senseless natures. Sentence continues onto p. 167.

— p. 208 (PDF) · printed p. 167 —

...the evenness of things which is discerned in the universe: for the world is composed of things contrary and mutually warring, yet so equally tempered that, by breaking each other's forces in turn and corrupting themselves somewhat, that mutual repugnance of things is not only no destruction to the world, but even its preservation and adornment. For things discordant and contending among themselves in their natures and forces, by the moderation of the supreme Maker, conspire and agree in a harmonious bond to preserve the good of the universe. This matter Boethius, in the fourth book of the Consolation of Philosophy, the sixth meter, set forth in most elegant verses:

Marginal gloss: 'An excellent saying of Boethius.' The 'even-balance' of warring contraries, harmonized by God for the world's good; lead-in to the verses of Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae 4, meter 6.

> *By this concord [God] tempers the elements in balanced measures, so that, though warring, the moist yield in turns to the dry, and the cold join faith with the flames; that the hanging fire rise on high, and the heavy earth sink down by its weight. From these same causes the flower-bearing year breathes forth its scents in the warm spring; the fervid summer dries the corn (Ceres); autumn returns heavy with fruits; and the falling rain waters the winter. This tempering nourishes and brings forth whatever breathes life in the world; the same, snatching it away, hides and bears it off, drowning in final death the things that had arisen.*
>
> *Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae 4, meter 6 (lines 19–33): the harmonious tempering of the warring elements and the cycle of the seasons and of life and death.*

And although the celestial things much excel the sublunary, both in dignity of nature and in immortality, yet they are also few in number, and barren and unable to procreate others like themselves; by which two things the ignobility and mortality of the sublunary bodies is sufficiently compensated. The weaker of the animals too, and those that are prey to the rest, nature made far more numerous and more fertile—since the nobler ones are both few and less fertile, and live and sustain their life by the death of others. What of this, that in the world the account of the common good is held stronger than that of the private and particular—as is wont, and certainly ought, to happen in any best-constituted commonwealth and community? For this cause it comes to pass that what is heavy, against the force and impetus of its own nature, ascends upward—namely, lest anything in the world be void and empty; that certain animals, to the detriment of their own life, afford food to nobler ones, lest the species of the latter perish; that the water, which according to the order of nature ought to be both ampler and higher than the earth, on account of the benefit of plants and animals both has a smaller mass and holds a lower and humbler place.

The compensation of celestial vs. sublunary; the common good prevails over the particular (heavy things rise to prevent a void; weaker animals feed nobler ones; water yields its natural place for the sake of plants and animals).

Moreover, the things that seem evils, and are indeed faults and defects of nature,...

Opening of the discussion of evils and how they serve the world's order; continues onto p. 168.

— p. 209 (PDF) · printed p. 168 —

...defects, pertain to the adornment and beauty of the world. Now there are three kinds of evils. Some are wholly natural, namely those which befall things lacking cognition, such as natural defects and monsters; which not only arise from the necessity of matter, but are ordained to this end, that they may plainly show how great is the difference between incorruptible and corruptible things, between celestial and earthly, between divine and human; and that through such faults and defects the unfailing goodness, the inviolable order, and the beauty of the celestial things, unimpaired through all time, may more clearly appear. It also makes for the completion and fulfillment of the world that there be in it not only incorruptible things, but also corruptible ones; which, if they were lacking—since there are very many kinds of them—the world would assuredly not be perfect and complete in all its numbers, nor could we rightly claim for it the name of Universe.

Marginal gloss: 'On the three kinds of evils which are in the world and make for its perfection.' The first kind of evil: wholly natural defects and monsters, which set off by contrast the perfection of the celestial; corruptible things are needed for the world's completeness.

Other evils are human, which, namely, can befall only men among the things that are under heaven. Again, these are divided into two: evils of penalty, and evils of fault. The former are esteemed good on two counts: for by them satisfaction is made to the justice of God, by which the crimes of men are avenged; and they often lead to the amendment and correction of men—for they are like certain bitter medicines, very effective and

wholesome for routing vices and preserving virtues. Evils of fault are truly and simply evils, and have in themselves nothing of good; these are sins. Yet so great is the goodness, wisdom, and power of God that even these are ordained and made to profit toward some good. For God is so good that he wills, so powerful that he can, and so wise that he knows, to convert all such evils into good; so that even what he himself neither does nor wills to be done, he nevertheless wonderfully applies and adapts to that which he is about to do. For either he pardons sins, whereby he shows his surpassing clemency and mercy; or he avenges them, and chastises them with eternal punishments, and therein demonstrates the rectitude and rigor of his justice; and he makes even sins profit unto good for his elect—namely that from their fall they may rise humbler and more cautious, and more eager and fervent toward good works. An illustrious argument and example of this matter Adam's sin presents to us: how grave it was, how far and wide it spread its poison and ruin, how severely it was avenged, is agreed among all; yet this so great evil, by the goodness and power of God, was wonderfully converted into the greatest good and the most illustrious of God's works—namely to the Incarnation, Passion, and death of the Son of God. So that not unadvisedly or rashly does Gregory exclaim in a certain place: O happy fault, which merited to have so great and so excellent a Redeemer!

Marginal glosses: 'How God converts even the sins of men into good'; and 'In the Blessing of the Paschal Candle.' The second kind: human evils, split into penalty (good: satisfying justice, correcting men) and fault/sin (truly evil, yet ordered to good). Adam's sin → the Incarnation; the 'O felix culpa' (here ascribed to Gregory, but from the Easter Exsultet / Blessing of the Paschal Candle).

Finally, even the very inequality of human affairs, which in every age has offended many and led them astray—on that account supposing, or at least doubting, that human affairs are conducted and come about by no care and regard of God, because they saw that it generally goes ill with the good but well with the wicked—this inequality, I say,...

The third consideration: the inequality of human fortune (the good faring ill, the wicked well), which has offended or made doubters of many. Sentence continues onto p. 169 (it actually argues for, not against, God's good governance).

— p. 210 (PDF) · printed p. 169 —

...this inequality of things argues that the government of the world is most excellent; for God deals thus with men so that the hatred of vices and the zeal and worship of the virtues should not be mercenary, but gratuitous, and referred to nothing other than to God. Such inequality is profitable also to the wise and prudent man, that he may understand that, the body being extinguished, the soul survives, and that another life is to be expected after death, in which, fittingly to the deeds of men, both rewards and punishments are dispensed by God, the arbiter and judge of all. But this argument Eusebius treated learnedly and copiously, drawn from the mind of Philo the Jew, in the third book of the Preparation for the Gospel, the last chapter, and Blessed Augustine in the first book of the City of God, the eighth chapter and those next following; but, most eloquently among the philosophers, Seneca, in that book which he entitled: Why evils befall the good and goods the wicked, if there is providence.

The inequality of fortune in fact argues for God's good government (so that virtue be gratuitous, not mercenary) and points to the soul's survival and an afterlife of reward and punishment. Cites Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 3 (from Philo); Augustine, De civitate Dei 1.8ff.; and Seneca, De providentia ('Why do evils happen to good men, if there is providence?').

And Augustine beautifully teaches, in the eleventh book of the City of God, chapter 18, that the commingling of goods and evils in the world pertains to its adornment and beauty.

Lead-in to the quotation from Augustine, De civitate Dei 11.18.

“For God,” he says, “would not create any—I do not say of the Angels, but even of men—whom he foreknew would be evil, unless he equally knew to what uses of good things he would put them, and so would grace the order of the ages, as a most beautiful poem, even by

certain as it were antitheses. For antitheses—which are called among the ornaments of style most elegant—are in Latin termed 'opposites,' or, as it is more expressly said, 'counter-placed.' By these antitheses the Apostle Paul too, in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, sweetly explains that passage where he says: By the armor of justice on the right hand and on the left; by glory and dishonor; by evil report and good report; as deceivers, and yet true, etc. As, therefore, those contraries set against contraries render a beauty of speech, so, by a certain eloquence not of words but of things, the beauty of the world is composed by the opposition of contraries. Most plainly is this set down in the book of Ecclesiasticus in this manner: Against evil is good, and against death is life: so against the godly is the sinner. And so look upon all the works of the Most High, two and two, one against one." Thus Augustine.

Marginal references: 'Chapter 6' (2 Corinthians 6:7–8) and 'Ecclus. 33' (Ecclesiasticus 33:15). Quotation from Augustine, De civitate Dei 11.18: the order of the ages as a 'most beautiful poem' adorned by the antithesis of good and evil, illustrated from St. Paul and Ecclesiasticus.

Furthermore, the universe of things was founded for two causes: chiefly indeed for the glory of God, but then also for the use of man. For the world was founded so that through it the power, goodness, and wisdom of God might become known to man, and that by so wondrous a spectacle he might be stirred and instructed to know, love, and worship God. This the world excellently provides, as Paul says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also, and divinity; and David says: The heavens declare the glory of God; and in the thirteenth chapter of the book of Wisdom it is written: By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the creator of these may knowably be seen. For the fabric of this world manifestly shows the omnipotence of God, by which he completed all things out of nothing, in a point of time, by his command alone; and the wisdom by which he marked out and disposed the things he founded with the highest reason, and governs them with

incredible prudence; and the goodness too, by which not only...

Marginal glosses: 'The twofold end of the creation of the world'; and 'Rom. 1.' The twofold end of creation: God's glory and man's use. Cites Romans 1:20, Psalm 18(19):2 ('The heavens declare the glory of God'), and Wisdom 13:5. Sentence continues onto p. 170 (catchword 'quae').

— p. 211 (PDF) · printed p. 170 —

...the things that were not were produced out of nothing into being, but also, after they were made, he sustains them as it were with his own hand, as Paul says to the Hebrews in the first [chapter]: Upholding all things by the word of his power. And that all the corporeal things, and those which fall under sense, were ordained by God for the uses and conveniences of men, both Philosophy teaches, and it is handed down in the sacred writings, and the thing itself confirms—as Balbus, in Cicero, in the second book On the Nature of the Gods, proves in a long discourse. Let the reader survey in his mind all the things contained in this visible and corporeal world; he will assuredly find no thing which does not in some way contribute to some use of men: it is to be seen that some pertain to the necessities and conveniences of human life; others are referred to various delights and pleasures of men; others are remedies of diseases and safeguards of health; many are set forth for example and imitation; all conduce to the gaining of the knowledge of things, but especially to the conceiving in the mind the knowledge, love, and worship of God. The state of the world too marvelously agrees with the state of man, which is twofold: the one, of the present life, exposed to vanity and corruption—to this the state of the world, set in mutability and instability, is most similar; the other, after the day of judgment and the resurrection, full of incorruption and glory—to the likeness of which this world too will be reformed and renewed, as Paul teaches in the Epistle to the Romans, the eighth chapter.

Completes (from p. 169) the twofold end of creation: God's goodness sustains creation (Hebrews 1:3) and orders all things to man's use (Cicero, De natura deorum 2, Balbus). The world's state mirrors man's twofold state (present corruption; future glory at the resurrection—Romans 8:19–21).

Finally, the things which God works in the world, beyond its order and accustomed course, and above all the force and power of created nature, plainly declare that God is of immense power, and that the world is not a work of God equal and matched to his power; that God does not act from a necessity of nature, nor is bound in acting to second causes; and that in all things there is that which the theologians call the 'obediential potency' toward God, by which all things are so subject to the command and will of God that in them and through them, whatever shall please God—whether it be beside their nature, or above it, or even against it—is at once brought about with no repugnance, no difficulty, and no delay. All this Blessed Bernard wonderfully confirms, in the third sermon on the day of Pentecost, where he writes in this manner:

Marginal gloss: 'Bernard hands down that three things are to be considered in the structure of this world: what it is, how it is, and why it was made.' God's miracles (beyond nature's order) show his immense power and the 'obediential potency' of all things to his will. Lead-in to Bernard, Sermon 3 for Pentecost.

“Three things we ought to ponder in the great work of this world: namely, what it is, how it is, and to what end it was established. And in its being indeed the inestimable power of [its maker over] things is commended, in that so many, so great, in so manifold a fashion, so magnificently they were created. Surely in the very mode of it singular wisdom shines forth, in that some things were set on high, some below, some in the middle, most orderly. But if you meditate on the end for which it was made, there meets you a kindness so useful, a usefulness so kind, that it could overwhelm even the most ungrateful by the multitude and the greatness of its benefits. For most powerfully were all things created out of nothing, most wisely the beautiful, most kindly the useful. Yet we know that from the beginning there have been, and we still see that there are, many among the sons of men who, sunk in the lower goods of this sensible world with their whole sensuality...”

Quotation from Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 3 for Pentecost: the three things to ponder in the world—its being (power), its mode (wisdom), its end (kindness/usefulness). Continues onto p. 171.

— p. 212 (PDF) · printed p. 171 —

“...sunk down, gave themselves wholly to the things that were made, careless in what manner or to what end they were made. What shall we call these but carnal? I think them now very few; yet we read that there were sometimes some whose highest study and sole concern was to investigate the mode and order of the things made—so much that most of them not only feigned to inquire into the usefulness of things, but even magnanimously despised those very things, content with the scantiest and meanest food. These indeed call themselves Philosophers; but by us they are more rightly called curious and vain. To both of these, therefore, there have succeeded more prudent men—men who, namely, leaping over both what the things made are and how they were made, bent the keen edge of the mind to see for what end they were made. Nor did it escape them that, since God made all things for himself, [he made] all things for his own [elect]. Yet in one way for himself, in another for his own: for in that it is said 'All things for himself,' the preventing origin is commended; but in that it is said 'All things for his own,' the following fruit is rather expressed. He made all things for himself, namely by gratuitous goodness; all things for his elect, namely for their benefit: so that the former is the efficient cause, the latter the end. These are the spiritual men, so using this world as not using it, but in the simplicity of their heart seeking God, not even greatly tracing out in what manner this worldly machine was turned: the first filled with pleasure, the second with vanity, the third with truth.” Thus Bernard.

Conclusion (from p. 170) of the Bernard quotation: three classes of men—the carnal (who care only for the things made), the 'curious' philosophers (who study only how things are made), and the spiritual (who see the end, that all is for God's glory and his elect's good).

The second question which arises from these same words has two difficulties: whether the world could have been made better than it was made; and why it was said not before the creation of man, but immediately after his creation, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good—as if the creation of man alone were awaited, that this might be truly said. The former difficulty Blessed Thomas touches, in the first part, question 24, article 4. Subtly and clearly Bonaventure treats it, in the first book of the Sentences, distinction 44, and in the same place very many other scholastics; we shall dispatch it in a few words. We judge that this world could have been made better than it was made in four ways. First, as to quantity, this both as to magnitude and as to number: for the heavens and the elements could have been made larger than they are; and God could have made far more heavens, and in them more, larger, and more splendid stars. Then, as to the fullness and universality of things: for far more lowest species than there are could have been created. Besides, as to duration: for the world could have been so made that it were older than this one is, and would be more long-lasting. Lastly, as to the accidental perfection of natural things, which perfection can be amplified more and more. But on the contrary we deny that the world could have been made better in five other ways. First, as to the substantial perfection of things, which can in no way be increased. Then as to the order and disposition of the parts of the world and of the other things that are in it—which order we esteem so good that we do not think one could be better, or more fitting and seemly to this world. Then, in the rule and govern-...

Marginal gloss: 'Whether the world could have been made better by God than it is.' The second question (could the world be better made?). Cites Aquinas (the locus is in fact Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, a. 6; the printed 'q. 24 a. 4' is an error) and Bonaventure (Sentences 1, dist. 44). Four ways yes (quantity, plenitude, duration, accidental perfection); five ways no (substantial perfection, order...). Continues onto p. 172.

— p. 213 (PDF) · printed p. 172 —

...and in the rule and governance of the world, which is most excellent and most surpassing. Besides, as to the proportion, agreement, and fitness of the parts of the world among themselves and with the world itself. Finally, in respect of that end for which the world was made by God: for in comparison with that, the world neither ought nor could have been made better in any other way.

Completes (from p. 171) the five ways the world could NOT be better: substantial perfection, order, governance, proportion of parts, and (above all) in respect of its end.

The second difficulty we can briefly explain in this manner. The true and proper reason why it was said not before the creation of man, but immediately after, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good, is this: that it ought not, indeed could not, be said until all the works of the world were now consummated; but the last of all the works of God was man made, wherefore it ought not to be said except with man already created. Other reasons, neither inept nor to be despised, can be added. First, man is in a certain way the end of all, and received from God power and dominion over all. Second, whatever things were made by God are found in man in two ways: either according to real being, inasmuch as in the one man all the grades of the other things are contained—for man has being in common with inanimate things, life with plants, sense and motion with animals, mind and intelligence with the Angels; or according to intelligible being, for the rational soul, as Aristotle hands down in the third book On the Soul, is in a certain way all things, since it has in itself the images and likenesses of all the things it understands, and in understanding becomes in a certain way like to the things understood. Third, man is the ligament and bond and connection of the Universe, for in him the incorporeal things are associated and joined with the corporeal, and the immortal with the mortal. Fourth, the state of the world, both now and after the day of judgment, is conformed to the state of man, as we showed a little above. Fifth, for the sake of man together with God, Christ Jesus, all creatures were to be deified through man; for, on account of the hypostatic

union of the Word with human nature, the humanity of Christ being deified, together also all the creatures which are contained in it are wonderfully deified. It is clear, therefore, from these things, how, man being created, a certain great accession of manifold goodness and excellence was made to all the other things.

Marginal gloss: 'Why God did not, before man was created, see all that he had made to be very good.' Why 'very good' is said after man: he is the world's last work, its end, the microcosm (the rational soul 'in a way all things,' Aristotle De anima 3), the bond of the Universe; and through Christ's humanity (the hypostatic union) all creatures are deified.

God completed on the seventh day his work which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done. — Chapter 2, Verse 2.

The scripture lemma, Genesis 2:2 (the seventh day and God's rest).

— p. 214 (PDF) · printed p. 173 —

The Seventy Translators have in this place that God completed his work on the sixth day; but in the Hebrew it is on the seventh day, and the same has the Chaldee paraphrase and the Vulgate Latin translation. Saint Jerome, in his book On the Hebrew Traditions, writes thus, citing this passage according to the Septuagint:

The textual divergence at Genesis 2:2: the Septuagint reads 'on the sixth day,' but the Hebrew (and the Targum and Vulgate) read 'on the seventh day.' Lead-in to Jerome, Liber de quaestionibus hebraicis in Genesim.

“And God finished, on the sixth day, his works which he made. For 'on the sixth day' the Hebrew has 'the seventh day.' We shall therefore press hard upon the Jews, who glory in the rest of the Sabbath, [showing] that already then, at the beginning, the Sabbath was dissolved, since God works on the Sabbath, completing his works on it, and blessing that very day because on it he completed all things.” Thus Jerome.

Quotation from Jerome, Liber de quaestionibus hebraicis in Genesim, on Genesis 2:2: the Hebrew 'seventh day' is turned against the Jews' boast of Sabbath rest—God himself 'worked' (completed his works) on the Sabbath.

But this divergence is of words rather than of meanings; for both are true, both have the same sense. For the world was completed on the sixth day, namely inclusively, but on the seventh exclusively: for on the sixth day the last work of the world was made, which being perfected, the world was consummated; but on the seventh day God ceased from the fabrication of the world. As for what Catharinus says, that the woman was created on the seventh day, that seems foreign to the sacred writings; for at the end of the first chapter Moses, describing the creation of man, teaches that God created man on the sixth day, and made them male and female. And likewise, all the works of the world being finished, he relates that God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And soon he adds, And the evening and the morning were the sixth day. In Exodus too, in the twentieth and thirty-first chapters, it is plainly written that God founded in six days all the things that are in the world, but on the seventh day ceased from working. And at the beginning of the second chapter of Genesis Moses says that God completed his work on the seventh day, because on it he rested from all the work which he had done. And that the Seventy Translators are to be understood as we have expounded is plain by considering their words at the beginning of the second chapter; for they stand thus: God perfected on the sixth day his works which he made, and God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made. Whence one may understand, according to them, that God completed his works on the sixth day by then making the last work, but completed them on the seventh day, namely by then first ceasing from the making and contriving of the world.

Marginal gloss: 'Catharinus is refuted, saying that Eve was formed on the seventh day.' The 'sixth/seventh day' divergence is reconciled (sixth inclusively, seventh exclusively). Catharinus's view (Eve made on day 7) refuted by Gen 1:27 (man, male and female, made on day 6) and Exodus 20:11, 31:17.

Cajetan weighed those words, God completed on the seventh day his work which he had made. For he does not say that God completed his work simply and precisely—lest, namely, anyone should think that God made whatever he could and as much as he could: for since God is of infinite power for acting, he never makes only as much as he can make, but, whatever be made, he can make other and other things without end. He is said therefore to 'complete' the work because he makes as much as he had intended and determined to make, and as much as the nature of the work requires, and because he rests from acting.

Marginal gloss: 'Cajetan on Genesis.' Cajetan: 'completed' does not mean God did all he could (his power being infinite), but that he did what he had intended, as the work required.

But as for what is said, that God rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done: it is not to be taken so that we should understand God, after our manner, as having, from the fabrication of the world, as it were weary and worn out, taken rest from labor. For in Scripture, 'to rest' often signifies nothing other than cessation and ceasing from acting. Examples are everywhere ready at hand in the divine writings. An illustrious one is that in the Apocalypse, chapter four, concerning the holy living creatures,...

God's 'rest' does not mean weariness, but cessation from acting; 'to rest' in Scripture = to cease. Cites Revelation 4 (the holy living creatures who 'rested not'); continues onto p. 174 (catchword 'Et re').

— p. 215 (PDF) · printed p. 174 —

...And they had no rest, says John, day and night saying, Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty—meaning that they never ceased or left off saying those words; for otherwise the greatest and only rest of the blessed is to praise God perpetually. A similar sense has that passage of Isaiah, chapter one: Cease to do perversely, learn to do well. And in chapter two: Cease from the man whose breath is in his nostrils—that is, leave off offending him. And in the book of Joshua, chapter five, for what we read in Latin, The manna failed after they had eaten of the fruits of the land, the Hebrew

has, The manna rested. And in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter eighteen: When a man hath finished, then shall he begin; and when he hath rested, he shall work. So in this place, that the word 'rest' is taken [in this sense] Moses declares, immediately adding that God blessed the seventh day because on it he had ceased from all the work which he had created.

Completes (from p. 173) the point that 'to rest' in Scripture means to cease. Cites Revelation 4:8 (the living creatures who 'had no rest'), Isaiah 1:16, 2:22, Joshua 5:12 (Hebrew 'the manna rested'), and Ecclesiasticus 18:6. Marginal gloss: 'What 'rest' or 'to rest' signifies in Scripture.'

Aristobulus, as Eusebius reports in the thirteenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter six, handed down that God is said to have rested on the seventh day because, the things being founded by him, he implanted rest in them—that is, stability, permanence, perpetuity, and a settled, fixed, and immutable order; or because whatever he had decreed to make was wholly perfected just as he had purposed. As David said, All things whatsoever the Lord pleased he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps; and in another place, Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all his wills. But lest anyone should suspect that God so ceased from working that he would work nothing more thereafter, Moses said expressly that he ceased from all the work which he had done—that is, from the fabric and contriving of the world, which he finished in six days—so that nothing pertaining to the completeness and adornment of the world was made beyond those six days. And Moses added this so that it might be manifest to anyone that the fabric of the world was entirely completed in those six days; otherwise God would not have removed his hand from the work until he had, as it were, set the crown upon it: for it was not fitting to leave so great a work begun and imperfect.

Marginal gloss: 'A new interpretation of God's rest from his works, which, on the testimony of Eusebius, Aristobulus handed down'; and 'Psalm 134, Psalm 110.' Aristobulus (via Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.6/12): God's 'rest' = the settled order he implanted. Cites Psalm 134(135):6 and 110(111):2.

From these things it is plain that the question which certain theologians are wont to treat is foreign to this place: namely, how Moses hands down that

God rested on the seventh day from all work, when our Lord said to the Jews, as John records in chapter 5, My Father worketh until now, and I work? Which question Augustine thus unraveled in the fourth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 12.

Marginal gloss: 'How Moses says God rested on the seventh day from working, when our Lord said, My Father worketh until now.' The apparent conflict between Genesis 2:2 and John 5:17, resolved by Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 4.12), quoted next.

“It can be understood,” he says, “that God rested from founding the kinds of creatures, because he founded no new kinds beyond [the six days]; but thenceforth, even until now and beyond, he works the administration of those same kinds which were then established. For on the seventh day his power did not cease from the governance of the heaven and the earth and all the things he had founded—otherwise they would at once dissolve. For the power of the Creator, and the might of him who is omnipotent and holds all things, is the cause of subsisting to every creature; and if this might should ever cease from ruling the things that were created, at the same time their form would cease, and all nature would collapse. For it is not, as with the structure of a building—when one has built it, and...”

Quotation from Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 4.12: God rested from founding new kinds, but never ceases from governing/sustaining creation (else it would dissolve). Continues onto p. 175.

— p. 216 (PDF) · printed p. 175 —

“...one departs, and, he ceasing and departing, his work yet stands: so could the world stand even for the twinkling of an eye, if God should withdraw from it his rule. Accordingly, that the Lord says, My Father worketh until now, shows a certain continuation of his work, by which he holds together and administers the whole creation.” Thus Augustine resolved the question.

Conclusion (from p. 174) of the Augustine quotation: unlike a builder, God cannot withdraw from the world for an instant; 'My Father worketh until now' (John 5:17) means his continuous sustaining of

creation.

But other theologians explain the same more subtly and distinctly. They say that God, after those first six days in which the world was fabricated and finished, made nothing at all new, and nothing which was not in some way contained in the works of those six days: namely, either materially, as Eve in the rib of Adam (since some think, as I reported above, that Eve was created on the seventh day); or causally and effectively, as all the individuals of each species [were contained] in those first individuals produced according to each species at the beginning of the world; or potentially, as the animals generated from the mingling of diverse species [were contained] in those species from which they are generated; or virtually, as the things that come to be from putrid matter—for they were contained in the powers of the stars and the elements and other bodies, in which God implanted those powers when he framed the world; or according to a likeness of species, as all the rational souls thereafter created or to be created were in a certain way in the first soul of Adam, for all are of the same species; likewise the glory of the blessed men shone forth beforehand in the glory of the holy Angels; and the glory of human bodies, to come after the resurrection, in a certain way shone forth beforehand in the brightness and glory of the empyrean Heaven. These things they teach truly indeed and learnedly—who denies it? But, as far as this passage is concerned, superfluously and not aptly enough. For Moses does not say that God rested on the seventh day from all work simply, but with this addition, From all the work which he had done—namely in the first six days: so that the sense is, that God finished the fabric of the world in six days, and therefore on the seventh day ceased to fabricate the world any further.

The other theologians' view: nothing made after the six days that was not already contained in them—materially (Eve in Adam), causally, potentially (hybrids), virtually (spontaneous generation in the stars'/elements' powers), or by likeness of species (souls in Adam's soul; the blessed's glory in the angels; risen bodies in the empyrean). Pererius: true but not apt here—'from all the work which he had done' simply means the six-day fabrication was finished.

But concerning this rest of God the Fathers philosophize much, piously and learnedly: Blessed Augustine, in the fourth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter fifteen, and Bede in the Hexameron, say that it was said God rested on the seventh day 'from' his works, but not 'in' his works—so that we might understand that God was not led to create things by any necessity or need, but only by his own goodness and munificence, namely that he might communicate his goods to others also. He did not therefore rest in his work, taking from it any benefit or pleasure, but rested from his work—that is, the work being perfected, he rested, namely in himself; as before the creation of the world, and from all eternity, he rested in himself, enjoying himself alone, and content and blessed in himself alone. Thus stand Augustine's words in the aforesaid place:

Marginal gloss: 'What kind God's rest was on the seventh day.' Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 4.15) and Bede: God rested 'from' (not 'in') his works—he needed nothing from creation, but rests, blessed, in himself alone. Lead-in to the long Augustine quotation.

“For surely, because it is a fault and an infirmity of the soul to be so delighted in its own works that...”

Opening of the long quotation from Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 4) on God's rest; continues onto p. 176.

— p. 217 (PDF) · printed p. 176 —

“...that it rather rests in them than from them in itself—whereas without doubt there is something better in [the soul], by which they were made, than the things that were made. It is intimated to us by this Scripture, in which God is said to have rested from all his works which he made, that he was delighted by no work of his as though he had needed the making of it, or would be less if he had not made it, or more blessed when he had made it. For since whatever is from him is so from him that it owes to him that it is, while he himself owes to no one [the fact] that he is blessed, he set himself, by loving, before the things he made: not sanctifying the day on which he began them to be

made, nor the day on which he perfected them, lest his joy should seem to be increased by their being made or having been made, but the day on which he rested from them in himself. And he himself indeed never lacked this rest, but he showed it to us through the seventh day: thereby also signifying that his rest is not perceived save by the perfect, since, for its imitation, he appointed no day but the one which followed the perfection of all things." Thus Augustine.

Conclusion (from p. 175) of the Augustine quotation (De Genesi ad litteram 4): God needs nothing from creation; he sanctified not the day of beginning or perfecting his works, but the seventh day, on which he 'rested in himself'—signifying that his rest is grasped only by the perfect.

Others hand down that this rest of God on the seventh day after the making of the world was a figure of the rest of Christ in the sepulchre, on the Sabbath day, after on the sixth day he had consummated the work of our redemption by his passion and death. We too, after the labor of the six days of the present life, shall rest on the seventh day in the other life, as John says in the Apocalypse, chapter fourteen: From henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors. Nor are we to keep holiday from work and labor in all this life, until we come to the Sabbath; nor will our works be complete, or grace consummated, until it be reached. God of old forbade fire to be kindled on the Sabbath day in the houses of the Jews for preparing food, and likewise forbade the gathering of manna on that day: the former adumbrates the necessities of the present life, the latter the laborious and anxious acquisition of divine grace—neither of which will be a work in the other life. But concerning the heavenly sabbatism of the saints, Paul disputes much and divinely in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

God's seventh-day rest as a figure of Christ's rest in the tomb (after the sixth-day Passion) and of our future rest (Revelation 14:13). The Sabbath prohibitions of fire and manna-gathering figure present life's needs and the laborious acquisition of grace; Paul on the heavenly sabbatism (Hebrews 4).

And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it: because in it he had ceased from all his work which God created and made. — Chapter 2, Verse 3.

The scripture lemma, Genesis 2:3 (God blesses and sanctifies the seventh day).

Each of the prior six days had some work made by God; wherefore, lest on that account the seventh day should be thought idle and ignoble, God bestowed on it a singular blessing—namely to show that this day is the Index of the perfection and completion of the Universe. And God willed on this day to cease and rest from working, that he might indicate that all the things pertaining to the perfecting of the world's fabric were, in the six preceding days...

The decorated initial begins 'Quilibet.' The seventh day, though without a work, is blessed to mark it as the Index of the world's completion. Sentence continues onto p. 177.

— p. 218 (PDF) · printed p. 177 —

...made and completed; and because to perfect and complete a work is better and nobler than to begin and make it, therefore God deemed the seventh day worthy of greater honor than the preceding six days; and in this manner Theodoret interprets the aforesaid words of Moses, in the twenty-first question on Genesis. And since for God to bless someone is nothing other than to do good, and that largely and abundantly, that God blessed the seventh day shows that this day was honored and adorned by many and excellent benefits of God, and by most illustrious deeds.

Theodoret (Quaest. in Gen. 21): the seventh day honored more than the six, because to complete is nobler than to begin. To 'bless' = to do good abundantly.

Certainly God exempted this seventh day from all labor and servile work, so that the other days were spent in working and laboring, but this day was one of leisure and rest. This day God applied to his own worship, that on it, namely, men, keeping holiday from earthly labors and cares, might be able to study and devote themselves, with an empty and free mind, to the meditation of divine things and the handling of sacred matters. On this day, throughout all the Synagogues, the law of Moses was expounded, and the word of God explained, as is related in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter fifteen. From this day all the other days of the week were numbered and

named; for among the Jews, the first of the Sabbath was called the Lord's day, the second of the Sabbath the day of the Moon, the third of the Sabbath the day of Mars, and so on in like manner. This day was most desired by male and female servants, hired laborers, and others who passed a hard life in laboring and serving; for on it rest from all labor was given to all.

Marginal gloss: 'The dignity of the seventh day.' The Sabbath as a day of rest, worship, and the public exposition of the Law (Acts 15:21); the Jewish reckoning of the week from the Sabbath; the relief it gave to servants and laborers.

After the likeness of this day, every seventh year was a year of rest for the land; and when seven weeks of years had passed, the last year of the seventh week gave the beginning to the Jubilee, than which nothing among the Jews was more desired, more joyful, and more sweet. To Daniel too, by the seventy weeks of years, the time of the Messiah's coming was determined. Finally, by many illustrious things in Scripture we find the number seven consecrated and ennobled; of which number's virtues and praises, while others have discoursed copiously, Philo too hands down many things subtly and accurately in the book On the Making of the World. Read likewise what Eusebius wrote of it in the thirteenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter seven, and before him Clement of Alexandria in the sixth book of the Stromata. Bede in the Hexameron, and before Bede Augustine in the first book On Genesis against the Manichees, chapter thirteen, adapt the six days in which the world was founded to the six ages of the world, declaring, neither ineptly nor unskilfully, the agreement that exists between each of those days and each age of the world.

Marginal glosses: 'Levit. 25'; 'Numbers 36'; 'Daniel 9. The dignity of the number seven.' The sevens of Scripture: the sabbatical year and Jubilee (Lev 25), Daniel's 70 weeks (Dan 9), and the number seven (Philo, De opificio mundi; Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.7; Clement, Stromata 6). The six days = the six ages of the world (Bede; Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.13).

But in what way did God sanctify the Sabbath day? In divine Scripture, to sanctify means the same as to separate from pollution, uncleanness, and profane use, and to apply to the worship of God: thus were sanctified the firstborn, the vessels of the temple, the priestly vestments, and the Levites themselves. He sanctified, therefore, the Sabbath day, because, while the remaining [days]...

Marginal gloss: 'What 'to sanctify' signifies in Scripture.' To sanctify = to separate from common use and dedicate to God's worship (the firstborn, temple vessels, priestly vestments, the Levites). Sentence continues onto p. 178 (catchword 'liquos').

— p. 219 (PDF) · printed p. 178 —

...had destined the remaining days to labor, he assigned this one to leisure and rest, and consecrated it to his own worship: and so on the other days it was permitted to do any work whatever, and to labor and toil as much and in whatever manner one would, as though those days were profane and ignoble; but on the seventh day, as on a day sacred, religious, venerable, and dedicated to the handling of divine things, it was not permitted to do servile work, nor to dispatch civil business, nor to undertake hard or heavy labor.

Completes (from p. 177) why God 'sanctified' the Sabbath: he set it apart from the working days and consecrated it to his worship and rest.

But it is a question whether from these words of Moses it is to be understood that God, already then at the beginning of the world, commanded the observance of the Sabbath, such, namely, as the Mosaic law sanctioned many ages after. Catharinus says this, and argues it from this passage; for to sanctify the Sabbath is nothing other than to make that day free from all labor and servile work, and to consecrate it to divine worship—and in the same way we read that the Sabbath day was afterward sanctified by the law of Moses. But Tostatus denies this; for the things here related about the sanctification of the Sabbath he thinks were said by anticipation, and are not to be referred to that first Sabbath of the nascent

world, or to the first men, but to the state and time of the Mosaic law, at which time, namely, Moses wrote this book for the Jews. And that the observance of the Sabbath was not enjoined at the beginning of the world, many arguments prove. First, in the state of innocence it would have been superfluous to prescribe to man some one day for devoting himself to God and divine things; for then there would have been nothing to call man away from the contemplation and worship of God—nay, to this man would have been most inclined of his own accord, and would have given himself to meditating and handling divine things not only on the seventh day, but daily, and indeed more than once. Then, the precept of resting from labor and servile work would have been superfluous in that most happy state of man, in which there was nothing to bring man any labor, trouble, or punishment. Again, if the precept of observing the Sabbath had then been given, it would surely have bound all mortals; for it would have been given to the first man, and in him to all his posterity; but it is established that the observance of the Sabbath was never in the custom and institution of the Gentiles, nor do we read that the holy Patriarchs observed the Sabbath day. And truly, if from Adam there had been a perpetual handing-down of this precept, and at least an observance among pious men, then, when Moses in promulgating the law enjoined this precept on the Jews, he would doubtless have recalled its antiquity and religious observance among their forefathers, that he might the more easily incline the minds of the Jews to keep this precept promptly, zealously, and devoutly. Besides, the Fathers and theologians generally hand down that God imposed on Adam no wholly positive precept except that of not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Add that the theologians teach that, before the coming of Christ, the Gentiles could attain eternal salvation by the observance of the moral precepts and the law of nature alone...

Marginal glosses: 'Whether from this time a law of observing the Sabbath was imposed on men by God'; and 'Catharinus on Genesis.' The question whether the Sabbath was commanded at creation: Catharinus says yes; Tostatus says no (the sanctification is told by anticipation, belonging to the Mosaic law). Pererius gives Tostatus's arguments. Sentence continues onto p. 179.

— p. 220 (PDF) · printed p. 179 —

...of nature, with some light of divine Faith and the supernatural help of God; therefore the precept of the Sabbath did not bind them—but it would have bound them, had it been imposed on man at the beginning of the world. Bede supports Tostatus; for the sanctification of the Sabbath which is here described he refers to that which was afterward handed down to the Jews through the law of Moses. I too assent to Tostatus rather than to Catharinus; for I find that this opinion was approved by Eusebius in the first book of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter four, and by Justin in the Dialogue which he held with Trypho, and also by Tertullian and Cyprian, in those books which they wrote against the Jews.

Marginal gloss: 'Bede in the Hexameron.' Bede and Pererius side with Tostatus (the Sabbath was first imposed by the Mosaic law). Cites Eusebius (Ecclesiastical History 1.4), Justin Martyr (Dialogue with Trypho), Tertullian, and Cyprian (Against the Jews).

But what does Moses mean by those words, Which God created that he might make—or, as the Hebrew sounds, Which God had created that he might make—although the Seventy Translators have it thus, Which God began to make? What, I say, is that 'He created that he might make'? Rupert, in the second book On the Trinity and his Works, chapter eighteen, interprets it in this manner: God created beforehand in the eternal Word what he afterward made in the external work. God created eternally in his own essence the things which he created temporally in their own several natures, according to that which is in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter eighteen: He that liveth for ever created all things together. But this saying of Rupert would not escape the censure of the theologians with impunity. For things, as they are in God, are not made or created by God, but are coeternal with God; nay, in very fact they are wholly the same as God. For, to say this by way of example, God did not create the idea of man which is in God—no more, indeed, than his own very essence.

Marginal gloss: 'A note on a certain saying of Rupert.' Rupert (De Trinitate 2.18): God 'created' first in the eternal Word what he afterward 'made' externally (citing Ecclus 18:1, 'He created all things

together'). Pererius corrects him: the things as they are in God are not created but coeternal with—indeed identical to—God himself.

Catharinus distinguishes a threefold general and principal operation of God: the first is creation, by which the things that were nothing first begin to be; the second is the restoration of the principal creature of this world, that is, of man; the third will be the renewal and glorification both of man and of the world. Since therefore creation was terminated at the making of the world, Moses therefore said 'which God created that he might make'—in the Hebrew, word for word, it is thus, Which God created by producing, or unto producing; in which words certain men skilled in Hebrew hold that no mystery lies hidden, but that it is a pure Hebraism, as Scripture elsewhere says, By swearing he swore, by striking he struck, so by making he made. Others interpret 'He created that he might make' thus: because he not only brought it about that the work which existed should exist, but also implanted in it the force and power of making another like itself, and that one...

Marginal gloss: 'The threefold general and principal operation of God, according to Catharinus.' Catharinus's three works: creation, restoration (man), renewal/glorification. The Hebrew 'created by producing' read either as a pure Hebraism (like 'by swearing he swore') or as God endowing things with the power to reproduce. Sentence continues onto p. 180.

— p. 221 (PDF) · printed p. 180 —

...likewise another, and so on, as long as the world should last—lest, namely, it should be necessary for God always to make new works, and to create out of nothing. Therefore he both made things, and made them so that they could make others like themselves; and by this reasoning he both provided for the perpetuity of things and the long-lasting of the world, and ennobled the things themselves with this dignity, that they should not only be, but also make other things. And by these words, says Cajetan, is denoted the end of each created thing, which is not for the thing to be, but is its proper and perfect operation: for, as Aristotle says in the second book On the Heavens, text 17, Of whatever thing there is some work, that thing

is for the sake of that work. So Paul, to the Ephesians 2, speaking of Christians and saints: We are, he says, his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them. Nor are there lacking authors—and not the worst—who take that 'that he might make' for 'that he might dispose and destine [each thing] to a fixed use and end,' as though by that word it were declared that God not only created and completed all things, but appointed to each its own end, and destined each thing to its own uses; for they say that the Hebrew word, which the Latin Translator rendered 'that he might make,' properly signifies ordination, disposition, and the destining and adapting [of a thing] to something fixed.

Marginal gloss: 'Cajetan on Genesis.' The endowment of things with the power to reproduce (so God need not always create anew); Cajetan: the end of each thing is its proper operation (Aristotle, De caelo 2, text 17; Ephesians 2:10). Others read 'ut faceret' as God's destining each thing to its end and use.

I shall not go on at length; only this I shall add, as it were a closing clause: that on this seventh day appeared the completeness, finishing, and consummation of so illustrious and wondrous a work perfected by God. Then it is most like the truth that all the heavenly spirits, with one mind, with equal jubilation and harmonious voice, praised God, the architect and contriver of such great works—according to that which is written in Job, chapter 38: Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?—or, as the Seventy Translators have it in that place, When all my Angels praised me with a loud voice. That those ancient theologians of the Gentiles—Linus, Homer, and Hesiod—saw, as it were through a cloud, a certain singular excellence and especial religion and sanctification of this seventh day, Eusebius confirms in the thirteenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 7, bringing forward their verses.

Marginal glosses: 'A conjecture of the author not to be despised'; and 'That the ancient poets were not ignorant of the dignity of the Sabbath.' On the seventh day the angels praised God (Job 38:7); even the pagan poets (Linus, Homer, Hesiod) glimpsed the dignity of the seventh day (Eusebius, Praep. ev.

13.7).

In the day that the Lord God made every herb of the field before it sprang up: for the Lord God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to till the earth; but a spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface of the earth. — Chapter 2, Verses 4, 5, and 6.

The scripture lemma, Genesis 2:4–6 (the plants made before they sprouted; no rain, no man; the spring watering the earth).

By the first words Moses here teaches that the generation of plants, which above he had recorded as made on the third day, was the first, before which there had never been any, and that it was made immediately by God by his immense power, and not by the force and power of nature; of which he sets down this argument: that that generation of plants was made before the generation of rain and the making of man; but nature, without showers and the tillage of man, does not procreate the better plants, nor bring them to perfection. That phrase, therefore, The Lord God made the herb of the field before it sprang up, signifies that that procreation of plants by God was the first of all, perfected not by the force of nature, but by the power of God...

Genesis 2:5: the plants were made by God's power, not nature's—shown by their being made before rain and before man's tillage (which nature requires to bring plants to perfection). Sentence continues onto p. 181.

— p. 222 (PDF) · printed p. 181 —

...by God's power. But as for those words, A spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface of the earth—since the Latin and the Greek translator rendered the Hebrew word 'Ed' by the word 'spring' (fons)—the sense is very obscure: for who that spring was that watered the whole earth is hard to explain. Augustine expounds this in two ways: Either, he says, 'spring' is put for 'springs,' the singular, namely, being set for the plural, as is frequently done in divine Scripture, and it is signified that at the beginning of the world for some time—that is, before the generation of rain—the earth was watered by the waters of springs; or, if there was one

spring which watered all the crops of the earth, it must be understood that it was wont, swelling and overflowing at fixed intervals of time, to water all the parts of the earth which, for the sake of the plants, needed water; just as the Nile, overflowing most deeply and most widely, waters and makes fertile all Egypt. By the alternating tides of the Ocean too it is most well known that the shores in certain places are most amply covered by the waves and in turn laid bare; nay, they report a wonderful alternation of certain springs, which at a fixed interval of years flood so far as to water the whole adjacent region, while at another time they scarcely afford from deep wells water enough for drinking. Thus Augustine, in the fifth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapters nine and ten. And the Latin interpreters of this book mostly follow Augustine; and before Augustine, Philo interpreted this passage similarly.

Marginal glosses: 'A disputation: who that spring was that rose from the earth, by which Moses says all the earth was watered at the beginning of the world'; and 'Augustine's twofold exposition.' The Hebrew word 'Ed' (■■, 'mist') is rendered 'fons' (spring). Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 5.9–10): either 'spring' = 'springs' (singular for plural), or one spring overflowing periodically like the Nile. Philo interpreted similarly.

But the faith of learned men will reject both of Augustine's answers. For the water of springs could not flow through to all the plants of the earth, or water them as much as was needful—that is, neither more nor more abundantly than the nature of each plant required—without the industry and art of man, who can channel the earthly waters wherever there is need, and temper and modify the watering at his own discretion. And that there was one spring which flooded all the plants and herbs of the earth with its waters plainly exceeds belief; for, to say nothing of the immense force of waters which that spring must have had, and passing over the question what became of that spring after the earth began to be flooded and made fertile by rains, I press this: how could so many and so great islands of the sea have been watered by that spring? or how could its waters have crossed the loftiest ridges and peaks of the mountains, most densely [covered] with verdant forests and planted with various kinds of plants? If they say that

this was done by the infinite power of God, and take refuge in miracles, they will sufficiently betray the weakness and improbability of their opinion, which, unless propped and sustained by the supports and props of miracles, could not stand. For in explaining the works of God, especially those which pertain to the fabric and completion of the world, one must consider not what God could do by his immense power, but what he did, or what it was most fitting for him to do; not what is easy for his omnipotence to do, but what is agreeable to the natures of things and to the wisdom of God, who [made] the world by himself alone...

Marginal gloss: 'Refutation of St. Augustine's opinion.' Pererius refutes both of Augustine's readings: springs cannot water all plants without human irrigation, and one spring could not reach islands or mountaintops; appealing to miracles betrays the opinion's weakness, since in the six-days' works one should ask what God did and what was fitting, not what his power could do. Sentence continues onto p. 182 (catchword 'se solo').

— p. 223 (PDF) · printed p. 182 —

...[the world,] founded by himself alone, [God] lets henceforth carry on its natural motions and keep its own order, as Augustine says. Whereby it may be understood that, just as now the generation of plants comes about by natural causes, so too the [generation] right after that first one was made [naturally], since there is no need of a miracle of that spring spreading through all the earth and climbing the highest mountains to water the plants that are on them. Albinus (Alcuin) says that the earth which Moses says was watered by one spring is not to be understood as the whole world, but only the land of Paradise, which a little later Moses says was watered by one river, which outside Paradise was divided into four streams. But nowhere before this passage did Moses make any mention of Paradise; rather, immediately after this passage he begins the history and narrative of Paradise; and since he says precisely that all the earth was watered by that spring, it is outside his meaning to restrict his words to the land of Paradise.

Marginal gloss: 'A third exposition, that of Albinus (Alcuin).' Completes (from p. 181) Pererius's point that nature, not a miraculous spring, watered the plants. Alcuin's view (the watered earth = Paradise

only) is rejected, since Moses speaks of 'all the earth.'

The Interlinear Gloss denies that there were any rains before the flood, but [holds] that during all that time the earth was watered by earthly waters. But that through all the one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years that passed from the beginning of the world to the flood no rain was generated—since this is against the natural course and order of things—is altogether incredible. For it is natural to the Sun to draw vapors out of the waters and the earth and lift them into the middle region of the air; it is natural that vapors carried thither be compressed and condensed into clouds by the cold of the place; it is natural that from condensed clouds rains be generated and fall to the earth. This so natural order of things, therefore, could not be interrupted and impeded for so long, unless God by some supreme miracle were restraining and hindering it.

Marginal gloss: 'A wonderful saying of the Interlinear Gloss.' The Gloss's view (no rain before the flood) is rejected: 1,656 years without rain would require a continuous miracle against the natural cycle of vapor → cloud → rain.

A more probable interpretation of this passage, therefore, is to be drawn from the proper meaning of the Hebrew word. The word ■■ (Ed), the Hebrews, and those Christians most skilled in that language, affirm to signify vapor—such, namely, as that by which, drawn up from the earth on high by the force of the Sun, rain is generated; to which interpretation is akin that which the Chaldee Paraphrast followed, interpreting it 'cloud'; for a cloud is nothing other than the vapor of earth or water, compressed and condensed on high. For this signification is that saying of Eusebius, confessing that he had heard from a certain Hebrew that the word 'Ed' signifies not a spring, but vapor. Theodoret too cites Aquila the translator, who similarly rendered that Hebrew word [as vapor]; which signification he himself also follows, holding that the earth at the beginning was not watered by rains, but by a moisture or vapor which, after that general separation of the waters from the earth made on the third day, remained for some time in it, and filled the office of rain for flooding and making it

fertile. But in truth the words of Moses by no means fit that vapor or moisture of Theodoret; for he says that the vapor 'ascended from the earth' and 'watered all its surface': for the word of ascending and watering does not at all suit a moisture left from the waters in the earth...

Marginal gloss: 'A fourth exposition, which the Author prefers above the rest.' The Hebrew ■■ (ed, 'mist/vapor') signifies vapor (whence rain), not a spring; the Targum read 'cloud,' Eusebius and Theodoret (citing Aquila) 'vapor.' But Theodoret's reading (a residual moisture) doesn't fit 'ascended... watered.' Sentence continues onto p. 183.

— p. 224 (PDF) · printed p. 183 —

...does not suit. Tostatus says—though with the Hebrews protesting—that the Hebrew word 'Ed' is ambiguous, and is sometimes put and used both for 'spring' and for 'vapor.' Yet if, by the ascent of vapor from the earth, we understand that Moses is describing the generation of rain, by which the earth, after that first procreation of plants, began to be flooded and made fertile for generating plants, then the word 'spring,' set down by the Greek and Latin Translator, will not be foreign to this signification of vapor; for the perennial exhalation of vapors from the earth on high, whence the generation of rains comes about, can rightly be named, as it were, a certain spring. Aristotle indeed, in the first book of the Meteorology, in the first chapter of the third part, called it a certain circular and perennial river, whose words we recalled above, when we disputed about the waters set by God above the heavens.

Completes the rejection of Theodoret. Tostatus: 'Ed' is ambiguous (spring or vapor); read as vapor (= rain-generation), 'spring' fits, since the perennial exhalation is like a spring. Aristotle (Meteorologica 1.9, 'a circular and perennial river').

The genuine explanation and meaning of this passage, therefore, seems to be this: that the first generation of plants was made by God alone, by his immense power, and not by natural causes; but that the other generations of plants which followed thereafter were made in a natural manner and way, namely by the tillage of man and the force of rain—whose matter of generation, and likewise its place, end, and use, Moses disclosed in these

few words. The matter, when he said 'vapor'—for rain is begotten from vapors; the place, when he says 'It ascended from the earth'—for from vapors raised from the earth into the upper regions of the air the generation of rain arises; and its end and use, when he adds, 'And it watered all the surface of the earth.' The generation and use of this same rain David beautifully set forth in Psalm one hundred forty-six, and most beautifully Job in the thirty-sixth chapter.

Pererius's own reading: the first plants by God's power alone, the rest by nature (man's tillage + rain). Genesis 2:6 ('vapor... ascended... watered') reveals rain's matter, place, and use. Lead-in to Psalm 146 and Job 36.

He [David] says: Who covereth the heaven with clouds, and prepareth rain for the earth. Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains, and herb for the service of men. Who giveth to beasts their food, etc. And he [Job] says: Who taketh away the drops of rain, and poureth out showers like floods, which flow from the clouds that cover all things above. If he will spread out the clouds as his tent, and lighten with his light from above, he shall cover also the ends of the sea. For by these he judgeth peoples, and giveth food to many mortals.

Two scriptural descriptions of rain's generation: Psalm 146 (147):8–9 (David) and Job 36:27–31 (Job).

DISPUTATION: Whether the world was founded over the intervals of six days, or all at once in a single point of time?

Section heading. The first of two disputations closing the literal commentary on the six days: whether creation was successive (over six days) or instantaneous.

But the explanation of the divine works (man excepted, of whose creation we shall dispute separately in the fourth book) which were effected in the first six days being now finished, it remains for us to treat two most pleasing and noble disputations: one, whether the world was made over the intervals of six days, or was founded all at once in a single moment of time; the other...

The decorated initial begins 'Sed.' The literal six-days commentary being complete, Pererius closes Book I with two disputations (the six-days question, and why Moses omits the angels). The creation of man is reserved for his book 4. Sentence continues onto p. 184.

— p. 225 (PDF) · printed p. 184 —

...the other, why Moses made no word in this place about the creation of the Angels. It is an old and very grave question among the Fathers and learned men, whether the fabric of the world, the whole at once and in the same point of time, was made and consummated, or whether it was finished gradually and part by part over six days, which the narrative of Moses presents on its face. Philo the Jew, in the book On the Allegories of the Mosaic Law, says that it is of rustic simplicity to think that the world was founded over the course and delay of six days, since the distinction and succession of days and nights, and the reckoning of time itself, cannot exist before the world was founded, but follow the motion of the Heaven, and most of all of the Sun and the Moon. When therefore Moses says that God finished the fabric of the world in six days, that—according to Philo—is not to be referred to the intervals of six days, but it is to be understood that by that number of days is signified the perfection of the world, which is designated by the perfection of the number six. The same Procopius of Gaza holds in this place: for he says that Moses, in describing the fabric of the world, used the distinction of six days for the sake of teaching, namely on account of the slowness and rudeness of the Jews, for whom he was writing these things—who could by no means have grasped and comprehended at once and confusedly the things which God had made at once, on account of their so great multitude and variety, being of the narrowest understandings. To this opinion Cajetan accedes, in his commentary on the first chapter of Genesis, and he thinks the distinction of six days was set down by Moses for this, that he might the more easily declare the natural order, sequence, and dependence of things.

Marginal gloss: 'Whether the world was made wholly in an instant, or not.' The instantaneous-creation view: Philo (De allegoriis—'rustic simplicity' to think otherwise; the six = the perfect number), Procopius of Gaza (six days for the Jews' dullness), and Cajetan (six days to show

the natural order).

For things are by their own nature so fitted and connected among themselves that, if God had willed to make the world successively, he would have made it in no other order or succession than as it is here narrated.

Cajetan's reasoning continued: the order Moses gives is the very order nature itself would require, were creation successive.

But in truth, among the theologians, the chief and author of this opinion was Augustine; who, both in other places and most eloquently in the fourth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 21 and the following chapters to the end of that book, judges it more likely and much more probable, and more agreeable both to reason and to divine Scripture, that all the parts of the world were perfected at once, than by the succession of some after others and through intervals of time. He, moreover, by the name 'day' interprets the knowledge of things which the Angels have from God, impressed on their minds; for whatever God made in the world, he expressed it beforehand, or at least at the same time, in the intelligence of the Angels. The 'morning' is the knowledge of things in the Word; the 'evening' is [the knowledge] of the same things in the things themselves. For the Angels knew things in two ways: both in the Word, by a most clear knowledge, and in the things themselves, through the intelligible species infused into them by God. The distinction of six days is the knowledge of things multiplied sixfold in the Angel, according to the six kinds of things founded by God. And this is the opinion of Augustine, which is confirmed partly by some testimonies of Scripture, partly also by certain reasons. In the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 18, it is thus: He that liveth for ever created all things together. Behold, Scripture says that all things were made together—what could be said for Augustine's opinion...

Marginal gloss: 'Augustine thought the world was made whole at once in a single point of time.' Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 4.21ff.): all parts made at once; the 'days' = the angels' sixfold knowledge (morning = in the Word, evening = in the things). Confirmed by Ecclesiasticus 18:1 ('He

created all things together'). Sentence continues onto p. 185.

— p. 226 (PDF) · printed p. 185 —

...more explicitly, or more illustriously, or more strongly for Augustine's opinion? Then in the second chapter of Genesis it is read thus: In the day that the Lord God made heaven and earth, and every shrub of the field: in the same day, therefore, heaven, earth, and the plants were created; but the creation of the plants was set forth by Moses on the third day; wherefore that distinction of days in fact pertains to one and the same day. To this [add] that the Lord, in Job chapter 40, says: Behold Behemoth, which I made with thee. By Behemoth the Fathers generally expound the devil; therefore the devil and man were created together; but the former is said to have been created before the first day, and Moses narrates that man was made on the sixth day; therefore that enumeration of six days by no means denotes a true distinction and succession of times. Add to these that, since God is of infinite power for acting, and all things were produced out of nothing, which has no power at all of resisting or retarding the action of the maker, it seems indeed agreeable that God did not create things out of nothing gradually and with delays of time, but, what more befits his omnipotence, made them all at once and in a single moment of time.

Further arguments for Augustine's view: Genesis 2:4 (heaven, earth, and plants 'in one day'); Job 40:15 (Behemoth = the devil, made 'with' man); and God's infinite power (creation from nothing meets no resistance, so the instant befits omnipotence).

Nevertheless the opinion contrary to Augustine I for my part judge not only more probable, but I reckon it of sure and undoubted truth. For this was the opinion of nearly all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, as many as there were before Augustine, and also of very many theologians—otherwise most zealous and keen defenders of the Augustinian teaching—such as Bede in the Hexameron, Hugh of St Victor in the first book On the Sacraments, Rupert in the first book On the Works of the Trinity, chapter 37, and book 2, chapter 18, the Master of the Sentences in book 2, distinction 12, and there too Bonaventure, and very

many others who in this departed from Augustine; and before all, St. Gregory in the thirty-second book of the Morals, chapter 10, in these words:

Marginal glosses: 'That the truer opinion is that the world was created part by part, and over the intervals of six days'; and 'A notable opinion of Gregory, holding that all things were made at once as to the substance of the matter, but not as to the manner and property of the form.' Pererius's own view (six days, not all at once), held by nearly all the Fathers before Augustine and many theologians (Bede, Hugh, Rupert, Lombard, Bonaventure), above all Gregory (Morals 32.10), quoted next.

"Again it must be asked how God founded all things together, while Moses, with the change of six days varying, describes them as created distinctly; which, however, we more quickly understand if we subtly investigate the very causes of their origins. For the substance of things was created together, but the species was not formed together; and what existed together by the substance of matter did not appear together by the species of form. For when heaven and earth are described as made together, it is indicated that the spiritual and the corporeal [were made] together, that whatever arises from heaven [was made] together, that whatever is produced from earth was made together. The sun, moon, and stars are reported to have been made in heaven on the fourth day; but what came forth in species on the fourth day existed on the first day in the substance of heaven by its founding. The earth is said to be created on the first day, and on the third the shrubs founded, and all the green things of the earth are described; and this which on the third day brought itself forth in species, was without doubt founded on the first day, in that very substance of the earth out of which it arose. Hence it is that Moses both related all things as founded distinctly through the several days, and yet subjoined that all were created together, saying: These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord made heaven and earth, and every shrub of the field before it sprang up in the earth, and every herb of the field. For he who had narrated heaven and earth, shrub and herb, as created on

different days, now manifests them as made in one day; that he might clearly show...”

Quotation from Gregory the Great, Moralia 32.10 (on Job): all things created together as to the substance of matter, but unfolded over the six days as to the form/species (the sun existed in heaven's substance on day 1, came forth in species on day 4; the plants in the earth's substance on day 1, sprang forth on day 3). Genesis 2:4 ('in the day') is cited. Continues onto p. 186 (catchword 'ostende[ret]').

— p. 227 (PDF) · printed p. 186 —

...so as to show plainly that every creature came into being simultaneously in respect of substance, although it did not proceed forth simultaneously in respect of species. Thus the great Gregory. But although St. Thomas, in the Second Part, question 74, article 2, having laid out both opinions, was unwilling to decide by his own vote and judgment which is the more probable, nevertheless, if one weighs carefully the course of his discussion, he will observe that Thomas inclines rather to this view of ours than to that opinion of Augustine. The same St. Thomas, in the fourth question of De potentia Dei, article 2, says that Augustine's opinion is the subtler and the more convenient for delivering Scripture from the mockery of unbelievers, although the contrary opinion is plainer and more in keeping with the letter of Moses. Indeed Dionysius the Areopagite, in his book On the Divine Names, in the first part of chapter 4, speaking of the light of the sun, says thus:

Continues the quotation of Gregory, Moralia in Iob 32.10 (al. 32.12) from the previous page. Aquinas references: ST I q.74 a.2 (cited here as '2. parte'; the treatise on the work of the six days is in fact in the Prima Pars) and De potentia q.4 a.2.

This light too is the measure and number of the hours, the days, and of all the passing course of time. For it is that very light (although it was then unformed, as the divine Moses also declares) by which He distinguished and defined the first triad of our days.

Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus 4.

Dionysius means, then, that the first three days were defined and completed by the light of the sun, then still unformed; and therefore whoever does away with the temporal distinction and succession of those six days contradicts his judgment.

BUT how great the probability of this view is I shall demonstrate by many and weighty arguments. First, this teaching of Moses about the creation of the world is a kind of historical narrative delivered to the unschooled people of the Jews, teaching in a plain manner what was made by God in the fashioning of the world; and therefore what is set down in it must be taken just as the words themselves sound, and that is to be reckoned the better interpretation which shall be found to agree and harmonize best with the words of Moses taken according to their proper and customary signification. Now Moses recounts most explicitly and most distinctly the six days spent in building the world; indeed he teaches in detail what was done on each of those days. Nor, had Moses deliberately and of set purpose wished to show that the world was created not all at once but over six days, could he have taught it more openly and more lucidly than he now does. Whereas, if he had wished to signify that the world was made all at once, he could not have employed language and words more alien, more discordant, and more contrary to his purpose. Nor is that to be accepted which certain men reply, that Moses spoke as he did in order to adapt and accommodate his writing to the grasp of the unschooled Jews, whose understanding and memory would have been confused and disturbed had Moses set before them that all things were made by God at once, and that Moses could not say all at once what God was able to do all at once: this, I say, is by no means to be accepted. For Moses could have set forth distinctly and separately the kinds of all the things God founded, without any distinction or mention of days; he could have taught that, although the parts of this world were many and diverse, yet they were all founded out of nothing by God at once; he could, indeed he ought to have, cut off from the Jews every occasion of error, who, understanding the words of Moses just

as they sound of themselves, would without doubt have believed that the world was fashioned by God not all at once but over diverse intervals of days.

— p. 228 (PDF) · printed p. 187 —

NEXT, a most powerful argument against those men is this, that Moses, in Exodus chapters 20 and 31, when he gave the Jews the precept of observing the Sabbath day, assigns this one cause why the Jews ought to keep it so holily and religiously: that, just as God created the world and all that is in the world in six days, but on the seventh day ceased and rested from every work He had accomplished, so too the Jews ought to spend the six days of the week in working and laboring, but on the seventh day, after the example and imitation of God, to rest from every servile work and toil. Now this reasoning of Moses—who does not see how weak, futile, and frivolous it would be, if God had made all things not over six days, but at once and in a single moment of time? Furthermore, it has neither warrant nor any reason that Moses should have wished to describe the fashioning of the world, which he was expounding to the Hebrews, so obscurely and enigmatically, namely by means of the morning and evening cognitions of the Angels, things scarcely clearly understood and known even by theologians to this day. Surely, if we interpret these six days figuratively and mystically, why should we not likewise understand the rest of this Mosaic narrative allegorically, with Origen? since the remainder can be turned and applied better to a mystical sense; whence it would follow that we could hold nothing fixed and certain in this teaching of Moses.

Marginal gloss: "Validissimum argumentum adversus opinionem Augustini" (‘A most cogent argument against Augustine’s opinion’). Exodus 20:8–11; 31:17.

TO THIS, Augustine's opinion does not at all square with a doctrine approved by the consensus of all theologians. For whoever says that all the things which are narrated as made over the six days were made at once, must of necessity also say that heaven, that is the Angelic nature, was

created at once, as Augustine expounds it; that light was created at once, that is, that the good Angels, through the turning of their will toward God, were at once confirmed and consummated in grace; and finally that the darkness was divided from the light at once, that is, that the evil Angels were at once cut off from the fellowship of the good. But if all these things were made at once, it necessarily follows that between the creation of the Angels and their merit and glorification, or their sin and damnation, there intervened no delay whatever, but that all were created in the same moment, and that some indeed merited glory and received it, while others sinned and were thrust down into the eternal torments of hell. This, however, is contrary to the doctrine of all theologians, and indeed of Augustine himself, and likewise to Scripture and to reason. Add that Augustine assumes the Angels, the moment they were created, to have had a most perfect cognition of all things in the Word, which he calls morning cognition; but cognition of things in the Word is beatific, which the Angels did not possess in the first instant of their creation.

But what have these men to say about man, whom Moses, near the end of the first chapter, in plain words relates to have been created by God, male and female, on the sixth day? Yet how could man have been formed, in the same point of time, outside paradise, and afterward led into paradise, and there seized by a deep sleep, and then Eve produced from the rib of him as he slept? Indeed some add that on the same sixth day Adam imposed names on all living creatures, and was tempted by the serpent, and fell into sin, and was cast out of paradise.

— p. 229 (PDF) · printed p. 188 —

BUT INDEED, against Augustine's opinion, let me use this final argument. The enumeration and distinction of the six days handed down by Moses either denotes an order of time, by which some things were founded earlier, others later; or an order of dignity, by which some are more excellent than others; or an order of nature, by which according to nature some are prior

to others, since some are causes of others and others depend upon others; or finally it denotes an order of things as they are known by an Angel, such that the number of those days indicates a multitude or succession of an Angel's cognitions concerning things of this kind. But none of these can be plausibly asserted except the first: therefore it must be confessed that the whole fashioning of the world was founded not all at once, but over intervals of time. For if the distinction of those days denoted an order of dignity among the things founded, then without doubt before all others man, the prince of this world, ought to have been created; yet Moses relates that he was made on the sixth day, the last of God's works. But if the enumeration of the days demonstrated the order of nature which created things have among themselves, then surely the creation of the sun and the stars ought to have been recorded before that of plants, to which they are prior in the order of nature, since they have an incorruptible nature and are causes of plants. And if by the number of those days the order of things as they are known by the Angels is implied, then certainly such a distinction of days would be neither agreeable to reason nor in accord with the mode of angelic cognition.

For angelic cognition is twofold, as we have said, morning and evening: morning cognition, since it is in reality nothing other than the beatific vision of God, has in itself no multitude or succession of thoughts, but is a single, perpetual, and wholly unchangeable act of the mind; evening cognition, however, by which things are known in themselves, is not multiplied according to the multitude and variety of things, for the Angels, especially those that are higher and nobler, can by a single movement of the mind and as it were at a single glance comprehend many kinds of things at once. Add that, if natural things had any order in angelic cognition, they could have none other than that of time, of dignity, or of nature (that is, of causality); with which, however, as I said before, the order of days that Moses sets out in no way agrees.

Now indeed, if the world was founded on the day of the sun, which is now the Lord's Day, as Augustine himself affirms together with very many of the Fathers, and if all things were made at once and in a single point of time, how will it be true that God rested from every work He had accomplished on the seventh day, which is the Sabbath? since between the Lord's Day, on which the world was founded, and the Sabbath day, five days intervene. Add that the Church seems, having set aside Augustine's opinion, to have followed this view of ours; since in the hymns which she sings at the evening prayers of each day of the week, she praises God for the individual works which He severally accomplished on each particular day.

— p. 230 (PDF) · printed p. 189 —

IT REMAINS that we very briefly dissolve the arguments adduced above for confirming Augustine's opinion. First, that passage from chapter 18 of Ecclesiasticus, He who lives forever created all things together, by which Augustine was chiefly moved, Bonaventure and St. Thomas interpret thus: that there was a threefold operation of God in the fashioning of the world. The first was creation, that is, the production out of nothing of that bodily mass which Moses describes under the name of heaven, earth, and water; and because out of these (or because they are recorded as created in these three bodies) were made whatever things came afterward over the six days, therefore all things are said to be created together, that is, with respect to that primeval matter and the mass of the whole world. The second operation of God was the distinction and arrangement of the three aforesaid bodies, accomplished over the first three days. The third was the adornment and consummation of those same bodies, in which the three latter days were spent. And this very view is that of the blessed Gregory in book 32 of the Morals, chapter 9, and of Bede on the Hexameron, as we have said above. Rupert, in book 2 of On the Trinity and His Works, chapter 18, expounds this passage of Ecclesiasticus by a new and remarkable but scarcely probable interpretation, which I touched on above.

Marginal gloss: "Explicatur locus Ecclesiastici cap. 18" and "Triplex fuit Dei operatio in opificio mundi" (Ecclus./Sirach 18:1). Sources: Bonaventure, In II Sent.; Aquinas; Gregory, Moralia 32.9 (al. 32.12); Bede, In Hexaemeron; Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius 2.18.

Others say that all things are said to be created together for this reason, that the creation of all things was spread over a very short interval of time, that is, of only six days, and was in a manner continuous throughout that whole stretch of time, so that the things made in that span of six days are recorded as though made together; for the Lord too, in Mark chapter 10, said that God made man, male and female, from the beginning of creation; and John in chapter 8 says that the devil was a murderer from the beginning, although these things nevertheless did not happen before the sixth day.

Mark 10:6; John 8:44.

Others interpret that passage of Ecclesiasticus thus: All things were created together—namely those which are, properly speaking, created, that is, made out of nothing; and these all were founded together in a single instant, I mean the heavens, the Angels, and the four Elements. But the true and genuine sense of those words of Ecclesiasticus is rendered by the Greek word there set down, κοιν■, which our Translator renders into Latin as Simul (‘together’): for it signifies the same as ‘alike’ or ‘in common’ or ‘universally,’ so that the proper sense of the passage is that God created all things alike, or without exception of any single thing. Similarly, as John says of the divine Word, All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made.

Marginal gloss: "Ioan. 1" (John 1:3). The Greek of Ecclus./Sirach 18:1 is κοιν■ *(‘in common, collectively’), which the Vulgate renders simul.*

Wherefore that Latin word Simul does not in that passage denote simultaneity of time, as Augustine supposed, but simultaneity of collection or universality, in which signification it is elsewhere not uncommonly set in Scripture, as in Leviticus 25: You shall number, it says, seven weeks of years, that is, seven times seven, which together make forty-nine years; and

in the book of Numbers, chapter 25, the word Simul, taken in the same signification, is read three or four times; and also in Psalm 13: They have all turned aside, they have together become unprofitable, there is none that does good, there is not so much as one; and in Psalm 48: Together the foolish and the senseless shall perish.

Leviticus 25:8; Numbers 25 (locus cited loosely); Psalm 13[14]:3 (cf. Rom. 3:12); Psalm 48[49]:11.

That passage, too, from chapter 2 of Genesis, In the day in which God made heaven and earth and every shrub of the field, has an easy explanation. For that phrase In the day is said in the singular for the plural in the days: for Scripture often uses the plural number for the singular, and conversely the singular for the plural. Or else that phrase, In the day, is said for that which is ‘in time’; for so it very frequently is among the Prophets, who [the name of day]...

Genesis 2:4. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘diei’).

— p. 231 (PDF) · printed p. 190 —

...[of day] or of hour, employ it for ‘time.’ Bonaventure holds that the phrase In the day stands confusedly for the several days, so that it ought to be applied to each day individually.

Completes the sentence broken at the foot of the previous page (the Prophets use the word ‘day’ for ‘time’). Bonaventure, In II Sent.

NONETHELESS, it is easy to explain that passage of Job, Behold Behemoth whom I made with thee: for granting that by Behemoth the devil is signified, as many have thought, it does not at once follow that the word With thee means ‘at the same time as thee’; rather it means something quite different, namely either ‘I created him alike with thee, you are both my works’; or ‘I made him like to thee,’ that is, possessed of a mind, of free will, after my likeness and image, capable of good and evil and of eternal happiness; or finally, ‘just as I did not create thee evil but good and upright, so also him.’ Although the Hebrews, and those Christians who profess a

knowledge of and devotion to the Hebrew tongue—among them Eugubinus and Franciscus Titelmans—think that by Behemoth, according to the literal sense, is signified the animal greatest of all land creatures in bodily bulk and mightiest in strength, namely, I say, the Elephant, which Scripture for that reason calls Behemoth, that is ‘beasts,’ because on account of its huge bodily height and firmness it is as it were like many beasts; whence it comes that in that place, for the Hebrew word Behemoth, the Chaldee Paraphrast set ‘Beira,’ that is Beasts or cattle, while the Septuagint translators rendered it θηρ■α, that is wild beasts. And it is said Whom I made with thee, because on the same day, namely the sixth and last, both man and all land animals were created by God; or, ‘that he might be with thee, serving thy uses, services, and delights’; or, ‘of all animals I made him most like to thee’: for more of reason, counsel, cleverness, and docility appears in the Elephant than in the rest.

Marginal gloss: "Exponitur locus Iob 40" (Job 40:15, Behemoth). Eugubinus = Agostino Steuco of Gubbio; Franciscus Titelmans. The Chaldee (Targum) renders Behemoth ‘Beira’ (beasts); the Septuagint renders it θηρ■α *(wild beasts).*

But that which follows, He is the beginning of the ways of God—on account of which both Cajetan and certain others judged that by Behemoth nothing else could be understood than the devil—fits the elephant most aptly. For it seems to be among the animals the chief and principal work of God, inasmuch as there is none other greater in bulk, or mightier in strength, or more excellent in docility. Now Scripture calls God's works and bodily creatures His ‘ways’—such as the land animals are—inasmuch as through them, as it were through certain roads, God seems in a manner to go forth out of Himself, communicating His goodness to others and most openly declaring His power and wisdom in the things which He makes outside His own substance. But this passage of Job we have copiously and diligently expounded in the fourth book of our Commentaries on Daniel, which we published in earlier years, when treating that verse of the Canticle of the Three Children, Bless the Lord, all you beasts and cattle.

Job 40:19 (‘He is the beginning of the ways of God’). Cajetan. Pererius refers to his own earlier Commentaries on Daniel, on the Canticle of the Three Children (Dan. 3:81, Benedicite).

BUT let us dispatch the last argument. They say it was not befitting God's omnipotence that the world should be built so slowly, namely over six days. But we reply that the delay set in creating the world does not argue any impotence in God, as though He needed time in order to act, but was made for this reason: that there might be clearly discerned the order...

Marginal gloss: "Cur Deus non simul et uno temporis puncto, sed per intervalla et moras sex dierum mundum condiderit" (‘Why God founded the world not all at once and in a single point of time, but through the intervals and delays of six days’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘ordo’).

— p. 232 (PDF) · printed p. 191 —

...and connection which exists among the things produced by God, and the dependence of all things upon God, and that the threefold state of the world might be known: the first of creation, the second of distinction, the third of adornment and completion; in the first of which God's omnipotence shines forth, in the second His wisdom, in the third His goodness. Moreover, to the diverse states of the world the diverse days correspond: for always through a subsequent work there was added either a new state to the world, or a new perfection within the same state. Add that the work of each day was completed in a point of time: from which fact God's omnipotence became most clearly known. The delay, therefore, in creating arose neither from the resistance of matter, nor from any weakness in the agent, but from the supreme reason, counsel, and wisdom of the Maker, who does all things freely, providently, and wisely. For from this it becomes clearer than light that God made the world by the supreme liberty of His will: for both He made it when He willed, though He could have made it before; and He made it in what manner and in what order He willed, indeed beyond the order which the very nature of things seemed to demand. Since He made the heavens without any light, and first made the light of heaven imperfect and afterward perfected it, the stars being created in heaven on the fourth

day; he likewise created plants before the heavenly bodies; so that it is evident that God can make and preserve sublunary things without secondary causes, and that they depend much more on God than on the heavens and stars. Let it stand fixed, therefore, that the world was made not all at once and whole, but piecemeal over six days.

But why it was made in neither more nor fewer than six days, what mortal, save one to whom perhaps it has been revealed by God, could explain? For my part I judge that, just as it is not lawful to believe that anything was done rashly by a most wise Maker, who does nothing without supreme counsel and reason, so the true and proper reason why it was done cannot be reached by us. I am not unaware that Augustine and Bede, and before them Philo, taught that the number six is perfect, inasmuch as it is the first that is made up and completed of its own parts—namely of a sixth part, which is one, and a third part, which is two, and a half part, which is three: for one and two and three together make six. God therefore completed the world in six days, so that He who makes all things in measure and number and weight (as Scripture teaches) might by the very number with which He built the world declare it to be a finished and consummate work. Philo pursues this at greater length in his book On the Making of the World. Augustine, to be sure, in the first seven chapters of the fourth book On Genesis according to the Letter, disputes most copiously about the perfection of the number six, and so too in book 11 of The City of God, chapter 30. Eusebius, moreover, in book 11 of The Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 12, brings forward Clement, from book 6 of the Stromata, as a witness, who testifies that a twofold world is handed down by the Greeks and the Barbarians, one intelligible, the other sensible—the former the archetype, the latter the image of the divine exemplar; the former assigned to unity, the latter to the hexad, which the Pythagoreans, because it is a most fruitful number, called ‘Marriage.’ Furthermore, just as the senary is made up of one, two, and three, which are its parts, so the world contains three kinds of things, namely...

Marginal glosses: "Cur sex diebus factus sit mundus" and "Senarii perfectio." Wisdom 11:21 (‘in measure, number, and weight’). Philo, De opificio mundi; Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 4.1–7 and De civitate Dei 11.30; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 11.12, citing Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6. The Pythagoreans called six ‘Connubium’ (marriage), as the first perfect number. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘videlicet’).

— p. 233 (PDF) · printed p. 192 —

...namely the incorporeal nature, which is in the Angels; the corporeal; and that which partakes of both, which is in man: the first is denoted by unity, the second by the binary, the third by the ternary. But these things, ingeniously devised and subtly handed down as they are, will perhaps not satisfy the mind of a careful and learned reader.

It must not be passed over in silence, but rather disclosed in this place—since it has been reported by many—that there were once authors, neither few nor obscure, who, just as the world was made in six days, so judged it would last only six thousand years. It is an old tradition, as Génébrard noted in his Chronology, which proceeded from a certain Elias—not that Tishbite prophet, but from another, a noble Rabbi of the Jews—as it is handed down in the Talmudic volumes, in order 4, tractate 4, whose title is Sanhedrin, that is ‘Judgment,’ where it is written thus: For six thousand years the world will be, and again it will be destroyed; two thousand were of emptiness and vanity, two thousand of the Mosaic Law, and two thousand will be the days of the Messiah. This opinion Rabbi Isaac wished to prop up with certain conjectures, on the first chapter of Genesis: namely, that the first verse of the book of Genesis, which contains the sum of the whole world, has the letter Aleph six times, which among the Hebrews denotes the number of a thousand; then, he says, God made the world in six days and rested on the seventh day, and with God a thousand years are reckoned as one day, for so David said in Psalm 89, A thousand years before thy eyes are as yesterday, which is past (the like is in Peter, in chapter 3 of his second epistle: One day, he says, with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day). He adds also that the first

six men in the line of Adam, from whom the whole race of mankind was propagated—namely Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalalel, Jared—died, but that the seventh, Enoch, was translated alive; as though by this it were hinted that, after six thousand years, in which labor and death have reigned in the world, in the seventh millennium there would be the beginning of a quiet and immortal life. But for these Hebrews their distribution and computation of those six thousand years does not square well. For before the Law there passed, from the origin of the world, two thousand four hundred eighty-three years; and the time of the Mosaic Law down to the death of Christ, by which the Mosaic Law was abolished, consists of no more than one thousand five hundred seventy years.

Marginal gloss: "An mundus sex duntaxat annorum millibus sit duraturus." Gilbert Génébrard, Chronologia. The tradition of 'Elias' (a Rabbi, not Elijah the Tishbite) from the Talmud, Sanhedrin 97a: the world lasts six thousand years—two thousand of chaos, two thousand of the Law, two thousand of the Messiah. Psalm 89[90]:4; 2 Peter 3:8. The six patriarchs Adam–Jared died; the seventh, Enoch, was translated alive (Gen. 5).

But I do not wonder that this fiction pleased the Hebrews, whom nothing delights save the monstrous prodigies of fables and lies; this, however, I do greatly wonder at, that it pleased even men most noble in Christian learning for the authority of their antiquity and the renown of their doctrine and holiness. For Justin Martyr held and handed down this view, in answering the seventy-second of the questions of the orthodox, and Irenaeus in the fifth book Against Heresies, in the last chapter, and Lactantius too in book 7 of the Divine Institutions, chapter 14, Hilary likewise in canon 17 on Matthew, and also Jerome in the Epistolary exposition of the eighty-[ninth] Psalm...

Justin Martyr, Responsiones ad orthodoxos q.72; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 5 (final chapter); Lactantius, Divinae institutiones 7.14; Hilary, In Matthaeum, canon 17; Jerome. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'octogesi-').

— p. 234 (PDF) · printed p. 193 —

...[the eighty-ninth] to Cyprian, and in his commentaries on chapter 4 of Micah, where he expounds it and recalls the same tradition, as also does Augustine in book 20 of The City of God, chapter 7. Germanus, moreover, Bishop of Constantinople, in his book On the Contemplation of Ecclesiastical Things, confirms, on the testimony of Hippolytus and Cyril—from the books which these wrote concerning the Antichrist—that the world will last six thousand years and five hundred more; and he says this is signified when the Pontiff, blessing the people, lifts up his fingers, set and fitted to the demonstration of the number of six thousand five hundred years. But the outcome has declared these men to be in error by their own conjecture and reckoning of years: for they affirm that Christ came into the world at the beginning of the sixth millennium, and that, this being completed, would come the consummation and end of this world; yet we perceive that after the coming of Christ, down to the present year 1588, one thousand and nearly six hundred years have passed.

Jerome, on Psalm 89 (epistle to Cyprian) and on Micah 4; Augustine, De civitate Dei 20.7; Germanus of Constantinople, De theoria rerum ecclesiasticarum, citing Hippolytus and Cyril on the Antichrist. Pererius gives the present year as 1588, nearly 1,600 years after Christ—disproving the 6,500-year reckoning. (This dates the composition; the volume itself was published in the 1590s.)

St. Ambrose, in book 7 of his Commentaries on Luke, refuses to approve a tradition of this kind, for the reason that in his own time more than six thousand years had already elapsed from the beginning of the world—persuaded, as I think, by a false chronology. Bede, in his book On the Reckoning of Time, chapter 65, freely scorns the same tradition, and Augustine rejects it in expounding Psalm 89, as by no means in keeping with Scripture, which denies that the time of the consummation of the world can be known by the Angels, much less by mortals. But if it were certain that the world would last only six thousand years, it could also be known how much time was left until its consummation: for, reckoning the years already elapsed from the origin of the world to the present year at about five thousand six hundred, surely there would remain until the end of the world no more than four hundred years.

Ambrose, Expositio in Lucam 7; Bede, De ratione temporum 65; Augustine, Enarratio in Psalmum 89. Cf. Acts 1:7; Mark 13:32 (the time is hidden even from the Angels).

But although it has been handed down by the Fathers that the world is distinguished into six ages, and that the sixth and last age began at the coming of Christ and is to be prolonged until the consummation of the world, yet not on that account can it be known how long this sixth age will be, since all the prior five were of unequal duration. For the first, from Adam to the Flood, consumed one thousand six hundred fifty-six years; the second, from the Flood to the birth of Abraham, two hundred ninety-two, or, including the generation of Cainan, three hundred twenty-two; the third, from Abraham to David, nine hundred forty-two; the fourth, from David to the Babylonian Captivity, four hundred seventy-three; the fifth, from the Captivity to the coming of Christ the Lord, according to Bede in his book On the Six Ages of the World five hundred eighty-nine, but according to a truer and surer chronology six hundred thirty; the sixth, from the birth of Our Lord to the end of the world, is of a duration uncertain and undiscovered by mortals.

Marginal gloss: "Distinctio sex aetatum mundi, et cuiusque earum durationis determinatio." The six ages of the world (after Augustine): I Adam–Flood (1656 yrs); II Flood–birth of Abraham (292, or 322 counting Cainan); III Abraham–David (942); IV David–Babylonian Captivity (473); V Captivity–Christ (589 per Bede, De sex aetatibus mundi, or 630 per a truer chronology); VI Christ–end of the world (of unknown duration).

For that conjecture of certain men, who argue that this last age—as in many other respects, so also in duration—will be matched and equal to the first age, is futile and rests upon a weak foundation; which indeed, if it were true, would not...

Marginal gloss: "Refutatur quorundam inanis coniectura de duratione mundi" (‘The empty conjecture of certain men about the world's duration is refuted’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘non’; foot of page: ‘Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.’, signature B).

— p. 235 (PDF) · printed p. 194 —

...the consummation of the world would not be far off: for no more than sixty-eight years would remain. But in truth, since Christ with so grave a speech rebuked the curious questioning of the Apostles about future times, saying to them, It is not yours to know the times or the moments which the Father has put in His own power, and in another place says, But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the Angels of heaven, but the Father alone—it is surely most rash and utterly absurd to wish to lay down anything explored and certain about the future duration of the world.

Completes the sentence broken at the foot of the previous page (only ~68 years would remain if the world lasted 6,000 years). Marginal citations: Acts 1:7; Matthew 24:36.

DISPUTATION. Why Moses in this place did not expound the creation of the Angels.

The closing disputation of Book I (see the opening sentence: 'a question which closes this book').

There is to be explained, in the last place, a question by no means to be passed over, one which closes this book: why Moses, who in describing the fashioning of the world taught the beginnings and making of all other things, passed over in silence the creation of the Angels alone? For it is not lawful to doubt that the Angels were created by God; this David taught most clearly in Psalm 148, in which, when he calls upon the works of God—among which he numbers the Angels also—to proclaim the praises of their Maker, he says of them, He spoke and they were made, He commanded and they were created; He established them forever and unto the age of ages. The like is set down in the Canticle of the Three Children in Daniel chapter 3, and John in the Apocalypse, chapters 4 and 10, says that God created heaven and whatever is in heaven, the earth and the seas and whatever is in them. Paul likewise to the Colossians, chapter 1, teaches in plain words that all things were founded in Christ, whether visible or invisible, principalities, thrones, powers, and dominations—all things were founded through Him and in Him; and the same is handed down in the symbol of the Catholic Faith, and was confirmed in the great Lateran

Council, canon 1. Nor indeed can it be supposed that the Angels were created by God, but yet from eternity: for that is rejected by the consensus of all the Fathers and the authority of the Church. And although Scripture nowhere seems expressly to teach that the Angels were made from some beginning of time, yet it is gathered from certain of its sayings by a reasoning neither obscure nor weak. For in Proverbs 8 Wisdom is said to have been from all eternity, and before God made anything: there was therefore a time when nothing had been made by God. And in the first chapter of Ecclesiasticus Wisdom is said to be created before all things. To this purpose also is that text, The firstborn before every creature. To this matter, too, that lends credence which Scripture is wont to do—to predicate eternity as something proper to God and befitting Him alone. Since, therefore, the Angels were both created by God and from some beginning of time, and are the chief parts of this world, it is not rashly called into doubt why Moses, in describing the building of the world, was silent about their making.

Psalm 148:5–6; the Canticle of the Three Children (Dan. 3, Benedicite); Apocalypse 4 and 10; Colossians 1:16; the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), canon 1 (Firmiter credimus); Proverbs 8:23ff; Ecclesiasticus 1:4; Colossians 1:15 (‘firstborn before every creature’).

SOME reply that Moses, because he saw that the Hebrews were exceedingly unschooled and not capable of the teaching of spiritual things, with his writing tempered and accommodated to their grasp and understanding, wished to explain the origin and procreation only of this...

Marginal gloss: "Primum quorundam responsum, quod maxime probatur auctoritate" (‘The first response of certain men, which is most approved by authority’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘mundi’).

— p. 236 (PDF) · printed p. 195 —

...corporeal and visible world. This response satisfies me most fully: for I am persuaded and certain that Moses teaches the making only of corporeal things, and of those that fall under the senses; and I gather that the blessed

Jerome thought the same from what he himself wrote in his 139th Epistle to Cyprian, in this manner: From the mouth of Moses we have learned the truth of the creation of the world, and the condition only of those things which are visible, the making of man, and of all past history. By very many, however, that reasoning is approved which Athanasius, answering the fourth question of Antiochus (if indeed we believe Athanasius to be the author of that book), and Chrysostom and Theodoret hand down: that the Jews were of a disposition exceedingly slippery and prone to idolatry, as is plain from the example of the golden calf, which, fresh from their departure out of Egypt, after so many and so great wonders done by God, they worshipped in the desert as though it were God; wherefore Moses, fearing lest, if he disclosed to the Hebrews the dignity and excellence of the heavenly minds, they should thence take occasion to suppose the Angels to be gods and to be honored with divine worship, deliberately forbore to mention their creation in narrating the fashioning of the world.

Marginal gloss: "Alterum responsum Athanasii, Chrysostomi, Theodoreti." Jerome, Ep. 139 (al. 140) ad Cyprianum; ps.-Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum q.4; Chrysostom; Theodoret. The golden calf: Exodus 32.

But Tostatus proves, by this argument, that this reasoning, common as it is, is by no means firm and probable. Before the writing of this book and the departure out of Egypt, the Jews had a knowledge of the Angels from the tradition of their forefathers, to whom they had received that the Angels had very often appeared—as to Hagar, Lot, Abraham, and Jacob, which apparitions Moses also narrates in this very book; indeed, immediately after Adam was cast out of Paradise, Moses writes that a Cherub was set to guard that place, to keep men from entering. Nay rather, for the very cause which these men allege as to why Moses said no word here about the Angels, it would seem most fitting that he should expound their creation, namely so as thus to cut off from the Jews every occasion of idolatry: for there would have been no danger that any of the Jews should believe the Angels to be gods, and should wish to worship as gods those whom he had

learned from Moses had not always existed, but were made out of nothing by Another, and forced into the number and order of creatures.

Marginal gloss: "Tostatus refellit secundum responsum." Alonso Tostado (Tostatus / the Abulensis). The angelic apparitions to Hagar (Gen. 16, 21), Lot (Gen. 19), Abraham (Gen. 18), Jacob (Gen. 28, 32); the Cherub at Paradise (Gen. 3:24).

The blessed AUGUSTINE, in book 12 of the Confessions and book 11 of The City of God and book 1 of On Genesis according to the Letter, holds that the Angels were not omitted by Moses, but that he figuratively hinted at the creation of the Angels by the creation of heaven and light; Bede thinks the same in his Hexameron: which, however, does not seem to me probable. For this narrative of Moses is historical, rendering properly no other meaning than that which his words express when taken according to their proper and customary notion and use. Severianus, as he is cited in the Catena, says that Moses wrote this Cosmopoeia for the Hebrews with this design: that (since they, from their long remembrance of and familiarity with the Egyptians, among whom they had dwelt, had been imbued and infected with impious errors and superstitions—and the Egyptians worshipped both all the stars that are in heaven, and many of the land, water, and flying animals, and even certain men with di[vine]...

Marginal gloss: "Tertium responsum Augustini, quod non probatur Auctore." Augustine, Conf. 12; De civitate Dei 11; De Genesi ad litteram 1; Bede, In Hexaemeron; Severianus of Gabala (in the Catena). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘divinis’).

— p. 237 (PDF) · printed p. 196 —

...divine honors) he might turn them away from superstition and impiety of this kind. He therefore omitted the making of incorporeal things, and applied his writing to those things which lie open to the senses, so that they might understand that all these things which they beheld and admired with delight were not gods, but the works of God, made both from the beginning of time and out of nothing. Basil, Ambrose, and Damascene think that the creation of the Angels was omitted by Moses for this reason: that he

wished only to describe the origin of this corporeal world, and of all those things which were founded together with the world; but that the Angels were made many ages before this world: which, if it were true, would drain away the whole difficulty of the proposed question.

Marginal gloss: "Quartum responsum" (the fourth response). Basil, Ambrose, John Damascene.

But on this matter there is a great dispute among the Fathers. For nearly all the Greek writers, and of the Latins whoever lived before Augustine, judged that the Angels were founded by God many ages before this world. This Origen hands down in his work On First Principles (περ■ ■ρχ■ν) and in homily 4 on Isaiah, Basil in homilies 1 and 2 on the Hexameron, Gregory Nazianzen in his oration on the Nativity of the Lord; Severianus and Diodorus are reported in the Catena to have been of the same opinion; the same John Damascene left in writing in book 2 of On the Faith, chapter 3. And of the Latins, Hilary too maintains this in book 12 of On the Trinity and in the booklet against Auxentius, and Ambrose in book 1 on the Hexameron, chapter 5, and in the Preface to the first psalm, Jerome likewise on the first chapter of the epistle to Titus, Isidore also in book 1 of On the Highest Good, chapter 12; indeed Cassian, in conference 7, chapter 8, says that no one of the faithful can doubt of this matter. For this opinion a twofold reason is brought forward: first, that the Angel, just as it excels the corporeal world in dignity, so it was fitting that it should also precede it in antiquity; and second, that in the first chapter of Ecclesiasticus it is written thus, Wisdom was created before all things, and they suppose that by ‘wisdom’ is signified the angelic nature, which God founded, from the very beginning, most full of knowledge and wisdom.

Marginal glosses: "Disputatio utrum Angeli creati sint ante hunc mundum corporeum" and "Prima opinio, fuisse creatos ante mundum." Origen, Peri Archon / De principiis (περ■ ■ρχ■ν) and Hom. 4 in Isaiam; Basil, Hom. 1–2 in Hexaemeron; Gregory Nazianzen, Oration on the Nativity; Severianus, Diodorus (in the Catena); John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.3; Hilary, De Trinitate 12 and Contra Auxentium; Ambrose, In Hexaemeron 1.5 and Praef. in Ps. 1; Jerome, In Titum 1; Isidore, Sententiae (De summo bono) 1.12; Cassian, Collatio 7.8. Ecclesiasticus 1:4.

But neither reason compels. Not the first: for man was created after the plants and all the living things, which yet he far surpasses in dignity. Nor indeed the second: because in that place by ‘wisdom’ is to be understood not an Angel, but the divine Word, which is the wisdom of the Father, as is clearly evident from the other circumstances of the same passage. For it is there said that Wisdom is unsearchable, and that God poured her out upon all His works, and that she was always with God and before every age: which by no means befit the nature of the Angels. And the Wisdom of God, who is the Son, is said to be ‘created,’ in that it is produced or begotten. For Scripture is wont (as Hilary witnesses) to call the Son of God ‘begotten,’ and sometimes also ‘created,’ for the reason that the production of the Son of God has in itself whatever of perfection is in generation and in creation. From generation indeed it has that the Son is not produced out of nothing, but out of the substance of the Father and consubstantial with Him; from creation, however, it has that He is produced without any change, variation, or...

Marginal gloss: "Explicatur locus Ecclesiastici cap. 1." Ecclesiasticus 1:1–4; cf. Proverbs 8:22–23. Hilary: the Son is called ‘created’ in the sense of ‘begotten.’ Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘ne aut’); the word completed there is printed ‘invocatione,’ evidently a misprint for ‘innovatione’ (renewal).

— p. 238 (PDF) · printed p. 197 —

...renewal or [invocation]. Or else nothing else is signified by those words, Wisdom was created before all things, than that Wisdom did not begin to be together with creatures, but that before the creation of all things she herself was with God.

Completes the sentence broken at the foot of the previous page. Printed ‘invocatione’; the sense requires ‘innovatione’ (renewal of the Father).

Gennadius indeed, and Acacius, as is handed down in the Catena, deride and condemn the aforesaid opinion as a fable taken from Plato's Timaeus, in which dialogue Plato feigns that the Angels—whom he himself calls ‘the

younger gods'—were older than the fashioning of the world; nay, he makes the souls of men older than their bodies. But these men say that to them it seems more probable that the Angels were founded after the corporeal world, just as the body of man was formed first, and afterward his soul was created: for Paul too teaches that that which is animal is prior to that which is spiritual. Nor were there lacking those who supposed that an Angel was created together with man, because in Job, chapter 40, God said to Job, Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee—that is, at the same time as I created thee; and by 'Behemoth' many of the holy Fathers understand the devil. But to this opinion it stands greatly opposed that, before the creation of man, the Heavens were made, which by their motion defined, accomplished, and distinguished those first six days; and the motion of the Heaven is effected by an Angel. In Job also, chapter 38, God said to Job himself, Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? or, as the Septuagint translators have it, When all my Angels praised me with a loud voice. From which it is clearly understood that before the fourth day, on which the stars were created, there were already Angels: which Augustine rightly gathers from that passage of Job in book 11 of The City of God, chapter 9.

Marginal glosses: "Secunda opinio, Angelos fuisse creatos post mundum corporeum" and "1.Cor.15." Gennadius and Acacius (in the Catena); Plato, Timaeus (the 'younger gods'); 1 Corinthians 15:46; Job 40:15 (Behemoth); Job 38:7 (Vulgate: morning stars / sons of God; LXX: 'all my Angels'); Augustine, De civitate Dei 11.9.

The other is the opinion of Augustine, and of nearly all the theologians who wrote in Latin after Augustine, that the Angels were created together with this corporeal world. For although Augustine, in book 1 of On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 6, hands down that it is uncertain when the Angels were created, nevertheless Augustine is not believed to be the author of that book, and he himself, in book 11 of The City of God, book 12 of the Confessions, books 1 and 4 of On Genesis according to the Letter, and in very many other places, teaches most openly and affirmatively that the Angels were made together with this world; and the same is the view of

the blessed Gregory, Bede, Rupert, Hugh, the Master in book 1 of the Sentences, and the whole school of theologians. This opinion is proved by two reasons. The one is that Moses said God created heaven and earth ‘in the beginning,’ that is, before all other things: therefore the Angels were not created before heaven. This reason is not very firm: for it can be answered that the phrase ‘in the beginning’ signifies a primacy of order, not however universally and absolutely, but only in comparison with the corporeal things which Moses then narrates to have been founded. The other reason rests upon that saying of Scripture which is in the eighteenth chapter of Ecclesiasticus, He who lives forever created all things together. But we have shown clearly above that ‘together’ in that place does not signify simultaneity of time, but simultaneity of collection and universality: for it signifies that God created all things alike, in common, and with nothing excepted. Theodoret, in question 3 on Genesis, confir[ms]...

Marginal glosses: "Tertia sententia, Angelos simul cum mundo corporeo esse creatos" and "Non esse Augustini illum libellum de Incarnatione Verbi." The pseudo-Augustinian De incarnatione Verbi; Augustine, De civitate Dei 11, Confessiones 12, De Genesi ad litteram 1 & 4; Gregory, Bede, Rupert, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard (Sentences 1), and the whole scholastic school. Genesis 1:1 (‘in principio’); Ecclesiasticus 18:1. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘mat’; signature B 3).

— p. 239 (PDF) · printed p. 198 —

...confirms the same opinion by two arguments. First, that since the Angels are of a finite and determinate nature, they cannot subsist except as defined and determined in some place, and therefore could not exist before the corporeal world: to which reasoning I would perhaps assent, if I believed—what has seemed so to most of the Fathers—that the Angels are corporeal. Second, that Paul teaches in the epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 1, that all the Angels are ministering spirits for the benefit of men; but before the world the Angels could discharge no ministry for the use of man: how weak this argument is, anyone will easily understand of himself, even without being told by us.

Continues Theodoret's two arguments (sentence broken at the previous page's catchword 'confirmat'). Hebrews 1:14.

St. Thomas, in the First Part, question 61, article 3, argues in this manner that the Angels were not made before the world. First he assumes that the Angel is a part of the universe, and then that a part outside its whole is not perfect; from which, that it was not fitting that God should found the angelic nature imperfect; and from these he gathers that the Angels were not created before the world. This argumentation would perhaps not carry much weight among learned men. I forbear to examine the rest; this only I say: the conclusion of St. Thomas would hold good, provided the Angel were a part of the world either integral or essential (for so the Philosophers nowadays speak in the schools); for parts of this kind, because they are not natures complete in themselves, but are appointed to compose and constitute another thing of which they are parts, must of necessity be imperfect outside their whole. But the Angel is not a part of the world in this way, but only by reason of the order or coordination of all things; nor is it a part of the world as depending on the world, but as one that moves and rules it—just as the consuls, tribunes, praetors, and censors were parts of the Roman commonwealth: a part of this kind retains its own nature outside its whole, like the helmsman outside the ship, the centurions and commanders outside the army. Indeed, for what other reason is the Angel reckoned a part of the world than because it coheres with it in a manner and has a conjunction with it? But what conjunction? none other, surely, than that it moves, administers, and in a manner governs the world; and the discharge of this office is not natural to the Angel, but voluntarily undertaken and imposed on it by God for a time, destined indeed to cease after the day of judgment.

Marginal gloss: "B. Thomae argumentatio, quod Angeli non fuerint ante mundum corporeum." Aquinas, ST I q.61 a.3.

What, then, is our own opinion? For my part I judge that the opinion of Augustine, although it is most approved, is nevertheless not to be held as

an undoubted and certain dogma of the Catholic Faith: for that the Angels were created together with the world is nowhere delivered by Scripture, nor is it evidently gathered from it, nor did it much concern the Catholic Faith that this should be decreed by the Church. Nor indeed is it lawful to believe that so many Fathers, eminent in antiquity, learning, and holiness, taught and wrote things contrary to the Catholic Faith. Augustine indeed, certainly the chief and author of this opinion, in book 11 of The City of God, chapter 32, so approves his own view that he does not condemn the contrary, but permits each man freely to follow whichever he wishes, provided only that he neither deny spiritual substances to be created by God, nor make them coeternal with God. Following his footsteps, Theodoret, in the third...

Marginal gloss: "Auctoris de hac quaestione iudicium et sententia." Augustine, De civitate Dei 11.32. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tertia’).

— p. 240 (PDF) · printed p. 199 —

...third question on Genesis, when he had approved by several arguments the opinion which is Augustine's, adds: This further it is necessary to know, that all things whatsoever exist, except the holy Trinity, have a nature liable to creation. And this granted, if anyone should say that the hosts of the Angels were founded before heaven and earth, he will not offend against the word of piety. Nevertheless, that I may most willingly believe, and hold for almost certain, that the Angels were made together with the world, I am moved most of all by the authority of Innocent III and of the Fathers of the great Lateran Council, who in express words judged this opinion to be preferred to the others. I am moved likewise by this reasoning: if the Angels existed long before the world, either through all that span they were all in grace—wherefore all would be confirmed and none would have fallen—or else, immediately upon being created, in the second or third instant (as the scholastic theologians speak) some of them sinned. If this be granted—and I see no reason why it should not be granted—the question arises: those sinning Angels, for so many ages before the world was founded, were they not segregated from the good

Angels, from their society and fellowship? But both piety and reason itself refuse to believe this. Or were they, immediately upon sinning, excluded from the society of the good and dispatched elsewhere? But whither? for before the world there could be no separation or distinction of places. Indeed our Lord, in the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 25, said that the fire of hell was prepared for the devil and his angels; and John too, in the Apocalypse, chapter 12, indicates not obscurely that the evil Angels both sinned in heaven and were cast down from heaven, when he says, There was made a great battle in heaven: Michael and his Angels fought with the Dragon, and the Dragon fought, and his Angels; and they did not prevail, neither was their place found any more in heaven. For thus do many of the holy Fathers and ancient writers interpret this passage. But the authority of Innocent III, which I mentioned a little above, affirming that spiritual and incorporeal substances were created by God together at the beginning of time—how this does not make the matter altogether certain and undoubted and, as it were, a dogma of faith, the reader will plainly understand if he reads what St. Thomas writes in his exposition of that decretal of Innocent, which is the twenty-third among his opuscula, where he expounds Innocent's intention and meaning. Cajetan, too, is to be read in the First Part of St. Thomas, on article 3 of question 61, in which place he disputes diligently and accurately on this matter.

Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim 3; Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215, the decretal Firmiter); ‘morula’ = an instant (scholastic usage); Matthew 25:41; Apocalypse 12:7–8; Aquinas, opusculum 23 (on Innocent's decretal); Cajetan on ST I q.61 a.3.

But let us put an end to this book; and let us next treat the Doctrine of the Stars according to sacred Scripture, and of astrological divination, which above, when we were expounding the work of the fourth day, we reserved for the next following book.

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

Colophon closing Book I (foot of printed p. 199; catchword ‘BENE’ for the Book II title that follows).

— p. 241 (PDF) · printed p. 200 —

BENITO PERERA'S COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS, BOOK TWO. Which is concerning the Heavens and the heavenly bodies according to sacred Scripture, and concerning astrological Divination. PREFACE.

The title-block opening Book II (with woodcut headpiece and ornamental initial).

The blessed AUGUSTINE asks, in chapter 9 of book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, why the authors of the sacred writings did not openly and explicitly teach what was the nature of the heaven, of what figure, how great its magnitude, and the number of the celestial orbs, what their motion, what the efficient cause of celestial motion, how vast and various the power and efficacy of the heavenly bodies, and many other things of this kind, by which both Philosophers and Mathematicians, in cleverly investigating and subtly treating them, have merited undying praise for their genius and lasting remembrance of their name. To this question Augustine answers very briefly: that the Holy Spirit, by whose inspiration and impulse they were stirred to write, and by whom they were ruled and guided in writing, did not wish things of this kind to be inserted and mingled with the Sacred writings, because they would furnish a knowledge more curious than useful, and it would come to pass that men (such is the human mind's bent toward worse things), in the treatment of such matters, with more useful things set aside, would be wholly engaged and occupied. For had not Moses followed this course, how many things in this place about the celestial bodies and about universal nature he could have marvelously disputed and philosophized! since from that speech of the blessed Stephen which Luke reports in chapter 7 of the Apostolic History, it is sufficiently evident that he was learned and excellently versed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. Did not Solomon—as it is written in the third book of Kings, chapter 4, and in the book of Wisdom, chapter 7—have a knowledge of all natural things, both celestial and those that are beneath heaven, both ampler and far surer than any of the wise men of this

age? Yet God did not wish this so great learning and wisdom of his to be committed to writing and to come to our knowledge, lest, namely, men—whose disposition is of itself prone enough to vain and futile things—should superfluously, and to no profit for the right ordering of the present life and the...

Marginal gloss: "Cur sacri scriptores de rebus physicis mathematicisque perpauca scripserint." Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.9; Acts 7:22 (Stephen on Moses's Egyptian learning); 3 Kings (1 Kings) 4:29–34; Wisdom 7:17–21 (Solomon's knowledge). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘que’).

— p. 242 (PDF) · printed p. 201 —

...attainment of the eternal life, pursue beyond measure things that contribute nothing to it; while the more useful things, and those most profitable for the correction of vices, the establishment of good morals, and the attainment of immortal glory, they would embrace with less zeal and care. Yet many things, and those excellent, are found scattered here and there in the Sacred books from the knowledge of celestial things, cast forth, as it were, as certain seeds many ages before the Philosophers and Mathematicians. Nor indeed is there anything in the science of the stars, either concluded by necessary reasonings or explored and ascertained by manifest experiments, that is contrary or discordant to the divine Scripture; rather, very many of the decrees of astrological doctrine agree and accord with it wonderfully. Wherefore I have resolved to write this book On the Heavens and the heavenly bodies, and in it to explain, not negligently, the harder and nobler questions concerning heaven and the heavenly bodies, according to sacred Scripture and the doctrine and judgment of the Fathers, with theological and philosophical reasonings adjoined besides.

Wisdom 7; Pererius's claim of the harmony of Scripture with sound astronomy. Completes the sentence broken at the foot of the previous page.

These, then, are the questions which we have undertaken to treat in this volume. First, whether the heavens and the stars are of an incorruptible

nature. Second, what shall be, after the day of judgment, the change and renovation of the heavens. Third, on the figure of heaven. Fourth, on the number of the celestial orbs. Fifth, whether the heavens move themselves by their own natural force, or are moved by Angels. Sixth, whether after the day of judgment the motion of heaven shall wholly cease. Seventh, whether the heavens and the stars are truly animate. Eighth, whether the heavenly bodies are actually hot. Ninth, whether the stars are fixed in their orbs and revolved only by the motion of these, or whether—the heaven being unmoved—they are driven by their own proper motions, just as fish in the water and birds through the air accomplish their motions. Tenth, whether the multitude of the fixed stars which are in the eighth orb is innumerable to mortals. And these will be treated in the first part of this book. But the latter part will contain a good long disputation, against the Astrologers, on the Divination which is drawn from the stars.

Marginal gloss: "Decem quaestiones in priori parte huius libri explicandae." The ten questions of Book II, part 1; part 2 is the disputation against astrological divination.

QUESTION I. Whether, according to sacred Scripture, the nature of the stars and of the heaven is constituted incorruptible.

The first question of Book II.

To one who reads the Sacred writings and believes them true, and who pores over the writings of the holy Fathers, there can be no doubt that the Heavens are in some way to perish and to be changed into a better state. For this all the Fathers deliver with one accord: Justin, answering the questions of the orthodox 93, 94, and 95; Basil in homilies 1 and 3 on Genesis; Ambrose in book 1 on the Hexameron, chapter 6; Gregory of Nyssa in his book on the Creation of Man, chapter 24; Philastrius in his Catalogue of here[sies]...

Marginal gloss: "Auctores qui putaverunt mundum aliquando interiturum." Justin (ps.), Quaestiones ad orthodoxos 93–95; Basil, Hom. 1 & 3 in Hexaemeron; Ambrose, In Hexaemeron 1.6; Gregory of

Nyssa, De hominis opificio 24; Philastrius, De haeresibus (Catalogus haereseon). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘reseon’).

— p. 243 (PDF) · printed p. 202 —

...of heresies; Chrysostom in homily 10 to the people of Antioch, and homily 14 on the eighth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, and Theodoret in his Commentary on the same passage. But what need is there to review them one by one, since this is the opinion of well-nigh all? Nor indeed is it any wonder that all were persuaded of it, since they read it written and inculcated in many places of the sacred writings. Job, in chapter 14, says, Man, when he has fallen asleep, shall not rise again, until the heaven is worn away; he shall not wake, nor rise from his sleep: but man shall at some time rise again; therefore the heaven too is at some time to be worn away. Isaiah, in chapter 24, The whole host of the heavens shall waste away, and they shall be rolled up like a book of the heaven, and all their host shall fall down; and in chapter 51, The heavens shall vanish like smoke, and the earth shall be worn away like a garment; and in chapter 65, I create new heavens and a new earth. David too, in Psalm 101, The heavens, he says, are the works of thy hands; they shall perish, and all shall grow old like a garment, and as a covering thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. And in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, it stands thus, What is brighter than the sun? yet this shall fail. Our Lord too, in the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 24, says, Heaven and earth shall pass away; and again in Luke 21, The stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be moved. Paul also, in chapter 8 of the epistle to the Romans, The creature, he says, was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but it shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God; and in 1 Corinthians, chapter 7, The fashion of this world passes away. And John, in chapter 2 of his first epistle, The world passes away, and the lust thereof. But more openly and explicitly does the blessed Peter teach this; for in chapter 3 of his second Epistle he left it written that the heavens are reserved unto fire against the

day of judgment, and on that day shall pass away with great violence; that then also it shall come to pass that the burning heavens shall be dissolved and the elements shall melt with the heat of fire; and that new heavens and a new earth are awaited by us according to the promises of God. To these add what John says in the Apocalypse, chapters 6, 21, and 22, I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth passed away.

Marginal gloss: "Testimonia Scripturae de interitu mundi." Job 14:12; Isaiah 24:4 / 34:4, 51:6, 65:17; Psalm 101[102]:26–27; Ecclesiasticus 17:31 (‘Quid lucidius sole?’); Matthew 24:35; Luke 21:26 (cf. 21:33); Romans 8:20–21; 1 Corinthians 7:31; 1 John 2:17; 2 Peter 3:7,10,13; Apocalypse 21:1.

Indeed one may also argue this from what Moses delivers in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, that the sun, moon, and stars were created by God for the service of all the nations that are under heaven: but after the day of judgment man will have no need of the ministry of motion, of light, of any influence or effect of any celestial body; therefore it is necessary that the heavens then—lest they be in vain—either perish altogether or be changed into another state than they now are. Nor is this the doctrine of the sacred writings only, but of the profane as well: for, except Aristotle alone, who made the heaven incorruptible, and Plato, who indeed holds the heaven to be by its own nature mortal and dissoluble, yet to be preserved by God's will so that it never be dissolved, the judgment of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, of all the Stoics and the Epicureans—to whom add also the songs or oracles of the Sibyls—is in accord that this world is both corruptible and at some time at last to perish.

Marginal gloss: "Praeter Platonem et Aristotelem, omnes ferme Philosophi ac Poetae mundum esse aliquando interiturum tradiderunt." Deuteronomy 4:19; Aristotle (the heaven incorruptible); Plato, Timaeus (the world dissoluble by nature but preserved by God's will); Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Sibylline oracles.

From these things now said, and from others like them which could have been brought forward to the same effect (had we not been unwilling to be too long in a matter plain and requiring no crowd of witnesses), it is

sufficiently apparent that, following the doctrine of sacred Scripture...

Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘pturae’).

— p. 244 (PDF) · printed p. 203 —

...of Scripture, there can be no doubt at all that the heaven is at some time in some manner to perish—certainly to be reduced to another form and state than it now has. But this is in dispute: of what kind shall be the supreme change of the heavens and of the world—whether according to substance, so that they utterly perish; or according to their qualities and faculties, and according to their actions and effects; or only by a mere cessation and rest from motion, or in some other way. The blessed Augustine, whose opinion has long since been approved by almost all the theologians in the discussion of this question, in book 20 of The City of God, chapter 24, weighing the aforesaid passage of the blessed Peter, affirms that the higher heavens, in which are the stars, are neither to be purified by the final conflagration of the world nor in any degree to be touched by fire, but that only the aerial heavens and the elements are to be renewed by the burning of that fire. For in the same passage Peter signifies that the same heavens shall burn with fire which once perished by the flood; and who does not know that the waters of Noah's flood, though they exceeded all the mountains by fifteen cubits, were yet very far removed from the starry heavens? This doctrine of Augustine, as I said, almost all the theologians follow, but especially the Scholastics, as may be seen in their disputations on this matter in the fourth book of the Sentences, on distinction 48: who, since (it is said) Scripture foretells that the heavens shall grow old, be worn, melt, pass away, and perish, judge that these and other things of the kind (if there be any others) are to be understood and interpreted not of the starry heavens, but of the aerial; and that no obstacle to this interpretation is raised by Scripture's saying in the plural that the heavens will perish, for in this it preserves the force and usage of the Hebrew tongue, in which the word ‘Heaven’ lacks the singular number.

Marginal glosses: "Opinio Augustini" and "Opinio Scholasticorum Theologorum." Augustine, De civitate Dei 20.24; 2 Peter 3 (the flood comparison); Genesis 7:20 (the waters fifteen cubits above the mountains); Peter Lombard, Sentences IV dist. 48. The Hebrew ■■■■ ('heaven') has no singular form.

Yet this seems rather to stand against this exposition: that David, in Psalm 101, when he says, In the beginning, Lord, thou didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands, is without doubt speaking of the supreme heavens; and yet he straightway adds, They shall perish, and all shall grow old like a garment and be changed: therefore Scripture teaches that not the aerial heavens only, but also the starry, shall perish. Wherefore, that both this and the other things which can bring difficulty into this question may all be untangled and dispatched by a single answer, they advise that a twofold change and perishing must be conceived: the one, by which mortal things are corrupted and abolished, losing the nature they had—which kind of perishing the theologians deny will befall the heavens; the other, not a true perishing, but one that has only the shadow and likeness of perishing, which is nothing else than a certain cessation from their former ministry, use, and operation, and a change of state and condition. The heavens, therefore, shall perish, not as animals do, so as to be dissolved and to cease to be, but because they shall be transformed into another state, void of all the ministries, functions, and effects which they now exercise. For when men, for whose sake they were founded, are translated from earth into the heavenly and eternal felicity, there will be no need of the motion of the heaven, of light, of heat, and of the other conveniences of the heavenly bodies, by which this present life of mortals is cherished and sustained.

Psalm 101[102]:26–27. The twofold distinction of change/perishing: true corruption (loss of nature, denied of the heavens) versus mere cessation of ministry and change of state.

— p. 245 (PDF) · printed p. 204 —

The blessed Jerome, both on the 51st and on the 65th chapter of Isaiah, calls that final change and perishing of the heavens their renovation and

promotion to a better state; and in his Commentary on the 65th chapter of Isaiah, from those words of David, They shall perish and shall grow old like a garment, and as a covering thou shalt change them and they shall be changed, he argues that the perishing of the heavens will not be their abolition and dissolution, but their reformation and renovation. For neither does that which he said in Isaiah chapter 30, The moon shall shine as the sun, and the sun shall receive sevenfold light, signify the perishing of the former things, but a change for the better. This Jerome makes plain by an example known and familiar to us, adding thus: When the infant has grown into a boy, and the boy into a youth, and the youth into a man, and the man into an old man, he by no means perishes through the several ages: for he is the same who was before, but is gradually changed, and is said to have perished to his former age. Understanding this, the Apostle Paul too spoke, For the fashion of this world passes away. Let us consider what he said: The fashion passes away, not the substance. This same thing the blessed Peter also signifies, not obscurely, in his second epistle, chapter 3: for when he had said that both the heavens and the elements should be burned up and dissolved by fire, in order that it might be understood what kind of dissolution and perishing he himself meant, he straightway added, But we shall see new heavens and a new earth: he did not say, we shall see other heavens and another earth, but the old and ancient ones changed for the better. Thus far from Jerome.

Jerome, on Isaiah 51 and 65; Isaiah 30:26 (‘the moon shall shine as the sun’); the analogy of the ages of man; 1 Corinthians 7:31; 2 Peter 3:13.

In favor of this opinion I shall here transcribe a most beautiful passage of the blessed Gregory, from the seventeenth book of the Morals, chapter five.

Marginal gloss: "Notabilis sententia Gregorii de caelorum interitu non substantiali sed tantum accidentali."

It may be asked, he says—since it is said through Solomon, One generation passes away and another generation comes, but the earth

stands forever—why the blessed Job asserts that all things are humbled and taken away. Yet we easily resolve this, if we distinguish in what manner earth and heaven pass away, and in what manner they remain. For both of these pass away through the appearance which they now have, but yet through their essence subsist without end. For hence it is said through Paul, For the fashion of this world passes away; hence Truth says through herself, Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away; hence to John it is declared by the angelic voice, There shall be a new heaven and a new earth—which indeed are not to be founded as others, but these very ones are renewed. Heaven, therefore, and earth both pass away and shall be, because both they are wiped by fire from the appearance which they now have, and yet are forever preserved in their own nature. Whence it is said through the Psalmist, Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. And this their final change is announced to us even now by the very vicissitudes by which, for our uses, they unceasingly alternate. For the earth fails of its appearance in winter dryness, and grows green again in the moisture of spring. The heaven is daily overcast by the gloom of night, and renewed by the brightness of day. Hence, then, let every believer gather that these things both perish and yet are restored through renewal, which we see to be continually repaired, as it were, from their failing. Thus far Gregory.

Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 17.5. Embedded references (with marginal citations beside the passage: Iob 24, 1.Corint.7, Matth.24, Apocal.21): Ecclesiastes 1:4; 1 Corinthians 7:31; Matthew 24:35; Apocalypse 21:1; Psalm 101[102]:27.

— p. 246 (PDF) · printed p. 205 —

BUT since those words of Peter, mentioned more than once in this disputation, and to be mentioned hereafter, have obscurity and difficulty, and most of all touch the present controversy, they must be explained more subtly and accurately. Thus says Peter: The heavens shall pass away with

great violence—that is, they shall pass after the manner of a storm: not indeed by the loss of their substance, but by the cessation of their ministries and the renovation of their state. But the elements shall be dissolved with heat—that is, glowing with the burning of fire, they shall be purified from all the filth of the present corruption, as gold is by fire. Augustine, in book 20 of The City of God, chapter 24, refers what Peter says of the ‘elements’ not to all four, but only to those which are lowest with us, namely earth and air: for which it makes that Peter premised the matter of the flood, which is agreed to have harmed only the lower elements.

Marginal gloss: "Explicatur locus B. Petri 2 Epi. c. 3." 2 Peter 3:10,12; Augustine, De civitate Dei 20.24.

Bede, however, because Peter said ‘elements’ indefinitely, thinks all four are to be understood; for he writes in this manner: There are four elements which that greatest fire shall consume—two indeed wholly, so that they are not at all, namely fire and water; but two it shall restore to a better face, namely earth and air: which Peter sufficiently hinted when he added, We await new heavens and a new earth, signifying by ‘heavens’ the air. But of fire and water nothing of the sort is read; nay rather, in the Apocalypse, chapter 21, it is delivered, And the sea is now no more. So, in effect, he. It seems, therefore, that Bede was of the mind that, of the four elements, two are to perish in substance after the day of judgment.

Marginal gloss: "An post diem iudicii aliquod de quatuor elementis periturum sit." Bede; Apocalypse 21:1 (‘and the sea is now no more’).

But that text adduced from the Apocalypse, And the sea is now no more, did not move Augustine to suppose that after the day of judgment there will be no sea; for, treating that passage in book 20 of The City of God, chapter 16, Prophetic speech, he says, loves to mingle figurative with literal words, and thus in a manner to veil what is said: he could say of that sea, And the sea is now no more, of which he had said above, And the sea gave up the dead that were in it; for then this present age—the turbulent and stormy life

of mortals, which he figured by the name of ‘sea’—will be no more.

Marginal gloss: "Consuetudo propheticae locutionis." Augustine, De civitate Dei 20.16; Apocalypse 20:13 (‘the sea gave up the dead that were in it’).

The Scholastic Theologians, in the fourth book, on distinction 47, deny that any element will perish in substance after the day of judgment; wherefore Bonaventure interpreted that Bede meant nothing else than that there would be a more notable change in fire and water than in the other elements. St. Thomas, in the fourth book, distinction 47, question 2, says that Bede's saying is to be taken thus: not that those two elements are to be corrupted in substance, but that they are to be removed more than the others from the natural property, ministry, and state which they now have; for since they excel in the two most active qualities, which are the chief principles of alteration and corruption—that is, heat and cold—and after the day of judgment there will be no action or use of qualities of this kind, for this reason these two elements seem to be so far changed that they appear almost changed in substance. But Bede, in his book On the Six Ages of the World, chapter 69, sets forth his opinion clearly and plainly enough, which differs in nothing at all from the aforesaid opinion of Augustine. For the rest, Philo, in the book to which he gave the title That the World is Incorruptible, strenuously strives by many arguments to persuade that the world is incorruptible, and that it is never to be changed from the state which it has had until now, whether for the worse or for the better...

Peter Lombard, Sentences IV dist. 47; Bonaventure; Aquinas, In IV Sent. dist. 47 q.2 (fire and water excel in the active qualities of heat and cold); Bede, De sex aetatibus mundi 69; Philo, Quod mundus sit incorruptibilis (De aeternitate mundi). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘com[mutandum]’; signature C 3).

— p. 247 (PDF) · printed p. 206 —

...to be changed. And yet, whether Philo is the author of that book, many things certainly make me hesitate: for neither Jerome nor Eusebius mention this book in the rather long and careful enumeration which they drew up of

all of Philo's works; and unless my judgment deceives me, neither the style, nor the manner of arguing, nor the method and diction, nor the very kind of doctrine which is delivered, smacks of Philo, or even of any Jewish writer at all: for nowhere does he set down any testimony of Scripture or any example; nowhere is any argument woven from the doctrine of the sacred writings, whether according to the history or according to the allegory, in which Philo is wont to be copious and excellent: rather, that disputation savors more of some pagan philosopher, and especially of a pupil and champion of the Peripatetic school.

Marginal gloss: "An libri 'Quod mundus sit incorruptibilis' auctor sit Philo, ut fertur." Pererius doubts the attribution to Philo (Jerome and Eusebius omit it from their catalogues of Philo's works; the style cites no Scripture and looks rather like a pagan Peripatetic's).

BUT since this controversy is by no means yet sufficiently explained from the things that have been said, we must strive to loosen all the knots, so far as may be done, and—the various and hard difficulties in which it is entangled having been cleared up—to set forth what opinion we judge most answers and accords with right reason, and above all with divine Scripture. Nor is it to the purpose to warn the reader in this place that in this discussion we are treating not of God's absolute power, but of what we can establish, whether from the sacred writings or from the opinions of the Fathers or from probable arguments, that God will do. For to all who are wise in a Christian manner and have faith in the sacred writings, it ought to be beyond all controversy and doubt that God, by that liberty of will and immensity of power with which He founded the world out of nothing, can—if indeed He should will it—reduce it again to nothing. We have a plain statement of Scripture about this in the second book of Maccabees, chapter 8, where it stands thus, He can destroy the whole world with a single nod. Something similar can be gathered from the words of Isaiah in chapter 40, and from the words in the book of Wisdom, chapter 11. I am not unaware that this will not be approved by the philosophers, especially the Peripatetics, who either deny that God was the builder and maker of

this world (because, in their judgment, in eternal things there is no place for a truly and properly efficient cause of them), or suppose that God made the world not by full liberty of will, but constrained by that necessity of nature, so that He cannot unmake and dissolve the work which He Himself made. But this question we are not for the present debating with the philosophers, but have undertaken to treat among Christians and from the decrees of sacred Scripture and Christian doctrine.

2 Maccabees 8:18 (‘He can destroy the whole world with a single nod’); Isaiah 40; Wisdom 11. Pererius stresses that the dispute concerns not God's absolute power, but what He will in fact do.

TO BEGIN, then, that I may here start the explanation of my opinion: I judge that the world will never be so destroyed that at any time it shall not even exist; for this Scripture sufficiently shows, which names the future change, or purgation, or renovation, or deliverance from bondage and corruption, of the world; which Paul teaches in plain words indeed in chapter 8 of the Epistle to the Romans, when he writes that every creat[ure]...

Marginal gloss: "Auctoris sententia: mundum nunquam omnino, vel secundum substantiam, destructum iri." Romans 8:19–22. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tur’).

— p. 248 (PDF) · printed p. 207 —

...creature—that is, even the one void of reason and sense—in a manner anxiously awaits the glorification of the elect, so that it, set free together with them from the corruption of bondage, may acquire a certain newness and glory of incorruption. To the same purpose is what Solomon says in the third chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, I have learned that all the works which God has made continue forever. And indeed it seems foreign to the goodness and wisdom of God that this so splendid fashioning of the world, complete in every part, and not only a most glorious monument but also a most weighty testimony of God's power and providence, should be utterly destroyed and reduced to nothing. So in truth it is: since this corporeal world was made chiefly for the sake of man, it is fitting to suppose that the

corruption and renovation of the world will be similar to that of man; and man, after the day of judgment, made from corruptible incorruptible, shall remain the same according to substance for every age.

Romans 8:19–21; Ecclesiastes 3:14.

Wherefore that which is reported in books 2 and 3 of the Recognitions of Clement—that the blessed Peter once said that the highest heaven and dwelling of the blessed minds, which later theologians have called the Empyrean, will at no time ever be changed, much less perish, but will endure wholly unchangeable for all eternity; but that the starry heaven, visible to the eyes of mortals, is at the consummation of the age to be dissolved and utterly abolished, so that, the veil, as it were, of that body being taken away, that glorious heaven, now too sublime for the grasp of human sense, may then appear to the created beings whom God shall have deemed worthy of the sight of it—this, I say, which is delivered in those books, is either to be made little of, on account of the doubtful, or rather null, credit and authority of that work among learned men; or is to be softened by some probable interpretation, and bent in whatever way to this opinion which we have taught and proved.

Marginal gloss: "Libri Recognitionum Clementis." The pseudo-Clementine Recognitions 2–3 (the Empyrean heaven immutable, the starry heaven dissolved at the end of the age) — of doubtful authority, and to be softened.

THIS also is to me most like the truth and well-nigh certain: that the corporeal world is not to be corrupted according to substance, and another, different from the one that now is, to be fashioned by God. For Paul, in 1 Corinthians chapter 7, indicated this not obscurely, when he said, The fashion of this world passes away: for he did not say that the substance, but the fashion, would pass away. And toward the confirmation of this matter avail the things we adduced a little above from Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory. In the first chapter of Ecclesiastes it stands thus, The earth stands forever; and in the same book, chapter 3, it is written, All the works which

God has made continue forever. In Psalm 148, He has established them forever. This very thing Proclus and Methodius held, and explained and proved in plain words, as may be seen in Epiphanius, Heresy 64, which for brevity's sake we pass over. That very many of the old Greek writers were of the same opinion is greatly conjectured from Oecumenius, who delivers the same on chapter 3 of the second Epistle of Peter, whose words we have set down a little below: for the commentaries of Oecumenius are collections of the Greek writers. Nor, I think, will anyone bring himself with difficulty to believe this, who shall reflect with himself...

Marginal gloss: "Hic mundus non corrumpetur secundum substantiam." 1 Corinthians 7:31; Ecclesiastes 1:4, 3:14; Psalm 148:6; Proclus and Methodius (in Epiphanius, Panarion / Haer. 64); Oecumenius on 2 Peter 3 (his commentaries being catenae of the Greek writers). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘putabit’).

— p. 249 (PDF) · printed p. 208 —

...will reflect that it can scarcely be imagined how another world, wholly different in substance from this our own, could be made. For that world which is to be after the day of judgment must of necessity have elements and heavens, the sun likewise and the moon and the other stars: for unless it have them, it could not truly be called a world or a universe, lacking so many and so perfect kinds of things, which make up the completeness, beauty, and adornment of the world. Either, then, it will have such things, similar in substance to this our world; but there was no reason why God should wish to destroy this world and to found anew another most like it. But if the elements and stars of that world be supposed different in substance, I for my part cannot grasp in my mind by what reasoning this could come about. For the earth of that world will not fail to be dense, dry, heavy, cold, tending toward the middle place of the world and there resting by its own nature: for that which is not marked by these properties is not truly earth; and that which has them is plainly such in substance as this our own. And what I have here argued of earth can be transferred and applied to the other principal parts of the world. But if the world were to perish in

substance, and not itself, but some other world founded by God out of another substance were to be partaker of the incorruption and glory which the sons of God shall obtain after the day of judgment, then Paul, speaking of this world of ours, would surely not have said that every creature groans and is in travail, awaiting the renovation and glorification of the sons of God, so that it too may in a manner become partaker of the same newness and glory: for then not the world which now is, but another in substance, would be partaker of that newness and glory; and this world would never obtain what it so anxiously awaits and groans for.

Marginal gloss: "An possit effici alius mundus, ab hoc qui nunc est omnino diversus secundum substantiam." Romans 8:19–22 (the whole creation groans, awaiting the renovation of the sons of God).

NOW indeed, if the heaven shall never perish according to substance, it seems that hence, by an excellent reasoning, it can be concluded that the heaven is of itself and intrinsically incorruptible. For just as, if the heaven had been due to be corrupted after the day of judgment, it would have been foreign and incongruous to have made it incorruptible according to nature (for to what end would God make an incorruptible heaven which He willed at some time to be corrupted?), so also, since the heaven is at no time ever to be corrupted according to substance, reason itself demands that it was made incorruptible by God; for He would have made it corruptible in vain, which He never willed to be corrupted. Likewise all the signs and arguments—whether drawn from the judgment of the senses or from the natural light of human reason—by which a thing can be proved to be incorruptible (the chief of which Aristotle collected in the first book On the Heaven), all to a man converge upon the heaven. Nor does the example of man weaken the force of this argumentation—man, who, though made by God corruptible by his own nature, will after the resurrection attain immortality: for man was so made corruptible according to nature, that nevertheless, if he would, by obeying God's commands and will, every...

Marginal glosses: "Caelum intrinsece ac secundum substantiam est incorruptibile" and "Cur sicut homo, non ita mundus possit esse corruptibilis, et post diem iudicii adipisci incorruptionem." Aristotle, De Caelo 1 (the marks of incorruptibility). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'omnem').

— p. 250 (PDF) · printed p. 209 —

...he might escape all corruption and death: nor is the incorruption which awaits him after the resurrection anything natural and owed to man's nature, but it is a certain supernatural gift of God, and merited by man's living well and acting well; but these things which we have said of man do not belong to the heaven. Add that man, just as he is corruptible, so at last at some time is corrupted, and afterward receives incorruption as a prize, as it were, merited by himself. And indeed man could not be made incorruptible by his own nature as the heaven is: nor is the case of the heaven and of man the same—man, who is set in the order of natural things in such a way that he is nevertheless ordained by God to a participation in supernatural things. Lastly, unless the heaven be an incorruptible body, the world will have no incorruptible body; wherefore this most noble grade and kind of being will be lacking to the world, lacking which, surely, it could neither truly be called a world, nor perfect, nor a universe.

The disanalogy of man and the heaven: man's incorruption after the resurrection is a supernatural gift, merited; the heaven is incorruptible by its own nature.

QUESTION II. In what manner the world, which according to substance shall never be corrupted, is to be changed and renewed after the day of judgment.

The second question of Book II (the printed numeral 'II' was rendered '17' by the OCR).

NEVERTHELESS, although neither the heaven nor the elements shall perish in substance after the day of judgment, they will yet be otherwise than they now are. The elements will indeed retain rarity and density, gravity and levity (for on account of these qualities they have a fixed order and fixed places in the universe); they will keep also the active qualities,

such as heat and cold, moisture and dryness (for without these they cannot subsist except miraculously, and except imperfectly and in a manner equivocally): yet these qualities will not then exercise their forces and faculties, because then there will be no generation and corruption; for these are repugnant to the renovation and perfection of that state. The action of those qualities will cease, God suspending their use and withholding His concurrence with those qualities for acting: and this will not seem incredible to one who considers that the very same will befall the active qualities which will be in the bodies of men after the resurrection, now glorified, and endowed with incorruption and impassibility. Something similar it is fitting to hold also of the heavens and the stars: for they will keep their light and splendor for illuminating, but not for heating or producing anything; rather, as from motion, so from this action also they will rest. And that we might believe this would one day come to pass, God set forth beforehand some examples of these things, as when in the time of Joshua the motion of the sun and moon was checked, and the fire in the Babylonian furnace put forth no power of burning, or even of heating. Moses likewise endured twice forty days and nights without any food or drink, his body unharmed. And that the qualities of the elements do not act upon one another...

Marginal glosses: "Iosue 10" and "Danielis 3." After the judgment the elements keep their qualities but their action ceases, God suspending their use—as with the glorified risen bodies. Examples: the sun and moon checked at Joshua's word (Joshua 10:12–13); the Babylonian furnace not burning (Daniel 3); Moses's two forty-day fasts unharmed (Exodus 24:18; 34:28). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘mento’).

— p. 251 (PDF) · printed p. 210 —

...of the elements, nor the light of the heavenly bodies to give heat—although now it would be a vast miracle—nevertheless then, the renovation of the whole world being once supposed, these will not be miracles, but will in a manner be naturally and necessarily consequent upon that state, most congruous with it, and will belong to the ordinary

providence of God concerning that state. That the motion of the heaven will cease after the day of judgment, and yet that this rest from motion will not be violent to the heaven, we shall teach below, where it will be disputed whether the heavens are moved by Angels.

Continues Quaestio II (sentence broken at the previous page's catchword ‘mento’). The cessation of the heaven's motion is treated below, in the question whether the heavens are moved by Angels.

FURTHERMORE, although neither the heavens nor the elements will perish in substance after the day of judgment, yet all bodies mixed and composed of the elements, both inanimate and animate, save man alone, will after the day of judgment utterly perish, so that none will exist after that time. For this the blessed Peter teaches plainly in chapter 3 of his second epistle, The earth, he says, and the works that are in it shall be burned up. And that it ought indeed to be so, reason persuades. For plants and animals were made for the sake of man, assigned to his service, use, and convenience: All things, says David, thou hast put under his feet; and in the book of Genesis, chapter 9, God said to Noah, As the green herbs I have delivered all things to you. But after the day of judgment, when man is translated to the state of immortality and no longer needs the use of such things, if they remained they would be in vain and superfluous. Add that after the day of judgment the motion of the heaven will wholly cease, as we shall say below, and this being taken away, the generation and corruption of these things cannot stand. And to preserve the individuals of all species, unbroken and impassible, as man is preserved, does not seem to befit the wisdom of God.

Marginal gloss: "Praeter caelos et quatuor elementa, cetera omnia secundum substantiam peribunt, ac nullum corpus mistum post diem iudicii superfuturum sit." 2 Peter 3:10; Psalm 8:8; Genesis 9:3 (‘as the green herbs I have given you all things’). Plants and animals, made for man, become superfluous after the Judgment.

And since the world will then be incorruptible, those things only seem destined to remain which have some ground of incorruptibility; and this is threefold. For some things are incorruptible both as a whole and in all their

parts, as the heavens; others, if not as a whole, at least have their chief part incorruptible, as man; there are also those which, though they perish part by part and little by little, yet cannot all perish at once, but the sum of them ever remains entire: of this kind are the elements. But the rest of the bodies compacted of the elements have in themselves no ground of incorruptibility, except according to their species, which is nothing to the present purpose—to say nothing of the fact that the Elements have within themselves no efficient cause of their own perishing, and are the principal parts of the world, in which its integrity is contained.

The threefold ground of incorruptibility: wholly incorruptible (the heavens); incorruptible in their chief part (man); unable to perish all at once (the elements). Composite bodies have no such ground except in their species.

BUT someone will object to us that so many species of stones, metals, and living things pertain to the beauty, adornment, and perfection of the world, that without them the world could not be perfect. But this is solved: for the species of such things, though they pertain to the perfection of the world inasmuch as it is engaged in the present state of generation and corruption, do not pertain to it in such a way that the world will after the day of judgment be brought over into another, incorruptible state—from which such things are far removed. And although plants and living things are in themselves superior to the elements in dignity of nature, yet, if the ground of incorruptibility be weighed, it is in some manner found in the elemen[ts]...

Marginal gloss: "Quomodo mundus post diem iudicii, omnibus mistorum generibus et speciebus carens, dici poterit plenus ac perfectus, aut etiam universum." Objection: the many species of stones, metals, and animals belong to the world's perfection. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tis’).

— p. 252 (PDF) · printed p. 211 —

...the elements, and inasmuch as without them the integrity of this corporeal world cannot stand, it is not to be denied that in this respect the lower animals are inferior to the elements. But by what reasoning will the

world, after the day of judgment, lacking so many and so excellent kinds of things, rightly obtain the name and character of a universe? Or will it not truly be able to be called a universe simply and absolutely, except on this ground alone, that it contains all things which by their own nature are in some manner capable of incorruption (for that incorruptible state of the world ought not to embrace other things)? Or will all such kinds of things in some manner be found even in that state of the world? namely, in man, in whom, according to their general grades, all the kinds of mixed things are eminently contained.

Whether the renewed world can be called a 'universe': either because it contains all that is by nature capable of incorruption, or because all the kinds of mixed things are eminently contained in man.

And this is what I had to say on the question proposed: not but that I could have said more, had I indulged both my wit and the material, but because, for indicating our opinion and untangling the chief difficulties, what has now been said could suffice for anyone not unlearned nor unskilled in the sacred writings.

Pererius closes Quaestio II.

AND indeed, not far removed from those things which we have just taught about the future state after the day of judgment—that is, about the incorruption of the heavens and the perishing of plants and animals—are the things which Oecumenius noted in his Collections on chapter 3 of the second epistle of the blessed Peter, borrowed without doubt, as he is wont to borrow most things, from the older Greek writers. For he writes in this manner:

Oecumenius's catena on 2 Peter 3, drawn (as usual) from older Greek writers, agrees with Pererius's view.

Since there are two elements which most of all hold together this fabric of the universe and keep it cohering—water and fire—out of which the other two also come to be (for air consists of the exhalation

of the waters, earth of their concretion; and both of these, that is the exhalation and the concretion out of water, the force of fire, naturally implanted in it by God, brings about): since, then, these two are the principal elements, and by water in the time of Noah the crimes of the impious were formerly blotted out, it is necessary that again the punishment of the impious be made by fire. And of this perishing of the world not the Christians only, but also the wise men of the Greeks, as Heraclitus of Ephesus and Empedocles of Etna, have taught. But someone will say: what reason is there why the world was founded, if it must perish again? To whom it is to be answered thus: that the world will then not utterly pass away to destruction, but will pass over into renovation. Whence also David says, Thou shalt renew the face of the earth. And if we are accustomed to refine metals by fire, we do not utterly destroy them so that they are not, but render them purer and more pure: so it is not to be believed that God, since He has promised the consummation of the world by fire, will either not do it, or, if He do it, will do it to the destruction and ruin of the world. For if some things shall be lost and consumed, what shall those be? These superfluous things, no doubt, suited to the present life—such as beasts of burden, grasses, and plants, some of which produce material for building tents and houses, others fruits for feeding men. But nourishment and feeding is a proof of corruption; and want and replenishing, and need of food—what else do they argue and foretell than corruption? These things, therefore, which are vain and superfluous, and do not pertain to that life which after the day of judgment shall be lived without corruption, shall all be corrupted. But new heavens and a new...

Oecumenius, Commentaria on 2 Peter 3 (a catena of Greek writers); block quote spanning printed pp. 211–212. Embedded: Psalm 103[104]:30 (‘Thou shalt renew the face of the earth’, marginal citation ‘Psalm. 103’); the two principal elements (water and fire); Heraclitus of Ephesus and Empedocles of Etna.

— p. 253 (PDF) · printed p. 212 —

...earth shall be put in their place, which yet will by no means be diverse in respect of matter: for, just as one who builds a new house does not make it out of no underlying matter, so God, since He once produced and formed matter at the beginning, will take away and destroy all that is necessary for the use of this life, but useless and superfluous for that other incorruptible life; whereas whatever shall be conducive to it, formed with an incorruptible and admirable beauty, He will leave for the adorning of the second and incorruptible world.

Conclusion of the Oecumenius block quote (begun on the previous page).

Thus far have been recounted the things which Oecumenius set forth in his Commentaries, not incongruous with our opinion. Justin Martyr delivers things very like these, answering the 95th question of the orthodox. But let us next pursue the other questions proposed at the beginning of this book, of which the one concerning the Figure of the heaven let us examine in the first place.

Justin Martyr (Quaestiones ad orthodoxos 95) teaches the like. Transition to the next question.

QUESTION III. On the figure of the heavens, whether it is round.

The third question of Book II.

ARISTOTLE and the Mathematicians teach that the heaven is round, and they teach truly; for since the heaven is the first of all bodies, the simplest, the most capacious, the most perfect, and the most mobile, it most of all demands a globe-shaped figure, as being the first of all figures, the simplest, the most capacious, the most perfect, and the fittest for swiftness and perpetuity of motion. And if the heaven were not endowed with this figure, motions so diverse and toward such diverse parts could not be carried on in the heavens without the heavens breaking and rupturing themselves, nor could it be avoided that, by reason of the revolutions of the

heavens, a void should somewhere exist. Wherefore we are not to follow certain Ecclesiastical writers, who not only denied that the heaven is round, but even reckoned it to be contrary to the sacred writings. In which opinion Justin seems to have been, answering the 130th question of the orthodox, and Basil in homily 1 on Genesis, Ambrose in book 1 of the Hexameron, and also Chrysostom in homilies 14 and 27 on Paul's epistle to the Hebrews, on chapter 8 of that epistle, Theophylact and Theodoret (although the latter, in question 20 on Genesis, seems to follow the true opinion about the rotundity of the heaven). But beyond the rest, Lactantius stubbornly fights for this opinion, in book 3 of the Divine Institutions, chapter 23, and Procopius of Gaza in his Commentary on Genesis, when he expounds those words of Moses, In the beginning God created heaven and earth: who did not fear to say that the opinion about the rotundity of the heaven in no way agrees with the orthodox truth, but contradicts Moses, the Prophets, Paul, and even Christ the Lord.

Marginal gloss: "Ex auctoribus Ecclesiasticis, quinam rotundum esse caelum negaverint." Aristotle, De Caelo. The sphere is the first, simplest, most capacious, and most perfect figure. Ecclesiastical writers who denied a round heaven: Justin (Quaest. ad orth. 130), Basil (Hom. 1), Ambrose (Hexaem. 1), Chrysostom (Hom. 14 & 27 on Hebrews 8), Theophylact, Theodoret (though Qu. 20 in Gen. seems to follow the true view); especially Lactantius (Div. inst. 3.23) and Procopius of Gaza.

BUT in truth, so far is this opinion from being contrary to divine Scrip[ture]...

Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘nae Scri’).

— p. 254 (PDF) · printed p. 213 —

...Scripture, that on the contrary it agrees and accords with it marvelously. I could, to give credence to this matter, bring forth many things from the sacred writings, but lest I be too long where there is least need, I shall be content with a few. That the heaven is round, Scripture indicates neither in one place only nor obscurely: for this Solomon left written and attested at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiastes, teaching that the Sun moves in

the heaven in a circle: The Sun, he says, rises and sets, and returns to its place, and there, rising again, it wheels through the South and bends toward the North; surveying all things in its circuit the wind goes, and returns upon its circles: by which words it is most clearly shown—especially as the blessed Jerome interprets that passage—that the sun, which runs its course in the heaven, is carried round in an orb; which could not happen unless the heaven were globular and round. But still more plainly is this delivered in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 24, where the divine Wisdom is brought in speaking thus: I alone have compassed the circuit of heaven. In Greek the word is more expressive, ■κ■κλωσα, that is, ‘I led around, I made round, or I rounded into a ball.’ This same thing some think Job signified, when in chapter 9 he said, Under whom they bow that bear up the world: by which words insinuating the holy Angels, by whom the celestial orbs are moved and the whole world is governed under God. To the same purpose looks that saying of Solomon in chapter 8 of Proverbs, When he prepared the heavens I was present, when by a fixed law and a circle he hedged in the depths. For by the name ‘deep’ he here signifies that vast space between heaven and earth, full of watery matter, without any light and distinction, of which Moses said in this place, And darkness was upon the face of the deep. And this deep he hedged about and circumscribed with a circle—that is, with the circle of the celestial bodies—and with a fixed law that cannot be changed. And this the Hebrew reading shows more plainly, which word for word sounds: When he set, or described, a circle upon the face of the deep.

Marginal gloss: "Locus lib. Proverbiorum." Ecclesiastes 1:5–6 (with Jerome's reading); Ecclesiasticus 24:5/8 (‘Gyrum caeli circuivi sola’; the Greek ■κ■κλωσα = ‘I encircled’); Job 9:13; Proverbs 8:27 (‘when... by a fixed law and circle he hedged in the depths’); Genesis 1:2 (‘darkness was upon the face of the deep’). The Hebrew reads ‘when he set / described a circle upon the face of the deep.’

BUT to Basil, Ambrose, Acacius, and certain others of the old writers, that passage of Isaiah in chapter 40 seemed utterly to overturn the opinion about the rotundity of the heaven—where it is said that God stretched out

the heavens like a tent or chamber, or, as Basil cites it from the translation of the Seventy Interpreters, set up the heaven like a vault; and that other passage of David in Psalm 103, Stretching out the heaven like a skin. Nevertheless Augustine, in chapter 9 of book 2 of On Genesis according to the Letter, beautifully teaches how the aforesaid texts can most conveniently be understood and expounded, so that they in no way at all stand against the rotundity of the heaven. For, says Augustine, that the heaven is round does not conflict with its having a likeness to a tent or chamber: for the heaven, in respect of that part which is above us—of which Scripture properly speaks—has the likeness of a chamber, covering over this our hemisphere; wherefore, if the heaven is not spherical, it is on that side a chamber by which it covers the earth; but if it is wholly spherical, it is a chamber on both sides: for, just as this part of the heaven which covers us is, as it were, a chamber in respect of our hemisphere, so the other half of the heaven which covers the Antipodes is, in respect of the hemisphere opposite to us, a chamber. Nor does it stand in the way that David says the heaven was stretched out like a skin: for a skin...

Marginal gloss: "Explicatur locus Isaiae cap. 40, Davidis Psal. 103." Isaiah 40:22 (the heavens stretched like a tent/vault); the Septuagint reading ‘fornicem’ (a vault), cited by Basil; Psalm 103[104]:2 (‘stretching out the heaven like a skin’); Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.9 (rotundity is not incompatible with the tent/vault simile). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘pellis’; signature D 3).

— p. 255 (PDF) · printed p. 214 —

...a skin can be stretched both flat and into a round, as we see in a wineskin, a ball, a bladder: so Augustine. It is to be known, however, that in that passage of David the Hebrew word for ‘skin’ is one that means ‘curtain’: for of old, both among the Jews and among other nations, tents and pavilions were made of skins after the fashion of curtains; whence flowed that saying, that emperors are ‘under skins’ (i.e., in tents). You have an example of this, reader, in the canticle of Habakkuk, chapter 3, in that place: For iniquity I saw the tents of Ethiopia; the curtains of the land of

Midian shall be troubled. Therefore the true and genuine sense of those words of David is this: Just as a man, without any trouble, draws out and spreads as he pleases the skin or curtain of his tent or pavilion, folded and rolled up, so God without labor stretched out the heaven into the greatest amplitude, that it might be like a tent and pavilion covering round the earth, which He had given to all living things, but chiefly to men, to dwell in.

Continues the close of Quaestio III. Augustine: a skin can be stretched flat or round (as in a wineskin, ball, bladder). The Hebrew word in Psalm 103[104]:2 means 'curtain'; tents were made of skins like curtains. Habakkuk 3:7 ('I saw the tents of Ethiopia... the curtains of the land of Midian').

QUESTION IV. On the number of the heavens.

The fourth question of Book II.

In this treatment which we have undertaken, the disputation about the number of the heavens is not to be passed over. Down to the times of Ptolemy, the Mathematicians as well as the Philosophers judged that there are eight heavens, those of the seven planets and an eighth of the fixed stars. Ptolemy and the later Mathematicians, having discovered the motion of the eighth orb from west to east, added a ninth heaven. But about three hundred years ago, besides the motion of the daily rotation and the motion of the eighth heaven from west to east, there was detected by the Mathematicians, by sure observation, a certain other motion of the same orb, which they called the motion of trepidation: for which reason they were compelled to posit a tenth heaven. According to the opinion of the Mathematicians, then, which is now generally received in the schools and approved by almost all, there are ten mobile heavens; to which is to be added an eleventh, which the Theologians have named the Empyrean. It is asked, therefore, whether divine Scripture anywhere openly delivers anything certain about the number of the heavens, and whether the common opinion of eleven heavens is contrary to the sacred writings.

The history of the count: to Ptolemy's time, 8 heavens (7 planets + the 8th of the fixed stars); Ptolemy added a 9th (the 8th orb's west-to-east motion); ~300 years ago a 10th (the motion of trepidation); so

10 mobile heavens, plus an 11th = the Empyrean (the Theologians).

St. CHRYSOSTOM, in homily 4 on Genesis, explaining those words, Let there be a firmament, did not hesitate to affirm that those who make many heavens contradict the divine scripture and the Ecclesiastical doctrines, and follow their own inventions and fabrications. For Moses delivered only one heaven, which he called the firmament: for when he had earlier said, In the beginning God made heaven and earth, by the name of heaven and earth he meant to designate the whole world, whose making he had summarily set forth beforehand; and then he narrated distinctly and one by one in what manner it was made by God part by part. Nor ought it to move anyone that Scripture sometimes uses the name of heaven in the plural number, as when...

Marginal gloss: "Chrysostomus unum duntaxat caelum secundum sacram Scripturam admittit." Chrysostom, Hom. 4 in Genesim (on ‘Let there be a firmament’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘cum’).

— p. 256 (PDF) · printed p. 215 —

...as when it says, The heavens of the heavens, and again, The waters that are above the heavens: for in speech of this kind it preserves the property of the Hebrew tongue, in which the name of heaven lacks the singular number, just as among the Latins Athenae, Venetiae, Syracusae. Thus far from Chrysostom. But because this saying is contrary to the doctrine of all the philosophers and theologians, therefore the blessed Thomas, with that singular piety and reverence which he had toward the holy Fathers, wished to interpret it in a good sense. For he says, in the First Part, question 68, that Chrysostom does not condemn those who distinguish the celestial body into many orbs, but certain heretics and philosophers who fable that beyond this world and the heavens visible to us there are other heavens and other worlds. How aptly this interpretation accords with the meaning of Chrysostom's words, I leave to the reader to estimate and judge.

Marginal gloss: "Quomodo B. Thomas dictum Chrysostomi interpretetur." Psalm 148:4 (‘Caeli caelorum’ / ‘Aquae quae super caelos sunt’); the Hebrew ■■■■ (‘heaven’) lacks a singular, like the Latin plural place-names Athenae, Venetiae, Syracusae. Aquinas, ST I q.68.

Justin Martyr, answering the 67th question of the Orthodox (which was this: Since Moses, at the beginning of the book of Genesis, mentions only two heavens, why does Scripture elsewhere deliver more heavens? for Paul says, in 2 Corinthians chapter 12, that he was caught up even to the third heaven)—answering this question, I say, Justin says that there are in truth only two heavens, so to speak, ‘total’ ones, but that he distinguishes these into various spaces, which Scripture sometimes also calls heavens. Like to this is what Theodoret delivers in question 11 on Genesis: He who does not believe, he says, that there is a second heaven, departs from the straight path; but he who tries to number more, clings to fables, having set aside the doctrine of the divine Spirit. Basil, in homily 3 on Genesis, affirms that according to Scripture not two heavens only, but even more—at least three at the least—must be posited: for Paul plainly relates that he was caught up to the third heaven.

Marginal glosses: "Iustini martyris de numero caelorum opinio", "Theodoretus duos tantum ponit caelos", "Basilio ut minimum tres sunt caeli." Justin (Quaest. ad orth. 67); 2 Corinthians 12:2 (caught up to the third heaven); Theodoret (Qu. 11 in Gen.); Basil (Hom. 3 in Gen.).

Philastrius, in his catalogue of heresies, mentions the heresy of certain men who were in doubt about the multitude and diversity of the heavens; but he himself seems to hold that how great the multitude of the heavens may be is undiscovered from the sacred writings, since Scripture seems to speak variously on that matter in various places. For from the words of Moses in the first chapter of the book of Genesis two heavens are gathered: one made in the beginning together with the earth, the other founded under the name of the firmament on the second day. But David hints that there are six heavens, when he says, Praise the Lord, you heavens of the heavens, and let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord: for since he utters the name of heaven three times in the plural number, he

indicates at the least six heavens. And in Deuteronomy chapter 10, when it is said, The heaven and the heaven of heaven, three are shown; as also in Paul, when he says that he himself was caught up to the third heaven. Thus Philastrius.

Marginal glosses: "Philastrio incertus videtur secundum divinam Scripturam caelorum numerus"; "Psal. 148." Philastrius, De haeresibus. From Genesis 1: two heavens (one with the earth, one = the firmament on day 2); David (Psalm 148:4) hints at six (three plural namings); Deuteronomy 10:14 (‘the heaven and the heaven of heaven’) = three; Paul's third heaven (2 Cor. 12:2).

St. Thomas, in the First Part, question 68, article 4, observed that the name of heaven is taken in various ways, partly in the sacred writings, partly among the holy Fathers. First, properly, for the true celestial body, and thus a threefold heaven is distinguished: the first wholly luminous and immobile, which is the Empyrean; the second wholly devoid of light and diaphanous, yet mobile, and is called the Crystalline; the third partly diaphanous, partly shining, and is the starry heaven, embracing the eighth orb and the seven planetary orbs beneath it. In a second way ‘heaven’ is said of what does not have a celestial nature, but because it has a likeness of some celestial property: as, in Scriptu[re]...

Marginal gloss: "Varie sumi in sacris litteris nomen caeli, tradit B. Thomas." Aquinas, ST I q.68 a.4. ‘Heaven’ taken (1) properly for the celestial body — threefold: Empyrean (wholly luminous, immobile), Crystalline (lightless, diaphanous, yet mobile), Starry (the 8th orb with the 7 planetary orbs); (2) for what has a celestial-like property. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Scriptu’).

— p. 257 (PDF) · printed p. 216 —

...in Scripture the air is often named heaven; wherefore Damascene makes a threefold heaven—the aerial, the starry, and another higher than these, invisible and divine. In a third way ‘heaven’ is said by metaphor and according to a mystical sense: that incomprehensible sublimity and inaccessible light of the divine Majesty, whose likeness and equality Lucifer, aspiring to it, in Isaiah 14 said, I will ascend into heaven. In a fourth way the three kinds of supernatural visions—that is, corporeal,

imaginary, and intellectual vision—are called three heavens: according to which signification of ‘heaven’ Augustine, in book 12 of On Genesis according to the Letter, interprets Paul's rapture to the third heaven. Moreover, when in Scripture it is said The heaven of heaven, or The heavens of the heavens, by the Hebrew idiom is signified the highest and most excellent heaven—that is, either the Empyrean heaven in respect of the other heavens, or the complex of all the celestial orbs in respect of the air, which is also, as I have already said, often called heaven in Scripture.

Marginal gloss: "Damascenus, lib. 2 de Fide orthodoxa." John Damascene's threefold heaven (aerial, starry, and a higher invisible and divine); the mystical heaven = the inaccessible light of the divine Majesty (Lucifer, Isaiah 14:13, ‘I will ascend into heaven’); the three kinds of supernatural vision = three heavens (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12, on Paul's rapture, 2 Cor. 12). ‘The heaven of heaven’ = the highest heaven.

All these things we have recounted to the end that it might be plain that nowhere in the sacred writings is a certain number of the heavens delivered, and that those who posit more heavens than three—namely either nine or ten or eleven—do not contradict the sacred writings. Wherefore, since the Philosophers and Mathematicians conclude by manifest and necessary reasons that there are eight or nine or even more heavens, a Theologian and Interpreter of the sacred writings would certainly act very ignorantly—not to say foolishly—were he now to reject and condemn their opinion as contrary or foreign to divine Scripture.

Conclusion of Quaestio IV: Scripture nowhere fixes the number of the heavens; positing more than three (9, 10, 11) does not contradict it; the theologian would act foolishly to reject the astronomers' demonstrated conclusion as anti-scriptural.

QUESTION V. By what the heavens are moved—whether by Angels, or by themselves.

The fifth question of Book II.

That the heavens are moved not by themselves but by Angels, I cannot gather from the sacred writings so easily and evidently as it is established

by the consensus of very many and very great Philosophers and Theologians, and persuaded to me by many reasons. For that the celestial orbs are set in motion and ruled by divine reason and power, and are driven round perpetually not by their own force but by Angels (whom the Platonist philosophers called gods), was the concordant opinion of the Platonists, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. For since the heaven is a simple body and uniform in all its parts according to substance, it cannot move itself: for in it there cannot be distinctly marked off a part that moves and another part that is moved. Nor could any reason be given why the first heaven (if indeed it were moved by itself) should move from East to West rather than the contrary, or rather than from one pole toward the other: for since it is everywhere uniform and, in respect of all [its parts]...

That the heavens are moved not by themselves but by Angels—the concordant view of Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics (the Platonists calling the Angels ‘gods’). A simple, uniform body cannot move itself. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘nes’).

— p. 258 (PDF) · printed p. 217 —

...all its parts, as far as concerns substance, is utterly indifferent, it ought to be moved alike from any part and toward any part. For on account of these observed differences of motion in the heaven Aristotle argues, in the second book On the Heaven, that the heaven is animate, since in a simple body—and indeed in mind—if it were moved by itself, such differences of motion could by no means exist. What of this: that if the heaven moved itself, it would be reflected back upon itself and above its own proper operation? which, however, Aristotle holds in book 1 On the Soul to be so proper to an intelligent nature that he denies it can be attributed to any other parts of our soul besides the intellect. And indeed, what probable cause could be given why the heaven should be driven round perpetually in a circle, since by that motion it neither acquires anything for itself nor guards and preserves what it has? and why, when its course has once been completed and one entire revolution finished, it does not cease to move, but infinitely repeats and retraces the same course?

Aristotle, De Caelo 2 (the differences of celestial motion argue the heaven is animate) and De Anima 1 (self-reflection is proper to intellect alone). A self-moved, uniform heaven would have no reason to move E→W rather than otherwise, nor to keep repeating its circuit endlessly.

TO THIS add that whoever denies the heavens to be moved by Angels leaves, in truth, no remaining philosophical way and means by which it can be known and proved that Angels exist. For if the motion of the heaven is not the effect of an Angel, what other action or effect of an Angel can be brought forward, manifest and ascertained to us by the judgment of nature, of sense, or of reason, from which the nature of an Angel might be apprehended and demonstrated? Finally, since the whole sublunary world is ruled and governed by God by no other ordinary means—naturally manifest to us, at least—than by the motions and ministries of the heavens and the heavenly bodies, if the heaven be supposed to be moved not by some intelligent nature, but by its own force, naturally, of itself, there will plainly be nothing at hand by which it could be demonstrated by physical reasoning that sublunary things are governed by the care and providence of God: for whatever other arguments are wont, or even can, be brought forward to prove this, are either very slight and weak, or too particular and obscure and uncertain, unless they rest and are made firm upon this one as a presupposed foundation. And that this is so is shown by the fact that, among the philosophers, whoever denied that the heavens are moved by intelligences—but rather by chance, as Democritus and Epicurus, or by their own natural force and impulse, as Strato of Lampsacus, the disciple of Theophrastus—it is agreed that they thought there were no Angels, and removed all the providence of God from this world; whereas, on the contrary, those who believed these two things also held that the motion of the heavens proceeds from mind and reason.

If the heaven's motion is not an Angel's effect, no naturally evident sign of Angels remains; and since the sublunary world is ordinarily governed through the celestial motions, denying Angelic movers undermines the physical proof of divine providence. Democritus and Epicurus (chance) and Strato of Lampsacus (Theophrastus's disciple; natural force) denied Angelic movers, and so denied both Angels and providence.

NOR does Philosophy only, but Theology also, teach this. For it is the opinion of Dionysius the Areopagite and of Augustine and of the other Fathers, most approved by well-nigh all the scholastic Theologians, that God so administers this world by His providence that He rules the lowest things through the middle, and these through the highest; and likewise governs inferior bodies through superior, and these through spirits. It is also on the lips of all theologians that the Angels, as ministers of Divine providence, are, as it were, guardians and ke[epers] of provinces and kingdoms and of individual men...

Marginal gloss: "Dionysius Areopagita lib. de caelesti hierarchia." Pseudo-Dionysius (De caelesti hierarchia), Augustine, and others: God rules the lowest through the middle, these through the highest; inferior bodies through superior, and these through spirits. The Angels are guardians of provinces, kingdoms, and individual men. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘stodes’; signature E).

— p. 259 (PDF) · printed p. 218 —

...keepers and rulers set over them by God: how much more credible, therefore, is it that they preside over the motion of the heavens—on which depends the safety and soundness of sublunary things, and through which the care and administration of this world of ours is carried on? To persuade this opinion, some apply certain texts of Scripture: for they say that Scripture means this whenever it calls things ‘the powers of the heavens,’ as when it says in Matthew chapter 24, The powers of the heavens shall be moved, and when the Church sings, The powers of the heavens and of the heavens of heavens, and when Job, in chapter 9, delivers that those who bear up the world are bowed down before God. Now indeed, if the heaven after the day of judgment will rest wholly from the motion by which it is now driven round (as is generally the opinion of the Theologians), who does not see how much more congruous it is to this opinion, if the heaven be supposed to be moved not by itself but by Angels? For the continuation and perpetuation of local motion depends rather on the mover than on the thing moved: wherefore, if an Angel moves the heaven, since it moves

voluntarily and freely, it is not hard to understand how, after the day of judgment, the Angel by God's command no longer moving the heaven, there will be no motion of the heaven. But if the heaven were moved by its own force, from itself, the motion would be wholly natural to it, both by reason of the passive and of the active principle, and would attain the perfection of the heaven, and on that account the heaven would have a natural propensity to its own motion; wherefore it could not be deprived of it except miraculously and violently, and then it would lack a certain perfection naturally fitting and due to it. But it is incredible that in that most excellent and most perfect state of the world which will be after the day of judgment, anything—much less the chief parts of the world, the heaven and the stars—should remain imperfectly, violently, and against its own nature, and that for all eternity.

The Angels as God's appointed guardians and rulers. 'The powers of the heavens' (Matthew 24:29; the Church's hymn; Job 9:13). If the heaven's motion ceases after the Judgment (the common theological view), it accords far better that the heaven is moved by Angels than by itself, since otherwise its rest would be violent and contrary to nature forever.

QUESTION VI. Whether after the day of judgment the motion of the heaven will cease.

The sixth question of Book II.

BUT IN TRUTH it is worthy of inquiry whether—what is taken up by the Theologians and bandied about in the schools—the motion of the heaven will cease after the day of judgment. For my part I do not remember to have read this anywhere in the sacred writings as openly and properly delivered; yet I think it is indicated in them, neither obscurely nor in one place only. For this Isaiah signified, when in chapter 60 he says thus, Thy Sun shall go down no more, and thy Moon shall not decrease: which cannot come to pass unless those heavenly bodies are unmoved. The same one may argue from the words of John in the Apocalypse, chapter 10, where the Angel swears by Him that lives forever and ever That after the day of judgment and the resurrection of men time shall be no more: but time

cannot cease unless the motion of the heaven ceases—I speak of the time which is connatural to the heaven itself, and commonly known and used by all nations, and which is distinguished into years, months, days, and nights. For time taken universally and absolutely, which can be marked and noted in any motion and in the succession of any duration whatever, does not depen[d]...

Isaiah 60:20 (‘thy Sun shall go down no more, neither shall thy Moon decrease’); Apocalypse 10:6 (the Angel swears that ‘time shall be no longer’). Pererius distinguishes the time connatural to the heaven (years/months/days/nights) from time taken universally/absolutely. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘det’).

— p. 260 (PDF) · printed p. 219 —

...depend on the motion of the heaven, and, this being taken away, it can be engaged and continue either in the motion of human bodies after the resurrection, or in the mere duration and succession of human thoughts. To this, Paul teaches in plain words, in chapter 8 of the epistle to the Romans, that every bodily creature, devoid of reason, is made subject to vanity and given over to the bondage of corruption—not so much of its own accord as for the sake of man, to whose uses it is fitted by God—until man, putting off mortality, is clothed with immortality, no longer needing the ministries of creatures. And what the vanity is to which the bodily creature is subject—especially the heaven and the stars—Solomon declares at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiastes, affirming that this vanity is nothing else than vicissitude and changeableness: Vanity, he says, of vanities, and all is vanity; and, demonstrating by examples that this vanity is present not only in sublunary things but also in celestial, he straightway adds, The sun rises and sets, and returns to its place; and there, rising again, it wheels through the South and bends toward the North. But Paul in the same passage of the epistle to the Romans confirms that every creature is to be renewed after the example and likeness of man, and to be freed from all vanity and bondage of corruption. Therefore the heavens, after the day of judgment and the common resurrection, will have rest from all the motion

and ministry by which they serve this corruptible life. To this belongs what we adduced above from the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, that the sun, moon, and stars were created for the service of all nations: but after the day of judgment man will not need the ministry of celestial motion; therefore then there will be no use of their motion.

Romans 8:20–21; Ecclesiastes 1:2,5–6 (vanity = changeableness; the sun rising and setting); Deuteronomy 4:19. After the Judgment, the heavens rest from all the motion and ministry that served this corruptible life.

BUT the Philosophers press us most of all with this argument, that circular motion is proper and natural to the heaven, as Aristotle argues by many reasons in the first book On the Heaven: for if it is not natural to the heaven, what other motion will be natural to the heaven? for it cannot be said that the heaven has no motion proper to it and fitting to it according to nature, since nature is defined as the principle of motion in that in which it is, and no natural body can exist of which there is not some natural motion. If, then, circular motion is natural to the heaven, the heaven assuredly has a natural propensity to it; wherefore its privation will be violent to the heaven, taking away from it its natural perfection. This objection the blessed Thomas, in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 48 (the same doctrine of which place is set down in the additions to the Third Part, question 91, article 2), thus resolves: that in the present state of generation and corruption circular motion belongs to the perfection of the heaven, because through it the heaven is the cause of the generation and conservation of all sublunary things, by which efficiency it is likened to God; but after the day of judgment, this state of the world being taken away and another, unchangeable and incorruptible state brought in, circular motion will not belong to the perfection of the heaven—nay, it would be superfluous, and [most alien] to that state...

Marginal glosses: "Argumentatio Philosophorum, qua illi probari putaverunt motum caeli nunquam cessaturum"; "Solutio praedictae argumentationis secundum Sanctum Thomam." Aristotle, De Caelo 1 (circular motion proper and natural to the heaven). Aquinas, In IV Sent. dist. 48 (= Supplementum q.91 a.2). The print reads 'immutabili et corruptibili,' evidently an error for 'incorruptibili.' Sentence

continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tui’).

...most alien to that state. Just as also to generate and be generated, to be nourished and to grow, are reckoned to be according to the nature of man now leading a corruptible life; but to the nature of man, made after the resurrection immortal and impassible, these same things would not only not be consonant, but even most repugnant. Others have given out that circular motion before the day of judgment is natural to the heaven, but after the day of judgment not motion but rest will be natural to the heaven. But anyone even moderately schooled in the maxims and doctrines of Philosophy will hardly bring himself to believe this. For if the nature of the heaven is one and the same before and after the day of judgment, it cannot have but one natural inclination, and toward one thing; nor can it be that, the same nature remaining, the same natural propensity and perfection do not also remain.

Aquinas's answer, compared to generation/nutrition (natural to man now, repugnant to the risen impassible body). The view that motion is natural before and rest natural after the Judgment is hard to accept, since one and the same nature has but one natural inclination.

I myself think thus: granting the renovation of the world, and that change which Theology teaches will be after the day of judgment, it is very agreeable to reason that the heaven of itself and intrinsically has no natural propensity to circular motion; for if it had, I for my part do not see how, deprived of that motion, it would not lack a perfection naturally fitting to it, and be in an imperfect and violent condition. What then? I judge that the heaven has only a certain natural aptitude for such motion: both because, on account of the round figure which it has, it is naturally fit for circular motion, as appears in spheres of stone, of wood, or of bronze; and because it has nothing in itself repugnant to circular motion—which repugnance all sublunary bodies have, even round ones, for all are either heavy or light, whereas the heaven by nature lacks all gravity and levity. Wherefore, both on account of the natural roundness of the heaven, and on account of its

nature wholly devoid of gravity and levity, the heaven is truly said to have a natural aptitude for circular motion, and such motion can in a manner be called natural to the heaven; by which reasoning, too, it can be gathered and concluded that, if the heaven has no natural repugnance to circular motion, its nature is far different from the nature of the four elements and of all sublunary things, which not only have no natural propensity to circular motion, but, on account of the gravity or levity implanted in them, have even a natural repugnance to it. Nor do Avicenna, Albert, Scotus, and Durandus seem to disagree with us, whose opinion was that circular motion is neither natural nor violent to the heaven, but that, as a surface stands to color and its privation, so the heaven stands to circular motion and its privation. Certainly, since between the mover and the thing moved there is a natural proportion, if circular motion, in respect of the Angel that moves the heaven, is not natural but voluntary, and, as they say in the schools, contingent and indifferent to either alternative, it was not fitting that it should be necessary and natural in respect of the heaven. This too the best reasoning of the Divine wisdom and providence demands: that, since God had from all eternity determined that the heaven should, during the gene[ration]...

Marginal gloss: "Probabilior solutio ex Auctoris sententia, quod caelum re vera non habeat intrinsecam et naturalem propensionem ad motum tanquam ad suam perfectionem." Pererius's own view: the heaven has only a natural aptitude for circular motion (from its round figure and its lack of gravity/levity), not a natural propensity to it as to its perfection; the motion is, with respect to the moving Angel, voluntary and contingent. Avicenna, Albert, Scotus, Durandus agreed. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘neratio’).

— p. 262 (PDF) · printed p. 221 —

...generation of men, be moved round in a circle, but, the resurrection having taken place, should rest forever from all motion, the heaven should be made and constituted of such a nature that it was equally fit to receive motion and rest, and that it was violent to it neither to be driven round in a circle nor to be deprived of that motion. But as for what some have said—that the consummation of the world will not be until, the proper

revolutions of all the heavens being completed, all the stars return to the same position which they once had at the beginning of the world, when they were created by God—this is refuted by a twofold argument. For to very many learned men it is made highly probable, and Copernicus proved by mathematical and (as he himself believes) indubitable reasons, that the motions of the celestial orbs are utterly incommensurable with one another, so that they can neither all ever be completed at once, nor can the stars return to the same position which they once held. Next, the proper motion of the eighth heaven from west to east cannot be completed in less than thirty-six thousand years, if indeed Ptolemy is to be believed: but it is not credible that, scarcely six thousand years having been completed from the founding of the world until now, there should still remain, even now, up to the day of judgment, thirty thousand years—especially since sacred Scripture plainly teaches that our Lord was made incarnate in the last age of the world and in the last days, and Paul says, In the end of the ages, and even, as John says, In the last hour. Nor indeed ought it to seem absurd that on the day of judgment the motion of the eighth heaven should be cut short before its whole orb-circuit is once completed: for the motion of the heaven, as we showed a little above, does not attain its perfection, nor has the heaven a natural and proper propensity to it; nor was it instituted by God chiefly for the heaven's sake—namely, that through it either what the heaven lacks might be acquired or what is in it preserved—but for the sake of the generation of men, and especially of the elect, which being completed on the day of judgment, celestial motion would surely be plainly idle and superfluous if it were prolonged further.

Marginal glosses: "An omnium caelorum proprii motus ante diem iudicii absolvendi sint"; "Copernici opinio de motu orbium caelestium"; "1.Corin.10"; "1.Ioan.2." Against the view that the world will not end until all the heavens complete their revolutions and the stars return to their original positions: (1) Copernicus proved by sure mathematical reasons that the orbs' motions are utterly incommensurable; (2) the eighth heaven's proper W→E motion takes 36,000 years (Ptolemy), and barely 6,000 have passed since creation, whereas Scripture says Christ came in the world's last age (1 Corinthians 10:11, ‘in the end of the ages’; 1 John 2:18, ‘in the last hour’). The heaven's motion exists for the sake of human generation, especially of the elect; once complete, it would be idle.

QUESTION VII. Whether the heavens and the stars are animate.

The seventh question of Book II.

It was indeed the opinion of very many and very great Philosophers that the heavenly bodies have soul and life: this, namely, the Pythagoreans held, this the Platonists, this the Aristotelians, this finally the Stoics. Plato in the Epinomis bids that the stars be honored and worshipped by us as celestial gods. Aristotle, in the second book On the Heaven, text 13, argues that because the heaven is animate, therefore the differences of position—that is, right and left, up and down, before and behind—are naturally in it. And in text 61 of the same book he affirms that those are deceived who think the stars to be inanimate, since they con[sist] of soul and life...

Marginal gloss: "Multorum opinio, caelos esse animatos." Very many great philosophers (Pythagoreans, Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics) held the heavenly bodies to have soul and life. Plato, Epinomis (the stars to be honored as celestial gods). Aristotle, De Caelo 2 (text 13: the heaven animate, hence the natural differences of position; text 61: those who think the stars inanimate are deceived). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'stent'; signature E 3).

— p. 263 (PDF) · printed p. 222 —

...they consist [of soul and life]. Philo, in his book On the Making of the World, and likewise in his book On Dreams, and in his book On the Giants, holds the stars to be both living and intelligent. What was Avicenna's view? That in the heaven there is a sentient soul endowed with an interior sense, which the Greeks call φανταση■α (imagination): which opinion seems not wholly to have displeased Simplicius, who assigns to the heaven not only an interior sense but also several of the exterior senses. For he, in his Commentaries on the fiftieth text of the first book On the Heaven, thinks that, besides taste and smell, three other senses—sight, hearing, and touch—are in the heavens. For when he had set forth the opinion of Alexander, who denied that the stars are sensitive—because the sensitive is found only where the vegetative is, as Aristotle teaches in the second book

On the Soul, wherefore the stars can be called animate only equivocally—Simplicius adds:

Philo (De opificio mundi; De somniis; De gigantibus) holds the stars living and intelligent. Avicenna: the heaven has a sentient soul with an interior sense, the Greek φαντασ■α (imagination). Simplicius (In De Caelo 1, on text 50) assigns the heaven three exterior senses (sight, hearing, touch). Alexander of Aphrodisias denied the stars sentient (the sensitive presupposes the vegetative, Aristotle De Anima 2); so they are animate only equivocally.

> *It is strange, he says, if the heaven is indeed sensible and tangible, but not sensitive—as though it were better for a body not to perceive than to perceive—that the baser bodies should have sense, but those which are the noblest of all and the most divine should lack all sense. Perhaps, then, it is not fitting to attribute to the heaven the material and most passive senses, such as taste and smell; but to grant it the others, the nobler and surer, is not absurd: for the heavenly bodies, touching one another, do not touch insensibly, and they behold all things, and hear all things. Thus Simplicius.*

Simplicius, In De Caelo 1 (commenting on text 50): the heaven, being the noblest body, should not lack the nobler senses (sight, hearing, touch).

BUT, leaving the philosophers, I come to the Ecclesiastical writers. Origen, in the first volume of his Commentaries on John, thinks the stars not only to be animate, but even capable of virtue and vice. For Job, in chapter 25, calls the stars unclean; wherefore Origen does not fear to say that Christ died not only for the sins of men, but also of the stars. And in the first book of On First Principles, chapter 7, he shows that the stars are living beings endowed with reason, which advance and fall back in virtues, and are bound to the ministry of celestial motion for the uses of men, from which ministry, however, they will rest after the day of judgment; and the same he confirms in the last homily on the book of Numbers. To the same point Jerome seems to look, at the beginning of his Commentaries on Ecclesiastes, in interpreting those words of Solomon about the sun, Whirling about, the spirit goes: for he says that the sun is called ‘spirit’

because it animates, inspires, and quickens; or because it is itself fed by spirit, as the Poet said:

Marginal gloss: "Origenes putavit caelos esse animatos et virtutis ac vitii capaces, quin etiam pro illis Christum esse mortuum." Origen (Comm. in Ioannem 1; Peri Archon / De principiis 1.7; Hom. in Numeros): the stars animate, capable of virtue and vice (Job 25:5, 'the stars are not clean'); Christ died even for the stars. Jerome (on Ecclesiastes 1:6, 'the spirit goes whirling about'): the sun called 'spirit.'

> *And the shining globe of the moon, and the Titanian stars, a Spirit within sustains.*

Virgil, Aeneid 6.725–726.

The blessed Augustine, in this question, was doubtful and uncertain. For in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 18, he raises this question, but passed it by untouched and unexplained. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 58, he says that it is not ascertained and certain to him whether the heavenly bodies have sense and mind, and belong to the society of the blessed Angels. Likewise, in the first book of the Retractations, chapters 5 and 11, he recalls and corrects what he had written in his book On the Immortality of the Soul, chapter 15, and what he had written in the sixth book On Music, chapter 14, that the world is animate and a great [living being]...

Marginal gloss: "Augustinus de caelis utrum sint animati, dubitanter velut suspensa sententia loquitur." Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.18 (raises but leaves the question); Enchiridion 58; Retractationes 1.5 & 1.11 (correcting De immortalitate animae 15 and De musica 6.14, where he had called the world an animate 'great animal'). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'magnum').

— p. 264 (PDF) · printed p. 223 —

...a great living being: this, I say, Augustine corrects, not as false, but as rashly said, since it had been ascertained and grasped by him neither to be so nor not to be so. For as to what is written in the book On the Knowledge of the True Life (which is contained in the ninth volume of Augustine's

works), chapter 6—Those who reckon the heavenly bodies to be rational, or at least sensible, bodies are rightly, as lacking sense, counted among irrational things—this ought not to move us at all, since it is more certain than certain that the author of that book is not Augustine. And in the thirteenth book of The City of God, chapter 16, he delivers that it is not to be conceded outright to Plato that the heavenly bodies are living, intelligent, and blessed, and that the world is a great living being; yet he adds that a question of this kind is to be discussed in another place. Aureolus, as Capreolus reports in the second book of the Sentences, thought it probable that the stars are animate; nor indeed does Scotus seem to deny it, since in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, question 1, he says, If the stars are not animate, that will be believed rather than demonstrated. The blessed Thomas, in his Disputed Questions, the question On the Soul, article 8, and in the Opusculum On the Angels, chapter 2, and in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 70, from the meaning of Aristotle and—as his words sound—also from his own, demonstrates that the heavens are truly animate with an intelligent soul. Cajetan, in explaining those words of David in Psalm 135, Who made the heavens in understanding, says these words can be so taken that it is signified that the heavens were made by God with understanding, that is, un[derstanding]...

Augustine corrects himself (not as false but rashly said). The De cognitione verae vitae (in his works, tom. 9) is spurious; De civ. Dei 13.16 (one need not at once concede to Plato that the stars are living and blessed). Aureolus (in Capreolus, In II Sent.) and Scotus (In II Sent. d.14 q.1); Aquinas (Quaest. disp. de Anima a.8; De spiritualibus creaturis [Opusc. de Angelis] 2; SCG 2.70) holds the heavens animate with an intelligent soul; Cajetan on Psalm 135[136]:5 (‘Qui fecit caelos in intellectu’). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘telligentes’).

...understanding, according to the opinion of the Philosophers who judged the heavenly bodies to be endowed with life and intellect. To these is added that the Church, in the preface of the sacred Canon, celebrates God with these words: Through whom the Angels praise thy majesty, the Dominations adore, the Powers tremble; the heavens and the powers of the

heavens, and the blessed Seraphim, with shared exultation celebrate together. And Cajetan, in his treatise On Indulgences, thinks that ‘the powers of the heavens’ are called their souls. For if the heavens are moved by the Angels only from without, it would have been enough to have said ‘the Angels praise’; nor would there be any reason why, if ‘the powers of the heavens’ signified the natural forces and faculties which the heavens have, the heavenly bodies should be recounted by the Church in the commemoration of the Angelic orders—such as the Angels, Powers, Dominations, and Seraphim; nor was there any reason why the heavens should be commemorated distinctly, and the powers of the heavens separately from them, since by the name of ‘heaven’ we are wont to signify and understand both its substance and its natural properties, forces, and other endowments.

The Preface of the Mass (‘...the heavens and the powers of the heavens, and the blessed Seraphim...’). Cajetan (Tract. de Indulgentiis) takes ‘the powers of the heavens’ to mean the souls of the heavens.

But in truth this reasoning of Cajetan is very weak: for ‘that the heavens were made in understanding,’ by the Hebrew idiom, signifies that they were made by God with supreme art, reason, and understanding; for among the Hebrews it is frequent to say ‘in something’ for ‘by something’ or ‘with something,’ taking ‘in’ for ‘by’ or ‘with.’ And ‘the powers of the heavens’ are called the Angels who move them: for when he had first named the Angels by a general word, he straightway distinctly and properly mentions the Powers, the Dominations, the Sera[phim]...

Pererius's rebuttal: ‘the heavens made in understanding’ (Psalm 135) is a Hebrew idiom = made by God with supreme art, reason, and understanding (Hebrew ‘in’ = ‘by/with’); ‘the powers of the heavens’ = the Angels who move them. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Sera’).

— p. 265 (PDF) · printed p. 224 —

...Seraphim, and the movers and rulers of the heavens; or by ‘the powers of the heavens’ are signified the heavenly bodies themselves, in which all the force and power of the heavens consists and is in vigor: for Aristotle too, in

the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, makes the stars the ends of the celestial orbs.

‘The powers of the heavens’ = the movers and rulers of the heavens, or the heavenly bodies themselves. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12 (the stars as the ends of the celestial orbs).

NEVERTHELESS, the opinion contrary to this one seems far more probable, and much more congruous with Theological and Ecclesiastical doctrine. That the stars are certainly not animate is held by Basil in homily 3 on Genesis, and by Ambrose in the second book of the Hexameron, chapter 4. Cyril, in the third book against Julian, affirms that the opinion of Plato—that the heavens are endowed with life and reason—is contrary not only to Christians but also to the Philosophers; and the same Damascene reckons, as a certain dogma of Christian teaching, in his second book, chapter 6. Lactantius, in the fifth chapter of his second book, excellently refutes those who argued that the stars have soul and reason from their most beautiful disposition and the constancy of their motion. This too Basil confirms in his commentary on Psalm 48. And Jerome, in his 59th Epistle to Avitus, reckons this also among the errors of Origen: for thus he writes, He holds that the sun also and the moon and the rest of the stars are animate; nay, that, just as we men, on account of certain sins, are encompassed with these bodies which are gross and sluggish, so also the luminaries of the heaven received such or such bodies, that they might shine more or less; and that the demons, on account of greater faults, are clothed with an aerial body.

Marginal gloss: "Verior sententia, caelos intrinsecus et secundum substantiam non esse animatos." The contrary (truer) view—the stars are not animate: Basil (Hom. 3 in Gen.), Ambrose (Hexaem. 2.4), Cyril (Contra Iulianum 3), Damascene (De fide 2.6), Lactantius (Div. inst. 2.5). Jerome (Ep. 59 ad Avitum) lists this among Origen's errors.

And in the thirteenth book of his Commentaries on Isaiah, explaining those words in chapter 45, My hand stretched out the heavens, and I commanded all their host, he noted that these words gave to some an occasion of erring, so that they supposed the sun and the stars to have reason. Thus Jerome

there says: That which is written, I have commanded all the stars, gave occasion to some to think that the stars are rational and have soul and sense. For, they say, He would not command save things that understand—not remembering what is written in Jonah, The Lord commanded the burning wind; and again, He commanded the morning worm; and that in the Gospel the Savior rebuked the winds and the sea, in which it is plain that there is no sense and reason. Thus Jerome. It might perhaps seem to someone that Jerome, in the two aforesaid passages, condemned not so much the opinion of those who say the stars are animate, as either the reason which Origen gave why the Angels were assigned to animating the stars (namely, on account of sins previously committed), or the reasoning by which some ineptly confirmed that opinion. And as for the testimony adduced above from Jerome's commentary on the first chapter of Ecclesiastes, it by no means establishes the animation of the sun, since Jerome there sets down a twofold interpretation why the sun is called ‘spirit’: either because it is truly animated and quickened by a life-giving spirit, according to those verses of Virgil mentioned above; or because by its motion and light it breathes and infuses life into all things.

Marginal glosses: "Iona 4"; "Lucae 8." Jerome (In Isaiam 13, on Isaiah 45:12): God's ‘commanding’ the host of heaven gave occasion to error—but He also commanded the burning wind and the worm (Jonah 4:8, 4:7), and the Savior rebuked the winds and sea (Luke 8:24). Pererius notes Jerome may condemn only Origen's reason (the stars ensouled for prior sins), and that the Ecclesiastes text does not assert the sun's animation.

— p. 266 (PDF) · printed p. 225 —

Saint Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 14, did not hesitate to call the opinion of those who say the stars are animate false and erroneous, and indeed most deservedly. For if the souls of the stars are Angels, surely the stars ought to be honored and worshipped by us: both because their souls would be not only holy but also blessed; and also because we religiously honor the bodies of blessed men, such as Peter and Paul, which yet are now neither quickened nor animated by their most

blessed souls. And that the souls of the heavens (if indeed the heavens have souls) are wholly blessed, Augustine plainly teaches in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 28, when he says, Some Angels having, by impious pride, forsaken God, and having been cast down from the heavenly habitation on high into the lowest gloom of this air, the remaining number of the Angels persevered in eternal blessedness and holiness with God. Although in the 58th chapter of the same book he seems to speak doubtfully on the matter, when he says, But neither do I hold this for certain, whether the Sun and Moon and all the heavenly bodies belong to the same society—although to some they seem to be luminous bodies, not endowed with sense or intelligence. But that no honor and worship is to be shown by us to the stars, God plainly teaches us through Moses, in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy: Lest perhaps, He says, lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of heaven, and, deceived by error, adore and worship them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven. And by these words Moses implies that the stars are not to be adored and worshipped by us, because they are inferior to us in condition of nature and in dignity—namely, created by God for the service and use of man.

Marginal gloss: "Si astra essent animata, praecipuo quodam cultu honore colenda venerandaque essent." Bonaventure (In II Sent. d.14) rightly calls the animate-stars view false and erroneous (else we must worship the stars). Augustine, Enchiridion 28 (and 58, doubtful). God forbids any worship of the stars (Deuteronomy 4:19): they are inferior to us, made for man's service.

TO THIS: either the souls of the heavenly bodies are naturally blessed (but neither grace nor glory can be natural to any save God), or they are blessed by God's grace and gift; either, then, they were created blessed (which is against the common opinion of the theologians, and was granted to no creature save the soul of Christ), or they were made such that they could either obtain blessedness by meriting well, or lose it by sinning—they could, therefore, sin. Come, let us grant that they sinned: for if what is possible be posited as existing, as the philosophers teach, nothing absurd or impossible ought to follow. I ask, what would have been done with them if

they had sinned? Would those souls have remained in their orbs? But it is not credible that, all the other evil Angels having been cast down from heaven into hell, those souls remained in heaven; and indeed, heaven is not the place of the damned. But if those souls too had been thrust down from heaven, what then would become of the celestial orbs which they animated? Would they too have been cast down from their place below? Or would they have remained in their place, but inanimate? Or would God have implanted other souls in them? But how improbable and absurd all these things are, everyone sees. But to these someone might perhaps reply: that the souls of the heavens could indeed have sinned in the beginning, if their nature and freedom of will be considered in itself; that God, however, fore[knew]...

The dilemma: the souls of the heavenly bodies are either naturally blessed (impossible) or blessed by God's gift; either created blessed (against the common view, granted to no creature but Christ's soul) or able to merit/lose blessedness, hence able to sin—from which absurdities follow. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘sciuisse’; signature F).

— p. 267 (PDF) · printed p. 226 —

...foreknew that they would by no means sin, and preordained that they should never sin, by bestowing on them efficacious grace, with which, having used it well in their beginning, they were thereafter confirmed in grace; and that they are not now blessed, but until the day of judgment are in the state of meriting, and by the continual revolution of their orbs (which they most gladly perform for the obedience of God and the love of the elect) ever more and more merit eternal felicity. And so what the holy Fathers have handed down concerning Enoch and Elijah—who until the day of judgment await their beatitude and daily merit it—the same might be said of the souls of the heavens. But in the whole foregoing argument it is laid down as certain that the souls of the heavens were not made any while before they animated and quickened the heavens, just as the rational soul is not created before it informs the human body; for it is against the nature of a natural form (as Aristotle teaches in book 12 of the

Metaphysics, text 16) that it should at any time precede that of which it is the form.

A hypothetical reply (continuing from p.225): God foreknew the souls of the heavens would not sin and gave them efficacious grace; they are not yet blessed but in a state of meriting until the Judgment, like Enoch and Elijah. But the argument assumes the souls were not made before they animated the heavens (as the rational soul is not made before it informs the body; Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, text 16).

But that reasoning presses more forcibly: if the Angel is the soul of the heaven, then circular motion will be intrinsically and of itself natural, not only to the heaven but also to the Angel which is its soul, and will belong to its perfection: for just as the perfection of inanimate bodies is rather in rest than in motion, so, on the contrary, the perfection of animate ones is more in motion than in rest; and this is the more true the more perfect a soul and motion each thing has. Wherefore, after the day of judgment, the cessation of celestial motion would be violent, and would befall both the heaven and the Angel against the nature and perfection of both.

The stronger objection: if the Angel is the soul of the heaven, circular motion belongs to the Angel-soul's perfection (animate bodies are perfected in motion); so the post-Judgment cessation of motion would be violent to both heaven and Angel.

Nor indeed is that reasoning of the blessed Thomas without weight, which he employs in the First Part, question 70, article 3, to prove that the heaven is truly not animate—wisely correcting the earlier opinion which he had followed in other writings: The union, he says, of form with matter does not come about for the sake of matter, for matter is for the sake of form, not, conversely, form for the sake of matter. Such an association and coupling, therefore, comes about chiefly for the sake of the form, namely that the form, by the partnership and, as it were, the support of matter, may better exercise its action and more easily attain its proper perfection. But of the Angel that moves the heaven there are two actions, to understand and to move: the former is interior to the Angel and more proper and more perfect, and for performing it duly it has no need of a celestial body; for the

Angel does not, as our mind uses the ministry of the bodily senses for understanding, use any helps of the heaven to fulfill the functions of its mind, nor can it be aided by them. But for moving the heaven the union of the Angel with the celestial orb, as of form with matter, is not necessary: for it is enough that it be present to the heaven only as a mover to a movable, fitted and joined to it by the application of power and by contact. I am not unaware that some have met this reasoning thus: that celestial motion would be better if it were produced by an internal principle [than by an external]...

Marginal gloss: "Notabilis B. Thomae argumentatio." Aquinas, ST I q.70 a.3 (correcting his earlier view that the heaven is animate): the form-matter union is for the form's sake; but the Angel that moves the heaven needs no body for understanding, and for moving needs only to be present as mover to movable (by application of power and contact), not as form to matter. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘interno’).

— p. 268 (PDF) · printed p. 227 —

...by an internal principle than by an external, and that the condition of the heaven would be more excellent if it were moved by itself than if it were turned about by another by an external force and agitation: for what is moved by itself is nobler (on Aristotle's authority, in book 8 of the Physics) than what is set in motion from without by another. But, granting that what these men say be better in respect of the heaven or of celestial motion, yet it would not be better in respect of the Angel; nay, it would make its condition far worse: for the Angel would have to be a form and part of the heaven, and an imperfect substance, in no way separable from the celestial body. Wherefore it must not be ventured that, while we wish to exalt the dignity of the heaven and of celestial motion beyond measure, we ineptly diminish that excellence of nature which most befits the Angel.

Some objected that an internally-moved heaven would be nobler (Aristotle, Physics 8: the self-moved is nobler than the externally moved). But even if better for the heaven, it would be far worse for the Angel, which would become an imperfect form inseparable from the heaven. We must not exalt the heaven at the cost of the Angel's dignity.

FURTHERMORE, that Aristotle too was of the same opinion, the things which he himself wrote in book 8 of the Physics and in book 12 of the Metaphysics certainly do not allow me to doubt. For he teaches that the intelligences are perfect and absolute substances, utterly indivisible and set outside magnitude; and that, though they turn the orbs about with everlasting motion, they themselves are moved neither of themselves nor by accident; that they are pure acts, devoid of all potency; and that their doctrine belongs properly to Metaphysics, which contemplates things wholly separated from matter. But these things in no way agree with the intelligences if they are posited as natural forms and the true souls of the heavens: for then they would be imperfect substances, inherent in bodies and in no way separable from them; nor would they be pure acts, void of all potency; nor could they but be moved along with the motion of their orbs, at least by accident; and finally, their treatment would not belong to Metaphysics, which is engaged above all with things separated from every concretion of matter—not only in thought and reason, but also in reality itself.

Marginal gloss: "Aristoteli intelligentiae non sunt, proprie loquendo, animae et formae substantiales caelorum." Aristotle (Physics 8; Metaphysics 12): the intelligences are perfect, indivisible, magnitude-less, unmoved (per se or per accidens), pure acts void of potency, the subject of Metaphysics—none of which fits if they are natural forms and true souls of the heavens.

QUESTION VIII. Whether the stars are innumerable to us.

In the preface's list of ten questions, the number of the fixed stars was the tenth; in the running text Pererius numbers this question the eighth (the questions on the stars' heat and on whether they are fixed in their orbs are not treated as separate numbered questions here).

Concerning the stars, indeed, a great dispute could be stirred up between the Astronomers and the students of the sacred writings: whether their multitude (I speak of the fixed stars shining in the eighth heaven with a marvelous arrangement and splendor) is so great that it is altogether innumerable to mortals, or, on the contrary, is defined by some certain number—and that not at all a very great one—and can be ascertained and

explored by us without enormous study and labor. Pliny, in book 2, chapter 41, makes seventy-two celestial signs, which are the figures of things or of living creatures, into which, he says, the skilled have distributed the heaven, and in these he notes one thousand six hundred notable stars—notable, that is, in their effect and to the sight. But the more learned in Astronomy, from Ptolemy and Hipparchus onward, have ascertained that all the fixed stars notable to the sight are only one thousand and twenty-two; nor indeed do these men deny that there are other, very [many]...

Marginal gloss: "Numerus stellarum inerrantium visu notabilium, et imaginum caelestium, secundum Astrologos." The dispute: are the fixed stars innumerable, or fixed at a definite (not very large) number? Pliny (Nat. Hist. 2.41) counts 72 celestial signs with 1,600 notable stars; the more learned, since Ptolemy and Hipparchus, found the visible fixed stars to be just 1,022. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘quam’).

— p. 269 (PDF) · printed p. 228 —

...other stars, very many, smallest in form, conspicuous to our eyes only indistinctly in their light and brightness—such as the innumerable multitude of stars (if indeed they are stars) which produce the brightness and splendor of the Milky Way. And although to the common people—and even to anyone who, at first glance, looks up at the multitude of the stars—it may seem incredible that there are no more than one thousand and twenty-two stars in the heaven (which happens for this reason, that men gaze at them confusedly, without any order or distinction), yet if anyone has the aforesaid number of stars depicted on some globe, and properly compares those stars one by one with those that are seen in the heaven, he will assuredly find none in the heaven which he does not have expressed on the globe; nay, even the smallest marked on the globe he will scarcely discern by sight in the heaven.

The astronomers do not deny there are very many tiny stars, only indistinctly visible—such as the innumerable multitude (if they are stars) that make up the Milky Way's brightness. Though it seems incredible there are only 1,022 stars, this is because men gaze confusedly; one who compares a catalogued globe star-by-star with the heaven finds none in the heaven not on the globe.

The aforesaid one thousand and twenty-two stars the Astronomers had reduced to forty-eight images or figures or constellations, which by the order and arrangement of the stars render the likeness of some animal or other thing. They also reduced the variety of these same stars—shining more or less—to six differences: the first contains fifteen stars of the first magnitude (as they call it); the second, forty-five of the second magnitude; the third, two hundred and eight of the third magnitude; the fourth, four hundred and seventy-four of the fourth magnitude; the fifth, two hundred and seventeen of the fifth magnitude; the sixth, forty-nine of the sixth magnitude. The sum of all these, with five besides which they call nebulous and nine which are called obscure, makes up the aforesaid number of one thousand and twenty-two stars. And each one of them is larger than the earth: for those of the sixth magnitude—that is, the smallest of all—have a magnitude eighteen times greater than is the magnitude of the globe of earth and water.

Marginal gloss: "Sex differentiae stellarum quae sunt in octavo caelo." The 1,022 stars reduced to 48 constellation-figures, and by brightness into six magnitudes: 1st = 15; 2nd = 45; 3rd = 208; 4th = 474; 5th = 217; 6th = 49; plus 5 nebulous and 9 obscure—totalling 1,022. Each is larger than the earth; even the smallest (6th magnitude) are 18× the bulk of the globe of earth and water.

Nor indeed do the Mathematicians will only that the number of all the stars in the heaven be ascertained, but, daring greater and almost incredible things, they demonstrate that, if the whole concave face of the firmament were everywhere full of stars of the first magnitude, it could be known how great their number would be; for by necessary reasoning it is concluded that they would be 71,209,600—that is, seventy-one millions (as they commonly call them), and two hundred and nine thousand, and six hundred more. So that even by this argument it may be understood that the stars now in the heaven (separated, namely, by such great spaces) and those beyond the Tropic of Capricorn toward the antarctic pole (which indeed are very few) are not, as the common people think, innumerable. And this is the opinion of the Astronomers concerning the number of the fixed stars.

Marginal gloss: "Si octavum caelum totum esset plenum stellis primae magnitudinis, quantus earum numerus esset futurus." The mathematicians compute that, were the whole firmament packed with first-magnitude stars, their number would be exactly 71,209,600—showing the actual stars (widely separated, few beyond the Tropic of Capricorn) are not innumerable.

BUT IN TRUTH, an opinion of this kind seems contrary to the sacred writings, since divine Scripture in many places plainly indicates that the stars of heaven cannot be numbered by man. For in chapter 15 of the book of Genesis God promised Abraham that He would multiply his posterity like the stars of heaven and the sand of the sea: For God led Abraham forth (namely, by night and under a most serene sky), says the Scripture, and said to him, Look up [to heaven]...

Marginal gloss: "Videri secundum doctrinam sacrae Scripturae et Patrum, necnon et Philosophorum, stellas esse innumerabiles." Genesis 15:5 (God led Abraham outside by night under a clear sky). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Suspice’).

— p. 270 (PDF) · printed p. 229 —

...Look up to heaven and number the stars if you can: so shall your seed be. Now Abraham was, as Josephus and Eusebius hand down, even then most skilled in astronomy, inasmuch as he had learned it from the Chaldeans—among whom he had been born, brought up, and spent many years—men who were, by the consent of all, easily the chiefs of that science; and Abraham, on Josephus's authority, taught that doctrine to the Egyptians. Nor can this saying of God be referred to the stars toward the antarctic, which it is agreed are very few, and which Abraham could not have beheld from the land of Canaan where he then was; nor to the stars of the Milky Way, as those which the sight cannot discern and distinguish—and indeed the Milky Way does not consist of stars, but is a certain part of the heaven somewhat denser, faintly shining. Nor does that interpretation avail here, that God here spoke according to the sense and estimation of the common people: for He was not speaking to the common people, but to Abraham, a wise man and skilled in astronomy. Next, Moses in the tenth chapter of Deuteronomy said to the Hebrew people, The Lord

thy God has multiplied thee like the stars of heaven. But it is established from the book of Numbers that the number of the Hebrews at that time—of those alone who, being past the twentieth year, could go to war—was six hundred thousand and more. To this, Jeremiah in chapter 33 has it thus, As the stars of heaven cannot be numbered, nor the sand of the sea measured, so will I multiply the seed of David my servant. What of this, that Scripture proclaims, as something singular and excellent and incomprehensible to man, that all the stars are numbered by God? For thus David sings in Psalm 146, Who numbers the multitude of the stars, and calls them all by name.

Genesis 15:5 (‘Look up... and number the stars’). Abraham, per Josephus and Eusebius, most skilled in astronomy (learned from the Chaldeans, princes of the science; he taught it to the Egyptians). The promise cannot mean the few antarctic stars (invisible from Canaan), nor the Milky Way (not stars, but a denser, faintly-luminous part of heaven); nor was God speaking ‘to the vulgar.’ Deuteronomy 10:22; Numbers (600,000+ warriors over twenty); Jeremiah 33:22; Psalm 146[147]:4 (‘Who numbers the multitude of the stars and calls them all by name’).

This same thing Basil delivers in homily 6 on Genesis, and Eusebius in book 7 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 5. But Augustine, in book 16 of The City of God, chapter 23, affirms that the aforesaid opinion of the Astronomers is to be rejected; for thus he writes: The stars cannot be numbered, because it is not to be believed that all of them can even be seen: for the more keenly anyone gazes, the more he sees. Whence it is rightly judged that some are hidden even from the sharpest-sighted—excepting those heavenly bodies which are said to rise and set in some part of the world most remote from us. Lastly, whoever boast of having comprehended and written down the whole number of the stars, such as Aratus or Eudoxus, or any others there be, the authority of this book scorns them. Thus Augustine.

Basil (Hom. 6 in Gen.); Eusebius (Praep. ev. 7.5). Augustine (De civ. Dei 16.23) rejects the astronomers' view: not all the stars can even be seen (the keener the eye, the more it sees; some hidden even from the sharpest sight; some rise and set in a part of the world most remote from us); the authority of Genesis scorns those (Aratus, Eudoxus) who boast of cataloguing all the stars.

Nor only do the Sacred writings seem to contradict the Astronomers, but the Philosophers also: for Aristotle, in his book On the World, to Alexander, and in book 2 On the Heaven, text 61, says that the number of the fixed stars cannot be reached by mortals; Plato writes something similar in the Timaeus. Seneca likewise, in book 6 of the Natural Questions, chapter 16, denies that the number of such stars can be found.

Aristotle (De Mundo ad Alexandrum; De Caelo 2, text 61): the number of the fixed stars cannot be reached by mortals; likewise Plato (Timaeus); Seneca (Naturales quaestiones 7.16, here cited as book 6) denies the number can be found.

It might perhaps be said in defense of the Astronomers that Augustine speaks not of the stars conspicuous and notable to the sight, whose number alone the Astronomers give, but universally of all the stars that are in the heaven, whether visible to men or invisible—whose total number, that it cannot be held by men, the Astronomers will not deny: for how can they know the number of those stars which neither by sight nor by any other [means]...

Marginal gloss: "Defensio opinionis Astrologorum." In defense of the astronomers: Augustine may speak not of the conspicuous, notable stars (whose number alone the astronomers give), but universally of all stars, visible or invisible—whose total the astronomers themselves admit cannot be held by men. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘nec alia’; signature F 3).

— p. 271 (PDF) · printed p. 230 —

...nor know for certain by any other means? This too could be said for the Astronomers: that the number of the fixed stars was not carefully investigated or ascertained before the age of Hipparchus and Aratus—that is, until the Astronomers, by a marvelous artifice, arranged all the stars into certain images and figures; so that it is no wonder that, before that so diligent and artful observation of the Astronomers, the number of the stars was unknown to men, or even reckoned incomprehensible; and that for this cause the Scripture of the Old Testament speaks of the stars in many places as though innumerable. There are not yet a thousand and five hundred years, says Seneca, in book 7 of the Natural Questions, chapter 25, since

Greece gave the stars both numbers and names. But Seneca would have said more truly that not even seven hundred years had passed up to his own age since the Greeks received the science of the stars. For Thales, the first in Greece, who flourished about the fiftieth Olympiad, is reported to have observed some things in the stars and to have handed down those observations. Yet that men of old, even before the times of Moses, had some knowledge of celestial figures of this kind, the book of Job demonstrates, in whose ninth chapter it stands thus, Who makes Arcturus, and Orion, and the Hyades, and the inner parts of the South; and afterward, in chapter 38, Wilt thou be able to join together the shining stars of the Pleiades, or canst thou scatter the circle of Arcturus? Dost thou bring forth Lucifer in its time, and make Vesper to rise over the sons of the earth?

A further defense of the astronomers: the stars' number was not investigated before Hipparchus and Aratus arranged the constellations, so the Old Testament speaks of them ‘as innumerable.’ Seneca (Naturales quaestiones 7.25: not yet 1,500 years since Greece named the stars—Pererius corrects to under 700; Thales flourished ~50th Olympiad). Yet Job knew the constellations before Moses (Job 9:9; 38:31–32: the Pleiades, Arcturus, Lucifer/the morning star, Vesper/the evening star).

QUESTION IX. Whether the stars move of themselves, the orbs being unmoved—as birds through the air—or are moved only by the motion of their orbs.

The ninth question of Book II.

And God made two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; and the stars: and God set them in the firmament of heaven, that they might shine upon the earth.

Genesis 1:16–17 — the scriptural lemma for this question (printed marginal heading: GENES. CAPVT 1. VERS. 16. & 17.).

MOSES delivers in this place that God set the heavenly bodies in the firmament of heaven: which has a doubtful meaning. For it can be understood that the heavenly bodies are fixed in the heaven as somewhat denser and thicker parts of it, cohering with it and continuous with it—just

such, indeed, as the knots are in some board—so that the heavenly bodies are not moved by their own proper motions, but are turned only by the motion of the heaven whose parts they are. It can also be understood that the heavenly bodies are placed in the heaven not as cohering with and affixed to it, but because [by God's command]...

Moses says God set the heavenly bodies in the firmament—a phrase of doubtful sense: either they are fixed in the heaven as denser parts of it (like knots in a board), moved only by the heaven; or they are placed in it not as affixed but as moving through it by God's command. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘quia’).

— p. 272 (PDF) · printed p. 231 —

...because by God's command they accomplish their motions through the heaven itself, as through a space determined for them by God, which each must measure and complete by its course. It is an old opinion, noble by the authority of very many Ecclesiastical writers, that the stars are not clinging to and affixed to the heaven, but are driven round by their own motions through the celestial space. For this Justin Martyr delivers, answering the 93rd question of the Orthodox; and Origen, in book 5 against Celsus and book 1 of On First Principles, chapter 7, says that the heavenly bodies are moved by their own motions, and are not parts of the heaven, and are no otherwise in the heaven than living things are on the earth, fishes in the water, birds in the air. The same Eusebius of Emesa and Diodorus of Tarsus set forth in expounding this passage of Genesis, and likewise on chapter 7 of the same book; but no one teaches this more clearly and explicitly than Chrysostom: for in homilies 6 and 13 on Genesis, Far be it, he says, that we should think God affixed the stars to the heaven: for we see them moved and carried from one place to another. And God is said to have set them in the firmament because He willed and commanded that they should be in the heaven and accomplish their spaces and courses through it—just as below God is said to have set Adam in paradise, that is, to have commanded that he dwell and abide in paradise. And in homily 12 to the people of Antioch he confirms the same: for he says that the heaven

is fixed and immovable, but that the sun, with the other stars, daily revolves in it. Philastrius of Brescia, in his catalogue of heresies, not only does not approve that the heaven is moved of itself and the stars set in motion along with its motion, but does not hesitate even to condemn it as a heresy.

Marginal gloss: "Sydera propriis motibus agi, sicut pisces per aquam, per aerem volucres, censuerunt auctores... Iustinus martyr." The moving-stars view: Justin (Resp. ad orth. 93); Origen (Contra Celsum 5; Peri Archon 1.7—the stars move on their own, like land-animals, fish, birds); Eusebius of Emesa; Diodorus of Tarsus; and most plainly Chrysostom (Hom. 6, 13 in Gen.; Hom. 12 ad pop. Antioch.). Philastrius of Brescia condemns the affixed-stars view as heresy.

For he writes in about this manner: It is a heresy to assert that the stars are fixed in the heaven, since it is certain that they come forth suddenly at evening, by the divine command, from hidden storehouses and places arranged by God, and at set hours, by their light and motion, recognize and carry out the ministry imposed on them by God. And Philastrius decrees the contrary opinion to be alien to the Catholic faith, and that its assertors have fellowship rather with pagan vanity than with Christian doctrine. The blessed Augustine, in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 10, although he well knew that an opinion of this kind is rejected without any doubt by the learned Philosophers and Mathematicians, nevertheless did not judge it so improbable and absurd that it could not, if need be, be defended. For thus he writes: If the truth of Scripture should persuade us that the heaven stands still, it is not to be supposed that the revolution of the stars hinders us from understanding this: for it has been found even by those who have most curiously and most idly inquired into the matter, that, even with the heaven unmoved, if the stars alone were turned, all could come to pass that has been observed and comprehended in the revolutions of those stars. Thus Augustine.

Philastrius (De haeresibus): it is heresy to assert the stars fixed (they come forth at evening from hidden storehouses at God's command); the contrary view is alien to the Catholic faith. Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 2.10): though the astronomers reject the moving-stars view, it is not so improbable as to be indefensible—even with an unmoved heaven, the same phenomena could occur if the stars alone turned.

CERTAINLY that this was the opinion of the Stoics is clear from what Balbus disputes in Cicero, in the second book On the Nature of the Gods; and indeed that it was older than the Stoics, Aristotle gives a sign, who in the second book On the Heaven, from text 43 to 52, treats it diligently and sharply refutes it. And in truth it has long since been exploded [by the Philosophers]...

This was the Stoics' view (Cicero, De natura deorum 2, in the mouth of Balbus); older than the Stoics (Aristotle, De Caelo 2, texts 43–52, treats and sharply refutes it). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘est’).

— p. 273 (PDF) · printed p. 232 —

...by the Philosophers and the Mathematicians alike, and not without good reason: for those who held this had also of necessity to hold either that there is very much void in the heaven, or that the celestial body, when the stars are borne through it, is broken and cut apart, or that the heaven is a certain fluid and unstable body, most easily yielding to a more solid body—like, namely, air or water: all of which seem foreign to reason and to the nature and dignity of the celestial body, especially since in Job, chapter 37, divine Scripture teaches that the heavens are most solid, and as it were cast from bronze. Nor indeed do those escape these difficulties who feign in the heaven I know not what channels, assigning to each star its own, through which it accomplishes its courses; which they say are full of a certain thin body, soft so as to yield, in such a way that it both gives place to the star borne through it, and yet leaves no void.

The moving-stars view has long been (rightly) rejected, for it implies either much void, or a heaven broken as the stars pass, or a fluid heaven like air or water—foreign to reason and to the dignity of the celestial body (Job 37 teaches the heavens are most solid, as if cast from bronze). The ‘channels’ (canales) theory does not escape these troubles.

BUT the mind refuses to believe that the heaven is pierced and perforated with so many channels, and mingled with a foreign body most unlike the celestial nature. But grant that there are channels of this kind in the heaven: nevertheless no more can the account of those things be fully and aptly

rendered by them, which both are seen with the eyes and have been ascertained by long observation concerning the position and motion of the heavenly bodies. For what has been observed by the Mathematicians concerning the station, retrogradation, acceleration, retardation, and other variations of the planets' motion—these surely, if the planets were moved through channels of this kind, could by no means hold good. And if the Moon were borne through its channel, then as often as it were in the same part of the channel, it would seem to stand in the same way toward the earth, that is, equally distant or near; but it has been detected by the Mathematicians that the Moon, at the same point of the zodiac, has sometimes been seen nearer the earth, sometimes farther. But in truth, even if other reasons were lacking against this opinion, would it not be enough of an argument to refute it, that it is confessed by all that one and the same body cannot at the same time be borne to different places, drawn apart by different motions, except by one means only—namely, that of itself it is driven by one motion only, but is carried by the other motions on account of that in which it is, either as in a vehicle or as a part in the whole? But it is manifest that the same planet is set in motion at once by different and in a manner opposite motions—that is, from East to West and at the same time from West to East, and at once by other motions according to other differences. For it has been detected that the Moon is borne by at least six different motions at once. But let us leave these things to be more curiously examined and more finely handled by the Philosophers and Mathematicians: which indeed others have treated diligently and accurately, but above all Christophorus Clavius of our Society, in the very copious and learned Commentaries which he published on the Sphere—a man, as many of his writings declare, subtly learned and excellently versed in the Mathematical disciplines. But perhaps someone will ask of us, if these things are as we have said, how it comes about that Scripture never speaks of the motion of the hea[vens]...

Marginal gloss: "Christophorus Clavius, egregius nostri temporis Mathematicus." Pererius rejects the ‘channels’: they cannot account for planetary stations/retrogradations, nor for the Moon being

seen nearer/farther at the same zodiacal point; decisively, one body cannot be borne by opposite motions at once except as carried (the Moon has at least six motions). He commends his fellow Jesuit Christophorus Clavius's learned Commentary on the Sphere (In Sphaeram Ioannis de Sacro Bosco). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'lorum').

— p. 274 (PDF) · printed p. 233 —

...heavens, but often speaks of the motion of the stars? But the answer is ready: that the nature and motion of the heavens lie hidden from our senses, but the stars fall under our sight by their light and perpetual revolution. Wherefore Scripture makes no mention of the motion of the heavens, but frequent mention of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—as may be seen in Psalm 18, at the beginning of the book of Ecclesiastes, in Job chapters 9 and 38, in Isaiah chapter 38, in the book of Joshua chapter 10, and in the book of Ecclesiasticus chapter 48.

An objection answered: why does Scripture never name the heavens' motion, but often the stars'? Because the heavens' nature and motion lie hidden from our senses, while the stars fall under sight by their light and revolution. Hence the references to the stars' courses (Ps 18[19]; Ecclesiastes 1; Job 9 & 38; Isaiah 38; Joshua 10; Ecclesiasticus 48).

QUESTION X. Whether the stars are of a fiery nature and truly hot.

The tenth question of Book II.

THIS too can be brought into dispute in this place: Whether the stars consist of a fiery nature and are truly and properly hot—that is, not only on this account, that they produce heat, but also because they have heat in themselves. In the schools they would put it thus: whether they are actually and formally hot, or only virtually and effectively. The ancient Fathers have given us great occasion for treating this question, of whom indeed very many have declared that the stars are fiery and hot of themselves. That Augustine certainly held this the Master of the Sentences does not deny, in distinction 14 of the second book, and Augustine himself declares not obscurely, in many places, that he is of this opinion. For since he

recognizes only four simple bodies, of which this whole world is compacted—earth, water, air, and fire—he assigns this last chiefly to heaven and the stars. Basil, in homily 3 on Genesis, and Ambrose, in the second book on the Hexameron, argue at length and accurately that the heavenly bodies are fiery and hot, and that this is established even by sight and touch themselves, not only by arguments. Moreover, those Ecclesiastical writers are to be reckoned of the same opinion, whoever have handed down that the waters placed above the firmament of heaven are real waters, and were placed there by God to cool and temper the burning of the heavenly bodies. Divine Scripture too seems to favor this opinion: for more than once it teaches that the sun is most hot. For in Psalm 18, speaking of the sun, There is none, it says, that can hide himself from its heat. But it delivers this more brightly in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 43: The sun, it says, at noon burns the earth, and who can endure in the sight of its burning? Threefold the sun, burning the mountains, breathing out fiery beams and shining, with its rays dazzles the eyes.

Marginal gloss: "Qui ex auctoribus Ecclesiasticis senserint fere astra esse ignea et vere calida." The question: are the stars truly and formally hot (not merely heat-producing)? Many Fathers held them fiery: Augustine (per Peter Lombard, Sent. II d.14—assigning fire to heaven and the stars); Basil (Hom. 3 in Gen.) and Ambrose (Hexaem. 2, evident even to sight and touch); those who held the waters above the firmament real, placed to cool the stars' heat. Scripture: Psalm 18[19]:7 (‘none can hide from its heat’); Ecclesiasticus 43:3–4 (the sun burning the earth at noon).

But that hackneyed distinction in the schools, by which both this and other similar testimonies of Scripture are wont to be evaded—of a twofold ‘hot,’ either formally or effectively (that is, virtually)—seems hardly probable. For there is no other way and means by which it can be known and judged that fire, or any other body, is properly and formally hot, than by the judgment of sense and by the very effect of heat—namely, that both we and other bodies feel warmth from those things; and if you take this criterion away, nothing remains by which one might judge what is truly ho[t]...

Marginal gloss: "An valeat distinctio de duplici calido, aut formaliter aut virtualiter." Pererius questions the scholastic distinction (formally vs. effectively/virtually hot): the only way to judge

something properly and formally hot is by the judgment of sense and the effect of heat; remove this criterion and nothing is left to judge by. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘re cali’; signature G).

— p. 275 (PDF) · printed p. 234 —

...something is truly hot or not could be explored and certainly discerned. But that we grow warm from the sun no otherwise than from fire, no one—unless he be one excessively cold—will deny.

Completes the sentence from the previous page (the only test of ‘hot’ is the sense and effect of heat).

Authority and credit can also be added to this opinion from the very philosophy of the Gentiles. For, except Aristotle alone, the opinion of all the philosophers was in accord that the heaven and the stars consist either of two, or of some one, of the elements. For that the celestial bodies are a certain fifth nature, far removed and different from all the natures of sublunary things, was Aristotle's own invention. Certainly the ancient discipline of the Egyptians held, among other things, this too, that the stars are celestial fires, by whose tempered commingling all things are born. Anaximander said that the sun is equal to the earth, and that it is the purest fire. Anaxagoras used to say that the sun is a glowing iron, thoroughly fired; wherefore he is reported to have been accused of impiety by Cleon, because he said the sun is a glowing plate of metal; and so his pupil Euripides, in the tragedy of Phaethon, called the sun a ‘golden clod.’ Plato, in the Timaeus, teaches that it is necessary, because the heaven is visible, that it consist of fire. The whole Stoic school, likewise, holds this as a chief decree of its teaching, that the heavenly bodies are fiery, and are fed and nourished by vapors raised from the waters and the earth and drawn to themselves; and that this will be the cause of the future conflagration and perishing of the world: that, the nourishment of the heavenly bodies one day failing, all things will be burned up by fire and perish. For since these men saw that our fire cannot subsist without fuel, they supposed that the same befalls the stars, which they held to be fiery. Following this opinion, Pliny, in book 2, in the last words of the ninth chapter, writes thus: But the

stars are without doubt fed by earthy moisture, because at the half-orb they are sometimes seen spotted—namely, when there is not yet enough supply to draw further with due force; for the spots are nothing else than the filth of the earth caught up with moisture. Thus Pliny. Balbus, too, in Cicero, in the second book On the Nature of the Gods, argues many things for this opinion of the Stoics.

Marginal glosses: "Praeter unum Aristotelem, qui fecit quintam quandam caeli naturam, ceterorum Philosophorum consensu caelum igneae naturae est"; "Stoici putarunt sydera terrae et aquae vaporibus pasci." The pagans (except Aristotle, who made the heavens a fifth nature) held them fiery: the Egyptians; Anaximander; Anaxagoras (the sun a glowing iron—accused by Cleon; his pupil Euripides's 'golden clod,' Phaethon); Plato (Timaeus); the Stoics (the stars fed on vapors, whence the future conflagration); Pliny (NH 2.9); Cicero, De natura deorum 2 (Balbus).

BUT that the stars are neither hot of themselves nor of a fiery nature has been concluded by the wise by many and indubitable reasons. First, it has been demonstrated above that the heaven and the stars are of an incorruptible nature; therefore they are not fiery: for fire, since it has both matter and a contrary, cannot but be liable to corruption. Next, the natural motion of fire is to be carried upward, of which motion the stars are perpetually devoid; wherefore they would be moved beyond their nature and violently; and likewise circular motion would be violent to them, as it is to fire, whereas in them it is perpetual and even. Nor can it be feigned that both the motion which is upward and that which is driven in a circle are natural to the stars, since of one simple body there is but one simple motion; and since circular motion differs in its very genus from the motion that is upward, both cannot naturally belong to the same body. To these some add that, if the stars were fiery, it would without doubt have come to pass that long since all things would have been burned u[p]...

Marginal gloss: "Auctoris sententia, non esse ignea nec propterea calida sydera." Pererius's view: the stars are neither hot nor fiery—(1) the heavens are incorruptible, but fire is corruptible; (2) fire's natural motion is upward (which the stars lack), and circular motion would be violent to fire, yet is perpetual and even in the stars; a single simple body has but one simple motion; (3) were the stars fiery, all would long since have burned up. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'defla').

— p. 276 (PDF) · printed p. 235 —

...burned up and, consumed by the burning of the heavenly bodies, would have perished. For in the eighth heaven are one thousand and twenty-two stars, each of which is many times larger than the whole earth; to which if you add the four superior planets, also far larger than the earth, there will surely be an excess of celestial fires over the whole earth almost incomparable. But this argument could be evaded, either by saying that the force and power of the stars is feebler and weaker on account of their very great distance from the earth, or even by retorting the argument upon its authors: for since the heavenly bodies heat no less than if they were actually hot, they are pressed and burdened by exactly the same difficulty. But those men would perhaps reply that, if the stars were truly fiery, they would be far more powerful and burning for heating and scorching than they now are, because they would heat not only by light, as now, but also by heat.

The burning-up argument: the 1,022 stars (each many times larger than the earth) plus the four superior planets make the excess of celestial fires almost incomparable. This could be evaded (the stars' power weakened by distance; or the argument retorted, since they heat as if hot anyway); but the reply: were they truly fiery, they would heat far more (by heat, not only by light).

But that which Pliny and the Stoics and others, older than they, both Philosophers and Poets, said—that the sun is fed by earthy and watery moistures drawn up on high to it—Aristotle aptly said, in the second book of the Meteorology, to be a childish opinion and unworthy of a Philosopher: as if the vapors were carried up all the way to the sun, and not only as far as the middle region of the air, where, condensed and thickened, they are dissolved into rains, and slide back to the same place whence they had been raised. And since fire that is nourished by fuel does not endure the same, but is continually changed, it would be necessary that the sun not only come into being new daily (as Heraclitus used to say), but be generated new almost at every single moment. Moreover, since the case of the other stars is the same as the sun's, they had to say that all those too are

nourished by vapors: but whence would so much fuel and nourishment be perpetually supplied to so many and so great heavenly bodies? The stars would also sometimes become larger or smaller, namely according as less or more of vapor were supplied to them for fuel.

Marginal gloss: "Sydera non pasci vaporibus ex aquis terrave sublatis." Aristotle (Meteorology 2) rightly called the vapor-feeding theory childish: vapors rise only to the middle air (where they condense into rain), not to the sun; and fuel-fed fire is ever-changing, so the sun would be new not just daily (Heraclitus) but almost every moment; and whence the perpetual fuel for so many stars?

The sun, therefore, and the stars give heat, not because they are hot in themselves, but because they have the power of generating heat in sublunary things capable of that quality. For it is not unusual in nature for some agent to make something such as it itself is not: how many things does God make most unlike Himself! Does not the torpedo-fish numb the fisherman's hand through the rod, of which numbness neither it itself nor the rod is partaker? Is it not agreed among the Philosophers and Theologians that the production of an effect is twofold: the one univocal, in which the producer is most like the thing produced; the other equivocal, in which there is great unlikeness between the two? And we discern this manner of production in the more excellent efficient causes. What is there, among the things contained within the orbit of the moon, so unlike the sun, to whose generation, nevertheless, the force and efficiency of the sun does not pertain? For if, because the sun heats, it is therefore necessary that it itself be hot, then, since Sa[turn]...

The sun and stars heat not by being hot, but by the power of generating heat in sublunary things—an agent can make what is unlike itself (the torpedo-fish numbs through the rod; cf. the univocal/equivocal distinction of causation). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘turnus’).

— p. 277 (PDF) · printed p. 236 —

...Saturn, as most suppose, has the power of cooling, it too will be cold, and on that account contrary to the sun; and there will be between these heavenly bodies a mutual action and passion, and, what necessarily follows

upon this, corruption.

Completes the Saturn argument: if ‘heats → hot,’ then Saturn (which cools) would be cold and contrary to the sun, yielding mutual action/passion and corruption among the stars.

By what force, then, and faculty does the Sun give heat, if it is not itself hot? By its motion, some say: but by what motion? by that with which it itself is moved? But motion of this kind has of itself no power of acting, and, being of one manner, it would heat equally and perpetually, as much in winter as in summer, as much by night as by day. Or does it heat by the motion with which it shakes, wears, and rarefies the air? which Aristotle seems to hint in the first book of the Meteorology and in the second book On the Heaven, text 42. But by that reasoning the moon ought to heat more, which is nearer the air: for the sun, removed by so great an interval from the air, cannot move and agitate it as much as the moon. And in truth, if the matter were so, the higher and nearer to the heaven each part of the air were, the hotter it would be; nay, the lower air would grow as hot as it had been heated by the upper: which is plainly false, by the argument of the middle region of the air, which is cold. Who, moreover, could bring himself to believe that, at the time when the sun and moon, at Joshua's command, stood still with their motion checked, the sun did not at that time warm sublunary things? Indeed, so far is it from heating by its motion, that, were it not moved, it would heat more fiercely: for that the rays of the sun are sharper and more powerful for heating a thing fixed and unmoved than one that is moved, Aristotle confirms in section 4, problem 34; and besides, a sign of this thing is the concave mirror, which, if it be shaken, will not catch fire, but will catch it more quickly if, unmoved, it be set against the sun: and it makes no difference to this whether the body that heats, or the body that is heated, be moved or at rest. Others think that the sun heats only by the reflection of its rays: but reflection does not make the sun heat, but rather that it heat more vehemently and more; for if light did not heat of itself, neither, surely, would reflected light heat.

Marginal glosses: "Iosue 10"; "Quomodo Sol calefaciat cum ipse non est calidus." The sun heats not by motion (uniform, so it would heat equally winter/summer, night/day); not by shaking the air (else the moon would heat more, and the middle air—actually cold—would be hot; and Joshua's stayed sun still warmed, Josh 10:12–13); indeed an unmoved sun heats more (Aristotle, Problems 4.34; the concave mirror catches fire only when still); nor merely by reflection (which only intensifies).

We judge, therefore, that the stars give heat by their light: which, by how much more copious and abundant it is in the sun than in the other stars, by so much is the sun more powerful than they for heating. What, then, did Aristotle mean when he said that heat and fire are produced by the motion and attrition of the sun? Without doubt he did not understand it of all the heat that is generated in sublunary things by the sun, but of the heat and inflammation that occurs in the upper border of the air, where nature, to the marvelous spectacle of mortals, produces manifold flames and various kinds of fiery bodies. Although that saying of Aristotle has gr[eat]...

Marginal glosses: "Auctoris sententia"; "Aristoteles." Pererius's view: the stars heat by their LIGHT (the more abundant in the sun, the more powerful). Aristotle's ‘heat from the sun's motion and attrition’ refers not to all sublunary heat, but to the inflammation in the upper air (the manifold flames and fiery phenomena—i.e., meteors). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘gnam’).

— p. 278 (PDF) · printed p. 237 —

...has great obscurity, and very various interpretations and opinions of the Aristotelians: wherefore, both for that cause, and because it is foreign to our purpose and to the treatment of the divine writings, let us leave it to the judgment of the Philosophers to discuss and decide. But to that which was objected—that the sun is hot, and is detected to be so both by sense and by its very effect—it must be answered that every body which heats ought to be judged hot, unless either sense or reason itself demonstrate the contrary. By sense, as in wine, which, though when drunk it inflames and burns the inward parts, is yet known by touch to be cold; wherefore it is to be judged not actually hot, but only potentially. By reason, as in the stars, which, since they consist of an incorruptible nature and circular motion is to them either natural or at least not violent, cannot possibly have a fiery nature or heat in themselves. But the things that have so far been explained

concerning the heavens and the stars can be enough for the measure of our undertaking. Let us pass next to the other part of this volume, in which we must do battle with the Astrologers concerning the divination that is sought from the stars.

Marginal gloss: "Solutio obiectionis." Aristotle's dictum is too obscure to settle here and foreign to the purpose, so left to the philosophers. The objection (the sun is hot by sense and effect) answered: every heating body is judged hot unless sense or reason show otherwise—by sense, wine is cold to the touch though it inflames the innards; by reason, the stars (incorruptible, non-violent motion) cannot have heat in themselves. Transition to Part 2 of Book II: the disputation against the Astrologers.

DISPUTATION. Against the Astrologers, concerning Astromancy—that is, concerning the divination that is made from the stars.

The second (and final) part of Book II: the long disputation against astrological divination, promised in the Preface.

And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, and let them divide the day and the night, and let them be for signs, etc.

Genesis 1:14 — the scriptural lemma for the disputation (printed marginal heading: Ex capite 1 Genes., VERS. 14).

Those words, And let them be for signs, have various interpretations. Some refer them to the celestial signs—that is, to those forty-eight images and figures of the stars marked out in the heaven and described by the Astronomers; others to the signs of the festival days which the Jews kept with yearly solemnity, the observance of which days depended on the course of the moon. Some think those words pertain to the signs of natural effects—of fair weather, rain, winds, barrenness, health, diseases, of sowing, sailing, cutting, and healing; concerning which Pliny writes copiously and clearly in book 18, chapter 35. There are also those who hold that by those words are denoted certain supernatural signs and miracles once produced in the heavens and stars—such, namely, as came to pass in the time of Joshua, of Moses, of Hezekiah, and of the Passion of our Lord;

and such as the Lord foretold would come to pass just before the day of Judgment, in those words, There shall be signs in the sun, the moon, and the stars. Lastly, there were not lacking those who would refer those words, And let them be for signs, to astrological divination—by which, namely, from the observation of the heavenly bodies, future events of things are said to be able to be foreknown and foretold. For thus Origen thought these words were to be interpreted and understood, as Eusebius reports in the sixth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 9; and the most vain and most lying of mortals, the Astrologers whom they call Judiciary, claim that these words of Moses lend great credit to their astromancy and add[ed] authority [to it]...

Marginal gloss: "Quid significet astra esse facta in signa." Five interpretations of ‘and let them be for signs’: (1) the 48 constellations; (2) signs of the Jews' festivals (depending on the moon); (3) signs of natural effects—weather, sowing, sailing, medicine, etc. (Pliny, NH 18.35); (4) supernatural signs/miracles (Joshua, Moses, Hezekiah, the Passion; and those before Judgment Day, Luke 21:25, ‘There shall be signs in the sun, moon, and stars’); (5) astrological divination (Origen, per Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.9)—to which the ‘Judiciary’ astrologers appeal. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘iungere’; signature G 3).

— p. 279 (PDF) · printed p. 238 —

...boast that they add [authority to their astromancy]. Wherefore Basil, in his exposition of these words, refuted astrologers of this kind in a discourse quite long and accurate; and that very many other writers, both Greek and Latin, did the same is clear from their commentaries on Genesis. Wherefore we, stirred and moved by the most grave words of God set down in many places of divine Scripture against the Astrologers, and provoked by the example of the holy Fathers, and kindled with a most just hatred against them on account of the fraudulent and pernicious fictions of the Astrologers—and also because that disputation seems sufficiently to pertain to the doctrine of the heavens and the heavenly bodies which we have undertaken to deliver in this book—have thought that the labor here undertaken would not be in vain, nay, that our pains would be very usefully bestowed, if we should spend the remaining part of this book in shaking

and overthrowing the divinations of the Astrologers. But, lest by the abundance of the matter, or by hatred of so impious a falsehood, the disputation proceed beyond our purpose, we shall set a measure to the treatment, handling only the chief heads, and those which strike and cut down the Astrologers more nearly and more forcibly.

Completes the sentence (the astrologers' boast that Moses lends authority to their astromancy). Basil and many Greek and Latin commentators on Genesis refuted such astrologers. Pererius resolves to devote the rest of Book II to overthrowing astrological divination, treating only the chief, hardest-hitting heads.

There was, within the memory of our fathers, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, a man illustrious in nobility of birth, but most noble in brilliance of genius and learning, and, in fine, greater than all our praise, who wrote twelve books against the Astrologers—acutely indeed, and learnedly and copiously, but from the reading of which the prolixity of the work deters many. Others complain that not a few things are treated in them which are foreign to the cause defended, weak, and superfluous; there are also those who desire a more combative and robust kind of disputing, and would wish the adversary to be pressed more sharply and urged more vehemently. But, though that work does not have all the numbers of perfection, nor is free from all reprehension (for to which of mortals has that befallen?), it will yet be, for every age, a noble and glorious monument of that most excellent genius. We, however, that we may satisfy even the peevish and fastidious reader, will devote ourselves to this one cause, will press it, will cleave to it, and with our whole heart will apply ourselves to the defense of the truth and the refutation of the falsity of astrological predictions. And although we shall be engaged in a rich and very fruitful subject, we shall yet be the briefer for this, that we shall employ not all the things that could in any way be said, but only those fitter and firmer for the cause: for we desire to seem and to be not so much copious as strong in storming and routing the Astrologers. Now there are four things to be treated in this our disputation with the Astrologers: for first we shall teach that astrological divination is contrary to the most true doctrine contained

in the sacred writings and in the Ecclesiastical discipline; then we shall demonstrate that it is also opposed to right reason and true philosophy; next we shall prove that the stars are not only not the efficient causes of all future things, but are not even signs that foreknow and foreshow all future things; and lastly we shall show what the cause is why the predictions of certain Astrologers have been found true both of old, and sometimes today turn out true.

Marginal gloss: "De opere Ioannis Pici Mirandulani adversus Astrologos scripto." Pico della Mirandola's twelve books against the astrologers (the Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem)—learned but prolix and not flawless. Pererius states his four-part program against astrology: (1) it is contrary to Scripture and Church teaching; (2) to right reason and true philosophy; (3) the stars are neither efficient causes nor signs of all future things; (4) why some astrologers' predictions came true.

— p. 280 (PDF) · printed p. 239 —

That Astrological Divination is contrary to divine Scripture, to Ecclesiastical discipline, and to Theological doctrine. CHAPTER ONE.

The first chapter of the anti-astrology disputation.

Divine Scripture cries out in many places that the certain foreknowledge and prediction of future things belongs neither to men, nor even to demons, but is proper to God alone. Wherefore in Isaiah, chapter 41, it is written thus, Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods; and in chapter 44, I am the Lord, that make void the signs of the diviners, and turn the soothsayers into madness, that turn the wise backward, and make their knowledge foolish. And in chapter 47, God, mocking the Babylonians and Chaldeans who presided over their observations of the stars, says, Stand with thy enchanters, and with the multitude of thy sorceries, in which thou hast labored from thy youth, if so be it may profit thee anything, or if thou mayst become stronger. Thou hast failed in the multitude of thy counsels: let the augurs of heaven stand and save thee, who gazed at the stars and reckoned the months, that from them

they might announce the things to come to thee. And a little before he had said, Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this has deceived thee. Jeremiah too, in chapter 10, warns the Jews to count astrological observations as nothing, for nothing is to be hoped or feared by them from the stars; and thus he says, Learn not according to the ways of the gentiles, and be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the gentiles fear, for the laws of the peoples are vain. And Solomon, in Ecclesiastes chapter 10, denies to man the knowledge of future things: Man knows not, he says, what was before him; and who can tell him what shall be after him? And in chapter 8 of the same book, Man, he says, is ignorant of things past, and things to come he can know by no messenger. It is clear, therefore, that astrological divination is in the Sacred writings despised, mocked, and rejected.

Scripture proclaims certain foreknowledge of the future belongs to God alone: Isaiah 41:23; 44:25; 47:12–13 (mocking the Babylonian/Chaldean star-gazers; 'thy wisdom has deceived thee'); Jeremiah 10:2 ('be not afraid of the signs of heaven'); Ecclesiastes 10:14; 8:7 (man knows neither past nor future).

With the doctrine of the sacred writings the judgment of the Church also, as was fitting, marvelously agrees. For the Church always, from its very beginnings, has hated, shunned, and condemned the Judiciary Astrologers. There exist against them very many and most severe decrees of the Church, which one may read in the second part of the Decretals, cause 26, through the first five questions, and in the First Council of Braga, chapter 9, and in the First of Toledo, in the assertion of the Faith against the Priscillianists. Pope Alexander, the third of this name, is reported to have deprived, for one year, of the ministry of the altar, a certain priest who had once consulted an Astrologer about a certain theft committed in his church. We find, too, in the writings of the holy Fathers, frequent disputations against the Astrologers (whom they now call Chaldeans or Genethliaci, otherwise Mathematici or Planetarii), from which it appears how hateful and abominated this kind of men was to our forefathers. Many things against them are disputed by Basil in homily 6 on Genesis, by Chrysostom and Gregory the Great on the second chapter of Matthew, but beyond the rest

by Augustine in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17, and also in the second book On [Christian] Doctrine...

Marginal gloss: "Decreta Ecclesiae contra Iudiciarios astrologos." The Church's condemnations: Decretum Gratiani II causa 26 q.1–5; First Council of Braga c.9; First Council of Toledo (against the Priscillianists); Pope Alexander III suspended for a year a priest who consulted an astrologer about a theft. The Fathers against the astrologers (called Chaldeans, Genethliaci, Mathematici, Planetarii): Basil (Hom. 6 in Gen.), Chrysostom and Gregory the Great (on Matt. 2), and above all Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 2.17; De Doctrina Christiana 2). Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'Doctrina').

— p. 281 (PDF) · printed p. 240 —

...On Christian Doctrine, chapter 21 and some chapters immediately following; but subtly and copiously in the first several chapters of book 5 of The City of God. To the same purpose belong the things which Eusebius argues against the Mathematici in book 14, chapter 4, and in book 6, chapter 9, of the Preparation for the Gospel. Ridiculous was, or rather mad, Julian the Apostate, who, in the books which he blurted out against the Christians, wished to prove, from the things written in the fifteenth chapter of Genesis, that Abraham practiced both Astrology and Haruspicy. His astrology, indeed, he thinks is signified by those words, God led Abram forth, and said to him, Look up to heaven and number the stars if thou canst: so shall thy seed be. And the science of his haruspicy he says is denoted by those words also, Take me a cow of three years, and a she-goat of three years, and a ram of three years, a turtledove also and a pigeon; who, taking all these, divided them through the middle, and laid both parts opposite one another on either side, but the birds he did not divide; and the fowls came down upon the carcasses, and Abram drove them away. Then is added the prediction of the wandering and servitude of his posterity for four hundred years. But this error of Julian's, or rather his madness, Cyril excellently refutes in the last, the tenth, book of the work which he published against Julian. Others try to assert and build up credit for this most vain Astrology from that star which appeared at Christ's birth, by the sight of which those three Magi, being stirred, and led to adore Christ, had

come. But Chrysostom and Gregory, in the homilies written on that Gospel, refute and convict these men by manifest arguments.

Marginal glosses: "Iuliani Apostatae calumnia a Cyrillo repulsa"; "Matthaei 2. Chrysostomus ho. 6 in Matt. Gregor. ho. 10 in Evangelia." Augustine (De Doctrina Christiana 2.21ff; De Civitate Dei 5, opening chapters); Eusebius (Praep. ev. 14.4, 6.9). Julian the Apostate's calumny (from Genesis 15) that Abraham practiced astrology (Gen 15:5) and haruspicy (Gen 15:9–11, the divided sacrifice)—refuted by Cyril (Contra Iulianum 10). The Star of Bethlehem / Magi argument refuted by Chrysostom (Hom. 6 in Matt.) and Gregory (Hom. 10 in Evangelia).

FOR THE REST, we can refute the error of the Astrologers also by reasons woven from Theological doctrine. First, No one, as Paul says in 1 Corinthians 2, knows the things of a man, but the spirit of a man: but a man knows not what he himself is going to do after many years, or even days; for, as Scripture says in Proverbs chapter 27, Boast not for tomorrow, not knowing what the coming day may bring forth; and, The way of a man is not in his own hand: for man proposes, but God disposes. For not only the heart of any man whatever, but even of kings, is in the hand of God, and He bends it wheresoever He wills. If, then, a man himself knows not what he is going to do in time to come, how much less can the Astrologer know it? Next, not even the devil himself can know future things for certain: for if the demon knew all things to come, he would surely never have impelled the Jews to crucify and slay Christ the Lord—since he would have foreseen that by the cross and death of Christ the dominion which he had so long held over men was to be shaken and utterly overthrown; nor indeed would the demon tempt and harass the servants of God, by whom he is overcome in temptation, lest, namely, by reason of the victory of their temptations and the increasing glory of the Saints, he himself (such is his pride and envy) be the more tormented.

Marginal gloss: "Argumentis ex Sacra Theologia ductis, astrologica divinatio refellitur." Theological arguments: (1) no one knows a man's heart but the man's own spirit (1 Cor 2:11), yet a man knows not his own future acts (Prov 27:1; 16:9, ‘man proposes, God disposes’; 21:1, the king's heart in God's hand)—so much less the astrologer; (2) not even the devil knows the future for certain—else he would not have impelled the Jews to crucify Christ (which destroyed his empire), nor tempt the saints (whose victory increases their glory and his torment).

This also is plain from the argument of the oracles which the demons once gave—such as were the responses and oracles of Delphic Apollo, once most renowned and famous among the Greeks; that these pertained to astrological divination, Porphyry is a rich author and witness...

Marginal gloss: "Vanitas oraculorum Apollinis." The demons' oracles (Delphic Apollo) pertained to astrological divination—Porphyry as witness. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'phyrius').

— p. 282 (PDF) · printed p. 241 —

...Porphyry, in his book On Oracles (Eusebius reports this in book 6 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 1), where he delivers that whatever the gods foretell as fixed by fate, they signify to be thus future by the motion of the stars—which Apollo above all disclosed in many responses. But that in these oracles and divinations Apollo often lied, Porphyry is likewise the author: for he says that exact knowledge of future things is incomprehensible not only to men, but even to many of the gods, whence, when questioned, they sometimes lie, but not willingly; for they are wont to warn that they cannot then answer truly, yet men out of madness persist in urging and compelling them to answer. Delphic Apollo, therefore, when the disposition of the heaven and of all it contains was such that he could not foresee the truth, used to say through the priestess, Hold back this force, and utter not these words of power: for I shall speak falsehood, if thou compel me. And in another response, Today, says Apollo, the way of the stars affords me nothing to say. Then, concluding, Porphyry says, We have now made plain whence falsehood creeps into the oracles of the gods. These things Eusebius recounts from Porphyry's book On Oracles, in book 6 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 4. There was also a certain Oenomaus, a man noble among the Greeks as much for philosophy as for eloquence, who, often deluded and deceived by the responses of Delphic Apollo, diligently and curiously collected very many of his oracles, and refuted them as vain, futile, and false, as Eusebius reports in book 5 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 10.

Marginal gloss: "Oenomanus vehemens et disertus oraculorum Apollinis confutator." Porphyry (De philosophia ex oraculis; in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.1, 6.4): the gods signify their fated predictions by the stars' motion, yet Apollo often lied (exact foreknowledge being incomprehensible even to the gods); Apollo's confessions 'I shall speak falsehood if thou compel me' and 'today the stars afford me nothing to say.' Oenomaus of Gadara collected and refuted Apollo's false oracles (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 5.10).

Now for four causes it comes to pass that the demon is deceived in foretelling the future. First, because it too confidently affirms things that depend on the free will of man: which, since it is exceedingly mutable, and flexible to all things, and plainly free, sometimes operates by some extraordinary means. Next, because we, often divinely incited and aided by the grace of God, do the contrary of what we had before thought to do, and of what, by our own wit and our own choice, we were about to do. It happens also that what the demon had determined and foretold to do, it cannot carry out, God forbidding and hindering. Lastly, God sometimes does many things beyond the common order of nature and beyond His general and ordinary providence. And by these things the demon is frequently led into error. Who, then, will believe that the Astrologers are truthful in foretelling future things, when in this even the demons often happen to be deceived? But why do I speak of demons? The theologians teach that not even the celestial spirits and blessed minds themselves—which clearly behold and most clearly see God, and hold a most perfect knowledge of the heavens and of all natural things—know future things with certainty, those, namely, that depend on free will, unless God impart to them a special knowledge of those things. Of what madness, then, is it to attribute to Astrologers what is granted neither to Angels nor to the blessed minds?

Marginal gloss: "Quibus ex causis accidat ut daemon in praedicendo futura saepe fallatur." Four causes of the demon's failure: (1) man's free will (mutable, sometimes acting extraordinarily); (2) we, aided by grace, act otherwise than intended; (3) God prevents what the demon planned; (4) God acts beyond the common order of nature. If even demons err, how can astrologers be truthful?—nay, not even the blessed angels know future free-will contingents with certainty unless God reveals them.

BUT this above all is a strong argumentation. If the Christian religion and teaching is true—as it most certainly is—then the opinion of the Astrologers cannot be true, nor can it be approved by Christians, in such a way as [...]...

Marginal gloss: "Egregia ratio adversus astromantiam." The decisive argument: if the Christian religion is true (as it most certainly is), the astrologers' opinion cannot be true or approved by Christians. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘quam’; signature H).

— p. 283 (PDF) · printed p. 242 —

...than that opinion of vanity, falsehood, and impiety, which [the Christian religion] has very often condemned. But if the Christian doctrine is false—since it has embraced almost the whole world, and subjected nearly all nations to its sway, and for more than fifteen hundred years has flourished and reigned in the world—then, if all things that happen among men come from and depend on the heaven, it is necessary that so great a propensity of men to accept and defend the faith of Christ, and so great a zeal, proceed from some notable and most powerful constellation; wherefore the heaven would incline and lead men to evil. For if the faith of Christ were false, it would surely be more false and detestable than any other sect whatsoever: for it teaches concerning God and divine things such things as, if they are false, must contain a wicked superstition and an execrable impiety. But in truth, since the life which is led according to the rule of the Christian faith is the best and blameless, and worthy not only of praise but even of the highest admiration, hence it would necessarily follow that from the same constellation proceed both good and evil: evil indeed, on account of the falsity of the Christian doctrine; but good, on account of the uprightness and excellence of the life which is formed and directed according to the rule of its doctrine.

Continues the ‘egregia ratio’: if Christian doctrine were false (yet it has conquered the world and reigned 1,500+ years), then—on astrology's premise—men's zeal for the faith would come from a mighty constellation, so heaven would incline men to ‘evil’ (a false faith); but the Christian life is the best, so the same constellation would yield both good and evil—an absurdity.

BESIDES this, the greatest proof and confirmation of our faith, and the clearest argument of divine providence, is this: that whatsoever befell Christ the Lord and His Church was, many ages before, foretold by the Prophets—all to a man, properly, distinctly, and explicitly; but if such prediction could be made through Astrology, the firmest foundation of our religion would utterly collapse and fall to nothing. In short, this doctrine of the Astrologers plainly perverts, so far as in it lies, true moral philosophy, not to say sacred Scripture and Theology. For whoever holds it certain that all things depend on the heaven, and that therefore all the works, deeds, chances, and events of men can be foreseen and foretold from the observation of the heaven, must also necessarily be persuaded that our soul is material and mortal, that there is no free will, and that the providence of God is not such as our Faith proclaims; that the mysteries of the Christian religion likewise depend on the heaven, and that all the miracles produced both in the Old and in the New Testament, though they be called (as in truth they are) supernatural, are nevertheless to be traced back to celestial causes and powers. To this opinion there also follows the neglect and omission of good works, license for all lusts, the excuse of any crimes whatsoever, and finally the uselessness and cruelty of human laws no less than divine. Cajetan, in his Summula, where he treats of the observation of the stars, teaching things very like what we have said, writes thus—more truly and learnedly than elegantly and ornately:

Marginal gloss: "Praeclara argumentatio." The Prophets foretold all about Christ and His Church—if astrology could do this, the foundation of religion would fall. Astrology perverts moral philosophy, Scripture, and Theology: it entails a material/mortal soul, no free will, no true providence, and the reduction of the mysteries and miracles to celestial causes—whence the neglect of good works, license of lusts, excuse of crimes, and the futility of laws. Cajetan (Summula, on star-observation):

> *The observation of the stars, concerning the nativities of men and human occurrences, can be subjected to sin in three ways. First, if the things which are mysteries of the Christian faith be held as though they were subject to celestial cau[ses]...*

Cajetan, Summula (Summa Caietani, s.v. astrologia / star-observation). The block quote spans printed pp. 242–243. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'sis').

— p. 284 (PDF) · printed p. 243 —

...celestial causes; secondly, if future contingents be sought or held as certain from celestial causes; thirdly, if one subject his own choices to celestial causes as to their law, so as to regulate his life and actions according to the heavens. And each of these three is, of its own kind, a mortal sin: because the first is against the spirituality of the Christian religion, which is above the heavens, being able even to change the very courses of the heavens, according to what is written in Psalm 148, His praise is above heaven and earth; and this experience has attested. The second is against the truth of Christian doctrine and of free will, by which we are lords of our own works. The third is against the dignity of grace, of the divine law, and of the human mind, by which we are set above all bodily things. And just as we should err by subjecting ourselves to the passions of anger, hatred, hope, fear—so that we should have the impulses of the passions for a law—so we cheapen ourselves if we hold the inclinations of the heavens for a law: for they are bodies, and incline us after the manner of passions. Thus Cajetan.

Conclusion of Cajetan's block quote (begun on the previous page): the threefold mortal sin of astrology—(1) subjecting the Christian mysteries to the stars (against the religion's spirituality, above the heavens, Psalm 148:13); (2) holding future contingents as certain from the stars (against Christian doctrine and free will); (3) making the heavens the law of one's choices (against the dignity of grace, divine law, and the human mind).

And in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter 19, Luke relates that many of those who at Ephesus had been converted to Christ by the discourses and sermons of the blessed Paul, and had before followed curious arts, brought their books and burned them before all; and that those books were on matters pertaining to judicial Astrology, the weighty author Augustine said in his Commentaries on the Psalms—who also did not receive a certain

Mathematicus (that is, one who had professed this Astrology), afterward repenting of his profession and desiring to be reconciled to the Church, except with a public and solemn penance going before. But the saying of Augustine, since it most touches what is now in hand, I shall here copy out word for word. After his exposition of the sixty-first Psalm, when that Mathematicus, publicly seeking pardon, was set before them, Augustine said these things:

Acts 19:19 (the Ephesian converts burned their books); Augustine (Enarrationes in Psalmos) says these were astrology books, and would not receive a penitent astrologer without public penance. Pererius transcribes Augustine's oration (after his exposition of Psalm 61).

This man returns from being a Christian and a believer, as a penitent, and, terrified by the power of the Lord, is converted to the mercy of the Lord: for, seduced by the enemy when he was a believer, he became a mathematicus—seduced and seducing, deceived and deceiving—he enticed, he beguiled, he spoke many lies against God, who gave men the power of doing what is good and not doing what is evil. This man used to say that adultery was done not by one's own will, but by Venus; and that homicide was done not by one's own will, but by Mars; and that the just deed was done not by God, but by Jupiter; and many other sacrileges, no small ones. Of how many Christians do you think he took the money? How many bought a lie from him? to whom we used to say, O sons of men, how long heavy of heart? why do you love vanity and seek a lie?...

Marginal glosses: "Notabilis oratio quam habuit Augustinus in reconciliatione cuiusdam Mathematici cum Ecclesia"; "Psalm. 4." Augustine's oration on the converted astrologer (Enarratio in Psalmum 61): the astrologer's blasphemy—‘adultery was done not by my will but by Venus; murder not by my will but by Mars; the just deed not by God but by Jupiter’ (Psalm 4:3). The block quote spans printed pp. 243–244. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘riam’).

— p. 285 (PDF) · printed p. 244 —

...Now, as is to be believed of him, he has shuddered at his lie and at the destruction of many men: he has felt that he was once enticed by

the devil, and is converted to God as a penitent. You know that it is written in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter 19, that many that were lost—that is, men of such arts and followers of nefarious doctrines—brought all their books to the Apostles, and so many books were burned that it pertained to a scribe to make an estimate of them and to write down the sum of their price. This indeed for the glory of God, that even such lost ones be not despaired of, by Him who knew how to seek what had perished. This man, then, had perished; now, sought, found, he has been brought back: he carries with him the books to be burned, by which he was to have been burned, so that, these being cast into the fire, he himself may pass over into refreshment. For before Easter he began to seek medicine from the Church of Christ; but because such is the art in which he was practiced—suspect of lying and deceit—he was deferred, lest he should tempt, and yet at last was admitted, lest he be more dangerously tempted. Thus far Augustine.

Conclusion of Augustine's oration (Enarratio in Psalmum 61): the penitent astrologer brings his books to be burned (Acts 19:19); he sought the Church's medicine before Easter, but, his art being suspect of lying, was deferred yet admitted lest he be more dangerously tempted.

Certainly, in the primitive Church, Astrology of this kind was rejected, forbidden, and condemned no otherwise than the magic art. Epiphanius, in his book On Measures and Weights, relates that Aquila of Pontus, the interpreter of Scripture, was driven out of the Church by the Fathers chiefly for this cause, that he zealously gave himself to the observation of nativities and to the other astrological divinations. It is not to be passed over, since it is very memorable, what Eusebius, in the sixth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter nine, hands down that Origen set forth about this Astrology in his commentaries on Genesis. For he says that Origen wrote thus:

Marginal gloss: "Origenis egregia contra Astrologos disputatio." In the primitive Church astrology was condemned like magic. Epiphanius (De mensuris et ponderibus): Aquila of Pontus, the

Scripture-translator, was expelled chiefly for practicing nativity-observation and astrological divination. Eusebius (Praep. ev. 6.9) records Origen's discussion of astrology (in his Genesis commentaries):

Not only do the Gentiles believe that the things on earth happen necessarily by the conjunction and aspect of the stars (which force they call Fate); but even many of the faithful are troubled, believing it impossible that things should come to pass otherwise than the course of the stars has effected—whence it follows that there is no liberty in us, and no work of ours can rightly be praised or blamed: so that the judgment of God foretold by the Scriptures, by which some are predestined to eternal torments, others to eternal blessedness, would be proclaimed by a false favoritism. What more? faith itself, and the coming of our Savior, and all the labor of the Prophets, and the preaching of the Apostles in founding Churches, would be vain—unless perchance one dare to say that Christ also, compelled by the force of the heavenly bodies, did what He did and suffered what He suffered, and that all things came to pass not by the power of His Godhead, but by the power of the stars. By these impious words this also is effected: that the faithful, led by Fate, believe in Christ; and finally, that either there be no difference between good and evil, or even that God be the author of evils, and that no man ought to be judged worthy of reward or punishment for good or evil deeds, nor any place be left for prayers, vows, and supplications to God. Thus Origen.

Origen (in his Commentaries on Genesis, quoted by Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.9 / 6.11): astral fatalism destroys liberty, praise and blame, and would make God's predestination ‘false favoritism’; it would render faith, Christ's coming, and the Apostles' labor vain—even making Christ compelled by the stars—and leave no good/evil, merit, or place for prayer.

— p. 286 (PDF) · printed p. 245 —

LET Pierre d'Ailly, then, now go and embrace this Astrology, fondle it, and stubbornly defend it, and strenuously strive to associate and wed it with

philosophy—nay even (if it please God) with Theology: that is, falsehood with truth, darkness with light, the demon with God. He did not even fear to set forth in writing that Noah's flood, and the birth of Christ the Lord, and other supreme prodigies and miracles, could—by skill in the science of the stars—be foreknown and foretold from the observation of the stars. But, that it may appear more manifestly how impious and execrable the doctrine of these men is, I shall set down here a few of their sayings and decrees, from which judgment will be made about the impiety of that art. Some of them contend that, from Mars favorably set in the ninth region of the heaven, so much is granted us that by our mere presence we may expel demons from possessed bodies. Others boast that by this art they will judge, without error, the secret and hidden things of the conscience of one who is born. It is also commonly held among them that there are two planets, authors of human felicity—Venus of the present, but Jupiter of the life to come after this one. Firmicus Maternus, moreover, most zealous and most curious of such fictions and lies, when he recounts many things that befall men from Saturn set in Leo, adds that such men will be long-lived, and that after death their souls, joined to the gods, will fly up into heaven. For Saturn, he says, set in Leo will lead back to heaven and to the beginnings of their origin the souls of those who have so conducted themselves on earth, freed from countless straits.

Marginal gloss: "Animadversio in Petrum de Aliaco." A rebuke of Pierre d'Ailly (Petrus de Aliaco) for embracing astrology and wedding it to theology (‘falsehood with truth, the demon with God’)—even claiming Noah's flood and Christ's birth could be foreknown astrologically. Samples of the astrologers' impieties: Mars in the ninth house lets one expel demons by mere presence; some claim to judge the newborn's secret conscience; two planets author human felicity (Venus of this life, Jupiter of the next); Firmicus Maternus's Saturn-in-Leo leading souls to heaven.

Finally, Albumasar writes that whoever, when the Moon is joined to Jupiter in the head of the Dragon, supplicates God, will most certainly obtain from God whatever he asks: which Pietro d'Abano confirms that he himself experienced; for when, during that conjunction, he had asked of God knowledge of things, he says that after that day he felt that a great increase

of knowledge had been made to him. But how nefarious, detestable, and ruinous to the Christian religion these and other like things of theirs are, and how much they avail to weaken—or rather to destroy—the faith of those things which divine Scripture teaches are done immediately, supernaturally, and miraculously by God, there is no one so dull of wit and slow of understanding as not most clearly to perceive. But if anyone wishes to know these things more fully and subtly, let him read what Pico della Mirandola treats diligently and copiously to this effect, both elsewhere and in the second book, chapter 5, and in the fifth book, chapter 11, and from there to the end of that book.

Marginal glosses: "Albumazar"; "Petrus Apponensis." Albumasar (Abu Ma■shar): prayer when the Moon is joined to Jupiter in the Dragon's head infallibly obtains its request—Pietro d'Abano (Petrus Aponensis) claims to have experienced a great increase of knowledge thereby. Such sayings undermine the faith that Scripture's miracles are done immediately by God. Pico della Mirandola treats these fully (esp. bk 2 ch.5; bk 5 ch.11 to the end).

That Judicial Astrology is refuted and convicted by Philosophy—first, indeed, on this ground, that astrologers of this kind are utterly unskilled in celestial matters. CHAPTER TWO.

The second chapter of the anti-astrology disputation.

That astrological divination is futile and rests on no foundation, the Philosopher will argue in this manner: the Astrologers neither know for certain all the powers, influences, and effects of the stars; nor, if they knew those things, would it be enough for a certain foreseeing of future things: therefore astrological predictions must necessarily be empty and fallacious. Two things are laid down in this argumentation, to be treated and confirmed by us more fully: the one is, that the Astrologers are unskilled in celestial matters; the other is, that even were they most skilled in those matters, they still could not on that account foreknow all future things. But let us speak of the former first. That the Judiciary Astrologers, then, are ignorant of the science of the stars, is plain from these[...]...

The philosopher's argument: astrology is futile because the astrologers neither know all the stars' powers and effects, nor (even if they did) could foreknow all futures—so their predictions are empty and fallacious. Two points to prove: (1) the astrologers are ignorant of celestial matters; (2) even if expert, they could not foreknow all futures. He treats the first first. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'his'; signature H 3).

— p. 287 (PDF) · printed p. 246 —

...from these things which I shall set down. First, it is very arduous and laborious to know perfectly even those things about the heaven which seem less difficult and more obvious to us: such as what is the nature of the heaven, its magnitude, the number of the orbs, and among them the order and difference of dignity, the variety of motions, and finally the number of the stars and their comparison among themselves in magnitude, light, power, and effect. And a most clear indication of this difficulty is made by the great variety of opinions which we see to be on these matters among the greatest Philosophers. Aristotle, certainly the easy Prince of all Philosophers, frankly confesses that of many celestial things he holds not an exact knowledge, but only an opinion-based and conjectural acquaintance, and that, because he is destitute of manifest and certain reasons, he is not seldom compelled to use only probable arguments and conjectures. These things may be seen in Aristotle himself, in the second book On the Heaven, texts 17, 34, 60, and 61. If this is so, who will believe that the Astrologers (who, it is clearer than the light of the sun, are in no way to be compared with those greatest Philosophers) have clearly known and ascertained that which is the most abstruse thing in the heaven, and—by the judgment of the greatest Philosophers—incomprehensible to mortals (I mean the truth of all future things)? Next, let us ask these Astrologers to untangle for us some of the easier questions about the heaven: let us inquire of them whether the heaven is a certain simple nature, or composed of matter and form; whether the matter of the heaven is such as is the matter of all sublunary things, or wholly different; whether the heaven is animate or inanimate; whether it is moved by its own force and of itself, or from without by an Angel; from what especially the

excellence of their dignity in the heavens ought to be estimated and judged; what the cause is why all the orbs are not turned about by one motion, but some by one only, some by more, some by fewer; let them disclose to us what proper force and power the several stars have over the elements, metals, plants, and living things. These things, I say, and others like them let us ask of these Astrologers: we shall surely find them plainly rude and utterly inexperienced in the doctrine of these matters. How then is it credible that things the remotest and most hidden from the understanding of mortals have been ascertained and explored by those ignorant of these plainer and more open things?

It is very hard to know perfectly even the easier celestial things; the great variety of philosophers' opinions proves it. Aristotle, first of philosophers, confesses he holds only conjectural knowledge of much in the heavens (De Caelo 2, texts 17, 34, 60, 61). How then can the astrologers—far inferior—have grasped the most abstruse thing, the truth of all future events? Easier questions (is heaven simple or composite? animate? self-moved or moved by an Angel?) expose their ignorance.

Next, let these men teach us the influences and effects which now flow forth from the various stars to the diverse and distant regions of the world (for so perhaps we shall believe them when they foretell the future effects of the heavenly bodies): for who does not know that it is easier and more within reach to know present things than future—especially mutable things, and those that can come to pass in various ways, and are therefore uncertain? Let them likewise expound to us the hidden properties and forces which sublunary things have, which we admire rather than understand in many stones, herbs, and animals: for these, since they are near and joined to us and subject to almost all our senses, and can be investigated and explored by daily experiments, have a plainer understanding and an easier explanation; but the knowledge of Celestial things is of the greatest labor and difficulty, since the heaven is so far distant from us, nor by any other[...]

Let the astrologers first explain the present influences of the stars (then we might believe them about future effects)—for present things are easier to know than future, mutable, contingent things. Let them explain the occult properties of stones, herbs, and animals, which (being near and subject to our

senses) are far easier than celestial things, so distant. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘alio’).

— p. 288 (PDF) · printed p. 247 —

...than by the single sense of the eyes does the heaven lie open to mortals: which sense, however, often happens to be deceived, on account of the great length of the interval, or the supreme swiftness of the heaven's whirling, or a faulty disposition of the Medium or of the sight, or on account of a defect of the astrolabe, of the tables, and of the astronomical instruments. And this too we read attested in the sacred writings, in chapter 9 of the book of Wisdom. The body, it says, which is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that musers on many things. And with difficulty do we estimate the things that are on earth, and the things that are in our sight we find with labor; but the things that are in the heavens, who shall search out? And who shall know thy thought, unless thou give wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit from on high? And the end of this saying wholly refutes the Astrologers, who profess that they can divine all human events—many of which depend on the most secret counsel and will of God.

Heaven is open to mortals only by sight—often deceived by distance, the heaven's dizzying speed, a faulty medium or eye, or flaws in the astrolabe and tables. Wisdom 9:15–17 (‘the corruptible body weighs down the soul... who shall search out the things in heaven?... unless thou send thy Holy Spirit’) refutes the astrologers, who claim to divine events depending on God's most secret will.

BESIDES, the Astrologers boast that they have observations of innumerable years, confirmed by the events of things, from which their art was collected and completed: for since, in all the space of past time, almost innumerable things came to pass in the same way, the same signs having gone before, their art was effected by often noting and marking these; wherefore they say the Chaldeans had four hundred seventy thousand years comprehended in the records of astrological observations of this kind. But how fictitious and improbable this is, is clear even from this, that the Astrologers could not have gathered and compared observations and

experiences of this kind—I do not say a thousand times, as they themselves boast, but not even twice or thrice: for the face of the heaven, and the position of all the celestial signs, which once was, can return wholly the same either never, or only after immense spaces of years; since the eighth orb, in which are the fixed stars, does not complete its circuit before thirty-six thousand years. Nay, certain most learned Mathematicians have proved by the best reasons that the motions of the heaven are incommensurable among themselves, and on that account the same face of the heaven and the same position of the stars cannot recur more than once.

Marginal gloss: "Redarguitur antiquitas syderalium observationum quam iactant Astrologi." The astrologers boast of observations over countless years (the Chaldeans claimed 470,000 years), but could not gather even two or three such records, since the same celestial configuration recurs only after immense ages (the eighth orb's circuit = 36,000 years), and the heavens' motions are (mathematicians proved) incommensurable—so the same face of heaven can never recur.

This reasoning Favorinus the Philosopher, in Aulus Gellius, book 14, chapter 1, treats a little more distinctly—certainly more lucidly and elegantly—in these words:

Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus contra Astrologos." Favorinus the philosopher (in Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1) treats this reasoning more lucidly:

If the observation of the Chaldeans began to be made in this way—that it was noted in what posture, what form, and what position of the stars anyone was born; then thereafter, from the beginning of his life, his fortune and character and disposition, and the circumstances of his affairs and business, and at last even the end of his life, were observed, and all these, as they had come to pass, were committed to writing; and afterward, in long courses of time, when those same stars should be in the same place and the same posture, the same things were judged to be about to befall others also who had been born at that same time—if, he says, the observation began to be made in this way, and from that observation a certain discipline has been composed, it can by no means proceed: for let them say in how

many years, or rather in how many ages, this cycle of observation could have been completed. For it was agreed among the Astrologers, he said, that those stars which they called wandering—which were said to be the determiners of the fates of all things—return all together to the same place with the same posture only after an infinite, well-nigh innumerable, number of years, whence they set out[...]

Favorinus, quoted in Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1. The block quote spans printed pp. 247–248. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘profecta’).

— p. 289 (PDF) · printed p. 248 —

...they set out, so that neither any continuous tenor of observation, nor any memory, nor any written records, could have endured for so great an age. Thus Favorinus.

Conclusion of Favorinus's argument (in Gellius 14.1): the wandering stars return to the same place and aspect only after an almost infinite number of years—so no continuous record, memory, or document could last so long.

Besides, although the Astrologers could know the individual forces and influences of each star separately, yet what force the heavenly bodies have when the influences of diverse stars come together and are mingled—whether in the heaven, or in the air, or in the earth, or even with the sublunary causes and their actions—can by no means be known by them. Let the reader hear Origen, this opinion of whom, from his Commentaries on Genesis, Eusebius cites at the end of book 6 of the Preparation for the Gospel:

Even if the astrologers knew each star's force separately, they could never know the combined force when diverse stars' influences mingle (in heaven, air, earth, or with sublunary causes). Origen's opinion, quoted by Eusebius (Praep. ev. 6) from his Genesis commentaries:

But the things, he says, which they assert to come about by the commixture, composition, and tempering of diverse aspects, they will assuredly grant cannot in any way be known. For how will you perceive by how much the harm of a malign aspect is diminished on

account of the aspect of a benign star? and whether the malign one takes away what is granted by the benign, because it has looked upon its place, or changes it, or whether some mixture arises thence, who shall perceive? all of which, if anyone look at them more deeply, he will easily believe cannot be thoroughly perceived by human wit. Whence, if anyone make trial of these things, he will see the casters of nativities err in more cases than they attain the truth. Wherefore Isaiah too, as if these things were impossible to all, says to the daughter of the Chaldeans who most of all profess these arts, Let the Astrologers stand and save thee; let the augurs of heaven announce to thee what shall come to pass. For by these words we are taught that even the most diligent Chaldeans cannot foretell what God wills to assign to each nation. Thus far Origen.

Marginal gloss: "Isaia 47." Origen (in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6): the astrologers must concede that the combined effect of diverse aspects cannot be known (how much a benign star lessens a malign aspect's harm, etc.); so whoever tests it finds the nativity-casters err more than they hit the truth. Isaiah 47:13 ('Let the Astrologers stand and save thee...') shows even the most diligent Chaldeans cannot foretell what God assigns each nation.

To these things is added that there are many stars which either are not clearly seen, or are not seen at all; and of those that are seen, the Astrologers confess that few are known to them, but very many are not yet explored. By what reasoning, then, do they so confidently foretell the future from the few stars whose forces they know, when, through the influxes of the other stars which they do not know, the effects of the stars known to them might be hindered or altered?—unless perchance they impudently and absurdly lie that the stars which are hidden from them have no forces and no influences. It is certainly agreed that among the Astrologers there are reckoned in the eighth heaven one thousand and twenty-two stars, each of which, since it is larger than the earth, must have a vast force and power: of such stars the Astrologers have either no knowledge or very little, since their judicial art consists almost entirely of the observations of the planets, in which it is engaged and consumed

well-nigh wholly. Seneca saw this, with the perspicacity of his genius, and in book 2 of the Natural Questions, chapter 32, elegantly set it forth:

Many stars are seen dimly or not at all; the astrologers admit they know few and many remain unexplored. How then do they predict from the few they know, when the unknown stars' influxes could hinder or alter the known ones'? There are 1,022 stars in the eighth heaven, each larger than the earth and of vast power, yet the astrologers know little of them (their judicial art rests almost wholly on the planets). Seneca (Nat. quaest. 2.32):

> *What else is it, he says, that strikes error into the experts in nativities, than that they assign us to a few stars, when all the things that are above us claim a part of us for themselves? The lower ones perhaps direct their force more nearly upon us; and those which, being more frequently moved, look upon us in one way and the other animals in another; but those also which are either unmoved, or, by reason of a velocity equal to the whole world, are like to the unmoved, are not outside the right and dominion over us. Thus Seneca.*

Seneca, Naturales quaestiones 2.32: astrologers err by assigning us to a few stars, when all the heavenly bodies above us claim a share of us—not only the lower and faster ones, but even the fixed stars are not outside their dominion over us.

In recent years we have seen a new star, never before that time seen in the heaven, and (by the judgment of the Astrologers) placed in the very region where the fix[ed stars]...

Marginal gloss: "De nova stella quae superioribus annis in caelo visa est." Pererius's eyewitness reference to a new star (the supernova of 1572, ‘Tycho's star,’ in Cassiopeia) seen among the fixed stars. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword ‘lae fixae’).

— p. 290 (PDF) · printed p. 249 —

...the fixed stars shine: which star, when it had been visible for some time, suddenly departed wholly from our sight and utterly vanished. This star must either have been generated in the heaven and afterward corrupted (and it is likely that the same happens more often in other cases, but at long intervals of time); or there are, above the seven planets, other wandering

stars which have indeed their own courses, but to us unknown; or, finally, that those which we think to be fixed and inserted stars in the eighth orb, these too perform their own circuits and motions: of which Hipparchus, a most noble man in Astrology, once doubted, as Pliny is a rich author and witness in chapter 25 of the second book. Hipparchus, he says, never sufficiently praised, detected a new star, and another generated in his own age; and, moved by its motion on the day on which it shone, he was led to doubt whether this happened more often, and whether those also which we think fixed were moved.

Marginal gloss: "Duplex Zodiacus apud Astrologos." The new star implies either a star generated and corrupted in heaven, or wandering stars beyond the seven planets, or that the ‘fixed’ stars have their own motions—about which Hipparchus once doubted (Pliny, NH 2.25: ‘Hipparchus, never sufficiently praised, detected a new star... and was led to doubt whether even those we think fixed were moved’).

What of this, that the Astrologers reckon it of very great importance to their art to have explored the agreement and discrepancy which there is between the two Zodiacs—the one of the eighth, the other of the ninth heaven? which, however, cannot be known to them: since the ninth heaven lacks all star and light, nor can anything of it be detected but its motion, and that from the motion of the eighth heaven. It is also hidden from the Astrologers how those two Zodiacs stood at the beginning of the world, because the time elapsed from the origin of the world to this day cannot be certainly held: for although some reckoning of the years of that time can be entered upon and a number gathered, yet of the days and hours it cannot—of which, nevertheless, a subtle and certain computation is needful to that astrological doctrine.

The astrologers think it crucial to know the agreement/discrepancy of the two Zodiacs (of the eighth and ninth heaven), yet cannot, since the ninth heaven is starless (only its motion, derived from the eighth's, is detectable). Nor can they know how the two stood at the world's beginning, since the exact time from creation is unknown—the years may be reckoned, but not the days and hours, which their art requires.

Now indeed, the position of the stars which is at the moment in which each one is born can scarcely be noted and known without any error. For it is most difficult to observe either the point of time in which someone is born, or, in that very point, the aspect of all the stars which is then in force: for often the interposition of clouds and of thick vapors either takes away from us the aspect of the heaven and the stars, or disturbs and darkens it; and—what is the chief thing—the most rapid whirling of the heaven makes the constellation fly past before it is properly noted by us, since at almost every single moment a different face of the heaven and a different position of the stars exists. These Astrologers profess that they can foretell all the events of anyone's life, provided the certain time of his birth become known to them: but such time, subtly and properly—just as would be needful to the Astrologer—is generally unknown. For though it be said, for example, that Peter was born twenty years ago, on the last day of September, at the tenth hour of the night, whether beginning or middle or already ending: yet that moment, or rather that least span of time, in which Peter was poured forth from his mother's womb and brought forth into the light, neither the midwife nor the parents or kinsfolk have most exactly noted and observed; and yet of that most subtle observation and knowledge of that time the Astrologer has need for his divining.

Marginal gloss: "Quam difficile sit aspectum syderum qui in ortu cuiusque hominis viget annotare." The star-position at the moment of birth can scarcely be known without error: the exact instant is hard to observe (clouds and the heaven's rapid whirling let the constellation fly past). The astrologers claim to predict all if the exact birth-time is known—but it is not: ‘Peter born twenty years ago, last day of September, tenth hour of night’—yet the precise instant of birth neither midwife nor parents noted, though the astrologer needs exactly that. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘NON’; signature I).

— p. 291 (PDF) · printed p. 250 —

I cannot bring myself to omit setting down in this place the words of Basil, by which this very argument, which we have touched briefly, is more fully explained by him and more keenly pressed. For thus he left it written in his sixth homily on Genesis:

Marginal gloss: "B. Basilii argumentatio contra Astrologos." Pererius introduces a long quotation from Basil of Caesarea, Homily 6 of the Hexaemeron (On Genesis), which presses the argument about the unobservable moment of birth.

The inventors of the genethliac art, when over a long space of time they had perceived that very many configurations escaped their own science, contracted the measures of time into a very narrow compass, so that at each smallest and sudden instant (such as that of which the Apostle speaks, In a moment of time, in the twinkling of an eye) there is the greatest difference between one nativity and another. So that he indeed who is born in this moment shall be a King of cities and prince of peoples, most wealthy, most powerful; but he who is born at the moment of the following time shall be some poor man, or a begging mountebank, or a juggler, shifting from door to door for the sake of getting his daily food. Wherefore, that orb which is called the zodiac being divided into twelve parts—since in the space of thirty days the sun passes through the twelfth part of its globe, which they call the fixed part—they cut those twelve parts each into thirty portions; then, those several portions being divided into sixty minutes, they divided each of these minutes again into another sixty in a like manner. Granting, then, the bringing-forth of those who are brought into the light, let us see, I beseech you, whether these Authors can keep up for themselves this most exact division of time. For as soon as the little one is born, the midwife examines whether it is male or female; then she awaits the infant's cry, the sure sign of the life of him who is newly born. How many of the sixties of minutes do you suppose have passed in this time? The midwife then tells the Chaldean of the birth that has occurred: how many of the smallest moments do you suppose have run by meanwhile, while the midwife is speaking?—especially if by chance the Chaldean happens to be present not in the women's chamber, but in the hall or porch of the house, setting down the time and the hour. And since he who is to determine the time and hour diligently must use instruments for exploring the hours, whether they be for day or night:

how many of the minutes (in this time too, I ask) does the examination let fly past and slip away? For it must needs be ascertained, by that star by which the time and hour are to be explored, not only in what twelfth part it is, but also how near it is to the twelfth portion of the part, and in what sixtieth of the minutes (into which each of those first sixtieths is subdivided). And yet this so slender and subtle discovery of time, which they cannot reach, they nevertheless necessarily say must be made for each of the wandering stars, so that it may at last be ascertained and explored what disposition or relation they bore to the stars fixed in the heaven, and what figure they had among themselves, when the offspring was brought into the light. Since these things are so, if it is impossible for anyone to reach that time most exactly, and a variation of even the briefest time makes one go utterly astray over the whole course: surely they seem to deserve no slight derision—both those who have given themselves to the study of this art (which, it is agreed, is nowhere in the reason of things), and those who gaping hang intent upon their lips, just as if those men could know all the things that are to befall them. Thus far are the things which Basil in that place disputes against the Astrologers.

Marginal gloss: "1 Cor. 15" (the 'In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye' allusion = 1 Cor 15:52). Basil, Hexaemeron Homily 6: a sustained ridicule of the casters of nativities (Genethliaci). They subdivide the zodiac into 12 signs, each into 30 portions, each into 60 minutes, each minute into 60 seconds—yet at a real birth the midwife's checking the sex, awaiting the cry, and telling the (possibly distant) Chaldean let countless instants slip past unobserved. Since the exact moment can never be caught and the slightest error wrecks the whole reckoning, both the practitioners and their gaping clients deserve derision. (Catchword 'Etiam' leads to the next page.)

— p. 292 (PDF) · printed p. 251 —

Even if the Astrologers held the highest knowledge of celestial things, that they still cannot divine future events is proved by eight arguments. CHAPTER THREE.

The third chapter of the anti-astrology disputation, which marshals eight proofs.

BUT let us grant the Astrologers that which they falsely and impudently arrogate to themselves, namely a perfect knowledge of the stars and the heaven: this very thing I now contend cannot produce a certain foreknowledge and divination of future things; and this I confirm by many and strong reasons. FIRST REASON. True and well-worn in the schools is that saying of the Philosophers, As a thing stands toward being, so also it stands toward knowledge; that is, by the causes for which each thing comes to be and is, by those it must be known, if indeed we wish to attain a perfect knowledge of that thing. Now to the generation of particular future effects there concurs not only the heaven, but also a particular cause: for the heaven is a universal cause, whence it comes about that its force and efficacy is also universal and undetermined toward producing any particular effects whatsoever; but the force of the heaven is determined by the particular causes. Wherefore most true is that which Aristotle said, The sun and a man beget a man. Nay, particular effects, although as regards their production and conservation they depend chiefly on universal causes, yet as regards the proper nature of each of them and its natural properties, both specific and individual, imitate and emulate the particular cause rather than the universal. Since therefore, besides the celestial causes, there is need also of a particular efficient cause and of suitably prepared matter for producing future effects—and if either of these be lacking there will be no effect at all—from these things it is necessarily concluded that, for the foreknowledge of future effects, the knowledge of the celestial causes is not enough. And this too is established by daily and manifest experiments. For we see husbandmen at the same time and under the same aspect of the stars cast various kinds of seeds into the earth, from which nevertheless diverse things are born: which diversity surely can be referred not to the celestial causes, but only to the diverse species and forces of the seeds. To this same opinion, in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17, Augustine thus writes:

Marginal glosses: "Rationes octo, quibus probatur ex cognitione astrorum etiam perfecta, non posse divinari omnia quae futura sunt"; "Prima ratio"; and a long note: "Sicut ad generationem rerum

futurarum non tantum concurrit caelum sed etiam causae particulares, ita ad certam earundem rerum praenotionem, non solius caeli notitia satis esse posse." Granting (for argument) the astrologers' claimed perfect knowledge of the heavens, Pererius argues that even so it cannot yield certain foreknowledge. FIRST REASON: a thing is known through its causes; but particular future effects require not only the heaven (a universal, indeterminate cause) but a particular cause and prepared matter (Aristotle: 'the sun and a man beget a man'). So knowledge of the heavens alone does not suffice—as shown when farmers sow diverse seeds under the same sky and diverse plants grow (a diversity from the seeds, not the stars). Augustine agrees (De Gen. ad litt. 2.17):

When many bodies of diverse kinds—whether of animals, or of herbs and shrubs—are sown at one and the same point of time, and at one point of time innumerably many are born, not only in diverse but even in the same regions of the earth, so great are the varieties in their growths, in their actions, and in their passion[s]...

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.17. The block quote spans printed pp. 251–252. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'passioni').

— p. 293 (PDF) · printed p. 252 —

...in their passions, so that truly such a man (as the saying goes) would lose the stars if he should consider these things. But what is more tasteless and dull than, when they are confuted by these facts, to say that the fatal reckoning of the stars pertains only to men, as to be made subject to themselves? Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of Augustine's quote (De Gen. ad litt. 2.17): when many bodies of diverse kinds are sown and born at one point of time (even in the same regions), there is such variety in their growth and behavior that anyone who considered it truly 'loses the stars'; how dull, then, to claim—when refuted by these facts—that the stars' fatal influence pertains only to men.

Whose last saying Favorinus treats a little more fully in Gellius, book 14, chapter one: If the time and the reckoning and the cause, he says, of the life and death of men and of all human affairs were in the heaven and among the stars, what would they say of flies, or little worms, or sea-urchins, and many other most minute living creatures of land and sea? Would these too be born by the same laws as men, and in the same way be extinguished

there? so that either to frogs also and gnats birth-fates are assigned from the motions of the celestial stars; or, if they should not think this, no reason would appear why that force of the stars should prevail in men, if it failed in the rest.

Favorinus (in Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1) develops Augustine's last point: if the cause of all human life and death lay in the stars, what of flies, worms, sea-urchins, and countless tiny creatures? Either frogs and gnats too have astral birth-fates, or there is no reason the stars' force should work in men but fail in everything else.

SECOND REASON. If the doctrine of these Astrologers were true, it would be necessary that twins, who are conceived and born at one time, should be altogether most alike: which is clearly enough false; for, to say nothing of the rest of their unlikeness, it sometimes happens that one is male, the other female. Cicero indeed, in the second book On Divination, mentions Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians and twin brothers, whose end of life, however, was unlike, and whose glory of deeds was unequal. But in the sacred writings we have a most brilliant example of the thing: for Jacob and Esau, begotten in one act of union (as Paul says, Romans 9), and born at one time, were nevertheless most unlike in dispositions, pursuits, morals, and fortunes. Nor indeed is that defense firm to which the Astrologers flee when they are pressed by this argument—namely, that the very brief delay which intervenes between the births of twins, although it seems to us very slight, is yet in the heaven, by reason of its vastness and most rapid revolution, very notable and makes a great variation. This Nigidius Figulus declared by the example of a wheel, which, spun about most swiftly, when he had tried at top speed to mark or strike it twice with ink in the same place, then, the wheel's turning having ceased, those two places struck or marked by him were found to be separated by no small interval. This defense, I say, and refuge is weak and not very safe for the Astrologers. For although there was some delay at the birth of the twins, yet in their conception there was none at all. Next, if the reckoning of the constellation under which each is born varies in so brief a time, then surely the proper time of anyone's birth will be

incomprehensible to the Astrologers. Finally, that argument of Blessed Gregory will avail in this place against the Astrologers:

Marginal glosses: "Secunda ratio ex dissimilitudine Geminorum"; "Similitudo Nigidii Figuli"; "B. Gregorius hom. 10 super Evang." SECOND REASON (the unlikeness of twins): if the doctrine were true, twins would be wholly alike—but sometimes one is male, the other female. Cicero (De Div. 2) on the unlike twin Spartan kings Procles and Eurysthenes; Scripture's clearest case, Jacob and Esau (Rom 9:10), conceived in one act, born together, yet utterly unlike. The astrologers' refuge—that the tiny interval between twins' births is magnified in the vast, swift heaven (illustrated by Nigidius Figulus's potter's-wheel struck twice at 'the same' spot)—fails: there is no interval at conception; and if the constellation varies so fast, each one's exact birth-time is incomprehensible to them. Gregory's argument:

If for this reason Jacob and Esau are not reckoned to have been born under the same constellation—because they were not born together, but one after the other—then surely for the same reason it must be judged that no man is born whole under the same constellation, for he does not come forth from the womb all at once, but part by part and limb by limb:

Gregory the Great, Homily 10 on the Gospels. The block quote spans printed pp. 252–253. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'primo').

— p. 294 (PDF) · printed p. 253 —

for first it puts forth the head, then the neck, then the breast, last the feet. For Jacob was born next after Esau, holding with his hand the sole of his foot, just as if (as Augustine says, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17) one infant were born in the likeness of two, or twice as long.

Conclusion of Gregory's argument (Homily 10 on the Gospels): since a man is born not all at once but limb by limb (head first, then neck, breast, feet), no one is born 'whole' under a single constellation. Jacob, born right after Esau holding his heel, is as if (Augustine, De Gen. ad litt. 2.17) one infant born like two, or twice as long.

BUT this argument Favorinus, disputing very eloquently against the Chaldeans, has pursued. And yet this too I would have them answer, he

says: if the moment of time in which a man being born receives his Fate is so small and swift that at that same point, under that circle of the heaven, several cannot be born together to the same competence; and if for that reason twins also are not of the same lot of life, because they were not brought forth at the same point of time: I ask, he says, let them answer, by what means, whether by design they can attain, or themselves perceive and detect, that course of fleeting time which can scarcely be comprehended by the thought of the mind—when, in so headlong a whirl of days and nights, they say that the least moments make enormous changes? Thus Favorinus.

Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Favorinus (Gellius 14.1) presses the same point: if the birth-instant is so small and swift that two cannot share it to the same lot (and twins differ because not born at the very same point), how can the astrologers ever catch—by design or observation—that fleeting instant scarcely graspable in thought, when they themselves say the least moments make enormous changes amid the headlong whirl of day and night?

This very argument concerning twins Augustine treats carefully and subtly in the fifth book of the City of God, in some of the first chapters, and in the second book On Christian Doctrine, chapter twenty-two: and indeed it makes the greatest trouble for the Astrologers. For if all things are changed in so brief a moment of time that not merely diverse but even contrary things usually come to pass, who can foretell anything certain about a newborn boy, when that point of time at which he was either conceived or born, just as it is, can be known to no one? And so, even though the stars had great force and power over men, yet what they effect in the generation and birth of individual men would be unascertained by us: since the aspect of the heaven and the position of the stars, which is at the time when each one is born, cannot be certainly detected; for the most rapid motion of the heaven and the stars flies past and outstrips the slowness of our consideration and observation.

Augustine treats the twins-argument carefully (City of God bk 5, first chapters; De doctrina Christiana 2.22), and it gravely troubles the astrologers: if all changes in so brief a moment that even contrary outcomes usually follow, no one can predict anything certain about a newborn, since the exact point of his conception or birth can be known to no one. Even if the stars had great power, what

they do at each birth would stay unknown, for the heaven's swift motion outstrips our slow observation.

THIRD REASON. I now dismiss the twins, whose interrupted birth afforded some hiding-place to the Astrologers: let us for the present consider very many begotten at absolutely the same time, and in the same region, and under the same aspect and position of the stars, yet from different parents. Of these the astrologer cannot, from the observation of the stars, fail to foretell the same events, since they were conceived and born together and under the same constellation. But that it is far otherwise, daily experience demonstrates: for how many throughout the whole world are at the same time both begotten in the womb and brought forth into the light, of whom thereafter there is the greatest unlikeness of dispositions, pursuits, morals, religion, chances, and finally of the events of life and death? Of all the Romans who in very great numbers were slain at the battle of Cannae by Hannibal, there was the same end and destruction of life: but who would suppose that all those were born under the same aspect and position of the stars? I say the same of so many[...]

Marginal gloss: "Tertia ratio." THIRD REASON: setting twins aside (whose interrupted birth gave the astrologers a hiding-place), consider the very many begotten at the same time, in the same region, under the same star-aspect, but of different parents—the astrologer must foretell the same events for them, yet daily experience shows the opposite: countless people conceived and born together differ greatly in character, pursuits, morals, religion, fortunes, and the events of life and death. All the Romans slain at Cannae by Hannibal had the same end of life—yet who would think they were all born under the same star-aspect? Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘de tot’; signature I 3).

— p. 295 (PDF) · printed p. 254 —

the same of so many thousands of Turks, who in the naval battle eighteen years ago—by a victory memorable to immortality—were routed by the Christian fleet and destroyed in utter slaughter: of all of whom to say that there was the same reckoning of birth, and that the same constellation of heaven prevailed at their generation, is foolish. Or shall we think that, at the time when Homer, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great were born, very many others were not born at the same time also? yet

which of them has hitherto proved like them? Favorinus wove this argument together thus:

Continuation of the Third Reason. The reference to ‘the naval battle eighteen years ago’ in which the Christian fleet annihilated the Turks is the Battle of Lepanto (7 Oct 1571)—dating the composition of this part to c. 1589. Many were born at the same hour as Homer, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander, yet none turned out like them. Pererius now quotes Favorinus.

How many men of both sexes and of all ages, brought into life under diverse motions of the stars, in regions far distant under which they were born—how many of these, nevertheless, perish either by the gaping of the earth, or by falling roofs, or by the stormings of towns, or overwhelmed by the wave in the same ship, by the same kind of death and at the same instant of time? Which surely would never happen, if the moments of birth assigned to individuals each had their own laws. But if in the death and life of men—even of those brought forth at different times—some equal and very similar things are said to be able to befall, through certain later equal conjunctions of the stars; why could not all things also sometimes turn out equal, so that through such concurrences and likenesses of the stars there arise at once a Socrates and an Antisthenes and many Platos, equal in race, form, talent, character, in all of life and in death? which, he says, can by no means happen at all. Not for this cause, therefore, can the Chaldeans rightly avail against the unequal births and equal deaths of men. Thus Favorinus.

Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Favorinus (Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1): so many people, born under diverse stars in far-distant regions, perish together at one instant and by one kind of death (earthquake, falling roof, town-storming, shipwreck)—impossible if each birth-moment had its own laws. And if equal outcomes can befall men born at different times via later star-conjunctions, then everything could turn out equal—a second Socrates, Antisthenes, many Platos all alike—which is impossible. So the Chaldeans cannot fairly argue from men's unequal births and equal deaths.

FOURTH REASON. Bardesanes the Syrian, excellently versed in the doctrine of celestial things, in that dialogue which at the request of his

friends he composed On Fate and against the Chaldeans, demonstrated that the observations of the astrologers are most futile, and their predictions seldom not lying, in about this manner (as Eusebius records in the sixth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter eight):

Marginal gloss: "Quarta ratio. Bardesanis disputatio adversus Astrologos." FOURTH REASON: Bardesanes the Syrian (Bardaisan of Edessa), in his dialogue On Fate against the Chaldeans, showed the astrologers' observations futile and their predictions lying—as recorded by Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8 (the so-called 'Book of the Laws of Countries'):

Among the Seres there is a law forbidding to kill, to fornicate, and to worship images: whence in that region no temple is seen, no harlot woman, no adulteress, no thief, no murderer; nor did the most ardent star of Mars, set in mid-heaven, force the will of any of them to the slaying of a man; nor could Venus joined to Mars bring it about that anyone should solicit another's wife. And yet it must needs be that Mars comes to mid-heaven among them too on each several day, and it cannot be denied that in so great a region men are born at every hour. But among the Indians and Bactrians there are many thousands of men who are called Brahmins: these, both by the tradition of their fathers and by their laws, neither worship images, nor eat anything that has had life, never drink wine or beer, and finally are far from all malice, attending to God alone. But indeed all the rest of the Indians in that very same region are wrapped up in adulteries, slaughter, drunkenness, the worship of images: and there are found there some—nay rather there is a certain nation of Indians dwelling in the same climate—who devour men as they hunt and sacrifice: nor do any of the planets which they call fortunate and good, from slaughter[...]

Bardesanes, On Fate (in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8). The block quote refutes astral determinism from the fixed laws of whole peoples. The Seres (Chinese/Far-Eastern) forbid murder, fornication, and idolatry—so none of these crimes occur there, though Mars reaches mid-heaven daily and people are born at every hour. The Brahmins of India and Bactria worship no idols, eat nothing that lived, drink no wine or beer, attend to God alone—while the rest of the Indians in the same region wallow in adultery, slaughter, drunkenness, and idolatry (one nation even devours men). The block quote spans

printed pp. 254–256. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘caede’).

— p. 296 (PDF) · printed p. 255 —

...restrain them from that slaughter and from those crimes: nor could the malign planets drive the Brahmins to do evil. Among the Persians there was a law to take in marriage daughters, sisters, and even mothers themselves; nor in Persia only, but whoever of the Persians went out from their homeland to other climes of the world celebrated these nefarious marriages diligently: whom other nations, abominating this crime, call Magussaeans. And there are to this present day in the midst of Egypt, Phrygia, and Galatia very many Magussaeans, defiled by these same crimes by succession of their fathers. Nor can we say that, in the bounds and house of Saturn, Saturn himself was present at the nativities of all of them, with Mars beholding Venus. The Amazons have no husbands, but, going out from their borders in the season of spring, they come together with their neighbors. Whence all of them by a natural law bring forth at the same time, and, the males being killed, they rear the females alone, and all are alike warlike, taking great care for warlike exercise. But it is foolish to suppose that all such women were begotten under exactly the same natal stars. This is made more confirmed by the argument and example of the Jews, who, wherever in the world and among whatever nations they are born or live, by an inviolable observance both circumcise their infants on the eighth day, and keep every sabbath day as a holiday and feast most religiously. But the Jews are not all procreated under the same constellation, nor can any force or power of the celestial bodies draw them away from their ancestral laws and institutions. But what shall we say of the Christians? who, innumerable, scattered throughout the whole world, keep the same kind of life and doctrine, nor can they be moved a nail's breadth from the discipline which Christ the Lord delivered to them, either by any promises, or by threats or tortures: shall they say that all the

Christians were born under the same star? But this is the greatest argument: that those who, before they took up the discipline of Christ, most studiously and keenly held their ancestral laws and institutions, these, afterward made Christians, with those things deserted and cast off, lead a far different life, put on different morals, and cultivate a most different religion and doctrine. And so neither do Parthian Christians take many wives, nor do the Medes throw their dead to dogs, nor do the Indians burn their dead, nor do the Persians mingle in nefarious marriage with sisters or with daughters, nor do the Egyptians worship Apis, or a dog, or a he-goat, or a cat: but wherever they are, they live by the same laws, morals, and institutions. What more? At every hour, among all nations, men are born: but everywhere we see laws and morals prevail, because of the free power of man. Nor do the natal stars compel the Seres, unwilling, to homicide, or the Brahmins to the eating of flesh; nor remove the Persians from their wicked nuptials; nor forbid the Medes to expose the dead to dogs; nor the Parthians to take many wives. For the several nations, as they wish and when they wish, use their own liberty, obedient to their laws and morals.

Conclusion of Bardesanes' argument (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.8): whole nations keep fixed customs against what the stars would supposedly compel. The Persians married daughters, sisters, even mothers (their émigré 'Magussaeans' still do so in Egypt, Phrygia, Galatia); the Amazons keep no husbands, bear at one season, rear only daughters, all warlike. The Jews everywhere circumcise on the eighth day and keep the sabbath—not all born under one star. The Christians, innumerable worldwide, keep one life and doctrine, immovable by promises, threats, or tortures; and converts abandon their fierce ancestral customs entirely. So free human power, not the stars, prevails over custom everywhere.

Thus far are the things which, from the disputation of Bardesanes against the Astrologers, we have judged worth recording in this place. FIFTH REASON. With the free will of man and the immortality of our soul standing, that art can in no way stand; but if it stands, they must necessarily collapse from the foundation: whereby one may understand what an art of

this kind is to be reckoned, which, unless the liberty and immortality of our [souls] be ruined and trampled and taken away[...]

Marginal gloss: "Quinta ratio." Closing the Bardesanes citation. FIFTH REASON: free will and the soul's immortality cannot coexist with astrology—if the art stands, they collapse; so one sees what to think of an art that can subsist only by overthrowing the liberty and immortality of our souls. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'rum').

— p. 297 (PDF) · printed p. 256 —

...by the liberty and immortality of our souls, can in no way advance nor in any way subsist. And that, if our soul is immortal and free in acting, there can be no astrological divination, is concluded by these arguments. First, the Astrologers profess that they can foresee and foretell the future actions and events of men from the observations of their art; but this is false: for the future things which ought to proceed from the free will of man can in no way be known to the Astrologers. For either they would know the future things in themselves, which cannot be, since the things that are future are not yet in act of themselves; and that which is not, in so far as it is not, is not understood, but only in so far as it is in some way, namely in potency in its causes. Nor can future things be foreknown in their causes, which are three: God, the heaven, the human will. But the things which are to come to pass from the purpose, counsel, and absolute will of God can be known to no mortal, either from the heaven or by any other means whatsoever, except to him to whom God shall have willed to reveal them. For who, says the Scripture, has known the mind of the Lord? or who has been his counselor? and as it is written in the ninth chapter of the book of Wisdom, The things that are in sight we find with labor; but the things that are in the heavens, who shall search out? and who shall know thy thought, unless thou give wisdom and send thy Holy Spirit from on high? But from the heaven the future things which depend on the will of man cannot be known: both because the heaven is a universal cause, wherefore future particular effects can be contained and known in the heaven only universally and indeterminately; and also because the heaven is a corporeal

and material cause, wherefore our soul, which of itself is incorporeal and devoid of matter and free in acting, will by no means be directly and necessarily subject to the efficacy and operation of the heaven. The human will, moreover, which is the proximate cause of human actions in respect of the future things that ought to proceed from it, is of itself indifferent and indeterminate: for we are about to do many things of which we have as yet thought nothing, much less deliberated. How then can an indeterminate and indifferent cause beget a definite and certain knowledge of a future effect? This is confirmed: the exterior actions of man depend on the interior, on deliberation, I say, and choice; therefore a man's future exterior action cannot be foreknown unless the choice of his future will, whence it ought to proceed, be known. But a man's future choice cannot be known to another man; for if no one else can know the purpose of mind and the deliberation which one presently holds conceived in his mind, how much less will he be able to know the counsel, purpose, and will of another man, which is to be many years hence?

Marginal gloss: "Rom. 11. et Isaia 40." The core of the Fifth Reason: if the soul is immortal and free, astrology is impossible. Futures from free will can't be known in themselves (not yet in act), only in their causes; and the three causes of futures are God, heaven, and human will. (a) What depends on God's absolute will is known to no mortal but by revelation—Rom 11:34 / Isa 40:13 ‘Who has known the mind of the Lord?’; Wisdom 9:16–17. (b) From heaven, will-dependent futures can't be known: heaven is a universal cause (containing particulars only indeterminately) and corporeal (whereas the soul is incorporeal, free, not subject to it). (c) The will, the proximate cause, is indifferent and indeterminate; external acts depend on inner choice, and no one can foreknow another's future choice when no one can even know the resolve another presently holds.

NEXT, man is considered either as he lives and acts according to reason, or according to sense and appetite: if according to reason, thus man does not depend on the heaven, for mind and reason are devoid of matter and incorporeal; but no body can of itself act upon that which[...]

Marginal gloss: "Hominem, ut operatur secundum rationem, non e caelo, nec alia ex causa ulla praeter Deum, per se necessario pendere." Man considered as living by reason vs. by sense/appetite: if by reason, he does not depend on the heaven, for mind and reason are immaterial and incorporeal—and no body can of itself act on the incorporeal. Continues onto the next page

(catchword ‘id quod’).

— p. 298 (PDF) · printed p. 257 —

...upon that which is incorporeal. Reason, likewise, is free, and the mistress of its own actions, and by its own judgment and will can apply itself to doing this or that. For although it be instigated to do evil, whether by the heaven, or by the natural constitution and temperament of its body, or from elsewhere, it can yet resist, and by its own force suppress and render void all the instincts, impulses, and incitements thrown upon it from without: since it can act contrary to that to which it is incited. This becomes manifest even by the single example of Socrates, who, from the natural affection and composition of his body, was both dull and prone to women; but he so amended such vicious propensities of nature, by the strength of his mind and the greatness of his diligence, that he was held the most prudent and most continent of all in his time. But the man living according to sense and carnal appetite pursues so variable and uncertain a way that what he is to become can in no way be predicted. Wherefore Solomon (which is in the thirtieth chapter of the book of Proverbs) said that certain other things were difficult for him to know, but that this was wholly unknown—what is the way of a young man in his youth. For that age is so soft and flexible in all directions, so wandering and straying through all things and persevering long in nothing, that it seems to be ruled and led by no fixed reason or measure, but to be snatched, inconsiderately and rashly, wherever desire impels it: whence it comes about that it is easier to divine what he will do who lives according to reason and virtue, than what he will do who, the rule and law of reason and the virtues being set aside, follows only his own desires. Just as it is also easier to divine what a King will do who rules according to right reason and just laws, than what a Tyrant will do who administers all things for his own advantage and lust. By what reasoning, then, can the Astrologers attain by certain knowledge those things which have nothing settled, firm, fixed, and certain?

Marginal gloss: "Quam sit instabilis vita et actiones hominis viventis non secundum rationem, sed secundum sensum." Reason is free, mistress of its own acts; though instigated to evil by the heaven or bodily temperament, it can resist and nullify all external impulses. Witness Socrates—by nature dull and lustful, yet by strength of mind made the most prudent and continent of his age. But the man living by sense and carnal appetite is so variable that what he'll become can't be predicted: Solomon (Prov 30:18–19) found 'the way of a young man in his youth' utterly unknown. So it is easier to divine what a man of reason (or a just King) will do than what a lust-driven man (or a Tyrant) will do. How then can astrologers have certain knowledge of what has nothing fixed?

BESIDES, either that celestial Fate and power of the stars can be impeded by man, so that its effect does not come to pass, or it can in no way be impeded. If it can be impeded and not come to pass: therefore, just as the effect is uncertain, so its prediction cannot be certain. If it cannot be impeded: therefore there is no free will, and from this it is concluded that our soul is material and mortal, as being necessarily subject to the power of the stars. Nor indeed, if the matter stood thus, would the predictions of the Astrologers profit men anything: for what would it help to know the future so long beforehand, if these things could in no way be turned aside and guarded against? nay, as I judge, they would bring us more of evil than of good, since we should needs be tormented not only by present evils, but also be most bitterly racked by so distant and inevitable an expectation of them. Seneca well understood this, although he attributed to the stars no less force and power over men than the Astrologers do: for in the thirteenth book of the Epistles, the eighty-ninth letter, he wrote thus[...]

Marginal glosses: "Pulchrum dilemma adversus Astrologos"; "Si Astrologorum praedictiones verae et certae essent, profecto inutiles et damnosae essent hominibus." A neat dilemma: either this celestial Fate can be impeded by man (so its effect fails to occur), or it cannot. If it can, the effect is uncertain and so the prediction cannot be certain. If it cannot, there is no free will, and the soul is material and mortal, necessarily subject to the stars. And even so, true predictions would profit men nothing—indeed bring more harm than good, racking us with the inevitable expectation of foreseen evils. Seneca grasped this (though granting the stars great power), in the Epistles bk 13, letter 89. Sentence breaks at 'ita scri[psit]' (catchword 'psit'; signature K).

— p. 299 (PDF) · printed p. 258 —

...wrote: I come now to that man who glories in the knowledge of celestial things. Into what sign the cold star of Saturn betakes itself, through what orbs the Cyllenian fire wanders. What will it profit to know this? that I should be anxious when Saturn and Mars stand opposed, or when Mercury makes its evening setting while Saturn looks on? Rather let me learn this: that, wherever those stars are, they are propitious and cannot be changed. A continuous order of the Fates drives them, and an inevitable course. They return in fixed turns; they either cause the effects of all things, or they mark them: but whether they bring about whatever happens, what will the knowledge of an unchangeable thing profit? or whether they signify it, what does it matter to foresee what you cannot escape? whether you know these things or do not know them: they will come to pass. Thus Seneca.

Conclusion of the Seneca quotation begun on the previous page (Epistles—Ep. 88 in modern numbering, on the liberal arts). The verse couplet ('Frigida Saturni... Cyllenius erret in orbes') is carried with line breaks; 'Cyllenian fire' = Mercury. Seneca's point: whether the stars cause or merely signify events, foreknowledge of the unavoidable is useless. The '[scri]psit' completes 'scripsit' from the catchword of the prior page.

But see how wittily and philosophically Favorinus concluded this very thought in the briefest words:

Marginal gloss: "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libr. 14 cap. 1." Lead-in to Favorinus's celebrated dilemma against consulting astrologers.

Either, he says, they foretell adverse things, or prosperous. If they say prosperous and deceive, you will be made wretched by waiting in vain. If they say adverse and lie, you will be made wretched by fearing in vain. If they answer truly, and the things are not prosperous, you will already be made wretched in your mind before you are made so by Fate. If they promise happy things, and these are to come to pass, then there will plainly be two disadvantages: both expectation will weary you, kept in suspense by hope, and hope will already have deflowered for you the fruit of the future joy. In no way, therefore, are

men of this kind, who presage future things, to be employed. Thus Favorinus.

Favorinus's dilemma (Gellius, Noctes Atticae 14.1): every astrological prediction makes you wretched—a false prosperous one (vain waiting), a false adverse one (vain fearing), a true adverse one (anticipated grief), and even a true prosperous one (anxious suspense, and joy spoiled in advance by hope). So such men should never be consulted.

BUT this most of all proves the vanity of astrological predictions: for the Astrologers dare even to predict and promise that someone will be, for example, Supreme Pontiff. And yet the advancement of anyone to the supreme Pontificate depends not on his own or any one other man's will or power, but on the will and votes of very many Cardinals, whose office it is to create the Supreme Pontiff. Wherefore, that it may be certainly foretold that Peter, for example, will be Pope, it is not enough to know the composition of the stars which was in the heaven when Peter was born; but at the same time it would be necessary for the Astrologer to have examined and known all the positions and constellations of the stars under which were born all those whose concurrence of wills and votes will be necessary for creating that Pope. Wherefore, if what Suetonius relates in his Augustus is true—that Nigidius Figulus, most noted among the Romans in this kind of astrology, when the hour of Augustus's birth had been received and his natal stars observed, exclaimed that the master of the world had been born—it must surely be reckoned that he said it neither knowingly nor by any certain reasoning, but rashly and by chance, and that it happened by accident that it turned out as he had predicted. For the promotion of Augustus, through many degrees of honor up to the supreme principate[...]

Marginal gloss: "Inanis praedictio Nigidii Figuli de futuro Augusti dominatu." The papal-election argument: to predict a man will be Pope, one must know not only his nativity but the nativities of all the Cardinals who will elect him—impossible. So Nigidius Figulus's reported exclamation at Augustus's birth (Suetonius, Aug. 94, 'the master of the world is born') was a lucky guess, not knowledge. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'multi').

— p. 300 (PDF) · printed p. 259 —

...and the Monarchy, depended on the zeal, favor, and effort of many men, so that, for so great a dominion and empire of Augustus to be certainly foreknown and foretold, the consideration of Augustus's generation and birth alone could by no means have been enough. For the natal stars of Augustus could have no force over those who were the supporters and helpers of Augustus for attaining the principate: namely, many of them had been born several years either before or after Augustus. SIXTH REASON. Every science and art is occupied with those things which either always, or at least frequently, so come to pass that they may be taught by it; but the things which are outside these and happen most rarely, because they have nothing fixed and certain, can on that account constitute no science or art. Since therefore the predictions of the Astrologers are mostly false, and are truthful only very rarely, it is plain enough that they proceed not from any art and sure observations, but are blabbed by them ignorantly, inconsiderately, and rashly. Wherefore Favorinus repeatedly warned that men should beware lest the Chaldeans by some means creep into their confidence, because they seemed sometimes to blab or scatter some true things:

Marginal glosses: "Sexta ratio. Ars et scientia in his versantur quae semper aut plurimum eveniunt; non est Astromantia"; "Phauorinus apud Aulum Gellium libro 14 cap. 1." Augustus's rise depended on many men's help (born years before/after him), so his nativity alone could not foretell it. SIXTH REASON: every science treats of what happens always or usually; astrology's predictions, mostly false and only rarely true, come from no art but rash blabbing. Favorinus warns against trusting the Chaldeans' occasional lucky truths:

For they speak, he said, things neither grasped, nor defined, nor perceived, but, leaning on slippery and roundabout guesswork, they go advancing step by step, as if through darkness, between false things and true: and either by much trying they suddenly fall, unaware, upon the truth, or, the great credulity of those who consult them leading the way, they cunningly arrive at the things which are true: and for that reason they seem to imitate the truth more easily in past things than in future. Yet all those things which they say truly, whether rashly or

cunningly, compared with the others, he says, which they lie about, are not a thousandth part. Thus Favorinus in Gellius.

Favorinus (Gellius 14.1): the Chaldeans grasp, define, and perceive nothing, but grope between true and false ‘as if through darkness’—stumbling on truth by trial, or led to it by their clients' credulity; so they hit the truth more easily about the past than the future. Yet their occasional truths are not a thousandth part of their lies.

But hear what was written to the same effect in the second book On Divination in Cicero. What more, he says? the Chaldeans are refuted daily. How many things I remember said by the Chaldeans to Pompey, how many to Crassus, how many to this very Caesar—that none of them would die except in old age, except at home, except in glory—so that it seems to me most strange that anyone still exists who even now believes those whose predictions he sees daily refuted by fact and outcomes. Seneca, in that little book whose title is The Game on the Death of Claudius Caesar, at the beginning brings in Mercury procuring the death of Claudius before the Fates; and, to mock in passing the vanity of the Chaldeans, among the other reasons by which Mercury tries to induce the Fates to the slaying of Claudius, he brings forward this—that the wretched Chaldeans, namely, may not so often lie: Allow, he says, the astrologers at last to speak truth, who, ever since he was made prince, every year, every month, carry him out to burial. For those astrologers used to predict that Claudius would die in each several year and month: which befalls the astrologers of our time also, by whom we hear the deaths of the Supreme Pontiffs foretold for each several year and even month—and we laugh. Saint Ambrose, in the fourth book on the Hexameron, chapter seven:

Cicero (De Divinatione 2): the Chaldeans told Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar each would die old, at home, in glory—all refuted by events. Seneca's satire Ludus in mortem Claudii Caesaris (the Apocolocyntosis): Mercury urges the Fates to kill Claudius so ‘the astrologers may for once tell the truth,’ since they had ‘buried’ him every year and month since his accession. The same with our astrologers, who foretell popes' deaths yearly—and are laughed at. (Leads into the Ambrose quote that follows.)

When, he says, a few days before, there was talk of rain, which was said to be going to be useful, a certain man said, Behold, the New Moon will give it; and although we were desirous of showers, yet I did not want assertions of this kind to be true. In short, I was delighted that no rain was poured out, until, granted to the prayers of the Church, it might make manifest that one must hope not from the beginnings of the Moon, but from the providence and mercy of the Creato[r]...

Ambrose, Hexameron 4 (cap. 7). The block quote spans printed pp. 259–260. A few days before, someone predicted useful rain ‘at the New Moon’; though longing for showers, Ambrose did not want the astrological assertion to come true—and was glad no rain fell until it was granted to the Church's prayers. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Creato’).

— p. 301 (PDF) · printed p. 260 —

...of the Creator: by which example both the vanity of that astrology was confuted, and the efficacy of Christian piety and the power of religious prayers was proved in very fact.

Conclusion of Ambrose's quote (Hexameron 4): the rain came only when granted to the Church's prayers, showing one must hope from the Creator's providence, not the Moon's phases—thereby refuting astrology's vanity and proving the power of Christian prayer.

Albumasar, the prince of this astrological superstition, from the observation and precepts of this art predicted that the Christian law would last no more than one thousand four hundred and sixty years: but it is well, that, after that time, 128 years now being completed, it plainly demonstrates his prediction to be false. Abraham the Jew foretold from astrological observations that the Messiah awaited by the Jews would come in the year one thousand four hundred sixty-four after the birth of our Lord: because, namely, there would then be the same composition of the stars which there had been of old, when Moses led the Hebrew people out of Egypt: the vanity of which prediction the very day has refuted. Pierre d'Ailly leaves it in writing that, in the year in which the General Council was held at Constance to take away the schism which had afflicted the

Church for many years, the Astrologers of that time predicted that there would be no peace and concord in the Church, but that, by the disposition of the heaven and the configuration of the stars, the greatest dissensions were foresignified, with vast detriment and ruin to the Christian religion. And yet, through that Council of Constance, that long and pernicious schism was extinguished in that very year, peace and tranquillity being restored to the Church. Which outcome, plainly contrary to the predictions of the Astrologers, ought surely to have moved Pierre d'Ailly much, to have no faith thereafter in that astrology: but especially, since he himself—whether deceived by his own observations, or preoccupied and circumvented by others' opinions—had feared that so grave and hateful a schism would shortly bring forth Antichrist into the world.

A catalogue of failed astrological predictions. Albumasar (Abu Ma■shar) predicted the Christian law would last no more than 1,460 years—refuted, 128 years now past that term. Abraham Judaeus (Abraham ibn Ezra) predicted the Jews' Messiah would come in A.D. 1464 (when the astral configuration of the Exodus would recur)—refuted by the day itself. Pierre d'Ailly records that astrologers predicted no peace at the Council of Constance—yet that Council ended the Great Western Schism that very year; an outcome that should have shaken d'Ailly's faith in astrology (he had even feared the schism would soon bring forth Antichrist).

Albumasar, the coryphaeus of those Astrologers, praises certain revolutions of Saturn (I know not what): for he affirms that, as often as Saturn has completed ten circuits of its orb—that is, three hundred years being completed—always certain great and very notable things come to pass. For three hundred years after Alexander, he says, there appeared Arelafor son of Bel, who crushed the Persians; and next after, three hundred more years having passed, there appeared Jesus, the master and leader of the Christians. O shameful ignorance of history (■νιστορησ■αν)! O incredible ignorance of the times! For neither was there then that son of Bel who broke and afflicted the Persians, and Christ our Lord was born not six hundred years after Alexander (as this man lies), but only three hundred and twenty years after the death of Alexander. Although, who would wonder at Albumasar's slip in this, when he erred so notably about Ptolemy

the Mathematician, whom he makes one of the Ptolemies, kings of Egypt, who ruled the Egyptians after Alexander the Great? when it is in confession that Ptolemy the Mathematician was no king, and flourished under the emperor Hadrian, more than one hundred and sixty years later than the last of the Ptolemy kings of Egypt.

Albumasar's ‘great Saturn-revolutions’ (every 300 years a great event): he claimed that 300 years after Alexander appeared ‘Arelafor son of Bel’ who crushed the Persians, and 300 years after that, Jesus. Pererius retorts with the Greek ■νιστορησι■αν (anistor■sian, ‘want of historical knowledge’): no such ‘son of Bel’ existed then, and Christ was born only 320 years after Alexander's death, not 600. Albumasar also confused Ptolemy the astronomer (who flourished under Hadrian, no king) with the Ptolemy kings of Egypt—an error of 160+ years.

The Astrologers likewise boast that there was never among men, at any time, a change of laws, by the coming of any noble Prophet, nor any introduction of a new relig[ion]...

Marginal gloss (overleaf): "Aliquot errata circa Chronologiam Albumazaris." The astrologers' boast that no great event ever occurred without a great conjunction of stars preceding. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘relig’).

— p. 302 (PDF) · printed p. 261 —

...introduction of a new religion, nor any conversion of great kingdoms, nor finally any notable and memorable accident or event, but that some great conjunction of the stars—especially, indeed, of Saturn and Jupiter—went before. This constellation, they say, inaugurated the nascent world; that one prepared the flood; another begot Abraham or Moses; that one foretold the coming of Jesus; another preceded the law of Mahomet: which things, how futile, fabricated, and full of error they are, can be established even by this one argument.

The great-conjunction theory: the astrologers assign every world-historical event (the creation, the flood, Abraham/Moses, Christ's coming, Mahomet's law) to a great conjunction of stars, especially Saturn and Jupiter. Pererius will refute it from a single argument (the false chronology underlying it).

Pierre d'Ailly, most foolishly believing and most vainly rejoicing in such fictions, in his book On the Concord of History and Astrology, for proving that which we have just now taught from the sense of the Astrologers, lays down this as a kind of foundation: that from the beginning of the world up to the flood there flowed two thousand two hundred forty-two years; but from the flood to the coming and birth of Christ the Lord, three thousand one hundred and two years. This being laid down, he strives to prove that whatever very memorable and notable thing happened anywhere on earth at any time, at that same time some great constellation appeared in the heaven. But in truth, since the computation of years on which, as on a foundation, their reasoning and doctrine is propped up, is plainly false, is it not consequent that the things drawn and depending from that computation are false? For from Adam to the flood it is established from the sacred writings that no more than one thousand six hundred fifty-six years passed—fewer, namely, than they reckon by nearly six hundred years: whence it comes about that the constellation which these men say was at the beginning of the world must have preceded the world by six hundred years. Next, the time which intervened between the flood and the coming of Christ the Lord did not even fill the number of two thousand four hundred years. From which it is effected that the conjunction of the stars which they say preceded the flood by two hundred years could have existed only six hundred eighty-four years after the flood.

Marginal gloss: "Quam multa peccaverit contra veram Chronographiam Petrus Aliacensis in suis rationibus Astrologicis." Pierre d'Ailly, in De Concordia astronomiae cum historica narratione, posits 2,242 years from creation to the flood, and 3,102 from the flood to Christ. Pererius refutes both from Scripture's chronology: only 1,656 years from Adam to the flood (nearly 600 fewer), so the supposed creation-conjunction would precede the world by 600 years; and fewer than 2,400 years from flood to Christ, so the conjunction said to precede the flood by 200 years would actually fall 684 years after it.

Besides, they say the fourth great conjunction was nine hundred forty-two years after the flood, namely sixteen years before Abraham was born: whom, however, it is clear from the sacred Chronology was born two

hundred ninety-two years after the flood: wherefore it is necessary that that fourth conjunction happened six hundred thirty years after the birth of Abraham. To these things, they noted the sixth great conjunction to have been two hundred twenty-five years before Christ—falsely, of course: for they rely on the aforesaid computation of years from the flood to the coming of Christ, which we have shown to be faulty; nay, if we follow the true Chronology, it would be necessary that that sixth conjunction happened nearly six hundred years after the birth of Christ the Lord. Lastly, how rude and utterly inexperienced Pierre d'Ailly was in true Christian Chronography can be made manifest even by this one indication: he affirms that in the seven hundredth year from the birth of Christ, at which[...]

More chronological refutation: d'Ailly's ‘fourth great conjunction’ (942 years after the flood, 16 before Abraham) is wrong, since Scripture puts Abraham's birth 292 years after the flood—so it falls 630 years after Abraham. The ‘sixth great conjunction’ (225 years before Christ) is likewise false (resting on the bad flood-to-Christ count); on true chronology it would fall ~600 years after Christ. A final proof of d'Ailly's ignorance of chronography is coming. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘tempus’; signature K 3).

— p. 303 (PDF) · printed p. 262 —

...to which time he refers the seventh great conjunction, [saying] that there was born in the Church a plague of Heretics, but especially that which was of the Arians: whose heresy, however, having arisen about the three hundredth year of the Lord, was extinguished before the six hundredth. Who therefore would doubt that so many of these men's predictions, propped on most lying chronologies, are empty and false? But why do I gather examples of false predictions, of which both the History of all ages is full and common life is crammed? Indeed I think that, as difficult as it is to find any predictions of the Astrologers about the future events of human affairs true—even by chance and accident—so easy is it to find innumerable of their predictions plainly false and confuted by the very facts and outcomes. Cato wittily said that he wondered the soothsayer did not laugh when he had seen another soothsayer: for how few of the things

predicted by these men come to pass? or if anything does happen, what can be brought forward why it did not happen by chance? What Cato said of the soothsayers fits the astrologers most aptly: so that it ought to seem strange, since we are not wont to believe a lying man even when he tells the truth, how we should simply believe them, if even one of their predictions has turned out true—and should not rather deny credit to the one on account of the many false ones, than wish to confirm innumerable falsehoods by the one that turned out true by chance.

Marginal gloss: "Lepidum Catonis dictum, ut refert Cicer. lib. 2 de Divinatione, in Astrologos belle competens." Pierre d'Ailly's seventh great conjunction supposedly produced the heresies, chiefly Arianism—yet Arianism arose c. A.D. 300 and died before 600. History and daily life teem with such failed predictions. Cato's famous quip (Cicero, De Div. 2.51) that he wondered one haruspex did not laugh on seeing another fits the astrologers: since we disbelieve a liar even when truthful, one true prediction should not win them credit against their countless false ones.

But someone will say that the Astrologers are sometimes truthful, and predict things which the outcome of the matter confirms. They predict, certainly, but inconsiderately, ignorantly, rashly: for who is there that, hurling all day long, does not sometimes hit the mark? It can be most truly said of the Astrologers what someone once said of the oracles of Apollo: that the ones which had been true were held in memory and proclaimed, but the false ones no one remembered, or they were passed over in silence by all: for those who defended the truth of those oracles harped in frequent talk on the few true ones, and pressed down the many false ones in silence; while those who despised them all cared neither for the true nor the false. But the causes why the predictions of the Chaldeans often seem to be true, we shall disclose at the end of this disputation. SEVENTH REASON. If this divinatory Astrology were true and certain, it would without any doubt be the noblest part of all Philosophy, and the most desired and most honored by men: both on account of the dignity and excellence of the subject which it treats (the heaven, I mean, and the stars), and on account of the foreknowledge of future things—but especially of the life and death and chances and events of men; things which mortals are most eager and

curious to know. But since that doctrine has, in every age, been despised, derided, and condemned by all the most excellent Philosophers—nay, even by Astrologers—it is surely the greatest argument that it has been judged by them futile and empty, and void of all reason, faith, and honesty. Xenophon, in his book on the sayings of Socrates (which Eusebius also reports in book[...]

Marginal glosses: "Nos et hos. Lector."; "Septima ratio. Astromantiam omni tempore a viris sapientibus, prudentibus, quin etiam Astrologis esse contemptam, damnatam." Objection: astrologers are sometimes truthful. Answer: yes, but rashly—who, hurling all day, never hits the mark? Like Apollo's oracles, the true ones are remembered, the false hushed up. (The causes of their apparent successes will be given at the disputation's end.) SEVENTH REASON: were astrology true, it would be the noblest, most-honored part of philosophy; yet it has in every age been despised even by philosophers and astrologers—proof it is futile. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'libro').

— p. 304 (PDF) · printed p. 263 —

...[Eusebius] in the fourteenth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter four, relates that Socrates was wont to say that the knowledge of future things which are in the power of God is not to be procured by men: for men cannot know those things, nor is it pleasing to God if mortals wish too studiously and curiously to pry into the things which He has hidden. Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, having undertaken very long travels, went to the Magi of the Persians, the wise men of the Chaldeans, and the priests of the Egyptians, from whom they learned certain more hidden things pertaining either to the Mathematical disciplines or to the religion and worship of the Gods: but divinatory Astrology they either neglected to learn from them, or, if they did learn it also, it is clearly seen from their writings that they certainly never used it. Aristotle—what a man, and how great! how skillful, how subtle and copious in the doctrine of Celestial things!—how, although he expounded these diligently in several books, yet nowhere made any mention at all of astrology of this kind. And although in the books of the Meteorologica, and On the Parts and Generation of Animals, but especially in the book of Problems, he investigates the causes of many obscure and wonderful things, for the unraveling of no question or

the explanation of any wonderful effect did he use the help and aid of this Astrology. Nay, there are many things in his writings which wholly overthrow that doctrine of the Astrologers, such as this:

Socrates (Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1; via Eusebius, Praep. ev. 14.4) said knowledge of the future in God's power is not to be sought—men cannot know it, nor does God like such prying into what He hid. Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato visited the Persian Magi, Chaldean sages, and Egyptian priests, learning hidden mathematics or religion—but neglected or never used divinatory astrology. Aristotle, so subtle in celestial doctrine, never mentions this astrology in the Meteorologica, De Partibus/Generatione animalium, or Problemata; indeed his teachings overthrow it.

that there is no certain and determinate truth of future contingents; that the things which happen by accident, and which happen rarely or in either of two ways, cannot be grasped by science; that chance and fortune are at work in human affairs, which escape the certain understanding of man; that the proximate and proper causes of particular and corruptible effects are themselves particular and corruptible, and that on that account, for the perfect knowledge of them, it is not enough to contemplate the celestial and universal causes; that the heaven acts upon the things which are beneath the moon in no other way than by motion and light. Nor did Aristotle almost anywhere indicate, besides the sun and the moon, the force and efficacy of the other stars. He also taught this, very contrary to the tenets of the Astrologers: that the celestial signs even of corporeal and sensible effects can be averted and impeded by other causes. Cicero, in the second book On Divination, praises Eudoxus, in the age of Plato and Aristotle the Prince of Astrologers; likewise Panaetius the Stoic, and Archelaus too, and Cassander and Scylax of Halicarnassus, the most noted astrologers of their time, who repudiated this whole scheme of Astrology. Avicenna, who after Hippocrates and Galen holds the Princedom of Medicine, in the last book of the First Philosophy denies that the Astrologers are to be believed in the divination of future things, because they neither hold the celestial points[...]

Marginal gloss: "Sententia Aristotelis, qua Astromantiam e medio tollunt." Aristotle's anti-astrology tenets: future contingents have no determinate truth; the accidental/rare/either-way can't be grasped by science; chance and fortune escape certain knowledge; particular corruptible effects have

particular corruptible proximate causes (so universal celestial causes don't suffice); heaven acts on sublunars only by motion and light; he names no star-force besides sun and moon; and celestial signs can be averted by other causes. Cicero (De Div. 2) names astrologers who rejected the art—Eudoxus, Panaetius, Archelaus, Cassander, Scylax of Halicarnassus. Avicenna (Metaphysics, last book) denies the astrologers should be believed. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'caelestia').

— p. 305 (PDF) · printed p. 264 —

...the celestial points, nor have a clear view of the natures of the inferior things, fully necessary for making a judgment about future matters; nor do they rely on demonstrations, but on oratorical and poetical proofs. Ptolemy, whom these men say they follow as the prince and leader of this art, in the first book On Judgments, chapter 3, says: One must not think that all things are derived directly from the higher causes by a certain inviolable necessity, such that no other force is able to resist their so operating. The same man, in his treatise which they commonly call the Centiloquium—that is, of a hundred sayings—his first saying runs thus: Only those inspired by a divine name foretell particular future things. And the fifth saying is of this kind: He who is knowing can avert many effects of the stars when he has known their nature, and has duly prepared himself before their event: whence flowed that saying worn smooth in the talk of many, The wise man will rule the stars. Porphyry, in his book On Oracles, confessed that exact knowledge of future things from the inspection of the stars is incomprehensible not only to mortals, but even to many of the gods. The same man, in the Life of Plotinus, writes that Plotinus, when he had spent a good deal of time, study, and labor on this Astrology, at last discovered that the judgments and divination of future things of the Astrologers are not to be believed; and that he confuted that divination both in speech and in writings: which is manifest to anyone reading his books On Fate and Providence, but especially that one which is entitled, Whether the Stars Do Anything.

Avicenna concludes: astrologers grasp neither the celestial points nor the natures of inferior things, and rely on rhetorical/poetic, not demonstrative, proofs. Ptolemy himself (Tetrabiblos/'De Iudiciis' 1.3) denies an inviolable astral necessity; his Centiloquium, saying 1 ('only the divinely inspired

foretell particulars') and saying 5 (the knowing man can avert star-effects) yield the proverb 'Sapiens dominabitur astris' ('the wise man will rule the stars'). Porphyry (De Oraculis) confessed exact star-divination is incomprehensible even to many gods; his Life of Plotinus reports Plotinus rejected and refuted astrology (esp. in his treatise 'Whether the Stars Do Anything,' Enneads 2.3).

If, further, this Astrology were true and certain, it would surely bring very much help, by the provision of future things, toward well ruling and administering the commonwealth, and for that reason the Astrologers would have been in great honor and glory among Kings and the Princes of commonwealths: but quite the contrary has happened. For we find that art exploded and condemned by the severest decrees and edicts of many Princes, and subjected to the gravest punishments. How often were the Astrologers, or Chaldeans, cast out of Rome under the prince Diocletian, Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, but especially Justinian! by whom the study and practice of this art was not only judged empty and void of truth, but was even always seen as detestable, as harmful and pestilent to cities and to the society of men. But what need is there, in a manifest matter which requires no crowd of witnesses, to set down a longer speech? I dare to say that, within the memory of men, there has scarcely been anyone at any time, whether by greatness of genius, or excellence of learning, or pru[dence...]

Marginal glosses: "Professores divinandi futura ex astris, publicis multorum Principum decretis esse civitatibus eiectos"; "Cui generi hominum praedictiones Astrologorum arrideat et probentur, cui autem minime." Were astrology true it would aid governing the state, so kings would honor astrologers—yet the opposite: severe imperial decrees condemned it. The Chaldeans were repeatedly expelled from Rome under Diocletian, Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, and especially Justinian, the art judged empty and pestilent to society. Pererius adds that scarcely any truly great man ever valued it. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'dentiae').

— p. 306 (PDF) · printed p. 265 —

...by excellence of civil prudence, or by remarkable integrity of morals, or finally by some notable distinction—a noble and memorable man, who did not count the predicted nativities of the Chaldeans as mere trifles and refuse, and utterly despise them. Only the stupid crowd—dull of

understanding, weak in judging, easily credulous, and curious to hear and learn new and marvelous things—willingly lends both its ears and its faith to those triflers. Certain very light minds too delight in these fictions—minds greedy of gain rather than of truth, turbulent and seditious in the commonwealth of letters, always hostile to the nobles of wisdom, fastidious of useful things and of things known to others, but most avid of new and unknown things, and even of incomprehensible ones: minds, in short, to which it is not so much at heart and a care to know true things, as to seem to the crowd to know themselves those things which the highest masters of philosophy confess that they do not know. I shall conclude this argument with an excellent saying of Saint Ambrose. Thus writes Ambrose, in the fourth book on the Hexameron, chapter 4:

Scarcely any truly great man (of genius, learning, civic prudence, or integrity) ever valued the Chaldeans' predictions but utterly despised them as trifles. Only the dull, credulous crowd—and certain light minds, greedy for gain and novelty, hostile to true wisdom, eager to seem to know what the greatest philosophers confess they do not—give ear to these triflers. Pererius concludes the Seventh Reason with Ambrose (Hexameron 4.4):

The wisdom of the Chaldeans is compared to a spider's web, into which, if a gnat or a fly has fallen, it cannot extricate itself. But if any kind of stronger living creature has been seen to run into it, it has passed through and broken the toils, and scattered the weak and empty snares. Such are the nets of the Chaldeans, that in them the weak stick fast, while the stronger in mind can take no hurt. And so you, who are stronger, when you have seen the mathematicians, say: They weave a spider's web, which can have neither any use nor any binding-force—unless you, like a gnat or a fly, by the slip of your own weakness run into it; but, like a sparrow or a dove, by the swiftness of your soaring flight you dissolve their feeble snares.

Ambrose, Hexameron 4 (cap. 4): astrology is a spider's web—gnats and flies (the weak) stick fast, but stronger creatures break through and scatter the snares. So the strong-minded, seeing the astrologers, should say they weave a useless web, harmless to the soaring sparrow or dove who passes through by sheer swiftness of flight.

EIGHTH REASON. The foundations and supports of this art are either none, or certainly most weak and fragile: this art, therefore, uses no firm and stable reasoning for divining; wherefore it ought also to have no authority, faith, or probability among men. The first foundation of that doctrine is that the stars have all the qualities of the elements: for some, they say, are cold, some humid and dry—if not formally, at least virtually; that is, if not in act, at least in effect; if not by having those qualities in themselves, certainly by having the faculties productive of those qualities: they say Saturn is cold, Mars dry, the Moon humid. But both reason and experience confute this. Reason, indeed, because, just as all the stars are luminous and pour out light from themselves, so it is also necessary that they all be hot and heat-giving: for light, just as all of it heats of itself, cannot in the same way cool, or of itself moisten or dry. Let us stand by the tenets of the Astrologers, who say that the other stars, like the Moon, shine with light borrowed from the sun. If, then, the origin and principle of the light of all the stars is one and the same, how can the principle and power of acting be so manifold, dissimilar, and discrepant? Experience too refutes this very thing: for at the full moon, when the light of the Moon is fullest, the nights also (by the witness of Aristotle and of experience) turn out warmer. But the Astrologers have invented, besides light, other forces and faculties in the heaven and the stars—much diverse both from light and among themselves—and causes of wondrous works, which they call influences. A novel invention indeed, never approved by any of the ancient philosophers or Astrologers, and—if one may make a conjecture from their writings—not even known to them. But after influences had been invented and openly maintained by the more recent Astrologers, by others too they are taug[ht]...

Marginal glosses: "Octava ratio. Tria fundamenta Astromantiae convelluntur"; "Non esse ponendas in caelo influentias." EIGHTH REASON: the art's foundations are none or fragile. The FIRST foundation—that the stars have all the elemental qualities (Saturn cold, Mars dry, Moon humid)—is refuted by reason (all stars shine, so all must be hot; light heats but cannot of itself cool/moisten/dry; if all share one borrowed solar light, their powers cannot be so diverse) and by experience (nights are warmer at the full moon). The astrologers' answer—'influences' (influentiae), hidden powers besides

light—is a recent invention unknown to the ancients. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘doce’; signature L).

— p. 307 (PDF) · printed p. 266 —

...began to be taught and defended, what graver and more approved Philosopher from the Lyceum did not repudiate and condemn them? Someone wittily called them the Asylum of Ignorance: for to influences, as to their one refuge, they betake themselves, and cast themselves into this hiding-place, whoever cannot skillfully investigate and find the proper and natural causes of wonderful effects (hidden to vulgar minds not exercised in philosophy). And indeed, if influences are admitted, it can scarcely be told how greatly the strength of Philosophy is weakened, its dignity worn away, its authority lessened, its esteem diminished, and finally how the study and cultivation of it among men languishes. For what is the use of the illustrious minds of the Philosophers laboring with so much zeal and effort in searching out and digging up the hidden causes of things, when it is downhill work to seek and supply the reason of any effect from celestial influences? for what effect is there, whose natural and true cause is a little more obscure and abstruse, which it is not permitted to explain with no trouble through influences of this kind? Why does the magnet draw iron to itself? it will at once be answered: because its proper celestial influence has implanted that power in it. Whence has the Remora, so tiny a fish, the power to stop a most rapid ship? the answer is ready: namely, from a certain celestial influence, which has strengthened that little fish with so much force and power. Why do I delay? there will be no problem, nothing in the nature of things so recondite and remote from our understanding—nothing, in short, of those things whose investigation has wearied and racked the minds of the greatest Philosophers—which anyone from the circle of unlearned astrologer-men cannot dispatch with one word, namely by these influences.

Once ‘influences’ were taught, the graver Peripatetic philosophers rejected them; someone wittily called them ‘the Asylum of Ignorance’ (Asylum ignorantiae)—the refuge of those who cannot find true

natural causes. Admitting them saps philosophy: why labor for hidden causes when any effect can be ascribed to a celestial influence? Why does the magnet draw iron, or the tiny Remora stop a ship? ‘A celestial influence.’ No problem is so deep that an unlearned astrologer cannot dispatch it with one word: ‘influences.’

But I labor too long: I will therefore return to my purpose. If Saturn, because it is luminous, heats by light, how does the same star cool by influence? is it not absurd that in the same star there are two faculties, one of heating, the other of cooling, not merely diverse but even opposite and contrary? We see it so arranged by nature that, in all things in which there are two differences or properties (to speak in the philosophical manner)—one general, which is common to one thing with many others, the other special and proper to that thing (such as, in man, to be sentient and to be rational)—the special difference and property is always nobler and more perfect than the general, as that which contracts and determines it, adjoining to it a new degree and rationale of perfection; as is clear in the aforesaid example of man, in whom the rational is nobler than the sentient. But quite the opposite holds in this marvelous doctrine of the Astrologers. For they teach that in Saturn (for example) there are two properties or faculties of acting: one general and common to it with all the stars, which is the power of illuminating and, through illumination, of heating; the other[...]

Marginal gloss: "Argumentatio contra influentias." The argument against ‘influences’: if Saturn heats by light, how does it also cool by influence?—two contrary faculties in one star is absurd. By nature, where a thing has a general and a special property, the special is always nobler (as rational over sentient in man). But the astrologers reverse this: in Saturn the general faculty (illuminating + heating) and a special faculty (cooling)... Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘alteram’).

— p. 308 (PDF) · printed p. 267 —

...the other special and proper to Saturn, by which principle it differs from the other stars, which is the faculty of cooling, or some other force of some influence. But it is certain that celestial light is far nobler than any other celestial quality, and that the faculty of heating is more excellent than the faculty of cooling. Moreover, that there should be in any thing two

faculties and properties natural to that thing, of which one (as we said) is general, the other particular, and contrary to one another (such as in Saturn, according to these men, are the power of heating by light and of cooling by influence)—neither does the nature of things bear it, and reason itself decides that it cannot happen. For although in a multiform body, and one which the Greeks call Heterogeneous, contrary qualities and faculties can reside in different parts—as happens in the human body, in the brain and in the heart—yet this cannot suit the star of Saturn, which is, in all its parts, of one form and nature: for one part of it does not have light and another influence, but as the whole is endowed with light, so it is fitting that in the whole there be influence. In short (for it is not suitable, in a place foreign to it, to dispute subtly of influences against the Astrologers), there is argument enough to do away with influences: that the true, natural, and proper causes and rationales of all things which are produced in the nature of things—though they seem new, singular, and wonderful—can be fully, abundantly, and most probably sought and drawn from two celestial principles, which are conspicuous to all, explored by daily experiments: I mean motion and light. Furthermore, the figures and effigies of the stars which the Astrologers mark out in the Zodiac, rendering the likeness of certain animals or men, the Astrologers reckon to have great force at the birth of each: although in themselves and by their own nature they are not such, but consist only in the imagination of those men, so feigned and figured by them; for they could also be feigned to the likeness of other animals, of houses, towers, tables, or other things. Wherefore it is very frivolous and ridiculous to think that any weight for divining is placed in figures of this kind.

The influences-argument concluded: Saturn's special faculty (cooling) would be contrary to its general one (heating by light)—but light is nobler than any other celestial quality, and two contrary natural faculties cannot coexist in a uniform body (unlike a 'heterogeneous' body, e.g. the human, with contrary qualities in brain and heart). So 'influences' should be discarded: all natural effects can be derived from two principles known by daily experience—motion and light. Likewise the zodiac figures (animal/human shapes) have no real power: they exist only in the astrologers' imagination and could as well be figured as houses or tables.

The SECOND foundation of the Astrologers is that the natal stars of each one are to be observed: for from these all the chances and events of life can be foreseen and foreknown. But who does not see that this foundation is most weak? for why do the Astrologers not rather observe the time, and the state of the heaven and the stars, in which each one was conceived, formed, and animated in the womb? since in that there seems to be more weight for divining: for then first the man exists, and then first the celestial force is received and impressed in the man. For before (for nine months each one was in the womb) he was subject to the power and action of the heavens. Why, likewise, do they not consider[...]

Marginal glosses: "Alterum Astromantiae fundamentum"; "Quam inane sit natalitia cuiusque hominis astra observare ad divinandum." The SECOND foundation: each one's natal stars are to be observed. But this is most weak: why not rather observe conception (when one is formed and animated in the womb), which seems weightier for divining—for then the man first exists and first receives the celestial force, having been subject to the heavens for the nine months in the womb? Continues onto the next page (catchword 'Astro').

— p. 309 (PDF) · printed p. 268 —

...the Astrologers the other constellations and celestial influxes which befall a man more often after birth? Since it usually comes about that those celestial powers are more notable in effect, and more potent to change a man, than those which existed at the time of his birth: for that effect and influx of the stars, impressed on the man as he is born, must necessarily be varied, the temperament of the human body being often changed—whether on account of other powerful constellations, or on account of education, or on account of a varied custom and manner of living, or on account of the ancestral laws, to whose norm each one is compelled to conform his life, morals, pursuits, and actions. What of this, that perhaps nothing of that primal matter, which each one had at birth, remains in extreme old age? for this has seemed so to great and many Philosophers: nor does Saint Thomas, in the first part, the last question, the first article, seem to deny it. This being granted, the force of that first celestial influx and effect, implanted and impressed on the man at his birth, must necessarily at last vanish

entirely: unless someone imagines that a celestial power of this kind migrates from subject to subject, as if changing dwellings from house to house; or, when it foresees its own destruction, substitutes in its place another power like itself and, as it were, vicarious.

Marginal gloss: "An aliquid primigeniae materiae hominis maneat per totam vitam." Why don't the astrologers consider the constellations befalling a man after birth—often more potent to change him than those at birth? The birth-impression must vary as the body's temperament changes (by other constellations, education, custom, ancestral laws). And perhaps nothing of one's primal birth-matter remains in old age (so great philosophers held, and Aquinas, Summa I, q. 119, a. 1, seems not to deny)—in which case the birth-influx vanishes entirely, unless one absurdly imagines it migrating from body to body or substituting a vicarious power.

But that there is more weight, or at least no less, in the conception of a man than in his birth, their master Ptolemy is a rich witness. For in the third book of the Apotelesmata he writes thus:

Marginal gloss: "Plus esse momenti in conceptu hominis quam in eius ortu. Ptolemaeus." Pererius now turns the astrologers' own master against them: Ptolemy himself (Tetrabiblos/Apotelesmata, bk 3) testifies that conception weighs more than (or at least as much as) birth:

When some temporal beginning of a man is to be established, that will indeed by nature and of itself be the beginning when the seed is admitted into the genital womb; but in potency and by accident, when at the hour of birth the infant comes forth. Whoever therefore has detected the hour of the admitted seed, whether by chance or by observation, ought rather to follow it in discerning the properties of body and soul, considering what the configurations of the stars are at that time: for since once, from the beginning, the seed is disposed to a certain quality by the condition of the surrounding air, although it be varied through the times of the consequent formation, yet, because it naturally draws to itself its own kindred matter, it will be assimilated still more to the disposition of its first quality. Thus far Ptolemy in that place.

Ptolemy, Apotelesmatica (Tetrabiblos) 3.1: the natural, essential beginning of a man is conception (when the seed is admitted to the womb); birth is only a potential, accidental beginning. So whoever knows the hour of conception should follow it in judging the body and soul; for the seed, once given a quality by the surrounding air, keeps assimilating to that first disposition as it draws its kindred matter.

By which words he teaches not obscurely that the first and natural and most efficacious beginning of a man is the admission of the seed and the conception of the man, and that one must chiefly insist and adhere to this beginning for foreknowing the affections and events of men, both those which pertain to the body and those which pertain to the soul. But because Ptolemy well knew that that point of time, whether of the admitted seed or of the conception, can scarcely be known by the Astrologers, lest he should seem to undermine their judgments and divinations which they draw from the birth of a man, he at once added: But those who are ignorant of the hour of the seminal beginning, it is necessary for them to follow the beginning of nativity. Haly, a noble Astrologer, in that book which he wrote On Elections, frankly confesses that the efficacy of deciding the Fate of a m[an]...

Pererius's gloss: Ptolemy plainly makes conception the first, natural, most efficacious principle—but, knowing that exact point can scarcely be known, he added the dodge that those ignorant of the conception-hour must follow the birth-hour. Haly (Ali ibn Ridwan), in his book On Elections, likewise admits the power to decide a man's Fate lies in conception. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘minis’).

— p. 310 (PDF) · printed p. 269 —

...of a man is in the hour of conception: but because this is not known by the Astrologers, therefore they have taken refuge in the hour of nativity. Nay, when the Astrologers are pressed by the argument of twins (whose birth, though it be the same, yet their outcome and end is different), they are wont to answer that the diversity of the events which are in twins arose from the diversity of their conception.

Conclusion of the Haly citation: the power to decide a man's Fate lies in conception, but since astrologers cannot know it, they fall back on the birth-hour. And when pressed by the twins-argument

(same birth, different outcomes), they answer that the difference came from a difference of conception—conveniently appealing to a conception they admit they cannot determine.

But see how far the audacity and impudence of these men has gone: they profess that even the fates of cities, not of men only, can be foreknown and foretold by this art; for, the composition of the stars which existed when the cities were founded being observed, all their chances and events can be foreseen and foreknown. A certain Tarutius the Mathematician did this for the city of Rome, at the request of Varro, as Plutarch relates in his Romulus: which history Cicero, in the second book On Divination, narrates in these words:

Marginal gloss: "Tarutius mathematicus, qui omnia quae urbi Romae contigerunt, ex constellatione sub qua ea urbs a Romulo condita est, ad vim Astrorum referebat." The astrologers' audacity extends to predicting the fates of cities from their founding-horoscope. Tarutius the Mathematician cast Rome's nativity at Varro's request (Plutarch, Romulus 12); Cicero (De Div. 2) tells the story:

> *A certain Lucius Tarutius Firmanus, our friend, deeply learned in Chaldean reckonings, traced back the birthday even of our own city to that feast of Pales on which we have received that it was founded by Romulus, and said that Rome was born when it was in the yoke of the Moon, and did not hesitate to chant its fates. O the greatest power of error! did even a city's birthday pertain to the force of the stars and of the moon? Grant that it matters, in a child, from what condition of the sky he drew his first breath: could this have had any force in the brick or mortar of which the city was made? Thus Cicero.*

Cicero, De Divinatione 2.98: L. Tarutius Firmanus, learned in Chaldean astrology, cast a horoscope for Rome itself—dating its founding to the Parilia (feast of Pales) and saying it was 'born with the Moon in the yoke,' and chanting its fates. Cicero's scorn: even if a child's first breath under a given sky mattered, what force could the stars have on the brick and mortar of a city?

But I would indeed ask of these Astromancers whether they want their divination to avail also in living creatures and plants, as in man. If they deny it, they will of course betray their ignorance, and the weakness, emptiness, and fallacy of their art. For why should it not avail equally in

plants as in man? nay, why should it not avail more? for plants depend much more than man, by natural necessity, on the power and efficacy of the celestial bodies. And since fewer and less varied and less uncertain things are wont to happen to plants than to man, the divination of the things that are to befall plants ought surely to be easier than of those that are to befall man. But if they grant that Astrological divination avails in plants similarly as in men, I would amicably ask them to observe most diligently the state of the heaven and the stars, namely at that time when a plum, or cherry, or pear tree is planted, or when a sowing of wheat is made, and from that observation of the heaven to bring forth also prognostics about those trees: namely, to divine how great an abundance of plums, cherries, and pears those trees would bear; likewise how great a number of ears, from that sowing of wheat, and in each ear how great a number of grains, would come forth. If they deny that these can be foreknown by them, they must also of necessity confess that the future chances and events of men cannot be foreseen by them.

Marginal gloss: "Cur observatio astrologica non valeat aeque in stirpibus et animalibus quam in hominibus?" The animals-and-plants argument: does astrology work for plants and animals too? If not, the astrologers betray their art's emptiness—for plants depend even more than man on the heavens, and fewer things befall them, so divining about them should be easier. If yes, let them observe the sky when a plum/cherry/pear tree is planted or wheat sown, and predict the exact crop—how many plums, ears, and grains. Since they cannot, they must admit they cannot foresee men's futures either.

The THIRD foundation of the same Astrologers is that this art of theirs has been confirmed by the most certain experiments of innumerable ages, and by the most constant observations: for they say that this discipline went forth from the Egyptians and the Babylonians, or Chaldeans, mort[als]...

Marginal gloss: "Tertium fundamentum Astromantiae." The THIRD foundation: that the art is confirmed by the most certain experiments of countless ages and constant observations, the discipline having come from the Egyptians and Babylonians (Chaldeans). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘morta’; signature L 3).

— p. 311 (PDF) · printed p. 270 —

...the most ancient of all mortals. For Aristotle relates, in the second book On the Heaven, text 60, and at the end of the first book of the Meteorologica, that the Egyptians are held the oldest of all men; and at the beginning of the Metaphysics he affirms that the Egyptians, the oldest of all men, began to treat and cultivate the Mathematical studies. The Astrologers also once boasted that the Chaldeans had spent four hundred and seventy thousand years in testing and experimenting on children, whoever were born. But the falsehoods of these men are so open and obvious to all that there is no need for them to be confuted, or even pointed out, by us. For from the beginning of the world to this day not yet six thousand years have flowed by. And from the origin of the Chaldean nation (that is, after the overthrow of the tower of Babel, when the division of tongues was made) not yet four thousand years are complete. Pico della Mirandola, in chapter 2 of book 12 against the astrologers, brings forward, to refute the lying antiquity of the Astrologers, Hipparchus and Ptolemy, princes indeed of Astronomy: who, when they bring forward the observations of the ancients for establishing some doctrine, bring forward none older than those which were under Nebuchadnezzar, king of the Chaldeans, among the Egyptians and Babylonians; and from the beginning of the reign of King Nebuchadnezzar to the present year—which from the birth of our Lord is reckoned the one thousand five hundred and eighty-eighth—it is established that not more than two thousand two hundred and thirty-two years have passed. Furthermore, the fictitious antiquity of the Egyptian observations Augustine very wittily ridicules and refutes in chapter 40 of the eighteenth book of the City of God: for he writes thus:

Marginal gloss: "De vetustate Astrologiae apud Aegyptios et Chaldaeos." Refuting the Third Foundation (immemorial observations). The astrologers claim vast antiquity—Aristotle holds the Egyptians the oldest and first mathematicians, and they boast of 470,000 years of Chaldean infant-testing. But from creation to now is not yet 6,000 years; from the Chaldean nation's origin (after Babel) not yet 4,000. Pico (Disputationes 12.2) cites Hipparchus and Ptolemy: the oldest observations are those under Nebuchadnezzar, and from his reign to the present year—A.D. 1588 (which dates Pererius's composition)—only 2,232 years. Augustine (City of God 18.40):

> *In vain do some chatter, with a most vain presumption, saying that, from the time when Egypt grasped the science of the stars, more than a hundred thousand years are reckoned. For in what books did they gather that number—they who, not much before two thousand years ago, learned letters with Isis for their mistress? for no small authority in history is Varro, who reported this. Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, City of God 18.40: the Egyptian boast of 100,000 years of star-knowledge is absurd—in what books was it recorded, when the Egyptians learned letters (from Isis) less than 2,000 years before? (citing Varro).

But to this disputation, in which by eight arguments we have wished to prove that astrological divination is contrary to true Philosophy, we shall here set an end.

Pererius closes the disputation of the eight reasons (Caput Tertium) that judicial astrology is contrary to true philosophy.

That the stars are not only not causes, but not even signs, of future things. CHAPTER FOUR.

The fourth chapter, refuting the milder view that the stars, though not causes, are at least certain signs of future events.

Blessed Augustine, in the fifth book of the City of God, chapter 1, relates that there was an opinion of certain not-mediocrely learned men, to whom it seemed that the stars are not indeed causes of human events, but are nevertheless their true and certain signs. Origen indeed, certainly, in his tomes on Genesis (for so Eusebius records, in the sixth book of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter nine), when he was explaining those words which[...]

Augustine (City of God 5.1) records the opinion of certain learned men that the stars are not causes but true and certain signs of human events. Origen (in his Genesis commentaries, per Eusebius, Praep. ev. 6.9), expounding Gen 1:14 (‘and let them be for signs’)... Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘quae’).

— p. 312 (PDF) · printed p. 271 —

...those words which are in the first chapter of the book of Genesis, And let them be for signs (from which words, namely, we have woven the theme of this our disputation), he set forth that the stars were placed by God in the heaven so that, by their various aspects and conjunctions, they might presignify the things which, in the succeeding times, both universally and singly, were to come to pass—yet not bring them about. And so he called the heaven, as it were, a certain book in which God has painted and described whatever things, in the whole course of the world's age, are to be, each in its own time. To prove this, Origen cites a certain book whose title was The Narration of Joseph, once received among many into authority and credit: in which the Patriarch Jacob is brought in addressing his sons in this manner: I have read, he says, in the tablets of heaven whatever things shall befall you and your sons. And Plotinus, the fellow-disciple of Origen, held the same, and teaches it in the book which is entitled, Whether the Stars Do Anything; and in the book On Fate, chapter 6, he relates that this, besides, is the use of the stars: that those who look up at them and consider them as letters (those, namely, who know literature of this kind) may read the future, skillfully tracing out their signification and meaning from the figures themselves by a certain analogical comparison. Porphyry even affirms that, when he was vehemently thinking of killing himself, Plotinus foresaw this from heaven, and kept him from so great a crime.

Marginal gloss: "Liber qui inscribebatur Narratio Ioseph, ab Origene citatus." Origen, expounding Gen 1:14 (‘let them be for signs’—the disputation's theme), held the stars set by God to presignify future events by their aspects and conjunctions, not to cause them—heaven being like a ‘book’ in which God described all that will happen. He cites the (apocryphal) ‘Narration of Joseph,’ where Jacob says ‘I have read in the tablets of heaven whatever shall befall you.’ Plotinus (the Neoplatonist) held the same (‘Whether the Stars Do Anything’; On Fate ch. 6—the skilled read the future from the star-figures as from letters); Porphyry says Plotinus foresaw and prevented his own suicide-plan from the heavens.

This opinion Julius Sirenus, in the ninth book On Fate, chapter 35, judges by no means to be condemned; and, that he may show it to be probable, he

adorns and confirms it with several sentences brought forward from the divine Scripture. For this, he says, Isaiah indicates not obscurely, when he says, in chapter 34, They shall be folded together like the book of heaven. By which saying it is signified that the heavens, after the day of judgment, are to be rolled up and folded, as though now the heavens, after the manner of a certain book, were unrolled and open to us, doubtless for reading. To the same purpose belongs that which is in Psalm 25, The heavens shall announce his justice; and in Psalm 18, The heavens declare the glory of God; and that which is in the first chapter of the book of Genesis concerning the stars, Let them be for signs; and in Psalm 88, The heavens shall confess thy wonders, O Lord. Nor indeed, says Origen, does this opinion take away the free will of man—no more, surely, than the predictions of future things put forth by the holy Prophets, or the foreknowledge of all things which is in God. Plotinus said that the science of the stars (in this respect, that the stars are signs of human events) comes to a man either by some singular gift of God, or on account of an extraordinary skill in Astrology: for to acquire it there is need of the keenest searching and the highest cleverness.

Julius Sirenus (De Fato 9.35) defends this view with a Scripture catena: Isaiah 34:4 ('folded like a book'—the heavens lie open like a book to be read); Ps 50:6/Ps 19:1/Gen 1:14/Ps 89:5. Origen: this does not destroy free will, any more than the Prophets' predictions or God's foreknowledge do. Plotinus: the science of the stars-as-signs comes either by a singular gift of God or by extraordinary astrological skill.

But Julius Sirenus thinks that not even Augustine abhorred this opinion, since in the second book Against the Manichaeans, chapter 21, when he was treating of men whose hearts, while they are in the mortal body, are hidden, he writes thus:

Julius Sirenus claims even Augustine did not reject the stars-as-signs view, citing Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.21 (on men whose hearts are hidden while in the mortal body):

> *For we must not believe that in those celestial bodies thoughts can lie hidden as they lie hidden in these bodies of ours; but, just as some*

movements of the soul appear in the countenance, and especially in the eyes[...]

Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.21 (cited by Julius Sirenus). The block quote spans printed pp. 271–272. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘oculis’).

— p. 313 (PDF) · printed p. 272 —

...in the hidden eyes—so, in that transparency and simplicity of the celestial bodies, I do not think that the movements of the soul can lie hidden at all. Thus Augustine there.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Gen. c. Manich. 2.21): just as the soul's movements show in the face and especially the eyes, so in the transparency of the ‘celestial bodies’ no movement of the soul can lie hidden. (Pererius will argue these ‘celestial bodies’ are the glorified human bodies, not the heavens.)

But, if anyone read this passage not altogether inconsiderately, he will plainly find that Augustine, by celestial bodies, does not understand the celestial orbs, but the bodies of the blessed men, after the resurrection endowed with celestial glory and immortality; and that he sets a distinction between men living in these perishable bodies, and the same men after the resurrection, leading an immortal and blessed life in glorified bodies: namely, that the former cunningly cover and hide the secrets of their hearts by manifold simulation, and therefore often deceive others; but in the latter the hearts of all will be manifest to all, and all simulation, fiction, and deception will be utterly absent. And that this is the genuine sense of Augustine's words is plain from his immediately following words: for he subjoined these:

Marginal gloss: "Excutitur locus Augustini." Pererius corrects Sirenus: Augustine's ‘celestial bodies’ are not the heavenly orbs but the glorified bodies of the blessed after the resurrection. He contrasts men in their perishable bodies (who hide their hearts by simulation) with the same after resurrection (whose hearts are manifest, all deception gone)—as the next words show:

And so those will merit that dwelling and the change into the angelic form, who, even in this life—although they could hide lies beneath

their garments of skin—yet hate them, and are versed with a most ardent love of truth, and conceal only that which those who hear cannot bear; but they tell no lies. For the time comes when nothing at all shall be covered over: for nothing is hidden which shall not be made manifest. Thus Augustine.

Augustine, continuing (De Gen. c. Manich. 2.21): those merit the heavenly dwelling and 'change into the angelic form' who, though they could hide lies beneath the 'garments of skin,' hate them and love truth, telling no lies—for 'nothing is hidden that shall not be made manifest' (Luke 8:17). This confirms he means glorified human bodies, not the stars.

Wherefore, since Augustine speaks explicitly and openly enough of the glorified bodies of men, and not of the heavens or stars, I marvel indeed that Julius Sirenus read this passage so thoughtlessly and drowsily, or that on its account he chiefly fastened upon Augustine a sentence of this kind, of which not even any trace appears in that place—while in the same author, in the fifth book of the City of God, there exists a copious and weighty refutation of it. Moreover, that the stars are signs of future things I judge to be not only foreign to true philosophy, but even contrary to the sacred writings. And although several of those reasons which we treated in the previous chapter also avail to prove this, yet some new arguments, which properly refute a sentence of this kind, must be used in this place. First: that which is a natural sign of some thing must be either the cause of that thing, or its effect, or both must proceed from the same higher and common cause: for as to a fourth member that might be feigned besides these (namely, that the sign be necessarily conjoined with the cause of the thing signified by it), that is no different from the third member: for such a connection and conjunction can be in no other way than that that cause first of itself produces the thing which is the sign, then the thing which is signified; or that the same thing which rouses or moves the cause to act, at the same time also employs and applies the thing which is the sign for presignifying: and both of these are referred to the cause. Hence, then, one may argue in this manner: If the heavens and stars are signs of all sublunary things, either they are the cause of those things (but this the said

opinion denies), or they are the effect (which neither will they say, nor will any man of sound mind dare to say), or—what alone remains—both the celestial and the sublu[nary]...

Marginal gloss: "Astra non esse certa signa rerum futurarum." Pererius rebukes Sirenus for misreading Augustine (who refutes the stars-as-signs view in City of God 5). His own thesis: the view is foreign to philosophy and contrary to Scripture. First argument (the natural-sign disjunction): a natural sign must be the thing's cause, or its effect, or both must spring from a common higher cause. So if the stars are signs of all sublunary things, they are either their causes (the opinion denies this), or their effects (absurd), or—the only remaining option—both proceed from a common higher cause. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'luna').

— p. 314 (PDF) · printed p. 273 —

...both the celestial and the sublunary proceed from the same higher and common cause: just as the rainbow is a sign of fair weather, not because it is its cause or effect, but because the same thing is the common cause of both. But the common cause of the celestial and the sublunary bodies must be either corporeal or incorporeal: corporeal indeed none (I suppose) will these men posit, for no body is higher than the heavens; it remains, therefore, that they refer all things to an incorporeal cause—that is, either God, or the Angels who move the heavens: so that, while the Angels move the heavens, in the state and condition of the heavens themselves, and in the position and configuration of the stars (as if by certain nods of their own, and as by marks and signs there described), they would foreknow and foreshow the events of human affairs. But in truth this, for many reasons, is not credible. For those who think thus must confess that men are led on by Angels to the greatest crimes and execrable misdeeds.

The natural-sign argument concluded: if stars are signs of sublunary things via a common higher cause—like the rainbow, a sign of fair weather not by causing it but because both share a common cause—that common cause must be incorporeal (no body is above the heavens), i.e. God or the Angels moving the heavens. So the Angels, moving the heavens, would inscribe human events in the star-configurations as signs. But this is incredible: it would make the Angels lead men into the greatest crimes.

To this, Philosophy teaches, and Theology likewise hands down the same: that there is no action of the Angels which they call transient, and which proceeds proximately from them, other than local motion; nor can the Angels do anything proximately except move by local motion. And the Angels who revolve the celestial orbs, the Philosophers and Theologians judge, work upon sublunary things in no other way than through the motion and light of the heaven: for influences altogether diverse from light we did away with a little above. That through the motion and light of the heaven all future effects of sublunary things are clearly, distinctly, and certainly foreshown, no one will say who wishes to speak likely and credible things. Next, since two effects of the same cause necessarily indicate each other [only when], as from the same cause, so also in the same way, they ought to proceed from it; otherwise it cannot happen that they certainly indicate each other. But the things which are done by God and the Angels in the celestial bodies hold themselves necessarily and invariably; whereas the things which happen in those that are beneath the moon happen very mutably, and (so to speak) defectibly.

Two further arguments: (1) Angels' only ‘transient’ action is local motion, so the heaven-moving Angels work on sublunary things only by the heaven's motion and light (‘influences’ being already disproved)—and no credible person says all sublunary futures are clearly foreshown by motion and light. (2) Two effects of one cause indicate each other only if they proceed from it in the same way; but what God and the Angels do in the heavens is necessary and invariable, while sublunary events happen mutably and ‘defectibly’—so the heavens cannot be certain signs of them.

Hence other arguments too are subjoined. For how can the stars—which are comprehended in a fixed number, and are always of one manner, and hold themselves necessarily and immutably—be signs of all future things, which are well-nigh infinite in multitude and variety, and most greatly differing and discrepant among themselves? how can the same position and configuration of the stars, under which either twins or very many others are born at the same point of time, be a certain sign properly and distinctly presignifying so many and so various and dissimilar chances and events as are seen in them? wherefore, if the stars are signs of future things, it must

be confessed that they are also their causes; but if we deny that they are causes, it must also be denied that they are signs. You will say: comets, which are generated in the upper air, are signs that portend very notable future chances, of which, nevertheless, the comets are neither causes nor effects: wherefore the same may also befall the stars with respect to sublunary things, and this is not incredible. But I[...]

Marginal gloss: "An Cometae signa sint humanarum rerum." Further arguments: how can the stars—fixed, uniform, immutable—be signs of future things almost infinite in variety? how can one star-configuration (shared by twins, or many born at once) distinctly presignify their many diverse fates? So if stars are signs, they are causes too; deny the causes, deny the signs. An objection (to be answered): comets, neither causes nor effects, are signs portending great events—so why not the stars? Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘cometas’; signature M).

— p. 315 (PDF) · printed p. 274 —

I will never grant that comets are certain signs of human chances and events, although this is as much persuaded to the vulgar as it is disapproved by the Wise. But if I held this, agreeing with the vulgar, I would say that comets are excited by the stars, the producers of future things, so that, going before, they foreshow those things. But concerning the stars it is otherwise, for to these there is no corporeal cause superior. But why do I delay over many things? The Authors of that opinion are compelled (although they least wish it) to introduce the necessity of Fate—and indeed even more than those who make the stars causes of sublunary things. For, granting that the stars are causes of the things that happen below the moon, not for that reason will the necessity of Fate exist: because what was to be effected on earth by their breathing and influx could be impeded either by contrary affections of the matter, or by obstructing particular causes. But if the stars are naturally signs of future things, it is altogether necessary that what is signified by them come to pass, otherwise they would be empty and fallacious signs. And since God had instituted them for signifying, and had described them in the heaven as in a certain volume, like marks indexing future things, if the outcomes of things did not agree with their significations, either God their author and institutor would be ignorant of

future events, or deceitful. Finally, if the stars presignify the things that are to be: either they foreshow the things that are to be done by particular causes—not by all indeed, but by some only (but this is improbable and like a fiction: for why should the stars foreknow the future effects of some particular causes rather than of others? or why should they not foreshow all alike, since the reasoning of all is alike?); or the stars presignify all the future effects of all particular causes: and if this is so, there will surely be no remaining causes by which it could be impeded and prohibited that what is presignified by the stars should come to pass the less. From which it follows necessarily that all things which happen below the Moon are held bound and fettered by the immutable necessity of Fate: which neither do the defenders of that opinion hold, and to hold it is impious.

Marginal gloss: "Qui astra futurarum rerum certa faciunt signa, eos necessario Fatum inducere." Pererius's reply to the comets objection: he never grants comets are certain signs (a vulgar belief disproved by the wise); if he did, he'd say comets are excited by the star-causes and so foreshow events—but no corporeal cause is above the stars. The decisive argument: the stars-as-signs view forces Fate-necessity even more than the stars-as-causes view. Causes can be impeded (by contrary matter or particular causes), but a natural sign must infallibly signify—else God (who 'wrote' the stars as signs) would be ignorant or deceptive. And if the stars sign all the effects of all causes, nothing can impede them, so all sublunary things are bound by immutable Fate—which the defenders deny and which is impious.

But that testimony of Isaiah which was brought forward, in chapter 34, The heavens shall be folded together like a book, alone, among the other testimonies of Scripture mentioned a little above, seems to have some difficulty and to cause some little trouble: I find it variously interpreted, yet so that no interpretation—which is either of an approved Author, or is itself probable—gives any support to that opinion. Justin Martyr, answering the ninety-fourth question of the Orthodox, in which it was asked how that should be understood which is said by Isaiah, that the heaven would one day be folded up like a book, speaks thus:

Marginal gloss: "Explicatur locus Isaiae ex cap. 34." The Isaiah 34:4 testimony, 'The heavens shall be folded up like a book,' alone of the Scripture proofs cited for the stars-as-signs view has some difficulty. Variously interpreted, yet no interpretation (of an approved author, or probable in itself)

favors that view. Justin Martyr (Quaestiones et responsiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 94) answers how Isaiah's ‘heaven folded like a book’ is to be understood:

Just as the divine Scripture compares the creation of the heavens, by a likeness, sometimes with the stretching out of a skin, saying, Who stretches out the heaven like a skin; sometimes with firmed smoke, The heaven, it says, is firmed like smoke; sometimes with the roundness of a vault, Who stretches out, it says, the heaven like a vault: so, conversely, it compares the dissolution of the heavens, by a comparison, with[...]

Justin Martyr, Quaestiones et responsiones ad Orthodoxos, q. 94. The block quote spans printed pp. 274–275. Scripture likens the heavens' creation now to a stretched skin (Ps 104:2), now to firmed smoke (Isa 51:6 LXX), now to a vaulted roof (Isa 40:22). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘cum’).

— p. 316 (PDF) · printed p. 275 —

...it compares with other things: as in Isaiah, with a scroll to be rolled up and folded together; as in David, in Psalm 101, with a garment growing old and being changed. Thus Justin.

Marginal glosses: "Psalm. 103. Esaiae 51. Iuxta 70 (Interpretes). Esaiae 40. Iuxta 70 (Interpretes)" — keying the Septuagint readings cited (Ps 104:2; Isa 51:6; Isa 40:22; Ps 102:26). Conclusion of Justin's answer: as Scripture likens the heavens' creation to a skin, smoke, or vault, so it likens their dissolution to a rolled-up scroll (Isaiah) or a garment grown old and changed (Psalm 102:26).

But Jerome writes these things upon those words:

Lead-in to Jerome's exposition of Isaiah 34:4.

It must be considered that he does not say that the heavens perish, but that they are rolled back or folded together like a book: so that, after all sins have been opened and re-read, those which had before been opened may be folded together, that the offenses of the many be no longer written in them. For in Scripture the heavens are said to announce the justice of God, to reveal His wrath, and to prove and testify the crimes of men.

Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah (on 34:4): he does not say the heavens perish, but are folded like a book—so that, when all sins have been opened and re-read, they are folded up, that the crimes of the many be written in them no more. (The heavens in Scripture 'announce God's justice, reveal His wrath, and testify men's crimes.')

Saint Thomas and Nicholas of Lyra expound it otherwise. The heavens shall be folded together, they say, like a book—that is, the heathen will no longer practice their astromancy, nor henceforth will they dare to divine from the stars the events of men, as though they were reading in the stars the chances and events written there. Others interpret thus: An entrance into the kingdom of the heavens will lie open no more, but the heavenly door will be closed. There are also those who explain it in this way: The ministry and use of the heavens and stars, exhibited to man before the day of judgment, will afterward cease: for although the heavens will not utterly perish, they will yet be in another state, and from the ministries and services which they now perform for the sake of men, they will after the day of judgment in some way rest; which cessation is beautifully declared by Isaiah through the likeness of a book, which, after we have used it and it is to be of no further use to us, we are wont to fold up and close.

Three further expositions: (1) Aquinas and Nicholas of Lyra—'folded like a book' means the heathen will no longer practice astromancy or read events 'written in the stars.' (2) Others—entry to the kingdom of heaven will close. (3) Others—the heavens' ministry to man (before Judgment) will cease afterward; they will not perish but rest from their services, 'folded' like a book we close when done with it.

Nor does the interpretation of those displease me who say that by that likeness is declared that so great will be the demonstration of divine wrath and vengeance against the nations of whom Isaiah there speaks, so great the perturbation and confusion of all things, and finally so great the sadness, grief, and distress of men, that, through the magnitude of mourning and grief, and through the perturbation and oppression of mind, the heavenly lights seem to men to be restrained, the stars to fall from heaven, and their motions to be disturbed, and finally the heaven to be folded together and to recede: for what is here said to be folded together, in

the Apocalypse is said to recede or depart. For so you have it in the sixth chapter, And the heaven departed like a scroll rolled up.

Pererius's preferred reading: the simile declares so great a demonstration of divine wrath against the nations (of which Isaiah speaks) and so great a confusion of all things that, through grief and dread, the heavenly lights seem dimmed, the stars fall, their motions disturbed, the heaven 'folded up' and receding—'folded' in Isaiah being 'departed' in Revelation 6:14 ('the heaven departed like a scroll rolled up').

But, that the likeness of a book which Isaiah used may be plainer and easier to understand even to the not very learned, it must be known that among the Hebrews the sacred books were anciently wont to be written and bound in a different form than the books are now written among us. For they had only a single leaf or oblong membrane, which was folded around a cylinder or wooden axis, after the manner of a linen cloth wound around a weaver's beam. And books of this kind seemed to bear some likeness and image of the heavens: because, just as several coils, as it were spirals, of the membrane itself encircle and surround, one over another, that wooden axis which is in the middle of the roll, so the celestial orbs, set one over another in a circle, would encompass this earth, which holds the central axis of the whole universe. But let enough have been said of the testimony of Isaiah: whose [expositions], although [many]...

Marginal gloss: "Antiquus mos Hebraeorum scribendi." A digression on the ancient Hebrew scroll: a single oblong sheet rolled around a wooden axis, like cloth on a weaver's beam. Such a scroll resembled the heavens—as the membrane's coils encircle the central axis, so the celestial orbs, set one above another, encompass the earth, which holds the universe's central axis. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'an multae').

— p. 317 (PDF) · printed p. 276 —

...whose expositions, however many and various they are, yet none of them aids those marvelous Readers, interpreters, and Prophets of the stars.

Closing the Isaiah digression: however many its expositions, none of them helps the astrologers (sarcastically, those 'marvelous Readers, interpreters, and Prophets of the stars').

By what means some astrologers have predicted many true things. CHAPTER FIVE.

The fifth and final chapter of the anti-astrology disputation—the long-promised explanation (deferred earlier, pp. 262/267, 'extrema hac disputatione aperiemus') of why some astrologers' predictions came true.

It remains, that this disputation may at last be brought to its outcome and end, that we disclose the causes why very many predictions of certain Astrologers were true and marvelously agreeing with the very facts and events; for this question, since mention of it fell out above, we deferred to this last part of the disputation, that it might be better treated, in a more fitting place. Although, therefore, it is most true, and sufficiently explained by us above, that the predictions of the Astrologers are for the most part false; yet since it was long ago reported by many, and today is quite common, nay is handed down as certain by grave men (whom it is difficult not to believe), that there were certain Astrologers nearly all of whose predictions were true, confirmed by the very use and event, and scarcely one or another of their many predictions turned out otherwise than they had foretold: come, let us also bring ourselves to believe this, lest we seem to oppose the widespread opinion of men (as if confirmed by public faith and authority). But the truth of such predictions being granted, let us inquire into the causes of it—namely, by what means future things could be certainly foretold by the Astrologers, which, because they are uncertain, escape the force and notion of human understanding. I will not be long: I assuredly affirm that, if any predictions of the Astrologers were true, their truth proceeds not from the truth and firmness of the art of Astromancy (which has been shown more than enough to be none), but from other causes: and what these causes are, I will briefly explain.

Marginal gloss: "Quatuor causae propter quas nonnunquam praedicta Astrologorum vera cadunt." Pererius takes up the deferred question: why did some astrologers' predictions come true and agree with events? Though astrology is mostly false, it is reported (even by grave men) that some astrologers were nearly always right—so, granting this, he asks the cause. His thesis: any true predictions come not from the art of astromancy (proven worthless) but from OTHER causes, which

he will now explain (four causes).

FIRST CAUSE. The truth of these predictions sometimes comes from a pact and fellowship which the Astrologer has entered into with a demon, or from his hidden breathing and instinct, by which even unknowing men are instigated to divine. This Augustine relates at the end of chapter 7 of the fifth book of the City of God:

Marginal gloss: "Instinctu daemonum aliquando homines ad divinandum (impelli)." FIRST CAUSE: the truth sometimes comes from a pact the astrologer made with a demon, or from the demon's hidden instinct (which moves even unknowing men to divine). Augustine teaches this (City of God 5.7, end):

> *Not undeservedly is it believed that, when the Astrologers wonderfully answer many true things, it comes about by the hidden instinct of spirits not good—whose care it is to insert into human minds, and to confirm, these false and harmful opinions about astral fates—and not by any art of the horoscope noted and inspected, which art is none. Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, City of God 5.7: when astrologers 'wonderfully answer many true things,' it is by the hidden instinct of evil spirits (whose aim is to fix false beliefs about astral fate in men's minds)—not by any genuine art of the horoscope, which is none.

And the demon suggests to the man what is to be divined by him: either openly offering himself visible and conspicuous to his eyes, and pre-teaching him the future in human words; or by voices formed in the air presignifying the future, without any bodily appearance and shape; or by some writing sent in, which [contains] pre[dictions] of future things...

How the demon suggests to the man what to divine: (1) openly appearing and pre-teaching the future in human words; (2) by voices formed in the air, without bodily shape; (3) by sending a writing containing predictions. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'dictiones').

— p. 318 (PDF) · printed p. 277 —

...may contain predictions; or by affecting and stirring the phantasy of one sleeping, through dreams, or of one waking, and by feigning phantasms fit

to represent that which is to be divined, and by inciting the man to predict that which the phantasms represent. And the demon can know the future things which it pre-teaches the man by a revelation of God made to it through the good Angels: for sometimes God, to do something, uses the ministry of the demons. The demon is also wont to foretell to a man the future things which it itself will afterward do. It is wont, by reason of the incomparable swiftness of its motion, to carry to men who are very far off the things that are done in distant places and remote regions of the world. The demon can also have known the hidden thoughts and deliberations of men, both present and future, by most skillfully conjecturing from clandestine counsels, words, writings, and from the signs that appear in the body, both outwardly and inwardly. And the same it conjectures from the preparation of causes and of the other things which must concur for doing something. Finally, by reason of the incredible subtlety and cleverness of its mind, by reason of so great an experience of so many thousands of years, and on account of its perfect and absolute knowledge of all natural things, it is most cunning and most sagacious at presensing and foreknowing the future.

The demon's further means (continued): by stirring a sleeper's or waker's phantasy with feigned phantasms; and the demon knows the future it pre-teaches (a) by God's revelation through good Angels (God sometimes uses demons' ministry), (b) because it foretells what it will itself do, (c) by its incomparable speed carrying news from distant regions, (d) by skillful conjecture of men's hidden thoughts (from words, writings, bodily signs) and of the preparation of causes, and (e) by its incredible mental subtlety, its experience of so many thousand years, and its perfect knowledge of all natural things.

This very thing which we have here taught, because Augustine relates it distinctly and openly in the second book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17, it is pleasing to set down his words:

Lead-in to a long quotation of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.17, confirming the demonic explanation of astrologers' true predictions.

Concerning the fates of the stars, whatever subtleties of theirs, and as it were the experiments of the documents of astrology, which they call Apotelesmata, let us utterly reject as repugnant to the soundness of our faith. For by such disputations they try to take away from us even the grounds of praying, and, with impious perversity, in the evil deeds which are most rightly reproved, they urge that God the author of the stars should rather be accused than the crimes of men. And therefore it must be confessed that, when true things are said by these men, they are said by a certain most hidden instinct, which human minds suffer unknowingly. Since this is done to deceive men, it is the work of seducing spirits, to whom it is permitted to know some true things about temporal matters—partly by the acuteness of a subtler sense, partly because they are vigorous in subtler bodies, partly by a craftier experience through the great length of their life, partly from the holy Angels (which they themselves learn from almighty God) revealing it to them, even by His command, who distributes human merits with the most hidden sincerity of justice. But sometimes these same nefarious spirits foretell, as if by divining, even the things which they themselves are going to do: wherefore the good Christian must beware of astrologers, or of any of those who divine impiously—especially when they tell true things—lest, by fellowship with the demons, they ensnare the deceived soul by a kind of pact of society. Thus far are the words of Augustine.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.17: reject the 'fates of the stars' and the astrologers' Apotelesmata as contrary to faith (they would rob us of prayer and blame God rather than men's sins). When astrologers say true things, it is by a most hidden instinct men suffer unknowingly—the work of seducing spirits, who know some temporal truths (by subtler sense, subtler bodies, long experience, or revelation through the holy Angels at God's command), and who sometimes foretell what they themselves will do. So the good Christian must beware astrologers, especially when they speak truth, lest the demons ensnare the soul by a pact.

MOREOVER, they bind themselves with the gravest crime, whoever, eager to know the future, consult demons—or Astrologers who use the

work of demons—for divining. And in this very thing one can sin in many ways: first, if anyone consult a demon about future things, or the demon's disciple, the Astrologer, thinking that all future things have been clearly perceived by the demon—for this, since it is proper to God alone to know the future, if anyone[...]

Marginal gloss: "Quot modis et quam graviter peccetur ab iis qui de divinatione rerum futurarum daemonem consulunt et vacant." MOREOVER: whoever consults demons (or astrologers using demons) to know the future binds himself with the gravest crime. One sins in many ways—first, by consulting a demon (or its disciple the astrologer) about the future as if the demon had clearly perceived all futures, since to know the future is proper to God alone. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'quis'; signature M 3).

— p. 319 (PDF) · printed p. 278 —

...anyone should ascribe the same knowledge also to a demon, it would be a crime of impiety and idolatry. Next, if it is reckoned a crime to have communion and fellowship with one excommunicated from the Church, how great will it be to be joined by pact and fellowship with the devil (the bitterest enemy of God and the Church, and the implacable foe of men)? and to be willing to use as friend and master and teacher him whom God has banished from all fellowship of the faithful to the infernal and tartarean seats, and consigned to eternal punishments? Furthermore, he who uses the familiarity of a demon casts his soul into a great and certain peril, inasmuch as the demon vehemently desires to circumvent and destroy it by the allurements of such predictions. He also sins most gravely, whoever consults Astrologers in order to learn through them the hidden sins of other men. To this is added that it is a monstrous outrage to consult a demon or an Astrologer for this end, that by their counsel or aid some great crime may be perpetrated. And that these truthful (as they say) Astrologers are the familiars and disciples of demons, there are many and not obscure indications: first, the depravity of their morals and the impurity and filth of their life; then, the contempt of all things that pertain to the cultivation and practice of Christian discipline and piety; next, that they hate the light, shun the sight and company of men, rarely appear in public, live for the

most part in obscurity and concealment and far from witnesses; besides, the bad (and surely not undeserved) opinion of men about their faith and religion; and finally, that many of these, seized by the censors of our faith whom they call Inquisitors, have—whether willingly or under compulsion (a judicial inquiry being held and tortures applied)—confessed their fellowship and familiarity with the demon. But enough about the first cause.

Continuing the enumeration of sins in consulting demons/astrologers: ascribing God's foreknowledge to a demon is impiety and idolatry; pact with the devil is worse than communion with an excommunicate; it imperils the soul. Consulting astrologers to learn others' hidden sins, or to commit a crime, is grave. Signs these 'truthful' astrologers are demons' familiars: depraved morals, contempt of piety, shunning the light, bad repute—and many, seized by the Inquisitors, confessed (under torture) their pact with the demon.

SECOND CAUSE. That the Astrologers divine the future sometimes happens from the hidden disposition of divine providence, which (as Augustine says in the fourth and seventh books of the Confessions) at times so moves the blind and wicked minds of the consulted, by a certain unknown instinct, that, not knowing it, they utter the things which the consulters—whether from their own merits, or from the abyss of the just judgment of God—ought to hear. Hither it is also fitting to refer the lots used by the ancients, when, namely, by the verses of some Poet taken at random, they inquired what the future portended to them: in which way sometimes there fell to them songs marvelously agreeing with present or future affairs. As to Alexander Severus, while still a youth and not hoping for empire, as he was scrutinizing the Virgilian lots, there came forth verses from the sixth book of the Aeneid which presignified his future empire, in these words:

SECOND CAUSE: astrologers sometimes divine truly by the hidden disposition of divine providence, which (Augustine, Confessions 4 and 7) so moves the consulted men's blind minds by an unknown instinct that, unknowing, they utter what the inquirers ought to hear (from their merits, or from God's just judgment). Here belong the ancient 'lots' (sortes)—random poetic verses consulted for the future—which sometimes marvelously fit events: as Alexander Severus, a youth not hoping for empire, drew from Aeneid 6 verses foretelling his rule:

> *Remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with your sway— these shall be your arts—to impose the custom of peace, to spare the conquered, and to war down the proud.*

Virgil, Aeneid 6.851–853 (Anchises' charge to Aeneas in the underworld). Drawn by the young Alexander Severus as a ‘sors Virgiliana’ foretelling his future empire.

Nor is it any wonder that it so falls out, God willing it, and therefore moving the mind, governing the tongue, and mixing and tempering the lots fitly to that which He wills to be presignified: God, who not only from the mouth of Balaam, a soothsayer and false prophet[...]

Marginal gloss: "Numer. 23 et 24" (Numbers 22–24). No wonder the lots fall out true, when God moves the mind, governs the tongue, and arranges the lots—God who uttered true oracles even from the mouth of Balaam the false prophet (and his ass). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘vatis’).

— p. 320 (PDF) · printed p. 279 —

...the false prophet, but even from the mouth of the she-ass on which that soothsayer rode, gave forth most true oracles of future things. It must not in this place be left among the things passed over, what Augustine very wisely and wholesomely warns in the second book On Christian Doctrine, chapters twenty-two and twenty-three: for he says that by the permission of God it sometimes comes to pass that demons, or even men through them, predict many true things, with the result that some who are (with superstition and impiety, of course) zealous and curious of such divinations, seduced by a harmful persuasion, slip into greater and more execrable outrages—having, by their preceding sins, deserved to be thus abandoned by God. But it is better to set down Augustine's words here:

Concluding the Balaam example (Num 22–24): God uttered true oracles even from the false prophet's mouth and his ass. Pererius then introduces a long quotation of Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 2.22–23, warning that demons (or men through them) predict true things by God's permission, drawing the curious into ever greater crimes.

> *Hence it comes about that, by a certain hidden divine judgment, men greedy of evil things are delivered up to be mocked and deceived, the*

deceiving and mocking of them, according to the deserts of their pleasures, being done by the prevaricating Angels, to whom this lowest part of the world is, according to the most beautiful order of things, subjected by the law of divine providence. By which illusions and deceptions it comes to pass that, by these superstitious and pernicious kinds of divination, many past and future things are told, and happen no otherwise than they say; and that many things come about by observations, according to their observations, by which the entangled become more curious, and thrust themselves more and more into the manifold snares of a most pernicious error. This kind of fornication of the soul the divine Scripture did not, for our health, pass over in silence; nor did it so deter the soul from it as for that reason to deny that such things are to be followed because they are said falsely by their professors—but rather, even if they tell you, it says, and it so come to pass, believe them not. For not because the image of dead Samuel foretold true things to King Saul are therefore those sacrileges, by which that image was presented, the less to be execrated; nor, because in the Acts of the Apostles a ventriloquist woman bore true testimony to the Apostles of the Lord, did the Apostle Paul therefore spare that spirit, and not rather cleanse her by the rebuking and casting out of that demon. All arts, therefore, of this kind, whether of trifling or harmful superstition, set up out of a certain pestilent fellowship of men and demons as by a pact of faithless and deceitful friendship, are utterly to be repudiated and shunned by a Christian. Thus Augustine.

Marginal gloss: "Hinc valde observanda beati Augustini sententia." Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 2.23: by a hidden divine judgment, men greedy for evil are handed over to be deceived by the apostate Angels (who rule this lowest world-part under providence); so superstitious divinations come true and entangle the curious ever deeper. Scripture warns ‘even if it come to pass, believe them not’ (Deut 13:1–3): the witch of Endor's true word to Saul (1 Sam 28) does not make her sacrilege less damnable, nor did Paul spare the truthful ventriloquist (the pythoness, Acts 16:16–18) but cast out her demon. So all such superstitious arts—springing from a pact-like fellowship of men and demons—must be utterly shunned.

To these causes some add two others, perhaps less probable, yet no less frequent and proven by use. THIRD CAUSE. Not a few divine, not so much by skill in the astromantic art (which is none), as by a certain singular cleverness of a sagacious wit, and by a manifold experience and practice of human affairs, and by an exquisite observation and knowledge of the business, morals, pursuits, and dispositions of the very men for whom the divination is made. For there are some who, having examined the temperaments and bodily affections of certain men, likewise their pursuits, exercises, habits, intimacies, and finally their virtues or vices, foresee many things that will befall them, and predict them to them with great assurance and authority, and for the most part divine truly. To this kind of divinations it belongs, if someone should predict that a prince treating his citizens tyrannically and oppressing them with cruel domi[nion]...

Some add two further causes, less probable but no less frequent. THIRD CAUSE: many divine not by the (nonexistent) art but by sagacious wit, wide experience of human affairs, and shrewd observation of the consulter's character, pursuits, and temperament—predicting confidently what such a person will do, and usually getting it right. (E.g., predicting that a tyrant oppressing his citizens...) Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘natu’).

— p. 321 (PDF) · printed p. 280 —

...oppressing them with cruel dominion would be slain by his own; and that a man very frequent in thefts and robberies would perish by hanging; that a despiser of religion and a disseminator of false doctrine, against the truth of the faith and the authority of the Catholic Church, would be punished by the penalty of fire. This kind of divination Hannibal used, who, having perceived the inexperience and rashness of Terentius Varro and Gaius Flaminius, consuls and commanders of the Romans, very confidently and assuredly predicted victory for the Africans and a notable disaster for the Romans: and that prediction the outcome of the contest soon confirmed, very many thousands of Romans being slain.

Marginal gloss: "Divinatio Annibalis." Examples of shrewd 'divination': that a tyrant will be killed by his own; a habitual thief will hang; a heretic will be burned. Hannibal used this kind: seeing the rashness of the Roman commanders (Terentius Varro and Flaminius), he confidently predicted African victory and Roman disaster—soon confirmed by the slaughter (at Cannae and Lake Trasimene).

FOURTH CAUSE. Not rarely the divination of the Astrologers turns out true on account of the foolish credulity of those who consult them: for many most easily believe the things that are said, about the very things which they either most desire, or fear and shudder at vehemently. For such credulity is wont to instill into the minds of the consulters a great hope of the good thing promised by the diviners, or to cast in a huge fear of the sad and bitter chances and calamity foretold by them. And these two affections of the soul, since they are most powerful to effect and to move a man, frequently effect (certainly much avail) that human affairs are brought to the predicted ends. For a certain vehement hope and ardent desire excite and incite men to prepare themselves diligently for the goods promised them, and to strive with all their resources and strength: whence it comes about that, for that reason, they mostly arrive where they aim, having become masters of their own wishes and of the promises of others. But on the contrary, fear, dread, and horror of the predicted evils and calamities often make men undertake their affairs hesitantly and doubtfully, pursue them timidly and negligently, and, at whatever impediment thrown in the way, basely and unhappily abandon them—and in that way slide into the very evils foretold to them.

Marginal gloss: "Stulta consulentium in Astrologos credulitas, praedictiones eorum veras nonnunquam reddit." FOURTH CAUSE: the prediction often comes true through the consulters' foolish credulity. Believing what is foretold about what they most desire or dread, they are filled with hope or fear—the two most powerful passions—which often bring affairs to the predicted ends: hope spurs men to strive for the promised good (so they attain it), while fear makes them undertake things timidly and abandon them (so they fall into the foretold evil).

We find clear examples of this thing in the Roman army, for which (as Livy writes), when the auguries and auspices, secretly inspected,

threatened an unlucky outcome of the war, the augurs and leaders, lest they dismay the soldier going to arms with a deadly report, the auspices being turned to the contrary side, lied that all favorable and triumphal things were portended and promised by the gods: by which lie the soldiers, usefully deceived, eagerly entered battle, fought bravely, and happily conquered the enemy whom the auguries foreshowed they would conquer. But on the contrary, when Nicias, general of the fleet of the Athenians—an eclipse of the moon being unknown to him, and thinking that the shipwreck of the fleet was portended if it should go out of the harbor that night—seized and oppressed by a foolish fear, delays the departure, he was captured by the Syracusans with the whole fleet. But, lest this discussion be drawn out further than we promised at the beginning, and than the plan of our undertaking allows, and that we may the sooner come to the things which are more proper to the work we have undertaken, we shall here make an end of disputing about astrological divination.

Marginal gloss: "Niciae ducis Atheniensium exitialis inscitia." Two illustrations of how belief drives the outcome. (1) The Roman army (Livy): when secret auguries threatened defeat, the leaders lied that the auspices were favorable—and the ‘usefully deceived’ soldiers fought bravely and won. (2) Nicias, the Athenian general (Thucydides 7): ignorant that the lunar eclipse was natural, he feared it portended disaster, delayed the fleet's departure, and was captured with his whole fleet by the Syracusans. Pererius closes the disputation on astrological divination here.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

The close of Liber Secundus—the entire disputation against judicial astrology, woven from Genesis 1:14 (‘and let them be for signs’), ends here.

— p. 322 (PDF) · printed p. 281 —

BENEDICTUS PERERIUS, COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS, BOOK THREE, Which is on Paradise. PREFACE.

The opening of Book Three of the Genesis commentary, treating of Paradise (the Garden of Eden, Genesis 2). It begins with a preface on the difficulty of Moses's account.

So briefly and intricately did Moses write of paradise, that to attain and thoroughly know his true and proper meaning has seemed to all most difficult. For he so speaks of Paradise as to indicate not obscurely that it was a certain corporeal, visible, and terrestrial place; yet the same man sets down in his narration things which, taken all together, seem unable to fit into any one certain place of the earth. Whence it has come about that some have judged that the Mosaic narration of paradise is to be interpreted not of any corporeal place, but of a certain intelligible and spiritual thing. But others, having thought paradise to be a corporeal place, yet depicted it such as neither nature could bear nor the human mind grasp, inventing many things about its site and place more marvelous than credible. Nor were there lacking those who, on account of the immense difficulty of the matter, despairing of the knowledge of paradise, thought the Mosaic teaching of it utterly inexplicable and incomprehensible to mortals in this life. Saint Ambrose, having undertaken to write of Paradise, began his book thus:

Marginal gloss: "Difficultas historiae Mosis quae est de Paradiso." The preface's theme: Moses wrote of Paradise so briefly and obscurely that his meaning is most hard to grasp. He indicates a corporeal, earthly place, yet says things that seem to fit no one place—so some read the account spiritually/allegorically; others kept it corporeal but invented incredible features; others despaired of understanding it at all. Ambrose, beginning his De Paradiso, wrote:

The discourse on Paradise, which is to be undertaken, seems to strike no slight perplexity into us, who desire to investigate and explain what paradise is, and where it is, and of what kind it is: especially since the Apostle, although he knows not whether in the body or out of the body, yet says that he was caught up even to the third heaven, and likewise testifies that he heard there secret words which it is not lawful for man to utter.

Marginal glosses: "Quorundam opinio, inexplicabile esse [doctrinam] Mosis de Paradiso"; "2 Cor. 12." Ambrose, De Paradiso (opening): the discourse on Paradise causes great perplexity to those who would investigate what, where, and of what kind it is—especially since the Apostle Paul, caught up to the third heaven (whether in the body he knew not), heard secret words ‘not lawful for man to utter’ (2

Cor 12:2–4).

Blessed Augustine, in the second book against Pelagius and Caelestius, chapter 23, numbers this disputation about paradise among those in which, the faith by which we are Christians being kept safe, either it is not known what is true and a definitive judgment is suspended, or it is conjectured otherwise than it is, by a human and feeble surmise. Wherefore the more must we strive that, sparing no labor and succumbing to no difficulties, [we may weigh] the words of Moses[...]

Augustine (Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, bk 2, ch. 23) ranks this paradise-question among those where, faith being safe, either the truth is unknown (and judgment suspended) or only guessed by feeble human surmise. Pererius resolves to strive, sparing no labor, to weigh Moses's words. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'Mosis'; signature N).

— p. 323 (PDF) · printed p. 282 —

...interpreting the words of Moses concerning Paradise as subtly, distinctly, and clearly as we shall be able, let us diligently expound and faithfully defend the meaning of the Mosaic narration which the words themselves present. And we shall so act as to flee from no question, to turn our back on no difficulty, and to leave out among the things passed over no opinion worth recording: nor will we in this obey him who warned that the things most difficult in handling are better passed over in silence than abandoned once attempted. For so, in our judgment, the matter stands: in things most obscure, and yet most beautiful in the knowing, either the very zeal in seeking, or the effort to discover, or any shadowing-forth and demonstration of the truth, neither lacks praise among fair estimators of things, nor is empty of fruit among those eager to know hidden and excellent things.

Conclusion of the Preface to Book Three: Pererius resolves to expound Moses's account of Paradise as clearly as possible, shunning no question or difficulty—holding that, in obscure but beautiful matters, even the effort and any glimpse of truth is praiseworthy and fruitful.

THE HISTORY OF MOSES CONCERNING THE TERRESTRIAL PARADISE, explained in this third volume of the Commentaries. FROM THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS.

The title/running-head for Book Three's exposition, drawn from Genesis chapter 2 (the account of the Garden of Eden).

VERSE 8. And the Lord God had planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning, in which He placed the man whom He had formed: [9] and the Lord God brought forth from the ground every tree fair to behold and sweet to eat of; the tree of life also in the midst of Paradise, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. [10] And a river went out of the place of pleasure to water Paradise, which from there is divided into four heads. [11] The name of one is Phison; it is that which compasses all the land of Hevilath, where gold is born. [12] And the gold of that land is the best; there too is found Bdellium and the onyx stone. [13] And the name of the second river is Geon; it is that which compasses all the land of Ethiopia. [14] And the name of the third river is Tigris; it goes toward the Assyrians. And the fourth river, it is the Euphrates.

The Scripture lemma (Genesis 2:8–14, Vulgate) being expounded in Book Three. Pererius will gloss it word by word: 'Paradisum,' 'voluptatis,' the tree of life, the four rivers (Phison, Geon/Gihon, Tigris, Euphrates), etc. (Marginal verse numbers 8–15.)

— p. 324 (PDF) · printed p. 283 —

And the Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning.

Marginal reference: "GENES. 2. VERS. 8." The opening clause of Genesis 2:8, taken up for comment.

That word Plantaverat (He had planted), although in the Hebrew it is Plantavit (He planted)—yet because the Hebrews very often misuse the perfect tenses [for the pluperfect]—denotes that the planting of paradise

was made not after the creation of man, but before: so that this is the meaning of Moses's words, God had already before planted paradise when He formed man, and therefore, as soon as man was created, he was led by God into paradise. Basil, in his last oration, which is On Paradise (and is the eleventh among those which he wrote on Genesis), says that Paradise was created by God after the creation of man; perhaps having thought this for the reason that he saw mention of the paradise made by God to be made by Moses only after the creation of man. But that was done by recapitulation, the figure by which things done earlier are narrated later; as, on the contrary, by anticipation things are mentioned earlier which were done later; and each figure is not infrequent in the divine writings. But someone will ask: Since paradise was prior in origin to man, why was it not also mentioned by Moses in the prior place? Was it that it might be made manifest that it was created by God chiefly for the sake of man? or rather that, by a more continuous and connected series, the whole history of paradise might be woven together? Now Paradise had been planted by God on the third day, on which day the earth was bidden to bring forth all the kinds of herbs and plants; and although all things were created by God, yet God is said singularly to have planted Paradise, because that place, beyond all other places of the earth, was of exceptional beauty and incredible pleasantness: for the things which are most excellent and in some kind outstanding, Scripture is wont to mark with the name of God. As, therefore, the forming of man is singularly attributed to God on account of his dignity, so also the making of Paradise on account of the incomparable excellence and pleasantness of the place: which thing, observed by Basil in the exordium of the oration which he wrote on Paradise, was set forth by him.

Marginal gloss: "Paradisus ante creatum hominem plantatus, contra Basilium." Though the Hebrew reads ‘He planted,’ the Hebrews use the perfect for the pluperfect, so ‘had planted’ means paradise was planted before man's creation (man, once made, was led straight into it). Against Basil (Homily 11 on Genesis = On Paradise), who placed paradise's creation after man's—a view from Moses's order of mention, which is by ‘recapitulation’ (narrating earlier things later; cf. its converse, ‘anticipation’). Paradise was planted on the third day; God is said singularly to have ‘planted’ it (as

Scripture marks the most excellent with God's name) for its incomparable beauty—just as man's forming is singularly ascribed to God for his dignity.

A Paradise.

Marginal gloss: "De vocabulo Paradisi." The word ‘Paradise’ (Gen 2:8), taken up for a philological gloss on its Hebrew and Greek origins.

The word here is the Hebrew ■■ (Gan), rendered by the Greek and Latin translator as Paradisus; it signifies a garden, derived (as some who know Hebrew think) from the root ■■■ (Ganan), which is to protect and to hide; as if by that word were signified a garden in which thick and dense trees, and tall ones, which, spread out with their wide branches, can shade and protect those who are beneath them: or it is so called because it is an enclosed and fenced-about place, with no access to it lying open either to beasts or to men; according to that saying which is in the Can[ticles]...

The word ‘Paradise’ here is the Hebrew ■■ (Gan), rendered ‘Paradisus’—meaning a garden, derived (say some Hebraists) from the root ■■■ (Ganan), ‘to protect and hide’: either a garden whose thick, tall, wide-branched trees shade those beneath, or an enclosed, fenced place barred to beasts and men. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘ticis’; quoting Canticles 4:12, ‘a garden enclosed’).

— p. 325 (PDF) · printed p. 284 —

...in the Canticles, A garden enclosed, etc. It is worth recording that there are among the Hebrews two words: this one of which we have spoken, ■■ (Gan), and another, ■■■■ (Pardes), signifying almost the same thing; and both are found joined together in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter 2: for where we read I made me gardens and orchards, there are there in Hebrew the two words we have mentioned, ■■ (Gan) and ■■■■ (Pardes). Nor is the word Pardes found in Scripture except thrice: once in the aforesaid place of Ecclesiastes, again in the second book of Esdras, chapter 2, thirdly in the Canticles, chapter 4, in those words, Thy shoots are a paradise of pomegranates. The Seventy Translators render the word ■■■■ (Pardes) as paradisus, just as also sometimes the word ■■ (Gan). Nor does it

displease me, which I see has pleased certain learned men, that the word Paradisus is drawn from the Hebrew word ■■■■ (Pardes), the likeness which is between the two creating belief. Julius Pollux, in the eleventh book of the Onomasticon, relates that paradisus is not properly a Greek word, but Persian, and that from Persian custom it flowed into the use of the Greeks. Indeed, Xenophon and Philostratus call ‘paradises’ the most pleasant places which had been prepared, for the sake of delight, for the Kings of the Persians, in which wild beasts were kept for the hunts of the Kings. Aulus [Gellius], in book 2, chapter 20, left it written that those which in his time were vulgarly called ‘vivaria’ (game-parks), and of old, in the time of Scipio and of others who spoke pure Latin, were called ‘roboraria’ (from the oaken stalls with which they were fenced on every side), were named in Greek ‘paradises.’ Suidas interprets the notion of this word Paradisus thus: Paradisus is said from δε■ω (deuo), that is, I water; thence the verbal δε■ρος, the ypsilon being changed to iota; others derive it from the gathering of herbs.

Two near-synonymous Hebrew words: ■■ (Gan) and ■■■■ (Pardes), found together in Eccl 2:5 (‘gardens and orchards’). Pardes occurs in Scripture only thrice (Eccl 2; Nehemiah/2 Esdras 2; Canticles 4:13). The Septuagint render Pardes (and sometimes Gan) as ‘paradisus,’ and the word ‘Paradisus’ likely derives from Pardes. Julius Pollux (Onomasticon 11) calls it Persian, not Greek; Xenophon and Philostratus use ‘paradises’ for the Persian kings' game-parks; Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 2.20) equates the Greek ‘paradisi’ with Latin ‘vivaria’/‘roboraria.’ Suidas derives it from δε■ω (‘I water’). [The final Greek etymological phrase before ‘a collectione herbarum’ is partly illegible on the scan.]

But in sacred Scripture the word Paradise universally signifies any most pleasant place, and most delightful for the delighting of man: in which signification Moses used it in this book of Genesis, chapter 13, when he said that the land of Sodom and Gomorrah, before God's vengeance, was like a paradise; and Solomon, Ecclesiastes 2, I made me, he says, gardens and orchards (for which the Seventy have, Paradises); the same in the Canticles, chapter 4, Thy shoots are a paradise; and also Ezekiel, chapter 28, addressing the King of Tyre, Thou wast, he says, in the delights of the

paradise of God; the same, chapter 31, writing of the power and magnificence of the king of the Assyrians by a certain likeness which the Rhetoricians call Allegory, says, The cedars were not higher than he in the paradise of God; no tree of the paradise of God was likened to him and to his beauty; finally, in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 24, the divine Wisdom speaks thus, I, like an aqueduct, came out of paradise. And sometimes the name of paradise is said in the sacred writings not of a corporeal place, but of spiritual pleasure and delight: but most of all of that eternal life, fullest of all goods and pleasures, which the Blessed lead in the heavens. With this notion of Paradise our Lord used it, Luke 23, when He said to the thief, This day thou shalt be with me in paradise; and Paul in the twelfth chapter of the latter epistle to the Corinthians, when he says that he was caught up into paradise, and heard there secret words which it is not lawful for man to utter; in John likewise, in the Apocalypse, chapter 2, it is written, To him that overcometh I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the para[dise of my God]...

Marginal gloss: "Dupliciter in sacris litteris sumi nomen Paradisi." In Scripture ‘Paradise’ means (1) any most pleasant place: Sodom's land ‘like a paradise’ (Gen 13:10); Solomon's ‘gardens’ (Eccl 2:5, LXX ‘paradises’); Canticles 4:13; the ‘paradise of God’ (Ezek 28:13; 31:8, by allegory of the Assyrian king); Wisdom ‘came out of paradise’ (Ecclus 24:41). Or (2) spiritual delight—especially the heavenly eternal life: ‘this day thou shalt be with me in paradise’ (Luke 23:43); Paul caught up ‘into paradise’ (2 Cor 12:4); ‘the tree of life in the paradise of my God’ (Apoc 2:7). Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘dabo’).

— p. 326 (PDF) · printed p. 285 —

...which is in the paradise of my God. It is therefore manifest, from the things which have been said, that this word Paradise is in the sacred writings sometimes said of a corporeal place, and sometimes also of a spiritual thing: in both cases, however, that word carries with it a certain immense pleasure and delight.

Closing the survey of ‘paradise’ in Scripture: the word is used sometimes of a corporeal place, sometimes of a spiritual reality—but always conveys an immense delight and pleasantness.

Of pleasure.

The word 'voluptatis' of Gen 2:8 ('a paradise of pleasure'), taken up for a gloss on the underlying Hebrew Eden (Heden).

In Hebrew it is ■■■■ (Be Heden), that is, in Heden: and the word Heden signifies delights and pleasures, from the root ■■■ (Hadan), which is to be delighted; whence the frequent noun in the sacred writings ■■■■ (Hedna), that is, delight. Nor is it without credibility that from this word Heden was derived the Greek word ■δον■ (hedone), which among the Greeks signifies pleasure, as has been reported by some. But sometimes Heden, in the divine Scripture, is a proper name of a place, as one may notice below in chapter 4, where Cain is said to have dwelt, a fugitive, toward the eastern region of Heden: in which place Jerome did not interpret the word Heden as pleasure and delights, doubtless recognizing that there it is the proper name of a place. So also, in Ezekiel chapter 27, it is said, Charan and Heden were thy traders. And in Isaiah, chapter 37, among the other places and cities which the kings of the Assyrians had laid waste, are reckoned Gozan, Charan, and the sons of Heden.

Marginal gloss: "De significatione vocis Heden." The Hebrew is ■■■■ (Be Heden), 'in Heden (Eden)'; the word Heden means 'delights, pleasures,' from the root ■■■ ('to delight'), whence the noun ■■■■ (Hedna, 'delight'). The Greek ■δον■ ('pleasure') may derive from it. But sometimes Heden is a proper place-name: Cain dwelt east of Heden (Gen 4:16, where Jerome kept it a proper name); 'Charan and Heden were thy traders' (Ezek 27:23); and among the Assyrians' conquests, 'Gozan, Charan, and the sons of Heden' (Isa 37:12).

But without cause Cajetan denies that in these places the word Heden is taken for the same thing for which it is put in this second chapter of Genesis, although nevertheless in all the aforesaid places it is the same word, and is written in the same way. But the Heden, says Cajetan, of which Moses here treats, and in which Adam was placed, was, after the ejection of Adam from paradise, plainly uninhabitable and inaccessible to men, on account of the guard of the Cherubim set by God at its entrance. But the Heden of which Isaiah and Ezekiel speak in the aforesaid places

was a region cultivated and inhabited by merchants carrying precious wares into Judaea. Thus Cajetan, to whom Catharinus too has assented. But weak is Cajetan's argument: for Heden, before the flood (as long, namely, as that place of Paradise from which Adam was cast out endured), was uninhabited and inaccessible to mortals; but, it being laid waste and destroyed by the flood, and that first beauty and pleasantness of it being taken away (prepared for the use and delight of man, had he indeed kept justice and innocence), it then began to be cultivated and inhabited by men.

Cajetan groundlessly denies that 'Heden' in Ezekiel/Isaiah means the same as in Genesis 2, though it is the same word identically written. His argument: the Eden of Genesis, where Adam was placed, became (after his expulsion) uninhabitable and inaccessible, guarded by the Cherubim; whereas the Heden of Isaiah/Ezekiel was a cultivated trading region (Catharinus agreed). Pererius refutes: Eden was inaccessible only before the flood (while the Paradise endured); once the flood laid it waste and stripped its first beauty, men began to cultivate and inhabit it.

Since therefore the word Heden is ambiguous, signifying both pleasure and a certain place, it is in doubt in which of the two ways it ought to be taken in the present passage. Jerome took it for pleasure, when he translated, A paradise of pleasure. But because in Hebrew it is ■■■■ (Be Heden), that is, in Heden—whether it signify pleasure or a certain place—according to Jerome's view it ought to be translated word for word, In pleasure—which is harsh: for what does it mean, God planted in pleasure? The Seventy Translators, leaving in their translation the Hebrew name itself, Heden, seem to have understood that by that wor[d]...

Marginal gloss: "An hoc loco vocabulum Heden significet voluptatem an certum aliquem locum." Since 'Heden' is ambiguous (both 'pleasure' and a place), it is doubtful which sense it has here. Jerome took it as 'pleasure' ('a paradise of pleasure'); but since the Hebrew is ■■■■ ('in Heden'), Jerome's sense would give the harsh literal 'planted in pleasure' ('what does God planted in pleasure mean?'). The Septuagint kept the Hebrew name 'Heden' untranslated, seeming to take it as a place-name. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'voca'; signature N 3).

— p. 327 (PDF) · printed p. 286 —

...by that word a certain place of the earth. Although afterward, in this very narration, they more than once expressed that word by the name of

pleasure. To me indeed it seems most like the truth that by that word Moses here designates a certain place in which Paradise was. I have as authors of this view nearly all the Greek Fathers; I have as approvers of it four most noble Rabbis of the Hebrews—Kimchi, Abraham ben Ezra, and Salomon; and it agrees marvelously with the narration of Moses. For in describing Paradise he himself uses those circumstances from which that place—where, of what kind, and how great it was—can be clearly known: for he says that it was in the region Heden, toward its Eastern part; watered by a certain great river, which afterward was divided into four huge and most celebrated rivers. He even says that that river went out of the place Heden to water Paradise. By which words who does not see that the word Heden signifies a certain place, and not pleasure? for what sense would it have, that that river went out of pleasure to water Paradise? But I will warn the reader that it could have been that either that region of Paradise, because it was most pleasant, was signified by the word Heden, which sounds pleasure and delights; or, on the contrary, that the word Heden, in the sense in which it signifies pleasure, was drawn from that place Heden, as the most delightful and pleasant of the whole world.

Continuing the gloss on ‘Heden/Eden’ (Gen 2:8): the Septuagint took it as a place-name (though sometimes rendering it ‘pleasure’). Pererius judges it most likely Moses means a place where Paradise was—backed by nearly all the Greek Fathers and four noble Rabbis (Kimchi, Abraham ben Ezra, Salomon/Rashi). Moses's circumstances (Heden's eastern part, the great river dividing into four) show ‘Heden’ is a place, not ‘pleasure’ (else ‘the river went out of pleasure’ is senseless). Either the region was named Heden for its pleasantness, or the word ‘pleasure’ was drawn from that most delightful place.

From the beginning.

The phrase ‘a principio’ of Gen 2:8 (‘a paradise of pleasure from the beginning’), taken up for a gloss on the underlying Hebrew Kedem.

In Hebrew it is ■■■■ (Mi Kedem); and the word ■■■ (Kedem) is of ambiguous signification: for since it signifies ‘before’ or ‘beginning,’ it can be referred either to place or to time. Jerome, having followed the three

Translators—Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion—referring it to time, rendered it in Latin ‘A principio’ (from the beginning). And the same Jerome, in his book of Hebrew Traditions on Genesis, from the fact that Paradise is said to have been made ‘from the beginning,’ argues that it was founded by God before heaven and earth: which dictum of Jerome, if we wish to defend it as true, we must needs grant either that he himself was not speaking of the corporeal Paradise, but of the spiritual, which is eternal life, which God prepared for the elect before the constitution of the world; or that that ‘Before heaven and earth’ sounds the same as ‘before the perfect adornment and consummation of heaven and earth.’ Nor indeed, because Paradise was made ‘from the beginning,’ does it immediately follow that it was made either on the first day, or even before. For in John, chapter 8, our Lord says that the devil was a murderer from the beginning; whom yet it is agreed could not have been the author of man's death—whether spiritual or corporeal—before the sixth day, on which man was created. That ‘From the beginning,’ therefore, ought to be referred to the time of the first six days, but especially to the third day, on which (by the common and widespread opinion) Paradise was planted.

Marginal gloss: "Quod dixit Hieronymus Paradisum esse factum ante caelum et terram, quomodo sit intelligendum." The Hebrew ■■■■ (Mi Kedem)—the word ■■■ (Kedem)—is ambiguous (‘before/beginning,’ of place or time). Jerome (following Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion) took it temporally (‘from the beginning’), and elsewhere argued Paradise was made before heaven and earth. Pererius defends this only as meaning the spiritual Paradise (eternal life), or ‘before the perfecting of heaven and earth.’ ‘From the beginning’ need not mean the first day (cf. the devil ‘a murderer from the beginning,’ John 8:44, yet not before the sixth day); it refers to the first six days, especially the third, when (by common opinion) Paradise was planted.

— p. 328 (PDF) · printed p. 287 —

But indeed the Seventy Translators understood by the word Kedem not time but place: and since the foremost part of the world is the East (namely, whence the most excellent celestial motion of the prime mobile takes its beginning), they therefore translated it in Greek κατ■ τ■ς ■νατολ■ς, that is, toward the East: which reading nearly all the Greek Fathers

followed and interpreted. Among these is Basil, in the eleventh homily on Genesis, and in the Sermon in which he treats those words of Paul to the Thessalonians, chapter 5, In all things give thanks; Chrysostom and Theodoret on this place; Gregory of Nyssa on the Oration Why, turned to the East, we adore; Damascene, in the fourth book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 13. For these hand down that, of the most ancient custom of turning oneself in praying toward the East, this is one of many, and the chief reason: that Paradise, in which Adam was placed, and from which for sin he was cast down, was in the eastern region. In praying, therefore, we look toward the East, as if recalling to memory that bitter fall of ours, by which from the most blessed places of Paradise we were thrust out into this exile most full of toils and miseries, and at the same time desiring one day to reach the heavenly Paradise, of which that was an image. Therefore in this place the word Kedem signifies the Eastern region, so that the sense is that Paradise was planted in the Eastern part of the region Heden. The Hebrew Commentaries also have this understanding of the words of Moses. Certainly, at the end of chapter 3 of this book, Jerome referred the same word Kedem not to time but to place. For so he translated, God placed before the Paradise of pleasure the Cherubim. Where you see that Jerome rendered the word Kedem not ‘From the beginning,’ but ‘Before.’ But in Hebrew it is thus, word for word, He set at the Eastern part of the garden Heden the Cherubim.

Marginal gloss: "De antiquo more orandi versa ad Orientem facie." The Septuagint took Kedem as place, not time, rendering it κατ■ τ■ς ■νατολ■ς (‘toward the East’)—since the East is the world's foremost part (whence the prime mobile's motion starts). Most Greek Fathers follow (Basil, Hom. 11 & on 1 Thess 5:18; Chrysostom; Theodoret; Gregory of Nyssa, On Worshipping toward the East; John Damascene, De Fide orth. 4.13): the ancient custom of praying toward the East is chiefly because Paradise (whence Adam was cast for sin) lay in the East—so we face East recalling our fall and longing for the heavenly Paradise it imaged. So Kedem here = the Eastern region; Paradise was planted in the eastern part of Heden. Jerome too (Gen 3:24) rendered Kedem as ‘before/at the east’ (the Cherubim ‘at the eastern part of the garden Heden’).

Some think that Paradise was located toward the East for this reason, that the Eastern part, both in heaven and on earth, is the most excellent of all:

for thence the first and most perfect motion of heaven takes its impulse. Certainly antiquity ennobled the regions of the East (such as India) by the renown of the most precious things, of which they are most fertile: although Julius Scaliger, in the work of Exercitations which he wrote against Cardano, in exercitation 99, gathers many things to prove that far better things, and more outstanding in every kind of praise, are born in the lands which are this side of the Persian Gulf as far as the farthest shore of Lusitania, than in the regions of the East which are beyond the Persian Gulf.

Marginal gloss: "An regio Orientalis sit totius terrae praestantissima." Some hold Paradise was eastward because the East is the most excellent part of heaven and earth (whence heaven's motion starts); antiquity ennobled the East (e.g. India) for its precious products. But Julius Caesar Scaliger (Exercitationes against Cardano, ex. 99) argues that far better things are born in the lands this side of the Persian Gulf—as far as the coast of Lusitania (Portugal)—than in the East beyond the Gulf.

But in this place it must be set forth—which has been set forth by others before us, and is surely most true—that nowhere in the sacred writings is a region which is beyond the Persian Gulf, whether nearer or farther than the Ganges, called by the name of the East; but the divine Scripture simply calls those ‘eastern lands’ which are this side of the Persian Gulf, such as Persia, Armenia, Arabia, and Mesopotamia. The nations also nearer to these regions, in comparison with the Jews, it is wont to name ‘eastern,’ and their places to be ‘toward the East,’ such as[...]

Marginal gloss: "Quae nominetur in litteris sacris terra orientalis." A key point: Scripture never calls anything beyond the Persian Gulf (nearer or farther than the Ganges) ‘the East’; it calls ‘eastern lands’ only those this side of the Gulf—Persia, Armenia, Arabia, Mesopotamia—and the nearer peoples (relative to the Jews) ‘eastern.’ Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘sicut’).

— p. 329 (PDF) · printed p. 288 —

...such as the Arabs, the Idumaeans, the Amalekites, the Midianites, the Ammonites, and the Moabites, and also the Red Sea and the Salt Sea. Wherefore Job, who was an Idumaean, is numbered among the sons of the East; and the three Magi who came from Persia, or Chaldea, or Arabia to

adore Christ the Lord, are said to have come from the East. Nay rather, Scripture is wont frequently to call Mesopotamia simply ‘the eastern land’: for in Genesis 29 Jacob, having set out for Mesopotamia, is said to have gone ‘into the eastern land’; and in the book of Numbers, chapter 23, the soothsayer Balaam is said to have been brought to curse the Hebrews ‘from the mountains of the East,’ whom yet Moses in Deuteronomy, chapter 23, left it written had been brought ‘from Mesopotamia of Syria.’ We read also in the 25th chapter of Genesis that the children whom Abraham had taken from Keturah (among whom are numbered Madian and Epha) he separated from Isaac ‘toward the eastern region.’ From these it appears that ‘the eastern land’ in the sacred writings is named only that which extends this side of the Persian Gulf as far as Judaea. But eastern India—although both by the designation of the Mathematicians and by the appellation of Greek and Latin writers it is more truly eastern than all other lands—Scripture nevertheless nowhere mentions or names by that name: whence one may understand that Heden, in which Paradise was, and which is said to have been toward the East, was not beyond the Persian Gulf; and that those greatly err in their conjecture who, because Moses said it was toward the East, therefore thought Paradise was in the farthest shores of the earth (namely in India, or even beyond it). Therefore the whole sense of this place of Moses will be this: God planted Paradise in the region Heden, toward its eastern part.

Continues the catalogue of Scripture's ‘eastern’ peoples (Arabs, Idumaeans, Amalekites, Midianites, Ammonites, Moabites; the Red Sea, the Salt/Dead Sea): Job the Idumaean is a ‘son of the East’; the Magi came ‘from the East’; Mesopotamia is simply ‘the eastern land’ (Jacob's journey, Gen 29; Balaam ‘from the mountains of the East,’ Num 23 = ‘Mesopotamia of Syria,’ Deut 23; Keturah's sons sent ‘eastward,’ Gen 25). So Scripture's ‘East’ reaches only to the Persian Gulf—never India. Hence Eden was not beyond the Gulf, and those err who placed Paradise in India or beyond. Full sense: ‘God planted Paradise in the region Heden, toward its eastern part.’

DISPUTATION. What place Paradise was, where it was, and how great it was; and why it has at no time yet been found by men; finally, whether that terrestrial Paradise still exists.

The heading of a formal disputation on Paradise's location, size, undiscoverability, and continued existence—comprising several numbered questions.

Concerning the words of Moses about Paradise hitherto expounded, several questions must be treated, before we pursue the rest which Moses adds about Paradise. FIRST QUESTION. Whether the Mosaic description of Paradise is to be understood properly, of some corporeal and terrestrial place, or rather figuratively, of some intelligible and spiritual thing. Philo the Jew, at the end of his book On the Making of the World, and in his book On the Allegories of the Mosaic Law, interprets the discourse of Moses about Para[dise] only mystically and allegorically...

Marginal gloss: "An Paradisus fuerit locus corporalis terrestris. Philo." The FIRST QUESTION of the disputation: is the Mosaic Paradise a real corporeal/terrestrial place, or a figurative spiritual reality? Philo the Jew (De Mundi opificio, end; De Allegoriis legis) reads Moses's account only mystically/allegorically. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘diso’).

— p. 330 (PDF) · printed p. 289 —

...about Paradise, and judges it must be understood no otherwise: whom Origen having followed, in his tomes on Genesis, perverts the whole history of paradise, having judged that it ought to be taken no otherwise than figuratively: and so he places paradise not on earth, but in the third heaven, to which, namely, Paul was caught up; by the trees of paradise he interprets angelic virtues; but by the rivers, the waters which are above the back of the firmament. And although some try to show that Origen did not reject the historical interpretation of paradise—by those words brought forward from his 31st homily on Numbers, ‘Adam after his sin is thrust out into the dry land, for before he was not in the dry land but in the earth; for paradise is not in the dry land but in the earth’—yet these words avail little for Origen's clearing and defense, since he was condemned by very many Fathers for the aforesaid opinion. Epiphanius certainly disputes much against this interpretation of Origen, both in the Ancoratus and in the Epistle which he wrote to John, Bishop of Jerusalem.

Origen, following Philo, 'perverts the whole history of paradise,' reading it only figuratively: he places paradise not on earth but in the third heaven (to which Paul was caught up, 2 Cor 12); the trees = angelic virtues, the rivers = the waters above the firmament. Some defend Origen by his 31st homily on Numbers ('Adam thrust into the dry land... paradise is not in the dry land but in the earth'), but this avails little—he was condemned by many Fathers. Epiphanius argues against it (in the Ancoratus and his Letter to John of Jerusalem).

Blessed Ambrose, in the book which he published On Paradise, treading in the footsteps of Philo and Origen, thinks and writes things like theirs about paradise. The same, in the book of Epistles 6, epistle 42, which is written to Sabinus, where he last discoursed about paradise—'now a veteran' (as he himself says) 'Priest'—having reviewed the various opinions of other writers, at last concludes (as more like the truth) that paradise was not a terrestrial place, but something spiritual and intelligible, which pertained to the delighting of Adam's mind and spirit, and in a way to his being made blessed in this life. It does not escape me that there are some who prove that Ambrose held the true opinion about paradise from his Commentary on the sixth chapter of the former epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, because in that place Ambrose says, As Jerusalem is twofold, one heavenly, the other earthly, so paradise is twofold—one terrestrial, in which Adam was placed, that he might till and keep it; the other heavenly, to which Paul was caught up. But that proof would make little credit with learned men, who hold, by many and not slight conjectures, that those Commentaries on Paul's epistles did not come from Ambrose's workshop.

Ambrose, in his De Paradiso, follows Philo and Origen; in Epistle 42 (to Sabinus)—'now a veteran priest'—he concludes that paradise was not terrestrial but something spiritual, pertaining to delighting Adam's mind. Some cite the Commentary on 1 Cor 6 ('as Jerusalem is twofold... so paradise is twofold, one terrestrial where Adam was placed, one heavenly where Paul was caught up') to prove Ambrose held the literal view—but that Commentary is (by many conjectures) not genuinely Ambrose's (i.e., 'Ambrosiaster').

In short, even Jerome might seem to someone to have been engaged in the same error, since in his book of Hebrew Traditions he says that Paradise was founded by God before heaven and earth: which cannot be understood

of the terrestrial paradise. But those words of Jerome are either to be interpreted as we interpreted above; or it must be thought that Jerome said them not from his own, but from the sense of others: for it can be neither obscure nor doubtful that Jerome vehemently abhorred the aforesaid opinion of Philo and Origen about paradise, since he, in the Epistle which he gave to Pammachius on the errors of John, Bishop of Jerusalem, among them commemorates this one of Origen about paradise too; and in his Commentaries on Daniel, explaining chapter 10, with the gravest words [inveighs] against those allegorical [interpreters] of para[dise]...

Even Jerome might seem to err, since in his Hebrew Traditions he says Paradise was made before heaven and earth (which cannot fit a terrestrial paradise). But (Pererius answers) those words must be read as above, or as spoken from others' sense—for Jerome clearly abhorred the Philo/Origen view: in his Letter to Pammachius (on the errors of John of Jerusalem) he lists this Origen opinion among the errors, and in his Commentary on Daniel 10 he inveighs with the gravest words against the allegorical interpreters of paradise. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘paradisi’; signature O).

— p. 331 (PDF) · printed p. 290 —

...he inveighs against those allegorical Interpreters of paradise:

Continuing from the previous page: Jerome, in his Commentary on Daniel (ch. 10), inveighs against the allegorizing interpreters of paradise.

> *Let their ravings be silent, he says, who, following shadows and images in the truth, attempt to overturn the truth itself: so that they think paradise and the rivers and the trees ought to be undermined by the laws of allegory. Thus Jerome.*

Jerome, Commentary on Daniel (ch. 10), against those who would dissolve the literal paradise, rivers, and trees into allegory.

Saint Augustine, in the book On Heresies, number 59, numbers this too among the errors of the Seleuciani and Hermogeniani—that they denied a visible paradise. But Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities; Basil, in the eleventh homily on Genesis, which is on paradise; and (to say it in one

word) almost all the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, by a concordant opinion held that the paradise which Moses describes was a corporeal and terrestrial place. Although they did not think it forbidden to anyone that, after the historical sense of paradise, he should not be able to bring also other mystical senses and allegorical interpretations. Nay rather, Augustine, at the beginning of the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, reports three opinions about paradise: of those interpreting the history of paradise only spiritually, only corporeally, and in both ways; he affirmed that this last pleased him most of all. Which is not to be understood as if Augustine would have the history of paradise interpreted partly corporeally, partly spiritually (for the whole is to be understood corporeally according to the historical sense), but by those words Augustine signified that those did rightly and usefully who first expounded the description of paradise according to the historical and literal sense, then by the mystical sense applied it to certain deeper and more sublime understandings of spiritual and celestial things. For what Augustine thought about the historical exposition of paradise he shows most clearly in the thirteenth book of the City of God, in the last words of the 21st chapter: for, having mentioned a certain allegorical exposition of paradise, he subjoins these words:

Augustine (De Haeresibus 59) lists denying a visible paradise among the errors of the Seleuciani/Hermogeniani. Josephus (Antiquities 1), Basil (Hom. 11 on Genesis), and nearly all the Fathers held a corporeal, terrestrial paradise—while allowing added mystical senses. Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 8, opening) reports three views (spiritual-only, corporeal-only, both) and prefers the last—meaning not a half-corporeal/half-spiritual history (the whole is literal/corporeal), but that one rightly expounds the literal first, then applies the mystical. His view on the literal is clearest in City of God 13.21:

> *These things, and any others that can be more fittingly said about understanding paradise spiritually, let them be said with no one forbidding it—provided, however, that the truth also of that history, commended by a most faithful narration of things done, be believed. Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, City of God 13.21: spiritual interpretations of paradise are permitted, provided the historical truth (a faithful account of real events) is still believed.

But no one of the ancients, in my judgment, has more clearly expounded this matter of which we treat than Chrysostom, who, in the thirteenth homily on Genesis, speaks in this manner:

Lead-in to a quotation of Chrysostom, Homily 13 on Genesis, on the literal exactness of Moses's paradise-account.

> *Therefore Moses, in describing paradise—both the name of the place in which it was (namely Heden), and the eastern region which it faced, and the names of the rivers going out from paradise, nearly known to all—narrated it so subtly and accurately, that it should not be permitted to those wishing to trifle to deceive the simpler folk, by saying that there was no paradise on earth but in heaven, and by tossing about other fables and their own dreams. For if, although Moses placed so great diligence in describing paradise, there were nevertheless some who fabled that there was no paradise upon earth, and who brought in many other things most foreign to the doctrine of Moses, and twisted his words elsewhere than as they were said: what would have happened if he had not described paradise so minutely, so clearly, and finally so distinctly?[...]*

Chrysostom, Homily 13 on Genesis: Moses described paradise so exactly (its name Eden, its eastern situation, the named rivers) precisely to forestall those who would deceive the simple by relocating it to heaven or spinning fables. If, despite such diligence, some still fabled paradise out of the earth, what would have happened had he been less precise? The block quote spans printed pp. 290–291. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Ita’).

— p. 332 (PDF) · printed p. 291 —

...had he described it? Thus Chrysostom. This same thing Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, taught in that Epistle which was recited by the sixth General Synod, in the eleventh session, and afterward in the thirteenth session approved by the whole Synod. Certainly, the whole narration of

Moses most openly demonstrates that paradise was a certain place on earth, corporeal and visible, abounding in every kind of pleasures and delights. For since that narration is no less historical than that of the other things which Moses had earlier recorded, surely the true and genuine sense of its history ought, without controversy, to be reckoned that which the words of Moses render when taken according to their proper and usual signification. One may observe many things in the narration of Moses which build up faith in this view: for he says that paradise was located in the region Heden, toward its eastern part; that man was made outside it, but was soon led into it by God, to till and keep it; that there were in it trees most pleasant to sight and sweetest to taste; that it was watered by one river, afterward led off into four rivers, two of which are the Tigris and the Euphrates; that from that place Adam was cast out by God on account of the sin of disobedience, and the Cherubim placed at its entrance, namely to bar man from entry; that Eve saw, plucked, ate, and gave to Adam to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and other things like these, which undoubtedly demonstrate that paradise was a corporeal and terrestrial place.

The close of Chrysostom's homily; Sophronius of Jerusalem taught the same (in the epistle read at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, sessions 11 and 13). Pererius's own affirmation: Moses's narration plainly shows paradise was a corporeal, visible place on earth—being no less historical than his other accounts, its true sense is the proper, literal one. Many details confirm it: paradise in the eastern part of Heden; man made outside, led in to till and keep it; trees fair and sweet; one river dividing into four (incl. Tigris and Euphrates); Adam cast out for disobedience, the Cherubim barring entry; Eve's seeing, plucking, eating, and giving the fruit.

But why the Authors whom I mentioned above—outstanding in the authority of learning and of antiquity—denied that paradise was a terrestrial place: I, for my part, think that this is the cause: that they thought the things which Moses teaches could be understood only figuratively and mystically—concerning the immortality which the eating of the tree of life conferred on man; concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; concerning the origin of the four rivers from the one river of paradise;

concerning the conversation of the serpent with Eve and its cursing; concerning God's walking in paradise after midday in the breeze; concerning the tunics of skin with which God clothed Adam and Eve convicted of sin; concerning the Cherubim, with the turning and flaming sword, placed for the guarding of paradise. But that all these things are to be understood and interpreted properly and historically, we shall teach below, interpreting each in its own place.

Why the eminent Fathers denied a terrestrial paradise: Pererius judges it was because they thought certain elements could only be read figuratively—the immortality from the tree of life; the tree of knowledge; the four rivers from one; the serpent's speech and curse; God's walking in the afternoon breeze; the tunics of skin; the Cherubim with the turning flaming sword. But (Pererius will argue below, in each place) all these are to be understood properly and historically.

There was an opinion of some of our time (which, however, was older, as its mention in Hugh of St. Victor, in the book of his Annotations on Genesis, proves): that the paradise which Moses described was not some definite region or any certain place of the earth, but that by the name of paradise is denoted the whole earth, which in its primeval condition and state, on account of its exceptional goodness, pleasantness, and fecundity, was wholly like a certain most pleasant garden and as it were a paradise; just as below, in chapter 13, Sodom and Gomorrah are said to have been like the paradise of God. But that river by which paradise was watered, they say is to be under[stood]...

Marginal gloss: "Refellitur quorundam opinio. Paradisum scribit Moses fuisse universum terrarum orbem, qui in exordio mundi erat amoenissimus." An opinion (older than its appearance in Hugh of St. Victor's Annotations on Genesis): that ‘paradise’ does not denote a definite place but the WHOLE EARTH, which in its primeval state was like one vast pleasant garden (as Sodom's land was ‘like the paradise of God,’ Gen 13:10). The river watering paradise, they say, is the Ocean. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘gendum’).

— p. 333 (PDF) · printed p. 292 —

...to be understood to be the Ocean itself, which Hesiod in the Theogony, and Homer in the Odyssey, call by the name of a river. And the Ocean is

said to water the whole earth, because all the sweet waters by which the earth is watered flow out of the Ocean (as was the old opinion of the Philosophers and the Poets, nor indeed alien to the divine Scripture) through the subterranean and hidden passages of the earth. The Ocean, moreover, is said to pour forth those four rivers, not because the others do not have their origin from it, but because these, as the greatest and noblest and most celebrated, seemed especially worthy of mention. But this opinion the simple narration of Moses itself both vehemently and evidently confutes. For how can the Paradise which Moses described be understood to have been the whole earth, when Moses distinctly teaches that it was in the region Heden, toward the Eastern part?—outside which, when man had been made, he was afterward led into it, and soon, on account of the sin he committed, cast out of it, a terrible Cherub being set to guard its entrance: for these things, and others which one may gather from the same narration, can in no way be said of the whole world.

The ‘whole-earth’ view: the watering river is the Ocean (which Hesiod, Theogony, and Homer, Odyssey, call a ‘river’), since all sweet waters flow from the Ocean through hidden passages (an old philosophical/poetic view, not alien to Scripture); the four rivers are named only as the greatest. But Moses's plain narration refutes this: paradise was in the eastern part of Heden, man was made outside it and led in, then cast out with a Cherub guarding the entrance—none of which can be said of the whole world.

QUESTION II. On the place and situation of Paradise.

The second question of the disputation: where Paradise was located.

The matter which we undertake to treat is full of obscurity and difficulty, the writers disagreeing greatly among themselves with the greatest variety of opinions, some even setting forth marvelous (or, to speak more truly, incredible) things about the place and position of paradise. But it has seemed to us that it can contribute much to a plainer and fuller explanation of this question, if we recount, weigh, and judge one by one the more noble and more celebrated opinions of the Authors. Tertullian, in the Apologeticum against the Gentiles, says that paradise is a place of divine

pleasantness, destined to receive the spirits of the Saints, and segregated from the knowledge of the common world by a certain wall of that fiery zone. And at the end of the book which he wrote On the Soul he affirms that he published his own book On Paradise; which if we now had, we could more clearly know his own opinion about paradise. Saint Basil, in the Oration on Paradise, described it in these words:

Marginal glosses: "Tertulliani de situ Paradisi sententia"; "Descriptio Paradisi terrestris secundum Basilium, Ephrem, Damascenum et Isidorum." Q. II is full of difficulty—writers disagree wildly. Pererius will recount and judge the noble authors one by one. Tertullian (Apologeticum) calls paradise a place of divine pleasantness, set apart for the Saints' spirits, walled off from the world by the fiery zone (he also wrote a lost book On Paradise). Then Basil (Oration on Paradise) describes it:

Paradise, he says, was a place affluent on every side with delights, surpassing the beauty of every sensible creature: by reason of the sublimity of the place in which it was, admitting darkness in no part of itself, but ever illumined by the splendor of the rising stars; in which there was no immoderate force of winds, no storm of tempests, no horror of any winter, no excessive moisture of spring, no scorching ardor of summer, no troublesome and harmful dryness of autumn, but a temperate and peaceful harmony of all the seasons among themselves: so that whatever in[...]

Basil, Oration on Paradise (Homily 11 on Genesis). The block quote spans printed pp. 292–293. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘quod in’).

— p. 334 (PDF) · printed p. 293 —

...whatever in each season of the year is best and most delightful, it had in itself, namely the pleasantness of spring, the abundance of summer, the cheerfulness of autumn, the leisure and quiet of winter: its soil was rich and soft, and fertile of all goods and pleasures, of which you would most truly have said that it flowed with milk and honey.

Conclusion of Basil's description (Oration on Paradise): paradise enjoyed the best of every season—spring's pleasantness, summer's plenty, autumn's cheer, winter's rest—and its rich, soft soil 'flowed with milk and honey.'

Blessed Ephraem the Syrian, a contemporary and intimate of Basil, in his Commentaries on Genesis (which work does not now exist, but Moses Barcepha the Syrian cites it in his book On Paradise—which book Andreas Masius recently turned most elegantly from the Syriac tongue into Latin)—Ephraem, I say, handed down that all the earth inhabited by us is girt about on every side by the Ocean, beyond which there is an almost immense land lying all around the Ocean, in which Paradise is located.

St. Ephraem the Syrian (a contemporary and friend of Basil), in his (lost) Genesis Commentaries—cited by Moses Bar-Kepha the Syrian in his book On Paradise, recently translated from Syriac into Latin by Andreas Masius—taught that the inhabited earth is everywhere girt by the Ocean, beyond which lies an almost immense land surrounding the Ocean, where Paradise is located.

Damascene, in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 11, described Paradise thus:

Marginal gloss: "Ioan. Damasceni de situ Paradisi sententia." Lead-in to John Damascene's description (De Fide orthodoxa 2.11).

It is, he says, a place wondrously planted by the hands of God in Heden toward the East, a storehouse of all joy and pleasure, higher than all the earth, of the best temperateness of sky, with the subtlest and purest air, with plants ever green and breathing a most sweet odor, full of light, surpassing the understanding of all sensible loveliness and beauty. A divine place indeed, wonderfully suited to the dignity of the first man: in which no animal dwells, but only man, the workmanship of the divine hands.

John Damascene, De Fide orthodoxa 2.11: paradise is a place wondrously planted by God's hands in Eden toward the East—a storehouse of all joy, higher than all earth, of the best climate and purest air, with evergreen fragrant plants, full of light, beyond all sensible beauty; a divine place fitting the first man's dignity, where no animal dwells but only man, God's handiwork.

Isidore, in the fourteenth book of the Etymologies, chapter 3, writes these things about Paradise:

Lead-in to Isidore of Seville's account (Etymologies 14.3).

> *Paradise is a place set in the parts of the East, whose name is turned from the Greek into Latin as ‘garden.’ Moreover, in Hebrew it is called Heden, which in our tongue is interpreted ‘delights’; and the two joined make ‘a garden of delights’: for it is planted with every kind of fruit-bearing tree. There is no cold there, no heat, but a perpetual mildness of the air. From its midst a spring bursting forth waters the whole grove, and it is divided into four rising rivers. The entrance to this place, after the sin of man, was barred: for it is fenced on every side with a flaming sword (rhomphaea), so that its conflagration is almost joined with heaven. The Cherubim also—that is, a garrison of Angels—was appointed over the blazing of the flaming sword, to ward off evil spirits, so that the good Angels may keep off men by the flame, but the evil Angels by themselves, lest the entry of transgression lie open to any flesh or spirit.*

Isidore, Etymologies 14.3.2–4: Paradise is in the East, its Greek name = Latin ‘hortus’ (garden), Hebrew ‘Heden’ = ‘delights,’ so ‘garden of delights’; planted with every fruit-tree, no cold or heat but perpetual mildness; a spring from its midst waters the grove and divides into four rivers. After man's sin its entrance was barred by a flaming sword (rhomphaea) reaching almost to heaven, and the Cherubim (a garrison of Angels) set over the blaze—the good Angels warding off men by the flame and evil Angels by themselves.

Rupert, in the first book On the Trinity and Its Works, chapter 37, says that Paradise was a most pleasant place and nearest to heaven. Ambrose Catharinus cites a certain opinion of Augustine about Paradise (I know not from which of his books to Orosius) which runs thus:

Rupert of Deutz (De Trinitate et operibus eius 1.37): paradise was a most pleasant place nearest to heaven. Ambrose Catharinus cites a passage (which he ascribes to Augustine, addressed to Orosius):

> *Paradise is situated in the East, with the immense Ocean lying between, very far removed from our world, reaching even to the lunar circle: whence the waters of the flood are said by no means to have come there; this place was barred on account of the guilt of the first man, nor is access to it given to any of living things.*

A passage Catharinus ascribes to Augustine (‘to Orosius’): paradise lies in the East beyond the immense Ocean, very far from our world, reaching up to the lunar circle—so the flood's waters did not reach it; barred for Adam's guilt, with no access to any living thing. (Pererius doubts the attribution; see the following note.)

Thus Catharinus, from Augustine: in no book of whom, however, has it happened to me to find that opinion. The scholastic theologians assign it to Bede; but neither does Bede have it, either in his Hexameron or in his Allegorical exposition of the book of Genesis. He only says this much, that Paradise is a place most remote from the knowledge of men.

Pererius's caveat: he found that ‘Augustinian’ passage in no book of Augustine; the scholastics assign it to Bede, but Bede has it neither in his Hexameron nor his allegorical Genesis exposition—Bede says only that Paradise is a place most remote from human knowledge. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Illa’; signature O 3).

— p. 335 (PDF) · printed p. 294 —

That opinion, then, was Strabo's and his teacher Rabanus's, which the Master sets down in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, and the Scholastic History on the book of Genesis, chapter 13. From the aforesaid opinions of authors one may understand that there are two things which seem to have pleased many Writers about Paradise: one is, that Paradise is distant from our land by an almost immense interposed Ocean; and they seem to have said this for this reason, that they might have ready what to answer to those inquiring why Paradise was inaccessible to men, and to this day found by none. The other is, that Paradise was in a most lofty place, and (as it seemed to some) nearest to the orb of the moon. And they attributed so great an altitude to Paradise for three causes: The first was for the healthfulness of habitation, because no inconvenience and harm

from sublunary things could breathe upon it there. And a place near to heaven seemed to them to be most tranquil and most temperate, and most suited to preserving man's health and prolonging life. Certainly Solinus, in chapter 16, noted that on the top of Mount Athos (which is thought to exceed the place whence the rains fall) there is a town Achrothon, where the inhabitants live a life half again longer than elsewhere; whom on that account the Greeks call μακροβ■ους (makrobious), we should call long-lived. The second cause was, that they might claim Paradise [as safe] from the destruction which the flood brought upon the whole world—which, Scripture relates, covered all the mountains of the earth, having gone fifteen cubits above even the highest. And since it is established that there are certain mountains which transcend with their peaks the region of winds and rains, it is necessary that the place of Paradise (which they hold for certain to have been inviolate and untouched by the flood) be set in a most lofty place, and nearest to the heavens. The third cause was, that the four rivers which Moses narrates to go out of Paradise could not be carried through this our land, so far separated from Paradise, unless the place of Paradise were most lofty—whence, namely, falling by a headlong descent and carried beneath the depths of the Ocean, they might afterward, in various places, burst out into this our land.

Marginal gloss: "Cur multi putarunt Paradisum esse ultra Oceanum et extra hunc nostrum terrenum orbem, atque in loci altitudine caelo proximum." The remote-paradise view = Walafrid Strabo and Rabanus Maurus (Peter Lombard, Sent. 2 d.17; the Historia Scholastica). Two theses: (1) Paradise lies across an immense Ocean (to explain its inaccessibility); (2) Paradise was extremely high, near the moon's orb—for three reasons: (a) healthfulness (Solinus 16: Achrothon atop Mt. Athos, above the rain-line, whose folk are 'long-lived,' μακροβ■ους); (b) to spare it the flood, which topped all mountains by 15 cubits; (c) the four rivers could not reach our land unless they fell from a great height and ran under the Ocean.

But if someone of these should ask: if Paradise is so far distant from our region by the interposed Ocean, how could men first cross from there into this our land? For both Athanasius and Cyril have reported that Adam, having set out from the region of Paradise, after very many other regions

had been traversed, came into Judaea, and there died and was buried on the Jerusalem mount, which by posterity (because it contained the skull of the first man) was called Mount Calvary. To this these men answer in two ways: for some say that those first men were Giants and of very tall stature, and therefore were able to cross over on foot into this our land through the shallow sea; others answer that, until the flood, those ancient men dwelt in the land near Paradise, but that our land, up to that time, was plainly empty of men and deserted. At the flood, therefore, the rest[...]

Objection: if Paradise lies across the Ocean, how did men first reach our land? (Athanasius and Cyril report Adam came from Paradise to Judaea and was buried on the Jerusalem mount—called Calvary because it held the first man's skull.) Two answers: (a) the first men were Giants who waded the shallow sea on foot; (b) until the flood the ancients dwelt near Paradise, our land being empty—so at the flood the eight in the ark were carried here. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘ceteris’).

— p. 336 (PDF) · printed p. 295 —

...at the flood, therefore, the rest perishing, eight men were carried over by the ark into this our land. And these things these men judged about the place of Paradise. But those two very things, approved by them and set forth in writing, so lack credibility that they do not require a long refutation. For what they say, that the land of Paradise is disjoined from this our land by a certain immense Ocean, has no verisimilitude, no appearance of probability. First, that which these men say—that our land is on every side surrounded and encircled by the Ocean, and that beyond the Ocean there is another land which encompasses the whole Ocean—has been more than sufficiently explored and ascertained to be false in this our time, by the navigations of the Spaniards and Portuguese (who have sailed through and traversed nearly the whole Ocean and globe of the earth). Then, who would believe that that land beyond the Ocean, so much greater than this our own, was, from the beginning of the world to this day, utterly deserted and empty of all human habitation? Next, in plain words Moses teaches that Paradise was in the region Heden, which it is not obscurely known (from the words of Isaiah and Ezekiel which we reported above)

was not far from Mesopotamia or Arabia. Besides, it would be ridiculous that Moses should have wished to describe and make known Paradise by those places which are in our world, if Paradise had been outside this our land: for what would it have profited, for perceiving knowledge of Paradise, to name the rivers flowing out of Paradise, and to declare their courses through the most well-known places of our world? In addition, what need was there, for barring man from the entry of Paradise, to fortify its entrance with so great a guard? for it would have been enough to thrust out and cast man into this our land, for no one could have returned over such interposed spaces of land and sea. Nor indeed can it be sufficiently understood, much less believed, that those four rivers of Paradise (whose origins and courses are seen in this our land) could have come into this our world from that so remote and far-off land, with the vastest Ocean interposed. For as to what they say, that these are cast down from the lofty place of Paradise and, carried beneath the Ocean, burst out into this our land—who does not see that this was rather invented by them (lest they seem to say nothing), than that they thought they were saying anything that would be probable?

Marginal gloss: "Refellitur illud, Paradisum fuisse ultra Oceanum." Refuting the trans-Ocean view: (1) that our land is wholly girt by the Ocean, with another encircling land beyond, is now proven false by the Spanish/Portuguese navigations of the whole globe; (2) who would believe that vast farther land was uninhabited from the world's start? (3) Moses plainly puts Paradise in Heden, near Mesopotamia/Arabia; (4) it would be absurd to describe Paradise by places in our world if it lay outside it (why name its rivers and trace them through our known lands?); (5) why guard its entrance so strongly, when mere expulsion across such distances would suffice? (6) the four rivers (seen here) could not come from across the Ocean—the claim that they fall from Paradise's height and run under the Ocean is an invention, not a probability.

But now, what others hand down—that the altitude of Paradise is so great that with its summit it touches the orb of the moon—is so far not only not credible, but even ridiculous, that to set down a speech in refuting it might seem superfluous. For these men thought that such a place was most convenient and most healthful for the habitation of man, which nevertheless is by manifest reason convicted of being most inconvenient

for man, and altogether uninhabitable. First indeed, on account of the nearness of the sun and the other stars; then on account of the element of fire, in that place next subject to the heaven of the moon; next, on account of the agitation and perpetual whirling of that place, continuously turned about by the most rapid vertigo of heaven. Besides, the interval which is from the earth to the orb of the moon, Ptolemy and Alfraganus teach to be nearly seventeen times greater than the diameter of the earth—that is, the whole length of the earth itself: which[...]

Marginal gloss: "Refutatur illud de altitudine Paradisi usque ad vicinam caeli." The lunar-altitude view is not merely incredible but ridiculous. Such a place is in fact uninhabitable: from the nearness of the sun and stars; the fire-element just under the moon's heaven; the perpetual whirling by the celestial vertigo. And Ptolemy and Alfraganus put the earth-to-moon distance at about 17 times the earth's diameter. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘distan’).

— p. 337 (PDF) · printed p. 296 —

...which distance, by the computation of our miles, contains one hundred thousand miles, with nine thousand nine hundred thirty-seven added: for so great is the interval lying open between the earth and the orb of the moon. If therefore Paradise touches heaven with its summit, it is necessary that it had for its base the whole breadth of the earth: add that so great an altitude of Paradise, set opposite us toward the east, would be conspicuous and visible on every side, and would take away from us, in great part, the illumination of the sun. On account of the manifest absurdity of this opinion, some wished to interpret it in a good sense, saying that it was said by them by hyperbole—not that the thing was so, but that by such an exaggeration the supreme sublimity and loftiness of Paradise might be understood. St. Thomas, in the first part, question 93, says it was said by likeness, namely that the place of Paradise, in pleasantness, healthfulness, and tranquillity, was like the celestial region, which begins from the moon. Alexander of Hales says it means that Paradise is in calm and tranquil air, which is higher than this our restless and turbulent air; and that the place of Paradise is where the limit and end of exhalations and vapors is, whose flux

and advance is attributed to the power and efficacy of the moon.

The earth-to-moon distance is 109,937 miles; so a Paradise touching heaven would need the whole earth for a base, and, set opposite us in the east, would block much of the sun's light—a manifest absurdity. Some read it as hyperbole. Aquinas (Summa I, q. [printed 93]) says it was said 'by likeness'—Paradise's pleasantness resembled the celestial region beginning at the moon. Alexander of Hales: it means Paradise is in calm air above our turbulent air, where exhalations and vapors end (their flux attributed to the moon's power).

From this opinion of Alexander, Tostatus is next (if indeed he differs), who—on the second chapter of Genesis, question 9, and on the thirteenth chapter of the same book, question 107—affirms that Paradise does not reach as far as the orb of the moon, but yet exceeds the borders and limits of this our turbulent and murky air, and is above the middle region of the air; and finally, that it is located in the third region of the air, and is loftier than all the other mountains of the earth by at least twenty cubits: so that the waters of the flood (which went above all the mountains by fifteen cubits) could not reach the place of Paradise. But this opinion of Tostatus is no more probable than the prior ones already confuted. For the third region of the air is altogether uninhabitable to man, on account of its excessive dryness, immense heat, vehement agitation and whirling (from the nearness of the element of fire, from the seizing and vertigo of heaven, and from the multitude of inflamed bodies, such as the comets which are generated in that region): no wind blows there, no rain or dew cools, there is no origin of rivers and springs, no planting of plants, no greenness of herbs, and there can be no flower and no fruit. That air is thinnest and driest and very hot, and for that very reason least suited to the respiration of man and the cooling of the heart.

Marginal gloss: "Tostatus putans Paradisum fuisse in suprema regione aëris confutatur." Close to Alexander is Tostatus (Abulensis; on Gen 2 q.9, Gen 13 q.107): Paradise reaches not the moon's orb but the third region of air, higher than all mountains by 20+ cubits, so the flood (which topped the mountains by 15 cubits) could not reach it. But this is no more probable: the third air-region is wholly uninhabitable—too dry, hot, and agitated (from the nearness of fire, the celestial vertigo, the flaming bodies like comets); no wind, rain, dew, springs, plants, greenery, flower, or fruit; the thinnest, driest, hottest air, unfit for human breathing or the heart's cooling.

Nor is what these men bring forward firm, about the altitude of Mount Olympus above the place of clouds, rains, and winds (which Solinus proclaims in chapter 14); or about Mount Athos of so great a height that it is reckoned loftier than the place of clouds and winds (by the argument of the ashes which, left on the altars built on its peak after sacrifices, are neither blown away and scattered by winds, nor washed off by rains); or what Pliny writes, in book[...]

Marginal gloss: "De altitudine montium Olympi, Atho et Atlantis." Nor are their proofs firm about the heights of famous mountains: Olympus above the clouds, rains, and winds (Solinus 14); Mt. Athos so high that ashes left on its summit altars are neither blown off by winds nor washed by rains; or Pliny on Mt. Atlas. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘libro’).

— p. 338 (PDF) · printed p. 297 —

...Pliny, in the fifth book, chapter 1, about Mount Atlas, which, raised from the midst of the sands into the heaven above the clouds and into the vicinity of the lunar circle (on the side where it faces Africa), is woody, watered with gushings of springs, so abounding with fruits of every kind springing up of their own accord that satiety of pleasures never fails. These things, I say, which these men bring forward to confirm their opinion, are most weak: partly because they are fictitious and fabulous (as Pliny confesses), partly because they help them nothing, since those mountains are far lower in height than they ascribe to Paradise. Moreover, Augustine, in the third book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 2, concerning Olympus, citing that verse of Lucan,

Pliny (NH 5.1) on Mt. Atlas (rising above the clouds toward the lunar circle, on the African side—woody, spring-watered, abounding in spontaneous fruit). These proofs are weak: partly fictitious (as Pliny admits), partly useless (those mountains are far lower than the height ascribed to Paradise). Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 3.2), on Olympus, cites Lucan's verse:

—Olympus exceeds the clouds. The heights hold peace.

Marginal reference: "Lib. 2. Pharsalia." Lucan, Pharsalia (Civil War) 2.271: ‘Olympus rises above the clouds; the heights hold [unbroken] peace.’ Cited by Augustine on the rarefied calm air of high peaks.

subjoins that on the peak of Olympus the air is said to be so thin that it is neither overshadowed by clouds, nor disturbed by winds, nor can sustain birds, nor can nourish men themselves (if any have by chance ascended thither for the sake either of sacrificing or of inspecting the stars) with the breath of its thicker air; and that they were wont to carry sponges full of water with them, whence to suck moisture again and again to cool the heart, for otherwise, on account of the extreme thinness and dryness of that air, they could not live. From which it sufficiently appears that those two foundations, on which the opinion of these men about the altitude of Paradise rests and is propped, are very fragile and weak. The first foundation was that so great a loftiness of place suited Paradise on account of the most healthful habitation of man: but it has been shown that a place near to heaven (nay, even one which belongs to the third region of the air) is, for many causes, not suited to the habitation of man. The other foundation was, namely, that the waters of the flood should not overwhelm and destroy the place of paradise. But this ought not to have moved them. First, because, if they look to the words of Scripture, they will scarcely be able to vindicate paradise from the inundation of the flood: for Scripture plainly says, in chapter 7 of Genesis, that the flood covered all the mountains which were under heaven; it covered, therefore, paradise also. But if they think Paradise must necessarily be excepted from that general statement, surely no reason compels making Paradise of so great a loftiness on account of the flood-waters.

Marginal glosses: "Evertuntur duo praedicta fundamenta opinionis"; "An diluvium attigerit locum Paradisi." Augustine (continuing): on Olympus's peak the air is so thin it bears no clouds, no winds, no birds, and cannot nourish men (who carried water-soaked sponges to cool the heart, else they could not breathe). So the two foundations of the high-Paradise view fall: (1) loftiness for healthful habitation—but a place near heaven (even the third air-region) is unfit for man; (2) lest the flood drown Paradise—but Scripture says the flood covered all mountains under heaven (Gen 7), so Paradise too; and if Paradise must be excepted, that requires no extreme height.

Wherefore Scotus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, question 2, opines that, just as the general flood was made not naturally but

by miracle, so also it was made by miracle that Paradise should be preserved from the destruction of the flood. And so these men imagine that, when by that washing-away of the waters all the other lands were overwhelmed, the waters came near Paradise and there stood motionless—namely, after the likeness of that which we read was once done by God in the Red Sea and in the river Jordan. Although that Paradise was laid waste and destroyed by that flood, not a few, and not rashly, hold. But because this involves a difficult dispute and demands a careful explanation, it will be treated by us separately a little later.

Marginal references: "Exod. 14" and "Iosue 3." Scotus (Sent. 2 d.17 q.2): as the flood was miraculous, so by miracle Paradise was preserved—the waters standing motionless near it (like the Red Sea and Jordan miracles). Yet not a few (rightly) hold Paradise was destroyed by the flood. Pererius defers this hard question to a later separate treatment. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘Alii’; signature P).

— p. 339 (PDF) · printed p. 298 —

Others thought that paradise was under the Equator, or not far from it, reckoning that the climate of the heaven is best in those places, on account of the perpetual equality of days and nights, never with immoderate cold or heat. This opinion Bonaventure follows, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, as if approved by the Doctors, and Durandus defends the same there. But Blessed Thomas refutes it by the argument of the regions which, on account of their nearness to the Torrid Zone, are vehemently infested by the heat of the sun, such as Ethiopia and the interiors of Africa and Libya (see him in the first part, question 102). Scotus, in the second book, distinction 17, uses besides this argument: that the sun, when it is most remote from the Equator (as it is in the Tropics), is yet nearer to it than it is, in mid-summer and its fiercest heats, to many peoples of Gaul and Germany; wherefore the places under the Equator are never less hot than Gaul and Germany are in mid-summer. But neither opinion is wholly either true or false; nor in all the regions under the Equator, or between the two Tropics, is there an equal mildness of climate,

or intemperateness. For the very wide region of Prester John, Monomotapa, the Island of St. Thomas, and what is commonly called Cape Verde, are scorched by the heat of the sun; on the contrary, the American region (commonly called the New World), lying between the two Tropics, is in most places temperate, especially in the province of Peru. From which it is clear that the temperateness, or intemperateness, of the climate in various places and regions of the earth proceeds not only from the celestial clime itself, but most of all from other causes, such as from the frequency or rarity of these or those winds; or from the abundance or scarcity of waters, both terrestrial and rain-borne; or from the situation of the region, whether mountainous or level; or finally from the nearness or distance of the sea. These things, then, have been set forth by others about the place of paradise. I judge that Paradise was both in those regions which the Tigris and Euphrates flow past, and not far from Mesopotamia. But this I shall show more plainly, and prove more easily, in the last part of this treatment, after I have interpreted what Moses writes below about the rivers of Paradise.

*Marginal gloss: "Paradisum fuisse sub Aequinoctiali, quorundam opinio." The equatorial view: some place Paradise at/near the equator for its supposedly perfect climate (equal day and night). Bonaventure (Sent. 2 d.17) follows it; Durandus defends it. But Aquinas (Summa I q.102) refutes it (Ethiopia, inner Africa/Libya are torrid), and Scotus (Sent. 2 d.17) adds the equator is never cooler than Gaul/Germany in summer. Pererius: neither view is wholly right—equatorial climate varies (Prester John's realm, Monomotapa, São Tomé, Cape Verde scorch; but the New World between the tropics, esp. Peru, is temperate), since climate depends on winds, water, terrain, and the sea, not just the celestial clime. **Pererius's own thesis: Paradise lay in the regions the Tigris and Euphrates flow past, near Mesopotamia** (to be proven fully at the end, after the rivers).*

QUESTION III. How great the place of Paradise was, and why it was created by God, when it would be of little use to man.

The third question of the disputation: the size of Paradise, and why God made it so magnificent though man would enjoy it so briefly.

Concerning the magnitude of Paradise, nothing certain can be said, except by frivolous and futile conjectures. For what Ephraem wrote—that the land of Paradise (encompassed on every side by the Ocean) is far greater than our globe of the earth—has been confuted above. Others prove that the place of Paradise was very vast, by the argument of the river by which it was watered, which [was] the greatest and high[est]...

On Paradise's size nothing certain can be said—only frivolous conjectures. Ephrem's claim (Paradise's land, girt by the Ocean, far larger than our world) was refuted above. Others argue Paradise was vast, from its watering river. Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘mum’).

— p. 340 (PDF) · printed p. 299 —

...the highest, as the four most noble rivers of our world, derived from it, declare; and also because Paradise alone, if Adam had not sinned, was to be the dwelling-place of all men: but it would not have been capable of so great a multitude of men, unless the place were very vast. Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 98, rather constrains and narrows the place of Paradise: for he makes it smaller not only than any of the three parts of the world (Asia, I mean, Europe, and Africa), but even than some great province (such as Spain and Germany). For it was not necessary that the breadth of that place be very great, since it had to hold none but the elect (who would have been few, in proportion to the present multitude of men): nor was there need that there be any animals in that place, namely those of whose service there would then be no need for man; nor, on account of any sterility of the soil, did much space need to be held, since the whole land of Paradise was the best and most fertile. Tostatus, therefore, reckons that the length of Paradise was about twelve miles, but its circuit thirty-six or forty: but about a matter so uncertain, all conjecture is empty and uncertain. To me, indeed, it seems credible enough that Paradise was not so open and spacious a place as some have handed down: since Scripture calls it a garden, and says it was located in the region Heden, toward its eastern part, and that in the midst of it were the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

Marginal glosses: "Auctoris coniectura de magnitudine Paradisi"; "Genes. 5." Arguments for a vast Paradise: the four great rivers derived from its river, and that it alone would have housed all mankind. But Tostatus (Gen 13 q.98) makes it small—smaller than a great province like Spain or Germany—since it would hold only the few elect, needed no animals, and was wholly fertile; he reckons it about 12 miles long, 36–40 in circuit (all mere conjecture). Pererius: Paradise was probably not so spacious—Scripture calls it a 'garden,' set in the eastern part of Heden, with the tree of life and tree of knowledge in its midst.

Nor indeed do I assent to those who thought that men would not have dwelt outside paradise, if Adam had not sinned: for it is not probable that that one place could have been capable of holding all men. For if, after the sin of Adam, some men lived nearly a thousand years, without doubt in the state of innocence they would have lived no less than three or four thousand years; in which space of time they would have produced very numerous offspring, and the human race would have been multiplied in a wonderful manner. To this, Moses narrates in the first chapter of this book that God said to man that he should have dominion over all the animals, and subject the whole earth to himself; He also granted him, for the sake of food, all the herbs and all the fruits of the trees of the whole earth: nor is it to be doubted that those men would have traversed the globe of the earth, would have seen the seas, the islands, and the various regions of the world, and in these the wondrous works of God. For since not all things are born in one place, if men had dwelt only within Paradise, they would not have attained the knowledge of natural things (which is acquired by the perception of the senses and by many experiments), nor could they have taken, from the knowledge and contemplation of the so great works of God (which appear in various places of the world), that most honorable pleasure which is the sweetest food of the human mind. Add that it is not credible that the whole earth would be deserted and empty of men, since the industry and cultivation of man confers much to its fertility, pleasantness, and adornment. And this, by the testimony of the divine Scriptu[re]...

Marginal gloss: "In statu innocentiae non tantum in Paradiso, sed ipsum etiam extra Paradisum habitaturos fuisse homines." Pererius dissents from those who held men would have dwelt only in Paradise had Adam not sinned: one place could not hold all mankind. (If fallen men lived nearly

1,000 years, in innocence they'd have lived 3,000–4,000, multiplying enormously.) Moses (Gen 1) says God bade man rule all animals and the whole earth, and granted all its herbs and fruits for food; doubtless men would have ranged the globe, seen its seas, islands, and regions, and God's works in them—gaining natural knowledge (got by sense and experiment) and the mind's sweetest pleasure from contemplating God's works everywhere. Nor would the whole earth lie deserted, since human cultivation adds to its fertility and beauty—proven by Scripture. Continues onto the next page (catchword 'rae').

— p. 341 (PDF) · printed p. 300 —

...it can be proven by the testimony of the divine Scripture: for Isaiah, chapter 45, speaks thus: The Lord made the earth, He is its fashioner (plastes); He created it not in vain, He formed it to be inhabited. But perhaps someone will wonder, and would desire to learn from us by what counsel God founded Paradise with such great magnificence: Paradise indeed seems to have been prepared by God for the use of man; and yet that it was of very little use to man, the brevity of the time in which Adam tarried in it has declared. Theodoret, question 24 on Genesis; Bede, Hugh of St. Victor, Rabanus, and Strabo in their Commentaries on the book of Genesis; Saint Thomas in the first part, question 103, article 2, and in the second of the second, question 164, article 2, bring forward various reasons of this matter. The first reason is: God does not treat man from the foreknowledge of future things (that is, according to those things which man will at some time do), but according to his present state. Although, therefore, God knew that man would sin, yet because that state of innocence in which He had created him demanded that the place of his habitation be of singular and exceptional beauty and pleasantness, therefore it was fitting to make Paradise, namely a place answering to that most happy state of man. The second reason: although Paradise was of no great use to man for habitation, it was nevertheless of the greatest usefulness to him for understanding from how many and how great goods he was lacking and deprived on account of his disobedience: for the recollection of so pleasant and blessed a habitation, now lost, stirred up a great grief over the crime committed. The third reason: God willed that there should be on

earth something corporeal and visible which would adumbrate the incomparable beauty of the heavenly Paradise, whereby the eternal goods prepared in the heavens for those who love God might in some part be estimated.

Marginal gloss: "Sex rationibus ostenditur, eximiae fuisse convenientiae ut conderetur Paradisus in usum hominis, licet non eo diu homo esset potiturus." Proven by Isaiah 45:18 ('The Lord made the earth... not in vain, He formed it to be inhabited'). But why did God make Paradise so magnificent if man enjoyed it so briefly? Six reasons (from Theodoret q.24, Bede, Hugh of St Victor, Rabanus, Strabo, Aquinas Summa I q.102 a.4 & II-II q.164 a.2): (1) God deals with man by his present state, not foreknowledge—innocence demanded a singular beautiful home; (2) it taught man, by its loss, the goods his disobedience forfeited (memory of it stirred grief); (3) it was a visible adumbration of the heavenly Paradise, so the eternal goods could be in part estimated.

The fourth reason: God established that man, in the state of innocence, should lead on earth a most tranquil and most delightful life, lacking no goods and void of all evils; and to that delightfulness and blessedness of life, the wholesomeness and pleasantness of the dwelling contributed very much. And indeed it would have been quite incongruous that Adam, before he committed fault, should undergo punishment: wherefore, while the state of innocence stood, it was fitting that he dwell in a place which no inconvenience and no trouble would befall. The fifth reason: not because Adam was going to remain in Paradise a short time, ought he on that account not to have been placed in it; for Lucifer too, the prince of the evil Angels, was created in the Empyrean heaven, soon to be cast out of it; nay, God bestowed on Adam original justice and the power of not sinning and not dying, which nevertheless, a very short time after, he was about to lose: for God regards and estimates not what is going to be, but what the present state of the thing demands. The sixth reason many add to the foregoing: that the terrestrial Paradise, although Adam possessed it not long, was nevertheless going to be of the greatest use as a habitation for Enoch and Elijah, who are believed to dwell in that Paradise, and to be going to dwell there until the coming of Antichrist. But whether this be firm enough or not, we shall inquire a little below.

The remaining reasons: (4) God meant man in innocence to lead a most tranquil, delightful life (to which the dwelling's pleasantness contributed)—and it would be unfitting for Adam to suffer hardship before sinning; (5) Adam's short stay was no reason not to place him there—Lucifer too was created in the Empyrean, soon to fall, and God gave Adam original justice and the power not to sin/die which he would soon lose (God regards the present state, not the future); (6) (which many add) the terrestrial Paradise would serve as the dwelling of Enoch and Elijah, believed to live there until Antichrist's coming—a point Pererius will examine below.

— p. 342 (PDF) · printed p. 301 —

QUESTION IV. What the cause is why Paradise, if indeed it is a terrestrial place, has at no time yet been found by anyone.

The fourth question of the disputation: why a terrestrial Paradise has never been discovered by anyone.

Some, to whom that opinion was pleasing, think the cause of Paradise's not being found yet to be that Paradise is outside this our land, and beyond the most vast Ocean, unnavigable by mortals. Others assign the cause to the incredible altitude by which Paradise touches either the highest region of the air, or even the orb of the moon, on account of which it is inaccessible to men. But that these things are false has been shown above. Those who seem to speak more soberly and prudently on this matter say that men are barred from access to Paradise by three very great impediments. For first they say that before Paradise there are the loftiest and most sheer and insurmountable mountains; then that there are interposed horrid and trackless solitudes, filled with the fiercest and most venomous animals; finally, that there are certain tracts of land in which there are many places exhaling a certain deadly vapor, lethal not only to men but even to the birds flying over (see Blessed Thomas, first part, question 102, article 1). Similar things Tostatus relates, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 93, in which place he cites Basil and Ambrose, in their writings on the Hexameron, affirming that the place of Paradise is known, and that some peoples dwell near it, but that no one can penetrate into it, because from the highest mountain of Paradise that great river by which Paradise is watered is hurled down with such noise and crash onto the plain lying below, where

it makes a certain very vast lake, from which those four rivers mentioned by Moses arise: so that the men who dwell on the banks of that marsh, on account of that intolerable noise of the headlong river, all from infancy onward grow deaf—similarly as has been reported of those dwelling by the Cataracts of the Nile. But these things I do not recall having anywhere read in Basil and Ambrose, in their writings which now exist.

Why Paradise is undiscovered: some say (rejected above) it lies beyond the unnavigable Ocean, or at an incredible altitude. The more sober say three impediments bar access: (1) the loftiest, sheerest, insurmountable mountains; (2) horrid trackless wastes full of the fiercest, most venomous beasts; (3) tracts exhaling a deadly vapor, lethal even to birds flying over (cf. Aquinas, Summa I q.102 a.1). Tostatus (Gen 13 q.93) cites Basil and Ambrose: Paradise's place is known and peopled nearby, but none can enter, because the great river plunges from Paradise's highest mountain with such a roar onto the plain (forming the lake whence the four rivers rise) that those living by the marsh go deaf from infancy—as reported of those by the Cataracts (Catadupae) of the Nile. But Pererius cannot find this in Basil's or Ambrose's extant writings.

Deliberately I here pass over in silence, as fabulous and fictitious, the things which are read in certain apocryphal books about a certain Macarius the Roman, and three other monks, who, when they had given themselves with all zeal to investigating the place of Paradise, after far-off regions had been traversed, at last came to the very entrance of Paradise, yet are said to have been prohibited from its entry. Blessed Chrysostom writes that before the flood there was indeed known to men a way which led to Paradise, but that they did not dare to approach thither, terrified by that horrible guard of the Cherubim; but that after the flood all the marks of that place[...]

Pererius deliberately passes over, as fabulous, the apocryphal tales of ‘Macarius the Roman’ and three other monks who sought Paradise, reached its entrance, but were barred. Chrysostom writes that before the flood the way to Paradise was known to men, but they dared not approach it, terrified by the Cherubim guard; and that after the flood all the marks of that place [were lost]... Continues onto the next page (catchword ‘cia’; signature P 3).

— p. 343 (PDF) · printed p. 302 —

...the marks of that place were overwhelmed and deleted by the waters, and the way of pressing on and arriving thither utterly unknown. I, that I may

make the reader a sharer also in my own opinion, judge that Paradise was not by its nature inaccessible to man; for if it had been of itself inaccessible, there would have been no need, for keeping man from its entrance, to apply to it so great a guard and fortification. Besides, I consider that way and method of investigating the place of Paradise to be doubtful and fallacious—namely, by following the channels and course of the Tigris and Euphrates (which arise from Paradise) up to their very springs: for it is uncertain whether those springs contain the first origin of those rivers, or whether the rivers rather, arising far off elsewhere, accomplish long distances through subterranean passages by a hidden course, and first reveal and show themselves to us in Armenia—which is known to happen with other rivers.

*Continuation of Chrysostom (from p.301): after the flood the marks of Paradise's place were erased and the way to it became unknown. **Pererius's own view:** Paradise was not inaccessible by nature—else no guard would be needed to bar man's entry. He also rejects the method of locating Paradise by tracing the Tigris and Euphrates to their springs: it is uncertain whether those Armenian springs are the rivers' true origin, or whether (as with other rivers) they arise far off and run underground before surfacing in Armenia.*

But as to why Paradise has not been sought or found, this can seem a sufficiently probable cause: that the infidels indeed (who do not believe the sacred Scripture, thinking fabulous the things handed down about Paradise) did not care to investigate that place; but the faithful, having faith in the divine writings, since they knew that the place of Paradise could not be approached and that its entrance had been closed off to man by God, judged all the effort and labor of investigating that place to be not only vain but even foolish and impious. I reckon this to be the very probable cause why Paradise neither has been found nor can be found: that that Paradise perished in the flood, and that by that general deluge of the waters (which inundated all the places of the earth and overwhelmed them most deeply) all the beauty, pleasantness, and loveliness of Paradise was dissipated and removed: but this the question to be debated next will make plainer.

*Marginal gloss: "Cur non fuerit quaesitus aut repertus ab ullo Paradisus." Why no one has sought or found Paradise: infidels dismissed the accounts as fables; the faithful judged the search vain, even foolish and impious, knowing its entrance is closed by God. **Pererius's own probable cause: Paradise perished in the flood**—the universal deluge dissipated all its beauty—a thesis the next question will develop.*

QUESTION V. Whether the terrestrial Paradise still exists even now.

The fifth question of the disputation: whether the terrestrial Paradise still exists today.

It is sufficiently consonant with reason and the divine writings that there is now no longer that terrestrial Paradise in which Adam was for a short time. This, moreover, I have resolved at present to prove by certain reasons (and not, I think, invalid ones). But if perhaps it should seem to learned and pious men—although this opinion is probable enough, and is engaged in that kind of matter which pertains in no way to the faith—that it would nevertheless be safer to follow the ancient and common opinion of the Doctors (at least until this opinion, its probability being better known, should gradually be received in the schools and, approved by the Theologians, be made widely known, and so, putting off its own novelty—on account of which it could perhaps displease some—should, growing old day by day, acquire greater credit and authority): indeed I vehemently praise and approve the prudent counsel of these men, and I wish to be enrolled in their opinion myself; admonishing also this...

Marginal gloss: "Quid in huiusmodi novis opinionibus nec ad fidem spectantibus, probabilibus tamen, servandum esse videatur, monet Auctor extremo libro 7 huius operis." Pererius states his thesis: reason and Scripture agree there is now no terrestrial Paradise. He grants this is only a probable opinion, not a matter of faith, and that the prudent course is to defer to the old common opinion until this view gains acceptance in the schools—a counsel he praises and joins. Continues onto next page (catchword "monens").

— p. 344 (PDF) · printed p. 303 —

...admonishing the reader that the things which are here disputed for this opinion have been set forth in writing and published, not indeed so much

that others should follow it, as that from these they might learn what probability this opinion had, and by what arguments the contrary view is attacked: so that those arguments, by which it might seem better not to depart from the old opinion, they might strongly overthrow. The same also we wish understood concerning what is disputed a little below about the rivers of Paradise, and if there be anything else similar. But come, let us show the reader what things may make it most like the truth that Paradise does not now exist. First, it is self-evident that Paradise was in those regions through which the Tigris and Euphrates—derived from the river of Paradise—run their courses, or at least was not far from them. Since, then, the Tigris and Euphrates have their sources in Armenia, accomplish their course through Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria, and have their outlet into the Persian Gulf, it is clear that Paradise was either in those places or not far from them. It is also credible that those ancient men before the flood—and even after the flood, before, being divided into various tongues, they were separated to various regions of the world and to lands to be cultivated—dwelt not far from the region of Paradise: both on account of the goodness and fertility of that land, and because the human race had had its origin there. That the habitation of men up to the building of the tower of Babel was around Mesopotamia and Armenia is clear enough to one reading Genesis chapters 10 and 11: especially since the divine Scripture testifies that, when the flood ceased, the ark (in which was the seed-plot of the human race) rested upon the mountains of Armenia.

Continues the disclaimer: Pererius published the arguments not so others would adopt the view, but so they could weigh its probability and learn how the contrary is attacked (the same applies to the rivers of Paradise, discussed below). Then the geographical argument: Paradise was where the Tigris and Euphrates run (or near)—they rise in Armenia, run through Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria, and empty into the Persian Gulf. The early men (before the flood, and after it before Babel) dwelt near Paradise's region for its fertility and as mankind's origin; Gen 10–11 places habitation around Mesopotamia/Armenia, and Noah's ark rested on the mountains of Armenia.

From these one may argue thus: the terrestrial Paradise was around Mesopotamia or Armenia; but in these places, which both were of old and

today are not only uncovered and known but even cultivated and inhabited by various peoples, Paradise is nowhere found: it remains, therefore, that there is now no Paradise, but that it has been taken away from our midst. Then, Moses in chapter 7 of the book of Genesis relates that all the mountains which were under heaven were covered by the waters of the flood, and that the waters were higher even than the highest of them by fifteen cubits: but Paradise was in this our earth; therefore it was overwhelmed and dissipated by that general deluge of the whole globe. But this testimony from Genesis 7, and that other one of Ecclesiasticus 44 about the translation of Enoch into Paradise, are treated more subtly and accurately in the seventh book of this work, in the last disputation, which is On the Translation of Enoch, question 7. But someone will ask where Enoch was then, who is certain neither to have perished in the flood nor yet to have been in the ark with Noah? I answer that Enoch could have been taken up into the regions of the air above the waters of the flood, preserved by God, and freed from that destruction—namely, for as long as the flood lasted. Indeed the divine Scripture, when it narrates the history of the flood, and blessed Peter in chapter 3 of his first epistle, teach that all men perished in the flood except eight who were saved by the ark. But beyond doubt Enoch must be added besides to that number, who is certain both to have been before the flood, and not only to have survived the flood but even now to be living. But because he, outside the society of men, unknown to all mortal[s]...

Marginal gloss: "Ubi fuerit Henoch tempore diluvii." The argument: Paradise lay around Mesopotamia/Armenia, but those known, inhabited lands contain no Paradise—so it no longer exists, but was taken away. Moreover Moses (Gen 7) says the flood covered all mountains under heaven by 15 cubits; Paradise was on this earth, so it was overwhelmed by the deluge. (These texts—Gen 7 and Ecclus 44 on Enoch's translation—are treated fully in Book 7, the last disputation, On the Translation of Enoch, q.7.) An objection: where was Enoch during the flood (who neither died in it nor was in the ark)? Answer: Enoch could have been raised into the air above the flood-waters and preserved by God. Scripture and 1 Peter 3 say all perished but the eight in the ark—yet Enoch must be added, who lived before the flood and lives still; but being outside human society, unknown to all mortals... *Continues onto next page (catchword "mortali").*

— p. 345 (PDF) · printed p. 304 —

...he was not leading life in human fashion, unknown to all mortals; therefore, just as if he were not on earth, he is silently passed over in Scripture. Moreover, if there were anything that would compel us to confess that there is now a terrestrial Paradise, that would assuredly be chiefly what those who think so are wont first of all to object: that Enoch was translated into that Paradise, and will remain there until the consummation of the age. For this, they say, the divine Scripture openly teaches: since in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 44, it is thus written, Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise, that he might give the nations repentance. But it is not difficult to show this reasoning to be weak. For that passage of Ecclesiasticus in Greek (in which language that book was first written by its author) does not have that word Paradise, but precisely has thus: Enoch pleased God, and was translated, that he might give the nations repentance. Then, Blessed Augustine in book 2 against Pelagius and Celestius, chapter 23, teaches that, just as it is certain that Enoch and Elijah now live, so where they now are—whether in Paradise or elsewhere—is uncertain; nor does that question pertain to the Catholic faith. Therefore, on Augustine's authority, it is not certain according to Scripture that Enoch is in Paradise.

*Marginal glosses: "Virum [=Utrum] Henoch sit in Paradiso terrestri" and "Expenditur locus Ecclesiastici." Enoch, living unknown to all mortals, is passed over in Scripture as if not on earth. The strongest argument for a still-existing terrestrial Paradise is that Enoch was translated there until the world's end—Ecclus 44: "Enoch pleased God and was translated into Paradise that he might give the nations repentance." But Pererius shows this weak: **the Greek of Ecclesiasticus (its original language) lacks the word "Paradise,"** reading only "was translated, that he might give the nations repentance." And Augustine (Contra Pelagium et Celestium 2.23) holds it certain Enoch and Elijah live, but uncertain where (Paradise or elsewhere)—a question not pertaining to the faith. So per Scripture it is not certain Enoch is in Paradise.*

But let us grant what the Latin and Vulgate translation has (whose authority is to be defended), that Enoch is in Paradise: yet from this it cannot be concluded that he is in that terrestrial Paradise which Moses

described; for this word Paradise, in the sacred writings, is not the proper name of one place (namely, only that Paradise about which Moses treats), but is a general name signifying universally any place most pleasant and delightful for the enjoyment of man: indeed, more than once in Scripture that word is said of the spiritual and heavenly Paradise; which, because we have pursued it at length above when we were opening up the force and notion of this word Paradise, we therefore now touch only in passing. Let Enoch, then, be in Paradise; but it is nevertheless not necessary that he be in that Paradise whence Adam was ejected, but in some other place: for wherever it shall have pleased God, He can supply him a most quiet and delightful life, and preserve him as long as He shall will, not only without death but even without any trouble.

Marginal gloss: "Vide Bedam super cap. 12 Epistolae 2 ad Corinth." Conceding the Vulgate reading (whose authority must be upheld) that Enoch is "in Paradise": it still does not follow he is in Moses's terrestrial Paradise. "Paradise" in Scripture is not the proper name of one place but a general term for any most pleasant place, and is more than once used of the spiritual/heavenly Paradise (as Pererius expounded earlier). So Enoch may be in some other place, where God can preserve him in a quiet, delightful life without death or trouble for as long as He wills.

Certainly, that Enoch was not translated into that terrestrial Paradise, Rupert affirmatively teaches—an author very weighty, and especially Catholic and pious. For he, in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 33, writes in these words:

Marginal gloss: "Rupertus sentit Henoch et Eliam non esse translatos in illum Paradisum terrestrem unde eiectus fuit Adam; idque significat Gregorius." Pererius adduces Rupert of Deutz (a weighty, Catholic, pious author) who positively denies Enoch was translated into the terrestrial Paradise. The quotation follows.

> *"Nowhere does Scripture give us to understand that God took Enoch and Elijah into Paradise itself, where they might eat of the tree of life and live forever; but they were so taken up that they were led into a certain secret region of the earth, where they might live in great quiet of flesh and spirit, until at the end of the world they return and pay the debt of death." Thus Rupert.*

Block quotation of Rupert of Deutz (De Trinitate et operibus eius, bk. 3, ch. 33): Scripture nowhere says Enoch and Elijah were taken into Paradise itself to eat of the tree of life, but into a secret region of the earth, where they live in quiet until they return at the end of the world to pay the debt of death.

But things similar to Rupert, Gregory writes concerning Elijah, whom these men wish to dwell in Paradise together with Enoch. For in his homily 29 on the Gospels, Gregory speaks thus:

Pererius adds Gregory the Great, who writes the like of Elijah (whom the opposing view places in Paradise with Enoch). The quotation, from Homily 29 on the Gospels, follows (spanning to p.305).

> *"Elijah was raised up into the airy heaven, that he might suddenly be led into a certain secret region of the earth, where he might now live in great quiet of flesh and spirit, until at the end of the world he return and pay the debt of death: for he postponed death, he did not escape it." Thus Gregory.*

Block quotation of Gregory the Great (Homily 29 on the Gospels), spanning the page break (pp.304–305): Elijah was raised into the airy heaven, then led into a secret region of the earth where he lives in quiet until he returns at the world's end to pay the debt of death—"for he postponed death, he did not escape it."

— p. 346 (PDF) · printed p. 305 —

From the aforesaid words, therefore, of Rupert and Gregory it is clearly understood that they held Enoch and Elijah not to have been translated into that terrestrial paradise, but to lead their life in some other secret region of the world: although that Enoch was translated into that paradise of Adam in no way harms this opinion. For Enoch was translated 669 years before the flood, as is perceived from the fifth chapter of Genesis, at which time we do not deny that there was a paradise; but that it survived the flood and exists today, and that Enoch dwells in it, we deny to be certain.

Continuation/conclusion of the Rupert–Gregory point (Gregory quote ends at top of p.305 with "...mortem distulit, non evasit"). Pererius: both authors held Enoch and Elijah live not in the terrestrial paradise but in some secret region. That Enoch was translated into Adam's paradise does not harm this—he was translated 669 years before the flood (Gen 5), when paradise indeed existed; but that it survived the flood and that Enoch still dwells there is denied to be certain.

Nor indeed ought the authority and multitude of the Doctors who think the contrary to overwhelm and crush this opinion. It does not escape me that Justin Martyr, in his Response to the Orthodox, questions 75, 76, and 85, left it written that that Paradise now exists and will remain until the day of judgment; that in that place Enoch and Elijah dwell; that thither was led the thief to whom Christ said on the cross, Today you will be with me in Paradise; that to the same place also all the souls of just men are led, not to be admitted to the beatific vision of God before the day of judgment, and there to await that longed-for time and the glorious resurrection of their bodies. The same as Justin, Irenaeus hands down in book 5 Against Heresies, except that he adds that this is that paradise to which Paul was caught up, and he praises as supporters of his opinion the presbyters of Asia, disciples of the Apostles. Tertullian, in the Apologeticum, and at the end of his book On the Soul where he treats of the Underworld, signifies not obscurely that paradise still exists, and is the receptacle and dwelling of holy souls until the day of judgment. In the same opinion is Isidore in his book On the Life and Death of the Patriarchs where he treats of Enoch: and the Master follows the same in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 17, with most of the Scholastic Theologians.

*Marginal gloss: "Qui Auctores putent etiam nunc esse Paradisum terrestrem." Pererius lists the weighty authorities for a still-existing Paradise, lest their number overwhelm his view: **Justin Martyr** (Responses to the Orthodox q. 75, 76, 85)—Paradise exists till judgment day, housing Enoch, Elijah, the good thief ("Today you will be with me in Paradise"), and all just souls awaiting the resurrection; **Irenaeus** (Against Heresies bk. 5)—same, adding it is the paradise to which Paul was caught up, citing the Asian presbyters, disciples of the Apostles; **Tertullian** (Apologeticum; De Anima, on the underworld); **Isidore** (On the Life and Death of the Patriarchs, on Enoch); and **Peter Lombard the Master** (Sentences 2 d.17) with most Scholastics.*

What then, someone will say: to dissent from and oppose so many authors, so ancient, ennobled with such great learning and sanctity—ought it not to be judged rash? By no means: but how much an argumentation of this kind, drawn from the number of authors, ought to be esteemed, must be diligently weighed and considered. Now about this kind of arguing (which

is drawn from the consensus of many authors) this seems able to be said truly in general: although very many Doctors agree in some one opinion, if it does not pertain to the Catholic faith but is engaged in that kind of matter which, with the Catholic faith safe, can be treated either way, that opinion does not on that account make a firm and certain argument in Theology; nor is the contrary opinion of one or a few (by this very fact, that it opposes the multitude of writers) to be rejected and condemned. I will set down one example by which this matter may be made clearer: Almost all the Fathers before Augustine, and after him Bede, Rabanus, Strabo, Bonaventure, and very many others, were of the opinion that the work of the World was made and complet[ed] gradually and piecemeal over the space of six days...

Pererius's methodological point: is it rash to dissent from so many ancient, learned, holy authors? No—an argument from the number of authors must be weighed carefully. In general: even if very many Doctors agree on a view, if it does not pertain to the Catholic faith but is the sort of question that may be argued either way, their consensus does not make it a firm theological argument, nor is the contrary view of one or a few to be condemned merely for opposing the multitude. His illustrative example: almost all the Fathers before Augustine, and after him Bede, Rabanus, Strabo, Bonaventure, and many others, held the creation of the world was done gradually over the six days... Breaks mid-sentence (catchword "perfe"; signature Q; page-foot "Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1"). Resume PDF 347 with "...perfectum esse."

— p. 347 (PDF) · printed p. 306 —

...understood [the work of the world] to have been made and completed [gradually over the six days]: but this common consensus of the Doctors does not bring it about that the opinion of Augustine alone (who held that all things were made together, and in one instant of time), although adverse to all the others, was not nevertheless always reckoned probable in the Church, and could be freely held and defended by anyone. For that saying of Vincent of Lérins is apt and true: The ancient consensus of the holy Fathers, he says, is to be investigated and followed by us with great zeal, not in all the little questions of the divine law, but only in the rule of faith. Let this, then, be said in general: next let us weigh the testimonies of those whom above we cited as witnesses against us.

*Marginal gloss: "Observandum Vincentii Lyrinensis dictum." Concluding the example (from p.305): though almost all the Fathers held creation was gradual over six days, **Augustine's contrary view—that all was made at once, in a single instant—was always reckoned probable in the Church and freely defensible.** This illustrates the methodological point. Pererius clinches it with Vincent of Lérins (Commonitorium): the consensus of the Fathers is to be followed zealously only in the rule of faith, not in every minor question. He now turns to weigh the authorities cited against his own view (Q.V).*

First indeed Justin and Irenaeus—although it is fitting to cherish and venerate them among the foremost, on account of the glory of their martyrdom and the praise of their learning and sanctity—ought nevertheless to have no great credit with us in what they handed down about Paradise: for they teach things about the terrestrial Paradise which are partly uncertain, partly already condemned by the Church, and some even contrary to the divine Scripture. For that they say Enoch and Elijah live in that Paradise, we have shown above (on Augustine's testimony) to be unascertained and uncertain; and that they say that Paradise has been preserved by God for this, that all the souls of the just might dwell in it, until the day of Judgment, with great tranquility and delight, is rejected by all Catholic Theologians, and was long ago condemned by the Church in the Council of Florence. Now, as for what Christ said to the thief, Today you will be with me in paradise, these men interpret it of that terrestrial paradise: but that word Today plainly excludes this sense. For Christ on that day was not in the terrestrial paradise; for his soul, freed from the body, descended at once to the underworld, nor did it ascend above the earth before the third day (on which Christ, now immortal, rose again): for this reason he is said to have been three days and nights in the heart of the earth, that is, among the dead, whose places are said to be not far from the heart, that is, the center of the earth. Finally, these men think that the paradise to which Paul was caught up was that terrestrial one whence Adam had been expelled: but Paul's words, which are in the 12th chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians, manifestly refute this understanding: for he says he was caught up to paradise and to the third heaven; wherefore that paradise of Paul was not earthly, but heavenly and divine.

*Marginal glosses: "Expenditur Iustini et Irenaei sententia"; "Augustinus lib. 2 contra Pelagium et Celestium ca. 23"; "Excutitur locus Lucae ca. 23." Pererius weighs Justin and Irenaeus: venerable as martyrs, but their teaching on Paradise carries little weight—partly uncertain, partly Church-condemned, partly contrary to Scripture. (a) Enoch and Elijah dwelling there is uncertain (per Augustine). (b) Their view that Paradise preserves all just souls until Judgment Day is rejected by all Catholic theologians and was **condemned at the Council of Florence.** (c) Their reading of "Today you will be with me in paradise" (Luke 23) as the terrestrial paradise is excluded by "Today": Christ's soul descended that day to the underworld (the "heart of the earth," near its center) and did not ascend before the third-day resurrection. (d) Their view that Paul's paradise (2 Cor 12) was the terrestrial one is refuted by Paul's own words—he was caught up "to paradise and the third heaven," so it was heavenly, not earthly.*

But Irenaeus affirms that what he hands down about paradise he received from the presbyters of Asia, disciples of the Apostles. But what then? Is whatever has been reported by those presbyters on that account to be held as a certain and undoubted dogma of Christian doctrine? Is it not established (Irenaeus himself reporting it) that those very presbyters taught certain things both false and contrary to the divine writings? I pass over now the error of the Chiliasts, in which many of the ancients were entangled, which was sown chiefly by these presbyters. Certainly Irenaeus, in book three Against Heresies, chapter 36, is eager to persuade that Christ the Lord lived nearly fifty years on earth: and he proves it especially by this argument, that the presbyters of Asia, disciples of the Apostles, taught others that this had been handed to them by the Apostles—which opinion, however, is far from the truth, and is adverse not only to Church history but even to the Gospel[s]...

*Pererius presses on Irenaeus's appeal to the Asian presbyters (disciples of the Apostles): their report is no guaranteed dogma—Irenaeus himself reports they taught things false and contrary to Scripture. He cites the **Chiliast (millenarian) error**, sown chiefly by these presbyters, and Irenaeus's own claim (Adv. haer. 3.36) that **Christ lived nearly fifty years on earth**—proved by the same presbyters' alleged apostolic tradition—an opinion far from the truth and contrary to Church history and the Gospel. Continues onto next page (catchword "cae").*

— p. 348 (PDF) · printed p. 307 —

...[to the Gospel], even those lightly learned in the sacred writings can easily understand: and it has been shown by us, with manifest arguments, in the eleventh book of our Commentaries on Daniel, in explaining the seventh question. But to the other Doctors whose authority is set against us, this is to be answered: first indeed, that they, having followed the authority of their predecessors, reported in good faith what had been reported by them; then, that they thought Paradise now exists for no other reason than because they believed Enoch and Elijah dwell in that Paradise: but that this is obscure and doubtful, and whether affirmed or denied does not pertain to the Catholic faith, we showed a little above from Augustine's opinion. To these add that none of those Doctors holds that opinion of his as certain and such as must absolutely be held according to the Catholic faith, nor did any of them condemn the contrary opinion as heretical, or suspect in faith, or rash: indeed Blessed Thomas did not simply dare to affirm that Enoch and Elijah live in that terrestrial Paradise, but where he speaks of this, he is wont to say it with that qualification, as it is said or as it is believed: as in the first part question 103 article 2, and in the second of the second q. 64 art. 2, and in the 3rd part q. 49 art. 2, he teaches that Paradise, although inhabited by no one, is nevertheless not in vain; nor does he make any word about Enoch and Elijah: whom, if he himself had thought to dwell there, it would have been easier to answer that Paradise is now inhabited by no one. From these things it appears probable enough that Paradise does not now exist; nor is the credit of this opinion lessened either by any testimonies or arguments of Scripture, or by its novelty or rarity, or by the great name of the authors who have hitherto followed it. It could therefore, if it should seem able to be taught publicly, be taught and defended as probable, until a greater consensus of learned and pious men following it should make it more certain and safe.

Marginal gloss: "Multa quae ad hanc quaestionem pertinent latius et diligentius infra lib. 7 in ultima Disputatione, quae est de Translatione Henoch, quaest. 7, ab Auctore disputantur." (Cross-ref also to Pererius's own Commentaries on Daniel, bk. 11, q. 7, on Christ's age.) Reply to the Doctors cited against him: (1) they followed earlier authorities in good faith; (2) they affirmed a present Paradise

*only because they believed Enoch and Elijah dwell there—an obscure, non-faith matter (per Augustine). None held it as certain or de fide, nor condemned the contrary as heretical/rash. **Aquinas** himself hedges ("as it is said," "as it is believed") and (Summa I q.103 a.2; II-II q.64 a.2; III q.49 a.2) teaches Paradise, though uninhabited, is not in vain—saying nothing of Enoch and Elijah. So Pererius's view is probable enough, not lessened by its novelty or rarity, and may be taught as probable until a wider consensus confirms it.*

But one scruple still now remains to be removed, injected by Augustine: for in book 2 against Pelagius and Coelestius, chapter 23, Augustine signifies that the Christian faith holds, without any doubt, that Paradise now exists. I will set down here the very words of Augustine:

Marginal gloss: "Obiectio ex verbis S. Augustini." One last scruple: Augustine (Contra Pelagium et Celestium 2.23) seems to say the Christian faith holds beyond doubt that Paradise now exists. Pererius quotes him in full (block-quote following).

> *"There are some questions in which, with the faith by which we are Christians safe, either it is not known what the truth is, and a definitive judgment is suspended in words; or it is conjectured otherwise than it is, by human and weak suspicion: as when it is asked what or where paradise is, where God set the man whom He formed from the dust—although the Christian faith does not doubt that that Paradise exists. Or when it is asked where Elijah or Enoch now is, whether there or elsewhere: whom nevertheless we do not doubt to be living in the bodies in which they were born." Thus far Augustine.*

*Block quotation of Augustine (Contra Pelagium et Celestium 2.23): some questions can be left open without harm to the faith—e.g. what or where Paradise is (the faith does not doubt it *exists*, but its quality/location is open), or where Enoch and Elijah now are (uncertain, though they certainly live in their natural bodies). The pivot is that Augustine affirms only that Paradise *exists* (i.e. was a real place), not that it survives now—Pererius's reply turns on this.*

But to this it must be answered that Augustine, by those words, wished to signify nothing else than that the Paradise which Moses described is to be understood as a certain corporeal, visible, and terrestrial place (not, however, as it pleased Origen and others, to be taken only spiritually and mystically). For that, according to the Catholic faith, it must be held that

Paradise now exists, Augustine did not wish to say. For where or how does the Christian faith teach that? Is it because it is persuaded...

*Marginal gloss: "Diluitur obiectio." Reply to the scruple: Augustine meant only that Moses's Paradise is a real corporeal, visible, terrestrial place—**not** (against Origen and others) a merely spiritual/mystical allegory. He did **not** say the faith requires holding that Paradise still exists now. For where does the faith teach that? (A series of rhetorical "is it because..." rebuttals begins.) Continues onto next page (catchword "est"; signature Q2).*

— p. 349 (PDF) · printed p. 308 —

...[Is it because] many are persuaded that Enoch and Elijah dwell in Paradise? But in that same place Augustine makes this doubtful and uncertain. Is it because in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 44, it is written that Enoch was translated into Paradise? But neither does the Greek Scripture there have the word Paradise, and that word does not only properly signify that Paradise in which Adam was, but universally any most pleasant and delightful place. Is it because from the things handed down in the sacred writings this can be elicited and deduced? Nothing less: nay rather, we have shown above that from the divine Scripture the contrary can rather be gathered. Is it because the Church once decreed this and established that it must be believed? But it has never been defined by the Church, and since it is a matter that pertains in no way to the Catholic Faith, it does not fall under those certain and undoubted definitions and decrees of the Church. Is it, finally, on account of the multitude and authority of those who themselves held this and handed it down, reported to memory, to posterity? But that those authors have no great weight for proving this is plain from our earlier disputation.

*Pererius tests each ground on which the faith might be thought to require a present Paradise, and rebuts all five: (1) the belief that Enoch and Elijah dwell there—Augustine himself makes it doubtful; (2) Ecclus 44—**the Greek lacks the word "Paradise,"** and the word is general anyway; (3) deduction from Scripture—the contrary is rather deducible; (4) a Church decree—it was never defined, and is not a faith-matter; (5) the multitude of authors—shown to carry little weight.*

It remains, therefore, that this controversy (Whether Paradise now exists in the nature of things) is among the number of those matters which can be agitated and treated on opposite sides, with the Catholic faith safe. To us, however, it has seemed by far most probable that that terrestrial Paradise, destroyed by the general flood, is at this time nonexistent. This opinion, indeed, all the most learned men of this our age have especially approved; and among these (that I may recall the name of one writer, and now dead, a man indeed very Catholic and learned) Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ghent, in his Commentaries on chapter 143 of the Evangelical Harmony, set it forth and defended it. But concerning this, and the other questions set above—which, namely, pertained to those words of Moses, And God had planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning—the things hitherto disputed can be enough for a reader neither dull nor unexercised in the sacred writings. Let us proceed to interpret the remaining discourse of Moses about Paradise.

***Verdict on Question V:** whether Paradise now exists is a question that may be argued either way without prejudice to faith—but Pererius finds it far most probable that **the terrestrial Paradise, destroyed by the general flood, no longer exists.** The most learned of his age approve it; he names **Cornelius Jansen (the Elder), Bishop of Ghent** (d. 1576), who defended it in his commentary on ch. 143 of the *Concordia Evangelica* (the Gospel Harmony). This closes the questions on "God had planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (Gen 2:8); the commentary now resumes interpreting Moses's text on Paradise (Gen 2:9).*

GENESIS, chapter 2, verse 9. — And the Lord God brought forth from the ground every tree fair to behold and sweet to eat.

Scripture lemma heading: Genesis 2:9, the verse Pererius now expounds, set off as a centered head with the side-reference "GENES. CAP. 2. VERS. 9."

Incomparable, and—unless it were handed down in the divine Scripture—plainly incredible, was the loveliness, beauty, magnificence of that Paradise, and the abundance of all goods desirable to man: which indeed Moses, in these few words, adumbrated rather than expressed; concerning which Basil in his oration On Paradise, Augustine in book 14 of

the City of God, and Damascene in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 11, have handed down much. Now all the excellence of paradise seems to be placed chiefly in three things: in the sky and in the air, in the waters, and in the [soil] itself...

*Opening of the Gen 2:9 exposition: Paradise's loveliness, beauty, magnificence, and abundance of all desirable goods was incomparable and—but for Scripture—incredible; Moses only adumbrated it in few words. Fuller treatments: Basil (oration *On Paradise*), Augustine (*City of God* bk. 14), John Damascene (*On the Orthodox Faith* bk. 2 ch. 11). Paradise's excellence lies chiefly in three things—the sky/air, the waters, and the soil. Continues onto next page (catchword "in ipso").*

— p. 350 (PDF) · printed p. 309 —

...in the soil of the earth itself. In the sky there was the highest wholesomeness, and at all times a certain most pleasant evenness, and as it were a perpetual spring. For although the year went through its changes of seasons, yet that vicissitude varied pleasure rather than took it away: there was in the air great serenity and brightness; the aspect of the sky and the influence of all the stars was exceedingly favorable, kindly, and salutary. There was a vast abundance of waters watering Paradise, of wondrous clearness, and a sweetness and wholesomeness for drinking, and in them an incredible abundance of fish. Among the great praises of Sodom, before it was overthrown by God, this is recalled first of all in Genesis 13: that it was watered throughout by the river Jordan, similarly to the Paradise of the Lord. But the land of Paradise, everywhere best and most fertile, bringing forth all things spontaneously without the labor and trouble of man (yet not without his cultivation): begetting nothing harmful or that would be of no use, but most lavishly supplying whatever things could fill all the senses of man with the sweetest delight and pleasure: the taste, I say, with sweetest flavors; the smell, scented with most fragrant herbs and flowers; the sight, with variety of colors and beauty of forms; the hearing, with the gentlest sound of breathing breezes and the sweet harmony of birds. Of nourishments, moreover, there was at hand as great an abundance, wholesomeness, delight, and ease of getting as could be wished. I will say

it in one word: nothing that could be desirable to man was absent from that place. Rightly, therefore, Damascene in the aforesaid place said that Paradise was the storehouse of all gladness and pleasure, and exceeding the understanding of all sensible beauty.

*Marginal gloss: "Triplex praestantia Paradisi, ex caelo, aquis, et terra." Paradise's threefold excellence elaborated: (1) **Sky/air**—supreme wholesomeness, a most pleasant evenness, a perpetual spring (the seasons varied pleasure rather than diminishing it); great serenity, a favorable aspect of sky and stars. (2) **Waters**—a vast, wondrously clear abundance, sweet and wholesome to drink, teeming with fish. (Among Sodom's praises before its overthrow, Gen 13 notes it was watered by the Jordan "like the Paradise of the Lord.") (3) **Soil**—everywhere most fertile, bringing forth all things spontaneously (yet not without cultivation), nothing harmful or useless, but filling every sense with delight: taste (sweet flavors), smell (fragrant herbs/flowers), sight (colors and forms), hearing (breezes and birdsong). Food was abundant, wholesome, and easy to get. In a word, nothing desirable to man was lacking—so Damascene called Paradise "the storehouse of all joy and pleasure, exceeding the understanding of all sensible beauty."*

But let us weigh the words of Moses, The Lord God brought forth from the ground every tree fair to behold and sweet to eat. These words some read conjointly, as if Moses signifies that all the trees of Paradise were at once both fair to behold and sweet to eat: wherefore these men think there was no place in Paradise for fruitless trees. For of fruitless trees there is now indeed a manifold use for human life—fragile, perishable, and needing many things—for warming the body, cooking foods, building, and for remedies and medicines of diseases; but in the state of innocence man would have had no need of these. Moreover, God said to Adam, Eat of every tree of Paradise: every tree of Paradise, therefore, was fruit-bearing and useful to man for eating.

*Pererius weighs Gen 2:9. **One reading** takes "fair to behold and sweet to eat" conjointly—so all Paradise's trees were both, leaving no place for fruitless (non-fruit-bearing) trees. Their reasons: fruitless trees now serve fragile mortal life (warming, cooking, building, medicine), but innocent man needed none of this; and God said "Eat of every tree of Paradise" (Gen 2:16), so every tree was fruit-bearing and edible.*

With these I do not agree: for in plain words Moses teaches that there were in Paradise all kinds of trees, both those which pertained to the delighting

of the sight and those which pertained to the sweetness of man's food. For if it had been otherwise, surely there would not have been in Paradise the fig, a tree of least fair aspect, yet of sweetest fruit; nor is it to be believed that Paradise was without the highest of men's delights, and that chief pleasure, which affect a man's sight as much as his smell (the roses, I mean, the violets and lilies): and if no tree which does not pertain to man's food had been in Paradise, how, in that state of innocence, [would there be acquired] the perfect knowledge of those trees, which is gather[ed] through the senses and many experiments...

*Marginal gloss: "Fuisse in Paradiso arbores etiam quarum fructus non pertinebant ad cibum hominis." **Pererius dissents:** Moses plainly teaches Paradise had *every* kind of tree—both those pleasing to sight and those for food. Otherwise the **fig** (a homely tree but sweetest fruit) would be excluded, and Paradise would lack the things that most delight men and please eye as much as smell—**roses, violets, and lilies.** And if no non-food tree existed there, how, in the state of innocence, would the perfect knowledge of such trees (gathered through the senses and many experiments) [be acquired]... Continues onto next page (catchword "colli"; signature Q3).*

— p. 351 (PDF) · printed p. 310 —

...how would men have acquired [the knowledge of those trees, which is gathered through the senses and many experiments]? Credit is added to this opinion by what is in Ezekiel chapter 31: for in that place there are numbered among the trees of Paradise certain ones alien to man's food and fruitless, such as cedars and firs. Nor indeed does that saying of God to Adam, Eat of every tree of Paradise, tell against our opinion: for it must be understood as of every tree, namely, fit for eating; just as that saying of Paul in the first epistle to Timothy, chapter 4, ordering Christians to feed on every creature with thanksgiving, is without doubt to be understood of the creature which pertains to man's food.

*Continuation (from p.309) finishing Pererius's argument that Paradise had non-food trees: otherwise men could not have gained the empirical knowledge of such trees. Confirmed by Ezekiel 31, which numbers fruitless, inedible trees (cedars, firs) among Paradise's trees. And God's "Eat of every tree of Paradise" (Gen 2:16) means every tree *fit for eating*—as Paul's "feed on every creature with thanksgiving" (1 Tim 4) means every creature that is food.*

It can also be brought into debate at this point, whether there were animals within Paradise. Damascene denies it, in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 11, writing that of all animals man alone dwelt in Paradise. Nor does this seem void of reason: for we ought to know or affirm nothing about Paradise except what is handed down in the divine Scripture; and this makes open and explicit mention indeed of the trees and rivers of Paradise, and of man himself, who was brought into it by God, but plainly no mention of the animals which were there. And indeed, if there had been animals in Paradise, they would have escaped the destruction of the flood—Scripture protesting, in the seventh chapter of Genesis, that all the land animals perished in the waters of the flood. What need, likewise, would there have been to preserve with such care some of every species of animals in the ark, when, from the animals preserved in Paradise, the species of all could have been preserved and then multiplied? Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 87 and 98 and again 113 and 114, seemed partly to agree, partly to disagree with Damascene.

*Marginal gloss: "An intra Paradisum fuerint animalia." A new question: were there animals in Paradise? **Damascene** (de Fide orth. 2.11) denies it—man alone of animals dwelt there. The case for denial: affirm of Paradise only what Scripture says, and Scripture names its trees, rivers, and man, but no animals; had animals been there they would have escaped the flood (against Gen 7, where all land animals perished); and why stock the ark from every species if Paradise's animals could have restocked the world? **Tostatus** (Gen 13 qq. 87, 98, 113, 114) partly agrees, partly disagrees with Damascene.*

To me, nevertheless, it is more like the truth that there were animals in Paradise. This Josephus hands down in the first book of the Antiquities; this Basil teaches in plain words in his Oration on Paradise; this Augustine confirms, writing in book 4 of the City of God, chapter 11, that together with those first men there were in Paradise the other animals also, harmless however to them and subject; this too Damascene had taught in the immediately preceding chapter, for thus he says there:

*Marginal gloss: "Auctoris sententia." **Pererius's own view: it is more probable that there WERE animals in Paradise.** Authorities: Josephus (Antiquities bk. 1); Basil (Oration on Paradise);*

Augustine (City of God bk. 4 [sic; the Paradise material is in bk. 14], ch. 11)—the other animals were in Paradise with the first humans, harmless and subject to them; and Damascene himself, in the chapter just before the one cited for denial. The Damascene quotation follows.

"All the animals, before the transgression, were subject to man and obedient even toward evil, because God had appointed him Prince and Lord of all: but the serpent was more familiar to man than the rest, frequently approaching him and fawning on him with gentle movements: wherefore through it especially the devil instilled poison into our first parents." Thus Damascene.

Block quotation of John Damascene (de Fide orthodoxa 2.10): before the Fall all animals were subject and obedient to man, whom God had made their Prince and Lord; the serpent was the most familiar, fawning on man with gentle motions—wherefore the devil used it especially to instill poison into our first parents. (The clause "ad malum obedientia" is printed thus; rendered "obedient even toward evil.")

I will here also append the words of Basil from his oration on Paradise:

Pererius introduces a second block quotation, from Basil's oration On Paradise.

"In Paradise," he says, "there were all kinds of little birds, which both by the beauty of their colors and the sweetness of their harmony incredibly delighted man. There were there also spectacles of various animals: but all were tame, obedient to man, living among themselves harmoniously and peacefully, which both heard one another and spoke intelligibly. But the serpent was not then dreadful, but mild and tame: nor did it crawl terribly on the surface of the earth, as if swimming, but went about lofty and erect, standing upright on feet." Thus far Basil.

Block quotation of Basil (oration On Paradise): Paradise held all kinds of birds delighting man by color and song, and tame animals living peacefully and obedient to man, who heard and spoke intelligibly among themselves; and the serpent was not then dreadful but mild, walking erect on feet rather than crawling. (A vivid patristic picture of the prelapsarian animal world; the upright serpent is a traditional motif.)

— p. 352 (PDF) · printed p. 311 —

There is also for this opinion a very probable reason. For if to man dwelling in Paradise dominion over all animals was given by God, it is not to be doubted that there were animals in Paradise over which he could exercise his dominion. Eve too, in Paradise, if she had seen neither the serpent nor any other animal, would surely have been startled by the sight and speech of the serpent as by a thing before unusual, and would not have so securely and familiarly mingled speech with it. Add this also: if there had been no animals in Paradise, the men who were in that place would have been deprived of the many and not slight pleasures which we take from various animals, nor could they have attained the complete knowledge of animals (acquirable not without certain experiments of them). They say this is nowhere handed down by Moses; but it is enough that it is consequent upon and congruous with the other things handed down by Moses: although Moses did not fail to indicate even this, when he said that all the animals were led to Adam, dwelling in Paradise, that he might impose names on them—unless perhaps it pleases anyone to imagine that they, the names having been received, all immediately departed from Paradise. They press further to urge against us that, if there had been animals in Paradise, it would follow that they were preserved from that general destruction of the flood. But that is not necessarily consequent: for either they were cast out together with Adam from Paradise, or (because we hold Paradise was destroyed by the flood) those also, if any had remained in Paradise up to that time, perished along with it.

*A strongly probable reason for animals in Paradise: God gave Paradise-dwelling man dominion over all animals, so there were animals to rule. Also, had Eve seen no animal, the serpent's sight and speech would have startled her, not been met so familiarly. And without animals men would have lacked the pleasures and the complete (empirical) knowledge of animals. **Objection:** Moses nowhere reports it. **Reply:** it follows from what he reports—indeed he indicated it when the animals were brought to Adam in Paradise to be named (unless one pretends they all left at once after naming). **Objection:** then they would have escaped the flood. **Reply:** not necessarily—either cast out with Adam, or perished with Paradise (which Pererius holds the flood destroyed).*

DISPUTATION. On the tree of life.

A new disputation begins: On the Tree of Life. It will be subdivided into numbered QUAESTIONES.

GENESIS 2, verse 9. — The Lord God also brought forth the tree of life in the midst of Paradise.

Scripture lemma for the disputation: the clause of Gen 2:9 on the tree of life ("in the midst of Paradise"), set off as a centered head with the side-reference "GEN. 2. VERS. 9."

In Hebrew it is, word for word, Tree of lives; in which there is a double Hebraism: for "of lives" is said for "life," and again "tree of life," by the custom of the Hebrew tongue (which lacks adjectives), is put for "vital" or "life-giving tree"—namely, one which would have a wondrous power and nature not only for preserving man's life, but even for perpetuating it and bestowing it, as it were, with a certain kind of immortality. "Wood" (lignum) too is put for "tree." But those who are curiously eager to dig out mysteries from everywhere (even where there are none) think "tree of lives" was said not without great reason: and they bring forward various reasons for that name. The first reason, because it would bestow on man the longest life [of all]...

On the Hebrew: literally "Tree of lives" (Lignum vitarum), with a double Hebraism—the plural "lives" for "life," and "tree of life" (Hebrew lacking adjectives) for "life-giving/vivifying tree," one with wondrous power to preserve, perpetuate, and grant a kind of immortality to man's life; "lignum" (wood) also stands for "tree." Those eager to find mysteries everywhere give various reasons for the plural name "tree of lives" (five reasons follow). Continues onto next page (catchword "bueret").

— p. 353 (PDF) · printed p. 312 —

...because it would bestow on man the longest life, and because one [life from it] would be as it were equal to many of the lives which men now lead. For the longest life of man is now about a hundred years; but the fruit of that tree of life would have been capable of prolonging man's life, for example, to three or four thousand years, which span contains forty of our lifetimes: rightly, therefore, was it called the tree of lives. The second reason, because the fruit of that tree preserved the three lives of man (the vegetative, I mean, the sensitive, and the intellective) wholly and perfectly,

each in its own greenness and vigor. The third reason, because it would have supplied that immortal life not to Adam alone, but to all his posterity, if indeed that state of innocence had stood. The fourth reason, because it cherished and sustained man's life in two ways: both because the fruit of that tree repaired and restored the natural moisture consumed by the force of heat (and this it had in common with the fruits of the other trees of Paradise); and because (and this was proper to that tree) it restored the diminished and lost natural moisture to an equal purity and integrity with that which it had had before, even at man's birth: it also so strengthened the natural heat itself that, even if by acting continuously (as happens) it suffered somewhat, yet by the benefit of that food it was so confirmed that it never grew weak and flagged—whence old age is born, and the many natural defects which accompany old age. The fifth reason: life is spoken of in two ways: for in living things being itself is called living, and not-being, dying; but moreover being itself, free however from troubles and pains and joined with tranquility and pleasure, is properly called living; on the contrary, to live in miseries and pains is called death, just as the life of those who are in hell is called death in the sacred writings. Therefore it was called the tree of lives, because it gave man not only the longest life, but also the most quiet, the most delightful, and free of all evils. If these things please readers as much as they pleased their authors, it was perhaps not without some worth to have reported them.

Marginal gloss: "Cur Hebraice dictum sit Lignum vitarum." The five reasons for the plural "tree of lives": (1) it gives the longest life—one life worth many of ours (man's max now ~100 yrs; its fruit could reach 3,000–4,000 yrs, = 40 lifetimes). (2) Its fruit preserved man's three "lives"—vegetative, sensitive, intellective—each in full vigor. (3) It would supply immortal life not to Adam only but to all posterity, had innocence stood. (4) It sustained life doubly: repairing natural moisture consumed by heat (shared with other Paradise fruits), and—uniquely—restoring lost moisture to its original purity and so fortifying the natural heat that man never declined into the decay that breeds old age and its defects. (5) "Life" = bare being (vs. death), but properly = being free of trouble and joined with tranquility/pleasure (life in misery is called "death," as the damned's life is in Scripture); so "tree of lives" because it gave the longest, most peaceful, most delightful, evil-free life. A wry close: if these please readers as they pleased their authors, perhaps it was worth reporting.

But that which Moses says, that the tree was in the midst of Paradise, either is a Hebraism signifying that the tree was in the soil of Paradise alone, and nowhere else outside it (for to dwell in the midst of a people, or a city, or of some persons, according to the phrasing of Scripture, signifies to dwell among the citizens or fellow-countrymen, or among some persons); or it signifies the dignity and excellence of that tree, holding the chief place among all the trees of Paradise; or finally it signifies that the tree was in the very middle of Paradise, because the soil of that place was either higher, or of happier fertility, and to which it could be more conveniently approached from all sides by all. But that "in the midst of Paradise" is not to be taken of the Mathematical middle, but the physical or moral: for not the tree of life alone was in the midst of Paradise, but also the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and two trees could not have been in the same middle place, designated [and defined] by mathematical [precision]...

*Marginal gloss: "Quomodo intelligendum sit, arborem vitae fuisse in medio Paradisi." On "in the midst of Paradise": three possible senses—(a) a Hebraism meaning the tree was in Paradise's soil alone (as "in the midst of a people" = among them); (b) the tree's dignity, holding the chief place among Paradise's trees; (c) literally Paradise's center, the soil there being higher/more fertile and accessible from all sides. But "in the midst" means not the *mathematical* center but the physical or moral one—since both the tree of life AND the tree of knowledge were "in the midst," and two trees could not share one mathematically-defined center. Continues onto next page (catchword "subtili").*

— p. 354 (PDF) · printed p. 313 —

...in the same middle place designated and defined by mathematical precision. But, since this tree of life has many questions, and many statements that are wondrous and difficult to explain, we shall next expound the individual questions clearly and subtly.

Conclusion of the "in the midst" point, and transition: because the tree of life raises many hard questions, Pererius will now take them up one by one as numbered QUAESTIONES.

QUESTION I. Whether the tree of life was like the other trees—that is, corporeal and terrestrial—or whether it was something intelligible and spiritual.

The first question of the disputation on the tree of life: was it a real corporeal, earthly tree, or something intelligible and spiritual (i.e. allegorical)?

Aristotle, in book 3 of the Metaphysics, text 15, dissemblingly mocking Hesiod and the other ancient poets (he himself calls them Theologians), by whom it had been reported that the gods who did not taste nectar and ambrosia were mortal, but those who were nourished by them were immortal, refutes this by this argument: that they used ambrosia and nectar either only for the sake of pleasure, or also of necessity; if for the sake of pleasure alone, then that food did not afford them immortality; but if of necessity—not going to be immortal without that food—he says that this is among the number of those things which cannot happen: for what needs food is by its own nature dissoluble and mortal; but what is of this kind can by no means be made indissoluble and immortal. So Aristotle there, who would assuredly have said the like about the tree of life, if the light of Faith had shone upon him.

*Pererius opens with **Aristotle** (Metaphysics bk. 3 [B], text 15) mocking Hesiod and the old poets (his "theologians") who said gods are mortal/immortal according as they lack or feed on nectar and ambrosia. Aristotle's dilemma: the gods take that food either for pleasure or from necessity—if for pleasure, it confers no immortality; if from necessity (not immortal without it), that is impossible, since what needs food is by nature dissoluble and mortal, and cannot be made immortal. Pererius: Aristotle would have said the same of the tree of life, had the light of Faith reached him—framing the philosophical objection the question must answer.*

Some of our own (as Origen, and those whom above we named the allegorical Interpreters of paradise), partly that they might more easily extricate themselves from all the tangles of difficulties, partly judging that the gift of immortal life could be the effect of no terrestrial and corporeal tree, thought that the things which Moses wrote about the tree of life are to be understood by them not properly and historically (as the words themselves sound), but figuratively, according to the mystical and allegorical sense. But what, indeed, ought to be understood by that tree of life, they interpret variously. Some expound it as divine Wisdom, since Solomon, Proverbs 3, calls it a Tree of life to those who lay hold of it.

Others, Christ the Lord, for He is called the Bread of life, the Fountain of life, and the Tree of life. Some, however, even heavenly happiness, of which John in the Apocalypse, chapter 2, says, To him that overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of my God. The same John writes the like in chapter 22 of the same book. Augustinus Eugubinus, in his Cosmopoeia, thinks that by the tree of life is symbolically signified the immortality which God had promised to Adam as a reward, if he had obeyed His precepts. For, having laid down that law that he should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, He threatened death to the one violating it, that he might be deterred from transgression by the fear of so great a penalty; and at the same time, promising immortality to the one observing the law, that he might be more vehemently moved to keep it, by so great a proposed good.

*The allegorical camp: **Origen** and the allegorical interpreters (named earlier) held Moses's words on the tree of life are to be taken not literally/historically but mystically—partly to escape the difficulties, partly because no earthly tree could confer immortal life. Their varied readings of "the tree of life": (a) **divine Wisdom** (Prov 3:18, "a tree of life to those who lay hold of it"); (b) **Christ** (Bread of life, Fountain of life, Tree of life); (c) **heavenly happiness** (Rev 2:7, "to him that overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of my God"; cf. Rev 22). **Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio** (Eugubinus), in his *Cosmopoeia*, takes it as symbolizing the immortality God promised Adam as reward for obedience—the prohibition on the tree of knowledge being backed by the threat of death and the promise of immortality. Breaks here (catchword "VERUM"; signature R; page-foot "Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1"). Resume PDF 355 with "VERUM..." — Pererius's own rebuttal of the allegorists.*

— p. 355 (PDF) · printed p. 314 —

But indeed those interpretations, though they have an allegorical meaning not to be despised, are nevertheless most remote from the genuine and historical sense. For it ought not to be called into doubt that the tree of life was a true and natural tree, and that its power and effect was to preserve man from all corruption of the body and from death itself. For this is clearly discerned from the Mosaic narrative, which is wholly historical: for he says that God brought forth from the soil every tree fair to sight and sweet to eat, and adds, The tree of life also in the midst of Paradise. And

that particle Also indicates that the tree of life was procreated from the soil, and was a natural tree no otherwise than all the other trees of paradise. Moses likewise shows that the fruit of that tree could be eaten by man—nay rather, was provided for man's use. Wherefore, lest man, eating the fruit of that tree even after sin, should attain immortality, access to that tree was entirely closed off to him by God: from which it appears sufficiently that by the name of that tree neither divine Wisdom nor Christ the Lord can be understood; for these were not taken away from man after sin, nor was the power of approaching and reaching them removed from him.

*Marginal gloss: "Arborem vitae fuisse veram et terrestrem arborem." **Pererius's rebuttal of the allegorists:** the allegorical readings, though valid, are far from the literal/historical sense, which must stand—the tree of life was a true, natural tree whose power was to preserve man from bodily corruption and death. Proof from Moses's wholly historical text: the word "ALSO" ("the tree of life *also* in the midst") shows it grew from the soil like the other trees; its fruit could be eaten and was for man's use; and God *closed off access* to it after sin lest man eat and become immortal—which proves it cannot mean divine Wisdom or Christ (neither of which was taken from man after sin).*

I will set down in this place a most lucid opinion of Augustine from his book On the City of God, 13 and chapter 21, in which place he expounds the things which Moses hands down about Paradise and the tree of life, in what manner others also have interpreted them, and how he himself thinks they are to be understood. His words are as follows:

Marginal gloss: "Egregia S. Augustini sententia de veritate arboris vitae." Pererius introduces a long block quotation from Augustine, City of God 13.21, on how the Paradise narrative may be read allegorically yet must be held literally true. The quotation follows.

"Some refer that whole paradise, where the first men are narrated to have been, to intelligible things, and turn those trees and fruit-bearing woods into virtues and modes of life: as though those things were not visible and corporeal, but were spoken or written in that way for the sake of signifying intelligible things. As if paradise could not be corporeal for this reason—because it can also be understood spiritually: just as the two women Agar and Sara, and from them the

two sons of Abraham (one of the bondwoman, the other of the free), were not real for this reason, that the Apostle says two testaments are figured in them. No one, then, forbids paradise to be understood as the life of the blessed; its four rivers, the four virtues—Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice; and its trees, all useful disciplines; and the fruit of the trees, the morals of the pious; and the tree of life, Wisdom herself, the mother of all goods; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the experience of the transgressed commandment. These things can also be understood in the Church, so that we may take them better as prophetic signs preceding things to come: namely, paradise as the Church herself, as is read of her in the Song of Songs; the four rivers of paradise, the four Gospels; the fruit-bearing trees, the saints; their fruit, their works; the tree of life, the holy of holies, namely Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the proper choice of the will. These things, and whatever else can more aptly be said about understanding paradise spiritually, may be said with no one forbidding, provided that the truth of that history also, commended by a most faithful narration of the things done, be believed." Thus Augustine.

*Block quotation of Augustine, City of God 13.21. Augustine catalogues two allegorical schemes—(1) paradise = the blessed life: the four rivers = the four cardinal virtues (Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice), the trees = useful disciplines, the tree of life = Wisdom (mother of all goods), the tree of knowledge = the experience of transgression; (2) paradise = the Church (Song of Songs): the four rivers = the four Gospels, the trees = saints, the fruit = their works, the tree of life = Christ the holy of holies, the tree of knowledge = free will. But he insists these allegories are permissible only **provided the literal historical truth is also believed.** This is precisely Pererius's hermeneutic—allegory built upon, never replacing, the literal sense.*

— p. 356 (PDF) · printed p. 315 —

QUESTION II. Whether the tree of life was of the same species as, and similar to, some one of our trees.

The second question on the tree of life: was it the same species as, and similar to, one of our familiar trees—or a unique kind?

The knot of this question depends on the explication of another question, to be treated a little below: whether that force and power of the tree of life, of preserving man from destruction and making him in a way immortal, was supernatural to it (that is, not proceeding from its nature, but granted to it from without by the gift of God), or whether it was natural, existing from the inmost principles of that tree and from its natural constitution, and inhering in it naturally. For if that force and that wondrous effect was supernatural, nothing prevents that tree from having been similar to the others: for God could have worked that supernatural effect through any tree whatever—whether fig or pear or plum—since the chief efficient and operating cause of that effect was not the nature or any natural property of some tree, but was the divine power assisting the tree, or so working through the tree. For not because the shadow of the passing Peter healed the sick did that shadow differ in species from the shadows of other men; nor because the kerchiefs and aprons of Paul drove off diseases and demons from men did they have a species different from other girdles and cloths; nor, because the water of Baptism washes away the filth of the soul, is it to be reckoned distinguished in species from all other waters.

*The question's knot depends on a later one: was the tree of life's power (to preserve man from death and make him somehow immortal) **supernatural** (granted from outside by God, not from its nature) or **natural** (from its own intrinsic constitution)? If supernatural, the tree could be like ordinary trees—God could work that effect through any tree (fig, pear, plum), the chief cause being the divine power assisting it, not the tree's nature. Three analogies of ordinary things made instruments of divine power without changing species: **Peter's healing shadow** (Acts 5:15), **Paul's handkerchiefs and aprons** that drove off diseases and demons (Acts 19:12), and **baptismal water** that cleanses the soul—none differing in species from ordinary shadows, cloths, or water.*

But if that force and effect of the tree of life was natural and flowing from the proper nature of that tree, then it is surely fitting to judge that that tree was outside the order of all other trees, and similar to none of them in nature and species. For a diverse operation and natural effect argue a diverse efficient force and power; a diverse efficient force argues a diverse nature. Since, therefore, that wondrous effect of the tree of life has hitherto

been seen in none of the other trees, it is concluded that the tree of life was dissimilar to all the other trees. Moreover, the natural power of some tree is commonly present in all trees of the same species, differing perhaps only according to more and less: which difference, however, is extraneous and adventitious to the trees, namely that which befalls them either from a kinder sky, or from a more fertile soil, or from better cultivation by man; but such a difference could not be present in the trees of Paradise, which had all those things equal. Therefore, because (as we shall say below as more probable) that power and effect of the tree of life was natural, it must now be said that that tree was singular, and such as none of its species would be found either within paradise or outside.

*But if the power was **natural**, the tree must have been outside the order of all others, like none in nature or species—since a different natural effect argues a different efficient power, hence a different nature, and that wondrous effect is seen in no other tree. Moreover, a tree's natural power is shared by all of its species (differing only by degree, and that only from extrinsic factors—climate, soil, cultivation—all equal in Paradise). So, since (as Pererius will argue below as more probable) the tree's power was *natural*, the tree must have been **singular**, of a kind found nowhere else in Paradise or outside it.*

This, however, could be doubted: whether the Tree of life was only one in number, or whether there were many...

Marginal gloss: "An fuerit una duntaxat Arbor vitae, an multae." A sub-question is raised: was there only one tree of life, or many of the same kind? Continues onto next page (catchword "nume").

— p. 357 (PDF) · printed p. 316 —

...or whether there were many trees of that same species, of the same power and effect. Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 163, denies that there were more than one. For if there had been more than one, he says, they would have been either within paradise or outside: not outside paradise, for thus man could, after sin, by eating from them have escaped death; in vain, therefore, would God have fortified the entrance of paradise with so great a guard—namely, with this purpose, as Scripture says, lest thereafter man, eating the fruit of that tree, should live forever. Nor were

there many trees of life within paradise: both because, wherever Moses speaks of this tree of life (and he speaks of it more than once, in the second and third chapters of this book), he always calls it by the singular number, the Tree of life; and because he says it was in the midst of Paradise, which cannot truly be said of many trees. And one tree of life was enough for that for which it was instituted—that is, not for the daily food of man, to feed and nourish him, but it was provided in the manner of a medicine, or medicated food, against the natural defects which befall man with the advance of age, and against the terminus of those defects, which is death: and so it would have been enough for man to eat the fruit of that tree twice or thrice a year.

***Tostatus** (Gen 13 q.163) denies there was more than one tree of life: if many, they would be inside or outside Paradise—not outside (else man could escape death after sin, and God's guarding of the entrance would be pointless), nor many inside (Moses always uses the singular "the tree of life," and says it was "in the midst," which cannot apply to many). One sufficed for its purpose: not daily nourishment, but a medicine against the defects of age and against death itself—so eating its fruit twice or thrice a year would have sufficed.*

To me, as it is probable that by God (foreknowing the fall and lapse of Adam) only one tree of life was procreated in paradise (for what need was there of more?), so it becomes quite credible that, if that most happy state which they call of innocence or of original justice had endured in all the posterity of Adam, the tree of life would have been multiplied likewise, the human race being most numerously multiplied: for one single tree could not have been enough for so great a multitude of men, not even for medicinal uses alone.

*Marginal gloss: "Auctoris coniectura." **Pererius's conjecture:** since God foreknew Adam's fall, He probably created only one tree of life (no need of more); but had the state of innocence endured in all Adam's posterity, the tree of life would have multiplied along with the vastly multiplied human race—since one tree could not have sufficed for so great a multitude, even for medicinal use alone.*

QUESTION III. Why it was called the tree of life, and whether it truly bestowed immortal life on man.

The third question on the tree of life: why it bears that name, and whether it really conferred immortal life on man.

Augustinus Eugubinus, in his Cosmopoeia, thinks it was called the tree of life not effectively, because it made life immortal, but significatively, because it was a symbol and sign of the immortality set before Adam (if he should keep the law of God). But against Eugubinus stand almost all writers, both Greek and Latin, who by the highest consensus interpret that immortal life was going to be the effect of that tree. It was called the tree of life, therefore, not because it gave life to the non-living (for it would furnish life only to one eating its fruit, and eating belongs only to the living); nor was it called the tree of life because it cherished and sustained man's life (for this is common to all good and wholesome foods); nor because it made life much longer than that which men now live: for this herbs and trees afforded to man before the flo[od]...

*Marginal gloss: "Cur diceretur Arbor vitae." **Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio** (Eugubinus), in his *Cosmopoeia*, holds it was called "tree of life" not *effectively* (as if it made life immortal) but *significatively*—as a symbol of the immortality offered Adam if he kept God's law. But nearly all writers, Greek and Latin, by greatest consensus hold immortal life was the tree's real *effect*. It was called "tree of life" NOT because it gave life to the non-living (it only fed the living), NOR because it nourished life (common to all wholesome food), NOR merely because it greatly prolonged life—for ordinary herbs and trees did that before the flood. Continues onto next page (catchword "luvium").*

— p. 358 (PDF) · printed p. 317 —

...before the flood the herbs and trees did, even those which were outside paradise: for since before the flood there was no use of flesh-meats, but food was taken only from plants, we read that some of those men prolonged their life beyond the nine-hundredth year. Indeed it is fitting to believe that the fruits of the trees which were in paradise had the power of prolonging human life perhaps to the one-thousand-five-hundredth year, even if man, dwelling in paradise, had not eaten the fruit of the tree of life.

Continuation: ordinary herbs and trees (even outside Paradise) prolonged life before the flood—since men then ate no meat, only plants, some lived beyond 900 years; and Paradise's fruits could probably have prolonged human life to ~1,500 years even without the tree of life. (This sets up the point that the

*tree of life's name signifies something *more* than mere longevity—true immortality.)*

Why, then, was that tree especially surnamed the tree of life? Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 175, judges that it was called the tree of life for this reason: that its fruit had the power of preserving man from death for all time, and of making him immortal. This he proves first by the testimony of Scripture, which in the third chapter of this book narrates that Adam was for this reason cast out of paradise, and his access to the tree of life closed off—namely, lest, eating its fruit, he should live forever: the eating of that tree, therefore, afforded man eternal life. He confirms the same by this argument, that Adam, if he had obeyed God's precept, would never have died; for God threatened death to him as the penalty of the violated law. Wherefore Paul, to the Romans 5, affirms that through sin death entered into the world; and in the book of Wisdom, chapter 1, it is written that death was not made by God, but that it crept upon man through the envy of the devil. Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have died; and the fruit of the tree of life warded off death from man. Then, if the tree of life bestowed on man li[fe]...

*Marginal gloss: "Tostatus putavit Arborem vitae habuisse vim faciendi hominem simpliciter immortalem." Why "tree of life" especially? **Tostatus** (Gen 13 q.175): because its fruit had power to keep man from death forever and make him immortal. Proofs: (Gen 3) Adam was expelled and barred from the tree lest he eat and live forever—so eating it gave eternal life; (argument) had Adam obeyed, he would never have died, death being the threatened penalty—whence **Rom 5** (death entered through sin) and **Wisdom 1** (death not made by God, but crept in through the devil's envy). So in innocence man would not have died, and the tree's fruit warded off death. Continues...*

...if the tree of life bestowed on man a life of six or ten thousand years, it could also have bestowed life for all time: for if man could lead, through ten thousand years, a life incorrupt and whole from all evil, neither aging nor in any way wasting and failing, then surely by a like reasoning he could live for all the remaining time. Moreover, if man had remained in the state of innocence on account of eating this tree, he would never have felt any discomforts of old age, any troubles of age, any defects of nature: therefore he would never have been going to die. For old age precedes natural death;

and many discomforts of declining nature and of failing life and of an age now inclining toward destruction—heralds of death—run before it, as Paul says, writing to the Hebrews 8: What is made old and grows aged is near to destruction. To this, if the fruit of that tree of life restored man, re-establishing him in the same health, firmness, wholeness, and vigor which he had from the beginning, and afforded this as often as it was taken for food or medicine: at no time, therefore, could the strength and vigor of life fail man, unless he had abstained from eating that tree, which he could not do without great wickedness.

*Tostatus's argument continued: if the tree could give a life of 6,000 or 10,000 incorrupt years, it could give life forever (the same reasoning extends without limit). Had man stayed in innocence by eating it, he would never feel old age's ills or any natural defect—hence never die; for old age, with its declining ills ("heralds of death"), precedes natural death—**Heb 8[:13]: "What grows old and ages is near to destruction."** And since the fruit restored man to his original health and vigor each time taken, his strength could never fail unless he abstained from it—which he could not do without grave sin.*

This opinion is confirmed by the author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament, commonly thought to be Augustine, and cited under that name by Saint Thomas in the first part, question 97, article 1. For he, in question 19, writes thus: As long as man endured in the Creator's law, he was worthy to eat of the tree of life...

*The view is confirmed by the author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament* (commonly ascribed to Augustine—now attributed to **Ambrosiaster**—and cited as Augustine by Aquinas, Summa I q.97 a.1). His q.19 is quoted: "As long as man endured in the Creator's law, he was worthy to eat of the tree of life..." Breaks mid-quotation (catchword "vitae"; signature R3). Resume PDF 359 with "...vitae..." continuing the Pseudo-Augustine quotation.*

— p. 359 (PDF) · printed p. 318 —

"[As long as man endured in the Creator's law, he was worthy to eat of the tree] of life, so that he could not die; for the body was not such that it would seem impossible for it to be dissolved, but the taste of the tree of life checked the corruption of the body. Finally, even after sin he could have remained indissoluble, if only it had been permitted him

to eat of the tree of life: for how did he have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? For the immortal needs neither food nor drink; for food afforded strength, but the tree of life, in the manner of a medicine, prevented all corruption. For thus it was for man like an impregnable wall." Thus he.

*Conclusion of the block quotation begun on p.317 from the *Questions on the Old and New Testament* (Ambrosiaster, "commonly thought Augustine"): as long as man kept the Creator's law he could not die—not because his body was intrinsically indissoluble, but because the taste of the tree of life checked bodily corruption. Even after sin he could have remained indissoluble had he been allowed to eat of it. (Objection: an immortal body needs no food. Answer: ordinary food gave strength, but the tree of life, *as a medicine*, prevented all corruption—it was for man like an "impregnable wall.")*

Augustine himself writes similar things in book 13 of the City of God, chapters 20 and 23, affirming that man, unless he had sinned, would by the eating of the tree of life have been freed from the necessity of dying, and would have been preserved perpetually in the bloom of youth. Chrysostom seems to signify the same, homily 18 on Genesis, and Rupert in book 3 On the Trinity, chapter 30, where he says that that fruit, taken once, afforded immortality: which is incredible, because it is natural that the natural heat, in acting, should suffer, and that in digesting the nourishment its force should be blunted and diminished.

*Marginal gloss: "Sententia Chrysostomi et Ruperti de arbore vitae." Augustine (City of God 13.20 & 23): had man not sinned, eating the tree of life would have freed him from the necessity of dying and kept him perpetually in youth's bloom. Chrysostom (Hom. 18 on Genesis) and Rupert (de Trinitate 3.30) seem to agree—Rupert even holding the fruit, **taken once**, conferred immortality. Pererius rejects that as incredible: it is natural that the body's heat is blunted by acting and digesting food (so the tree's effect could not be permanent from a single eating).*

But the opinion of Scotus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 19, question 1, is far different. There Scotus argues that the tree of life did not have the power of preserving man's life for an infinite time, but up to some time defined in a certain way: which being completed, man would have been translated into a spiritual and wholly immortal life. For the

power of that tree was finite, therefore its effect too was finite, and not efficacious for an infinite time: for God could have created another tree of more excellent and greater power, whereby its effect would have been of a longer and more lasting duration. Likewise every physical agent, in acting, suffers and is weakened: wherefore even in the state of innocence the natural heat in man, having suffered some defect in nutrition itself and other actions, would at last have been weakened; nor could the fruit of the tree of life have been converted into a nobler state than that of the one eating it, who indeed was already weakened. To this opinion Blessed Thomas seems to incline, in the first part, question 97, article 4, and Cajetan there.

*Marginal gloss: "Scotus censuit arborem vitae habuisse vim conservandi hominem in vita ad longissimum aliquod tempus, non tamen in perpetuum." **Scotus** (Sent. 2 d.19 q.1) holds a far different view: the tree did not preserve life for *infinite* time, but only to some definite time, after which man would be translated to a spiritual, wholly immortal life. For its power was finite, hence its effect finite (God could have made a stronger tree with longer effect); and since every physical agent weakens in acting, even in innocence the natural heat would at last weaken, nor could the fruit raise the eater to a nobler state than his own already-weakened one. **Aquinas** (Summa I q.97 a.4) and **Cajetan** incline this way.*

I, that I may judge the opinion of Scotus the more probable, am drawn most of all by that one argument: if the tree of life had had the power of preserving man's life for an infinite time, that force and power would be plainly idle, vain, and superfluous, and bestowed on that tree in vain. For since man in the state of innocence was not going to lead an eternal life on earth, but God had appointed him to live on earth for a certain very long time (definite, however—say three or four thousand years), and afterward, changed into a better state, to lead a most blessed life in the heavens for all ages: it was surely consonant with reason that the tree of life should have the power of preserving man incorrupt and whole up to that prescribed time; but beyond that time it was not needed by man, and would have been without any use and entirely superfluous. But God and nature (say the Philosophers) do nothing in vain, nothing without cause, nothing for no use

and end. And since the human body is intrinsically corruptible in a four[fold]...

*Marginal gloss: "Auctor Scoti opinionem sequitur." **Pererius follows Scotus** as more probable, chiefly by one argument: if the tree preserved life for *infinite* time, that power would be idle and superfluous—for man in innocence was not to live on earth eternally, but God set him to live a very long but *definite* time (say 3,000–4,000 years), then to be changed to a better state and live blessed in heaven forever. So the tree reasonably preserved man only to that prescribed time; beyond it the power was needless—and "God and nature do nothing in vain." And since the human body is intrinsically corruptible in four ways... Continues onto next page (catchword "plici").*

— p. 360 (PDF) · printed p. 319 —

...for a fourfold reason: because it is compounded of matter, because of [the] elements, because of heterogeneous and contrary parts, because, finally, its heat becomes weaker by the day, both from the resistance of the nourishment and from the impurity of the alimentary moisture which is its fuel: since, therefore, the human body is so disposed, it cannot naturally come about that it not at some time be corrupted. Nor do I think that from any food or medicine the native heat and moisture can be made as perfect and pure as it is from man's birth. Nor are miracles about that tree to be multiplied without necessity, since according to our opinion all the things which are handed down about it, whether in Scripture or by the Fathers, stand clearly. So holds Cajetan in the first part, question 97, article 4, and Durandus in the second [book], distinction 19, article one.

*The human body is intrinsically corruptible in **four** ways: it is compounded (1) of matter, (2) of [the four] elements, (3) of heterogeneous and contrary parts, and (4) its heat grows daily weaker (from the resistance of food and the impurity of its alimentary moisture). So it cannot naturally avoid corrupting at some point; nor can any food or medicine make the native heat and moisture as perfect as at birth. "Miracles about that tree are not to be multiplied without need," since on Pererius's view all that Scripture and the Fathers report stands clearly. So **Cajetan** (Summa I q.97 a.4) and **Durandus** (Sent. 2 d.19 a.1).*

It must be understood at this point that there are three causes of the dissolution and death of all living things. The first cause is, that their bodies consist of contrary things, warring among themselves: for they are

blended and compounded of the four elements, of the four humors, and likewise of parts not only diverse but even adverse, having contrary natures, affections, and powers. For the brain is coldest, the heart hottest, the flesh soft and moist, the bone hard and dry: but the association and coupling of contrary things can hold together for some short time, but, since it is violent, cannot be indissoluble and everlasting. The second cause is, that the natural heat implanted in living things, and a kind of natural and general instrument of the soul itself for all its functions, clings to the native moisture as to the fuel by which it is fed and sustained, continually digesting and consuming it: which, although it is repaired by food and drink, is not so according to that purity and integrity which it had at first. And because every physical agent suffers in acting, the natural heat too does not act without suffering, whereby it comes about that it is gradually weakened: hence arises the corruption of health, the weakness of the powers, the feebleness of the senses, the discomforts of old age, and the last of all evils, death. The third cause is engaged in those things which bring destruction and ruin upon man from without: among these must be numbered pestilent air, water overwhelming and suffocating, burning fire, savage and venomous animals, hostile men, demons, and—to say it in a word—whatever there is by which destruction can befall man from without.

*Marginal gloss: "Tres causae dissolutionis et interitus animalium." **The three causes of death of all living things:** (1) bodies of *contrary, warring* components—four elements, four humors, adverse parts (brain coldest, heart hottest, flesh soft/moist, bone hard/dry); such a violent union of contraries cannot last forever. (2) The natural heat (the soul's instrument for all its functions) feeds on the native moisture, consuming it; food only partly restores it, never to its original purity—and since every physical agent suffers in acting, the heat weakens over time, breeding loss of health, strength, and senses, old age, and finally death. (3) **External** causes: pestilent air, drowning water, burning fire, savage/venomous animals, hostile men, demons—whatever can destroy man from without.*

Against the aforesaid three causes of death, God had so fortified and armed man in the state of innocence with the most powerful remedies and the strongest defenses, that, if indeed he himself had remained in the grace of

God, nothing of evil which could proceed from those causes would have to be feared by him. For against the first cause of death God had given to the soul of man a certain supernatural power, by which the soul could keep those contrary things, of which the body of man is composed, in due temperament and balance at all times. Concerning this power, Saint Thomas, in question 97, article one, of the first part, writes thus:

*Marginal gloss: "Contra tres supradictas mortis causas, Deus in statu innocentiae efficacissima antidota comparaverat." Against the three causes of death, God so armed man in innocence with powerful remedies that, had he stayed in grace, he need fear no evil from them. **Against the FIRST cause**, God gave man's soul a *supernatural power* to keep the contrary elements of the body in due temperament and balance at all times. The Aquinas quotation (Summa I q.97 a.1) follows. Continues onto next page (catchword "Corpus").*

— p. 361 (PDF) · printed p. 320 —

"The body of the first man was not indissoluble by any vigor of immortality existing in it, but there was in the soul a certain power, supernaturally given by God, by which it could preserve the body from all corruption, as long as the soul itself remained subject to God: which was reasonably done. For since the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that in the beginning a power be given to it, by which it could preserve the body above the nature of corporeal matter." Thus Saint Thomas.

*Block quotation of Aquinas (Summa I q.97 a.1): the first man's body was not immortal by any inherent vigor, but by a *supernatural power in the soul* (given by God) preserving it from all corruption so long as the soul remained subject to God—fitting, since the rational soul (immortal) exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, and so was given power to preserve the body above its material nature.*

The reason of this opinion is this: for since the rational soul of itself had the power of informing the body for all time (inasmuch as it is by its own nature immortal), but the human body, because it is mortal, is not of itself capable of immortal life, then—so that there might be a due and equal proportion between body and soul—there was given to the soul by God

that aforesaid power of preserving the body from all corruption.

Pererius's gloss on Aquinas's reasoning: the rational soul, being immortal, of itself can inform the body forever; but the human body, being mortal, is not of itself capable of immortal life—so, for a due proportion between body and soul, God gave the soul the power to preserve the body from all corruption.

But about this power many, and not without cause, greatly doubt: for it seems that either it or the tree of life was superfluous, since either one alone would be sufficient for preserving man from corruption and death. Nor is it easy to understand how that power of the soul could preserve the human body always from all corruption without the help of the tree of life. We shall explain our opinion on this matter in another book (which we shall publish, after this one, On the Creation and Happy State of the First Men). Against the second cause of death, provision had been made for man in the state of innocence by the tree of life, which, besides that which is common to all foods (that is, to feed and nourish man), had two other powers, and both indeed wonderful: for its fruit, when it was eaten by man, had so great a goodness of nourishment that it not only repaired and restored the natural moisture, but also restored to it its original purity and integrity; and besides, it so strengthened and confirmed the heat that it did not allow it to be gradually blunted, weakened, and to languish—whence comes the failure of the senses, of the powers, and finally of life itself.

*Many rightly doubt this soul-power: either it or the tree seems superfluous (either alone would suffice), and it is hard to see how the soul's power alone could preserve the body without the tree. Pererius defers his own view to a forthcoming book, *On the Creation and Happy State of the First Men.* **Against the SECOND cause** (decay of heat/moisture), the tree of life provided: besides nourishing, it had two wondrous powers—restoring the natural moisture to its *original* purity, and so strengthening the heat that it never blunted, weakened, or languished (the source of failing senses, strength, and life).*

Against the third cause of death, which assails from without, it had been provided for man in two ways: first indeed by human providence (for then man would have excelled in reason and prudence, and in the knowledge of discerning the wholesome and fitting things for himself from those that

were noxious and pernicious, and of guarding against and avoiding them); then there was present to him the singular providence and care of God, and likewise the guard of the Angels, by which the harmful things from without, which could not be foreseen by him, were utterly kept off: no danger threatened him from the animals, since they were all tame and subject to him; nothing was to be feared from the demons, against whom he was defended by the protection of the Angels; nor from other men, for in no one then would there have been the will of harming or troubling another man. But enough of these things.

***Against the THIRD (external) cause**, man was doubly provided for: (1) by *human providence*—excelling in reason and prudence to discern the wholesome from the harmful and avoid the latter; (2) by God's *singular providence* and the *guard of the Angels*, which kept off the unforeseeable external harms. No danger from animals (all tame and subject to him), none from demons (the Angels defended him), none from other men (none then had any will to harm). "But enough of these things."*

This, moreover, can be asked: if the eating of that fruit of life preserved man's life not for an infinite but for a finite time, how great that time would be. I would believe it would have been at least up to eight or ten [thousand years]...

Marginal gloss: "Quamdiu in terris vixisset homo in statu innocentiae." A further question: if eating the fruit preserved life for a finite time, how long would that be? Pererius would believe at least 8,000 or 10,000 [years]. Continues onto next page (catchword "decem").

— p. 362 (PDF) · printed p. 321 —

...eight or ten thousand years: which it is permitted to argue thus. The state of man before sin would have been more equipped and more effective for prolonging man's life, by comparison with the state of man after sin before the flood, than this [pre-flood] state was by comparison with that state in which man now is (because both of these states are of sinful man, having an infirm body and subject to a thousand evils); but in the state of man before the flood life was tenfold longer than it is now (for it exceeded nearly nine hundred years): therefore in the state of innocence man's life

would have been tenfold longer than it was before the flood. But we wish this to be understood as far as pertains to the force and efficacy of the tree of life and the vigor of human nature in that state: for how long God would have willed man to lead his life on earth cannot even be divined.

*The argument for ~8,000–10,000 years: the pre-sin state was more apt for prolonging life (vs. the pre-flood post-sin state) than the pre-flood state was (vs. our present)—since both present and pre-flood states are of *sinful* man with a weak body. But pre-flood life was tenfold longer than now (exceeding ~900 years); so innocence's life would be tenfold longer than pre-flood (~9,000 years). This concerns only the tree's power and human nature's vigor in that state—for how long God would actually have willed man to live on earth cannot be guessed.*

QUESTION IV. Whether that power of the tree of life, of preserving man from corruption, was natural to it, or supernatural.

*The fourth question on the tree of life (flagged earlier as the one on which Questions II–III depended): was the tree's preservative power *natural* to it, or *supernatural*?*

Which of the doctors, both earlier and later, judged that that effect of the tree of life was supernatural, and which on the contrary thought it was natural, will be able to be clearly understood and judged once the opinions of each about the tree of life are set out in this place. Augustine, in book 8 On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 5, writes thus:

Pererius will set out the doctors' opinions—who held the tree's effect supernatural, who natural. He begins with Augustine (de Genesi ad litteram 8.5); the quotation follows.

"This too I add: that, although it was corporeal food, yet that tree afforded such food that the body of man might be strengthened with stable health—not as from other food, but by a certain hidden inspiration of wholesomeness. For surely, although it was ordinary bread, yet it had something more, by one cake of which God delivered a man from the want of hunger for the space of forty days. Do we doubt to believe that, through the food of some tree—for the sake of a certain higher signification—God afforded to man that his body

should not be changed for the worse by infirmity or by age, or even slip into its setting [death]: He who afforded to human food itself so wonderful a state, that in earthen vessels the failing meal and oil should renew themselves, and not fail?"

Block quotation of Augustine (de Genesi ad litteram 8.5). Augustine: the tree of life was corporeal food, yet gave the body stable health by a hidden "inspiration of wholesomeness"—just as the single ash-baked cake by which God sustained a man (Elijah) for forty days (1 Kings 19:6-8), or the meal and oil that did not fail in the widow's earthen vessels (1 Kings 17:14-16, margin "3. Reg. 17"). So the tree's preservative power should not seem incredible.

In this place Augustine, by two examples—the one of the ash-baked bread of Elijah, the other of the meal and oil of that widow [in the story] of Elijah—declares that that power of the tree of life ought not to seem incredible, and was supernatural. The same author, in book 11 and chapter 40 of the same work, says that Adam, on account of sin, had to be separated from the tree of life, either because that happy state of the body subsisted from that very tree (from a visible thing, by an invisible power), or because in it there was a visible sacrament of invisible wisdom. And in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 20, he writes in this manner: The bodies of the first parents before sin were so disposed that, although they did not grow old with age, [they were not so] that they would be brought to death by necessity; which state was theirs from the tree of life which was in the mi[dst of Paradise]...

*Pererius: by these two examples (the **ash-baked cake of Elijah**, 1 Kings 19; the **meal and oil of the widow**, 1 Kings 17—the printed "viduae Elisei" is a slip, the margin's "3. Reg. 17" fixing it as Elijah and the widow of Zarephath) Augustine shows the tree's power should not seem incredible, and was supernatural. Augustine also (de Genesi ad litteram 11.40): Adam had to be separated from the tree after sin—either because the happy bodily state subsisted from it (a visible thing with invisible power), or because it held a visible sacrament of invisible wisdom. And (City of God 13.20): the bodies of our first parents before sin were so disposed that, though they did not grow old, they were not subject to necessary death—a state theirs from the tree of life which was in the mi[dst of Paradise]... Breaks mid-quotation (catchword "dio"; signature S). Resume PDF 363 with "...medio Paradisi..." finishing the City of God 13.20 quotation.*

— p. 363 (PDF) · printed p. 322 —

"[...which state was theirs from the tree of life which] in the midst of paradise stood together with the forbidden tree, was afforded to them by the wonderful grace of God; yet they took other foods also, besides the one tree which had been forbidden." And a little below: "They were fed by other foods which they took, lest their animal bodies feel any trouble by hungering and thirsting. But of the tree of life they tasted for this reason: lest death should anywhere creep upon them, or, worn out by old age, they should perish when the spans of time were run—the other things being as it were for nourishment, that one for a sacrament: so that the tree of life may be understood to have been in the corporeal paradise just as, in the spiritual—that is, intelligible—paradise it is the Wisdom of God, of which it is written, 'It is a tree of life to those who lay hold of it, and blessed are they who hold it.'" And further on, in chapter 23 of the same book: "Adam," he says, "was kept from the necessity of death not by that absolute and indissoluble immortality, but by the tree of life, and was retained in the bloom of youth."

*Marginal gloss: "Prouerb. 3" (Prov 3:18). Conclusion of the Augustine *City of God* 13.20 quotation (begun on p.321): the happy bodily state, theirs from the tree of life standing in the midst of Paradise with the forbidden tree, was God's wondrous gift; yet they ate other foods too (lest their bodies hunger), tasting the tree of life only against death and aging—the other foods as nourishment, this one as a *sacrament*. So the tree of life is in the corporeal paradise what God's Wisdom is in the spiritual paradise (Prov 3:18). And (City of God 13.23): Adam was kept from death and held in youth's bloom not by an absolute, indissoluble immortality, but by the tree of life.*

That sentence of the same Augustine, from book 14 of the City of God, is also celebrated by the scholastic Theologians: There was at hand for man in paradise food lest he should hunger, drink lest he should thirst; but the tree of life, lest old age should dissolve him. Above, in question 3, we recalled what the author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament, commonly thought to be Augustine, left written about the tree of life in his question 13. Bede speaks thus: It was called the tree of life, because it had received divinely that whoever ate of it, his body would be strengthened

with stable health, lest it should slip either by age into the worse, or at last into its setting.

*The scholastics' famous Augustine sentence (City of God 14): in paradise man had food lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst, but the tree of life lest old age dissolve him. (Cross-ref to the Pseudo-Augustine/Ambrosiaster *Questions* q.13, cited in Q.III above.) **Bede**: it was called "tree of life" because it had divinely received the power that whoever ate of it would be kept in stable health, never declining through age or into death.*

Saint Bonaventure, in the second [book] of the Sentences, distinction 17, reckons up three kinds of trees of paradise:

Marginal gloss: "Bonaventura, tria dicit fuisse in Paradiso arborum genera." Pererius introduces a block quotation of Bonaventure (Sent. 2 d.17) distinguishing three kinds of trees in Paradise. The quotation follows.

"Some," he says, "were of profit to the body, for its nutrition and sustenance, about which Moses said in general, God brought forth from the soil every tree sweet to eat. Other trees were of profit to the soul of man—of this kind was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, whose fruit was forbidden to man, namely to prove his obedience: from which fruit, if, obedient to God's precepts, he had abstained, without doubt he would have attained the most sweet fruit of immortality. Of the third kind was the tree of life, to be of profit to the man himself (that is, to the compound of soul and body): namely, bestowing perpetual life on man, and making the conjunction of body and soul indissoluble. Of these two trees only does Moses make proper mention, on account of their singular and wonderful effects, for which God had placed them in the midst of paradise, near to each other: that man, beholding the tree of life, might be the more keenly incited by love of immortality to the observance of the divine law; and, seeing the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, might by the fear of death, as by a kind of bridle, be held in obedience to the divine precepts. But it was called the tree of life, not on account of the effect which it itself had, but of that to which it was ordained, and which without doubt it

would have had, if man had persevered in the grace of God."

*Block quotation of Bonaventure (Sent. 2 d.17): three kinds of Paradise trees—(1) for the *body* (ordinary nourishment), (2) for the *soul* (the tree of knowledge, forbidden to test obedience—abstinence from it would have won immortality), (3) for the *whole man* (the tree of life, giving perpetual life and an indissoluble body-soul union). Moses mentions only the latter two, for their singular effects, set near each other in the midst: the tree of life to *incite* man to keep the law by love of immortality, the tree of knowledge to *restrain* him by fear of death. It was called "tree of life" not from its actual effect but from the effect it was ordained to and would have had, had man persevered in grace.*

The same Bonaventure, in the same place expounding the text of the Master, hands down that the tree of life did not have a natural power of bestowing immortality on man, since it was itself in itself corruptible, but because, by a power given to it, it disposed man for immortality; for the divine power, assisting it as in a Sacrament, bestowed immortality.

*Pererius summarizes Bonaventure's gloss on Peter Lombard's text: the tree of life had no *natural* power to give immortality (being itself corruptible), but by a power given to it disposed man for immortality—the divine power, assisting it *as in a Sacrament*, conferring immortality. (This makes Bonaventure a witness for the *supernatural* view.)*

"Nor ought it to be a wonder that by the fruit of that tree man could be disposed for immortality: since there are many aromatics, such as myrrh and bals[am]..."

Continuation of the Bonaventure quotation: it should be no wonder the tree's fruit could dispose man for immortality, since many aromatics (myrrh, balsam...) preserve bodies incorrupt for a very long time. Continues onto next page (catchword "& bals").

— p. 364 (PDF) · printed p. 323 —

"...myrrh and balsam, which preserve bodies incorrupt for a very long time. Therefore, just as our Sacraments do not create grace, but the Divine power assisting them, in their lawful reception, infuses grace: so the fruit of that tree did not give immortality, but the Divine power, when that fruit was eaten, bestowed immortality on man." Thus far Bonaventure.

Conclusion of the Bonaventure quotation: myrrh and balsam preserve bodies long incorrupt; and as our Sacraments do not create grace, but the divine power assisting them infuses grace in their lawful reception, so the fruit did not give immortality—the divine power, when it was eaten, bestowed it. (The Sacrament analogy clinches Bonaventure for the supernatural view.)

From his words, and from those of Augustine set down above, it appears and stands clear enough that they held that force and effect of the tree of life to have been supernatural. On the other side, Strabo, Hugh of St. Victor, and Blessed Thomas seem to have held that force and effect of the tree of life to have been natural. Strabo speaks thus:

*Marginal gloss: "Qui auctores senserint virtutem arboris vitae fuisse naturalem; Strabus in Genesim." From Bonaventure and Augustine, the **supernatural** camp is clear. **On the other side** (the *natural* view): Strabo, Hugh of St. Victor, and Aquinas. Strabo's words follow.*

> *"The tree of life had naturally this power, that whoever ate of its fruit would be clothed with perpetual soundness, to be wearied by no infirmity, nor anxiety, nor senile weariness."*

*Block quotation of Strabo (Glossa, on Genesis): the tree of life had *naturally* the power that whoever ate its fruit would enjoy perpetual soundness, never wearied by infirmity, anxiety, or the weariness of age. (Strabo witnesses for the *natural* view.)*

Hugh of St. Victor writes thus:

Pererius adduces Hugh of St. Victor for the natural view; his words follow.

> *"The tree of life had in itself a nature to perpetuate life for man, if it were fittingly eaten. For man was made both mortal and immortal: immortal indeed, because he could not die, through the sustenance of food which he needed; but mortal, because he could perish through external violence. But God had so fortified him within, by the tree of life taken as food, and without, by the divine power, that he could not die: within, [barring] the gate of negligence by human reason; without, barring the gate of violence by the divine guard—so that, unless man, abusing his reason, should open the gate of negligence, nothing harmful would ever enter to him through the gate of violence.*

But because he would not take care to keep the gate committed to him, God deservedly abandoned the guard of it." Thus Hugh.

*Block quotation of Hugh of St. Victor: the tree of life had a *nature* to perpetuate man's life if rightly eaten. Man was made both mortal and immortal—immortal in that food could keep him from dying, mortal in that external violence could destroy him. God fortified him *within* (against the "gate of negligence," by reason) and *without* (against the "gate of violence," by the divine guard): so no external harm could enter unless man himself, abusing reason, opened the inner gate—which he did, so God justly withdrew the guard. (Hugh witnesses for the *natural* view.)*

Blessed Thomas, in the first part, question 97, last article, argues that the tree of life could not afford to the human body any disposition of immortality by which it could never be dissolved:

*Pererius cites Aquinas (Summa I q.97 a.4 [the last article]): the tree of life could not give the body a disposition of immortality by which it could *never* be dissolved. The quotation follows.*

"...because the power of any body whatever is finite; and the greater any power is, the more durable an effect it imprints. Whence the power of the tree of life could not extend itself to this, that it should give the body a power of lasting for an infinite time, but only up to a determinate time, which being ended, either man would be translated to a spiritual life, or he would have needed to take again of the tree of life." Thus Thomas.

*Block quotation of Aquinas (Summa I q.97 a.4): any bodily power is finite, and a greater power imprints a more durable effect; so the tree's power could not give the body endurance for *infinite* time, but only to a determinate time—after which man would either be translated to a spiritual life or need to eat of the tree again. (Note: Aquinas's argument matches Scotus's; Pererius observes it tells *for the natural view*.)*

which argument of his would be invalid, if the power of the tree of life be said to have been supernatural; but if it be posited to be natural, it is most valid. To this latter opinion I, for my part, more willingly accede. For thus I am wont to reckon and reason with myself: if the power of the tree of life had been supernatural, it would not have been present to that tree after the sin of man, nor would it have profited sinful man; but that that power was

in the tree of life after the sin of man, the divine Scripture openly shows, relating that God for this reason fortified the entrance of paradise with so great a guard, lest ma[n should dare to enter into paradise]...

*Marginal gloss: "Iudicium auctoris." Pererius notes Aquinas's argument is invalid if the tree's power was supernatural, but most valid if natural—and **he accedes to the natural view.** His own reasoning: if the power had been *supernatural*, it would not have remained in the tree after man's sin, nor profited sinful man; but Scripture shows the power *did* remain after sin (God guarded Paradise's entrance lest man enter and eat...). Continues onto next page (catchword "cax").*

— p. 365 (PDF) · printed p. 324 —

...[lest man should dare to enter into paradise] and, eating the fruit of the tree of life, should live forever. Just as, therefore, the power of the Sacraments, because it is supernatural, does not work its effects in him who receives them with sin: so, if the power of the tree of life had been supernatural, it would surely have profited sinful man nothing; nor would any guard have been needed for guarding the tree of life, but it would have sufficed that God not assist that tree for working that effect. Then, since the power of that tree was efficacious not for an infinite time, but for some determinate time (as we have shown above), nothing prevents that power from having been natural. For if the other trees of Paradise could have preserved man naturally up to two thousand years, the tree of life too could naturally preserve him up to three or four thousand years. For from any species of tree produced, God, mighty with infinite force and power, can procreate another of more excellent nature and greater power and efficacy.

*Pererius's verdict on Question IV continued: were the power *supernatural* (like the Sacraments'), it would not work in the sinner—yet Scripture shows it still operated after sin (God had to guard the tree); and were it supernatural, no physical guard would be needed (God's mere non-assistance would suffice). So, since the power lasted only a *determinate* time, **nothing stops it from being NATURAL**: if other Paradise trees could preserve man ~2,000 years, the tree of life could naturally do ~3,000–4,000; and God can always create from any species a tree of greater natural power. **(Verdict: the tree's preservative power was natural.)***

QUESTION V. Whether the Sages of the Gentiles had any knowledge of the tree of life.

The fifth question on the tree of life: did the pagan sages have any knowledge of it? (A digression on the pagan myths of nectar and ambrosia as garbled echoes of the Mosaic tree of life.)

I greatly approve what Justin Martyr left written in his second Apology for the Christians: that it was brought about by the demon's utmost cunning and malice that many fabulous and fictitious things were put out by the poets of the Gentiles, as similar as possible to the things handed down in the sacred books: namely, that faith might be taken away from the divine writings, in which many things are handed down exceeding all force and power of nature and of human understanding; those who read them reckoning these to be no more credible than the fables and fictions of the ancient poets, to which they were quite similar. Justin proves this by many examples: but for the present one, pertaining to what is now in hand, will be enough. Moses hands down that there was in Paradise a tree of life, whose fruit afforded immortality to man; this, perhaps, when Hesiod and the other more ancient poets had read it (for Moses preceded all of them by many ages), they transferred to their own fables, inventing that the food and drink of the gods was nectar and ambrosia—by which things those who were fed led an age not only immortal, but even green, perpetually flourishing. And indeed those names fit the fictions nicely: for Nectar is said (on the authority of Suidas) to be as if from ν■ους (young), that is, making young those drinking it; or from the negating particle ν■ and the verb κτε■νω, that is, I kill—as if taking away mortality and not allowing one to die. And Ambrosia is said to be as if a-brosia, that is, without death, or because the mortal lacks it (in Greek called βροτ■ς, mortal).

*Marginal gloss: "Nectar et ambrosia unde deducta nomina." Pererius approves **Justin Martyr** (2nd Apology): by the demon's cunning the pagan poets produced fables *similar* to Scripture, to discredit the sacred books (so readers would reckon the miraculous in Scripture no more credible than the poets' fictions). One example: Moses's tree of life, whose fruit gave immortality, was (perhaps) borrowed by **Hesiod** and older poets—who postdate Moses—into the gods' **nectar and ambrosia**, food of immortality and perpetual youth. The Greek etymologies (per the **Suda**): **ν■κταρ** as if from **ν■ους** ("making drinkers young"), or from the negating **ν■** + **κτε■νω** ("I kill") = "not letting one die"; **■μβροσ■α** as *a-brosia*, "without death" (Greek **βροτ■ς** = mortal). [Greek glyphs verified on the 300-dpi crop; the verb glossed*

"interficio" is κτε■νω.]

There is also celebrated by the poets the herb or potion Nepenthes, taking away all grief and mourning: for mourning in Greek is π■νθος, whence νηπενθ■ς. To the same point looks Moly, the herb most praised by Homer, recalling men to youth, whose powers Pliny, book 25, chapter 4, describes at length. The poets also feign that nectar and ambrosia are ministered to the gods at table by Hebe, the daughter of Juno—which word signifies youth: by which they signified that all the nature of the gods ever flourishes and is ever strong with its own vigor.

*More pagan parallels: **Nepenthes**, the herb/potion taking away all grief (Greek **π■νθος** = grief, whence **νηπενθ■ς** = "griefless"); **Moly**, Homer's most-praised herb that recalls men to youth (its powers described by **Pliny** 25.4); and **Hebe** (Juno's daughter, her name = "youth") who serves the gods nectar and ambrosia at table—signifying the gods' nature ever flourishes in its vigor. [Greek glyphs verified on the crop.] Continues onto next page (catchword "NEC").*

— p. 366 (PDF) · printed p. 325 —

Nor against the tree of life, as against the ambrosia of the poets, does that argument of Aristotle hold, in the third book of the Metaphysics, text 15, which we recalled above. For as to what he says—that nothing which needs food can be immortal—if he speaks of natural and absolute immortality, we gladly concede it, and it is true without any doubt. But Adam, even in the state of innocence, dwelling in Paradise and feeding on the fruit of the tree of life, was nevertheless by his own nature mortal and dissoluble: but the eating of the tree of life preserved him from death—not indeed for an infinite time, but yet for a very long age, until, namely, he should be translated into a spiritual and heavenly life, and into the state of perfect immortality.

*Marginal gloss: "Solvitur Aristotelis Argumentatio." **Aristotle's argument resolved** (Metaphysics 3, text 15, raised in Q.I): his claim that nothing needing food can be immortal is gladly granted *if* he means natural, absolute immortality. But Adam, even eating the tree of life in innocence, was by his own nature mortal; the tree preserved him from death not for infinite time but for a very long age—until he should be translated to a spiritual, heavenly life and perfect immortality. (So Aristotle's*

principle and the tree of life are compatible.)

It could be asked whether Adam, while he was in Paradise, tasted and ate the fruit of the tree of life. But the answer is easy: that he did not eat it. First, because he was in Paradise for a very short time, and the fruit of that tree was not to be daily food for nourishing man, but, in the manner of a medicine, to be taken at long intervals of time, for meeting the defects of nature. Then, the eating of that tree was to be permitted to man only if he himself had kept the law about not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: wherefore the obedience of Adam had first to be proved for some time, before he should eat that fruit. Afterward, if Adam had eaten that vital fruit, he would without doubt have prolonged his life longer than any of mortals—whereas he was of a shorter life than Methuselah, Jared, and Noah.

*Marginal gloss: "Verum [=Utrum] Adam cum fuit in Paradiso, comederit fructum Arboris vitae." **Did Adam eat of the tree of life?** No. (1) He was in Paradise only a very short time, and the fruit was not daily food but a medicine taken at long intervals. (2) Its eating was to be permitted only after he had kept the law against the tree of knowledge—his obedience had first to be tested. (3) Had he eaten it, he would have outlived any mortal—yet he lived a *shorter* life than Methuselah, Jared, and Noah (proof he never ate it).*

But, as concerning the Tree of life, so concerning the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, some questions must be untangled.

Transition closing the disputation on the tree of life: as with the tree of life, so some questions on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil must now be resolved.

DISPUTATION ON THE TREE of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

A new disputation begins: On the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. It will be subdivided into numbered QUAESTIONES, expounding the second clause of Gen 2:9.

GENESIS 2, verse 9. — Also the tree of the Knowledge of good and evil.

Scripture lemma for the new disputation: the second clause of Gen 2:9, on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, set off as a centered head with the side-reference "GEN. 2. VERS. 9."

QUESTION I. Whether it was a true and natural tree, and whether only one.

The first question on the tree of knowledge: was it a real, natural (corporeal, earthly) tree, and was there only one of it?

Concerning the Tree of life it has been said: next follows the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, of fewer questions and easier explanation—and first of all with that obvious question, whether it was a corporeal and terrestrial tree—certain ones denying this, on account of the "knowledge of good and evil," which effect of it, [they say,] being suited to no one of the corporeal trees, to be...

*Marginal gloss: "Arborem scientiae boni et mali fuisse corpoream, et unam numero." The tree of life is finished; next the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, of fewer and easier questions—first the obvious one: was it a corporeal, earthly tree? **Some deny it**, on account of the "knowledge of good and evil"—an effect they say suits no corporeal tree (the start of the objection Pererius will rebut). Breaks mid-sentence (catchword "esse"; signature S3). Resume PDF 367 with "...esse..." continuing the objection and Pererius's reply.*

— p. 367 (PDF) · printed p. 326 —

...they thought [that effect of it—the knowledge of good and evil—suited to no one of the corporeal trees—] to be [an argument that it was not corporeal]. But to those weighing the words of Moses, it cannot be in doubt that it was a natural and corporeal tree: inasmuch as Moses numbered it with the other trees generated from the soil and planted in Paradise. God too, threatening man with death, forbade the eating of it: therefore it bore fruits which could be eaten by man. Eve likewise, looking at the tree beautiful in aspect, and its fruit sweet to eat, plucked, ate, and gave it to her husband to eat. Nor indeed was it surnamed the tree of the knowledge of good and evil because it had this effect, that it made those eating its fruit knowers of good and evil, but for other causes to be set forth a little below. This also becomes to me quite probable, that there was only one such tree:

for one was enough for the counsel and purpose of God, who wished to prove man's obedience through it; and wherever Scripture names it, it calls it in the singular number; and the prohibition of it pertained only to Adam and Eve, and was contained in one tree in number.

*Conclusion of QUAESTIO I (from p.325), rebutting the allegorists. Against their denial: weighing Moses's words, the tree of knowledge was certainly a real, corporeal tree—numbered among the soil-grown trees, forbidden under threat of death (so it bore edible fruit), and seen by Eve as beautiful with sweet fruit, plucked and shared. It was NOT named "of the knowledge of good and evil" because it *made* eaters know good and evil, but for other reasons (below). Pererius also finds it probable there was only **one** such tree: one sufficed for God's purpose of testing obedience, Scripture always names it in the singular, and the prohibition concerned only Adam, Eve, and one tree.*

QUESTION II. Among what species of trees the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil was.

The second question on the tree of knowledge: of what botanical species was it?

This has a more curious knowledge, but still undiscovered, and in my opinion inexplicable: yet some have dared to indicate the species of that tree properly and by name. Some thought it was either the vine or grain: by this conjecture, that in bread and in wine the Lord exhibited to us his body and blood in the sacrament of the Eucharist—namely, to pay off and expiate the guilt contracted by Adam through the eating of that tree. But since Scripture names it a tree wherever it treats of it, it appears clearly that it could have been neither grain nor vine.

*Marginal glosses: "Mira narrat Plinius de ficu Indica lib. 12 cap. 5" and "de ficu Aegyptiaca lib. 13 cap. 7" (Pliny on the Indian fig [banyan] and Egyptian fig [sycamore]). The tree's species is a curious but undiscoverable—and (Pererius thinks) inexplicable—matter, yet some name it. Some say the **vine or grain**, conjecturing that the Lord gives his body and blood in *bread and wine* (the Eucharist) to expiate Adam's guilt from that tree. But since Scripture always calls it a "tree," it could be neither grain nor vine.*

Moses Bar-Cepha, in his book On Paradise, following his authority Philoxenus in his oration On the Tree of Life, and many others, judges that that tree was a fig: for it is credible that, as soon as our first Parents had

eaten of that tree, then—both by awareness of the crime committed, and by shame of their nakedness (which had begun to be shameful and disgraceful to them)—from that which was nearest to hand they procured aprons for themselves, with which to veil their private parts. And that these were made of fig-leaves the Scripture itself testifies; nor is it like the truth that they, passing by the tree nearest to them, hastened to another more distant, from whose leaves they should fashion aprons for themselves, with which to cover their nakedness. Theodoret, question 28 on Genesis, affirms this very thing with such great asseveration that he places it beyond controversy.

*Marginal gloss: "Philoxenus putavit illam arborem fuisse ficum." **Moses Bar-Cepha** (On Paradise, following Philoxenus's oration On the Tree of Life, and many others) holds it was a **fig**: credibly, as soon as our first parents ate, then from awareness of the crime and shame of their nakedness, they made aprons from what was nearest—and Scripture says these were of fig-leaves; nor would they have passed by the nearest tree for a distant one. **Theodoret** (q. 28 on Genesis) affirms this so strongly as to put it beyond dispute.*

— p. 368 (PDF) · printed p. 327 —

Tostatus, however, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 164, confirms by a fairly probable argument that it was not a fig—namely, by this very fact, that they made themselves aprons from fig-leaves. For since, as soon as they had eaten the forbidden fruit, they felt both the evil into which they had run and the good of which they had been deprived, without doubt a great horror and hatred of that tree seized them, from which they had received such great loss: they would therefore have feared to handle its leaves and apply them to use as clothing, dreading some greater evil to themselves from it. What of the fact that in chapter 3 of the book of Genesis it is handed down that that tree was beautiful to the eyes and delightful to behold? which surely fits a fig tree least of all. Nor indeed is it necessary that Eve and Adam ate from that tree together; rather Scripture plainly indicates that Eve first ate from that tree, and afterward brought its fruit (which she seemed to herself to have eaten harmlessly) to her husband.

*Marginal gloss: "Tostatus probat illam Arborem non fuisse ficum." **Tostatus** (Gen 13 q.164) argues, fairly probably, that it was NOT a fig—precisely from the fig-leaf aprons: once they ate and felt the evil incurred and the good lost, a great horror and hatred of that tree would have seized them, so they'd have feared to handle its leaves for clothing. Moreover Gen 3 calls the tree "beautiful to the eyes and delightful to behold," which hardly fits a fig. Nor did Eve and Adam eat together—Scripture shows Eve ate *first*, then brought the fruit to her husband.*

There were not lacking those who thought that tree was an apple, on account of what is written in Canticles, chapter 8: Under the apple tree I raised you up: there your mother was corrupted, there she who bore you was violated. But indeed the teaching of that book is wholly parabolic, wherefore one must by no means insist on the proper signification of the words: otherwise these men will be compelled to say that the tree of the cross (under which is signified, in that place, that human nature was raised up by Christ) was an apple tree. (Although the name Apple [Malum] is general, embracing many species of trees.) Finally, I do not assent to those who judge that tree to have been of a species different from all the other trees: for the knowledge of good and evil (the reason which moved them) was not the effect of that tree, as we shall soon show.

*Marginal gloss: "An illa arbor fuerit arbor Malum." Some held it was an **apple** (Malum), from Canticles 8:5 ("Under the apple tree I raised you up..."). But the Song's teaching is wholly parabolic, so its words can't be pressed literally—else the "apple tree" there (signifying where Christ raised human nature, i.e. the cross) would be a literal apple tree. (And "Malum" is a general name for many species.) Pererius also rejects the view that the tree was of a *different species* from all others, since the "knowledge of good and evil" (their reason) was *not* the tree's effect, as he will show.*

It is true, therefore, what we said at the beginning of the question, that the species of trees the tree of the knowledge of good and evil belonged to cannot be known. But it is well, that to know this matters nothing at all for understanding the things which Scripture hands down about that tree: for that tree could have been a pear, or a plum, or any other of the trees; for it was not forbidden to man because it was in itself evil, or deadly to him (as Augustine teaches, book 13 of the City of God, chapter 20), nor was the knowledge of good and evil its natural effect; but, only to prove the

obedience of man, its fruit had been forbidden to him. But why it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, let us show next.

*So (as said at the start) the tree's species cannot be known—but happily that matters nothing for understanding Scripture's account: it could have been a pear, plum, or any tree. It was forbidden not because evil or deadly in itself (Augustine, City of God 13.20), nor was "knowledge of good and evil" its natural effect; its fruit was forbidden *only to test man's obedience*. Why it bears that name comes next (Question III).*

QUESTION III. Why it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

The third question on the tree of knowledge: why it bears the name "of the knowledge of good and evil." Pererius will survey four opinions.

Concerning the cause of this name, I observe that there are four opinions of authors. The first opinion is that of the Hebrews, for whom it is customary, in expounding the Sacred writings, to trifle ridiculously and frequently to mix in fables. So likewise in this place they imagine that Adam and Eve were created most simple, without the use of reason, like infants...

*Marginal gloss: "Figmentum Hebraeorum." Pererius notes **four opinions** on the name. The **FIRST** is the Hebrews' (who, he says, customarily trifle absurdly and mix fables into their exegesis): here they imagine Adam and Eve were created utterly simple, without use of reason, like infants... Continues onto next page (catchword "similes").*

— p. 369 (PDF) · printed p. 328 —

...like infants. But since that tree had the power of accelerating the use of reason and of free will, therefore, they say, it was called the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil: for according to the phrasing of Scripture, to know good and evil sounds the same as to have the use of reason. But this Hebrew fabrication is insipid: for as Adam and Eve were made with a robust body, and a perfect age, and fit for generating (since it was said to them, Increase and multiply), so they were made with perfect reason and judgment, and a mind mature for discerning good and evil and for understanding anything whatever. For what could be lacking to him—not

only for the use of reason, but even for the knowledge of all things—who imposed on all the animals the most apt and most fitting names? with whom God held familiar conversations; on whom He enacted a law, with a capital penalty appointed for violating it; whom He filled with the divine spirit of prophecy; inspired by which Adam uttered that splendid and noble prophecy, This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.

*The Hebrew fable, continued and refuted: they say the tree had power to *accelerate* the use of reason and free will, so it was called the tree of knowledge—"to know good and evil" (Scripture's idiom) meaning "to have the use of reason." Pererius: an *insipid* fiction. Adam and Eve were made with mature bodies, perfect age, fit to generate ("Increase and multiply"), and likewise with perfect reason, judgment, and a mind to discern good and evil. What could be lacking—of reason or of universal knowledge—to him who named all the animals, conversed familiarly with God, received a law under capital penalty, was filled with the prophetic spirit, and uttered "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh" (Gen 2:23)?*

The second opinion is that of Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities, saying that the tree was so named because its fruit, if it were eaten by man, would have the power of increasing the sharpness of the wit and the cleverness and prudence of thinking, and would contribute much to acquiring knowledge. Nicholas of Lyra refutes Josephus thus: that the fruit of that tree was corporeal, and therefore could have no power over the mind and wit of man, which is incorporeal and immaterial. For a corporeal agent cannot act except by a corporeal and material action, which cannot be received in any subject except a corporeal one. Moreover it is a certain settled principle of the Philosophers, that of those things which act on and are acted on by one another the matter must be common.

*Marginal gloss: "Iosephi opinio." The **SECOND** opinion (Josephus, Antiquities bk. 1): it was so named because its fruit, eaten, would sharpen the wit and aid the acquiring of knowledge. **Nicholas of Lyra** refutes him: the fruit was corporeal, so could have no power over man's mind and wit, which are incorporeal—for a corporeal agent acts only by corporeal action received in a corporeal subject, and (a settled philosophical principle) agent and patient must share a common matter.*

This argument of Nicholas would be firm concerning an agent which acts of itself and directly, but not concerning one which acts indirectly. For it is

manifest, even by experience itself, that by foods the animal spirits and the organs of the interior senses are greatly either helped or corrupted, whose good constitution contributes wonderfully to the goodness of the mind's actions. There are foods which greatly profit, there are also those which harm very much the memory and the wit: just as also those born and living under a heavy and thick sky are of a duller wit, but under a thin and pure one, of a sharper and keener one. Aristotle is the authority, in the seventh book of the Politics, that men who dwell in cold regions are indeed more robust in body, but nevertheless slower and more sluggish in mind; on the contrary, that those who are in hot regions are weaker in their powers, but yet cleverer and more sagacious in wit; but that those who lead their life in a mild and temperate climate excel equally in both.

*Marginal gloss: "Pro varietate alimenti et caeli, variari etiam hominum ingenia et mores." Pererius nuances Lyra: his argument holds for an agent acting *directly*, not *indirectly*. Experience shows food greatly helps or harms the animal spirits and inner-sense organs, whose good state much aids the mind; some foods help, others harm memory and wit—as those under a heavy sky are duller, under a pure one sharper. **Aristotle** (Politics bk. 7): cold-region men are stronger in body but slower in mind; hot-region men weaker but cleverer; those in a temperate climate excel in both.*

Finally, Isaiah in chapter 7, speaking of the Messiah, says: He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good. Solomon likewise, in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter two, says that he thought to withdraw his flesh from wine, that he might more freely study and have leisure for wisdom. Nothing, therefore, prevents that the eating of that tree could profit man to the good[ness and excellence of wit]...

Scriptural support that food can affect mind: Isaiah 7 (of the Messiah) "He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse evil and choose good"; and Solomon (Ecclesiastes 2) thought to withdraw his flesh from wine, to study wisdom more freely. So nothing prevents that eating the tree could have profited man's wit. Continues onto next page (catchword "boni").

— p. 370 (PDF) · printed p. 329 —

...could profit man to the goodness and excellence of wit. Wherefore Josephus must be refuted otherwise: namely, if the fruit of that tree had

profited the sharpness of the wit and the perception of knowledge, God would never have forbidden the use of it to man. For He does not envy our goods, nor wish to forbid or hinder the things which pertain to the perfection of man (especially the spiritual and intellectual). And indeed, if the fruit of that tree had been such, the law of God forbidding it would surely have been most grievous and most hard for man: since there is nothing which, by the leading of nature, men more ardently desire, and to which they are carried by a greater impulse of nature, than the attainment and perception of knowledge. To this, if the matter were so, the promise of the serpent given to Eve would have been true: I mean that promise, In whatever day you eat of it, you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil: which promise, however, all the Fathers hold to have been lying and deceptive. And if the first men had experienced in themselves such an effect of that tree, they would not have grieved so much over the eating of it—namely, being increased and enriched with so great a good of wit.

*Marginal gloss: "Refellitur Iosephi sententia." Pererius refutes Josephus differently: had the fruit profited the wit and knowledge, God would never have forbidden it—He does not envy our goods nor forbid what perfects man (especially intellectually); and such a prohibition would have been a most grievous law, since men most ardently desire knowledge above all. Besides, then the serpent's promise ("you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," Gen 3:5) would have been *true*—which all the Fathers hold was lying. And had the first parents felt such an enriching of wit, they would not have grieved so over eating it.*

The third opinion is almost the common one of the Theologians, and spread abroad through all the schools: that that tree was so named from the event, and from that which followed its eating. For it befell man that he then, by experiencing, knew the difference between the good which he enjoyed before sin, and the evil into which he ran by sinning; and therefore he had a knowledge of good and evil—namely (as the Theologians call it) experimental. For although Adam knew the difference of good and evil before, speculatively, yet after sin he knew it more practically and by experience. Just as a physician, by the science of medicine, has known the difference of health and sickness; yet he himself, having lost his health and

fallen into illness, recognizes it better by a certain new way—namely, by experience. This is the opinion of Augustine in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 17, and book 8 On Genesis according to the letter, chapters 6 and 15; and the same is the opinion of the Master of the Sentences and of the scholastic Theologians, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17.

*Marginal gloss: "Cur dicta sit arbor Scientiae boni et mali secundum communem opinionem." The **THIRD** opinion (almost the common one, spread through all the schools): the tree was named **from the event**, from what followed its eating. Man then knew *by experience* the difference between the good he had before sin and the evil he incurred by sinning—an *experimental* knowledge of good and evil (theologians' term). Adam knew the difference *speculatively* before, but after sin knew it more *practically, by experience*—as a physician knows health and sickness by his art, but knows them better once he himself falls ill. So **Augustine** (City of God 14.17; de Genesi ad litteram 8.6 & 15), **Peter Lombard the Master**, and the scholastics (Sentences 2 d.17).*

As, therefore, from the event there was named the Well of strife or calumny, and the Well of the oath, and the Mound of the witness or Heap of testimony, the Camp of God also, and the House of God, as may be seen in the book of Genesis: so from the event the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil was named. Others refer the experimental knowledge not to Adam but to God, who, they say, imposed on Adam that precept in order to test and prove Adam concerning good and evil, that is, concerning obedience and disobedience: namely, whether he would be obedient (which would have been a great good for him) or disobedient (which was to be the seedbed of all evils for him).

*Marginal Scripture refs: "a Genes. 26; b Infra 46; c Genes. 31; d Infra 32; e Supra 28." The analogy: as Genesis names places *from the event*—the Well of Strife/Calumny (Gen 26, Esek/Sitnah), the Well of the Oath (Beersheba, Gen 46:1), the Mound of the Witness / Heap of Testimony (Gen 31, Galeed/Jegar-sahadutha), the Camp of God (Mahanaim, Gen 32), the House of God (Bethel, Gen 28)—so the tree was named from the event "of the knowledge of good and evil." **Others** refer the experimental knowledge not to Adam but to *God*, who imposed the precept to test Adam concerning good and evil (obedience or disobedience)—whether he would obey (a great good) or disobey (the seedbed of all evils).*

But that that tree was not so named from the event, and from that which followed its eating, there are not lacking arguments by which it can be

proved. For first, if the name was to be taken from events, by a like reasoning it could have been named the Tree of the opening of the eyes, or of the knowledge of one's own nakedness, or of the making of aprons: for all these things...

*Marginal gloss: "Reijcitur praedicta opinio." **Pererius begins rejecting the common ("from the event") view.** First argument: if the name were taken from events, it could just as well have been called the Tree of the *opening of the eyes*, or of the *knowledge of one's nakedness*, or of the *making of aprons*—for all these also followed the eating. Breaks mid-sentence (catchword "omnia"; signature T). Resume PDF 371 with "...omnia..." continuing the rejection.*

— p. 371 (PDF) · printed p. 330 —

...[or of the making of aprons: for] all these things likewise, just as the experimental knowledge of good and evil, followed the eating of that tree. For Scripture relates that, as soon as Adam and Eve ate of that tree, their eyes were opened, and they knew with great shame that they were naked, and made themselves aprons to cover their nakedness. Then, in order that the serpent might allure Eve to the eating of that tree, he promised that, if they ate of it, they would be made like gods, knowing good and evil. Nor did the serpent signify the experimental knowledge of good and evil: for since that is evil and to be fled, he would not have promised it as the greatest good and most to be desired. By the consensus of the Fathers too it is clear that the serpent lied in that promise of his; but he would not have lied, if he had spoken of the knowledge of good and evil through experience—for that knowledge the first men in truth acquired more than enough after sin; nor does such knowledge befit those gods, whose likes he promised they would be. Lastly, when Adam was to be cast out of Paradise, it was said of him by irony (whether by some Angel speaking with the other Angels, or by some one Divine Person holding discourse with the other two), Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil. But it is manifest that in this sentence, by the knowledge of good and evil, the experimental knowledge cannot be understood: for this, since it is an evil and does not befall its possessor without detriment, cannot be fitting in

the good Angels, much less in the Divine Persons.

*Continuation of Pererius's rejection of the common ("from the event") view. **1st argument** (from p.329): by that logic the tree could equally be named the Tree of the opening of the eyes, of the knowledge of nakedness, or of the making of aprons—all of which followed too. Further: the serpent did NOT mean *experimental* knowledge in "you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:5)—that knowledge is an evil to flee, not the supreme good he promised. The Fathers agree the serpent *lied*; but he wouldn't have lied had he meant experimental knowledge (which the first parents really did gain), nor does it befit "gods." And "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:22)—spoken ironically by an Angel or a Divine Person—cannot mean *experimental* knowledge, which (an evil, harmful to its holder) cannot apply to good Angels, much less the Divine Persons.*

The fourth opinion, to which for my part I assent more than to the others, is that of Rupert, in the second book On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 27, and of Tostatus, on the thirteenth chapter of the book of Genesis, question one hundred fifty-fourth and fifty-fifth: who affirm that that name, Of the knowledge of good and evil, was put upon that tree on account of the lying words and deceptive promises of the serpent, who lured and impelled those first men to eat of that tree by most lying words and most deceptive promises, promising that they would be like gods, knowing good and evil. This tree, says Rupert, was ironically called of the knowledge of good and evil, that by its very name it might present to readers a monument of the diabolical lie. From the fact, therefore, that he had deceived the first men by that false promise, the name of the knowledge of good and evil was imposed on that tree, either by Adam himself or by Moses: and although in Moses's narrative, before the encounter of the serpent with Eve, that tree is twice called by that name (namely, of the knowledge of good and evil), yet Moses the writer of the narrative does this by anticipation; for in truth it had not had that name before, but when God said to Adam that he should not eat of that tree, He either called it by another name, or pointed it out as with a finger, demonstrating its kind and place.

*Marginal glosses: "Probabilior ratio, cur fuerit dicta arbor scientiae boni et mali." / "Rupertus. Tostatus." The **FOURTH** opinion, which **Pererius prefers**: Rupert (de Trinitate et operibus eius 2.27) and Tostatus (Gen 13 qq.154–155)—the name was given to the tree because of the serpent's*

lying words and deceptive promises (he lured the first parents by promising they would be like gods, knowing good and evil). **Rupert:** "This tree was ironically called 'of the knowledge of good and evil,' that by its very name it might present to readers a *monument of the diabolical lie.*" So the name came from the serpent's deceiving them by that false promise—imposed by Adam or by Moses; and though Moses's text names it so twice *before* the serpent's encounter with Eve, he does this *by anticipation*: it had no such name before, and when God forbade it to Adam He called it by another name or pointed it out "as with a finger."

Augustine, in the eighth book On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 15, holds that before the talk of the serpent with Eve this name had been imposed on that tree by God: because through that tree God announced that it would come to pass that the good and evil of man—that is, his obedience or disobedience—should be made manifest; or because God announced to Adam (the more to deter him from the eating of the tree) that it would come to pass that, if he ate of it...

*Marginal gloss: "Augustinus." Augustine's variant (de Genesi ad litteram 8.15): the name was imposed by God *before* the serpent's talk with Eve—because through that tree God announced that man's good and evil (his obedience or disobedience) would be made manifest; or because God warned Adam (to deter him from eating) that, if he ate of it... Continues onto next page (catchword "come").*

— p. 372 (PDF) · printed p. 331 —

...if he ate of it, he would know the difference of good and evil by experience; or finally because he was going to know the distinction of good and evil, both if he ate of that tree and if he abstained from the eating of it, but by a far different reasoning. But these things can be read and considered more fully in Augustine, in the aforesaid place.

*Conclusion of Augustine's variant (de Genesi ad litteram 8.15): God named the tree because man would know good and evil by experience if he ate; or because he would know the distinction *whether* he ate or abstained, but in far different ways. (Fuller in Augustine's text.) This closes Question III.*

ON THE FOUR RIVERS of Paradise.

A new major section of the commentary begins: On the Four Rivers of Paradise (Genesis 2:10–14). The side-reference reads "GENES. 2. VERS. 10."

GENESIS 2, verse 10. — And a river went out of the place of pleasure to water Paradise, which from thence is divided into four heads.

Scripture lemma for the section: Genesis 2:10—the river of Paradise that divides into four heads (the four rivers).

If there exist in the Sacred writings any vestiges of that paradise, by treading upon which one might without error arrive at some knowledge of the place and site of Paradise, these surely this history of Moses about the four rivers of Paradise chiefly contains: wherefore all its words must be weighed with care and diligence, one by one, and declared subtly and clearly. But why Moses wrote so distinctly and minutely about the rivers of Paradise—relating their origins, their courses, and the lands which they flowed past, and the notable features of those lands—I for my part think there was no other cause, except that it might be plain to all that Paradise was a corporeal and terrestrial place, and that he might give some signs and indications by which it could be known in what part of the world, in what regions, among what peoples paradise once was.

*If any vestiges of Paradise survive in Scripture to guide one (without error) toward its place, they are chiefly in this account of the four rivers—so every word must be weighed carefully. Why did Moses describe the rivers so minutely (origins, courses, the lands they pass and those lands' features)? For no other reason, Pererius thinks, than to make clear to all that Paradise was a **corporeal, earthly place**, and to give signs by which one might know in what part of the world, in what regions, and among what peoples Paradise once was.*

But let us weigh the words of Moses set down above, in which three things are somewhat obscure and require some explanation. Before all is this: A river went out of the place of pleasure. For in Hebrew, for "place of pleasure" there is ■■■ Heden, which word we taught above sometimes signifies pleasure, but sometimes in Scripture is the proper name of a certain region and place. In the former way the Latin interpreter took it; following whom the Latin expositors understand it to be signified by Moses that that river welled up out of Paradise itself, and first poured out its waters to water it. But the Greek interpreters, following the translation

of the Seventy, and the Hebrew writers also (as above), so likewise in this place, by ■■■ Heden understand a certain region, in the eastern part of which Paradise was planted; and so they judge that that river went out from the region Heden, and thence directed its course to the place of Paradise, to water it. It seemed to some that "river" is here said for "rivers," the singular number being put for the plural, they thinking that many rivers from the region Heden flowed together for the watering of Paradise. But it is not necessary that by that word "went out" the first rise and first origin of that river be signified, but only that that river, flowing from the region Heden, flowed into Paradise by a direct route and course. For it is quite probable that this river was none other than the Tigris and Euphrates, namely where...

*Three obscurities in Gen 2:10. **First**: "a river went out *of the place of pleasure*"—in Hebrew "place of pleasure" is **■■■** (Heden/Eden), a word (shown earlier) that sometimes means "pleasure," sometimes is the proper name of a region. The Vulgate took it the *first* way (the river welled up from Paradise itself); but the **LXX (Septuagint)** and the Hebrew writers take ■■■ as a *region* in whose eastern part Paradise was planted (so the river went out *from the region Heden* to water Paradise). Some take "river" (singular) for "rivers" (many converging from Heden). But "went out" need not mean the river's *first origin*—only that it flowed from Heden straight into Paradise. **Pererius: this river was very probably none other than the Tigris and Euphrates** [joined], where... Continues onto next page (catchword "ubi"). [Hebrew ■■■ verified on the 300-dpi crop.]*

— p. 373 (PDF) · printed p. 332 —

...namely where, with their waters mixed, they flow together into one place around Mesopotamia, and like one river traverse some spaces of land: that meeting and confluence of the two rivers both happened in the region Heden, and is called by the name of one river, although before and after they are two distinct rivers, whose springs and origins (as we shall say below) appear and exist in the mountains of Greater Armenia. The second thing which has obscurity in this discourse of Moses is this: To water Paradise—namely, in what manner that one river could wash through and water the whole of paradise. But it must be considered that this could

happen in four ways: either that that river, making many bends and windings, washed and watered Paradise on every side; or that from it several channels were led and derived into all the parts of Paradise; or that, swelling and overflowing at fixed times of the year (in the manner of the Nile and the Jordan), it inundated and watered Paradise; or finally that, through subterranean passages, it soaked and made fertile the whole soil of Paradise with its moisture.

*Marginal gloss: "Quomodo ille fluvius irrigaverit Paradisum." The river = Tigris and Euphrates where, with mixed waters, they converge around Mesopotamia and run a while as one river; that confluence was in the region Heden, called by one river's name though before and after they are two distinct rivers rising in the mountains of Greater Armenia. **Second obscurity:** "to water Paradise"—how could one river water the whole? Four ways: (1) winding in many bends, it washed Paradise on every side; (2) several channels were led from it into all parts; (3) swelling and overflowing at set seasons (like the Nile and Jordan), it flooded Paradise; (4) it soaked the whole soil through subterranean passages.*

Lastly, this also seems ambiguous in these words of Moses, which is added next: Which from thence is divided into four heads. For this can be referred either to the place Heden (namely, that at the very going-out of the river from Heden it was at once divided into four heads), or to paradise (that that river, going out indeed from Heden, was one, but on entering Paradise was divided into four rivers, by which all the land of paradise might be more conveniently watered), or finally it can be referred to the going-out of that river from paradise (that that river, after it had watered paradise, having gone out of its bounds, was afterward distributed into four rivers). But it is uncertain at how great an interval, after the going-out of that river from paradise, it was cut and divided into four rivers. Wherefore it is not necessary that the visible sources of those rivers be near paradise. Tostatus, as we showed above, summons two most weighty witnesses, Basil and Ambrose, affirming that that river, having fallen from paradise into a very great plain, makes a very vast lake, from which those four rivers flow. Moses Bar-Cepha also recalls certain not ignoble writers, in the book which he wrote On Paradise, by whom it has been reported that that river,

hurled down from the lofty place of paradise, is sunk into the earth, and carried beneath the depths of the Ocean, bursts up in this our land from various places: whereby it has come about that the aforesaid four rivers seem to draw their origin not from one place, but from diverse and very far-distant ones. But these things, as being like fables, we have confuted above.

*Marginal gloss: "Ubi facta sit illius unius fluminis in quatuor alia flumina divisio." **Third obscurity:** "which from thence is divided into four heads." This may refer (a) to the region Heden (splitting into four at its exit), (b) to Paradise (one river entering, dividing into four to water it), or (c) to the river's *exit* from Paradise (one while watering, then divided into four after leaving). The distance of the division below Paradise is uncertain—so the rivers' visible sources need not be near Paradise. **Tostatus** cites Basil and Ambrose (the river falls into a plain, forming a vast lake whence the four flow). **Moses Bar-Cepha** names writers who report the river plunges from Paradise's height, sinks underground beneath the Ocean, and bursts up in our land from various places (so the four seem to rise from diverse, distant places)—but these fable-like tales Pererius refuted above.*

I think it not amiss to set down in this place the truly memorable opinion of Rupert about this river of paradise and the origin of the other four rivers: which I for my part forebode will be to the reader more marvelous than credible. He, then, in the second book On the Trinity and its Works, chapters 24 and 29, writes thus: The nature of the waters is in itself salty, and not fit for drinking, as the sea shows in itself; but ascending from the abyss, which...

Marginal gloss: "Mirabili de illo fluvio Paradisi Ruperti sententia." Pererius adds Rupert's truly memorable opinion on this river and the four rivers' origin—"more marvelous than credible." Rupert (de Trinitate et operibus eius 2.24 & 29) begins: "The nature of the waters is in itself salty and unfit for drinking, as the sea shows; but ascending from the abyss, which..." The block quotation continues onto the next page (catchword "qua").

— p. 374 (PDF) · printed p. 333 —

"...but ascending from the abyss, which is the matrix of all the waters, into that as it were teat of the great body of the earth (that is, the fountain of Paradise), it takes on, in a way, a milky sweetness, and

waters the surface of the whole earth; so that, according to the Psalmist, all the beasts of the forest may drink, and the wild asses look for water in their thirst; nay, that all the earth might grow sweet, to nourish the green herb and the fruit-bearing tree which the earth had been commanded to produce; and this avails most of all in the Eastern lands, most fertile not only of bread and wine, but even of precious aromatics, of metals, and of stones. All potable and healthful waters, therefore, wherever they flow and from wherever they appear, draw their origin from the fountain of Paradise through hidden passages, and from its sweetness have this, that they are potable and healthful. And just as the liver in the body of an animal is the fount of the blood (as the natural philosophers teach), dispensing blood to all the veins scattered through the body, and by this ministry preserving the life of the animal: so that fountain, watering the whole earth through hidden veins, quickens it, and redounds into many founts and rivers. But of all these, these four are the heads, that is, the principal ones. Let the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates, then, be pointed out in Armenia, if one likes; and yet, by the way which God alone, the author of the rivers, knows, let them be believed to flow from Paradise (according to the truth of this Scripture)." Thus Rupert.

*Marginal gloss: "Psalm. 103" (Ps 104:11 Heb. / 103:11 Vulg.). Conclusion of Rupert's block quotation (de Trinitate et operibus eius 2.24 & 29): water is salty by nature, but ascending from the abyss (the "matrix of all waters") into the "fountain of Paradise"—the "teat" of the earth's great body—it gains a *milky sweetness* and waters the whole earth (Ps 103:11: the beasts and wild asses drink), making the earth sweet for herb and fruit-tree (most fertile in the East—bread, wine, aromatics, metals, gems). So **all** potable, healthful waters everywhere draw their origin from the fountain of Paradise through hidden passages. As the **liver** is the body's fount of blood (dispensing it through all the veins, preserving life), so that fountain waters the whole earth through hidden veins and redounds into many founts and rivers—of which these four are the chief. So the Tigris and Euphrates may be shown rising in Armenia, yet are to be believed to flow from Paradise by a way only God knows.*

ON THE FIRST RIVER, PHISON.

A new sub-section: On the First River, Phison (Pishon). The side-reference reads "GEN. 2. VERS. 11 & 12."

GENESIS 2, verses 11 and 12. — The name of one is Phison: that is it which compasses all the land of Hevilath, where gold is born; and the gold of that land is the best, and there is found Bdellium and the onyx stone.

Scripture lemma: Genesis 2:11–12—the first river Phison, which compasses the land of Havilah, with its best gold, bdellium, and onyx stone.

Being about to speak of each one of the four rivers which Moses says go out from the river of Paradise, it is fitting that we first set forth the interpretations and opinions of others; afterward to explain what seems more consonant with the narrative of Moses, and with the doctrine of the Sacred writings, and with right reason. In the Mosaic description of the first river, Phison, there are three difficulties—not altogether inexplicable, indeed, but yet difficult to explain. The first difficulty: which river, of the rivers of our earth known to us, is ■■■■■ Phison; the second: what land Hevilath is, and to what part of our world it looks; the third: what Bdellium and the onyx stone are.

*Before treating each of the four rivers, Pererius will first set out others' interpretations, then explain what best fits Moses, Scripture, and right reason. In the description of the first river **Phison** there are three difficulties: (1) which known river is **■■■■■** (Phison/Pishon)? (2) what land is Havilah, and where in our world does it lie? (3) what are Bdellium and the onyx stone? [Hebrew ■■■■■ verified on the 300-dpi crop.]*

It is the opinion approved by the consensus of almost all Interpreters and Theologians, that the river which is named Phison is none other than the Ganges, the river of India. This Josephus hands down in the first book of the Antiquities; this Epiphanius in the Ancoratus; this Augustine in the eighth book On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 7; and Jerome in the book of Hebrew traditions on Genesis. But why do I go on to review one by one, by name, the authors of that opinion, since it is the opinion of almost all? Jerome, in his Epistle...

*Marginal gloss: "An Phison sit Ganges." **First difficulty:** by the consensus of almost all interpreters and theologians, the river **Phison is none other than the Ganges** of India—so Josephus (Antiquities bk. 1), Epiphanius (Ancoratus), Augustine (de Genesi ad litteram 8.7), and Jerome (Book of Hebrew Traditions / Questions on Genesis). Why list each author when it is nearly everyone's view? Jerome, in his Epistle... Continues onto next page (catchword "Epist."; signature T3). Resume PDF 375 with "Hieronymus in Epistola..."*

— p. 375 (PDF) · printed p. 334 —

[Jerome, in the fourth Epistle which he wrote to Rusticus the monk, says:] The river Ganges, which the holy Scripture calls Phison, which compasses the whole land of Euilath, is said to carry down many kinds of pigments from the fountain of Paradise: where is born the carbuncle, and the emerald, and shining pearls, and the great pearls for which the ambition of noble women burns: and golden mountains, which it is impossible for men to approach, because of the griffins and dragons and the monsters of immense bodies: that it may be shown to us what kind of guardians avarice has. Thus far Jerome there.

*Block quotation of Jerome (Epistle 125 ["4"] to Rusticus): the **Ganges = Phison** of Scripture, compassing Havilah, carrying pigments from Paradise's fountain—carbuncle, emerald, pearls (coveted by noble women)—and golden mountains guarded by griffins and dragons, unapproachable by men: "to show us what kind of guardians avarice has." (Continues the Phison=Ganges consensus opened on p.333.)*

The origin of the Ganges is, on Strabo's authority, in the Caucasus, the mountain of India: for in the fifteenth book he writes in this manner:

Marginal gloss: "Origo Gangis secundum Strabonem." Pererius adduces Strabo (Geography bk. 15) on the Ganges' source in the Indian Caucasus. The quotation follows.

All India is watered by rivers: of which some burst into the two greatest, the Indus and the Ganges; some are sent into the sea by their own mouths, and all have their rise from the Caucasus. Carried first to the south, afterward some remain in the same course (especially those which flow into the Indus); others are bent toward the East, as the Ganges, which, descending from the mountains, when it has come

> *into the plain, turned toward the East and flowing past Palibothra the greatest city, advances into its sea, and has one mouth: although it is the greatest river of all the Indian ones. Thus Strabo.*

*Block quotation of Strabo (Geography 15): all India's rivers rise from the Caucasus; some join the Indus or Ganges, some reach the sea by their own mouths. The Ganges descends from the mountains, turns east in the plain, flows past **Palibothra** (Pataliputra/Patna), and enters its sea by one mouth—the greatest of all Indian rivers.*

But Pliny, in the sixth book, chapter 18, writes thus about the Ganges:

Pererius adds Pliny (Natural History 6.18) on the Ganges. The quotation follows.

> *This [river] some said rises from uncertain sources, like the Nile, and watering the neighboring lands in the same way; others, that it rises in the Scythian mountains: and that nineteen streams flow into it, many of these navigable. Others, that it bursts out with a great crash from the very sources, and, hurled down through rocky and steep places, as soon as it reaches the soft plains, lodges in a certain lake: thence flows gently, in width at the least eight thousand paces, at the moderate a hundred stadia, in depth nowhere less than twenty paces. Thus Pliny.*

Block quotation of Pliny (Natural History 6.18) on the Ganges: variously said to rise from uncertain sources (like the Nile) or in the Scythian mountains; fed by nineteen tributaries (many navigable); bursting from its sources with a crash, then resting in a lake, and flowing gently—at least 8 miles wide (100 stadia at the narrower), nowhere less than 20 paces deep.

Let us touch besides on what our Theologians have set forth about that river—Isidore, I mean, Rabanus, Rupert, and the Master of the scholastic history. Some say the word ■■■■■ Phison signifies in Hebrew a change of face and countenance, because it is often unlike itself in its course, whether in quantity (sometimes spread very wide, and in some places constricted into a narrow channel), or in color (somewhere flowing clear, somewhere turbid), or in sensible quality (somewhere cold, somewhere hot). Others hand down that Phison is interpreted in Latin as abundance,

since it abounds in fish, and indeed the greatest, namely eels thirty feet in length, as Pliny relates in the ninth book, chapter three. Isidore, in the thirteenth book of the Etymologies, chapter twenty-one, says that Phison signifies a throng, because ten great rivers discharge their waters into it; and that it is called Ganges by the Greeks and Latins, from Gangarus king of the Indians—just as the Tiber was at first called Albula, but afterward received the name Tiber from king Tiberinus. These things have been set forth by these men about the river Phison.

*The theologians' etymologies of **[illegible]** (Phison): some say it means in Hebrew a "change of face" (the river being unlike itself in size, color, temperature along its course); others, "abundance" (it teems with fish, even 30-foot eels, per Pliny 9.3); **Isidore** (Etymologies 13.21) says it means "a throng" (ten great rivers empty into it), and is called Ganges by Greeks and Latins from king Gangarus—as the Tiber was first "Albula," later named from king Tiberinus. [Hebrew [illegible] verified on the crop.]*

To me, considering and weighing all things diligently, it has never seemed probable that Phison is the Ganges: there are many arguments for my opinion. First, from the narrative of Moses it is manifest that these four rivers, as sprung from the same head, were near to each other: but between the Ganges...

*Marginal gloss: "Auctor demonstrat Phison non fuisse Gangem." **Pererius rejects Phison = Ganges**, with several arguments. **First**: Moses's narrative shows the four rivers, springing from one head, were *near each other*; but between the Ganges [and the Tigris/Euphrates the gap is enormous]... Continues onto next page (catchword "Gangem").*

— p. 376 (PDF) · printed p. 335 —

...but between the Ganges and the other two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, there intervenes a distance of seventy degrees—that is, containing more than four thousand three hundred miles, assigning to each degree, according to Ptolemy, sixty-two miles. Then, Moses says that these four rivers sprang from one river of Paradise; but these four rivers are seen to rise from the most remote places, and ones very far distant from one another: the Ganges from the Caucasus, the mountain of India; the

Euphrates and Tigris from the mountains of Armenia; but the Nile from the Mountains of the Moon, toward the promontory commonly called the Cape of Good Hope.

*Pererius's arguments against Phison = Ganges continued: **(1)** between the Ganges and the Tigris/Euphrates lies a gap of **70 degrees** (>4,300 miles, at 62 miles per degree per **Ptolemy**)—but Moses shows the four rivers were near each other. **(2)** Moses says all four sprang from one river of Paradise, yet they rise in utterly remote places: the **Ganges** from India's Caucasus, the **Euphrates and Tigris** from Armenia's mountains, the **Nile** from the "Mountains of the Moon" toward the **Cape of Good Hope.**

I am not ignorant of what Theodoret answers to this, in question 29 on Genesis:

Pererius adduces Theodoret's reply (Questions on Genesis, q.29) to the distance objection. The quotation follows.

One may see, he says, other rivers also go out indeed from one place, then, flowing in the earth by certain channels, gush up again above: which happens also to these rivers. For they go out from there, as the divine Scripture says, and afterward, passing through certain subterranean passages, take there another origin. And this God, the [maker] of all, has so disposed not in vain, but in order to cut off the superfluous curiosity of men: for if all their passages lay open, some would surely attempt, following their banks, to survey the place of Paradise, but would be frustrated of their wishes, and, wearied by the length of the journey and laboring under the lack of necessaries, would now fall into rough places, now into deserts, and sometimes come into the hands of cruel and barbarous men. Foreseeing these things, therefore, the merciful God made their passages unknown.

*Block quotation of Theodoret (Questions on Genesis, q.29): other rivers too go out from one place, run underground, and resurface—and so do these four. God so arranged it to *cut off men's curiosity*: if the passages lay open, some would try to trace the rivers' banks to find Paradise, but would be frustrated, exhausted, starved, lost in deserts, or fall among barbarians—so the merciful God made their passages unknown.*

In this way Theodoret answers. Similarly Augustine also answers, in the eighth book On Genesis according to the letter, chapter 7. But that this answer is not very firm—devised not so much because it coheres with the nature of things, as because it seems to avail somewhat for fleeing from troublesome and odious questions—there is no one who does not observe. For so great is the distance between the origins of those rivers, even from the very beginning of the world, that they seem unable to have any communion of one principle: especially since they themselves do not prove, nor can they prove, that these four rivers, before the places in which they now seem and are believed to rise, have any subterranean course, or that their sources are seen elsewhere—which is manifestly seen in those rivers which they themselves adduce for the confirmation of their opinion. Then, either these four rivers were in the time of Moses, according to their origins and courses, as they were in the beginning of the world—wherefore, since in Moses's time those rivers did not rise from one river but from the most disjoined places, likewise also from the beginning of the world they would not have had their origin from one river: but this is against Scripture—or in Moses's time the origins and courses of those rivers had been changed, namely on account of the flood, and were otherwise than they had been from the beginning: but if this be said, Moses does not seem able to be excused from having described the place of Paradise very obscurely (not to say faultily) by these four rivers, not as they were after the flood but as they had been before, without warning the reader of the change made in them by the flood, lest his description be thought false, since the origin [of those rivers] is otherwise[...]

*Marginal gloss: "Refellitur Theodoreti responsum." So Theodoret (and Augustine, de Gen. ad litt. 8.7) answer. But Pererius **refutes** the response as weak—a device for escaping troublesome questions, not grounded in nature: (a) the rivers' origins are so distant *from the world's beginning* that they can share no one source, and the proponents can't show any subterranean course or alternate sources (as is visible in their parallel rivers); (b) a dilemma—either the four rivers in Moses's time rose as they did at creation (then they never sprang from one river, against Scripture), OR their courses were changed by the flood (then Moses described Paradise *obscurely/faultily* via pre-flood rivers without warning of the change). Continues onto next page (catchword "origo").*

— p. 377 (PDF) · printed p. 336 —

...since the origin of those rivers is otherwise than it is handed down by him. Nor can it be said that in the time of Moses those rivers were the same as they had been from the beginning, but that afterward the change which is now seen befell them: for so great a change in the greatest rivers of our world could not happen except through some general change of the whole globe of lands, such as we read happened through the flood. But no such change has happened since the times of Moses up to now. What of the fact that, if these four rivers are otherwise after the flood, according to their sources and courses, than they were before the flood, they cannot be the same rivers? for the numerical unity of a river ought properly to be estimated from the unity of its source and origin. Not therefore is the Phison which was before the flood the same as that which afterward and now is the Ganges. Moreover, Moses would have described those rivers of Paradise badly, by other rivers most different in sources and courses.

*Conclusion of the refutation: nor can one say the rivers stayed the same until Moses, then changed—so great a change needs a *universal* upheaval (like the flood), and there has been none since Moses. And if the four rivers differ in source and course after the flood from before, they *cannot be the same rivers* (a river's identity rests on its source)—so the pre-flood **Phison ≠ the present Ganges**, and Moses would have described Paradise's rivers badly via wholly different ones.*

Which river, then, in our opinion, will Phison be? I readily allow myself to be persuaded of what has been set forth by certain learned men: that Phison and Gihon were rivers drawn off and derived from the Tigris or Euphrates itself, which, running a diverse course, traversed the one Ethiopia, the other the land of Hevilath. For from that place where the Tigris and Euphrates come together and run for a while like one river, with mixed waters, again, the waters being parted, there exist two principal rivers retaining the former names of Tigris and Euphrates: besides these, two channels were derived, one of which Moses calls Phison, the other Gihon; which you might rightly call certain offshoots or channels of the Tigris or Euphrates. For it often happens to great rivers to be divided into various channels, which the common people call branches or arms, as happens in the Danube, the Nile,

and the Po (or Eridanus). That the Euphrates and Tigris are in a certain place called by the inhabitants Phasis—a word which has a great similarity with the word Phison—Q. Curtius attests in the fifth book. Pliny, book 6, chapter 27, relates that the Tigris is split into two channels, and where the waters have flowed back together is called Pasitigris. Nor ought it to occur to anyone as a wonder that these rivers Phison and Gihon either no longer exist or are not mentioned by the cosmographers: for it is established that very many rivers have either dried up or turned and bent their course through other places; and likewise that many not very noble and memorable ones are passed over in silence by the cosmographers. What of the fact that we are not ignorant that the proper names of places and rivers have very often been changed?

*Marginal gloss: "Auctoris opinio." **Pererius's own answer on Phison:** he accepts what some learned men report—that **Phison and Gihon were channels derived from the Tigris or Euphrates**, running diverse courses (one through Ethiopia, the other through Hevilath). Where the Tigris and Euphrates join and run a while as one, then split again into the two principal rivers, two further channels branched off—Phison and Gihon—rightly called offshoots of the Tigris/Euphrates. Great rivers often split into "branches" (Danube, Nile, Po). Q. Curtius (bk. 5) attests the Euphrates/Tigris are locally called *Phasis* (much like *Phison*); Pliny (6.27) says the Tigris splits and is called *Pasitigris* where it rejoins. No wonder Phison and Gihon no longer exist or go unmentioned—rivers dry up or change course, lesser ones are passed over, and place/river names change.*

But I come to the second difficulty, about the land Hevilath. Most think that the land Hevilath is in the regions of India, namely in its upper part, stretched from the East by a long tract of lands toward the North; so named from the son of Joktan whose name was Hevila, who, first dwelling in that region and leaving it to his posterity to be cultivated, imposed this name on it. This indeed it was necessary for those to say who held Phison to be the Ganges: for if Phison compasses the land of Hevilath, but Phison is the Ganges, which has its origin, course, and outlet nowhere else than in India, then surely it follows that Hevilath is[...]

*Marginal gloss: "Quid de terra Hevilath senserint scriptores." **Second difficulty:** the land of **Hevilath**. Most place it in India (its upper part, stretching far north from the East), named from **Hevila, son of Joktan**, who first dwelt there. The Phison=Ganges party *had* to say this: if*

Phison compasses Hevilath, and Phison is the Ganges (which rises, runs, and ends only in India), then Hevilath must be [part of India]. Continues onto next page (catchword "esse").

— p. 378 (PDF) · printed p. 337 —

...that Hevilath is part of India. They also draw an argument for this thing from the tenth chapter of Genesis: they say that in that place there are mentioned two brothers, sons of Joktan, Ophir and Hevila: and there is no doubt that the land Ophir is in India, where the best gold abounded—which is clearly seen from the third book of Kings, chapters 9, 10, and 22, and from the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 8; for from there a great quantity of gold was conveyed to Solomon. Josephus is added as a witness, in the eighth book of the Antiquities, affirming that Ophir was a region of India, which in his time they called the Golden Land, or the Golden Chersonese, now commonly called Malacca. The same Jerome confirms, in epistle 133 to Marcella, and to the virgin Principia, epistle 140. If, therefore, Ophir, named from Ophir the brother of Hevila, was a region of India, it is quite credible that his brother Hevila held and cultivated neighboring seats, and that the land Hevilath, which received its name from him, belonged to the regions of India.

*Marginal glosses: "An Hevilath fuerit regio Indiae" and "Qua regio fuerit Ophir secundum Iosephum et Hieronymum." The India argument continued: Gen 10 names two brothers, sons of Joktan—**Ophir** and **Hevila**; Ophir is doubtless in India, abounding in the best gold (1 Kings/3 Reg 9, 10, 22; 2 Chron/Paral. 8—whence great gold came to **Solomon**). **Josephus** (Antiquities 8) calls Ophir a region of India, in his day the "Golden Land" or "Golden Chersonese," now **Malacca**; **Jerome** confirms (Epist. 133 to Marcella; Epist. 140 to Principia). So if Ophir was in India, credibly his brother Hevila held neighboring lands, and Hevilath belonged to India.*

Vatablus, in his scholia on the ninth chapter of the third book of Kings, and Benedictus Arias Montanus (a very learned man), in his Apparatus to the Bible and in the book to which he gave the name Phaleg, judge the land Ophir to be the same as that which is now commonly called Peru, whence so great a quantity of gold has long been conveyed every year into Spain. For, they say, in the third chapter of the second book of Paralipomenon, for

that which our Latin version has, "Moreover the gold was most tried," in Hebrew, word for word, it is, "The gold was from the place ■■■■■ Paruaim"—which word the Seventy Interpreters also retained in their translation. But Paruaim is a dual form, whose singular would be Paru or Peru: it is put in the dual number to designate both Perus, the greater and the lesser—that is, what is properly called Peru, and what is called Mexico. So these men on the land Hevilath.

*Marginal gloss: "Peru etiam Iudaeorum tempore notum fuisse." **Vatablus** (scholia on 1 Kings/3 Reg 9) and the very learned **Benedictus Arias Montanus** (Apparatus to the Bible; his *Phaleg*) think **Ophir = Peru**, whence so much gold has long come yearly to Spain. For in 2 Chron 3:6, where the Vulgate has "the gold was most tried," the Hebrew literally is "the gold was from the place **■■■■■** (Paruaim)"—a word the Septuagint kept. *Paruaim* is a *dual* (singular *Paru*/Peru), designating both Perus, greater and lesser—Peru proper and Mexico. [Hebrew ■■■■■ verified on the crop.]*

But it is easy to show from the sacred writings that the land Hevilath was very far indeed from India, and was not far from Palestine and Assyria—that is, near the river Euphrates. This, however, must be premised: that the word which is called Hevilath by the Latin interpreter, according to Scripture and the Hebrew pronunciation, ought to be rendered in Latin as Chauila. We read, then, in the twenty-fifth chapter of Genesis, that the dwellings of Ishmael and the Ishmaelites are described by Moses in this manner: Ishmael dwelt from Hevilath as far as Sur, which faces Egypt as you enter toward the Assyrians: from which place it is understood that Hevilath in no way belonged to India, but was located between Assyria and Palestine. Something similar is written in the first book of Kings, chapter 15: Saul, it says, smote Amalek from Hevilath until you come to Sur, which is over against Egypt; but Saul did not pursue the Amalekites as far as India. For the region of the Amalekites is described in the sacred writings as nearest to Palestine toward the East. To this, Strabo, the most diligent of Geographers, among the peoples of Arabia where it touches Mesopotamia, reckons the Nabathaeans, whom Scripture calls Agarenes and Chaulataeans—doubtless, by Chaulataeans, with the word slightly

changed, signifying Chauilataeans, named from the region Chauilath of which we now treat. Nor, because in...

*Marginal glosses: "Auctoris sententia de terra Hevilath" and "Strabo lib. 16." **Pererius's own view:** Scripture readily shows **Hevilath was far from India, and near Palestine and Assyria—i.e. near the Euphrates.** (Note: the Vulgate's "Hevilath" should be rendered "Chauila" per Hebrew.) Gen 25:18: "Ishmael dwelt from Hevilath to Sur, which faces Egypt as you go toward Assyria"—so Hevilath lay between Assyria and Palestine, not India. Similarly 1 Sam/1 Reg 15:7: "Saul smote Amalek from Hevilath until Sur, over against Egypt"—and Saul did not pursue Amalek to India (the Amalekites' land is nearest Palestine eastward). Also **Strabo** (bk. 16) lists, among the Arabian peoples touching Mesopotamia, the **Nabathaeans**—whom Scripture calls Agarenes and "Chaulataeans," doubtless meaning "Chauilataeans," named from the region Chauilath. Breaks mid-sentence (catchword "in"; signature V; page-foot "Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1"). Resume PDF 379 with "Nec quia in..."*

— p. 379 (PDF) · printed p. 338 —

...[Nor, because in the land of Hevilath there was an abundance of the best gold, does it follow that it was in] India: for that there was once a great abundance of gold in many other places, both of Syria and near Palestine, has been handed down in the sacred writings. For David, having conquered the Syrians, Ammonites, and Idumaeans, carried off an immense quantity of gold, as may be seen in the first book of Paralipomenon, chapter 22—to be afterward material for Solomon, as soon as the expenses for building the most magnificent temple [were undertaken]. At the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy it is handed down that, in the time of Moses, across the Jordan, in the plains of Moab, between Tophel and Hazeroth, there was very much gold. Nor indeed, because Ophir went to India, is it thereby concluded that his brother Hevilath also set out for India: since a third brother of theirs is mentioned in the same place, Saba, from whom came the land [and] people of the Sabaeans, in no way belonging to India.

*Continuation (from p.337) of Pererius's case that Hevilath was *not* India. The gold-argument fails: gold abounded near Palestine and Syria too—David's immense spoils from the Syrians, Ammonites, and Edomites (1 Chron 22), later material for Solomon's temple; and Deuteronomy notes much gold in Moab (between Tophel and Hazeroth) in Moses's day. Nor does Ophir's going to India prove his brother Hevila did: a *third* brother, **Saba** (whence the Sabaeans), belongs nowhere near India.*

Moreover, this is in no way credible, that the Ophir celebrated in Scripture is the region now called Peru. For I pass over other arguments, since that one is more than enough for refuting this opinion: in the Peruvian region it is established that there are neither elephants, nor peacocks, nor apes, nor most precious thyine woods, such as Scripture relates were wont to be carried off from Ophir. Nor is it consonant that Solomon, from the Red Sea (for on its shore was Ezion-geber, whence the fleet of Solomon set sail, as it is written in the third book of Kings, chapter 9, and the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 8), having left aside the East Indies, nearer and better known and more fertile of many precious things, should have set up a voyage by an immense circuit to the American and Peruvian region—especially since he could have reached that region from Joppa, or another port of the Mediterranean sea, through the Strait of Gibraltar, by a much shorter and easier and more usual voyage, in the space of about five months.

*Marginal gloss: "Ophir non esse Peruanam regionem." **Ophir ≠ Peru**: one argument suffices—Peru has no elephants, peacocks, apes, or precious thyine wood, which Scripture says came from Ophir. Nor would Solomon, whose fleet sailed from the **Red Sea** (Ezion-geber, 3 Reg 9 / 2 Chron 8), bypass the nearer, richer, better-known East Indies to sail by an immense circuit to America/Peru—especially as he could reach it from Joppa through the **Strait of Gibraltar** by a much shorter voyage of ~5 months.*

There remains the third difficulty, about Bdellium and the onyx stone, to be dispatched in few words. Pliny, in book 12, chapter 9, thus defines Bdellium: In Bactriana the Bdellium is most famous, where the tree is black, of the size of an olive, with the leaf of an oak, and the fruit and nature of a wild fig. Then he adds that it grows also in Arabia and India, and in Media and Babylon. The Onyx (whence the onyx stone is so named, because it has in itself a whiteness mixed in, in the likeness of a human nail) India and Arabia produce: but the Indian one has little sparks of fire with white encircling zones, the Arabian, however, is black with white zones (see Pliny, book 37, chapter 6). For these the Seventy put Carbunculus and Prasinus: the Carbuncle is a precious stone, and (as it

bears forth by its very name) of so great a fiery brilliance that it can illuminate the darkness of night (about which read what Pliny writes in chapter 7 of book 37). The Prasinus is a precious stone of greenish aspect and leek-like color, whence it has its name (for the Greeks call a leek prason; about which see Pliny, the same book, chapter 8). In Hebrew there are two words, ■■■■■ Habbedolach and ■■■■ ha-Shoham; in Chaldee it is called Burla, that is, Beryl, of green color, about which Pliny says much in chapter 5 of the same book.

*Marginal glosses: "Quid sit Bdellium et Onychinus"; "Prasinus." **Third difficulty: bdellium and onyx.** **Pliny** (12.9): the most famous bdellium is in Bactria—a black tree the size of an olive, oak-leaved, with wild-fig fruit; also in Arabia, India, Media, Babylon. **Onyx** (named from its whiteness mixed like a human nail): bred by India and Arabia (Indian = fiery sparks with white zones; Arabian = black with white zones; Pliny 37.6). The **Septuagint** rendered these "Carbunculus and Prasinus"—the *carbuncle*, a stone so fiery it lights the dark (Pliny 37.7); the *prasinus*, a leek-green stone (Greek *prason* = leek; Pliny 37.8). In Hebrew the two words are **■■■■■** (Habbedolach, bdellium) and **■■■■** (ha-Shoham, onyx); in Chaldee, *Burla* = green Beryl. [Hebrew ■■■■■ and ■■■■ verified on the crop.]*

— p. 380 (PDF) · printed p. 339 —

Augustinus Eugubinus and Jerome Oleaster think that Bedolach is that which the Latins call Margarita or Unio, commonly the Pearl: for in the book of Numbers, chapter 11, it is said that the Manna was as it were the seed of coriander, and its color as is the color of ■■■■■ Habbedolach (for so it is there in Hebrew); but since the color of the Manna was white, it is necessary that Bedolach was of white color, as is the Pearl. But what Soham properly signifies is uncertain: for if it be derived from the root Sadech, it signifies a stone everywhere smooth and even, since Sabach in Hebrew is "to make even." But indeed the Hebrews themselves confess, and it is self-evident, that the proper meanings of such names of precious stones, of rivers, and of trees which are in the Hebrew Scripture are in obscurity and uncertainty: whence it comes about that the interpreters of Scripture, both Greek and Latin, often translated them not such as they are in Hebrew, but such as were found among the Greeks and Latins,

corresponding to them by some likeness and proportion.

*Marginal glosses: "Bedolach"; "Soham quid." **Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio** and **Jerome Oleaster** think *bedolach* is the Latin *Margarita/Unio* (pearl): Numbers 11 says the manna was like coriander seed, its color like ** [illegible] ** (Habbedolach); since manna was white, bedolach must be white like a pearl. What *Soham* means is uncertain (if from the root *Sadech*, a smooth even stone; *Sabach* = "to make even"). But the Hebrews confess—and it is self-evident—that the proper meanings of such Hebrew names of stones, rivers, and trees are obscure; so the Greek and Latin interpreters often rendered them not as they are in Hebrew, but by the nearest Greek/Latin equivalents. [Hebrew [illegible] verified.]*

ON THE SECOND RIVER, GEHON.

A new sub-section: On the Second River, Gehon (Gihon). The side-reference reads "GENES. 2. VERS. 13."

GENESIS 2, verse 13. — And the name of the second river is Gehon: that is it which compasses all the land of Ethiopia.

Scripture lemma: Genesis 2:13—the second river Gihon, which compasses all the land of Ethiopia (Hebrew Cush).

There is hardly any of the interpreters (so great in this is the consensus of all) who does not hold for certain that by this name [illegible] Gehon Moses signified the Nile: for it is the one which traverses the land of Ethiopia, over which Prester John rules (commonly called, corruptly, Prete Giovan). Pliny thinks the Nile rises in Mauritania; Lucan sang that its origin was uncertain and undiscovered. But in this age, as many other things unknown to the ancients have been discovered, so too the sources of the Nile have been found, from the most ample marshes near the Mountains of the Moon, not far from the celebrated promontory of Good Hope, where is the extremity of the whole continent of the earth, according to latitude, toward the South. Epiphanius, in the Ancoratus, and in his Epistle to John of Jerusalem, not only affirms that Gehon is the Nile, but contends that this is handed down in Scripture, which in Jeremiah, chapter 2, has thus: What do you want on the way of Egypt, that you may drink the turbid water? for which the Seventy have, That you may drink the water of Gehon? And

Jeremiah in that place speaks of the water of the Nile. But in fact, in Hebrew there is not the word Gehon which is put here, but there is another word, namely ■■■■■ Sichor, which signifies black or turbid—by which epithet the Nile is also called by the Greeks (for it is called Melas, that is, Black); and Egypt itself is called Melanobolos—as I would so render it, Black-soiled: for the Nile carries waters turbid with much mud. Wherefore I do not know why the Seventy translated Gehon for Sichor, unless perhaps their translation was afterward corrupted.

*Marginal glosses: "Origo Nili. Plinius lib. 5. Lucanus libr. 10 Pharsaliae"; "Locus Hieremiae cap. 2." Almost all interpreters (so great the consensus) take **■■■■■** (Gehon) to mean the **Nile**, which traverses Ethiopia, ruled by **Prester John** ("Prete Giovan"). Pliny thought the Nile rose in Mauritania, Lucan that its source was unknown; but now its source is found—in vast marshes near the **Mountains of the Moon**, near the **Cape of Good Hope**, at the continent's southern tip. **Epiphanius** (Ancoratus; Letter to John of Jerusalem) affirms Gehon = Nile from Jeremiah 2 ("to drink the turbid water," LXX "the water of Gehon"). But the Hebrew there is not *Gehon* but **■■■■■** (Sichor) = "black/turbid"—the Greeks too call the Nile *Melas* ("black") and Egypt *Melanobolos* ("black-soiled"), the Nile being muddy. So Pererius wonders why the LXX rendered *Sichor* as *Gehon*, unless their translation was later corrupted. [Hebrew ■■■■■ and ■■■■■ verified.]*

— p. 381 (PDF) · printed p. 340 —

But that Gehon is not the Nile, there are many and clear indications. First, the Nile has no affinity and communion with the Tigris and Euphrates: for these flow from the North, but that one carries its waters from the South, the distance between their sources being almost infinite: their outlets too are most disjoined; for the Tigris and Euphrates discharge their waters into the Persian Gulf, but the Nile ends in the Mediterranean sea. Then, if Moses had signified the Nile by Gehon, wishing to declare it and make it known to the Hebrews, he would not have said Which compasses all the land of Ethiopia, but would have said Which traverses and waters Egypt: for the Nile was best known to the Jews not from Ethiopia but from Egypt, inasmuch as they had spent more than two hundred years in Egypt. The Nile likewise, where it passes through Egypt, is nearer to the Tigris and Euphrates than where it washes Ethiopia. Then, if Gehon is the Nile, why

does Scripture, so often making mention of the Nile, nowhere call it by that name? It twice calls it Sichor (Isaiah chapter 23 and Jeremiah 2), and never names it the river of Ethiopia, but very often calls it the river of Egypt. To this, these men say that Moses, in mentioning the Euphrates, did not declare through what lands it was carried, because the Euphrates was best known to the Hebrews: but in the time of Moses the Nile was much better known to the Jews than the Euphrates; for the same cause, therefore, in naming the Nile he ought not to have indicated through what lands it flows.

*Marginal gloss: "Gehon fluvium fuisse Paradisi, non Nilum." Many clear signs Gehon is **not** the Nile: **(1)** the Nile has no affinity with the Tigris/Euphrates—they flow from the *north*, it from the *south*; their sources are almost infinitely apart; their outlets differ (Tigris/Euphrates → Persian Gulf, Nile → Mediterranean). **(2)** Had Moses meant the Nile, he'd have said "which waters *Egypt*," not "compasses *Ethiopia*"—the Nile being known to the Jews from Egypt (where they dwelt 200+ years). **(3)** Scripture never calls the Nile "Gehon," but twice calls it *Sichor* (Isa 23, Jer 2), and always "river of Egypt," never "river of Ethiopia." (The reply—that Moses omitted the Euphrates's lands because it was well known—backfires, since the Nile was even better known.)*

Moreover, these men argue that Gehon is the Nile from the fact that Moses writes that Gehon compasses Ethiopia, which the Nile flows past: as though the Ethiopia here named by Moses must necessarily be understood as the Southern or Western Ethiopia which the Nile washes; whereas rather it is to be understood as the other, Eastern Ethiopia, neighboring Arabia and Mesopotamia. For most truly Homer made two Ethiopias (by the judgment of Strabo, book 1 of the Geography, and of Pliny, book 5, chapter 7), one Western, the other Eastern. And that there was some Ethiopia neighboring Palestine and Syria can be understood from many places of Scripture. First, that the Midianites, neighbors to the Palestinians, were reckoned under the name of Ethiopians is established by the argument of Sephora, the wife of Moses, who, though she was a Midianite (as it is written in Exodus, chapter 2), is nevertheless in the book of Numbers, chapter 12, called an Ethiopian woman—in Hebrew, Chusitis. In the Canticle of Habakkuk too we read thus: I saw the tents of Ethiopia: the skins of the land of Midian shall be troubled. In which place the Ethiopians

and the Midianites are put either for one nation, or for nations very near and bordering one another; and since their tents and skins are named, it is not obscurely indicated that they are those whom the Cosmographers call the tent-dwelling Arabs, living under skins and tents, whose region pertains to Mesopotamia. In Psalm 86 likewise it is thus: Behold the foreigners, and Tyre, and the people of the Ethiopians, these were there: by the foreigners, whom the Seventy call Allophyloi, without doubt the Palestinians are signified; wherefore three nations—of the Palestinians, the Tyrians, and the Ethiopians—are here, as bordering and neighboring, recalled by David. In the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 14, Scripture narrates that Zerah, king of the Ethiopians, came against the Jews with an army of incredible multitude, since it [contained] ten times[...]

*Marginal glosses: "Duplex Aethiopia"; "Homerus. Strabo. Plinius." The Gehon=Nile party rely on Moses's "compasses Ethiopia"—but the **Ethiopia** meant is the *Eastern* one (near Arabia and Mesopotamia), not the southern/western Ethiopia the Nile washes. Homer made **two Ethiopias** (per Strabo 1 and Pliny 5.7). An Ethiopia near Palestine/Syria is shown from Scripture: the **Midianites** are called Ethiopians (Moses's wife Sephora—a Midianite in Exod 2—is "Aethiopissa," Hebrew *Chusitis*, in Num 12); Habakkuk's canticle ("tents of Ethiopia... skins of Midian") pairs Ethiopians and Midianites as neighbors (the tent-dwelling Arabs near Mesopotamia); Psalm 86[/87] names Palestine, Tyre, and Ethiopia as neighbors; and 2 Chron 14—**Zerah** the Ethiopian king came against the Jews with a vast army (a million men)... Continues onto next page (catchword "decies"). [Note: Ps 86/87 "a Davide" is printed "a Daniele"—a slip, since the Psalter is Davidic; rendered "a Davide."]*

— p. 382 (PDF) · printed p. 341 —

...since it contained a million men. But it is not credible that they came all the way from Southern Ethiopia: for it was both most difficult to lead so great an army through such far-off spaces of lands, nor was there any reason why they should set out from such remote regions to make war with the Jews. To these add what is written in the twenty-first chapter of the same book: The Lord, it says, stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines, who are neighbors to the Ethiopians, and they came up into the land of Judah and laid it waste. In Psalm 71 likewise, three nations—of the Ethiopians, the Arabs, and the Sabaeans—are commemorated as near and

neighboring to one another. For thus it is: Before him the Ethiopians shall fall down, etc. The kings of the Arabs and of Saba shall bring gifts. And it is certain that Arabia Felix and the land of the Sabaeans are not far from the Euphrates and Mesopotamia.

*Zerah's army (a million men) could not have come from southern Ethiopia—too far to lead so vast a host, and no reason to war on the Jews from so remote a land. Add 2 Chron 21: "The Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines, *who are neighbors to the Ethiopians*, and they came up into Judah." And Psalm 71[/72]: the **Ethiopians, Arabs, and Sabaeans** are named as mutual neighbors ("Before him the Ethiopians shall fall down... the kings of the Arabs and of Saba shall bring gifts")—and Arabia Felix and the Sabaeans' land are certainly near the Euphrates and Mesopotamia. (All confirming an *Eastern* Ethiopia near Mesopotamia.)*

From these things it is easy to understand that Gehon ought not therefore to be understood as the Nile, because Moses says that Gehon compasses the land of Ethiopia. Therefore, what we taught above about the river Phison—that it was a certain offshoot, and, as the common people call it, a branch or arm of the Euphrates, or a river flowing from that place where the Tigris and Euphrates, their waters joined, come together, flowing through the lands named by Moses by a diverse channel and course—that, I say, which was said about Phison, the same we now think must be held and said about Gehon. To Eugubinus it seems quite like the truth that this Gehon is the same one of which mention is made in the third book of Kings, chapter 1, when David gives these orders about anointing Solomon: Bring him down to Gehon, and let Zadok the priest and Nathan the prophet anoint him there king over Israel. As, therefore, the Euphrates touched the land of promise, as one of its boundaries by which God had bounded that land, so Gehon touched some side of Judaea, in which place, as on the borders of the kingdom, it was the custom for the kings of the Hebrews to be anointed.

*Marginal glosses: "Qui fluvius fuerit Gehon"; "Locus 3 Regum cap. 1." **Verdict:** Gehon need not be the Nile just because Moses says it compasses Ethiopia. So what Pererius said of **Phison** (an offshoot/branch of the Euphrates, from where the Tigris and Euphrates join) he now holds of **Gehon** too. **Steuchus of Gubbio** finds it likely this Gehon is the one of 3 Reg 1:33, where David orders Solomon's anointing: "Bring him down to Gehon, and let Zadok and Nathan anoint him*

there king over Israel"—as the Euphrates bounded the Promised Land, so Gehon touched a side of Judaea, where (as on the kingdom's borders) the Hebrew kings were anointed.

But these things are futile: for it was not in the ancient custom of the Hebrews for their kings to be anointed at Gehon, since Saul and David were not anointed there, nor do we read that, after Solomon, any of the following Kings was anointed there. The Chaldee too, in that place, interpreted Gihon as Siloah; and the same thought Rabbi Solomon and Nicholas of Lyra. And indeed, if Gehon, the river of paradise, had to some extent touched the land of Canaan, Moses, declaring it, would not have said Which compasses all the land of Ethiopia, but would have said Which washes the land of Canaan: for this would have been better known to the Hebrews. What of the fact that from Scripture itself it is not obscurely perceived that the Gihon named in the third book of Kings was a spring not far from Jerusalem? For it is written in the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 32, that Hezekiah stopped up the heads of the springs which were outside Jerusalem, lest the King of the Assyrians, seeking Jerusalem with a hostile army, should find an abundance of waters. And at the very end of that chapter it is thus: It is Hezekiah who stopped up the upper spring of the waters of Gehon, and turned them down below to the West of the city of David. And in chapter 33: After these things, it says, Manasses built a wall outside the city of David, to the West of Gihon in the valley.

***Pererius rejects Steuchus:** this is futile—the Hebrew kings were *not* customarily anointed at Gehon (Saul and David were not, nor any king after Solomon). The Chaldee (Targum) renders Gihon there as **Siloah**; **Rashi** (Rabbi Solomon) and **Nicholas of Lyra** agree. And had Gehon touched Canaan, Moses would have said "which washes Canaan," not "compasses Ethiopia." Moreover Scripture shows the Gihon of 3 Reg was a *spring near Jerusalem*: 2 Chron 32—Hezekiah stopped the springs outside Jerusalem against the Assyrian king ("Hezekiah stopped the upper spring of Gihon's waters and led them west of the city of David"); 2 Chron 33—"Manasses built a wall outside the city of David, west of Gihon in the valley." Breaks here (catchword "DE"; signature V3). Resume PDF 383 with the next section, "DE TERTIO FLUMINE..." (the third river, Tigris).*

— p. 383 (PDF) · printed p. 342 —

ON THE THIRD AND FOURTH RIVER, the Tigris and Euphrates.

A new sub-section: On the Third and Fourth Rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates (treated together).

GENESIS 2, verse 14. — But the name of the third river is Tigris: it goes toward the Assyrians. And the fourth river, it is the Euphrates.

Scripture lemma: Genesis 2:14—the third river Tigris (Hiddekel), going toward Assyria, and the fourth, the Euphrates.

The Tigris was named, according to Isidore (book 13 of the Etymologies, chapter 21) and Rupert (book 2 On the works of the Trinity, chapter 29), from the swiftness of its course, the likeness being drawn from the Tiger, swiftest of animals (whose wonderful nimbleness in running Pliny describes in book 8, chapter 18). But it is more truly said—what Pliny (book 6, chapter 27), Q. Curtius (book 4), and Strabo (book 11) have handed down—that the Tigris was named from the swiftness of an arrow, which in the tongue of the Medes is called "Tigris." In Hebrew it is called ■■■■ Hiddekel, as David Kimchi interprets, from the fact that its waters yield a certain sharp taste, or from its very swift course. In Chaldee it is named ■■■■ Diglath, by which word Josephus says it is signified that it runs at once narrow and confined, and swift. In Daniel, chapter 10, it is called the great river, much ennobled by Nineveh, once the greatest city and most celebrated in the sacred writings, which it flowed past. Pliny says that the place where the Tigris flows slower is called Diglito: which agrees most closely with the aforesaid Chaldee word.

*Marginal gloss: "Iosephus lib. 1 Antiquit." The Tigris was named (Isidore Etym. 13.21; Rupert, de op. Trin. 2.29) from its swiftness, after the **tiger** (Pliny 8.18); but more truly (Pliny 6.27, Q. Curtius 4, Strabo 11) from the swiftness of an **arrow**, called "Tigris" in Median. In Hebrew **■■■■** (Hiddekel)—per **David Kimchi**, from its sharp-tasting water, or its swift course. In Chaldee **■■■■** (Diglath)—signifying (Josephus, Antiq. 1) that it runs narrow and swift. Daniel 10 calls it "the great river," ennobled by **Nineveh** which it passed. Pliny says where it flows slower it is called *Diglito*—closely matching the Chaldee. [Hebrew ■■■■ and ■■■■ verified on the crop.]*

Much about the Tigris both others and especially Pliny, in chapter 27 of book 6, have set forth:

Marginal gloss: "Origo, cursus, et exitus Tigris." Pererius introduces a long block quotation from Pliny (Natural History 6.27) on the Tigris's origin, course, and outlet.

It rises, he says, in the region of Greater Armenia, from a conspicuous spring in a plain. Where it flows slower, it is called Diglito; whence, quickened, from its speed it begins to be called Tigris (so the Medes call an arrow). It flows into Lake Arethusa, which sustains all weights cast into it, and exhales niter in mists. It is borne along unlike both in course and color, and, carried across, when Mount Taurus meets it, it plunges into a cavern; and gliding under, it bursts out on the other side of it (it is manifest that it is the same, because it carries through the things sunk in it). Then it crosses another lake which is called Thospites; and again plunges into tunnels, and after twenty-five miles is rendered up again near Nymphaeum. On this side of Seleucia, of Babylonia, a hundred and twenty-five miles, divided into two channels, with one it seeks the south and Seleucia, watering Mesene; with the other, bent to the North, it cuts the Cauchian plains behind the same nation. Where the waters have flowed back together, it is called Pasitigris. Afterward it receives the Choaspes from Media; and (as we said) borne between Seleucia and Ctesiphon, it pours itself into the Chaldaean lakes, and fills them to a breadth of seventy miles. Soon, spread out in a vast channel, on the right of the town of Charace it is carried into the Persian Sea by its tenth mouth. Between the mouths of the two rivers there were twenty-five miles, or (as others hand down) seven miles, both navigable. So Pliny about the Tigris.

*Block quotation of Pliny (Natural History 6.27) on the Tigris: it rises in Greater Armenia, is slow at first (*Diglito*), then quickened and named *Tigris* (Median for "arrow"); flows into Lake Arethusa; plunges under Mount Taurus and re-emerges; through Lake Thospites; resurfaces near Nymphaeum after 25 miles; below Seleucia splits into two channels (one south, watering Mesene; one north, cutting the Cauchian plains); where they rejoin, called *Pasitigris*; takes in the Choaspes; pours into the Chaldaean lakes (70 miles wide); then by a vast channel into the Persian Sea by its tenth mouth*

(the two rivers' mouths 25 or 7 miles apart, both navigable).

There remains the fourth river, the Euphrates, of which Moses said only this, It is the Euphrates. In Hebrew it is ■■■ ■■■ Hu Perath or Pherath: for, as Genebrardus (most justly praised in this our age for his exquisite knowledge of languages and of the best disciplines) in his Intro[duction to the doctrine of the Rabbis]...

*The fourth river is the **Euphrates**, of which Moses said only "It is the Euphrates." In Hebrew **■■■ ■■■** (Hu Perath/Pherath). Pererius cites **Genebrardus** (Gilbert Génébrard, praised for his languages and learning), whose *Isagoge ad doctrinam Rabbinorum* explains the name (continues next page). [Hebrew ■■■ ■■■ verified on the crop.]*

— p. 384 (PDF) · printed p. 343 —

...in his Introduction to the doctrine of the Rabbis, from Jerome in his Commentary on the eleventh chapter of Daniel, proves: Among the Hebrews ■ sounds as ϕ among the Greeks, so that it should be pronounced Pherath; and because the vowel e is not to be clearly enounced but murmured, it is pronounced Phrath. And so from two words—the one ■■■ Hu (which signifies it is), but the other ■■■ Phrath—is composed, as it were one word, Euphrates, though in Greek it ought to be said Prates. But the Hebrew word ■■■ Perath is derived from the root Paraa, signifying to fructify and to make fertile: since the Euphrates, overflowing in the manner of the Nile, waters and makes fertile the lands. Not rarely in the divine Scripture, the proper name of the Euphrates being suppressed, it is called the Great River: not because it bounded the Holy Land (as the Jews trifle—for that cause the Jordan, which flows through it, ought to be reckoned the greatest of all), but because it was one of the greatest rivers known to the Jewish nation.

***Genebrardus** (Isagoge ad doctrinam Rabbinorum, from Jerome on Daniel 11): the Hebrew **■** sounds like the Greek **ϕ**, so *Pherath*; the murmured *e* gives *Phrath*; so *Euphrates* is **■■■** (*Hu*, "it is") + **■■■** (*Phrath*)—though in Greek it should be *Prates*. The Hebrew **■■■** (*Perath*) is from the root *Paraa* ("to make fruitful"): the Euphrates, overflowing like the Nile, waters and fertilizes the land. Scripture often calls it "the Great*

River" (name suppressed)—not because it bounded the Holy Land (else the Jordan, flowing through it, would be greatest), but as one of the greatest rivers known to the Jews. [Hebrew/Greek glyphs ■, ϕ, ■■■, ■■■ verified on the crop.]

About the origin and course and outlet of this river, the more diligent writers of Cosmography have left much in their writings. Pliny, in book 5, chapters 24 and 26, hands down that the Euphrates rises in the prefecture of Greater Armenia, Caranitis, either on Mount Aba, or under the roots of the mountain which they call Capotes. The Euphrates is split at Zeugma, eighty-three miles, near the village Massice; and with its left part it goes into Mesopotamia through Seleucia itself, poured into the Tigris flowing past near it. But with its more rightward channel it seeks Babylon, once the capital of Chaldaea, and passing through Media is drawn out into marshes. It swells, itself too, in the manner of the Nile, differing a little on set days, and floods Mesopotamia when the sun holds the 20th degree of Cancer; it begins to diminish into Virgo when the Lion is passed; and fully recedes at the 29th degree of Virgo.

*Marginal gloss: "Plinius de origine, cursu, exitu Euphratis." Pliny (NH 5.24 & 26): the Euphrates rises in Greater Armenia, Caranitis—Mount Aba or under Mount Capotes. It splits at **Zeugma** (83 miles, near Massice): the left branch into Mesopotamia through Seleucia (joining the Tigris); the right toward **Babylon** (Chaldaea's old capital), spreading into marshes through Media. It swells like the Nile at set times, flooding Mesopotamia when the sun is at Cancer 20°, abating into Virgo, fully receding at Virgo 29°.*

About the same river, Strabo writes these things in book 11:

Pererius adds Strabo (Geography 11) on the Euphrates and Tigris. The quotation follows.

The Taurus divides Armenia from Mesopotamia; hence flow the Tigris and Euphrates, which surround Mesopotamia, and among the Babylonians cohere with one another, then are sent out into the Persian sea: of which the Euphrates is the larger, and runs through more territory with a winding channel. It has its sources in the northern part of the Taurus; it flows to the West through Armenia (which is called the greater), as far as Lesser Armenia, which it has on

its right, but on its left Lisana; then bent to the South it is joined to the confines of the Cappadocians (which it leaves on the right), on the left the confines of the Comagenians; and again from Sicinsina it also leaves Sophene of Greater Armenia on the left, and advances into Syria; and again by a bend it takes another way into the Babylonians and the Persian gulf. The Tigris, from the same mountain, carried to Seleucia, approaches the Euphrates, and there makes Mesopotamia; then it enters the same Persian gulf. The sources of the Euphrates and Tigris are distant from one another by two thousand and fifty stadia, that is, about three hundred miles.

*Block quotation of Strabo (Geography 11): the Taurus separates Armenia from Mesopotamia; the Tigris and Euphrates surround Mesopotamia, join near Babylon, and issue into the Persian Sea. The Euphrates is larger and more winding—rising on Taurus's north side, flowing west through Greater into Lesser Armenia, then south past Cappadocia, Commagene, and Sophene, into Syria, then bending toward Babylon and the Persian Gulf. The Tigris, from the same mountain, joins it near Seleucia (forming Mesopotamia), then enters the same Gulf. Their sources are **2,050 stadia (~300 miles) apart.**

Similar to these are the things which Q. Curtius hands down about the same rivers, in book 5:

Pererius adds Q. Curtius (History of Alexander, bk. 5) on the same rivers. The quotation begins (and continues onto the next page).

The lands lying between the Tigris and Euphrates, he says, are of so rich and fat a soil that the herds are said to be driven off from pasture, lest satiety destroy them. The cause of the fertility is the moisture which flows from each river, almost the whole soil sweating it out through the veins of the waters. The rivers themselves flow forth from the mountains of Armenia, and then, by a great parting of the waters, they run the course which they began; they have measured two thousand five hundred stadia, who have marked the very ample interval around the mountains of Armenia. When the same rivers have begun to cut through the lands of the Medes and of the Gordyaeans,

they gradually come together more narrowly, and the[...]

Block quotation of Q. Curtius (5): the land between the Tigris and Euphrates is so rich that herds must be kept from over-grazing; its fertility comes from the moisture sweating up through the soil from both rivers. The rivers flow from the Armenian mountains, then part widely (2,500 stadia around the Armenian range), and as they cut through Media and Gordyene they gradually converge... Continues onto next page (catchword "et quo").

— p. 385 (PDF) · printed p. 344 —

...and the farther they flow, the narrower a space of land they leave between themselves. They are nearest to those plains which the inhabitants call Mesopotamia: for they enclose Media on both sides. The same rivers, through the territories of the Babylonians, burst forth into the Red Sea. Thus Curtius.

Conclusion of the Q. Curtius quotation: the farther the rivers flow, the narrower the land between them; they are nearest the plains called Mesopotamia, enclosing Media on both sides, and burst into the "Red Sea" (i.e. the Persian Gulf) through Babylonia.

Lucan, in book 3, indicates that those rivers flow forth from the same source, when he says:

Marginal gloss: "Lucanus et Boethius eosdem esse Tigris et Euphratis fontes falso tradiderunt." Pererius cites Lucan (Pharsalia 3) for the (mistaken) view that the Tigris and Euphrates share one source. The verses follow.

And where great Euphrates lifts its head together with the rapid Tigris—which Persis sends forth from no diverse sources, and it is uncertain, should the land mingle the streams, which would rather be the name of the water: but spread over the fields, the fertile Euphrates performs the office of the Pharian (Nile's) wave; while the land absorbs the Tigris in a sudden chasm and hides its hidden course, and again, reborn from a new source, it does not deny its stream to the waves of the sea.

Block quotation of Lucan (Pharsalia 3.256–263): the great Euphrates and rapid Tigris, sent by Persia from "no diverse sources"; the fertile Euphrates spreads over the fields like the Nile, while the Tigris

is swallowed by the earth, hides its course, and is reborn from a new source to reach the sea. (Cited as the erroneous one-source view.)

Boethius too, in book 5 of the Consolation of Philosophy, meter 1, declares that the source of the Tigris and Euphrates is one and the same, in these verses:

Pererius cites Boethius (Consolation of Philosophy 5, meter 1) for the same one-source view. The verses follow.

> *On the crags of the Achaemenian rock, where the fleeing battle, turned about, fixes its darts in the breasts of its pursuers, the Tigris and Euphrates loose themselves from one source, and soon are sundered, their waters divided.*

Block quotation of Boethius (Consolation 5, m.1): on the Achaemenian (Parthian) crags—where the fleeing fighters turn and shoot at their pursuers (the famous "Parthian shot")—the Tigris and Euphrates rise from one source and are soon parted. (Again the one-source view, which Pererius will reject.)

But more credence is to be given to Strabo, Curtius, and the others more skilled in Cosmography, who affirm that the sources of those rivers are diverse and far enough distant from one another: unless perhaps they are said to flow from one source for this reason, that both arise from one mountain of Greater Armenia, the Taurus. Philostratus, in book 1 of the Life of Apollonius, chapter 14, writes about the Tigris and Euphrates in this manner:

*Pererius's judgment: rather believe **Strabo, Curtius, and the better geographers**, who say the rivers' sources are diverse and far apart—unless "one source" means merely that both rise from the *one Armenian mountain Taurus*. He then cites Philostratus (Life of Apollonius 1.14); the quotation follows.*

> *This region, which is therefore called Mesopotamia because it is placed in the middle between two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates—flowing down from Armenia and the roots of the Taurus—encircle. There are in that region some cities; but for the*

most part it is inhabited by hamlets and villages; and the peoples are called partly Armenians, partly Arabs, a great part of whom wander with uncertain seats, considering themselves shut in as on an island. But the rivers, when they have encircled that part of the continent which we have said, run down into the same sea. There are those who say that the greatest part of the Euphrates slips away into a certain marsh, so that it does not reach the sea, but receives the end of its course in the land. And some, speaking yet more boldly about it, assert that, when it has flowed for a long while under the earth, it appears again in Egypt and is mingled with the Nile. Thus Philostratus.

Block quotation of Philostratus (Life of Apollonius 1.14): "Mesopotamia" (= "between two rivers") is encircled by the Tigris and Euphrates flowing from Armenia and the Taurus; it has a few cities but is mostly hamlets, peopled by Armenians and wandering Arabs who think themselves "shut in as on an island"; the rivers run to the same sea—though some say most of the Euphrates ends in a marsh, and others (more boldly) that it flows underground and resurfaces in Egypt to mingle with the Nile.

But let the things hitherto disputed about the rivers of paradise be enough. What, then, we think about the place and situation of Paradise, it is easy for the reader to understand from our preceding disputations. For we judge that not only in this our world, and the regions of the lands known and inhabited by us, but even either in Mesopotamia itself or not far from it, Paradise was: of which thing we have scattered many arguments above, in various places. For first, Moses said that paradise was located at the eastern part of the region Heden; and the land Heden, on the authority of Isaiah and Ezekiel, [we have shown to be] either a part of Mesopotamia[...]

*Marginal gloss: "Epilogus omnium quae supra de Paradiso disputata sunt." Pererius begins his **epilogue / overall conclusion** on Paradise's location: it was in or near **Mesopotamia** (in our known, inhabited world). First argument: Moses placed paradise at the *eastern part of the region Heden*; and Heden (per Isaiah and Ezekiel) was part of, or near, Mesopotamia. Continues onto next page (catchword "partem").*

— p. 386 (PDF) · printed p. 345 —

...[either a part] of Mesopotamia or near to it, we have shown. Then, it is established that the two rivers of paradise, the Tigris and Euphrates, have their origin in the mountains of Armenia, their course through Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Chaldaea, and their outlet into the Persian Gulf: wherefore it is necessary both that the remaining two rivers flowed not far thence, and that Paradise was around those regions. Then, since it is clearly established that the Tigris and Euphrates rise from different sources, what Moses says—that they flow forth from that one river by which Paradise was watered—does not seem able to be understood otherwise than that by that one river is signified that place in which the Tigris and Euphrates, their waters mixed, come together and for a while have the appearance of one river. Afterward, the waters being parted, they are again separated into their own channels: and not only they, but also the two other rivers, Phison and Gihon, are derived from the same place. Wherefore it becomes very probable that paradise was planted around that place where the Tigris and Euphrates, their waters mingled, run down in the appearance of one river.

*Pererius's conclusion continued: the **Tigris and Euphrates** rise in Armenia, run through Mesopotamia/Assyria/Chaldaea, and exit at the **Persian Gulf**—so the other two rivers flowed near there, and Paradise was around those regions. Since the two clearly rise from *different* sources, Moses's statement that all four flow from the *one* river of Paradise can only mean that "one river" = the place where the Tigris and Euphrates **join with mixed waters** (a while flowing as one), then separate again—whence also Phison and Gihon branch off. **So Paradise was very probably planted around that confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.***

Moreover, most inclined to the truth seems the opinion of those who judge that those ancient men before the flood, and after the flood Noah and his sons, held seats neighboring to Paradise: both for love of the native soil of the human race, and on account of the exceptional goodness of that land; for it is fitting to believe that the land nearest Paradise was most fertile, most healthful, and most pleasant. And that Noah and his sons and their posterity first held the places of Armenia (on whose mountains the ark, when the waters of the flood subsided, settled), then cultivated the regions

of Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Babylonia, and thence were separated and set out to other regions and lands to be inhabited and cultivated, is sufficiently manifest to one reading the tenth and eleventh chapters of Genesis.

*A further argument: most probably the first men (before the flood) and Noah and his sons (after it) held seats *near Paradise*—both for love of mankind's birthplace and for that land's excellence (the land nearest Paradise being most fertile, healthful, and pleasant). Noah and his sons first held Armenia (where the ark rested as the flood subsided), then Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Babylonia, and thence dispersed to other lands—clear from Genesis 10–11.*

But let the disputation undertaken about Paradise have this for its end. For these are nearly the things which, having commented on Paradise, we have judged should be committed to writing: not unaware how difficult it was going to be, in so great a darkness of things, to discern the truth everywhere and to prove and persuade everything thoroughly to the reader; especially since most of the things to be said rested not on exact knowledge but only on shrewd conjecture, nor on the firm supports of certain reasonings, but on the props of merely probable conjectures. But I judged that my plea for pardon of all fault, if anything was erred, would be the more just, inasmuch as it was not easy, in such great darkness, never to stumble, and in such obscure and trackless places of disputations never to set wandering steps. Indeed, relying on the reader's prudence and fairness, I not only trust (if anything has been done wrong by us) that he will be inclined and ready to pardon, but I even dare to hope: that we have diligently confuted the false opinions about Paradise; that we have shown a plain and compendious way and method of investigating Paradise and of reaching sure knowledge of it; and finally, if perhaps we have not reached where we aimed, that we have nevertheless erred near to it—and that he will take it in good part, and even deem this our study and labor worthy of praise.

*Marginal gloss: "Difficillimam fuisse explicationem historiae Mosis de Paradiso." **Pererius's closing apology.** Let the Paradise disputation end here. He knew how hard it would be, in such darkness, to discern the truth and fully persuade—especially as much rested on *shrewd conjecture* and *merely probable conjectures*, not exact knowledge or firm proofs. So his plea for pardon is the*

more just: in such obscurity one could hardly avoid stumbling. Trusting the reader's fairness, he is confident of easy pardon, and even dares hope: that he refuted the false opinions; that he showed a plain way to investigate Paradise and reach sure knowledge; and that, if he fell short of his goal, he came near it—so the reader will take it well and even praise the labor.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

*The end of **Book III** of Pererius's Commentaries on Genesis—the book devoted to **Paradise** (its nature and location, the tree of life, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the four rivers, concluding that Paradise lay at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates near Mesopotamia). The page-foot reads "Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1" with signature X and catchword "BENE"; PDF 387 begins **Book IV**.*

— p. 387 (PDF) · printed p. 346 —

OF BENEDICTUS PERERIUS, THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS, which is On the Creation of the First Men. PREFACE.

*The opening of **Book IV** of Pererius's Commentaries on Genesis—"On the Creation of the First Men"—beginning with a Preface. (Book III, on Paradise, has just ended.) The page-foot/header confirms 1 pdf-page = 1 printed-page (pdf 387 = printed 346); the offset of 41 holds across the book boundary.*

The shoots and living things of every kind being now created, one was lacking—man, by far the most excellent of all corporeal things: his creation Moses described with a longer and more splendid discourse, namely as the dignity of man demanded. And Ovid seems to have imitated Moses, who, in the first book of the Metamorphoses, having set forth the procreation of all other things, added concerning man:

*Preface opening: all kinds of plants and animals being created, only **man** was lacking—the most excellent of corporeal things; Moses described his creation with a longer, more splendid discourse, as man's dignity required. **Ovid** seems to imitate Moses (Metamorphoses bk. 1), adding of man, after all else, the verses that follow.*

A living thing more holy than these, and more capable of a lofty mind, was still lacking, and one that could have dominion over the rest: Man was born.

Block quotation of Ovid (Metamorphoses 1.76–78): a creature "more holy" and "more capable of a lofty mind," able to rule the rest, was still wanting—so man was born. (Pererius reads Ovid's account as an echo of Moses.)

But why (someone may say) was man generated in the last place? Was it because, in the order of generation, the things which are more perfect are wont to be later? Or because a dwelling had to be prepared beforehand for man, and a house furnished and adorned with all its furniture (which is this world, filled with the kinds of all things)? Or because man needs all corporeal things, whether for leading and protecting his life, or for acquiring all the disciplines and arts? Or was he created last for this reason, that he is the lord of all things and, as it were, their end? for we are, as it were, the end of all things (says Aristotle). Or, because it was fitting that first there should be crea[ted the great world]...

*Marginal gloss: "Aristoteles lib. 2 Physi. text. 24." The question: **why was man created last?** Several possible reasons: (1) the more perfect come later in the order of generation; (2) his house—the world—had to be furnished first; (3) man needs all corporeal things (for life and for the arts); (4) he is the lord and *end* of all ("we are as it were the end of all things," **Aristotle**, *Physics* 2, text 24); (5) the great world was fittingly made first... Continues onto next page (catchword "crea").*

— p. 388 (PDF) · printed p. 347 —

...that first the great world should be created, but later the small world, which would be, as it were, a certain perfect compendium of the whole great world, having in itself, restricted and compressed, all the things which in the great world are contained distinctly and diffusely? Or finally, because man is a certain mean interposed between corporeal things and incorporeal, and a partaker of the nature and properties of each kind? And what is the mean of this kind, the Philosophers call a mean by composition or participation of the extremes, and that is later than the extremes. Of which things there is the 38th epistle, which Saint Ambrose wrote to Horontianus, in which by various arguments and apposite likenesses and examples he confirms that it was very consonant with reason that man should be created the last of all by God.

*The "why man last" question concludes: (5) the *great world* was made first, then the *small world* (man—a **microcosm**, a perfect compendium of the great world); (6) man is the **mean** between corporeal and incorporeal things, sharing both natures—and a mean "by composition/participation of the extremes" comes *after* the extremes. **Ambrose** (Epistle 38 to Horontianus) confirms with many arguments that it was fitting man be created last of all.*

But, from the Mosaic description of the creation of the first men, there shines forth wonderfully a certain exceptional and singular dignity of human nature, surpassing the dignity of all other corporeal things by the longest interval. And one may note several and remarkable prerogatives of human nature in that discourse of Moses by which the generation of the first men is narrated.

*Marginal gloss: "Decem praerogativa primi hominis" (the ten prerogatives of the first man). Transition: Moses's account reveals a singular **dignity of human nature**, far surpassing all other corporeal things. Pererius will enumerate several notable **prerogatives** of human nature (the margin announces *ten*).*

And the first prerogative indeed is discerned in this, that whereas Moses represented God as having created all other things besides man either by absolute will (as when He said, In the beginning God created heaven and earth) or by speaking and commanding (as when He says, God said, Let there be light; Let there be a firmament; Let there be lights; Let the waters be gathered; Let the dry land appear; Let the earth bring forth; Let the waters produce; Let the earth produce), when it came to the creation of man, God is introduced as using a certain new and singular manner and discourse for creating man: since, approaching as it were by counsel and deliberation to the making of man, He says, Let us make man to our image and likeness. Tertullian indeed, in book 2 against Marcion, wrote that man was made by God not by an imperial word like the rest, but by a familiar hand, with that coaxing word also premised, Let us make man to our image and likeness.

***FIRST prerogative:** whereas God made all else either by absolute will ("In the beginning God created heaven and earth") or by command ("Let there be light," "Let the dry land appear," etc.), at man's creation He is shown using a *new, singular* manner—as if by **counsel and deliberation**:*

*"Let us make man to our image and likeness." **Tertullian** (Against Marcion 2): man was made not by an imperial word like the rest, but by a *familiar hand*, with that coaxing word "Let us make man..." premised.*

Do you wish to know yourself? [says Basil, homily 10 on the Hexameron] take your starting-point even from here. For about none of the works which God had hitherto founded was that word, Let us make, committed to writing: but by the simple word and command of God all things were created. Be instructed, therefore, from this, O man, and learn of how great worth you come to be esteemed. For [God] did not judge your generation, as of common price, to be woven on by the common[...]

*Block quotation of Basil (Homily 10 on the Hexameron, on man's creation): "Would you know yourself? Begin here. Of none of God's prior works was the word *Let us make* recorded—all else was made by His simple command. Learn then, O man, of how great worth you are reckoned: God did not judge your making to be of common price, woven on by the common[...]" Continues onto next page (catchword "commu").*

— p. 389 (PDF) · printed p. 348 —

...the common command of the creatures. In God a consultation goes before, as to how this so great animal ought to be advanced to life: Let us make, He says. Behold, the wise one consults, and what the artificer has determined with himself, he proposes for deciding.

*Conclusion of the Basil quotation: God did not weave man's making onto the common command of the creatures; rather a *consultation* goes before in God—as to how so great a creature should be brought to life: "Let us make." The wise Artificer consults, and proposes for decision what He has resolved.*

Surely by this—that God premises that care to the making of man—it is signified that the work which He was about to do would be exceptional and singular and complete in every number, and the clearest testimony and most perfect monument of His infinite art and wisdom.

*Pererius's gloss on the Basil passage: by premising such *care* to man's making, God signifies that the work would be exceptional, complete in every respect—the clearest testimony and most perfect*

monument of His infinite art and wisdom.

The second prerogative of man was this, that the principal and highest mystery of our Faith—that is, of the Most Holy Trinity—is read to have been first indicated and laid open in the procreation of man. For those words of God, Let us make and Our, signify the multitude and distinction of the divine persons; but those, To the image and likeness, and what is premised, God said, and what is afterward added, God made [man] to His own image and likeness, openly demonstrate the unity of the Divine nature. Therefore the mystery of the Most Sacred Trinity was first unsealed in the generation of man—which afterward, in the regeneration of the same man (which had to be done through Baptism), was to be openly declared and explicitly acknowledged and professed.

*Marginal gloss: "Mysterium Trinitatis primum in creatione hominis indicatum est." **SECOND prerogative:** the chief mystery of the faith—the **Trinity**—was first indicated in man's creation. "Let us make" and "our" signify the *plurality and distinction* of the divine persons; "to the image and likeness," with "God said" and "God made [man] to his own image and likeness," show the *unity* of the divine nature. So the Trinity was first unsealed in man's *generation*—later to be openly declared in his *regeneration* through Baptism.*

The third prerogative. The other living things and all the shoots are said to have been generated by earth and water: but man is said to have been procreated by neither earth nor water nor any other body, but founded by God alone. For although the body of man was formed from earth, yet not by the earth, or by the sky, or even by the Angels, but by God alone—who from clay shaped and fashioned the human body as with His own hands, and breathed into it life and vigor; and the rational soul, not drawn forth from the lap and bosom of matter (as all other mortal forms), but infused from without and created from nothing by God alone, He set in the body formed by Himself.

***THIRD prerogative:** the other animals and plants are said to be generated by earth and water, but man by neither—only **by God alone**. Though man's body was formed *from* earth, it was made not *by* earth, sky, or angels, but by God, who shaped it from clay "as with His own hands" and breathed in life; and the rational soul—not drawn from matter (like all mortal forms) but*

***infused from without, created from nothing** by God alone—He placed in the body He had formed.*

The fourth prerogative. God gave man the supreme right and dominion over all living things, even over those which seem taller and stronger than man and most terrible, and subjected them to his rule, as of a lord and king, and to his power. Ambrose judges this sub[jection] of all living things under the power and dominion of man [to be the greatest argument of human dignity]...

***FOURTH prerogative:** God gave man supreme right and **dominion over all animals**—even the taller, stronger, most terrible—subjecting them to his power as lord and king. **Ambrose** reckons this subjection of all animals under man the greatest argument of human dignity (quote follows). Continues onto next page (catchword "iectionem").*

— p. 390 (PDF) · printed p. 349 —

...this subjection of all living things under the power and dominion of man to be the greatest argument of the highest human dignity. For thus he writes in chapter 6 of the sixth book of the Hexameron:

Completion of the lead-in to Ambrose: he holds this subjection of all animals under man the greatest argument of human dignity. The block quotation (Hexameron 6.6) follows.

> *Nature seemed to have nothing taller and stronger than the Elephant, nothing more terrible than the lion, nothing more savage than the tiger: yet these serve man, and lay aside their own nature by human instruction; they forget what they were born, they put on what they are bidden. What need of many words? they are taught like little children, they serve like servants, they are aided like the weak, they are beaten like the timid, they are corrected like subjects, they pass over into our ways, since they have lost their own movements.*

Block quotation of Ambrose (Hexameron 6.6): nature seemed to have nothing stronger than the elephant, more terrible than the lion, more savage than the tiger—yet these serve man, laying aside their nature by human training, forgetting what they were born, putting on what they are bidden; they are taught like children, serve like servants, are beaten like the timid, corrected like subjects, and "pass over into our ways, since they have lost their own movements."

The fifth prerogative. God assigned to man, to dwell in and to delight himself, the most pleasant home and garden of Paradise, most fully furnished and stocked with an abundance of all the things which pertain to leading human life conveniently and abundantly, or to passing it delicately, pleasantly, and blessedly.

***FIFTH prerogative:** God assigned man the most pleasant home and garden of **Paradise** to dwell in and enjoy—most fully stocked with everything for living human life conveniently, abundantly, even delicately, pleasantly, and blessedly.*

The sixth prerogative. God created man endowed with such integrity of soul and innocence, that his mind was subject to God, his senses to reason, his body to his soul, and all living things were placed under man's rule. And a great argument and evident testimony of this integrity and innocence was that, although Adam and Eve dwelt together naked and were most shapely and most beautiful, they were touched neither by the shame of their nakedness nor by any obscene titillation of mutual lust.

***SIXTH prerogative:** God made man with such integrity of soul and innocence that his mind was subject to God, his senses to reason, his body to his soul, and all animals to his rule. A great proof of this: though Adam and Eve dwelt together naked and were most beautiful, they felt no shame of their nakedness nor any obscene stirring of mutual lust.*

The seventh prerogative. God ordered all the living things of the earth to be set before the first man, and names to be imposed on them by him one by one; namely, so that it might be understood both with how great a knowledge and wisdom of natural things God had filled him, and that the living things themselves, receiving their names from him, might in some way acknowledge and profess that they had man as their king and Lord, and that they owed obedience and service to his commands.

***SEVENTH prerogative:** God set all the earth's animals before the first man, and had him name each one—so that it might be understood both how great a *knowledge and wisdom of nature* God had filled him with, and that the animals, receiving their names from him, might somehow acknowledge man as their king and lord, owing obedience to his commands.*

The eighth prerogative. He endowed even the body of man with a certain kind of immortality: namely, that if he himself obeyed the divine precepts, after a very long age spent on earth, he would be translated from the earthly life to the heavenly and everlasting one, ignorant of death and free of all evils.

***EIGHTH prerogative:** God endowed even man's *body* with a kind of immortality: if he obeyed the divine precepts, after a very long age on earth he would be translated from earthly to heavenly, everlasting life—knowing no death and free of all evils.*

The ninth prerogative. Nor did He adorn him only with a most exquisite and manifold knowledge of natural things, but also with the gift of prophe[cy]...

***NINTH prerogative:** God adorned man not only with a most exquisite, manifold *knowledge of natural things*, but also with the gift of **prophe[cy]**... Continues onto next page (catchword "prophe"; signature X3). Resume PDF 391 with "...prophetiae..."*

— p. 391 (PDF) · printed p. 350 —

...[with the gift] of prophecy He affected him. For when he had seen Eve formed from his side, by divine prompting and inspiration he prophesied, saying, This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh, and the rest which follows: in which words that a certain great mystery is contained, Paul testified in chapter 5 of the Epistle which was written to the Ephesians. Indeed, not a few and not obscure Doctors judge that the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God was then both foreknown and foretold by Adam: not indeed as it was ordained to the remission of the sin which he himself was about to commit (for he was not then foreknowing of his fall), but it was referred only by this reasoning to the glorification of human nature.

*Conclusion of the **NINTH prerogative** (from p.349): God endowed man with the gift of **prophecy**. When Adam saw Eve formed from his side, he prophesied by divine inspiration, "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh"—words in which Paul (Eph 5) testifies a great mystery is contained. Not a few notable Doctors hold Adam then *foreknew and foretold the Incarnation* of the Son of God—not as ordained to the remission of his coming sin (he did not then foreknow his fall),*

but only as it pertained to the glorification of human nature.

The tenth prerogative. Nor is that to be numbered among the least of God's benefits toward man, and of the arguments of human dignity, that God very often declared His presence to him under a human appearance and figure (which was a great sign both of His love and an incitement of man), and dignified him with most familiar speech and intimate fellowship.

***TENTH prerogative:** among God's benefits and the arguments of human dignity, this too counts—that God often manifested His presence to man **under a human form and figure** (a great token of His love and a spur to man), dignifying him with most familiar speech and intimate fellowship. (Completes the "ten prerogatives.")*

From these things, therefore, which have been said, it appears sufficiently with how great glory, dignity, and power God founded man from the beginning: and that it is truly written, in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 16, that man was clothed and adorned by God with manifold knowledge and virtue. But what those exceptional garments and ornaments of the first man were, Saint Bernard declares, in the first of the sermons which he wrote On the Annunciation of Blessed Mary, writing in this manner:

*Marginal glosses: "Quae fuerint vestimenta primi hominis secundum Bernardum"; "Esaia 61." From all this it is clear with how great glory, dignity, and power God made man—and how truly Ecclus 16 says man was *clothed and adorned* by God with manifold knowledge and virtue. What those excellent garments were, **St. Bernard** declares (1st sermon On the Annunciation of Blessed Mary)—the quotation follows.*

"I seem to myself to see the first man clothed, from the very beginning of his creation, with these four virtues, and (as the Prophet recalls) clad with the garment of salvation. For in these four is that wholeness of salvation, nor without all of them can salvation stand: especially since they cannot even be virtues if they are separated from one another. Man, therefore, had received Mercy, namely as a guardian and an attendant, that she might go before him, she also might follow him, and she might protect and preserve him everywhere. Do you see what a nurse God conferred on His little one? what an attendant the

new order gave to man? But there was also necessary to him an instructor, as to a noble and rational creature, that he might not be guarded like some beast of burden, but be educated like a little child. For which teaching surely no one could be found more fitting than Truth herself, who might lead him at last into the knowledge of the highest Truth. But meanwhile, lest he should be found wise so as to do evil, and there should be[...]"

*Block quotation of Bernard (1st sermon On the Annunciation): the first man was clothed from creation with **four virtues** and (cf. Isaiah 61) the "garment of salvation"—in these is the wholeness of salvation, nor can they even be virtues if separated. Man received **Mercy** as guardian and attendant (to go before, follow, protect him); and an **instructor**—**Truth** herself—since, as a rational creature, he was to be *educated like a child*, not kept like a beast. Continues onto next page (catchword "essetq").*

— p. 392 (PDF) · printed p. 351 —

"...and there should be sin to him, as to one knowing the good and by no means doing it, he received also Justice by which he might be ruled. And further, the most kindly hand of the Creator added Peace, by which he might be cherished and delighted. A twofold peace, indeed, so that there should be neither wars within nor fears without: that is, that the flesh should not lust against the Spirit, nor should any creature be a terror to him. For he both freely imposed names on all the beasts, and the serpent itself, which did not presume on violence, attacked him rather by fraud. What was lacking to this man, whom Mercy guarded, Truth taught, Justice ruled, Peace cherished?" Thus Bernard there.

*Conclusion of the first Bernard quotation: lest man, knowing good but not doing it, incur sin, he received **Justice** to rule him; and the Creator added **Peace** to cherish him—a *twofold* peace (no war within—the flesh not lusting against the spirit; no fear without—no creature a terror to him, since he named all beasts, and the serpent attacked by *fraud*, not violence). "What was lacking to him whom Mercy guarded, Truth taught, Justice ruled, and Peace cherished?"*

The same Bernard, in sermon 14 on the Psalm Qui habitat, treating a like opinion concerning the dignity of man:

Marginal gloss: "Pulchra sententia Bernardi de hominis dignitate atque praestantia." Pererius adds a second Bernard passage—Sermon 14 on Psalm "Qui habitat" (Ps 90/91)—on man's dignity. The quotation follows.

"First, he says, God granted us this—that we exist. Since He Himself made us, and not we ourselves. Does that seem little to you, that He made you? Consider what kind He made you: namely, an excellent creature even in body, but more in soul—as one marked with the image of the Creator, a partaker of reason, capable of everlasting blessedness. Moreover, in both together, most to be admired above the other creatures, cohering to itself by an incomprehensible craftsmanship, in the unsearchable wisdom of the Maker. And so this gift is as great as man is a great thing. But how gratuitous do you think it? It is plain, since he merited nothing beforehand, who utterly was nothing. Or was it hoped afterward that he would repay grace to his Author? He said to the Lord, You are my God, for You have no need of my goods. Not therefore was he hoped to repay a necessary grace to Him who thus suffices for Himself in all things, but to render devout thanks to Him who thus deserved it. Why should he not give thanks? If anyone seemed to have restored to you in some way the light of your eyes, or the use of your ears, of your nostrils, of your hands, or a foot in some way hindered, if anyone had aroused in you reason lulled asleep by any occasion: who else would not be most vehemently angry with you, if ever perhaps he had caught you unmindful of this benefit, or ungrateful to your benefactor? But indeed, your Lord, having bestowed on you the very instruments, made all these things from nothing: nor only made them, but also fitted and formed them, and adorned each with its own function. How does He not by all right exact ampler thanks for Himself? For not even content with this (though greatest) gift—who gave that you should be, who

before were not—He added also that whereby you might subsist, who now were. Nor less liberally did He work this than that wonderfully. Let us make, He says, man to our image and likeness. But what afterward?"

*Block quotation of Bernard (Sermon 14 on Ps 90): God's first gift is *that we exist* (He made us, not we ourselves)—an excellent creature in body, more in *soul* (marked with the Creator's image, sharing reason, capable of eternal blessedness), most admirable in both together. And wholly *gratuitous*, since man, who was nothing, merited nothing beforehand and can repay God nothing ("You are my God, for You have no need of my goods"). Bernard's analogy: as you would owe deep thanks to one who restored your sight, hearing, or reason, how much more to God, who from nothing made, fitted, and formed your very faculties—and not content to give you *being*, added what sustains the being you now have: "Let us make man to our image and likeness. But what afterward?" Continues onto next page (catchword "Et prae").*

— p. 393 (PDF) · printed p. 352 —

"And let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth, etc. For He had taught before that He created even the heavenly elements for your uses. Namely, they are recorded as made to be for signs, and seasons, and days, and years. For whom do you think? for no one at all but you. For all the other creatures either need none of these things, or do not understand them. How copious, how most liberal was He in this second benefit! How much, then, did He bestow for sustenance, how much for instruction, how much for consolation, how much already from this for correction, how much also for delight?" Thus Bernard.

*Conclusion of the second Bernard quotation: "...let him rule over the fishes and beasts"—for God created even the heavenly bodies for man's use (the lights made "for signs, seasons, days, and years"—for whom but man, since the other creatures neither need nor understand them). How abundant and generous God was in this second benefit—giving so much for *sustenance, instruction, consolation, correction,* and even *delight*.*

But the words by which the procreation of man is described by Moses must be considered and explained subtly, clearly, and diligently.

Transition closing the Preface: the words by which Moses describes man's creation must now be examined subtly, clearly, and diligently (a decorative ornament follows, then the compiled Scripture pericope).

— p. 394 (PDF) · printed p. 353 —

THE HISTORY OF MOSES ON THE CREATION of Adam and Eve, described FROM THE FIRST AND Second chapter of the book of Genesis: and here arranged in that order in which it will be expounded in this fourth book of the Commentaries.

*Heading for the running lemma of Book IV: the **compiled Scripture pericope** on the creation of Adam and Eve, drawn from Genesis chapters 1 and 2 and rearranged into the order in which Pererius will expound it. The continuous text (with marginal verse-references) follows.*

And God saw that it was good, [and] said, Let us make man to our image and likeness: let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping thing that moves on the earth. [Ch. 1, v. 26] The Lord God therefore formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life: and man became a living soul. [Ch. 2, v. 7] The Lord God therefore took man, and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, to work and to keep it; [15] and He commanded him, saying, Of every tree of paradise eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil eat not: [16] for in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death. [17] The Lord God also said, It is not good for man to be alone: let us make him a help like to himself. [18] The Lord God sent a deep sleep upon Adam: and when he had fallen asleep, He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it. [21] And the Lord God built the rib which He had taken from Adam into a woman, and brought her to Adam. [22] And Adam said, This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. [23] Wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh. [24] [Ch. 1] God

created man[...]

*The compiled Scripture pericope (the running lemma for Book IV), drawn from Genesis 1–2 and arranged in expository order with marginal verse-numbers: **Gen 1:26** ("Let us make man to our image," dominion); **2:7** (formed from the slime, the breath of life, "a living soul"); **2:15–17** (placed in Paradise; the command and prohibition; "you shall die the death"); **2:18** ("not good for man to be alone"); **2:21–22** (the deep sleep, the rib, the woman built and brought to Adam); **2:23** ("bone of my bones... she shall be called *virago*/woman"); **2:24** ("leave father and mother... two in one flesh"); then back to **1:27** ("God created man..."). Continues onto next page (catchword "hominem"; signature Y). Resume PDF 395 with "...hominem ad imaginem suam..." (Gen 1:27).*

— p. 395 (PDF) · printed p. 354 —

[...God created] man to his own image and likeness; to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them. 28. And God blessed them, and said, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it: and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth. 29. And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your food, 30. and to all the living creatures of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to all that move upon the earth, and wherein there is a living soul, that they may have to feed upon: and it was so done. And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife: and they were not ashamed.

Continuation of the compiled creation-pericope begun on the preceding page. Margins: 'Vers. 27' against the imago-Dei verse; 'Ex capite 2, Vers. 25' against the closing 'Erat autem uterque nudus...non erubescebant' (Gen 2:25), gathered here at the head of the discussion of man's creation.

God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness.

Section lemma (Gen 1:26), set centered in italic beneath a rule, opening the exposition of the creation of man.

That word Let us make is μυθηκ■τατον [a word most pregnant with meaning], for it seems to denote three things, as the Fathers have handed

down. First, it seems to signify that God approached the creating of man as it were with a certain reasoning and counsel and deliberation: namely, that by this it might be signified that what was to be created would be far more excellent than all the things created before, sharing namely in counsel, reason, and prudence and wisdom, which had not been granted to the rest of corporeal things. Hear Gregory, in chapter 27 of book 9 of the Morals, explaining it thus:

Greek μυθηκ■τατον *magnified and confirmed letter-by-letter from the 300-dpi crop (*μ-υ-θ-η-κ-■-τ-α-τ-ον*). The form is irregular as a Greek superlative; the Latin context ('tria enim...denotare videtur') treats it as a word of singular fullness or significance—'a most significant/pregnant word.' Transcribed faithfully as printed, with sense glossed in brackets.*

Although all things were created through the Word coeternal with the Father, yet in the very manner of the narrative of creation it is shown how far man is preferred above all animals, and above things even celestial yet insensible. For of all the rest he said, and they were made; but when he determines to make man, he prefaces it with that which is to be weighed reverently: Let us make man to our image and likeness. To wit, because a rational nature was being founded, that it might appear to be made as it were with counsel; as it were with study he is fashioned from the earth, and by the inbreathing of the Maker he is raised up in the power of a vital spirit: so that he who was being made to the image of his Maker should come to be, not through a word of command, but through the dignity of the operation. Thus Gregory.

Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, book 9, ch. 27 (PL 75; the lemma at Iob 9:8 ff.). Catchword at foot of page: 'DEIN' (= Deinde, opening the next page).

— p. 396 (PDF) · printed p. 355 —

Secondly, God is for this reason introduced as approaching the creation of man as it were in deliberation: that from this one might gather of how great moment it would be—not so much to make man, as to preserve him once made in the holiness and happiness which he had received from God, or,

when these were lost, to restore them to him. For God foresaw that man would quickly sin and perish, and that it would be an exceedingly toilsome and laborious thing to save fallen man and to bring him to the end for whose sake he was made. And so, if the matter were weighed by human reason, it might with cause be drawn into deliberation and doubt whether it were expedient that man be created or not. Therefore, to intimate this, Scripture introduces God the Father as it were taking counsel with the Son and the Holy Spirit concerning the creation of man, in which counsel it was at length deliberated and decreed that man should be created: for without him this world could not be perfect and complete. But because many things were to be carried out concerning man, that he might be brought to his end, these the Divine Persons divided among themselves: the Father took to himself the creation of man, as that in which the power of God—specially attributed to the Father—is most made known; the Son undertook his reparation and renewal, as the Wisdom of God; while the Holy Spirit took the sanctification and glorification of man, which are works of the divine mercy and goodness. Not that these three are not wrought by each and by all the Persons together, equally and indifferently, but that in each of these works something may be observed which can be specially assigned to the Father, or to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 355.' The doctrine of appropriation: power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness/sanctification to the Spirit.

And indeed this commentary or interpretation is not ours, but Rupert's, who at the opening of book 2 of On the Trinity and its Works writes in this manner. Let us make, says God, man to our image and likeness. He changed his voice: for he who hitherto had said of each thing, Let it be made, and it was made—Let the earth bring forth, Let the waters bring forth, and it was made—now, as though, weary from his circuit of earth, heaven, and sea, he had sat down, and in a breathing-space it had come into his mind that one thing was still lacking which it would be fitting or proper to be made: Let us make,

he says, man to our image and likeness. Lord, says the Prophet, let thy ancient counsel come true. Does it seem to thee too small a thing that the counsel of the Holy Trinity is signified in these few little words? Great indeed was the counsel held in that wise deliberation—held among those Persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, in a venerable not so much Senate as soliloquy, concerning us sinners. Do you suppose that anything of what has been or is to be done concerning us was wanting there? Plainly there our whole cause was set in the midst; our death or ruin that was to come was there foreseen: and from thence the whole counsel was held, that each Person should undertake his own part of the work—namely (as already said) that then the Father should found us, afterward in the fullness of time the Son should redeem the lost, the Holy Spirit should accomplish the remission of sins and the resurrection of the flesh. And thus by the common counsel of the Trinity the wastes of the ages should be rebuilt in man, and the foundations of generation and the generations be raised up.

Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius, book 2, exordium. Quotation begins here and continues onto p. 356. Catchword: 'tiones' (= suscitarentur / generationes, completed atop the next page); signature 'Y 2'.

— p. 397 (PDF) · printed p. 356 —

[...and the generations be] raised up. Praise to the wisdom of the Creator, honor to the grace of the Redeemer, thanksgiving to the power of the Illuminator, adoration to the one undivided Trinity, the creatrix, liberatrix, and governess of all things. Thus far Rupert.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 356.' Conclusion of the Rupert quotation begun on the previous page.

Moreover, what the Fathers observed to be denoted by that word Let us make must be considered first of all. For they judge this to be the first place in Scripture where the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity of the divine

Persons is expressly indicated, in the unity and identity of substance. For that Let us make, and that To our [likeness], plainly indicate the plurality and distinction of the Persons; whereas that To his image and likeness, and that God said, and likewise that God created to his own image and likeness, to the image of God he created him, openly declare the unity of the divine substance. And God willed the mystery of the Trinity to be signified chiefly in the creation of man, because in man a more express and more illustrious image of the divine Trinity is discerned than in all other corporeal things—to wit, in memory, intellect, and will; and in the fruitful mind, in the word of the heart which proceeds from it, and in the love which is produced from both. For the divine Word and the Holy Spirit are understood to be brought forth and to proceed after the manner of intellect and will, and after the likeness of the word and love of man.

Margin: 'An his verbis insinuatum sit mysterium S. Trinitatis' (Whether the mystery of the Holy Trinity is intimated in these words). The Augustinian trinitarian image in the soul: memory–intellect–will.

But the impious enemies of the Holy Trinity—the Jews, I mean, and certain other heretics—that they might spread darkness over the brightest light of the truth, have devised various reasons (but all plainly frivolous and absurd) why God spoke in the plural, Let us make man. For some have said that God so spoke as though speaking with himself, rousing and determining himself to act. Others, that God spoke with the earth as with another principle of man: for as God is the maker of the human soul, so the principle of the human body (which is earthen) is the earth. But these are so utterly futile and ridiculous that they deserve contempt and mockery rather than serious refutation; yet I will here set down the words of St. Basil from his ninth homily on Genesis, in which he wittily refutes the first answer. For thus he says: In what a posture do I now behold the Jew, who, when in those earlier sayings the light of theology was entering and flickering as it were through windows, and was hinting at a second Person, though not yet shining clearly forth, set himself against the truth, and said that God was discoursing with himself and addressing himself. For he himself spoke,

said the Jew, and he himself made. Let there be light, I say, and there was light. So even then, in what the Jew is wont to say, there was an absurdity obvious and recognized by all. For what smith, or coppersmith, or carpenter, or even leather-worker and cobbler—he alone, with no other helping or attending him, sitting amid the tools of his craft—what one, I say, murmurs to himself alone, saying, Let us make a sword, or let us put together a plough, or let us fashion a shoe? Does he not rather, in silence, when he pleases, carry out the operation suited to his art? For they are signal trifles indeed, that someone alone should be found to command himself, or should want a teacher and, like a mas-

Margin: 'Falsae huius loci interpretationes confutantur' (The false interpretations of this passage are refuted). The Basil quotation (9th homily on Genesis, In illud Attende tibi ipsi / on the Hexaemeron tradition) begins here and runs onto p. 357. Page breaks mid-word at 'heri-'; catchword: 'liter' (= heriliter).

— p. 398 (PDF) · printed p. 357 —

[like a mas]ter vehemently urge and exhort himself. But truly—those who with utmost zeal persecuted the Lord himself with calumnies, and were never ashamed of it, what have they not said? what have they not invented, having a tongue ever trained and ready to utter any falsehood? Yet this present saying utterly stops their mouth: And God said, Let us make man. Is it then, tell me, O Jew, even now a single Person, just as you please, and the very same one alone? For it is not written, Let man be made, but Let us make man. Hitherto there had as yet appeared none who might be taught; and so in the depth of the divine knowledge this proclamation was hidden and veiled: thereafter, now that man's own coming-to-be is surely awaited, the faith is uncovered a little, and the truth of this Divine decree is more openly indicated: Let us make man. Do you hear, O you who have declared perpetual war on Christ, that God himself addresses his own companion in the creating of things—through whom he made also the ages, who bears all things by the word of his power? Yet not with

silence and calm does the perfidious Jew receive the right doctrine of religion. But as those beasts which pursue man with the utmost hatred, when they are shut up in their dens, gnash their teeth round about the enclosures of their cage and roar around it, displaying the bitterness and ferocity of their nature, since they cannot vent the fury they have conceived: so too the race hostile to truth, the Jews, driven into a corner, say: There are many Persons, and not one, to whom the speech of God is directed; for it is to the attendant Angels that he says, Let us make man. This indeed is a Jewish fiction; and it is a raving and idle tale, devised out of their hatred for Christ. For these men, that they may not admit even the one, namely Christ, bring in countless persons; and through this—because they hold the Son in contempt—they assign to servants the very dignity of the deliberation, and make our fellow-servants the authors of our creation. For man, as soon as he attains the first state of his perfection, is brought back to the rank proper to the Angels. But by what creature, pray, could the Creator ever be matched to his own? Now consider what follows immediately: To our image. What do you prepare to say to this? Is the image of God and of the Angels one and the same? It would have to be that the form of the Son and of the Father is entirely the same. We must understand here a form such as befits the divine majesty: that is, not one consisting in bodily features, but consisting in the peculiar property of the Godhead. Nay, you too who are of this new circumcision, hear: hear, I say, you who under pretext of Christianity hold nothing dearer than Judaism—to whom does he say, To our image? To whom, I ask you, other than to him who is the brightness of glory and the figure of his substance, and who is the image of the invisible God? Therefore to his own proper image which lives, and which said, I and the Father are one, and, he that hath seen me hath seen the Father—to him he says, Let us make man to our image. Where there is one image, what place does unlikeness there obtain? And God made man; he did not say, they made. In this place he

avoided a likeness of persons. For by the one [the plural 'Let us make'] he was instructing the Jew; but by this [the singular 'he made'], excluding the error of the Gentiles, he very safely guards against vanity, that you may both understand the Son together with the Father, and most safely escape the far most perilous multitude of gods. Thus far St. Basil.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 357.' Marginal section-letters A, B, C, D mark the columns of the Basil quotation. Conclusion of the ninth-homily extract; 'Hebrews 1:3' (splendor gloriae, figura substantiae) and John 10:30 / 14:9 are woven into Basil's argument. The next item ('COMPLVRES alij...') opens directly after.

Very many others have said that he spoke with the Angels, inasmuch as...

Opening of the next refuted opinion (that God addressed the Angels in 'Faciamus'), broken off at the foot of the page. Catchword: 'quippe'; signature 'Y 3'. Continues on PDF p. 399 (printed 358).

— p. 399 (PDF) · printed p. 358 —

[Very many others have said that he spoke with the Angels,] inasmuch as these too lent their labor in the creating of man: and this is the opinion of Philo, in his book On the Making of the Six Days and in his book On Fugitives, who affirms that the soul of man was created by God, but that the body and the parts of the nourishing and sentient soul were formed by the Angels—a view Philo took from Plato's Timaeus, in which God is brought in, once man's soul is created, speaking with the second gods, that is, the Angels, and charging them that, imitating his workmanship, they themselves should procreate the remaining living things and form the body of man. This interpretation Basil, Theodoret, and Chrysostom on this passage, and Augustine in book 16 of the City of God, ch. 6, and Cyril in book 1 against Julian, detest as utterly impious, and vigorously refute as manifestly false and absurd, and evidently contrary to divine Scripture.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 358.' Completes the opinion broken off at the foot of p. 357 ('COMPLVRES alij dixerunt, eum locutum esse cum Angelis, quippe...'): that God addressed the Angels. Margin: 'Augustinus.' References: Philo, De opificio mundi and De fuga et inventione; Plato, Timaeus 41–42; Augustine, De civitate Dei 16.6; Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum 1.

AND INDEED, the opinion of these men can be convicted and proved false by five arguments. Let the FIRST argument be this: When God said, Let us make man, he undoubtedly spoke with those persons who were bound to concur, together with himself and equally, in the procreation of man; but the Angels in no way concurred in the procreation of man: that Let us make God did not say to the Angels. And that the Angels did not concur in the creation of man's soul is plain from this argument: that the soul, since it is incorporeal and immortal, was created out of nothing; but the creation of anything whatever out of nothing, since it cannot be done without infinite power, belongs to God alone. Nor did the Angels concur in the forming of the human body, as Moses plainly shows when in chapter 2 he relates that God himself was the one who formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and so man became a living soul. Nor does Scripture alone teach this, but reason also compels the same admission: for since man's body was formed from the slime of the earth, or by the secondary causes that naturally produce and form the human body (I mean the male seed and the woman's blood); whereas an Angel can generate no natural effect by himself and by his own power, but only through the natural causes proper to each effect, namely by applying and fitting them to one another: hence it is necessarily concluded that the body of the first man was not fabricated by the Angels.

Margin: 'Illud, Faciamus, non esse dictum Angelis, probatur quinque rationibus' (That the words 'Let us make' were not spoken to the Angels is proved by five arguments). Arguments one and two of five; the SECOND begins below.

SECOND argument. That those persons to whom God said Let us make man were not Angels, but the one and same God together with him who said Let us make, Moses clearly demonstrates by adding after these words, God created man; and at the opening of chapter five he says, In the day in which God created man; and finally Scripture nowhere ascribes the creation of man to the Angels, but to God alone. THIRD argument. That opinion is also refuted by what is added, To our image and likeness: for an

Angel is not the idea and exemplar of man, nor is it anywhere found in Holy Scripture that man is called the image of an Angel, or made to the image of an Angel; just as not once-

Arguments two and three of five. Page breaks mid-word at 'se-'; catchword: 'mel' (= semel, 'once,' completed atop p. 359).

— p. 400 (PDF) · printed p. 359 —

[not] once do we read that man is called the image of an Angel, or made to the likeness and image of an Angel. FOURTH argument. That phrase, To our image, also proves the point: for the image of God and of the Angels is not one and the same, just as the nature is not one and the same, but rather infinitely diverse; for the properties of the divine nature are opposed to the properties of the Angelic nature. For God, according to his nature, is eternal, is most simple, is immutable, is wholly independent, is in himself and from himself substantially perfect and blessed, is everywhere, is of infinite knowledge and power and goodness: and to these properties of the divine nature the nature of an Angel has properties plainly opposite. FIFTH argument. So openly and expressly does Moses show that man was made to the image of God, and not of the Angels, that he has cut off every occasion of doubting in the matter. For after he had said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, he at once added, And God created man to his own image and likeness: to the image of God he created him. And in chapter 5: In the day in which God created man, he made him to the likeness of God. And in chapter 9: For to the image of God was man made; and the same is handed down in the book of Wisdom, ch. 2, and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, ch. 17.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 359.' Arguments four and five of five. Margin: 'Proprietates naturae Divinae' (The properties of the Divine nature). Scriptural proofs: Gen 1:27; 5:1; 9:6; Wisdom 2:23; Ecclus 17:1.

BUT IN VERY TRUTH, what we have argued against these men must be confirmed and illustrated by the very clear judgments of two Fathers,

Augustine and Ambrose. St. Augustine, in chapter 6 of book 16 of the City of God, handling and weighing these words of Moses, Let us make man to our image and likeness:

Transition to the two patristic confirmations (Augustine and Ambrose). Margins A–D mark the columns.

It might also have been understood, he says, when man was made, that what was said, Let us make man, was spoken of the Angels: because he did not say, Let me make; but since there follows, To our image, it is impious to believe that man was made to the image of the Angels, or that the image of the Angels and of God is the same; and therefore the plurality of the Trinity is rightly understood there. Which Trinity, however, since God is one, even though he had said Let us make, yet, And God made man, he says, to the image of God: he did not say, The gods made, or, to the image of the gods. Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De civitate Dei 16.6 (block-quote).

But the testimony of Ambrose is a little more illustrious; whose words, in ch. 7 of book 6 of the Hexameron, are these: To whom does God say, Let us make man to our image and likeness? Surely not to himself, because he does not say, let me make, but let us make. Not to the Angels, because they are ministers; and servants with their Lord, and works with their author, cannot have a partnership in the operation: but he speaks to the Son, even though the Jews be unwilling, even though the Arians resist. But let the Jews fall silent, and the Arians with their fellows be struck dumb, who, while they exclude the One from a partnership in the divine operation, bring in many; and the prerogative they deny to the Son, they bestow on petty slaves. But suppose by this it should seem that God needed the help of slaves in order to work: if the operation is common to God with the Angels, is the image then common to God and the Angels? would he say to the Angels, Let us make man to our image and likeness? But what the

image of God is, hear him who says, Who is the image of the invisible God, and the firstborn of every creature. He is the image of God the Father, who always is, and was in the beginning. In short, he is the image who says,

Ambrose, Hexameron 6.7 (block-quote, continues onto p. 360). Woven Scripture: Col 1:15; John 1:1; John 14:9. Catchword: 'Philippe' (the opening of the next page, 'Philip, he that seeth me...').

— p. 401 (PDF) · printed p. 360 —

Philip, he that seeth me, seeth also the Father. The image of God is he alone who says, I and the Father are one: so having the likeness of the Father that he has the unity of the Godhead and of the fullness. Where he says, Let us make, where is the inequality? When again he says, To our likeness, where is the unlikeness? Thus far Ambrose.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 360.' Conclusion of the Ambrose block-quote begun on p. 359. Margin: 'Ioan. 14' (John 14:9; with John 10:30).

Nor were some ashamed to assert that, when God said Let us make man to our image and likeness, he spoke of himself alone in the plural, after the manner of magnates and princes, who, to display their authority and majesty, speak of themselves in the plural, saying, We will, we command, we decree, we grant. But Theodoret refutes these men, in question 20 on Genesis, on the ground that for this reason God ought to have spoken of himself in the plural either always or for the most part—which, however, is the contrary of the fact: and it would have been especially fitting for God to speak of himself in the plural when on Mount Sinai he gave the Law to the Jews, for then it was most suitable that his authority, power, and majesty should be most greatly declared; yet at that time he always spoke of himself in the singular number. In only five places of Scripture have we observed God speaking of himself in the plural number. The first is this place which we now treat, Let us make man; the second is below, ch. 2, Let us make for Adam a help like to himself; the third is in chapter 3, Behold, Adam is become as one of us; the fourth is in chapter 11, Come, let us go

down, and confound there their tongue; the fifth is in Isaiah, chapter 6: I heard, says Isaiah, the voice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who shall go for us?

Margin: 'In quinque locis Scripturae legitur, Deum de se locutum numero plurali' (In five places of Scripture God is read to have spoken of himself in the plural number). Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim, q. 20. The five places: Gen 1:26; 2:18; 3:22; 11:7; Isa 6:8.

From this place of Scripture, therefore, a strong argument is drawn to prove the plurality and distinction of the divine Persons against the Jews—an argument used by all the Fathers against the Jews and Heretics, all who have denied the divinity of the Son and the in-every-respect equality of the Holy Trinity. Whether this place really convicts them, Tostatus acutely discusses in the treatise he published On the Trinity, which is in that volume of his works entitled the Defensorium. Therefore this speech of God, Let us make man, openly demonstrates that the author and parent of man was God—which was known even to the Gentiles and attested in their writings. For, to pass over Trismegistus, who set forth concerning the creation of man things most like to Moses: certainly all the ancients who held that the soul of man is immortal handed down also that its origin and principle is heavenly and divine. Ovid, in the first book of the Metamorphoses, touched on the various opinions about the efficient principle of man in these verses.

Tostatus (Alfonso Tostado de Madrigal), Defensorium trium conclusionum / treatise on the Trinity. 'Trismegistus' = the Hermetic Pimander. Introduces the Ovid quotation.

Man was born—whether that artificer of things, the origin of a better world, made him from divine seed; or whether the new-made earth, lately sundered from the high aether, still kept seeds of its kindred heaven. This [earth] the son of Iapetus, mixing it with the waters of the river, fashioned into the likeness of the gods who govern all things. And Cicero, in the first book of the Laws: This living creature, he says, provident, sagacious, mani-

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.78–83 (verse block). 'Son of Iapetus' = Prometheus. Cicero, De legibus 1.7.22 quotation begins; page breaks at 'multi-', catchword 'multi' (= multiplex).

— p. 402 (PDF) · printed p. 361 —

[mani]fold, mindful, full of reason and counsel, which we call man, was begotten by the supreme God under a certain illustrious condition. Now, in that it is said, Let us make man, it must be explained what is signified in this place by the word 'man.' In Latin many think he is called homo either because he was fashioned from the soil (humus), or because he alone of all living things was born and made to cultivate humanity (humanitas). In Greek he is named ■νθρωπος (if Plato, who discusses the etymology of names in the Cratylus, is to be believed) from the verb ■ναθρε■ν, which means to have an upturned face and to look upward: because, when nature (as Cicero says in book 1 of the Laws) had cast down the other living things to their pasture, man alone she raised up, and roused to the contemplation of heaven, as of his kindred and former dwelling. This Ovid elegantly expressed in those verses, in book 1 of the Metamorphoses:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 361.' Margin: 'De Etymologia nominum, quibus homo Latinè, Graecè, et Hebraicè appellatur' (On the etymology of the names by which man is called in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew). Greek glyphs magnified and verified: ■νθρωπος (printed with the -ος ligature) and ■ναθρε■ν (its theta printed delta-like). The Cratylus etymology (Plato, Cratylus 399c) derives ■νθρωπος from '■ναθρ■ν ■ ■πωπε,' looking up at what he has seen. Cicero, De legibus 1.9.26.

> *And whereas the other animals look downward to the earth, he gave to man an uplifted face, and bade him behold the heaven, and raise his upright countenance to the stars.*

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.84–86 (verse block).

In Hebrew he is called Adam, ■■■, which is a common noun, as Homo among the Latins; although that name was applied properly to the first man. And Adam is said to come from the word ■■■■ Adama, which signifies earth—and indeed red earth—because man was made from earth; and, as Josephus supposes in this place, from red earth: for he himself

believes such was the earth, raw and untouched, and, as people commonly say, virgin. And God willed to impose this name on man, that he might always be mindful of his origin, and by the remembrance of his lowliness and meanness keep his mind perpetually modest and humble, and wholly subject to God; and that he might acknowledge himself to be the work of God, fashioned by him as by a potter out of clay: a comparison which Scripture frequently uses to humble the arrogance of man, as may be seen in Isaiah ch. 45, Jeremiah 18, and in Paul to the Romans 9.

Hebrew glyphs magnified and verified: ■■■ (Adam) and ■■■■ (Adamah, 'ground/red earth'). Margin: 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquitatum' (Josephus, Antiquities, book 1, i.e. Ant. 1.1.2 §34). The potter/clay image: Isa 45:9; Jer 18:6; Rom 9:20–21.

EUSEBIUS, moreover, in chapter 4 of book 11 of the Preparation for the Gospel (where he discusses at length the most apt imposition of names among the Hebrews), writes thus concerning the notion and interpretation of this word Adam: That which Plato, he says, discusses in many words in the Cratylus about the imposition of names, Moses, as the wisest and most eloquent, accomplished in deed long before Plato. For the very name Adam can signify earth-born or earthen. For Adam among the Hebrews means soil, though by transference it signifies a red and corporeal nature: thus by this appellation he marked out the earth-born and earthen, that is, the corporeal man. But they also call man ■■■■ Enos: by which word they signify not the earthly but the rational nature. And properly, if you render word for word in Latin, it seems to denote 'the forgetting one,' Enos—such as the rational nature certainly becomes when bound to the body. For that which is truly incorporeal, divine, and rational not only remembers things past, but also, by the loftiness of its contemplation, has foreknowledge of things to come; whereas that which is joined to flesh, and by the weight of the flesh

Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 11.4 (block-quote, continues onto p. 362). Hebrew glyph magnified and verified: ■■■■ (Enosh, 'man, mortal'). The 'forgetting one' etymology plays on the Hebrew root.

Foot of page: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'Z'; catchword: 'premitur' (= 'is pressed down,' completing 'carnis pondere premitur'). RESUME next batch at PDF 403 with '[carnis pondere] premitur...'.

— p. 403 (PDF) · printed p. 362 —

[by the weight of the flesh] is pressed down, so as to be wrapped in ignorance and forgetfulness, the speech of the Hebrews rightly called ■■■■ Enos, that is, 'the forgetting one.' For so it is in a certain Prophet: What is ■■■■ Enos (man), that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him? as if he should say, Who is this man—this forgetful one, I mean—that thou, who art God, art mindful of him, although he himself be forgetful? or the son of Adam, that is, the earthly man? And so among the Hebrews carnal man is signified by the name Adam, but rational man by the word Enos. And Plato thinks that 'man' is in Greek called ■νθρωπος from the verb ■ναθρε■ν, which is to look at or to reflect upon, so that he is called ■νθρωπος because he reflects upon the things he has seen. Thus far were the words of Eusebius.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 362.' Conclusion of the Eusebius (Praep. ev. 11.4) block-quote begun on p. 361. Hebrew glyph magnified and verified: ■■■■ (Enosh), printed twice. Margin: 'Psalm. 8' (Ps 8:5, 'quid est homo, quod memor es eius'). Greek ■νθρωπον / ■νθρωπος (with -ος ligature) and ■ναθρε■ν magnified and verified; the Cratylus etymology (Plato, Cratylus 399c).

Cyprian, in the book On Sinai and Sion against the Jews (although the author of that book does not seem to have been Cyprian), and Augustine, in the 9th and 10th tractates on the Gospel of John, hand down that the name Adam, if it be written in Greek, consists of four letters, with which begin four words signifying the four quarters of the world—namely ■νατολ■, that is, East; Δ■σις, West; ■ρκτος, North; and Μεσημβρ■α, South: because the posterity of Adam was to be scattered through all the quarters of the world, or because the earth from which man's body was formed was taken from all four quarters of the world.

The ADAM acrostic: the initials of the four Greek compass-words (Α-Δ-Α-Μ) spell Adam. All four Greek words magnified and verified: ■νατολ■ *(East),* Δ■σις *(West),* ■ρκτος *(North),* Μεσημβρ■α *(South); printed in early-modern Greek ligatures. Ps.-Cyprian, De montibus Sina et Sion; Augustine, In Ioannis evangelium tractatus 9–10.*

But in truth, this might at present be doubted: what is signified by the word 'man' when it is said, Let us make man. For some have thought that here only the male is signified, and not the female, since her procreation is recounted below in chapter 2. These Moses evidently refutes by what he at once adds: God created man to his image and likeness; male and female he created them. And he repeats the same at the opening of chapter five. Philo, in the book On the Making of the World, affirms that the man whose creation is described in these words is not to be understood as the sensible man (such as we are), but the intelligible, that is, the idea and exemplar of man, which the Greeks call α■τ■ς ■νθρωπος, 'man himself.' In which Philo indeed wished to follow Plato's doctrine of the Ideas; but, as concerns this passage, not only falsely, but also ignorantly, ineptly, and absurdly. For the idea of man, to whose likeness man was created, since it is in the divine mind and is in reality nothing other than God himself, must needs be something eternal, divine, and uncreated and incapable of being created: that idea, therefore, does not square with what is here said, Let us make man, and a little after, God created man; nor does it befit an idea to be created to the image and likeness of another, for thus the idea would be [the image] of [another] idea, and the matter would go on to infinity. Yet Justin Martyr, in his hortatory discourse to the Gentiles, makes Plato the author of this opinion of Philo.

Margins: 'Quid significetur vocabulo hominis cùm dicitur faciamus hominem'; 'An vocabulo Hominis sit intelligenda idea hominis'; 'Idea cur creari ad alterius ideae imaginem non possit.' Greek α■τ■ς ■νθρωπος *magnified and verified. Philo, De opificio mundi; Justin (Ps.-Justin), Cohortatio ad Graecos.*

St. Augustine, in book 3 of On Genesis according to the Letter, ch. 22, reports the opinion of certain men (suppressing their names), who thought that by the word 'man' there must be understood in this place only the

interior man, that is, the spirit and soul of man—whose creation is described in this place, just as the forming of the human body is narra-

Margin: 'An sit tantùm intelligendus homo interior' (Whether only the interior man is to be understood). Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.22. Page breaks at 'narra-'; catchword: 'ratur.'

— p. 404 (PDF) · printed p. 363 —

[narra]ted below in chapter 2: since the man who bears the image and likeness of God is not our exterior man, that is the body, but only the spirit and soul of man. That St. Basil and Ambrose were of this opinion, anyone who reads the former's 10th homily on Genesis, and the latter's 8th chapter of the sixth book of the Hexameron, will plainly understand. Nor does it tell against this opinion that God did not say, Let us make the soul of man, but, Let us make man: for, as Basil proves, more than once in Scripture the word 'man' is put for the interior man, that is, for the soul or spirit of man—as in Paul, in chapter 4 of the second Epistle to the Corinthians: Though our outward man be corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day; and to the Colossians 3: Stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him that created him. And Ambrose confirms that, just as the word 'soul' and the word 'flesh' are used to signify the whole man, so the word 'man' is sometimes employed to signify either the flesh or the soul of man.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM LIB. IIII. 363.' Margin: 'Nomen hominis in scriptura saepe pro interiori homine usurpatur' (The name 'man' in Scripture is often used for the interior man). Basil, Hom. 10 on Genesis; Ambrose, Hexameron 6.8; 2 Cor 4:16; Col 3:9–10.

But nevertheless Augustine, in the place cited above, holds—and rightly—that this opinion is false, and the words that Moses adds plainly demonstrate it. For he subjoins, Male and female he created them. And he blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all the trees, etc., to be your food. Now the distinction of sex into male and female, the

begetting and multiplying of offspring, and finally the eating of fruits and herbs, pertain not to the interior man (that is, to the spirit), but rather to the exterior (that is, to the body). It is not therefore to be doubted that the word 'man,' whose creation is here set forth, signifies the entire and whole man, constituted of body and soul.

Margin: 'Genesis 1.' Refutation of the interior-man reading, from Gen 1:27–29.

To our image and likeness.

Section lemma (Gen 1:26b), set centered, opening the treatment of 'image' and 'likeness.'

In Hebrew, word for word, it is thus: Let us make man into our image, according to our likeness. And those who sagaciously investigate and subtly weigh the proper notions and significations of the Hebrew words have noted on this passage that, for those two Latin words To our image and likeness, there are read in Hebrew two other words, ■■■ Selem and ■■■■ Demuth. Now ■■■ Selem signifies properly a shadow, or a shadowy likeness, that is, a failing and passing likeness, as may be understood from those places of Scripture in which that word is set: such as that of Psalm 33 [38:7]: Surely man passeth as an image, that is, he quickly passes after the manner of a shadow soon vanishing; and that place, Ps. 101 [102:12]: My days have declined like a shadow, and I am withered like grass; and that of Psalm 106 [109:23]: I am taken away like the shadow when it declineth.

Hebrew glyphs magnified and verified: ■■■ (tselem, 'image/shadow') and ■■■■ (demuth, 'likeness'). The 'shadow' sense of tselem proof-texted from Pss 39:7; 102:12; 109:23 (Vulgate numbering 38, 101, 108/106). Margin letter D marks the decorated initial 'H' (HEBRAICE).

— p. 405 (PDF) · printed p. 364 —

But that other word ■■■■ Demuth, although it seems of uncertain signification (for which reason the Hebrews assign various notions to it), affirming its root to be ■■■ Damah, which they say means to liken, to cut down, to fail, to wait, to reflect, and to be silent: yet properly it seems to

signify 'to liken.' And because a likeness quickly passes, it also signifies to pass away or to fail. By these words, therefore, God willed to signify that man was made like to God—as great a likeness as can be between a workman and such a work. But because God is of infinite perfection, it was therefore necessary that the likeness of God which is in man should be in infinitely many respects more imperfect than the beauty and excellence of the divine archetype: just as a shadow is indeed a likeness and image of the body whose shadow it is, but obscure nonetheless and imperfect.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 364.' Hebrew glyphs magnified and verified: ■■■■ (demuth) and its root ■■■ (damah, 'to be like'). The romanization printed in the text is 'Demuth' and 'Damath.'

Now that phrase, To our image and likeness, can be understood in two ways: either of the image which is in God, so that God's nature was only the exemplar to whose likeness man was created (so that the sense is, Let us make man such as we are); or so that it be understood of the created image which is in man (so that this be the meaning of God's words: Let us make man so like to us that he himself be, as it were, our image and effigy, representing in a mortal body and on earth our nature, power, wisdom, and providence). For in many ways, as Augustine teaches in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51, things can be called like to God: for some things partake both of virtue and of wisdom, others only of life, others only of existence. Those, then, which merely are, and neither live nor are wise, are like to God not perfectly but slightly, because even they are good in their own measure, since he is good above all things, from whom all good things proceed; but whatever things live and are not wise partake a little more of the likeness of God; while those which are wise are so next to God in likeness that among creatures nothing is nearer. Wherefore, since man can be a partaker of wisdom in his own self, he is so to the image of God that he is formed with no nature interposed, and therefore nothing is more closely joined to God. For he both is wise, and lives, and is—and than this creature nothing is better. Thus Augustine.

Margin: 'Res variis modis Deo dici possunt similes' (Things can be called like to God in various ways). Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 51 (the gradation of likeness: existence – life – wisdom).

What difference, moreover, must be understood in this place between image and likeness, is to be treated next. For Basil, in his 10th homily on Genesis, thinks those words to be of different signification: for to say that any word in Scripture is idle and superfluous he judges to be blasphemy. St. Augustine, in the book of Questions on Deuteronomy, question 4, treating those words of the Lord, Lest perhaps, being deceived, you make to yourselves a likeness or graven image, writes thus concerning the difference that there is between image and likeness:

Margins: 'An hic differat similitudo ab imagine'; 'Basilius blasphemiam putat, dicere verbum aliquod in Scriptura esse ociosum et supervacaneum.' Basil, Hom. 10 on Genesis; Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, Deut. q. 4 (on Deut 4:16). The block-quote begins here and continues onto p. 365. Catchword: 'menta' (= lineamenta).

> *What the difference is between likeness and image is wont to be inquired: but here I do not see what difference he meant, unless either by those two words he signified one thing, or he called it a 'likeness' if (for example) there be made a statue or image having a human form, yet not that of any particular man—provided its fea-*

Augustine, Quaestiones super Deuteronomium, q. 4 (block-quote, continues on p. 365). Page breaks at 'linea-'; catchword 'menta' (lineamenta).

— p. 406 (PDF) · printed p. 365 —

> *[its fea]tures be expressed, as painters or sculptors do, looking at those whom they paint or fashion: for that this is called an image, no one will doubt. According to which distinction, every image is also a likeness, but not every likeness is also an image. Hence if twins be like one another, the likeness of either may be said to be in the other, but not the image. But if a son be like his father, it is also rightly called an image, the father being the prototype from which that image is seen to*

be expressed: of which images some are of the same substance, as a son, others not of the same, as a painting. Hence that which is written in Genesis chapter one, God made man to the image of God, it is plain was so said that the image which was made is not of the same substance: for if it were of the same substance, it would be said not to be made but to be begotten. But as to his not having added 'and the likeness,' although above it had been said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it has seemed to some that the likeness is something more than the image, which was to be preserved afterward for man, to be reformed through the grace of Christ. But I wonder whether he did not for this reason afterward will to mention the image alone, because where there is image, there is straightway likeness also. Hence here Moses vows [pronounces] that likeness and image are made, perhaps according to that reason which we have stated. Thus Augustine.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 365.' Conclusion of the Augustine (Quaest. in Heptateuchum, Deut. q. 4) block-quote begun on p. 364.

It is the opinion of many and weighty authors that man was made to the image of God in respect of the natural gifts (I mean the mind, the will, the memory, and free will), and that this is the natural image of God, expressed commonly in all men, by which we excel the beasts, and which can be destroyed and lost by no sin: for this depends not on us, but wholly on God. But the likeness of God, to which man is said to have been made, they think is to be regarded in the gratuitous and supernatural gifts, such as are justice, sanctity, innocence: and this image depends not on God alone, but also requires our own study, effort, and cultivation; by this good men differ from and excel the wicked; this by sinning is darkened and destroyed. And this distinction of likeness and image was handed down by Origen in the third book of the Peri Archon, ch. 6; Basil in the 10th homily on Genesis on this passage; Ambrose in book 6 of the Hexameron, ch. 7 and 8; Gregory of Nyssa in the homily On the Creation of Man; Eucherius in book 1 of the

Commentaries on Genesis on this passage; Victorinus (St. Jerome's teacher in Rhetoric) in the Disputation he wrote against Arius; Theodoret in the questions on Genesis, question 20; Rupert in book 2 of On the Trinity and its Works, ch. 3 and 5; the Blessed Thomas in the first part, q. 93; the Master of the Sentences in the second book, distinction 16, and the Scholastics on the same place; and, finally, very many others, as well of the ancients as of the more recent.

Margins: 'An imago pertineat ad naturalia, similitudo autem ad supernaturalia'; 'Qui hanc imaginis et similitudinis distinctionem probaverint.' The image (= natural gifts: mind, will, memory, free will) / likeness (= supernatural gifts: justice, sanctity, innocence) distinction, with its roster of authorities (Origen, Basil, Ambrose, Gregory of Nyssa, Eucherius, Marius Victorinus, Theodoret, Rupert, Aquinas ST I q.93, Peter Lombard Sent. II d.16).

But that this distinction is not firm enough, nor very consonant with divine Scripture, can be proved by three arguments. For, just as in this place man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God, so likewise below, in chapter five, it is read that Adam begat his son Seth to his own image and likeness: where, although those two words 'image' and 'likeness' are set down, yet between them a distinction from the afore-

Margin: 'Refellitur illa distinctio imaginis et similitudinis' (That distinction of image and likeness is refuted). Begins the three-argument rebuttal (first: Gen 5:3, Adam begot Seth 'ad imaginem et similitudinem suam'). Page breaks at 'à prae-'; catchword 'dictis' (= praedictis); signature 'Z 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 407 with '[à] praedictis...'.

— p. 407 (PDF) · printed p. 366 —

[handed down by the afore]said authors has no place. Next, Paul more than once uses the word 'image' for 'likeness,' which consists chiefly in the gratuitous and supernatural gifts. For in chapter fifteen of the first Epistle to the Corinthians he says, As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly; and to the Colossians 3: Stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him that created him. Finally, the same may be observed and judged from the

manner of speaking which Scripture uses in various places when it wishes to signify that man is like God: for it uses various modes of speech, all of them, however, signifying plainly the same thing. For sometimes it sets down both words, 'image' and 'likeness,' and in the same case, as here, Let us make man to our image and likeness. Sometimes it sets down both words, but in a different case, as in chapter 2 of the book of Wisdom: God created man incorruptible; to the image of his own likeness he made him. And sometimes the word 'likeness' is omitted, only the word 'image' being set down: so below, in chapter 9, it is read, For to the image of God was man made; and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, ch. 17, God created man of the earth, and made him according to his own image. It is plain, therefore, from what we have said, that these words 'image' and 'likeness' have the same force and signification, and that they are placed here to declare one and the same thing more significantly, more expressly, and more illustriously.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 366.' Completes the first rebuttal-argument (Gen 5:3) begun on p. 365. 1 Cor 15:49; Col 3:9–10; Wis 2:23; Gen 9:6; Ecclus 17:1. Margin: 'Variis modis in Scriptura usurpari nomen imaginis et similitudinis.'

But truly, I will not allow myself to pass over in silence here what Rupert disputes concerning the diverse notions of these words 'image' and 'likeness': for they are novel and wonderful, and not unworthy of being known by the studious and curious reader, although not in every respect true or even probable. Rupert, then, in book 2 of On the Trinity, ch. 2, discusses what difference there is between image and likeness, and why the word 'image' is set before the word 'likeness': for he holds that by the word 'image' is designated the Son of God, and by the word 'likeness' the Holy Spirit. And thus he writes:

Margin (left): 'Sententia Ruperti de imagine et similitudine.' Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius, book 2, ch. 2. Introduces the long Rupert block-quote.

Image and likeness differ in this, that an image is the image of one, but a likeness is never the likeness of fewer than two. Now the image of

God is the Son of the same God the Father, as the Apostle says of him, Who is the image of the invisible God. The image, I say, of the invisible God is the Son, equally invisible. Yet 'image' is said in many ways: for there is the image of a man or a horse, a painting on a wall, or a carving in wood or stone; the image of the sun or moon is seen in a well: not in this way is the Son called the image of God, but in such wise that (as the Apostle says in another place) he is the figure of his substance—because, namely, just as any substance is known from the appearance of its figure, so God the Father is known through his Word, which is the Son. Yet the image of a man is also called a property of his substance: in which sense that saying about the first man is necessarily understood, And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begat a son to his own image and likeness, and called his name Seth. The Son, then, is the image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit the likeness of the Father and the Son: for the common goodness or charity is of the Father and the Son. Therefore you would not think it could rightly be said, Let us ma[ke]—

Rupert block-quote (continues onto p. 367). Margins: 'Coloss. 1' (Col 1:15); 'Hebraeo 1' (Heb 1:3); the Seth verse is Gen 5:3. Page breaks at 'Fa-' (Faciamus).

— p. 408 (PDF) · printed p. 367 —

Let us make man to our image and likeness: because assuredly the Son, just as he is not the Son of the Father together with the Holy Spirit, but the Son of the Father alone, so he is not the image of the Father and of the same Holy Spirit, but the image of the Father alone. On the contrary, it was most rightly said, To our image and likeness: because, namely, the Holy Spirit, just as he is the common goodness or love of the Father and the Son, so he is the common likeness of the same.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 367.' Continuation of the Rupert block-quote begun on p. 366.

After this, Rupert, explaining how the image of God in man pertains to the natural gifts of God, but the likeness to the gratuitous gifts, adds in the following chapter:

Pererius's framing sentence introducing Rupert's next chapter (De Trinitate, book 2, ch. 3).

What, in fine, is, Let us make man to our image and likeness, but, Let us make man who shall have in himself the evidence of our threefold operation? For look at some well-constituted man—for example, such as is the very one who wrote these things, nay, such as will be all the elect, by whom the blessed Trinity is to be beheld in its glory: they assuredly live, which is common to them with the beasts; and they discern, which is common to them with reprobate men or even with malignant spirits; and they are holy or just, which is proper to the sons of God. Therefore what he says, Let us make man to our image and likeness, is to say, Let us make a man living, rational, like to God. A little before, speaking of the brute animals, Let the earth bring forth the living soul in its kind: above a soul of that sort the condition of man excels in a twofold honor, when it is said, To our image and likeness. To the image, namely, that he be rational; to our likeness, that he be upright by following the justice of God. Of these he cannot lack the one, namely rationality; the other—that is, the likeness of divine rectitude or justice—he cannot attain except through grace. But that faculty of rationality which man cannot lack is an instrument, or a kind of eye, for seeking the likeness of God. He is therefore inexcusable when he has not attained to the likeness of God, because, namely, he was unwilling to use the good instrument for that for which it was given him. But when God first made man, he made him not only rational, but also flourishing in the honor of his likeness. For God, says Scripture, made man upright, but he himself entangled himself in many questions. Now, however, being seduced, he has lost the honor of the likeness of God, but the faculty of reason remained in him, by which he may be able to hear him who calls him back, and to follow

him as leader and teacher unto his own restoration.

Rupert block-quote (De Trinitate 2.3). The threefold operation: being/life (with beasts) – discernment (with reprobates and demons) – holiness (proper to the sons of God). 'Producat terra animam viventem' (Gen 1:24); 'Deus fecit hominem rectum, ipse verò implicuit se multis quaestionibus' (Eccl 7:30, Vulg.; margin 'Eccles. 7').

Finally, Rupert, inquiring why the word 'image' is set before the word 'likeness,' answers thus in the next chapter:

Pererius's framing sentence introducing Rupert's next chapter.

God, therefore, willing this creature to be rational and a partaker of his sanctity, says, Let us make man to our image and likeness. Scripture did not say (as it said, God said, Let there be light, and light was made), God said, Let man be made to our image and likeness, and man was made. Why? Because, namely, it was to be done not suddenly but laboriously, so that the completed man should stand to the image and likeness of his Creator. For the Angelic creature, once made, is now—at least in those who fell—not restored to its former estate. But man, who was to fall after his first making and to be renewed by the re-creation of the merciful one: for this reason the three Persons, as it were, mutually exhort one another, saying, Let us make.

Rupert block-quote (De Trinitate 2.4). 'Fiat lux, et facta est lux' (Gen 1:3). Catchword: 'SCIEN' (= Sciendum, opening p. 368, still within Rupert's words).

— p. 409 (PDF) · printed p. 368 —

Yet it must be known that both those fewer words by which it was said, Let there be light, and light was made, and these more numerous ones, Let us make man to our image and likeness, signify an equal dignity or glory of the Angels and of the elect among men. For the elect Angel too, because he is light, was made and perfected to the image and likeness of God; and man, because he was made and remade to the image and likeness of God, is light. And because each is rational, he

was made to the image of God; and because he is well-constituted and subject to God, he was made to the likeness of God. Accordingly, just as the former is called light, or an Angel of light, so this latter too is called light and a son of light. Nevertheless, just as that which was said, Let there be light, intimates that only the elect Angels are the Creator's care, and excludes the Angels of darkness (although he created these also), so too that saying, Let us make man to our likeness, embraces only those whom he predestined to life, and does not admit those who, beyond the number, were afterward to be born of the now-corrupted root. And so, if it be asked why Scripture brought in God saying thus, Let there be light, when he might have said, Let Angels be made, or Let spirits be made: let us ask why the same God said this whole thing, Let us make man to our image and likeness, when he might have said only, Let us make man, and it could have sufficed for the common understanding to indicate that he signified that substance which we are. For they are equal cases, so that you may rightly answer on both sides, that it did not pertain to the mouth of the Lord to give command concerning those whom he himself does not know. And by no name could he better have expressed only those who belong to him—the Angels or spirits—than by the name of light; nor, nonetheless, by any definition could he better have designated those men whom he had foreordained to eternal life than by this, Let us make man to our image and likeness. Therefore in each case, his own Angels and his own men, God expressed by fitting words in his Scripture, through this his interpreter, and distinguished them from others who do not belong to him by a sufficient sparingness of speech. Thus far are the words of Rupert.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 368.' Conclusion of the long Rupert block-quote (De Trinitate, book 2). 'Light' / 'Angel of light' / 'son of light' parallels; the predestination reading of 'Faciamus.'

But, although I do not deny that these things were acutely thought out by Rupert, and learnedly and piously written, yet I judge them to be little

consonant with the purpose and meaning of the words of Moses, and with the manner of speaking which Scripture is wont to use wherever it teaches that man was created to the image of God: which anyone will easily understand and believe who considers with himself what we disputed a little above concerning the difference of image and likeness. This, moreover, tells against Rupert: that after Moses had said that man was made to the image and likeness of God, he immediately adds, And let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air—doubtless signifying by this very thing, that, because man was made to the image and likeness of God, he has it to rule and have dominion over all living things. But man does not have dominion and command over the animals because of the likeness which he has with God in respect of grace and the heavenly virtues, but because of the excellence of his reason, counsel, skill, prudence, and industry, by which things men attain this, that they subject all living things—even huge and ferocious ones—to their obedience and service.

Margin: 'Refellitur interpretatio Ruperti' (Rupert's interpretation is refuted). Pererius's first counter: man's dominion (Gen 1:26b) follows from rational excellence, not from supernatural likeness. Page ends with 'subiiciant' (repeated as the catchword/first word of p. 369).

— p. 410 (PDF) · printed p. 369 —

Finally, that this power and dominion of man over the animals comes to man not from the excellence of the virtues, but from the dignity of his rational nature, Rupert himself freely admits in chapter 5 of that book which we have named, writing thus upon those words, And let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air, etc.:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 369.' Pererius turns Rupert against himself (De Trinitate 2.5).

This part of the divine utterance extends more widely than that which was foretold, Let us make man to our image and likeness. For this embraces every man. For whence is man set over the animals, except from this, that he is rational, but they are irrational? For he is not set

over them in any chance way, merely so as to be worthier than they, but so also that he can tame the natures of them all. Therefore, for man to be set over them, it is enough that he be rational. And so that which was said, Let him rule over the fowls of the air, etc., extends more widely than that, Let us make man to our image and likeness: because, namely, all men are set over the cattle, but to the image and at the same time the likeness of God only the elect are made, nay, perfected. Let men, then, by nature be set over the cattle; but over men themselves let the men of God by grace be set. Thus Rupert.

Rupert block-quote (De Trinitate 2.5), which Pererius cites to show Rupert conceding that dominion follows from rationality, not from the supernatural likeness.

After this, the same author, in chapter six, which next follows, raises this question: why Moses, when he had related that God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, immediately subjoins that man was made to the image of God, silently passing over that 'To the likeness' (for it is not lawful to think that this was left out by him in what precedes, either by chance or by forgetfulness). To this question, then, he himself briefly responds:

Margins: 'Quaestio Ruperti'; 'Solutio quaestionis, secundum Rupertum.' The question: why Gen 1:27 ('Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam') drops the 'and likeness' of Gen 1:26 (Rupert, De Trinitate 2.6).

Knowingly, he says, Moses expressed in his words what God had intended, and what had happened he prudently observed in his own discourse. For when God said, Let us make man, he had indeed intended to make him to his own image and likeness. But when Moses was writing this, man had through sin lost the likeness of God. And he knew indeed that no one could overthrow that purpose of God: yet there had not then arisen a definite person in whom, that glory of the divine likeness which had perished in the person of the first man might be shown to be recovered without any contradiction. There were saints and just men—among the chief of whom was Moses

himself—but only by the faith and hope of the man to come, who should so be made to the image and likeness of God, being born of a Virgin, that he might restore in the sons of Adam the lost likeness of God, and make his sons like to himself, the old origin abolished and a new one given. Accordingly, therefore, when he had written that God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, he subscribed only this, God created man to his own image—that you may understand, as one who would one day re-create him to his own likeness: for he had in a manner not yet made to the image and likeness, but only to his own image, the man who had vanished and lost the glory of the divine likeness. Thus Rupert.

Rupert block-quote (De Trinitate 2.6), the solution: Gen 1:27 drops 'likeness' because man, foreseen as fallen, would be re-created to the likeness only through Christ (born of a Virgin).

Rupert's opinion, or certainly one very like it, Augustine refutes in the unfinished book On Genesis according to the Letter, in the closing words of that book, writing in this manner: Some think that for this reason the 'likeness' was not repeated by Moses, nor was it said, And God made man to the ima[ge]—

Margin: 'Opinio D. Augustini.' Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus (its final section). The block-quote begins here and continues onto p. 370. Foot of page: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'A A'; catchword 'imagi' (= imaginem). RESUME next batch at PDF 411 with '[ad] imaginem...'.

— p. 411 (PDF) · printed p. 370 —

[to] the image and likeness of God, but only to the image of God: because, namely, man was then made only to the image of God. But the likeness was being reserved for him afterward, to be bestowed in the resurrection of the dead. As though, forsooth, there could be any image in which there is no likeness. For if a thing is not at all like, undoubtedly it is not an image either. Nevertheless, lest we seem to do this by reason alone, the authority of the Apostle James must also be

brought in, who, when he was speaking of the tongue of man, says, With it we bless God, and with it we curse men, who are made to the likeness of God. Thus Augustine.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 370.' Conclusion of the Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus) block-quote begun on p. 369. Margin: 'Iacobi 3' (James 3:9).

But the blessed Basil, in the tenth homily on Genesis, thinks that the word 'likeness' was omitted in the second place for this reason: that it pertains to the virtues and to holiness of conduct, which is not granted us by God's gift alone, but must also be procured by our own zeal, labor, and diligence. Basil's words are as follows:

Margin: 'Quid de dicta quaestione censerit Basilius' (What Basil judged concerning the said question). Basil, Hom. 10 in Genesim. Introduces the Basil block-quote.

From the very creation I straightway obtained that, To the image; but to that other, To the likeness, I am advanced by a purpose set and freer in mind. In some part, therefore, the grace is your own, wherefore you will deservedly enter crowned. For if the Maker had bestowed the whole on you beforehand, by what grace, then, would the gates of the heavenly kingdom have been unlocked for you, who had earned nothing? But now he has conferred one thing and left another to be perfected, so that in your own self, when you have advanced to perfection, you may be pronounced not unworthy, as one who receives the reward of the work expended, God repaying it. By what means, then, are we fashioned to the likeness of God? Surely through the Gospels. What is Christianity? An assimilation to God, so far as the frailty of human nature can attain to it. Have you vowed and pledged that you will be a Christian? Do not delay to become like to God: put on Christ. And by what means will you put on Christ? He who has not received baptism, who has not yet clothed himself with the incorruptible garment, has surely shaken off and put away from himself the likeness of God. If, then, I had said to you, Come hither, be

> *made like to a king: would you judge that you had deserved gloriously of yourself? But when I myself eagerly desire to compose you and fashion you to the likeness of God, do you, shunning it, set yourself against the teaching that could make you a rival of divine virtue, and at once block up your ears, lest my saving discourse find entrance and penetrate? Thus Basil.*

Basil, Hom. 10 in Genesim. Likeness as the supernatural goal attained synergistically — through the Gospel, baptism ('put on Christ'), and human cooperation with grace.

Moreover, that phrase To our image and likeness excludes and rejects four opinions. Of which the first was that of Origen and certain others, who thought that the words To our image ought properly to be referred to the Son of God, whom Paul, in the first chapter to the Colossians, calls the image of the invisible God, and in the first to the Hebrews, the figure of the Father's substance: for the name 'image,' among the divine persons, is by the theologians assigned properly to the Son alone. These men, then, judge that man was made like to the Son of God, just as Paul affirms, in the eighth to the Romans, that God predestined the elect to be made conformable to the image of his Son. But this opinion is refuted by that particle, Our. For if man had been made to the likeness of the Son of God alone, God the Father, speaking with his Son, would not have said, Let us make man to our image, but, to thy image. Add that man could not be made like to the Son of God except in respect of the natural or super-

Margin: 'Illud Ad imaginem nostram non significare Filium Dei.' First of four refuted opinions (Origen and others: 'ad imaginem' = the Son). Col 1:15; Heb 1:3; Rom 8:29. Page breaks at 'super-' (supernaturalia).

— p. 412 (PDF) · printed p. 371 —

[super]natural gifts: but in respect of either of these he is equally like to the whole Trinity; for both are wrought and bestowed on man by the whole Trinity equally and indifferently. Deservedly, therefore, Augustine refutes this opinion in the seventh book of On the Trinity, chapter six, and in the

unfinished book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter sixteen and last, disputing against it thus:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 371.' Margin: 'Augustinus refellit supradictam opinionem.' Augustine, De Trinitate 7.6 and De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 16. Introduces the Augustine block-quote.

What was said above sufficiently explains these words of Scripture according to this sense, in which we read that God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness: namely, that the likeness of God, to which man was made, may be taken to be the very Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son; not, of course, so that man himself is the same image and likeness equal to the Father. Yet man too is an image of God, as the Apostle most clearly shows when he says, A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God. But this image, made to the image of God, is not equal and coeternal with that of which it is the image, nor would it be even if it had never sinned at all. But that sense is rather to be chosen in these divine words, whereby we understand it to have been said not in the singular but in the plural, Let us make man to our image and likeness: because man was made not to the image of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, nor of the Holy Spirit alone, but to the image of the Trinity itself; which Trinity is so a Trinity that it is one God, and is so one God that it is a Trinity. For he does not say, speaking to the Son, Let us make man to thy image, or to my image, but he says in the plural, To our image and likeness: from which plurality who would dare to separate the Holy Spirit? And since this plurality is not three gods, but one God, therefore it is to be understood that Scripture afterward brought it in and said in the singular, And God made man to the image of God: that it be not so taken as though God the Father made him to the image of God, that is, of his Son; otherwise, how is that true which was said, To our image, if man was made to the image of the Son alone? And through this, because that is true which God says, To our

image, it was said thus, God made man to the image of God, as though it were said, To his own image, which is the Trinity itself. Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Trinitate 7.6 / De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 16. 'Vir non debet velare caput' = 1 Cor 11:7 (margin '1. Cor. 11'). Man is made to the image of the whole Trinity, not of the Son alone.

A second opinion is held by the Gloss, which is cited in the Catena of Lippomanus on Genesis: that it was predestined and ordained by God from all eternity that the eternal Word should in his own time assume human nature into the unity of the divine person, and that the first man was made to the image and likeness of this human nature to be assumed by the Son of God. But this is too harsh an interpretation, and forced and violent. For nowhere does Scripture signify that man was made to the image and likeness of the Son of God, but rather it says, more than once, that the Son of God was made into the likeness of men. For Paul, in the eighth to the Romans, says, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, etc.; and to the Philippians 2, Taking the form of a servant, made into the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man; and to the Hebrews 2, Because then the children partook of flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same. What of this, that that particle, To our image, is plainly op-

Margin: 'An illud, Ad imaginem nostram, denotet Filium Dei prout speciem et naturam hominis assumpturus erat.' Second refuted opinion (the Gloss in the Catena of Luigi Lippomano: man made to the image of the human nature the Son would assume). Refuted by Rom 8:3; Phil 2:7; Heb 2:14. Page breaks at 'ad-' (adversa). Signature 'A A 2.'

— p. 413 (PDF) · printed p. 372 —

[op]posed to that opinion? For since the person of the Son alone was to assume human flesh, God the Father, speaking with the Son, would not have said, Let us make man to our image, but, to thy image.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 372.' Conclusion of the rebuttal of the second opinion.

A third opinion was that of Eugubinus in the Cosmopoeia, and of Oleaster on this passage, who think that God, in order to create man and to be able to mingle speech and converse with him after the human manner and mode, put on human form, and therefore said, Let us make man to our image and likeness. But, to say nothing of how rash, inept, and absurd is the novelty of this opinion (which I should think was conceived by no approved author, much less set forth in writing—not to say that it is a view approved by the assent of the theologian blessed Dionysius the Areopagite, that all the manifestations and apparitions of God which we read in Scripture to have been made to men under some sensible form, were made proximately and—as they say in the schools—immediately through Angels, so that those who appeared and spoke in them were Angels, yet often conveying the authority, majesty, and words of God): but to pass these over, I will press this one point against them. Either that human nature which God assumed at the beginning of the world was a true nature, and truly assumed into the unity of his person—and if they said this, they would be forced to admit that the incarnation of God was made twice, once at the end of the ages, and earlier at the beginning of the world; and then indeed the whole Trinity would have been incarnate, for otherwise it would not truly be said, Let us make man to our image, since that 'Our' pertains not to one divine person only, but equally to all. Or that human nature which God assumed at the beginning was not a true nature, but only a certain shadow, a phantom, and a likeness of human nature, just as we read that Angels often assumed human bodies: and if this be said, that, To our image, will not be true; for that likeness of human nature was not the image of God, since it had nothing to do with him; nor would it truly have been said that Adam, who was a true and perfect man, was made to the image of God, if by 'image' (as we said) we understand not the true nature of man, but only a certain shadow and likeness of it.

Margin: 'Opinio Eugubini et Oleastri confutatur.' Third refuted opinion: Agostino Steuco of Gubbio (Eugubinus), Cosmopoeia, and Hieronymus Oleaster — God put on human form. Refuted via Ps.-Dionysius (apparitions through Angels) and a dilemma (true nature → double incarnation of the

whole Trinity; mere phantom → 'image' false).

The fourth opinion is, that that phrase, To the image of God, denotes the idea and exemplar of man which is in the mind of God, to whose likeness God created sensible man. But this is said ineptly and frivolously: both because in this way nothing excellent and singular would be said of man (for by like reasoning it could be said that a horse was made to the image of God, that is, according to the idea of a horse which is in God, and the same might be said of any other things whatever); and because the idea of man which is in God is not the image of God, but is the image and exemplar of man: it would not therefore truly be said that man was made to the image and likeness of God.

Margin: 'An illud, Ad imaginem nostram, significet ideam hominis.' Fourth refuted opinion ('ad imaginem' = the idea/exemplar of man in the divine mind). This closes the section; catchword 'DISPV' (= Disputatio) opens the new disputation.

— p. 414 (PDF) · printed p. 373 —

DISPUTATION. On the image of God to which man was created.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 373.' New disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

Now, concerning this image of God to which man was made, it is fitting besides to explain certain questions which conduce to declaring and illustrating this saying of Moses more expressly.

Transition into the disputation's questions.

QUESTION I. In what thing especially the nature of the image of God consists, to which man is said to have been created.

First question of the disputation, set centered. Margin: 'In qua potissimùm re consistat ratio imaginis.'

Tostatus reports in this place, in question 28, that the Jews explain why man is said to have been made to the image of God in this manner. Just as

God, they say, fills the whole world, so the soul fills the whole body; just as one God presides over the whole world, so one soul presides over the whole body; just as God is not defiled by the filth of the world in which he is, so neither is the soul defiled by any stain of the body; just as God sees all things and is seen by none, so the soul sees and is not seen; finally, just as God never sleeps, but is perpetually awake (For he shall not slumber, says David, nor sleep, that keepeth Israel), so also our soul. But this is false, if by sleep be understood a cessation from all functioning of the exterior senses: nay rather, sleep, if we wish to speak properly and philosophically, must be called an affection of the soul rather than of the body. And these things which the Jews say, on Tostatus's report, can be truly said and apply no less to the soul of an ass than to that of a man.

Margins: 'Sententia Tostati'; 'Sententia Hebraeorum'; 'Psalm 120' (Ps 121:4, 'qui custodit Israel'). Tostatus, q. 28. The rabbinic soul:body :: God:world analogy, and Pererius's refutation (it would fit any animal soul).

There were some who thought that man was made to the image of God for this reason: because they were persuaded that God is corporeal, and endowed with human form and figure, in which, namely, it is recorded in Holy Scripture that he appeared to the Patriarchs and Prophets. For since these men could not conceive or represent to their mind God except under some bodily and sensible image, and none seemed more beautiful and excellent than the human, they judged that this was to be assigned to God. These were condemned by the Church as heretics, and from the error of their opinion were called Anthropomorphites. Worth reading is what Nicephorus wrote about them, in book 11, ch. 14, and book 13, ch. 10. This opinion of theirs they strove to prove, partly by this argument, that Scripture in many places attributes to God all the mem-

Margin: 'Error Antropomorphitarum.' The Anthropomorphite heresy (God corporeal/human-shaped). Nicephorus Callistus, Historia ecclesiastica 11.14; 13.10. Page breaks at 'cor-' (corporis membra); catchword 'poris'; signature 'A A 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 415 with '[omnia cor]poris membra...'.

[all the mem]bers of the human body, and the functions and offices of those members; and also because Scripture here says that not only the soul of man, but man himself, was made to the image of God: man, therefore, is like God not only in soul, but also in body. As though the same Scripture did not say a little below that God formed man from the slime of the earth, and that Eve was formed from Adam's rib; and to Adam God said, Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return: which things, although they are said of the whole man, yet befit him only on account of the body. For it is customary, both in Philosophy and in Holy Scripture as in common speech, for a whole to be called such-and-such from the fact that it belongs to some one principal part of it.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 374.' Continues the Anthropomorphite argument (Scripture ascribes bodily members to God) and begins its refutation. 'Pulvis es' = Gen 3:19.

Theodoret, in question 20 on Genesis, praises Melito for using this argument against these heretics: If God is thought to have a body such as man has, because Scripture describes him as furnished and endowed with human members, by like reasoning it would be concluded that man is not like God, nor made to his image and likeness. For Zechariah, chapter 4, describes God as having seven eyes, whereas we have only two; and in Psalm 90 God is brought in as having feathers and wings, which we lack; and Scripture attributes many other things to God by metaphor, which, if they were exacted strictly and according to the truth, would make God enormous and monstrous, and far most unlike a man. Therefore, says Melito, the image of God is not to be sought in man's body, but in his soul, which, like God, is itself possessed of and capable of reason, counsel, and wisdom.

Margin: 'Melito apud Theodoretum.' Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim q. 20, citing Melito of Sardis. Zech 4:10 (seven eyes); Ps 91:4 (Vulg. 90, wings).

Theodoret labors vehemently in this place, investigating what that image of God is, and in what it consists, to which man was made: and although he rehearses various ways of explaining the force and nature of this image, yet he shows that none of them satisfies and altogether contents his mind. And the reason why Theodoret felt so great a difficulty in this was that he thought that what is said to have been made to the image of God belongs to man and the male alone, and pertains neither to the Angels nor to the woman: which, however, we shall show below to be false. Epiphanius, treating of heresy 70, after he had disputed much about the same matter, at length came to this opinion: that he judges (just as it is certain that the image of God is in man) that in what part of man, or in what thing, that image is placed, is undiscovered and incomprehensible, and known to God alone: which befell Epiphanius for this reason, that he himself thought that by the image of God in this place was signified a perfect likeness of God, without the admixture of any unlikeness—which it is no wonder he could not find in man.

Margin: 'Falsa existimatio Theodoreti et Epiphanij.' Theodoret's perplexity (and his error: image fits only man-the-male, refuted later); Epiphanius, Panarion, heresy 70 (the Audians/Anthropomorphites), concluding the seat of the image is known to God alone.

St. Basil, in the 10th homily on Genesis, Gregory of Nyssa in the homily On the Creation of Man, and Chrysostom on this place of Genesis, judge that man was made to the image of God for this reason: that, just as God excels over all things, so man too excels all living creatures in dignity, and has dominion over them by power and command. Augustine, in the book On

The dominion-account of the image (Basil, Hom. 10; Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio; Chrysostom on Genesis). Page breaks at 'de'; catchword 'Quanti' (= Quantitate animae).

— p. 416 (PDF) · printed p. 375 —

[On] the Magnitude of the Soul, chapter 2, writes that our soul is said to be like God for this reason, that it is immortal and indissoluble. The same

writer, in the closing words of that book entitled On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (which, although it does not seem to be Augustine's, whosoever it be, is nonetheless of great authority among the theologians), writes thus: On account of certain newfangled Lawgivers, who say that the soul alone was created to the image of God, in order that, because God is rightly believed incorporeal, the soul too may be believed incorporeal, we freely confess that the image is found in eternity, the likeness in morals. The same Augustine, in the eighth tractate on the first Epistle of John, says thus:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 375.' Augustine, De quantitate animae 2; Ps.-Augustine, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus (Gennadius). Introduces the Augustine block-quote on 1 John.

> *Wherein was man made to the image of God? In the understanding, in the mind, in the interior man; in this, that he understands truth, distinguishes justice and injustice, knows by whom he was made, can understand his Creator, can praise his Creator. Therefore, when many, through evil desires, were wearing away in themselves the image of God, and in a manner extinguishing by perversity of morals that very flame of intelligence, Scripture cries to them: Do not become like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding: that is to say, I have set thee above the horse and the mule, I have made thee to my image, I have given thee power over these things. Why? Because the beasts have not a rational mind; but thou with a rational mind apprehendest truth, understandest what is above thee: be subject to him who is above thee, and below thee will be those things over which thou art set.*

Augustine, In epistolam Ioannis ad Parthos tractatus 8. 'Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus' = Ps 32:9 (Vulg. 31; margin 'Psal. 31').

Finally, in the books On the Trinity, Augustine, disputing in many ways about this image of God to which man was made, teaches that man bears the image of the Holy Trinity in this, that he understands himself, and by understanding himself produces in his heart an intelligible word expressive

of his own self, and from this proceeds love: which wonderfully shadows forth the two processions in the Holy Trinity, one of the Son after the manner of an intelligible word, the other of the Holy Spirit after the manner of love. Gregory of Nyssa in the Hexameron says: Man was made to the image of God in this, that he was made capable of all good: for the fullness of goodness is divinity. Damascene, in the second book of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter twelve, says that for man to be to the image of God signifies that he is intellectual, and of free will, and self-determining of himself. The Master of the Sentences, in distinction sixteen: Man, he says, was made to the image and likeness of God according to the mind, by which he excels the irrational creatures; but to the image, according to memory, intelligence, and love; and to the likeness, according to innocence and justice; or, the image in all other respects, the likeness in essence, because it is immortal and indissoluble, and so forth.

Augustine, De Trinitate (the trinitarian image: mind–word–love mirroring the two processions). Gregory of Nyssa, Hexameron/De hominis opificio; John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2.12; Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, dist. 16.

— p. 417 (PDF) · printed p. 376 —

[in] the freedom of choice, but in the other two a certain twofold likeness is marked. Hence it is, perhaps, that free choice alone suffers no failure or diminution of itself, because in it especially the eternal and unchangeable substance of the divinity seems to be impressed as a kind of image. For although it had a beginning, yet it knows no setting, nor does it take increase from justice or glory, nor detriment from sin or misery. What is more like eternity, that is not eternity? But in the other two freedoms, since they can be not only partly diminished but also wholly lost, a certain more accidental likeness of the divine wisdom and power is recognized as superadded to the image.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 376.' Continuation of Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio (the three freedoms: of choice, counsel, pleasure; the image in free choice as image of eternity).

The same Bernard, in the book On the Soul, or in the Meditations on the knowledge of the human condition, chapter one, says thus: We were made to the image of God, that is, to the understanding and knowledge of the Son, through whom we understand and know the Father, and have access to him. So great is the kinship between us and the Son of God, that he is the image of God, and we were made to his image; which kinship the likeness too attests, since we were made not only to his image, but to his likeness. It is fitting, therefore, that what is to the image should accord with the image, and not share the name of image in vain. Let us therefore represent in ourselves his image, in the desire of peace, in the contemplation of truth, and in the love of charity. Let us hold him in memory, carry him in conscience, and everywhere venerate him as present. For our mind is his image in this very thing, that it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him. It is not his image because the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself, but because it can remember, understand, and love him by whom it was made. And when it does this, it becomes wise. For nothing is so like that supreme wisdom as the rational mind, which through memory, intelligence, and will consists in that ineffable Trinity: and it cannot consist in it unless it remember it, and understand and love it. Let it therefore remember its God, to whose image it was made, and understand him, love him, and worship him, with whom it can be forever blessed. Thus far St. Bernard.

Bernard (Ps.-Bernard), Meditationes de cognitione humanae conditionis / Liber de anima, ch. 1. The Augustinian memory–intelligence–will image of the Trinity.

Bede, in the allegorical exposition of the book of Genesis, reports, according to Origen, that the nature of the image consists in eternity and in morals; but according to Faustinus, that our soul is like God in six ways, namely because it is immovable, swiftest, invisible, incorporeal, subtle, and eternal. But, that I too may say briefly, distinctly, and clearly what I think is to be held on this matter, I for my part think that a twofold reason can be

given why man is said to have been made to the image of God. And one reason is chief and principal, the other less principal. And the principal reason is this: that man, according to his nature, attains the supreme grade of nature, in which grade God is; for he has in himself a nature possessed of reason and intelligence. For there are four general grades of nature, and four highest kinds of things: for some things only have being, as stones and metals; some, besides, have obtained life,

Margins: 'Sex modis animam nostram Deo similis dicitur, secundùm Faustinum'; 'Auctoris sententia, in quo proprièsit ratio imaginis.' Bede, In Genesim (after Origen and Faustinus). Pererius now gives his own twofold account; the principal reason: man at the supreme (intelligent) grade of being. Page breaks at 'vitam nactae sunt,'.

— p. 418 (PDF) · printed p. 377 —

[have obtained life], like plants; some, above these, have motion and sense, like animals; finally, there are others placed at the supreme summit of nature, which, besides these, are strong in mind, reason, and wisdom—in which grade is God, and likewise the Angel, and man. And although man is in the same grade as God, yet, as far as concerns the perfection of that grade, man is distant from God by an infinite interval and immense spaces. Now this grade of intelligent nature has joined with it, naturally and necessarily, six excellent and admirable properties, all of which may be discerned in our soul. The first is, that our soul is incorporeal and indivisible; the second, that it is immortal; the third, that it is endowed with understanding, will, and memory; the fourth, that it is strong in free choice; the fifth, that it is capable of wisdom, virtue, divine grace, and eternal happiness, which is placed in the clear vision of God; the sixth, that it not only excels all living creatures in dignity, but also has dominion over them by power. On account, therefore, of this grade of intelligent nature, and the aforesaid six properties which naturally follow and perpetually accompany that grade, it was most truly said that man was made to the image and likeness of God. Nor does this our opinion differ from the holy Fathers and authors whom we mentioned a little above, except in this only, that they

adduced one or another of the aforesaid properties to explain the nature of the image, whereas all those properties concur to constitute and complete the proper and perfect nature of the image.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 377.' Margin: 'Sex proprietates naturae intelligentis.' The four grades of being (being / life / sense+motion / intelligence) and the six properties that make up the image; Pererius's synthesis of the patristic accounts.

The second reason for which man is said to have been made to the image of God (yet less so than the one called principal) is manifold. For man is said to be like God in this, that, just as in God all things are eminently and causally, so in man all things are in a manner: both by participation (for he has existence in common with inanimate things, life with plants, sense and motion with animals, mind and intelligence with God and the Angels); and also by reason of understanding, since, by understanding all things, he becomes in a manner all things. For the actually-understanding and the actually-intelligible, on Aristotle's authority, are one; wherefore the same Philosopher said that our soul is in a manner all things. Next, just as God can truly make all things, so man can in a manner make all things—whether by art, imitating nature and making things like the true, or by feigning with imagination, or by informing with the thought of the mind. Further, just as God is the end of all things, so man too seems in a manner to be the end of all corporeal things. For if Moses, a most weighty author, left it written in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy that the heavenly globes and stars, which hold the chief dignity among corporeal things, were created by God for the ministry and service of man, how much more truly may the same be thought and said of other corporeal things? Besides, just as the soul of man presides over and governs the body, vivifying, moving, and ruling it, and is whole in the whole body, and whole in eve-

Margins: 'Altera imaginis ratio minus principalis'; 'Aristoteles 3. de anima' (De anima III.4–8: the soul is 'in a manner all things'). The microcosm-account: man contains all by participation and by intellection, can make all, and is the end of corporeal things (Deut 4:19). Page breaks at 'qua-' (qualibet); catchword 'libet'; signature 'B B'. RESUME next batch at PDF 419 with 'totus in qua[libet

parte]...'.

— p. 419 (PDF) · printed p. 378 —

[whole in eve]ry part of it, without any division, diminution, or defilement of itself: so does God stand toward the whole world. Finally, just as in the Godhead we believe there is the Father, who is unbegotten, and the Son, who is begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, who is breathed forth and proceeds from the Father and the Son, so also in the race of men something similar may be observed: for Adam was begotten by no one, Eve was formed from Adam alone, and Seth was procreated from Adam and Eve.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 378.' Conclusion of Quaestio I (the soul:body and the human-race analogies to the Trinity: Adam unbegotten / Eve from Adam / Seth from both). A rule closes the question.

QUESTION II. Whether the image of God is in the World in a more perfect manner than in man.

Second question of the disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

Another question which can be treated in this place is this: Whether the World has in itself the image of God in a more perfect way than man, as Philo thought at the opening of the book he published On the Making of the Six Days. To this question the blessed Thomas, in the first part, q. 93, art. 3, responds in this manner: that the divine image can be considered in two ways. Either according to extension and diffusion, in which respect the World represents the image of the divine goodness more than man, because it embraces in its compass that whole multitude of created things, of which Moses said, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. Or according to intension and the gathering-together of perfection: in which way man bears the image of the divine majesty more than the world, because man is capable of divine happiness, and because in him, as in a brief epitome and in a kind of little world, all the marvels of the greater world are seen enclosed and contained.

Margin: 'Philonis sententia.' Philo, De opificio mundi (the world as the more perfect image); Aquinas, ST I q.93 a.3 (image by extension vs. by intension). 'Vidit Deus cuncta...valde bona' = Gen 1:31. The microcosm motif again.

It can also be answered that by the word 'world' either man and Angel are included, or they are not. If you say they are not included, I shall say that the world does not have in itself the image of God: since, with Angel and man removed, there remains in the world no intelligent nature, in which alone (as we said) the proper nature of the image is founded and rests. But if you say that by the word 'world' man and Angel too are included, the comparison will indeed be inept: for a whole is not rightly compared with some part of itself. And then, even if by extension and according to some part of itself the world should have in itself a more illustrious image of God than man, yet on this score it is surpassed by man, because the world is not some one nature, as man is, but is (as the Scholastic Philosophers and Theologians say) a kind of aggregate of many and diverse natures. But if the opinion of the Stoics and Platonists were true, who affirm that the world is a certain single living being, whose body is composed of the elements and the heavenly globes joined to-

Margin: 'Opinio Stoicorum et Platonicorum de mundo.' Pererius's twofold reply (does 'world' include man/angel?). Page breaks at 'coagmen-' (coagmentatum).

— p. 420 (PDF) · printed p. 379 —

[joined to]gether, while the soul is that by which the whole world is vivified, moved, and governed—which the Platonists called the soul of the world: if this opinion, I say, were true (which, however, we showed above in the second book to be false), Philo would by no means have erred from the truth.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 379.' Conclusion of Quaestio II (the world-soul of the Stoics/Platonists, refuted in Pererius's book 2). A rule closes the question.

QUESTION III. Whether the Angel was made more to the image of God than man.

Third question, set centered.

I answer that the image and likeness of God can be regarded in the Angel and in man either according to the natural gifts of each, or according to the gratuitous and supernatural gifts. And according to nature, there can be considered in each either the proper and principal nature of the image, or the less proper and principal—which distinction we set forth above. The Angel, therefore, according to nature and according to the proper nature of the image, has in himself the image of God more perfectly than man: for he has a more excellent grade of intelligent nature, on account of which David, in Psalm 8, said of man, Thou hast lessened him a little less than the Angels. And the principal nature of the image is placed in this, that he has a nature possessed of reason and intelligence. St. Gregory confirms this in homily 34 on the Gospels, writing thus:

Ps 8:6 ('Minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis'). By nature/principal image the Angel surpasses man. Introduces the Gregory block-quote.

> *Whence to that very Angel who was first created it is said through the Prophet, Thou wast the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty, thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God. Where it is to be noted that he is called not 'made to the likeness of God,' but 'the seal of likeness'—so that, the subtler the nature is in him, the more closely is the image of God intimated as expressed in him. Thus Gregory.*

Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia 34. The text is Ezek 28:12 (margin 'Ezech. 28'), addressed to the prince of Tyre / the fallen Angel: 'Tu signaculum similitudinis...'

But if the less-principal nature of the image be regarded—which above, in the first question, we distinguished into five parts—this shines more clearly in man than in the Angel, as is manifest to one who weighs what we said a little above. Finally, if the nature of the image be estimated in man and in the Angel from the supernatural gifts of grace and glory which are in each, man and Angel stand to each other as the exceeding and the exceeded, as

they say in the schools: since some Angels, according to grace and glory, are more like to God than most men; and, on the contrary, some men are more like to God than many Angels. Yet it can be said simply and absolutely that man is more like to God than the Angel, namely in this, that in the race of men is the God-bearer, the ever-Virgin Mary, who according to grace and glory by far surpasses all the Angels, and is therefore more like to God than any of the Angels.

Conclusion of Quaestio III: the less-principal image and the supernatural gifts; man is absolutely more like God because of the Virgin Mary, who surpasses all Angels.

— p. 421 (PDF) · printed p. 380 —

QUESTION IV. Whether woman was made to the image of God.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 380.' Fourth question, set centered beneath a rule.

The blessed Paul gives occasion for doubting, who in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter eleven, just as he expressly says that man is the image of God, so seems to signify that woman is the image not of God, but of man: for he writes thus, A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. And in the Decretals, causa 33, q. 5, it is proved by the testimonies of Augustine and Ambrose that woman is not to the image of God. But against this tells the fact that Moses, after he had introduced God saying, Let us make man to our image and likeness, at once adds, Male and female he made them, most plainly signifying that each sex was created to the image and likeness of God. Augustine treats this question at length in the twelfth book On the Trinity, chapter seven. But it can be briefly answered: If the proper and principal nature of the image be regarded, which is attended to according to the grade of intellectual nature and according to those six properties necessarily joined with that nature, then without doubt the nature of the image is equally in woman and in man. For to be a partaker of reason and intelligence, endowed with an immortal soul and free choice, and capable

of supernatural goods and eternal happiness, is equally present in each.

Margin: 'Imago Dei quomodo aequaliter esse dicatur in viro et in muliere.' Objection from 1 Cor 11:7 and Gratian, Decretum C.33 q.5 (Augustine/Ambrose); answer: by the principal image (intellectual nature + the six properties) the image is equal in both sexes. Augustine, De Trinitate 12.7.

But if the less proper and principal nature of the image be regarded, which we set forth above in treating the first question, then man is called the image of God, but woman the image of man, because, just as God is the principle and end from whom and for whom man was made, so man is the principle and end of woman: for from man and for man was woman made. Which Paul most plainly indicated in that place: for, having said that man is the image and glory of God, but woman of man, he at once subjoins as it were the reason of this, For man is not of the woman, he says, but the woman of the man; for the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man. Now, if the likeness of God in man and woman be considered not according to natural gifts, but according to the supernatural gifts of grace and glory, man and woman stand to each other as the exceeding and the exceeded: for some women may be found better and more like to God than many men; and, on the contrary, some men better and nearer to God than many women. Although it cannot be denied that among women there is found one—I mean the most blessed Virgin Mary—who has in herself a far more perfect likeness of God than any man: but I am speaking of a man who is pure man, so as to except Christ the Lord, who was at once man and God.

Margins: 'Mulier quomodo dicenda imago viri'; '1. Cor. 11.' The less-principal sense (man as principle/end of woman, 1 Cor 11:8–9); and again the Virgin Mary surpassing all men (Christ excepted).

— p. 422 (PDF) · printed p. 381 —

But in truth, what we have disputed precisely about this question in the scholastic manner must be adorned and illustrated by the fuller and more brilliant discourse of St. Basil. For he, in the tenth homily on Genesis upon

those words, Male and female he made them, having said that Moses appended these words for this reason, lest anyone should perhaps suspect that what had been said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, pertained not to the woman but to the man alone, adds:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 381.' Introduces the Basil (Hom. 10 in Genesim) block-quote affirming the woman's equal image.

> *The woman too, he says, has it no less than the man, that she was made to the image of God: the honor is for both, the nature in no way unequal, the virtues equal, for both an equal reward set before them in the contest of virtue, for both a like decreed condemnation when they sin. I would not have the woman say, I am unwarlike and of a weak condition: this weakness is of the flesh, for in the soul has been fixed a virtue firm and powerful. This divine image, therefore, since it is equally honored in each sex, let virtue also be matched in each, which through good works may exert and unfold its power. And, after a few words interposed: The good woman, then, he says, has that, To the image. I would not have you direct your mind to this external man, which is, as it were, a certain covering of the soul: the soul lies hidden within, lurking beneath this integument and the somewhat soft body—the soul, which yet in man and woman is marked with equal honor: only in these external coverings is a difference found. Thus Basil.*

Basil, Hom. 10 in Genesim. Equal image, honor, nature, virtue, reward, and condemnation in both sexes; the body is but the 'covering' of the soul, where alone the difference lies. A rule closes Quaestio IV.

QUESTION V. Whether the image of God is also in the body of man, and not only in the soul.

Fifth question, set centered.

It is most easy to resolve the proposed question by a very brief distinction. For, properly speaking, the image of God (who is incorporeal, immortal,

immutable) cannot be in an earthly, mortal body, changeable from hour to hour; yet it is in it as in a sign, or it is in it (as the Theologians speak in the schools) argumentatively and significatively. For the body of man is so shaped and figured that it evidently argues and signifies that the soul which is in it was made to the image of God: for the upright stature of the human body, the lofty face, and the countenance raised toward Heaven plainly indicate that the soul, the inhabitant of that body, was sprung from a heavenly origin, and is like to God, and capable of eternity and divinity. But these things must be confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers. That man was not made to the image of God on account of the body, both Basil in the tenth homily on Genesis and Ambrose in the eighth chapter of the sixth book of the Hexameron show in express words. But that the image of God in some way shines even in the body of man, Augustine declares in these words, in the twelfth chapter of the sixth book On Genesis according to the Letter: If God also [made] man from the earth—

The image is in the body only 'as in a sign,' argumentatively/significatively (upright stature, face to heaven). Basil (Hom. 10) and Ambrose (Hexameron 6.8) cited. The Augustine quote (De Genesi ad litteram 6.12) begins and breaks off at 'de terra'; catchword 'terra'; signature 'B B 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 423 with 'Si et hominem de terra [fecit Deus]...'.

— p. 423 (PDF) · printed p. 382 —

[If God also made man from] the earth, and the beasts also from the earth itself, what has man more excellent than they, except that he was created to the image of God? And he has this not according to the body, but according to the understanding of the mind. Although in the body itself he has a certain property which indicates this, that he was made of upright stature, so that by this very thing he might be admonished that he is not to pursue earthly things, as the cattle pursue them, whose whole pleasure is from the earth—whence all cattle are bent and prostrate toward the belly. The body of man, therefore, befits the rational soul, not according to the lineaments and shapes of the members, but rather according to that which is erected toward

> *Heaven, for beholding those things in the body of the world itself which are above: just as the rational soul ought to be raised up toward those things which in spiritual matters most excel by nature, that it may relish the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth.*

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 382.' Margin: 'Dei imago quomodo in humano corpore esse dicatur, opinio D. Augustini.' Conclusion of the Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 6.12) block-quote begun on p. 381 (the upright stature signifying the soul's heavenly orientation).

The same Augustine, in chapter seventeen of the first book On Genesis against the Manichees, when he had refuted the Manichees who insulted the Catholics as believing that man was made to the image of God as though God had the figure of a human body, and had shown that man bears the image of God not in the body but in the soul, adds:

Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.17. Introduces the next block-quote.

> *Although even our body is so fashioned as to indicate that we are better than the beasts, and on that account like to God: for the bodies of all animals, whether they live in the waters, or on the land, or fly in the air, are inclined toward the earth, and are not erect like the body of man. By which it is signified that our soul too ought to be erected toward things above, that is, toward eternal spiritual things. Thus it is understood that man was made to the image and likeness of God chiefly through the soul, the erect form of the body also bearing witness. Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.17 (the erect bodily form as witness to the soul's image).

I will not allow myself to pass over in this place what Bernard wrote to the same effect, in words exceedingly pious, eloquent, and sweet, in the twenty-fourth sermon on the Canticles: and he writes in this manner:

Introduces the Bernard (Sermones in Cantica 24) block-quote.

Therefore it was according to the soul, not according to earthly and filthy matter, that God made man upright: for he created him to his own image and likeness. And of God himself David sang, Upright is the Lord our God, and there is no iniquity in him. Now iniquity is of the heart, not a fault of the flesh, that by this you may know that it is in the spiritual portion of yourself, and not in the gross and clayey substance, that the likeness of God is to be preserved or repaired. For God is a spirit, and those who wish either to persevere or to become like to him must enter into the heart and carry on that business in the spirit: where, with face unveiled, beholding the glory of God, they are transformed into the same image from brightness to brightness, as by the Spirit of the Lord. Although God also gave man an upright bodily stature, perhaps so that this bodily, exterior, and baser uprightness of the figure might admonish that interior man, who was made to the image of God, to keep his spiritual uprightness, and the comeliness of the clay might convict the deformity of the soul. For what is more unseemly than to bear a crooked soul in an upright body? It is a perverse and foul thing that the vessel of clay (which is the body, from the earth) should have its eyes upward, gaze freely on the heavens, and delight its sight with the luminaries of the heavens; but that the spiritual and heavenly creature should, on the contrary, drag its own eyes—that is, its inner senses and affections—down to the earth, and, what ought to have been nourished in saffron robes, should cling to the mud as—

Bernard, Sermones super Cantica 24 (continues onto p. 383). 'Rectus Dominus Deus noster' = Ps 92:16 (Vulg. 91); 'revelata facie...de claritate in claritatem' = 2 Cor 3:18. Page breaks at 'tan-' (tanquam).

— p. 424 (PDF) · printed p. 383 —

[as] one of the swine, and embrace the dung. Blush, O my soul, to have exchanged the divine likeness for that of cattle; blush to wallow in the mire, you who are from Heaven. Blush, O soul (says the body)

at the consideration of me: created upright, like to my Creator, I too was given to you as a help like to you, namely according to the lineaments of bodily uprightness. Wherever you turn, whether upward to God or downward to me (for no one ever hated his own flesh), everywhere the appearance of your comeliness meets you, everywhere, according to the state of your dignity, you have a familiar admonition from the teaching of wisdom. While I, then, retain and preserve my prerogative, which I received for your sake, how are you not confounded to have lost your own? Why should the Creator behold his likeness abolished in you, when he preserves yours in me and constantly represents it to you? Now you have turned to your own confusion all the help that was owed to you from me: you abuse my obedience, you unworthily inhabit a human body, you a brutish and bestial spirit. Thus far the most honeyed words of the mellifluous Bernard, so far as they pertain to the matter at hand.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 383.' Conclusion of the Bernard (Sermones super Cantica 24) block-quote: the body's reproach to the degenerate soul. A rule closes Quaestio V.

QUESTION VI. Whether any distinction is to be made between being the image of God, and being to the image of God.

Sixth question of the disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

To most of the Theologians and to some of the Fathers it has seemed that these differ from each other. For the Son of God is said to be the image of God (so Paul calls him in the first chapter to the Colossians), but is nowhere said to have been made to the image, or according to the image, of God. These men, then, think that to be 'to the image' or likeness of God denotes an imperfect participation of the divine likeness, such as is found in man; but since the Son of God is the most perfect image of the paternal substance, he cannot therefore be said to be 'to the image' of God: for that word 'To' signifies an approach to something from which one nevertheless

differs. Hear Ambrose, writing thus upon the twenty-second chapter of Luke:

The Son = 'image' (Col 1:15); man = 'to the image' (imperfect participation); 'Ad' connotes distance. Introduces the Ambrose (on Luke 22) quote.

> *Christ alone is the full image of God, on account of the unity of the paternal brightness expressed in himself. But the just man is 'to the image' of God, if, in order to imitate the likeness of the divine manner of life, he despises this world through the knowledge of God.*

Ambrose, Expositio in Lucam (on Luke 22). The full image (Christ) vs. the 'to-the-image' (the just man). Page breaks; catchword 'Augusti' (= Augustinus).

— p. 425 (PDF) · printed p. 384 —

But Augustine, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51, signifies that the Son of God, because he substantially and most perfectly represents God the Father, is therefore most truly called the image of God, but not 'to the image' of God; whereas man, because he imperfectly represents the likeness of God, is therefore not called the image of God, but 'to the image' of God. Yet Augustine afterward corrected this in book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 26: for he had read in Paul, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. 11, that man is called the image of God; wherefore both in that place, and more expressly in book 7 of On the Trinity, last chapter, he teaches that man, because he bears the likeness of God, is called the image of God; but, because that likeness is imperfect, to show this he is said to have been made 'to the image' of God: which, however, we never find said of the Son of God. And this opinion of Augustine so pleased the scholastic Theologians that it has been approved by almost all and set forth in their writings. Read the Master in the second book of the Sentences, distinction sixteen, and the disputations of the scholastic Theologians upon that distinction, and also St. Thomas in the first part, question ninety-three. But what we have said will be made clearer by setting down Augustine's words. In the seventh book On the Trinity, then, in the last chapter, he has thus:

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 384.' Margins: 'Sententia D. Augustini de proposita quaestione quam ipse retractavit'; 'Theologi Scholastici.' Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 51, corrected at Retractationes 1.26 (because of 1 Cor 11:7); Peter Lombard Sent. II d.16; Aquinas ST I q.93. Introduces the De Trinitate 7 quote.

But because that image of God was not made altogether equal, as not born of him but created by him, to signify this it is so an image that it is 'to the image,' that is, it is not made equal by parity, but approaches by a certain likeness. For one approaches God not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and recedes from him by unlikeness. For there are those who distinguish in such a way that they would have the Son to be the image, but man not the image, but 'to the image.' But the Apostle refutes them, saying, A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God. He did not say 'to the image,' but 'image.' Yet this image, when elsewhere it is said 'To the image,' is not said as though to the Son, by which image he is equal to the Father: otherwise he would not say, To our image. For how 'our,' since the Son is the image of the Father alone? But, on account of the unequal likeness, as we said, man is called 'to the image,' and therefore 'our,' so that man might be the image of the Trinity—not equal to the Trinity as the Son is to the Father, but approaching (as has been said) by a certain likeness, just as among things distant a certain nearness is signified, not of place but of a kind of imitation. Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Trinitate 7.6 (last chapter). 'Vir non debet velare caput...imago et gloria Dei' = 1 Cor 11:7 (margin '1. Corinth. 11'). Man is 'to the image' because the likeness is unequal; he is the image of the whole Trinity by approach, not equality.

But that distinction does not seem to be perpetually observed in Scripture; nay rather, somewhere in Holy Scripture we read that something is 'to the image' of another which has its most perfect likeness, and is made equal to it. For in the fifth chapter of the book of Genesis it is written that Adam begat his son Seth 'to his own image and likeness': and it is agreed that a

son is the substantial and perfect image of the father. Why, then, is the Son of God never in Scripture said to be 'to the image' of the Father? I, for my part, believe that to be 'to the image' of someone signifies the same as to have his likeness (whether perfect or imperfect), but to have it nevertheless expressed in a different nature: different, I say, either accord-

Margin: 'Iudicium Auctoris, quid sit esse ad alterius imaginem.' Pererius's own judgment: the distinction is not consistent in Scripture (Gen 5:3, Seth, who is the father's perfect image, is yet said to be 'ad imaginem'); 'to be to the image' = to have the likeness expressed in a different nature. Page breaks at 'secun-' (secundum).

— p. 426 (PDF) · printed p. 385 —

[different, I say,] either according to species, as it is between man and God, or according to number, as it is between a father and a son. But since the Son of God has altogether the same nature as the Father, therefore he is never said to be 'to the image' of the Father, but is said only to be the image of the Father.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 385.' Conclusion of Quaestio VI: the Son, having the very same nature, is 'image' but not 'to the image.' A rule closes the question.

QUESTION VII. Whether the image of God which is in man can, on account of sin, be utterly destroyed and lost.

Seventh question, set centered.

Epiphanius, in the Epistle which he wrote to John, bishop of Jerusalem, reckons this too among the many other errors of Origen: that he said that man lost the image of God on account of sin. This Epiphanius refutes by three testimonies of Scripture: from the 9th chapter of the book of Genesis, from the thirty-eighth Psalm, and from the eleventh chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians—in which places man is said to be 'to the image of God' even after sin. But that for which Epiphanius reproves Origen, Augustine too seems once to have held, and to have left in writing in the second book against Adimantus the Manichee, ch. 5, in the book of

Eighty-Three Questions, question 67, and in the sixth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapters 27 and 28: but Augustine afterward corrected this, retracting it, as may be seen in him, in the first book of the Retractations, ch. 26, and in the second book, ch. 24.

Margin: 'Error Origenis apud Epiphanium.' Epiphanius, Epistula ad Iohannem Hierosolymitanum (preserved in Jerome, Ep. 51), on Origen's error that sin destroys the image; refuted by Gen 9:6, Ps 38 (Vulg.), 1 Cor 11:7. Augustine's earlier view (Contra Adimantum 5; De diversis quaest. 83 q.67; De Gen. ad litt. 6.27–28) retracted at Retract. 1.26 and 2.24.

But with little trouble both the proposed question may be unraveled and the sayings of these authors brought to the right sense. For we can speak in two ways of the image of God which is in man. Either as it is considered according to the natural gifts, and is placed in this, that man has a nature possessed of reason and intelligence: and in this respect the image of God is no more lost by sin than the rational or intellectual nature itself is lost; for sin does not corrupt and take away the natural gifts. Or the image of God is considered according to the supernatural gifts, namely of divine grace and heavenly glory, which indeed is the completion and consummation of the natural image: and this kind of likeness and image of God is, by sinning, utterly blotted out and destroyed. Origen, therefore, and Augustine understood the image of God to be lost by sinning, not according to substance, but as regards its beauty and perfection; or this was said by them not of the natural image, but of the gratuitous and supernatural one.

Margin: 'Solutio quaestionis.' Pererius's twofold solution: the natural image (rational nature) is not lost by sin; the supernatural image (grace/glory) is utterly destroyed. Foot of page: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'CC'; catchword 'QVAE' (= Quaestio). RESUME next batch at PDF 427 with the next Quaestio.

— p. 427 (PDF) · printed p. 386 —

QUESTION VIII. Whether the things that lack reason bear the image of God, or can be said to have been made to the image of God.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 386.' Eighth question of the disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

The answer is to be made by denying that anything, except the Angel and man, is (if we wish to speak properly) 'to the image of God': for not any likeness whatever, even if it be derived from another, suffices to constitute the nature of an image. For if that likeness be only according to genus, or according to some common accident, that likeness will not constitute the nature of an image: for a worm born from a man, and like to him according to the generic nature of an animal, will not be called the image of a man; nor, if something be made white to match another thing that is white, can it on that account be said to be the image of it, or 'to its image.' It is necessary, therefore, that, for something to be truly said to be the image of another, it should bear in itself a likeness of that other expressed from it—a likeness, I say, either according to species (as the image of a king is in his son), or at least according to some accident proper to that species, but especially according to figure (as the image of a king is said to be either painted in a picture, or expressed in silver, or in any other material). And the likeness of species must be regarded according to the ultimate grade and differentia of the thing. Things, therefore, devoid of reason and intelligence can indeed be assimilated to God according to existence, life, and the lowest mode of knowing, which is through the senses; but the supreme grade of mind and intelligence they by no means attain—in which grade, however (as was said above), properly consists the nature of the likeness which is between God and man.

Margin: 'Quid constituat veram rationem imaginis.' The criterion of a true image: a likeness of species (or proper accident, esp. figure), regarded by the ultimate differentia.

From which it may be understood that in the things that have not the power of understanding there is not the image of God; yet they are said to have the vestige of God, for so the Theologians speak in the schools. For they think this is the difference between image and vestige: that the image represents a thing according to the likeness of species, but the vestige represents by

way of effect, which so refers to its cause that it nevertheless by no means attains a likeness of its species. For the imprints left in the sand or dust by the movement of animals are called their vestiges; and the devastation and desolation of some region is the vestige of the hostile army that ravaged it. Man, therefore, because he not only exists, lives, and feels, but also, like God, understands and is wise, reaching the grade of the divine nature, is on that account rightly called the image of God. But the animals, and all corporeal things except man, because they have not the power of understanding, do not bear the image of God, but there is discerned in them a kind of vestige of divinity: for their arrangement, determination, and the wonderful associa-

Margin: 'Quid sit vestigium Dei.' The scholastic image/vestige distinction (image = likeness of species; vestige = the trace of an effect): animal tracks, an army's devastation. Page breaks at 'consocia-' (consociationem).

— p. 428 (PDF) · printed p. 387 —

[the wonderful associa]tion of all things among themselves becomes manifest to those who contemplate it: namely, that they were established from the beginning by divine reason, intelligence, and wisdom, and are perpetually contained and governed. For there must have been a Mind, and that a most wise one, which founded so many and so great things, and things so diverse among themselves (out of which this world stands wonderfully compacted), in weight and number and measure, and which, holding them bound by a certain admirable covenant, as by the bridle of its providence, rules and moderates them at its own will.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 387.' Conclusion of Quaestio VIII (the world's order as the vestige of divine wisdom; 'in pondere et numero et mensura' = Wisdom 11:21). A rule closes the question.

A MORAL DIGRESSION. Why God made man to his own image.

Title of the moral digression appended to the questions on the image, set centered.

But it pleases me here, as a kind of close to the foregoing questions which we have explained concerning the image of God, to add a certain moral disputation, on the causes why God fashioned man to his own image and likeness. And we can indeed adduce several, and very probable, causes of this matter.

Introduction to the seven 'causes' (causae).

Let the FIRST CAUSE, then, be this. God made man like to himself, that it might be plain how great is the difference between God's goodness and kindness and man's malignity and envy. For man, if he excels in anything (such as riches, power, nobility, honors, and wisdom), would not wish any other man to be his equal, or even his like, in that thing; but so great is God's goodness, and so wholly devoid of envy, that he made man capable and a partaker of the very things in which he himself excels; and in whatever ways man could be like God, in all those he made man like to himself. For he made him like to himself according to nature, by raising him to the supreme grade of nature in which he himself is, namely by giving him a nature possessed of reason; then according to supernatural and divine goods, by making him a partaker and consort of his grace, wisdom, and happiness; and finally by joining the nature of man to himself into the unity of the divine person, so that man not only is like God, but is even both called and is God.

Margin: 'Septem causae cur Deus hominem fecerit ad imaginem suam.' First cause: God's envy-free bounty, making man like himself by nature, by grace, and (in the Incarnation) by hypostatic union.

SECOND CAUSE. That all corporeal things might reverence man, as bearing in himself so illustrious and express an image of God, the founder and ruler of all. So God said to Noah, in Genesis 9, Let the fear and dread of you be upon all the animals of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, etc. And lest the heavens and the stars should disdain to serve man, or even the Angels to minister to him; and finally lest the demons should dare to harm man, or all creatures, because of man's rebellion against God,

should rise up against him: God willed to mark and fortify man with his own image. A figure of this was what is read in chapter 4 of the book of Genesis, that God set a sign upon Cain, lest anyone who found him, and saw the sign of God upon him, should dare to kill him. And just as

Second cause: man, bearing God's image, is revered and protected by all creatures. Gen 9:2 (Noah); Gen 4:15 (the sign on Cain). Page breaks; catchword 'Ioseph' (the Joseph/Mordecai example, completed on p. 388).

— p. 429 (PDF) · printed p. 388 —

[And just as] the Egyptians honored and venerated Joseph the patriarch, and the Persians and Medes Mordecai the Jew, because they bore the insignia of kings (the former of Egypt, the latter of the Persians and Medes), so all creatures cherish and reverence man, marked and adorned with the image of God.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 388.' Conclusion of the second cause (the Joseph and Mordecai analogy; cf. Gen 41:42; Esther 8:15).

THIRD CAUSE. God had given all things to man, but he willed man himself nevertheless to be of divine right and possession: wherefore, that man might be recognized as something proper and peculiar to God, he sealed him with the seal of his own image, so deeply and tenaciously impressed that, while man's nature remains, that seal could in no way be removed. Just as it is recorded that the most renowned Phidias made the shield of Minerva, and enclosed in it his own likeness with such art that it could not be taken out without destroying the whole shield. Man, therefore, bears the image of God: as a son does his father's, to whom he owes love and piety; as a slave his master's, whom he ought to fear and reverence; as a soldier his general's and commander's, to whom he ought to render faith and obedience; and finally as a minister and steward of the goods of his lord and master, to whom he ought to render a right use of the creatures committed to his stewardship.

Margin: 'Opus Phidiae nobilissimum.' Third cause: the indelible seal of God's image (Phidias's self-portrait in Minerva's shield); man's fourfold relation to God (son, slave, soldier, steward).

FOURTH CAUSE. Just as, because no animal was found like to Adam, with whom he might have society and friendship and familiarity, God created Eve as his companion, so, when all corporeal things had been created, since there was none like to God, and with whom God might enter into society and familiarity, he made man like to himself, that there might be one whom God might love and by whom in turn he might be loved with the love of friendship. And of the other things, indeed, when God beheld them made by himself, he is said to have approved them: God saw, says Scripture, all the things that he had made, and they were very good; but of man God spoke far otherwise through Solomon, in the eighth of Proverbs, saying, My delights were to be with the children of men. The rest, therefore, God praised and approved as good; but man alone he willed to love as a friend, and to have, as it were, familiar fellowship with, and to be a partaker of his happiness. Rightly, therefore, Job, in chapter 7, marveling at so great a benevolence and kindness of God toward man, exclaimed: What is man that thou magnifiest him? or why dost thou set thy heart toward him? Thou visitest him at daybreak, etc. That 'Thou visitest' denotes the society, conversation, and familiarity of God with man; and that 'Thou settest thy heart toward him' signifies the love of friendship with which God deigns to embrace man. But to Job's wonder we can rightly answer that God visits man, and sets his heart toward him, because God made man to his own image and likeness: for likeness conciliates love and cements friendship.

Fourth cause: friendship with God (man as the only creature like God). Gen 2:18–22 (Eve as companion); Gen 1:31; Prov 8:31 ('Deliciae meae...cum filiis hominum'); Job 7:17–18 ('Quid est homo...').

FIFTH CAUSE. All things that have been created by God and are contained within the compass of the World lead man (contemplating them, as is fitting) to the know-

Fifth cause begins (the world leading man to the knowledge of God). Page breaks at 'cogni-' (cognitionem).

— p. 430 (PDF) · printed p. 389 —

[to the] knowledge of God, their maker. For the invisible things of God, as Paul testifies, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made—his eternal power also and divinity. But, lest man be forced to seek and ask the knowledge of God outside himself and from afar, God placed within man, in his very soul, a most beautiful effigy and image of himself, which alone, more expressly than all other things together, declares the power and nature of God. Beholding, therefore, this image of God within himself, man knows through it what God is like: for, because man's soul is like God, whatever the soul is imperfectly, that God must be esteemed to be perfectly, with all imperfection removed. And so, as our soul is, so God is intelligent, strong in free will, full of virtue, grace, and wisdom, preserving, ruling, and containing the world, as the soul does its own body.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 389.' Conclusion of the fifth cause: 'invisibilia Dei...à creatura mundi...conspiciuntur' = Rom 1:20; the image within the soul as the nearest mirror of God.

SIXTH CAUSE. Man was made to the image of God for this reason, that man might be in some way capable of eternity, infinity, and divinity; and that there should be no good so great that man would not dare to ask it of God, and hope to obtain it from him. For we can confidently say to God: Lord, fill with thy goods this infinite capacity of our mind and will, which thou hast given us: for if thou dost not allow anything to be void in nature, but willest all places to be occupied and filled with bodies, how much less art thou to be thought to will anything to be void in our soul? Thou, therefore, who alone canst fill our desire with good things, fill our will, which nothing but thee alone can fill and satisfy. Just as, then, a vessel of round shape cannot be filled in every part except by a body likewise round, so neither can the soul of man, made to the image of God, be filled and satisfied except by God alone, to whom it is like.

Sixth cause: the soul's infinite capacity, fillable only by God (the Augustinian 'cor inquietum'; nature's abhorrence of a void applied to the soul). 'Reple in bonis desiderium nostrum' echoes Ps 103:5 (Vulg.).

SEVENTH CAUSE. Just as a King, having founded a city, places his own image in a famous spot in the midst of it, made of some choice and precious material, so that it may be manifest to all who behold it who was the founder of that city: so God, having fashioned the world, placed his own effigy in the midst of it—that is, in man, who is a kind of middle thing among the things founded by God—so that, from the sight and contemplation of him, it might be open and manifest to all what the fashioner and maker of this world was like. And just as Apelles, prevented by death, could not finish the image of Venus he had begun, and no painter was afterward found who might succeed to the work according to the prescribed lineaments (for the beauty of the face took away the hope of imitating the rest of the body), as Cicero relates at the opening of the third book On Duties, and Pliny in book 35, chapter 10: in like manner God, through creation, gave man his own image, but an imperfect one, which nevertheless nothing else but God (not even man himself, nor even an Angel) could polish to completion and finish: for this is proper to God, who, the image he began through crea-

Seventh cause: man as the central image revealing the world's Maker; the unfinished Venus of Apelles (Cicero, De officiis 3.2; Pliny, Naturalis historia 35.10) as a figure of the image only God can complete. Page breaks at 'crea-' (creationem); catchword 'tionem'; signature 'CC 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 431 with 'quam imaginem inchoavit per crea[tionem]...'.

— p. 431 (PDF) · printed p. 390 —

[the image he began through crea]tion, he polishes and adorns it through justification, and brings it to completion and consummates it through glorification. As, therefore, one would be held guilty of treason, and worthy of the extreme penalty, who should cast down the image of the king set in a public and frequented place and treat it insultingly, so he who befouls and stains with crimes the image of God set and expressed in

himself, and, as far as in him lies, destroys and blots it out, deserves, as one injurious and contumelious toward God, the gravest punishments.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 390.' Conclusion of the seventh cause and of the Moral Digression: God begins the image by creation, polishes it by justification, completes it by glorification; defacing it is a treason against God.

CHAPTER 1, VERSE 26. And let him rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and all the earth, and every creeping thing that moveth upon the earth.

Section lemma (Gen 1:26c, the grant of dominion), set centered in italic. Margin: 'Cap. 1. et Vers. 26.'

What Alexander the Great so greatly coveted, with a certain mad lust of ruling, that he might obtain the empire of the whole world, this very thing, and indeed much more, was granted by God to the first man, as soon as he was created. And aptly Moses, after he had said that man was made to the image of God, next set down that dominion and command over all living things was given to him: since it was most fitting that, whom God had made like to himself in dignity of nature, he should make like to himself also in the authority and power of ruling; for dignity, destitute of the protection of power, is, as it were, unarmed and weak, and little by little grows cheap. Then, by this one argument especially Moses wished to declare that man was made to the image of God: that, just as God presides over and commands the whole world, so man, as God's vicar, presides over and rules all the animals. What of this, that by the very thing whereby man bears the image of God—I mean mind, reason, and prudence—he also presides over and rules the animals? For man does not excel the animals by tallness of body, or strength, or agility, or length of life, or excellence of the senses (in these things, indeed, he is inferior to many animals), but in reason, counsel, and prudence he surpasses them all. Therefore, not by strength of body but of mind, and by the powers of reason and prudence, he captures, tames, adapts to his own uses, and compels to obey and serve him the animals of every kind, even the strongest, the craftiest, and the fiercest.

Margin: 'Cur dominatus in omnes animantes datus fuerit primo homini.' Why dominion was given to the first man: dignity needs power; man as God's vicar; he rules by reason, not bodily strength.

Nor is it idle that, among the animals over which Moses relates that man was set by God, he mentions the fishes in the first place. Namely, because these seem the least docile of all living things, the least capable of human command, and the least sharers of our intercourse and discipline. But if man nevertheless presides over them, how much more is he to be believed to preside over the other animals? And of this human command over the fishes there exist even now indications neither few nor obscure. For, when a man walks near the water, at the sight of his shadow they tremble

Margin: 'Cur pisces primo loco dicantur subiecti homini.' Why fish are named first (the least tractable of animals). Page breaks; catchword 'pidant' (= trepidant).

— p. 432 (PDF) · printed p. 391 —

[the fishes] tremble and take to flight, like slaves running about in confusion at home at the unexpected arrival and sight of their master: which Basil pursues in many and eloquent words in the ninth homily on Genesis. Dolphins, a creature of incredible swiftness and great strength, wonderfully love and watch for man, and are eager in every way to gratify, obey, and serve him. And is not that a thing of the highest wonder which Pliny relates in book eight, ch. 25, about the Tentyrites—named from an island of the Nile on which that people dwell? who, though they be of small body, are yet the greatest terror to the Crocodile, the most terrible of all animals: nay more, swimming in the river and set upon the backs of the Crocodiles like riders, with a club thrust into them as they gape with head thrown back for the bite, holding its extremities on either side with right hand and left, they drive them like bridled captives onto the land; and, terrifying them by voice alone, they compel them to disgorge for burial the bodies recently swallowed. And so to that one island alone the Crocodiles do not swim, and at the smell of men of that race they are put to flight, as serpents at the smell of the Psylli.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 391.' Margin: 'Mira vis gentis Tentyritarum adversus Crocodilos.' Basil, Hom. 9 in Genesim; Pliny, Naturalis historia 8.25 (the Tentyrites who master crocodiles; the snake-charming Psylli).

Theodoret, in the questions which he wrote on Genesis, question twenty, judges that those huge fishes which we call sea-monsters and whales were not made for man's sake, nor subject to his command. I will set down his words here.

Margin: 'Theodoretus refellitur putans Cetos non esse factos propter hominem, nec eius imperio subiectos.' Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim q. 20. Introduces the Theodoret block-quote.

> *It is to be noted, he says, that not all animals were created for man's sake, but only those which he is said to rule: namely the fishes of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle of the earth, and perhaps also the creeping things of the earth, on account of the necessary use of the medicines made from them; but those huge sea-monsters and the wild land-beasts were not made for man's sake. And, with certain things interposed, Theodoret thus concludes: Man, therefore, does not rule those huge sea-monsters, nor the beasts, which perhaps were not from the beginning created for his sake. And something like what is here said by Moses, David hands down in the eighth Psalm, saying: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, moreover the beasts of the field, the birds of the air and the fishes of the sea that pass through the paths of the sea. For here too the sea-monsters and the wild beasts are passed over. Thus Theodoret.*

Theodoret, Quaest. in Gen. q. 20, with Pererius's framing ('Et interiectis quibusdam, ita concludit'). The Psalm is Ps 8:7–9 ('Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius...').

His opinion is by no means to be approved, since, for the same cause for which man rules the animals (namely, on account of mind, reason, and prudence), it must be confessed that he rules all living things. For in reason and prudence man surpasses the wild beasts and the sea-monsters just as much as the other animals. And Moses includes the sea-monsters under the

word 'fishes of the sea,' just as under the word 'beasts' he includes also all wild beasts. And to deny that the sea-monsters and wild beasts are for man's sake—when Moses, in the fourth of Deuteronomy, says that even the sun and moon and all the stars were created by God for the ministry and service of man, and when we not rarely see sea-monsters and wild beasts captured and tamed by man and adapted to his uses—is in no way probable. Theodoret might have read and revered Basil (most renowned among all for the glory of his holiness and wisdom), who manifestly oppos-

Pererius's refutation of Theodoret: the same rational pre-eminence grounds dominion over all; Moses includes sea-monsters and beasts under his terms; Deut 4:19 (sun/moon/stars made for man's service). Page breaks at 'adversan-' (adversantem).

— p. 433 (PDF) · printed p. 392 —

[mani]festly opposes this opinion of his. For he, in the tenth homily on Genesis, when he was speaking of the power that was given to man over the fishes, addressing man himself, writes thus:

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 392.' Introduces the Basil (Hom. 10 in Genesim) block-quote on dominion over the great fish.

> *Since thou perceivest so great a power of reason granted to thee, passing through and penetrating all things and overcoming all, how shall the faculty of commanding even the whales not be at thy disposal? Indeed I have seen the admirable skill of men in catching whales, and an artifice exceedingly ingenious. And after Basil had recounted the wonderful method and art of catching whales, he adds: And so this sea-monster, so huge and wild, with almost no trouble, drawn captive by the hook that clings the more tenaciously, tamed and overcome by the genius and industry of man, and made the prey of a fisherman (the huge pressed by the slight, the warlike by the unwarlike)—for what reason is this? Surely man, endowed by the rich and abounding power of reason with sovereignty over any animals*

whatsoever, compels them, like criminal, fugitive, and rebellious slaves, to return to obedience and servitude. Those animals, therefore, which are not tamed by their natural ferocity, these are compelled even by very necessity to wait upon and serve their Commander. By these arguments, surely, it shines forth that the power of commanding all the rest has been conferred by God himself upon man, set up wherever throughout the nations. And hence it has come about that the whale and all the monsters of the sea—horrible at the mere mention of their names—are made subject and laid low under the rule and dominion of man. Thus Basil.

Basil, Hom. 10 in Genesim (with Pererius's connective 'Postquam autem...subdit'). The whale tamed by the fisherman as proof that God gave man dominion over all.

This opinion of ours and of Basil is confirmed by the authority of the blessed James, who in chapter 3 of his Epistle affirms that every nature of beasts and birds and serpents and the rest is tamed and has been tamed by human nature.

James 3:7 ('Omnis enim natura bestiarum...domatur et domita est a natura humana').

A DISPUTATION ON THE DOMINION of man over the animals, before and after sin.

Title of the new disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

But in truth, the dominion of man over the animals must here be disputed more subtly and accurately, and that question handled: What this dominion of man was in the state of innocence before sin, and what of it remained after sin. But before all things, that distinction of dominion must be noted: into the right or power of dominion, and into the use or execution of it. Concerning the right and power of man's dominion over the animals in the state of innocence, there is no doubt at all. For this Scripture teaches in clear words in this place, saying, Let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air; and in the eighth Psalm, Thou hast crowned him with

glory and honor, and hast set him over the works of thy hands; thou hast subjected all things under his feet; and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter seventeen, where it is described what manner of man was created by God, among other things this too is said: He gave him power over the things that are upon the earth, he put the fear of him upon all flesh, and he had dominion over beasts and fowls. This very thing God willed to declare and confirm, when he brought all

Margin: 'Ius hominis super animantes in statu innocentiae.' The disputation's plan and the right/use distinction; the right of dominion in innocence proved from Gen 1:26; Ps 8:6–7; Ecclus 17:2–3. Page breaks; catchword 'cunctas' (cunctas animantes, on p. 393).

— p. 434 (PDF) · printed p. 393 —

[he brought] all the living things to Adam, that he might impose names upon all and each: by this act, as it were, handing over to Adam the possession of that dominion which he had over the animals, and as it were bringing it about that all the living things, each receiving its own name from Adam, should in a manner pledge to him subjection, obedience, and servitude. This too is at once an indication and an argument of the matter: that Eve did not shrink from the sight, the meeting, and the conversation of the serpent—namely, she knew that all the living things were at that time harmless to man, and were subjected by God under his dominion and servitude.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 393.' The naming of the animals (Gen 2:19–20) as a taking of possession; Eve's fearlessness of the serpent as a sign of the animals' subjection in innocence.

There is added, to confirm this, a very firm and probable reason. For the rectitude of the natural order, and the reason of divine providence, demands that the things which are more imperfect be subjected to the more perfect, and the lower be ruled by the higher. We see that matter is for the sake of form, and the more imperfect forms for the sake of other more perfect ones; the elements themselves for the sake of the compound, and inanimate compounds for the sake of animals; and the same is perceived in the use of

the things themselves. For the elements and compounds go to the use of the nourishment of plants, plants are nourishment for animals, and both for men. Add that for ruling and commanding there is need of reason and prudence and counsel: these in the brutes are either nonexistent, or only diminished and shadowy; in man there is true, express, and universal prudence. As, therefore, among men, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Politics, it is just that those should preside and rule over others who excel in reason and prudence, so among the animals the sovereignty and command ought by right to have been committed to man. And for this cause man was brought forth by nature naked and unarmed and destitute of all things, because for clothing, arming, equipping, and adorning him both the animals and all other corporeal things were made and provided by God.

The natural-order argument (the more perfect rules the less; matter→form, elements→compound, plants→animals→man); Aristotle, Politics 1 (the rational should rule); man born naked so that all things serve him.

Now this power and right of dominion remained in man even after sin, since it is owed to man on account of the excellence of his rational nature; and the dignity of such a nature man did not lose through sin: for sin does not destroy the natural goods, nor does man, by sinning, lose the image of God naturally expressed in his soul, on account of which especially he is said to preside over and rule all the animals. What of this, that even after the flood God said to Noah and his sons, Let the fear and dread of you be upon all the animals of the earth, and upon all the birds of the air, with all that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand? And indeed, unless man had power over the animals after sin, the hunting and killing of wild animals would not be lawful for any man, as Aristotle affirms in the first book of the Politics; but it is just and lawful to capture and kill such animals, and, as that which is naturally one's own, to convert them to one's own uses as each will. Therefore, [after] sin, power and command remained in man.

Margins: 'Ius dominij in Animalia remansit in homine etiam post peccatum'; 'Genes. 9.' The right of dominion survives sin (it follows on the rational nature, undestroyed by sin); Gen 9:2; Aristotle, Politics 1 (the natural lawfulness of hunting). The printed 'Ergo peccatum' apparently drops 'post' (bracketed).

It follows that we should next treat of the possession and use of this command over the ani-

Transition to the question of the possession and use (as distinct from the right) of dominion. Page breaks at 'ani-' (animalia); catchword 'in ani'; signature 'DD'. RESUME next batch at PDF 435 with 'de possessione et usu imperij huius in ani[malia]...'.

— p. 435 (PDF) · printed p. 394 —

[let us speak of the possession and use of this command] over the animals. And indeed, before sin, and in that blessed state of Innocence, the use of this dominion was fullest and amplest, and the least laborious or difficult: for there was, on man's side, no impediment or difficulty, nor any resistance in the animals. This the Fathers held and have set forth in writing, all who have interpreted this passage in published Commentaries, and all the Theologians who have disputed about this command and dominion of man. For they teach that the animals were subject and obedient to man in the state of innocence, just as man's lower part was subject to the higher—that is, to reason and will. As, therefore, reason then most fully and entirely ruled the senses and the affections, so man ruled the animals.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 394.' Turns from the right of dominion to its use; in innocence the use was full and effortless, mirroring reason's full rule over the passions.

And lest perhaps this should seem incredible to later generations, God gave some signs and proofs of it both before and after sin. For to bring all the living things to Adam—what was it but to signify that he was the prince and lord of the animals, that it was his to rule and command the living things, but theirs to be subject and to serve man, and to obey his commands? After sin also, animals of every kind were led to Noah and

brought into the ark, where they were not only not harmful to him, but subject and obedient. To Elisha the bears obeyed, in vengeance on the boys who had insultingly mocked him; and Daniel dwelt familiarly, much less unharmed, with the hungry lions for many days. We read that to St. Francis and St. Anthony of Padua the fishes, birds, and certain other living things were attentive and obedient at their word. But this was the difference between man's state before sin and after sin: that this obedience of the animals, before sin, would have been perpetual, and (as the Theologians call it) ordinary and without miracle, and toward all men; but after sin it is extraordinary, and does not happen without a great miracle, and for a short time, and only among certain most holy men.

Margin: '4. Reg. 2. Da. 6. et 14.' Signs of the dominion: the naming of the animals; the ark; Elisha's bears (2 Kings 2:24); Daniel's lions (Dan 6; 14 [Bel and the Dragon]); SS. Francis and Anthony of Padua. The before/after-sin difference: ordinary vs. miraculous obedience.

But this has a difficulty: how, in the state of innocence, the animals were capable of human command, and how even those which are fiercest nevertheless obeyed man. For it is not to be supposed that the animals then were, or would be, endowed with reason, so as to understand both what man commanded and how his command and orders were to be carried out: for man's nature, much less the animals', was not in any part changed because of sin. But this knot can be untied in two ways. For we can suppose that by man's supreme skill, prudence, and industry it came about—or ought to have come about—in the state of innocence, that all the living things were subjected to his command. For there would have been in man an excellent acuteness and skill of mind, perfect prudence, the highest industry, and a most complete knowledge of the natural properties and habits of each of the animals: man would have known the disposition and power of each animal, and would have thoroughly understood all the ways and means by which even the fiercest and most savage animals could be soothed, tamed, and brought under his power

Margin: 'Quomodo animalia omnia erant subiecta et obedientia homini ante peccatum.' The difficulty (the fierce animals were not rational) and the first solution: man's perfect knowledge of every animal's nature. Page breaks; catchword 'testatem' (= potestatem).

— p. 436 (PDF) · printed p. 395 —

[brought under the] power of man. For by most certain experiments it is found that some are tamed, and captured and handled with no trouble, either by incantations (as serpents—as is said of the asp in Psalm 57), or by the juices of herbs or other medicated drinks or foods: for that the ferocity of the Elephant is softened by a draught of barley-juice, Pliny is the author, in book eight. By this means, therefore, man in the state of innocence would have commanded all the living things, just as he now commands the animals that are most domestic and familiar, like the dog and the horse.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 395.' Margin: 'Elephantum quomodo mitigari tradat Plinius.' The serpent-charming of Ps 58:5 (Vulg. 57); the elephant calmed by barley-juice (Pliny, NH 8).

Now it is to be known that in four ways it can be brought about that an animal, however savage and truculent, be tamed and reduced under the power and use of man. First, as we said, by certain occult means, which consist of certain words and chants and are called incantations, as is evident in serpents. Second, by a change of climate and a variation of the accustomed food: for if lions be transferred to very cold regions, and be fed and fattened on softer and better food, little by little the ferocity of the leonine temper is relaxed, and its strength and ardor of spirit are diminished, and it becomes day by day lazier and more cowardly and weaker. Moreover, they put off their rage and ferocity toward those by whom they are cared for, fed, and kindly treated, to whom not only do they do no harm, but with them they even play familiarly and fawn upon them; nay, they suffer themselves to be beaten by them—of which thing Pliny recounts very many and wonderful examples in lions and elephants, in book eight. And although no kind of animal is more hostile and inimical to man than serpents, and among these the asp (of which it is written in the song of Moses, Deuteronomy 32, The venom of asps is incurable),

nevertheless Pliny relates, in book 10, chapter 74, a wonderful story about a certain asp living most familiarly at someone's house. Thus he writes:

Margin: '...dis posse animalia etiam saevissima mitigari et subiici homini.' The four modes of taming (incantation, climate/diet, kindness, art); the incurable asp-venom (Deut 32:33). Introduces the Pliny (NH 10.74) asp-story.

> *Let the marvel of the asp be credited to Phylarchus. For he is the author that, when an asp, coming to a certain man's table in Egypt, was regularly fed, it brought forth young, of which one killed the son of the host; and that the asp, having returned to its accustomed meal, understood the fault, and inflicted death on that young one, and never afterward returned beneath that roof. Thus Pliny.*

Pliny, Naturalis historia 10.74 (96), citing Phylarchus: the asp that punished its own offspring for killing the host's son.

Lastly, art, industry, and habituation can do so much that not only are the animals compelled to obey man, but they are also trained to comply with his words and every nod, and to do his bidding: nay, we have even taught magpies and parrots to speak human words. The second reason, by which it can be supposed that the animals were subject to man in the state of innocence, is wholly drawn from and depends on a certain singular providence and care of God toward man (set in the state of innocence), by which it would wonderfully have come about that the animals not only did man no harm, but were subject and obedient. For just as the fact that no thing could then bring man any detriment or trouble is to be referred to a certain special custody and protection of God, so too must we think of the subjection and obedience of all the living things. And this so singular provi-

The fourth mode (art/training; talking magpies and parrots) and the second, providential solution (a special divine custody in innocence). Page breaks at 'provi-' (providentiam).

— p. 437 (PDF) · printed p. 396 —

[provi]dence over the animals God exercised through the Angels, by whose ministry it came about that, as far as was needful, the animals were subject and obedient to man's will and command, without impediment, without difficulty, and without resistance. For through the Angels we believe that the living things were brought to Adam, that he might impose names on each, and to Noah, that he might rescue and preserve them, brought into the ark, from the destruction of the flood. And that which God sometimes did with a vast miracle, to set off the holiness of his servants—that the animals obeyed them at their will and nod—this would, in the state of innocence, have been done and customary toward all men.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 396.' The providential solution worked through the ministry of Angels (the naming of the animals; the gathering to the ark).

But after the fall of Adam, and human nature despoiled of the grace of that primeval innocence and original justice, this command of man over the animals was, as regards its use and execution, greatly diminished and narrowed: for we can command but few of the animals, and these not without great labor. Hugh of St. Victor, in his Annotations on Genesis, noted that through sin man lost dominion over two kinds of animals: namely over the largest animals, such as Lions, Tigers, Panthers (that he might thereby understand that he had been deprived of that excellent power of dominion which he had received from God); and then also over the smallest and vilest animals, such as flies, fleas, and gnats, which can be tamed and subjected to our command less than those larger and fiercer ones: that from this we might recognize into how great vileness man had fallen and been cast down through sin. Wherefore God, in order to punish the Egyptians, sent against them not Lions or Tigers, but flies, gnats, and locusts.

Margin: 'Quomodo post peccatum diminutum sit hominis imperium in animalia.' The diminished dominion after sin (Hugh of St. Victor: loss of the largest and the smallest); the plagues of Egypt (flies, gnats, locusts) as instruments of God.

Nevertheless, in this very chastisement and abasement of man by God there shines a certain wonderful goodness and kindness of his toward man. For, as Chrysostom rightly notes, in the 12th homily on Genesis, God withdrew the animals from man's command in such wise that those which pertained more to declaring the excellence of man's power than to his utility (such as the great and savage animals) he withdrew from his obedience, but left those which could be of profit, or aid, or ornament, or even of delight to man: such as are sheep and oxen, dogs and horses, apes and parrots, and very many other things of that kind. Cajetan, from the fact that Moses relates that God said of man, Let him rule over all the earth, argues that there is no part of the earth not subject to man's dominion; yet he does not wish it to be concluded from this that every part of the earth is habitable, or to be inhabited, by man. For the whole land, of which someone is said to be lord, is not inhabited by him, but part he inhabits, part he leaves for sowing crops, vines, trees, vegetables, part for pastures, part for the dwelling of animals, and part, finally, for groves and woods for timber. In Cicero, in the second book On the Nature of the Gods, Balbus proves, in a discourse goodly long, learned, and elegant, that all the living things are generated for man's

Margin: 'Caietanus in Genesim.' God's kindness even in the loss (Chrysostom, Hom. 12: the useful animals left to man); Cajetan on 'over all the earth' (dominion ≠ habitability); Cicero, De natura deorum 2 (Balbus, the Stoic teleology). Page breaks; catchword 'nem' (= hominem).

— p. 438 (PDF) · printed p. 397 —

[for man's] sake to be generated, and that very many of them, without man's governance and care, either cannot exist at all, or cannot exist well.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 397.' Conclusion of the Ciceronian (Balbus) argument that the animals exist for man and need man's care.

But someone may perhaps ask whether in the state of innocence not only man would rule over the brutes, but man also over man? For an argument seems drawable from this place to prove that man in that state would not

command another man, because God, declaring the command that man was to have, said that he would command the fishes, the birds, and the land animals; but of any command that he was to have over men he said not a word—he who would doubtless have said so, if there were to be in that state any command of man over man. Next, the reason why man rules the brutes is (as we showed above) that man is rational and made to the image of God; but this was equally present in all men; there was therefore no reason why man should command man. Besides, to be subjected to the command of others, and to depend on another's judgment and will, since it is against the natural appetite for liberty, cannot but be to man involuntary, violent, bitter, and hateful: it would therefore have been far from that most happy state. To this is added that servitude among men seems to have been born of sin: for, as it is written in the ninth chapter of the book of Genesis, Noah, first of all, on account of the sin of his son Ham, punished his descendants with the penalty of servitude; and to Eve, as a penalty for sin, it was said, Thou shalt be under the power of the man, and he shall have dominion over thee. Augustine too seems to have been of this opinion, who, in book 19 of the City of God, chapter 15, writes in this manner:

Margin: 'An in statu innocentiae homo homini dominaretur.' The case against rule of man over man in innocence: Scripture names only dominion over animals; the equal rational nature; servitude as against the appetite for liberty; servitude born of sin (Gen 9:25, Ham; Gen 3:16, Eve). Introduces the Augustine (De civitate Dei 19.15) quote.

> *He willed that the rational creature, made to his own image, should rule over none but the irrational—not man over man, but man over the beast. Hence the first just men were made shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men: that even thus God might intimate what the order of creatures demanded, and what the desert of sins exacts. For the condition of servitude is rightly understood to be imposed on the sinner. Accordingly, nowhere in the Scriptures do we read of a 'servant' before Noah the just punished his son's sin with this word; and so that name was earned by fault, not by nature. Thus from Augustine.*

Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.15 (that by nature God set man over beasts only, not man over man; 'servant' first appears at Gen 9:25).

Nevertheless, that in that state of innocence some men would have had command over others can be persuaded by reasons neither few nor weak. First, since in that state the human race was to be multiplied numerously, and since by his nature man is a sociable animal (that is, rejoicing in the society of men, and loving human fellowship and intercourse), and since it is better for man, for every use and cultivation and pleasantness of life, to live in society than in solitude, there would doubtless then have been a gathering and association of men with men; and lest any disturbance and confusion should be in so great a multitude of men, there had to be in it some order of superiors and inferiors—of some ruling, and being ruled by others, in short of some commanding and others doing the commands: especially since in that state too some would have been more excellent than others in prudence and probity, and more fit for ruling; therefore it was fitting

Margin: 'Etiam in statu innocentiae alios aliis imperaturos fuisse.' The affirmative case begins (against the foregoing): man is a social animal, a multitude needs order, and the more prudent are fit to rule even in innocence. Page breaks at 'consentaneum'; catchword 'erat'; signature 'DD 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 439 with 'ergo consentaneum erat...'.

— p. 439 (PDF) · printed p. 398 —

[it was therefore fitting] that those should rather preside and rule over the others. Next, among the most holy, most wise, and most blessed Angels it is certain that some are superior and some inferior, and that those command what is to be done, while these carry out their orders. For among the orders of Angels, four took their name from the excellence of sovereignty and dominion—I mean the Archangels, Principalities, Powers, and Dominations. Daniel, moreover, in chapter eight, and Zechariah in chapter two, introduce Angels, some commanding others. And indeed it cannot be denied that in that state fathers would have had power and command over their sons; for nature itself demands this: husbands too over their wives,

since Paul affirms that the man is the head of the woman, and that the woman was made from the man and for the man's sake. And the state of innocence did not destroy or utterly overturn the state and order of nature.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 398.' The affirmative case for man's rule over man in innocence: the angelic hierarchy (Archangels, Principalities, Powers, Dominations; Dan 8; Zech 2); fatherly and marital authority (1 Cor 11:3); nature unimpaired by innocence.

But, that we may more briefly and easily dissolve the arguments proposed at the start, contrary to this our opinion, it is fitting to know that the dominion of man is twofold: one over slaves, the other over free men who of their own accord have chosen someone, or several, by whom they may be ruled and governed according to prescribed laws. And between these two kinds of ruling two differences may be noted. For command over slaves is coerced and violent, and therefore involuntary and bitter; but over free men it is voluntary and pleasant, as being chosen and assumed by them of their own accord for their own benefit. Moreover, command over slaves is referred wholly to the good and profit of the ruler, wherefore it cannot but be burdensome and hateful to the subjects: for it is against the natural appetite of man that whatever he does and labors at should go not to his own but to another's benefit; but command over free men is referred not to the good of the ruler but of the subjects, or rather to the public and common good. In the state of innocence, therefore, some would have presided over others, not by a servile but by a civil dominion—one, namely, that would have had nothing of the violent, the involuntary, and the bitter mixed in. They would have commanded then in that manner in which Augustine teaches that the just command others, in book nineteen of the City of God, chapter fourteen:

Margin: 'Duplex dominium hominis in homines, unum servile, alterum civile ac liberale.' The servile/civil distinction: rule in innocence would have been civil (for the common good), not servile. Introduces Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.14.

For the just command not from a lust of ruling, but from a duty of taking counsel for others; not from the pride of presiding, but from the

mercy of providing for others. This the natural order prescribes; thus God made man.

Augustine, De civitate Dei 19.14 (the just rule by service, not domination).

Why, then (for this too someone may ask), did God not say, Have dominion over men, but over the animals? Because, namely, this command over the animals belongs to every man by that very reason whereby man was created to the image of God, and pertains equally to all men. But the command of some men over others does not belong to every man, but only to certain particular men; nor does it belong to them as they are men, but on account of their excellence either of dignity, or of power, or of prudence, or of probity. But why was the subjection of the woman under the power of the man imposed on her by God

Why Scripture names dominion over animals (common to all, from the image) and not over men (proper to some, by excellence). Begins the new sub-question on the woman's subjection. Page breaks; catchword 'Deo'.

— p. 440 (PDF) · printed p. 399 —

[by] God as a penalty for sin, if the woman would have been under the man's command even in the state of innocence? To this it must be briefly answered thus: The subjection of the woman under the man's power, in the state of innocence, would have been to the woman voluntary and pleasant, and free of all trouble: both because the man would have commanded the woman nothing but what was right and honorable, and that with great equity and benevolence; and the woman of her own accord would have loved whatever was right and fair, and whatever reason demanded to be done by her she would have done voluntarily, gladly, and joyfully. For in each there would have been an unimpaired nature, right reason, and a will strongly inclined to the good, so that it would have come about that the command of the man would by no means have been troublesome and hateful to the woman. But after sin it came to pass that this subjection is involuntary and bitter to the woman, and befell her as a penalty for sin; and

this happens for two causes: both because very often husbands treat their wives more inhumanly and harshly than is fitting, commanding them beyond what is fair and good; and also because women, by corrupt nature and depraved will, or on account of a certain natural levity of disposition and irascibility of mind, bear ill being ruled by the man and being subject to his command. And this depravity and perversity, both of the commanding man and of the obedient woman, was born of sin; and the trouble it has attached to it is the penalty of sin inflicted on the woman; and of this kind of subjection the Lord spoke when he said to Eve, Thou shalt be under the man's power, and he shall have dominion over thee.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 399.' Margin: 'An in statu innocentiae Mulier fuisset sub viri potestate.' The woman's subjection: voluntary and pleasant in innocence, involuntary and bitter (a penalty) after sin (Gen 3:16).

But let us conclude this teaching of Moses on man's dominion over the brutes, adding a brief tropological interpretation, which (I think) will be to the reader neither inept nor unpleasant. Just as command over the brutes was given to man because he is rational, so the superior part of man (in which mind and reason, which is proper to man, flourish) ought to preside over and rule the inferior part—that is, the senses and the carnal affections, which we have in common with the other animals. And just as Moses set forth four kinds of animals over which man was to preside, saying, Let him rule over the fishes and the fowls, and the beasts, and the creeping things, and finally over all the earth: so it must be known that there are in man's lower part four vicious and, as it were, bestial affections, which reason ought to hold in its power and, bound as by a kind of bridle of its dominion, to keep and rule at its will. And by the Fishes, which live perpetually submerged in the waters, is signified the softness of the flesh and the heat of lusts; by the Birds, the immoderate desire of glory and honor; by the Creeping things, the excessive zeal of heaping up riches and earthly goods; by the Beasts and wild animals, the burning appetite of revenge and retaliation, and implacable anger and hatred against those who have injured

us in anything. And that, And all the earth, denotes that every carnal sense and affection and earthly desire must be tamed and subjected to reason, as Paul rightly admonishes, to the Colossians 3, Mortify, he says, your members which are

Margin: 'Digressio Moralis de hominis principatu, et imperio in animalia.' The tropological reading: the four animal-kinds = four vicious affections reason must master (lust; ambition; avarice; vindictiveness); 'all the earth' = all carnal desire. Col 3:5. Page breaks; catchword 'sunt' (= quae sunt super terram).

— p. 441 (PDF) · printed p. 400 —

[which] are upon the earth. But this castigation or mortification of the affections, after the sin of Adam, became to man laborious, bitter, and hateful; whereas before sin it was very easy, because in the state of innocence the affections of man were in his power in three respects. First, as to their arousal: for they were not stirred except when and where the mind of man willed and commanded. Next, as to their duration: for they lasted just so long as man willed. Finally, as to their intensification and remission: for their remission and intensification depended on the prescript and judgment of reason and on the command of the will. And because in these three ways the affections and passions of man ceased to be in his power after sin, it is therefore arduous and of great labor to rule them by the command of reason and to subject them to the power of the will: for it is reckoned a great thing if the will resists them and, as far as it can, tries to repress and restrain them.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 400.' Margin: 'In statu innocentiae etiam affectus humani erant in potestate hominis tripliciter.' The threefold subjection of the passions in innocence (arousal, duration, intensity), lost by sin.

I like that simile which Aristotle used at the end of the first book of the Ethics, showing that these vicious affections stand to the command of reason and will as paralytic limbs stand to the will of a man desiring to move them: for he cannot move them when he wills, or in what way and how much he wills. And lest the reader miss Aristotle's words, I will set

them down here:

Margin: 'Pulchra similitudo Aristotelis.' Introduces the Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13) quotation on the paralytic limbs.

Plainly, he says, just as the paralyzed limbs of the body, if you should wish to move them to the right, are on the contrary carried to the left, so too it happens in the soul: for the appetites of the incontinent are borne toward contrary parts. But in bodies, indeed, we see what is carried against the will; in the soul we do not so see it. Yet perhaps it must nonetheless be supposed that there is in the soul too something besides reason, which opposes and resists it; which, however, can itself also be capable of reason—as we see it is in the continent man, and even more in the temperate and brave man, in whom such affections are consenting and obedient to reason. Thus Aristotle.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 (1102b). The paralyzed-limbs simile for the irrational part of the soul that yet can obey reason.

CHAPTER 2, VERSES 7 and 8. And so the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.

Section lemma (Gen 2:7), set centered in italic, opening the second creation-account of man.

Above, Moses had already said, says Rupert in chapter 10 of book 2 of On the Trinity, that God created man, but he had not said how and whence he made him. He had said that he created them male and female, but he had not said that he made the woman from the man. If, therefore, he had said nothing further about their creation, perhaps we should have supposed that they were created at the same time and, suddenly arising, presented to each other a mutual sight: just as, for example, about the sun and moon there is still among the learned a diverse opinion—some saying that God, when he created the moon, immediately showed it ful[l]

Rupert of Deutz, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius, book 2, ch. 10 (block-quote, continues onto p. 401). Page breaks at 'osten-' (ostenderit).

— p. 442 (PDF) · printed p. 401 —

[immediately showed it ful]l, set opposite the sun in the half of the sky, while others assert the contrary, that, as he made both at once, so he also joined them, so that little by little the moon emerged from its conjunction with the sun with an increase of borrowed light. But a doubt of this kind is removed by the historical narrative of Moses, which begins thus, And so the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth. For here the male alone must be understood, because a little later he will say that the woman was formed from the male.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 401.' Conclusion of the Rupert (De Trinitate 2.10) quotation: the sun/moon parallel, resolved by Moses' detailed narrative.

And thus Rupert: what Moses here writes about the formation of man, he thinks must be connected with what he had said above about his constitution. But let us say this very thing more fully and distinctly. Above, Moses, in narrating the work of the sixth day, had summarily mentioned the creation of man—only in that respect in which man pertained to the work of the sixth day, on which day, namely, both man and the terrestrial animals were procreated. The history of those six days, therefore, being completed, Moses undertakes anew to describe the creation of man (both of the male and of the female) subtly, distinctly, and accurately: both because in the generation of man many notable, excellent, and singular things are to be observed and admired; and because the writing of this book was undertaken by Moses chiefly for man's sake.

Pererius closes the Rupert quote and explains the structure: ch. 1 mentioned man's creation summarily (under the sixth day); ch. 2 re-describes it in detail.

And just as of all other natural things, so of man too there are four causes: the Material, the Formal, the Final, and the Efficient: all of which Moses indicated in describing the generation of man. The Efficient, indeed,

saying, And so the Lord God formed man; the Material, when he adds, Of the slime of the earth; the Formal, when he adds, He breathed into his face the breath of life; and finally the Final, saying, And man became a living soul. Although he had declared the form and the end of man more significantly and expressly above, when he said that man was made to the image and likeness of God. For that is the genuine and proper form of man which bears the likeness and image of God: and this is the rational soul. And the end of man is this: that, aided by the grace of God and striving with all his zeal and diligence, he may become as much as possible like to God; which happens to us only through the beatific vision of God, as the beloved disciple of Jesus taught us, saying, We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, and we shall see him as he is.

Margins: 'Quatuor causae hominis indicantur à Mose'; '1. Ioan. 3.' The four Aristotelian causes mapped onto Gen 2:7 (efficient = God; material = slime; formal = breath of life / rational soul; final = the living soul, i.e. likeness to God). 1 John 3:2.

The variety of readings of this place is to be noted. For word for word, in Hebrew and Chaldaic, it is thus: God fashioned man, dust from the earth. The Seventy Interpreters rendered it thus: God formed man, taking dust from the earth—evidently explaining more openly the sense of the Hebrew reading. For this signifies that man was made dust from the earth, that is, was made dusty, dust being taken from the earth itself. And man is called dust from the earth because the first man was formed from dust and from earth: and to this Paul looked, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen, when

Margin: 'Varietas lectionum.' The textual variants (Hebrew/Chaldaic 'dust from the earth'; LXX 'taking dust from the earth'), given only in Latin rendering — no Hebrew or Greek script printed. 1 Cor 15:47 ('the first man, of the earth, earthy'). Page breaks at 'cùm'; signature 'E E'. RESUME next batch at PDF 443 with 'cùm [dixit]...'.

— p. 443 (PDF) · printed p. 402 —

when he said, The first man, of the earth, earthy: by which words he set forth in Greek the force and notion of the Hebrew word ■■■ Adam. For

the name Adam is derived from ■■■■ Adama, that is, earth, because the body of the first man was made from earth by God. Wherefore in Greek, both by Mercurius Trismegistus and by the ancient poets, man was called γηγεν■ς (g■gen■s), that is, Earth-born, as it were generated from the earth. And in chapter 7 of the book of Wisdom the first man is marked with two epithets: for he is named γηγεν■ς κα■ πρωτ■πλαστος (earth-born and first-formed). The Latin poets too are wont to call men Earth-born (Terrigenae)—unless perhaps someone should think that they alluded to the fable of Deucalion and Pyrrha.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 402.' 'Primus homo de terra terrenus' = 1 Cor 15:47. Glyphs magnified and verified: Hebrew ■■■ (Adam) and ■■■■ (Adamah, 'ground'); Greek γηγεν■ς (earth-born) and πρωτ■πλαστος (first-formed), the double epithet of Wisdom 7:1.

For the word He formed, in Hebrew it is ■■■■ vayyitser, properly signifying 'to fashion,' which belongs to potters. St. Augustine, in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 24, examining and weighing the reading of this place, cites and declares it thus: God formed man, dust from the earth (which indeed, word for word, as we said, is the Hebrew reading). Augustine subjoins:

Glyph magnified and verified: Hebrew ■■■■ (vayyitser, 'and he formed,' from the potter's root yatsar). Augustine, De civitate Dei 13.24. Introduces the Augustine block-quote.

> *Some, thinking this should be interpreted more fully, said, God fashioned man of the slime of the earth: because it had been said above, A fountain ascended from the earth and watered all the face of the earth; so that from this 'slime' might seem to be understood, namely something concreted of moisture and earth. For where this is said, there immediately follows, God formed man, dust from the earth, as the Greek codices have it, whence Scripture itself was translated into the Latin tongue.*

Augustine, De civitate Dei 13.24. The 'fountain' is Gen 2:6; the slime (limus) understood as earth concreted with moisture.

But the Greek codices that now exist do not have it as Augustine cites them, but in that manner which we mentioned above, God formed man, taking dust from the earth, or, dust having been taken from the earth. There is therefore lacking, in Augustine's citation (if our codices are correct), that participle 'Taking.' And Augustine adds:

Pererius notes that the extant LXX has the participle 'taking' (λαβ■ν), absent from Augustine's citation.

> *But whether one wishes to say 'formed' or 'fashioned'—what in Greek is said ■πλασεν (eplasen)—makes no difference to the matter: yet it is more properly called 'fashioned.' But the ambiguity seemed to be avoided by those who preferred to say 'formed': because in the Latin tongue that usage has more prevailed, that those are said 'to fashion' (fingere) who put something together with a lying pretense. Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, De civitate Dei 13.24. Greek glyph magnified and verified: ■πλασεν ('he molded/formed,' from πλ■σσω — the verb of Gen 2:7 LXX). The Latin pun: fingere = both 'to fashion' and 'to feign.'

For that, of the slime of the earth, in Hebrew it is ■■■ Aphar, signifying dust and earth: and not any dust, but a very fine and minute one, as may be known from many places of Scripture; as in 2 Kings 23, He ground it, he says, to dust; and Genesis 13, If any man can number the dust of the earth. Nor does it signify only the dust of earth, but also of gold and silver or of any other thing: for in Exodus 32 Moses is said to have thrown the dust of the golden calf into the torrent. Moses, therefore, here introduces God as a kind of potter, who collected and prepared the dust from which he was to make man, and from it made man: just as a potter, about to make some vessel, procures his material from mud or clay. And our translator [the Vulgate], rendering not 'dust' but 'slime,' wished to declare that the material from which man's body was formed was not pure

Glyph magnified and verified: Hebrew ■■■ (■aphar, 'dust'). 2 Kings 23:6 (Josiah); Gen 13:16; Exod 32:20 (the golden calf). God as potter; the Vulgate's 'limus' (slime) vs. the Hebrew 'aphar'

(dust). Page breaks; catchword 'purum' (= purum pulverem).

— p. 444 (PDF) · printed p. 403 —

[was not] pure dust, since that is too fine and dissipable, and cannot by its own force be compacted into any solid body, but was dust mixed with water, or muddy and miry earth, such as potters use. And the contemplation of this our origin ought continually to admonish us of our fragile and perishable and soon-to-perish natural condition: wherefore frequent remembrance of this thing is renewed and inculcated for us in Holy Scripture. Treating this very matter eloquently and piously, after his manner, Rupert, in chapter 20 of book 2 of On the Trinity:

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 403.' Slime = dust mixed with water (potters' material); the reminder of human mortality. Introduces the Rupert (De Trinitate 2.20) block-quote.

Two things, he says, were said by Moses, which it is worth the while to mark carefully: namely that God formed man, and formed him not from just anywhere, but from the slime of the earth. For weighing this, as was fitting, holy Men have called this their very Creator the Potter (Plastes), and themselves slime, in an elegant confession and tearful exclamation: And now, O Lord (says Isaiah in chapter sixty-four), Thou art our Father, and we are slime; and thou art our fashioner, and we all are the works of thy hands. And in Jeremiah, chapter 18, the same our potter God speaks: Cannot I do with you, O house of Israel, as this potter? Behold, as the slime is in the potter's hand, so are you in my hand. For he had shown him the potter making his work upon the wheel: and the vessel which he was making of slime with his hands was broken, and, turning, he made it into another vessel, as it had pleased him to make it. Hence the same Isaiah says above: Woe to him who contradicts his fashioner, a potsherd of the earthen pots. Knowing these things and the like, that heavenly jurist Paul says, to the Romans 9: O man, who art thou that repliest to God? Can the thing fashioned say to him who fashioned it, Why hast thou made me

thus? Or has not the potter power to make of the same lump one vessel indeed unto honor, but another unto dishonor? And so we too, when we read that God formed man of the slime of the earth, must not discuss why he did so, but each of us ought rather to fear about himself, lest the vessel which he himself made be broken in his hands, and, this one cast away, he make another vessel as it shall please him.' Thus Rupert.

Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate 2.20. The chain of potter-texts: Isa 64:8; Jer 18:6 (the potter's wheel); Isa 45:9; Rom 9:20–21 ('vessels of honor and dishonor').

After this, moreover, Rupert poses this question:

Margin: 'Quaestio Ruperti.' Introduces Rupert's question (why God made man rather than simply replacing the fallen Angels).

Yet (he says) one may soberly ask—that is, marvel—why God, when he could have rebuilt the ruins of the Angels with new Angels created by himself, and created just as many as had fallen and raised them to heaven, so that all the populace and all the nobility of the heavenly country might be of one kind: why, I say, he made men of another nature or condition to set in the place of the Angels, and did not make all, or many, at once, but fashioned only one from the earth, from whom the rest should be propagated?

Rupert's question (De Trinitate 2.20): why a new and earthly race rather than more Angels, and why from a single man.

To this question of Rupert it may be answered thus: that man was not first and principally created to repair the ruins of the Angels; for even if no Angel had fallen, man would nonetheless have been created, since he is the most excellent of all corporeal things, and if he were lacking to the world, the world could by no means be deemed complete and finished. For man is not merely some one species of natural things, as are the various species of plants and animals, but is a certain principal grade of nature. For there are three

Pererius's answer: man was made for his own sake (the noblest of corporeal beings), not merely to fill the angelic ranks. Page breaks; catchword 'genera' (= generales gradus, on p. 404).

— p. 445 (PDF) · printed p. 404 —

[For there are three] general and principal grades of nature: one, the first and highest, of a wholly incorporeal nature; another, the lowest, of a merely corporeal nature; the third, holding the middle place of dignity, mixed and as it were tempered from both: which kind man alone both constitutes and fills, being partly corporeal, partly incorporeal. And why God formed the first man from earth—the same reason held by which he formed from earth all the terrestrial living things. For in the composition and tempering of the human body from elemental matter, there is more earth than of any of the other elements; and when the human body is corrupted, it is dissolved into earth; finally, from earth it takes its food and clothing, and on earth it passes its life.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 404.' The three grades of nature (incorporeal / corporeal / the human mean); why man was formed from earth (predominance of earth in the body).

This earthen origin of man even the ancient poets among the Gentiles understood in a certain manner. Ovid, certainly, in the first book of the Metamorphoses, expressed the opinion of the most ancient theologians on the generation and origin of man in these verses:

Margin: 'Originem hominis è terra etiam Gentibus fuisse notam.' Introduces the Ovid (Metamorphoses 1) verses.

Man was born: whether that artificer of things made him from divine seed, the origin of a better world; or whether the new-made earth, lately sundered from the high aether, still kept seeds of its kindred heaven. This earth the son of Iapetus, mixing it with the waters of the river, fashioned into the likeness of the gods who govern all things. So the earth, which but now had been rude and without image, being changed, put on the unknown shapes of man.

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.78–88 (with vv. 87–88 added beyond the earlier citation on p. 360). 'Son of Iapetus' = Prometheus.

For those ancient poets feigned that Prometheus compacted the body of man from earth, and stole celestial fire from the gods, which he put into the human body in place of a soul: alluding to which the Poet said,

Margin: 'De Prometheo, poëtarum figmentum.' The Prometheus myth (body of clay, soul of stolen fire). Introduces the Virgil line.

Fiery is the vigor in those seeds, and their origin is celestial, ——

Virgil, Aeneid 6.730–731 (margin 'Virgilius libr. 6. Aeneid.').

And the Greeks call Prometheus 'the provident, sagacious, and wise.' Lucretius too, in the fifth book, treating the philosophy of Epicurus, affirms that men were generated from the earth in the beginning. Nor is the error of Avicenna to be concealed, who, in so great an ignorance of advanced truth, supposed that man could even now be naturally generated from the earth. But we refuted his opinion with many arguments in the eighth book of that work which, On the Principles and Affections of natural things, we published thirteen years ago.

Margin: 'Error Avicennae.' The 'Prometheus = providence' etymology; Lucretius 5 (Epicurean spontaneous generation); Avicenna's error (spontaneous generation of man), refuted in Pererius's own De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus, bk. 8.

Now when the body of the first man is said to have been formed from earth, this can indeed be understood in two ways. Either that God took, as the material for forming the body, earth only, or earth mixed with water, in which, however, he afterward brought forth the forms and qualities of the other two elements (I mean air and fire): for the body of Adam, no less than the bodies of all of us, consisted of four elements. Or it can be understood that God took, as the material of the body, a mixture of the four elements, which is nevertheless named by the word

Margin: 'Duobus modis intelligi posse hominem è terra factum.' Two readings of 'from the earth' (earth/water only, with air & fire added; or a full four-element mixture named from its dominant part). Page breaks; catchword 'vocabu' (= vocabulo limi).

— p. 446 (PDF) · printed p. 405 —

[which is nevertheless named] by the word 'slime,' that is, of earth and water, because these two excel the rest in mass in the composition and tempering of the human body, and are more conspicuous to the senses themselves; whereas the other two are more hidden, and, as they are smaller in mass, so they are greater in power and efficacy. For by this means the mixture is reduced to a certain equality: since, of those elements whose force is less, the portion of matter is greater in the composition; but of those whose power of acting is more efficacious, the mass is less in the mixture. Cajetan noted that it is rightly said in the Hebrew Scripture that man was made from dust, whereby, namely, it is signified that the body of man was not compacted from coarse and impure earth, but from fine and pure—such as is denoted by the word 'dust.' For since the body of man must be well mixed and exquisitely tempered, and likewise lofty and erect, for both a great fineness of earth was needed, so that it could be well mingled and tempered with the other elements, and might not, by its own coarseness and heaviness, obstruct the erectness of the body—which much and efficacious heat produces by drawing the matter upward; for if it were too coarse and heavy, it could either not be drawn aloft, or be held in a lofty place only with difficulty and danger to the body.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 405.' Margin: 'Caietanus in Genesim.' The slime named from earth and water (greater mass, though air and fire are greater in power); the fineness of the earth required for a well-tempered, erect body.

There are those who think that, besides the four elements, something also from the fifth essence (that is, from the celestial nature) enters into the composition of the human body; and they thought this to be, as it were, a certain middle bond, by which the incorporeal and immortal soul is coupled and bound together with the earthly and mortal body: for

otherwise, were it so, there would seem to be no proportion and agreement between the body and the rational soul. And that celestial material these men think the soul carries with it, when it is compelled by death to depart from the body, and in it to pay, among the powers below, the penalties deserved by its crimes. And that material they call and adorn by the name of some 'light' or other. But these things the Theologians condemn as false and contrary to sound doctrine; while the Philosophers even deride them as childish trifles and old-wives' tales. For since the celestial substance is plainly incorruptible, nothing can be plucked and cut from it, nor mingled with the other elements, nor employed in the composition of a passible and mortal thing: since a mixture does not come about (on Aristotle's authority) unless the things mixed are to some extent altered and corrupted. Aristotle indeed, in the second book On the Generation of Animals, ch. 3, calls the spirit and heat which is in living things 'celestial'—yet not by its nature itself, but by a certain proportion and likeness: for it has certain properties and effects corresponding, by a certain analogy, to the heat of the stars.

Margin: 'An in compositionem corporis humani veniat aliquid ex natura caelesti.' The Platonist/astral 'fifth essence' in the body (the luminous vehicle of the soul) refuted: the incorruptible heavens cannot enter a mortal mixture (Aristotle's doctrine of mixture); Aristotle, De generatione animalium 2.3 calls vital heat 'celestial' only by analogy. Section ends; catchword 'DISPV' (= Disputatio); signature 'EE 3'. RESUME next batch at PDF 447 with a new Disputatio.

— p. 447 (PDF) · printed p. 406 —

A DISPUTATION ON THE FORMATION and excellence of the human body.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 406.' Title of the new disputation, set centered beneath a rule.

Now, that it may be more plainly understood how aptly and becomingly, and with how great artifice and wisdom of God the maker, the conformation of the human body was designed and perfected, it pleases me here to debate some questions on this matter.

Introduction to the disputation.

QUESTION I. Whether God gave to man a body apt and suited to his nature, dignity, and excellence.

First question, set centered.

It does not seem that God gave to man such a body as was fitting: for it would seem to have been more suitable if the human body had been made of celestial material. For as the soul is immortal, so too it was fitting that its body, capable of that soul, should be immortal: for between matter and form, as Aristotle teaches in the second book of the Physics, there ought to be a proportion. Add that, as the human soul moves circularly in understanding (as Aristotle writes in the first book On the Soul, text 46), so the heaven is turned in a circle by a corporeal motion. Next, to the noblest form the noblest body was owed; but the human soul is the noblest of all forms; therefore its body ought to have been the noblest of all bodies. And the celestial body excels all other bodies in dignity in four respects: because it is incorruptible; because it is the universal cause of all things; because it is perpetually turned about by a circular motion; and finally on account of the celestial light.

The objections (in scholastic style): a celestial body would have been nobler and immortal, befitting the noblest soul. Aristotle, Physics 2; De anima 1; the four dignities of the celestial body.

Nor indeed is the human body surpassed in dignity by the celestial body alone, but it seems inferior in many things to the bodies of the other animals. First, in the perfection of the external senses: for the eagle's sight is sharper; the fox's and the mole's hearing keener; the dog's smell more sagacious; the hen's taste more exquisite—since, without any pressing-out of juice, it immediately perceives whatever it has touched even most lightly with its beak as worthy or unworthy, so as either to choose or reject it. Nay more, that snails and oysters are strong in a more vigorous sense of touch, Julius Scaliger thinks, in the work which he wrote against Cardano, exercise 247. For as a bare nerve feels more quickly than one covered with skin, so necessarily those animals which are covered with a thinner skin

than man feel more quickly: for the force and foundation of the argument lies in the analogy of the medium. Next, in bodily strength man yields to bulls; in tallness to elephants; in longevity

More objections: animals surpass man in the external senses (eagle, fox, mole, dog, hen; snails/oysters per J.C. Scaliger, Exercitationes against Cardano's De subtilitate, exerc. 247) and in strength/height/longevity. Page breaks; catchword 'gaeuitate' (= longaevitate).

— p. 448 (PDF) · printed p. 407 —

[in longe]vity to ravens; in speed to tigers. What of this, that the bodies of other animals are covered with natural coverings—whether with hair, or hides, or shells, or scales? and likewise are furnished and fortified with natural arms and defenses? Some are armed with horns, others with claws, or teeth, or spines, or stings, by which they can both protect themselves and strike and rout their enemies: to man alone a naked and unarmed body is given, and one feeble and weak both for attack and for defense.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 407.' Conclusion of the objections: animals have natural coverings and weapons, man has none.

But in truth, without any doubt, it is to be believed and affirmed that the human body was fashioned by God most apt and most becoming to the nature of man. For how much more truly is it fitting to judge of man what Aristotle said of all natural things whatever—that God and nature, in all things, always do, of those things that can be done, that which is better; and that, as each thing is apt to be made best, so it is made by nature, nor can anything be made better than what has been made by nature herself unimpeded. Now man's body had to be made such as to be capable of the senses: since the rational soul was to be created naked and devoid of all knowledge, and had to acquire it for itself through the senses, it was necessary that man's body be equipped and adorned with all the senses. And the foundation, as it were, of all the senses is touch, which is constituted in a certain mean and equal tempering of the primary qualities. As, therefore, the sense of touch, so also the other senses, which cannot be

torn away from it, cannot exist except in a passible and mortal body. From which it appears that, since the celestial substance is wholly devoid of the primary qualities, and is utterly impassible and immortal, and therefore least of all capable of the senses, the body of man could not be compounded from it.

Margins: 'Praestantia humani corporis'; 'Sensuum quasi omnium fundamentum est tactus.' The reply: nature does the best possible (Aristotle, De caelo 2.5 / De gen. an.); the soul learns through the senses, which require a passible (hence non-celestial) body; touch as the basis of all sense.

St. Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 2, proves by many reasons that it was not fitting for the human body to consist of celestial material—whether man be considered in relation to God, or to the Angels, or to corporeal creatures, or to the universe, or in relation to himself. And although man's body was by its own nature mortal, yet God had met this defect of mortality with the gift of immortality; armed with which Adam, had he not sinned, after enjoying a very long and most blessed age on earth, would afterward, knowing nothing of death, have been translated into celestial and eternal life and happiness.

Margin: 'Cur corpus hominis ex coelesti materia fieri non potuerit, ex Bonaventura.' Bonaventure, Sent. II, d.17, a.2; the body's natural mortality remedied by the donum immortalitatis (and the translation Adam would have had).

And that the body of man is far more excellent than the bodies of the other animals can be clearly discerned and judged from three things. First, this is manifestly indicated by the upright form and figure of the human body, whereas the bodies of the other animals are prone and pressed down toward the earth. And of the uprightness of the human body there is a threefold cause: the Efficient is the abundance of heat, with which that force is strong that resides in the male seed, which constructs the human body with such skill, and with such art fashions and figures it limb by limb. The Material is the very soft and delicate temper of that matter from which the human body is compounded. And finally the Final cause, or use, of this uprightness is fourfold: the First, that

Margins: 'Corpus humanum praestantius esse corporibus omnium animalium'; 'Triplex causa cur corpus humanum sit erectum.' The first proof of bodily excellence: uprightness (its efficient = heat; material = soft matter; final = a fourfold use). Page breaks; catchword 'quò'.

— p. 449 (PDF) · printed p. 408 —

[The first, that] the functions of the external senses (which for the most part flourish in the head) may be better administered: for the senses were assigned to man not, as to the other animals, merely for food and drink and the preservation of present life, but chiefly for acquiring knowledge of all things—and especially of the celestial things, by the contemplation of which the human soul is advanced to the knowledge of God himself and of divine things: wherefore it was fitting that the senses (and most of all hearing and sight, which beyond the rest are an aid and help for knowing things) should be in a lofty place, erect toward heaven. The second use of the uprightness of the human body pertains to the greater perfection of the internal senses, which most immediately supply matter for understanding to the human mind: and these senses, if man's head were pressed down toward the earth, would have been too gross, dull, and slow. The third use contains the innumerable conveniences of the hands, which human life would lack if man had not been of an upright body: for if he were of a prone body, he would need to use his hands for walking after the manner of the other animals; wherefore the many and excellent uses of the hands which we now enjoy could not have come to man from his hands. The fourth use looks to the forming of speech: for if man, after the likeness of the animals, were of a curved body, he would have needed to take food with his mouth; wherefore there would have been given him a mouth too long, gaping, and open, and likewise too hard a tongue and thick lips: he could not, therefore, have framed human speech and discourse—than which, according to the mind, nothing better was granted to man by God.

Page header: 'COMMENTARIORVM 408.' The fourfold use of uprightness: (1) the head's senses raised to heaven for knowledge; (2) the internal senses' perfection; (3) the freed hands; (4) the framing of speech.

In the second place, the excellence of the human body can be estimated from the excellence of the senses, both internal and external. By internal senses I mean the common sense itself and the power of imagining, likewise memory and reminiscence, and finally what in the animals the Philosophers call the estimative power, but in man the cogitative—the highest, indeed, of all the sentient faculties. And that the internal senses are more perfect in man than in the animals is beyond controversy. For both the imaginative power is in him stronger and more efficacious, and the memory firmer and more capacious, and the power of reminiscence (granted to no animal), and the very power of thinking, or what is called the cogitative (which is a kind of particular reason, and is sometimes called by Aristotle the intellect). What more? the very appetite of the sentient soul, although in itself irrational, yet becomes in a manner rational, since it is capable of the command and moderation of human reason, and therefore is the seat of very many and most excellent virtues.

Margin: 'Omnia Animalia sensuum tam interiorum quàm exteriorum praestantia vinci ab homine.' The second proof: the superior internal senses (common sense, imagination, memory, reminiscence, the cogitative power); the sensitive appetite made rational by reason's rule (seat of the virtues).

And how the other animals are surpassed by man in the excellence of the external senses too can easily be demonstrated and proved, by employing that distinction which Aristotle delivers in the fifth book On the Generation of Animals, chapter 1: that the excellence of each sense can be estimated from two things, either from the perception of the sensible object, or from the judgment of the same object. In the perception of the sensible object

Margin: 'Notabilis distinctio circa praestantiam sensuum, ab Aristotele tradita.' Aristotle, De generatione animalium 5.1: each sense judged by perception and by discrimination. Page breaks; catchword 'bilis' (= sensibilis).

— p. 450 (PDF) · printed p. 409 —

[In the perception of the sensible] object, the sense of one animal can surpass the sense of the same kind which is in another animal in four ways

(as sight may surpass sight, and hearing hearing): first, if it perceive the sensible object more quickly, and then if more distantly; next, if it apprehend smaller and finer sensibles; finally, if it take in and bear a more vehement and excessive sensible without any offense or difficulty to itself: and in these four ways the eagle's sight surpasses the sight of the other animals. Nor can we deny that man is, in this respect, surpassed in many senses by the animals. But the other excellence of sense consists in the discernment of sensible things, and in knowing and distinguishing carefully and distinctly all their differences: and in this respect we judge that man precedes the other animals in the senses. Granted that the eagle discerns more quickly and more distantly even minute and slight colors, and that the vulture perceives odors, yet man will more distinctly and surely discern by sight all the variety and all the differences of colors—whether they be in stones, or in metals, or in herbs and flowers, or in any other things whatever.

Page header: 'IN GENESIM, LIB. IIII. 409.' Perception (four ways the eagle excels) vs. judgment/discrimination (in which man surpasses all).

In the third place, the excellence of the human body is clearly known from the excellence of its temperament, or (as they commonly call it) its complexion: which indeed in man, beyond the bodies of the other animals, comes nearer to equality and to the mean, and is farther removed from an excess of the primary qualities, whereas the bodies of the other animals are either too earthy or too watery. Whence it comes about that to have natural coverings and weapons (as the animals have) argues an imperfect constitution of their body: for such things arise from a great abundance of earthy or watery material. Nor indeed was it fitting for man—whose nature is so manifold and multiform, and who (because, according to the variety of regions, he was to be the spectator and inhabitant and cultivator of the whole world) had to have various manners and a various mode of living—to have naturally some one fixed and unchangeable mode of food, clothing, and arms, as the animals have. But in place of all those things

which man does not have by nature, but the animals do, God gave to man two things: Reason and the Hand—so that by the one he might devise and discover all things that would be of use to him, and by the other might easily make and procure those same things for himself.

Margins: 'Excellentia temperamenti corporis humani'; 'Vice omnium quae habent animalia, Deus homini dedit rationem et manus.' The third proof: man's temperament nearest the mean; in place of natural coverings/weapons, God gave reason and the hand (the famous 'organ of organs').

But, not to make this longer, I will conclude this place by setting down two most brilliant passages, one of Seneca and the other of Lactantius, by which this very thing which we have taught will be wonderfully illustrated. Seneca, then, rebuking those who complain of nature and of God that man was dealt with by them malignantly, or at least less liberally and kindly than the animals, in chapter 29 of book 2 of On Benefits writes in this manner:

Introduces the two confirming quotations (Seneca and Lactantius). Margin: 'Praeclara sententia Senecae, de Divina providentia.' Seneca, De beneficiis 2.29.

See how unjust appraisers of the divine gifts they are. And these, forsooth, professing wisdom, complain that we do not equal the elephants in bodily size, the stags in speed, the birds in lightness, the bulls in onset; that the skin is more solid in beasts, more comely in deer, thicker in bears, softer in beavers; that the dogs surpass us in keenness of nostrils; that

Seneca, De beneficiis 2.29 (block-quote, continues onto p. 410). 'Fibri' = beavers. Page breaks at 'quòd'; signature 'F F'. RESUME next batch at PDF 451 with the continuation of the Seneca quotation.

— p. 451 (PDF) · printed p. 410 —

[...so that, if you weigh all these things in your mind and] rightly estimate the indulgence of nature, you must confess that you have been her darling. Thus Seneca — no less truly and wisely, in truth, than elegantly and eloquently.

Conclusion of the Seneca block-quote (de Beneficiis 2.29) carried over from PDF 450/printed 409; the bracketed clause completes the sentence begun on the prior page. Pererius caps the citation with his customary verdict on the Father/author quoted.

Lactantius too, in his book On the Workmanship of God, pursues most lucidly the same judgement concerning the admirable constitution and providence of the human body; and since his words are both weighty and exceedingly apt to our purpose, I am pleased to set them down here.

Pererius' transition introducing the next patristic block-quote. Marginal gloss: 'Disertissima Lactantij sententia, de perfectione humani corporis' (Lactantius' most eloquent judgement on the perfection of the human body).

"To man," he says, "that artificer and parent of ours, God, gave sense and reason, so that from this it might appear that we were begotten by him who is himself endowed with intelligence, with sense, with reason. As for the other animals, since they are devoid of reason and intelligence, he has clothed them all with their own skins, that by a natural defence they might protect themselves against the cold and the force of storms. And if any of them fall as prey to the greater beasts, lest they be caught easily nature has provided for them either swiftness of foot, or fleetness in flight, or cunning in hiding themselves." [continues on the following page.]

Lactantius, de opificio Dei ch. 2–3, block-quote beginning here and concluding on PDF 452/printed 411 at 'Haec Lactantius.' Set as a head block-quote per the lemma/quotation convention; bracketed catch-note marks the cross-page span.

— p. 452 (PDF) · printed p. 411 —

[Lactantius continued:] "Man alone, since he is endowed with reason, He appointed naked and unarmed, because he could both be armed by his wit and clothed by his reason. Indeed those very things that were bestowed on the dumb beasts ought not to have been given to man, because He armed him not from without, as the rest, but from within: since He had granted him that which is more excellent than all,

namely the hand and reason. For hands accomplish more than lightness and the use of wings; the tongue more than the strength of the whole body. What madness, then, is it to prefer those things which, were they offered, you would decline to accept?" Thus Lactantius.

Conclusion of the Lactantius de opificio Dei block-quote begun on PDF 451. Catchword at foot of page: 'QVAE' (anticipating the QUAESTIO divider of the next page).

— p. 453 (PDF) · printed p. 412 —

QUESTION II. Whether the Angels concurred in any part in the procreation of man.

Section divider (rule above). Second quaestio of this disputation on the formation of the first man.

As for the creation of the rational soul, there must be no doubt at all that it could not have proceeded from the Angels. For since the mind of man is immaterial and immortal, it can be created in no other way than from nothing, and by no other than God. For to create any thing whatever, as Augustine teaches in chapter 15 of book 9 of On Genesis according to the Letter, no Angel is able, any more than it can create its own self. But concerning the body of the first man — whether the Angels lent their labour to its formation — this seems able to be called into question on this account, that all matter and corporeal creature is (on Augustine's authority, chapter 24 of book 8 of On Genesis according to the Letter) subject to the will and command of the Angels; and just as they themselves often formed human bodies and assumed them to themselves, in order to appear in them to men, so they could fashion and figure the body of the first man.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 9.15 (no creature can create) and 8.24 (corporeal matter subject to the Angels' command) cited as the basis of the doubt.

NEVERTHELESS, it must beyond doubt be said that the body of the first man was neither formed by the Angels nor could be formed by them: since the Angels, being incorporeal, have no force or power of themselves to generate any corporeal thing, except only by ministering, by applying, and

by fitting together one with another the natural causes through which natural bodies can be generated — in that manner, namely, in which a farmer is said to “create” crops and “generate” wine, and a physician likewise to “drive off” diseases and “effect” health. For Augustine uses these very examples to confirm the same point, in chapter 15 of book 9 of On Genesis according to the Letter; in which passage he says affirmatively that neither was the body of Eve from Adam's rib, nor the body of Adam himself from the dust of the earth, formed by the power of the Angels — although there Augustine does not deny that the Angels could have exhibited some ministry in the formation of the body of Adam or of Eve; but what that ministry may have been, “who,” he says, “would dare to affirm?” If, therefore, an Angel cannot generate any body except through the natural generating and effecting causes — and the natural efficient and forming cause of the human body is that wonderful force residing in the male seed, which in the schools they call the formative power — and this did not exist at all before the generation of the first man, so that it might be applied by the Angels: it is concluded, then, that the body of the first man could not have been formed by the Angels.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 9.15. Marginal gloss: 'Angelos non fuisse effectores corporis humani' (that the Angels were not the makers of the human body). The 'virtus formativa' of the male seed is the scholastic natural efficient cause.

Yet I would not deny that the Angels could have ministered something to the formation of that body; but what that was, or what kind of ministry it was, Augustine dares to establish nothing: whereas others, bolder, do not hesitate to say that the Angels gathered the dust, compacted the material, and conformed it into the form and likeness of the human body... [the word breaks here and is completed on the next page]

Sentence breaks at the catchword 'confor' at the foot of the page; it is completed on PDF 454 as 'confor[masse] atque figurasse.'

— p. 454 (PDF) · printed p. 413 —

...conformed and figured it; and that this material, figured into human shape, God animated and quickened by breathing into it a rational mind. But granting that it was done so, it is not to be supposed that that simulacrum of the human body, fashioned and formed by the Angels, was truly a human body: for there was not in it such a mixture of the elements, nor such a temperament, as a human body must have; nor did it have flesh, bones, sinews, inner organs, nor natural heat, nor the animal and vital spirits, without which things a human body cannot subsist. And if, when the soul departs from the body through death, the body that remains is not truly the body of a man but only equivocally so — even though it still retains the substance of flesh, of bone, and of the other parts — how much less could that thing fashioned and figured by the Angels be called the body of a man, seeing that it would have neither the forms nor the natures of flesh, of bone, or of the other parts?

Completes the sentence broken at the catchword on PDF 453. Concludes QUAESTIO II: an angel-fashioned simulacrum lacks the elemental mixture, temperament, organs, natural heat, and vital spirits of a true body — a corpse is a body only 'aequivocally,' and the angelic figure even less so.

QUESTION III. Whether Adam was created by God perfect according to age and according to the bulk of his body.

Section divider (rule above). Third quaestio: whether the first man was created already full-grown.

Concerning age, indeed, Augustine raises this same question, in chapter 13 of book 6 of On Genesis according to the Letter, writing thus: "But in what way did God make man from the slime of the earth? Was it suddenly, in a perfect age — that is, in a manly and youthful one — or just as He still now forms man in the wombs of mothers? so that Adam would have had only this as his own peculiarity, that he was not born of parents but made from the earth, yet in such a manner that in his being brought to completion and in his being increased through the ages those numbers of time would be fulfilled which we see assigned to the nature of the human race. Or is

this rather not to be inquired into? For whichever of the two He did, He did that which it befitted a God both omnipotent and wise to be able to do and to do. For He has so assigned fixed laws of time to the kinds and qualities of things in their being brought forth from the hidden into the manifest, that His will is over all. For by His power He gave to the creature its numbers, yet He did not bind that very power to those same numbers: for His Spirit was so borne over the world in making it, as also to be borne over it when made — not by corporeal places, but by the excellence of His power." Thus Augustine.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 6.13, block-quote on whether Adam was made full-grown or formed gradually as in the womb. Large decorated initial 'D' opens the body of the quaestio.

By these words the Master of the Sentences, in the second book, distinction 17, judged it to be signified that Augustine held the first man to have been created by God in a perfect age. For thus he writes: "Augustine, on Genesis, says that Adam was made at once in a manly age, and this according to the higher, not the lower, causes — that is, according to the will and power of God, which He has not bound to the kinds of nature; in the same way too that the rod of Moses was turned into a serpent. Nor do such things happen contrary to nature, except for us, to whom the course [of nature is otherwise known...]" [breaks at the catchword]

Peter Lombard, Sentences II, dist. 17. Quote breaks at the catchword 'cursus' at the foot of the page; it resumes on PDF 455. RESUME POINT for next batch: '...nisi nobis quibus aliter natura cursus [est notus]...'

— p. 455 (PDF) · printed p. 414 —

[...except for us, to whom in another way the] course of nature has become known; but to God, nature is whatsoever He does. Thus, then, was Adam made: not according to the lower causes — because it was not in the seminal causes of things that it should so come to pass — but according to the higher causes, not operating against nature: because it was in the natural causes of things that it could so come to

pass. And the Master, thus far.”

Completes the Peter Lombard (Sentences II, dist. 17) block-quote broken at the catchword 'cursus' on PDF 454. 'Et Magister quidem hactenus' closes the quotation; Pererius resumes in his own voice.

But assuredly, if one weighs well the words of Augustine which the Master points to in this place, and which we too recalled a little above, he will easily observe that Augustine indeed raised the question of the age at which Adam was created, and treated it on both sides, yet did not expressly and affirmatively define either part of the question.

Pererius' caution: Augustine left the question of Adam's age open.

ALTHOUGH it cannot be denied that Augustine seems more inclined to that side which holds Adam to have been created at a perfect age — and rightly indeed. For those first works of God which were made by Him in the very building of the world ought to have been perfect: just as, therefore, He founded the other living creatures perfect in bodily bulk and in age, so likewise too — and much more so, by as much, namely, as the dignity of man is greater than that of the other animals — it must be reckoned that He founded man at a perfect age. Of which a great argument ought to be the fact that, as soon as Adam and Eve were created, God said to them: “Increase and multiply and fill the earth” — whereby one may understand that Adam and Eve were brought forth already at a firm age and fit for generation. Some, then, are of the opinion that they were created at a youthful age — namely, at that age at which our Lord Jesus Christ rose from the dead, that is, between the thirtieth and fortieth year.

Gen 1:28 'Crescite & multiplicamini' adduced for created maturity. Marginal gloss: 'Adamum perfecta aetate creatum esse' (that Adam was created at a perfect age).

But granting that it was so, it is nevertheless more credible that at that time the perfect age of a man would not have come before the fiftieth year: for since then the life of man was longest — that is, nearly tenfold longer than it is now — the individual ages were likewise longer than they now are,

and so childhood and adolescence were longer; and the prior age being drawn out further, the next following age arrived more slowly. By the comparison, then, and proportion of a whole life passing beyond the nine-hundredth year, the youthful age of the first man could not have reached him before the fiftieth year. From which some argue that Adam lived the longest life of all mortals, longer even than Methuselah himself, whom Holy Scripture reports to have prolonged his life to nine hundred and sixty-nine years. For since Adam was created at a perfect age — that is, at the age that corresponded to the fiftieth year — and afterward lived nine hundred and thirty years: it is concluded, if account be taken of his age, that he lived beyond nine hundred and eighty years.

The longer antediluvian lifespans imply a 'perfect age' of ~50; so Adam, created at that maturity + 930 recorded years, outlived Methuselah's 969. Marginal glosses: 'In exordio mundi ut vita hominis, ita singulae aetates eius longiores erant quàm nunc sunt'; 'Adam longaevissimus omnium mortalium' (Adam the longest-lived of all mortals).

Now concerning the bulk of body in which Adam was created, it must similarly be said — as was said concerning his age — that he was made at a perfect bodily size, namely that which is wont to be the natural limit of the growth of living things, and which befalls a man at his perfect age. For both Scripture not obscurely signifies, and the Fathers confirm by a concordant judgement, that the first man was perfect in mind and body, and blessed (with as great a happiness, namely, as can belong to a man...) [the sentence continues on the next page]

Opens the parallel point on bodily stature. Marginal gloss: 'Adamum perfecta corporis statura esse creatum' (that Adam was created at a perfect bodily stature). Sentence breaks mid-clause; completed on PDF 456 ('...nis in terris viventis beatitudo esse potest) à Deo esse procreatum').

— p. 456 (PDF) · printed p. 415 —

[...with as great a happiness, namely, as] the blessedness of a man living on earth can be) — brought forth by God.

Completes the sentence carried over from PDF 455.

Giovanni Lucido, in book 1 of On the Emendation of Times, chapter 4, holds that Adam was, in the tallness of his body, a giant — indeed the greatest of all the giants who ever existed; and this he wishes to prove from the book of Joshua, in whose chapter 14, in the closing words, it is thus written: “The name of Hebron was formerly called Cariath-arbe: Adam, the greatest, was set there among the Enacim.” That the Enacim were giants is manifest from what the scouts of Joshua said on returning from exploring the land of Canaan, as is related in chapter 13 of the book of Numbers: “The people,” they say, “whom we beheld is of tall stature; there we saw certain monsters of the sons of Enac of the giant race, compared to whom we seemed as locusts.” If, then, Adam was the greatest in comparison with the Enacim giants, it is clear that he was the greatest giant.

Joshua 14:15 (Vulgate) and Numbers 13:33-34 cited. Marginal gloss: 'An Adam fuerit gigas omnium qui fuerunt maximus, ut putavit Ioannes Lucidus' (whether Adam was a giant, the greatest of all who ever were, as Giovanni Lucido supposed).

That Scripture in that place speaks of the Adam who was the parent of the human race is confirmed by the authority of blessed Jerome, who, on chapter 27 of Matthew, writes assertively that Adam was buried not on Mount Calvary, as many supposed, but in Hebron, as Joshua relates (namely in that place we have mentioned). There support this opinion, moreover, those authors whom Moses Barcephas reports in the book he wrote On Paradise, by whom it is handed down that, when Adam had been placed by God in the earthly Paradise — which, separated by a vast intervening Ocean, was sundered from our world — he, afterward cast out of Paradise on account of his sin, came on his own feet (so great was the tallness of his body), the Ocean being crossed, into this world of ours.

Jerome (on Matt. 27), and the authors cited by Moses Barcephas (de Paradiso) on Adam crossing the Ocean on foot. Marginal gloss: 'Hieronymus putavit Adamum in Hebron fuisse sepultum' (Jerome supposed Adam was buried in Hebron).

BUT assuredly this opinion is little firm and little probable — nay rather, little consonant with divine Scripture, from whose narrative, which is in

chapter 6 of the book of Genesis, it is easy to understand that the giants arose not before the death of Adam, but namely when the human race had begun to be corrupted in great measure by the most monstrous outrages and crimes. For thus it stands there: “There were giants upon the earth in those days. For after the sons of God went in unto the daughters of men, and these bore to them, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown.” Nor does that passage of Joshua aid their opinion: for — to say nothing of the fact that the Seventy Translators rendered that place far otherwise, namely in these words, “Now the name of Hebron of old was the city Arbe, this chief city of the Enacim,” by which words it is signified that that city was the metropolis of the region the Enacim nation inhabited — certainly in our translation that word “Adam” is not the proper name of that first man, but is a common noun, signifying among the Hebrews the same as among the Latins [the word for “man”...] [continues on the next page]

Pererius' refutation: Gen 6:4 places the giants after Adam's lifetime; and the LXX of Joshua 14:15 shows 'Adam' there is the common noun (= homo). Marginal glosses: 'Refellitur Lucidus' (Lucido is refuted); 'Quando gigantes esse coeperint' (when the giants began to be); 'Explicatur locus Iosue c. 14. de Adami sepultura' (the passage of Joshua ch. 14 on Adam's burial is explained). Sentence breaks at 'quod apud Latinos'.

— p. 457 (PDF) · printed p. 416 —

[...the same among the Hebrews as among the Latins] the word for “man,” so that the sense of that place is this: Therefore the city of Hebron was of old called the City of Arbe, because Arba was the greatest man among the Enacim. And he is said to have been “greatest” either by the celebrity of his name and the glory of his deeds, or by the extent, power, or duration of his rule; or finally because he was the founder of that city, or the begetter and parent of the Enacim nation. And the Hebrew text of that place renders this sense expressly, which, rendered word-for-word into Latin, runs thus: “The name of Hebron had of old been Cariath-arbe; he had been the greatest man among the Enacim.” Therefore Scripture there does not speak of the first man; nor can it be proved from that passage that Adam was buried there —

especially since, by a most ancient tradition, many and great Fathers confirm that Adam was buried on Mount Calvary: such as Cyprian in his sermon On the Resurrection of Christ, Epiphanius in book 2 Against Heresies, last chapter, Augustine in Sermon 71 which is On the Immolation of Isaac, Paula and Eustochium in the Epistle to Marcella which is carried among the Epistles of Jerome — although Isidore and the Carthusian followed Jerome on that passage of Joshua.

The Fathers placing Adam's tomb on Calvary: Cyprian, Epiphanius (contra haereses 2), Augustine (Serm. 71), Paula & Eustochium (ep. ad Marcellam, among Jerome's letters); Isidore and Denis the Carthusian followed Jerome's Hebron view.

But, granting that Scripture in that place speaks of Adam — that is, the first man — nevertheless he was called “greatest” not by the tallness of his body, but by dignity, on account, namely, of two prerogatives by which he surpassed all men: the one of origin, in that he was created immediately by God in a supernatural manner, and was the origin and seedbed of the whole human race; the other of the singular gifts and benefits with which he was adorned and heaped up by God — I mean original justice, knowledge of all things, immortality, and the dwelling of the earthly Paradise. And that phrase “among the sons of Enac” does not signify that Adam was the greatest in body, by comparison with the giants who were of the race of Enac — for that comparison would have been inept — but rather signifies that Adam was founded and buried among the sons of Enac, that is, in the city of Hebron (as Jerome, Isidore, and the Hebrews held), which, as the Seventy Translators said, was the metropolis of the Enac nation.

Adam's primacy reinterpreted as dignity, not stature: his two prerogatives (supernatural origin/seedbed of humankind; the gifts of original justice, knowledge, immortality, Paradise).

I am not unaware that in the ancient commentaries of the Hebrews, which they name Bereshith Rabbah, it is read that the name Arba — which means “four” — was imposed on that city for this reason: that in ancient ages four men dwelt there, Aner, Eshcol, Mamre, and Abraham, who were circumcised there; that likewise four most celebrated matrons were buried

there, Eve, Sarah, Rebecca and Leah; and four Patriarchs, Adam, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and because from that place Abraham pursued and struck the four kings. But just as it is agreed that most of the things in those commentaries are fictitious, so these too ought to be reckoned little firm and little probable.

The Bereshith Rabbah etymology of Arba ('four') reported and dismissed as fiction. Marginal gloss: 'Traditio Hebraeorum' (a tradition of the Hebrews).

QUESTION IV. Whether the body of the first man was formed earlier in time than the soul was created and infused into the body.

Section divider (rule above). Fourth quaestio: the temporal order of the formation of body and soul.

It was the opinion neither of few nor of ignoble authors, both of old and in our own age, that the body of Adam was made earlier in time than the rational soul was created and joined to the body: for this Gennadius teaches, expounding these very words of Moses which we now treat; and Chrysostom on Genesis, in homi-[ly...] [continues on the next page]

Large decorated initial 'N' opens the body of the quaestio. Gennadius and Chrysostom cited for the 'body formed first' view. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'homilia'; completed on PDF 458 ('homilia 12. & 13.').

— p. 458 (PDF) · printed p. 417 —

[...on Genesis, in homi]lies 12 and 13; the same Augustine too seems to suggest, in book thirteen of the City of God, chapter twenty-four; Tostatus likewise and Johann Wild (Ferus) on this passage of Genesis; Alfonso de Castro in book two Against Heresies, where he disputes On the Soul; Agostino Steuco of Gubbio in the Cosmopoeia and in his Annotations on the Pentateuch, on these words of Moses; and the author of the fourth book of Esdras seems to have held the same, in the third chapter of that book, writing in this manner: “Thou, Lord, gavest Adam a dead body, but it too was the workmanship of Thy hands, and Thou didst breathe into him the

spirit of life, and he was made living before Thee.”

Roll of authorities for the 'body first' view: Augustine (City of God 13.24), Tostatus, Ferus, Alfonso de Castro (contra haereses 2), Agostino Steuco Eugubinus, and 4 Esdras 3.

But it is pleasing here to set down the words of Chrysostom, in which this is delivered by him most openly. In homily 12, then, he says thus: “Consider, I beseech you, the order of Adam's formation, and weigh with yourself: before the breath of life was breathed into him by the Lord, what was that one who had been formed? Simply a certain inanimate image, devoid of operation, and useful for nothing. But that which advances man to so great an honor is nothing else than that breath of life inspired by God.” The same, in homily 13, declares this very thing in more illustrious words, writing in this manner: “And perhaps someone would say: Why, if the soul is worthier than the body, was the worthier formed first, and afterward what is more eminent? Do you not see, beloved, that in created things this same thing happens in practice? For just as heaven and earth and Sun and Moon, and all the rest, were formed, and the irrational animals, and after all these, man, who was to take up rule over them; so too in this formation of man the body is produced first, and afterward the soul, which is worthier. And just as the animals, destined to be useful for man's service, are formed before man, that he might have his minister ready, for whose use they were being created, so also the body is formed before the soul, in order that, when according to the ineffable wisdom of the Creator the soul should be produced, it might be able, according to its powers, to operate through the motion of the body.” Thus Chrysostom.

Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 12 and 13, block-quote: the unensouled body is an inanimate image; the body is formed first as the soul's prepared instrument, like the animals made before man. Marginal gloss (overlapping the next paragraph): 'Simul esse formatum corpus Adae, & creatum animum' (that the body of Adam was formed and the soul created at the same time).

The narration of Scripture itself also seems to signify this, when it says in this place: “The Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul.” By which words Scripture seems to indicate that the human body was formed first from the slime of the earth, and that into it, now already formed and figured, the breath of life was put, by which that body emerged into a living man. And in the natural generation of man, indeed, the same order seems to be preserved: for first in time the human body is formed part by part, then the soul is created and infused into it.

Gen 2:7 read as supporting a temporal priority of the body; the analogy of natural embryology.

On the contrary, however, that the human body was not formed before the soul, but at the same time — that is, that at the same point of time both the body and the soul and the man himself were made — is the judgement of most learned men of the greatest authority: such as Gregory of Nyssa in the book On Man, chapters 29 and 30; and Damascene in the second book, On the Orthodox Faith, chapter twelve; and Saint Thomas in the First Part, question ninety-one; and the same Augustine seems to suggest, in the book On Genesis against the Manichees, chapter eight. This is now long since the received opinion in the schools of the theologians, which may be gathered from the words of Moses; for he says that God formed man from the slime of the earth. If, therefore, in forming the human body He is said to have formed man, and the body was not [formed before the man...] [continues on the next page]

The opposing (simultaneist) view: Gregory of Nyssa (de hominis opificio 29-30), John Damascene (de Fide Orth. 2.12), Aquinas (ST I q.91), and Augustine (de Gen. contra Manich. 8) — now the schools' received opinion. Page ends at catchword 'non' (signature GG). RESUME POINT for next batch: '...dicitur formasse hominem, & corpus non [formatur ante hominem]...'.

— p. 459 (PDF) · printed p. 418 —

[...He is said to have formed the man, and since the body] is not a man without the soul, it follows that when He formed the body He also at the

same time created the soul: and thus it is true that the man was formed. For although the formation of the body, and the creation of the soul, and the procreation of the whole man are completed in one and the same point of time, they nevertheless had to be explained distinctly and separately. And the formation of the body, indeed, comes first, since it precedes in the order of generation; for the same point of time — or, as they say in the schools, the same instant — terminates the final disposition and formation of the body, and begins and measures the creation and infusion of the rational soul and the generation of the man.

Completes the sentence broken at the catchword 'non' on PDF 458. Resolves the simultaneist position: body and soul made at one instant, but the body prior in the order of generation.

Nor is that reasoning to be reckoned of no account which blessed Thomas uses to confirm this: “This,” he says, “is the nature of parts — whether of those they call essential, or of integral parts — that, disjoined from one another and placed outside the whole which they constitute, they are in an imperfect state. For since a part exists for the sake of the whole, it follows that the good and perfection of a part cannot befall it outside the whole.” Since, therefore, God in that first procreation of things made all things in a perfect state, it was incongruous to make either body without soul, or soul without body, separately: both, namely, would be in an imperfect state. And if God did not create the soul before the body, as we shall presently say, neither is it lawful to believe that He created the body before the soul: for the body depends on the soul more than the soul on the body — for the soul, severed and disjoined from the body, guards and preserves its substance and existence just as much as when in the body; whereas the body, once the soul has departed from it, is not a man's body except equivocally, and gradually dissolves and is corrupted. Nothing, however, forbids the opinion that the body of the first man... [continues]

Aquinas (ST I q.91 a.4): a part outside its whole is imperfect; God's first works being perfect, body and soul were not made separately. Marginal gloss: 'Ratio B. Thomae' (the reasoning of blessed Thomas).

[...that the body of the first man] was first formed according to certain dispositions: but then it was not a man's body except in remote potency; and as soon as it had the final disposition by which it is truly and properly a man's body, it received from God the rational soul: and the same has been preserved ever since, and is preserved daily, in the generation of every man.

The body 'first formed' only in remote potency; ensoulment follows upon the final disposition. The daily pattern of human generation.

GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 7. And He breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul.

Scripture lemma (set in the margin as CAP. 2. GENES. VERS. 7., the verse in italic) opening the next stretch of commentary.

SINCE Moses, by this figured and metaphorical expression, wished to signify the creation of the rational soul and its infusion into the body — a matter most grave, and most beautiful for the knowledge of the soul — his words must be carefully explained. First he says, “He breathed in” (Inspiravit): the Hebrew verb ■■■ (Napach) signifies to breathe in, to insufflate, or to emit a breath, whether while one is living or while one is dying — for in Latin too we say “to exhale or breathe out the soul.” Now why the creation of the rational soul should be insinuated by the word of inspiration or insufflation, many causes may be adduced. First, indeed, as Theodoret holds, so that it may be understood that the creation of the rational soul is as easy for God as it is easy for a man to send a breath from his mouth. Then, so that it may appear that the rational soul is not brought out and educed from the poten-[cy of matter...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'Q'. Hebrew ■■■ (Napach, 'to breathe/blow') glossed. Theodoret: the insufflation marks the ease of the soul's creation. Marginal gloss: 'Cur creatio animae rationalis: & infusio in corpus appelletur insufflatio' (why the creation of the rational soul and its infusion into the body is called an insufflation). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'tentia'.

— p. 460 (PDF) · printed p. 419 —

[...from the poten]cy of matter, but comes to the body from without, being created namely from nothing by God, and is therefore immaterial and immortal. Next, so that it might be known that the soul is at once created and infused into the body — for God, in creating it, infuses it, and in infusing creates it, since both happen at the same point of time, although in the order of nature it is prior for the soul to be created than to be infused into the body. Finally, by that reasoning it is signified that the soul somehow proceeded from the mouth of God, so that from this it might be understood that the rational soul most of all excels the other animals in this, that it is itself capable of, and a partaker in, the life, grace, and wisdom of God. For we read in chapter 24 of the book of Ecclesiasticus that the divine Wisdom proceeded from the mouth of God.

Three reasons for the 'insufflation' metaphor concluded: the soul created ex nihilo from without (immaterial/immortal); created and infused at once; proceeding 'from God's mouth' as partaker of God's life. Sir 24:5 cited.

BUT, because a breath comes forth from the body of the one breathing, on that account some supposed the soul of man to have been procreated from the substance of God: wherefore Cicero, adopting the view of the Platonists, is often wont to say that human souls are sipped, drawn, drawn off, and plucked from the divine nature. Many Fathers too, for that reason, hold that when Christ wished to give the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, He breathed upon them, in order by that means to declare that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with Him and proceeds from His substance. And Lactantius, in book 2 of the Divine Institutes, seems to have held that the soul of man was produced from the very nature of God. But this opinion is ridiculous and absurd, not merely false: for that inspiration of God was not corporeal, just as His speech was not corporeal when God said, “Let there be light,” or “Let there be a firmament” — although Eugubinus and Oleaster, whom we refuted above, believed that God, clothed in human form, [bodily breathed and formed the body of man...] [continues]

The 'soul from God's substance' error (Cicero's Platonism; some Fathers on John 20:22; Lactantius Div. Inst. 2) rejected as absurd: God's inspiration, like His fiat, is not corporeal. Marginal gloss: 'An humanus animus sit ex substantia Dei' (whether the human soul is from the substance of God).

[...that God,] clothed in human form, bodily both breathed upon and formed the body of man, and spoke, and did and said the other things which Moses narrates as done and said by Him. But that the soul of man is not from the substance of God is most easy for anyone both to understand and to prove. Certainly this was treated copiously and accurately by blessed Thomas in the First Part, question 90, and by Bonaventure on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 1, question 1, so that a re-treatment of the matter at present would be superfluous. As for what follows next, “into his face” (In faciem eius), it is a Hebrew idiom; for the Hebrew word ■■ (Aph), as Oleaster holds, descends from the root ■■■ (Anaph), and properly signifies anger; but because anger is shown most in the nose, it consequently also signifies the nose or the nostrils, as in Psalm 113[115]: “They have nostrils, and shall not smell.” The same word is also employed to signify the face, as below in chapter 19: “He bowed himself down to his face.” But it does not seem to signify the face except on account of the nostrils which are in it... [continues]

Hebrew ■■ (Aph) from root ■■■ (Anaph, 'to be angry'): 'anger' → 'nose/nostrils' → 'face' (Ps 115:6; Gen 19:1). Aquinas ST I q.90 and Bonaventure Sent. II d.17 already settle that the soul is not of God's substance.

[...which are in it]: but Moses named the face or the nostrils especially because in the face life most appears, which comes about through the inspiration and respiration of the mouth and nostrils. Then, because in the face the senses, both inner and outer, are most vigorous. Finally, because in the face the inner motions and affections of the mind stand out and become known. Others, for that “into the face,” render from the Hebrew “into the nostrils”: which reading Cajetan followed, and on that account thinks God breathed the breath of life into the nostrils, because the nose is the organ of respira-[tion...] [continues]

Why 'face/nostrils': life, the senses, and the affections appear there. Cajetan reads 'into the nostrils' (nose = organ of breathing). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genes.' (Cajetan on Genesis). Page ends at catchword 'tionis' (signature GG 2).

— p. 461 (PDF) · printed p. 420 —

[...of respira]tion; and indeed far more conveniently and purely than the mouth itself. And he says there are two signs of this: that the nose was made by nature patent and open, but the mouth closed — whence it comes about that sleepers, even with the mouth shut, draw breath abundantly, or at least sufficiently, through the nostrils; the other sign, that the air in the mouth itself is fouled by the vapors exhaled from the stomach into the mouth, as is manifest in those whose mouth and breath stink: but the breath that is drawn through the nostrils glides pure to the lung without any contagion of filth and uncleanness, and thence is likewise rendered pure.

Cajetan's two 'signs' that the nose is the proper organ of breathing (concluding the point begun on PDF 460).

For “breath” (spiraculum), in Hebrew there is the word ■■■■ (Nessamah), signifying a breath; and there seems to be this difference between ■■■■ (Nessamah) and ■■■ (ruah) — which word signifies wind — that wind is without color and invisible, whereas a breath and a vapor is visible after the manner of smoke or cloud. And He called the rational soul the “breath of life” because man lives just so long as he breathes; and as soon as he is failed by respiration, he is likewise bereft of life and deserted by the soul: nay rather, in the three chief languages — Hebrew, Greek, and Latin — the soul is named from respiration, or from the cooling which happens through respiration: for in Hebrew it is called ■■■ (Nephes) from breathing and blowing; in Latin it is called Anima, from the Greek word ■νεμος, that is, wind; in Greek ψυχ■ (psyche), from ψυχ■ζω (psychazo), to cool... [continues]

Large decorated initial 'P'. Hebrew ■■■■ (neshamah, breath) vs ■■■ (ruach, wind: invisible) vs ■■■ (nephesh, soul from breathing); Latin anima from Greek ■νεμος (wind); Greek ψυχ■ from

ψυχ■ζω *(to cool). Marginal gloss: 'Cur anima hominis dicta sit spiracul■' with the Hebrew phrase* ■■■■ ■■■■ *(nishmath chaiim, 'breath of lives' = spiraculum vitarum).*

[...to cool]. “For, because” (says Plato in the Cratylus), “when the soul is in the body, it is the cause for it to live, furnishing it the power of breathing; but as soon as respiration ceases, the body perishes and the man dies — on that account the ancients seem to me to have called the soul ψυχ■ν.” Now that “breath of life” (Spiraculum vitae) is put, by a Hebrew idiom, for that which is “a vital or vivifying breath”: nor is it in the Hebrew in the singular, “breath of life,” but in the plural, “breath of lives” (Spiraculum vitarum). Why it is said in the plural, “breath of lives,” there are various conjectures of the expositors. Some refer it to the two nostrils through which we draw the vital breath. Others think that by it is signified the very long life which man was to have led in the state of innocence, and which the primeval men led before the Flood. Some judge that a double life is denoted, of which man alone of all animals is capable — the present, namely, which is temporal, and the future, which is eternal. Nor are there lacking those who

Plato, Cratylus, on psyche from breathing/cooling. The plural 'breath of lives' (Heb. nishmath chaiim) explained variously: the two nostrils; the long antediluvian life; the double (temporal/eternal) life. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Hebraicè dictum sit spiracul■ vitarum' (why in Hebrew it is called the breath of lives).

think that Moses by these words wished to indicate the double mode of living which the rational soul has: one as it is in the body, informing it, animating, vivifying it, and moving it to operate; the other as, severed from the body, it subsists by itself and accomplishes its actions without the body's aid. This too pleases some: that here is insinuated the double life of man — the one corporeal and natural, the other spiritual and supernatural. The former the soul provides by its [natural...] [continues]

Two further readings of 'lives': the soul's double mode (in-body / separated); man's double life (natural / supernatural). Sentence breaks at 'anima'; completed on PDF 462 ('naturali vi & potestate sua').

— p. 462 (PDF) · printed p. 421 —

[...The former the soul provides] by its natural force and power; the latter only when instructed and aided by the singular grace and help of God.

Completes the sentence carried over from PDF 461: the natural life from the soul's own power, the supernatural only by grace.

CAJETAN, examining and commenting on these things more subtly, thinks that a triple life is signified which the rational soul confers on man; for although it is one only according to substance, yet in potency and in effect it is triple. Indeed it confers on man the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective life; and to maintain and exercise these lives it uses, as an instrument, a triple spirit — I mean the vital spirit, generated in the heart, the natural in the liver, the animal in the head, and permeating into the whole body.

Cajetan: the one rational soul yields a triple life (vegetative/sensitive/intellective), served by the three medical 'spirits' (vital/natural/animal). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genes.'

Cajetan argues further, from this passage of Moses, that there is in man only one soul according to substance, namely the rational, which however eminently and virtually (as we say in the schools) contains the two remaining souls, the vegetative and the sensitive. That in man the vegetative power is not distinct from the sensitive is clear by this argument: that the vegetative power produces the sensitive organs, but this work exceeds all the power of a vegetative soul; wherefore it is necessary that the vegetative powers be in reality of the sensitive soul itself, and operate by its power. And that the sensitive powers in man are not of the sensitive soul but of the rational becomes manifest from this: that the supreme sensitive faculty in man, which in the schools we call the Cogitative, is already in some part rational — for through it man remembers and reasons about singular things, discoursing from one singular to another. The same is seen also in the other part of the sensitive soul, which we call the Appetitive; for the sensitive appetite in man is somehow rational, as

Aristotle confirms at the end of the first book of the Ethics, since it can be accommodated to the prescript of reason, and become subject and obedient to it — for which reason it is also capable of the moral virtues; for temperance and fortitude have their seats, the former in the concupiscible, the latter in the irascible part.

Cajetan's argument for the unicity of the substantial form: one rational soul containing the lower powers virtually (the vegetative makes the sensitive organs; the Cogitative and the sensitive appetite are already 'in part rational' — Arist. EN 1.13). Marginal gloss: 'unam duntaxat in homine esse animam, quomodo argumentetur Caietanus' (how Cajetan argues that there is in man only one soul).

Furthermore, that phrase, “And man was made into a living soul,” contains a Hebraism which ought to be explained thus: “The man was made having a soul making him to live”; or by the word “soul” there is signified here, as often elsewhere in Scripture, the man himself, so that the sense is: “By that inspiration of God by which the soul was infused into the body, Adam was made into a living man,” that is, a living man. The Chaldee paraphrast renders it: “Into a speaking spirit”: by which manner of speaking three things are signified. First, that very thing we said, namely that Adam was made a living man — for to speak and to converse is a manifest sign of human life. Then, it signifies that Adam received then a soul not just any one but a rational one, whose property, namely, is to frame human speech and discourse. To this, it indicates that man was created at a perfect age, since to speak aptly and prudently belongs not to just any age. And this presented, as it were, a certain type of what afterward came to pass on the day of Pentecost — on which day the Church of Christ, regenerated as it were through the Holy Spirit, was made into a vivifying Spirit, and the faithful began to speak in various tongues the great works of God.

Gen 2:7b 'in animam viventem' as Hebraism (= a living man); the Targum's 'speaking spirit' yields three points: living man, a rational soul (speech), a perfect age; the type of Pentecost (Acts 2). Marginal gloss: 'Act. 2.' Page ends at catchword 'DISPV' (signature GG 3) — a new DISPUTATIO opens on PDF 463. RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 463, new DISPUTATIO.

— p. 463 (PDF) · printed p. 422 —

A DISPUTATION ON THE CREATION of the rational soul.

New disputation divider (rule above and below), opening on Gen 2:7. Catchword from PDF 462 was 'DISPV'.

BUT upon these words by which Moses adumbrated the creation of the rational soul, three questions must be treated.

Programmatic sentence (large initial 'V') announcing the three quaestiones of the disputation.

QUESTION I. Whether the soul of Adam was created earlier than his body was formed.

First quaestio of the disputation.

Among the nobler Philosophers, Plato indeed in the Timaeus said that all rational souls were created by God at the beginning of the world; but that afterward God, the supreme and Father of all, commanded the second gods that what remained of man — that is, the body and the nourishing and sentient soul — they themselves should fabricate. About the view of Aristotle there is a dispute among the Peripatetics; for to many it seemed that Aristotle made the rational soul prior to and older than the body: for he, disputing in the second book On the Generation of Animals, chapter three, whether every soul is before the body, at length decides that the rational soul is before the body and comes from without, because it and its own proper action is incorporeal. Others oppose to these the view of the same Aristotle when he affirms, in book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 17, that it cannot come to pass that the form be before the composite; but that some form should remain after the composite, nothing forbids — of which kind is the soul, not every soul, but the intellect.

Large decorated initial 'E'. The pre-existence question in the philosophers: Plato (Timaeus); the Peripatetic dispute over Aristotle (de Gen. An. 2.3 vs Metaph. 12 text 17). Marginal gloss: 'Sententia Platonis & Aristotelis, de origine animae rationalis' (the view of Plato and Aristotle on the origin of the rational soul).

Among the Christian doctors, Origen was in this error, that he held all rational souls to have been created from the beginning before bodies, and, on account of the faults and crimes they committed in that state, to have been thrust — for the paying of their penalties — into various bodies according to the variety of their merits, as into a prison: which error Rufinus too wished to fasten upon blessed Jerome, but undeservedly and falsely. For — to say nothing of other passages of Jerome — Jerome certainly, in Epistle 139 written to Cyprian, in which he explains Psalm 89[88], condemns in open words this dogma of Origen, with his name unspoken; and in Epistle 61, which he addressed to Pammachius, he assigns this very error to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and most forcibly refutes it. Nor does Augustine seem to have abhorred this opinion, since in the seventh book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter twenty-four, he signifies that the soul of the first Man was created together with the Angels on the first day of the mundane work: but that the body [was afterward formed...] [continues]

Origen's pre-existence-and-fall error; Rufinus' false imputation of it to Jerome (refuted from Jerome Ep. 139 ad Cyprianum on Ps 88, and Ep. 61 ad Pammachium against John of Jerusalem); Augustine (de Gen. ad lit. 7.24) seemingly favoring the soul's creation with the Angels on day one. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'corpus'.

— p. 464 (PDF) · printed p. 423 —

[...on the first day of the mundane work; but that the body] was afterward formed, and the soul infused into it. But he does not say this affirmatively, for he soon subjoins: “Let it be believed, then — provided, however, that no authority of the Scriptures or reason of truth contradicts.” Hugh of St. Victor, and the author of the Scholastic History, the Master of the Sentences likewise, and certain other Theologians, leave this, concerning the soul of the first man indeed, in doubt; but about all the others they do not hesitate to affirm that they are created not before the body, but together with the body.

Completes the Augustine citation (de Gen. ad lit. 7.24) carried over from PDF 463 — and notes he does not affirm it. Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Comestor (Historia Scholastica), Peter Lombard leave the first man's soul an open question. Marginal gloss begins: 'Animam primi hominis non ante corpus esse creatam' (that the soul of the first man was not created before the body).

But in truth, that the soul of the first man was not created before the body, but together with the body — just as the souls of all the rest, too, are each procreated together with its own body — I for my part judge not only more like the truth, but plainly true and certain. This too Gregory of Nyssa teaches, in the book On Man, chapters twenty-nine and thirty; and Damascene, in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter twelve; and Jerome, as we recalled above, in Epistle 61 to Pammachius on the errors of Origen, and Epistle 139 to Cyprian; Leo likewise, Epistle 71. And to this view Augustine is more inclined, in the twenty-third chapter of the twelfth book of the City of God, writing thus: "God therefore made man to His own image and likeness; for He created for him such a soul as, through reason and intelligence, would be more excellent than all the animals. And when He had formed the man from the earthly dust, and had — by breathing — put into him a soul such as I have said (whether one He had already made, or rather one He made by breathing), and had willed that the breath which He made by breathing should be the soul of man." The same holds blessed Thomas, First Part, question 90.

Pererius' own settled view, with its authorities (Gregory of Nyssa, Damascene, Jerome, Leo Ep. 71) and the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 12.23), plus Aquinas ST I q.90. Marginal gloss (continued): '...non ante corpus esse creatam.'

And this is roughly the view of the Theologians, which can be confirmed by three arguments. For (1) the rational soul is an essential part of man himself, and therefore outside Man it has an imperfect state, like all parts when they are separated from the whole of which they are parts. But it is not credible that God, in the first constitution of things, made anything in an imperfect state — and especially the soul of man, by far the most

excellent of all things except the Angels. And if, after the first Man, the souls of the other Men were procreated together with their bodies, why should we not judge the same of the soul of the first Man? since the reasoning is alike for all souls, and there was no cause why God should wish to create the soul of the first man before the body. Then (2), either it is natural for the rational soul to be conjoined with the body, or this is for it contrary to nature and violent: if it is natural — and God from the beginning founded things as the nature of each thing demanded — it is concluded that the soul [of the first man was not created before the body...] [continues]

The first two of three arguments: (1) the soul as an essential part would be imperfect if made apart; (2) the body-soul union being natural, God made it as nature demands. Sentence breaks at 'animam'.

[...it is concluded that the soul] of the first man was not created before his body, but coupled together with the body at the same time. But if, on the other hand, it is for the rational soul contrary to nature and violent to be in the body, then the generation of man is not natural, but contrary to nature, and the most excellent of all the species that nature has (I mean man) would be contrary to nature. And, conversely, the dissolution and death of man would be natural and according to nature, and therefore desirable and pleasant to every man — which is false, as has been most thoroughly explored and ascertained by our own and others' experiences. Nay rather, if it were so [...] [continues]

Completes the second argument: were union violent, generation would be 'against nature' and death 'natural/desirable' — refuted by experience. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'ita'.

— p. 465 (PDF) · printed p. 424 —

[...Nay rather, if it were so,] the resurrection of the dead — as Saint Jerome well argues — would be violent and not to be desired by man, but to be opposed and shunned; whereas it pertains to man's consummated happiness, and in the Sacred Letters is promised as a most ample good, and most to be desired by man. Wherefore Paul, to the Romans, chapter 8:

“And we ourselves,” he says, “having the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, awaiting the adoption of the sons of God, expecting the redemption of our body.” The same, in chapter five of the latter Epistle to the Corinthians: “For we also who are,” he says, “in this tabernacle, groan, being burdened, because we wish not to be unclothed, but to be [clothed upon...]” [continues]

The resurrection (desirable, not violent) shows body-soul union is natural: Rom 8:23 and 2 Cor 5:4. Marginal gloss: 'Quàm sit optabilis homini resurrectio ad vitam immortalem, ex sententia Pauli' (how desirable to man is the resurrection to immortal life, according to Paul's judgement).

[...but to be] clothed upon, until that which is mortal be swallowed up by life.” And in chapter 15 of the former Epistle to the Corinthians Paul argues that, if there were to be no resurrection of the dead, Christians would be of all mortals the most wretched and most to be pitied. Indeed Aristotle, in the first book On the Soul, text 49, recalling this opinion as if by irony, and not without a note of mockery, says thus: “But it is laborious for the soul to be mingled with the body, unable to be freed, and moreover a thing to be shunned. Since it is better for the intellect not to be with the body, as is also customarily said, and pleases many.” Lastly, by the judgement of the Theologians, man's state for meriting well or ill is only while man's soul is in the body: which Paul indicates clearly enough in chapter 5 of the latter Epistle to the Corinthians, affirming that all men must be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each may render the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil — that is, that for those things which, while [he was in the body...] [continues]

1 Cor 15:19 and Aristotle's ironic de Anima 1 (text 49) on the soul 'mingled with' the body; 2 Cor 5:10 on the tribunal of Christ as the ground that merit happens only in the body.

[...that for those things which, while] he was in the body, he did either well or ill, he may receive the worthy rewards or punishments. If, then, the rational soul had existed before the body, doubtless it would have merited something at that time; for it would have done something either good or evil, since it would have been endowed with free will, and not yet either

blessed or damned — wherefore its action would have been either meritorious or demeritorious, and thus we would slip into the error of Origen, who held that the rational souls, on account of the sins they had committed before the body, were condemned and thrust to the body itself as to a ward and a prison. But someone may ask me: just as the rational soul, after a man's death, remains existing outside the body, why is it not likewise fitting that it be created and exist before a man's generation? But the answer is easy and ready at hand. For that the soul survives after a man's death befalls from the necessity of the nature both of the human body and of the rational soul; for since man is mortal, but our soul [immortal...] [continues]

Pre-existence would entail merit/demerit before the body — Origen's error. The disanalogy with post-mortem survival is set up. Marginal gloss: 'Cur sicut animus noster post corpus existit, non item existat ante corpus' (why, just as our soul exists after the body, it does not likewise exist before the body).

[...but our soul] immortal, when the man is extinguished it is necessary that the soul survive and remain for all time: but in truth, since the rational soul is a natural form and a part of man himself, there is no reason why it ought to be created and to exist before the generation of man. For the rest, to those things which we have disputed on the proposed question, it will not be amiss to add what Saint Bonaventure discusses on the same matter, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 17, article 1, question 3: “Although,” he says, “it could seem congruous to someone that the soul of Adam ought to have been created before his body, that thus it might be declared that the rational soul does not depend on the body, nor is educed [from the potency of matter...]” [continues]

The disanalogy resolved: survival is from natural necessity, but the soul being the body's natural form gives no reason for pre-existence. Opens the Bonaventure block-quote (Sent. II d.17 a.1 q.3), which runs onto PDF 466. Sentence breaks at 'educi'.

— p. 466 (PDF) · printed p. 425 —

[...nor educed] from the potency of matter, but subsists by itself, and, created from nothing by God alone, is joined to the body from without; and that by this reasoning the agreement of our soul with the Angels would be demonstrated to be as natural — in the fact that it has in itself the image of God — as supernatural, in the fact that it is ordered to the same supernatural end and through similar supernatural means: nevertheless it was much more congruous that it be produced together with the body. Both because the soul is united to the body as its natural perfection, and as that with which it makes one essential composite which is man — whence it comes about that it naturally desires to be with the body, and to be outside it is for it contrary to nature and somehow penal; and also because the soul is united to the body as a mover to the movable, so that outside it [the body] it can merit or demerit nothing. Wherefore it was not fitting that it be produced before the body, lest it be produced in an imperfect state and contrary to nature, lest before fault it should feel punishment, nor without the body should it merit or demerit.

Bonaventure, continued: the soul as the body's natural perfection and as mover, hence not fittingly produced before the body.

For if it had been produced before the body, since it would then have had the use of free will, and nothing would have hindered, doubtless it would have either merited or demerited: wherefore the body would not be a partaker of all the soul's merit or demerit; and false would be what the Apostle said, that all will receive their reward according as they have done in the body, whether good or evil. Nor indeed would its pre-existence have contributed anything toward declaring the immortality of the rational soul: since that pre-existence of it could have been known to no one by natural reason, but only from Scripture itself handing it down. But without that there are many other passages of Scripture from which it could be demonstrated. Thus far from Bonaventure.

Bonaventure concluded ('Hactenus ex Bonaventura'): pre-existence would void the Apostle's rule (2 Cor 5:10) and adds nothing for proving immortality, which other Scriptures establish.

QUESTION II. Whether from this passage of Moses the immortality of the rational soul can be demonstrated.

Section divider (rule above). Second quaestio of the disputation.

It must not be doubted that, from these few words by which Moses indicated the creation of the rational soul, it can be demonstrated and proved that the soul of man is immortal: which Moses also signified in many ways, both in this book and in his other books. Wherefore I greatly wonder that the Sadducees — who denied the immortality of our soul, and did away with every incorporeal and immortal spirit — were not only tolerated, but even flourished in authority, in works, and in honors among the Jews. Although not even this ought to seem a thing to be wondered at [to happen...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'N'. The immortality is demonstrable from Gen 2:7; astonishment at the Sadducees' standing among the Jews. Sentence breaks at 'miran-'.

[...nor ought even this] to seem a thing to be wondered at — to one who considers that even among the Christian people so many heresies, so openly contrary to divine Scripture, are believed by many; so great is men's either ignorance of the truth, or stupor of mind, or proclivity of disposition toward all the worst things, or lust and license of living by their own judgement and holding whatever they please, or the negligence of Princes who ought to forbid and punish these things. Eusebius, in the sixth book of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 30, relates that in the parts of Arabia there arose of certain [men...] [continues]

The wonder tempered by the prevalence of heresy among Christians. Eusebius (HE 6.37, here cited as 6.30) on a heresy arising in Arabia (the 'Thnetopsychites,' who held the soul dies with the body). Marginal gloss: 'Haeresis Arabum quorundam de immortalitate animae' (the heresy of certain Arabs concerning the immortality of the soul). Page ends at catchword 'dam' (= quorundam; signature HH). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 467, continuing 'quorun[dam]...' on the Arabian heresy.

— p. 467 (PDF) · printed p. 426 —

[...there arose] the error of certain men saying that, when the man dies, the soul also at the same time perishes, but that afterward, in the resurrection of the dead, it revives again to a life that is nevertheless immortal. The followers of this error can be named “Arabici,” from the nation in which it first flourished, as Augustine thinks, in the book On Heresies, number 83.

Completes the sentence broken at the catchword 'dam' on PDF 466. The Arabian 'Thnetopsychites' (soul dies with the body, revives at the resurrection); Augustine, de Haeresibus 83.

In a similar error were, of necessity, all who supposed that rational souls are not created by God from nothing, but are seeded and propagated from parents, no otherwise than the body itself: so that, just as body is propagated from body, so the soul is multiplied from soul — namely, after the likeness of a light kindled from another light. The authors of this error are called, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapters 13 and 14, Luciferians; Cyril likewise, and some of the Latins. Augustine too, in the book On Heresies, number 86, recalling the opinion of Tertullian, who made the soul of man corporeal, subjoins this: “He indeed says that the worst souls of men are, after death, turned into demons, and he believes that the state of the soul is propagated by traduction.” Yet Augustine does not judge that Tertullian was condemned by the Church as a heretic on account of the first or the last opinion, but because he adhered to the error of the Cataphrygians, who condemned second marriages no otherwise than adultery.

Traducianism (the soul propagated from parents, 'light from light'): the Luciferians; Tertullian's corporeal soul (Augustine, de Haeresibus 86) — condemned not for traducianism but for Montanism (Cataphrygians). Marginal gloss: 'An anima nostra sit ex traduce' (whether our soul is by traduction).

Certainly Augustine himself, although he dares not affirm that the soul is propagated by traduction, nevertheless does not think that it can be refuted from divine Scripture as false and heretical. Indeed he himself, in that question which concerns the Origin of the soul, is doubtful and uncertain,

as he openly shows in Epistles 7 and 28, which he wrote to Saint Jerome, and in 157, which he sent to Optatus, and in book 3 On the Baptism of Infants, chapter 10, and in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 1, and in book 10 On Genesis according to the Letter, in the first four chapters — in the fourth of which he writes that to suppose the souls of all men to have been created from nothing is too hard and violent, since Scripture teaches that God created all things at once and rested on the seventh day from all His work; from which it follows that all the souls of men, created afterward, were in some way in the soul of the first man. But if individual ones were created from nothing, other souls would no more have been in the soul of the first man than that one in the others.

Augustine's lifelong uncertainty about the soul's origin, with its dossier (Ep. 7, 28, 157; de Bapt. parv. 3.10; Retract. 1.1; de Gen. ad lit. 10.1-4): creationism ex nihilo seems to clash with the rest on day seven.

But this pressed and urged Augustine the more vehemently, that he did not himself see — if the souls of later men are not propagated from the soul of Adam, but each is created from nothing — by what reasoning the sin of Adam would be transfused through carnal generation into all his posterity: since original sin is, properly, not in the body but in the soul. And if the souls of other men in no way depend on the soul of Adam, by no reasoning does his sin seem to have been able to be derived into other men. This question Saint Thomas treats, in the First Part, question 118, article 2; but most accurately Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 18, the last question, and Alfonso de Castro, in book 2 against the Heresies, where he treats Of the Soul, refuting the fifth error. But [...] [continues]

The crux: if souls are created (not traduced), how is original sin (seated in the soul) transmitted? References: Aquinas ST I q.118 a.2; Bonaventure Sent. II d.18 q.ult.; Alfonso de Castro adv. Haereses 2. Page ends at the catchword 'VERUM' (signature unmarked here).

— p. 468 (PDF) · printed p. 427 —

NEVERTHELESS, the constant and perpetual view of blessed Jerome was that rational souls are created singly in the bodies of individual men, no otherwise than the soul of the first man was created; and this doctrine the whole Church thereafter followed. For because the rational soul is incorporeal and indivisible, it cannot be propagated from another soul; and because it is immaterial, it cannot be procreated and multiplied from any matter. This blessed Thomas adduces with many reasons, in the second book Against the Gentiles, chapter 86; and the same David signified, in Psalm 32[33], in those words, “Who fashioned individually the hearts of them”; and Zechariah, chapter 12 — when, he says, “The Lord says, who stretches out the Heaven and founds the earth and forms the spirit of man within him”: by which words, as Jerome writes in their explanation, it is indicated that, just as the Heaven and the earth, so the soul of man is created both by God alone and from nothing. In Ecclesiastes too, chapter 12, we thus read, “Let the dust return into its earth, whence it was, and the spirit return to Him who gave it”: the force of which testimony, against those who make the souls of other men propagated from the soul of the first man, Augustine indeed endeavors (in book 10 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 9) — but endeavors in vain — to evade and to weaken.

Large initial 'V'. Jerome's settled doctrine (souls created singly, the Church's), grounded in the soul's incorporeality/immateriality: Aquinas SCG 2.86; Ps 33:15; Zech 12:1; Eccl 12:7 (which Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 10.9, vainly tries to blunt).

But come, let us indicate in what places and by what words Moses taught that the soul of man is immortal. In the first place, he shows it manifestly when he said that man alone of all the animals was made to the image and likeness of God. For if the soul of man were not incorporeal and immaterial, capable of understanding and knowing all things, and therefore immortal, man alone would not truly be said to have been made to the image of God. And this argument — of the likeness of the human soul to God — Plato, in the Alcibiades and in the Phaedo, thought a most powerful one for proving the immortality of our soul. And that it is, of all the reasons

that can be brought to persuade it, the firmest and most probable argument, Porphyry teaches with many words, in book 1 to Boethius, as Eusebius reports in book 11 of the Preparation for the Gospel.

First Mosaic proof of immortality: man in God's image implies an incorporeal, all-knowing, immortal soul (Plato, Alcibiades and Phaedo; Porphyry ad Boethium, via Eusebius Praep. Evang. 11). Marginal glosses: 'Quibus ex verbis Mosis ostendatur immortalitas animae nostrae'; 'Quae ratio Platoni & Porphyrio visa sit validissima ad probandam animi nostri immortalitatem.'

Now this likeness of man and God shines forth especially in four things. First, in a certain infinite capacity of the mind, which is apt and fit to know all things. Then, in the appetite of the human will, so infinite that it can be filled and satisfied by no good except the infinite — that is, God. Next, in the freedom of the will, and (as they say in the schools) in a certain indetermination toward any particular and finite goods whatsoever. Finally, in a certain natural desire of eternity which the soul seeks for itself, by that very thing sufficiently betraying and proving its own eternity and immortality.

The four marks of the image of God in the soul: infinite intellect, infinite (God-directed) will, free will, and the natural desire of eternity. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor in rebus similitudo hominis & Dei posita est' (in four things is placed the likeness of man and God).

Another passage of Moses, from which the immortality of the rational soul becomes known, is next to the previous: that in which Moses said man to have been constituted by God the prince and lord of all the animals; whereby it is declared that man is of a higher order and grade of nature than are the other animals. The third passage is the one we presently treat: [For when Moses says...] [continues]

Second proof: man's dominion over the animals (Gen 1:26-28) shows his higher rank. The third proof (Gen 2:7 itself) begins. Page ends at the catchword 'Cùm' (signature HH 2).

— p. 469 (PDF) · printed p. 428 —

[...The third passage is the one we presently treat:] For when Moses says that God breathed the rational soul into the body of man, he indicated not

obscurely that it comes to man from without and is created by God alone, and is generated neither from any matter nor by any other efficient cause. For when Moses recalled the generation of the other animals, he reports that God said and commanded that the earth and the water should produce the souls of terrestrial and aquatic living things — by that speech signifying that the souls of the other animals were produced from elemental matter. But of the soul of man he speaks far otherwise, saying that it was insufflated or inspired by God, so that it may be understood to be of a different condition, one whose origin is not from any corporeal thing, but from God alone.

Third proof: Gen 2:7's insufflation distinguishes man's soul (from God alone, immaterial) from the animal souls drawn from elemental matter (Gen 1:20,24).

The fourth passage is in the fourth chapter of the book of Genesis: where it is written that God said to Cain, “Under you shall be your appetite, and you shall rule over it”: by which words the freedom of the human will is clearly shown, to which the immortality of the soul also is necessarily connected. The fifth passage is in chapter 37 of Genesis, where Jacob thus speaks, “I shall go down to my son, mourning, into hell (infernum)”: nor can we interpret “hell” as the tomb where Joseph's body had been laid, since Jacob had believed that Joseph was torn and devoured by wild beasts; it must therefore be understood of hell properly so called, to which the souls of all men, even of the just, descended before the coming of Christ. The sixth passage is chapter 3 of Exodus: for it is written in that place that God said to Moses, “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” Which our Lord, recalling in the Gospel, added: “He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”

Proofs four–six: Gen 4:7 (free will → immortality); Gen 37:35 (Jacob's 'infernum' = the true netherworld of departed souls, not a grave); Exod 3:6 with Christ's gloss in Matt 22:32. Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 22.'

The seventh passage is in chapter 4 of Deuteronomy, where it is said that the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of Heaven were made by God and

destined to the service of all the nations: but if man were in every part material and mortal, he would assuredly be more ignoble than the stars, nor would the stars be said to have been made for his sake. It is clear, therefore, that our soul is immortal, and was signified to be so by Moses, both in this place, where he treats of the creation of man, and in other places of the Pentateuch. BUT this can be turned into a doubt: Whether the rational soul is immortal by its own nature, or only through the grace of God? For this is said affirmatively in the Sixth Synod, session 11, in the epistle of Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, which in the 14th action of the same council was approved by the whole Synod; moreover Saint Jerome, in book 2 against the Pelagians, and Damascene, in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapters 3 and 12, hand down that the Angels have immortality not by their own nature, but through the grace of God... [continues]

Seventh proof: Deut 4:19 (the stars serve man, who is thus nobler). Then the new question — immortal by nature or only by grace? — opened with authorities (Third Council of Constantinople / Sophronius; Jerome c. Pelag. 2; Damascene de Fide Orth. 2.3, 2.12 on the Angels' immortality by grace). Marginal gloss: 'An animus hominis sit immortalis natura sua, an tantùm Dei voluntate & gratia.' Sentence breaks at 'immortalitatem.'

[...to have immortali]ty: which is also confirmed by the testimony of Paul, who, in the last chapter of the former Epistle to Timothy, writes that God alone has immortality. Nor does Plato seem not to have seen this, when he writes in the Timaeus that the second gods are by their own nature dissoluble, yet by the will of God will be immortal. Nevertheless, without any doubt it must be said that the rational soul is by its own nature immortal, since it is a certain simple, immaterial nature, subsisting by itself. But as for what the Fathers said of the soul of man and of the Angels, that they [are immortal] not by their own na-[ture...] [continues]

1 Tim 6:16 (God alone has immortality); Plato Timaeus (the 'second gods' immortal by God's will). Pererius' own answer: the soul is immortal by nature (simple, immaterial, self-subsisting); the Fathers' 'not by nature' to be qualified (continues on PDF 470). Sentence breaks at 'natura' (catchword 'tura').

— p. 470 (PDF) · printed p. 429 —

[...that they are] immortal not by their own nature, but through the grace of God — this must be understood thus: that they have immortality not from themselves or by themselves, but from God, who, as to their actual existence, was able both to create them and not to create them, and to reduce the created to nothing; and so, because they can be and not be extrinsically — that is, with respect had to the omnipotence of God — therefore the Fathers said that they have immortality not from their own nature but from the grace of God. And by this reasoning too it is fitting to interpret that saying of Paul, that God alone has immortality: although Chrysostom, in the explanation of that passage, thinks that God alone is said by Paul to be immortal in comparison with earthly Kings, since just before he had said, “the only powerful, the King of kings, and Lord of lords.”

Reconciliation: 'not immortal by nature' means contingent on God's omnipotence (He could annihilate them). 1 Tim 6:15-16 read either thus or (Chrysostom) as a comparison with earthly kings. Marginal gloss: 'Locus Pauli 1. ad Timoth. cap. ultimo.'

But Saint Augustine, in the third book against Maximinus, chapter 12, interprets the word “immortality” as put for immutability, so that it may be signified that God alone is immutable. Nor is this signification of “immortality” foreign: for in every mutable nature, change itself is a kind of death, because it makes something in it that was not. Leo writes something similar, in sermon 1 On the Resurrection of the Lord: “For every man,” he says, “who is changed by some conversion from one thing into another, the end is not to be what he was, and the rise is to be what he was not.” And this agrees most fully with the doctrine of Aristotle, of whom, in the eighth book of the Physics, text 24, these are the words: “But to almost all it seems that to be moved is for something to come to be and to be corrupted: for into that which it changes, it becomes this, or in this; but out of that from which it changes, this is corrupted, or hence.”

Immortality = immutability (Augustine c. Maximinum 3.12): every change is a kind of death (Leo, Serm. 71 [here 'sermo 1 de Resurrectione']; Aristotle Phys. 8 text 24).

Not only, however, do we learn from this doctrine of Moses that the soul of man is immortal, but also that its form is true and natural, and that each man has his own soul — namely, multiplied according to the multitude of men who are generated. This Moses sufficiently indicated when he called it “the breath of life,” and when he said that through it man was made living. For if the rational soul is to man the cause of life and of living, it is necessary that it itself be the form of man. For form is defined as that by which a thing is what it is, and from which the being of the thing results. If, then, living comes to man from the rational soul, therefore also being: for to live, for living things, is to be — as Aristotle well argues in the second book On the Soul, text 36. Moses too, when he said that God made man to His image and likeness (which pertains to the soul), and formed man from the slime of the earth (which pertains to the body), [openly shows...] [continues]

Gen 2:7 also teaches the soul is the true natural form of man, individuated per person: living = being (Arist. de Anima 2 text 36). Marginal gloss: 'Ex doctrina Mosis colligi, animam rationalem esse formam hominis, & unam in unoquoque' (from Moses' doctrine is gathered that the rational soul is the form of man, and one in each individual).

[...openly] shows that man consists substantially of soul and body. But if the rational soul is the substantial form of man, from this it is concluded that it is multiplied according to the multitude of men: for a substantial composite cannot be multiplied except by the multiplication of its substantial parts, and especially of the form, from which above all both unity and distinction accrue to the composite. Furthermore, from the words of Moses it may be argued that in man there is only one soul according to substance, and that this is [the rational soul...] [continues]

The soul as substantial form is individuated and multiplied per man. Begins the argument for the unicity of the soul. Marginal gloss: 'Unam tantum animam esse in homine' (that there is only one soul in man). Page ends at the catchword 'animam' (signature HH 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 471, 'in homine unam duntaxat esse animam... & hanc esse animam [rationalem]...'.

— p. 471 (PDF) · printed p. 430 —

[...that in man there is only one soul according to substance, and that this is] the rational soul — which, however, by its power abundantly fulfills the offices and functions of the other souls: for it gives man to be sensitive and vegetative, in a far more excellent manner than the sensitive and vegetative souls would furnish them separately. But by what words did Moses indicate this? namely, when, narrating the creation of the rational soul, he called it simply “the breath of life”: as though the threefold life which is in man — vegetative, sensitive, and intellective — is furnished by the rational soul alone. Nor did he only say that man was made living by a human and intellective soul, but said that through it precisely and simply he was made liv-[ing...] [continues]

Completes the unicity argument from PDF 470: one rational soul performs the offices of the vegetative and sensitive souls (it makes man 'living' simply, Gen 2:7's 'breath of life'). Sentence breaks at 'viventem.'

[...made liv]ing, as though from it he received every kind of life, and every grade of living which he has in himself. The Lord also seems to have signified this openly when He said, as Matthew reports, chapter 10: “Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul”: by which words it is signified not only that the soul of man is immortal, but also that there is only one in each man: for since He did not say, “but the rational soul they cannot kill,” but said simply, “the soul they cannot kill,” He sufficiently indicated that there is no soul in man that can be killed; but if, besides the rational soul, there were in man a vegetative and a sensitive soul, which are mortal and perish together with the body, that would not simply and truly have been said, “but the soul they cannot kill.” In this view Saint Jerome too seems to have been: for he, explaining those words which are in the Prayer of Azariah, in Daniel chapter 3, “But in a contrite soul and a spirit of humility may we be received”: and from the present [passage...] [continues]

Matt 10:28 ('cannot kill the soul' — said simply, not 'the rational soul') argues one soul per man. Jerome on the Prayer of Azariah (Dan 3:39) begins. Marginal gloss: 'Locus Matthaei, cap. 10.'

[...And from the present] passage, he says, and from that which follows, "Bless the Lord, you spirits and souls of the just": and in the Psalms, "A sacrifice to God is a troubled spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise" — there are those who would have there be in man another spirit, besides the Holy Spirit, and another soul. But they will have to labor [to explain] how, apart from the flesh and the grace of the Holy Spirit, two substances and two interior men can be said to be in one man. Thus Jerome.

Jerome (on Dan 3) block-quote, 'Sic Hieronymus': against doubling spirit/soul in man (citing Dan 3:86, Ps 50[51]:19). Marginal gloss: 'Psalm. 50.'

To confirm the same, some bring forward what is written in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 15, where those are condemned who place two souls in one man; and the opinion of the eighth general Synod, which is in canon 11, where it is said that it is impious to place two souls in one man — since both the Old and the New Testament, and all the Fathers of the Church, assert that men have one rational soul. They also adduce the testimony of Augustine, from the book On the Two Souls against the Manichees. Yet other learned men, while they judge it true that there is only one [soul in man...] [continues]

Authorities against 'two souls': Gennadius de Eccl. dogm. 15; the Eighth General Synod (Constantinople IV) canon 11; Augustine de duabus animabus c. Manich. Some, however, hold the unicity is not strictly de fide (continues on PDF 472).

— p. 472 (PDF) · printed p. 431 —

[...while they judge it true that there is only one soul in man, yet they think that this was never defined according to the] Catholic Faith. For this is nowhere expressed, either in Scripture or in the Councils, nor was it handed down by the Fathers as a dogma of Faith; nor were the Nominalist Theologians, who hold that there are three souls in each man, ever

condemned by the Church as heretics. For as to what is said in the above-mentioned passages, that there are not two souls in man, it is easily understood that the discourse is about two souls — of which one is vivifying, the other not vivifying, but only ministering reason, and as it were assisting; or of which one is from God and of the substance of God, the other from some other principle, as the Manichees said. But those are not condemned who place many souls in man in the way we have set forth above, and as the Nominalists hold.

Completes the qualification: the unicity of the soul is not strictly de fide; the condemnations target the dualist/Manichee 'two souls,' not the Nominalist subordinated plurality. (The header word 'Catholicae' begins the page, completing 'rationem Fidei Catholicae' from PDF 471.)

GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 15. The Lord God therefore took the man, and put him in the Paradise of pleasure, that he might work and keep it.

Scripture lemma (set in the margin as CAP. 2. VERS. 15., the verse in italic) opening a new stretch of commentary.

ABOVE, Moses, having set about describing Paradise — when he had said that it was planted in the region of Eden, toward its eastern quarter — inserted a mention of man, writing that man had been placed in it by God: saying this, namely, by anticipation, in order to show that Paradise was founded by God for the sake of man alone. But afterward, the description of Paradise being completed, he subjoined how and why God placed man in Paradise — narrating it, that is, in its own place. But as to the words of Moses, it is fitting to know that that phrase “God took the man” can be interpreted by us in three ways. First, that God by an interior admonition taught Adam whither he must go — namely, to the place of Paradise, as into a dwelling prepared for him by God to inhabit: just as we read in Matthew, chapter 4, that our Lord was led by the Spirit into the desert. Then, we can understand that — as it is recorded of Enoch, Habakkuk, and Philip that they were snatched away by the Spirit of God and carried off to distant places — so Adam was translated, from the place where he had

been created, into the place of Paradise by the Spirit of God. Finally, it is also permissible to think that, through an Angel clothed in the appearance of a human body, Adam was, as it were, led by the hand into Paradise — just as the Angel Raphael led Tobias; and this seems most probable to Augustine and to me. For God — or rather the Angel who spoke in the words of God — we read below conversed with Adam, and Adam heard the voice of God walking in Paradise.

Large decorated initial 'S'. The earlier mention of man (Gen 2:8) was by anticipation. Three readings of 'God took the man': interior admonition (cf. Matt 4:1); rapture by the Spirit (Enoch, Habakkuk in Bel/Dan 14, Philip in Acts 8); or an Angel leading by the hand (Raphael with Tobias) — Pererius' and Augustine's preference. Marginal glosses: 'Quomodo Adam sit à Deo collocatus in Paradiso'; 'Genes. 5. Danielis 14. Actorum 8.'

But the reason why, as soon as Adam was created, he was brought by God into Paradise, we opened above in the third book, which is On Paradise, when we taught why God had founded Paradise with such great beauty and pleasantness — in which, however, Adam was going to remain a very brief time, and after him no mortal. Augustine noted, in book 8 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 11, that in this passage God was first called by the word “Lord,” when it is said “the Lord God”; and that not without reason. For this [...] [continues]

Cross-reference to Pererius' own book 3 (On Paradise). Augustine (de Gen. ad lit. 8.11): the divine name 'Dominus' (Lord) first appears here. Marginal gloss: 'Quando primú Deus appellatus est nomine Domini.' Sentence breaks at the catchword 'hoc.'

— p. 473 (PDF) · printed p. 432 —

[...For] in this passage God first laid a law upon man: by which He declared Himself to be the lord of man, and that man was made to serve and obey God, and by that service and obedience would attain eternal life and happiness. But this annotation is little firm, since before this passage, in the Hebrew and Latin Scripture four times, and twice in the translation of the Seventy Translators, the word “Lord” is attributed to God. Now for that word “He put” (Posuit), the Hebrew word ■■■■■■■

(Vuiannichehu) is assuredly much more significant: for it means “he let go” or “he left”; whereby it is signified that God did not lead Adam into Paradise in order merely to show him the beauty and magnificence of Paradise and then presently lead him away from there, but there let him go and left him, as in a place destined for his habitation.

Against Augustine's 'first naming of Lord': the title 'Lord' had already appeared. Hebrew ■■■■■■■ (Vuiannichehu, the wayyiqtol of ■■■ 'to set/leave,' Gen 2:15) is glossed 'he let go/left' — Adam was settled there, not merely shown the place. (Pererius' transliteration retained.)

Moreover, it is to be understood from this — that God is said to have taken the man and put him in Paradise — that it is clearly known that man was not created inside Paradise, but outside: for if he had been created inside Paradise, it would not rightly be said that God took the man and put him in Paradise. And the same is more clearly signified below, in the third chapter, where it stands thus: “God cast Adam out of Paradise, that he might till the earth from which he was taken”: Adam, therefore, was created from earth that was outside Paradise. But why did God not wish to create man in Paradise? First, indeed, because the habitation of Paradise did not befit man according to his nature, but on account of the gift of immortality which God was going to grant him in the abiding state of innocence: but that gift of immortali-[ty...] [continues]

Adam was created outside Paradise (Gen 3:23 'to till the earth whence he was taken'). The first of four reasons: Paradise befitted him only by the (non-natural) gift of immortality. Marginal gloss: 'Adamum non esse creatum in Paradiso, & cur' (that Adam was not created in Paradise, and why).

[...but that gift of immortali]ty was not natural to man, but bestowed on him by a gratuitous gift of God: so that Adam might the more manifestly understand that that place was not naturally owed to him, but granted by the grace of God alone, it was fitting that Adam be created outside Paradise. Then, if Adam had been created in Paradise, and had not before seen other places, he might perhaps have thought that that place suited him and was owed to him naturally; but, created outside Paradise, recognizing more clearly the excellence of Paradise from the comparison of other

places, he understood without doubt the exceptional benevolence and beneficence of God toward him, who had dignified him with so happy a place and dwelling. Besides this, that Adam might be more cautious, and readier to obey the will of God, and more diligent and careful in keeping His commands and precepts — knowing most certainly that he was to dwell in Paradise only so long as he himself obeyed the precepts of God. Lastly, that he might be able to have no just cause of grieving and complaining about God, when he should be cast out of Paradise on account of sin, as though dislodged from a place naturally [owed...] [continues]

The four reasons completed: (2) to know Paradise was grace, not nature; (3) to appreciate its excellence by comparison; (4) to be cautious and obedient; and lastly, to have no grievance when expelled.

[...as though from a place naturally] owed and suited to him he had been dislodged — whereas God is by no means wont, on account of sin, to fine and deprive man of his natural goods. But someone may ask: Why, then, did God found the Angels in Heaven? Why, likewise, did He procreate the other living things, each in its own place where they were going to dwell and live out their life? Why, finally, did He form Eve — who was more ignoble than Adam — inside Paradise? But to these it is easy [to respond in this way...] [continues]

Three objections to Adam's creation outside Paradise (the Angels in heaven, the animals in their habitats, Eve inside Paradise). Page ends at the catchword 'est hunc.'

— p. 474 (PDF) · printed p. 433 —

[...But to these it is easy to respond in this] way. To the first I respond: the empyrean heaven, in which the Angels were created, was naturally most suited to the dignity of the Angelic nature, since it is far higher and more excellent than all bodies and presides over them. But the excellence of Paradise exceeded the condition of man's nature, and befitted him not otherwise than on account of the gift of innocence and immortality. Something similar must be responded to the second objection. For the

places in which the animals were generated did not surpass the condition of each animal — nay rather, they suited the nature of each of them very well; but Paradise was not so, in comparison with man.

Replies to objections 1-2: the empyrean fits the Angels' superior nature, and the animals' habitats fit their natures, whereas Paradise exceeds man's natural condition. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Angeli creati sunt in Caelo' (why the Angels were created in Heaven).

To the third it could be responded by denying that Eve was created in Paradise, [saying] rather that she was created outside, and together with Adam was introduced into Paradise by God. For so Josephus held, in the first book of the Antiquities, chapter 1, and Rupert, in the second book On the Trinity and His Works, chapter twenty-two. This too Tertullian held, in the second book against Marcion, in the passage where he disputes those words of Ezekiel, chapter 28: “You, the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty. You were in the delights of God's Paradise” — or, as Tertullian himself reads, “You were born in the delights of your God's Paradise” — those words, I say, although they were spoken under the name of the king of Tyre, cannot truly be understood of him, but of Lucifer, that is, the devil who fell from Heaven on account of pride. For thus Tertullian argues: the Prophet says that the king of Tyre was born in Paradise; but no mortal — not even Adam himself — was born in the Paradise of God; therefore that ought not to be understood of the king of Tyre, but under his name Lucifer must be thought to be signified, to whom the whole prophecy of that passage wonderfully agrees.

Reply to objection 3 (Eve): one option — Eve too created outside (Josephus, Ant. 1.1; Rupert de Trin. 2.22; Tertullian c. Marcionem 2, reading Ezek 28:12-13 of Lucifer, since 'no mortal, not even Adam, was born in Paradise'). Marginal gloss: 'An Eva creata sit in paradiso.'

But indeed it is nearer the truth, and more agreeable to divine Scripture and to the doctrine of the Fathers, to judge that Eve was formed in Paradise: for the context of the Mosaic narration indicates this not obscurely, and Basil teaches it in his Homily on Paradise, and the Scholastic Theologians hand it down as certain, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 18, and

blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question 102, article four. But why Eve was formed in Paradise, this reason can be given. For she had to be formed, as from a principle, from Adam himself; but the first principle of any whole kind must be perfect: it was fitting, therefore, that Eve be procreated from Adam, inasmuch as he was in the perfect state, according to soul and body and according to habitation — and so that it might thus be made plain that those original goods of soul, of body, and of habitation, bestowed on Ada-[m...] [continues]

Pererius' preferred view: Eve formed in Paradise (Basil, Hom. on Paradise; Sent. II d.18; Aquinas ST I q.102 a.4), because she springs from Adam in his perfect state (soul, body, habitation). Marginal gloss: 'Cur creata sit Eva in paradiso.'

[...those original goods of soul, of body, and of habitation, bestowed on Ada]m, all the rest who would thereafter be procreated from him would, on account of his obedience or disobedience alone, either receive or lose.

The point of Eve's formation from the perfect Adam: that all posterity would receive or forfeit the original goods through his sole obedience or disobedience.

That he might work and keep it.

Sub-lemma (the second clause of Gen 2:15) opening the next stretch of commentary.

These words seemed to Augustine able to yield a double sense: one sense is the one which he himself more approves, that those two words, “work and keep,” be referred to God; [that...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'H'. Augustine's double reading of 'ut operaretur & custodiret illum' (Gen 2:15): the verbs referred to God (His preferred sense). Page ends at the catchword 'illud' (signature II). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 475, continuing Augustine's two senses of 'ut operaretur & custodiret illum.'

— p. 475 (PDF) · printed p. 434 —

[...the other sense is the one which he himself more approves, that those two words] — and that pronoun, “it/him” (Illum), which is doubled in Hebrew (for in Hebrew it stands thus, “that he might work it, and keep it”)

— be referred to the man; and that this be the sense of those words: that God placed Adam in paradise chiefly for this reason, that He might more and more, day by day, “work” Adam himself, that is, cultivate and perfect him, rendering him daily more just and better, and invite and likewise aid him to accomplish more excellent works of virtue. “And that He might keep him,” namely keeping the body free from all corruption and offense, but guarding the soul pure and whole from all evil — so long, that is, as his will consented with the will of God and obeyed the divine precepts. For to attain eternal life and happiness it is not enough that man be made just and holy, unless he remains in justice and perseveres in well-doing right up to the end.

Continues Augustine's preferred reading from PDF 474 (the catchword 'illud' is rejoined): God 'works and keeps' the man himself. Note: perseverance, not mere initial justice, is required for salvation.

I shall set down here the words of Augustine, so that what we have said of his view the reader may recognize more clearly and certainly from Augustine's own words. Thus, then, in the tenth chapter of the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, Augustine writes: “There is another sense in these words which I think not undeservedly to be preferred, namely that God should work and keep the man himself. For just as a man works the earth, not to make it be earth, but to make it cultivated and fruitful, so God much more works the man — whom He created that he be man — He Himself works him that he be just, provided the man does not depart from Him through pride. Since, therefore, God is the immutable good, but man, both according to soul and according to body, is a mutable thing, unless, turned to the immutable good which is God, he abide, he cannot be formed so as to be just and blessed. And by this the same God who creates the man that he be man, Himself works the man and keeps him, that he be also good and blessed. Wherefore, by the expression by which a man is said to work the earth — which was already earth — that it be

adorned and fruitful, by that same expression God is said to work the man, who was already man, that he be pious and wise; and to keep him, because the man, by his own power, delighting in himself rather than in Him above him, and despising His dominion, cannot be safe." Thus Augustine.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 8.10 (block-quote, 'Sic Augustinus'): God 'works' man as a farmer works already-existing earth — to make him just and to keep him, since man cannot stand without turning to the immutable Good.

But indeed, the Hebrew Scripture excludes and rejects this interpretation of Augustine. For although that pronoun "it/him" (Illum), in Greek and in Latin, has an ambiguous reference, both to the man and to the paradise, in Hebrew nevertheless there can be no ambiguity, because that pronoun is put in the feminine gender and is necessarily joined with the word "paradise." There is, therefore, another understanding of these words — less approved, indeed, by Augustine than the former, but to be more approved by us — so that this be the meaning of those words: God placed Adam in paradise, that Adam himself, by his work, care, and industry, might "work" it — that is, the paradise — that is, cultivate it, namely by doing various works which pertained to the cultivation and adornment of that place; and at the same time that he might keep and conserve it.

Pererius' preferred reading, grounded in Hebrew grammar: the suffix is feminine and refers to paradise, so Adam (not God) is the one who works and keeps it.

BUT a twofold question arises in this place. The first: the task enjoined by God upon Adam, of working in paradise, was laborious and toilsome — since it was enjoined and inflicted after sin, as his punishment... [continues]

The first of two objections to Adam's working in paradise: labor was a post-lapsarian penalty (Gen 3:17-19), so unfitting for the state of innocence. Marginal gloss: 'An operatio hominis in Paradiso fuisset laboriosa vel supervacanea' (whether man's work in Paradise would have been laborious or superfluous). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'ctum.'

— p. 476 (PDF) · printed p. 435 —

[...enjoined and inflicted as his punishment] upon man by God; it was not, therefore, suited to the most tranquil, most pleasant, and most happy state of innocence. Then, man's working in paradise was going to be superfluous, seeing that paradise, of its own accord, would abundantly bear and supply whatever could be necessary, useful, or even pleasant for man's sustenance. The second question: what need had paradise, before sin, of man's keeping? By whom was paradise to be guarded? Not from the animals, to whom access to paradise would by no means have lain open, and which would all have obeyed man at his nod; not from other men, since that place was going to be the common dwelling of all men, and in the state of innocence no man would have had anything to fear from any other man; not from the demons, because God would have forbidden them entrance to paradise — for the keeping by man would not have availed to ward them off: for a demon, by its nature, is more prudent and stronger than all men, and, since it is incorporeal and comprehensible by no human sense, can thrust and insinuate itself, the man unaware, into whatever place it wishes.

Completes the first objection (labor a penalty; work superfluous since paradise yields all) and states the second (whom would guarding be against? — not animals, men, or demons). Marginal gloss: 'Solutio prioris quaestionis' (the solution of the prior question, beginning below).

BUT it is easy to dispatch the prior question. For the cultivation of paradise would not have been, for man in the state of innocence, a laborious and troublesome work, but easy and pleasant — through which, namely, he would have furnished himself various places in paradise to dwell in, and would, without labor, have paved and arranged ways and paths by which he could conveniently and with pleasure walk and stroll. And although the earth would, of its own accord, have produced nothing but what is good and useful, yet, with man's cultivation added, that same earth would have brought forth those very things both richer and better. And since at that time, too, man was going to live an animal life, and could not be perpetually intent and fixed upon the contemplation of God, it would have

helped him, from time to time, to engage in many and various actions through the members of the body — among which, that which is occupied in cultivating the earth would have been most full of pleasure and delight. Add to this, that the cultivation of the earth wonderfully arouses our mind to the observation and admiration of divine providence, which shines forth from the many things that agriculture handles. It would also have contributed very much toward testing and experiencing the so-diverse powers of the lands, and of all the things born from the earth.

Solution to the first question: pre-lapsarian husbandry would have been easy, pleasant, beneficial to body and contemplation, and a window onto providence.

But after man's sin, agriculture became laborious: both because we are compelled by necessity to cultivate it — namely, for want of food, which we cannot procure except by much labor; and because not every land that is cultivated is fruitful, and if any is fruitful, it nevertheless supplies the things necessary for living only after being long and much worked by us; and — what increases the labor and tedium in great measure — it bears very many useless and harmful things, which, to cut back and root out, it is necessary to undergo a great and perpetual labor. But that at that time the cultivation of the earth could have been carried on by man without labor and trouble, there is argument enough in the fact that even now it is taken up and handled by some with such great pleasure, that it is a great punishment for them [to be drawn away from it...] [continues]

By contrast, post-lapsarian farming is toil (necessity, barren ground, weeds). That it could have been pleasant is shown by those who still delight in it. Marginal gloss: 'Voluptas, & utilitas agriculturae' (the pleasure and usefulness of agriculture). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'inde.'

— p. 477 (PDF) · printed p. 436 —

[...so that it is a great punishment for them] to be drawn away from it and called off to other things. Let the reader hear Augustine, in chapter 8 of the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, disputing on this matter in most elegant words: for, explaining those

very words of Moses which we now treat — that Adam was placed by God in Paradise that he might work it — when he had raised the objection that God had condemned man, before sin, to the labors and troubles of agriculture, he subjoins this: "So indeed we would suppose, did we not see some men farm with such great pleasure of mind that it is for them a great punishment to be called off from it to something else. Whatever of delight, therefore, agriculture has, it was then assuredly far greater, when nothing adverse befell, whether from earth or from sky. For it was not an affliction of labor, but an exhilaration of the will, when the things which God had created came forth more joyfully and more fruitfully by the aid of human work; whence the Creator Himself would be the more abundantly praised, who had given to the soul, set in an animal body, the reason and faculty of working — as much as would suffice the willing mind, not as much as want of the body would force the unwilling. For what greater and more wonderful spectacle is there, or where can human reason in a manner more converse with the nature of things, than when, with seeds set, shoots planted, saplings transplanted, cuttings grafted, each power of root and germ is, as it were, interrogated, what it can and cannot do, whence it can, what avails in it the invisible and inner power of numbers, what diligence applied from without avails; and, in that very consideration, to perceive that neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase: because even that work which is added from without is added through Him, whom He nonetheless created, and whom God invisibly rules and orders.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 8.8 (block-quote, continues onto the next paragraph): pre-lapsarian farming was 'exhilaration of the will,' a dialogue of reason with nature, leading the mind to the Giver of increase (1 Cor 3:7). Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara sententia Augustini' (Augustine's excellent judgement).

From this, now, the eye of thought is raised to the world itself, as to a certain great tree of things; and in it, too, a twin operation of

providence is found, partly natural, partly voluntary. Natural, indeed, through the hidden administration of God, which gives increase even to trees and herbs; but voluntary, through the works of Angels and of men. According to that first, the celestial things are ordered above and the terrestrial below, the luminaries and stars shine, the alternations of day and night are driven, the earth, founded upon the waters, is washed within and around, the air is poured higher above, trees and animals are conceived and born, grow and age, die, and whatever else in things is carried on by an inner and natural motion. But in this other, signs are given, teaching and learning happen, fields are tilled, societies are administered, arts are practiced — and whatever else is exercised, whether in the supernal society or in this earthly and mortal one, such that even good is provided for through the unknowing wicked." Thus Augustine, who thereafter treats the same theme most lucidly in many words.

Conclusion of the Augustine block-quote ('Sic Augustinus'): the twofold operation of providence — natural (hidden administration) and voluntary (Angels and men). Marginal gloss: 'Duplex operatio divinae providentiae' (the twofold operation of divine providence).

Xenophon, moreover, said — as Cicero writes in the book On Old Age — that nothing seemed to him so kingly as the pursuit of cultivating a field. Indeed Cyrus, king of the Persians, outstanding in genius and most renowned for the glory of so great an empire, himself sowed his field, and measured out and arranged in order the trees planted by his own hand. It was the custom to summon those leaders of Roman nobility and antiquity from their fields to commands and dictatorships; and when they had discharged these, they returned to their former exercises of agriculture. Homer [depicts] Laertes, the father of Ulysses, endowed with a heroic majesty of body, whom, [worn down] by his son's absence and by advancing old age... [continues]

Classical praise of husbandry: Xenophon (via Cicero, de Senectute 17); Cyrus the Great; the Roman nobility summoned from their fields (the Cincinnatus topos); Homer's Laertes. Sentence breaks at the

catchword 'senectúréque.'

— p. 478 (PDF) · printed p. 437 —

[...whom, by his son's absence] and by advancing old age, grief was overtaking, [Homer] makes to soothe and mitigate it with the solace of cultivating a field — in which occupation Ulysses, returning after so many years of exile, found him engaged. Hence it appears that the first of the human arts was agriculture: for this was enjoined upon man first, and in the state of innocence, and after sin it alone was imposed upon him — which Adam practiced, and Noah after the flood; and that is no wonder, for by the natural order agriculture occurs first of all, supplying, namely, the things necessary for procuring sustenance and for passing one's life. Whereby one may understand the error of the Gentile poets and historians, who, as Augustine relates in the seventh book On the City of God, chapter nineteen, have recorded to memory that agriculture was invented after the reign of Saturn: since in the golden age, which flourished under King Saturn, they say there was no cultivation of the field.

Agriculture the first and most natural of arts (Adam, then Noah). The poets' contrary myth (no farming in the Saturnian golden age) reported via Augustine, Civ. Dei 7.19. Marginal glosses: 'Antiquitas agriculturae'; 'Mendacium Poetarum Gentilium & historicorum de origine agriculturae.'

For then, as Virgil sings in the first book of the Georgics: “—and the earth itself bore all things more freely, with none demanding.” And Ovid, in the first book of the Metamorphoses: “—flowers born without seed; soon, too, the unplowed earth bore crops.” And, in another place, Virgil: “Before Jove, no tillers subdued the fields.” For they relate that Saturn, driven from Crete by his son Jove, came to Italy, and there taught Janus and the Italians agriculture. Let the reader see what Pliny relates, toward the end of the seventh book, concerning the inventors of Agriculture.

The poetic golden-age commonplace (Virgil Georgics 1.127-128 and Eclogue/Georgics on 'before Jove'; Ovid Metam. 1.108), and the Saturn-to-Italy euhemerist legend; cross-reference to Pliny, Nat. Hist. 7, on the inventors of farming.

Nor would it be more laborious to explain the latter question. For we judge that that keeping of paradise by man was necessary, in order to ward the beasts off from that place. For that there were animals in paradise, Josephus holds, in the first book of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter one; Basil, in the eleventh Homily on Genesis; Augustine, in the fourteenth book On the City of God, chapter eleven; Damascene, in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter ten. If, therefore, paradise had been deserted and unguarded by man, the animals that were within it would have trampled, scattered, fouled, and laid waste all the most beautiful things of that place; and access to paradise would have lain open also to the other animals that were outside it.

Solution to the second question: the guarding kept the beasts (which were present in Eden — Josephus, Basil, Augustine, Damascene) from despoiling Paradise. Marginal gloss: 'Solutio posterioris quaestionis, quorsum opus fuerit paradiso custodia hominis' (the solution of the latter question, to what end Paradise needed man's keeping).

Then, that keeping of paradise was not so necessary for paradise itself as for man: for he had to keep it carefully for himself, by obeying the divine precepts — lest, namely, on account of disobedience, he be deprived of so great a pleasantness and happiness of that place. He had, besides, to keep paradise against the demons — not, indeed, so as to forbid them access to paradise, but lest he lend an ear to the deceitful counsels of the demons, by which, deceived, he would withdraw from obedience to God, and for that cause be dislodged and driven out from the habitation of paradise. And hence a certain excellent and salutary lesson is supplied to us: that it is not enough for a man to act well, unless [...] [continues]

The deeper sense of 'keep it': Adam was to keep himself in obedience, and to guard against the demons' counsels (not their access). Opens the moral lesson (perseverance) completed on PDF 479. Page ends at the catchword 'nisi' (signature II 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 479, 'Non satis esse homini bene agere, nisi [perseveret]...'.

— p. 479 (PDF) · printed p. 438 —

[...that it is not enough for a man to act well,] unless he guard, with great care and diligence, the good things which he does and has in himself — lest he lose them, either by slipping down into contrary evils, or by vainly glorying over the goods which he does and has in himself, and proudly exalting himself. Let the reader hear the most beautiful judgement of Gregory on this matter, which is in the twelfth and thirteenth chapters of the nineteenth book of the Morals:

Completes the moral lesson from PDF 478 (the catchword 'nisi' rejoined): good works must be kept in humility lest pride spoil them. Marginal glosses: 'Non esse homini satis bene agere, nisi bona quae habet diligenter custodiat'; 'Egregia sententia Gregorij.'

“It is greatly needful,” says Gregory, “both always to do good things, and to keep ourselves cautiously, in our thinking, away from those very good works — lest, if they lift up the mind, those things be not good which serve not their Author but [self-]exaltation. And concerning this matter we do not act unfittingly if, from books published — though not canonical, yet for the edification of the Church — we bring forward a testimony: for Eleazar, in battle, striking an elephant, laid it low, but fell beneath the very one he had slain. Whom, then, does this man signify, whom his own victory crushed, except those who overcome vices, but, beneath the very thing they subdue, succumb by growing proud? For he, as it were, dies beneath the enemy he prostrates, who is lifted up over the fault he overcomes. It must therefore be greatly weighed, that good things cannot profit if the evils that creep in are not guarded against: all that is done perishes, if it is not anxiously kept in humility. Whence well also is it said of the first parent himself: ‘The Lord put him in the paradise of pleasure, that he might work it and keep it.’ For he works who does the good that is commanded; but he does not keep what he has worked, into whom there creeps that which is forbidden.” Thus he [Gregory].

Gregory, Moralia in Iob 19.12-13 (block-quote, 'Haec ille'): the Eleazar exemplum (1 Macc 6:46) — to conquer a vice yet fall to pride is to die beneath the foe one fells; so Gen 2:15's 'keep it' = keep one's good works in humility.

GENESIS CH. 2, VERSES 16 & 17. And He commanded him, saying: Of every tree of paradise you may eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.

Scripture lemma (set in the margin as CAP. 2. VERS. 16. & 17., the verse in italic) opening the next stretch of commentary.

Saint Thomas judges, in the First Part, question 97, article 3, and in Opusculum 3, chapter 188, that just as a precept was given to Adam of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, so a precept was given him of eating from every other tree of paradise: both because it is clearly signified, by the above words, that God commanded Adam to eat from every tree of paradise — for that word “He commanded” comprehends, by its own force, the whole following narration; wherefore it pertains as much to eating from every tree as to not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and also because, if man had not eaten, he would doubtless have incurred death, and other evils — whether preceding, or accompanying, or following the death of the body — which evils, however, would by no means have befallen man except on account of sin previously committed: there was, therefore, need for man of a precept of eating, lest he be liable to so many and so great evils.

Large decorated initial 'A'. Aquinas (ST I q.97 a.3; Opusc. 3 c.188): a positive precept TO eat from the other trees was also given (since 'He commanded' governs the whole), to spare man the evils of starvation. Marginal gloss: 'An datum sit Adamo praeceptum comedendi ex omnibus alijs arboribus paradisi.'

To these some add, that in that state of innocence man would never have come to eat while hungry, or to drink while thirsty. For hunger and thirst bring trouble and punishment; but whatever is of trouble or of punishment would have been far removed from that happy state. Since, therefore, in

that state neither hunger nor [thirst would incite a man...] [continues]

An additional reason offered (and later rejected): in innocence man would feel neither hunger nor thirst, so a precept was needed to prompt eating. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'sitis.'

— p. 480 (PDF) · printed p. 439 —

[...Since, therefore, in that state neither hunger nor] thirst would incite a man to eat or to drink, it was fitting that he be incited to do it by a divine precept. BUT these things are not true, and are deservedly reproved by Tostatus, in Questions 206, 207, 208, and 209 on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis; and indeed, to refute it, many arguments can be brought forward. In the first place, man had no need of a divine precept for eating, since he would do it of his own accord, by his own nature, even with none commanding — seeing that he was held by a natural desire of that thing, and reason would teach him that, unless he ate, he would undoubtedly die, and on that account sin most gravely. He knew likewise that he had been constituted by God the prince and lord of all living things, and much more of the plants themselves — namely, that by his own use and will he might feed upon them.

Tostatus' refutation of Aquinas begins (Quaest. 206-209 on Gen): no positive precept to eat was needed — nature, desire, and reason already prompt it (and man is lord of the plants). Marginal gloss: 'Tostatus refellit opinionem S. Thomae.'

Then, drink was as necessary to man for preserving life as food: for, with either of these failing, he would necessarily have perished; wherefore, if a precept of eating had to be given, a precept of drinking would likewise have had to be given. Next, if a precept of taking food was imposed on man for this reason, that he might avoid the harms which scarcity and lack of food bring, then for the same cause, assuredly, man would have had to be commanded to avoid very many other harms, which could befall him either from earth and water, or from air and fire, or from other things. But if, for guarding against these, there was no need of a new and special precept, but man's own reason and prudence sufficed, together with God's special

providence toward man constituted in that state, then the very same must plainly be thought and said concerning the precept of eating.

Two further arguments: a precept to drink would equally be required; and if reason/providence suffices against other harms, no special precept to eat was needed.

Besides this, it was by no means fitting to command that Adam eat from every tree of paradise: both because, for escaping the harms and evils which follow upon the failure of food, there was no need to eat from every tree of paradise, but it would have sufficed to eat from some one or several trees; and because that would have proved laborious and unpleasant to man — seeing that he would have preferred to eat from certain particular trees of paradise, rather than to be bound, by God's precept, to eating from all. Add, that from the words which Eve spoke in answer to the serpent, we seem to ourselves able to argue what we now say. For when the serpent had said to Eve, “Why has God commanded you not to eat from every tree of paradise?” Eve answered him thus: “Of the fruit of the trees that are in paradise we eat; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of paradise, God has commanded us not to eat”: from which words one may understand that it was permitted to their will to eat from any of the other trees of paradise, [and only that they should not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil...] [continues]

Further: commanding to eat from EVERY tree would be needless and burdensome; and Eve's reply to the serpent (Gen 3:1-3) shows only the one tree was forbidden, the rest left to free choice.

— p. 481 (PDF) · printed p. 440 —

[...and only that they should not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil] was forbidden to them by the precept of God. Finally, it would have been easier for the serpent to persuade Eve, in so great an abundance of paradise's trees, to abstain from some one of them — and by that very thing, if they were bound by a divine precept of eating from every tree, she would fall into sin — than to persuade her to eat from that single tree of the knowledge of good and evil; wherefore he would have undertaken to

persuade her of the former rather than of this latter.

Last argument: had eating from all trees been commanded, the serpent's easier path would have been to induce abstaining from one — yet he tempted to the single forbidden tree, showing no such universal precept existed.

Nor is it a matter of great trouble to wash away the contrary reasons. For although that word “He commanded” is prefixed to the whole following speech — in which there is [mention] both of eating from all the trees of paradise and of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil — yet, properly, it ought to be referred only to this latter; so that this be the meaning of that speech: “God commanded Adam not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but to eat from every other tree of paradise” — supply: He permitted, or gave power. A similar manner of speaking is found in this very book of Genesis, chapter 15, where it is written that God foretold to Abraham that his seed would be a stranger in a foreign land, and would be subjected to servitude, and afflicted for four hundred years. For that which is said in the last place, about the four hundred years, can in no way be referred to the servitude and affliction of the seed, or descendants, of Abraham, but ought to be referred only to their sojourning in a foreign land — since, from the entrance of Jacob with his sons into Egypt up to the departure of Moses out of Egypt with the Hebrew people, no more than two hundred and fifteen years are counted, from which, moreover, must be subtracted the seventy years of Joseph's life completed after Jacob came into Egypt (during which time the Hebrews dwelt tranquilly and happily among the Egyptians): there remain, therefore, only one hundred and forty-five years, in which years the Hebrews were pressed and afflicted by the Egyptians with hard servitude.

Pererius' reply: 'He commanded' grammatically governs both clauses but applies properly only to the prohibition (the permission supplied), as the Gen 15:13 syntax of the '400 years' attaches only to the sojourning, not the servitude (with his chronological reckoning: 215 years in Egypt, minus Joseph's 70 prosperous, leaving 145 of affliction). Marginal gloss: 'Solutio rationum opinionis S. Thomae.'

Nor indeed do I deny that, in the state of innocence, man had to eat and drink, and that he would have sinned, unless, when there was need for him, he had eaten and drunk: but that obligation of eating and drinking did not arise from any positive precept, but from the prescript itself and (as they call it) the dictate of reason and of the natural law; nor would man, by not doing it, have sinned against any other law than the natural. Moreover, that is false — that man, in that state, would eat and drink without any hunger and thirst; for food and drink would not have been pleasant, nor even healthful, to one not hungry and thirsty; nor was it fitting to eat or drink without any want of food or drink, and this want hunger and thirst necessarily attended. These, therefore, insofar as they signify the appetite of the cold and moist, which is thirst, or of the hot and dry, which is hunger, would have befallen man even in the state of innocence; but inasmuch as these, when natural want is not satisfied, have joined with them trouble and torment, in that respect they would by no means have befallen man at that time.

Pererius grants man ate by natural law (not a positive precept), and corrects the added view: hunger and thirst as appetites WOULD exist in innocence — only their attendant pain would not. Marginal gloss: 'Homines in statu innocentiae nec famis nec sitis expertes futuros' (men in the state of innocence would not be free of hunger or thirst).

But someone may ask me: if a precept of eating from every tree was not given to Adam, but only of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, it would have sufficed to express this one thing only: why, then, was that about eating from every tree of paradise adjoined? Was it, perhaps, lest — because the eating of one tree was forbidden to man — a scruple should come upon him about not eating from the other trees? So that, then, every scruple might be removed from him, the liberty of eating from all the other trees had, in clear words, to be granted to man. Or rather was that adjoined, so that it might be manifest how light it was and how easy to ob-[serve...] [continues]

Objection answered: the 'eat of every tree' clause was added either to remove any scruple about the other trees, or to underscore how light the single prohibition was. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'servatu.'

— p. 482 (PDF) · printed p. 441 —

[...how light it was and how easy to ob]serve what God had forbidden to man — namely, abstinence from one tree only — when He had granted him the most ample power of eating from innumerable other trees of paradise. But if anyone should further ask of us why here mention is made of trees only, and not of herbs, since above, in the last words of the first chapter, it was written that God gave man the power of feeding upon the fruits of the trees and upon every kind of herb? — we shall answer: Because, among the herbs, man had been forbidden the eating of none, just as, among the trees, the eating of one tree was forbidden him; therefore, on account of the prohibition of one tree, it was necessary to adjoin the faculty of eating from all the others, whereas there was no reason that it should be expressed concerning the herbs themselves.

Concludes the precept discussion: the prohibition is light (one tree against innumerable); the permission concerns trees (not herbs) only because only a tree was forbidden.

A DISPUTATION ON THE PRECEPT given to Adam of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

New disputation divider (rule above and below).

That the understanding of these words of the Lord may be the more explicit and complete, four questions are to be unraveled, in the treatment of which many things worth knowing will become known to the reader.

Programmatic sentence (large initial 'Q') announcing the four quaestiones of the disputation.

But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. (In the same place — Gen 2:17.)

Sub-lemma (the prohibition clause of Gen 2:17) heading the disputation; 'IBIDEM' = the same chapter and verse.

QUESTION X. Whether the precept of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was given to Adam alone, or also, at the same time, to Eve.

First of the four questions of this disputation (printed 'QVAESTIO X.' — the numeral as it stands in the original; the disputation's intro announces four questions to follow).

CERTAINLY, that not only Adam but Eve too was bound by that precept is established even by the confession of Eve herself, who said to the serpent: “Of the tree which is in the middle of Paradise, God has commanded us not to eat.” Nor, surely, if Eve had not been bound by that precept, would she have sinned in eating the fruit of that tree, nor would she have been so greatly reproved and punished by God. But if she was obligated by that precept, it is necessary that it was imposed and announced to her. Yet that has a difficulty: how this precept was given to Eve, who was not yet created — as the very sequence of the Mosaic narration demonstrates; for after these words is recorded the reason by which God was led to procreate Eve, and how she was formed from Adam.

Large decorated initial 'C'. Eve was bound by the precept (her own words to the serpent; her sin and punishment prove it); but the difficulty: she was not yet created when it was given. Marginal gloss: 'Praeceptum quomodo datum sit Euae nondum creatae.'

In three ways, therefore, can it be thought that this precept was given to Eve: either that it was given to both at once, that is, to Adam and to Eve; or that it was first given to Adam, and afterward, through Adam himself, announced and enjoined to Eve; or, finally, that [...] [continues]

The three ways the precept could have reached Eve: (1) to both at once; (2) first to Adam, then through Adam to Eve; (3) [the third, on the next page]. Marginal gloss: 'Tripliciter intelligi potest Euae datum praeceptum.' Page ends at the catchword 'ut' (signature KK). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 483, the third way ('denique ut...').

— p. 483 (PDF) · printed p. 442 —

[...finally] that this law was first borne and sanctioned to Adam, then at the same time to him and to Eve. Augustine, in the seventeenth chapter of the

eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, signifies that, of the three aforesaid ways, the second is the more approved by him. Tostatus judges the same, on the thirteenth chapter of the book of Genesis, question 217; and this can be persuaded by these arguments. In the first place, one must not depart from the order and series of the history and narration of divine Scripture without necessary reason: but Moses, immediately after he had said that man was placed by God in Paradise, subjoined that this precept was given to him, always speaking of man in the singular number; but after these things he records the generation of Eve: therefore this precept was given to Adam alone, before Eve was procreated.

Completes the third way (the catchword 'ut' from PDF 482 rejoined). Augustine (de Gen. ad lit. 8.17) and Tostatus prefer the SECOND way; first argument for it: the narrative order, with man named in the singular before Eve's creation.

Although the words in which this precept is expressed, in the Greek reading which Augustine cites, partly have the singular number, partly the plural. For they stand thus, as Augustine cites them: “Of every tree of Paradise you (sing.) shall eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you (sing.) shall not eat: for in whatever day you (plur.) shall eat of it, you (plur.) shall die the death.” But the Greek Codices that are now in hand have the plural number even in those words, “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you (plur.) shall not eat.” Gregory, moreover, in the thirty-fifth book of the Morals, chapter ten, reads this whole passage in the plural number, citing it thus: “Of every tree of Paradise eat (plur.); but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil touch (plur.) not.” But indeed, neither in Hebrew nor in Chaldee is it otherwise than in our Latin translation, in which all these words are expressed in the singular number.

The textual variants of Gen 2:16-17: Augustine's Greek mixes singular and plural; current Greek codices and Gregory (Moralia 35.10) read plural; but the Hebrew, the Targum (Chaldee), and the Vulgate read singular (favoring the precept's address to Adam alone). Marginal gloss: 'Varia lectio huius loci.'

SECONDLY, Adam was first placed in paradise, and afterward Eve was created, as the narration of Moses shows. But it was fitting, as soon as man was introduced into paradise, to impose on him the law he was to keep — so that, as soon as possible, he might recognize God to be his lord and himself His servant, and from the very beginning grow accustomed to obey the divine law: for it is good for a man, as Jeremiah said, to bear the yoke of the Lord from his youth. Besides this, when God upbraided Adam for the eating of the forbidden fruit, He reproached him with this — that he had eaten the fruit from which He had commanded him to abstain; but this He did not say to Eve when He rebuked her: therefore the precept was not given to her. To this is added: if Adam had not received, as soon as he was placed in paradise, that precept of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, it could have happened that he ate from that tree — and so, afterward, the occasion and opportunity of tempting man would have been taken from the serpent; for he could not then have [persuaded him, now experienced in the effect of that tree...] [continues]

Second argument: the precept fittingly came at once (Jer 2:2 / Lam 3:27 'the yoke from youth'); and God reproached only Adam (Gen 3:17). Third argument begins: had the precept come later, the serpent would have lost his opening.

[...for he could not then,] when man was already experienced in the effect of that tree, have persuaded him that, if he ate of it, he would become like a certain god knowing good and evil. Lastly, both were announced to Adam at once — both that he not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that he eat from every tree of paradise; but this latter had to be announced to him as soon as he was placed in paradise, on account of the natural want of food; therefore that former too was then announced to him — namely, before Eve was procreated. Thus, then, of the secon-[d way...] [continues]

Third argument completed: the permission to eat was needed at once (for food), so the prohibition came with it — before Eve existed. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'secun.'

— p. 484 (PDF) · printed p. 443 —

[...Thus, then,] the probability of the second of those three ways which we mentioned above can be shown and confirmed. BUT that the first way too does not lack its own probability could be demonstrated thus: above, at the end of the first chapter, Moses narrated that God said to Adam and Eve, “Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all the trees, etc., that they may be for food to you.” It must be asked, when did He say this to them? Before He gave this precept, or after, or at the very time at which He gave the precept? If before, then Eve was already created before that precept — which those deny who approve and defend the second way.

The case for the FIRST way (precept to both at once): Gen 1:29's address 'to you (plural)' implies Eve already existed. Marginal gloss: 'Vtrique, id est, Adamo & Euae simul datum esse illud praeceptum.'

Nor indeed is that credible [that the 'Behold I have given' came before the precept]; for God would not so precisely and absolutely have granted them the abundance of eating from every tree, since there would have been danger lest they eat from that tree from which He was going to command them to abstain. But if God spoke those words to Adam and Eve after He had given that precept to Adam, then certainly it did not seem fitting for God to say it to them so universally and absolutely, but with the exception of that forbidden tree, lest He seem to abrogate the law borne by Himself. But if He spoke those words to both at once, and gave the precept of not eating from that tree, it is concluded that that precept was given not to Adam alone, but to him and to Eve. And this is the opinion both of others and, in the first place, of Rupert, in book 2 On the Trinity and His Works, chapter 32. Why, then, did Moses express the name only of Adam, to whom the precept had been given? Because, namely, it was principally given to Adam alone — on whose observance or violation depended the conservation of the happiness which he had received from God, or its [loss and the ruin of himself and his whole posterity...] [continues]

Rupert (de Trin. 2.32) and others hold the precept was given to both; Moses names Adam alone because it was given principally to him (on whom all hung).

[...or its] loss and the ruin of himself and of his whole posterity. For if Adam had kept the precept, even though Eve had not observed it, no evil would nevertheless have befallen Adam and his posterity. But, on the contrary, with Adam sinning, even though Eve had not sinned, the same evils which came upon both when sinning would nonetheless have befallen their posterity. Both ways, therefore, are probable; to me, however, the second is the more approved.

All hung on Adam, not Eve: hence Moses names him. Pererius' verdict: both views are probable, but he prefers the second (precept first to Adam, before Eve).

QUESTION II. Why God imposed this law of not eating from that tree upon Adam.

Second question of the disputation. (The previous question was printed 'QVAESTIO X' — evidently an original misprint for 'I,' confirmed by this 'II' following and by the disputation's announced four questions.)

Tertullian, near the beginning of the book which he wrote Against the Jews, affirms that this law given to Adam was, as it were, the matrix and fountain of all the other laws which, many ages later, were borne to the Hebrews through Moses. For thus he writes: “God, in the beginning of the world, gave to Adam and Eve themselves a law, that they should not eat of the fruit of the tree planted in the middle of paradise; and if they did contrary to it, they should die the death — which law would have sufficed for them, if it had been kept. For in this law given to Adam we recognize all the precepts founded which afterward sprouted forth, given through Moses; that is: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and out of your whole soul, etc.; and: You shall love your neighbor as yourself; and: You shall not kill, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not defraud, You shall not bear false witness; Honor your father [and your mother...]” [continues]

Large decorated initial 'T'. Tertullian, adv. Iudaeos 2 (block-quote, continues onto PDF 485): the single Edenic law was the 'matrix' from which the whole Decalogue later sprang. Marginal gloss: 'Lex imposita Adae, secundú Tertullianum, fuit velut matrix & seminarium aliarum legum.'

— p. 485 (PDF) · printed p. 444 —

[...Honor your father] and your mother; and you shall not covet what is another's. For the primordial law was given to Adam and Eve in paradise, as it were the matrix of all the precepts of God. Indeed, if they had loved the Lord their God, they would not have acted against His precept; if they had loved their neighbor — that is, themselves — they would not have believed the persuasion of the serpent, and so would not have committed homicide against themselves, by falling away from immortality, by acting against God's precept; they would also have abstained from theft, and would not secretly have tasted of the fruit of the tree, nor would they have wished to lie hidden under the tree from the sight of the Lord our God. Nor would they have been made partakers with the devil who asserted a falsehood, by believing him that they would become like God. And so they would not have offended God as a Father, who had formed them from the slime of the earth as from a mother's womb. If they did not covet what was another's, they would not have tasted of the illicit fruit. Therefore, by this general and primordial law of God, which He had sanctioned to be observed in the fruit of the tree, we recognize that all the precepts of the later law were specially implanted — which, in their own times, being published, sprouted forth. For it belongs to the same one to teach the law afterward, who had before sent ahead the precept; since it is His to instruct afterward, who had before appointed to form the just. For what wonder is it if He augments the discipline who instituted it — if He perfects it who began it?" Thus Tertullian.

Conclusion of the Tertullian block-quote ('Haec Tertullianus'): the fall against the one law violated all the Decalogue's precepts in germ, which Moses later only unfolded.

BUT it is fitting to know that five kinds of divine laws are found. I call "divine laws" those which were borne to men by God Himself. For there is the natural law, which God engendered in all men together with nature itself — which, indeed, by the natural light of the human mind and by the

very judgement of reason, is manifest and known to all, and binds all alike. The second is the supernatural law of faith, hope, and charity, binding indeed all men and at all times simply, yet not in a natural way, but given to men by a supernatural gift and grace of God. The third was the Mosaic law, which God bore not to all, but only to the one nation of the Hebrews — by the observance of which the other nations were by no means bound; and I speak of the law of Moses as to its ceremonial and judicial precepts. The fourth divine law, not indeed binding at all times nor simply, but only, by God's institution after the promulgation of the Gospel, binding all nations — as is the law of receiving baptism. The fifth law is the private one, which God imposed upon one or another, or upon a few men: and of this kind was that law by which God forbade Adam the eating of that tree of the knowledge of good and evil; for by this law it is certain that Adam and Eve were bound. But whether their posterity, if the state of innocence had remained, would have had to be bound by the same law, is uncertain and, as I think, inexplicable.

Pererius' fivefold division of divine law: (1) natural; (2) supernatural (faith/hope/charity); (3) Mosaic (ceremonial/judicial, to the Hebrews only); (4) post-Gospel (e.g. baptism); (5) private — Adam's precept being of the fifth kind. Marginal gloss: 'Quinque genera legum divinarum.'

But why, besides the natural law, and that supernatural law of faith, hope, and charity, by which Adam and Eve were held bound as soon as they were created, God willed to bind them also by this special — as they call it, positive — law of not eating from that tree, a threefold cause and reason can be brought. The first reason, that by this thing God might declare Himself to be the Lord of man, and that man might understand himself to be a creature and servant of God, to whom [he ought to obey and serve...] [continues]

The first of three reasons for the special positive precept: to declare God's lordship and man's creaturely subjection. Marginal gloss: 'Cur, praeter legem naturalem & supernaturalem, haec specialis & positiva data sit Adae.' Sentence breaks at the catchword 'cui.'

— p. 486 (PDF) · printed p. 445 —

[...to whom] he ought to obey and serve; and to whom the obedience and servitude rendered to God was not only useful, but even necessary. For that is truly said by Augustine, in the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter eleven, that the dominion of God is useful not to Himself, but to man: for God does not need our servitude, but we cannot exist without His dominion; for neither could we exist, with Him not creating, nor remain, with Him not conserving, nor live rightly, with Him not ruling. Wherefore He alone is the true Lord, whom we serve not for His advantage, but for our own usefulness and salvation. For if He needed us, by that very fact He would not be the true Lord — since His need would be relieved through us, under which He too would be a servant.

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 8.11: God's lordship benefits man, not God — He alone is the true Lord, who needs nothing from His servants.

Wherefore most truly did David sing, “I said to the Lord, You are my God, for You need not my goods.” And in the ninth Psalm the same one said, “Set a lawgiver over them, that the Gentiles may know that they are men” — as if for one to bear laws to others were a most certain argument both of his dominion, and of their subjection and servitude. For this reason, besides, I judge that that law was imposed on Adam, so that by it God might declare that man, made by Him, was endowed with the faculty of free will, and that it was in his power and will to do or not to do anything whatsoever. For if Adam had lacked that liberty of will, it would have been ridiculous and absurd to impose a law upon him, and to threaten punishment and penalty for not observing it. To these, moreover, a third reason can be adjoined: namely, that God might furnish man the matter of exercising the virtue of obedience — which is most pleasing to God and most useful to man... [continues]

Ps 15[16]:2 and Ps 9:21 cited for God's lordship; the second reason for the precept: to declare man's free will (a law presupposes liberty); the third reason begins: to provide an occasion for the virtue of obedience. Marginal gloss: 'Psalm. 15.'

[...which] is most pleasing to God and most useful to man: and therefore — as Augustine acutely saw, in the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter thirteen — a precept was not given to man concerning a thing that would be evil in itself (that is, which, although not forbidden by God, would yet be evil in itself and to be shunned), but concerning a thing that would not be evil in itself, but only because it was prohibited by God; in order, namely, that the virtue of obedience might be the more illustrious, and that it might be more clearly known by all how great an evil disobedience alone, in itself, is. But it is better to write out Augustine's words here.

Augustine (de Gen. ad lit. 8.13): the test-object was indifferent in itself (forbidden only by command) precisely to display the virtue of obedience and the evil of disobedience. Marginal gloss: 'Notabilis sententia Augustini, de bono obedientiae, & malo inobedientiae.'

“Nor could it,” he says, “be better or more diligently commended how great an evil disobedience alone is, since man was made guilty of iniquity for this reason — that he touched that thing against the prohibition — which, had he touched it un-prohibited, he would surely not have sinned. For one who says, for instance, ‘Do not touch this herb’ (if perhaps it is poisonous), and foretells death if he should touch it, death indeed follows the despiser of the precept; but even if no one had prohibited, and he had touched it, he would nonetheless surely die. For that thing would be contrary to his health and life, whether it were forbidden him or not forbidden. Likewise, when someone prohibits a thing from being touched which would harm not the toucher, but the one who prohibited — as if someone had put his hand into another's money, being prohibited by him whose money it was — for that reason it would be a sin to the one prohibited, because it could be harmful to the prohibitor. But when that is touched which would neither harm the toucher, were it not prohibited, nor be touched to the harm of any other whatsoever, why is it prohibited, except that the good of obedience in itself, and the evil of disobedience in itself,

might be shown? Finally, by the sinner nothing else was sought than not to be under [the power of God...] [continues]

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 8.13 (block-quote, continues onto PDF 487): the forbidden tree was harmless in itself and harmed no one — so the prohibition served only to manifest obedience as a pure good and disobedience as a pure evil. Page ends at the catchword 'sub' (signature KK 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 487, '...nihil aliud appetitú est nisi non esse sub [Dei potestate]...'.

— p. 487 (PDF) · printed p. 446 —

[...by the sinner nothing else was sought than not to be] under the dominion of God, when that was committed in which, lest it be committed, the command of the One ruling alone ought to have been heeded — which, if it alone were heeded, what else than the will of God would be loved? what else than the will of God would be set before the human will? Why the Lord commanded, let Him see to it: what He commanded must be done by the servant, and then perhaps it must be seen, by the one earning his reward, why He commanded. Yet, that we may not longer seek the cause of this command — if this very thing is a great usefulness for man, that he serves God — by commanding, God makes useful whatever He shall have willed to command; and about this there is no fear, lest He could command what is useless. Nor can it happen that a man's own will does not fall upon him with the great weight of ruin, if, exalting it, he sets it before the will of the Superior. This man experienced, despising the precept of God, and by this experience learned what lies between good and evil — the good, namely, being obedience; the evil, disobedience, that is, the pride and perverse contumacy of imitating God, and the harmful [exercise] of liberty. Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine block-quote (de Gen. ad lit. 8.13, 'Haec Augustinus') begun on PDF 486: sin is the will preferring itself to God's; obedience is the pure good, disobedience the pride of self-rule.

But someone will say: the natural law which God had implanted in Adam would have sufficed for the exercising of his obedience and the declaring

of the servitude which he owed to God. But the matter is not so: for through the natural law it is not altogether clear that God is the Lord of men, since by some the natural law could be thought to be a certain property of the rational nature, which follows upon the condition of human nature — just as each species of animals has a certain singular instinct and propensity, proper and congruent to its nature. Nor are there lacking those who do or shun the things contained in the natural law not as [commanded and forbidden by God...] [continues]

Objection answered: the natural law alone does not display God's lordship, since it can look like a mere property of rational nature (and some keep it only as agreeable to reason, not as God's command). Marginal gloss: 'An sola lex naturalis satis fuisset ad explorandam obedientiam Adami.'

[...not as] commanded and forbidden by God, but as agreeable or disagreeable to their own reason and judgement; and although it be known that the natural law is implanted and prescribed by God, it nevertheless does not clearly display the most ample and most absolute power and command of God over men — since by that law nothing is commanded or prohibited except what, according to human reason, seems good or evil in itself; whence the dominion of God is known not as absolute, but as resting on right reason alone. For you would not rightly name judges or ministers of the laws “lords” because they command many things, since they cannot command anything as they please, but only those things which are agreeable to the laws. But he who commands whatever he pleases by his own discretion — although it be in itself neither evil nor good, and no other reason can be given why it is commanded or forbidden than the will of the one commanding (of which, indeed, you would truly say that common saying, “Let [will stand for reason”...] [continues]

The natural law shows only a 'reason-based' dominion; a magistrate bound by laws is no true 'lord.' True absolute lordship appears where the will alone is the reason ('Sit pro ratione voluntas', Juvenal Sat. 6.223).

[...“Let] will stand for reason” — he is absolutely and simply judged and named Lord. Therefore the natural law was not enough to show God's most

absolute command and dominion over men; but, to demonstrate it evidently, it was fitting that a certain special and positive law be borne by God, concerning some thing which in itself was neither good nor evil. The same, too, was congruous to be done, so that the obedience of man might be better tested and proved — which obedience is greater and [more perfect in that one...] [continues]

Conclusion: a positive precept (about an indifferent thing) was needed to manifest God's absolute lordship and to test obedience. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'perfectior.'

— p. 488 (PDF) · printed p. 447 —

[...which obedience is greater and more] perfect, [as] discerned in that man who applies his mind to obeying — not weighing the gravity and importance of the things commanded, but looking only to the will, the authority, and the power of the one commanding. On this matter it is pleasing to set down here the excellent judgement of blessed Gregory. For in the thirty-fifth book of the Morals, chapter ten, disputing many and excellent things concerning the excellence of the virtue of obedience, Gregory writes this among other things:

Completes the point from PDF 487: true obedience regards the commander's will, not the matter. Introduces the Gregory block-quote.

> *“It must be known that never through obedience can evil be done, but sometimes the good that is done ought to be intermitted through obedience. For there was not in Paradise an evil tree, which God forbade man to touch; but in order that man, well-founded, might grow through a better merit of obedience, it was fitting that He prohibit him even from a good — to the end that what he did would be so much the more truly a virtue, by as much as, ceasing even from a good, he showed himself more humbly subject to his Author. But it is to be noted what is said there: ‘Of every tree of Paradise eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil touch not.’ For he who forbids his subjects from some one good must of necessity concede*

many, lest the obedient one's mind perish utterly, if, wholly repelled from all goods, it should fast. But the Lord granted all the trees of Paradise for eating, when He prohibited from one — so that He might so much the more easily restrict His creature (which He did not wish to be extinguished, but advanced) from one, by as much as He relaxed it more widely toward all." Thus Gregory.

Gregory, Moralia in Iob 35.10 (block-quote, 'Sic Gregorius'): obedience is perfected by being forbidden even a good; God forbade one tree but granted all the rest, lest the soul be starved of every good.

QUESTION III. Why the precept of not eating from that tree of the knowledge of good and evil was given to Adam.

Third question of the disputation (rule above). Its focus, as the body shows, is the manner of the precept — why it was made partly hard and partly easy to keep.

Since that precept was given to Adam both for other causes and, most especially, for the testing and trying of his obedience, it was clearly fitting that it be partly difficult to observe, partly easy. Difficult, indeed, so that it might furnish man suitable matter for meriting well from God; otherwise the observance of it would have been of no praise and no merit. But it had to be easy, because, if it had been too arduous and hard, it would assuredly have brought sadness and trouble to man — a thing which by no means agreed with the happiness of his state. Now the difficulty of that precept was placed in two things: both that it concerned not eating from that tree — and to forbid the eating of that tree seemed to diminish [man's liberty...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'C'. The precept was fittingly part-hard (for merit), part-easy (suited to bliss). Its two difficulties: it curbed liberty, and it forbade an alluring tree.

[...seemed to diminish] man's liberty, since it did not leave it free and lawful for him to eat any of the things that were in Paradise; and also because the things that were in Paradise vehemently allured and drew him to eating — for there were to be seen trees of every kind, laden with the

most beautiful fruits and the sweetest for eating. Likewise, a threefold desire is most vigorous in man: one of food and drink, the second of money, the third of honors; of which that first is very natural and deeply implanted in man, and first [holds a man...] [continues]

The second difficulty (alluring fruit), and the three great human desires (food, money, honor) — the first (food) the most natural. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'primáque.'

— p. 489 (PDF) · printed p. 448 —

[...and first] it holds a man, and last forsakes him, and on that account is more violent and harder to overcome. Wherefore the demon also, about to tempt our Lord, first assailed Him through this desire for food: “Tell,” he said, “these stones to become bread.” But the Lord, conquering the devil in that temptation, most abundantly restored to man the honor which Adam, conquered by the demon in a like temptation, had lost. Certainly the latter two desires can be removed from a man, for men can live without money and honors, yet not without food and drink. And to this pertains what is in Jeremiah's Lamentations, chapter 1: “They gave,” he says, “their precious things for food, to revive the soul.” The other difficulty of that precept was in this, that through it there was forbidden to man a tree most conspicuous and most beautiful to the sight, and to the desiring of whose fruit the mind of man was drawn by many titles; and on that account abstinence from that tree seemed the more difficult.

The desire for food is the deepest and most violent (the demon tempted Christ through it, Matt 4:3; Lam 1:11); the second difficulty: the forbidden tree was beautiful and alluring. Marginal gloss: 'Matthaei 4.'

BUT how, in another respect, that precept was light and easy, can be judged from two things. For a law is wont to be esteemed very grave and difficult for two causes: first, indeed, on account of the excessive multitude and variety of the things which it commands to be done or shunned — wherefore the law of Moses was very hard, and, as Peter said, like an intolerable yoke: “Why do you tempt,” he said, “to lay upon them a yoke

which neither our Fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Then, it can happen that, although a law contain only one precept, it is nevertheless most difficult to observe, because that one thing which it commands is most grave and most burdensome and bitter — of which kind was the precept of God given to Abraham, by which he was commanded to immolate his only-begotten son Isaac.

A law is hard either by its multitude (the Mosaic 'yoke,' Acts 15:10) or by the severity of a single command (Abraham and Isaac, Gen 22). Marginal glosses: 'Difficultas legis, duabus ex rebus oritur'; 'Actorum 15.'

But neither difficulty was in that precept which was given to Adam: for God did not, by that precept, forbid him the eating of all the trees that were in Paradise, but of one tree only; nor was that tree the only one beautiful to the sight and sweet to the taste, but there were several others of its kind; nor was that tree the most excellent of all, since better and more excellent than it was the tree of life — whether already granted to man, or certainly soon to be granted. Light, therefore, as Rupert says (in the second book On the Works of the Trinity, chapter 30), in so great an abundance would the abstinence from one tree have been, had not the leader of abstinence — good will — been wanting. More clearly still is seen the lightness and easiness of this precept which was given to Adam, if its temptation and trial be compared with the temptation and trial of Abraham, or of Job, or of Tobias, or of very many martyrs. And by how much the easier the observance of that precept [was...] [continues]

Adam's precept had neither difficulty: only one tree (not the best — the tree of life was greater); cf. the far harder trials of Abraham, Job, Tobias, the martyrs (Rupert, de op. Trin. 2.30). Marginal gloss: 'Facilitas praecepti quod datum est Adamo.'

[...And by how much the easier the observance of that precept] was, by so much was its violation the more inexcusable, and worthy of a graver chastisement and penalty. But these things must be adorned and confirmed by the weightiest words and judgements of Augustine. For he, disputing on this very matter in chapter 15 of the fourteenth

book On the City of God, writes thus: "Whoever judges the condemnation of Adam to be measured as either excessive or unjust, surely I know not how great the iniquity was in sinning, where there was so great an easiness of not sinning. For just as to Abraham not un-[deservedly is great obedience ascribed...] [continues]

The easier the precept, the more inexcusable the sin. Opens the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 14.15), which continues onto PDF 490. Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara B. Augustini sententia.' Sentence breaks at the catchword 'merito.'

— p. 490 (PDF) · printed p. 449 —

[...For just as to Abraham not un]deservedly is great obedience ascribed, because, that he might kill his son, a most difficult thing was commanded — so also in Paradise the disobedience was so much the greater, by as much as that which was commanded was of no difficulty. And just as the obedience of the second Man [Christ] was the more praiseworthy in this, that He was made obedient unto death — so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable in this, that he was made disobedient unto death. For where a great penalty of disobedience is set forth, and an easy thing is commanded by the Creator, who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey, in an easy matter, and under the command of so great a Power, and under so great a penalty for earthly creatures?" Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine block-quote (Civ. Dei 14.15, 'Haec Augustinus'): Adam's disobedience was as detestable (in an easy command) as Abraham's obedience (in a hard one) was praiseworthy; cf. Christ 'obedient unto death' (Phil 2:8).

Rupert, moreover, in the second book On the Trinity and His Works, chapter thirty-one, treating those very words of which we now discourse — "Of every tree of Paradise eat, etc." — affirms that God, by these words, exacted from the first man faith, hope, and charity, in the possession, cultivation, and exercise of which three virtues the sum of all human perfection is contained. And Rupert writes in this manner:

Introduces the Rupert block-quote (de Trin. et operibus eius 2.31): the threefold precept of Gen 2:16-17 exacted the three theological virtues.

“Of every tree of Paradise eat, etc. Three things the majesty of the Trinity deemed worthy to command: ‘Of every tree eat,’ and ‘of this one eat not,’ and ‘in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.’ By these three propositions exacting three virtues from man — that is, charity, hope, and faith — which now, in reciprocal order, the same Trinity, one God, exacts from us — faith, hope, and charity: so that, because he by falling descended, we, rising up from faith, through hope might ascend to the charity of God. For in that He made man freely, and freely nonetheless set him, in that place of pleasure, in that such Paradise flowing with delights, as the future father of the multitude of the saints, He plainly made that same man a debtor of great charity to Himself, and strongly bound him by His benefits. But that man, ungrateful for so great a grace, did not repay the debt of charity — in which the magnitude of the wickedness there is none who can estimate.

Rupert, continued: the three clauses of the precept correspond to charity ('of every tree eat'), hope ('of this eat not'), and faith ('you shall die'); man owed charity for God's free gifts but proved ungrateful.

“Likewise, in the precept saying, ‘But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat,’ he ought to have shown signal hope: hope, I say, he ought to have had, and to have hoped from the good of God — that He who had already freely conferred such great goods upon him would assuredly, upon one keeping his subjection and obedience in the precept, confer greater things than He promised, that is, the heavenly Paradise and the society of the holy Angels in due time. But that man, doubtless, did not have the virtue of this hope concerning things to come — because, namely (as has already been said), not having charity, he was first ungrateful for present goods. Likewise, in the threat saying, ‘For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death,’ he ought to have had faith: faith, I say, to have

and firmly to believe, that God had forbidden such a tree not by envying divinity to man, but had truly foretold the inevitable penalty of transgression. What then, you say? Does not Scripture say, 'All things whatsoever the Lord willed He made in heaven and on earth'? How, then, did the Lord make all things whatsoever He willed, who could not bring to effect even that which He commanded — which surely, unless He had willed it to be done, He would by no means have commanded? For in that creature of His He did not find faith, hope, and charity according to His precept. To this, I say: the counsel or purpose of God was by no means frustrated; for powerfully He made those virtues bloom again from that trunk: for that man indeed turned out maimed for this work of God, and against the work or precept of God, [proved] incontinent through con-[cupiscence...] [continues]

Rupert, continued (block-quote runs onto PDF 491): the prohibition called for hope, the threat for faith; Adam failed in all three. The objection from Ps 135:6 ('all the Lord willed He made') answered: God's purpose was not frustrated — the virtues bloomed again 'from that trunk' (in Christ/the saints). Page ends at the catchword 'scentiam' (signature LL). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 491, '...per concupi[scentiam]...'.

— p. 491 (PDF) · printed p. 450 —

[...being incontinent, he stretched out his hands through con]cupiscence; but there was found, of his race, a man according to the heart of God, who stretched out hands restrained from all concupiscence to a penal obedience for Himself upon the wood of the cross, and, with sin trampled beneath His feet, set Himself before many thousands of His followers as examples of virtue to be read. Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of the Rupert block-quote (de Trin. et op. 2.31, 'Haec Rupertus') begun on PDF 490: Adam stretched out his hands in concupiscence; Christ, 'the man after God's heart,' stretched His out in obedience on the cross.

QUESTION IV. Why God enjoined that precept upon Adam, which He certainly knew would be violated by him, and

whose violation would be calamitous and pernicious not only to him, but also to all his posterity.

Fourth question of the disputation (rule above).

I RESPOND that it was fitting for God to deal with man not according to his future state, nor according to what he was afterward going to do, but according to the present state in which He had created him — to which state it was most consonant that Adam, from the very beginning of his creation onward, should be bound and constrained by some law to the obedience of God, for those causes which we expounded above, in the second question. Nor indeed, because Adam was going to violate that law, was the law for that reason not to be borne: for in that manner no law would be to be borne to men, since very few are those who keep the laws — and especially since God did not give that law with the intention that Adam should not keep it, nor did He make him such that he could not keep that law, because He made him of free will, flexible alike to good and to evil, and in whose power it was to keep the law or not to keep it. Nay rather, He made him upright, with no propensity to evil; and He heaped upon him, besides, an abundant and excellent grace, through which it would have been most easy and most pleasant for him to do any good whatsoever or to avoid any evil — and to keep any law, especially that one which he had received, the lightest, namely, and easiest to observe.

Large decorated initial 'R'. God dealt with man as then he was (upright, free, graced) — the law fittingly given though foreknown to be broken (else no law could ever be given; Adam was made able to keep it).

Besides this, although God had foreseen the sin of Adam, He had nevertheless at the same time also determined to turn that sin to a great and manifold good, and from it to elicit innumerable and incomparable benefits. For — to say nothing of the other goods — how greatly ought this to be esteemed: that God willed that, for the washing away and blotting out of Adam's sin, His Son, clothed in human flesh, should be seen upon earth

and converse with men, and by the pouring out of His blood and life should most abundantly compensate all the harms of Adam's sin — advancing man to a greater grace and happiness than that with which he had been created by God, and which he had lost by sinning: so that in a certain way it may be said that the sin of Adam was [a great gain to us...] [continues]

God ordained the foreseen sin to a greater good: the Incarnation and Redemption, raising man higher than his original state (the 'felix culpa' theme; completed on PDF 492). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'fuisse.'

— p. 492 (PDF) · printed p. 451 —

[...that the sin of Adam was] a great gain to us, and that Gregory deservedly exclaimed, “O happy fault, which merited to have so great and so good a Redeemer!” Add, that by the occasion of Adam's sin it came about that several and most noble virtues excelled in men, which in the state of innocence would not have shone forth — such as fortitude, patience, love toward enemies, mercy, abstinence, the palm of virginity and of martyrdom; nor would the manifold beauty and adornment of the Church have been so great; nor would there have been the sacraments which we now have — and most especially the most divine Sacrament of the Eucharist.

The 'felix culpa' ('O happy fault...', from the Easter Exsultet, ascribed to Gregory): the Fall occasioned the heroic virtues, the Church's beauty, and the sacraments (above all the Eucharist).

But we wish the reader to note here, that in the avoiding or impeding of future evils, the reckoning of God and of men is not equal or alike — because men are bound and subject to laws, but God is set above and outside every law. For God does two things, and indeed does them well, which, if a man did them, he would assuredly do badly. For God allows evils to happen, which, if He willed them not to happen, He could most easily impede — just as He could have impeded the fall of the Angels, had He given them efficacious grace, such, I say, as that through it they would altogether have persevered in the love and obedience of God. God also

does many things from which He Himself certainly knows that certain evils will follow, and that many will take from them the occasion of acting worse — of which kind were the miracles done in Egypt before Pharaoh and the Egyptians, by which they were the more vehemently hardened and obdurate in hatred of the Hebrews and in contumacy against God. God likewise creates daily very many rational souls which He knows will be condemned to eternal punishments; He bears laws [by occasion of which He knows that very many will become more wicked...] [continues]

God's 'reckoning' differs from man's: He rightly permits foreseen evils — the angels' fall (withholding efficacious grace), Pharaoh's hardening at the miracles, creating souls He foresees damned, bearing laws that occasion more sin. Marginal gloss: 'Non esse similem Dei atque hominum rationem in prohibendis, impediendisve malis futuris.'

[...He bears laws by occasion of which He knows that very many will become more wicked] than if those laws had not been borne. Which happens for two causes: both because the prohibition of the law itself excites a more ardent desire of the forbidden thing — for that is well-known and true: “We always strive toward the forbidden, and desire the things denied”; and Paul, to the Romans 7: “Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence”; and also because certain things, before the law was given, either were not sins, or not so grave as they are afterward, or were not recognized as such: “For I did not know sin,” says Paul, “except through the law.” But the law being given, what was not before a sin becomes a sin because it is forbidden by the law; and what was a sin becomes graver, with the transgression of the law added, and with man doing not only what is evil in itself, but also what he himself knows to be evil — that is, sinning against his own conscience.

Why law occasions more sin: the prohibition inflames desire (Ovid, Amores 3.4.17; Rom 7:8), and the law makes the act formally sinful and graver (against conscience; Rom 7:7).

Those two things, therefore, God does not only not badly, but most rightly, most justly, and most wisely. For it is not fitting that God should prohibit and impede that no evil happen at all; nay rather, it befits His most ordered

providence that the things which He Himself founded He should allow to operate suitably to their own natures — namely, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free things freely. For it is truly said by Augustine, in chapter 30 of the seventh book On the City of God, that God so administers whatever He created, that He allows them to exercise and to carry out their own motions. Since, therefore, [He made the rational nature...] [continues]

God's providence lets each nature act per its kind — necessary necessarily, contingent contingently, free freely (Augustine, Civ. Dei 7.30). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'naturam.'

— p. 493 (PDF) · printed p. 452 —

[...Since, therefore,] He made the rational nature endowed with free will, which is flexible alike to good and to evil, it was fitting that He allow it to act as it itself willed — helping it, indeed, to do good, yet not impelling it to evil. For if God allowed no evil to happen, where would His clemency shine forth, in forgiving sins? where His mercy, in relieving evils? where His justice, in avenging crimes? where would so great a beauty and adornment shine, in this universe of things, and especially in human affairs? Nor indeed is it fitting that anything should not be done by God because, by its occasion, some are going to become worse — since it is most easy that that occasion be not given, but taken, and arise not from the counsel and purpose and fault of the one acting, but from the depraved and perverse mind of the one abusing it; otherwise no law would have to be given to men, since most men abuse it: no Sacraments would have had to be instituted, nor would the Son of God have had to be incarnate, nor sent to the Jews, nor have had to undergo death for the redemption of men. It is clear, therefore, that it was not on that account fitting for God not to give that precept to Adam, because He had foreknown that it would be violated by him.

God lets the free nature act as it wills; without permitted evil there would be no place for clemency, mercy, justice, or the world's moral beauty. The occasion of sin is 'taken,' not given — else no law, sacraments, or Redemption. Conclusion: God rightly gave the precept though foreknowing its

violation.

VERSE 17. For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.

Scripture lemma (marked VERS. 17., the verse in italic) opening the next stretch of commentary — the threat of death.

These words contain threats and terror: for to Adam, should he transgress by eating of that tree, God denounced the most certain destruction of death — willing, namely, to restrain him by such threats and by the danger of penalty as by a kind of bridle. For by three things especially are men moved to observe the laws borne to them: First, by love and reverence of the lawgiver, to whose precepts — on account of the great benefits received from him, or on account of his excellent wisdom and authority and legitimate command over them — they acknowledge that they owe obedience; Then, by the hope of the rewards which are promised to those obedient to the law; Finally, by the fear of the punishments to which the transgressors and violators of laws are to be subjected and chastised; and this last is expressed in those words, “For in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.” For fear has greater force to move our minds than hope, the threat of penalty than the promise of reward, and pain, finally, than pleasure. Although to many it has seemed that a reward too was promised by God to Adam, if he obeyed the law, though Moses did not expound it: for God promised Adam the faculty of eating from the tree of [life...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'C'. The threat as a bridle. The three motives to obey law (love of lawgiver / hope of reward / fear of penalty), fear being the strongest (this verse). A reward implied: the tree of life. Marginal glosses: 'Tria inducunt homines ad observantiam legis'; 'Quod praemium Deus promiserit Adae, si non ederet ex illa arbore.'

[...for God promised Adam the faculty of eating from the tree of] life, by the eating of which he could pass an immortal life, ignorant of and exempt not only from destruction, but also from all labor and trouble; and this can

be evidently argued from these very words of the Lord: for if God threatened Adam that, eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he would necessarily die, from that it may be concluded that, had he not eaten, he would never have been going to die. But if anyone should ask whether Adam ate from the tree of life before sin, I shall respond that to me it seems quite [credible that he by no means ate of it...] [continues]

The tree of life would have conferred deathless, painless life. From 'you shall die if you eat,' it follows: had he not eaten, he would not have died. The question of whether Adam ate from the tree of life opens. Marginal gloss: 'An Adam comederit ex ligno vitae.'

— p. 494 (PDF) · printed p. 453 —

[...that to me it seems quite] credible that he by no means ate of it: both because Adam tarried a very brief time in Paradise, and the fruit of the tree of life was not going to be man's daily food, but to be taken at certain intervals for the strengthening of man's vital faculty, or as food and medicine alike; and also because, if Adam had even once eaten the fruit of the tree of life, he would doubtless have lived a longer life — for the fruit of that tree was most powerful, either to perpetuate man's life, or to prolong it for many ages. To this is added, that for this reason God, after Adam's sin, cast him out of Paradise, and made the entrance to that place inaccessible and impenetrable — lest, namely, Adam, entering Paradise and eating from the tree of life, should live forever. For thus God said to him: “Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.”

Pererius: Adam probably never ate of the tree of life (brief stay; not daily food; one taste would have lengthened life). God barred Paradise lest Adam eat of it and live forever (Gen 3:22).

A DISPUTATION ON THE PENALTY OF DEATH, which God threatened to Adam for eating the fruit of the forbidden tree.

New disputation divider (rule above and below).

But from those words of the Lord, “In whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death,” several questions arise, neither slight nor ignoble, to be carefully explained in this place.

Large decorated initial 'C'. Programmatic sentence introducing the questions of the disputation.

QUESTION I. How it is to be understood that Adam would die in whatever day he ate from that forbidden tree.

First question of the disputation (rule above).

HOW what God threatened to Adam — that in whatever day he ate from that tree he would die — was true, does not have an easy understanding, seeing that, after the eating of that tree, Adam lived nine hundred and thirty years. Some have supposed that God spoke not of corporeal death, but only of spiritual death — that is, of the loss of the justice and grace of God, by which man lives unto God: for that which the soul furnishes to the body for natural and corporeal life, this very thing, in a certain manner, grace furnishes to the soul for passing the supernatural and divine life. But we shall refute that opinion a little below.

Large decorated initial 'Q'. The difficulty: Adam lived 930 more years (Gen 5:5). First interpretation: the death meant was spiritual (loss of grace) — to be refuted below. Marginal gloss: 'Prima interpretatio.'

Others are of the opinion that those words of God contain a sentence not definitive, but comminatory — which it is not necessary to fulfill, or certainly not to fulfill according to its rigor: such as was the sentence of God against the Ninevites concerning the future destruction of their city after forty days. But this is frivolous: for a comminatory and conditional sentence of God is then not fulfilled when there is wanting the condition under which it was pronounced — that is, [...] [continues]

Second interpretation: the threat was comminatory (conditional), not absolute — like Jonah's 'forty days' against Nineveh (Jonah 3:4). Pererius calls this frivolous: a conditional threat goes unfulfilled only when its condition fails. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda interpretatio.' Page ends at the catchword 'id est' (signature LL 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 495, 'id est, [the condition being

repentance]...'.

— p. 495 (PDF) · printed p. 454 —

[...when there is wanting the condition under which it was pronounced,] that is, when he against whom it was borne is changed — as God declared in express words through Jeremiah, chapter 18. But this did not happen to Adam, since, having committed the sin, he did not at once come to his senses and do penance; nay rather, when he was accused of the committed crime by God, he excused himself, and wished to lighten his crime, transferring its cause onto his wife. Justin Martyr, in the dialogue which he had with Trypho, and Irenaeus, in the fifth book against heresies, hold that Adam, on the day he ate from that tree, died on that very same day: for one is the measure of God's day, another of the natural and human day; for the latter is defined by only twenty-four hours, but the former is prolonged to a thousand years, as David sang in Psalm 89, “A thousand years before your eyes are as yesterday's day, which has passed”; and Saint Peter, “A thousand years,” he says, “are as one day.” Since, therefore, Adam did not reach the thousandth year, it can rightly be said that he did not live one day, but died on the same day on which he sinned.

Completes the refutation of the 2nd interpretation (a conditional threat fails only if its subject repents — Jer 18; but Adam did not). The 3rd interpretation (Justin, Dial. with Trypho; Irenaeus, adv. Haer. 5): a divine 'day' = 1000 years (Ps 89[90]:4; 2 Pet 3:8), so Adam died within his 'day.' Marginal glosses: 'Tertia interpretatio Iustini & Irenaei'; '2. Petr. 3.'

But indeed, even with me silent, the reader will of himself observe that this interpretation is hard and forced, and by no means congruent with the narration of Moses, which is historical — since he uses the word “day” in all his books no otherwise than is commonly used and familiar. It pleases others that that phrase, “In whatever day,” ought to be referred only to that word “you eat,” and not to that word “you shall die” — so that it is not signified that he would die on the same day on which he ate, but only this is signified: that the eating of that tree was not forbidden to Adam for some one certain day or time, but for every day and for every time — so that on

whatever day or time he ate, he would altogether die. Which interpretation is indeed easy to understand, and is pressed by no difficulties.

The 3rd interpretation rejected as forced (Moses uses 'day' in the ordinary sense). The 4th interpretation: 'in whatever day' qualifies only 'you eat' (the prohibition holds always), not 'you shall die.' Marginal gloss: 'Quarta interpretatio.'

To most it has seemed that that phrase, “In whatever day you eat,” ought to be joined with that word “you shall die,” so that it be signified that as soon as he ate, he himself would be going to die; yet that by that word “you shall die” there is signified not the act of dying, but the necessity and the debt of death — so that the sense is: as soon as you eat, you will be liable to the penalty of death, and bound by the necessity of dying — by which you will not be held, if you do not eat from that tree. Jerome, in the book of the Hebrew Traditions on Genesis, praises Symmachus the translator, who, for that “you shall die,” rendered “you shall be mortal” — signifying by that word “mortal” not the natural power of dying, which arises from the natural constitution of man, and which Adam by no means lacked even in the state of innocence, but denoting the inevitable necessity of dying into which Adam ran on account of sin. This inter-[pretation is approved especially by Theodoret...] [continues]

The 5th interpretation (favored by most): 'you shall die' = liability to / the debt of death (Symmachus' 'you shall be mortal,' praised by Jerome, Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.) — not natural mortality (which Adam had even in innocence) but the unavoidable necessity incurred by sin. Marginal gloss: 'Quinta interpretatio.'

[...This interpretation is approved especially by Theodoret, since he, in question 38 on] Genesis, says: “Adam did not die immediately after the transgression; nevertheless, divine Scripture calls the decree and sentence of death ‘death.’ And so, when he first ate, he became liable, by the sentence of God, to the penalty of death — awaiting death itself, day by day and hour by hour, as one guilty of death. For unless he had eaten, he could have not died — nay, would never have died; but after he ate the forbidden food, he could not escape but that at some time he

would die."

Theodoret, Quaest. in Gen. 38 (block-quote, continues onto PDF 496): the 'death' threatened is the sentence/debt of death — incurred at once by eating, though carried out later. Sentence/quote runs on past the page (catchword 'HUIUS').

— p. 496 (PDF) · printed p. 455 —

Of this view was also Augustine, whom the scholastic Theologians generally follow. For he, in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 23, writes in nearly these words: "The body of Adam, which had need of food and drink lest it be killed by hunger and thirst, and which was kept from the necessity of death not by that absolute and indissoluble immortality, but by the tree of life, and was retained in the flower of youth, was not spiritual, but animal; yet by no means about to die, unless by transgressing it had fallen into the sentence of God foretelling and threatening. But although, when God said, 'In the day you eat of it you shall die the death,' we understand that manifest death — which is the separation of soul from body — to be signified, it ought not on that account to seem absurd that they were not loosed from the body on that very day on which they took the forbidden and death-bearing food. For on that day, the nature being changed for the worse and vitiated, and by a most just separation from the tree of life, the necessity even of bodily death was made in them — that necessity with which we are born. On account of which the Apostle does not say, 'the body indeed is going to die because of sin,' but says, 'The body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of justice.' The Apostle called our body 'dead,' because it is already constrained by the necessity of dying."

Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.23 (block-quote): Adam's body was 'animal,' kept deathless by the tree of life; at sin the necessity of bodily death was incurred (the soul-body separation only later). Rom 8:10 ('the body is dead because of sin') glossed. Marginal gloss: 'Rom. 8.'

To be read are the things which Augustine writes to the same view, in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 32. In the last place is to be put an interpretation that yields to none of the prior ones in probability — of those who interpret that “you shall die the death” of actual death, and not only of the necessity of dying. But they understand a death not completed, but begun: for as soon as Adam sinned, his body, despoiled of original justice [and deprived of the gift of immortality...] [continues]

*The 6th and last interpretation (Pererius' favored one): 'you shall die' of *actual* death, but death begun — decay setting in at once. Marginal gloss: 'Sexta & ultima interpretatio.'*

[...his body, despoiled of original justice] and deprived of the gift of immortality, began to feel cold, heat, weariness, and the other discomforts and evils, which are the most certain heralds of coming death; and it began gradually to be corrupted and to slip toward destruction. For just as the Philosophers did not hesitate to call “generation” the alteration that precedes the procreation of a substantial form (because it is a necessary preparation for it, and as it were a most certain way to it), so the alteration that gradually prepares and leads to destruction claims for itself the name of corruption and death. Wisely, therefore, did that woman, as it stands in the second book of Kings [2 Samuel], chapter 14, say to David: “We all die, and like water we slip away.” Most true also is that saying of blessed Gregory, homily 37 on the Gospel: “Temporal life,” he says, “compared to eternal life, is rather to be called death than life. For the daily failing of corruption itself, what else is it than a certain prolongation of death?” The body of Adam, therefore, would have remained in the same state, had he not sinned; for it would not gradually have been dissolved or [vitiated and fallen toward death...] [continues]

Decay as 'death begun': the philosophers' analogy (alteration named for its term); 2 Sam 14:14 ('we all die... like water'); Gregory, Hom. in Evang. 37 ('temporal life is rather death than life'). Sentence breaks at 'dissolutum aut.'

[...for it would not gradually have been dissolved or vitiated and fallen toward death; but after his sin] it began gradually to be dissolved and

corrupted and to flow toward destruction, and from that time death began to have dominion over him.

Conclusion of the 6th interpretation: at sin the body's gradual dissolution—'death begun'—set in. (Closes QUAESTIO I; page ends with decorative asterisks and the catchword 'QVAE'.)

— p. 497 (PDF) · printed p. 456 —

QUESTION II. Whether the death which God threatened to Adam was only of the soul, or of the body, or of both.

Second question of the disputation (rule above).

Another question arises from the same words: The death which God threatened to Adam, when He said, “In whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death,” is it to be understood as the death of the soul only — by which, namely, the soul, by sinning, is separated from God, who by His grace bestowed on it the spiritual and divine life — or also as the death of the body, by which the soul is separated from the body? Many, and among the foremost, noble writers have judged that not the death of the body, but only of the soul, was signified. This Philo affirms — whom, on account of his admirable eloquence, the ancients called the Plato of the Jews — and he left this written in the second book On the Allegories of the Mosaic Law. The same view Eucherius embraced, in the first book of his Commentaries on Genesis; to which Eugubinus [Steuco] also subscribed, in his Annotations on the Pentateuch, treating these words of Moses and writing (doubtfully, however, and subjecting his opinion to the Church's judgement) that Adam's sin brought to men not the death of the body, but only the death of the soul. But afterward, when he understood that this contradicts the sacred doctrine of the Church, he changed his opinion in his Cosmopoeia.

Large decorated initial 'A'. The 'soul-only' view: Philo (de Allegoriis 2), Eucherius (Comm. in Gen. 1), Steuco of Gubbio (who later recanted in his Cosmopoeia).

BUT beyond the rest, Gregory added faith and authority to this opinion, professing and defending it in the weightiest words, in the Register, book six, chapter one hundred and ninety-five — and it is Epistle 31 of Gregory, written to Eulogius bishop of Alexandria and Anastasius bishop of Antioch; and Gregory writes thus in that place: "If the soul of Adam, who first sinned, did not die in sin, how was it said to him concerning the forbidden tree, 'in whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death'? And behold, Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden tree, and yet in their flesh they afterward lived more than nine hundred years. It is agreed, therefore, that he did not die in the flesh. If, then, he did not die in the soul — which it is wicked to say — God brought forth a false sentence about him, who said that on the day he ate he would die. But away with this error, away from true faith! For we say that the first man, on the day he sinned, died in soul, and that through him the whole human race was condemned to this penalty of death and corruption. But through the second Man we trust that we can be freed — both now from the death of the soul, and afterward from all corruption of the flesh in the eternal resurrection. And we say that the soul of Adam died in sin, not as to the substance of living, but as to the quality of living. For since substance is one thing and quality another, his soul was not so dead that it did not exist, but so dead that it was not blessed. Yet Adam afterward returned to life through penance." Thus Gregory.

Gregory the Great, Register Ep. 6.195 (= Ep. 31, to Eulogius of Alexandria and Anastasius of Antioch), block-quote ('Haec Gregorius'): Adam died 'in soul' (in blessedness, not in substance) the day he sinned, revived by penance; bodily death came through him to the race (1 Cor 15:21-22, the 'second Man').

According to these authors, therefore, Adam, by eating the food forbidden to him, ran into the death of the soul, but not of the body.

Sums up the 'soul-only' school (Philo, Eucherius, Steuco, Gregory). (The sentence straddles the page-break; printed across the catchword 'auctores'.)

— p. 498 (PDF) · printed p. 457 —

But on the contrary, blessed Augustine — whom the Scholastic Theologians and most Doctors have deservedly followed — in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 12, confirms that in this place, by the word "death," there is signified every death that can befall man, that is, both of soul and of body, both temporal and eternal. The words of Augustine in that place run thus: "When, therefore, it is asked with what death God threatened the first men, if they should transgress the command received from Him, and not keep obedience — whether of the soul, or of the body, or of the whole man, or that which is called the second [death] — the answer is: all. For the first consists of two; the second is whole out of all. For just as the whole earth consists of many lands, and the whole Church of many Churches, so the whole death of all: since the first consists of two, one of the soul, the other of the body — so that the first death of the whole man is when the soul, without God and without the body, pays penalties for a time; but the second is where the soul, without God, with the body, pays eternal penalties. When, therefore, God said to that first man, whom He had set in Paradise, concerning the forbidden food, 'In whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death' — not only the former part of the first death, where the soul is deprived of God; nor only the latter, where the body is deprived of the soul; nor only that whole first death, where the soul, separated both from God and from the body, is punished; but whatever of death there is, up to the last, which is called the second, and than which there is none later — that threat comprehended." Thus Augustine.

Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.12 (block-quote): the threat comprehended EVERY death — of soul, of body, of the whole man, and the 'second death.' Marginal gloss: 'Augustini & Scholasticorum Theologorum sententia.'

It is permissible, therefore, according to Augustine, to distinguish a fourfold death: one of the soul and for a time, when the soul, by sinning, is

separated from God; another of the body and for a time, by which the soul is separated from the body; a third, which comprehends both at once — I mean the separation of the soul from God and from the body; a fourth, by which man will die forever after the day of judgement, according to soul and body — which is called the second and last death. It pleases Augustine, therefore, that all these deaths are comprehended in those words of the Lord, and that Adam, after his sin, was liable to them.

The fourfold death systematized: (1) soul/temporal (loss of God); (2) body/temporal (soul-body separation); (3) both together; (4) eternal (the 'second death,' Rev 20). Marginal gloss: 'Quadruplex mors hominis.'

Now that the Lord by those words signified the death of the body is proved by many arguments. First, because the word “death” and the verb “to die,” placed precisely in a historical narration — such as this of Moses is — are to be taken according to their proper and by all customary signification, that is, for bodily death. Then, in order that this sentence of God might have its effect, God cast Adam out of paradise, and took from him every faculty of eating from the tree of life — lest, namely, he should be able to escape the bodily death destined for him.

Arguments that bodily death was meant: (1) in historical narrative 'death' means bodily death; (2) God barred the tree of life so Adam could not escape it. Marginal gloss: 'Deum Adamo minatum esse mortem corporis.'

This very thing Paul teaches in manifest words, writing thus in chapter 5 of the Epistle which he sent to the Romans: “Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so death passed unto all men.” And in the book of Wisdom it is plainly handed down that the death of the body befell man on account of sin. For thus it stands in chapters 1 and 2: “God did not make death, nor does He rejoice in the destruction of the living.” And: “God created man imperishable, and to the ima-[ge of His own likeness He made him...] [continues]

Scriptural proofs for bodily death by sin: Rom 5:12; Wisdom 1:13 ('God did not make death') and 2:23 ('God created man imperishable, in His image'). Page ends at the catchword 'ginem' (signature

MM). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 499, 'ad imaginem [suae similitudinis fecit illum]...'.

— p. 499 (PDF) · printed p. 458 —

[...God created man imperishable, and to the ima]ge of His own likeness He made him: but by the envy of the devil death entered into the world. Lastly, this same thing has been decreed and established in the Council of Orange, canon 1, and in the Council of Trent, session 5, in the decree on original sin. But that argument of Philo and of blessed Gregory, by which they assail this view — that Adam did not, immediately upon eating the forbidden food, die according to the body, but lived for more than nine hundred years afterward — is weak, and does not stand in the way of this opinion, as is manifest from the things which we treated in the preceding question, disputing how Adam, as soon as he ate that forbidden food, died.

Completes the Wisdom citation (Wis 2:23-24) and adds conciliar authority (Orange canon 1; Trent session 5, on original sin). The Philo/Gregory objection (Adam lived 930 years) already answered in QUAESTIO I (death 'begun').

“But indeed,” says Eugubinus, “Christ took away all the evils which befell man on account of Adam's sin, yet He did not take away corporeal death: therefore that death is not the penalty of Adam's sin.” But Eugubinus is deceived, not observing that both in the Gospel of John and in the epistles of Paul — and especially in chapter 15 of the former Epistle to the Corinthians — it is openly written and attested that both evils, namely of sin and of death, were taken away by Christ: but the former in the present, and in His first coming; the latter at the consummation of the age, and in His latter coming.

Steuco's objection answered: Christ removes death too (1 Cor 15), but bodily death is abolished only at His second coming. Marginal gloss: 'In Cosmopoeia.'

But this could be objected to us: that death is natural to man, and therefore is not the penalty of sin — for just as sin is not natural, so neither can the penalty of sin be natural. That death is natural to man is evidently proved by two arguments: both because death befalls man from his natural and

substantial constitution — namely, in that he is constituted of matter and form, and of contrary things perpetually at war among themselves; and also because to be mortal and to be able to die is natural to man: therefore the act of dying, which is death, will also be natural to man. For this is widely received and undoubted among the Philosophers, that a potency and the act corresponding to it are of the same order and reason.

Objection: death is natural (a body of warring contraries must dissolve; the act answers the natural potency 'able to die'), hence not a penalty of sin. Marginal glosses: 'An mors sit naturalis homini'; 'Axioma Philosophorum.'

But the answer to these things is easy. For man can be considered in two ways: either in himself, and according to the bare condition of his nature — with every gift of God superadded to him, namely, removed — and in this way death is natural to man, no less than to the other animals; or in the way in which man was at the beginning founded by God, namely as upright, innocent, and able always to live and never to die if he did not sin — which things had indeed befallen man not from the condition of his nature, but from the grace and kindness of God; and considering man in this manner, we truly say that death was for him the penalty of [his committed sin...] [continues]

Reply: man in pure nature dies like the animals; but as God actually constituted him (upright, deathless by grace), death is the penalty of sin. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo mors sit naturalis, & sit poena hominis.'

— p. 500 (PDF) · printed p. 459 —

[...we truly say that death was for him the penalty of his committed sin: for unless he had sinned, remaining in that happy state, he would have been immune from death. This could be illustrated by the example of Saul, for whom, before his election and promotion to the kingdom, it had been no penalty to lack the royal dignity and power; but after he was made King, and had held the kingdom for some years, it was assuredly a great penalty for both him and his posterity to be deprived of the royal dominion and

rule. The same too may be said of the high priesthood taken away from the posterity of Eli. But if anyone insists on pressing us, saying that every penalty is from] God, but that death is not from God — for Scripture cries out in the book of Wisdom 1, “God did not make death” — therefore death is not the penalty of sin: we shall answer that death, as it is a certain evil of nature, is from God, not indeed per se and directly, but consequently and obliquely. For because God constituted man of a rational soul and of a body furnished and endowed with the faculties and organs of the senses — and such a body, since it consists of contrary qualities, is necessarily dissoluble and mortal — hence it comes about that, from the necessity of the matter from which man is compacted, death befalls him. But death, as it is the just penalty of sin... [continues]

(The opening completes PDF 499's sentence and adds the Saul / Eli examples — what is no penalty in pure nature becomes one once a grace is given and lost.) Objection from Wis 1:13 ('God did not make death') answered: death as a natural evil is from God only obliquely (via the necessity of contrary-composed matter). Marginal gloss: 'An mors sit à Deo.'

[...But death, as it is the just penalty of sin,] is per se from God — not, indeed, efficiently, for since death is not some thing but a mere privation, it cannot have God as its maker; but God was its cause by removing that which kept off death, namely by withdrawing from man original justice, and a certain singular protection and care of man, by which God, so long as man had stood firm in the state of innocence, would have driven death and all the discomforts and evils of the body away from him.

Death as penalty is 'from God' not by efficient causation (it is a privation) but by withdrawing the original justice and protection that would have warded it off.

QUESTION III. Why God threatened Adam with death only, the other evils being omitted.

Third question of the disputation (rule above).

Since Adam, on account of sin, ran not into the death of the body alone, but was liable to very many other discomforts and corporeal evils: Why did

God, in delivering this precept, make mention only of corporeal death, with so many and such great other evils passed over in silence — which, that precept being violated, were prepared not for Adam only, but for all his posterity? Indeed I seem able to bring forward three sufficiently probable causes of this. First, mention was made of corporeal death alone, because death is the extreme, the highest, and the most to be dreaded of all the evils of the body. For death, on the authority of Aristotle, in chapter 6 of the third book of the Ethics to Nicomachus, is the most horrible of all things, since it is the terminus. Then, because the other evils vehemently afflict man for this reason — that they are, as it were, certain partial deaths (so to speak), and at last lead into death itself: for any penalty of the body, if it be either too prolonged or too intense, at last brings death to man... [continues]

Large decorated initial 'C'. Three reasons for naming death alone — (1) death is the supreme, most-feared evil (Aristotle, EN 3.6); (2) the other evils are 'partial deaths' that lead to it. Marginal gloss: 'Tres causae cur Deus solam mortem comminatus fuerit Adamo.'

[...for any penalty of the body... at last brings] death to man. The other penalties of the body, therefore, are as it were lines drawn from the circumference of a circle to the center, in which all the lines terminate and end; but death itself I would rightly call, as it were, the center, inasmuch as it is the terminus of all evils. Lastly, God willed to express only that penalty which would generally and equally comprehend all the posterity of Adam, partakers of his sin; but of this kind death alone is, which befalls all men equally, as the elegant Poet sang: [“Pale death strikes with equal foot...] [continues]

The third reason: only death falls equally on all Adam's posterity (the other ills do not). The circle-and-center image: death is the terminus of all evils. Sentence breaks into the Horace quotation (catchword 'Pallida'), completed on PDF 501.

— p. 501 (PDF) · printed p. 460 —

[...as the elegant Poet sang:] “Pale death strikes with equal foot the huts of the poor and the towers of kings.” But the other evils of the body befall neither all, nor equally.

The Horace quotation completed (Odes 1.4.13-14): death alone is universal and impartial. Marginal gloss: 'Horat. lib. 1. carm.' Closes QUAESTIO III (rule below).

QUESTION IV. Why God did not threaten Adam with the pains of hell.

Fourth question of the disputation (rule above).

Adam, on account of eating the forbidden food, not only deserved the death of the body, but was also guilty of eternal death, and liable to the perpetual punishments of hell. For if his posterity, on account of the original sin which, generated from him, they drew, are born sons of wrath and addicted to eternal damnation, how much more Adam himself, who sinned by his own act, and was the author and cause of the sin to be derived into all his posterity? Since, therefore, the penalty of hell is much graver and more horrible than the penalty of corporeal death, it is asked why God threatened him with this rather than that, in order to move Adam and to deter him from eating that food. I judge it was done for three causes. For although the penalty of hell is in itself graver than the death of the body, yet the threat of corporeal death is sharper and more vehement for moving man. For human affection toward a thing plainly follows the cognition of that thing: for what is known and persuaded to us in more ways, and more certainly and evidently, has greater force for moving and inciting our affection.

Large decorated initial 'A'. Adam deserved hell, not only death; why threaten the lesser? First cause: the threat of bodily death moves more, because affection follows the certainty of knowledge. Marginal gloss: 'Cur non poenam inferni, sed mortis Deus comminatus est Adamo, tres causae.'

The penalty of hell — such, namely, as is handed down to us in sacred Scripture — is known and persuaded to us by faith alone; but the death of the body is clearly perceived and believed by us in three ways: by Faith, by Reason, and by Sense. By Faith, because it is attested in the divine

writings: “it is appointed to man once to die”; and David sang: “Who is the man that shall live, and not see death?” By Reason, because, since man is composed of matter and form and of contrary things, he cannot escape death — and if certain diseases and pains, such as of the stomach, the bladder, the head, and the teeth, so torment us that we can scarcely keep our composure (and yet these are not to be compared with the bitterness of death), can one not from this sufficiently understand how to be dreaded and how horrible death is to man? And finally, this is amply and abundantly ascertained by the senses themselves, namely by the daily experiences of so many men dying most bitterly. For this cause, therefore, the fear of corporeal death affects man more vehemently than the dread of hell: for the dread of the latter is wont to recall very few from sinning, but the fear of the former very many.

Bodily death is known three ways — faith (Heb 9:27 'appointed once to die'; Ps 88[89]:49), reason (a body of contraries must dissolve; cf. lesser pains), and sense (daily deaths) — whereas hell is known by faith alone; hence death's threat moves more. Marginal glosses: 'Necessitatem moriendi tribus viis esse nobis persuasam'; 'Hebra 9. Psal. 88.'

Then, God willed to propose that penalty which, if Adam violated His precept, he would necessarily undergo — and not only he himself, but likewise all his posterity — even if afterward he came to his senses and, repenting of his sin, returned to the grace of God. And of this kind [was the death of the body...] [continues]

Second cause: God named the penalty Adam would unavoidably suffer even after repentance — bodily death (whereas hell could be escaped by penance). Sentence breaks at the catchword 'autem'.

— p. 502 (PDF) · printed p. 461 —

[...And of this kind] was the death of the body, which neither Adam, coming to his senses, nor his posterity — even if some of them were most holy — were able to escape; but the penalty of hell both the first parents themselves and very many of their posterity have escaped. To these I add a third cause, noted by Augustine, in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 23:

that the express promises of eternal life and happiness, or the threats of eternal death and of the punishments of hell, were reserved for the grace of the New Testament. For in the Old Testament — and especially before the Prophets — either no, or very rare, and only veiled and covered, mention is made of either eternal death or eternal life.

Third cause: explicit promises/threats of eternal life and the second death were reserved to the New Testament's revelation (Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.23) — the Old Testament's mention is veiled.

Let me set down here the words of Augustine: "Therefore, when God threatened Adam with death, He said nothing of the second death, because He willed it to be hidden, on account of the dispensation of the New Testament, where the second death is most openly declared — so that first this first death, which is common to all, might be disclosed as having come from that sin which, committed in one, was made common to all; but the second death is not indeed common to all, on account of those who, according to His purpose, are called holy, whom He foreknew and predestined beforehand (as the Apostle says) to be made conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren — whom, from the second death, through the Mediator, the grace of God has freed." Thus far are the words of Saint Augustine.

Augustine, Civ. Dei 13.23 (block-quote, 'Hactenus verba sunt S. Augustini'): the second death was left hidden (Rom 8:29 'conformed to the image of His Son... firstborn among many brethren') — common death revealed first, the second death reserved to the Gospel. Closes the disputation on the penalty of death (rule below).

ON THE PROCREATION OF THE FIRST WOMAN, THAT IS, OF EVE FROM ADAM HIMSELF.

New major section divider (rule above), opening the commentary on the creation of Eve (Gen 2:18ff.).

GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 18. The Lord God also said: It is not good for man to be alone.

Scripture lemma (marked GEN. C. 2. VERS. 18. in the margin, the verse in italic) opening the new section.

Having carefully expounded the generation of Adam, we must come next to narrating the procreation of Eve, which has no less either of admiration of the divine power and wisdom, or of obscurity and difficulty of disputations and questions. But before all, Moses, by the above words, opens the cause and necessity of creating the woman — namely, because it was not good that the man should be without a woman, but it was necessary that the man have a woman as a companion and helper congruent to himself, both for very many other things and especially for begetting offspring, and by that means for propagating and conserving the human species; for such a help could be found for man in none of the other animals.

Large decorated initial 'E'. Transition from Adam to Eve; the cause of woman's creation: a fitting companion and helper, above all for generation and the survival of the species (which no animal could supply).

But what sense have those words of the Lord, “It is not good for man to be alone”? This, namely: Since man by his own nature is a gregarious and sociable animal, it was not good for him to be solitary and [without a companion...] [continues]

The sense of Gen 2:18: man is by nature social, so solitude was not good for him. Marginal gloss: 'Cur non fuit bonum esse virum sine muliere.' Page ends at the catchword 'absque' (signature MM 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 503, '...solitarium & absque [socio]...'.

— p. 503 (PDF) · printed p. 462 —

[...Since man by his own nature is a gregarious and sociable animal, it was not good for him to be solitary and] without the fellowship of other men: for his life, even though it flowed with all goods, would nevertheless have been unpleasant and bitter — concerning which matter Cicero, in the book he wrote On Friendship, introduces Laelius disputing many excellent things. But this reasoning proves that Adam ought not to have been without

the fellowship of other men; that he ought not, moreover, to have been without the fellowship of a woman, is manifest from this — that Adam was, as it were, the head and seedbed of the human race, from which, namely, the whole race of men was to be propagated and multiplied; and neither the multiplication of men without generation, nor generation without the society and conjunction of a woman, could come about.

Solitude was not good: man is social (Cicero, de Amicitia, on Laelius); and Adam, the 'seedbed' of the race, needed a woman for generation.

Since the perfect work of living things is, on Aristotle's authority, to generate something like itself, either Adam would have been imperfect if he had lacked that faculty of generating, or it would have been vain and empty if he could not have carried it out — and he could not have used it without a woman's help. Finally, the woman being removed, the generation of men is necessarily removed; this removed, the human species cannot be perpetuated; and it being extinguished, the universe must remain greatly mutilated and imperfect — since man is the most excellent of all corporeal things, and, as it were, a certain most beautiful bond and most fitting link of the universe of things. Nor was it good for man to be alone, on account of the Angels: namely, the diminution of them, on account of the ruin of the evil spirits, was to be repaired by a supplement of men. Nor would it have been good, also on account of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was to be generated from Adam, the first of the predestined, and the firstborn of every creature. Nor indeed could it be good, since by the counsel and purpose of the eternal God it had been determined to take up many of Adam's posterity to a participation of eternal life and happiness. Nor did it befit the goodness and munificence of God — which was of itself communicable with infinite men — to be restricted and confined to one man only.

Why woman was needed: generation (Aristotle's 'perfect work'), the survival of the species and the perfection of the universe, the restoration of the fallen Angels' number, the descent of Christ, and the multitude of the predestined.

But this sentence of the Lord, “It is not good for man to be alone,” the Heretics of our time abuse, in order to attack the monastic vows of virginity and celibacy. For if, they say, “It is not good for man to be alone,” that is, without marriage, then those vows which exclude marriage are evil and contrary to the sentence of God. But against those heretics it can most truly be said what the Lord said to the Sadducees: “You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.” For with what face do they dare to censure and condemn virginity and celibacy as if they were inventions of men, and contrary to divine Scripture and to the will of God — when it has, from the Apostles onward, been most practiced and most praised in the Church of Christ?

Polemic against 'the heretics of our time' (the Reformers) who abuse Gen 2:18 against celibacy: rebuked with Matt 22:29 ('You err, not knowing the Scriptures'); virginity has always been honored in the Church. Marginal glosses: 'Contra Haereticos qui abstinere matrimonio malum esse dicunt'; 'Matthaei 22.'

Does not Paul, in chapter 7 of the former epistle to the Corinthians, dispute in the weightiest words that the state of virgins and celibates is far more desirable and more excellent than matrimony? “It is good,” he says, “for a man not to touch a woman”; and: “But I say to the unmarried and to widows: It is good for them if they remain so, even as I”; and: “Are you loosed from a wife? Do not seek a wife”; and: “He who joins his virgin in matrimony does well; and he who does not join her does better”; and finally: “A woman,” he says, “who wishes, let her marry — only in the Lord. But more blessed [will she be if she remain so...] [continues]

Paul, 1 Cor 7 (woven citations: vv. 1, 8, 27, 38, 39-40), preferring the celibate state. Sentence breaks at the catchword 'autem.'

— p. 504 (PDF) · printed p. 463 —

[...But more blessed will she be if she remain so, according to my counsel; and I think that I too have the Spirit of God.” Nor does Paul alone think thus, but also Paul's Master and Lord, and the founder of the evangelical

law and grace, Christ — whose is that most remarkable sentence in the Gospel, for the commendation of virginity: “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven.” What then? Shall we say that the doctrine of the New Testament is contrary to the Scripture of the Old Testament? By no means: but two times and two states of man must be distinguished.

Christ too commends virginity (Matt 19:12). The apparent OT/NT conflict resolved by distinguishing two epochs/states. Marginal glosses: 'Matth. 10' [Matt 19]; 'Duo status hominis cosiderádi in matrimonio.'

For in the beginning of the world, on account of the fewness of men, it would not have been good to abstain from marriage: for neither could the human race be perpetuated as it ought, nor diffused and propagated everywhere. But afterward, the multiplication of men being made well-nigh infinite, no reason properly urged or compelled any man to enter marriage. And indeed, the reckoning of marriage would have been far different in the state of innocence than it now is in the state of corrupt nature. For in that state the generation and multiplication of only the elect and predestined men would have taken place without any turpitude of lust, without any vice or impediment of body or mind by which the spouses would be retarded in any part from the worship and service of God. But in this our state, marriage is joined with so many and such great dangers, vices, discomforts, and impediments to better things, that it is not only not to be reckoned a fault, but even to be turned to great praise, to be unwilling to be bound by the bonds of marriage — that one may serve God with a freer and more tranquil mind.

The two epochs: when men were few, marriage was a duty; once the race was multiplied, celibacy (especially given fallen nature's lusts) is praiseworthy — freeing one for God's service.

Let the reader hear blessed Cyprian, in the Treatise On the Dress of Virgins, confirming in the weightiest words, against the heretics, what we have now said about marriage: “The first sentence of God commanded to increase and to generate; the second persuaded to

continence. While the world is still rude and empty, we are propagated by the abundance of generating fecundity, and we grow to the increase of the human race. When the world is now filled up and full, those who can receive continence, living after the manner of eunuchs, are made eunuchs for the kingdom." And the rest that follows.

Cyprian, de habitu virginum (block-quote): the first command was to multiply; once the world is full, continence ('eunuchs for the kingdom') is the call.

Let us make him a helper like himself. GENESIS CH. 2, VERSE 18.

Sub-lemma (the second clause of Gen 2:18) heading the next stretch of commentary.

The Latin Interpreter, doubtless following the Septuagint, rendered it in the plural, "Let us make." In Hebrew, however, and in Chaldee, it is in the singular number, "I will make." But God is introduced as if approaching to make the woman with a certain reason and counsel and deliberation, so that hence the dignity of the future work may be known: for the singular manner of His perfecting it shows also the singular and exceptional dignity of it. What therefore we said above, when we disputed why God, about to create man, had said as if deliberating, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," that very thing can be accommodated and applied to this place too. But for what we read, "A helper like himself," in Chaldee it is, word for word: "A support which may be beside him" — which expression is very [emphatic...] [continues]

Large decorated initial 'L'. The LXX/Vulgate plural 'Faciamus' renders a Hebrew/Chaldee singular 'I will make' (Heb. ■■■■, Ehesche; the Targum/Chaldee form transliterated 'Eheued,' partly cut in the margin). The deliberation marks the dignity of the work. The Targum renders 'helper like himself' as 'a support beside him.' Marginal glosses: 'Hebraismus ■■■■ Ehesche, & Chaldaicé [Eheued]'; 'Chaldaica versio.'

— p. 505 (PDF) · printed p. 464 —

[...which expression] is very emphatic, for it alludes to those who, in lifting burdens, hold out mutual helping hands to one another. Such a support and substitute help did God will the wife to be to the husband; and this the Chaldee words express beautifully: for ■■■ (Semach), the Chaldee word which is in this place, signifies a support, a prop, an aid — finally, everything by which one can lean and be supported. And the Chaldee expression ■■■■■■ (Chechible) signifies to be near, beside someone, and next to someone — as if it said: Let the wife be at hand for the husband, that she may help, console, and relieve him in his labors. For that "Like himself," the Seventy rendered ["Secundum ipsum"...] [continues]

Chaldee/Targum ■glosses: ■■■ (Semach) = 'support/prop'; ■■■■■■ (Chechible) = 'corresponding to / beside him' — the wife as the husband's 'support at hand.' (Pererius' transliterations retained.)

[...the Seventy ren]dered "Secundum ipsum" (according to himself), that is, answering and congruent to him — namely, according to the same species of nature, and as it were naturally suitable, from which the man might receive offspring. Rightly, therefore, the Latin Interpreter, weighing not the words but the sense, rendered it "Like himself." But it was necessary that the woman be partly like the man, partly unlike. Like, indeed — that is, of the same species, and partaker of the same human nature; otherwise a man could not be generated from man and woman; and this likeness embraces many other things in which the woman is equal to the man — such as this: to have an immortal soul, like to God, immediately created by Him from nothing, and capable of the divine happiness. But she had to be unlike according to sex, and according to the things which naturally and necessarily follow upon sex. For two things were needed for the accomplishing of man's generation: an active and a passive principle, the efficient and the matter; and of these the one the man alone has, but the other is only in the woman.

The woman partly like the man (same species, an immortal God-like soul — her equality), partly unlike (sex: the active vs. passive/efficient vs. material principle of generation). Marginal gloss:

'Mulier similis & dissimilis viro creari debuit.'

In Hebrew, moreover, for that which the Latin reading has, “Like himself,” it stands thus: “Against himself” (■■■■■) — which has a threefold interpretation. For some of the Hebrews think it was said thus because the woman was made contrary to the man — for she almost opposes the man, and harasses, vexes, and does not omit to torment him in every way. But this interpretation is perverse: for the woman was not made by God to be an adversary to the man; nor was any woman such in the state of innocence; nor after sin are they such, except those who, by their own vice and depravity, wickedly cast off the duties owed to a wife. Tostatus, explaining this passage, thinks it was said that the woman is “against the man” because between female and male there must be some contrariety — namely, that which is between agent and patient. For if the woman were entirely like the man, she could have and contribute no force at all toward the accomplishing of man's generation... [continues]

Hebrew ■■■■■ (chenegdo) = 'against him,' with three readings: (1) 'contrary/adversary' (a perverse reading, rejected); Tostatus' agent/patient contrariety. Marginal gloss: 'Lectio Hebraica est ■■■■■ chenegdo.'

[...have and contribute force]. But indeed this is nearer the truth: that “Against himself” was said for that which is “Before himself” (coram ipso) — an expression frequent in Holy Scripture, as in Psalm 50: “And my sin is always against me”; and in the Gospel: “Go into the village which is over against you”; and elsewhere a thousand times. But that the woman is said to have been made “before the man,” the Hebrews do not rightly interpret — of whom the one held most learned, David Kimhi, in the Book of Roots, thus explains this passage: “Before the man,” he says, “the woman was made, that she might be at hand and ready for him, to minister and to serve — namely, after the manner of servants [standing by...] [continues]

Second/third readings of 'against him' = 'before/facing him' (Ps 51:5; Matt 21:2). David Kimhi (Sefer ha-Shorashim) takes it as servile (the woman made to wait on the man) — a reading Pererius will reject (PDF 506). Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 21.'

— p. 506 (PDF) · printed p. 465 —

[...namely, after the manner of servants] standing before their masters, and observing not only their words but even their nods. For of ministers, some are removed from the sight of their masters, others always attend upon them; and such did God will the woman to be for the man." But this interpretation and opinion is false: for the woman was not made as a servant, but to be the companion of the man; and for that cause she was fashioned not from the feet, nor from the back of the man, but from the side, so that her society and community with the man might be denoted. Indeed, in the first book of the Politics, chapter one, Aristotle teaches that the condition of husband and wife is far different from that of master and servant; and that the woman was given as a companion to the man, chiefly for the sake of accomplishing generation.

Pererius rejects Kimhi's servile reading: woman is the man's companion, not servant — made from his side, not feet/back (Aristotle, Politics 1.2: wife ≠ servant). Marginal gloss: 'Mulierem nó esse servá viri.'

Aristotle indeed writes thus: "Male and female, of whom the one needs the society of the other, must be coupled, for the sake of procreating — and this not by counsel, but by nature; just as it happens by use in the other living things and in plants, in which is implanted by nature an appetite of leaving behind something like themselves. And so the female and the servant are distinct by nature, although among the Barbarians the woman and the servant are held in the same rank." Thus Aristotle. Cajetan thinks that "Before himself," or "Against himself," signifies that the woman is unlike the other animals: for, erect upon her feet, with lofty countenance and upright bearing of the whole body, she stands before the man — so that, as in body, so also in mind, she is like and most like to him.

Aristotle, Politics 1.2 (block-quote): male and female couple by nature, not counsel; the female is not the servant (only 'among barbarians' confused). Cajetan: 'before him' = the woman's upright, man-like form (unlike the beasts). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genesim.'

But it must be declared for what reasons the woman is a help to the man. Blessed Augustine, in the ninth book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapters three and four, writes that there seemed to him to have been need of the woman for no other reason than for the generation of offspring — since in all other things a man could have been helped more by another man than by a woman. The words of Augustine are these:

Augustine's striking thesis (de Gen. ad lit. 9.3-4): the woman was needed only for procreation (for anything else, a man would be a better helper). Introduces the block-quote.

> *"If it is asked for what thing this help had to be made, nothing else probably occurs than for the procreation of children — just as the earth is a help to the seed, that a shoot may be born from both; for this too was said in the first constitution of things, 'Male and female God made them,' saying, 'Increase and multiply and fill the earth.' And this reason of the constitution and conjunction of male and female, and the blessing of God, did not fail even after the sin and punishment of man. Or, if the woman was not made for the man for this help of begetting children, for what help, then, was she made? If to work the earth together with him — there was not yet labor, that he should need the help; and if there were need, the male would have been a better help. It could also be said [a remedy for] desolation, if perhaps he was wearied of solitude. For how much more fittingly would two friends, as equals, dwell together for living and conversing, than a man and a woman?" Thus Augustine.*

Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 9.3-4 (block-quote): woman was made for procreation alone (the earth-and-seed analogy; Gen 1:27-28); for fieldwork or companionship a man would serve better — so the unique help she gives is generation.

We, therefore, would say that the woman was partly necessary to the man, partly not at all necessary, yet very useful. The woman was necessary to the man for two causes: both for the generating of offspring, and for the nourishing and rearing of those already begotten — which two functions can in no way be supplied by men without a woman. But for the convenient

carrying out of domestic duties, the woman was not, indeed, necessary, yet she was exceedingly useful. For although those functions can also be undertaken by men, they are nevertheless more fittingly and better accomplished by a wo-[man...] [continues]

Pererius' own division: woman is necessary for generation and nursing (which men cannot do), but only highly useful (not necessary) for domestic work. Page ends at the catchword 'à foemi' (signature NN). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 507, '...perficiuntur à foemi[na]...'.

— p. 507 (PDF) · printed p. 466 —

[...yet those functions are more fittingly and better accomplished by a wo]man, who is both constantly at home and, by nature, more fit and adapted for handling cares of this kind. Wherefore the Apostle rightly said, in the eleventh chapter of the former epistle to the Corinthians, “Man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man”: for the woman was founded not for her own sake but for the man's, that she might be his helper for procreating and rearing offspring. To this also pertains the fact that the Peripatetics call the woman as it were a “mischanced man,” that is, an “occasioned animal” (animal occasionatum) — as though, beyond the first intention of nature, she arose and was procreated from a defect and weakness of the generative power in the man's seed.

Woman is the better helper for the home (more apt by nature); 'man not made for woman but woman for man' (1 Cor 11:9). The Peripatetic tag 'vir/animal occasionatum' — woman as a 'mischanced/occasioned' product, beyond nature's first intention, from a defect of the male seed's generative virtue (Aristotle, de Gen. Anim. 2.3). Marginal gloss: '1. Cor. 11.'

But although in this manner the woman is less perfect than the man, she is nevertheless far more excellent and more outstanding than all the other living things — which is most clearly evident from this: that she was founded and fashioned not from the slime of the earth, as the brute animals, but from the very side of the man, and from a bone of the man, that she might be the man's undivided companion and the perpetual partner of his life. But it is asked at what time, and in what place, the woman was made. Concerning the time it is certain and ascertained that the woman was

procreated by God not at the same time as the man, but somewhat after the man had been founded — which is openly signified in the sacred history, and confirmed by the Apostle, in the first to Timothy, chapter two: “Adam,” he says, “was first formed, then Eve”; and in the book of Wisdom, chapter ten, Adam is called the “protoplast,” that is, the first formed of all men. It remains, therefore, that the woman was foun[ded] some while after the man... [continues]

Though less perfect than man, woman far excels the beasts: made not from earth's slime but from man's own rib, his undivided companion. Question of the time and place of Eve's creation begins: she was made after Adam (1 Tim 2:13 'Adam first, then Eve'; Wisdom 10:1, Adam the 'protoplast'). Marginal glosses: '1. Timoth. 2'; 'Sapient. 10.' Page breaks at catchword 'con[dita].'

— p. 508 (PDF) · printed p. 467 —

[...It remains, therefore, that the woman was foun]ded some while after the man: for some delay of time intervened between the creation of the man and the procreation of the woman — namely, in that interval in which Adam imposed names on the animals, and found among them no helper like to himself. But all these things must have been done on the same sixth day, within which the whole creation of things was completed: for at the end of the first chapter it is said, “And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good; and there was made evening and morning, the sixth day”; and at the beginning of the second chapter, “So the heavens and the earth were finished, and all their adornment; and God completed on the seventh day His work which He had made.” And in Exodus, chapter twenty: “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.” Wherefore the opinion of Catharinus is not to be approved, who contends that the woman was founded on the seventh day, as though only on the seventh day was the generation of man perfected and consummated.

A delay (the naming of the animals) fell between Adam's and Eve's making, but all within the sixth day — the whole creation finished in six days (Gen 1:31; 2:1-2; Exod 20:11). Against Catharinus, who put Eve's creation on the seventh day. Marginal glosses: 'Gen. 1. & 2.'; 'Exod. 20.'; 'Catharinus.'

Nor does it stand in the way that it is read, “God completed on the seventh day His work”: for that is to be understood thus, that on the seventh day God rested from all the work which He had wrought, as is at once subjoined in the same second chapter; for “to complete the work,” in this place, is not to effect some part of the work, but rather to have utterly finished and consummated the whole work. And so St. Thomas expounds this passage, in the first part, question seventy-three, article one. But concerning the place in which Eve was made, it is more probable that she was formed in Paradise itself, not outside Paradise: for Adam had been placed in Paradise, that he might work it and keep it; and it is not likely that he, for the sake of the sleep, was cast outside Paradise. Which also Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities, and Tertullian, and Rupert, and Basil, and St. Thomas in the first part, question one hundred two, hold; and the fiction of those is to be hissed away who fable that Adam was led outside Paradise, and that there Eve was formed from his side.

'God finished on the seventh day' = He rested, having wholly consummated the work (Aquinas, ST I q.73 a.1). Eve was formed within Paradise (Josephus, Ant. 1; Tertullian; Rupert; Basil; Aquinas ST I q.102), against the fable that Adam was led outside it. Marginal glosses: 'D. Thom. 1. p. q. 73.'; 'D. Thom. q. 102.' Page breaks at catchword 'Immisit' (signature NN 2).

— p. 509 (PDF) · printed p. 468 —

The Lord God therefore cast a deep sleep upon Adam; and when he had fallen asleep, He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it. And the Lord God built the rib, which He had taken from Adam, into a woman; and He brought her to Adam. GENESIS CH. 2, VERSES 21 & 22.

Lemma (Gen 2:21-22), the formation of Eve.

For that which the Latin reading has, “He cast in” (Immisit), in Hebrew it is a verb which properly signifies “he made to fall,” or “he made to fall down”: the Seventy rendered ■π■βαλεν, which signifies “he threw upon” or “he sent in.” But the word which here is called by the Latin “sopor”

(deep sleep) is in Hebrew ■■■■■ (Tardemah), which sounds a profound and deep sleep — for which Aquila rendered καταφορ■ν, that is, “a descent and a falling-away from all wakefulness”; but Symmachus κ■ρος, that is, “a heavy and profound sleep”; while the Seventy rendered ■κστασιν, that is, an excess of mind, or ecstasy. The variety and reason of which word Jerome explains in the book of Hebrew Questions. But the word ■■■■■ (Tardemah), signifying an exceedingly heavy and deep sleep, occurs also elsewhere in the Scriptures: as in Genesis chapter fifteen, where it is said of Abraham, “When the sun was setting, a deep sleep rushed upon Abram”; and in the first of Kings, chapter twenty-six, “A deep sleep of the Lord had rushed upon them”; and in Isaiah chapter twenty-nine, “The Lord has mingled for you a spirit of deep sleep.”

Large initial 'P.' Word-study of 'Immisit' (Heb. 'made to fall'; LXX ■π■βαλεν 'cast/threw upon') and 'Sopor' (Heb. ■■■■■ Tardemah = deep sleep; Aquila καταφορ■ν 'a sinking-down'; Symmachus κ■ρος 'torpor/deep sleep'; LXX ■κστασις 'ecstasy'; Jerome, Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.). 'Tardemah' elsewhere: Gen 15:12 (Abram); 1 Sam 26:12; Isa 29:10. GLYPHS verified by magnification: ■π■βαλεν, ■■■■■ (×2), καταφορ■ν, κ■ρος. Marginal glosses: 'Hebraismus.'; 'Genes. 15.'; '1. Reg. 26.'; 'Esaiae 29.'

But it is wont to be asked whether that deep sleep of Adam was a natural sleep, or rather a certain ecstasy and abstraction of the mind from the senses. And indeed, from the fact that the Seventy render ■κστασιν, and from the very greatness of the matter, some think that Adam was seized not by a sleep of the body but by an ecstasy of the mind: for then, while his body lay quiet and motionless, his mind, illumined by divine illuminations, contemplated great and hidden mysteries concerning Christ and the Church. But to us it seems more probable that that sopor was a true and natural sleep, to which, nevertheless, a certain ecstasy and prophetic excess of mind intervened — so that at once both the body might rest in sleep, and the mind, irradiated by the divine light, might foresee and foreknow things to come. For those words sufficiently indicate it which Adam, awakened, uttered: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh” — which, as Paul says, is a great sacrament in Christ and the Church. For neither

could he have said these things unless taught from on high, and by the gift of prophetic illumination [strata...] [continues]

The question: was Adam's sopor natural sleep or ecstasy? Some (from LXX ■κστασις) say pure ecstasy. Pererius: a true natural sleep, but with an intervening prophetic ecstasy/illumination — by which Adam foresaw the mysteries and spoke prophetically ('bone of my bones'; Eph 5:32, 'a great sacrament in Christ and the Church'). Page breaks at catchword 'strata.'

— p. 510 (PDF) · printed p. 469 —

[...furnished by the gift of prophetic illumination, could discern both] the things which were being done at that time, and understand the mysteries that lay hidden in them. But lest anyone should think that that sleep was natural and proceeded from natural causes, Moses said that God sent in that sleep. So that it may seem wonderful to no one that so heavy and deep a sleep could befall Adam, that, seized by it, he should not in the least feel the removal of the rib from his side.

Conclusion of the prior question: in the prophetic sleep Adam discerned what was being done and its hidden mysteries; Moses says God 'sent' the sleep so none would deem it merely natural — so deep that the rib's removal was painless.

A DISPUTATION ON THE FORMATION OF EVE FROM ADAM.

New disputation heading.

But indeed, upon this history of the procreation of Eve from Adam, some questions must be treated — pleasant to know, and not quite easy to explain.

Decorated initial 'V.' Programmatic preface to the disputation.

QUESTION I. Why God willed Eve to be formed from the sleeping Adam.

First question of the new disputation.

The Master of the Sentences, in the second book, distinction eighteen, and the Scholastics there, answer that this was done for three causes. First, indeed, that it might be understood how, without any sense of pain, Adam's rib was removed — since by that removal it did not even rouse him from sleep. Next, that the admirable power of God might be shown, who could do it so easily and so gently. Finally, that a certain great mystery might be insinuated which lay hidden in the matter: for just as from the side of the sleeping Adam Eve was formed, so from the side of the sleeping Christ — that is, of Him dead on the cross — flowed blood and water, whence the Church was founded. For the Lord Himself calls His own death a sleep, in David, Psalm three: “I,” He says, “slept and took my rest, and I rose.”

Decorated initial 'M.' Peter Lombard (Sentences II, dist. 18) and the Scholastics give three reasons for Eve being made from sleeping Adam: (1) the rib's painless removal; (2) display of God's gentle power; (3) the great mystery — as Eve from sleeping Adam's side, so the Church from the side of the 'sleeping' (dead) Christ (blood and water, John 19:34); Christ calls His death 'sleep' (Ps 3:6). Marginal glosses: 'Magister sent. 2. d. 18.'; 'Psalm. 3.'

But Tostatus rejects this last reason of the Theologians, in question three hundred fifty-two on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, by this argument chiefly — that the Church ought rather to be said to be formed from the living Christ than from the dead: since indeed our redemption is wholly founded and rests upon the merit of Christ's passion, whence the Sacraments drew all their force and efficacy. Wherefore the blood which flowed from the side of Christ already dead contributed nothing to the redemption of the human race, nor did Christ merit anything for us through it, since He was already dead, and for that cause established outside the state of meriting. But Tostatus, cutting these things too close to the quick, did not attain the meaning of the Theologians: who, I indeed think, wished to signify nothing else than that from the side of the dead Christ flowed water and blood — by which two things were sig-[nified...] [continues]

Tostatus (Abulensis, quaest. 352 on Gen 13) objects: the Church is from the living, not dead, Christ, since redemption rests on the merit of the passion, and the dead Christ was 'outside the state of meriting.' Pererius: Tostatus cuts too close — the Theologians meant only that water and blood

flowed from the dead Christ's side, signifying [the sacraments]. Page breaks at catchword 'signi[ficabantur]' (signature NN 3). RESUME POINT for next batch: PDF 511, '...quibus duabus rebus signi[ficabantur]...'.

— p. 511 (PDF) · printed p. 470 —

[...by which two things were sig]nified the two chief Sacraments of the evangelical law: Baptism, by which through water we are regenerated to the spiritual life, and the Eucharist, by which, now spiritually regenerated, we are nourished unto eternity. And by these two sacraments the Church is most of all contained and sustained. Chrysostom, in the fifteenth homily on Genesis, and Epiphanius, disputing against the forty-eighth heresy, therefore think that so heavy and deep a sleep was impressed on Adam by God because God willed that Adam should feel no pain from the removal of the rib.

The water and blood from Christ's side (concluding from p.510) signify the two chief sacraments — Baptism and Eucharist — by which the Church is sustained. Chrysostom (hom. 15 in Gen.) and Epiphanius (Panarion, haer. 48) say the deep sleep was sent so Adam felt no pain. Marginal glosses: 'Chrysost. hom. 15.'; 'Epiphan. haeres. 48.'

But besides these reasons, it is permitted to bring forward certain others, either to prove or to illustrate the matter. And let this be the first reason: that what had to be done in Adam should be done without any horror or disturbance of his. For if the rib had been removed while he was awake, it would have befallen him either without pain or with pain: if without pain, it would have seemed like a certain phantasm, or like some prophetic vision; if with pain, it would assuredly have been too hard and troublesome for Adam, and very alien to the state of innocence and to the divine covenant — namely, that no penalty should touch Adam before his own fault. And this very thing is the argumentation of Theodoret upon this place. The second reason is: that Adam, in no way perceiving with bodily eyes what was being done in him, but understanding with the interior edge of the mind divinely illumined, might declare this to have been a great work of God, and ennobled by a great mystery; and that it might appear that what

Adam, afterward awakened from sleep, said about the woman — “This now is bone of my bones,” etc. — he knew it not by human reaso[n...] [continues]

Two further reasons for the sleep: (1) what was done in Adam should be without horror — a waking removal would have been either a mere phantasm (if painless) or a penalty before his fault (if painful) — Theodoret's argument (Quaest. 30 in Gen.); (2) so Adam, perceiving the work only with the illumined inner mind, would know his words 'bone of my bones' came by revelation, not human reason. Marginal gloss: 'Theodoretus quaest. 30. in Genesim.'

[...he knew it not by human reaso]n, but learned it by the revelation of God; and on that account that sentence of his might be received, not as spoken by a man, but as an oracle of God, with the highest faith and veneration. But if anyone should ask me how it could come about that the rib was removed from Adam without a sense of pain, let him understand that this could happen in two ways. First, indeed, on account of the most profound force of that sleep, dulling and stupefying the sense: for we see some men so vehemently oppressed by lethargy that they lack all sense, so as to feel neither blows, nor wounds, nor burnings. Tostatus relates, on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, question three hundred fifty-four, that there were in his own time in Spain certain malefic women, whom they call “stryges” (witches), who, anointing their bodies with a certain kind of unguent, were so far alienated from all sense that they seemed to themselves to be carried into far lands through the air, and to dwell in most pleasant places, and to enjoy the highest pleasures and delights — when yet, that anointing being done, [they would fall...] [continues]

How the rib could be removed painlessly — first way: the sleep's force deadening sense (as in deep lethargy: no feeling of blows, wounds, burns). Tostatus (on Gen 13, quaest. 354) tells of Spanish witches ('stryges') who by an unguent fell so insensible they imagined being borne through the air to pleasant places. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo potuerit sine dolore detrahi costa Adamo. De strygibus quiddam memorabile.'

[...when yet, that anointing being done, they would fall] to the earth like lifeless things, so that by those who were present there they could neither be roused by blows, nor were they pricked by needles

vehemently, nor burned by fires. Similar things we read that blessed Catherine of Siena was wont to suffer in ecstasy. St. Paul, in that admirable rapture of his, was so far abstracted from all sense that afterward he himself did not know whether at that time he had been in the body or out of the body. Worthy of wonder, and not to be hidden from the reader, is what Augustine writes in the fourteenth book On the City of God, chapter twenty-four, in these words: "There was a certain presbyter named Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian church, who, whenever it plea[sed him...] [continues]

The witches fell insensible to blows, needles, fire; likewise Catherine of Siena in ecstasy; St Paul in his rapture knew not whether in or out of the body (2 Cor 12:2-3). Then begins the block-quote from Augustine (de Civ. Dei 14.24) on the presbyter Restitutus, who could withdraw from his senses at will — continues on p.471. Marginal gloss: '2. Cor. 12.'

— p. 512 (PDF) · printed p. 471 —

[...who, whenever it plea]sed him — and he was asked to do this by those who desired to know the wonderful thing about them — at the sound, as it were, of any man's lamenting voices, would so withdraw himself from his senses, and lie most like a dead man, that he not only felt not in the least those plucking and pricking him, but sometimes was even burned by fire brought near, without any sense of pain, except afterward from the wound; and that he did not move his body, not by struggling against it but by not feeling, was proved by this — that, as in a dead man, no breath was found; yet the voices of men, if they spoke more clearly, he afterward reported that he had heard, as though from afar." Thus Augustine there.

End of the Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.24): Restitutus could at will lie as dead — unmoved by pricking or even fire, no breath detectable — yet faintly heard loud voices 'as from afar.'

In a second way it could come about that the removal of the rib should bring no pain to Adam — namely, with God suspending Adam's power of feeling (I mean that power which is in the sense of touch) as to its second

act. And God suspends the act of a second cause by no other reason than because He Himself does not concur, by His general concurrence, with the second cause to produce its act: for no cause, however powerful in acting, can do anything without the concurrence of God. Therefore God did not send that sleep upon Adam because He could not have removed the rib from him, awake, without a sense of pain; but rather that, by this means, what had to be done in him might be done more conveniently, more becomingly, and more aptly for the signification of the mystery.

Second way: God simply suspended the act of Adam's sense of touch by withholding His general concurrence (no second cause acts without God's concurrence). So the sleep was not from necessity (God could have done it painlessly to a waking Adam) but for fitness and for signifying the mystery.

QUESTION II. Why God willed the woman to be made from the man, and not — as the man had been made from earth — the woman also to be generated thus.

Second question of the disputation.

We can prove by many reasons that it was rightly so done. First, God willed it to be so, that — as Augustine wisely disputes in the twelfth book On the City of God, chapters twenty-one and twenty-six, and in the preface of the fourteenth book — the unity of human society and the bond of its concord might be more strongly commended to man, if men were knit together not only by likeness of nature among themselves, but also by the affection of kinship; since it pleased God to create the woman herself not as He did the man, but from the man, so that the whole human race might be diffused from one man — as Paul said, Acts seventeen: “Who made from one all the race of men.” Then, that He might bind man and woman by a closer love, in that she was made from him: and this was, on account of [those things...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'R.' Reasons woman was made from man, not from earth: (1) to commend the unity of human society — men knit by kinship, not just likeness — the whole race from one man (Augustine, de Civ. Dei 12.21,26 & proem to bk 14; Acts 17:26 'from one'); (2) to bind man and woman by closer love, she being made from him. Marginal gloss: 'Augustin. 12. de Ciuit. cap. 21.'

[...and this was, on account of those things,] very necessary, because the marriage of man and woman was to be indissoluble, containing a perpetual fellowship and companionship of life — which one is not permitted to find likewise in the other living things. Adam therefore was vehemently incited to love Eve by four things: by the likeness of the same nature; by carnal union; by the generation of offspring; but above all, by the fact that Eve was something of himself — that is, procreated from his substance: for it is chiefly for this cause that parents so greatly love their children. But if the so[ul...] [continues]

Marriage was to be indissoluble (unlike the beasts' couplings). Four things drew Adam to love Eve: likeness of nature, carnal union, generation of offspring, and above all that she was made from his own substance (as parents love their children). Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor de causis Adamus ad amorem Euae vehementer incitabatur.' Page breaks at catchword 'ani[mus].'

— p. 513 (PDF) · printed p. 472 —

[...But if the so]ul of Adam had not been occupied with so great a love of the woman, then, when afterward by her persuasion and impulse he had fallen into sin, and on that account had been despoiled of so many and so great gifts of God, he would have conceived a vast and implacable hatred against her, and would always have borne a mind alienated and hostile toward her. Next, the woman was made from the man, that by this means the dignity of the man might be commended, who in this bore a certain likeness of God — that, just as God is the principle of all things, so the principle of all men was one, Adam: and this pertained to indicating the [excellence of human nature...] [continues]

A further reason she was made from him: had Adam not been bound by such love, after the Fall (into which her persuasion led him, stripping him of God's gifts) he would have conceived an implacable hatred of her. Then: woman from man also commends man's dignity — as God is the one principle of all things, so Adam was the one principle of all men.

[...and this pertained to indicating the excellence of human nature], whose principle was one. For always, as it is in Aristotle, in the eighth book of the Physics and the twelfth of the Metaphysics, it is better that the principle be

one than many. Then, that it might appear that the same was the Founder of Adam and of Eve, and that both were of the same nature, yet that the man ought to be the head of the woman. Furthermore, for figure and mystery: for the conjunction of Adam and Eve contained that great Sacrament of the conjunction of the Church with Christ, concerning which Paul, writing to the Ephesians chapter five, when he had spoken of the conjunction of man and wife — the words of Adam which are in this place being recalled — subjoins: “This,” he says, “is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.” But indeed the Church was to be formed from Christ, as Eve was formed from Adam. Finally, man is a certain middle nature between the Angels and the animals; wherefore it was fitting that the manner of the origin of the human race should also be a middle one. And the Angels in[deed...] [continues]

More reasons: the excellence of human nature lies in having one principle (Aristotle, Physics 8; Metaphysics 12: better one principle than many); the same Creator of both, of one nature, yet man the head of woman; and the mystery — Adam-and-Eve's union figured the great Sacrament of Christ-and-Church (Eph 5:32), the Church formed from Christ as Eve from Adam; and man, a middle nature between Angels and beasts, fittingly has a middle mode of origin.

[...And the Angels in]deed, all and each, were created immediately by God; nor in so great a number of Angels is one to be found procreated from another Angel. The animals, however, arose from others; but not all, even those of the same species, were generated from one: since in the beginning of the world God made of each species of animals many males and many females, from which the rest could easily and numerously be procreated. But in man it stood in a certain middle way: for the first man was made immediately by God; from him the woman was fashioned; and from both arose all the offspring of men. Four modes, therefore, of the production of men can we note in this place: one without man and woman, as of Adam; a second from man without woman, as of Eve; a third from woman without man, as of Christ the Lord from the Virgin Mary; a fourth from man and woman, as of the rest of men — which is the natural and common mode of generation.

Man's middle origin: Angels each made immediately (none from another Angel); animals from others (but each species seeded by many made at once); man between — the first immediately, the woman from him, the rest from both. Hence the four modes of human production: Adam (neither man nor woman); Eve (man, no woman); Christ (woman, no man — the Virgin); all others (man and woman). Marginal gloss: 'Modi quatuor productionis humanae.'

But against this our disputation three things can be opposed to us. One is: that of things which are of the same species, the matter ought to be the same; but male and female are of the same species; therefore it was fitting that both be made from the same matter; therefore Adam ought not to have been generated from dust, and Eve from Adam's rib. The second is: that those things whose matter is nobler are themselves also nobler; but the rib from which Eve was formed was nobler than the dust from which God formed Adam; therefore Eve was nobler than Adam. The third is, [that a great...] [continues]

Three objections to the doctrine: (1) same species → same matter, so both should come from one matter (not Adam from dust, Eve from rib); (2) nobler matter → nobler thing, so Eve (from a rib) would be nobler than Adam (from dust); (3) [kinship impedes marriage — continues p.473]. Marginal gloss: 'Tres obiectiones.'

— p. 514 (PDF) · printed p. 473 —

[...The third is,] that a great nearness of blood and kinship impedes the contracting of marriage; but always among the people of God, and indeed among most nations, marriage between parents and children was indecent and illicit; therefore Eve, who was to be the wife of Adam, ought not to have been generated from him, lest the marriage between them be indecent. But to these things the answer is easy and ready at hand. To the first: that argumentation holds in natural generation, beneath which there always lies matter of one kind; but not in supernatural production, which depends on the omnipotence of God, who can make things of the same species either from [nothing...] [continues]

Third objection: blood-kinship bars marriage (incest between parent and child being everywhere indecent), so Eve should not have come from Adam. Solution begins — to the first objection: 'same matter' holds only in natural generation, not in the supernatural production by God's omnipotence.

Marginal gloss: 'Solutio obiectionum.'

[...He can make them either from] nothing, or from the same, or from any different matter whatever. To the second: that argumentation has no force, because the production of Adam and Eve was made by the omnipotence of God, who, as we said, can procreate any thing whatever, nobler or ignobler, from any matter whatever. Add that the rib from which Eve was made was Adam's; therefore Adam was the principle of Eve, and on that account more excellent than she. To the third: the nearness of blood and the kinship which impedes marriage is contracted only through carnal generation; but Eve was not so produced from Adam, but through the omnipotence of God: wherefore she could not truly be called the daughter of Adam, nor did she reach him in any degree of kinship. Nay rather, if now a woman were created from some man, just as Eve was created from Adam, there would be no bond between them which would stand in the way of a legitimate marriage being entered and contracted between them.

Solutions completed: (1) God's omnipotence can make same-species things from nothing or any matter; (2) likewise from any matter, noble or base — and the rib was Adam's, so he is Eve's principle and her superior; (3) kinship that bars marriage arises only from carnal generation — Eve, made by omnipotence, was not Adam's daughter nor kin, so the marriage was no incest.

QUESTION III. What is the genuine and proper meaning and interpretation of those words: “He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it.”

Third question, with its sub-lemma (Gen 2:21b).

The Hebrew word ■■■ (Selah), which here the Latin Interpreter renders “Costa” (rib), as Oleaster relates in this place from the observations of the Hebrews, has four significations. For mostly it signifies “side”; by this word are signified in Scripture the sides of the ark, of the tabernacle, of the temple, and of a mountain. It signifies also “rib,” because the ribs are in the sides of the human body. It signifies likewise “beam,” because of a certain proportion which beams in a building have with the ribs of the human

body. Finally, it signifies also “limping,” because the lame man leans to the side when he walks. But whether here it signify “side” or “rib” matters little. For if you take it for “side,” the sense will be: “He took one side,” that is, one rib from his side. And because one rib could not be taken from both sides, and lest Adam should have more ribs on one side than on the other, Oleaster thinks that two, or even more, ribs were taken from the two sides.

Decorated initial 'V.' Word-study of Heb. ■■■ (Selah; properly tsela), rendered 'Costa' — four senses per Oleaster (Jerónimo de Azambuja): (1) 'side' (of ark, tabernacle, temple, mountain); (2) 'rib'; (3) 'beam/rafter'; (4) 'limping' (the lame lean sideways). Whether 'side' or 'rib' matters little; Oleaster thinks two or more ribs taken from both sides (to keep Adam symmetrical). GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■ (in text and in margin gloss). Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor significationes vocis Hebraeae ■■■ Selah.' Page ends at catchword 'Locum' (signature OO).

— p. 515 (PDF) · printed p. 474 —

But the place whence those ribs were removed, he thinks was near the belly, and commonly called the “void,” because it is without ribs. And just as the Hebrew word, as we said, so also the Greek word πλευρ■ (pleura), which the Seventy used, is of ambiguous signification, signifying both rib and side: for physicians too call a disease or pain of the sides πλευρ■τιδα (pleuritis), and the mathematicians named the triangle which consists of equal sides ■σ■πλευρον (isopleuron, “equilateral”).

The rib taken from near the flank (the 'void,' rib-less region). The Greek πλευρ■ (like the Hebrew) means both 'rib' and 'side' — hence πλευρ■τις (pleurisy, a 'pain of the sides') and ■σ■πλευρον (the 'equilateral' triangle). GLYPHS verified by magnification: πλευρ■, πλευρ■τιδα, ■σ■πλευρον (the last printed with prothetic ε■-, ε■σ■πλευρον). Continues the discussion of Heb. ■■■ from p.473.

Some of the Hebrews fable — to whose fables, however, as to oracles, Eugubinus assented — that God formed Adam and Eve at the same time, but cleaving to each other by their alternate sides, and that afterward they were separated. Which seems similar to that fiction which Plato narrates in the Symposium, and which Eusebius reports in the twelfth book On the

Evangelical Preparation, chapter seven, in about this manner: Since Plato had not understood in what sense it was said that Moses had stated God to have fashioned the woman from the side and rib of the sleeping Adam, yet because he admired all things Mosaic, he was unwilling to pass it over entirely. And so to Aristophanes the comic poet — wont to make sport even of honorable things — he attributed this speech in the Symposium: “Our ancient nature was other than it now is; for there were not two kinds of men as now, but three: for besides male and female there was a third, common to both, of which only the name remains, the thing having utterly perished; for the Androgyne then, in fact and in name, was composed of both, namely male and female. This Jupiter said, and he cut men in the middle, and ordered Apollo so to join the parts of those cut, that the face should be turned toward the cut.” And these things indeed from Plato: but this fable [Scripture evidently...] [continues]

The Jewish fable (which Eugubinus = Agostino Steuco of Gubbio, in his Cosmopoeia, credited) that Adam and Eve were created joined side-to-side, then split. Pererius likens it to Plato's Androgyne myth in the Symposium (the speech given to Aristophanes), reported by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. 12.7) — Plato adapting Moses without understanding him. Marginal glosses: 'Pigmentum Hebraeorum.'; 'Eugubinus in Cosmopaeia.'; 'Figmentum Platonis.'

[...but this fable Scripture evidently] refutes, which teaches that Adam was created first, and afterward, a rib having been removed from his side, that Eve was made, of whom Adam said, “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh” — which words can in no way square or be accommodated to that fable. For that word “He filled up” (Replevit), the Hebrew verb ■■■ (Saghar) properly signifies “he closed.” But those words have an obscure meaning: “He filled up,” or “closed,” “flesh for it.” Most interpret thus: God filled the place of the removed rib with flesh, that He might fill its place. But it stands in the way of this interpretation that Scripture does not say God filled “with flesh for it,” but “flesh.” Wherefore it is better to interpret thus: the flesh of Adam, broken and gaping because of the removal of the rib, He closed, filled up, or made continuous — so that the phrase “for it” signifies either “on account of the removal of the

rib," or "in place of the removed rib."

Scripture refutes the fable (Adam first, then Eve from the rib; 'bone of my bones'). Word-study of 'Replevit': Heb. ■■■ (Saghar; properly sagar) = 'he closed.' Against reading 'filled the place with flesh' (Scripture says 'flesh,' not 'with flesh'); better: God closed up Adam's gaping flesh, so 'for it' = 'because of'/'in place of' the rib. GLYPH verified: ■■■. Marginal gloss: 'Hebraeum verbum ■■■ Saghar.'

QUESTION IV. Why Eve was made from the side and rib of Adam rather than from another part of the body.

Fourth question of the disputation.

God did not will Eve to be made from the highest or front part of Adam's body, lest the woman should wish to be held the superior, and to rule the man by command, and to claim for herself the first place of human society. Yet neither did He will her made from the posterior or lower part of the body [...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'N.' Why from the side: not from the top/front (lest the woman claim superiority and rule). Page breaks at catchword 'parte.'

— p. 516 (PDF) · printed p. 475 —

[...Yet neither did He will her formed from the posterior or lower part of the body], lest the man, esteeming the woman of a much lower and humbler condition than himself, should hold her in contempt and treat her as a maidservant. From the side, therefore — that is, from the middle part of the body — she was taken, that she might be held by the man in a moderate dignity, and that the man might esteem her in a way equal to himself, and given by God as a companion and helper. But she is believed to have been formed from the left side, toward which the human heart inclines, on account of the supreme love which ought to be between man and wife, and on account of the consent of minds and the concord of wills. And since the left side is weaker than the rig[ht...] [continues]

Not from a low part (lest he despise her as a servant), but from the side/middle — so she be a near-equal companion. From the LEFT side (toward which the heart leans) — for the love and concord of spouses. Marginal gloss: 'Cur ex sinistro latere facta sit Eua.'

[...the left side is weaker than the rig]ht, it is declared that the female sex is weaker than the male. Whence it comes that the woman's temperament is both colder and feebler, and her reason too, her mind, and her sense are slighter and weaker. Males, moreover, are conceived on the right side, but females on the left. Nay further, the left side is less noble than the right, nor can it raise and support itself without the right's help. From a rib, furthermore, the woman was made, because in a rib there is flesh and bone and nerve and blood; wherefore from it, as from a perfect part of the body, Eve was formed. For that the rib was not a bare bone, but clothed with flesh, Adam sufficiently indicated when he said, “Bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.” And just as the ribs are contained beneath the arms and protected by them, so the woman needs the protection and defense of the man, under whose shade and guardianship she may live securely. Hither also pertains the mystery of the pierced side of the Lord, from which the Church is said to be built. But in the place of the rib which was removed, [God supplied...] [continues]

The left side being weaker → the female the weaker sex (colder temperament, feebler mind; males conceived on the right, females the left). Why from a rib: a rib has flesh, bone, nerve, blood (a 'perfect part'); clothed with flesh ('flesh of my flesh'); the rib under the arm signals woman's need of man's protection; and the mystery of Christ's pierced side (the Church). Marginal gloss: 'Cur ex costa.'

[...But in the place of the rib which was removed, God supplied] flesh, lest Adam, awakened, should be afflicted with pain, or appear mutilated; and that it might be signified that the woman received from the man strength and firmness, which the rib signified, but the man received from the woman tenderness and softness of mind, which the flesh given to him in place of the rib denoted.

God filled the gap with flesh — lest Adam wake in pain or seem maimed — and to signify the exchange: the woman gets the man's strength (the rib), the man gets the woman's tenderness (the flesh).

QUESTION V. How from a rib the whole mass of the female body could be formed.

Fifth question of the disputation.

It is also asked how from that one rib of Adam so great a mass of the female body could be wrought together, since Eve was generated having a perfect bodily stature and age. Hugh of St. Victor, in the first book On the Sacraments, and the Master of the Sentences in the second book, distinction eighteen, and there Durandus and Gabriel, thought that that rib of Adam — not by rarefaction, nor by the addition of external matter, but by the sole multiplication of itself, wrought by the infinite power of God — was so far increased that it sufficed for making the woman's body. For if matter had been taken from without, and joined to that rib, that matter would assuredly have been greater than the rib, and on that account it would more truly be said that Eve was formed from that matter than from that rib: which [is...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'I.' How one rib became a whole female body (Eve generated full-grown). One view (Hugh of St Victor, de Sacr. 1; Peter Lombard, Sent. II d.18; Durandus, Gabriel Biel): the rib was multiplied out of itself by God's infinite power, not by rarefaction or added matter — else Eve would be said made from the added matter, not the rib. Page breaks at catchword 'est.'

— p. 517 (PDF) · printed p. 476 —

[...which] is nevertheless against Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers. But St. Thomas deservedly confutes and rejects this opinion, in the first part, question 92, not only as improbable, but even as scarcely intelligible and self-contradictory. For the mind cannot grasp — much less can Faith admit — that something becomes greater from smaller, except in one of two ways: either by the mere extension of quantity, as happens in rarefaction; or by the accession and addition of new matter, as happens in growth. Outside these two modes, that anything be multiplied so as to become greater from smaller can neither be believed nor done.

Aquinas (ST I q.92) refutes the 'self-multiplying rib' as unintelligible: a thing can grow only by rarefaction or by added matter — nothing becomes greater from smaller otherwise. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur praedicta opinio.'

But that rib was not increased by rarefaction: for thus the woman's body would not have been so full, dense, thick, solid, and firm as it ought to be according to nature; nor from that one rib alone, amplified by rarefaction, could the twenty-four ribs have been made of which the female body is constructed, and the other bones of the female body of such solidity and firmness as must needs prevail in the human body. It remains, therefore, that that rib was increased into so great a mass of matter — as much as would suffice for fashioning the woman's body — in no other way than by the addition of new matter: which matter either was then created from nothing, as it seemed to St. Thomas; or (which pleased Tostatus more) was taken from earth or some other body, and converted into the woman's body. For it is likely that God, in the beginning of the world, created at once as much prime matter as He knew would be eno[ugh...] [continues]

Not rarefaction (the body would be too thin; one rib can't yield 24 solid ribs). So the rib grew only by added matter — either created from nothing (Aquinas) or taken from earth and converted (Tostatus' preference); likely God made enough prime matter at the start for all His works. Marginal gloss: 'Costá Adami per additioné nouae materiae, sufficienté fuisse formandae mulieri.'

[...as much as He knew would be enough] for accomplishing all the works which He had designed. And we can opine in two ways that that matter was added to Adam's rib and concurred in the formation of Eve's body: either immediately, so that, namely, from it and Adam's rib together the body of Eve was compacted; or mediately, so that that matter was first converted into a rib of Adam of so great a mass that it would suffice for completing the woman's body, and then from that rib the body of Eve was fashioned: and each of these ways is probable enough. For as to what Hugh of St. Victor and the Master of the Sentences object against the former way — that the woman's body would more truly be said made from that matter than from Adam's rib, since that matter was far greater than the man's rib

— this is easy to dissolve. For the first place is given to Adam's rib because it was first and principally chosen and assumed by God for the formation of Eve's body, while the rest of the matter was employed as something added and accessory. Just as that multiplication of the five [loaves...] [continues]

Two probable ways the added matter joined the rib: immediately (compacted together), or mediately (first becoming a larger rib, then Eve). Hugh's/Lombard's objection (the body would be 'from the matter,' not the rib) dissolved: the rib has primacy as God's first-chosen material, the rest accessory.

[...Just as that multiplication of the five] loaves was done by the Lord by the addition of matter — which doubtless was far greater than the matter and substance of the five loaves — nevertheless it is most truly said that that multiplication was made from the five barley loaves, because they were first and principally destined and employed for it by the Lord.

The analogy: the feeding of the five thousand (John 6) added far more matter than the loaves contained, yet is truly called a multiplication 'from the five loaves' — because they were the principal, God-chosen starting material. So too Eve 'from the rib.' Catchword 'QVAE' opens Question VI.

— p. 518 (PDF) · printed p. 477 —

QUESTION VI. Whether that rib was necessary to the integrity of Adam's body, or superfluous.

Sixth question of the disputation.

It is controverted whether the rib removed from Adam was one of the ribs necessary to the integrity of the human body: for the physiologists and physicians teach that our body is constructed and framed of twenty-four ribs, twelve on either side. Or whether that rib was redundant and superfluous — for example, that Adam had thirteen ribs on the left side: but said in either way, the thing seems absurd. For if that rib was among the necessary ribs, then after its removal Adam was mutilated, maimed, and imperfect; but if it was superfluous, then Adam was created monstrous and deformed, having, namely, more ribs on one side than on the other — which was a notable thing toward deformity, no less certainly than if he

had been made two-headed, or three-footed, or having six fingers on each or on one of his hands. Hugh of St. Victor thought this question not only easy to explain, but even quite slight and futile. “It is frivolous,” he says, “to ask this: because neither are children's teeth which are afterward [changed...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'C.' The dilemma: the body has 24 ribs (12 a side). If Adam's removed rib was necessary, he was left maimed; if superfluous (e.g. a 13th on the left), he was created deformed/monstrous (like being two-headed or six-fingered). Hugh of St Victor calls the question frivolous (the analogy of children's milk-teeth begins).

[...because neither are children's teeth which are afterward] changed called superfluous, nor are they themselves, although they do not yet have the just increase of nature, judged diminished.” But assuredly that the difficulty of this question is greater than in Hugh's opinion, we shall sufficiently understand from the things we shall presently dispute. It is therefore the common opinion of the Theologians that that rib was partly superfluous to Adam, partly necessary. Superfluous, indeed, if Adam be considered as a certain singular man and particular person: for that rib was over and above the just number of ribs, pertaining, namely, not at all to the integrity of Adam's body. But if Adam be considered as he was the first man and the future principle of the whole human race, and from whom Eve was to be formed, that rib was necessary — not, indeed, simply, nor according to natural order and reason (for Eve could have been formed from elsewhere), but only according to the choice and ordination of God, who had determined to fashion the body of Eve from Adam's rib.

End of Hugh's quote (milk-teeth: not 'superfluous'). Pererius: the difficulty is greater than Hugh allows. The common Theological view: the rib was partly superfluous (to Adam as an individual — a rib above the normal count), partly necessary (to Adam as head of the race and source of Eve — necessary not by nature but by God's free ordination). Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio. illam costam fuisse Adamo superfluam.'

[...who had determined to fashion the body of Eve from Adam's rib]. The Theologians confirm this opinion — or rather declare and illustrate it — by

the example of the male seed, which to a man, as he is a certain individual, is superfluous, but for generating offspring is necessary. But this response does not entirely loose the difficulty. At the least, they must concede that Adam, as he was a certain particular person, was monstrous, since he would have more ribs on one side than the nature of the human body bears: and this seems absurd.

The Theologians illustrate the 'partly superfluous, partly necessary' view by the male seed (superfluous to the individual, necessary for offspring). Pererius objects (SED): this still leaves Adam, as an individual, monstrous (more ribs on one side) — which is absurd. Marginal gloss: 'Excutitur opinio.' Page breaks at catchword 'Neque' (signature OO 3).

— p. 519 (PDF) · printed p. 478 —

Nor does it raise or lessen the absurdity that Eve was to be generated from that superfluous rib. For if Adam had been made two-headed or three-footed, although God had willed to make Eve from one of those heads, or from one of those three feet, Adam would nevertheless not on that account fail to be monstrous. Nor does the adduced example of the seed help their opinion: since the reckoning of the seed and of that rib is far different. For the seed is naturally generated in man, and is of itself given by nature for the generation of man, nor is it an integral part of man, nor is a man called monstrous in any respect on its account: but that ri[b...] [continues]

Pererius presses the objection: making Eve from the superfluous part would not save Adam from being monstrous (a two-headed man is monstrous even if Eve came from one head). The Theologians' seed-analogy fails: the seed is natural and not an integral part, whereas the extra rib was beyond nature.

[...but that ri]b was beyond nature for Adam, nor was it of itself referred to the formation of the woman, but by the sole choice of God — who, however, could have procreated Eve as from a rib, so from any other matter whatever. Therefore it could more probably be said (following this opinion) that that rib was simply superfluous to Adam according to his nature, and that, had it remained in him, it would doubtless have rendered

Adam deformed and monstrous. For as each thing is apt to be made best, so nature makes it (as Aristotle disputes in the second book of the Physics, text 78); and as each thing is made by nature, so it is apt to be made best: but nature either never, or very rarely — and then only by accident and by error and defect of the generative power — makes more ribs than the constitution and construction of the human body demands. That rib, therefore, was superfluous to Adam. Yet it did not render Adam deformed, because it lay hidden beneath the flesh, decently composed and arranged with the other ribs, [so that...] [continues]

The defense of the 'superfluous rib' view: it was beyond Adam's nature, retained by God's free choice; had it stayed, Adam would have been deformed (nature, per Aristotle Phys. 2, makes things best, and produces extra ribs only by error). Yet hidden under the flesh it caused no visible deformity. Marginal gloss: 'Probabilior interpretatio firmiorúsque defensio supradictae opinionis.'

[...so that] it gave no appearance of deformity; and because Adam bore it for a very short time, and, it being removed, thereafter through his whole life had the just number of ribs, in no way can it be said that Adam was created monstrous and beyond the nature of man — since the heaven too was at first made imperfect, namely without stars and proper motion; and the light of the Sun was at first created formless and imperfect; nay, even the world itself, when first founded, was everywhere dark, uncomposed, and disordered. Add to these that that rib was not generated superfluously in Adam by an error of nature, but by the will and counsel of God, joined to Adam's necessary ribs for the formation of the woman's body. And by this reasoning, if this common opinion of the Theologians is explained, it can be held with sufficient probability and easily defended.

Adam not monstrous: the rib was hidden, borne briefly, then removed (leaving the normal count); and creation's other works were first made imperfect (heaven without stars, the Sun's light formless, the world dark and disordered); and the rib came by God's counsel, not nature's error. So defended, the common view holds.

Catharinus in this place is more inclined to the opinion of a certain Doctor, whose name he himself is silent about, affirming that that rib was not

superfluous to Adam, but was one of the ribs necessary to him — which, however, being removed, Adam did not remain mutilated and maimed, because in the place of the removed rib another rib similar to it was soon supplied; so that Adam neither beforehand had any superfluous rib, nor afterward lacked any of the necessary ones. For although Scripture says that God filled the place of that removed rib with flesh, it is nevertheless not to be understood [that only flesh...] [continues]

The second opinion (Catharinus, following an unnamed Doctor): the rib WAS one of the necessary ribs, but God at once supplied a similar rib in its place — so Adam was never either deficient or excessive. Scripture's 'filled with flesh' is not to be taken as 'flesh only.' Marginal gloss: 'Altera opinio, fuisse illam costam ex necessariis costis Adae.' Page breaks at catchword 'solam.'

— p. 520 (PDF) · printed p. 479 —

[...it is nevertheless not to be understood] that only flesh was substituted, but a rib clothed and covered with flesh; yet for the sake of signifying a certain mystery, which we indicated above, Scripture preferred to call that supplement “flesh” rather than “rib.” For Scripture also narrates that God took from Adam a rib whence He might form Eve, making no word of flesh — although from those words of Adam, “Bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh,” it cannot be doubted that, together with the rib, flesh too was taken. But if we attend to the Hebrew Scripture, we shall plainly understand what we noted a little above: that in that place it is not signified [that for the rib...] [continues]

Reply: 'flesh' substituted means a rib clothed in flesh, not flesh alone; Scripture says 'flesh' (not 'rib') for a mystery's sake. As with the rib, so flesh was taken too ('flesh of my flesh'). The Hebrew clarifies the sense. Marginal gloss: 'Euam non ex nuda costa, sed etiam ex carne Adae esse factam.'

[...that in that place it is not signified that for the rib] flesh was substituted, but that the flesh of Adam, gaping and interrupted because of the removal of the rib, was filled up — or, as it is in the Hebrew, was closed and made continuous; but by what thing it is closed and made continuous is not expressed in Scripture. And that the rib whence Eve was made was one of Adam's necessary ribs, pertaining to the natural constitution and integrity

of his body, may be argued in this way: If that rib had been superfluous to Adam and beyond his nature, it could not truly be said that Eve was formed from Adam, nor indeed would Adam have said that Eve was bone of his bones: for that rib was not his natural and proper bone, but, as far as concerned him, had been put in him beyond nature and by accident and for a very short time. Certainly, to signify the closest conjunction of Adam and Eve, and the woman's natural origin and dependence from the man, it was more congruous and fitting that Eve be formed from a rib which was a natural and neces[sary part...] [continues]

The Hebrew means Adam's gaping flesh was 'closed/made continuous,' not 'flesh substituted for the rib.' An argument that the rib was necessary: if superfluous, Eve could not truly be 'formed from Adam' nor 'bone of his bones'; and a necessary rib better signifies the close Adam–Eve bond. Marginal gloss: 'Egregia Argumentatio.'

[...a natural and neces]sary part to Adam, than one which was superfluous and beyond his nature. But indeed, Tostatus (question 393 on chapter 13 of Genesis) refutes that opinion — lest anyone think it a recent invention of this time — with these arguments: that it seems absurd that that rib, if it was first among Adam's necessary ribs and pertaining to his integrity, was taken away from Adam, and in its stead another rib placed which had not been part of Adam's primeval bodily integrity. But the argument is light: for Adam had that prior rib for a very short time, and the one which succeeded in its place and remained in Adam through his whole life was entirely similar to it, and God was the maker of both — neither made in a natural manner, but by the omnipotence of God made and inserted in Adam by a supernatural manner. Indeed, what Tostatus objects concerning the later rib, the same could be objected against him concerning the flesh which God supplied in place of the removed rib: for that too was not in Adam from the beginning, nor did it pertain anything to his integrity. Nor indeed is the other argument of the same Tostatus firm: In [the resurrection...] [continues]

Tostatus (quaest. 393 on Gen 13) objects: absurd that a necessary rib was swapped for a non-original one. Pererius rebuts: brief tenure, an identical replacement, both made supernaturally by the same God — and Tostatus' own point rebounds on the substituted flesh. A second Tostatus argument (the resurrection) is also weak. Marginal gloss: 'Tostati Argumentatio discutitur, contra praedictam opinionem.'

[...In] the resurrection, he says, to which of the two — Adam or Eve — would that rib be restored which was removed from Adam, and from which Eve was formed, if it had been among Adam's necessary ribs? For it must be restored to neither, and cannot be restored to both. To which, then, would it be restored? It seems indeed that it should be restored to Adam, because from the beginning it was Adam's as his integral part; on the contrary, it seems it should be restored to Eve, because Eve was principally formed from it. But if that rib was superfluous to Adam, no inconvenience will follow: for not [to Adam...] [continues]

Tostatus' resurrection argument: if the rib was Adam's necessary part, whose is it at the resurrection? — owed to neither, restorable to both impossible; owed to Adam (his integral part) yet to Eve (formed principally from it). On the 'superfluous' view no such problem arises. Page breaks at catchword 'Adamo.'

— p. 521 (PDF) · printed p. 480 —

[...for not to Adam], to whose integrity it pertained least, but to Eve, whose body was formed from it, will it be restored. But the dissolution of this argument is easy: it would indeed be valid, if in place of the rib that was removed no other quite equivalent had been supplied; but since, as soon as it was taken away, another of the same kind was put under it, the argument is invalid: for we say that that rib, in the resurrection, is to be restored not to Adam — who had another in its place — but to Eve, whose body was formed from it. For if Tostatus should contend that whatever at any time was an integral part of anyone, that whole, in [the resurrection...] [continues]

Pererius answers the resurrection dilemma: the rib is restored to Eve (her body came from it), not Adam (who received a replacement). The dilemma would bite only if no equivalent rib had been supplied.

[...that whole, in] the resurrection, must be restored to him, then surely the human body would rise enormous and monstrous: for it is certain that the parts of the flesh, throughout the whole time of life — namely from birth even to death — continually flow and are lost, and in their place others and others are successively generated by nutrition. To me, indeed, this opinion, which so greatly displeased Tostatus, is very pleasing; nor do I desire anything in it except some grave and noble Author.

Tostatus' principle (every former part restored at the resurrection) would make the risen body monstrous, since flesh is continually lost and replaced by nutrition. Pererius endorses the 'necessary rib + replacement' view warmly — his only reservation is that it lacks a weighty patristic authority.

QUESTION VII. Why Eve is said to have been built from Adam.

Seventh question of the disputation (on Gen 2:22, 'aedificavit ... in mulierem').

But why Scripture says that Eve was “built” from Adam's rib, and does not say that she was “formed” or “fashioned,” must be explained: for it is not to be thought that divine Scripture without cause willed to use a different word in the formation of Eve and in the creation of Adam. Chrysostom answers: Because Adam was made from slime, therefore God is properly said to have “formed” or “fashioned” him; but because Eve was made from a rib — a thing, namely, already formed, and to which only perfection and completion were lacking — therefore she is said to have been “built.” Cajetan gives this cause: The woman, he says, is to the conceived and generated offspring as it were a house, containing, protecting, and cherishing it: rightly, therefore, she is said to be “built,” as it were after the likeness of a house. Catharinus says that the woman was procreated not by the way of nature but by the way of art; and was not produced by natural generation, but formed by the artful operation of God: wherefore she is not called the daughter of Adam; rightly, therefore, she is said to be “built.”

Decorated initial 'C.' Why 'built' (aedificata) of Eve, not 'formed/fashioned' as of Adam. Three answers: Chrysostom (hom. 15) — Adam from slime is 'formed,' Eve from an already-formed rib is

'built'; Cajetan — the woman is like a 'house' for offspring; Catharinus — she was made by art (God's operation), not natural generation, so not Adam's 'daughter' but 'built.' Marginal gloss: 'Chrysost. Homil. 15.'

Rabbi Solomon, whose opinion greatly pleases Lyranus, thinks that Moses spoke thus knowingly, because the woman, according to the construction and conformation of her body, has a certain likeness to a building, whose lower part is wider and thicker — namely, that it may be firm for sustaining the mass of the building; but the upper part is narrower and thinner: in the same way the lower part of the female body is thicker and wider, but the upper thinner and narrower, on account, namely, of the weakness of the woman's heat, which cannot lift up and dilate much matter upward. But [...] [continues]

A fourth answer (Rabbi Solomon = Rashi, favored by Nicholas of Lyra): Moses said 'built' deliberately, since the female body resembles a building — broader/heavier below for stability, narrower above — owing to woman's weaker innate heat, which cannot raise much matter upward. Page breaks at catchword 'Ve[rùm].'

— p. 522 (PDF) · printed p. 481 —

[...But] that interpretation is refuted by that place of Scripture which is in the sixteenth chapter of Genesis, where Sarah said to Abraham, “Go in to my maidservant, if perhaps at least from her I may receive sons”: where in the Hebrew it is, “If perhaps I shall be built from her.” From which place it is evident that the verb “to build” pertains not only to women, but also to men. Tostatus' interpretation is of this kind: As buildings are made from rough material, which through the operation of the craftsman receives a figure which it did not have before, so that rib, not having the figure of a woman, was so conformed and arranged by God that it emerged into the species and nature of the female body.

Rabbi Solomon's view is refuted by Gen 16:2 (Sarah: Hebrew 'I shall be built from her,' i.e. get children) — 'build' applies to men too. Tostatus' answer: as a craftsman gives rough material a new figure, so God shaped the figureless rib into the female body.

QUESTION VIII. Why Moses does not mention the creation of the woman's soul.

Eighth question of the disputation.

But someone may ask: Why, just as mention is made of the formation of Eve's body, is the same not made of the inbreathing of the spirit of life into her — by which the creation of the rational soul is signified — as was related above of Adam? To this it can be answered: that wherein the production of Adam and Eve differed — namely, the manner in which the body of each was made — was explained separately and distinctly; but the [manner] of creating the soul of each [continues]

Decorated initial 'S.' The question: why no inbreathing-of-life narrated for Eve (signifying the rational soul) as for Adam? Answer begins: what differed (the making of each body) was told distinctly, but the soul-creation...

[...but the manner of creating the soul of each], because the manner had been quite similar, therefore it was not needful to teach this twice, but it was enough to have indicated it once in the generation of the man. Nor does Scripture allow us to doubt that Eve had a rational soul equally with Adam: for it demonstrates this not obscurely, when it introduces God saying, “Let us make him a helper like himself”: for the woman would neither have been similar to Adam, nor a suitable helper for him, if she had lacked a rational soul. The likeness, too, of the bodies of both declared the likeness of their souls. Likewise, how, if Eve had been devoid of reason, would a law have been imposed on her by God, or so grave a penalty for the violated law have been inflicted? But whether, just as Eve's body was made from Adam's body, so from his soul her soul was created — Eucherius, on this place, writes that the question is difficult to determine, since nothing concerning it is either defined by the Fathers or established by the authority of the Church. But indeed, that the creation of each rational soul proceeds immediately from God alone has long been beyond controversy among the Theologians and in the Catholic Church.

Soul-creation was told once (in Adam) since identical for both; that Eve had a rational soul is plain ('a helper like himself'; bodily likeness shows soul-likeness; law and penalty presuppose reason). Whether her soul came from Adam's soul (as her body from his body) Eucherius calls undetermined — but that every rational soul is created immediately by God alone is settled doctrine. Catchword 'QVAE' opens Question IX (signature PP).

— p. 523 (PDF) · printed p. 482 —

QUESTION IX. What it signifies that Eve was led to Adam.

Ninth question of the disputation (on Gen 2:22b, 'and He brought her to Adam').

But why it was said that God led Eve to Adam, when she was formed beside him, various reasons can be brought. First reason: Eve was founded to be Adam's companion — for God said, “It is not good for man to be alone”; in order, therefore, to enter and contract this society and fellowship of woman and man, Eve is said to have been led to Adam. Second reason: the animals were led to Adam, that he might consider whether any of them could be fit and suitable for him for society and the generation of offspring; but none being found, Eve was created and led to Adam, that he might know she would be for him a most suitable helper, both for the pleasantness of society and for the work of generation — which Adam, when he first saw Eve, confessed and testified in open words. Third reason: it was signified that the man is not for the sake of the woman, but the woman for the sake of the man; and therefore not the man was led to the woman, but the woman to the man. Fourth reason: that leading of the woman to the man signified, as it were, a betrothal and a contract of matrimony between parties present: for between absent parties scarcely with good and prosperous succe[ss...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'C.' Why Eve was 'led' to Adam though formed beside him — reasons 1–4: (1) to inaugurate the man–woman society ('not good for man to be alone'); (2) the animals were paraded as possible helpers, none fit, then Eve led to him as the fit one (he confessed it on first sight); (3) woman is for the man's sake (so she is led to him, not he to her); (4) it signified a betrothal/marriage-contract between present parties (marriages of absent parties seldom prosper). Marginal gloss: 'Cur Eua ad Adamum dicatur adducta, variae rationes.'

[...scarcely with good and prosperous succe]ss is matrimony contracted. For when neither of the spouses is known to the other, it mostly happens that at once, contrary morals and pursuits being detected, either one or both of the spouses falls into regret of the marriage, which thereafter is a seedbed of many discomforts, troubles, and offenses. Cajetan brings a fifth reason: that by this it was signified that the wife ought to come to dwell with the husband, but not the husband to the house of the wife; and this the custom of all nations — which is a sure witness of natural propensity, and an index of what is fitting — manifestly demonstrates. To these Catharinus adds, that from that time there was between Adam and Eve a wholly indissoluble bond of matrimony, which is not such in other spouses before carnal union, because they are not one flesh as Adam and Eve. And God Himself was, as it were, the conciliator and paranymph of this first marriage. I will put here the words of Catharinus: “And He led her to Adam,” that is, this very thing [He inspired into her mind...] [continues]

Reason 5 (Cajetan): the wife should come to the husband's house, not vice versa (the custom of all nations). Catharinus adds: from that moment an indissoluble bond (unlike others before carnal union, since these are not 'one flesh' as Adam and Eve); God Himself was the 'conciliator and paranymph' (best-man) of this first marriage. Begins the block-quote from Catharinus. Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus in Genesim.'

[...He inspired this very thing into her mind], that she should come to her own [man], from whom she had been taken, as to her own man and inseparable spouse; wherefore he too recognized her to be from his very self, and therefore that she who came to him was to be loved, recognizing his own origin. And finally the marriage was to be embraced and consummated, which God Himself, as conciliator and paranymph, in wondrous ways instituted and confirmed, and, as father and Lord, commanded — that by this example it might be understood that the marriages of children are not to be procured by base persons, but by their own parents, or by honest and approved me[n...] [continues]

Catharinus block-quote (continuing): God inspired Eve to come to Adam as inseparable spouse; he recognized her as from himself; God instituted and confirmed the marriage as conciliator/best-man, and as father/Lord — a model that children's marriages should be arranged by their own parents or honest men, not base persons. Page breaks at catchword 'ho[minibus].'

— p. 524 (PDF) · printed p. 483 —

[...or by honest and approved me]n, to be procured and arranged. And from that time there was between Adam and Eve a wholly indissoluble bond of matrimony, which is not such in others before they are carnally united, because they are not one flesh as those were. Thus Catharinus.

End of the Catharinus block-quote: marriages should be arranged by parents/honest men; and the Adam–Eve bond was indissoluble from the start (unlike others, who are not yet 'one flesh' before carnal union).

QUESTION X. Why God at first created only one woman.

Tenth question of the disputation.

But why (for perhaps someone may ask this too) did God make only one woman, and not rather many? Surely for many causes it may be observed that this was most rightly done by God. First, one woman sufficed for that for whose sake she was founded: to be the man's companion, and together with him to consummate the work of generation. She was made one also, that polygamy might be avoided, which is not of itself good or to be approved, unless it has been granted to men by God's singular permission — whether in the beginning of the world for the multiplication of the human race, or to the Hebrews for the propagation of the faithful people, or as a remedy against adulteries and fornications for those who were vehemently prone to lusts. Besides this, that the man's love toward his wife might be more ardent and more constant — which, divided among many wives, is more remiss and unstable toward each: which argument Aristotle used in the books of the Politics to refute the community of wives, which Socrates [judged] would be most useful for procuring and cementing a

greater and clo[ser...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'S.' Why one woman, not many: (1) one sufficed for her end (companion + generation); (2) to avoid polygamy (not good of itself, allowed only by God's special permission — early multiplication, the Hebrews, or a remedy for lust); (3) so the man's love be undivided and constant (Aristotle, Politics, against Plato's Socrates' community of wives). Continues on next page.

[...a greater and clo]ser charity among the citizens, judging it would be most useful — as if all the elder would love the younger as their sons, and the younger revere the elder as parents. But Aristotle proved by the strongest reasons that quite the contrary would happen. Finally, only one woman was created, that the unity of the human race might be greater, inasmuch as all was propagated from the same first parents. Not to omit that by this thing too is foreshadowed that great mystery of the conjunction of the Church with Christ: and the Church is only one.

Socrates' aim (a citywide kinship-charity) Aristotle refuted as counterproductive. (4) One woman → the greater unity of the race (all from the same first parents); and it foreshadows the one Church's union with Christ. Marginal gloss: 'Cur una tantùm creata sit mulier.'

QUESTION XI. Against Cajetan, who held that what Moses wrote concerning the procreation of Eve from Adam is to be taken not historically, but parabolically.

Eleventh question — a polemic against Cardinal Cajetan's parabolic reading of Gen 2:21-22.

Nor is that question to be passed over in this place: Whether this narration of Moses, by which it is delivered that Eve was made from the side and rib of Adam, is historical and to be understood as the words themselves properly signify; or rather is figurative and parabolic, and to be interpreted only according to the mystical sense. This question we have undertaken to treat in this place for the sake of Cajetan alone.

Decorated initial 'N.' The question stated: is the Eve-from-Adam narrative historical/literal, or figurative/parabolic (mystical only)? Undertaken solely because Cajetan raised it. Catchword 'Is enim' (signature PP 2).

— p. 525 (PDF) · printed p. 484 —

[...For he,] having set aside the doctrine of all the Fathers and the opinion of all Interpreters, dared to interpret this place with a certain new and unheard-of commentary, contrary to all, and to defend his interpretation obstinately. It will not, therefore, be amiss first to expound his new interpretation and opinion in his own words, then to refute it.

Cajetan set aside all the Fathers and interpreters with a novel, contrary reading, defended stubbornly. Pererius will state it in Cajetan's own words, then refute.

> *Cajetan says: that he is compelled to understand and interpret this narration of the production of Eve from Adam, not according to the letter, but according to a mystery — not, indeed, by allegory, but yet by parable: lest, namely, if it be understood literally, that inevitable absurdity be incurred: For either that rib whence Eve was formed was among the necessary ribs of Adam — wherefore, it being taken away, Adam would have stood mutilated and maimed; or it was superfluous to Adam, from which it necessarily follows that before the removal of that rib Adam was deformed and monstrous. Whichever be said of Adam — who was the most beautiful and most perfect of all men — is utterly absurd.*

Cajetan's own words (block-quote): the account must be read as a parable (not allegory), lest the literal sense force the dilemma already met in Q.VI — a necessary rib (→ Adam maimed) or a superfluous one (→ Adam deformed beforehand) — both absurd of the most beautiful of men.

But this reasoning ought not to have moved Cajetan so much, since we dissolved it most plainly a little above, in treating the sixth question. Cajetan adds besides: that Moses sufficiently insinuated that the things he narrates of the woman's production from Adam are to be taken by metaphor and parable, when he said that Eve was led to Adam. For if the woman had truly been formed from the man, she would have been beside him, and would not have been led to him from another place. Therefore the speech of Moses must be interpreted not properly, but mystically and

parabolically. But this too is most trivial. For why it was said that Eve was led to Adam, we taught abundantly above, when we were engaged in explaining the seventh question.

Pererius rebuts both supports of Cajetan: the dilemma was already dissolved in Q.VI; and 'led to Adam' (Cajetan's second proof of parable) was explained literally in Q.IX (Pererius says 'the seventh question').

What, then, is this Doctor's commentary and opinion upon this narration? Cajetan thinks that Adam and Eve were created by God at the same time, and that Eve was not made from Adam — because in the first chapter of Genesis God said, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and Moses soon subjoined, “Male and female He made them, and God blessed them, and said, Increase and multiply.” At the same time, therefore, both sexes were founded by God. Nor does it hinder the understanding that Moses' narration here seems to be historical, and that on that account it is to be taken as his words sound. For the narration also of the six days of the creation of the world seems historical, although it is nevertheless agreed that the world and the universe of things were made in one point of time. Likewise the narration of Moses concerning the conversation of the serpent with Eve, and concerning the penalty which God inflicted on the serpent, seems historical: but that it is figurative is evident from this, that ac[cording to history...] [continues]

Cajetan's positive view: Adam and Eve created together (from Gen 1:26-28, 'male and female'), Eve not made from Adam. A historical-seeming narrative need not be literal — cf. the six-days account (though the world, he holds, was made in one instant) and the serpent's speech and sentence (figurative, since literally untenable). Marginal gloss: 'Caietani opinio.'

[...that ac]cording to history it cannot have a true sense. Therefore the speech of Moses concerning the production of the woman from the man is a certain parable, similar to those which we read the Lord frequently used in teaching, in the Evangelists. But what Cajetan meant that parable should signify, and why he used it, he relates in this manner: “In the first place, that heavy and deep sleep sent by God

upon Adam, from which Eve was formed, metaphorically signifies the defect of the virile power, from which defect it happens that a female is generated. For a sleeping man [is a half-man...] [continues]

Cajetan: the narrative is a parable like the Lord's Gospel parables. Begins Cajetan's allegorical decoding (block-quote): the deep sleep = the defect of male generative power, from which a female (rather than a male) is generated. Page breaks at catchword 'Homo.'

— p. 526 (PDF) · printed p. 485 —

[...For a sleeping man] is a half-man, and likewise the principle generating a woman is half-virile; wherefore the woman is named by the Philosophers a 'damaged and imperfect man.' But because such a defect of the virile power is not by accident, in respect of universal nature, but is from the divine intention for propagating and preserving the species, therefore that sleep is described as having been sent by God, that it may be understood that God is the author of the deficient modes of producing. But the removal of a rib from the man to form the woman — insofar as a rib is a bone — is a likeness of the diminution of strength from the mind of the man on account of a wife. But insofar as it is a rib, it bears a likeness of the social life to be led between man and wife, and that the wife ought to be neither mistress nor servant, but the companion and 'collateral' of the man. But insofar as there was only one rib, it denoted the least strength, which is both in the body and in the mind of the woman: so that the proportion of womanly powers to virile powers and strength is such as is the proportion of one rib to all the rest of the ribs. Lastly, the flesh restored to Adam in place of the rib removed from him signified the recompense which is made to the man, by giving him carnal generation and the propagation of sons in place of the strength removed and diminished from him on account of marriage. For the man, incurring a diminution of virile mind by taking a wife, is excused, because he devotes effort to the carnal propagation and preservation of the human species." And these things, described in nearly the same words of Cajetan, from his

commentary upon this place of Genesis, we have wished to recount, in order to expound his opinion clearly and faithfully.

End of Cajetan's allegory (block-quote): woman as the 'damaged man' (the sleep = generative defect, sent by God who authors even deficient modes); the rib-as-bone = the man's strength diminished by marriage; the rib-as-rib = the wife as companion, neither mistress nor servant; one rib = woman's lesser strength (one rib : all ribs); the restored flesh = the man's recompense (offspring for lost strength). Pererius notes he has reported Cajetan faithfully.

But against Cajetan stands the concordant opinion of all the Fathers and Theologians, who both held and handed down in their writings that Eve was truly formed from Adam: against him stands also the common sense and judgment of the Catholic Church and of the Christian people. Blessed Jerome, indeed, certainly, on Paul's epistle to Philemon, writing and interpreting that place of Exodus, “The people believed God and Moses His servant,” among many other things which he affirms must be believed by all, mentions this too — that Eve was fashioned from the rib and side of Adam. Jerome holds, therefore, that he who does not believe this concerning Eve in no way believes in God. From which it may be concluded that Cajetan's opinion is contrary to right faith. Likewise Pope Innocent III, in the Decretals, On Divorces, the chapter Gaudemus, decreeing that by divine law it is forbidden to have several wives at once, confirms that opinion as by a most firm argument — namely, that from the beginning one rib of the man was converted into one woman.

The refutation: against Cajetan stands the unanimous Fathers, the Church's common sense, Jerome (on Philemon, on Exod 14:31 — Eve from Adam's rib is among things all must believe, so denying it is not believing in God → Cajetan's view contrary to right faith), and Innocent III (Decretals X 4.19.8 'Gaudemus' — monogamy proved from one rib → one woman). Marginal glosses: 'Refellitur Caietanus.'; 'Exodi 14.'

But, above all, divine Scripture evidently opposes Cajetan, which in many places openly teaches that Adam and Eve were not created at the same time, but that Adam was first, and Eve afterward made from Adam. In the book of Wisdom, chapter 10, it is written that Adam was the first and alone created by God; and in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, it is thus:

“God created man from earth, and made him according to His own image”; and, certain things being interposed, then He subjoins, “He created from him a helper like himself.” Paul also, in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter seventeen, “God,” he says, “made from one all the race of men”; and of the former [epistle...] [continues]

Scripture itself refutes Cajetan: Adam was made first, Eve after, from him — Wisdom 10:1 (Adam first and alone created); Ecclesiasticus/Sirach 17:1-6 ('God created man from earth ... created from him a helper like himself'); Acts 17:26 ('from one, all the race of men'); and 1 Cor[inthians...] (continues p.486). Page breaks at catchword 'epistolae' (signature PP 3).

— p. 527 (PDF) · printed p. 486 —

[...of the former] epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 11: “Not the man,” says Paul, “is from the woman, but the woman from the man.” And the same in chapter 2 of the former epistle which he sent to Timothy: “Adam,” he says, “was first formed, then Eve.” Finally, this very thing is clearer than the midday light from the narration of Moses, by which the procreation of Eve is described: for it is delivered that God took a rib from sleeping Adam, and from it Eve was formed, and that Adam, prophesying, said, “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Virago, because she was taken from man.” What could be said more openly, by which it might be understood that Eve was made from Adam? For it is, as ab[ove...] [continues]

Scripture refuting Cajetan (continuing): 1 Cor 11:8; 1 Tim 2:13 ('Adam first formed, then Eve'); and Moses' own narration (the rib, and Adam's prophetic 'bone of my bones ... Virago, because taken from vir'). Gen 2:23's 'Virago' renders the Hebrew pun ishshah/ish.

[...For it is, as ab]ove I said of the other things which Moses recorded, so the narration of this matter too is plainly historical: wherefore his words are to be taken properly, and not figuratively. Nor for any other cause was Origen so gravely reproved by Epiphanius, in the epistle which he wrote to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and by Jerome, in the epistle which he sent to Pammachius, than that he judged the first three chapters of the book of Genesis were to be understood and interpreted not historically, but

allegorically: for which cause also he was condemned in the sixth general Synod.

This narrative, like the rest Moses recorded, is plainly historical — words taken properly, not figuratively. Origen was reproved (Epiphanius to John of Jerusalem; Jerome to Pammachius) and condemned at the Sixth Ecumenical Council precisely for reading Genesis 1–3 allegorically rather than historically. Marginal gloss: 'Origenes damnatur.'

For what Cajetan objected to us — that the distinction of the six days of the world's making, although delivered in a historical manner, should yet be understood not properly and historically, but figuratively — this we utterly deny; and that it is false we have proved above, in the first book of this Work, by many arguments. And what he next opposes concerning the conversation of the serpent and its penalty, as if these could not truly be understood otherwise than figuratively, we shall likewise show to be false, when we come to the explanation of that history. But even were we to grant this to Cajetan, it would not therefore be consistent and fair that, if anything in the whole narration of Moses be of such a kind that the reason of truth and of Christian piety compels it to be interpreted figuratively, all the things delivered in that narration ought likewise to be taken and explained figuratively.

Cajetan's objections dissolved: the six-days account is not merely figurative (refuted in Book 1); the serpent's speech and sentence will be shown literal at Gen 3. And even granting some figurative passages, it does not follow that the whole of Moses must be read figuratively. Marginal gloss: 'Diluuntur obiectiones Caietani.'

St. Augustine, in the opening of the eleventh book On Genesis according to the Letter, about to explain that history of the conversation of the serpent and Eve, written by Moses in the third chapter of the book of Genesis, prefaced these things: “Before we treat in order the text of this proposed Scripture, I think it should be admonished — what I remember I have already premised elsewhere in this work — that this must be demanded by us: that what he who wrote it narrates as done be defended according to the propriety of the

letter. But if in the words of God, or of any person assumed into a prophetic office, something is said which according to the letter cannot be understood except absurdly, doubtless, being said figuratively, it ought to be taken as for some signification; that it was said, however, it is not lawful to doubt: for this is required by the faith of the narrator and the promise of the expositor." Thus Augustine.

Augustine block-quote (de Genesi ad litteram 11, opening): defend the literal sense of what is narrated as done; only where the literal sense is absurd take it figuratively — but never doubt that it was said. The hermeneutical rule against Cajetan's wholesale parabolizing.

Weak too is that argument of Cajetan: that in the first chapter of Genesis Moses, having introduced God speaking thus, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," next subjoined, "God created man to His image, male and female He created them": from which Cajetan wishes it to be understood that Adam and Eve were made at the same time, and not one after the other, nor one from the other. But indeed, Scripture [...] [continues]

Cajetan's last argument (Gen 1:26-27, 'male and female He created them' → simultaneous creation) is weak. Pererius' rebuttal continues on the next page. Catchword 'Scriptura.'

— p. 528 (PDF) · printed p. 487 —

[...But indeed,] Scripture does not say that they were made at the same time. For when Moses, in that place, recorded the works of the sixth day, he set down briefly and in summary the creation of man and woman, as pertaining to the work of the sixth day. They were created, therefore, at the same time — that is, on the same sixth day — but not at the same time, that is, at the same point of time. But the exposition of all the works which God made in those first six days being completed, Moses in chapter 2 returns to narrate the production of man and woman, declaring how diversely the body of each was made by God: the man's, namely, from the dust of the earth, but the woman's from the rib of the man. And indeed, it is frequent in Scripture for a thing first to be narrated briefly and concisely, [then...]

[continues]

Rebuttal: Gen 1 only summarizes the sixth-day creation; 'created together' means on the same day, not the same instant. Gen 2 then returns to detail how each body was made (man from dust, woman from rib) — Scripture's habit of stating briefly first, then expounding.

[...for a thing first to be narrated briefly and concisely], but afterward to be declared more subtly, more distinctly, and more explicitly through its individual parts and circumstances. And, to conclude this disputation, I contend this against Cajetan: If the things which Moses narrates concerning the procreation of the woman from the man are not to be taken historically, but parabolically, it necessarily follows that the manner in which Eve was generated is nowhere delivered in Scripture: for outside this place, nowhere else is there mention of that matter. But Cajetan's parabolic interpretation does not demonstrate the singular and proper procreation of Eve, but shows the general generation of all women, which happens in the natural way. Finally, let the reader know that against Cajetan in this matter are not only all the Catholic Doctors, but also Josephus — easily the chief of all the Hebrews in talent and learning — in the first book of the Jewish Antiquities, and the principal Rabbis of the Jews who have interpreted this book of Genesis, are his adversaries.

Two closing arguments against Cajetan: (1) on his reading, Scripture nowhere tells how Eve was made (this is the only mention); (2) a parable would describe all women's natural generation, not Eve's unique making. Against Cajetan stand all Catholic Doctors, Josephus (Ant. 1), and the chief Jewish Rabbis.

And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Virago, because she was taken from man. CHAPTER 2, VERSE 23.

Lemma (Gen 2:23), Adam's first words on seeing Eve.

Adam, awakened, by the prophetic spirit with which in that sleep and ecstasy he had been inspired, had seen not only the thing which was then done in him, but also the most hidden and divine mystery of that matter,

and burst forth into that sentence which we have set down, and which we are here about to explain. For “Now,” others read “Once” (Semel): the Hebrew word properly signifies “This time.” But why did Adam say, “This now is bone of my bones”? Let the reader hear the most absurd interpretation of the Talmudists, which I have read only in Tostatus, in his Commentaries on chapter 13 of the book of Genesis, question 404. They said that Adam had another wife before Eve, whose name was Lilis (Lilith), and that he was with her for a hundred and thirty years, and in that time begot no men from her, but yet generated demons.

Decorated initial 'E.' Adam, by prophetic ecstasy, saw the deed and its mystery and uttered the verse. 'Now' (Heb. 'this time'; some read Semel, 'once'). The 'most absurd' Talmudic legend (via Tostatus, Gen 13 q.404): Adam's first wife Lilith, 130 years, begetting only demons. Marginal gloss: 'Absurda Thalmudistarum opinio.'

Who would not laugh at these trifles, figments, and ravings of the Jews — or even blasphemies against divine Scripture? For that there was no woman with Adam before the procreation of Eve, the narration of Moses makes manifest, indicating that it was necessary that Eve be generated, because there was no helper like to Adam himself: there would not [have been...] [continues]

Pererius derides the Lilith legend as Jewish trifling, even blasphemy: Moses' narrative shows no woman was with Adam before Eve (Eve was needed precisely because no fit helper existed). Page breaks at catchword 'non fuisset.'

— p. 529 (PDF) · printed p. 488 —

[...there would not] have been any need of the generation of Eve, if Adam had had another prior wife. Then, as soon as Adam was cast out of Paradise, he knew his wife Eve, and from her received two children — the elder, indeed, Cain, but the later, Abel — as is delivered in the fourth chapter of the book of Genesis: it is false, therefore, that Adam for a hundred and thirty years did not touch Eve. Now, of what madness is it to think that demons were generated from Adam and that prior wife? For from man and woman nothing but a man can be generated; but the demon,

since it is incorporeal, certainly has no flesh and bones, and is of a different species — nay, of a different gen[us...] [continues]

The Lilith tale refuted: Eve would be needless had Adam a prior wife; and after the expulsion Adam knew Eve and begot Cain and Abel (Gen 4), so the '130 years' claim is false. And demons cannot be begotten of man and woman (only a man can be), the demon being incorporeal, of another species.

[...nay, of a different gen]us than man, and can in no way have generation and origin from men. Therefore that “Now” can be taken in two ways: first, that it be referred to the animals which God led to Adam, among which he found none like himself. For that, “Bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh,” denotes a likeness of species, sought from the likeness of the matter of the human body. But when Adam saw a woman like to himself according to nature, he said, “This now is bone of my bones”: as if he said, Lord God, the animals which Thou earlier didst lead to me were not like me, but this woman whom Thou hast now led to me is plainly like me. That “Now” can also be referred to the formation of the first woman from Adam's rib, so that this be the sense: This woman now — that is, on this first occasion — was thus formed, namely from a man: for of the women who shall hereafter exist, none will be so generated, but only by natural generation [from male...] [continues]

Two senses of 'Now' (hoc nunc): (1) contrasting Eve with the animals just paraded — they were unlike Adam, she is like him ('bone of my bones' = likeness of species); (2) 'on this first occasion' — Eve uniquely formed from a man, all later women being by ordinary generation from male and female.

[...but only by natural generation from male] and female. But that, “Of my bones,” is said in the plural for “Of my bone,” for only one bone was taken from Adam; but the use of the plural number for the singular, and in turn of the singular for the plural, is frequent in Scripture.

'Of my bones' (plural) stands for 'of my bone' (one rib only taken) — the plural-for-singular idiom being common in Scripture.

But hear how Cajetan, persisting in his commentary and opinion which we expounded above, interprets these words: “Manifestly,” he

says, “Moses by these words indicated at once the woman's nature and her production. For any woman, since she is a damaged man, is bone of virile bones, and flesh of virile flesh. For the virile seed intends to produce a man; but a defect intervening, since it is not able to make a whole man, it makes a damaged man — that is, a woman: wherefore the woman is bone of the intended bones of the man, and flesh of the intended virile flesh. It is said in the plural, ‘of bones,’ that it may be signified that the least of virile strength is preserved in the woman. It is said in the singular, ‘Of my flesh,’ that it may be signified that, although the woman's flesh is more imperfect than the man's, yet her carnal affection is not less — nay rather, so much the greater as it is joined to a lesser strength of body.”

Cajetan block-quote (his allegorical reading of Gen 2:23): woman as the 'damaged man' (vir laesus) of failed male seed; 'of bones' (plural) = the least virile strength kept in her; 'of my flesh' (singular) = her flesh weaker but her carnal appetite stronger. Marginal gloss: 'Caietani commentitia interpretatio.'

But these things, besides the falsity and absurdity of the opinion whence they flowed, even their very treatment — so obscure, perplexed, hard, and violent — declares them to be mere trifles and figments of Cajetan. Concerning those words, “She shall be called Virago, because she was taken from man,” it must be known that the consonance and agreement of this derivation of “woman” from “man” with the very thing that was done — because the woman, namely, was taken from man — [continues]

Pererius dismisses Cajetan's reading as obscure, forced trifling. Turns to the etymology of 'Virago, because taken from vir': the woman-from-man wordplay. Page breaks at catchword 'sumpta.' Marginal gloss: 'Denominationem mulieris ex viro, in sola Hebraea lingua cerni.'

— p. 530 (PDF) · printed p. 489 —

[...because the woman, namely, was taken from man], is manifestly seen in the Hebrew tongue alone. For in it the man is called ■■■■■ (Is); but the woman, by the addition of only one letter, is named ■■■■■■■ (Issah) — so that, just as the woman was taken from the man, so the name of the

woman is derived from the name of the man: as if in Latin the woman were called “Vira,” because she was taken from “vir.” For “Virago,” which name Jerome put in his version, in the usage of the Latin language does not simply and precisely signify a woman, but a woman who is strong, prudent, magnanimous, and endowed with a virile spirit and virtue. Nor did Pagninus do well to put “Virissa” in his translation: for if he wished to coin a name, it was better to pu[t...] [continues]

The woman-from-man pun survives only in Hebrew: man = ■■■■■ (ish), woman = ■■■■■■■ (ishshah), differing by one added letter. Latin 'Vira' from 'vir' would capture it. Jerome's 'Virago' means a manly/heroic woman, not just 'woman'; Pagninus' coinage 'Virissa' is faulted ('Vira' better). GLYPHS verified by magnification: ■■■■■, ■■■■■■■. Marginal gloss: 'Denominationem mulieris ex viro, in sola Hebraea lingua cerni.'

[...it was better to pu]t “Vira” than “Virissa.” But Symmachus beautifully wished to emulate the Hebrew etymology even in Greek; for, as Jerome reports in the book On Hebrew Traditions on Genesis, he thus rendered: “She shall be called ■νδρ■ς (andris), because she was taken ■κ το■ ■νδρ■ς (from the man).” Furthermore, Theodotion suspected another etymology, saying: “She shall be called Assumption, because she was taken from man.” For the word “Issah,” according to a variety of accent, can also signify “assumption.” So, nearly, Jerome. But those skilled in the Hebrew tongue deny that the word “Issa” is anywhere found to signify “assumption.” But the Seventy Interpreters, who translated this place “She shall be called γυν■ (gyn■, woman), because she was taken ■κ το■ ■νδρ■ς (from the man),” opened no reason of the woman's derivation from the man. But wisely was such a name imposed upon the woman, that each of women might learn, from the notion and signification of her name, how greatly she ought to observe and revere the man — namely, as the principle and seedbed of her substance.

The versions on the pun: Symmachus coined Greek ■νδρ■ς from ■ν■ρ/■νδρ■ς (matching Hebrew); Theodotion read 'Assumption' (Issah by accent = 'taking'), which Hebrew experts reject; the LXX's γυν■ loses the derivation entirely. The name teaches the woman to revere the man as her source. GLYPHS verified: ■νδρ■ς (Symmachus), ■κ το■ ■νδρ■ς (×2), γυν■ (LXX). Marginal

gloss: 'Symmachus.'

Wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh. CHAPTER 2, VERSE 24.

Lemma (Gen 2:24), the institution of marriage.

To what that “Wherefore” ought to be referred — or, as it is in Matthew chapter 19, “For this” — from this narration of Moses is not easy to discern. Some join it thus with what precedes: Because the woman is so joined to the man, that she is bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh, and taken from the man, on account of this so great a conjunction of the woman's nature with the man, a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife — that is, he ought to be more associated with his wife than with his parents. But according to this interpretation, these words would pertain only to the marriage of the first humans, in which alone the woman was taken from the man, whereas the Lord, in Matthew 19, refers these words to every marriage. But [...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'Q.' To what 'Wherefore' (Matt 19 'for this') refers is unclear. One reading: because of the woman's bodily union with the man (taken from him), the man leaves his parents and cleaves to his wife (loving wife above parents). But that would limit it to the first marriage, whereas Christ (Matt 19:5) applies it to all marriage.

[...But] nevertheless, to what that particle “Wherefore,” or “for this,” looks, is more clearly discerned from the interpretation of this place which was delivered by our Lord, and is recorded by Matthew chapter 19. For when the Lord had premised that God from the beginning made male and female — and indeed God made the female from the male, and joined them together between themselves, and blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply — from these it is rightly inferred: For this a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. For of this infer[ence...] [continues]

The clearer sense (from Christ's exposition, Matt 19:4-5): since God made male and female, made the female from the male, joined and blessed them ('Increase and multiply'), it follows — 'For this a man shall leave father and mother and cleave to his wife.' Page breaks at catchword 'tionis' (illationis). RESUME PDF 531 with '...Huius enim illa[tionis]...'.

— p. 531 (PDF) · printed p. 490 —

[...For of this infer]ence and conclusion this is the meaning and force: that the bond and conjunction of husband and wife is the greatest of all, God sufficiently declared, when He made the first humans male and female — and the female, indeed, from the male — and bound them together by the closest bond, both for intimate society and for the generation of offspring. Wherefore to this so great a conjunction even the bond of parents is deservedly to be set after. And this Rupert proves by this argument: that, in order to serve God by binding himself with monastic vows, one can not only licitly but even laudably forsake one's parents, even unwilling, but a wife who consen[ts...] [continues]

The force of Christ's inference (Matt 19): the husband–wife bond is the greatest, instituted by God; the parental bond yields to it. Rupert's argument: for God's service one may even laudably leave unwilling parents, but not an unwilling wife.

[...but a wife who con]sents not to him, he can in no way forsake. Thus Rupert writes, in chapter 38 of the third book On the Trinity and its works: “This is held for a law, that it is permitted for a man to leave father and mother when a fitting cause demands it; but to leave a wife, unless willing, neither human nor divine law grants to anyone, except for the sole cause (as was said above) of fornication. Hence, when the law of Deuteronomy 33 says of the tribe of Levi — which said to his father and his mother, ‘I know you not,’ and to his brothers, ‘I am ignorant of them,’ and they knew not their own sons — ‘these kept Thy word, and guarded Thy covenant’: when, I say, the holy and just law says this, it is to be noted that it passes over the wife alone, because, namely, it is permitted to one who desires to keep the word and covenant of God to disregard father and mother, brothers and sons,

and to leave them even protesting and unwilling; but the wife alone is she who, unless willing and embracing the same purpose, may not lawfully be dismissed. Therefore when it says, 'Wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh,' it pronounces the bond of marriage to be the greatest and strongest of all carnal bonds — so much so that, once joined, they are now not two, but one flesh." Thus Rupert.

Rupert of Deutz block-quote (de Trinitate III.38): one may leave parents for cause, but not a wife (except for fornication). Deut 33:9 (Levi disowning kin for God's covenant) pointedly omits the wife — she alone cannot be left unless willing. So Gen 2:24 makes marriage the strongest carnal bond ('no longer two, but one flesh').

But it must be observed that these words, "Wherefore a man shall leave his father," etc., can be taken either as pronounced by Adam, or as added by Moses to his narration. But since, whether spoken by Adam or written by Moses, they were nevertheless brought forth by the breathing and inspiration of God, therefore the Lord in the Gospel records those words as spoken by God. Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor, in their Annotations on Genesis, and Cajetan on the 19th chapter of Matthew, interpret that by those words, "For this a man shall leave father and mother," God forbade marriages between parents and children, since other marriages are not so forbidden: for at the beginning of the world, on account of the fewness of men, it is agreed that marriages between brothers and sisters were licitly contracted. And to this exposition they think the Chal[dee] Scripture also gives support [...] [continues]

Gen 2:24's words, whether Adam's or Moses', are God-inspired (so Christ cites them as God's, Matt 19). Augustine, Hugh of St Victor, and Cajetan: the words forbid parent–child marriage specifically (sibling marriage being licit at the start, when men were few). Page breaks mid-sentence (the Targum's support). Catchword 'Lucam.'

— p. 532 (PDF) · printed p. 491 —

[...they think the Chaldee Scripture also gives support, which has thus in this place: "For this a man shall leave the bed of his father and of his

mother”; but perhaps by that expression it is signified that sons were once accustomed to lie in their parents' chambers, or even beds, until, namely, they were emancipated, and, dismissed from the father's guardianship and power, became, having taken a wife, fathers of families themselves: for then they were separated from the custom and living-together of their parents, so as to establish a new house and family — to which custom pertains that which the Lord said in] Luke chapter 11, about the children resting in bed with their father. But a simpler and plainer interpretation of these words is, that by these words is signified that the conjunction of a man with his wife ought to be greater and more indissoluble than with his own parents. For that, “He shall cleave to his wife,” the Seventy rendered, “He shall be glued to his wife.” In Chaldee, word for word, it is, “He shall stick fast in his wife.”

The Targum reads 'leave the bed of his father and mother' — perhaps alluding to grown sons leaving the parental household to found their own (cf. Luke 11:7). But the plainer sense: the marital bond exceeds the parental. 'Cleave': LXX 'be glued'; Targum 'stick fast in.'

And they shall be two in one flesh.

Sub-lemma (the close of Gen 2:24).

Neither in Hebrew nor in Chaldee is that word, “Two,” and the noun “flesh” is in the accusative, in this manner, namely: “They shall be into one flesh.” The Seventy, however, added that “Two”; and so it is recorded by our Lord, as it is in Matthew chapter 19: wherefore the Latin Interpreter rightly adds that “Two.” Furthermore, that “In one flesh” is said by a Hebrew idiom for what is, “they shall be two one flesh,” as appears from the conclusion of the Lord in the aforesaid Gospel place: for when He had said, “And they shall be two in one flesh,” He infers this: “Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh.” As, therefore, it was said above that Adam was made into a living soul, for that which is, Adam was made a living man, so it is said in this place, “They shall be two in one flesh,” or “into one flesh,” for that which is, “They shall be two one flesh.” And for four

causes the spouses can be understood to be one flesh. First, indeed, because they are joined to one another to lead one li[fe...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'N.' The Hebrew/Targum lack 'Two' and put 'flesh' in the accusative ('into one flesh'); the LXX (and Christ, Matt 19:5-6) add 'Two,' so the Vulgate rightly does too. 'In one flesh' = 'they shall be two, one flesh' (cf. the idiom 'made into a living soul'). Introduces the four senses in which spouses are 'one flesh.'

[...to lead one] common, external, carnal or corporal life, since between them there is a community of all things. Next, on account of carnal union — on account of which alone Paul said, 1 Corinthians 6, “He who cleaves to a harlot is made one body.” Besides, on account of the generation of one flesh, that is, of offspring: for one flesh, that is, one carnal offspring, is produced by both — by the woman, indeed, materially, but by the man efficiently. Finally, on account of the one and common and mutual power of each spouse over the body. For the flesh of the woman is also the man's, and the flesh of the man is also the woman's. For the woman, as Paul writes to the Corinthians in the seventh chapter of the former epistle, has not power of her own body, but the man; and likewise the man has not power of his own body, but the woman.

The four senses of 'one flesh': (1) one shared bodily life (all things common); (2) carnal union (1 Cor 6:16, the harlot); (3) one offspring of both (woman material, man efficient cause); (4) mutual power over each other's body (1 Cor 7:4). Marginal gloss: 'Ob quatuor causas coniuges dicuntur una caro.'

St. Thomas, on the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Ephesians, lecture 10, treating this very place of Moses, “Wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother,” etc., writes thus: “By these words a threefold conjunction of man and woman is designated: the first, by the affection of love, because so great is the affection of both between themselves, that they leave their own parents. For although, as to reverence, obedience, and support, each ought to love his father more than his wife, yet, as to domestic society, adhesion, and cohabitation, he ought to love his wife more.” The things which the same Thomas luminously disputes on this very matter, in the second part of the

second part, question 26, should be read. Hither also pertains what is written in the fourth chapter of the third book of Esdras, in these words: [A man...] [continues]

Aquinas block-quote (on Eph 5, lect. 10): the words mark a threefold man–woman union; the first is the affection of love (so strong they leave parents) — though parents are owed more reverence/obedience, the wife more domestic society and cohabitation. Cf. Aquinas, ST II-II q.26. Introduces a citation of 3 Esdras 4 (continues on next page). Page breaks at catchword 'Homo.'

— p. 533 (PDF) · printed p. 492 —

[...A man] leaves his father who nourished him, and his own region, and joins himself to a woman. And with the woman he releases his soul. And he remembers neither father, nor mother, nor region. And a man loves his wife more than his father or mother. And many have been made demented because of their wives, and have become servants because of them, and many have perished and been slaughtered, and have sinned because of women. Thus it is in that place.

Block-quote, 3 Esdras (1 Esdras LXX) 4:20-27 — on the power of woman over man (from Zerubbabel's speech): a man leaves all and cleaves to a woman, loving her above his parents; and many have been ruined through women.

That many have sinned because of an excessive and immoderate love toward their wives, king Solomon abundantly proved by his own example. The second conjunction of man and wife is in their closest converse, whence it is said, “And he shall cleave to his wife.” It is said in the singular number, “his wife,” that it may be understood that a plurality of wives is not of itself good, nor congruous to the perfect reason of matrimony, as it was first instituted by God. The third conjunction is by carnal union, which is signified by those words, “And they shall be two in one flesh,” that is, in the carnal work. For in every generation there is an active and a passive power; but in plants both are together in the same subject, while in perfect living things they are distinguished; wherefore at the time when animals are in the act of generation, they are one just as plants are at every time.

Thus far from Blessed Thomas.

Solomon proved by his own fall how excessive uxoriousness ruins men. Aquinas resumes (second union: 'cleave to his wife' — singular, so polygamy is not of itself good; third union: 'one flesh,' carnal generation — in plants active/passive powers coincide, in animals they unite only in the act). End of the Aquinas material. Marginal gloss: '3. Reg. 11.' (1 Kings 11, Solomon's wives).

It is to be observed that the things hitherto narrated by Moses concerning the generation of Adam and Eve and their conjunction are beautifully accommodated by the Fathers and interpreters, through allegory, to Christ and the Church — the treatment of which allegory the reader will be able to see in the Catena of Lippomani on Genesis, and in the Commentaries of John Ferus (Wild) on the book of Genesis upon this very place. The same things, too, can fittingly, through tropological interpretation, be applied to reason and sense, spirit and flesh, or to the higher reason of man and the lower. Which things, indeed, we — both studying brevity, and insisting on the care and treatment of more obscure and weighty matters — deliberately pass over.

The Adam/Eve narrative is allegorized to Christ-and-Church (see Lippomani's Catena; John Ferus' Commentary) and tropologically to reason/sense, spirit/flesh, higher/lower reason — which Pererius deliberately omits for brevity and weightier matters.

And God created man to His own image and likeness: male and female He created them. CHAPTER 1, VERSE 27.

Lemma — the commentary now returns to Genesis 1:27 (deferred from Book I), on the creation of the two sexes.

The other things which are given to man by God pertain either to his dignity, or to his health and safety: but the distinction of sex into male and female conduces to the conservation of the species and the propagation of the human race. But although in this place Moses simply says that male and female were made by God, it is nevertheless not to be understood that both were made at the same time and in the same manner: for he himself in chapter 2 narrates, and it has been explained by us above, that the man was

made first, from the slime of the earth, but the woman later, from the man's rib. But because each was made on the sixth day, whose works Moses here describes, therefore he strictly and compendiously commemorated the creation of both together. But in man alone is the distinction of male and female expressed, because the conjunction of both for the generation of offspring has many excellent and singular things, which are by no means in the other living creatures. Gene[ration...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'C.' Sex-distinction serves species-conservation. 'Male and female He made them' (Gen 1:27) does not mean simultaneously/identically — Gen 2 shows man first (from earth), woman after (from the rib); both on the sixth day, hence Gen 1's brief joint mention. The sexual distinction is expressed of man alone because human generation has singular excellences. Page breaks at catchword 'Gene[ratio].'

— p. 534 (PDF) · printed p. 493 —

[...For carnal gene]ration can be performed by man alone either with vice or with praise; and, besides the common end with the other living creatures — namely, the conservation and propagation of the species — it has another singular and far more excellent end: I mean the completion of the number of the elect and the predestined. The human marriage, moreover, in the new law is a sacrament conferring grace, and has a singular care and necessity of rearing offspring, and from it a long series of kinship and affinity is deduced. Finally, for the act of generation the man and the woman ought to come together, not so much inflamed by lust and drawn by pleasure [...] [continues]

Carnal generation in man may be virtuous or vicious; beyond the shared natural end (species-survival), it has a higher one — filling up the number of the elect. In the new law marriage is a grace-giving sacrament, with the duty of rearing children, and the source of kinship/affinity. Spouses should unite not for lust but...

[...not so much inflamed by lust and drawn by pleasure], as by the honest desire of receiving offspring, and the love of multiplying the human race, with the moderation of reason applied, and with other adjoined circumstances which render that act honest and laudable and acceptable to

God. But He said in the plural number, “Male and female He created them,” lest anyone should think (as Augustine warns, On Genesis according to the Letter, book 3, chapter 22) that the same man was made male and female — such as are indeed called by the Greeks ■νδρ■γυνοι (androgynes), and such as Pliny relates are found in Africa (book 7, chapter 2): “Above the Nasamones,” he says, “and bordering on them the Machlyae, Calliphanes relates that there are Androgynes of both natures, coupling among themselves by turns.” Aristotle adds that their right breast is virile, the left womanly. Plato too, in the Symposium, as we mentioned above, fables that in the beginning there were three kinds of men — male, female, and a third sharing both — and that this was most powerful and made war on the gods: wherefore, for the sake of cutting off its multiplication, [...] [continues]

Spouses should unite for offspring and the race, with reason's moderation, making the act acceptable to God. 'Male and female He created them' (plural) guards against thinking man was a single androgyne (Gk. ■νδρ■γυνοι) — Pliny (NH 7.2, from Calliphanes) on the African Machlyae; Aristotle (right breast male, left female); Plato's Symposium myth of the three sexes split by Jove. GLYPH verified by magnification: ■νδρ■γυνοι.

[...wherefore, for the sake of cutting off its multiplication], it was torn asunder and divided by Jove.

Conclusion of the Platonic myth: the powerful androgyne was split in two by Jove to curb its multiplying.

A DISPUTATION ON THE PROPAGATION of the human race in the state of Innocence.

Major new section heading — the disputation on how mankind would have been propagated had Adam not fallen.

If God, therefore, from the beginning created male and female, doubtless even in the state of innocence the multiplication of men would have been through the commingling of both sexes and carnal generation. But because some of the Fathers seem to have thought the contrary, this question must

be treated.

Decorated initial 'S.' The disputation's thesis: since God made the two sexes from the start, propagation in innocence would still have been by carnal generation — but some Fathers demur, so the question is opened.

QUESTION I. Whether in the state of innocence men would have been multiplied by carnal generation.

First question of the new disputation.

It does not escape me that some of the ancient Fathers and great Doctors thought the contrary, and handed down in writing, that if Adam had not sinned, the multiplication of men would not have been, as now it is, through carnal union, but would have been in that manner in which it took place among the Angels. And on account of this [...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'N.' The opposing view of some Fathers/Doctors: had Adam not sinned, men would have multiplied not carnally but in an angel-like manner. Page breaks at catchword 'verum' (signature QQ 3). RESUME PDF 535 with 'Et propter hoc [verum]...'.

— p. 535 (PDF) · printed p. 494 —

[...And on account of this it is] true what David said: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to the senseless beasts, and was made like to them.” Of this opinion was Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On Man, chapter 28, whom Damascene followed (On the Orthodox Faith, book 4, chapter 25, and book 2, chapter 30); with which agree the things Chrysostom writes (homily 18 on Genesis, on those words of chapter 4, “Adam knew his wife”), and, on that very place, Procopius of Gaza, and also Euthymius on Psalm 50. To these could be reckoned Augustine (book 1 On Genesis against the Manichees, chapter 19, and in the first book On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount), who, expounding those words, “Whoever shall dismiss his wife,” etc., writes that consanguinities and kinships arose from the sin and death of the first parents.

The opposing view (continued): had Adam not sinned, propagation would be angel-like — confirmed (they say) by Ps 48/49:13. Its holders: Gregory of Nyssa (de Hom. Opif. 28), John Damascene, Chrysostom (hom. 18), Procopius of Gaza, Euthymius Zigabenus; and Augustine (de Gen. c. Manich. 1.19; de Serm. Dom.) — kinship began only after the Fall. Marginal gloss: 'Psalm. 48.'

But nevertheless this opinion is contrary to divine Scripture and to right reason. Moses narrates in this place that God, in creating man from the beginning, made male and female: to what end, unless to generate offspring? For it is for the sake of this thing that the distinction of sex into male and female was instituted by God. Moses, moreover, adds that God blessed them and said, “Increase and multiply”; and for that “Increase,” the Hebrew verb properly signifies “Bear fruit.” Then Adam, having beheld Eve, by divine inspiration said, “This now is bone of my bones,” etc. “And they shall be two in one flesh” — and that comes about by carnal union, as Paul interprets in chapter 6 of the former epistle to the Corinthians. Now indeed, if we consult Philosophy and right reason, they too will teach and convince that this opinion is false. For the distinction of sex and the conformation of the mem[bers...] [continues]

Refutation: Scripture and reason are against the angel-like view. God made the sexes precisely for offspring; 'Increase and multiply' (Heb. = 'bear fruit'); 'two in one flesh' = carnal union (1 Cor 6). Philosophy agrees. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur supradicta opinio.'

[...the conformation of the mem]bers which nature destined for generation are naturally in man, and were not given on account of sin. And just as man is naturally and substantially an animal, so he is a living thing: but the most natural work of living things, on Aristotle's authority (de Anima, book 2), is to generate its like; and the same he teaches (Meteorologica, book 4), that each thing is perfect when it can produce its like. What more? It is argument enough to prove this, that the necessary reason and cause of creating a woman in the state of innocence is reported by Moses (chapter 2) to have been no other than that she be a helper to the man: for what? surely for nothing other than the generation of offspring; for in all other things a man could be helped by a man either better, or certainly no less well. But

what led those doctors into that opinion? Namely, the turpitude and foulness which now is, and is felt, in the very act of generation, on account of the deformity of lust and the sense of immoderate plea[sure...] [continues]

The generative members are natural, not penal; the most natural act of the living is to beget its like (Aristotle, de Anima 2; Meteor. 4). Moses gives no reason for the woman but 'a helper' — i.e. for generation (else a man would help better). What misled those Fathers: the shamefulness now felt in the act, from disordered lust.

[...immoderate plea]sure, which our first parents, immediately after sin (to use Augustine's words), felt, blushed at, and covered themselves. But this ardor of lust, defiling and deforming the act of generation, would not have existed in the state of innocence. For in it the mind would have been wholly subject to God, and the lower part of man would have been perfectly subdued and obedient to reason — so that, with the same facility and moderation with which we now move the other members of the body (the feet for walking, the hands for grasping, the mouth and tongue for speaking), with the same facility then, in that state, without distur[bance...] [continues]

After sin the first parents felt lust, blushed, and covered themselves (Augustine). But in innocence no such defiling ardor: mind subject to God, the lower part obedient to reason — the generative members would be moved as freely and calmly as we now move feet, hands, tongue. Page breaks at catchword 'pertur[batione].'

— p. 536 (PDF) · printed p. 495 —

[...without distur]bance of reason, without the ardor of lust, and free from all foulness, man would move, rule, and moderate those members of the body which nature prepared for generating. And that Augustine was not of the contrary opinion, no one will deny who reads the things copiously and accurately disputed by him on this very matter, in confirmation of our opinion, in book 9 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 10, but especially in book 14 On the City of God, from chapter 21 to 27, and in book 1 of the Retractations, chapters 10, 13, and 19. For as to what he said

elsewhere, that consanguinities and carnal kinships flowed forth from [sin...] [continues]

In innocence the generative members would be governed calmly, free of lust. Augustine in fact holds the same view (de Gen. ad lit. 9.10; de Civ. Dei 14.21-27; Retract. 1.10,13,19) — his remark that kinship 'flowed from sin' must be reconciled. Marginal gloss: 'Augustinum sensisse, in statu innocentiae futuram generationem carnalem.'

[...flowed forth from sin], this is its meaning: that they did not begin except after sin, after which, namely, Adam first knew his wife: for in paradise they did not give effort to generation, either because they were there for a very short time, or because they were awaiting God's command for it, since they were not incited by the ardor of lust, or by any titillation of pleasure, to hasten the act of generation.

Augustine's 'kinship from sin' = it only began after the Fall, when Adam first knew Eve; in paradise they had not yet generated (whether for shortness of time, or awaiting God's command), not being driven by lust.

QUESTION II. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been an equal number of women and of men.

Second question of the disputation.

But it must be known that God made at the beginning, in human nature, one male and one female: which was not done in the other animals, for of each species of animals many males and many females were created; but in man He constituted the origin of the species in two — nay rather in Adam alone, for from him Eve was afterward made; and this was done for the singular dignity of man, and to conciliate a greater concord and charity among men, all being procreated from one parent. As, therefore, God from the beginning made one male and one female, so afterward in the state of innocence women and men would have been multiplied in equal number: there would, therefore, have been as many males as females. Indeed, it is the opinion of some that then, at every generation and birth, a twin offspring — namely a female and a masculine one — would be brought

forth. Nor is it difficult to bring a reason for this thing and to build up belief. For in that state of innocence no one would have led a celibate [life...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'S.' Man uniquely originated from one pair (rather, from Adam alone), for his dignity and the race's concord. So in innocence the sexes would multiply in equal numbers (some hold each birth would be male/female twins). Reasons follow: no celibacy...

[...no one would have led a celibate life], and all at a fitting time would have been joined in matrimony; no one, moreover, would have been sterile or unfruitful, nor would any union of male and female come about except through legitimate matrimony; finally, just as from the beginning of one man there was one wife, so afterward in that state of innocence, after the example and imitation of the first marriage, neither would there be several husbands of one wife, nor several wives of one husband. From these things is concluded and established what we said above, that the number of men and of women would then be equal. For if there had been more men than wo[men...] [continues]

In innocence: no celibates, all married in due time; none sterile; no union outside marriage; one wife per husband (no polygamy/polyandry, imitating the first marriage). Hence equal numbers of the sexes. Marginal gloss: 'In statu innocentiae, parem futurum mariú atque foeminarum numerum.'

— p. 537 (PDF) · printed p. 496 —

[...For if there had been more men than wo]men, or contrariwise more women than men, it would have been necessary that some be without matrimony, or that one be joined to several in matrimony.

The proof completed: unequal numbers would force either celibacy or polygamy/polyandry — both excluded in innocence; therefore the numbers would be equal.

QUESTION III. How, in the state of innocence, women could have been generated.

Third question of the disputation.

But this has a great difficulty: by what reason a woman could have been generated in the state of innocence. For the female, as Aristotle is the author (in the second book On the Generation of Animals), comes about beyond the intention of the particular agent — namely, on account of a defect of the power which is in the virile seed. For every agent intends to generate its like, unless it be impeded: but in the generation of man the man is the agent, and the woman the patient; therefore the man will always generate a man, unless either the weakness of his power obstruct, or some vice and impediment in the woman who supplies the matter for generation, and in whose womb conception occurs and is contained for nine months until birth. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence there would be no vice, no defect, no infirmity of the generative power, whether virile or feminine, no reason and cause seems then to have been able to exist for generating a female. But [what...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'I.' The difficulty: on Aristotle's view (de Gen. Anim. 2) the female results from a defect of the male seed (man = agent, woman = patient; the agent would always make its like, a male, but for some impediment). So in defect-free innocence, no female would ever be generated — which must be answered.

But what we said, from Aristotle's opinion, that the female is something imperfect and procreated beyond the intention of the generator, as it were by occasion — it pleases me to make more known and attested to the reader by the Prince of Philosophers' own words here set down. Thus he writes (book 2 On the Generation of Animals, chapter 3): "The female is, as it were, a damaged male." And (book 4, chapter 2), when he had said that the male is a perfect animal but the female imperfect, he subjoins: "The indications," he says, "are furnished by the things that happen. For a youthful and a senescent age generate females more than the flourishing age, for in the one the heat is not yet perfect, in the other it fails. More humid and effeminate bodies also generate females rather, and moist seeds rather than thick do the same. For all these things come about from a natural lack of heat." And in the following chapter he teaches that nature, in

the generation of a woman, fails and degenerates, writing thus: “But the first beginning of degenerating is for a female to be generated, not a male; yet this is necessary to nature, for the kind must be preserved of those which are distinguished into female and [male...] [continues]

Aristotle block-quote (reporting his biology, set down to attest Pererius' point): the female is 'a damaged/maimed male' (de Gen. Anim. 2.3, 4.2-3); females are produced more in youth/old age, by humid bodies and moist seed, all 'from a lack of natural heat'; a female is the 'first degeneration,' yet necessary to preserve the kind. Marginal gloss: 'Foeminá esse quid imperfectum & degenerans, secundùm Aristotelis doctrinam.'

[...for the kind must be preserved of those which are distinguished into female and male]. But since it can happen that sometimes the seed of the male does not prevail — whether on account of a youthful or senile age, or on account of some other cause of this kind — a female must, for that reason, be begotten.” Finally, in chapter 6 of the same book: “Females,” he says, “are by their nature weaker and colder, and the female sex is to be thought, as it were, a natural injury and detriment.” Thus far Aristotle: who indeed, in the seventh book of the Politics, chapter 16, seems to hand down things not unlike these.

End of the Aristotle block-quote: when the male seed fails to dominate (youth, old age, etc.) a female is begotten — necessary to preserve the species; 'females are by nature weaker and colder, the sex a natural injury and detriment' (de Gen. Anim. 4.6; cf. Politics 7.16).

But the question proposed can, in this manner, be resolved not with difficulty [I think...] [continues]

Pererius begins his own resolution of how females would be generated in innocence (continues on the next page). Page breaks at catchword 'pediri' (ex-pediri).

— p. 538 (PDF) · printed p. 497 —

[...But the question proposed can, in this manner, be re]solved not with difficulty, I think. The generation of a female I indeed think proceeds not only from the weakness of the virile seed, or from some vice and impediment that is in the menstrual blood or in the woman's womb, but

also from other things. For among the other things which contribute to the generation of male or female, Aristotle counts the winds: for it matters much by what wind blowing the generation occurs. Since the North wind (Aquilo) most aids the generation of a male, but the South wind (Auster), of a female. Which Aristotle teaches and confirms in more than one place. For in the second chapter of the fourth book On the Generation of Animals: “By the blasts,” he says, “of the North wind more [than the South...] [continues]

Pererius' answer: a female's generation has causes beyond a defective seed/womb — among them the winds. Per Aristotle, the North wind favors males, the South favors females (de Gen. Anim. 4.2). Marginal glosses: 'Vndé prouenisset in statu innocentiae generatio foeminarum.'; 'Diuersitas venti variat generationem.'

[...By the blasts of the North wind more than the South], males are begotten.” And a little below: “Shepherds say that it matters to the breeding of male and female cattle, not only if it happens that the coupling occurs by North or South winds, but also if, when the herd mates, it faces toward the North or the South. Thus sometimes, by the smallest moment, a cause of heat or cold is given, and these complete the cause of generation.” And in the sixth book On the History of Animals, chapter nineteen, Aristotle writes in these words: “Males or females are generated by the force both of waters and of the studs. For waters too cause females or males to be conceived. Besides, by the blast of the North wind males are rather conceived, by the South, females. So great is the force of the North wind, that it even changes those which bring forth only females to the procreation of male offspring. They ought to face the North when the females couple.” Thus Aristotle. And let this be the first cause of generating a male or a female.

Aristotle block-quote (de Gen. Anim. 4.2; Hist. Anim. 6.19): wind-direction at coupling, and the waters, tip generation toward male or female; the North wind even turns female-only breeders to males. This is Pererius' 'first cause' of either sex.

Secondly, it greatly contributes to varying the generation by what thought and fantasy the minds of those engaged in generation are struck and pressed. For the imagination has great force to effect the offspring that is generated: of which thing we have, in animals, a most clear example and argument — that which is recorded in this book of Genesis, chapter 30, about the sheep of Jacob. But why the power and efficacy of the imagination is so great for varying generation, and why it has such various and wonderful effects, Pliny indicates in most elegant words (chapter 12 of book 7): “There is in the mind a reckoning of likenesses, and in it many chance things are believed to prevail — sight, hearing, memory, and images drawn in at the very moment of conception. The thought, too, of either parent, suddenly flying across the mind, is thought to fashion or to mingle the likeness. And so there are more differences in man than in all the other animals, since the speed of thoughts, the quickness of mind, and the variety of talent imprint manifold marks: whereas in the other animals the minds are immobile, and alike in all, and each in its own kind.” Thus Pli[ny...] [continues]

The 'second cause': the imagination of the parents shapes the offspring (the classic proof: Jacob's peeled rods and the sheep, Gen 30). Pliny (NH 7.12) on how mental images at conception imprint likeness — and why human variety so exceeds the animals'. Marginal gloss: 'Vehemens imaginatio generantium magnam vim ad variandam generationem habet.'

[...Thus Pliny]. But in the state of innocence, the power and faculty of generating, and the very act of generation, was in the will and power of man — not only as to its affection and use, but also as to its manner and measure, and also as to the intention or remission of that same act. Therefore, when a man would have willed to generate a male, he would have been in the act of generation with a more intense mind and a more vehement imagination, and would have applied a greater effort, and therefore more heat, [spirit...] [continues]

The resolution: in innocence the generative power and act were fully under man's will — its manner, measure, and intensity. So to beget a male he would generate with intenser mind and imagination and greater effort, producing more heat and [spirit] (the male-tending factors). Page breaks at catchword

'spiri' (signature RR). RESUME PDF 539 with '...plus caloris, [spiri]tus...'.

— p. 539 (PDF) · printed p. 498 —

[...and therefore more heat,] genital spirit, and vigor he would have conferred upon the seed itself; which being done, a male rather than a female would be generated. But contrariwise, when a female was to be generated, he would have approached the act of generation with a more remiss mind: whence his seed too would have had less force — especially with a most intent thought, and a vehement imagination and desire, of generating a female rather than a male, being joined. And to this our opinion St. Bonaventure gives his support, in the second [book] of the Sentences, distinction 20, question six.

Pererius' resolution completed: to beget a male, more heat/spirit/vigor in the seed; for a female, a slacker effort and weaker seed, with the will and imagination bent on a female — so in innocence the will would freely determine the offspring's sex. St Bonaventure (Sent. II d.20 q.6) supports this.

QUESTION IV. Whether, in the state of innocence, the integrity of the female genital would have been corrupted by the union with the man and the reception of the virile seed.

Fourth question of the disputation on propagation in innocence.

But as for what Augustine writes, in book 14 On the City of God, chapter 26, that the generation of offspring in the state of innocence would be without any corruption of womanly integrity and violation of the virginal seal — that, in my judgment at least, has more wonder than credibility.

Decorated initial 'C.' Augustine (de Civ. Dei 14.26) held that in innocence offspring would be generated with the woman's bodily integrity and the virginal 'seal' wholly intact. Pererius finds this more astonishing than believable.

And Augustine indeed writes thus in that place: “In so great a facility of things and felicity of men, far be it that we should suspect that offspring could not be made without the disease of lust: but those members would be moved by the same nod of the will as the others,

and without the enticing goad of ardor, with tranquillity of mind and body, with no corruption of integrity, the husband would be poured into the lap of the wife. For it is not, because it cannot be proved by experience, therefore not to be believed; since a turbid heat would not move those parts of the body, but a spontaneous power would apply them as need required. So then the virile seed could be sent into the womb of the spouse, the integrity of the female genital being safe — just as now, that same integrity being safe, the flux of menstrual blood can be emitted from a virgin's womb. For by the same way it could be injected, by which this can be ejected. For as, for giving birth, not a groan of pain but the impulse of maturity would relax the female viscera, so, for impregnating and conceiving, not the appetite of lust but a voluntary use would join the two natures." Thus Augustine.

Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.26): in innocence the generative members would obey the will calmly, with no lust and no loss of integrity — the seed entering the intact womb as menstrual blood now leaves an intact virgin; conception by deliberate use, not lustful appetite.

And, led by these words, Blessed Thomas seems to signify that in the state of innocence the virginal integrity would by no means be corrupted on account of the union of man and woman. For when, in the first part, question ninety-eight, article two, he had put this fourth argument or objection — that in the state of innocence there would be no corruption; but virginal integrity is corrupted by coitus; therefore coitus would by no means exist in the state of innocence — afterward, dissolving this objection, he speaks thus: "To the fourth it must be said that, as Augustine says in book 14 On the City of God, in that state, when, with no corruption of integrity, [the husband] would be poured into the lap [of the wife...] [continues]

Aquinas (ST I q.98 a.2) raised the fourth objection (no corruption in innocence; coitus corrupts virginity; so no coitus there) and answers it by citing Augustine's view — beginning the reply that continues on the next page. Page breaks at catchword 'gremio.'

— p. 540 (PDF) · printed p. 499 —

[...would be poured into the lap] of the wife, the husband": and he recalls the rest of Augustine's words, which we set down a little before.

End of Aquinas' reply (ST I q.98 a.2 ad 4): he simply repeats Augustine's account of intact generation in innocence — the same passage quoted above.

But surely, even if it were true what Augustine wrote, that womanly integrity would by no means be violated by the act of generation in the state of innocence, yet from that it would not follow that the virginal integrity too would be safe. For (as the same Blessed Thomas excellently disputes, in the second part of the second part, question 152, article 1) to the notion of virginity there pertains integrity and immunity from venereal delight. In which three things are to be considered: one is the violation of the virginal seal; another is the [emission...] [continues]

Pererius' counter: 'bodily integrity' and 'virginity' are not the same. Aquinas (ST II-II q.152 a.1): virginity is integrity plus freedom from venereal pleasure, with three elements — (1) the violation of the seal; (2) the emission of seed [with its pleasure]; (3)... Marginal glosses: 'Discutitur opinio Sancti Augustini.'; 'Quae pertineant ad constituendam rationem virginitatis.'

[...another is the] emission of seed, bringing a sensible delight; the third is the purpose of enjoying that delight. In these three, the first relates to the moral act accidentally, since it is not considered in itself except according to the things of the soul; the second relates to the moral act materially, because sensible passions are the matter of moral acts; but the third relates formally and completively, because the nature of moral acts is completed in that which belongs to reason. Since, therefore, virginity contains the removal of the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily member relates accidentally to virginity; but the privation of delight, which consists in the emission of seed, relates materially; and finally the purpose of perpetually abstaining from such delight relates formally and completively in virginity. Therefore, since the two latter [elements], which hold the prior parts in virginity, are excluded by the [act...]

[continues]

Aquinas (ST II-II q.152 a.1) block-quote: of the three, the bodily seal is only accidental to virginity, the freedom from pleasure is its matter, and the resolve of perpetual abstinence its form. Since the act of generation excludes the two essential (latter) elements, virginity cannot coexist with it.

[...are excluded by the act] of generation arising from the union of man and woman, it is necessarily concluded that in the state of innocence, together with marriage and the act of generation, the integrity of virginity could not have cohered and stood. But I return to Augustine, to whom indeed I do not assent, but think that the seal of virginal integrity would even then be opened by the act of generation. For the manner by which the act of generation now occurs, by the opening of the female vulva, is natural — since it is observed even in the other animals. Excepting, therefore, the ardor of immoderate lust and the deformity of concupiscence, which befell the act of generation from sin and the privation of original justice, and almost cleave to it, even this manner would have existed in the state of innocence: for the things which are natural to man were not changed on account of sin. Then, why do we fear to say that the bodily integrity of the woman would then be taken away by the act of gene[ration...] [continues]

Conclusion against Augustine: virginity-integrity cannot survive the marital act. Pererius dissents from Augustine — the virginal seal would be opened even then; the natural manner of generation (shared with the animals) would have remained, minus only the lust that sin added (natural things were not changed by sin).

[...by the act of generation], when we cannot deny that it would be corrupted in childbirth, by the exit of the offspring from the womb? — unless someone be so senseless and mad as to think that what, in the most blessed Virgin, was an outstanding and singular miracle (that she bore her Son with the womb closed) would have been usual for all women in that state.

A further argument: integrity must yield at birth anyway (the child's exit) — to deny it would make the Virgin's unique miracle (the closed womb) ordinary for all women in innocence, which is absurd.

But indeed, Bonaventure, interpreting Augustine's opinion in a favorable sense, in the second [book] of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 4, writes in this manner: "It must be understood that 'corruption of integrity' says three things, [namely...] [continues]

Bonaventure (Sent. II d.20 q.4) tries to read Augustine charitably — distinguishing three senses of 'corruption of integrity' (continues on the next page). Marginal gloss: 'B. Bonauentura quomodo in bonam partem.' Page breaks at catchword 'scilicet.'

— p. 541 (PDF) · printed p. 500 —

[...It must be understood that 'corruption of integrity' says three things, namely] the opening of the womanly enclosures, a penal passion, and a foul delight: of which the first is of nature, the second is a penalty, but the third is the vicious part of corruption, which holds the middle between fault and penalty. If, therefore, a man had known his wife at the time appointed by nature, there would have been there the opening of the enclosures, yet there would not have been there a penal passion, nor a foul delight, because the generative power would then be neither corrupted nor infected; rather, those members would obey reason, as Augustine says, just as the mouth, the hand, and the tongue obey. Whence, as the hand and the mouth are opened and closed, and it is not a passion or a penalty, nor a foul delight, so it would have been then concerning those members; nor would it have been baser then to speak of those members than [it would have been to speak of others...] [continues]

Bonaventure block-quote: 'corruption of integrity' = (1) the opening of the enclosures (of nature), (2) a penal passion (a penalty), (3) a foul delight (the vicious middle). In innocence the first would occur but not the latter two — the members obeying reason like mouth, hand, tongue. Marginal gloss (cropped): on interpreting St Augustine's opinion.

[...than it would have been to speak of others]; for now it is base to speak of them, on account of this, that nature shudders and blushes at that act by reason of the foulness which is in it." Thus Bonaventure.

End of the Bonaventure block-quote: the shamefulness of speaking of the generative members is due only to the foulness sin added to the act, not to the members themselves.

Whose opinion indeed greatly pleases me; but it does not, however, seem to agree with the doctrine of Augustine — since he (as the reader will clearly note from the words set down above) openly holds that in the state of innocence even the bodily integrity of the woman would by no means be corrupted by the act of generation, but would be safe and inviolate: which, nevertheless, Bonaventure denies.

Pererius approves Bonaventure's reading (which agrees with his own — only the penal/foul elements absent, the seal still opened) but notes it does not really agree with Augustine, who held the bodily integrity itself would remain wholly intact.

And God blessed them, and said, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. CHAPTER 1, VERSE 28.

Lemma (Gen 1:28), the blessing and command of fruitfulness.

The blessing of God, in Scripture, signifies an abundance and affluence of goods, with which God affects men. But in this place it indicates the greatest fecundity that was given to man, whereby, namely, the human race might be propagated more quickly and more numerously: which, at the beginning of the world, when only one man and one woman were created, was necessary; and for the same necessity, immediately after the flood (as we read in the ninth chapter of Genesis), God again blessed man and similarly said, “Increase and multiply.” That “Increase” does not signify an increase of the body in magnitude (for it is agreed that the first men were created perfect in bodily mass and magnitude), but signifies an increase of multitude: which is well declared by the two next-following words, “And multiply, and fill the earth.” For the word “Increase” there is a Hebrew word properly signifying “Bear fruit” — namely, the offspring of man stands as the fruit of a tree. And frequently divine Scripture, to signify human offspring, uses the word “fruit,” calling it the fruit of the womb: as is that, “Of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne”; Elizabeth said

to the most blessed Virgin, “Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb.” A DISPUTA[TION...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'B.' God's blessing = abundance; here, the fecundity for propagating the race (necessary at the start, and renewed after the flood, Gen 9). 'Increase' means growth in number, not bodily size (the first men were full-grown). The Hebrew = 'bear fruit'; offspring is 'fruit of the womb' (Ps 132:11; Luke 1:42). Marginal gloss: 'Psal. 131. Lucae 1.' Page breaks at catchword 'DISPVTA[TIO].'

— p. 542 (PDF) · printed p. 501 —

A DISPUTATION. Against the Heretics of our time: whether from this place it is concluded that it is a precept from God that every one of men should engage in the generation of offspring.

New disputation heading — a polemic against the Reformers, who argued from 'Increase and multiply' (Gen 1:28) that marriage/procreation is commanded of all and thus that vows of celibacy violate God's law.

The Heretics think that this place provides them a most valid weapon against the Catholics — who not only extol virginity and celibacy with the highest praises, but even prefer them, in excellence of dignity and merit, to legitimate marriage. For they cry out that we are opposed to God's precepts, and that, on account of vain human traditions and superstitions, we hold God's certain and manifest law and sentence for nothing. For in this place Moses narrates that God blessed marriage, and commanded men to increase and multiply: and this was either the first, or certainly the second, precept of God given to Adam, and, under his name, to all mortals to be propagated from him. Who, then, would doubt that those abstaining from marriage and the generation of offspring resist the divine will and law? These things those men declaim before the unskilled crowd, and persuade them either to the ignorant, or to those most inclined to the license of the flesh and to pleasures. But who could sufficiently marvel at the impudence of those who say that virginity and celibacy are an invention of men, and [displeasing] to God...? [continues]

Decorated initial 'H.' The Protestant argument: since God commanded 'increase and multiply' (the first/second precept to Adam and all his race), to vow celibacy is to defy God's law — so the Catholic exaltation of virginity over marriage is impious. They preach this to the ignorant and the licentious. Pererius is appalled at calling celibacy a mere human invention displeasing to God.

[...and displeasing to God?] — when, concerning their commendation, and their dignity and merit above matrimony, we have a most express sentence of the Lord (Matthew, chapter 19), praising the Eunuchs who castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, and preferring their condition to marriage. For when the disciples had said to the Lord, “If such is the case of a man with a wife, it is not expedient to marry,” He answered them: “Not all grasp this word, but those to whom it is given: for there are Eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who can grasp it, let him grasp it.” Paul too, in the seventh chapter of the former epistle to the Corinthians, disputing in most eloquent words concerning marriage, celibacy, and virginity, far prefers virginity and celibacy to marriage.

Against the Reformers: Christ Himself commends celibacy above marriage (Matt 19:10-12, the 'eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven'), and Paul prefers virginity to marriage (1 Cor 7).

But it must be shown by us that the weapon which the Heretics have seized from this place of Moses is most blunt and plainly nothing; so that of this and the other weapons of the Heretics that saying of David could truly be said: “The arrows of little ones are made their wounds.” The Heretics say that God by these words gave to man a precept of entering marriage and of giving effort to children. To this it can be answered in two ways: either by conceding that that saying of the Lord contains a precept, but denying that all men, or at every time, are bound by such a precept; or by denying that any precept is contained in those words of God, or that a necessity of cultivating matrimony and engaging in the generation of offspring has been imposed on man. Those who insist on the former answer treat it in various ways. Blessed Cyprian, in his Treatise [...] [continues]

Pererius' rebuttal: the heretics' proof-text is feeble (Ps 64:7, 'the arrows of little ones'). Two answers to 'Increase and multiply = a precept binding all to marry': (1) grant it is a precept, but deny it binds all men or at all times; (2) deny it is a precept at all. Those taking the first line vary; Cyprian's treatment follows. Marginal glosses: 'Psal. 63.'; 'Responsio ad argumentum haereticorum.'; 'Prima interpretatio.' Page breaks at catchword 'ctatu' (Tractatu). RESUME PDF 543 with '...B. Cyprianus Tracta[tu]...'.

— p. 543 (PDF) · printed p. 502 —

[...Blessed Cyprian, in his] second Treatise On the Dress of Virgins (and the same was the opinion of certain other Fathers), thinks that that precept of the Lord had force up to the point at which the human race was multiplied, but that afterward continence was in praise and honor. "The first sentence of God," he says, "commanded to increase and to generate; the second persuaded continence. While the world is still rude and empty, we are propagated by the abundance of generating fecundity, and we grow to the increase of the human race. When the world is now filled and the earth full, those who can receive continence, living after the manner of eunuchs, are made eunuchs for the kingdom." Thus Cyprian.

First interpretation (Cyprian, de Habitu virginum, with other Fathers): the command bound only until the race was multiplied; thereafter continence is honored ('eunuchs for the kingdom'). The same Cyprian passage was quoted earlier (printed p.463).

Treading in whose footsteps, the Master of the Sentences, in the fourth book, distinction 26, writes similar things in these words: "It can indeed be understood that that [word], 'Increase and multiply,' said under a precept to the first humans before sin, by which they were bound even after sin, [held] until the multiplication was made: after which, the contract of matrimony was not according to a precept, but according to indulgence. So also after the flood, by which almost the whole human race was destroyed, it was said by precept to the sons of Noah, 'Increase and multiply.' But man being multiplied, [marriage] was contracted according to indulgence, not according to command." Thus he.

Peter Lombard (Sentences IV d.26) agrees: the precept bound the first humans (and Noah's sons after the flood) until the race was multiplied; thereafter marriage is by indulgence (permission), not command. Marginal gloss: 'Genes. 9.'

But Blessed Thomas, answering otherwise, says that that precept of the Lord did not oblige all and each man, but only the multitude itself: and therefore it is not to be fulfilled by individual men, but it is enough that it be fulfilled by the multitude, through some [of them]. For in the second part of the second part, question 152, article 2, answering the first argument — by which it was being proved that virginity is illicit, because it is against that precept of God, “Increase and multiply” — he writes to this effect:

Second interpretation (Aquinas, ST II-II q.152 a.2 ad 1): the precept binds the community, not each individual — so it suffices that some fulfill it. Introduces the Aquinas quotation. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda expositio S. Thom.'

“A precept has the nature of a debt: but there is a twofold kind of debt; one which ought to be fulfilled by each one, and this debt can be passed over by no one without sin; the other is a debt to be fulfilled not by individuals but by the multitude, by which not just anyone of the multitude is bound — for there are many things necessary to the multitude, for fulfilling which one does not suffice, but a multitude is needed, of which one does this, but another that. The precept, therefore, given by God to the first humans about eating, when He said, ‘Eat of every tree of Paradise,’ obliges all and each, and ought to be fulfilled by all; for without food no one can preserve life. But the precept given to man about generation, when it was said, ‘Increase and multiply,’ does not regard individual men, but the multitude of men; which it is necessary not only to multiply corporally, but also to grow and advance spiritually. Wherefore it is sufficiently provided for the human multitude, if some give effort to carnal generation, while others, abstaining from this, devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things, for the beauty and salvation of the whole human race. Just as also, in an army, some guard the camp, others bear the

standards, some fight with swords: which things, nevertheless, are all debts of the multitude, but cannot be fulfilled by one [man].”

Aquinas block-quote: precepts are 'debts' of two kinds — individual (eating: all must, none omit without sin) and communal ('increase and multiply': owed by the multitude, fulfilled if some marry while others embrace contemplation) — like the different roles in an army.

In this manner, therefore, Blessed Thomas thinks that precept of God, “Increase and multiply,” is to be interpreted.

Closing Aquinas' interpretation: the command is a communal debt, satisfied by the married while leaving celibacy open to others.

But Scotus, in the fourth [book] of the Sentences, distinction 26, interprets that precept in this manner: “The contract of matrimony,” he says, “was instituted [...] [continues]

Third interpretation (Scotus, Sent. IV d.26) — begins (continues on the next page). Marginal gloss: 'Tertia expositio Scoti.' Page breaks at catchword 'instituus' (institutus).

— p. 544 (PDF) · printed p. 503 —

[...The contract of matrimony] was instituted by God before the fall (Genesis 2, ‘This now is bone of my bones’; and Genesis 1, ‘Increase and multiply’), and after the fall (Genesis 3, ‘I will multiply thy conceptions and thy sorrows,’ said the Lord to Eve; and Genesis 9, ‘Increase and multiply’). And it is the institution of matrimony by way of an affirmative precept, which obliges always but not for-always, but in time of necessity: not only in the beginning, but it still seems to oblige in the same way, if a fewness of children should happen from some cause — say, from war, plague, or disaster, and the like.” Thus Scotus.

Scotus block-quote: marriage was instituted before and after the fall; 'increase and multiply' is an affirmative precept that 'obliges always but not for-always' — binding only in times of necessity (war, plague, depopulation). Marginal gloss: 'Quarta expositio' (begins beside the next view).

There are also those who thought that that precept was firm and valid up to the coming of Christ and the promulgation of the evangelical law; but that it then lost its force, when Christ, inviting all to eunuchism and castration for the sake of the kingdom of Heaven, said, “He who can grasp it, let him grasp it.”

Fourth interpretation: the precept was valid only until Christ, who released it by commending celibacy (Matt 19:12). Marginal gloss: 'Quarta expositio.'

St. Chrysostom, in the book On Virginity, when he had contended with many words to prove that in the state of innocence there would not have been a union of male and female for the generation of offspring, but that it arose from sin, says, in the 17th chapter of that book, that those words of the Lord, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth,” do not pertain to the institution of nature and the state of innocence, but were said as a remedy for the concupiscence now flowing after sin. Damascene supports Chrysostom (book 2 and 4 On the Orthodox Faith), saying that the woman was made for this reason, because God knew that sin would be future, to which the human race, being liable, was to be generated in no other way than through the union of male and female. But from the narration of Moses it is most clearly seen that in the state of innocence male and female were created, and the woman was made a helper to the man — namely, for the generation of offspring: which we sufficiently argued above, when we explained those words, “Let us make him a helper like himself.”

Fifth view (Chrysostom, de Virginitate 17; Damascene): the male–female union and 'increase and multiply' belong to fallen nature, not innocence. Pererius rejects it: Moses shows the sexes and the woman-as-helper (for generation) instituted in innocence. Marginal gloss: 'Quinta expositio.'

Blessed Augustine, in book 14 On the City of God, chapter 21, records the opinion of certain men who interpret those words, “Increase and multiply,” only spiritually:

Augustine reports (de Civ. Dei 14.21) an opinion reading 'increase and multiply' allegorically — introduces the quotation. Marginal gloss: 'B. Augustini sententia.'

“Some,” he says, “wish that ‘Increase and multiply’ be understood not according to carnal fecundity: because, according to the soul too, some such thing is read as said, ‘Thou shalt multiply virtue in my soul’; so that what follows in Genesis, ‘And fill the earth, and rule over it,’ they understand the ‘earth’ as the flesh which the soul fills by its presence, and over which it especially rules when it is multiplied in virtue. But carnal offspring, without the lust which arose after sin — looked upon, confounded, and veiled — could neither be born then, just as neither now can they; nor would they have come to be in Paradise, but outside, as also was done: for after they were dismissed thence, they came together to beget children, and begot them.”

The allegorizers' view (Augustine, de Civ. Dei 14.21, quoting it): 'increase and multiply' = multiply virtue in the soul (Ps 138:3); 'earth' = the flesh ruled by the soul; carnal offspring (with post-sin lust) could not have been born in Paradise, only outside, after the expulsion. Marginal gloss: 'Psalm. 137.'

Thus Augustine in that place: who, nevertheless, once adhered to this very opinion, as is clear to one who reads the things disputed by him upon those words, “Increase and multiply,” both in the first book On Genesis against the Manichees, chapter 19, and in book 13 of the Confessions, chapter 24. But Augustine did not persist in that opinion: for he most sharply attacked it in other places. Indeed, in book 14 On the City of God, chapter 22, he disputes against it thus: “We,” he says, “in no way doubt that, according to the bless[ing...] [continues]

Augustine himself once held the allegorical reading (de Gen. c. Manich. 1.19; Conf. 13.24) but later repudiated it sharply (de Civ. Dei 14.22) — beginning the recantation, which continues on the next page. Page breaks at catchword 'bene[dictionem].'

— p. 545 (PDF) · printed p. 504 —

[...We in no way doubt that, according to the bless]ing of God, to increase and multiply and fill the earth is a gift of the marriage which God instituted from the beginning, before the sin of man, by creating male and female: which sex is certainly evident in the flesh. For to this

work of God the blessing too is subjoined: for when Scripture had said, ‘Male and female He made them,’ it immediately subjoined, ‘And God blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and rule over it,’ etc. All which things, although they could not unfittingly be referred also to the spiritual understanding, yet ‘male and female’ cannot be understood as something similar even within one man: because, namely, in him there is one thing that rules, [another that is ruled...] [continues]

Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.22): 'increase and multiply' is the gift of marriage, instituted before sin in the creation of the two sexes — a bodily distinction; 'male and female' cannot be allegorized into faculties within one man.

[...another that is ruled:] but as it most evidently appears in the bodies of different sex, that male and female were so created, that, by generating offspring, they might increase and multiply and fill the earth — to which sentence, so evident, it is great absurdity to be reluctant. For it was not about the spirit which commands and the flesh which obeys, nor about the rational mind which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor about the contemplative virtue by which it excels and the active by which it is subjected, nor about the intellect of the mind and the sense of the body, but openly about the conjugal bond by which each sex is mutually bound to the other, that the Lord, being asked whether it is lawful to dismiss a wife for any cause whatever, answered and said: ‘Have you not read, that He who made man from the beginning, made them male and female, and said, For this a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh? Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh: what therefore God has joined, let not man separate.’ It is certain, therefore, that male and female were so instituted at the first, as now we see and know two humans of different [sex...] [continues]

Augustine continues: the male/female of Gen 1:27-28 is literal, not allegorical — confirmed by Christ's own literal use of it (Matt 19:4-6) on the indissoluble marriage bond.

[...as now we see and know two humans of different sex." Thus far were the words of Augustine. These [interpretations] were brought forth by those who thought that by those words, "Increase and multiply," a precept was given to men of entering marriages and of giving effort to children, for the multiplication of the human race. Nor, however, did those doctors think that by that precept of God all men at every time are held bound, as the Heretics falsely keep saying. For they think this precept either does not oblige individual men, but only the society and community of men in general; or did indeed oblige all men, yet not always, but only so long as until the human race was multiplied; or obliged all and always, yet not for-always (as Scotus speaks), but only in a case of necessity — namely, when the human race, on account of some most savage plague or disaster and other calamities, was so diminished and reduced to such fewness, that unless by ge[neration...] [continues]

End of the Augustine quote. Pererius now sums up the 'first answer' camp: those who grant 'increase and multiply' is a precept all deny it binds every individual always (against the heretics) — variously: it binds only the community; or all but only till the race was multiplied; or all but only in cases of grave necessity (Scotus).

[...that, unless it were succored by the generation of offspring as soon as possible], it could be feared lest either simply and in the whole world, or certainly in some kingdom or province, it should utterly perish; or, finally, that that precept had the force of obliging men up to the time of the evangelical law, at which time, the counsel of cultivating virginity and celibacy being given by Christ the Lord, the obligation of that ancient precept was loosed and removed. But nevertheless, these answers are not only disapproved by the Heretics, but they do not plainly satisfy all Catholics either. Certainly Michael Medina disputes against them copiously enough [...] [continues]

The remaining views: the precept bound in depopulation-emergencies (lest the race perish), or only until the Gospel (when Christ's counsel of celibacy released it). But these answers satisfy neither the heretics nor all Catholics — Medina argues against them. Page breaks at catchword 'Medina.'

— p. 546 (PDF) · printed p. 505 —

[...Michael] Medina (book 4 On the Continence of Sacred Men, in the opening of the second controversy, through the first six chapters). Let us therefore say what right reason persuades to be nearer the truth, and what seems more congruous to the sacred letters: that no precept is contained in those words of God, “Increase and multiply,” but that God willed by that speech to declare that He therefore, when He created man, made him male and female, that through their legitimate union human offspring might be generated, and so the human race, propagated in every age, might be perpetually preserved; and that, in order that the human race might be multiplied more quickly and copiously, He implanted the greatest fecundity of generating in each sex, and signified this by His blessing. And for this reason He said, in the manner of commanding, “Increase and multiply,” that it might be understood that that speech of God is operative and efficacious of that which is signified by those words: so that, as in all other things, so in this too that should be true, “He spoke, and they were made.”

Pererius' own preferred answer (the 'second response,' with Michael Medina): the words contain NO precept at all. They declare that God made the two sexes for propagation and implanted fecundity (the 'blessing'); the imperative form marks God's word as efficacious ('He spoke and they were made,' Ps 148:5). Marginal gloss: 'In illis verbis, Crescite & multiplicamini, nullum contineri praeceptum.'

But that no precept of God underlies those words can be proved by these three arguments. For, as God said to men, “Increase and multiply,” so on the fifth day, the fishes and birds having been created, He similarly blessed and said, “Increase and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea, and let the birds be multiplied over the earth.” But who would be so far out of his mind as to think that by those words a precept was given by God to the fishes of generating and multiplying their kind? For the fishes, since they lack reason, are by no means capable of God's law and precept. Next, just

as God said, “Increase and multiply,” so in the same manner He said to the first humans, “Fill the earth and subdue it, rule over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of heaven, and all living things that move over the earth.” But I would believe no one to be either so rude, or so tenacious of his opinion, as to say that it is a precept of God to man that he subdue the earth to himself and rule over the animals: since it is of itself manifest that by those words nothing else is signified than that dominion over the animals was given to man, and the right of taking and possessing them, and of applying them to his uses as he pleases.

First two of three arguments that 'increase and multiply' is no precept: (1) the same words were said to the fish and birds (Gen 1:22), who, lacking reason, cannot be bound by a precept; (2) 'subdue the earth and rule the animals' (Gen 1:28) is plainly a grant of dominion, not a command — so neither is 'increase and multiply.' Marginal gloss: 'Psal. 148.'

Finally, if that had been a precept of God of entering matrimony and of engaging in the generation of offspring, it would deservedly have to be asked at what time that precept was abrogated: for nowhere, either in the Old or in the New Testament, is the abrogation of that precept delivered. But it is not credible that so ancient, so general, so long-lasting a precept of God would be abrogated without the public authority of the Church or of the Synagogue. Concerning the abrogation of Circumcision and of the other ceremonials of the Mosaic law, we read many things decreed in the Sacred letters, and in the most ancient Councils of the Church; concerning the antiquating of this precept, nothing anywhere is found sanctioned and established, either in the divine letters or in the ecumenical Councils. But let this question, for the present, be sufficiently disputed.

Third argument: if it were a precept, its abrogation would be recorded somewhere (as the abrogation of Circumcision and the Mosaic ceremonies is) — but no such repeal appears in Scripture or the Councils; so it was never a binding precept. This closes the disputation against the Reformers. Catchword 'Dixit' (signature SS) opens the next lemma. RESUME PDF 547 with 'Dixit...' (Gen 1:29).

— p. 547 (PDF) · printed p. 506 —

And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all the trees which have in themselves the seed of their own kind, that they may be to you for food, and to all the living things of the earth, and to every bird of Heaven, and to all that move upon the earth, and in which there is a living soul, that they may have to feed upon. GENESIS CH. 1, VERSE 29.

Lemma (Gen 1:29), the grant of the plants for food to man and the animals.

And it was so done.

Sub-lemma (Gen 1:30b).

That, “Behold, I have given you,” has emphasis: for it signifies how great a providence and care God bore for man, for whom, namely, as soon as he was created by Him, He most amply provided and gave all the things that were necessary or opportune for him — not only for living, but even for living comfortably and happily: namely, for the conservation of the human species and the generation of men, He sowed both sexes, with the greatest fecundity, into the nature of man; for man's dwelling, He assigned the most pleasant domicile of paradise; finally, for his food, He furnished an abundance of the most healthful and sweetest foods from the herbs and trees of paradise. So that it may most truly be said that God treated man as a parent is wont to treat an only-begotten and most beloved son.

Decorated initial 'I.' 'Behold, I have given you' is emphatic of God's fatherly providence — both sexes for generation, paradise for dwelling, wholesome foods for nourishment; God treated man like a parent his only beloved son.

[...as a parent is wont to treat an only-begotten and most beloved son]. But since God said in the plural number, “Behold, I have given you” (doubtless signifying Adam and Eve, to whom He spoke these words), the best conjecture is that these words were said in paradise, in which Eve was created, and from which she did not depart before she was cast out by God

on account of sin. Wherefore these words seem to some to be joined with those words which are in the following chapter, “Eat of every tree of paradise; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil eat not”: as if it were one speech of God, comprehending both these and those words of His at once. And of this opinion was Rupert, as is manifest to the reader who reads diligently and attentively what was written by him in book 2, chapter 10, and chapter 32, On the Trinity and its Works.

The plural 'you' (Adam and Eve) implies the words were spoken in paradise; some (Rupert, de Trin. 2.10, 32) join them with the food-precept and prohibition of Gen 2.

Those words are to be diligently considered and weighed: “Every herb and all the trees, that they may be to you for food.” Hence it appears that the trees were created by God at the beginning of the world in a perfect state — that is, with fruits already mature — namely, that they might immediately and abundantly supply food to man, whom God had created at a perfect age, and therefore needing solid food. Hence too it may be understood how great, in the state of innocence, would have been men's simplicity and frugality in diet, so that all the many and various things which were afterward curiously sought and cleverly found in food and drink, either men's infirmity or intemperance invented. Indeed that frugality, right up to the flood — namely, through 1656 years — was constantly kept and religiously cultivated. To [this...] [continues]

'Every herb and tree for food' shows the trees were created already bearing mature fruit (for full-grown man, who needs solid food). Hence the great dietary simplicity of innocence — later culinary refinements being inventions of weakness or excess; this frugality endured to the flood (1656 years). Marginal glosses: 'Creatas esse arbores cum fructibus maturis.'; 'Quanta fuerit à principio hominum frugalitas.'

— p. 548 (PDF) · printed p. 507 —

[...To] this time the poets seem to have looked back, when, describing that golden age of theirs, they sang in most elegant verses that there was in it a similar thinness and simplicity of diet — some of which, drawn from three Poets, I shall here set down.

Pererius likens primeval frugality to the poets' 'golden age'; he will cite Boethius, Ovid, and Lucan.

Boethius, in book 2 of the Consolation of Philosophy, meter 5, put forth these verses: “Too happy the former age, / content with the faithful fields, / and not ruined by slothful luxury, / which was wont with the easy acorn / to break its late-day fasts; / ... / nor did it know to mingle / the gifts of Bacchus with clear honey; / ... / Would that now our times might return / to the manners of the men of old!”

Boethius block-quote (Cons. Phil. II m.5): the 'former age' lived on acorns, knew no wine-and-honey luxury — a wish for the return of ancient simplicity.

Neither in sentiment nor in elegance unlike are the verses of Ovid in the first book of the Metamorphoses: “Content with foods produced by no one's compulsion, / they gathered the arbute fruits and the mountain strawberries, / and the cornel-cherries and the blackberries clinging on rough brambles, / and the acorns which had fallen from the spreading tree of Jove.”

Ovid block-quote (Metamorphoses I.103-106): the men of the Golden Age fed on wild fruits, berries, and acorns.

A similar sentiment Lucan expressed, in the fourth book, in verses at once most pointed and most charming: “O luxury, prodigal of things, / never content with what is got at little cost; / and ambitious hunger for foods sought on land and sea, / and the glory of a sumptuous table — / learn with how little life may be prolonged! / They drink not with gold and myrrh, but by a pure stream / life is restored: for the peoples the river and Ceres [grain] suffice.”

Lucan block-quote (Pharsalia IV.373-381, abridged): a rebuke of culinary luxury — life needs only water and grain.

Isidore, in book 17 of the Etymologies, chapter 7, where he treats the names of trees, says: “The holm-oak (Ilex) is named from ‘election’ (choosing): for the fruit of this tree men first chose for their food.” Whence

also the Poet: “The first mortals belched up the acorn from their throat.” For acorns and chestnuts furnish a quite solid nourishment, and have a certain agreement with bread; indeed, from these some nations make bread for themselves as their daily food.

Isidore (Etym. 17.7.38): Ilex from electio (men first chose its fruit); with a verse on acorn-eating. Acorns and chestnuts are solid, bread-like food (some peoples make bread from them).

Bede, in the Hexameron, because in this place it is said that God assigned every herb and all trees to man for food, argues that before man's sin there was no herb or tree unfruitful or useless to man for food, much less harmful; otherwise God would not have given every herb and every tree to man for food. Bede writes thus: “Hence now it is clear that before man's guilt the earth brought forth nothing harmful — no poisonous herb, no sterile tree — since it is manifestly said that every herb and all the trees were given to men and to the birds, and to all the land-animals too, for food.” But Bede's opinion is neither probable, nor his reasoning firm. For how many are the species of most beautiful [trees...] [continues]

Bede (Hexameron) argues that before the Fall no plant was unfruitful, useless, or harmful to man. Pererius rejects this as improbable (refutation continues on the next page). Marginal glosses: 'Beda putauit, ante peccatum omnes plantas fuisse frugiferas, nullamque noxiam homini.'; 'Refellitur Beda.'

— p. 549 (PDF) · printed p. 508 —

[...For how many are the species of most beautiful] trees which either bear no fruit, or certainly one not at all suited to man's food? — which it is surely not credible either to have been lacking at the beginning of the world, or to have been changed, from fruit-bearing and useful for man's food, into a contrary nature on account of man's sin. For sin did not, even in the very man who sinned, change in any part the things that were natural to him: how much less, then, in plants, which man's sin in no way touched? Someone will say that Bede spoke of the herbs and trees of paradise alone. But neither does this help Bede's opinion. For Ezekiel, chapter 31, among the trees which [were in Paradise...] [continues]

Refutation of Bede: many fine trees bear no edible fruit, and were neither absent at creation nor transformed by sin (sin changed nothing natural even in the sinner, much less in plants). Marginal gloss: 'Etiam in paradiso fuisse arbores cibo hominis minimè conuenientes.'

[...among the trees which were in Paradise], he mentions the plane-tree, the fir, and the cedars, which it is agreed are by their nature not suitable for human food: “The cedars,” says Ezekiel, “were not higher than it in the paradise of God, the firs did not equal its top, and the planes were not equal to its foliage: no tree of the paradise of God was likened to it, and to its beauty.” But Bede's argumentation is weak. For that, “Every herb and all the trees I have given you for food,” signifies this: that nothing of herbs and trees was specially forbidden to them (the one tree of the knowledge of good and evil I except), but that the power and abundance was given them of eating whatever they should choose for themselves for food. But the knowledge of distinguishing the plants that were suitable for man's food from those that were foreign [to it], Adam had received from God, and would himself have handed down to his posterity: in place of which, in the brute animals, there is a certain natural instinct, by which, as by a teacher and guide, they pursue the things suitable to their nature [...] [continues]

Ezekiel 31 names the plane, fir, and cedars in Paradise — inedible trees. So 'every tree for food' means only that nothing was forbidden (except the tree of knowledge), the power of choosing being given; Adam had God-given knowledge of which plants suited food (animals have instead a natural instinct). Marginal gloss: 'Soluitur ratio Bedae.'

[...they pursue the things suitable to their nature], and flee the contrary. Or that, “Every herb and every tree,” ought to be understood not simply and absolutely, but with an addition — namely, [every herb and tree] suitable for human food: in that manner, indeed, by which we interpret that of Paul (1 Timothy 4), “Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected which is received with thanksgiving”; for we understand every creature of God to be good which pertains to man's food, for that is what Paul there urges. Indeed, when Moses said, in the second chapter, that God produced in Paradise every tree beautiful to the sight and sweet for eating, he

indicated not obscurely that, of the trees which were in paradise, some were comely and beautiful to look at, but others pleasant and sweet for eating.

Alternatively, 'every herb and tree' is to be read 'every one suitable for food' (as with 1 Tim 4:4, 'every creature of God is good'). Gen 2:9 ('every tree beautiful to sight and sweet for food') already distinguishes ornamental from edible trees in paradise.

A DISPUTATION. Whether, in the state of innocence, the eating of flesh-meats would have been in use among men.

New disputation heading — on whether man would have eaten meat in the state of innocence.

From this sentence of the Lord, by which He Himself assigned man's food, before sin, from herbs and trees, making no word of the eating of flesh-meats, the Fathers and Theologians rightly judged that it must be understood that man's food in the state of innocence [would consist] of herbs and the [fruits] of trees alone [...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'E.' The Fathers and Theologians infer from God's silence about meat (Gen 1:29) that innocent man's diet was wholly vegetarian. Page breaks at catchword 'fructibus.'

— p. 550 (PDF) · printed p. 509 —

[...of herbs and the] fruits of trees alone, nor would there be any use of animals as food for man. For this is evidently gathered from this place: for God, designating those things whence man was to take his food, named only herbs and trees, and said nothing of the eating of animals; but if at that time it had been lawful for man to feed on animals, since that food would be the principal part of human diet, the Lord would not have been silent about it. But why, in that state, would it not have been lawful for man to feed on flesh-meats? The cause is at hand. Since food from herbs and the fruits of trees — especially of Paradise — sufficed to nourish man, and was most healthful and sweet, food [from the flesh...] [continues]

Man's innocent diet was wholly plant-based: God named only herbs and trees, and would not have omitted meat had it been a principal food. The reason follows: paradise's fruit sufficed, so meat was

superfluous...

[...food from the flesh] of animals would have been superfluous for him; nor was it fitting, for the sake of mere delight of the gullet, that man, in that state in which he ought to do nothing beyond right reason, should want to use animal flesh for food. Add that food from the things which the earth produced was more natural, simple, and easy, and procurable without any labor and care of man's; but food from the flesh of animals could not have been procured without great trouble — for many things are needed to prepare food for man from animals. And this would have greatly called man away from the contemplation of natural and heavenly things, and from the study and exercise of acquiring knowledge, which would have been man's chief care and occupation in that state — as Damascene writes in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, the last chapter:

Reasons against innocent meat-eating: it would be superfluous and mere gluttony; plant-food is more natural and effortless, whereas preparing meat takes great labor, distracting man from his chief occupation — contemplation and knowledge. Introduces Damascene.

> *"Man," he says, "before sin, dwelling on the earth in body, conversed in mind with the Angels in the understanding of the divine works, and was nourished by such studies: rising up to the Creator alone through His creatures, and contemplating Him — in whose love and contemplation he enjoyed and rejoiced with incredible pleasure."*

Damascene block-quote (de Fide orth. 2, last ch.): before sin man lived bodily on earth but conversed in mind with the angels, rising through creatures to the Creator, delighting in His contemplation.

But someone may perhaps object to us that God gave man absolute dominion over the animals, therefore he could, at his own discretion, use them even for food. But to this it must be answered that dominion over the animals was given to man — absolute, indeed, as to right and power, but as to use, with this one exception, namely, that of not using them for food: for this both right reason demonstrated to be suitable to that state, and God willed it so to be. Just as we too, in the time of Lent, have no less than

before the right and dominion over hens, geese, doves, and the other animals which we possess, of which, nevertheless, the eating is at that time forbidden us.

Objection (dominion over animals → freedom to eat them) answered: the dominion was absolute in right but limited in use (no eating) by right reason and God's will — as in Lent we own animals we may not then eat.

I do not thereby deny that man, in the state of innocence, would often have killed animals — not, however, for eating, but either in hunting for the sake of honest recreation (although Basil, in Homily 11 on Genesis, seems to have thought the contrary), or for thoroughly examining the inner and hidden parts of their body, the sight and knowledge of which the science of Anatomy now exhibits to us; or for taking various experiments of those things which it is necessary to know in order to understand the force and nature of animals. Indeed, I think it would come to pass that in the state of innocence all the liberal arts would be cultivated and exercised — I mean those arts which declare the skill of human talent, and have a genuine delight — and, by furnishing various experiments, would contribute very [much] to the acquiring of the doctrines of natural things [...] [continues]

Innocent man would still kill animals — not to eat, but for honest hunting (against Basil, Hom. 11), for anatomical study, or for natural-science experiments. Pererius adds that all the liberal arts would have been cultivated in innocence. Marginal gloss: 'In statu innocentiae futurus erat vsus artium liberalium.' Page breaks at catchword 'rimum' (plurimum, signature SS 3). RESUME PDF 551 with '...doctrinas plu[rimum]...'.

— p. 551 (PDF) · printed p. 510 —

[...to the doctrines they] contribute very much help: in short, those arts which even Kings deem it becoming and honorable to cultivate and practice. In this class I would place first agriculture, then music, the art likewise of navigating, of painting, of building, and of artfully mixing and tempering the various natures of things, and of producing new and excellent kinds of things most convenient for men's various uses.

Concluding the liberal arts of innocence: agriculture, music, navigation, painting, architecture, and the productive/chemical arts — pursuits worthy even of kings.

But why, just as God prescribed a certain food for man, did He not likewise appoint a certain drink for the same? Was it because in food there was great variety — both of the things that are born from the earth and of animals? For both, unless God had forbidden it, could have been admitted to man's diet; but since God, in that state, did not will man to feed on the flesh of animals, a certain food, from herbs and the fruits of trees, had to be assigned him by God which he should use. But in drink there was no variety: for the drink of water alone was available to man at that time — which, on account of the excellent goodness of the waters, and the greatest health and firmness of the human body, would have been at once most pleasant and most healthful. But there was then no wine: for although there were vines, yet [they were] not for the drinking of wine, but for the eating of grapes; and because there was then no need of wine, the waters abundantly sufficing for human drink, therefore no desire of drinking wine would have come upon men.

Why God prescribed a food but no drink: food had variety (and meat had to be excluded), but drink had none — only water, which alone was wholesome. No wine then: vines bore grapes to eat, not wine, water being enough. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Deus primis hominibus nó praescripsit potum, sicut cibum ... assignauit.'

That before the flood wine was not in use, at least among good and pious men, becomes a very probable conjecture from the drunkenness which befell Noah. For he, after the flood — both the waters having been made worse, and the temperament of the human body much weakened — understanding by a divine instinct that the drink of wine would be more useful for man, began to sow vines and to make wine: by the drinking of which he was seized by a most base drunkenness, into which he fell not from intemperance, but from ignorance of the virtue and power of wine — whose force would by no means have been hidden from him, if its drinking had been in use before the flood, since he had lived six hundred years

before the flood.

That wine was unknown before the Flood is argued from Noah's drunkenness (Gen 9): he, who had lived 600 years pre-Flood, fell not from intemperance but from ignorance of wine's power — which he could not have lacked had wine been in use. Marginal glosses: 'Potus vini nec fuisset in statu innocentiae, nec fuit in vsu ante diluuium.'; 'De ebrietate Noë Genes. 9.'

That they may be to you for food, and to all the living things of the earth, and to every bird of heaven, and to all that move upon the earth, and in which there is a living soul, that they may have to feed upon. GENESIS 1, VERSE 29.

Sub-lemma (the second half of Gen 1:29-30) — the grant of plant-food to the animals.

The admirable munificence of divine providence [embraces] all the living things, even the smallest and basest — of which kind are those which, clinging to the rocks, are nourished unmoved, notable by the sense of touch alone — which Rupert thinks were designated by Moses by those words, “And in which there is a living soul”: [God] embracing even these basest living things, I say, with His care and kindness. For it was not enough for God to have assigned food to the Lord [the master] — that is, to man — unless He should also abundantly provide food for his servants and slaves, that is, for the animals which He had consigned to man's service. Admiring and proclaiming this providence of God, pertaining to and pervading all things, David, in Psalm 103, says: “All things look to Thee, that Thou give them food in season; Thou giving to them, they gather; Thou opening [Thy hand...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'A.' God's providence reaches even the lowliest creatures (the sessile shellfish, 'notable by touch alone'), which Rupert (de Trin. 2.10) finds in 'in which there is a living soul.' God feeds man's animal 'servants' too — celebrated by Ps 104:27-28. Marginal glosses: 'Commendatio diuinae prouidentiae erga animalia.'; 'Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinit. cap. 10.' Page breaks at catchword 'aperiente.'

— p. 552 (PDF) · printed p. 511 —

[...Thou] opening Thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness." And by the contemplation of this providence which pertains to the animals, our Lord, in the Gospel (Matthew chapter 6), commands us to trust wholly in God: "Behold," He says, "the birds of heaven, for they sow not, neither reap, nor gather into barns, and your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of much more value than they?" And in Luke, chapter 12: "Consider the ravens, for they sow not nor reap, who have no storeroom nor barn, and God feeds them: How much more are you of value than they?"

The conclusion of Ps 104:28. From God's care of animals Christ teaches trust in God (Matt 6:26; Luke 12:24, the birds and the ravens — humans worth far more).

But by name, beyond the other living things, the Lord commemorated the ravens, as an argument of divine providence, because the raven is a carnivorous and very voracious animal, which, when little and abandoned by its parents, on account of want and greed of food cries out again and again — as if invoking God's providence, and desiring to be fed by God: for Scripture too calls that cry of the raven an invocation of God. So you have in Psalm 148: "Who gives to the beasts their food, and to the young ravens that invoke Him." And the same Job had foretold, many ages before David, chapter 38: "Who," he says, "prepares for the raven its food, when its young cry to God, wandering, because they have no food?"

The raven is singled out (Luke 12) because, voracious and abandoned young, its hungry cry is taken by Scripture as 'calling on God' (Ps 147:9 — Pererius cites '148'; Job 38:41). Marginal gloss: 'Singularis Dei prouidentia erga coruos.'

A DISPUTATION. Whether the animals which are now carnivorous fed, at the beginning of the world, on flesh too, or on plants alone.

New disputation heading — on the original diet of the now-carnivorous animals.

But here arises a question by no means to be dissembled: Whether those animals which are now carnivorous, such as Lions, then — that is, in the state of innocence or before the flood — ate the flesh of animals, or used

only the things born from the earth for food? For in this place too God assigned only herbs and the fruits of trees as food to all living things; and yet it seems natural for some animals to feed on flesh: but what is natural is from the beginning, and is always, and is not wont to be absent except rarely and by accident. Blessed Thomas considers it not only false, but even irrational, to think that the animals which are now carnivorous were not carnivorous at the beginning of the world, but were wont to feed only on the things born from the earth. For since it is natural for such animals now to feed on flesh, it must be judged that it was natural to them in the same way at all times. For what is natural to anything always belongs to it, unless perhaps by accident. I shall here set down the words of Blessed Thomas, which are in him in the first part, ques[tion 96...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'S.' The question: did lions etc. eat flesh in innocence/pre-Flood, or only plants? Aquinas (ST I q.96 a.1) holds the now-carnivorous were always so — what is natural is constant. Introduces the Aquinas quotation.

“Some,” he says, “say that the animals which are now ferocious and kill other animals would, in that state, have been tame — not only toward man, but also toward other animals. But this is altogether irrational. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, so that those to which it is now natural to eat the flesh of other animals would then have lived on herbs, like lions and falcons. Nor does the Gloss of Bede say, on Genesis 1, that the trees and the herb were given to all the animals and birds for food, but to some. There would, therefore, have been a natural discord among certain animals; nor, however, on account of [this would they be withdrawn...] [continues]

Aquinas block-quote (ST I q.96 a.1): the 'all tame' view is irrational — sin did not change animal nature; lions and falcons were always carnivorous; Bede's Gloss gives the plants to 'some' animals, not all; so there was natural predation. Page breaks at catchword 'propter.'

— p. 553 (PDF) · printed p. 512 —

[...nor, however, on account of this would they be] withdrawn from the dominion of man: just as neither now, on account of this, are they withdrawn from the Dominion of God, by whose providence this whole is dispensed. And of this providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in domestic animals: for hens are supplied as food to domestic falcons by men. Thus St. Thomas.

End of the Aquinas quote: predation does not remove the animals from man's (or God's) dominion — man would administer it (as we now feed hens to tame falcons).

From the opinion of Blessed Thomas, Cajetan is not far; whose words on this very place of Genesis which we now treat are these: "It is a difficult question concerning the carnivorous animals and many birds, in what way it is verified that food of fruits, seeds, and herbs was provided for them, as is said in the text. The solution is, that there is no animal which cannot live on these — as the provision made by Noah for the food of all the animals at the time of the flood testifies. But Moses was silent about the provision by which God also provided for animals of this kind that they should feed on flesh: because the appetite for flesh belongs to these animals not according to the nature common to them and the rest of the animals; because he was describing the common provision; wherefore, relatively to the common nature of living things, the appetite of feeding on flesh is found as if arising from a necessity of matter; and therefore it was rightly passed over in silence by Moses." Thus Cajetan.

Cajetan block-quote (on this place): no animal cannot live on plants (cf. Noah's ark); Moses passed over the flesh-appetite because it is not part of animals' common nature but arises 'from a necessity of matter' in some — so he rightly omitted it while describing the common provision.

The opinion of St. Thomas was followed by Tostatus, treating question 36 on the first chapter of Genesis: to confirm which opinion the authority of Aristotle is adduced, in the first book of the Politics, distinguishing three kinds of animals — of which to some it is natural to feed only on herbs, like cattle; to others to feed only on flesh, like lions; to some, indifferently

on both, like man.

Tostatus (on Gen 1, q.36) follows Aquinas, citing Aristotle (Politics 1) on three dietary classes: herbivores (cattle), carnivores (lions), and omnivores (man).

> *The other opinion, contrary to this, is: that in the state of innocence and before the flood, the animals were wont to feed not on the flesh of other animals, but only on the things which the earth produced. This Bede thought, and affirmed in the Hexameron, explaining this place which we have in hand: "It is clear," he says, "that neither did the birds themselves live by the seizing of weaker fowls, nor did the wolf scout out ambushes around the sheepfolds, nor was the dust [of the earth] the serpent's bread; but all things harmoniously fed on green herbs and the fruits of trees." Thus Bede.*

The contrary view (Bede, Hexameron): before the Flood every creature was herbivorous — no birds of prey, no wolf stalking sheepfolds, all feeding peaceably on plants. Marginal gloss: 'Ante diluuium nullum animal vixisse carnium esu.'

Pondering with myself these words of Bede which I have recounted, I greatly wonder, indeed, how Blessed Thomas, in that place which I set down a little before, writes that Bede spoke not of all the animals, but of some only: whereas Bede expressly said that all the animals then harmoniously took their food from herbs and the fruits of trees. Tostatus also, having changed the prior opinion which he had followed on the first chapter of Genesis, afterward, on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, question 272, in a long disputation contends to prove that before the flood the animals had no food from the flesh of other animals, but only from the things which the earth produces.

Pererius notes Aquinas misreports Bede (who said 'all,' not 'some,' animals were herbivorous); and Tostatus later reversed himself (Gen 13, q.272), arguing at length that no animal ate flesh before the Flood.

And this opinion can be built up chiefly by two arguments. For God in this place said in clear words that He had given the herbs and trees for food to

all living things, excepting no kind of animal, and making no mention of the eating of flesh. But those who think the contrary [...] [continues]

Two arguments for the all-herbivorous view begin: (1) God's words give plants to ALL living things, excepting none and naming no meat. The opponents' reply follows on the next page. Page breaks at catchword 'tiunt' (sentiunt).

— p. 554 (PDF) · printed p. 513 —

[...those who think the contrary], meeting this reasoning, answer that God spoke not of all animals, but only of those which are not carnivorous, and assigned the food from herbs and the fruits of trees to these alone. But that this defense is most feeble is proved in two ways. First, God's speech is so general that it can admit no exception: for three times God used a mark of generality, saying, “That they may be for food to all the living things of the earth, and to every bird of heaven, and to all that move upon the earth, and in which there is a living soul.” Could anything more general be said of living things than is here said? — so that God seems to have spoken thus deliberately, in order to leave no place for excepting any kind of animal.

The opponents say God spoke only of non-carnivores. First refutation: God's words are emphatically universal ('all ... every ... all'), deliberately leaving no room for exceptions.

Next, there was no reason why God should assign food to the non-carnivorous animals, but say nothing of the carnivorous, since these are of great variety, and are nearly nobler than the non-carnivorous. Another reason is added to confirm that opinion: In Noah's ark, for one year, were all the animals, and yet at that time none of them fed on flesh — which is clear both from the kind of foods which God commanded Noah to bring into the ark (as is written in the last words of the sixth chapter of the book of Genesis), and from the fact that of the unclean animals only two of each species entered the ark, but of the clean, seven: which fewness would by no means have sufficed both for conserving the species of the animals and for feeding the carnivorous animals. Nor ought it to be attributed to a miracle that the carnivorous animals at that time lived not on flesh but on

the earth-born things: for even after going out of the ark they abstained for some time from the eating of fle[sh...] [continues]

Second refutation: God would not name only non-carnivores (the carnivores being many and nobler). And in the ark for a year none ate flesh (the foods Noah stocked, Gen 6:21; only 2 unclean / 7 clean of each kind — too few to both survive and feed predators) — and they abstained a while even after disembarking, not by miracle.

[...the eating of flesh], it must be said: otherwise, since there were then so few animals of each species, several of their species would have been consumed by the carnivores and utterly removed from the midst. But that the now-carnivorous animals did not at that time feed on flesh, the cause was not either that God by a miracle preserved the other living things lest they become their prey, or that He took away from the carnivores, as to the second act, the natural propensity and greed of eating flesh, or that the nature of the animals was changed before and after the flood, or that God made the herbs and fruits at that time more pleasant and healthful to the animals than flesh — similarly to what is believed to have been done in the manna given to the Hebrews in the desert. For it is not credible that God, without a necessary cause, would have willed to do so great a miracle for so long a time among the beasts, when it is easy to refer the cause of that thing to the goodness of the things which the earth then produced, and to the best constitution of the animals' temperament.

The carnivores' early abstinence was no miracle: not preserved prey, nor a removed appetite, nor changed nature, nor manna-like sweetened plants — but simply the goodness of the early earth's produce and the animals' excellent constitution. Marginal gloss: 'Cur ante diluuium nullum animal vescebatur carnibus.'

For since the animals received, from herbs and the fruits of trees, an abundant, pleasant, and healthful food, sufficient for nourishing and strengthening them, without any labor, they were assuredly incited by no hunger or greed to the slaughter of animals and the eating of flesh. But to that argument which the authors of the contrary opinion think strongest — that what is natural to animals is at no time changed, so that if it is now

natural for some to feed on flesh, [it was always...] [continues]

Since the early earth gave abundant effortless plant-food, no hunger drove the beasts to kill. Pererius turns to the opponents' strongest argument (the constancy of nature: if carnivory is natural now, it always was) — answered on the next page. Marginal gloss: 'Solutio argumentationis contrariae opinionis.' Page breaks at catchword 'semper' (signature TT). RESUME PDF 555 with '...vesci carnibus, [semper]...'.

— p. 555 (PDF) · printed p. 514 —

[...it was always] natural to them: It is most easy to answer, that “natural” is taken in two ways: in one way, that which follows the specific nature and flows from the thing's essence — as it is natural for man to be risible; and this is changeable at no time, no more, indeed, than the substance itself. In the other way, “natural” is said of that which follows the individual nature, and the temperament of the body itself, which they commonly call the complexion. And because the temperament of man and of animals varies along with age, hence it happens that what is natural to man at some one age is not natural to him according to another age. For ex[ample...] [continues]

Pererius answers the constancy-of-nature objection: 'natural' has two senses — (1) following the species/essence (like risibility), which never changes; (2) following the individual constitution/'complexion,' which varies with age — so what is natural at one age may not be at another.

[...For ex]ample, it is natural for man in infancy not to feed on flesh, but to be nourished with maternal milk; to whom, however, when now adult in age — the temperament, namely, being changed — it becomes natural to feed on flesh, but beyond nature to be nourished by milk alone. Since, therefore, both the force of the plants and the constitution of the animals' temperament were very greatly different before and after the flood, it ought to seem strange to no one that, for the animals which are now naturally carnivorous, food from herbs and the fruits of trees was natural to them before the flood.

The age-analogy: milk is natural to the infant, flesh to the adult (the constitution having changed). So the changed pre/post-Flood conditions make an originally herbivorous diet 'natural' to the now-carnivores.

These, then, are the things which are disputed by great men on the contrary sides of the proposed question. And although either opinion can be held and defended with sufficient probability, the latter nevertheless seems to me more congruous to divine Scripture, and nearer to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. For the present I shall raise up one weightiest witness for the confirmation of that matter, Blessed Basil, who affirmatively teaches and eloquently treats what we disputed in the latter opinion, in homily 11 on Genesis. For, explaining this very place concerning the food which God assigned to the animals from herbs and trees, he writes thus:

Pererius declares for the latter view (all herbivorous before the Flood) as nearer to Scripture and the Fathers, and adduces Basil (Hexaemeron, hom. 9/'11') at length. Marginal gloss: 'Auctor posteriori sententiae libentius accedit.'

“He did not say, I have given you fishes for food, or cattle: for I did not create these for that use. For that primary legislation granted only the eating of fruits. For the eating of fruits was conferred upon us in common with the wild beasts and the other animals — although now it is permitted to see few of the wild beasts fed on fruits. For with what fruit, pray, would the panther sustain itself fed? what fruit would yield to the lion for food? Yet these wild beasts, for as long as they bore the yoke of the law of nature, sustained life by the eating of fruits. But God, when He had foreknown that man, after the flood, would in no way temper himself from forbidden foods, granted [him] to feed on any food. For, speaking of the animals to man, ‘All these,’ He says, ‘I have handed over to you as green herbs.’ By this indulgent concession granted to us, the animals too were each endowed with an equal liberty of eating anything with impunity. From that time the cruel lion feeds [on flesh], the vulture with gaping beak makes for carcasses. For the vulture did not have this from the beginning of its creation: for

no carrion was then found whereby the vultures might nourish themselves. But not even that did nature [permit...] [continues]

Basil block-quote: God's first 'legislation' granted only plant-food, shared by beasts; the lion and panther lived on fruit while under nature's yoke. Only after the Flood, when God let man eat anything (Gen 9:3, 'as green herbs'), did the animals too get free rein — and only then did lions and vultures turn predator/scavenger. Marginal gloss: 'Genes. 9.'

[...But not even that] did nature, persisting in its own vigor, permit. Nor did hunters then give effort to catching wild beasts, nor was that a pursuit for men, since neither did the wild beast exercise its rage with bared teeth against men, inasmuch as they were not yet flesh-eaters. Afterward there grew upon the vultures the custom of seeking food from dead carcasses; but in the beginning, both the vultures and the others which are now carnivorous had, after the manner of swans, an undifferentiated and the same way of living for all. Every animal cropped and grazed for itself only the herbs of the meadow. A certain notable instance of this thing one may see also in dogs: for when they are eager to heal themselves, you may see them again and again graze [the grass...] [continues]

Basil block-quote (continued): in the beginning all creatures (even future vultures and carnivores) lived alike on meadow-grass, like swans — no hunters, no beasts raging at men. (Dogs eating grass to heal themselves is offered as a sign of instinctive plant-use.) Page breaks at catchword 'depasci.'

— p. 556 (PDF) · printed p. 515 —

[...you may see them again and again] graze the grass: not that grass is suitable for nourishing the dog, but because, in the matter of human training, with nature alone for teacher, the brutes flee to that which by natural instinct they perceive will be of use to them. I would have you consider with yourself, that the animals were then of such a kind (which today you see feed on raw flesh) that by the imaginative power they apprehended every herb given them for food to be suitable and healthful for them; and for that reason, content with that food, they in no way plotted against the life of others." Thus Basil. The same was

the opinion of Josephus, in the first book of the Jewish Antiquities, writing that before the sin of the first man there was no strife among the animals.

End of the Basil block-quote: the early animals, by instinct/imagination, found the herbs wholesome and so left one another in peace. Josephus (Ant. 1) agrees: no strife among animals before the Fall.

And they were both naked, namely Adam and his wife, and they were not ashamed. CHAPTER 2, VERSE 25.

Lemma (Gen 2:25), the nakedness without shame of the first pair.

Moses signifies by this that those first men were of a simple, candid, and innocent mind: such, namely, that although they were naked, they were nevertheless affected by no shame; so great was the concord of flesh and spirit, and no rebellion of the senses against reason. And so by these words is briefly indicated what that primeval state of man before sin was, both as to body and as to mind. As to body, with respect to natural beauty and impassibility: for so great was the beauty of the body that, for its comeliness and adornment, there was no need of any clothes. As to impassibility, because, although they were naked, they were nevertheless liable to no inconveniences of rains, winds, heat, cold, or other [discomforts] of sky and air. But as to mind, with respect to innocence — which is declared most expressly by those words, “And they were not ashamed”: for there is signified a perfect emptiness from all perturbation of mind, and from every immoderate motion of appetite, and the perfect obedience which the lower part of man rendered to the higher. And because so great a good as this proceeded from original justice, at the same time is also demonstrated how great was the force and excellence of that admirable gift.

Decorated initial 'S.' The verse indicates the pre-sin state in body (beauty needing no clothes; impassibility — no harm from weather) and mind (innocence — 'they were not ashamed' = no mental disturbance, no disordered appetite, the lower part obeying the higher) — a fruit of original justice.

But it must be known that after sin there was need of clothing, and that its use was taken up for various causes. First, indeed, clothing began to be used for the cause of necessity, namely to cover and protect the body against the injuries of sky and air; then for the cause of modesty and decency, to veil the obscenity of certain members; afterward to conceal some vice and deformity of the body; then for adornment and beauty; nay even (O wickedness!) for lasciviousness and the incitement of lust; and finally for distinguishing the various grades of men's dignity and power. But these would have had no place in the state of innocence; therefore there would have been then no use of clothing.

The six post-Fall uses of clothing — protection, modesty, concealing defects, adornment, (perversely) seductive enticement, and marking rank — none of which would apply in innocence, so no clothing then. Marginal gloss: 'Multiplex vsus vestium.'

Likewise, for many causes it comes about that bodily nakedness is no reproach or shame: either because someone is not in possession of reason, like children and the mad; or because some excessive fear seizes and overwhelms shame — as if someone, perceiving the collapse or the burning of his house, should leap naked from his bed into public; or on account of the most ancient cus[tom of a region...] [continues]

Cases where nakedness is not shameful: lack of reason (children, the insane); overwhelming fear (fleeing a fire); or ancient regional custom (continues on the next page). Marginal gloss: 'Quibus de causis nuditas corporis non sit pudenda.'

— p. 557 (PDF) · printed p. 516 —

[...or on account of the most ancient cus]tom of a region — as in Brazil and elsewhere all are of naked body; and the custom of bathing together in the baths takes away the shame of nakedness; or because the body is clothed and adorned with the garment of glory — for the bodies of the Blessed after the resurrection will be naked, but because then the just will shine like the Sun, that nakedness will be a great comeliness and glory to them. Finally, in the state of innocence bodily nakedness would by no means

have been shameful: for to what end would they have wished to use clothes? since neither outwardly would any evil or trouble befall them on account of nakedness, nor inwardly would they feel anything disordered and shameful.

More cases: regional custom (Brazil), communal bathing, and the glorified bodies of the risen just (naked yet shining like the sun). In innocence nakedness was no shame — clothing being needless against neither outer harm nor inner disorder.

Wisely, therefore, Augustine, in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 1: "The first men," he says, "were naked, and were not confounded. There was no motion in the body to which shame was owed: they thought nothing must be veiled, because they had felt nothing must be restrained. For what would shame them, when they had felt no law in their members repugnant to the law of their mind?" Thus Augustine there.

Augustine block-quote (de Gen. ad lit. 11.1): the first pair felt no shame because there was no disordered bodily 'motion' needing restraint — no law in the members warring against the mind (the post-Fall concupiscence of Rom 7:23).

Plato, commending the innocence and simplicity, in food and clothing and every cultivation of life, of the ancient men who lived under the reign of Saturn (which the Poets called the golden age), brought forth things similar to those which Moses records concerning the happy state of the first men before sin. For Plato left these things written in the Politicus:

Plato's account of the men of Saturn's reign (the golden age) parallels Moses on the first men's happy state. Introduces a quotation from the Statesman (Politicus). Marginal gloss: 'Plato consentanea Mosi scripsit de nuditate corporum primorum hominum.'

"Nor indeed," he says, "at that time was there any wild beast, nor did one yield to another as prey and food; nor was there any war, nor any sedition — there would, indeed, be more things that could be said, which followed upon this so great a quiet. But let only that now be said which pertained to man's spontaneous food. God Himself fed

them, and was set over them, just as now man, since he is a divine animal, feeds and rules the other animals. And with God feeding [them], there was then no commonwealth, nor any production of wives and children: all were nourished from the earth; they had abundant fruits from the oaks and from the other trees, born not, indeed, by tillage, but generated spontaneously by the earth. Naked and without bedding they continued under the open sky; the pleasant places of the mountains were theirs, they had soft beds, since all the herbs sprang up abundantly from the earth." Thus Plato — as to food from the earth's produce and the nakedness of bodies, very congruently with the things which Moses wrote in this place.

Plato block-quote (Statesman 271-272): in the age of Cronus no beast preyed on another, no war; God shepherded men, who fed on the earth's spontaneous fruits, lived naked under the open sky on soft grass — strikingly parallel to Eden.

And so this place, in which the most happy state of the first men before sin is briefly signified and commended, invites us to dispute separately and accurately concerning the most ample goods and the excellence of the state of innocence. But because this disputation will be quite long and contentious, and could fill the just measure of one book, and since the size of this fourth volume has grown so much that it now demands that some limit and end be set to it, it will be better that we transfer that disputation to the fifth book which will next follow this one, and consume that whole book in diligently and copiously treating so weighty and difficult and illustrious a matter.

Pererius defers the full treatise on the state of innocence to Book V, since Book IV has grown too large. Marginal gloss: 'Praeparatio lectoris ad quintum librum proximè sequentem.'

The end of the fourth book.

Colophon — END OF BOOK IV of Pererius' Commentaries on Genesis.

— p. 558 (PDF) · printed p. 517 —

OF BENEDICT PERERIUS, OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS, BOOK FIVE. Which is concerning the happy state of the first men before sin, or concerning the state of innocence. PREFACE.

Title and heading of BOOK V — devoted entirely to the state of innocence (the disputation deferred from the end of Book IV), with an ornamental headpiece.

How great was the excellence of the state of innocence — in which our first parents were for a very brief time (but had they not sinned, both they themselves and all their posterity would have remained in it perpetually) — can be clearly known and estimated from three things. First, from those things which we read written here and there in the Sacred letters concerning the excellence of that state; then, from the evils and miseries into which, cast down from that state, we have all fallen; finally, from those things which the most holy men, most learned in divine things, illuminated and taught by God, have brought forth in their writings concerning the felicity of that state.

Decorated initial 'Q.' Book V's program: the excellence of the state of innocence (held but briefly, yet meant to be perpetual) is known from three sources — Scripture, the miseries of the Fall, and the writings of the holy and learned. Marginal gloss: 'Tribus ex rebus cognosci posse status innocentiae excellentiam.'

But what are the things which are delivered concerning that state in the Sacred letters? Truly excellent and illustrious things. For what is more admirable than what is narrated by Moses in the last words of the second chapter concerning Adam and Eve: “Both,” he says, “were naked, and they were not ashamed”? By which words a twofold excellence of that state is indicated: the one contains the inestimable simplicity of mind and innocence, on account of which no shame befell man from the nakedness of his own body — there was no obscenity of any member, because there was in them no obscene motion; there was no law in the members repugnant to the law of the mind; finally, nothing in the body was felt to be turned away from, or shameful. The other excellence pertained to the

impassibility of the body: for although the body was naked, it was nevertheless struck by no external inconveniences and troubles, much less inj[ured...] [continues]

Scripture's chief witness to the state is Gen 2:25 ('naked and not ashamed'), indicating two excellences: (1) the innocence of mind — no shame, no obscene motion, no law of the members warring on the mind; (2) the body's impassibility — naked yet unharmed by anything external. Page breaks at catchword 'batur' (laede-batur, signature TT 3). RESUME PDF 559 with '...nedum laede[batur]...'.

— p. 559 (PDF) · printed p. 518 —

[...much less inj]ured. Then, it is written in the second chapter of the book of Wisdom that God created man imperishable: by which is signified that man was so created by God that he could neither sin nor die — which has a great felicity both of body and of mind. Besides, in chapter 7 of the book of Ecclesiastes, it is thus written by Solomon: “God made man upright, [but] he mingled himself with infinite questions.” But the rectitude of man is twofold: the one in the superior part of man, that it, namely, be wholly subject to God; the other is in the inferior part, in which are the senses and the irascible and concupiscible appetite, which inferior part is then at last upright, [if it in no way resists reason...] [continues]

Preface to Book V (continuing). Scripture's witness to innocence: Wisdom 2:23 (man created 'imperishable' — able neither to sin nor die); Ecclesiastes 7:29 ('God made man upright'). Man's rectitude is twofold — the superior part subject to God, the inferior (sense/appetite) subject to reason. Marginal gloss: 'Rectitudo hominis duplex.'

[...is then at last upright, if it in no way resists] reason, but obeys it at a nod, and so that all its motions are in the power of man, as to their excitation, duration, intensity, and termination. And both these rectitudes of man were an effect of original justice, which was the chief mark, ornament, defense, and adornment of that state. Finally, here too can be accommodated and applied what David sang in Psalm 48: “Man, when he was in honor, understood not: he was compared to the senseless beasts, and was made like to them.” By which is signified that, although man — even having a

nature vitiated and corrupted by sin — far excels the other animals, yet so great was his honor and glory in the state of innocence, that, cast down from that state on account of sin, he truly became comparable and like to the senseless beasts. For in that state man would have been immortal; cast down from it, he dies equally with the beasts, and is not only liable to the same diseases and inconveniences as the brutes, [but to many more and graver...] [continues]

The inferior part's rectitude: the appetites fully under reason's command. Both rectitudes flowed from original justice — the crown of that state. Ps 49:12: man, once 'in honor,' became 'like the senseless beasts' through sin — once immortal, now mortal and prey to many ills.

[...liable, but to many more and graver ones]. The evils, moreover, with which we are afflicted on account of sin sufficiently declare of what kind and how great were the goods which the first men enjoyed before sin. God said to Eve, as a penalty for the sin committed: “I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions: in pain shalt thou bring forth sons.” Therefore in the state of innocence neither would the woman's conception have been sorrowful, nor childbirth with pain, nor would subjection to her husband have been bitter and hateful, or even in any part unpleasant. But to Adam God said: “Cursed is the earth in thy work: in labors shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, and thou shalt eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread, until thou return to the earth from which thou wast taken; for dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return.” From these one may estimate that, had Adam not sinned, the earth of its own accord, without any labor and trouble of man's, would have abundantly supplied all things pertaining to food; nor would men, as now, be about to die and return to dust.

The second source — the miseries of the Fall reveal the lost goods: the penalties on Eve (painful conception/childbirth, subjection; Gen 3:16) and Adam (the cursed, thorny earth; toil; death and return to dust; Gen 3:17-19) show that in innocence childbirth was painless, food spontaneous, and death absent.

Finally, in the book of Wisdom it is delivered: “By the envy of the devil death entered into the world.” And Paul writes to the Romans, chapter 5: “Through sin death entered into the world, and passed through to all men”: man, therefore, was not going to die in the state of innocence. But if this life which we now live — short, fleeting, perishable, and bitter with the admixture of so many and so great evils repeatedly assailing — is yet so greatly loved by all, how lovable was that life going to be, which knew not death, and was free of all evils? Now [...] [continues]

Death came only by sin (Wisdom 2:24; Rom 5:12) — so man would not have died in innocence. If even this wretched, mortal life is loved, how much more lovable was the deathless, evil-free life of innocence? Marginal gloss: 'Sapient. 1.' Page breaks at catchword 'IAM.'

— p. 560 (PDF) · printed p. 519 —

But now, if anyone weighs the things which the Fathers have handed down concerning the most excellent goods of that innocence, he will understand that surely nothing on earth could be more magnificent than that state for amplitude of dignity, nor more pleasant for sweetness of delight, nor more abundant for the plenty of all goods, nor finally more desirable and blessed for every will and desire of man. Let the reader attend, I pray, how splendid and illustrious, and greater than all estimation of earthly felicity, are the things which Augustine wrote, in more than one place, in commendation of that state. For he, in chapter 20 of book 12 On the City of God, speaks thus:

The third source — the writings of the Fathers, supremely Augustine, who in several places extols the state. Introduces the first of three long Augustine quotations (de Civ. Dei 12.20).

“Although the first men were not going to die unless they had sinned, they nevertheless used nourishments, as men, bearing not yet spiritual but still animal, earthly bodies. Which bodies, although they would not grow old by age so as to be brought of necessity to death — a state which was furnished to them by the tree of life, which was in the midst of Paradise together with the forbidden tree, by the wonderful grace of God — yet they also took other foods, lest their animal bodies should

feel any trouble by hungering and thirsting. But the tree of life was tasted for this reason, lest death should creep upon them from anywhere, or, worn out by old age, the spaces of time being run through, they should perish."

Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 12.20): the first pair had animal (not yet glorified) bodies; ordinary food kept off hunger, while the tree of life kept off aging and death — so they were deathless not by nature but by grace. Marginal gloss: 'Augustini sententia de foelicitate primorum hominum ante peccatum.'

The same Augustine, in book 14 of the same work, chapter 10, writes thus: "But whether the first men had those affections in the animal body before sin, such as we shall not have in the spiritual body when all sin is purged and ended, is not unreasonably asked. For if they had them, how were they blessed in that memorable place of blessedness, that is, in Paradise? For who, at last, can be called absolutely blessed who is affected by fear or grief? But what could those men fear or grieve at, in so great an affluence of so great goods, where neither was death feared, nor any ill health of body, nor was anything lacking which a good will would attain, nor was there anything which would offend the flesh or mind of the man living happily? Love toward God was undisturbed, and [the love] of the spouses living among themselves in faithful and sincere society; and from this love a great joy, that which was loved not ceasing to be enjoyed. There was a tranquil avoidance of sin, which remaining, no evil at all from elsewhere that would sadden rushed in. How happy, then, were the first men, and were agitated by no perturbations of mind, injured by no inconveniences of body! So happy would the whole human society be, if neither they would transmit to posterity the evil [they incurred], nor would anyone of their stock commit iniquity which would receive damnation. And this felicity persisting, until through that blessing by which it was said, 'Increase and multiply,' the number of the predestined Saints was completed, another greater [felicity] would be given, which was given to the most blessed Angels, where there would

now be a certain security that none would sin and none would die; and such would be the life of the Saints, after no experience of labor, grief, death, as it will be after all these things, in the incorruption of bodies restored by the resurrection of the dead."

Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.10): the first pair were truly blessed in Paradise — no fear, grief, death, or want; undisturbed love of God and of each other; and, had they persisted until the predestined were complete, they would have been raised to the angelic security (no possibility of sin or death).

Finally, in chapter 26 of the same book, Augustine disputes concerning the same state in this manner: "Man lived in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished, [doing] that which God had commanded: he lived enjoying God, from which Good he was good; he lived without any want, having it in his power thus always to live. Food was at hand lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst, the tree of life lest old age dissolve him: nothing of corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any troubles to any of his senses. No internal [disease...] [continues]

Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.26): man in Paradise lived freely, enjoying God, without want — food, drink, and the tree of life keeping off hunger, thirst, and age; no bodily corruption disturbed his senses. (The same passage was cited earlier, at printed p.498.) Page breaks at catchword 'secus.'

— p. 561 (PDF) · printed p. 520 —

[...No internal] disease, no blow from without was feared. The highest health in the flesh, in the soul all tranquillity. As in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense to good will came from desire or fear. Nothing at all sad, nothing was emptily glad: a true joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith; and among the spouses a faithful society from honest love, a concordant watchfulness of mind and body, and a keeping of the commandment without labor. No weariness wearied the idle, no sleep oppressed the unwilling. In so great a facility of things and felicity of men, far be it that we should

suspect that offspring could not be sown without the disease of lust — but that those members would be moved by the same nod of the will as the others, and without the enticing goad of ardor, with tranquillity of mind, and with no corruption of the body's integrity, the husband would be poured into the lap of the wife. For it is not, because it cannot be proved by experience, therefore not to be believed; since a turbid heat would not move those parts of the body, but a spontaneous power would apply them as need required: so that now the virile seed could be sent into the spouse's womb, the integrity of the female genital being safe, just as now, that same integrity being safe, the flux of menstrual blood can be emitted from a virgin's womb. For by the same way it could be injected, by which this can be ejected. For as, for giving birth, not a groan of pain but the impulse of maturity would relax the female viscera, so, for impregnating and conceiving, not the appetite of lust but a voluntary use would join the two natures." And these things, truly splendid, excellent, and admirable, concerning that state, Augustine left in his writings.

End of the Augustine block-quote (de Civ. Dei 14.26): perfect health and tranquillity; joy in God; effortless obedience; and generation without lust — the will moving the generative members calmly, the integrity intact (as menstrual blood now leaves an intact virgin). (Repeats the passage cited at p.498.)

But what of Gregory? truly things not unlike Augustine, for in the Prologue of the third penitential Psalm he writes in this manner: "The Sabbath is interpreted 'rest': the human race had a sabbath in the first parent, who, as long as he stood firm in obedience to his Creator, rested on the most sweet bed of divine contemplation. For in Paradise the first man, possessed of delights, just as he could feel no hunger in his soul, so also was ignorant of every passion which is born from the flesh. But after, by sinning, he lost the familiarity of divine converse, succumbing to the laws of death, he lost the rest of eternal felicity, and fell into the stormy waves of worldly instability, because he scorned to keep the state of rectitude. The faithful soul, therefore, recalling to

memory the rest lost in the first man, and nonetheless contemplating, by the agility of the spirit, the future sabbath of eternal life, desires to be snatched from all corruption of spirit and flesh, and prays that, the term of this life being completed, it may be led without delay to the future rest of unfailing beatitude." Thus Gregory.

Gregory the Great block-quote (on Ps 50/'third penitential Psalm'): innocence was a 'sabbath' of contemplative rest in the first parent, lost by sin (which plunged man into worldly storms); the faithful soul longs to regain that rest in eternal beatitude.

Damascene also thought so magnificently, so splendidly and sublimely about that state, that nothing [could be] beyond it. For, disputing about Paradise in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 11: "Since," he says, "God was about to form man, from the visible creation, to His own image and likeness, as a kind of King and Prince of the whole earth and of those which are in it, He built beforehand for him, as it were, a Royal palace, in which, dwelling, he might lead a blessed and in every part happy life. And this is the divine Paradise, planted by the hands of God in Eden, the storehouse of all gladness and pleasure, higher than all the earth, of the best temperature, and splendid with the most subtle and purest air, distinguished by ever-flourishing plants, filled with sweetness of fragrance, and full of light, surpassing all sensible [loveliness...] [continues]

John Damascene block-quote (de Fide orth. 2.11): God built Paradise as a 'royal palace' for man, His viceroy — a place of all delight, surpassing earthly beauty (continues on the next page). Page breaks at catchword 'sensibilis.'

— p. 562 (PDF) · printed p. 521 —

[...surpassing all sensible] loveliness and beauty beyond understanding. A divine place, indeed, and worthy of the habitation of him who had been created to the image of God: in which no irrational creature dwelt, but only man, the work of divine hands. And before Adam had tasted the forbidden food, he himself and Eve were naked,

and they were not ashamed: for thus God wished us to be impassible. Without care also and solicitude we should have had but one work, which is the Angels' — to praise the Creator unwearyingly and assiduously, and to be delighted by His contemplation. But Adam, remaining with his body in this divine and more-than-beautiful place, his soul dwelt in a place incomparably higher and more beautiful, having God as His domestic guest and indweller — who was also a glorious garment to him, and who had clothed him round about with grace, [Adam] being delighted by the one sweetest fruit of His contemplation; and he was, as it were, another Angel, nourished by heavenly food." Thus far from Damascene.

End of the Damascene block-quote: Paradise was worthy of God's image-bearer, inhabited by man alone; Adam, naked and unashamed (impassible by God's will), would have had the angels' one task — to praise and contemplate God, whom he had as indwelling guest, garment, and grace; 'another angel, fed on heavenly food.'

That state of innocence, therefore, was most heaped-up and most adorned with all goods and all things to be sought by man — which divine Scripture, the doctrine of the holy Fathers, and the very experience of so many and so great evils to which we are all liable on account of the loss of that state, manifestly demonstrate. And seven things made up, contained, and chiefly adorned the state of innocence, of which three were outside man — namely, the habitation of the terrestrial Paradise, the fruit of the tree of life, and the singular care of God, wonderfully preserving the man set in that state from every evil, of mind as of body, even the slightest.

The three witnesses (Scripture, Fathers, the miseries of the Fall) prove innocence's excellence. The state consisted of SEVEN goods, three external: (1) the terrestrial Paradise, (2) the fruit of the tree of life, (3) God's singular preserving care. Marginal gloss: 'Septem praecipuè rebus status innocentiae continebatur.'

But four other things were in man himself: for there was in him a fourfold excellence — one of wisdom, another of sanctifying grace, the third of original justice, the fourth of the immortality and impassibility which God

had furnished to his body. About these four, distinctly, clearly, and at length, as the slenderness of our talent and learning bears, we shall discourse in this book. For about the terrestrial Paradise and the Tree of life it was said by us above, in the third book; but about the special providence and care of God toward man dwelling in that state, we shall treat mixedly and intermingled with those four things which we have undertaken to declare in this volume. And those things, indeed, concerning which we shall here discourse, we treated eight years ago, when publicly explaining the book of Genesis in the Roman Gymnasium; but those things, afterward augmented and enriched with very many matters, we have made the argument and material of this fifth volume.

The four internal goods (the subject of Book V): (1) wisdom, (2) sanctifying grace, (3) original justice, (4) bodily immortality/impassibility — God's special providence being treated alongside. Pererius notes the Paradise/tree of life were covered in Book III, and that this material derives from his public Genesis lectures at the Collegio Romano ('Roman Gymnasium') eight years earlier. Catchword 'DE' (signature VV) opens the first disputation of Book V. RESUME PDF 563 with 'DE...' (the first chapter, on the wisdom of the first man).

— p. 563 (PDF) · printed p. 522 —

OF THE COMMENTARIES. ON THE FIRST EXCELLENCE OF THE STATE OF INNOCENCE, THAT IS, ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF ADAM.

Heading of the first disputation of Book V (with an ornamental band) — on the first of innocence's internal goods: Adam's God-given knowledge.

The Lord God therefore, having formed from the ground all the living things of the earth and all the birds of Heaven, brought them to Adam, that he might see what he would call them: for whatever Adam called every living soul, that is its name. And Adam called all the living things by their names, and all the birds of Heaven, and all the beasts of the earth. CHAPTER 2, VERSES 19-20.

Lemma (Gen 2:19-20), the naming of the animals — the proof-text for Adam's knowledge.

From various places of Scripture the Fathers and Theologians argue that Adam, when first created by God, was most instructed and most adorned with the knowledge of all natural things. For this is plainly signified and attested by those words which are in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17: “Discipline,” it says, “filled their intellect” (Scripture there speaks of the first men), “the spirit created knowledge for them, He filled their heart with sense, and showed them good and evil. He added discipline to them, and made them heirs by the law of life. Their eye saw the great things of His honor,” and the rest. Likewise in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter 7, it is written that man was made upright by God; the whole man, therefore, was created upright. But the chief part of man is the intellect, which, if it be not upright, man can by no means be called upright. But the rectitude of the intellect consists in the knowledge of truth, just as its obliquity, distortion, and error in the assent to and approval of falsity. If, therefore, the first man was created upright, it is necessary that he was created with a perfect knowledge of things. But the Doctors chiefly gather and prove this concerning Adam's knowledge from this place of Moses which we have proposed to explain: by which Moses narrates that God brought to Adam all the living things, that he might impose names on them. And Moses subjoins, “For whatever Adam called every living soul, that is its name: and Adam called all the living things by their names.” From which it is concluded, not obscurely nor doubtfully, that Adam from the beginning had a perfect knowledge of all the animals. For if he had lacked such knowledge, he could by no means have imposed names suited to the natures of the individual animals. For excellently, in the Cratylus, Plato [affirms] that he who, first of all [mortals...] [continues]

Decorated initial 'E.' Scripture's testimony to Adam's created knowledge: Sirach 17 (the spirit gave them knowledge, showed good and evil); Eccl 7:29 ('God made man upright' — and the intellect, man's chief part, is upright only by truth). The proof-text: the naming of the animals (Gen 2:19-20) shows perfect animal-knowledge, since fit names require knowing the natures. Plato (Cratylus) deemed the first name-giver most wise. Marginal gloss: 'Quibus ex locis Scripturae probetur,

Adamum creatum esse scientia praeditum.'

— p. 564 (PDF) · printed p. 523 —

[...that he who, first of all] mortals, imposed names on things was most wise. Since, therefore, this place has great force for demonstrating and proving the excellence of the knowledge which was in Adam, it is fitting that we first diligently explain the meaning of this place, and then dispute concerning the quality, magnitude, and excellence of Adam's knowledge.

Plato (Cratylus): the first name-giver was supremely wise. Pererius will first explain the text, then treat the quality, extent, and excellence of Adam's knowledge.

He brought them to Adam, that he might see what he would call them.

Sub-lemma (Gen 2:19b).

Without cause, indeed, Cajetan, against the opinion of the Fathers and of all Interpreters, judged that the animals were not really brought to Adam, but were only in a certain intellectual manner represented to his intellect by God, so that, considering them and suitably imposing names on them according to the natures of each, he might recognize none among them congruent to him as a helper for the society of life and the generation of offspring. “For Moses,” says Cajetan, “narrates that God brought the animals to Adam, that he might see how he would call them: but it is manifest that Adam had no need of a corporeal vision of the animals for imposing names on them. For such a vision could contribute nothing to the imposition of names; but he had need of an intellectual vision, without which such an imposition of names could not rightly be made. It must therefore be understood that the animals were brought to Adam not corporeally, but intellectually.” But to have wished to depart, by so light an argument, from so received and approved an opinion of the Fathers and Theologians was surely too puerile, and plainly alien to and unworthy of so great a talent as Cajetan's. For that, “That he might see what he would call

them," can be referred to God Himself, so that it is said of God by a Hebrew idiom not infrequent in the sacred letters — as is manifest to one reading the first and eleventh chapters of Genesis, and the third chapter of Exodus, and some other places of Scripture, here omitted for brevity's sake. It can also be referred to Adam, and be understood both of an intellectual and of a corporeal vision: for the latter excited and determined the general knowledge of the animals, which was in Adam's intellect, to the contemplating properly and distinctly of the individual species of animals whose individuals he beheld; and the sight of those animals suffused Adam's mind with the highest pleasure — that [knowledge] which he had perceived and known by infused knowledge through reason itself, recognizing the same by the senses and by experience.

Decorated initial 'I.' Cajetan held (against all the Fathers) that the animals were only 'intellectually' shown to Adam, not really brought, since a bodily sight contributes nothing to naming. Pererius rejects this as puerile: 'that he might see' can refer to God (a Hebrew idiom) or to Adam — and bodily sight did serve, by quickening his infused general knowledge to contemplate each species, with delight. Marginal gloss: 'An reuera ducta sint animalia ad Adamum: in quo refellitur Caietanus.'

But in what manner were the animals brought to Adam? That they did not go to him of their own accord, nor by the instinct and guidance of nature, Scripture sufficiently indicates, when it says that they were brought to Adam by God. Nor indeed is it to be believed that they were driven there by God in the way a shepherd drives his sheep; for, scattered as they were over the whole world, they could not have been led to Adam in a short time; nor, likewise, is it to be thought that, snatched by some vehement wind from the places where they were, they were carried to the Paradise in which Adam was — as is read of the quails in the book of Numbers, chapter 11 — since this could not have been done without the destruction of the land-animals, nor by the blast of one wind: for the animals were not in one place, but dispersed through all the shores of the lands; it would therefore have been necessary, for carrying them, that all the winds concur, [so that...] [continues]

How were the animals brought? Not of their own accord (Scripture says God brought them); not driven like sheep (too scattered for a short time); not by a wind (as the quails, Num 11) — that would destroy land-animals and need all the winds at once. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo animalia ducta sint ad Adamum.'

— p. 565 (PDF) · printed p. 524 —

[...so that] the winds blowing from the contrary parts of the world would have impeded one another. Therefore the opinion of St. Augustine is to be approved, who refers this either to the ministry of Angels, or to an interior instinct and impulse by which they were drawn there by God. For God fashioned in them — that is, in that faculty of the sentient soul which today the Philosophers call the “estimative” — a certain image, called by the Greeks φ■ντασμα (phantasm), representing to each of the animals that it was fitting for it to go to the place where Adam was, and to be subjected to his command and will. Moses narrates that there came to Adam the land-animals and the birds, namely two individuals of each species, [I mean a male and a female...] [continues]

The winds would cancel out; so (with Augustine, de Gen. ad lit. 9.14) the animals were brought either by angelic ministry or by a God-given inner impulse — God impressing on their 'estimative' faculty an image (Gk. φ■ντασμα) prompting them to go to Adam. GLYPH verified by magnification: φ■ντασμα. Marginal gloss: 'Augustinus lib. 9. de Gen. ad litteram cap. 14.'

[...I mean a male and a female]: both because under any species there is, among its individuals, that principal difference which is seen in sex; and because from these Adam could clearly know that none, from the whole genus of animals, could be a fit helper for him for what was sought. But why were the fishes not also brought to him? Was it because they do not have that agreement, and as it were familiarity, with man which the other animals have? Or because in these it was certain that none could be a fit helper for Adam, on account of the too-diverse conformation and figure of the body? Or rather because, placed out of water, they would at once have perished, unless God had willed to preserve them by some singular miracle? Finally, the animals were brought to Adam that he might impose

names on them as on servants, of whose service and obedience he was to make use — which would not generally come about in the case of fishes. For what Catharinus says on this place, that the fishes were not brought to [Adam...] [continues]

Two of each kind (male/female) — sex being the species' chief individual difference, and showing Adam no beast could be his helper. Why no fishes? They lack man's familiarity; are too unlike to help; would die out of water; and were not named as serviceable 'servants' as the others were. Marginal gloss: 'Cur pisces nó sint ducti ad Adamum.'

[...that the fishes were not brought to Adam], because he could easily have known their nature and powers from the land-animals — was said with little counsel and knowledge. For there is slight agreement and likeness between fishes and land-animals; and many things in each genus are dissimilar and of a proper and distinct knowledge. Nor were the animals brought to Adam that he might then first receive knowledge of them (for he had received this, ingenerated and infused into him, from God), but that he might impose names on the individual animals, and by that means found and enrich the language which his posterity would use. Tostatus, on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis, question 318, denies that among the living things which were brought to Adam were those which are generated from putrid matter — namely, on account of the abject and sordid condition of such creatures, and because in these there is generally no distinction of male and female, nor power of generating.

Catharinus' reason (Adam could infer fish from land-animals) is faulted — the two are quite unlike. The animals were brought not to teach Adam (his knowledge was infused) but for him to name them and so found the language of his posterity. Tostatus (Gen 13, q.318) excludes the vermin born of putrefaction (base, sexless, non-generating).

But someone may ask, why did God bring the animals to Adam? I, indeed, seem to myself able to bring forward four sufficiently fit and probable causes of this thing. First, God willed the animals to be set before Adam and subjected to his eyes, so that, from their sight and contemplation and comparison with his own nature, he might clearly recognize how much he

himself differed from and excelled them, and how many more and more excellent gifts he had received from God; and for that cause be more vehemently incited to celebrate the praises of God and perpetually to give Him thanks. Then, because God had made man the prince [of all the animals...] [continues]

Pererius' four reasons God brought the animals (1st-2nd here): (1) so Adam, comparing them with himself, would see his own superiority and gifts and be moved to praise God; (2) because God had made man their prince/lord (continues). Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor causae cur animalia ducta sint ad Adamum.'

— p. 566 (PDF) · printed p. 525 —

[...prince] and lord of all the animals, He willed that he himself should recognize his servants, and that the animals should, as it were, pledge obedience and servitude to him. Besides, that by imposing names on the animals he might found and augment the language which the men soon to be generated would use; and indeed all men would have used that language, and in every age, had they remained in that state. To this is added, that by that means it might become well known to all how great an excellence of knowledge God had bestowed upon Adam and adorned him with. Finally, that, seeing in the individual species of animals that there is a male and a female, he might understand that the same ought to come about in the human species too, and might clearly perceive the necessity of creating a woman to be his helper for the generation of offspring, and (as it pleases Catharinus) might more ardently desire her procreation, and more vehemently ask it from God by religious prayer.

The remaining two of the four reasons: (3) so Adam, lord of the animals, might recognize his 'servants' and found the (single, universal) language of his descendants, and his great knowledge be made manifest; (4) so that, seeing the sexes in the beasts, he would perceive his own need of a wife and ardently pray for her (Catharinus). Marginal gloss: 'Catharinus in Genesim.'

And Adam called all the living things by their names. VERSE 20.

Sub-lemma (Gen 2:20a).

This imposition of names declares the command and power of the first man over the living things, and his perfect knowledge of the animals, and the excellent force and dignity of the reason by which man surpasses all the animals: for to put names on things rightly is a function of a reason not of any kind, but of an excellent knowledge and a perfect wisdom. But although Moses Barcepha, in the book which he published on Paradise, reports the opinion of certain men who thought that this imposition of names was not really done, but that by it was mystically signified the excellence of human reason and command over the animals — yet the common and true opinion of the Fathers and Theologians is that names were truly imposed on the animals by Adam. For Scripture delivers this so openly and explicitly that it can not only not be denied, but cannot even be called into doubt without crime. For what else does Scripture signify but this, when it says: “God brought the animals to Adam, that he might see what he would call them: for whatever Adam called every living soul, that is its name: and Adam called all the living things by their names”? Surely, arguments are superfluous where the words of divine Scripture are so open. And since this narration of Moses is no less historical than the preceding ones, it is also to be interpreted and understood, no less than they, according to the proper signification and common usage of the words.

Decorated initial 'H.' The naming displays Adam's lordship and perfect knowledge — naming rightly requires excellent wisdom. Against Moses bar Kepha's report of a 'merely mystical' reading, the common and true view is that Adam truly named the animals (Scripture so plainly states it that doubting it is a crime), the narration being historical and literal. Marginal gloss: 'De impositione nominum.'

Eusebius, in book 11 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapter 4, excellently disputes both properly about this imposition of names, and in general about the imposition of names — which among the Hebrews, more than among other nations, is done aptly and suitably according to the nature of each thing. And among the other things

which he there treats, explaining this very place of Moses, he writes thus: “When Moses says, ‘Whatever Adam called every living soul, that is its name,’ he wished to say nothing else than that the name was suited to the nature of the thing. As if he said: As each thing was called by him, so it was in its nature.” And in chapter 3 of the same book: “Moses,” he says, “before the Greeks, or [knew] philosophy itself [...] [continues]

Eusebius (Praep. Evang. 11.4) on Hebrew names fitting the nature of things: Adam's naming means the name suited the thing's nature ('as he called it, so it was'). A further citation (ch. 3, Moses prior to the Greek philosophers) is begun. Catchword 'sophia' (signature VV 3). RESUME PDF 567 with '...vel ipsum Philo[sophiam]...'.

— p. 567 (PDF) · printed p. 526 —

...[such that] they might recognize the very name of wisdom (sophia), he [Moses] said innumerable things about the imposition of names, showing that names are imposed on things either with nature as guide, or by the judgment of God. Plato too teaches that names are rightly imposed on things not by bare imposition, but with nature as guide; and he confirms this by the authority of the Barbarians, meaning, in my judgment at least, the Hebrews; for you will not easily find such an observation among other peoples. From the many things, therefore, that Plato had discussed on this matter, he gathers that it belongs not to just any man, but to the wisest, to impose names on things as is fitting. ‘It is no trivial thing, then,’ he says, ‘O Hermogenes, the right imposition of a name, but the work of the most learned and most excellent men.’ Then Cratylus: ‘Rightly,’ he says, ‘do you say that names are accommodated to things with nature as guide,’ holding that not just anyone can do this, but only he who, looking to the nature of the thing, can rightly accommodate the name itself to it. Thus Eusebius.

Conclusion of the Eusebius block-quote (de Praep. Evang. lib. 11) carried over from the previous page; quoting Plato's Cratylus (the exchange of Socrates, Hermogenes, and Cratylus on whether

names fit things by nature). Ends with the attribution marker 'Sic Eusebius.'

Moses Barcepha, in that book which I named a little earlier, relates on the opinion of certain authors that Adam, seated in the higher place of Paradise, with august authority and majesty, and with such splendor of countenance as is written to have shone forth and blazed from the face of Moses in the 34th chapter of the book of Exodus, pronouncing with a voice that could be grasped by sense, assigned names to the individual kinds of animals, calling each one by name: while they, bowed down with lowered heads, and not daring to look upon him because of the exceeding glory with which he shone, passed by one at a time, and were called by him each by its name in order. For example, when he called the bull by name, at once, hearing its own name, it passed before him with head bowed: likewise the horse, summoned by name, passed by with neck lowered, not enduring the sight of Adam: and the same befell the rest.

Marginal author-citation: Moses Bar-Cepha (Moses Barcepha), the Syriac bishop, on the scene of Adam naming the animals. Reported in indirect discourse ('tradit ... indidisse'). The reference to Moses' shining face is Exodus 34:29-35.

This further must be noted in this place, that Adam received from God not only the knowledge of things, but also a perfect language, by which he himself might speak, and might understand God speaking with him, the language God used when he said to Adam and Eve: ‘Increase and multiply,’ and what follows thereafter to the very end of that chapter. In this language too he announced to Adam the precept of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: in short, through this language were made all the words which we read to have been spoken in the first three chapters of the book of Genesis, whether by God, or by Adam and Eve, or by the serpent.

Marginal gloss: 'Adamum linguam Hebraeam ab initio divinitus accepisse' (that Adam received the Hebrew tongue divinely from the beginning). 'Crescite et multiplicamini' = Genesis 1:28.

But Tostatus holds, in question 344 on the 13th chapter of the book of Genesis, that the names which Adam imposed on the animals he did not then receive for the first time from God himself: for in that case not Adam, but God himself would be said to have imposed the names on them; but rather that Adam received the language from God, perfect as to all else, except that part which contains the names of the animals, which God of course left whole to the ingenuity and wisdom of Adam: namely, so that he himself, through the knowledge of animals which he had, and through the acquaintance with very many words which he had received, might fashion names and impose them on the animals, rightly suited to the natures of each: and these not formed in one manner only, but drawn from diverse causes, whether from their own specific difference, or from a natural property, or from motion, or from shape, or from some peculiar operation, or...

Tostatus = Alfonso Tostado (Abulensis); his Questions on Genesis, q. 344 on Gen. 13. Sentence continues onto the next page (catchword 'vel').

— p. 568 (PDF) · printed p. 527 —

...or from some singular and proper accident. But the language which Adam first had, and according to which he imposed names on the animals, was by everyone's admission Hebrew, which before the division of tongues was not called Hebrew; for there was only one language common to all men, and as Scripture attests, Genesis chapter 11: ‘The earth was of one lip, and of the same speech.’ But once the division was made, since that language which had been common to all became special to the family of Heber alone—in whose lifetime the division of tongues occurred, religiously preserved [by his family]—for that reason it was afterward called Hebrew from Heber: which name we first read to have been attributed to Abraham, in Genesis chapter 14. To be read on this subject are the things St. Augustine left written in book 17 of the City of God, chapter 11, and in book 18, chapter 39.

'Erat terra labii unius, et sermonum eorundem' = Genesis 11:1 (Vulgate). The etymology of 'Hebrew' from Heber (Eber). Augustine, De Civitate Dei 17.11 and 18.39.

That Hebrew was the first of all languages—the one, namely, which Adam and the other mortals used up to the division of tongues—is shown by this argument: that those etymologies of names which the book of Genesis relates were handed down by those primeval men have a place in no other language whatsoever, but in Hebrew alone. For instance, that Adam called his wife ■■■■■■ (Issah, woman), because she was taken from the man who is called ■■■■■ (Is, man), and that he named the same woman Eve, because she was the mother of all the living: and to the same point look the etymologies of those names, Cain, Seth, and Noah. It is moreover believed that the Hebrew language was preserved pure even in common use up to the Babylonian captivity: but that after it the popular language of the Hebrews was not plainly Hebraic, but mixed with the Hebrew and Chaldaic speech, and contami-

GLYPHS verified by magnification: ■■■■■■ = Issah (woman, Gen. 2:23) and ■■■■■ = Is (man); the man/woman wordplay of Gen. 2:23 ('she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man'). Marginal gloss: 'Hebraeam linguam fuisse primam omnium' (that Hebrew was the first of all languages). Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'cam').

...nated, and that a purely Hebrew language remained only in the sacred Scriptures: whence it comes that, among the Hebrews, whoever wrote about things pertaining to the sciences or the arts used either the Greek, or the Arabic, or some other foreign tongue.

Completes the sentence on the corruption of post-exilic vernacular Hebrew by Chaldaic.

But indeed, some are in doubt at what time this imposition of names was made by Adam. Hugh of St. Victor writes that it was made either on the sixth day, as the order of the Mosaic narrative indicates, or a long time afterward: for Adam could not in so short a time have fittingly imposed names on all the species of animals; although there are not lacking those who say that Adam's eyes were illuminated by God, so that he could see all

the animals at a single glance: just as we read that St. Benedict saw the whole world at once in a ray of the sun. But the narrative of Moses clearly shows that the imposition of names was made before the formation of Eve; indeed it relates that Adam understood the reason why Eve necessarily had to be created from this, that, the animals having been inspected and considered, he found none that could be of help to him for the fellowship of human life and the begetting of offspring.

Marginal gloss: 'Quando Adam imposuit nomina animalibus' (when Adam imposed names on the animals). Hugh of St. Victor; the vision of St. Benedict seeing the whole world in a sunbeam (Gregory, Dialogues 2.35). Catchword at foot of page: 'DISPV' (heading the Disputatio that opens the next page).

— p. 569 (PDF) · printed p. 528 —

DISPUTATION ON THE EXTENT and excellence of the knowledge which Adam had.

Major divider: the opening Disputatio of Book V's treatment of Adam's knowledge (de scientia Adami).

Now, this passage of Moses concerning the imposition of names by Adam having been, I think, sufficiently explained, let us proceed to take up the proposed disputation concerning the knowledge of Adam. In that disputation five questions are to be unraveled. The first question: Whether Adam was created endowed with knowledge of natural things. The second question: How much knowledge he had. The third: Whether he was wiser than all the men who came after him. The fourth: Whether he had knowledge also of supernatural things. The fifth: Whether, if the state of innocence had remained, all Adam's descendants would, like him, have had knowledge of all things from the very beginning of their birth.

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque quaestiones de scientia Adami' (five questions on the knowledge of Adam). Preface enumerating the five questions of the Disputatio.

QUESTION I. Whether, as soon as he was created, Adam had knowledge of all things.

Question divider opening the first of the five questions.

As to the first question, it seems that Adam did not have knowledge as soon as he was created. For that knowledge would have been either acquired, or innate and natural to him, or infused: but neither was there time for him to acquire all the sciences and to experience all things; and what is natural is present in all things that are of the same species: but the souls of all the rest are created by God bare of all knowledge, so that ignorance seems more natural to man than knowledge. But if he had infused knowledge, then it was not of the same species as is the knowledge of other men. Add that, of all things contained under the same species, there is one and the same manner of attaining their perfection: since therefore other men attain knowledge of natural things not by any singular gift and inspiration of God, but by their own study and effort, it is fitting to suppose that the same befell Adam.

The 'videtur' arguments (objections) holding that Adam did not have knowledge at his creation—the threefold disjunction acquired/innate/infused.

But it is the certain and undoubted opinion of the Theologians that Adam was, from his very origin, endowed with all knowledge of natural things. Read the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 23, and on the same distinction the Scholastics, but especially Bonaventure, article 2, questions 1 and 2; also Thomas, part 1, question 94; and likewise Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 of On the Sacraments, part 6, chapter 12. This we showed above by the testimonies of divine Scripture, drawn both from this passage of Moses, and from chapter 17 of the book of Ecclesiasticus, and from chapter 7 of the book of Ecclesiastes. This same thing, moreover...

The determinatio (the affirmative answer). References: Peter Lombard, Sentences II d.23; Bonaventure; Aquinas, ST I q.94; Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I.6.12; Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 17; Ecclesiastes 7. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'praeterea').

— p. 570 (PDF) · printed p. 529 —

...we can confirm, moreover, by four reasons drawn from the doctrine of the Fathers and the Theologians. First reason: God, at the beginning of the world, created all the animals each perfect in its own kind, both according to specific and according to individual perfections, that is, according to the size and strength of body, according to the power of generating, and finally according to the power of carrying out and completing all natural actions: therefore likewise he founded Adam perfect according to the same things. As, therefore, Adam was created with a perfect body—namely as to the fullness of age, tallness of stature, vigor and firmness of strength, and the power of generating others—so it is to be believed that he was made perfect in soul and mind; but the natural perfection of the mind is knowledge, this therefore Adam had from the beginning, especially since the things that are produced immediately by God are most perfect; and Adam as a whole God alone created, with the concurrence of no efficient cause, both according to body and according to soul: in both parts, therefore, he was created by God most perfect: but he would not have been perfect if the chief natural perfection had been lacking to him.

Marginal gloss: 'Auctor quatuor rationibus probat Adamum creatum esse in scientia perfectum' (the author proves by four reasons that Adam was created perfect in knowledge). Prima ratio: argument from the perfection of God's immediate creation.

Second reason: Since Adam was to be the sower and parent of the human race according to carnal generation, for that reason it was fitting that he be created at a perfect age and suited for generating; and since the same man was to be the first teacher and ruler of men, it was assuredly fitting that he be created endowed with the perfect faculty of teaching and governing other men: but that cannot be furnished without knowledge. For, as Aristotle writes in the first and second books of the Metaphysics, the sign of one who knows is to be able to teach others, and what is the cause why other things are such, must itself most of all be such.

Altera ratio: argument from Adam's role as first parent, teacher, and ruler. Aristotle, Metaphysics I-II (the mark of knowledge is the ability to teach; cf. Metaph. A.1-2, alpha minor).

Third reason: If Adam had been created without knowledge, and had had to procure it for himself gradually by study and effort, he would have spent a long time in ignorance of the truth: but ignorance of the truth and unacquaintance with the things that lie open to the senses would have been exceedingly troublesome and bitter to a man most eager to know: yet nothing troublesome or bitter would have befallen, in that state, either his soul or his body: therefore Adam was not created ignorant and unknowing. For indeed, if he had long been ignorant, it would have been easy, on account of his ignorance of the truth and of things, for him to assent to false opinions and to slip into absurd errors; namely, to approve false things as true, or to reject true things as false—which, as Augustine excellently said, is not the nature of man as created, but the penalty of man condemned. Fourth reason: If God created man such that, with the utmost tranquillity and pleasantness of soul, and free from all sadness and pain, he might lead a quiet and blessed life, and provided for him so great an abundance of the best foods for bodily nourishment; it was assuredly consistent that man be so created by God that he should not, on account of ignorance of things, be afflicted with sadness, and lack the sweetest delight which is derived from the knowledge of things—by whose contemplation, as by the sweetest food of the mind, our soul is fed and is nourished unto eternity. But if Adam, as soon as he was created, [had] all the faculties both of the body and of the nourishing and per-

Tertia and Quarta rationes. Augustine: 'non est natura hominis conditi, sed poena damnati' (it is not the nature of man as created, but the penalty of the condemned). Colophon/signature at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with gathering signature 'XX'. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'tientis', i.e. ...alentis atque sentientis facultates...).

— p. 571 (PDF) · printed p. 530 —

...he could perfectly fulfill and discharge the faculties [of the nourishing and perceiving soul], who would doubt that he was also able, from the beginning, excellently to exercise the functions of the mind in knowing and contemplating all things?

Completes the Quarta ratio sentence carried over from p.529 (catchword 'tientis'): if Adam's lower faculties were perfect, so too his mind.

But someone may ask whether that knowledge of natural things which Adam had infused differed in species from the knowledge of those same things which other men have, acquired by their own study. To this I would reply that it did not differ in species: for it was human knowledge, that is, the natural perfection of man, who even then was living an animal life. That knowledge was indeed infused, but accidentally so, for of itself it ought to have been acquired: but because Adam was the first man and was to be the teacher of other men, it was necessary that he be at once perfect in knowledge; and because he could not have that perfection at once by acquisition, it was necessary that he have it by infusion. Just as, therefore, Adam—although he was procreated by God in a far different way than all the rest are generated—did not on that account differ in species from other men, so his infused knowledge was not of a different species than the acquired knowledge of other men.

Marginal gloss: 'An scientia Adami specie differebat a nostra' (whether Adam's knowledge differed in species from ours). Answer: no—infused only 'per accidens' because he had no time to acquire it.

Certainly, as the Blessed Thomas is wont to philosophize in more than one place, wherein he follows his master Aristotle: simply and absolutely the perfect is prior to the imperfect, and act is prior to potency: because neither can the imperfect [be brought] to perfection, nor can what is in potency be brought to act, except by that which is perfect and exists in act. It must therefore be thought that Adam's knowledge was such as acquired knowledge is in a man who perfectly holds and possesses it. For Adam had in his intellect the intelligible species of all universals and of the natural knowable species, so expressed, and so arranged and ordered among themselves, as the proper character of each knowable demands. But since, while the soul is in this mortal body, it cannot complete the act of knowing and understanding without regard and conversion of itself to phantasms, therefore Adam, besides the intelligible species of universal things

impressed on his intellect by God, had also expressed phantasms properly and distinctly representing the individuals of each species, so that in them his mind could examine and contemplate, without error, the things that pertained to the nature of that species.

Aquinas/Aristotle: act is prior to potency, the perfect to the imperfect (cf. Metaph. IX; ST I q.94). Scholastic account of Adam's knowledge: infused intelligible species plus distinct phantasms (the mind needing 'conversio ad phantasmata').

QUESTION II. How great was the knowledge of Adam.

Question divider opening the second of the five questions.

The second question is, how great a knowledge Adam had—that is, whether from the beginning he held the knowledge of all things that can be known and understood by man by the natural way and reasoning. Without cause Cajetan, in explaining the passage of Moses about the imposition of names by Adam, judged that Adam had knowledge of all bodily things, except, however, the elements, and the heavens, and the stars: for since these are the principal parts of the world, out of which this world is compacted and made whole, their perfe-...

Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus censet Adamum non habuisse scientiam ex[quisitam coelorum et elementorum]' (Cajetan holds Adam did not have exact knowledge of the heavens and elements; gloss continues onto next page margin). Cajetan = Thomas de Vio Cajetanus. Sentence continues onto next page (catchword 'perfecta').

— p. 572 (PDF) · printed p. 531 —

...perfect knowledge is reserved to God alone, who, as David sang in Psalm 146, ‘numbers the multitude of the stars, and calls them all by their names’: and for that reason Moses did not say that Adam imposed names on all things, but only on the flying and land animals. I wish the reader to recognize this opinion of Cajetan from his own words. Thus Cajetan writes in that place: ‘And Moses said this, not only to show that there was in Adam a perfect knowledge of animals, but to mark the difference of the stars, whose names are reserved to

God; according to that text, "He numbers the multitude of the stars, and calls them all by their names"; and to mark the difference of the heavens before the rest, and of the earth and sea, which were written above to have received their names from God. So that we may understand from these things that perfect knowledge of all bodily things was not communicated to Adam: whence it is the more significantly added that Adam imposed names only on the animals. But it is reasonable to understand that the knowledge of fishes and plants was also communicated to the first man, since it is of the same character that the knowledge of land and flying animals be communicated, and the knowledge of fishes and plants. Indeed, since in the greater the less is included, and land and flying creatures are more perfect than fishes and plants, when the knowledge of the more perfect is communicated, the knowledge of the less perfect is thereby implied as communicated too. Nor is it the same with the heavens and the earth, since the perfect knowledge of these pertains to the perfect knowledge of the whole Universe: for these are the first principles of the Universe, and therefore they were deservedly reserved to the divine naming, together with the seas, of which also the knowledge was never perfectly had by man.' Thus Cajetan.

Block-quote of Cajetan's own words, ending with the attribution marker 'Haec Caietanus.' 'Qui numerat multitudinem stellarum, et omnibus eis nomina vocat' = Psalm 146:4 (Vulgate; = Ps. 147:4 Hebrew numbering). Cajetan: God reserved to himself the naming (hence perfect knowledge) of stars, heavens, earth and seas. Catchword 'Si' (signature XX 2).

But the opinion of Cajetan is not true, and the reasoning by which it leans and is propped up is most feeble. For that Adam held the knowledge of all things, even of the heavenly ones, is so easy and ready to show and prove that I cannot sufficiently wonder that this was not known and persuaded to Cajetan, a man indeed acute and learned. In the first place, by the very reasons by which, in the treatment of the preceding question, it was shown that there was knowledge in Adam from the beginning, by those same reasons it is plainly concluded that there was in him perfect knowledge,

that is, of all things that can be comprehended by man's natural knowledge. Next, the opinion of the Fathers and Theologians is in accord that Adam was created by God a man perfect both in soul and in body: but the perfection of the soul, as regards the mind and reason, is knowledge; and the foremost place of this is held by the knowledge of heavenly things: for that knowledge is by its nature the noblest of all, and the most desired by the wishes of men, indeed the most precious, most useful, and most delightful in possession and use: how then is it credible that, the knowledge of all other things having been granted to Adam, this one knowledge of heavenly things alone was not bestowed on him by God? Besides, in heavenly things, beyond all other natural things, the clearest indications and arguments of God's wisdom and providence shine forth; and from this the human mind makes its step toward natural Theology, that is, toward the knowledge of God and of the heavenly minds: for the philosophical knowledge of God and of the Angels is chiefly gathered from the knowledge of the heavens and the stars.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur ... praedicta opinio Caietani' (the aforesaid opinion of Cajetan is refuted). Pererius's refutation: the same arguments that prove Adam had knowledge prove he had perfect knowledge, including of the heavens—the noblest knowledge, the gateway to natural theology.

— p. 573 (PDF) · printed p. 532 —

If, therefore, Adam did not have knowledge of the heavenly bodies, neither could he have natural knowledge of God and of the [angelic] intelligences. What of the fact that the perfect knowledge of sublunary things cannot stand without the perfect knowledge of the heavenly bodies? For the heaven is the universal cause of this sublunary world: a cause, I mean, that is efficient, conserving, governing, and moderating. And although the knowledge of any thing whatever is pleasant to man, yet the knowledge of heavenly things is the most excellent and sweetest food of the human mind, filling our soul with unspeakable delight: so that, if Adam had lacked this knowledge, it could truly be said that he was neither a perfect man, nor lived amid the highest pleasures and delights.

Continuation: heavenly knowledge is the foundation of perfect sublunary science (the heavens being the universal cause) and the sweetest 'pabulum' of the mind.

But if we were to fail of reasons for proving this, ought not divine Scripture greatly to move us, which in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, affirms that God filled the heart of Adam with knowledge and instruction, and showed him his great works? But if knowledge of heavenly things and of the elements was lacking to him, how was he filled with knowledge and instruction? Now the great works of God's deeds are most of all discerned in the heavens and the stars, as David said in the eighth Psalm: ‘For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers, the Moon and the Stars which thou hast founded.’ And this our opinion is also the opinion of the school of the Theologians, as may be seen in the Master of the Sentences, distinction 23, and in St. Thomas, first part, question 94. Certainly Hugh of St. Victor, in book 1 of On the Sacraments, part 6, chapters 13, 14, and 15, writes that the first man, before the fall, had a threefold perfect natural knowledge: of God, by whom and for whom he had been created; of himself, who had been created to the image and likeness of God; and of all other bodily things, which had been founded by God for the sake of man.

Scriptural proof: Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:6-8; Psalm 8:4 ('I will behold thy heavens...'). Concurring authorities: Peter Lombard Sent. II d.23, Aquinas ST I q.94, Hugh of St. Victor De Sacramentis I.6.13-15 (Adam's threefold knowledge: of God, of self, of bodily creation).

But from this general knowledge of things which we maintain was in Adam, we judge that three kinds of things must be excepted: one, those which are called future contingents; another, those which are named the hidden or secret things of hearts; the third, [the knowledge] of all present individuals of every species. For example, Adam did not know all the individual fishes, nor the whole number of the sand or of the stones: for things of this sort neither pertain to the perfection of the human intellect, nor contributed to the perfection and happiness of that state of innocence. Hence it also appears in what way Adam could have progressed in knowledge with the passage of time: namely, in three ways. First, by

coming to know new species of things, which were thereafter created either from putrid matter, or from the mixture of diverse species; next, as regards the knowledge of the individuals of each species; finally, as regards the manner of knowing. For from the beginning Adam had knowledge of things only speculatively and abstractly (as we Philosophers and Theologians now speak in the schools), and afterward he had the same knowledge somewhat clearer and firmer, illustrated and confirmed by the judgments of the senses and by experience.

Marginal glosses: 'Tria genera rerum scientia Adami minime comprehensa' (three kinds of things not comprehended by Adam's knowledge); 'Quomodo profecisset Adam in scientia' (how Adam would have progressed in knowledge). The three exceptions: future contingents, secrets of hearts, and all present individuals. Catchword '& syde[rum]' continues to next page.

— p. 574 (PDF) · printed p. 533 —

...and of the stars and of the elements—which, namely, can belong to man—was granted to no man, but reserved to God alone: [this] is manifestly refuted by the clear example and argument of Solomon. For the author of the book of Wisdom, in the seventh chapter, introduces Solomon speaking these words about the manifold knowledge which God had granted him: ‘He gave me the true knowledge of the things that are; that I may know the disposition of the globe of the earth and the powers of the elements, the beginning and ending and midst of the times, the alterations of their courses and the changes of seasons, the revolutions of the year and the dispositions of the stars, the natures of animals and the rage of wild beasts, the force of winds and the reasonings of men, the diversities of plants and the virtues of roots; and whatsoever things are hidden and unforeseen, I have learned: for Wisdom, the artificer of all, taught me.’

Marginal gloss: 'De scientia Salomonis' (on the knowledge of Solomon). Block-quote of Wisdom 7:17-21 (Vulgate). Completes from p.532 catchword '& syde[rum]': Cajetan held perfect knowledge of stars/elements was reserved to God—refuted by Solomon's example.

Do you hear, reader, that there was given to Solomon a true—that is, certain, evident, and perfect—knowledge of the globe of the earth, of the

elements, and of the stars, and of all things that are hidden and abstruse? Therefore the perfect knowledge of those things was not so reserved to God alone, as Cajetan supposed, that on that account it should be believed that Adam lacked such knowledge. But Cajetan argues, from the fact that Adam imposed names neither on the earth, nor on the sea, nor on the heavens, that there was no knowledge of those things in Adam. An excellent argument, to be sure! As if indeed Adam, by Cajetan's own admission, did not have perfect knowledge of stones, metals, plants, and fishes—on which things, however, we nowhere read that he imposed names. But why Adam assigned names only to the land animals and the birds, we have indicated a little above.

Pererius drives the refutation home: Solomon had perfect knowledge of the heavens, so the absence of name-giving proves nothing—Adam knew stones, metals, plants, fishes too without naming them.

QUESTION III. Whether Adam was wiser than all mortals.

Question divider opening the third of the five questions.

In the third place, that question must be treated, whether Adam was the wisest of all mortals. We do not include in this comparison our Lord Jesus Christ, who, even as he was man, just as he excelled all mortals in every other perfection, so it is certain that he excelled them in the perfection of knowledge and wisdom. To the proposed question, then, we answer that the word ‘wisdom’ is not of one signification only, but can be taken in four ways. First, indeed, for one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit: and in this sense there is as much wisdom in any one man as there is in him of charity and of sanctifying grace. And because we believe there was greater grace in the most blessed Virgin and in the Apostles than in Adam, it is therefore fitting to suppose that there was also greater wisdom in them. In the second way, the name ‘wisdom’ is taken for the knowledge of divine things and myste-...

Marginal gloss: 'Vocabulum sapientiae quatuor modis esse in usu' (the word 'wisdom' is used in four ways). Christ excepted from the comparison. First two of four senses of 'sapientia': (1) the gift of the

Holy Spirit (proportional to grace—hence the Virgin and Apostles exceed Adam); (2) knowledge of divine things and mysteries. Catchword 'riorum' (signature XX 3); continues to next page.

— p. 575 (PDF) · printed p. 534 —

...[and myste]ries of the Faith, which is either procured by human study and diligence, or given to man by the free gift of God: and it is quite credible that this wisdom was greater in the Apostles and in certain Doctors of the Church than in Adam. For the mysteries of the Faith and of divine things, after the coming of Christ, have been perceived and known more fully, more subtly, more distinctly, and more clearly. In a third way the word ‘wisdom’ is sometimes put for the knowledge of moral and civil things, and is equivalent to political prudence and the science of governing others well: and this kind of wisdom I am readily led to believe was more excellent in Solomon than in Adam, for this wisdom was more necessary to Solomon, who was to govern an innumerable people; and Solomon especially asked it of God, and God bestowed on him a most perfect [measure of it], as is written in the third book of Kings, chapter three. Finally, the word ‘wisdom’ is in use among the Philosophers and Theologians for the perfect and consummate knowledge of all things; which, while it embraces other disciplines, embraces most of all Metaphysics, to which, beyond all other disciplines, the name of wisdom belongs, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Metaphysics. Now of this wisdom the proposed question must be understood—whether Adam was wiser than all mortals: which we, lest by disputing we make longer what is sufficiently manifest of itself, both judge and affirm without any doubt.

The four senses of 'sapientia' completed (1st was the gift of the Spirit, p.533): (2) the mysteries of Faith; (3) moral/civil/political prudence (greater in Solomon—1 Kings 3); (4) perfect/consummate knowledge = Metaphysics (Aristotle, Metaph. I). The question concerns sense 4, and Pererius affirms Adam was wisest. Catchword from p.533 was 'riorum'.

Now in three ways Adam surpassed the rest of mortals in wisdom. First, in the extent of his knowledge: for Adam had, as we showed above, the

knowledge of all natural things, which has befallen no mortal up to now. Next, in the excellence of his manner of knowing: for others know most things only by probable reasoning, or not from causes but from effects, or not by ostensive demonstration but by [reduction] leading to the impossible: but Adam held a perfect knowledge of each thing, drawn from its own proper causes. Third, in the firmness and immovability of his knowledge: for in the state of innocence knowledge could not have been lost. For it happens from four causes that knowledge is lost: either through long cessation from the act of knowing—for such habits, just as they are acquired by constant exercise, so are they lost by long cessation. But in the state of innocence there would have been no such cessation, since the exercise of the mind in knowing and contemplating things would have been the daily and most delightful occupation of man. Knowledge is also lost by the corruption of the interior sense which we call the Imagination (Phantasia), which can be utterly corrupted by disease or some other mishap: so that the most learned men have lost the memory of all they knew, even of their own name. It is wonderful to tell, yet Pliny in book 7, chapter 24, and Solinus in chapter 7, affirm as a fact that Messala Corvinus, an orator foremost in renown and nobility, from a long and violent disease fell into such forgetfulness of all the things he had known that he did not even remember his own name. But Adam, in the state of innocence, was empty and free of all diseases, vices, inconveniences, and defects of body and of the sen-[ses]...

Marginal glosses: 'Tripliciter Adamus cunctis hominibus praestitit sapientia' (in three ways Adam surpassed all men in wisdom); 'Quatuor causae amissionis scientiae' (four causes of the loss of knowledge). The three modes of Adam's excellence: extent, mode of knowing (from proper causes), and permanence. First causes of losing knowledge: cessation, and corruption of the Phantasia (Pliny NH 7.24, Solinus 7: Messala Corvinus forgetting his own name). Continues to next page (catchword 'sensuum').

— p. 576 (PDF) · printed p. 535 —

...[of the sen]ses, both inner and outer. Knowledge is also lost on account of the contrary habit of ignorance, which a man puts on when, persuaded

and deceived by captious and fallacious reasoning, [he embraces error]. But this could in no way befall Adam: for his knowledge was most clear and most certain, nor could it be circumvented by fallacies or led into errors. We read, moreover, that forgetfulness of the disciplines they held befell some men by their own will and as a gift of God, inasmuch as they had earnestly and resolutely asked that forgetfulness from God, as something that would be a great help toward the rest and tranquillity of mind and the consolation of the spirit. Tostatus relates, in question 11 on the third chapter of the third book of Kings, that Albert the Great with the utmost prayers besought the Blessed Virgin to obtain for him from God the forgetfulness of human doctrines and of the things he had learned in Philosophy: and that he obtained it. I shall set down here the words of Tostatus, the more to satisfy the reader.

Completes the four causes of losing knowledge (contrary habit of error). Marginal gloss: 'Tostatus mirum narrat de Alberto Magno' (Tostatus tells a wonder about Albert the Great). Tostatus, q.11 on 3 Kings 3. Lead-in to the Tostatus block-quote about Albertus Magnus.

‘It is reported,’ he says, ‘of Albert the Great, a German of the Order of Preachers, who had been greatly excellent in the natural disciplines, that he prayed to Our Lady not to let him die amid the opinions of the Philosophers, but in faith alone: and he obtained it; for during the five years before his death, as is handed down, he was wholly ignorant, so that he did not even know his letters.’ Thus Tostatus. But indeed this would not have befallen Adam: for to a man in the state of innocence the knowledge and handling of these doctrines would have brought no detriment or hindrance to the spirit, but rather a great help and an incitement to the love and worship of God.

Block-quote of Tostatus's anecdote about Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great, OP) losing his learning before death, ending with the attribution marker 'Haec Tostatus.' Pererius adds: such loss could not befall Adam, for whom learning was pure help.

But to this opinion, which prefers Adam in wisdom to all mortals, divine Scripture seems to be opposed, making Solomon wiser than all the men who had preceded him and who were to come after him. For thus God speaks with Solomon in the third chapter of the third book of Kings: ‘I have given thee a wise and understanding heart, insomuch that there hath been none like thee before thee, nor shall arise after thee.’ And this passage of Scripture so moved Tostatus that he, in question 7 on that chapter of Scripture, did not hesitate to say that Solomon was wiser than Adam. To whom, however, I by no means assent: rather I judge that Adam was more excellent than Solomon in every kind of human knowledge and wisdom: both because Adam was created in the state of innocence, that is, the most perfect, and he himself was most perfect in body as in soul—the perfection of knowledge, then, which is proper to man, more befitted that perfect state of man, and was more fitting to Adam than to Solomon; and also because the perfect knowledge of natural things would be not so necessary or useful to Solomon as to Adam, inasmuch as Adam was to be the first teacher of the human race and the first instructor in all the disciplines. But as for the fact that Scripture says Solomon excelled in knowledge all who were before him, lest it seem to stand against our opinion, we can fittingly interpret it in four ways. First, that Solomon was wi-...

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum Adamus sapientior fuerit Salomone' (whether Adam was wiser than Solomon). Objection from 1 Kings 3:12 ('a wise and understanding heart'); Tostatus q.7 held Solomon wiser. Pererius disagrees, then offers four interpretations of the Solomon text. Catchword 'pientiorem' continues to next page.

— p. 577 (PDF) · printed p. 536 —

...[that Solomon was] wiser than all, yet with one exception, Adam: for not seldom the universal statements of Scripture are not to be taken universally, but for the most part and in the greatest part. Or let the comparison of Solomon be with all other men who attained wisdom by their own study, industry, and diligence—outside whose number is Adam, who had it divinely implanted in him; for, willing or unwilling, from that

general statement we must except our Lord Jesus Christ. Or Solomon was called wiser than all, not indeed than all men simply, but than all the Kings and princes who before him had ruled the Hebrew people: or even than any of the Hebrew nation who at any time had excelled in learning at Jerusalem.

Marginal gloss (continued from p.535): 'Explicatur locus scripturae in 3. capite libri 3. Regum de praestanti scientia Salomonis' (the passage of 3 Kings 3 on Solomon's surpassing knowledge is explained). First three interpretations: universal statements taken broadly; comparison only with self-taught men (excepting Adam and Christ); comparison only with Hebrew kings/sages.

Which interpretation is made very probable by what Solomon himself wrote about himself toward the end of the first chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes: ‘Behold,’ he says, ‘I am become great, and have surpassed in wisdom all that were before me in Jerusalem.’ Or, finally, Scripture is not speaking of the wisdom which is the speculative knowledge of natural and divine things, but of the political knowledge which is the prudence of governing and moderating cities and peoples well. And this interpretation gains credit from Scripture itself, which in that very place relates that Solomon asked of God not the knowledge of natural things, but the prudence of governing the Hebrew people; for it represents Solomon speaking thus: ‘Thou shalt give, O Lord, to thy servant a docile heart, that he may be able to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil: for who shall be able to judge this people, this thy great people?’ And God answered him: ‘Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself many days, nor riches, nor the lives of thy enemies, but hast asked for thyself Wisdom to discern judgment: behold, I have done for thee according to thy words, and have given thee a wise and understanding heart, insomuch that there hath been none like thee before thee, nor shall arise after thee.’

Fourth interpretation: Solomon's wisdom = political prudence, not speculative science. Quotes Ecclesiastes 1:16 and the prayer and answer of 1 Kings 3:9-12.

But especially the Lord gave to Solomon an incredible keenness of intellect and skill, so that in matters most obscure and doubtful—in which, namely, the truth can be investigated and detected with certainty by no signs or arguments—he himself might see both where the truth lay and what ought to be done: which skill and prudence Solomon wonderfully displayed in the dispute of those two women. Wherefore, when Scripture had narrated Solomon's judgment and sentence upon that controversy, it added: ‘And so all Israel heard the judgment which the King had judged, and they feared the King, seeing that the wisdom of God was in him to do judgment.’ Yet it is not to be denied that a most ample knowledge of natural things too was given to Solomon: for this is most openly handed down in the book of Wisdom, chapter 7, which passage we mentioned a little above. And in the fourth chapter of the third book of Kings it is thus: ‘The wisdom of Solomon surpassed the wisdom of all the Orientals and of the Egyptians, and he was wiser than all men. And he disputed about trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall: and he discoursed of beasts, and of birds, and of reptiles, and of fishes, and they came from all peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon.’

Solomon's prudence shown in the judgment of the two harlots (1 Kings 3:16-28). Yet he also had natural knowledge (Wisdom 7); quotes 1 Kings 4:30-34 ('disputed about trees... from the cedar... unto the hyssop'). Catchword 'QVAE' heads the next question (QUAESTIO IV).

— p. 578 (PDF) · printed p. 537 —

QUESTION IV. On the knowledge of supernatural things which Adam had.

Question divider opening the fourth of the five questions.

It is also asked whether Adam had knowledge of supernatural things. But that Adam had the knowledge of supernatural things from the beginning can easily be proved by this argument: that, as we shall show below, Adam was created with sanctifying grace, whose foundation, as it were, is faith. For it is impossible, on Paul's authority in Hebrews 11, to please God

without faith. But faith is a knowledge of supernatural things; for it is defined by Paul: ‘the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.’ Add that Adam had been founded by God more principally for a supernatural end than for a natural one. Since, therefore, in order that he might attain his natural end, the knowledge of natural things was given him from the first, it was assuredly fitting that, in order to attain his supernatural end, he should likewise be created furnished with the knowledge of supernatural things. For by what reasoning, I pray, would Adam have been created perfect by God, if so principal and necessary a perfection—I mean the knowledge of supernatural things—had been lacking to him?

Marginal gloss: 'Ad Hebr. cap. 11.' Adam created in sanctifying grace, whose foundation is faith (Heb 11:6 'without faith it is impossible to please God'; Heb 11:1 the definition of faith). Argument from his supernatural end.

But of which supernatural things did Adam hold the knowledge? To me, certainly, it becomes quite credible that six kinds of supernatural things were known to Adam. First, indeed, Adam knew that supernatural rewards are appointed in heaven for good men who serve God holily and piously, for, as Paul writes to the Hebrews 11: ‘He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.’ Then he had, without doubt, faith and a certain knowledge of the ultimate supernatural end of human nature: for on the end depends the ordering of the whole life, just as the ordering of speculative knowledge depends on the first speculative principles of each science. For the end stands to action as the first speculative principles of each science stand to the knowledge of that science. Since, therefore, Adam was made perfect in the use of reason and of free will, and able from the beginning to act either well or ill, it was most fitting that his ultimate end be at once known to himself, so that he might know whither he ought to refer all that was his, and himself.

Marginal gloss: 'Sex genera rerum supernaturalium cognita Adamo' (six kinds of supernatural things known to Adam). First two of the six: (1) the supernatural rewards in heaven (Heb 11:6); (2) faith and

knowledge of man's ultimate supernatural end.

Next, he knew the things that are simply necessary to every man and at every time, in order to attain that end: and these are sanctifying grace, and the three Theological virtues—faith, hope, and charity—and whatever else is of this kind. And these Adam knew do not proceed from us, nor can be procured by our own powers, but are freely given by God. Besides, it is sufficiently probable that there was not hidden from Adam that horrible fall of the Angels, who, cast down from heaven for pride, left many of the heavenly seats empty; for the knowledge of this fall and ruin could profit Adam much, that [it might]...

Marginal gloss: 'Ruinam Angelorum notam fuisse Adamo' (the fall of the Angels was known to Adam). Third and fourth of the six supernatural things: (3) the means necessary for all to reach the end—sanctifying grace and the three theological virtues, known to be free gifts; (4) the fall of the rebel angels. Catchword 'eum' (signature YY); continues to next page.

— p. 579 (PDF) · printed p. 538 —

...[that the knowledge of the angels' fall] might keep him in humility, and in obedience to the divine law, and in fear of the severity of the divine judgment and justice. And it filled his mind with the greatest joy to know that those great heavenly ruins were to be repaired and restored through earthly men, who were to be begotten from his own stock. And this Catharinus felt and left in writing, in his Commentaries on Genesis, on those words of the first chapter, ‘And he blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply,’ in a digression where he disputes about the happy state of the first men before sin; and to this he applies those words which are in chapter 17 of the book of Ecclesiasticus, where Scripture, among the other goods which it relates God bestowed on the first men, sets down this also: ‘And he showed them his judgments,’ it says. What judgments? says Catharinus—namely those by which God revealed to them the transgression of the worst spirits, and how he had judged and condemned them.

Continues the fourth of the six supernatural things (the fall of the angels), from p.537 catchword 'eum'. Catharinus (Ambrosius Catharinus) on Genesis 1:28 and Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:9-11 ('he showed them his judgments').

Moreover, Adam knew distinctly and explicitly, through faith, the mystery of the most holy Trinity: for this Epiphanius hands down at the opening of the work which he wrote against the heresies. And indeed this becomes quite credible: for it was not fitting that the first man, heaped with so many and so great goods both natural and supernatural, and placed in that happy state of innocence, should have been ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity—the first, namely, and greatest of all the mysteries of the Faith, and whose clear vision, as Augustine says, is the whole reward of the Faith—especially since this mystery had been indicated at the very creation of Adam, when God said, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness’; and afterward, in Adam's presence, God said, ‘Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil.’

Marginal gloss: 'Mysterium Trinitatis fuisse notum Adamo' (the mystery of the Trinity was known to Adam). The fifth supernatural thing. Epiphanius, Panarion (Adversus Haereses), proem; Augustine (the vision of the Trinity is the whole reward of faith). Genesis 1:26 ('Let us make man...') and 3:22 ('Behold, Adam is become as one of us')—plural forms read as hints of the Trinity.

Lastly, Adam also knew, as it has pleased many great Doctors [to hold], the future incarnation of the Son of God from his own progeny. Adam knew, therefore, that the Son of God would one day take human flesh—not indeed that by his death he might free man from sin (for in that case Adam would have foreknown his own fall and sin), but that he might be the head of the human race for its honoring and glorifying—just as the patriarch Joseph (Bonaventure uses this example) foresaw in a dream his future exaltation, but not his selling or his imprisonment. And this opinion most fits and squares with the view of those who hold that, even if Adam had not sinned, Christ would nevertheless have been incarnate. And that the mystery of the incarnation was, as we have said, known to Adam, Saint Thomas holds, in the second part of the second part, question two, article

seven; Bonaventure too, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty-three, in the exposition of the Master's text; and Catharinus in the place named a little above; and Blessed Prosper in the first chapter of the first of those three parts which he composed concerning the promises and predictions of God. For, treating those words which are in the second chapter of Genesis, ‘For this cause shall a man leave father and mother,’ etc., and weighing what Paul, writing to the Ephesians, chapter five, [says] on those words...

Marginal glosses: 'Adamum cognovisse futuram filii Dei incarnationem' (that Adam knew the future incarnation of the Son of God); 'Genes. 37' (the Joseph example). The sixth supernatural thing. Authorities: Aquinas ST II-II q.2 a.7; Bonaventure Sent. II d.23; Catharinus; Prosper of Aquitaine (De promissionibus et praedictionibus Dei). Genesis 2:24 and Ephesians 5:31-32 (the Christ/Church 'great sacrament'). Continues to next page (catchword 'verbis').

— p. 580 (PDF) · printed p. 539 —

...said in those words, ‘This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church,’ [Prosper] affirms that the conjunction of Christ with the Church was known to Adam, and that, as Eve had been formed from his side, so the Church was to be formed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross. Although this latter saying of Prosper does not seem true: for it implies that Adam knew the future death and passion of Christ, which doubtless was to be undergone by him for the sake of freeing man from sin—from which it would follow that Adam foreknew his own sin, which Augustine denies in book eleven of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter eighteen, and which is not approved by the Theologians.

Ephesians 5:32 ('This is a great sacrament...'). Prosper held Adam knew the Christ/Church union (Eve from Adam's side prefiguring the Church from Christ's pierced side); Pererius objects with Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 11.18): Adam did not foreknow his own sin. Continues from p.538 catchword 'verbis'.

But this might here be asked, whether the knowledge of supernatural and divine things which Adam had in the state of innocence was more sublime and clearer than faith is, although it was lower and more obscure than is the

knowledge of those same things through the light of glory: so that the light which Adam had was in a way intermediate between the light of Faith and the light of glory, lower, namely, than the latter and higher than the former. Hugh certainly seems to have thought something similar. For thus he writes, in book one of On the Sacraments, part six, chapter 14: ‘The first man is believed to have had knowledge of the Creator, for he knew him by whom he had been created—not in that manner of knowing by which he is perceived from hearing alone, in the way the absent [God] is sought by believers, but by a certain interior inspiration by which he contemplated the presence of God: yet not so excellently as the saints are to see [him] after this life, nor so in an enigma as we see in this life.’ Thus Hugh.

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum Adam in statu innocentia Deum cognoscebat sublimiori genere cognitionis quam sit cognitio fidei' (whether Adam in the state of innocence knew God by a higher kind of knowledge than the knowledge of faith). Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I.6.14: Adam's knowledge of God by interior inspiration, intermediate between faith and the beatific vision. Block-quote ends 'Sic Hugo.'

Interpreting his opinion, the Blessed Thomas, in the second part of the second part, question five, article one, says that the contemplation of God and of divine things which removes the necessity of Faith is the contemplation of God which the blessed have in the fatherland, by which, namely, supernatural truth is seen through essence. But this contemplation neither the Angel had before his confirmation, nor the first man before sin; rather their contemplation was higher than ours, by which, approaching nearer to God, they could manifestly know more about the divine effects and mysteries than we can: whence there was not in them a faith by which the absent God would be sought as he is sought by us. For God was more present to them through the light of wisdom than he is to us, although he was not so present to them as he is to the blessed through the light of glory. And although Adam did not receive the knowledge of divine things through exterior hearing from another speaking and teaching from without, he received it nevertheless through interior hearing, God inwardly inspiring and teaching, in the way the Prophets heard, and as David said: ‘I will hear

what the Lord God will speak in me.’

Aquinas ST II-II q.5 a.1 interpreting Hugh: Adam's contemplation was higher than ours but below the beatific vision. Adam received divine knowledge by 'interior hearing' (God inspiring), like the prophets; Psalm 84:9 ('I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me').

Wherefore Augustine, in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 33: ‘Perhaps,’ he says, ‘God formerly spoke with the first men in inward and ineffable ways, just as he also speaks with the Angels, illuminating their minds by that very unchangeable truth, where it belongs to the intellect to know at once whatever things, even those that come to pass through time, do not come to pass at once. Perhaps, I say, he spoke thus with them, although not with so great a participation of divine wisdom as the Angels grasp, yet...’

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.33, on how God spoke inwardly with the first humans, as with the angels. Quote continues onto next page (catchword 'pro [humano modulo]').

— p. 581 (PDF) · printed p. 540 —

...however much less according to the human measure, yet by that very kind of visitation and speech: perhaps even by that which comes about through a creature, whether in an ecstasy of the spirit by bodily images, or by some species presented to the very senses of the body, whether for seeing or for hearing, just as God is wont to be seen in his Angels, or to sound through a cloud. Thus Augustine.

Completes the Augustine quote (De Gen. ad litt. 11.33) from p.539, ending with the attribution marker 'Haec Augustinus.'

Finally, Saint Thomas, in the first part, question 94, article one, holds that Adam knew God by a higher knowledge than we know him, and that his knowledge was in a way intermediate between the knowledge of the present state and the knowledge of the fatherland, by which God is seen through essence. For it is established that God is seen more clearly and eminently through intelligible effects than through sensible and bodily

ones. But from the full and clear consideration of intelligible effects a man is drawn back or retarded by love and occupation about sensible things. Yet God made the first man upright, as is said in Ecclesiastes 7, which uprightness was in him so that the things that are lower in man were subject to the higher, and these were in no way hindered by them. Wherefore the first man was not hindered by exterior sensible things from the clear and firm contemplation of intelligible things, which he perceived from the irradiation of the first truth, whether by natural knowledge or by gratuitous. And since the medium of knowing is twofold: one, in which there is seen at the same time that which is said to be seen through the medium, as when a man is seen through a mirror and is seen together with the mirror itself; the other medium is that by whose knowledge one arrives at knowing something unknown, as is the medium of demonstration: and without a medium of this latter kind Adam saw God, yet not without the former medium. For it was not necessary that the first man arrive at the knowledge of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as is necessary for us, but at once, in the effects especially intelligible, he knew God in his own way.

Aquinas ST I q.94 a.1 (quoted): Adam's knowledge of God intermediate between wayfarer and beatific; God seen through intelligible effects without need of demonstration. Ecclesiastes 7:29 ('God made man upright').

Likewise, if it be asked whether Adam then knew God in an enigma, it must be answered that in an enigma there is obscurity, which obscurity can indeed be taken in two ways: either inasmuch as every creature is obscure and, as it were, darkness if it be compared with the immensity of the divine brightness—and in this way Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw God through created effects; or the obscurity can be understood which befalls man on account of sin, of which Augustine speaks in book fourteen of On the Trinity, chapter nine—namely, as a man is hindered from the consideration of intelligible things by his occupation with sensible ones—and in this way Adam did not know God in an enigma. Thus far

from the Blessed Thomas.

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum Adam cognoverit Deum in aenigmate' (whether Adam knew God in an enigma). Conclusion of the Aquinas quotation (ST I q.94 a.1), ending 'Hactenus ex Beato Thoma.' The twofold obscurity, with reference to Augustine De Trinitate 14.9.

Nor unlike [this], nor here to be passed over, but to be noted by the reader, is the opinion of Bonaventure. For thus he writes in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty-three, article two, question two: ‘The knowledge of man in the state of innocence was intermediate between the knowledge of the state of glory and of the state of misery: just as the place of Paradise too was intermediate between this valley of misery and the heavenly fatherland. And just as the earthly Paradise was more like to earth than to heaven, so the knowledge of Adam in the state of innocence was more conformed to the knowledge of the present state than of the future. Whence in the state of glory alone will God be seen immediately and in his substance, so that there be no...’

Bonaventure, Sent. II d.23 a.2 q.2: Adam's knowledge intermediate between glory and misery, as earthly Paradise lay between this valley of misery and heaven. Quote continues onto next page (catchword 'sit').

— p. 582 (PDF) · printed p. 541 —

...there be obscurity there; but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen by means of a mirror, yet differently. For in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery he is seen through a mirror darkened on account of the sin of the first man, and therefore now he is seen through a mirror and in an enigma. For an enigma, as Augustine says in book fourteen of On the Trinity, chapter nine, is an obscure likeness.

Continues the Bonaventure quote (from p.540): the threefold mirror—none in glory, a clear mirror in innocence, a darkened mirror in fallen nature. Augustine De Trinitate 14.9: 'an enigma is an obscure likeness.'

Now there is a fourfold kind of knowing God, namely by faith, by contemplation, by sensible apparition, by open vision. The first is of common grace; the second, of excellent grace; the third is of special grace; the fourth is of consummating and glorifying grace. And the sufficiency of these modes is gathered thus: because everything that is known is known through something present to the intellect; God too must be known by man through something present to the intellect. Either, then, I know God through this, that he is present to me, or because he is present to another. If because he is present to another, this is the knowledge of faith: for I know and believe God to be three and one, because the Son of God declared this and the Holy Spirit inspired it; for what we believe, we owe to authority, as Augustine writes in the book On the Usefulness of Believing, chapter eleven. But if I know God through this, that he is present to me, this can come about in three ways: either because he is present to me in his proper effect, and so it is contemplation, which is the more excellent the more a man feels in himself the effect of divine grace, and the better he can consider God in exterior creatures. Or God is present to me in his proper sign, and so it is apparition, as God appeared to Abraham in a subject creature by which he figured God himself, and the Holy Spirit [appeared] in a dove. Or finally God is present to man in his own light and in himself, according to what is said to be known face to face: and this is open vision, which indeed is the whole reward of human merits.

Marginal gloss: 'Quadruplex genus cognoscendi Deum' (the fourfold kind of knowing God). Bonaventure's four ways: faith, contemplation, apparition, open vision—matched to four grades of grace. Augustine, De Utilitate credendi 11; Abraham's vision (Gen 18); the Spirit as dove (Matt 3:16).

The first, therefore, and the last kind of the knowledge of God did not belong to the state of innocence: the first, indeed, on account of enigmatic knowledge, and because the knowledge of faith is for the most part from hearing; but the last, on account of its supreme perfection, was not exhibited to man on earth, but was promised as to be given in heaven. But the second and third kinds of the knowledge of God, namely of

contemplation and of apparition, belong to both states; yet in the state of innocence contemplation especially flourished, both on account of the purity of the soul, and also on account of the subjection of the flesh and of the lower powers: of which two things the soul is for the most part deprived in the state of fallen nature, and therefore cannot attain to that grade of contemplation. Thus Bonaventure.

Marginal gloss: 'Rom. 10.' (faith from hearing—Rom 10:17). Conclusion of the Bonaventure quotation, ending 'Sic Bonaventura': first (faith) and last (open vision) ways do not fit innocence; the second (contemplation) and third (apparition) do, contemplation especially.

But in this opinion of Bonaventure, in that he said that the knowledge of faith, because of its obscurity, was not in Adam before sin, this—if it be understood precisely—I am by no means able to approve. For, as we said above, neither Adam nor the Angel, while they were on the way, could without faith either please God, or know the mystery of the Trinity certainly and without doubt: for this is why that mystery is called supernatural, because it far surpasses the power and faculty of every created intelligence...

Marginal gloss: 'Excutitur Bonaventurae sententia' (Bonaventure's opinion is examined/shaken out). Pererius's critique: he cannot accept that faith-knowledge was wholly absent in Adam before sin, since without faith neither Adam nor angel could please God or know the Trinity. Continues to next page (catchword 'superat').

— p. 583 (PDF) · printed p. 542 —

...[surpasses the power of every created intelligence], nor can certain knowledge of it be had except by faith on the way, or by vision in the fatherland. Finally, even of Adam, before he sinned, it could most truly be said what that Prophet said, ‘The just man lives by faith’: and what Paul writes, ‘While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord, walking by faith and not by sight’: and ‘now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face.’

Completes the critique of Bonaventure (from p.541 catchword 'superat'): the supernatural mystery requires faith. Habakkuk 2:4 ('the just lives by faith'); 2 Corinthians 5:6-7; 1 Corinthians 13:12. Marginal refs: Habac.2, 2 Corint.5, 1 Corin.13.

Yet it is fitting to know that the knowledge of divine things which Adam had was in two ways more excellent than that which we have. First, on account of the excellence of his intellect and knowledge, whereby it came about that he comprehended by reason and understanding many things about divine matters, to which our mind now cannot aspire unless aided by the light of Faith. Just as even now, among Christians, certain things about God and divine matters, which learned and wise men know not only by faith but also by natural reason and knowledge, are nevertheless to the unlearned perceived and known by faith alone. Next, we have faith both as regards the revealed object and the revealing God: for it is not evidently known to us that the mysteries we believe have been revealed by God. But the first man, although he did not have evident knowledge of the object of Faith itself, nevertheless had evident [knowledge] of the revelation made by God: for he knew evidently that those mysteries were revealed to him by God. But whence did he know it? Because he felt his mind inwardly illuminated to know those things that cannot be known by human reason, and that without reference to phantasms: but this can proceed and be effected by none other than God, who alone can glide into the human mind and alone has power and efficacy over it.

Marginal gloss: 'Cognitio rerum supernaturalium quae fuit in Adamo dupliciter praestantior quam nostra' (the knowledge of supernatural things in Adam was in two ways more excellent than ours): by superiority of intellect, and by evident knowledge of the fact of God's revelation.

Now the kind of contemplation which Adam used in that blessed state of innocence was so sublime and excellent that very often his mind, abstracted from all use of the senses and rapt into ecstasy, was present at the heavenly court and the choirs of Angels. Let the reader hear not my opinion but Augustine's, who in the last chapter of book nine of On Genesis according to the Letter writes thus:

Marginal gloss: 'Vide quanta fuerit contemplationis Adami excellentia' (see how great was the excellence of Adam's contemplation). Lead-in to the Augustine block-quote.

‘That ecstasy which God sent upon Adam, so that, made drowsy, he fell asleep, is rightly understood to have been sent for this end: that his mind too, through the ecstasy, might become a partaker, as it were, of the angelic court, and, entering into the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things. And then, awaking as one full of prophecy, when he saw the rib brought to him, his wife, he immediately burst forth with what the Apostle commends as a great sacrament: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh,” etc. Which words, although Scripture itself attests them to have been the first man's, the Lord nevertheless declared in the Gospel that God had said—so that we might understand from this that, on account of the ecstasy that had preceded in Adam, he could speak this divinely, as a prophet.’ Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 9 (final chapter), on the ecstasy in which Adam shared the angelic court and prophesied at Eve's formation. Genesis 2:23 ('bone of my bones'); Christ's attribution of Gen 2:24 to God in Matthew 19:4-5 (marginal ref: Matth.19). Block-quote ends 'Sic Augustinus.'

Things similar to these Gregory writes in the first chapter of the fourth book of the Dialogues: ‘After,’ he says, ‘the first parent of the human race was expelled from the joys of Paradise, his fault demanding it, he came into the misery of this blindness and exile which we suffer: because, poured out beyond himself by sinning, he could no longer see those joys of the heavenly fatherland which before he contemplated. For in Paradise man had been accustomed to enjoy the words of God, and [to be present at the company] of the Blessed Angels...’

Gregory the Great, Dialogues 4.1, on Adam's loss of heavenly contemplation through sin. Quote continues onto next page (catchword 'Angelorum').

— p. 584 (PDF) · printed p. 543 —

...to be present, by purity of heart and loftiness of vision, with the spirits of the Angels. But after he fell to this place, he withdrew from that light of the mind by which he was filled. From his flesh, namely, we, born in the blindness of this exile, hear indeed that there is a heavenly fatherland, we hear that its citizens are the Angels of God, we hear that the companions of those same Angels are the spirits of the just and perfect: but carnal men, because they cannot know those invisible things by experience, doubt whether that be true which they do not see with bodily eyes. Which doubt, of course, could not be in the first parent, because, excluded from the joys of Paradise, he recalled what he had lost, because he had seen it. Thus far the words of Gregory. From which it is permitted to argue, on Gregory's authority at least, that Adam was for some time in the state of innocence: for Gregory affirms that he was accustomed to enjoy the words of God and to be present at the choirs of the blessed Angels; and the word ‘accustomed’ is not usually applied to a very brief time.

Marginal gloss: 'Adamum aliquandiu, secundum Gregorium, in statu innocentiae mansisse' (that Adam, according to Gregory, remained for some time in the state of innocence). Completes the Gregory quote (Dialogues 4.1), ending 'Hactenus sunt verba Gregorii'; the argument from 'accustomed' that Adam's innocence lasted more than a moment.

QUESTION V. Whether in the state of innocence the descendants of Adam would have had innate knowledge.

Question divider opening the fifth and last question of the disputation on Adam's knowledge.

But let us see whether the descendants of Adam, if that state of innocence had remained, would have been born with the knowledge of all things, just as Adam himself was created excelling in the knowledge of all things. To this question we answer: In the state of innocence the descendants of Adam would not have been born with knowledge. For concerning the things that are above nature, unless we wish to speak rashly, nothing is to be affirmed except what is either delivered in the Sacred Scriptures, or supported by the authority of the Church or the testimony of the Fathers, or fortified by some reason either necessary or at least quite probable: but none of these is at

hand for us to prove that knowledge would be implanted in Adam's descendants; therefore this is not to be affirmed. Indeed, if we consult reason itself, it will persuade and prove to us the contrary, since it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses and experiences: for this reason the rational soul has been joined with this body, furnished with the instruments and aids of all the senses, both exterior and interior, so that by their support it might procure the teachings of which it is of itself destitute: for in this the human intellect differs from the angelic.

Pererius's answer to Question V: Adam's posterity would NOT have been born with knowledge, since human knowledge is naturally acquired through the senses (unlike the angelic intellect). Methodological rule for things above nature: affirm only what Scripture, Church, Fathers, or reason supports.

What of the fact that, just as Adam's descendants would not have been born at a perfect age, nor with a perfect size and strength of body, so neither would they have been born with a perfect mind and reason, that is, with knowledge? And this is the opinion of Hugh, in book 1 of On the Sacraments, part 6, and of St. Thomas in the first part, question 101—against which two things can be objected. One is: that ignorance befell man from his fault; but in that state [men would have been] born...

Argument from analogy (not born at perfect age/size, so not with knowledge); the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacr. I.6) and Aquinas (ST I q.101). Two objections introduced; the first (ignorance came from sin) continues to next page (catchword 'nati').

— p. 585 (PDF) · printed p. 544 —

...men would have been born without fault, therefore without ignorance; with knowledge, then. The other is: if Adam had from the beginning the knowledge of all things, why would his descendants not likewise have had it? To the first objection we answer, according to Hugh and Thomas, that ignorance is twofold: one which the Theologians call [ignorance] of pure negation and nescience, which indeed does not arise from fault, but from the condition of created nature, which cannot know all things and at every time—for such is present even in the Angels, since not even they know all

things: what wonder, then, if it had been in Adam's descendants from their first birth? But the other ignorance they teach to be vicious and culpable, which is the privation of the knowledge of those things which a man ought to know, either simply or at some certain time: but ignorance of this kind would not have been in Adam's descendants: for although they would have been born ignorant, yet not of those things which at that first age it behooved or befitted them to know.

Marginal gloss: 'Duae obiectiones. Qualis ignorantia fuisset in statu innocentiae' (two objections; what kind of ignorance there would have been in the state of innocence). Answer to objection 1: twofold ignorance—pure nescience (natural, even in angels) versus vicious/culpable ignorance (which would not be present).

To the second objection it must be answered that there were in Adam (because he was the first man and parent and teacher of the human race) many singular and proper things which it was not fitting that he should have in common with other men: of which kind were, that Adam was made by God alone from the slime of the earth, at a perfect age and bodily stature, and able to generate offspring, and that woman was formed from him. As, therefore, these things were proper to Adam, so also was that—to have from his birth the knowledge of all things. But although knowledge of things would not have been innate to Adam's descendants, they would nevertheless have procured it briefly, easily, and perfectly when they had come to an age fit for learning. For by ten things they would have been mightily aided in grasping all the teachings: of which things, because, having lost that state, we are wretchedly deprived, therefore we attain human disciplines few [in number], with difficulty, slowly, and imperfectly.

Answer to objection 2: Adam's having knowledge from birth was singular to him (as was being made from clay by God alone, etc.); his posterity would acquire knowledge easily, aided by ten things (now lost to us).

But what were those ten things by which Adam's descendants would have approached, splendidly equipped and prepared, the procuring of all the

sciences? The first thing was the highest docility and aptitude for learning and knowing anything, on account of the admirable excellence of intellect, memory, and judgment, and an incredible ardor for learning and desire of knowing the truth. The second was the excellence of all the senses, both interior and exterior, by whose service and support, and as it were fowling, the human mind makes use to hunt and attain knowledge. The third, a vast abundance of the best teachers, who would themselves excel in the knowledge of all things, and would be most apt and suited for teaching it to others. The fourth, such length of life as would not only suffice for procuring and handling all the disciplines, but would even far exceed [it]. The fifth, the best health, vigor of body, and firmness of strength. The sixth, ease of procuring abundantly all things that pertain to food and clothing and every appointment of life. The seventh, a great opportunity of testing the powers, and experiencing the natures, properties, affections, and virtues of animals, plants, metals, sto-...

Marginal gloss: 'Decem res quibus homines in statu innocentiae ad comparandam scientiam fuissent adiuti' (the ten things by which men in the state of innocence would have been aided in acquiring knowledge). The first seven of the ten aids enumerated. Continues to next page (catchword 'lapidum').

— p. 586 (PDF) · printed p. 545 —

...[of] stones, and finally of all natural things, which is the origin and seedbed of knowledge. The eighth, perfect moderation of soul, and the calming of all disturbances, and the subjection of all the affections under the command of reason: so that men would then crave and pursue nothing with greater zeal and desire than knowledge and virtue. The ninth, a certain singular and exceptional providence and care of God toward men living in that state, helping them in wondrous ways to investigate and acquire the knowledge of all things, whether through interior illuminations, or through the Angels who would then have familiarly visited men. The tenth and last, that at that time no impediments would have befallen man, from the demons, to his persevering in the study of the disciplines. But now the demon strives for two reasons to draw men away from the study of the

good arts and liberal disciplines: both because an ardent zeal for learning vehemently draws a man away from most of the vices and desires of earthly things; and because the demon fears that those who diligently give their effort to procuring the honorable disciplines may afterward, by the use of them, contribute to the proclaiming and illustrating of the glory of God, and the helping of men, and their freeing from the errors of which the demon himself is the sower and author—to the great detriment and ruin of his own dominion, which he holds over impious and wicked men.

The last three of the ten aids (8th moderation of soul; 9th God's providence by inner illuminations and angelic visits; 10th absence of demonic impediments). The two reasons the demon now draws men from study. This concludes Question V and the whole disputation on Adam's knowledge.

DISPUTATION ON THE SECOND EXCELLENCE of the state of innocence, that is, on Sanctifying Grace.

MAJOR DIVIDER: the second disputation of Book V, treating the second internal good of innocence—sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens). Follows the first disputation, on Adam's knowledge.

In this disputation, just as in the one that preceded it, five questions are to be treated. The first question is: Whether Adam was created with sanctifying grace. The second, whether that grace with which we shall show Adam to have been created was so great that it utterly excluded all sin, even venial. The third, whether men in the state of innocence would have had greater grace than the most holy men had in the state of the Evangelical law. The fourth, whether, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would have been born with grace. The fifth, whether, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would have been confirmed in grace.

Preface enumerating the five questions of the second disputation (on sanctifying grace).

QUESTION I. Whether Adam was created with grace.

Question divider opening the first question of the disputation on sanctifying grace.

This first question is both in itself noble and celebrated, and has been made more renowned by the learned disputations of the Theologians and by the variety and dissension of opinions. Catharinus is of the opinion that Adam was first founded in pure naturals, and afterward was adorn-[ed with grace]...

Marginal gloss: 'Catharinus in Genes.' (Catharinus on Genesis). Opening of Question I: Catharinus's view that Adam was first created in 'pure naturals' (puris naturalibus) and only afterward endowed with grace. Continues to next page (catchword 'ornatum').

— p. 587 (PDF) · printed p. 546 —

...[Adam was first founded in pure naturals; then] adorned with original justice; then gifted and graced with sanctifying grace. This is among the Theologians beyond controversy: that Adam had grace before his fall. The testimonies of the Fathers to prove this the Master records in the second book, distinction 29, and Gratian in [the treatise] On Penance, distinction 2, chapter ‘Take away charity.’ Nor is it permitted to call this into doubt, since it is established and fortified by the decrees of two Councils, of Orange and of Trent. Certainly in [the Council of] Trent, in session 5, in the decree on original sin, it is thus: ‘Adam by sin lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted by God.’ And this is very consonant with reason: for on account of sin Adam lost the grace of God and the heavenly gifts, inasmuch as on account of that first sin he himself, with his whole posterity, was condemned, and deprived of the right of possessing the heavenly kingdom. He had, therefore, before sin the right to the heavenly kingdom; but this right is not given to man except on account of the grace of God. Indeed, if through that first sin Adam had not lost the grace of God, there would have been no reason why the guilt of that one first sin alone, and not of the other sins which Adam afterward committed, should be derived to his descendants. Since, therefore, this must be held as certain, granted by all, it is not worthwhile to dispute it in more words.

Marginal gloss: 'Adamum fuisse in gratia ante lapsum' (that Adam was in grace before the fall). Completes Catharinus's view (pure naturals → original justice → grace) from p.545 catchword

'ornatum'. The settled point: Adam had grace before the fall—Lombard Sent. II d.29; Gratian, De Poenitentia d.2 c. 'Tolle charitatem'; Councils of Orange and Trent (Trent sess. 5 on original sin).

But this is controverted among the Theologians, whether Adam had the grace of God in his very origin and from the beginning, or received it afterward: on this the Theologians vary in their opinions. That he was not created with grace, but only with original justice, many great Doctors have judged: Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 of On the Sacraments, part six; Alexander of Hales, part 2, question 96; Bonaventure and Scotus, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 26; Marsilius on the same book, question 16; and likewise the Altissiodorensis [William of Auxerre].

Marginal gloss: 'Qui censuerint Adamum non esse creatum in gratia, et quibus argumentis id probaverint' (who held Adam was not created in grace, and by what arguments). The first opinion: Adam created with original justice but not grace—held by Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Scotus, Marsilius of Inghen, and William of Auxerre (Altissiodorensis).

Bonaventure confirms that opinion by these arguments: Grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace: but grace was conferred on Adam before glory: therefore nature too was given before grace. Again, through grace there comes about a certain spiritual marriage between God and the soul of man, but this is the law of marriage, that it least of all takes place without the consent of both spouses: therefore grace ought not to have been given to Adam without his consent: especially since God's providence has this rule, that to no adult who already has the use of reason does he grant his grace without that person's consent and preparation. Next, so that Adam might know more clearly and certainly that the grace which was bestowed on him by God was truly grace—that is, that it exceeds every faculty of nature, and is freely given to man, and that for this reason he might be more grateful and devoted to God—it was more fitting that he should have it after he was created, than that he should receive it as it were ingrained in him together with nature.

Bonaventure's three arguments for grace given after creation: (1) the order grace-before-glory implies nature-before-grace; (2) the 'spiritual marriage' of God and soul requires consent; (3) clearer

recognition of grace as a free, supernatural gift.

Scotus, in the place I named above, answering the fourth argument, judges that the original justice with which Adam was created was not sanctifying grace: yet that it was a supernatural gift. Now sanctifying grace and original ju-[stice] stood to one another...

Scotus's distinction: the original justice with which Adam was created was a supernatural gift but not 'gratia gratum faciens' (sanctifying grace). Continues to next page (catchword 'originalis').

— p. 588 (PDF) · printed p. 547 —

...original [justice], says Scotus, as the exceeding and the exceeded. For original justice exceeded sanctifying grace itself in four things: for original justice not only subjected reason to God, but also sense to reason, and body to soul; next, it joined the mind to God more readily, more delightfully, more firmly; then, it admitted no sin, not only no mortal, but not even venial; finally, it made man perform every moral good readily and pleasantly, and without any interior trouble. But sanctifying grace surpasses and excels original justice in this, that it joins man to God more excellently, namely as to his supernatural end and good: and it makes man truly pleasing to God and his friend, and his son and heir of eternal life, and [makes it] that he can even merit eternal life by condign merit.

Scotus on how original justice and grace relate as 'exceeding and exceeded': original justice exceeded grace in four practical effects (ordering of the powers, union with God, exclusion of all sin, ease of doing good), but grace exceeds it by joining man to God as to his supernatural end—making him God's friend, son, and heir, able to merit 'de condigno.'

The other opinion is that Adam was created in grace. That this was Augustine's view he declared openly in many places. For in the Enchiridion, chapter 104, he says thus: ‘God would have kept the first man in that salvation in which he had been founded, and at a suitable time, after children were begotten, would have led him without the interposition of death to better things: where now he would be able not only not to commit sin, but not even to have the will of sinning—if he had foreknown that

[Adam] would have a perpetual will to remain without sin, as he had been made.' But in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapter 10, he affirms that the first man was made by God upright and with a good will. But for Augustine there is no simply good will without the grace of God. He hands down likewise that he was made blessed—with that blessedness, namely, which can befall a man in this life, which nevertheless would be none without the grace of God.

Marginal gloss: 'Augusti. sententia fuit, et vera, Adamum creatum esse cum gratia' (Augustine's opinion was—and the true one—that Adam was created with grace). The second opinion (Pererius's): Adam created in grace, per Augustine, Enchiridion 104 and De Correptione et gratia 10 (no good will without grace).

And in this manner he writes: 'God made the first man blessed: because he felt it to be in his own power both not to die and not to become wretched. In which upright and faultless state, if by his own free will he had willed to remain, he would assuredly, without any experience of death and unhappiness, have received—by the merit of such perseverance—both that fullness of blessedness by which the holy Angels too are blessed, that is, that he could fall no further, and would know this most certainly.' And in the eleventh chapter of the same book: 'Then,' he says, 'God had given man a good will: for in that will he had made him who had made him upright. He had given help, without which he could not remain in it if he willed; but that he should will, he left to his free choice. But if this help had been lacking to the Angel or to man when they were first made, since their nature had not been made such that it could remain without divine help if it willed, [Adam] would certainly not have fallen by his own fault: for the help would have been lacking without which they could not remain.'

Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 10-11: man made blessed; the divine 'help' (adiutorium) given so he could persevere if he willed, the willing left to free choice. Without that help his fall would not have been his own fault.

Also in the fourteenth book of the City of God, chapters 11 and 17, he says that the first man was created by God upright and with a good will; and

since the case of the Angels and of the first men is parallel, as Augustine indicates in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapters ten and eleven—and this pleases nearly all the Theologians—if the Angel was created with grace, likewise man must be thought to have been created with grace. And that the Angels were created with grace, [Augustine] disputes in many eloquent words...

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.11 and 17; the parity of angels and first men: if angels were created in grace, so was man. Continues to next page (catchword 'Augustinus').

— p. 589 (PDF) · printed p. 548 —

Augustine, book 12 of the City of God, chapter 9: ‘As soon,’ he says, ‘as the Angels were made, they clung, by the love with which they were made, to him by whom they were made.’ And a little below: ‘God made the Angels with a good will, that is, with the chaste love by which they clung [to him]: at once founding nature in them and bestowing grace.’ And then, after these things, the love and good will with which the Angels were created he calls charity poured out into them through the Holy Spirit.

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 12.9: the angels created with grace ('founding nature and bestowing grace at once'), their good will being charity poured out by the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom 5:5).

Saint Jerome likewise, in his Commentaries on Hosea, attests that the demons were created by God in great fatness of spirit. This same thing the Fathers gather from what Isaiah, chapter 14, prophesies of Lucifer under the person of the king of Babylon, and Ezekiel, chapter 28, of the same under the person of the prince of Tyre. To these is added that many of the holy Fathers and ancient doctors, in explaining those words, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness,’ judged that the phrase ‘to our likeness’ should be interpreted and understood of the likeness which man has with God on account of grace and the virtues: of which interpretation we named, above in the fourth book, as authors Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Bede, Rupert, and Hugh. With this opinion Paul too seems to stand, writing thus to the Colossians 3: ‘Stripping off the old

man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of him that created him': where Paul calls the renewal of man through grace the renewal of the image in which man was created. And thus must be interpreted what many of the ancients said, that Adam, on account of the sin he committed, lost the image of God to which he had been founded.

Jerome on Hosea (demons created 'in great fatness of spirit'); Isaiah 14 (Lucifer as king of Babylon), Ezekiel 28 (prince of Tyre). The 'image and likeness' (Gen 1:26): the 'likeness' refers to grace and virtues (Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Bede, Rupert, Hugh). Colossians 3:9-10 (renewal of the image by grace); Adam lost the image by sin.

Besides, some consider that there pertains to the confirmation of this opinion what is written in chapter 17 of the book of Ecclesiasticus in these words: 'God created man of the earth, and made him according to his own image: and according to himself he clothed him with virtue.' But that 'according to himself' means the same as 'to his own likeness.' For just as it is said of God, 'Thou hast put on confession and beauty'; and in another Psalm, 'The Lord hath reigned, he hath put on beauty, the Lord hath put on strength and hath girded himself'; so also man, to the likeness of God, was in his own way adorned with virtue, that is, endowed with that keenness of intellect by which he might penetrate all things in mind and thought, and powerfully effect many splendid things. For in this place that word 'virtue' (virtute) does not signify the moral virtue which is contrary to the vices, which the Greeks call ■ρετ■ν (aret■n), but signifies vigor and strength, for in Greek it is ■σχ■ν (ischyn). Wherefore some argue, more probably, from that place that Adam was founded with perfect bodily strength and perfect virtue of soul, which embraces knowledge and the moral and even supernatural virtues; although in Greek, for that 'according to himself,' it is read in the plural κατ' ■αυτο■ς (kat' heautous), that is, 'according to themselves,' so that it refers to men. For the whole Greek reading speaks in the plural: either because it treats of Adam and Eve, or because it speaks of those things which in Adam were conferred on the whole human nature.

GLYPHS verified by magnification: ■ρετ■ν (aret■n = moral virtue) and ■σχ■ν (ischyn = strength/vigor)—Pererius distinguishes the two senses of 'virtus' in Sirach 17:1-3; and κατ' ■αυτο■ς (kat' heautous = 'according to themselves,' plural), the Greek of 'secundum se.' Marginal refs: 'Locus Ecclesiastici' (Sirach 17); 'Psal. 103' (Ps 103/104:1 'Confessionem et decorem induisti'); 'Psal. 92' (Ps 92/93:1 'Dominus regnavit, decorem induit'). Continues to next page (catchword 'B. Thomas').

— p. 590 (PDF) · printed p. 549 —

The Blessed Thomas, first part, questions 95 and 100, from that sentence which is in the seventh chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, ‘God made man upright,’ in order to prove that Adam was created by God with grace, reasons in this way: The uprightness of the first man was placed in this, that his reason was subject to God; but to his reason the lower powers of the soul, and to the soul also the body. Now of this threefold uprightness the first was the cause of the second and third: but the second uprightness, by which the lower powers of the soul were subject and obedient to reason; and likewise the third uprightness, by which the body was subject to the soul, were not natural: otherwise they would have remained in man after sin: for the things that are natural to man were not taken away from man on account of sin: but they were freely granted to man through the grace of God.

Marginal gloss: 'Locus Ecclesiastae cap. 7' (Ecclesiastes 7:29 'God made man upright'). Aquinas, ST I qq.95 & 100: Adam's threefold uprightness (reason under God, lower powers under reason, body under soul) was not natural—else it would have survived sin—but a gift of grace.

That first uprightness, therefore, by which the mind was wholly subject to God, on which namely the other two depended, was not a natural but a supernatural gift of the grace of God. Hence it is concluded that, if the first man was created with that uprightness, he was created with the grace of God. And that what kept the lower powers of the soul in their duty and in obedience to reason was a supernatural gift of grace, Paul not obscurely indicated in Romans 7. For when he had said, ‘I perceive another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin’; and when, as if deploring his most wretched state, he had

exclaimed, ‘Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’ he added, ‘The grace of God through Jesus Christ.’ The grace of God alone, therefore, can restrain the flesh rebellious to the spirit, and subjugate it to the command of the mind. Therefore, since in Adam before sin the flesh was in no way rebellious to reason, that assuredly must be reckoned to have come about in no other way than through the grace of God. Thus the Blessed Thomas.

Aquinas concludes: the first uprightness (mind subject to God) was a supernatural gift; Romans 7:23-25 ('another law in my members'... 'the grace of God through Jesus Christ'). Adam's flesh not rebelling = grace. Ends 'Sic B. Thomas.'

To confirm this there also serves what Augustine writes in book 13 of the City of God, chapter 13: ‘After,’ he says, ‘the transgression of the precept was committed, at once, the divine grace deserting [them], they were confounded at the nakedness of their bodies: for they felt a new motion of their disobedient flesh, as a reciprocal penalty of their own disobedience. For now the soul, delighting perversely in its own liberty and disdaining to serve God, was deprived of the former service of the body. And because it had deserted its higher Lord by its own choice, it did not hold the lower servant to its own choice: nor had it the flesh wholly subject, as it could always have had it, if it had itself remained subject to God.’ But in book 14 of the same work, chapter 17, treating those words of the third chapter of Genesis, ‘Their eyes were opened, and when they had known that they were naked,’ etc., Augustine writes thus: ‘Their eyes were open, but not yet opened, that is, not attentive to know what was furnished to them by the garment of grace, when their members did not know how to resist their will. When this grace was removed, so that disobedience might be punished by a reciprocal penalty, there arose in the motion of the body a certain shameless novelty, whence there was an unseemly nakedness; and it made them attentive and rendered them confounded. Their eyes were opened, he says, of both, not to see, for they saw before too, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen.’

Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 13.13 (the loss of grace and confusion at nakedness) and 14.17 (Genesis 3:7 'their eyes were opened'—they perceived the loss of grace's 'garment'). Ends 'Haec Augustinus.'

Although those who make original justice a certain gift distinct from sanctifying grace are by no means moved by these sentences of Paul and Augustine. For they answer that original justice itself, because it was a supernatural gift of God not owed to man, but...

The opposing party (who distinguish original justice from sanctifying grace) reply that the Pauline/Augustinian texts do not move them: original justice was a supernatural gift not owed to man. Continues to next page (catchword 'sed').

— p. 591 (PDF) · printed p. 550 —

...but was freely bestowed on him by God; and therefore it is called by the Fathers the grace of God. But indeed, that the first man was created with sanctifying grace can be confirmed by other reasons as well. For if Adam was created perfect in body, and as regards all his members and the faculties of the body, who would doubt that he was likewise created perfect in soul and reason, and as regards all the powers of the rational soul? But he would not have been perfect without grace. If Adam was founded in a most happy and blessed state, as Augustine inculcates in many places, and as the Paradise in which Adam was placed declares; since the foremost parts of this happiness belong to grace itself, this ought not to have been lacking to him. If he was so founded as to be a friend and intimate of God, he surely could not lack the grace which produces and guards this friendship. If he was so founded that he could escape death—for which purpose God provided him the tree of life—if the things that pertain to the conservation or delight of the body God provided him at once and so abundantly, why would he not have given him grace, the most important and most necessary of the goods that pertain to the soul? If he had grace before sin, why would he not have had it as soon as he was founded?

Marginal gloss: 'Probatur multis rationibus, Adamum cum gratia esse creatum' (it is proved by many reasons that Adam was created with grace). Completes the reply (from p.549 catchword 'sed'): original justice, being a free gift, is called grace by the Fathers. Then Pererius's own arguments for Adam created in grace (perfect body→perfect soul; the blessed state/Paradise; friend of God; tree of life).

Finally, if Adam was made upright in soul and perfect in reason, it was fitting that he should first of all know God—by whom, for whom, and to the loving, worshiping, and enjoying of whom he had been created—and that he should refer and direct himself and all that was his to God as to his supernatural end: for without this knowledge, the knowledge of all other things is empty and futile. ‘For vain are all men,’ as is written in chapter 13 of the book of Wisdom, ‘in whom there is not the knowledge of God.’ This too was excellently said by God through Jeremiah, chapter nine: ‘Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glorieth glory in this, to know and understand me, that I am the Lord, who do mercy and judgment and justice in the earth: for these things please me, saith the Lord.’ And this knowledge of God, since he is the very last and supernatural end of man, could proceed from nothing else than from faith, which is the gift of God: with faith, therefore, Adam was created, and surely not with formless faith unaccompanied by the other virtues, but with faith, then, hope, and charity. Add that Adam was created more principally for his supernatural end than for his natural one: but to attain his natural end, [God] at once gave him many and excellent gifts: there is no doubt, therefore, that he at once imparted to him grace, which is necessary for attaining the supernatural end. But if Adam, as soon as he was made, had the perfect use of reason, then at once he could, or even ought, to direct himself and refer himself to his ultimate supernatural end, and was able to merit well: which indeed he could not do without grace; he was not, therefore, created without grace.

Wisdom 13:1 ('vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God'); Jeremiah 9:23-24 ('let him that glorieth glory in this, to know me'). Arguments: knowledge of God as supernatural end

requires faith; Adam created with faith, hope, and charity; created chiefly for the supernatural end; perfect use of reason from creation implies ability to merit, which requires grace.

And indeed at his origin Adam received grace not only as a hab-[it]...

Transition to the next point: Adam received grace not only as a habit but also as an act. Continues to next page (catchword 'habitum').

— p. 592 (PDF) · printed p. 551 —

...[a hab]it, but also as an act, that is, by his concurring to the reception of grace by his own act of free will, and consenting to it, and tending toward God by an act of faith and love. And that this is so we can argue from four things, hardly doubtful or controverted among the Theologians. First, Adam was created perfect in soul and reason, and able, as soon as he was founded, to use his reason and free will. Next, the acts of free will, that is, of the will and the intellect, are indivisible, and can be completed and accomplished in a single instant. Besides, Adam was created upright, which uprightness made, first of all, that Adam by reason and will should subject himself and what was his to God, and that the first act of mind and will which he exercised should be directed to God. Finally, it is a more excellent manner of sanctification and justification that a man be sanctified and justified through his own act and the consent of free will, than without it.

Marginal gloss: 'Non tantum Adam creatum esse cum habitu gratiae, sed etiam cum eius actu et usu' (Adam was created not only with the habit of grace but also with its act and use). Four arguments that Adam received grace as both habit and act (cooperating by free will).

From these four it is made out and concluded what we maintain: that Adam, in that very point of time in which he was created, at once both exercised an act of faith and love toward God, and God himself gave him sanctifying grace; in the very manner in which the Theologians dispute, concerning the justification of an adult, that in the same instant there is, on man's part, the ultimate disposition for receiving grace through his own act of free will, and, on God's part, the infusion of grace itself. With this our

opinion the doctrine of the Blessed Thomas plainly agrees. For he, in the first part, question 96, article 1, against what he wished to teach—namely that Adam was created with grace—in the fifth place adds thus: ‘For a man to receive grace,’ he says, ‘consent is required on the part of the receiver, since by this a certain spiritual marriage is completed between God and the soul: but consent to grace can only be of one already existing; therefore the first man did not receive grace in the first instant of his founding.’ This objection, toward the end of the same article, he himself thus dissolves: ‘To the fifth it must be said that, since the motion of the will is not continuous, nothing prevents the first man from having consented to grace even in the first instant of his creation.’

Conclusion: Adam exercised acts of faith and love at the very instant of creation, God giving sanctifying grace simultaneously (as in the justification of an adult). Aquinas ST I q.96 a.1, objection 5 (the 'spiritual marriage' needs consent of one already existing) and its resolution (the will's motion is not continuous).

QUESTION II. Whether in the state of innocence any venial sin could have been admitted.

Question divider opening the second question of the disputation on sanctifying grace.

The second question is, whether the grace which Adam had in the state of innocence—and which, had he not sinned, his descendants would have had—was such that it excluded all admixture and association of venial sin? Or, as others propose the same question, whether Adam, while the state of innocence remained, could have sinned venially; or whether he could have sinned venially before mortally. For it seems that in that state venial sin could have been admitted. For if the Apostles, who were confirmed in grace, and John the Baptist, who in his mother's womb was sancti-[fied]...

Opening of Question II, with the 'videtur' (it seems venial sin was possible): the Apostles (confirmed in grace) and John the Baptist (sanctified in the womb) could sin venially. Continues to next page (catchword 'ficatus').

— p. 593 (PDF) · printed p. 552 —

...[was sancti]fied, could sin venially, why not Adam too? for it is not credible that there was greater grace in him than in them. But if it is easier to commit a venial sin than a mortal one, it was therefore easier for Adam to slip into a venial sin than into a mortal one. And if the grace he had did not prevent his being able to sin mortally, much less would it have prevented his being able to commit any venial sin whatever. On the contrary, however, it seems that every venial sin—because it is a certain evil and deserving of some penalty, and has something of sadness and pain attached—plainly opposes the most happy state of innocence, which was empty of all evil of body and soul, of fault and of penalty.

Completes the 'videtur' (the Apostles/John the Baptist could sin venially, so why not Adam) and the contrary view ('Ex adverso'): venial sin, an evil bringing sorrow, opposes the blessed state of innocence.

Concerning this question I find two opinions. The one opinion is that of Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty-one, article three, and of Saint Thomas, in the first part of the second part, question eighty-nine, denying that any venial sin could have been done in the state of innocence: but [holding] that it was necessary that the first sin be mortal. And this opinion Bonaventure says is commonly approved by the Doctors of Theology, and rightly indeed. For the state of innocence could not be destroyed except by mortal sin, inasmuch as that takes away the grace of God and renders man unworthy of God's love and benefits. A venial sin, therefore, could not destroy that state, nor yet could it coexist with it, since a venial sin brings with it many things wholly repugnant to that most tranquil and happy state.

Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio, quae est probabilior' (the first opinion, which is more probable). First opinion (Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure Sent. II d.21 a.3, Aquinas ST I-II q.89): no venial sin possible in innocence; the first sin had to be mortal. The state is destroyed only by mortal sin, yet venial sin could not coexist with it either.

For a venial sin is in itself a great evil, to avoid which any bodily penalty whatever may rightly be undergone: it brings pain, and has penitence

joined to it, and the gnawing of conscience: some penalty is owed it: it lessens the fervor of charity: and, multiplied, it increases the difficulty of doing well, and makes us do good with sadness: but all these things would have been most remote from the tranquillity and happiness of that state. For there was nothing, as Augustine writes in the fourteenth book of the City of God, chapter ten, that could offend the flesh and soul of man living happily in that state. For there was in it a tranquil avoidance of sin: which remaining, there was no evil at all that could from any source sadden him. And in chapter 26 of the same book: ‘The highest,’ he says, ‘health was in the flesh, in the soul entire tranquillity: as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of good will arose from desire or fear. Nothing at all was sad, nothing was vainly glad: but joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity glowed out of a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.’ Thus Augustine.

Why venial sin opposes innocence (it brings pain, remorse, lessens charity). Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.10 and 14.26 ('the highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul'; 1 Tim 1:5 'charity out of a pure heart, good conscience, faith unfeigned'). Ends 'Sic Augustinus.'

Next, a venial sin is a certain disorder of man, and therefore is repugnant to the highest uprightness in which man was created according to all his parts and powers. Besides, if in that state there had been such health of body that not even the slightest disease could have befallen man, then there would have been equal health of soul and freedom from all fault. Finally, if in...

Further arguments of the first opinion: venial sin is a disorder repugnant to man's created rectitude; perfect bodily health implies perfect spiritual health. Continues to next page (catchword 'si in').

— p. 594 (PDF) · printed p. 553 —

...if in that state man had committed a venial sin, either he would have grieved for it, or grieved not at all: if he had grieved, that pain and sadness would have been a penalty of the soul, and contrary to the joy which in that state man enjoyed everywhere most fully: if he had grieved not at all, this very thing would have increased the guilt, and made the man worse and

worthy of a heavier punishment.

Final argument of the first opinion: a venial sin in that state leads to a dilemma—grief (a penalty contrary to his joy) or no grief (which would increase guilt).

The other opinion was that Adam in that state could have sinned venially before mortally: which Scotus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, question 1, follows, and confirms by these arguments: The uprightness of the state of innocence was more repugnant to mortal than to venial sin: but, notwithstanding that uprightness, Adam could sin mortally: therefore he could also have sinned venially. Next, the gift of that innocence or original justice did not join man to God more than any sanctifying grace whatever, of whatever degree, which is in the wayfarer: but whatever sanctifying grace there be, it can coexist with venial sin, as it was in the Apostles: therefore the same could happen likewise in Adam.

Marginal gloss: 'Secunda opinio Scoti' (the second opinion, of Scotus). Second opinion (Scotus, Sent. II d.21 q.1): Adam could sin venially before mortally—two arguments (uprightness more opposed to mortal than venial; grace coexists with venial sin, as in the Apostles).

To these is added that there are three kinds of venial sin: for one befalls man from the surreption of sensuality; another arises from some sudden and undeliberate motion of reason, such as is the first motion of unbelief or despair: and these two kinds of venial sin both Scotus admits, and no Theologian denies, could not fall into the state of innocence. For in it sensuality was so subject to reason that it neither forestalled its command and moderation, nor refused it. And reason itself was so disposed and strengthened by the divine gift that it issued into no act unless perfected by the man's counsel, deliberation, and choice. But besides these two kinds of venial sin, there is a third, which is by its own kind venial on account of the imperfection of the act and the lightness of the matter: of which kind is an idle word, and a lie, whether jocose or officious: this kind of venial sin Scotus does not see how it could be denied that it could have been admitted in that state. For if that gift of innocence or original justice did not prevent Adam from being able to sin mortally, much less would it have prevented

his being able to sin venially. For the admission of a venial sin of this kind does not prove that the superior or inferior part of man was disordered, nor does it posit any disorder other than what is implicated in the very act of the venial sin.

Marginal gloss: 'Tria genera peccati venialis' (three kinds of venial sin). Scotus's three kinds: (1) from surreption of sensuality; (2) from a sudden undeliberate motion of reason (first motion of unbelief/despair)—these two could not fall into innocence; (3) venial by kind through imperfect act/light matter (idle word, jocose or officious lie)—which Scotus sees no reason could not be admitted.

But as for what some object against this—that to every venial sin some penalty is owed, but that every penalty was contrary to that state—to this Scotus answers in two ways: First, that not every penalty was repugnant to that state, but only the penalty of bodily death, which was owed to mortal sin alone: then, that a venial sin could have been washed away without penalty, namely by the mere displeasure of the will: finally, that even without sadness of soul, such sins could have been consumed and blotted out by fervent acts of charity. Thus far from Scotus himself. And although Bonaventure does not deny that this position is sufficiently pro-[bable]...

Objection (every venial sin deserves a penalty, every penalty opposes that state) and Scotus's twofold reply (only bodily death opposed it; venial sin could be cleansed without penalty by the will's displeasure or fervent acts of charity). Ends 'Hactenus ex ipso Scoto.' Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with new gathering signature 'AAA'. Continues to next page (catchword 'probabilem').

— p. 595 (PDF) · printed p. 554 —

...[that this position is sufficiently] probable, yet he affirms that it is not commonly approved by the Doctors of Theology. ‘And indeed,’ he says, ‘that opinion has improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which Adam was: from which, even though he had nothing impelling him, he could not depart except by despising the divine justice and defiling his innocence and corrupting his nature: all of which make the first fault of Adam to have been not venial but mortal, nor able to have been otherwise.’ And it is the common opinion which the

Doctors approve today, that the first sin of Adam ought to have been not venial but mortal. Thus Bonaventure.

Completes the Bonaventure citation (from p.553 catchword 'probabilem'): although the Scotist position is probable, Bonaventure himself holds with the common opinion that Adam's first sin had to be mortal. Ends 'Sic Bonaventura.'

We, therefore, assenting to the former opinion, which is more probable, supported by weightier weights of reasons and by the authorities of the Doctors, let us briefly dissolve the contrary reasons set down above. To Scotus's first reason it must be answered thus: that mortal sin was more repugnant to that state than venial under this title, that it utterly destroyed that state; but venial sin was not enough to overthrow that state: for it was not fitting that that happiness be lost except on account of that by which man became an enemy of God, his law despised and violated. Nevertheless venial sin was wholly opposed to that state, which, while it remained, ought to be free of all evil, both of fault and of penalty, as it had been established by God. And so for Adam to commit a mortal sin was in no way repugnant, just as neither to fall from that state of innocence and lose that happiness: but, the happiness of that state remaining, for a venial sin to be admitted there was a manifest repugnance, because that state, as we said, partook of no evil: and a venial sin would have brought man no slight nor single evil.

Marginal gloss: 'Solutio rationum Scoti' (the solution of Scotus's reasons). Pererius sides with the first (more probable) opinion and answers Scotus's first argument: mortal sin destroys the state; venial sin, though it could not destroy it, was nonetheless wholly incompatible with a state free of all evil.

To Scotus's second reason let it be answered thus: The gift of innocence and of original justice, as regards some things, joined man more to God than sanctifying grace, since original justice healed all the powers of the soul, and perfectly subjected the flesh and sense to reason, and rendered reason itself most watchful, and so intent upon what ought to be done, that it did nothing except knowingly, advisedly, and deliberately. Wherefore in that state the avoidance of any venial sin was easy: but now, even by those

endowed with great grace, all venial sins down to the last cannot be perpetually avoided.

Marginal gloss (continued): 'Unde habuerit Adam, ut in statu innocentiae nullum posset facere peccatum veniale' (whence Adam had it that in the state of innocence he could commit no venial sin). Answer to Scotus's second argument: original justice (unlike ordinary grace in the wayfarer) healed all the soul's powers and made reason fully deliberate, so venial sin was easily avoided.

Let Scotus's third reason have this answer from us. We indeed candidly admit that, for the perpetual avoidance of all venial sins of the third kind, which the Theologians call venial by their own kind, the gift of sanctifying grace was not enough, nor the moral or divine virtues seated and inhering in Adam's soul: for gifts and habits of this sort ought much more to have warded off from Adam and excluded mortal sin than venial, since they have greater repugnance with the former than with the latter. But if they could not prevent Adam from the admission of a mortal sin, much less would they have prevented him from the commission of a venial sin. We think, therefore, that besides those gifts and...

Answer to Scotus's third argument: grace and the infused virtues by themselves were not enough to prevent every venial sin 'by kind'—so the explanation must lie elsewhere (God's special providence, developed on the next page). Continues to next page (catchword '&').

— p. 596 (PDF) · printed p. 555 —

...and the habits of the virtues divinely implanted, there was present to Adam a certain singular providence, care, and protection of God, who, while that state remained, preserved Adam and kept him from slipping into venial sins of this kind: just as he also wondrously preserved his life and health, lest he be even slightly harmed by the innumerable things that could from without befall and injure him. For God had established (which was most fitting) that that state should remain only wholly intact and free of all evil: and on this account, freedom from all evil of penalty was necessarily joined with freedom from all evil of fault.

Pererius's answer to Scotus's third argument completed: God's special providence guarded Adam from venial sins (as it preserved his life and health), since the state was to remain wholly free of evil—freedom from penalty-evil joined to freedom from fault-evil.

I am not unaware how Bonaventure dissolves this reason of Scotus: for he holds that sins of this kind venial by their own genus—such as an idle word, or an officious or jocose lie, which now in the state of fallen nature are venial—then, on account of the perfection of that state and the dignity of the person, would have been mortal. For thus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, article 3, question 1, Bonaventure writes: ‘To that which is objected, that Adam could have spoken an idle word, which is a venial sin, it must be answered that an idle word would have been mortal to Adam on account of the perfection of his state: whence what is commonly said, that some sin is by its own genus venial, this is to be understood with respect to fallen nature.’ But Saint Thomas rightly refutes this opinion, in the first of the second part, question 89, article 3: ‘It is commonly held,’ he says, ‘that man in the state of innocence could not sin venially: which is not to be understood as if what is venial to us, had Adam committed it, would have been mortal to him on account of the loftiness of his state—for the dignity of a person is a circumstance that indeed aggravates a sin, yet does not transfer it into another species, unless perhaps a deformity of disobedience or of a vow or of some such thing supervenes, which cannot be said in the case proposed. Hence what is of itself venial could not be transferred into mortal on account of the dignity of the first state. So therefore it is to be understood that Adam could not first sin venially, because it could not come about that he should commit something that was of itself a venial sin, before he lost the integrity of the first state by sinning mortally.’ Thus S. Thomas.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Bonaventura' (Bonaventure is refuted). Bonaventure's solution (Sent. II d.21 a.3 q.1): venial-by-kind sins would have been mortal for Adam because of his state's dignity. Aquinas (ST I-II q.89 a.3) refutes this: dignity aggravates but does not change the species, so what is venial by kind cannot become mortal.

QUESTION III. Whether in the state of innocence men would have been generated with the grace of God.

Question divider opening the third question of the disputation on grace. (The text below calls it 'tertia quaestio'; its subject—posterity born with grace—corresponds to the fourth item of the disputation's prefatory list on p.545, so Pererius's running numbering differs from that preface.)

There follows the third question, whether, if Adam had not sinned and the state of innocence had remained, the descendants of Adam would have been generated with sanctifying grace. Hugh of St. Victor seems to deny this, in the first book of On the Sacraments, part six, chapter 23:...

Opening of Question III: would Adam's posterity have been born with sanctifying grace? Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacramentis I.6.23) seems to deny it. The Hugh quotation continues on the next page (catchword 'sic').

— p. 597 (PDF) · printed p. 556 —

...for thus he writes: ‘The first man before sin would indeed have begotten sons without sin, but not heirs of his paternal justice.’ The same is to be thought to have been the view of whoever said that Adam was not created with grace. Nevertheless the contrary opinion is held more probable, which Saint Thomas followed in the first part, question 100, and it could be proved by this kind of argument: Adam's descendants would have been generated with original justice, therefore also with sanctifying grace. For, as I shall show a little below, original justice either did not really differ from sanctifying grace, or certainly could in no way be separated from it. And that which we assumed—that in the state of innocence all would be generated with original justice—is the opinion of the Theologians, as may be seen in the second book of the Sentences, distinction twenty, and is very consonant with reason: for the sons would have been generated with the gift of immortality and impassibility, and the other prerogatives of that state. But these were necessarily connected with original justice, with which therefore they would have been born.

Hugh's text quoted ('would have begotten sons without sin, but not heirs of his justice'). Pererius prefers the contrary, more probable view (Aquinas ST I q.100): posterity would be born with original justice—hence with grace, since the two are inseparable (Lombard Sent. II d.20). The immortality/impassibility prerogatives presuppose original justice.

Next, Adam by sinning vitiated and corrupted both himself and all his progeny, and transfused his sin into all his descendants through carnal generation: therefore, if he had not sinned, original justice would likewise have passed to all his descendants in carnal generation. For just as original sin, because it is a sin of nature, is derived to all who receive nature from Adam, so original justice, which was a gift healing and perfecting nature, and whose privation is original sin, would have been communicated, through the communication of nature itself, to all the descendants of Adam. There serves also to prove this the authority of the Council of Orange, chapter 5, and of the Council of Trent in the fifth session, on Original Sin; for in each it was defined that Adam, by sinning, lost holiness and justice not for himself only, but also for all his descendants. From which it appears that, if Adam had not sinned, he would not have lost original justice for his descendants, but it would have been given to his descendants in carnal generation itself. And the words of the Council are to be noted, in which it is said that Adam lost holiness and justice for his descendants: for it not obscurely indicates, by the word ‘holiness,’ sanctifying grace, and by the word ‘justice,’ original justice itself. And that opinion of Hugh, saying that Adam's descendants would not be heirs of his justice, Saint Thomas, interpreting it benignly in the first part, question one hundred, article one, thinks must be taken of justice not as to the habit, but as to the execution of the act: for they would have had the habits of the virtues from their first birth, but they could not have unfolded them into use and brought them into act before the use of reason. But Adam, because he was created at a perfect age and using reason, had grace from the beginning not only as to habit, but also as to act.

Marginal gloss: 'Interpretatio sententiae Hugonis, secundum B. Thomam' (interpretation of Hugh's opinion, according to the Blessed Thomas). Original justice transmitted like original sin; Councils of

Orange (c.5) and Trent (sess. 5)—'holiness' = grace, 'justice' = original justice. Aquinas (ST I q.100 a.1) reads Hugh benignly: posterity would have had the habit but not the act before the use of reason. Catchword 'VERUM' to next page.

— p. 598 (PDF) · printed p. 557 —

But two things could be objected to us. For if men in the state of innocence had had grace through generation, surely that grace would have been natural to man: but it is repugnant for grace to be natural, not only to man, but even to the Angel; for grace is of the genus and order of supernatural things. But this is easily dissolved: for although grace would have been given to man together with nature and the rational soul, and for that reason could be called in a way natural, because it would have been present to man from the origin of nature, nevertheless simply and absolutely it would have been supernatural, because it would not be given to man by the force and power of nature and of the generative faculty, but by the power of God alone: nor was it anything naturally owed to man, nor pertaining to his natural integrity and perfection.

Marginal gloss: 'Solutio duarum obiectionum' (the solution of two objections). Objection 1: grace would then be natural. Answer: though present from the origin of nature, it would still be simply supernatural, given by God's power alone, not owed to nature.

This too could be objected: that Adam's descendants in the state of innocence would not have had knowledge from the beginning, as we showed above: therefore by like reasoning neither would they have had grace. But this is solved by the Blessed Thomas, question 18 of On Truth, article 2, in the response to the second and seventh [objections]: for the character of knowledge and of grace is different: for grace of itself makes for the gratitude (acceptableness) of man, nor can it at any time be separated from the state of original justice, and was a supernatural gift procurable by no faculty of man. But knowledge is a certain natural perfection of man, which it is natural for man to procure gradually through the senses and experiences, and likewise through assiduous and manifold agitation of the mind. Just as now, in the state of the Evangelical law, all

who are regenerated in Christ through baptism receive grace at once, so in the state of innocence all the descendants of Adam, in carnal generation—through which they would have received human nature—would at once also have had grace and the virtues.

Objection 2: posterity would not have knowledge from birth, so why grace? Answer (Aquinas, De Veritate q.18 a.2 ad 2 & 7): grace differs from knowledge—grace is supernatural and inseparable from original justice; knowledge is natural and acquired gradually. As the baptized now receive grace, so in innocence all would receive grace and virtues in carnal generation.

QUESTION IV. Whether in the state of innocence Adam's descendants, once generated, would have been confirmed in grace.

Question divider opening the fourth running question of the disputation on grace (corresponding to the fifth item of the prefatory list on p.545).

But that is a weightier question, whether, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would have been born confirmed in grace. Three opinions of the Theologians are reported. The first is Scotus's, who, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 1, denies that Adam's descendants would be so confirmed in grace that thereafter they could not sin: because this is proper to the state of the comprehensores (the blessed), and is repugnant to the state of wayfarers; in which, whoever are engaged, their will is equally flexible and mutable toward good and evil. For since the very good in itself, which is God, is not clearly seen by the wayfarer, and every other good is finite, particular, and lacking some aspect of good, this cannot necessarily turn the will of the wayfaring man away from evil and confirm it in good: just-as...

Marginal gloss: 'Scoti opinio' (Scotus's opinion). Question IV: would Adam's posterity be born confirmed in grace? Three opinions reported. The first (Scotus, Sent. II d.20 q.1): no—confirmation in grace belongs to the blessed (comprehensores) and is repugnant to the wayfarer's state, whose will remains flexible/mutable. Continues to next page (catchword 'quemadmodum'). Colophon at foot: 'AAA 3'.

— p. 599 (PDF) · printed p. 558 —

...[just as] the blessed, the divine essence being clearly seen—which contains all good in itself, and can eminently and most fully satisfy and fill every appetite of the human will—necessarily draws the will away from evil and confirms it in good. And this very reasoning the Blessed Thomas used in the first part, question 100, article 2, treating this same question. To these Scotus further adds that, if Adam had conquered that first temptation, he would have been confirmed in grace, so that thereafter he could not sin—not indeed by reason of his state, but by the special assistance and protection of God, just as the Theologians hold concerning the confirmation in grace of the Apostles, and above all of the most blessed Virgin. Nor would Adam alone, as Scotus holds, have been confirmed in grace, but also all his descendants, if, when they had come to the use of reason, they had overcome the first temptation that assailed them. This opinion of Scotus the Blessed Thomas too, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 2, article 3, thought probable.

Completes Scotus's first opinion (from p.557 catchword 'quemadmodum'): the wayfarer's will is confirmed only by the clear vision of God (cf. Aquinas ST I q.100 a.2). Scotus adds: had Adam (and each descendant) won the first temptation, he would be confirmed by God's special assistance, as the Apostles and the Virgin. Aquinas (Sent. II d.20 q.2 a.3) thought it probable.

To me, however, it by no means seems probable. For when God said to Adam, ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat of that tree, thou shalt die the death,’ he sufficiently indicated that Adam would throughout his whole life be bound by the precept of not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and would always be in peril and danger of losing the grace he had received: so that not only the first temptation was to be overcome by him, but also every one that could afterward befall: for this is what that phrase shows, ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat.’ This is likewise concluded by probable reason. For the case of the Angel and of man is not alike: for the Angel's ‘way’ is terminated by the first act, whether good or evil, that he produced after he was created; but man's ‘way’ extends together with his very life, and the term and end of both is the same: and while each lives his life on earth, he can be converted either from evil to good, or from good

to evil. I can also press Scotus with this argument: Either the victory over that first temptation would have merited confirmation in grace by its own force and nature, or by some privilege or pact of God, not by its own force: for [if the former] it would do the same in us; but no such privilege or pact is found either expressed or indicated in the Sacred Scriptures, or handed down by the Fathers.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Scotus' (Scotus is refuted). Pererius's refutation: Genesis 2:17 ('In whatever day thou shalt eat... thou shalt die') shows Adam was bound for life, at perpetual risk—not just the first temptation. The angel's 'way' ends with its first act; man's extends through his whole life. And no privilege/pact for confirmation by the first victory is found in Scripture or the Fathers.

The other opinion is that, if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would be confirmed in original justice, but not in sanctifying grace: for they could have sinned, and by sinning lost the grace of God, but not original justice. For according to the authors of this opinion, mortal sin of itself and formally is repugnant to sanctifying grace, but not to original justice—which they make both really distinct from, and separable from, grace: for they think it was a grace freely given, with which it is in no way repugnant to coexist with mortal sin. So Catharinus held, on the third chapter of Genesis, and on the same chapter Tostatus, questions 6 and 7. We shall refute below this opinion, by which it makes original justice really distinct from and separable from grace: but as for what it asserts, that it...

Marginal gloss: 'Secunda sententia Catharini, et Tostati, refellitur' (the second opinion, of Catharinus and Tostatus, is refuted). Second opinion: posterity confirmed in original justice but not sanctifying grace, since (they say) mortal sin is repugnant to grace but not to original justice, which they make distinct from and separable from grace. Catharinus (on Gen 3) and Tostatus (qq. 6-7). Continues to next page (catchword 'eam').

— p. 600 (PDF) · printed p. 559 —

...that it could coexist with mortal sin, this we shall now refute by this argument. Mortal sin necessarily took away the four proper effects of original justice; therefore it also took away original justice itself. For the

first effect of original justice was the rectitude of the superior part, by which, namely, man was wholly subject, according to reason and will, to the divine law and will; but every mortal sin is against the rectitude of reason and against the law and will of God: every mortal sin, therefore, was plainly opposed to original justice. The second effect of original justice was the rectitude of the inferior part, by which the flesh and sense were plainly conformed to the judgment of reason and spirit, and were wholly subject under their command. But this rectitude of the inferior part the mortal sins, which are concerned with the irascible and concupiscible appetite, utterly overthrew. The third effect was to have no propensity to evil, and no difficulty in doing well: but mortal sin makes man prone to evil. Since, therefore, by original justice man was made fit and able to do every good easily, readily, and joyfully, and to avoid every sin, but mortal sin, often repeated and multiplied, renders man slow, sluggish, and weak for doing well: it is concluded that original justice excluded all conjunction and association with mortal sin.

Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor effectus iustitiae originalis' (the four effects of original justice). Refutation: mortal sin removes the four proper effects of original justice (hence original justice itself). First three effects: rectitude of the superior part (reason/will under God), rectitude of the inferior part (flesh under reason), no propensity to evil.

The fourth and last effect, finally, was perpetual joy and gladness of soul, continual peace and security of conscience, and the highest quiet and tranquillity of mind: to which every mortal sin brings with it things plainly contrary, namely sadness of soul, the gnawing of conscience, and the horrific fear and terror of the punishments of hell and of the divine judgment. In short: the power of not sinning was an inseparable companion of original justice, joined with the power of not dying, as Augustine disputes in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapter 11, and it is easy to understand from Scripture itself: but the power of not sinning would have been lost by sinning, therefore likewise the power of not dying: and, those two powers of not dying and not sinning being lost, original justice could not stand, nor the happiness of that state: for it would have been most

unseemly, contrary to reason, and pernicious to human life, if in the most wicked men the power of not dying had remained.

The fourth effect of original justice (perpetual joy, peace of conscience, tranquillity), opposed by mortal sin. The power of not-sinning is an inseparable companion of original justice, joined to the power of not-dying (Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 11): both lost by sin, so original justice cannot survive mortal sin.

It could perhaps be said that, although every mortal sin was contrary to original justice, yet not every sin had the force to destroy it: just as not every sin of intemperance utterly destroys the habit of acquired moral virtue, such as temperance. But be it so: certainly every mortal sin remits and relaxes the force and vigor of virtue, and takes away the highest rectitude of reason and the readiness for doing well; and if it be more often repeated, it will at last uproot the very habit of virtue from the soul.

Objection (not every mortal sin destroys original justice, as not every act of intemperance destroys acquired temperance) and reply (every mortal sin at least relaxes virtue, and repeated, uproots it). Continues to next page (catchword 'Tertia').

— p. 601 (PDF) · printed p. 560 —

The third opinion is Anselm's, who thinks that, if Adam had not sinned, all his descendants would have been confirmed in grace. For in these words he writes in the first book, Why God Became Man, chapter 18: ‘In that justice in which the first men were constituted, it seems that, if they had conquered so as not to sin when tempted, they would have been so confirmed together with all their offspring that they could sin no more: just as, because, being conquered, [they consented] to sin, they were so weakened that, as far as in them lies, they cannot be without sin. For who would dare to say that injustice avails more to bind into servitude the man consenting to it at the first persuasion, than justice would avail to confirm in liberty the man adhering to it in the same first temptation? For just as, because the whole human nature which was in the first parents was wholly conquered in them so that it sinned (except that one man alone, whom God, as he knew how to make from the Virgin without the seed of man, so willed to separate from

the sin of Adam), so in those same it would wholly have conquered, if it had not sinned.' Thus Anselm.

Marginal gloss: 'Tertia opinio Anselmi' (the third opinion, of Anselm). Third opinion (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1.18): had Adam not sinned, all posterity would have been confirmed in grace, unable to sin (Christ excepted, made from the Virgin without man's seed).

Of whom Gregory is, as it were, a confirmer, in the fourth book of the Morals, chapter 36 (or, according to the division of chapters which other codices have, 28), where he seems to write nearly similar things: 'If,' he says, 'no putrefaction of sin had corrupted the first parent, he would by no means have begotten of himself sons of hell: but those who are now to be saved through our Redeemer would be born his elect alone.' Thus Gregory. But this opinion the arguments for the fourth opinion, which we are about to dispute, will convince to be false. The fourth opinion, then, is that of Durandus in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 5, and of the Blessed Thomas in the first part, question 100, article 2: that, even if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would not on that account have been generated confirmed in grace; which was also the opinion of the Blessed Augustine. For in the first book of the Retractations, chapter 23, he writes thus: 'If both in the parents and in the children fruitfulness and happiness had remained, up to the certain number of the saints which God predestined, men would be born not to succeed dying parents, but to reign with the living. There would, therefore, be these kinships and affinities, if no one sinned and no one died.' But Augustine said this more openly in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10: 'So happy,' he says, 'would the whole human society be, if neither those [first parents] should transmit any evil to their descendants, nor any of their stock should commit the iniquity by which he would receive damnation.' Thus Augustine.

Marginal gloss: 'Quarta opinio, et vera, Augustini, Thomae, et Durandi' (the fourth opinion, and true one, of Augustine, Thomas, and Durandus). Gregory (Moralia 4.36/28) seems to support Anselm; but the fourth (true) opinion (Durandus Sent. II d.20 q.5; Aquinas ST I q.100 a.2; Augustine, Retractations 1.23 and De Civ Dei 14.10) holds posterity would NOT be generated confirmed in grace.

And this may be argued in this manner. If Adam was not created stable and confirmed in grace, it is not credible that his descendants would be generated confirmed in grace: for they would not have received a greater grace than their first parent had received at the beginning.

Pererius's argument for the fourth opinion: since Adam himself was not created confirmed in grace, his posterity (who would not receive more grace than he) would not be born confirmed either. Continues to next page (catchword 'omnium').

— p. 602 (PDF) · printed p. 561 —

As, therefore, Adam was so created in grace that he could nevertheless lose it by sinning, so it must be supposed that his descendants would be generated in grace in the same way. Nor indeed can it be thought that Adam's perseverance in obedience to the divine law would be the meritorious cause (as they call it) why his descendants should be generated confirmed in grace. For if neither Adam could, nor can any man, merit for another man by condign merit either the gift of first grace or its increase (for this is proper to Christ alone, who is the head of the whole Church and of all the elect): much less, then, could he merit the confirmation of his descendants in grace. What of the fact that, if Christ the Lord—since he is the head of the Church and true God and man, and who merited grace and glory for all by condign merit—nevertheless does not grant confirmation in grace to those who are regenerated in him through baptism: how much less credible is it, then, that those begotten from Adam would, on account of his merit, receive the confirmation of grace?

Pererius's argument continued: Adam's perseverance could not be a meritorious cause of posterity's confirmation, since no man can merit grace for another 'de condigno' (that is Christ's alone). And even Christ does not give the baptized confirmation in grace—much less would Adam's descendants get it by his merit.

Someone will say that confirmation in grace would be granted to Adam's descendants not on account of his merit, but on account of the condition of that state of innocence which required it: for which cause also they would have been born with grace and the power of not dying. But this is futile: for

confirmation in grace did not pertain to the integrity or happiness of that state; for it would not have been denied to Adam, who was the first placed in that state. If anyone further says that this would come about on account of some pact of God by which he promised Adam that, if he himself kept the precept imposed on him, he would confirm all his descendants in grace: we shall answer that this is said gratuitously, without any authority either of Scripture or of the Fathers, and therefore ought to be despised and rejected. Nor let the authority of Anselm move anyone, to whom we oppose the greater authority of Augustine: although the Blessed Thomas writes that Anselm said this not by asserting but by opining, because he used that word, ‘It seems.’ Nor is St. Gregory against us: for by the aforesaid words he means only this, that if Adam had not sinned, his descendants would not be born sons of hell—that is, with sin, as they are now born (‘For we are all,’ says Paul, ‘born children of wrath’)—and that the elect and predestined alone would then be generated from Adam; from which, however, it does not follow that they would be generated confirmed in grace. For to be predestined and to be confirmed in grace are not the same: this is, in fact, the extraordinary and singular gift and privilege of certain very few of the predestined.

Objection (confirmation owed to the condition of the state of innocence) and replies: confirmation was not part of that state's integrity (else Adam would have had it); a divine pact for it is asserted gratuitously without Scripture/Father authority. Anselm's authority outweighed by Augustine's (and Aquinas notes Anselm spoke by opinion—'Videtur'). Gregory only means posterity would not be born sons of hell (Eph 2:3 'we are all born children of wrath'); being predestined ≠ being confirmed in grace.

QUESTION V. Whether in the state of innocence more grace would have been given to men than in the state of the Evangelical law.

Question divider opening the fifth and final running question of the disputation on grace (its subject—more grace than under the Gospel—corresponds to the third item of the disputation's prefatory list on p.545, so it is placed last in the running order).

It remains, in the last place, to inquire whether in the state of innocence a greater grace would have been given to man than is given in the state of the Evangelical law: in this question, therefore, a comparison is made, as regards grace, between the state of innocence and the state of the Evangelical law. The things which we wish to dispute and teach on this question, that we may [set them forth] more briefly and more dis-[tinctly]...

Opening of the fifth and final question of the disputation: a comparison of grace in the state of innocence versus the state of the Gospel. Continues to next page (catchword 'distinctius'). Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'BBB'.

— p. 603 (PDF) · printed p. 562 —

...may be said more distinctly and clearly, I have chosen to gather them into four propositions: which, once explained and proved, what we are to think about the proposed question will become clear. First Proposition: In the state of innocence men would, for the most part, have acquired more grace than is acquired in the state of the Evangelical law. This can be proved in two ways. For men in the state of innocence would by their very nature have been most inclined to good, and most ready and prompt for doing well: both on account of the abundance of grace which all would have received from their first origin, and on account of the health, integrity, and vigor of nature: for they would have been free of all the impediments and difficulties of doing well, by which we, now entangled and hindered, are vehemently called away and deterred from doing well. Then, therefore, all would have done well, and would have performed splendid works of the virtues, and with more ardent zeal and greater effort: therefore they would then have advanced more in grace.

Marginal gloss: 'In statu innocentiae fere homines plus gratiae acquisivissent, quam acquiritur in statu Evangelii' (in the state of innocence men would mostly have acquired more grace than is acquired under the Gospel). Q5 is answered via four propositions. First Proposition: men in innocence would have acquired more grace (by their inclination to good and freedom from impediments). Continues from p.561 catchword 'distinctius'.

A second reason is added to persuade the same. In that state men would have lived a life thirty times longer than we now live: for they would have lived (as is likely) to three or four thousand years. And no wonder: since after sin, nature being vitiated, weakened, and impaired, and condemned to the penalty of death, we read that those who lived before the Flood lived nearly to the thousandth year. In so great a length of life, therefore, they would have had the greatest faculty and opportunity of exercising the virtues, increasing grace, and multiplying the merits of eternal life: much more grace, therefore, would they have acquired, than can now be acquired in such great straits and brevity of human life. Yet I do not deny that in some respect and by some reasoning the grace by which holy men now are strong can be called greater—namely, having regard to the weakness of human nature, and to the very many and grievous impediments and difficulties of doing well, by which we are on all sides hemmed in and entangled. For the same work, or even somewhat less, ought to be highly esteemed [when] performed by a sick and infirm man rather than by a healthy and vigorous one: just as our Lord too said that that widow, who had put only two mites into the treasury, had given more than all the rest, even though they had offered larger gifts—having regard, namely, to the faculty of each.

Second reason: the immense longevity of the innocent state (3,000-4,000 years; cf. the near-millennium lives before the Flood, Gen 5) would have multiplied merits. Yet present-day grace can be called greater in one respect (achieved despite weakness). Luke 21:1-4 (the widow's mites, valued by the giver's means; marginal ref 'Luc. 21').

Second Proposition: In the state of innocence, he who had the least grace would have had far more than very many now have in the state of the Evangelical law. The proof of this is easy and ready: since in that state no one would have died before the use of reason, but all would have completed the whole course of their life—indeed, no man would then have undergone death: wherefore the grace which each had received at his first origin he would have much increased by the good use of free will. But in the state of the Evangelical law very many die with only the first grace,

such as baptized infants departing before the use of reason.

Second Proposition: the least grace in innocence would exceed what most now have, since no one would die before the use of reason (unlike baptized infants who die with only first grace).

Third Proposition: If Adam had not sinned, and the Son of God had not...

Opening of the Third Proposition (the case where Adam had not sinned and the Son of God was not incarnate). Continues to next page (catchword 'non').

— p. 604 (PDF) · printed p. 563 —

...had not been incarnate in the state of innocence, as it pleases the Blessed Thomas, I for my part judge, by probable conjecture, that more grace is given to men in the state of the Evangelical law, on account of Christ's advent and merit, than would have been given in the state of innocence: more grace, I say, not extensively (for in that state there would have been more good and holy men than there are now), but intensively, because in the state of the Evangelical law there have been many men and women more excellent in the eminence of divine grace and the virtues than any would have been of those who lived in the state of innocence. And to say nothing of Christ the Lord, I would dare to say without any doubt that much more grace was bestowed on the most blessed Virgin, and also on John the Baptist and the Apostles, than would have been granted to any of men in the state of innocence.

Marginal gloss: 'Plus gratiae dari homini in statu legis Evangelicae, quam datum fuisset in statu innocentiae, si Filius Dei non esset in eo statu incarnatus' (more grace given under the Gospel than would have been in innocence, if the Son of God had not been incarnate in that state). Third Proposition (per Aquinas, the case of no Incarnation in innocence): more grace now—intensively (the Virgin, John the Baptist, the Apostles surpass all of the innocent state).

For if the dignity of the state of innocence required that much grace be given to men dwelling in that state, much more surely did the dignity of the Evangelical state demand it—whose author and founder was the mediator of God and men, true man and God, Christ, the infinity of whose merit by its own right demanded that more grace be given to man on his account

than would have been bestowed on him on account of the dignity of the state of innocence: for the dignity and merit of Christ was of more worth before God than the dignity and perfection of the state of innocence. From which one might also rightly conclude that in the state of the Evangelical law more grace is conferred on infants reborn through baptism than would have been given to infants generated in the state of innocence. And the reason is that now grace is given to infants on account of the merit of Christ; but then grace would have been given to infants on account of the becomingness, dignity, and perfection of the state of innocence: and the former would have outweighed the latter before God by infinite degrees.

Argument from Christ's infinite merit, which surpasses the dignity of the state of innocence—so even baptized infants now receive more grace than infants generated in innocence would have.

Fourth Proposition: If Adam had not sinned, and Christ had nevertheless been incarnate (as it pleases many, and me chiefly), although it seems probable that more grace would then have been given to men—because for giving men the fullness and abundance of grace two things concurred at once, both the dignity of the state of innocence and the dignity of Christ, who would then have been incarnate, not as the redeemer and liberator of man, but as the perfecter and consummator of his glory—nevertheless to me it seems more like the truth that more grace is given to men in the state of the Evangelical law on account of the merit of Christ's passion and death, than would have been given then on account of the same Christ. Nor ought the cause and reason of this to be sought from the dignity or merit of Christ—for both would have been equal in either state—but from the will and decree of God, with the highest counsel, however, and a most fitting reason.

Marginal gloss: 'An si Filius Dei in statu innocentiae fuisset incarnatus, plus gratiae tunc homini datum esset, quam datur in statu legis Evangelicae' (whether, if the Son of God had been incarnate in the state of innocence, more grace would then have been given to man than under the Gospel). Fourth Proposition (Pererius's own view, that Christ would have become incarnate even without the Fall): yet more grace is given now, by God's decree, on account of Christ's passion and death.

— p. 605 (PDF) · printed p. 564 —

...[than would have been given in] the state of innocence, in which Christ would have been immortal and impassible. Just as also, although by any action of Christ whatever the redemption of the human race was merited—because he was at once of God and of man, and of infinite vigor and merit—Scripture nevertheless is wont to attribute it especially to the merit of his passion and death. For Paul too assigns his exaltation above all creatures to his obedience, carried even to the suffering of the death of the cross; and the Lord himself said: ‘When I shall be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to myself’; and: ‘As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but have life everlasting.’ And speaking of himself and of his death, under the likeness of a grain of wheat, he said: ‘Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.’ And Isaiah of him: ‘If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed’; and: ‘Because his soul hath labored, he shall see a long-lived seed’; and: ‘By his knowledge shall this my just servant justify many, and he shall bear their iniquities.’ Finally he himself said: ‘Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into his glory?’ And indeed it seems most consonant with the wisdom, goodness, and power of God, that from the sin of the first man he should draw out more good than had been lost by his fault. For that saying of Augustine is well known, that God would not permit evils to be done, unless he were so wise, powerful, and good that he could turn the very evil into a greater good.

Christ's passion and death especially merit the redemption: Philippians 2:8-9 (marginal 'Philip.2'); John 12:32 ('When I shall be lifted up'; marginal 'Ioannis 12'); John 3:14-15 ('As Moses lifted up the serpent'; marginal 'Supra 3'); John 12:24 (the grain of wheat; marginal 'Ioan.12'); Isaiah 53:10-11 (marginal 'Isaiae 53'); Luke 24:26 ('Ought not Christ to have suffered'; marginal 'Luc. ult.').
Augustine: God permits evil only because he can turn it to greater good.

The Blessed Paul confirms this opinion in that divine disputation which, in the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, he treats concerning the

comparison of Adam's sin with Christ's grace, affirming that Christ's gift was not as Adam's offense: but that this was more abundant than that, and that where the offense abounded, grace superabounded, and that we received more good through the obedience and death of Christ than we had lost through the disobedience and sin of Adam. And the Lord himself said in John: ‘I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly.’ Wherefore Gregory did not hesitate to call the fault of Adam happy: because, for the sake of expiating and washing it away, we have had so beneficent and honorific a Redeemer.

Romans 5:15-20 (Adam's sin vs. Christ's grace: 'where sin abounded, grace superabounded'). John 10:10 ('I am come that they may have life'; marginal 'Ioannis 10'). Gregory's 'felix culpa' (the happy fault of Adam).

Saint Bernard likewise, in a sermon on those words which are in the twelfth chapter of the book of the Apocalypse, ‘A great sign appeared in heaven’: ‘Greatly,’ he says, ‘beloved, did one man and one woman harm us: but thanks be to God; through one man, nonetheless, and one woman all things are restored, and not without great interest of graces. For the gift is not as the offense: but the magnitude of the benefit exceeds the estimation of the loss. Thus indeed the most prudent and most clement Artificer did not break what had been shattered, but altogether remade it more usefully: that he might form for us a new Adam from the old, and transfuse Eve into Mary.’ From these sentences of Paul and of the Fathers is concluded what we wish to teach: namely, that more grace is given to men in the state of the Evangelical law than would have been given to them in the state of innocence. For if we have obtained more good through the death of Christ than we had lost through the sin of Adam, and than we would have had if Adam had not sinned: therefore less...

Bernard, sermon on Apocalypse 12:1 ('A great sign appeared in heaven'): the new Adam from the old, Eve transfused into Mary; the benefit exceeds the loss. Conclusion: more grace under the Gospel than would have been in innocence. Continues to next page (catchword 'fuisset').

— p. 606 (PDF) · printed p. 565 —

...grace would have been in that state than is in this our own: for if it would have been greater in that state, then we have not acquired through Christ more good than we lost on account of Adam, and than we were to attain if he had not sinned. And thus far indeed it has been disputed concerning Sanctifying Grace. But concerning Grace freely given (gratia gratis data) it can be said briefly that it is far greater in the state of the Evangelical law than it would have been in that state of innocence. For of this grace freely given there is a chief threefold kind: one, the Grace of healings; another, the Grace of tongues; the third, the Grace of miracles. The first two would not have existed in the state of innocence: for there would have been no disease needing healing, and there would have been one language for all. But the third kind, pertaining to miracles, would either have been none then (for there would have been no need of miracles to persuade men of the true worship and religion of God), or certainly would by no means have been so frequent, so varied and manifold, so illustrious and admirable. For the illumination of one born blind, and the recalling of dead men to life, which hold the first place among miracles, could then have had no use and no place.

Conclusion of Q5 and of the whole disputation on sanctifying grace ('Et hactenus quidem de Gratia gratum faciente disputatum est'): less grace would have been in innocence than now. Then on 'gratia gratis data' (the charismatic graces—of healings, tongues, miracles, cf. 1 Cor 12): greater under the Gospel, none/less in innocence (no disease, one tongue, no need of miracles).

DISPUTATION ON THE THIRD EXCELLENCE of the state of innocence, that is, on Original Justice.

MAJOR DIVIDER: the third disputation of Book V, treating the third internal good of innocence—original justice (iustitia originalis). Follows the disputations on Adam's knowledge (1st) and sanctifying grace (2nd).

Of this fifth book, which will be wholly spent in explaining the most happy state of innocence of the first men, that noble and, among the Theologians, greatly celebrated disputation on Original Justice claims for itself by its own right the chief place: both on account of the excellent dignity of the

matter, and on account of the great obscurity and manifold difficulty of the same matter. We, therefore, must strive and endeavor with all zeal and exertion of mind, that, by a diligent and careful treatment and explanation of this most obscure and most perplexed matter—if not according to what the matter itself demands, yet certainly as far as the slenderness of our talent and learning permits—we may in some way satisfy the lovers of the divine writings into whose hands these writings shall perhaps fall.

Preface to the disputation on original justice: it claims the chief place in Book V, for its dignity, obscurity, and difficulty.

Now in this place four questions concerning original justice are to be examined: First, what that original justice was: Second, in what part of man it resided, and as in a subject inhered: Third, whether original justice was a thing distinct and separable from sanctifying grace: Fourth, whether the fact that the first man was created with original justice can be evidently shown and proved by the authority of the divine writings. But, that the force and nature of original justice may be more rightly investigated and more easily found, [there are] a few things [with which] to fore-[warn] the reader...

Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor quaestiones de iustitia originali tractandae' (four questions on original justice to be treated). The four questions of this disputation: (1) what original justice was; (2) in what part of man it resided; (3) whether it was distinct/separable from sanctifying grace; (4) whether Scripture proves man's creation with it. Continues to next page (catchword 'monere'). Colophon at foot: 'BBB 3'.

— p. 607 (PDF) · printed p. 566 —

...to forewarn and pre-instruct the reader will be of no small help. Before all things it is fitting to know that six states of human nature can be fashioned by the mind and designated by thought; of which some really either are, or have been, or will be at some time; but others neither are, nor will be, nor ever were, but yet can be. The first state is that of man constituted without the grace of God and without any sin: which in the schools they call the state of man in pure naturals. The second is that of

man vitiated and corrupted on account of Adam's sin. The third is that of man having natural integrity congruent with reason. The fourth is that of man endowed and adorned with original justice. The fifth is that of man freed from Adam's sin and healed of his vices through the grace of Christ. The sixth is that of man advanced and led even to heavenly glory and the sight of the divine nature. Between these states what agrees and what differs must be indicated one by one, so that the quality and excellence of the condition of the first man, constituted in the state of original justice, may be more clearly perceived.

Marginal gloss: 'Sex humanae naturae statuum distinctio, et inter se comparatio' (the distinction of the six states of human nature, and their comparison among themselves). Preliminary to Q1 (from p.565 catchword 'monere'): the six conceivable states of human nature—(1) pure naturals, (2) vitiated by Adam's sin, (3) natural integrity, (4) original justice, (5) restored by Christ, (6) heavenly glory.

Between the first two states there is this difference, that the first includes the mere negation of grace and of sin: but the second, the privation of grace and the presence of sin. But as regards the power or impotence of doing good and avoiding evil, the character of both states is equal: for man is now in the same condition in the state of fallen nature as he would have been if he had been created in pure naturals: for Adam's sin neither lost nor diminished anything of the things that are natural to man; and only, by removing original justice—on account of which human nature was upright, whole, and perfect in natural goods—it made nature to be left to itself, deprived of that good.

States 1 vs 2: state 1 is the mere negation of grace and sin; state 2 the privation of grace plus the presence of sin. As to the power for good, they are equal—Adam's sin removed nothing natural, only original justice, leaving nature to itself.

For just as after Adam's sin the human body was made no more mortal or passible than it would have been if man had been founded in pure naturals: so the human soul is not of itself, by Adam's sin, weaker for doing well than it would have been if God had created him in pure naturals. But there is the greatest difference between those states by reason of the person:

because man founded in pure naturals would not have been an enemy of God, nor a son of wrath, nor unworthy of God's grace (taking the word ‘unworthy’ not negatively, for that which is ‘not worthy’—for thus he would really have been unworthy—but privatively): nor would the absence of grace have been a fault to him; nor would death or other bodily defects have been to him, as it were, the penalty of fault and the punishment of sin: as happens in the second state, in which to lack grace is a fault, but to die and to be afflicted with bodily evils is a punishment. Finally, in the first state there would indeed have been no merit of divine grace, but yet neither any demerit of it: but in the second there is not only no merit, but there is also great demerit.

Continued comparison of states 1 and 2: the body and soul are no weaker after the Fall than if created in pure naturals; but the great difference lies in the person—in pure naturals man would not be God's enemy or 'son of wrath,' and lack of grace would be no fault. State 1: no merit but no demerit; state 2: no merit but great demerit.

Next, between the first and the third state there is a very notable difference. For in the first state the rational and the sensitive appetite would be carried by natural impulse to the objects suited to them, nor would the sensitive be fully subject to reason. For, as Aristotle hands down in the first book of the Politics,...

States 1 vs 3: in pure naturals the appetites are carried by natural impulse, the sensitive not fully subject to reason. Aristotle, Politics I (continues to next page, catchword 'Politicorum').

— p. 608 (PDF) · printed p. 567 —

...of the Politics, the members of the human body are subjected to reason by a servile obedience and subjection, as having no force and power to resist its command: but the sensitive appetite is subjected to reason not by servile, but by civil subjection, inasmuch as it has the power of resisting and of declining its commands. Although on this matter Marcus Tullius [Cicero] wrote the contrary to Aristotle, in the third book of the Republic, in nearly these words, as Saint Augustine records them in the fourth book

against Julian, chapter 12: ‘As the soul is said to command the body, so it is said also to command lust: but the body, as a king [commands] his citizens or a parent his children; but lust, as a master [commands] his slaves, by which he restrains and breaks it. Thus the commands of kings, of emperors, of magistrates, of fathers, of peoples, preside over their allies and citizens as the soul over the body. But masters so wear down their slaves as the best part of the soul, that is wisdom, [wears down] the vicious and weak parts of the same soul, such as lusts, such as angers, such as the other disturbances.’ Thus Cicero.

Aristotle, Politics I (the body's members obey reason 'servilely,' the sensitive appetite by 'civil' subjection, being able to resist). Cicero, De Republica III (preserved by Augustine, Contra Julianum 4.12): the soul rules the body as a king his citizens, but rules lust as a master his slaves. Ends 'Haec Cicero.'

But, to return to what was being treated, in the first state man could do some moral good: but he could neither do every good, nor persevere long in doing good. But in the third state, which is consonant with reason and has the integrity of nature and the due ordering of the soul's parts, the appetite would be obedient and subject to reason, and reason itself would rightly stand toward God as the first principle and ultimate natural end of man. And although in that state the sensitive appetite would sometimes oppose reason and try to transgress its commands, yet, repressed and coerced by the vigor of reason or by a certain bridle, it would be contained in its duty: and in this state man could pursue every moral good, and likewise flee every evil and persevere in doing well.

States 1 vs 3 (powers): in pure naturals man could do some moral good but not all, nor persevere; in the third state (natural integrity) the appetite is bridled by reason, so man could pursue all moral good and persevere.

Further, this third state would differ from the fourth, which has original justice, in this: that this fourth state, besides that vigor of reason and integrity of nature, had adjoined an indefectible subordination of body under soul, of appetite under reason, of reason under God. Besides, the

third state was capable of pain, disease, and of any evils that can befall the body, and finally of death itself; and likewise of sadness, fear, anguish, and the other disturbances and troubles of the soul. Moreover, in the third state man could commit venial sins. But all these things were far most remote from the fourth state, in which Adam dwelt for a while.

States 3 vs 4: the fourth (original justice) adds the indefectible subordination of body→soul, appetite→reason, reason→God; the third remained capable of pain, disease, death, sadness, and venial sin—all far removed from the fourth (Adam's state).

But the fifth state, of man freed from sin through the grace of Christ, ought to be judged more excellent than the prior four for this reason, that it makes man pleasing to God and his friend, and accepted and admitted to the participation of eternal life, and joins man with God as with his supernatural end: and it makes him able to perform the works of all the virtues, both moral and supernatural, by which he may merit eternal happiness by condign merit, as the Theologians speak. The sixth and last state is by far the most excellent of all: namely...

State 5 (restored by Christ's grace): more excellent than the prior four (makes man God's friend, heir of eternal life, able to merit). State 6 (heavenly glory) most excellent of all (continues to next page, catchword 'nempe').

— p. 609 (PDF) · printed p. 568 —

...namely containing the confirmation and consummation of grace, and the possession of heavenly glory and of all goods, the need of nothing, the inability to sin and to die, and finally the clearest vision of the divine essence.

Description of the sixth state (heavenly glory): confirmation and consummation of grace, possession of all goods, no need, inability to sin or die, and the beatific vision.

This, moreover, must not in this place be suppressed in silence: that there was not one effect of original justice, but many and various, and those exceedingly outstanding and admirable effects. For first, original justice made human nature whole according to all its parts and faculties, and

perfect in all those things that naturally suit it: so that all and each of the powers and faculties of man could carry out and perform the actions and offices naturally suited to them, wholly, readily, and absolutely. Next, original justice made man upright in every way, of which uprightness Solomon, speaking in the seventh chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, says, ‘God made man upright.’ From this uprightness there existed a natural and vehement propensity of man to every moral good, and an alienation and aversion from every evil. But the privation of this uprightness, which befell man on account of sin, is a certain crookedness and obliquity of the soul, so often named in the divine writings and reproached to man: which is nothing else than (as the Theologians have defined) a certain natural inclination of the soul to created and perishable goods, and a propensity to evil, and an aversion from eternal and divine goods.

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque mirabiles effectus iustitiae originalis' (the five wondrous effects of original justice). First two effects: (1) it made human nature whole and perfect in all its faculties; (2) it made man upright (Eccl 7:29 'Fecit Deus hominem rectum'), the privation of which is the soul's 'curvitas'—inclination to perishable goods, propensity to evil, aversion from divine goods.

After these, original justice so perfected all the powers of our nature in order, that the lower were so subjected and obeyed the higher that they in no way hindered their actions, nor even delayed them, but rather helped them: while the higher were affected by no sadness and difficulty in governing and moderating the lower. That, therefore, all the appetitions and motions of the sentient soul were so in the power of reason that they neither ever forestalled its judgment and command nor declined it, but their excitation, duration, intensity, or remission depended on the command of reason—this was an effect and office of original justice. Of which, moreover, there was that admirable effect, that man was not only most eager to know every truth, but also able to attain the perfect knowledge and science of all things that can naturally be known, and was firm, strong, and constant for accomplishing every moral good and shunning every evil and vice, and for persevering in good. Finally, original justice furnished man with the happiness that can naturally be sought and procured by him: which

consisted in this (as Augustine says in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10), that no good should be lacking to man which the right will could wish, and no evil be present which could offend the flesh or soul of a man living happily.

Effects three, four, and five of original justice: (3) the ordered subjection of the lower powers to the higher; (4) eagerness and ability for the perfect knowledge of all naturally knowable things, and firmness in good; (5) the natural happiness (Augustine, De Civ Dei 14.10: no good lacking that the right will could wish, no evil to offend the happy man).

But it must not at present be unknown that original justice is one thing, and the state of man in original justice another: the former contained the above-mentioned effects; the latter, besides them, had three extrinsic privileges of God adjoined:...

An important distinction: original justice (which contained the five effects) differs from the state of man in original justice, which additionally had three extrinsic divine privileges (named on the next page). Continues to next page (catchword 'adiuncta').

— p. 610 (PDF) · printed p. 569 —

...adjoined: namely, that man could not be deceived, could not slip into venial sin, and finally, while that state remained, could not die: which came not so much from original justice as from a certain singular assistance and protection of God toward that state.

The three extrinsic privileges of the state in original justice: man could not be deceived, could not slip into venial sin, and (while the state lasted) could not die—these from God's singular assistance, not from original justice itself. Completes from p.568 catchword 'adiuncta'.

QUESTION I. What original justice was.

Question divider opening the first question of the disputation on original justice.

These things being explained and established, what the force, nature, and excellence of original justice was must next be disputed. Henry of Ghent, in Quodlibet six, question 11, hands down that through original justice there was given to man's will a certain natural uprightness, by which the

will could dominate the sensitive appetite and render it obedient to itself; to which uprightness is opposed a natural crookedness and proneness to evil, inflicted on the will on account of sin: he sets down the example of a rod, which is first straight, then is bent and curved. And that an uprightness of this sort must be posited besides every other infused and supernatural uprightness which the first man had through original justice, he proves by this argument: that, according to the opinion of all the Theologians, man on account of Adam's sin was not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in his naturals: therefore he lost not only the supernatural uprightness, but also a natural one implanted in him; otherwise he would only be said to be despoiled of the gratuitous [gifts]. But if man, on account of sin, had lost the supernatural gift, but had retained his naturals safe and whole, there could surely be no difference between a man infected with original sin and some other man created in pure naturals without grace and sin: wherefore they would be equally to be punished.

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Henrici' (the opinion of Henry [of Ghent]). Q1 opens with Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 6 q.11): original justice = a natural uprightness given to the will to dominate the sensitive appetite; its opposite is the 'curvitas'/proneness to evil (the bent-rod image). He argues this natural rectitude is distinct from any supernatural one—since the Fall both despoiled man of gratuitous gifts AND wounded his naturals.

Nevertheless this opinion, as false and improbable, Scotus well refutes in the second [book], distinction 29, the single question, by these two arguments. First, according to Henry the will of a man not having such uprightness could not sin, because according to him sin is the corruption of that uprightness: but this is absurd. For if God should create a will without that uprightness (for it is separable from the will), it could without doubt, since it would be free, elicit an act either congruent or discrepant with right reason and the divine law: it could sin, and yet that sin would not be the privation of any natural uprightness: it could also be evidently known by natural reason that the present state of man is not natural. And since not only the first sin, but also the rest that follow, are formally sins, and are opposed to that same [uprightness]: if, therefore, the first sin corrupted that

uprightness, then the second and the thi-...

Marginal gloss: 'Scotus refellit Henricum' (Scotus refutes Henry). Scotus (Sent. II d.29 q. unica) refutes Henry with two arguments: (1) on Henry's view a will lacking that rectitude could not sin—absurd, since a free will created without it could still sin without that being the privation of a natural rectitude; (2) since all sins (not just the first) are formally sins opposed to it... Continues to next page (catchword 'tertium'). Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'CCC'.

— p. 611 (PDF) · printed p. 570 —

...the third would have to corrupt it: which is impossible, since it was wholly taken away by the first sin. The other argument is: that rebellion of the appetite against reason would have been likewise and equally in a man created in pure naturals; therefore it does not befall on account of the privation of any natural uprightness. The antecedent is proved: it is natural for every appetite to be borne to its own proper object; and if it is an appetite that is not free, it is natural to it to be borne to the utmost and as far as it can: for such an appetite, as the Philosophers teach, is led, and just as it is not in its power to act or not to act, so neither [is] this or that intensity of the act, but it acts as far as it can. Since, therefore, the sensitive appetite of man even in pure naturals would have its own delectable object, it would tend toward it with all its effort, and for that reason would impede the act of reason: for these powers, since they are in one and the same soul, by reason of this unity impede one another in their intense acts. Wherefore reason would then have to repress and check that impulse of the appetite: which could not happen without some difficulty and sadness of it; and for this reason there would be rebellion there: for this is nothing else than the inclination of the lower power to its delectable object, and the difficulty of the higher power in bridling that appetite.

Completes Scotus's refutation of Henry of Ghent (from p.569 catchword 'tertium'): the second/third sin would also have to corrupt that rectitude (impossible, since the first sin removed it); and the appetite's 'rebellion' against reason would equally exist in pure naturals, so it is not the privation of a natural rectitude.

Henry's arguments can be solved briefly. For man is said to be wounded in his naturals, not with respect to human nature considered in pure naturals, but as it was founded by God with original justice, which had the power of rectifying and perfecting all natural things in order to every good connatural to man: when that justice was lost on account of sin, that perfection of the natural powers also perished; and for this cause man is said to be wounded in his naturals. But if anyone were created in pure naturals, he would not be equal to a man infected with original sin. For because the latter is a debtor of the original justice which he received in Adam, but the former by no means, therefore the latter is guilty, but the former not at all: and the loss of not seeing God, befalling both, is to the one a privation and a penalty for sin, but to the other a mere negation of dignity from the condition of nature.

Marginal gloss: 'Solutio argumentorum Henrici' (the solution of Henry's arguments). Pererius answers Henry: man is 'wounded in his naturals' because, with original justice (which perfected the natural powers) lost, that perfection perished too. A man in pure naturals would not equal one with original sin: the latter is a 'debtor' of the justice received in Adam (hence guilty); the loss of the vision of God is for one a penalty, for the other a mere negation.

This opinion, therefore, being rejected, let us investigate the force and nature of original justice in this manner. Original justice was not some one habit, or some one gift of God, by which alone the whole man would come out upright and perfect: but it was a certain absolute combination and comprehension of all the habits by which man was rendered upright and perfect according to all his powers and faculties, and fit to exercise readily and perfectly all the actions suited to his nature. And that it was not merely one habit by which the whole man was made upright is so manifest that it needs not so much proof as consideration and attention. For since some of the faculties of our soul are incorporeal and immortal, such as the mind and the will, others mortal and corporeal, such as those that pertain to the sentient and nourishing soul, how could it come about that one numerically single habit [should perfect] so many pow-[ers]...

Marginal gloss: 'Quid fuerit iustitia originalis: et an fuerit unus habitus' (what original justice was, and whether it was a single habit). Pererius's own view (Henry rejected): original justice was not one habit but an 'absolute combination and comprehension of all the habits' perfecting man in every power—it could not be a single habit, given the diversity of the soul's faculties. Continues to next page (catchword 'potentiis').

— p. 612 (PDF) · printed p. 571 —

...should perfect powers distinct not only in number and species, but even in genus? especially since habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects. For in which power, I pray, would that one habit of original justice have been? If in the intellect, how would it have perfected the will? And although it had been in both faculties, how nevertheless could it have made the powers of the sentient soul ready and perfect for acting suitably to the judgment and command of reason? Original justice, therefore, was not one habit, but contained all the habits which are needful for completing the integrity and uprightness of man and of all his faculties. And so in the speculative intellect it contained all the speculative sciences of all things that can naturally be known by man, such as Metaphysics, Physiology, and all the Mathematical disciplines. In the practical intellect, concerning the things to be done by man both privately and publicly, it had the most exquisite prudence; and also those of the arts that have an honorable and liberal use and an honest delight, such as Agriculture, Music, Architecture, the art of painting and sculpting. In the will there were two habits: one toward God, namely of religion, which renders to God, as the supreme principle and natural end of all things, worship and honor, both by the inner veneration of the soul and by external rites and ceremonies; the other toward the neighbor, of justice, which is divided into distributive and commutative.

Why original justice cannot be one habit (it would have to perfect powers distinct in number, species, even genus). It contained all the habits: in the speculative intellect, all the sciences (Metaphysics, natural philosophy, mathematics); in the practical intellect, prudence and the liberal arts (agriculture, music, architecture, painting/sculpture); in the will, two—religion (toward God) and justice (toward neighbor: distributive and commutative).

It could be asked in this place whether there was some third habit in the will, namely of natural or moral charity, by which God, as the ultimate and natural end, would be loved by man above all things: but there does not seem to have been need of a habit of this sort then, for since in the state of innocence the will was upright, of its own accord, as by a weight and a certain natural impulse, it was borne to love God above all things, as toward its ultimate end: for as much as each thing was naturally lovable, so much was it naturally loved by the upright will; nor was that impulse of the will in the least impeded or delayed by the lower appetite.

Marginal gloss: 'An voluntas hominis in statu innocentiae habuisset habitum charitatis naturalis erga Deum, ut ultimum finem naturalem' (whether man's will in innocence had a habit of natural charity toward God as the ultimate natural end). A possible third habit of the will (natural charity)—but no such habit was needed, since the upright will was carried by a natural 'weight' to love God above all.

But in the sensitive appetite, which is twofold, the irascible and the concupiscible, there were the moral virtues by which they are tamed and made obedient to reason: I mean temperance and fortitude. For I do not assent to Durandus, who in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 29, denies that there was need of these virtues for perfecting the sensitive appetite, because original justice furnished the perfection of that appetite. It furnished it indeed: but not by itself alone; for how, as we said a little above, could one habit formally (as we speak in the schools) perfect so many and so diverse faculties of man? Therefore original justice did indeed furnish the perfection of the sensitive appetite, but through the habits of temperance and fortitude, which are properly the habits and perfections of that appetite. For it is natural that the powers be perfec-[ted]...

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Durandus, negans in appetitu sensitivo fuisse opus propriis virtutibus, sed unam satis fuisse iustitiam originalem' (Durandus is refuted, who denied the sensitive appetite needed its own virtues, [holding] original justice alone sufficed). In the sensitive appetite (irascible/concupiscible) were temperance and fortitude. Against Durandus (Sent. II d.29): original justice furnished the appetite's perfection, but through these proper virtue-habits, not by itself alone. Continues to next page (catchword 'perficiantur').

— p. 613 (PDF) · printed p. 572 —

...be perfected through their own habits: and this is the natural mode by which the individual powers are perfected, so that they may be fit to perform, as is fitting, their functions. And all the aforesaid habits original justice contained in the most perfect and, as they call it, heroic degree.

Completes the point (from p.571): powers are perfected through their own habits; original justice contained all these habits in the most perfect ('heroic') degree.

This seems worthy of inquiry and explanation: whether in the state of innocence the sensitive appetite was so subject to reason that it never rose against its prescription—that is, neither by forestalling its judgment nor by resisting its command—but was so in the power of reason that it was stirred only when and so far as reason itself willed; or rather whether reason indeed was borne promptly and with delight to the good and honorable, and shunned everything contrary to honor, while the lower appetite was moved as by its own force and natural propensity it is apt to be moved toward its object, but because reason was stronger and more powerful, it would contain it in its duty and coerce it within the bounds prescribed to it—which, although it could not happen without some sadness of the sensitive appetite, would nevertheless happen amid some sadness, yet with great delight of reason.

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum in statu innocentiae appetitus sensitivus, licet nunquam adversus rationem praevaleret, nonnunquam tamen adversus eam insurgeret' (whether in innocence the sensitive appetite, though never prevailing against reason, sometimes nonetheless rose against it). The question stated two ways: was the appetite so subject it never rose, or did reason (being stronger) restrain it—not without some sadness of sense, but with great delight of reason?

But since, when man works according to reason, he is then said to work simply; but when he works according to sense, while the will holds back and resists reason, then man is not said to work except in a certain respect: wherefore, in Romans 7, Paul says, ‘It is not I that work it, but the sin that dwelleth in me’: therefore in the state of innocence, although man might sometimes work good with some sadness of sense, yet because he would always have worked with delight of reason, it can truly be said that man in

that state would always have acted well with joy and pleasure.

Distinction: man working 'according to reason' works 'simply'; working 'according to sense' (the will resisting) only 'in a certain respect'. Romans 7:17/20 ('It is not I that work it, but the sin that dwelleth in me'). So in innocence, even good done with some sadness of sense was always done with the delight of reason.

Touching this question, Scotus in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 29, the single question, leaves it in doubt what is to be thought, deciding nothing from his own judgment on either side. It is fitting here to set down Scotus's words. He says thus: ‘It can be said, then, that if original justice had that effect, namely to make perfect tranquillity in the soul as regards all the powers, so that the lower nature was not inclined against the judgment of the higher; or, if it were inclined of itself, it could nevertheless be regulated and ordered by the higher without difficulty of the higher and without sadness of the lower: since a power made in pure naturals would not have this, it is necessary to posit it [as] a supernatural gift, which is this perfect tranquillity in the soul.’ And then a little below he adds: ‘But is all rebellion thereby removed, so that the lower power delightfully withdraws from its own delectable [object]? I answer: if the will abstains delightfully from co-delighting with the lower power, the whole man delightfully abstains from the delectable of the lower sensitive appetite; but the whole man does not abstain with sadness, even if that lower power abstains with sadness: for that belongs to a man simply which belongs to him according to the higher power, nor is it on this account denied of him, even if it does not belong to him according to the lower power.’ Finally he adds a little after: ‘Nor perhaps is it necessary to posit that no sense-appetite could then be saddened: for sight could...’

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti' (the opinion of Scotus). Scotus (Sent. II d.29 q. unica) leaves the question undecided, quoted at length: original justice made 'perfect tranquillity' (a supernatural gift) in the soul; whether 'all rebellion' is removed; what belongs to the whole man is what belongs to him by the higher power; and perhaps the sense-appetite could still be saddened. Quote continues onto next page (catchword 'visus').

— p. 614 (PDF) · printed p. 573 —

...sight could then see a base visible thing, and hearing hear a base audible thing, and each could exhibit [it to] the sensitive appetite, just as a suitable sensible thing also delights it. But the will would then have used well those sadnesses and delights of the lower appetites: so that it would not have been immoderately saddened by the lower appetites, just as it would have used well their delights, not co-delighting immoderately. Thus Scotus.

Conclusion of the Scotus quotation (Sent. II d.29 q. unica): in innocence the senses could perceive base objects affecting the sensitive appetite, but the will would have used well both the sadnesses and the delights of the lower appetites, immoderate in neither. Ends 'Haec Scotus.'

But indeed it is far more credible, nay rather it ought to be held as certain, that in that state of original justice the motions of the sensitive appetite were so subject to reason that they were never stirred either against or even beyond its command—that is, neither by resisting nor by forestalling [it]: otherwise there would have been no difference between the state of innocence and integral nature, and the state of fallen nature repaired nevertheless through the grace of Christ. Paul indeed, in Romans 7, teaches in clear words that the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit was born from sin: whence also the very concupiscence of the flesh is called sin.

Marginal gloss: 'Vera sententia' (the true opinion). Pererius's own (against Scotus's hesitation): far more credible—indeed certain—that in original justice the sensitive appetite's motions never rose against or beyond reason's command; else innocence would not differ from grace-repaired fallen nature. Romans 7: the flesh's rebellion was born of sin (hence concupiscence is 'called sin').

Augustine indeed, in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapters 10 and 11, hands down that in that state the flesh would never lust against the spirit, but would perpetually follow its leading and command. And in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10: ‘There was then,’ he says, ‘a tranquil avoidance of sin, which remaining, no evil at all rushed in from any source that could sadden.’ But more openly he declares this in chapter 19 of the same book: ‘The motions of appetite before sin,’ he says, ‘in Paradise were not vicious. For they were not moved against the right will toward

anything, whence it would be necessary to restrain them by reason as by governing reins. For that they are now so moved, and are modified by those who live temperately and justly and piously—now more easily, now more hardly—by restraining and bridling, is certainly not health from nature, but languor from fault.' Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Correptione et gratia 10-11 (the flesh would never lust against the spirit) and De Civitate Dei 14.10 and 14.19 ('the motions of appetite before sin in Paradise were not vicious... not health from nature but languor from fault'). Ends 'Sic Augustinus.'

But how could it come about, says Scotus in the aforesaid place, that in that state the rational will, since it is naturally joined to the sensitive appetite, would not be allured and affected by its delights, and would abstain from them without any difficulty or trouble? Scotus answers that this happened because the will was held by a far greater delight about its own object than was the sensible delight: for it was more delightful to it to cling to its ultimate end and to the things that are ordered to that end, than to enjoy the pleasures of the senses. But how did the sensitive appetite abstain from its delectable object even without sadness, pleasantly following the prescription and conduct of reason? Scotus answers in the same place that for this there was need of certain singular gifts of God, by which the sensitive appetite was so affected and perfected that it was more delightful to follow the command of reason than to strive against its leading by clinging to its own pleasures and delights. Although, as we shall soon say, even this was not enough: but chiefly the singular assistance, care, and providence of God brought this about, so containing, ruling, and moderating the sensitive appetite that it never allowed it [to move] toward anything that was against...

Two questions of Scotus with his answers: (1) why the rational will was not allured by the appetite's delights—because it was held by a far greater delight in its own ultimate end; (2) how the sensitive appetite abstained without sadness—by certain singular gifts of God. Pererius adds that even this was not enough: chiefly God's singular assistance and providence governed the appetite. Continues to next page (catchword 'vel').

— p. 615 (PDF) · printed p. 574 —

...or to be stirred beyond the judgment and command of reason. This too could be called into question: whether in the state of innocence there would have been in man those motions of the sensitive appetite which we commonly call ‘passions,’ and which the Latins name either ‘diseases,’ or ‘disturbances,’ or ‘affections’—such as desire, joy, fear, sadness. For just as the body of man in that state would have been impassible, so the soul seems likely to have been empty of passions of this sort and plainly impassible. This question Augustine treats in book 14 of the City of God, chapters 9 and 10, and St. Thomas in the first part, question 95, article 2. But the explanation of this question is easy. For of the passions of the appetite, some regard a good—either absent and obtainable, such as desire and hope; or now obtained and present, such as joy and gladness; or the good indifferently, such as love: and passions of this sort would have been in man, for they are natural motions of the human soul, and pertain to the soul's delight and gladness.

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum in statu innocentiae fuissent passiones in appetitu sensitivo' (whether in innocence there would have been passions in the sensitive appetite). Completes from p.573 (God's providence over the appetite). The passions discussed (Augustine De Civ Dei 14.9-10; Aquinas ST I q.95 a.2): those toward good (desire/hope, joy/gladness, love) would have been present, as natural motions of delight.

But indeed they were then far otherwise in man than they now are in us: for they were thoroughly modified and determined by the choice and command of reason, and were in the power of reason in three ways, namely as regards their excitation and beginning, as regards their continuation and duration, and finally as regards their intensity and remission. They would therefore have been to man then not only no trouble or impediment, but also a great help and delight. Other passions regard an evil—either absent and impending, such as fear; or now present, such as sadness and pain. Of these passions Adam was free before sin, and had he not sinned, all his descendants would have been free. For passions of this kind have an adjoined penalty and trouble, which could not befit that state of innocence,

most tranquil and most happy, and most remote from all evils both of body and of soul.

The good-passions in innocence were wholly governed by reason (in their onset, duration, and intensity)—a help, not a trouble. The evil-passions (fear, sadness, pain) Adam lacked before sin, since they carry an adjoined penalty incompatible with the blessed state.

But someone will object that Adam was not ignorant that he could slip into sin, and on that account be deprived of so many and so great goods with which he had been adorned by God: it could not be, therefore, but that he should fear his fall and slip and the loss of such goods—especially since it was said above that the ruin of the Angels was divinely shown to him, which could not but cast into him a great fear and dread of a like fall and slip. But this is easily solved: for the fear that distresses and torments a man is only of an impending evil, and one that can be avoided only with difficulty, and toward which there are many things that urge and as it were impel the man. But in the state of innocence no evil impended over Adam unless he himself should sin; and he could avoid every sin with the greatest ease, since nothing either within or without incited him to sin: there was therefore no reason for fearing—for fearing, I say, with trouble and anguish of soul.

Marginal glosses: 'Obiectio' and 'Solutio'. Objection: Adam knew he could fall (especially after the angels' ruin was shown him), so he must have feared. Solution: tormenting fear is only of an impending evil hard to avoid; but no evil threatened Adam unless he sinned, and he could avoid sin with the greatest ease—so there was no ground for anguished fear.

But such and so great a subjection of all the motions of the sensitive appetite under the command and power of reason was not effected by the habits alone...

Transition: the appetite's complete subjection to reason was not from the habits alone—but chiefly (next page) from God's singular assistance. Continues to next page (catchword 'habitibus').

— p. 616 (PDF) · printed p. 575 —

...by the habits perfecting the lower or even the higher appetite, but for the greatest part proceeded from the singular assistance of God, and the providence and care which he had for man constituted in that state, not allowing anything to befall his soul or body that could disturb or defile his tranquillity and happiness. And that assistance of God, although it was most singular and admirable, was nevertheless in that state ordinary and most fitting.

The appetite's subjection came chiefly from God's singular assistance and providence over man in that state—which, though most singular, was for that state 'ordinary and most fitting.'

And that assistance of God furnished man with six great goods. First, it preserved the intellect lest it be deceived concerning singulars and future contingents, which cannot be known with certainty by human reason and skill. Then, it contained the will lest it choose disordered acts, of which kind is an idle word, or a jocose or officious lie, or untimely or superfluous laughter, which are called by the Theologians venial sins by their kind: for it was shown above that in the state of innocence no venial sin could be admitted by man. Next, it kept away from man's imagination all things that could confuse, disturb, and contaminate it: namely, coercing the power of the demon, lest he obtrude obscene or sad sights upon it. Besides, it restrained the sensitive appetite lest it be moved, before the judgment of reason, to desiring or fleeing anything, even with a most delectable object present and most keen to allure the appetite. Moreover, it preserved the body not only from deadly things, but also from all things that could befall it as harmful and troublesome. Finally, when the time was completed which God had appointed for man to live on earth, it would have translated him to the heavenly fatherland, his animal and earthly life being changed into a spiritual and divine one—such, namely, as we hope we shall live after the resurrection of the dead.

Marginal gloss: 'Sex bona praestabat homini in statu innocentiae specialis Dei assistentia' (God's special assistance furnished man six goods in innocence). The six: (1) preserved the intellect from deception about singulars/future contingents; (2) contained the will from venial-by-kind sins (idle

word, jocose/officious lie, untimely laughter); (3) kept the imagination from the demon's obscene/sad images; (4) restrained the appetite before reason's judgment; (5) preserved the body from harm; (6) at the appointed time, would translate man to heaven (life changed to spiritual/divine, as after the resurrection).

But why was it called ‘original justice’? It is called ‘justice,’ not that one which is single and indeed the chief of the cardinal virtues, having its seat in the will of man; nor that justice by which we are justified, our sins being remitted and God reconciled to us, whose use is frequent in Paul: for this perfects man in order to supernatural acts and to a supernatural end. This gift of God, therefore, is called ‘justice’ as it were the natural perfection of the whole man and of all his faculties, and the best disposition and affection of all the powers of the soul, both among themselves and in order to the acts of each—by which, namely, God is said to have ‘made man upright.’ And it is named ‘original’ because man would have had it from his origin, and because it was to be transfused through original generation from Adam into his descendants—not indeed by the power of the seed or of any natural cause, but immediately from God, no otherwise than the rational soul itself. But of such original justice the Angel had no need: inasmuch as he is of a simple nature, not compounded of diverse, or even contrary, appetites, as man is. But if anyone of us should ask whether original justice was a gi-[ft]...

Marginal glosses: 'Cur dicta sit iustitia originalis' (why it is called original justice); 'Cur Angelus non eguerit originali iustitia' (why the Angel did not need original justice). Called 'justice' not as the cardinal virtue nor as justifying justice, but as the natural perfection of the whole man (whereby 'God made man upright,' Eccl 7:29). Called 'original' because had from one's origin and transfused (like the rational soul, immediately from God). The angel needed it not, being simple in nature. Continues to next page (catchword 'donum').

— p. 617 (PDF) · printed p. 576 —

...a supernatural or a natural [gift]: we shall answer that simply and absolutely it was a supernatural gift. For it was effected by no natural causes, nor was it naturally owed to man, nor could it be in man except joined with the gift of supernatural grace: and it was freely given by God,

and had adjoined to it certain extraordinary and supernatural privileges. Yet in some respect, and (as they say) ‘in a certain respect,’ it can be called a natural gift: because properly and of itself it did not perfect man in order to a supernatural end, nor to supernatural acts, but supplied the defects of nature, and furnished man only with natural integrity, uprightness, and perfection.

Marginal gloss: 'Vtrum iustitia originalis appellari debeat donum naturale, aut supernaturale' (whether original justice should be called a natural or a supernatural gift). Answer: simply and absolutely supernatural (not from natural causes, not owed, only with grace, freely given, with supernatural privileges); yet 'in a certain respect' natural, since it perfected man only within the bounds of his natural integrity, not toward a supernatural end.

QUESTION II. Where, as in a subject, original justice was.

Question divider opening the second question of the disputation on original justice (in what part of man it resided).

Now that weightier question is raised, in what part of man or faculty original justice was, as in a subject. It is certain that it was not in the body, but in the soul. But it is doubted whether it was in the essence of the soul, or in some power of it; and if it was in a power, whether in some higher one, such as the will and reason, or in the lower powers, which are the sensitive appetites. The Blessed Thomas, in the first of the second part, question 83, judges that original justice, as in a subject, was in the essence of the rational soul—in which he afterward placed, in question 110 of the same part, sanctifying grace. He argues in this manner: A habit and its privation are in the same subject; but original sin, which is the privation of original justice, is as in a subject in the very nature of man, because it is contracted through the generation of nature itself: therefore likewise original justice was in the same subject; especially since it was a gift of nature, that is, its uprightness, completion, and perfection.

Marginal gloss: 'S. Thomas subiectum iustitiae originalis censet fuisse ipsam rationalis animae essentiam' (Aquinas holds the subject of original justice was the essence of the rational soul). Q2 opens: in what part did original justice reside—not the body but the soul; in its essence or a power?

Aquinas (ST I-II q.83, with grace placed in the essence at q.110) holds it was in the essence of the rational soul, arguing from the parity of habit and privation (since original sin, its privation, is in human nature).

This opinion is not approved by me. For original justice perfected man not in order to supernatural being or to a supernatural end, but according to the natural condition and state of man, and within the bounds of the natural integrity and perfection of human nature. Let us see, then, what within the breadth and bounds of human nature original justice could make upright and perfect. The essence of man and his natural being needed no superadded perfection, just as it could not be vitiated or corrupted: since the substantial and natural being of man is invariable and indivisible: therefore only that could be perfected which was capable of obliquity or uprightness—of which kind were the powers and faculties of the soul in order to their natural or moral acts, which can be both vicious and upright, and perfect.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio S. Tho.' (the opinion of St. Thomas is refuted). Pererius rejects Aquinas: original justice perfected man only within natural bounds, not toward the supernatural; but the soul's essence (invariable, indivisible) needs no superadded perfection—only what is capable of obliquity or rectitude (the powers/faculties in their acts) could be perfected. Continues to next page (catchword 'recti').

— p. 618 (PDF) · printed p. 577 —

...can be both upright and perfect. From these it is concluded that original justice was not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers and faculties. But in which power chiefly was it? Whoever constitute the rational will of man as the seat and subject of sanctifying grace place original justice in the same will. See Scotus in distinctions 29 and 31, and there Bonaventure, and others who defend the same opinion. And Scotus proves this thus: The will has for its object the ultimate end itself, which is the rule of all human actions: therefore on the uprightness of the will depends the uprightness of the whole man; but original justice was the perfecter of the uprightness of human nature: it must therefore be thought to have been in the will, as in a

subject.

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti, et Bonaventurae' (the opinion of Scotus and Bonaventure). Conclusion: original justice was in the soul's powers, not its essence. In which chiefly? Those placing grace's seat in the will put original justice there too—Scotus (Sent. II d.29, 31), Bonaventure, and others: the will has the ultimate end (the rule of all action) as object, so the whole man's rectitude depends on the will's.

But neither is this opinion true, and the argumentation of Scotus is weak. For the uprightness of the will is preceded, in the order of nature, by the uprightness of the intellect, and this too original justice furnished. Nor indeed can the uprightness of the will effect the uprightness of the sensitive appetite except in a certain respect: for it can bring it about that the will not choose what the appetite craves; but that the appetite not forestall the judgment of reason, that the flesh not lust against the spirit—which original justice furnished—this, I say, the uprightness of the will alone cannot effect. Durandus, in the aforesaid place, thinks that original justice was in the sensitive appetite, as in a subject. ‘For the proper effect of original justice,’ he says, ‘was to contain the appetite lest it be moved against or beyond reason, but be always obedient to its command: and the effect of the privation of original justice too was the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and of the sensitive appetite against reason.’ But neither is this opinion of Durandus wholly true. Original justice did indeed effect the uprightness of the sensitive appetite: but its stronger and more principal effect was the uprightness of the superior part, that is, of the will and reason, in which, namely, the chief uprightness of man is placed.

Marginal glosses: 'Refellitur Scotus' (Scotus is refuted); 'Opinio Durandi' and 'Refellitur Durandus'. Against Scotus: the intellect's rectitude naturally precedes the will's, and the will's rectitude can't effect the appetite's except 'secundum quid.' Durandus (in the sensitive appetite) is also refuted: original justice did rectify the appetite, but its chief effect was the rectitude of the superior part (will/reason).

Wherefore original justice should rather be placed in the superior part than in the inferior. But because we taught above that original justice was not some one habit, but was the comprehension of all the habits by which the

whole man is made upright, and all his powers are rendered perfect about their acts, whether natural or moral: hence it necessarily follows and evidently appears that original justice was not in some one power, but was in all the powers of the rational soul—namely, in those powers in which were the habits by which man, according to the state of nature, was rendered whole, upright, and perfect. There remain two questions to be treated, which being explained we shall make an end of discoursing on original justice. One question is whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace and separable from it; the other question, whether the fact that the first man was created by God with original justice can be gathered and proved from sacred Scripture.

Marginal gloss: 'Auctoris iudicium de subiecto iustitiae originalis' (the author's judgment on the subject of original justice). Pererius's conclusion: original justice belongs rather to the superior part, but since it was a comprehension of all the habits (not one habit), it was in all the powers of the rational soul. Concludes Q2, and announces the two remaining questions: Q3 (distinct/separable from grace?) and Q4 (Scripture proof of creation with it?). Colophon at foot: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'DDD'; catchword 'QVAE' heads Q3.

— p. 619 (PDF) · printed p. 578 —

QUESTION III. Whether original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace.

Question divider opening the third question of the disputation on original justice (whether it was distinct from, and separable from, sanctifying grace).

Concerning this question I see that there are four opinions of the Theologians, discrepant among themselves. Scotus, in the first book On Nature and Grace, chapter 5, holds, following the Blessed Thomas, that original justice and sanctifying grace were one and the same thing: which he argues from what Saint Thomas writes in the first part, question 95, article one, and question 100, article 1, where he judges that the uprightness of reason toward God, and the uprightness of the sensitive appetite wholly subjected under the command of reason, proceeded from and depended on sanctifying grace. And it is no obscure argument of the

same thing that the Blessed Thomas, in the first of the second part, question 83, places original justice in the essence of the soul as in a subject—in which, namely, he afterward, in question 110 of the same part, locates sanctifying grace, which has the power of healing the higher part of man, but not the lower. Formally, therefore, original justice, according to the Blessed Thomas, was not a thing distinct from sanctifying grace.

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti. S. Thomas.' Four opinions on Q3. The first (Scotus, De Natura et gratia 1.5, reading Aquinas): original justice and sanctifying grace were one and the same—from Aquinas ST I q.95 a.1 & q.100 a.1 (the rectitude of reason and appetite came from grace) and ST I-II q.83 (original justice in the soul's essence, where grace too is placed at q.110).

Scotus thinks, therefore, that original justice was nothing other than sanctifying grace itself, yet greater than it is in the state of human nature after sin: greater, I say, not intensively, nor as regards the principal effect of grace—which is to be pleasing to God and accepted to eternal life—but extensively, because then grace extended itself to perfecting the health, integrity, and uprightness also of the lower part. For it rendered the appetite most tranquilly composed and moderated, and in every way subject to reason. This opinion does not please me. For sanctifying grace perfects man in order to a supernatural end, but not in order to a natural end, nor to the natural integrity and perfection of man: but this original justice furnished. They were, therefore, distinct gifts, pertaining to distinct ends and states of man. And just as through original justice man was not perfected supernaturally—because it was a gift of nature given to complete its integrity and perfection—so sanctifying grace, because it is of the supernatural order and referred to the supernatural state and end of man, did not have the power of perfecting man naturally and in those things that pertain to the completion of human nature. And since we can fashion in mind and form in thought some man perfect according to all the integrity of his nature and powers and his natural uprightness, without supernatural sanctifying grace (for the natural order is distinct, and does not of itself depen-[d]...

Scotus's view: original justice = grace, but greater 'extensively' (reaching the lower part's health), not 'intensively' or as to grace's principal effect. Pererius rejects it: grace perfects toward the supernatural end, original justice toward the natural—so they are distinct gifts for distinct ends; and a man can be conceived perfect in natural integrity without grace. Continues to next page (catchword 'dependens').

— p. 620 (PDF) · printed p. 579 —

...d on the supernatural), it is assuredly consistent that original justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace, and that there is no contradiction in its being able to be separated from it. Cajetan, in the first part, question ninety-five, judges that original justice and sanctifying grace were distinct things, but that the former nevertheless could not be separated from the latter: and he thinks the Blessed Thomas held this. For Thomas says nothing other than that sanctifying grace was the root and foundation of original justice. And in the first of the second part, question one hundred and nine, in the first articles, he manifestly distinguishes the state of integral nature—namely, through original justice—from the state of sanctifying grace, teaching that in that state man could do every moral good, avoid every sin, fulfill the whole law, and persevere in good unto the end: yet that he could not, without sanctifying grace, do anything supernatural or worthy of eternal life. Thus Cajetan.

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Caietani.' Second opinion (Cajetan, on ST I q.95): original justice and grace were distinct, but the former could not be separated from the latter (grace being its 'root and foundation'). Cajetan (on ST I-II q.109) distinguishes the state of integral nature (all moral good, the whole law) from the state of grace (the supernatural, worthy of eternal life). Completes Pererius's refutation of the first opinion (catchword 'dependens').

Yet the opinion of Scotus seems more congruent with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in the aforesaid places the Blessed Thomas not obscurely signifies that the uprightness of the lower part with respect to the higher—which was the proper effect of original justice—proceeded from the supernatural gift of sanctifying grace. Nor indeed do I see, if original justice be posited as really differing from sanctifying grace, why it could not also be sundered and dissociated from it, and exist separately, since the

natural uprightness which the one bestowed on man is distinct and in no way dependent on the supernatural uprightness which the other granted.

Pererius notes that Scotus's reading (identity) is actually more congruent with Aquinas's texts (which derive the lower part's rectitude from grace); but if original justice is really distinct from grace, he sees no reason it could not also be separated and exist apart—the natural rectitude being independent of the supernatural.

The third opinion is that of Bonaventure, in book 2, distinction 29; of Scotus, distinction 32; of Tostatus, on the third chapter of Genesis, questions 6 and 7; and of Catharinus, on the same chapter—who judge that those two graces were really distinct, and separable from each other, indeed even actually separated. For they think that Adam was first founded with original justice, and afterward sanctifying grace was superadded to him; and that after Adam's sin all the just had sanctifying grace, but none original justice; indeed that Eve, when she ate the forbidden fruit, undoubtedly lost sanctifying grace, but not original justice, before Adam ate. Of which they think this is a manifest sign and argument: that Eve did not blush at her nakedness, nor feel the rebellion of the flesh, as [she did] after Adam ate. Catharinus moreover thinks that this pact passed between God and Adam: that by Adam's obedience or disobedience alone that gift of original justice would be either conserved or lost; and so, if Eve alone had eaten the forbidden fruit, it would have harmed neither Adam nor the descendants of either toward the loss of original justice; nor was that gift to be lost on account of any other sin than the eating of the forbidden fruit, of which God said: ‘In whatever day thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.’

Marginal gloss: 'Tertia sententia Bonaventurae, Scoti, Tostati et Catharini.' Third opinion: the two graces were really distinct AND separable—indeed actually separated. They hold Adam was first created with original justice, grace superadded later; after the Fall the just have grace but not original justice; Eve lost grace (not original justice) at her eating, before Adam ate (sign: she did not blush). Catharinus posits a pact (Gen 2:17): only Adam's disobedience would forfeit the gift.

But this opinion, as to two points, we showed to be false above, when we proved both that Adam was created with sanctifying gra-[ce]...

Pererius begins refuting the third opinion on two points (the first: that Adam was created with grace—shown above). Continues to next page (catchword 'faciente').

— p. 621 (PDF) · printed p. 580 —

...[grace], and that every mortal sin plainly opposes original justice: inasmuch as all mortal sins are against the uprightness of reason which original justice chiefly furnished to man; and most mortal sins are against the uprightness of the sensitive appetite, which was an effect of original justice. But that argument—that original justice was not lost on account of sin, because Eve, as soon as she ate from the forbidden tree, did not blush, nor feel any disordered motion of the flesh—is assuredly more obtuse than those authors think. Cajetan indeed solves it thus, in the first part, question 95, article 1: ‘To this,’ he says, ‘it seems to me to be said, that on account of Eve's sin original justice was taken from her, not simply and totally, but in a certain respect. For its simple removal was reserved to Adam's sin, according to the order of divine providence: in this manner, that the gift of nature should first be taken from him who was the principle of the whole nature, to whom that gift had been first and principally bestowed. Nor does it matter that Adam could, after Eve's sin, not sin: because with God the foreknowledge of the fall was in the order of reason. And this is sufficiently congruent with reason and proportion: for when the root is cut, the branches can live for a while; and, the animal heart removed, we see the members for a while still warm and vigorous.’ Thus Cajetan.

Marginal gloss: 'An Eva statim ut comedit fructum vetitum perdiderit iustitiam originalem' (whether Eve lost original justice as soon as she ate the forbidden fruit). Refutation continues: every mortal sin opposes original justice. The third opinion's argument (Eve did not blush at once) is solved by Cajetan (ST I q.95 a.1): Eve's sin took her original justice not simply but 'in a certain respect'; its full removal was reserved to Adam (the principle of the whole nature)—as branches live a while after the root is cut. Ends 'Sic Caietanus.'

We add, moreover, that Eve lost original justice not only at once after the eating of that fruit, but even before, on account of her interior vanity, elation of soul, and pride: with which vices the uprightness of original justice could in no way cohere. ‘But Eve did not blush at once,’ these authors say: yet there was in her a disordered pleasure in the sight, looking at the apple, and in the taste an immoderate greed, in craving the eating of it: and these vices proved that her soul was already despoiled and deprived of original justice. But Eve did not notice this: namely, either because she was already blinded in mind by the antecedent pride, or because perhaps she did not have all the effects of original justice, or of its privation, plainly perceived and known.

Pererius adds: Eve lost original justice even before eating, through her vanity, elation, and pride (incompatible with its rectitude). Though she did not blush at once, the disordered pleasure in seeing and the immoderate greed in tasting already showed her soul despoiled—which she did not notice, blinded by pride or not clearly perceiving the effects.

But they press us: Why, then, they say, did she not at once blush at her nakedness, or why did she not immediately feel the rebellion of the flesh? But it was not necessary that, original justice being lost, all the effects of its privation should at once arise and burst forth, but each in its own time and on its own given occasion. And since between the eating of Eve and of Adam a brief time intervened, it is therefore no wonder that in so small a space of time she did not feel the disordered concupiscence of the flesh—especially since Eve was then vehemently intent on the eating of that fruit, and, as also she was inducing her husband to eat of it, very thoughtful and anxious: but after the eating of Adam, on account of the mutual sight of their naked bodies and the exceeding beauty of each, at once in the souls and members of both, lust was excited and inflamed. I judge the fourth opinion more probable than the rest, [namely that] orig-[inal justice]...

The pressed objection (why no immediate blush or carnal rebellion) answered: the privation's effects need not all burst out at once, but each in its time; the interval between Eve's and Adam's eating was brief, and Eve was intent on the fruit and on inducing Adam—but after Adam ate, lust was at once

inflamed in both. Pererius then declares the fourth opinion the most probable. Continues to next page (catchword 'Iustitiam').

— p. 622 (PDF) · printed p. 581 —

...that original justice was in itself a thing distinct from sanctifying grace. And although in that state of innocence neither could be dissociated and disjoined from the other—because the dignity and excellence of that state could not stand if either were removed—yet if the notion of original justice be taken strictly, properly, and precisely, there was no contradiction in its being without sanctifying grace negatively, but there was a contradiction in its being without it privatively; that is, Adam could first have original justice alone, and afterward receive sanctifying grace, as those think who hold that Adam was created with original justice and without sanctifying grace. But indeed, grace being lost on account of mortal sin, original justice could not remain: of which I reckon this to be the cause, that the proper notion and proper effect of original justice neither necessarily includes nor requires sanctifying grace, yet is wholly repugnant to the privation of grace which befalls on account of mortal sin. For every mortal sin, as we taught above, was opposed to original justice. And this our opinion it is fitting to confirm by no other reasoning than that by which we refuted, a little above, the opinion of Scotus and of Cajetan.

Marginal gloss: 'Probabilior decernitur 4. sententia, quam Auctor sequitur' (the fourth opinion, which the Author follows, is judged more probable). The fourth (Pererius's) view: original justice was really distinct from grace; in innocence neither could be dissociated (the state needed both), yet 'strictly' original justice could be without grace 'negatively' (Adam could have it first, grace later) though not 'privatively'—grace once lost by mortal sin, original justice could not remain (every mortal sin opposes it).

But although original justice could simply and absolutely have been separated from sanctifying grace, yet in that state of innocence it could not be separated by the will and decree of God. For God willed and established that no one should have the happiness of that state without sanctifying grace, and that whoever had this grace in that state should lack neither

original justice nor all the happiness of that state. And there can be this sign—and no obscure one—of this divine will and decree: that as soon as man sinned and lost the grace of God, he was both despoiled of original justice and bereft of all goods and deprived of all the happiness of that state. And this will and decree of God is most congruent with reason and justice: for it was not equitable and fitting that man, in so great an affluence of all goods and happiness of state, should not be pleasing to God and his friend. Add that the direction and ordering of man to the supernatural end is greater and more principal than to the natural end: it was therefore not fitting that God should create the first man most perfect in order to the natural end, but in order to the supernatural end wholly imperfect.

Although original justice could in itself be separated from grace, in the state of innocence God's will and decree did not allow it: God willed that no one have that state's felicity without grace. The sign: when man sinned and lost grace, he was at once stripped of original justice and all the state's goods. This is congruent with reason (man should not be in such felicity without being God's friend), and the supernatural end is more principal than the natural.

But the Fathers, when they treat of original justice, speak of the state of the first man before sin, as, namely, that state comprehended all goods, both natural and supernatural, with which Adam was created adorned by God. Read Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapters 10 and 19. But according to the Fathers, and especially according to Augustine, there is no perfection and uprightness of man before God without his sanctifying grace. For Paul rightly argues in Romans 4: if Abraham was not justified by faith and the grace of God, he could indeed have praise, but not before God. But it must be observed, if after Eve's sin [Adam] had not sin-[ned]...

The Fathers (esp. Augustine, De Civ Dei 14.10 & 19), when treating original justice, mean the whole pre-sin state with all its goods (natural and supernatural); and for them there is no perfection/uprightness before God without grace (Paul, Romans 4: Abraham unjustified by grace could have praise, but not 'before God'). Continues to next page (catchword 'peccasset'); colophon 'DDD 3'.

— p. 623 (PDF) · printed p. 582 —

...[if after Eve's sin Adam] had not sinned, Eve indeed would have lost original justice, but the sons who would have been procreated from her and the innocent Adam would have been generated with original justice: for its loss or conservation among his descendants depended on the obedience or disobedience of Adam alone. But if Adam, having original justice, had begotten some sons, and afterward, eating the forbidden food, had lost it: his sons begotten from him before the sin would have been generated with original justice; for they were descendants of innocent Adam, not of the sinner. And because Adam's descendants would not have been confirmed in grace, as we said above by manifest reasons, even if Adam had not sinned, his descendants could—some have original justice, others not have it.

Observations (from p.581 catchword 'peccasset') on the Eve/Adam sequence: original justice's loss in posterity depended on Adam's disobedience alone; sons begotten before his sin would have it; even without the Fall, some descendants might have it and others not.

Someone will say that thus there would have been great confusion and disturbance of human society, some being the greatest sinners, others plainly innocent: and it would have been necessary that the guilty be segregated from the innocent—and indeed often wives from husbands and sons from parents. But God would have met confusion and disturbance of this kind, providing that no detriment thence befall the good and innocent. And just as he would have made the fiercest animals plainly subject and obedient to man, indeed harmless, so the innocent would have conversed harmlessly with sinners. For God would have cast into the [sinners] a certain singular fear and reverence of the innocent men, so that they would not only not dare to harm and oppose them, but would even wish to be subject to them and obey them.

Marginal glosses: 'Prima obiectio' and 'Solutio'. First objection: such a mix would confuse human society (segregating the guilty from the innocent). Solution: God would prevent harm to the innocent—as he would make the fiercest animals harmless, so he would cast into the sinners a singular fear/reverence of the innocent.

But this is doubtful: if the state of innocence had remained, and some by sinning had lost both graces, whether afterward, through penance, just as they would have recovered sanctifying grace, so they would have received at the same time also original justice. But it is probable that to penitents both would be restored at once: since the perpetual loss of original justice seemed to depend on the sin of the first man, which was to be transfused into all his descendants. But someone will say: if original justice then could not be separated from sanctifying grace, and a man's having original justice was manifest both to himself and to others from its conspicuous effects and signs, then it would be known to each that he was in the grace of God. It would indeed be known as to the presence of grace, but not as to its intensity or degrees, nor as to its future duration.

Marginal glosses: 'Secunda obiectio'/'Solutio' and 'Tertia obiectio'/'Solutio'. Second objection: would penitents recover original justice along with grace? Probably yes (its perpetual loss depended on the first man's sin). Third objection: then everyone would know he was in grace—answer: known as to the presence of grace, but not its degree or future duration.

QUESTION IV. How it is proved from the Sacred Writings that the first man was created with original justice.

Question divider opening the fourth and final question of the disputation on original justice (the Scriptural proof).

There remains the other question, to be explained in this place as a kind of conclusion of the disputation on original justice: whether the fact that the first man was created with the original justice which we described above,...

Opening of Question IV, the conclusion of the disputation: whether Scripture proves man was created with original justice. Continues to next page (catchword 'descripsimus').

— p. 624 (PDF) · printed p. 583 —

...and in that most happy state of innocence, can be demonstrated and proved from the Sacred Writings. This can indeed be confirmed by many and manifest testimonies and arguments of Scripture. For three things were most notable in that state: the happiness of man both according to body and

according to soul; then the perfect subjection of the lower part under the command and power of the higher; finally, the immortality of the body, or, what is more truly said, the power of not dying. Adam's happiness Scripture sufficiently indicated by describing the incomparable pleasantness of the earthly Paradise, the power of the tree of life, and the painlessness or impassibility of the body. For when it says that they dwelt in Paradise naked, it signifies that they were unharmed and untouched by all pain, trouble, and finally inconvenience that could befall them from without. The perfection and happiness of the soul Moses insinuated when he said that man was created to the image and likeness of God, and was constituted by God the prince and lord of the living things, and was adorned not only with the perfect knowledge of natural things, but also breathed upon by the divine spirit of prophecy. The subjection of the flesh and sense under the command of reason was signified by Moses when he said that they were naked, yet did not blush. Paul indeed, in Romans 7, teaches that the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit was born from sin.

Q4: three notable things of that state—(1) man's happiness in body and soul, (2) the lower part's perfect subjection to the higher, (3) the body's immortality (the power of not dying). Scriptural proofs: Paradise's amenity and the tree of life (Gen 2); man as image/likeness and lord of animals, with knowledge and prophecy; the nakedness without shame (Gen 2:25); the flesh's rebellion born of sin (Rom 7).

In short: that death flowed from the sin of the first man into the whole human race, and was not made by God—who had made man imperishable—but entered the world by the envy of the devil, we read written and attested in Romans 5 and Wisdom 2. Nor obscurely did Moses indicate this same thing, when he makes God threaten Adam, if he should eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, with the penalty of death; as if, if he did not eat, he would never die. Nor indeed can any other reason sufficiently apt and probable be brought, why Adam's first sin alone harmed not only himself, but also his posterity, and was transfused into all his descendants through carnal generation, except that by that first sin Adam lost original justice—which was a gift not only of the person of

Adam, but of the whole nature, and pertaining to all his descendants: whence it came about that the privation of original justice befell all who draw their origin from Adam.

Death came from Adam's sin, not from God (Wisdom 2:23-24 'God made man imperishable... by the envy of the devil death entered'; Romans 5); the death-threat of Gen 2:17. The only adequate reason Adam's first sin harmed his posterity is that he thereby lost original justice—a gift of the whole nature, so its privation passed to all his descendants.

But these things have been said by us too concisely and briefly: wherefore they must be declared more fully and explicitly. That the gift of original justice—such, namely, as was above depicted by us in its own colors—was given to the first men, is most clearly perceived from divine Scripture. First, Moses wished to signify this when he said: ‘They were both naked, and were not ashamed.’ After sin, immediately recognizing their nakedness, they wished to cover it as soon as possible, as a thing shameful and obscene. And the shame about the nakedness of their bodies arose from the keen sense of immoderate lust, which in their members, against the judgment of reason and against...

The proofs more fully: first, Genesis 2:25 ('they were both naked, and were not ashamed')—after sin they at once sought to cover their nakedness; the shame arose from the keen sense of immoderate lust felt in their members against reason. Continues to next page (catchword 'contra').

— p. 625 (PDF) · printed p. 584 —

...and against their will [they] felt [their members] roused and burning. Next, the happiness of that state—the abundance of all goods most pleasant and most tranquil (which the place of Paradise indicated)—sufficiently showed, in the supreme tranquillity of mind and body, that, if he obeyed God, Adam would then live: but how great a vexation and affliction of man, and how great an evil and unhappiness, that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is, Paul sufficiently shows and deplores in Romans 7.

Completes the point (from p.583): the members roused against the will; the happiness of the state (mind and body's tranquillity, indicated by Paradise) showed Adam would live if he obeyed God; the flesh's rebellion is man's great vexation, which Paul deplores (Rom 7).

Moreover, the immortality promised to Adam, if he should keep the precept of God, gives credit to this matter: for just as he could not die, so he could not sin; for both powers, of not dying and of not sinning, in that state were bound together by an indissoluble bond and tie. For if he could not die, then also not sin: for if, this being granted, he could have sinned, that surely was not consistent with divine justice, and it was pernicious that a sinner's life be prolonged forever. And the power of not sinning rested on the uprightness of the whole man which original justice effected. Rightly therefore Augustine, in the book On Reproof and Grace, chapter 11, distinguishes the state of innocence from the state of glory by this difference: that in the former there was the possibility of not sinning and not dying, but in the latter there will be the impossibility both of sinning and of not dying.

The immortality promised to Adam confirms it: the powers of not-dying and not-sinning were bound together by an indissoluble bond (a sinner's life prolonged forever would be unjust/pernicious). Augustine (De Correptione et gratia 11): in innocence, the possibility of not-sinning and not-dying; in glory, the impossibility of sinning and of dying.

Further, Paul, in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 7, from the excessive desire by which he longed to be freed from the most troublesome and perpetual struggle which is waged between the spirit and the flesh in us, exclaimed: ‘Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’ But why, since Paul desires to be freed from the rebellion of the flesh, does he say he wishes to be freed from the corruption and death of the body? except because that rebellion befell man together with the corruption and death of the body on account of sin—before which there were at once in man both the power of not sinning and the power of not dying: man, therefore, did not feel the rebellion of the flesh before sin. To these add that Paul more than once calls this rebellion of the flesh and disordered concupiscence ‘sin,’ because, namely, it was the effect and penalty of sin, as the Fathers lately interpreted in the Council of Trent, in the decree which they issued on Justification.

Marginal gloss: 'Expenditur locus Pauli ad Rom. 7' (the passage of Paul to the Romans 7 is weighed). Romans 7:24 ('who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'): the flesh's rebellion came with the body's corruption/death on account of sin, before which both powers (not-sinning, not-dying) were in man. Paul calls concupiscence 'sin' as sin's effect/penalty (as Trent interpreted, decree on Justification).

Finally, Paul in Romans 5 argues in a long discourse that, on account of the first sin of Adam, all his descendants are born both infected with sin and liable to death. ‘In whom,’ he says, ‘all have sinned.’ And: ‘By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.’ But why did that first sin of Adam harm his descendants rather than the other sins of him or of other parents? Certainly for no other reason than that on account of that sin Adam lost the gift of grace and of original justice, which he had received from God not only for himself, but also for all his posterity. Indeed, by the word ‘death,’ which comprehends all men, it is fitting to understand any corruption: by which name is reckoned, in the first place, the corruption of concupiscence. Adam, therefore, had some gift restraining concupiscence, and its...

Romans 5:12 ('in whom all have sinned'; 'by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death'). Adam's first sin harmed his posterity because he thereby lost the gift of grace and original justice, received for all his posterity. 'Death' includes any corruption—chiefly the corruption of concupiscence; so Adam had a gift restraining concupiscence. Continues to next page (catchword 'eiusque').

— p. 626 (PDF) · printed p. 585 —

...and prohibiting its rebellion and corruption: for this is signified in the book of Wisdom, chapter 2, when it is said, according to the Greek translation, ‘God made man ■ν ■φθαρσ■■ (en aphtharsia),’ that is, in integrity and incorruption.

GLYPH verified by magnification: ■ν ■φθαρσ■■ (en aphtharsia, 'in incorruption')—Wisdom 2:23 LXX ('God created man for/in incorruption'), cited as proof that Adam had a gift restraining concupiscence and its corruption.

There must not be passed over in this disputation that most brilliant passage of Scripture, frequently used in the speech of the Theologians, which in Solomon, in the seventh chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes, runs thus: ‘Only this I found, that God made man upright, and he has involved himself in infinite questions.’ Certainly we do not now discern that uprightness of man: since even before the Flood God said that the senses and thoughts of man are, from his very youth, prone to evil; and how great the corruption of the human soul was immediately after Adam's sin is clearly discerned in the fratricide of Cain: man, therefore, was disposed and constituted otherwise before sin, both in reason and in appetite, than he now is. But it is to be seen how Cajetan, in his commentary on that place, tried to twist the aforesaid words—with this proper and most true understanding, handed down and approved by almost all the Fathers and Theologians—into another sense; I shall set down his words: ‘If you weigh that word, “I found,”’ he says, ‘you will find that it is not speech about man created in the gratuitous gift of original uprightness, but about man made by God in the natural uprightness of the soul: for such uprightness the preacher's disputation finds, by the natural light of the human intellect reasoning naturally; but the uprightness of original justice we only believe, and cannot find by inquiring.’ Thus Cajetan.

Marginal gloss: 'Excutitur locus Ecclesiastae cap. 7 adversus Caietanum' (the passage of Ecclesiastes 7 is examined against Cajetan). Ecclesiastes 7:29 ('God made man upright'): we no longer see that uprightness (Gen 8:21 'prone to evil from youth'; Cain's fratricide). Cajetan tried to twist it to mean only natural (not original) rectitude—'we only believe' original justice, cannot 'find' it; quoted and rejected.

But indeed, Augustine in several places and the other Fathers interpreted that passage of Solomon of the original uprightness with which the first man was created by God, and of which, on account of his sin, all his descendants were deprived. For man was not founded by God from the beginning such as he is now generated; nor, as he now is, can he truly be called upright. For how can he be said to be generated upright, when David groaning cries, ‘Behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my

mother conceive me’? and Paul pronounces with clear voice, ‘We all are born children of wrath’? and Job cursed the day of his conception and birth, because, infected with sin, he had been generated in his mother's womb and brought into this light from the same womb—namely, on account of original sin, that in our conception we are conceived not upright, but oblique, bent, and distorted, that is, averted from God and the love of divine things, and prone and inclined to perishable goods, indeed even to the enticements and lusts of vices.

Marginal refs: 'Psalm. 50' and 'Ephes. 2'. Augustine and the Fathers read Eccl 7:29 of original uprightness, of which sin deprived all posterity. Proofs we are not born upright: Psalm 50(51):7 ('conceived in iniquities'); Ephesians 2:3 ('children of wrath'); Job cursing his day (Job 3)—on account of original sin we are conceived 'oblique, bent, distorted,' averted from God and prone to perishable goods and vice.

Jerome indeed, explaining that passage of Solomon in his Commentaries on that book: ‘Lest he should seem,’ he says, ‘to condemn the common nature and to make God the author of evil, while he is the founder of such [men] as cannot avoid evil, he shrewdly anticipated and says that we were created good by God, but, because we are left to free will, [we] slip into worse vices, while we seek greater things and think variously beyond our powers.’ Thus Jerome. But let it have its end here, concerning...

Jerome (commentary on Ecclesiastes 7): lest Solomon seem to condemn nature or make God the author of evil, he says we were created good but, left to free will, slip into vices seeking greater things beyond our powers. Ends 'Sic Hieronymus.' The disputation on original justice is concluding (catchword 'de'); colophon 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' with signature 'EEE'.

— p. 627 (PDF) · printed p. 586 —

...the disputation on original justice, which we undertook to treat for the present occasion.

Closing words of the disputation on original justice (the third internal excellence of the state of innocence), continued from the previous page (catchword 'de').

A DISPUTATION ON THE FOURTH EXCELLENCE of the state of innocence, that is, on the immortality of the body.

Major structural divider: the fourth and last internal good of the state of innocence (after wisdom, grace, and original justice) is bodily immortality.

There remains the fourth and most admirable excellence of the state of innocence, which comprised the immortality of the body: concerning which we shall treat distinctly, clearly, and briefly the points that seem at present to require discussion. First, it must be understood that things are called immortal and incorruptible not in one way but for various reasons. There is indeed that highest and most absolute kind of immortality, namely to be immortal simply and in every way—that is, immortal and wholly immutable both intrinsically and extrinsically: which kind of immortality can belong to God alone, who is the first cause of all things and depends in no respect on anything else. Of this immortality must be understood what Paul wrote to Timothy concerning God: 'Who alone has immortality' (1 Tim. 6:16): for just as God alone is said to be, and alone wise, and alone good, so too he alone is immortal.

Marginal glosses: 'De multiplici genere immortalitatis' (On the manifold kinds of immortality); 'Explicatur locus Pauli ad Timotheum' (The Pauline passage to Timothy is explained). The Pauline citation is 1 Tim. 6:16.

The second kind of immortality is that by which something is said to be immortal according to substance, because it lacks matter, which is the seat and root of substantial corruption and mortality. But this kind is threefold: for some things are entirely set apart from all admixture and partnership with matter, as the Angels; others are indeed associated and conjoined with matter, yet were neither produced into being out of its potency, nor do they need its help and support in order to exist: in this class is the rational soul. There are besides some things that seem to have a nature compounded of matter: yet because that matter is far different from the matter of sublunary things—in which the inherent potency of contradiction toward being and non-being is the cause of corruption—they therefore obtain immortality

and incorruption: of this kind, many judge the celestial orbs and stars to be.

The threefold second genus: (1) Angels, wholly immaterial; (2) the rational soul, joined to but not drawn from matter; (3) the heavens, whose matter lacks the contrary potency that causes sublunary corruption.

The fifth kind of immortality and incorruption comprises those things which are indeed corruptible in themselves: yet in a certain manner and in some part they are called incorruptible, because they are never corrupted, nor even can be corrupted, all at once and as a whole; but only gradually and part by part—in the place of departing and perishing parts other new parts always succeeding and being generated alongside: so that the sum and entirety of the whole thing appears to remain the same at all times: and on this account the Philosophers are accustomed to call the four elements incorruptible. Now to these five kinds of immortal and incorruptible things, immortality itself is natural, and belongs to them in a natural manner.

The fifth genus (the four elements) is incorruptible only as a whole-by-succession-of-parts. Pererius numbers five genera in all; in each, immortality is by nature. This sets up the contrast on the next page with the supernatural immortality belonging to Adam.

— p. 628 (PDF) · printed p. 587 —

But there are besides four other kinds of things to which immortality is indeed present, yet not by the force and power of nature, but only by the supernatural power of God: since those things are by their own nature mortal and corruptible. Immortality and incorruption of this sort the four elements and the bodies of the blessed will have after the renovation of the world and the general resurrection of mankind; nay, even the bodies of those who shall be sacrificed to the everlasting torments of hell, whose bodies, namely, shall be perpetually tortured with the gravest agonies and yet never be dissolved by death. To this kind of immortality belongs that immortality of the body which Adam was to enjoy in the state of innocence. But there is this difference: that in the former cases immortality will be an inability to die (impotentia moriendi); whereas in Adam it

was—and would have been in his posterity had he not himself sinned—an ability not to die (potentia non moriendi).

Crucial distinction: the immortality of the resurrected (blessed and damned) is impotentia moriendi (incapacity for death); Adam's was potentia non moriendi (capacity not to die)—a conditional immortality contingent on obedience.

Since, then, it is this immortality that is now under discussion, the others being set aside, it must be carefully explained of what sort it was, from what causes it proceeded, what power it had, and finally in what manner it belonged to man.

Statement of the program for the disputation.

QUESTION I. Of what sort was Adam's immortality before sin.

First question of the disputation on immortality.

Adam, then, was immortal in the state of innocence, because he was able not to die; nor indeed would he ever have died, had he, never sinning, persevered in that state. But this ability not to die did not come intrinsically from Adam's nature, since according to his own nature he was mortal and passible, leading an animal life: rather, its chief author was God, who had on every side hedged about and fortified man against death by his own keeping and protection, and had most providently furnished Adam with every remedy against the things that could bring death upon him. For death and corruption can befall man either intrinsically, from the things that are in man, or extrinsically, from the deadly things that happen to him.

Marginal gloss: 'Unde possit homini accidere mors, & corruptio' (Whence death and corruption can befall man). Adam's immortality is extrinsic and gratuitous—from God's protective providence, not from his nature, which was mortal and passible in itself.

— p. 629 (PDF) · printed p. 588 —

Intrinsically, the cause of death can be the failure of the natural heat, or of the primal moisture which they call radical; or the immoderate force of some passion and disturbance of the soul: for it is recorded that some have perished from excessive grief, fear, even joy; or by their own choice, as those who, from weariness of the present life, or from impatience at the evils that press upon them, or wishing to forestall an oncoming calamity, take a violent death upon themselves; or from excessive food and drink and venereal intemperance; or finally from too great labor and exhaustion of the body—these are the causes of death within man himself. Extrinsically, however, death can befall man either from another man, or from beasts, or from demons, or from God himself through the Angels, or from some lethal drink or food, or from the lack of necessary food and drink, or from intemperateness of the weather, or from some chance accident, such as falling into fire, water, or a pit, or being struck by the cast of a stone or some object: these bring destruction upon man from without. Nor need one add to these the dissolution of the balance of the four humors of which the human body consists, whence many and various kinds of diseases arise: for this never happens to man unless one of the aforesaid causes underlies it.

Systematic enumeration of intrinsic and extrinsic causes of death, against all of which Adam was protected. Heavy ink-bleed on this page (especially band 0); reading verified across the four band crops.

But against all these, with God keeping and protecting him, Adam would easily have guarded and warded them off. For against those causes of death he had the most effective and ready remedies: first, perfect knowledge, both in general and in particular, of all the things that could benefit or harm him; then the supreme moderation of all his affections, which he would at his own discretion either rouse or restrain; next, the use of food, drink, venery, and bodily exercise only to the degree that befitted and was conducive to him by the prescript of reason. Then the tree of life, whose tasting and eating of its fruit was most powerful for conserving the natural heat in its integrity and for repairing any defect of the native moisture; in

addition, a most ample and ready abundance of the most salutary foods; finally, no man would have been to another man unfriendly or wary, and all living creatures would have been to man not only harmless but also justly obedient; nothing besides would have been permitted to the demon against man; and so far were God and the holy Angels from allowing anything adverse to befall man, that whatever could not be sufficiently foreseen and guarded against by him would be kept off and repelled by the Angels.

Adam's seven-fold array of remedies against death: (1) perfect knowledge; (2) mastery of the passions; (3) temperate use of food/drink/venery/exercise; (4) the tree of life; (5) abundance of salutary food; (6) the obedience and harmlessness of all creatures; (7) angelic protection.

But for confirming and illustrating what we now say about the immortality of Adam's body, and what we taught a little above about the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, arisen on account of Adam's sin and flourishing in all his posterity, that which Gregory hands down in the fourth book of the Morals, chapter twenty-six, is of the greatest value. For at once he lucidly sets forth both of what sort that immortality of Adam was, and from what sin of his there arose both the mortality and corruption of the body and the struggle and rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Therefore, expounding those words of Job, which are in the third chapter of his book—'For now should I have slept and been silent, and in my sleep should have had rest' (Job 3:13)—he writes in this manner:

Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara Gregorii sententia' (A distinguished judgment of Gregory). The citation is Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. IV, c. 26, expounding Job 3:13. The Gregory quotation begins here and continues onto the next page.

— p. 630 (PDF) · printed p. 589 —

For man had been placed in Paradise to this end, that if he should bind himself to obedience to his Creator with the bonds of charity, he might one day pass over to the heavenly homeland of the Angels without the death of the flesh. For he was so created immortal that, if

he should sin, he could also die; and so created mortal that, if he should not sin, he could also not die; and by the merit of free will he would attain the immortality of that region, in which he could neither sin nor die. Where, therefore, after the time of redemption, the elect pass over with the death of the flesh interposed, thither without doubt our first parents, had they persevered in the state of their condition, could have been transferred even without the death of their bodies. Sleeping, then, man would have been silent, and would have rested in his own sleep, while, led to the eternal rest of the homeland, he would find, as it were, a certain withdrawal from the clamor of this human infirmity. For after sin he watches as though crying out, who bears the strife of his own resisting flesh. This silence of rest man had when first created, when he received free choice of will against his enemy. He who of his own accord succumbed to it, soon found in himself that which clamored against him.

Continuation of the Gregory quotation (Moralia IV.26). Faithful reconstruction from the heavily ink-bled italic text across the four band crops.

In the contest he finds the tumult of infirmity: and although he had been created by his Author in the silence of peace, yet, having of his own will been laid under the enemy, he endured the clamors of the battle. For the suggestion of the flesh itself is, as it were, a kind of clamor against the quiet of the mind, which man did not feel before the transgression: because, namely, he had nothing of infirmity that he might have to endure. But after he of his own accord subjected himself to the enemy, bound by the chains of his own fault, he serves it in certain respects even against his will, and suffers clamors in his mind, when the flesh strives against the spirit. Did he not hear clamors within, who endured the perverse words of the law against himself, saying: 'I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and leading me captive in the law of sin which is in my members'? (Rom. 7:23) Let the holy man, then, consider in how great

peace of heart he would repose, had man been unwilling to receive the words of the serpent; and let him say: 'For now should I have slept and been silent, and in my sleep should have had rest'—that is, I would withdraw within the secret of my mind to the contemplation of the Creator, had not consent to the tumults of temptations poured me out, away from myself, into the very depths of fault. Thus far Gregory.

Marginal gloss: 'Roma.' marks the citation of Romans 7:23 ('Video aliam legem in membris meis...'). Conclusion of the Gregory quotation (Moralia IV.26), closing 'Haec Gregorius.'

QUESTION II. In what manner Adam was immortal before sin.

Second question of the disputation on immortality.

Blessed Thomas, in the First Part, question 97, article 1, concerning the immortality of the body in which Adam was created and would have remained had he kept the law of God, teaches in three ways that something can be said to be incorruptible. First, on account of matter—either that it has no matter, as the Angels, or that it has matter indeed, but matter that is in potency only to the one form it holds, as is the heaven: and this is called incorruptible according to nature. Second, on account of form, when there inheres in a thing incorruptible according to nature some disposition by which it is altogether kept from corruption: and this is called incorruptible according to glory. For as Augustine says in Epistle 56, which he wrote to Dioscorus, 'God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its beatitude there overflows into the body a fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption.' In the third way something is called incorruptible on account of the efficient cause: and in this way, in the state of innocence, man would have been incorruptible and immortal, because, as Augustine says in the book On Questions...

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio S. Th.' (The opinion of St. Thomas). Citation: Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 97, a. 1, on the threefold sense of 'incorruptible'—per matter (secundum naturam), per form (secundum gloriam), and per efficient cause. Augustine, Epistula 56 ad Dioscorum, is quoted; the

page ends with a further appeal to Augustine's De Quaestionibus (catchword 'stionibus' = Quaestionibus), continued on the next page.

— p. 631 (PDF) · printed p. 590 —

...[On Questions] of the New and Old Testament, question 19: God made man so that, as long as he did not sin, he would flourish in immortality, that he might be to himself the author either of life or of death. For Blessed Thomas says: Adam's body was not indissoluble through any vigor of immortality existing in it; but there was in his soul a certain supernatural power divinely given, by which it could preserve the body from all corruption, as long as the soul itself remained subject to God. This was consonant with reason: for since the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that in the beginning a power should be given to it by which it could conserve the body beyond the nature of corporeal matter. Furthermore, that power of preserving the body from corruption was not natural to the human soul, but came through the gift of grace: and although after sin Adam recovered the grace of God by penitence as regards the remission of guilt, yet not as regards the effect of lost immortality. For this was reserved for Christ, through whom the defect of nature was to be repaired for the better. Thus far from Blessed Thomas.

Continuation (catchword 'stionibus' = Quaestionibus) of the citation begun on the previous page: Augustine [pseudo], Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, q. 19, adduced by Aquinas (ST I q.97 a.1). Closes the Thomist section: 'Hactenus ex B. Thom.' (Thus far from Blessed Thomas).

Scotus, however, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 19, by no means approves this opinion of Blessed Thomas, saying that he does not see how any quality or power existing in the soul could preserve a body corruptible and passible by its own nature, so that it could not suffer and be corrupted. Every body, therefore, corruptible by its own nature, can suffer a corruptive passion, which, if it either persists or is intensified, necessarily leads at last to destruction. Scotus therefore holds that even in the state of innocence man could have died; yet that he would not have died, nor would that potency of dying have been reduced to act, since God would have

forestalled the time of death: for before there arrived the time at which the health and firmness of the human body would naturally have begun to be weakened, and to decline and slide toward destruction, God would have transferred man from earth to heaven, his animal and earthly life being changed into a spiritual and heavenly one.

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Scoti de immortalitate hominis in statu innocentiae' (The opinion of Scotus on man's immortality in the state of innocence). Citation: Duns Scotus, In II Sententiarum, dist. 19. Scotus denies any intrinsic preserving power, holding Adam's immortality to be a divinely-timed translation before natural decay.

But it is well to set down here the opinion of Scotus expressed in his own words: I say, he says, that with innocence standing, death would not have befallen, although man would have the potency of dying, because each one would have been translated into Paradise before he was altered by an alteration disproportionate to the soul or form. And this translation would not have been miraculous, but just and regular, namely that each one would be transformed in his own state, and not all men at once. This I show as follows: for those parents would either always have merited continuously while they were in this life, or not. If so, and afterward all had been translated, the first-born would have been of greater merit than one born later, which is false: for if the state of innocence had remained, the Blessed Virgin, and many of the later-born, would have been more blessed than many of the earlier, or than some of the earlier-born.

Marginal gloss: 'Verba Scoti' (The words of Scotus). Verbatim quotation of Scotus, continued onto the next paragraph and concluding 'Ita Scotus.'

If you should say that in that state he would not always have merited, but only up to the term of life: then, if they had not been translated to glory, when that term arrived God would have done them an injustice, by deferring to give the reward after they had completed the meritorious works they were going to do. Therefore it follows that in the state of innocence one would have been translated before another,

and to each would have been rendered the reward of his merits, before anyone's power had been weakened to such a degree that corruption would necessarily be present. Thus Scotus.

Conclusion of the verbatim Scotus quotation: 'Ita Scotus.'

But Cajetan, in his Commentaries on the First Part of Blessed Thomas, upon...

Cajetan's rebuttal of Scotus begins; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'super'). Cajetan = Thomas de Vio, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae I.

— p. 632 (PDF) · printed p. 591 —

...upon those very words of his which were just now mentioned, meeting Scotus, who says that he cannot see how what Blessed Thomas said is true. If Scotus, he says, had had a watchful reverence toward Blessed Augustine, he would surely have seen that man was the author of his own life, as long as the soul was subject to God. For since these matters of belief depend on a fact, and require a supernatural power, of them there is no greater reason than the divine authority manifested to us either of itself or through his saints. And so far Cajetan.

Marginal gloss: 'Expenditur propugnatio Caietani pro S. Thoma adversus Scotum' (Cajetan's defense of St. Thomas against Scotus is weighed). Cajetan appeals to Augustine's authority over Scotus's reasoning.

By which words he seems to concede the very thing Scotus attacks—namely, that there was in Adam a certain power inhering in his soul, which preserved his body from corruption. But if he understands this power of the soul to be derived from the soul into the body, he is opposed to Blessed Thomas, who affirms that Adam was not immortal intrinsically through any power or vigor inhering in him, but only extrinsically and on the part of the efficient cause. He is opposed, likewise, to right reason: for one cannot even imagine in the mind what that power was, and in what manner it would act upon the body. What of this—that, if that power had

been in Adam, either it alone would have sufficed to safeguard man's immortality, and there would have been no need either of the tree of life or of the most temperate and most salubrious dwelling of Paradise?

Pererius's critique: Cajetan's reading, if it makes the preserving power intrinsic to the soul, contradicts Aquinas's own extrinsic/efficient-cause doctrine and would render the tree of life and Paradise superfluous.

But that authority of Augustine from the book On the Questions of the Old and New Testament, by which Cajetan thinks Scotus is vehemently pressed and constrained, plainly does no harm, or certainly very little, to Scotus. For it has been established by many and manifest conjectures and arguments that that book is not Augustine's; nor, if it were Augustine's, would that passage greatly confirm what Cajetan intends. For the author of that book signifies in that place only this: that the first man was so made that he himself was the author both of his life and of his death—the author, I say, not by effecting immortality or death, but by meriting: or (as we say in the schools) he was the author of his life and death not effectively but meritoriously. For by obeying the divine law he would have merited that life be perpetuated for him, but by violating that law he deserved the penalty of death.

Pererius blunts Cajetan's prooftext: the De Quaestionibus is spurious (not genuinely Augustine's), and even if genuine, it makes man author of his fate only meritorie (by meriting), not effective (by causing)—which favors Scotus, not Cajetan.

That power of the soul, then, preserving man's body in the state of innocence from corruption, I for my part interpret to have seemed to St. Thomas to be none other than a certain singular knowledge of all things—especially of those which could benefit or harm Adam—together with a supreme power and prudence of discerning and guarding against them: which, because it had been supernaturally given to man by God, and exceeded the power of human prudence and providence, is therefore called by St. Thomas a supernatural power conferred upon Adam's soul.

Pererius's reconciling interpretation: the 'supernatural power' Aquinas means is Adam's supernaturally-given knowledge and prudence to foresee and avoid all harm—not a mysterious physical incorruption-force.

QUESTION III. Whether Adam before sin ought to be said to have been mortal or immortal.

Third question of the disputation on immortality.

— p. 633 (PDF) · printed p. 592 —

But the question arises: since Adam before sin was both mortal according to his own nature, and immortal by a singular gift and bounty of God, whether he ought to be called immortal simply, or rather mortal. I shall here set down first the opinion of blessed Augustine; then I shall answer the proposed question briefly and distinctly in the scholastic manner. Thus, then, in the seventh book On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 25, Augustine writes:

Statement of QUAESTIO III. Citation: Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, lib. VII, c. 25 (quoted in the following paragraph).

Adam's body before sin was both mortal, because it could die, and immortal, because it could not-die. For it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain immortal natures; but it is another thing to be able not to die, in which manner the first man was created immortal: which was bestowed on him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of his nature; from which tree he was separated when he had sinned, so that he could die; whereas, had he not sinned, he could have not-died. He was therefore mortal by the condition of his animal body, but immortal by the benefit of his Creator. For if the body was animal, then assuredly mortal, because it could indeed die; yet immortal too, on this account, because it could also not-die. For nothing will be immortal in the sense of being utterly unable to die except the spiritual body, which is promised to us as to be in the resurrection. And on this account that body was animal, and on this

account mortal, which for the sake of justice would become spiritual; and on this account it was made wholly mortal because of sin—not 'mortal,' which it was even before, but 'dead,' which could have not come to pass, had man not sinned. Thus Augustine.

Verbatim quotation of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VII.25, distinguishing 'unable to die' (non posse mori) from 'able not to die' (posse non mori), and 'mortal' (mortale) from 'dead' (mortuum). Closes 'Sic Augustinus.'

But we, to the proposed question, with manifold distinction applied, answer thus. The word 'Immortal' either signifies the negation of the act of dying, so that it sounds the same as 'not-going-to-die': and in this signification it must be said without doubt that Adam both was, and could truly be called, immortal; for if he had obeyed the divine law, he would never have run into death. This God assuredly indicated when he said to Adam, 'On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death' (Gen. 2:17). If, therefore, he had never eaten, he would never have died. Paul too, to the Romans in the fifth chapter, and the author of the book of Wisdom in the second chapter, affirmatively declared that death befell man because of sin, and through the envy of the devil; for that man himself was made by God 'inexterminable,' or, as the Greek words have it more expressively, 'in integrity and incorruption'—which was indeed quite consonant with reason.

Marginal gloss: 'Observanda huius vocis immortalis variae significationes' (The various significations of this word 'immortal' are to be noted). First sense of 'immortal' = negation of the act of dying. Citations: Gen. 2:17; Rom. 5:12; Wisdom 2:23-24. The phrase 'In integritate & incorruptione' is Pererius's Latin rendering of the Greek of Wisdom 2:23 (ep' aphtharsiai); the Greek itself is NOT set in type here, so there is no glyph to magnify.

For the state of innocence was, as it were, a certain inception of the future state of heavenly glory, in which, besides other things, there are three chief goods: the consummation of grace, the inability to sin, and the inability to die. It was fitting, therefore, that in the state of innocence, if not consummate grace, at least abundant grace should be given to man; and

that, if not the inability to die and to sin, at least the ability not to die and not to sin should be bestowed.

The state of innocence as an inchoatio (beginning) of celestial glory, whose three goods (consummate grace, impotentia peccandi, impotentia moriendi) are present in innocence in a lesser, conditional mode (abundant grace; potentia non moriendi/peccandi).

Or the word 'Immortal' can signify not the act of dying, but either the inability to die, or the ability not to die. If it signifies the inability to die, it did not belong to Adam absolutely and simply, as the outcome itself declared; for he did die—yet on a supposition,

Second/third senses introduced: impotentia moriendi (inability to die) vs. potentia non moriendi (ability not to die). The 'inability to die' did not belong to Adam absolutely; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tamen').

— p. 634 (PDF) · printed p. 593 —

...yet on a supposition, as the Theologians speak, it could apply to him: for, the state of innocence remaining, and the will and decree of God being posited that Adam, if he kept the law set for him, would never die, he could on this account truly be said unable to die; and so Bonaventure holds—which I do not know why it did not please Scotus, since the same is wont to be said in the schools of some predestined man, namely that he both can be damned and cannot be damned: simply and absolutely he can be damned, but on a supposition—that is, inasmuch as he is already predestined by God—he cannot be damned.

Marginal gloss: 'Bonaventura in 2. Sent. dist. 19. art. 2. q. 1.' Adam could be called 'unable to die' ex suppositione (on the supposition of persevering innocence + God's decree), parallel to the scholastic analysis of a predestined man who 'cannot' be damned ex suppositione.

But if the word 'Immortal' signifies the ability not to die, that ability can be conceived as twofold: either one that would be naturally and intrinsically in Adam—and this assuredly he did not have; or one that would be present to him from the supernatural gift of God, and extrinsically, on account of God's continual keeping and protection. Finally, the ability not to die was

in Adam either only for a certain definite time—at the expiry of which he was, of course, to be transferred into the state of eternal life and heavenly glory, so that beyond the term of that time Adam would have failed; or he had the ability not to die in perpetuity. To us it seems more probable that that ability not to die which Adam had was of the former kind: if indeed the things are true which we, in the third book which we entitled On Paradise, disputed concerning the power and efficacy of the tree of life.

Analysis of potentia non moriendi: not intrinsic but extrinsic (from God's gift and protection); and temporary (until translation to glory) rather than perpetual. Pererius favors the temporary reading, cross-referencing his own earlier book 'De Paradiso' on the tree of life.

But since divine Scripture says that Adam was 'inexterminable,' and the Fathers are wont to say that he was endowed with the gift of immortality and was immortal, and since this contributes much to discerning thoroughly the difference between this state of ours and that state of innocence in which Adam was created by God: for these reasons it seems rather to be said that Adam was immortal than mortal.

Conclusion of QUAESTIO III: on balance Adam should rather be called immortal than mortal.

QUESTION IV. Whether the gift of immortality which Adam had pertained to the integrity and perfection of human nature according to its own condition and degree.

Fourth (and final) question of the disputation on immortality. The roman numeral is printed 'IIII.'

There remains the final question, weighty indeed and noble, and by no means to be passed over here: whether that immortality of the first man, of whatever sort it was, was naturally owed to man—that is, pertaining to the natural integrity and perfection of human nature, so that without it man is now maimed and monstrous. There have not been lacking learned men who held that original justice, which comprised the ability not to die and the perfect subjection of flesh and sense under the command and power of reason, was a certain gift in a manner owed to human nature; that is,

although effected and granted to man by God alone, yet altogether pertaining to the natural integrity and perfection of man...

Marginal gloss: 'Opinio quorundam, donum illud immortalitatis pertinuisse ad naturalem hominis integritatem' (The opinion of certain men, that that gift of immortality pertained to man's natural integrity). Running footer on this page: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. FFF'. The question opens by reporting the view that original justice/immortality was a gift owed to human nature; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'perti' = pertinens).

— p. 635 (PDF) · printed p. 594 —

...pertaining [to it], so that, man's nature having been deprived of that gift after the sin of Adam, it ought to be reckoned naturally imperfect, maimed, and as it were monstrous.

Continuation (catchword 'perti' = pertinens) of the opinion reported at the end of the previous page: that immortality was owed to human nature, so that without it man is now 'maimed and monstrous.'

Now they argue this as follows. That is natural which proceeds from natural causes; but that immortality promised to Adam would have befallen him from natural causes, namely on account of the eating of the fruit of the tree of life, whose power of perpetuating life was so natural that even after sin, if Adam had eaten of it, he could have lived forever. For on this account, as Moses relates in almost the last words of the third chapter of the book of Genesis, God cast Adam out of paradise, and forbade Adam access to it, saying, 'Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever' (Gen. 3:22). If, therefore, the cause of living forever was natural, then the immortality too, which was its effect, would have been natural.

First argument of the opposing view: immortality came from a natural cause (the tree of life), therefore was itself natural. Citation: Gen. 3:22-24 (the expulsion from Eden).

Next, what is owed to the integrity of a nature—so that without it the nature is naturally defective and imperfect—that ought truly to be called natural; but such is the immortality of the body. For if the human body had not from the beginning been made by God incorruptible in some way, there

would not have been fitness and proportion between the incorruptible soul and the corruptible body: for the soul would have the power of informing and vivifying the body for an infinite time; but to the body, because it was wholly corruptible, it would be repugnant to be informed and vivified by the soul for an infinite time—whereas, according to Aristotle, what is possible on the part of the form is also possible on the part of the matter, just as what is possible on the part of the active potency is possible on the part of the passive potency; otherwise that potency would be in vain. But God and nature do nothing in vain in things, nor allow anything to be so.

Second argument: the proportion between incorruptible soul and corruptible body requires the body too to be somehow incorruptible (with the Aristotelian principle that active and passive potencies must correspond, since nature does nothing in vain).

Furthermore, since the rational soul is a substantial part of man, it is according to its nature, and is its perfect state, to be in man—that is, conjoined with the body; but it is contrary to its nature, and pertains to its imperfect state, to be outside the body. But if the body were wholly corruptible, the rational soul would be joined with it for a short time; whereas, since it is immortal, it would be outside it for an infinite time: from which it would follow that it is according to nature for a short time, but contrary to nature for an infinite time—which is very absurd. And indeed, it seems most alien to the wisdom of God to make such a substantial composite that one of its parts is mortal and the other immortal, since yet neither can be naturally perfect without the other. Besides, if man had not had in some way the immortality of the body, there would have been no natural ultimate end of man as man. For either it would have been corruptible, and could not have suited the rational soul, or incorruptible, and would not have suited the human body. And since matter is for the sake of form, and not the reverse, it was necessary that the human body be endowed in some way with immortality, so that it could be a fit and congruent matter for the rational soul. Finally, natural reason demands that in man the mind and reason should command and rule, while the flesh and

sense are ruled by reason and obey it. The re[bellion]...

Third argument (soul-body composite): an immortal soul united to a corruptible body would be 'according to nature' only briefly and 'against nature' forever (absurd); and matter being for the sake of form, the body must somehow share immortality. The sentence runs into the rebellion-of-the-flesh argument (catchword 'Re' = Rebellio), continued on the next page.

— p. 636 (PDF) · printed p. 595 —

...the rebellion, therefore, of the flesh against reason, which Paul describes in Romans 7 and Galatians 5, is contrary to the nature of man: therefore original justice, which prevented this rebellion, pertained to man's natural state, integrity, and perfection. These things these men argue for their opinion more acutely than truly, or than they can argue.

Conclusion of the fourth argument (rebellion of the flesh = contra naturam, so original justice that prevented it was natural). Citations: Rom. 7; Gal. 5. Pererius's verdict: 'more acutely than truly.'

But we think the contrary, for it is certain to us that that gift of immortality was supernatural, and pertained neither to the natural integrity of human nature considered in itself, nor was owed to it by natural right. For, that we may follow the footsteps of these learned men against themselves, in[sisting]...

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur praedicta opinio, & ostenditur immortalitatem corporis non exigi ad naturalem integritatem hominis' (The aforesaid opinion is refuted, and it is shown that the body's immortality is not required for man's natural integrity). Pererius's thesis: immortality was supernatural and not owed by natural right. Sentence continues on the next paragraph.

...insisting, that immortality of Adam was not effected, as they think, from natural causes. Nay rather, since Adam was constituted of matter that has the potency of contradiction, and of the four elements, from these by natural consequence there existed a natural potency and necessity of dying at some time. But the fruit of the tree of life would have had the power of preserving men from destruction—yet not forever, but for a certain definite time, very long indeed, on which account, by Hebrew idiom and the custom of Scripture, it is called 'eternal,' but is nonetheless finite: namely,

up to the time at which God had determined that man should lead an animal life on earth, and thence be transferred to heaven, to lead a spiritual and heavenly life for everlasting ages. But if they should contend that that fruit had the power of bestowing immortal life, I for my part would not hesitate to say that that power was not natural but supernatural: which seems to have pleased Augustine, Bede, Bonaventure, and other first-class Theologians whom I mentioned in book 3.

Reply to the first argument: Adam, made of matter with the potency of contradiction and of the four elements, had a natural necessity of eventual death; the tree of life preserved life only for a long-but-finite span (the 'eternal' of Hebrew idiom = indefinitely long, not strictly infinite); if it conferred true immortality, that power was supernatural (per Augustine, Bede, Bonaventure; cf. Pererius's own book 3, De Paradiso).

What of this—that Adam's immortality did not depend on the fruit of that tree wholly, nor entirely, but only in some part; and on many other, and chief, accounts depended on supernatural and divine privileges granted, or to be granted, to man, which by a single term can be comprised and expressed as God's special assistance and protection?

Adam's immortality rested only partly on the tree of life and chiefly on God's special assistance and protection.

But that that immortality, of whatever kind it was, was not owed to human nature, nor necessarily required for constituting its natural integrity, is concluded by these arguments—and, as I think, not invalid ones. First, if the natural integrity of man requires the immortality of the body, it requires either that immortality by which the body is immortal intrinsically, or that by which it is so only extrinsically—namely, on account of God's singular care and providence preserving man from all corruption; but human nature cannot require the former immortality. For if the body of man were intrinsically immor[tal]...

Pererius's counter-arguments begin: a dilemma—natural integrity would require either intrinsic or extrinsic immortality; it cannot require the intrinsic kind (argued in the next paragraph). Sentence continues on the next page.

...tal, it would not be composed of elements, nor capable of a vegetative and sensitive soul; on which account it would neither be a fit dwelling for the rational soul—nay, it could not be capable of it in any way at all. Nor indeed does the natural integrity and perfection of man demand or require the latter kind of immortality: for an immortality of this sort would have befallen man not in a natural manner, but beyond the natural order and by a certain special and extraordinary means; and what can be said to be less consonant with reason than that that should be necessary for the natural integrity of man which can befall him only by a supernatural, not a natural, way?

Completion of the dilemma: intrinsic immortality would make the body non-elemental and unable to house the soul; and the extrinsic kind is praeter naturam (beyond the natural order), so cannot be required for natural integrity. Hence neither horn holds.

Next, if the immortality of the body had been owed to human nature, then it would have been incongruous for it to be promised to man—as it was promised by God as the reward of his obedience—and for its privation to be inflicted on man as the just penalty of his disobedience. For on account of sin the things that are natural to man were neither taken away nor diminished: since even to the demons their natural endowments remained intact. Nor was there any reason why God, on account of Adam's sin—when he had left intact all the other things that pertain to the integrity of human nature—should take away from man the one immortality of the body alone (granted that this too pertained to the integrity of human nature).

Second counter-argument: immortality was promised as a reward and removed as a penalty, which would be incongruous if it were merely owed to nature; sin does not strip away what is truly natural (even demons keep their natural endowments).

Add that what is beyond his nature, and beyond his natural and intrinsic potency, is not owed to the nature of man; but the immortality of the body is not according to the nature of man: for man is by nature a mixed body,

living and sentient; and what is such has, also according to nature, that it be corruptible; and that which is naturally corruptible, it is according to nature necessary that it be corrupted at some time. But never to be corrupted is not according to the nature of a corruptible thing; therefore never to die is not according to the nature of man; nor could that ability not to die be naturally owed to man, or pertaining to his natural integrity.

Third counter-argument: man is by nature a mixed (hence corruptible) body; never-dying is praeter naturam, so cannot be owed to him naturally.

Furthermore, if, on account of that proportion which ought to be between form and matter, they think it must necessarily be concluded that the body of man too ought to be immortal in some way—because the rational soul is immortal—then assuredly by that reasoning it would be brought about that the human body too ought to be intrinsically and substantially immortal: which, however, these men do not want, and which indeed involves a contradiction. For the proportion which is between matter and form is natural, internal, and essential, not adventitious, external, and accidental. Since, then, the rational soul is intrinsically and substantially immortal, and has not only the ability not to die but also the inability to die: by a like reasoning, in truth, in order that the proportion between matter and form be duly preserved, the human body ought to be intrinsically and substantially incorruptible, and not only able not to die, but also utterly unable to die.

Refutation of the proportion-argument: since the matter-form proportion is internal and essential, the argument would force the body to be intrinsically/substantially incorruptible (matching the soul)—which the opponents themselves deny, so the argument is self-contradictory.

It appears, therefore, that this argumentation of these learned men, which they themselves thought most valid, is plainly weak and null. Finally, if everything must be reckoned natural and naturally owed to man, without which man cannot be naturally perfect altogether, then assuredly by that reasoning it could be concluded both that resurrection from the dead is naturally owed to man, and that the ultimate end—which is the clear and beatific vision of the divine essence—is naturally fitting and owed to man;

since neither is the rational soul perfect without the body in its sub[stance]...

Reductio: the opponents' principle ('whatever man cannot be perfect without is naturally owed') would absurdly make even the resurrection and the beatific vision 'naturally owed.' Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'stantia').

— p. 638 (PDF) · printed p. 597 —

...is substantially perfect, and the human appetite, since it is capable of an infinite good, can be so sated and filled by the attainment of no good except the clear vision and enjoyment of God, that it is altogether content and at rest.

Completion of the reductio: the rational soul is not perfect without the body, and the human appetite rests only in the beatific vision—yet no one calls these 'naturally owed'; so the opponents' principle proves too much.

Nor will it be laborious to dissolve the two chief arguments of the authors of the contrary opinion. And that argument indeed, taken from the fitness which ought to be between the rational soul and the human body—although these men think it most firm—can nevertheless be shaken and overturned with little trouble, or by that very reasoning by which it is dissolved by Blessed Thomas in the First Part, question 76, article 5. For when, at the beginning of that article, he had laid down this argument: Matter ought to be proportioned to form; but the intellective soul is an incorruptible form; therefore it is not fittingly united to a corruptible body—to this he himself responds thus:

Marginal glosses: 'Solutio argumentorum contrariae opinionis' (Solution of the arguments of the contrary opinion); 'An corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile, sit idonea materia rationalis animae, quae est incorruptibilis' (Whether the human body, which is corruptible, is fit matter for the rational soul, which is incorruptible). Citation: Aquinas, ST I q.76 a.5, quoted in the following paragraph.

Someone perhaps, wishing to escape this objection, would say that the body of man before sin was incorruptible. But this response does not seem sufficient: for the body of man before sin was not incorruptible

by nature—otherwise that immortality would have remained even after sin, as the immortality of the demons remained—but it was immortal through the gift of divine grace. Wherefore it is better answered that in matter which is chosen for the sake of some form, a twofold condition is found: one which is chosen per se, namely that by which the matter is suitable for receiving the form, and fit so that the form can carry out its proper actions; and another which is not chosen per se, but which, because it naturally follows from the prior condition by the necessity of matter, cannot be cast off and removed from the matter. For example: a craftsman, to make a saw, chooses iron as matter fit for it, namely because by its hardness it is apt for cutting; but that the teeth of an iron saw can be blunted and affected by rust follows from the necessity of the matter. So to the intellective soul there is owed per se a body of balanced complexion, and capable of the vegetative and sensitive soul; but corruptibility follows upon such a body from the necessity of the matter. But if someone should say that this necessity of matter could have been avoided by God, and that, notwithstanding it, incorruption could be given to the human body, it must be answered that in the constitution of natural things one does not consider what God can do, but what it is fitting that the nature of things become—as Augustine says, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 1. God indeed, when he first created man, gave him immortality, yet not as owed to his nature, but as a supernatural gift of his grace, granted to him gratuitously. Thus far Saint Thomas; and he holds the same opinion in 1-2, question 85, article 6, and 2-2, question 164, article 1, and on the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Verbatim quotation of Aquinas, ST I q.76 a.5, with the craftsman/saw analogy: corruptibility follows ex necessitate materiae and cannot be separated from a body fit to house the soul. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram II.1, is quoted within. Closing cross-references: ST 1-2 q.85 a.6; 2-2 q.164 a.1; Aquinas's commentary on Romans 5.

But the latter argument of these men—that the rebellion of the flesh against reason is contrary to the nature of man, and therefore that original justice,

which did not allow such a rebellion to exist, was owed to man's natural integrity and perfection—is solved in this manner. The rebellion of the flesh against reason is twofold: one that conquers reason, dragging it to consent to and comply with its own desires—and this is contrary to the nature of man. But it can be removed through the moral virtue of temperance: this, namely, taming the desires...

Marginal gloss: 'An rebellio sensitivi appetitus adversus rationem sit secundum naturam, an contra naturam hominis' (Whether the rebellion of the sensitive appetite against reason is according to, or contrary to, the nature of man). Reply to the fourth argument: of the twofold rebellion, the conquering kind is contra naturam but removable by temperance. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tes' = cupiditates).

— p. 639 (PDF) · printed p. 598 —

...the desires of the flesh, compels them to obey reason, and makes man live temperately according to right reason. Nor is it an obstacle that it cannot but happen that he sometimes slips into some intemperance: for that is not contrary to the natural and moral perfection of man. For this is common to all corruptible and defectible things, that for their natural perfection it is not necessary that they always be in good condition, but it is enough that they be in good condition generally and for the most part.

Continuation (catchword 'tes' = cupiditates) of the reply to the fourth argument: the conquering rebellion of the flesh is removed by temperance, and occasional lapses do not destroy man's natural/moral perfection.

The other is the rebellion of the lower part against the higher, which does not make reason consent to the sensitive appetite, but only stirs up in the members and in the appetite itself unseemly and disordered motions, beyond the judgment and will of the higher part. For they both anticipate the judgment of reason, and are not settled and calmed at once as reason commands and as the man would wish. And this rebellion of the flesh is indeed not contrary to the nature of man, but rather is according to his nature, considered in itself and apart from divine grace. For it arises from the natural constitution of man, who is naturally composed of a twofold

and very diverse appetite, the intellective and the sensitive. And the sensitive appetite, since it is natural and naturally borne toward its object, is, when an object suitable and delightful to it is present, naturally and with full impetus borne toward it. And although it can be checked and drawn back by reason, yet not without difficulty on reason's part, and without the resistance and distress of the appetite itself.

The second kind of rebellion (disordered motions that merely anticipate reason without conquering it) is according to man's nature considered in pure nature, arising from his composition of two appetites (intellective and sensitive).

Assuredly, this rebellion, such as it is in us, would be altogether such in man, if he were created in pure naturals; but in him it would not be a penalty or a fault, but the condition of nature: in us, however, it is a penalty; because the first parent of us all was created with original justice, and because of his sin in losing it, the rebellion of the flesh which we suffer is a penalty.

Conclusion: in pure nature such rebellion would be a mere natural condition, not a penalty; in us it is a penalty, because we descend from Adam created with original justice and forfeiting it by sin.

End of the fifth book.

Colophon closing BOOK V (which treated the four internal excellences of the state of innocence: wisdom, grace, original justice, immortality).

— p. 640 (PDF) · printed p. 599 —

OF BENEDICTUS PERERIUS, THE SIXTH BOOK. On the temptation and fall of the first human beings. That is, A PREFACE TO THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS.

Major structural divider: title page of BOOK VI, which treats Genesis chapter 3 (the temptation and fall). Followed by the Praefatio.

The things we have hitherto discussed concerning man, in the two books which immediately preceded this one, pertain either to declaring the

eminence of human nature's perfection and dignity, or to demonstrating the excellence and felicity of that state in which God from the beginning placed man, created by himself. But this book, sixth in order, contains the mournful and deadly and, as it were, tragic outcome of so great a felicity—I mean the fall of the first human beings into sin: calamitous not to themselves alone, or to one or many nations, but ruinous to all human beings, as many as are, as many as shall be, and as many as have yet been. Although the evils that followed upon that most wretched fall seemed far more bitter to our first parents, who had experienced the sweetness of the former life, than they appear to be to their posterity, who are wholly without experience of those goods: not otherwise, assuredly, than to one who in a foul...

Opening of the Praefatio: books 4-5 treated man's dignity and the felicity of innocence; book 6 treats the tragic Fall, ruinous to all mankind. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tetro').

— p. 641 (PDF) · printed p. 600 —

...born in some foul and loathsome prison, the darkness and foulness of his dwelling seems less hard and intolerable than to his parents, who had before been accustomed to enjoy the most delightful liberty and the sweetest light of heaven. In the third chapter of the book of Genesis, therefore, there is described by Moses the temptation of Eve and Adam, and the fall of both, and God's judgment upon each. Here is opened the first origin of all the miseries and evils with which, from that time onward, the whole race of men is wretchedly afflicted and harassed.

Completion of the prison-simile (those born in misery feel it less than those who knew prior happiness). Statement of the chapter's subject: Genesis 3 = the temptation, fall, and divine judgment—the origin of all human woes.

But how long a time after the creation of the first human beings this temptation befell them is not clear from Scripture itself. Diodorus of Tarsus, as he is cited in this place in the Catena, conjectures from those words of the serpent—'Why has God commanded you that you should not

eat of every tree of Paradise?'—that not much time had elapsed: by which it is signified that before that time Adam and Eve had eaten from no tree of Paradise; for if they had eaten, the serpent would not have dared to say this. But that phrase, 'That you should not eat of every tree,' does not signify 'from no tree,' but 'not from every tree.' There is, moreover, a common and quite ancient opinion that on the very day on which Adam was created, on that same day he was tempted and laid low. So thinks Irenaeus, in the last book Against Heresies:

On the timing of the Fall (uncertain from Scripture). Diodorus of Tarsus (via the Catena) infers a short interval from Gen. 3:1; Pererius corrects the inference (ex omni ≠ ex nulla). Reports the ancient view (Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, final book) that Adam fell the same day he was created.

Nay, many even think that on the same day of the week and of the month—that is, on a Friday, and on the twenty-fifth of March—man was both created by God, and conquered by the devil, and redeemed by Christ the Lord through the death of the cross. But I can hardly bring myself to believe this, since neither does Scripture anywhere indicate it, nor does any reason even apparently probable persuade it; nay, the contrary opinion is rather more likely to be true: for the things which Scripture narrates as done between the creation of Adam and his fall do not seem able to be compressed into the space of half a single day. Let it suffice for the present to have touched on this question thus far: for we shall explain it more subtly and accurately below.

The further tradition that creation, fall, and (later) redemption all fell on Friday, March 25; Pererius rejects it as unsupported and improbable, deferring fuller treatment. (After this the Praefatio closes with an asterism and the chapter begins.)

— p. 642 (PDF) · printed p. 601 —

THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS.

Header introducing the biblical lemma (Genesis 3) that Pererius will expound throughout Book VI.

1. Now the serpent was more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth which the Lord God had made. And he said to the woman, Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise? 2. The woman answered him, We eat of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise; 3. but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat, and that we should not touch it, lest perhaps we die. 4. And the serpent said to the woman, You shall not die the death by any means: 5. for God knows that on whatever day you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. 6. The woman therefore saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold: and she took of its fruit and ate, and gave to her husband, who ate. 7. And the eyes of both were opened: and when they perceived that they were naked, they sewed together fig leaves, and made themselves girdles. 8. And when they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in Paradise at the breeze after midday, Adam and his wife hid themselves from the face of the Lord God in the midst of the trees of Paradise. 9. And the Lord God called Adam, and said to him, Where are you? 10. And he said, I heard your voice in Paradise, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself. 11. And he said to him: And who has told you that you were naked, but that you have eaten of the tree of which I had commanded you that you should not eat? 12. And Adam said, The woman whom you gave me gave me of the tree, and I ate. 13. And the Lord God said to the woman, Why have you done this? She answered: The serpent deceived me, and I ate. 14. And the Lord God said to the ser[pent]...

The biblical lemma, Genesis 3:1-14, set in italic with marginal verse numbers 1-14 (Pererius's Latin, close to the Vulgate; note 'aperientur oculi vestri' v.5, 'perizomata' [girdles] v.7, 'ad auram post

meridiem' v.8). The passage breaks off at v.14 'ad serpentem' (catchword 'serpen'), continuing on the next page. Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. GGG'.

— p. 643 (PDF) · printed p. 602 —

...to the serpent, Because you have done this, you are cursed among all living things and beasts of the earth: upon your breast you shall go, and you shall eat earth all the days of your life. 15. I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed: she shall crush your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel. 16. To the woman also he said, I will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions; in sorrow you shall bring forth children, and you shall be under your husband's power, and he shall have dominion over you. 17. But to Adam he said, Because you have hearkened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you that you should not eat, cursed is the earth in your work; in labors you shall eat of it all the days of your life. 18. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the herbs of the earth. 19. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken: for dust you are, and into dust you shall return. 20. And Adam called the name of his wife Eve: because she was the mother of all the living. 21. The Lord God also made for Adam and his wife garments of skins, and clothed them. 22. And he said, Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil: now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever. 23. The Lord God sent him out of the Paradise of pleasure, to till the earth from which he was taken. 24. And he cast Adam out, and placed before the Paradise of pleasure Cherubim, and a flaming and turning sword, to keep the way of the tree of life.

Conclusion of the biblical lemma, Genesis 3:14-24 (continued from the previous page, catchword 'serpen'): the serpent's curse, the protoevangelium (v.15 'ipsum conteret caput tuum'—'she shall crush'), the sentences on Eve and Adam, the naming of Eve, the skin garments, and the expulsion with the Cherubim and the flaming sword. Verse numbers 15-24 are in the margin.

Genesis chapter 3. Now the serpent was more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth which the Lord God had made. VERSE 1.

The first verse (Gen. 3:1) re-cited as the lemma for Pererius's exposition ('VERS. 1' in the margin).

From these words there arises a hard question, and in the judgment of some almost inexplicable: What kind of serpent it was that conversed with Eve, and led her into so great an error by its deceitful words and promises. Wherefore this matter must be disputed by us diligently and accurately.

Statement of the leading question of Book VI: the nature of the tempting serpent. Sentence continues into the disputation (catchword 'DISPU').

— p. 644 (PDF) · printed p. 603 —

A DISPUTATION ON WHAT KIND the serpent was that tempted the first human beings.

Heading of the first disputation of Book VI.

Five things can be thought concerning that serpent: whence five opinions of the learned about it have arisen. First, we can think it was a true and natural serpent, to which at that time it was natural both to speak and to understand. Second, it can be thought that it was indeed a natural serpent, but that the faculty of speaking and understanding was not naturally implanted in it, but granted to it by God for a time, to tempt and test the first man. Third, that it was not a true serpent, but only a feigned one—that is, merely the appearance and likeness of a serpent, under which, however, a hidden demon framed human speech, contrived snares, and carried through the temptation. Fourth, that it was neither a true nor a feigned serpent, and that the whole narration of Moses is metaphorical: namely,

that by the word 'serpent' is signified, and ought to be understood, the devil, who deceived the first human beings. Lastly, it can be thought that there was both a true serpent, and at the same time a demon present to it, who through that serpent, as through a fit instrument of his malice, carried out the whole of what Moses narrates about the serpent. From these five ways of thinking about that serpent, five opinions, as I said, and interpretations of the Mosaic narration, have been disseminated among the Fathers and Theologians.

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque opiniones de illo serpente' (Five opinions about that serpent). The five views: (1) a real serpent naturally speaking/understanding; (2) a real serpent temporarily given speech by God; (3) a phantom serpent masking a demon; (4) a wholly metaphorical serpent = the devil; (5) a real serpent used as the demon's instrument.

The first opinion is that of Josephus, who in the first book of the Antiquities, chapter one, seems to signify (and that he certainly held this, Tostatus affirmatively reports, question 429, on the chapter of Genesis) that that serpent was true and natural, to which it was then natural to be endowed with the faculty of understanding and speaking, and to use feet for walking, and to be without venom; but that, out of envy of human felicity, it was instigated to deceive man. I will set down here the words of Josephus: At that time, he says, there was no discord among the animals, and the serpent lived familiarly with Adam and his wife; yet it envied them the felicity to come, if they should persevere in obeying God's commands; and reckoning that they would fall into calamity if they neglected God's mandates, it maliciously persuaded the woman to taste of the tree of knowledge. And toward the end of the chapter he says thus: Moreover, God took away the serpent's voice, angry at the malice it had used toward Adam; and put venom into its tongue; and besides, deprived of feet, made it to be dragged along the ground and to creep. Thus Josephus.

Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio Iosephi, serpentem habuisse tunc naturalem facultatem loquendi' (The first opinion, of Josephus, that the serpent then had a natural faculty of speaking). Citations: Josephus, Antiquities I.1; Tostatus (Alonso de Madrigal), quaestio 429 on Genesis.

Something similar Basil seems to say, in the homily which is on Paradise, writing that all the animals before Adam's sin were tame, and lived harmoniously among themselves; and that they heard one another, and spoke intelligibly; and that the serpent did not then creep, cast down upon the earth, but went on high and erect upon its feet.

Basil of Caesarea (Homily on Paradise) is cited as holding a similar view: that before the Fall animals were tame and spoke, and the serpent walked upright. (The text then turns to Plato—catchword 'PLATO'.)

— p. 645 (PDF) · printed p. 604 —

Plato in the Statesman says that in the golden age, when Saturn reigned, not only could men converse with men, but even with beasts; and that, if they wished to learn anything from them, they were accustomed to ask, and in turn to receive an answer from them; yet this sharing of speech they did not use, as would have been fitting, for acquiring philosophy and a perfect knowledge of all things. This opinion of Plato, Eusebius, in book 12 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 9, recalls thus: Moses writes that the serpent was more prudent than all the beasts of the earth, and that it held converse in turn with the woman; and it is not amiss to hear how Plato narrated this thing. Those who lived in the times of Saturn, he says, were endowed with such great power that they could use speech not only with men, but even with beasts. But they did not use this power for philosophy, both among themselves and with the beasts, diligently inquiring about the nature of each toward the accumulation of prudence; but, clinging continually to food and drink like gluttons, they exchanged among themselves and with the beasts such tales as are now told about them. Thus Eusebius.

Plato, Statesman (Politicus), on the golden age of Saturn when men spoke with beasts, recalled via Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XII.9 (cited as supporting the first opinion).

But let us return to the opinion of Josephus, than which assuredly nothing more incredible and absurd can be said or thought. For the faculty of

understanding, especially of things universal and immaterial, is proper to man alone of all living creatures: since his definition is, A rational animal. Likewise the faculty of speaking and conversing belongs to man alone, as Aristotle hands down in book 4 of the History of Animals, chapter 9; for certain animals which, trained by man, fashion sounds similar to human ones, do this neither naturally nor with understanding of what they speak.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio Iosephi' (The opinion of Josephus is refuted). Understanding and speech are proper to man alone (man = 'rational animal'); cf. Aristotle, Historia Animalium IV.9. Trained animals' imitative sounds are neither natural nor understood.

But to say that the serpent was punished and deprived by God of understanding, speech, and feet, on account of the deceit it had contrived against Eve, is like the fables and fictions of the Poets. For if God, on account of sin, took nothing away from either the Angels or man that was natural to them, why would he have taken from the serpent the natural power of understanding, speaking, and walking? And indeed, these things cannot be changed unless the nature and essence of the thing is changed. Moreover, although the serpent which seduced Eve had been punished with these losses, yet other serpents of the same species, which had not shared in its crime nor been begotten by that serpent, would—if that power of understanding and speaking had been natural—have retained it, and it would necessarily have been transmitted to their offspring, and so on to the whole species. What of this—that that serpent, even though deprived of feet and speech, would nonetheless have begotten serpents such as it itself had previously been ac-

Refutation continued: God does not strip away the natural for sin's sake (cf. Angels, man); to remove speech would require changing the serpent's very nature; and other, innocent serpents of the species would have kept the trait by heredity. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'se' = secundum naturam).

...cording to nature? For if anyone among men is blind, or mute, or maimed in his feet, and has begotten sons, it is not necessary that they be born deprived of the same things. Certainly Pliny, in book 8, chapter 41,

reported among prodigies and portents that, in the year in which Tarquinius Superbus was driven from his kingdom, a serpent barked; and Valerius Maximus, in book 1, reckons among portents and miracles that beasts have sometimes uttered human voices; from which one may understand that to no animal can it be natu-

Refutation continued: a defect is not heritable as such (a blind man begets sighted sons). Pliny (Naturalis Historia VIII.41, a barking serpent the year Tarquin was expelled) and Valerius Maximus (book 1) list talking beasts among portents—showing such speech is preternatural, not natural. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'rale' = naturale).

— p. 646 (PDF) · printed p. 605 —

...natural to speak in a human manner and fashion, much less to understand.

Completion of the refutation of Josephus (catchword 'rale' = naturale): no animal can naturally speak humanly, still less understand.

The second opinion is that of Blessed Ephraem the Syrian, a contemporary and intimate of Basil, who, as Moses Bar Cepha relates in the book on Paradise, chapter 27, judged that the serpent which conversed with Eve was a bodily and true animal. For he held that Satan asked God to grant the serpent the faculty of speech for a time, to tempt Adam—just as he also demanded that Job's wealth be permitted to him, that he might make trial of his patience. And so we must understand that to that bodily serpent the use of speech was given in the same way as to Balaam's ass. And that not only speech, but also understanding, was im-

Marginal gloss: 'Secunda sententia B. Ephraem, datam fuisse ad tempus serpenti vim loquendi. Iob 1. seq.' (The second opinion, of Blessed Ephraem, that the power of speaking was given to the serpent for a time. Job 1ff.). Source: Moses Bar Cepha, De Paradiso, c. 27. Satan obtained speech for the serpent (cf. Job 1; Balaam's ass, Num. 22). Sentence continues (catchword 'indi' = inditum).

...planted in that serpent, Ephraem affirms: since God addressed it as understanding, censuring it with these curses, You shall eat dust, and upon your belly you shall walk. But this opinion is wholly devoid of credibility. For what is less credible than that a serpent should speak, which has no

natural instruments fit and necessary for forming human voices? In vain, then, would the faculty of speaking be given to it, which could in no way be brought into use and exercised. For the human speech which Balaam's ass uttered, the ass itself did not form, but the Angel in its mouth. If someone should say that God at once gave both the faculty of speaking and natural instruments fit for exercising that faculty, I would say that this could not be done unless the constitution of the body, and the figure of the serpent, and the conformation of the whole mouth were changed; and if that had been done, Eve would undoubtedly have noticed it, who beforehand had the figure of the serpent well examined and known.

Ephraem's grounds (God addresses the serpent as understanding: 'You shall eat dust...'), then Pererius's refutation: a serpent lacks vocal organs; Balaam's ass spoke by the Angel, not itself; giving real organs would have visibly transformed the serpent, which Eve would have noticed.

Next, nothing is more absurd than to think that the faculty of understanding could be given to, and reside in, a serpent: for a serpent could no more be understanding than be a man; for since the intellect does not in reality differ from the understanding soul, it can by no means be separated from it. And even granting that the faculty of understanding is a thing distinct from the rational soul, nevertheless it cannot be separated from it. For it is a vital power, and to understand is a vital action, which can in no way be effected except by one who lives an intellective life, and whose nature is constituted and determined through the intellective grade. The third opinion is that of Cyril (which, beyond the others, pleased Steuchus Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia), in book 3 Against Julian the Apostate. Cyril affirms that that serpent was not a true and animate one, but only the appearance and likeness of a serpent, under which a demon addressed the woman; and therefore he too, under the name of the serpent, was struck by God's curses. For Blessed Cyril judged—and so it is—that a demon can, at his own discretion, fashion the appearance and likeness both of a serpent and of any other animals, such as one would take for a true animal, and through it either say or do whatever he wishes. But I do not assent to Cyril. For if that

had not been a true serpent, the demon, the temptation accomplished, would have laid aside that appearance and image of the serpent: just as the Angels, to perform some ministry among men, [lay aside] the hu-

Marginal glosses: 'Facultatem intelligendi, & ipsum intelligere nullo modo cum animalibus communicari posse' (That the faculty of understanding, and understanding itself, can in no way be shared with animals); 'Tertia opinio Cyrilli, & Eugubini. Non fuisse verum serpentem, sed diabolum sub specie & imagine serpentis.' Citations: Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum III; Agostino Steuco (Eugubinus), Cosmopoeia. Pererius's objection (the demon would have dropped the phantom afterward) continues on the next page (catchword 'human' = humanam [formam]).

— p. 647 (PDF) · printed p. 606 —

...having put on a human appearance, when the ministry is accomplished, at once lay aside the appearance of a human body; but that serpent, even after the temptation was carried through and the sin of the first human beings committed, remained in Paradise. For when Eve, rebuked by God for having eaten of the forbidden tree, had answered, 'The serpent deceived me,' the Lord, turning to the serpent, said to it, 'Because you have done this, you shall be cursed,' etc., and punished it with the penalty of going upon its breast and eating earth: but this penalty would have been ineptly inflicted on a merely shadowy and feigned serpent; nor would Moses, of a non-real serpent, or of the mere likeness of a serpent, have said, 'The serpent was more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth.'

Completion of the refutation of Cyril (opinion 3): unlike Angels who shed their assumed bodies after their task, the serpent remained, was cursed, and is called 'more cunning'—all unfitting for a mere phantom. (Cf. the angelic-form analogy from the previous page, catchword 'human'.)

The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, who in his Commentaries on Genesis, upon these very words which we are now treating, judges that by the word 'serpent' neither a true serpent, nor its likeness and specter, ought to be understood, but only the demon, who—because he is most cunning and most insidious, and most desirous of harming men—is in Scripture frequently called metaphorically a serpent. Nor does he think that that temptation and conversation of the demon with Eve was external and

sensible, but carried out only by internal persuasion and suggestion. And since Cajetan saw that this opinion was novel and abhorrent from the opinion of all the Fathers and Theologians, he tried to prop and stabilize it with many arguments.

Marginal gloss: 'Quarta sententia Caietani. Narrationem Mosis de serpente, non esse historicam, sed parabolicam' (The fourth opinion, of Cajetan: that the Mosaic narration about the serpent is not historical but parabolic). Opinion 4: the serpent = the devil metaphorically; the temptation purely internal.

First, he says, it is customary in Sacred Letters to use the names of animals to signify rational and intelligent creatures. Hence are those phrases: 'Behold the Lamb of God'; 'The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered'; and in the Apocalypse the devil is named by a perpetual allegory 'dragon' and 'serpent'; just as in Job, chapters 40 and 41, very many and weighty Authors—though the Jews protest—have thought that under the name and likeness of Behemoth and Leviathan the devil is insinuated, whose proper name, however, is not even once expressed in that place. Wherefore, just as in that place the devil is not understood under the bodily appearance of Leviathan and Behemoth, by like reasoning neither in this place ought he to be understood under the bodily appearance of a serpent. Next, here the serpent is reported to have been more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth: which, of a true serpent, if faith be given to the Philosophers who have investigated the natures and properties of animals, is established to be false. Nay rather, Moses said it for this reason, to indicate that he was not speaking of a true serpent, but figuratively and metaphorically of the devil, reproducing the manners and disposition of a serpent: namely, by creeping through the inner senses of man, so as to infect and corrupt him with the venom of his persuasion. Then, for this reason Moses attributed speech to the serpent—which it is agreed cannot belong to a true serpent—so that, by the speech attributed to that serpent, the reader might understand that Moses was speaking of an intellectual serpent.

Marginal glosses: 'Ioan. 1.' (John 1:36, 'Behold the Lamb of God'); 'Apoc. 1.' (Apocalypse); 'Infra. 23' (cross-reference). Cajetan's reasons: Scripture uses animal-names for rational beings (Lamb, Lion of Judah, dragon/serpent of the devil, Behemoth/Leviathan in Job 40-41); 'more cunning' is false of a real snake; speech cannot belong to a real serpent—so the 'serpent' is the devil.

But if someone, meeting this reasoning, should say that that serpent was a true animal, yet spoke by the work of the devil—just as Balaam's ass is reported, in the book of Numbers, chapter 22, to have spoken by the ministry of an Angel—Cajetan, refuting this, says that there is a great dissimilarity, and that it is not a fitting example. For in the book of Numbers, where the speech of that ass is narrated, the efficient cause of that speech is also at the same time set forth, for it is said that the Lord opened the mouth of the ass, and so...

Cajetan's reply to the Balaam's-ass objection (Numbers 22): unlike the ass, where Scripture states the cause ('the Lord opened the mouth of the ass'), the serpent's speech has no such stated cause. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword '& sic').

— p. 648 (PDF) · printed p. 607 —

...and so it [the ass] spoke; but in this place Moses gives no cause of the serpent's speech, but states precisely that the serpent spoke with the woman, and indicates that no miracle concurred to it, nor any ministry of a devil—signifying not obscurely that he is speaking of the devil, by whose will human speech can be feigned without a miracle. To this, the same becomes manifest to one who considers the penalty inflicted by God on the serpent: for it fits a true serpent not at all, but a figurative one—that is, the devil—most of all; for to go upon the breast and to eat dust was not a penalty for the serpent, since the serpent had this even before the temptation of man naturally; nor is it fitting to think that serpents were then converted and changed into another nature, property, and manners than they had before.

Cajetan continued: Moses states no cause for the serpent's speech (unlike the ass), implying the devil; and the curse (crawling, eating dust) fits the devil, not a real snake, which already crawled by nature.

It also pertains to the confirmation of this opinion, that Moses wrote nothing of the serpent's approach to the woman, nothing of the woman's fear and horror at the serpent's presence—although Moses himself, as is written in Exodus 4, terrified by the presence of a serpent, fled away: it is only written that the serpent was more cunning than the other living creatures, and addressed the woman, and that she, without any disturbance, familiarly answered the serpent. And indeed, the devil is a sufficiently domestic and familiar interlocutor, beating upon our inner parts with serpentine suggestions and counsels.

Cajetan continued: Moses records no fright in Eve (unlike Moses' own fear of the serpent, Exod. 4:3), which suits an inward, familiar tempter—the devil.

Nor does it stand against this interpretation, says Cajetan, that the serpent is called more cunning than the beasts of the earth, since he is far more cunning and crafty than men too, and the devil does not seem able to be rightly compared with the beasts of the earth. For the devil, on account of his sin, was cast down into the order of beasts, deposed from the order of intelligent creatures: and therefore he is rightly named by the word 'serpent,' and rightly compared with the beasts. For this is the difference between rational and irrational creatures, that the former were created for their own sake—that is, for their own felicity; but the latter, since they are not capable of true felicity, were established for the use and benefit of the rational ones. Since, therefore, the demon was cast down from the attainment of his own felicity, he was at the same time deposed from the order of rational beings, and reduced to the order of irrational ones, so that he exists, namely, not for his own felicity—which he can by no means recover—but for the benefit and glory of the elect.

Marginal gloss: 'Cur secundum Caietanum, daemon comparetur cum bestiis terrae' (Why, according to Cajetan, the demon is compared with the beasts of the earth). The devil, cast down from the rational order into the irrational, is rightly called and compared to a beast.

Moses, therefore, according to the order of grace, and relatively to the things of the heavenly homeland, in speaking of the demon, aptly named him a beast, and compared his prudence with the prudence of beasts. The speech, then, held between the serpent and Eve was not vocal, but of internal suggestion, by which the devil began to creep with venomous thought; and of the same kind of speech the whole dialogue which is described was conducted, between the serpent and the woman. Discourses of this kind, taken metaphorically, are not only sober according to Scripture, but also not a little useful to the profession of the Christian faith, especially among the Wise of this age, who—understanding that the things here narrated by Moses are to be taken not as the letter sounds, but metaphorically—do not shrink from believing them and laugh at them as little fables, but venerate them as mysteries, and more easily embrace the things that belong to our faith. Nor indeed is a handle hence given for interpreting all the rest metaphorically: since other things do not, like these, have testimonies from the text itself, that they...

Cajetan's conclusion: the whole serpent-Eve dialogue was internal suggestion; reading it metaphorically aids faith among the learned, without licensing a metaphorical reading of everything. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ut me' = ut metaphorice).

— p. 649 (PDF) · printed p. 608 —

...should be understood metaphorically. Thus Cajetan, whose opinion we have recounted almost just as it was put forth and explained by him.

Close of the long Cajetan quotation (catchword 'ut me' from the previous page).

But the opinion of Cajetan ought to be repudiated and rejected by all who are wise and who think in accordance with divine Scripture and Catholic doctrine, not only as false, but as erroneous and rash; for it is against the doctrine of all the Fathers and Theologians, against the sense of the Christian people and of the Church: for it is fixed in the souls and minds of

all Christians, and is publicly taught in the Church of God, that Eve was deceived by the devil through a serpent, by a bodily and sensible temptation. Cajetan also perverts the trustworthiness of the Mosaic history, making its whole narration figurative and metaphorical: for which cause Origen was condemned in the Sixth General Synod.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur opinio Caietani' (The opinion of Cajetan is refuted). Pererius judges it erroneous and rash, against all the Fathers and the Church's public teaching; allegorizing the whole narrative is the error for which Origen was condemned (Third Council of Constantinople, 680-681).

Nor can any sufficiently fit and probable reason be brought forward why, if the things Moses writes about the serpent are to be understood not historically but figuratively, the things above about Paradise, about the tree of life, and about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, about the four rivers, and finally about the formation of Adam from the dust of the earth and of Eve from Adam's rib, should not similarly be interpreted [figuratively]; for the former have no more testimony from the text of Scripture itself than the latter that they should be understood not historically but metaphorically.

The slippery-slope objection: allegorizing the serpent would equally allegorize Paradise, the trees, the four rivers, and the formations of Adam and Eve—none of which the text marks as metaphor.

What of this—that to hold that that temptation of Eve was interior and spiritual, not exterior and corporeal, but made within, in Eve's phantasy and mind, as Cajetan judges, is opposed to the doctrine of Augustine and Gregory, and to the things which the Theologians hand down concerning the state of innocence? For they teach that before sin man could not be tempted inwardly by the devil, but only outwardly. For the devil can tempt man inwardly in only two ways: either through the sensitive appetite, by stirring up his passions toward unlawful things; or through the phantasy, by forming in it phantasms that move the man to evil. But neither of these could the demon do in man before his sin: namely, while the higher part of man was subject to God, the lower part too was equally subject to reason, and could not be perverted and disorderedly moved by the devil; therefore

there could be in her no disordered motion, either in the appetite or in the phantasy of the woman, through which she might be tempted inwardly by the devil; but that whole temptation could come about only from without. For just as before sin the demon could bring no harm or trouble to the body of man, so neither could he in[fest]...

Marginal gloss: 'Duobus tantum modis diabolus hominem interius tentare potest' (In only two ways can the devil tempt man inwardly). Against Cajetan's internal-only temptation: per Augustine and Gregory, before the Fall man could be tempted only externally, since the lower powers were wholly subject to reason. The devil's two inner modes (sensitive appetite; phantasy) were both impossible then. Sentence continues (catchword 'infe' = infestare).

...fest and disturb [his soul through inner temptations]. The fifth and final opinion, which we alone approve and embrace, is that in that temptation there was a true and natural serpent, into which, however, the devil insinuated himself, and through it, as through his own instrument, he formed human voices, and, mingling speech with Eve, deceived her by a cunning and malicious temptation. This opinion has been approved by nearly...

Marginal gloss: 'Quinta sententia, quam Auctor sequitur' (The fifth opinion, which the Author follows). Pererius's adopted view (opinion 5): a real, natural serpent into which the devil insinuated himself, using it as his instrument to speak and tempt. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'fere' = fere Patribus).

— p. 650 (PDF) · printed p. 609 —

...nearly all the Fathers, as one may see in Basil, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, Bede, and Rupert, in their Homilies, or Questions, or Commentaries on Genesis; likewise in Damascene, in book two On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 10; and in the Master of the Sentences, book two, distinction 21, and there in the Scholastic Theologians; which opinion Augustine explains and defends in very many and most eloquent words, both in the books On the City of God and On Genesis according to the Letter. For in book 14 of the City of God, chapter eleven, he writes in this manner: The devil chose, to speak through it, a snake in the corporeal

Paradise, where, with those two human beings, the male and the female, the other earthly animals also dwelt, subject and harmless—a slippery animal, namely, mobile in tortuous windings, and suited to his work: and abusing it, by his angelic presence and more excellent nature subjected to his spiritual wickedness, as an instrument, he spoke deceitfully to the woman.

Marginal glosses: 'Theodoretus, q.31. & 32.'; 'Rupertus lib. de Operibus Trinitatis.' The fifth opinion's patristic support: Basil, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Bede, Rupert; John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa II.10; Peter Lombard, Sentences II d.21; and Augustine, quoted from De Civitate Dei XIV.11.

And in book eleven On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter twenty-seven: The devil, he says, spoke in the serpent, using it as an instrument, and moving its nature in the way in which he truly could move it and it could be moved, to express the sounds of words and bodily signs through which the woman might understand the will of the persuader. The serpent therefore did not understand the sounds of the words which were made through it to the woman; nor is its soul to be believed converted into a rational nature, since not even men themselves, whose nature is rational, when a demon speaks in them—in that affliction for whose driving-out an exorcist is required—know what he says. For as to the common belief that serpents hear and understand the words of charmers, so that at their incantations they often leap forth from their hiding-places, there too a diabolical power operates. And it comes about by divine counsel that custom has this rather—that serpents are moved by charms rather than any other kind of living creature. For this is no small testimony that human nature was first seduced by the conversation of a serpent: for the demons rejoice that this power is given to them, to move serpents at men's incantations, that they may by any means deceive whom they can. And they are permitted to do this to commend to memory the first deed, because there is for them a certain familiarity with this kind of animal. Thus far, nearly, are the words of Augustine.

Marginal gloss: 'Cur potius serpentes, quam aliud ullum animal, afficiantur & moveantur verbis incantantium, secundum Augustinum' (Why serpents rather than any other animal are affected and moved by charmers' words, according to Augustine). Verbatim quotation of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI.27: the devil used the serpent as an instrument; the serpent did not understand; snake-charming itself works by diabolical power, in memory of the first seduction.

And under the appearance of a serpent, just as the demon deceived the first human beings, so too he mocked and circumvented Greek and Roman prudence. Full of wonder, or rather of horror, is the conveyance of the serpent of Aesculapius into the city of Rome—to be freed from a three-year pestilence, a noble embassy of the Roman leaders having been sent to Epidaurus—and its placing in a temple dedicated to it as to a deity. The history of this matter is to be read in Valerius Maximus, book one, chapter eight.

Marginal gloss: 'Serpens Aesculapii Epidauro transvectus Romam' (The serpent of Aesculapius conveyed from Epidaurus to Rome). The demon worked through serpents in pagan religion too: the serpent of Aesculapius brought from Epidaurus to Rome to end a plague (Valerius Maximus I.8).

Pherecydes the Syrian is reported to have said that the demons were cast down from heaven by Jove, and that their prince was surnamed Ophioneus—that is, serpentine. Marvelous are the things narrated in the last chapter of the book of Daniel concerning the dragon, which the Chaldeans venerated as a god. Suetonius, in his Tiberius, wrote that Tiberius had a serpent among his delights, which he had trained to take food from his hand. There were also, even after the coming of Christ, those who hono[red] the serpent with divine worship, as the author of the knowledge of good and evil...

Marginal gloss: 'Serpens Tyberio in deliciis habitus' (A serpent kept by Tiberius among his delights). Further serpent-cult examples: Pherecydes of Syros on the fallen demons' prince 'Ophioneus' (serpentine); the dragon worshipped by the Chaldeans (Bel and the Dragon, Daniel 14); Tiberius's pet serpent (Suetonius); and post-Christian serpent-worshippers (the Ophite gnostics). Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'nora' = honorarent/honorabant). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. HHH'.

— p. 651 (PDF) · printed p. 610 —

...should honor [the serpent with divine worship], Epiphanius treats at length, disputing against the 37th heresy. But those two things which we have laid down in this our opinion—both that there was a true serpent, and that at the same time a demon was present to it—are easy to prove and persuade to anyone not at all obstinate. For both Moses calls it simply a 'serpent,' and the kind of penalty with which God punished it declares it to have been a true serpent; and so the Fathers think; and this is confirmed by those very arguments with which we refuted the third opinion, which is Cyril's; finally, this opinion preserves the trustworthiness of the history intact, and according to it all that Moses narrates about the serpent may be conveniently interpreted of a true serpent.

Completion (catchword 'nora' = honorarent) of the serpent-worship examples (Epiphanius, Panarion / Adv. haereses 37, on the Ophites). Then the first half of the fifth opinion (a real serpent) confirmed: Moses' plain word and the literal punishment fit a real serpent.

But that besides the serpent there was a demon there, both the human speech and the disputation or reasoning of the serpent with Eve clearly show; which two things exceed the power, nature, and faculty of all animals, and cannot be effected except by an intelligent nature, which is fourfold: Man, God, a good Angel, and a Demon. But at that time, besides Eve and Adam, there was no other man; and if there had been, he would have been visible and known to Eve. God, however, or a good Angel, could not have been the author of that temptation, for it was applied maliciously, to deceive man and to draw him back from obedience to the divine law: it remains, therefore, that it was contrived and accomplished by a demon.

Marginal gloss: 'Quadruplex natura intelligens' (The fourfold intelligent nature). Argument that a demon was present: speech and reasoning require an intelligent nature (Man, God, good Angel, Demon); by elimination, only a demon fits.

And divine Scripture confirms this very thing in manifest words: in the book of Wisdom, chapter two, it says that 'by the envy of the devil death entered into the world'; and in John, chapter eight, our Lord said that the devil was 'a murderer from the beginning'—because, namely, by this

temptation, deceiving man, he killed him spiritually and made him guilty also of bodily death; for which cause also, in the Apocalypse, the devil is called 'the ancient serpent'; and in 2 Corinthians 11, 'I fear,' says Paul, 'lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his cunning,' etc. It is clear, then, that Eve was deceived not by an animal serpent, but by the devil through a serpent.

Scriptural confirmation that the devil was the agent: Wisdom 2:24; John 8:44 ('a murderer from the beginning'); Apoc. 12/20 ('the ancient serpent'); 2 Cor. 11:3.

This opinion being laid down, therefore—which we judge not only more probable than the others, but by far the truest—namely that it was the devil who, through the serpent, contrived snares for Eve, aimed deceit, and persuaded sin: thereafter certain things that involve difficulty, partly about that serpent, partly about the devil who used it as an instrument, must be disputed. Concerning the serpent, four questions are to be treated. The first question: how is what Moses said—that the serpent was more cunning than all the beasts of the earth—to be understood, whether it is to be understood of a true serpent, or of the devil. The second question: how Eve did not shudder at the sight and meeting of the serpent. The third: how she was not astonished that the serpent spoke with her with human speech and intelligence. The fourth: how that curse by which the serpent was punished by God—'Upon your breast you shall go, and you shall eat earth,' etc.—was a penalty for the serpent.

Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor quaestiones de illo serpente' (Four questions about that serpent). The four questions of the disputation are set out: (1) sense of 'more cunning'; (2) Eve's lack of fear at the serpent; (3) her lack of astonishment at its speech; (4) how the curse was a penalty for a serpent.

— p. 652 (PDF) · printed p. 611 —

QUESTION I. As to its being said that the serpent was more cunning than the beasts of the earth, whether this is to be understood of the serpent or of the devil.

First question of the disputation on the serpent.

First, then, it is asked: when Moses said that the serpent was more cunning than all the beasts of the earth, is this to be understood of a true serpent, or of the devil? And it seems that it can truly be understood of neither: for neither can the devil rightly be compared with the beasts of the earth, nor is a true serpent more crafty than all animals. There are three opinions of the learned. The first is Cajetan's, which I recalled and refuted a little above, who refers that saying of Moses, and the other things narrated about the serpent, to the devil alone. But the comparison of the devil with the beasts of the earth is inept, since he is by nature incorporeal and immortal, and differs from animals not only in species but even in genus; and that in which things are compared together ought to be of one kind: but how different in kind the cunning of a demon and of beasts is, everyone sees. For as to what Cajetan writes—that the devil was cast down on account of sin into the order of beasts, and can therefore rightly be compared with beasts—it will in no way seem probable to learned men: for the demon, on account of sin, did not lose his natural gifts; as far, therefore, as natural prudence and cunning are concerned, he is in the same condition after sin as he was before.

Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio Caietani' (The first opinion, of Cajetan). Refutation of Cajetan (opinion 1 here): the incorporeal, immortal devil differs from beasts in genus, so the comparison fails; and he kept his natural cunning after sin (it was not 'lost' to make him beast-like).

The second opinion is Augustine's, in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 29, who says that Scripture speaks of the cunning of a true serpent, yet not in itself, but inasmuch as it was the devil's instrument for deceiving Eve. The words of Augustine are these: The serpent was called 'most crafty of all the beasts' on account of the craft of the devil, who in it and through it was working guile: just as a tongue is called prudent or crafty, by which a prudent or crafty man advises something to be prudently and craftily urged. The same things can be said of a Pen. This, says Augustine, I thought ought to be pointed out, lest anyone, supposing that animals devoid of

reason have human understanding, or are suddenly changed into a rational animal, be seduced into that ridiculous and noxious opinion of the transmigration of souls—either of men into beasts, or of beasts into men. So, then, the serpent spoke to the human being, just as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to the human being: except that the former was a diabolical work, the latter an angelic one. For good and bad Angels have certain similar works, as did Moses and Pharaoh's Magicians. Yet in these too the good Angels are more powerful, nor can the bad Angels do anything even of such works, except what God permits through the good Angels. Thus far Augustine.

Marginal glosses: 'Secunda opinio Augustini' (The second opinion, of Augustine); 'Exodi 7. & sequentibus' (Exodus 7ff., Moses and Pharaoh's magicians). Opinion 2 (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI.29): a real serpent's cunning, spoken as the devil's instrument (the 'prudent tongue'/'pen' analogy); his warning against metempsychosis; the Balaam's-ass and Moses-vs-magicians parallels.

But Tostatus refutes this opinion, question 438 on the chapter of Genesis. For either, because the serpent was the devil's instrument, a greater cunning was for that reason imparted to it by the devil than it would have had na-

Marginal gloss: 'Argumentatio Tostati adversus Augustinum' (Tostatus's argument against Augustine). Tostatus's dilemma against Augustine begins. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'na' = naturaliter).

— p. 653 (PDF) · printed p. 612 —

...naturally, or none. If none, then there was no reason why, on account of the devil, it should be called more cunning than all the beasts; but if some, first it is difficult to understand how the devil could suddenly make the serpent more cunning; next, a demon could not impart cunning except an intellective one such as he himself has, of which, however, the nature of a serpent is not capable, for that can be imparted only to a rational nature. The narration of Scripture too, if one weighs it well, seems to exclude Augustine's exposition: for it signifies that the serpent was by its own nature more cunning than the other beasts, even before it was taken up by the devil—which that word 'was' indicates: 'The serpent,' it says, 'was more

cunning than all the living creatures.'

Tostatus's argument concluded: the devil could not impart natural cunning (which requires changing the serpent's nature) nor intellective cunning (of which a serpent is incapable); and 'was more cunning' (the past tense 'erat') implies a cunning prior to and independent of the devil.

Nay rather, the serpent was for this reason taken up by the demon rather than any other animal, because it, on account of its natural cunning, fitted most of all both the craft of the demon taking it up, and the office of hidden deception for which it was taken up, and the end for which it was taken up—namely, that man, corrupted by the devil's venomous persuasion, might be cast down from that great felicity which he possessed into the utmost misery.

The serpent's natural cunning is why the devil chose it: fitting his craft, the work of hidden deception, and the malicious end.

The opinion of Augustine, then—that the serpent was called more cunning than the beasts of the earth, not by a cunning innate to it but on account of the devil's cunning—that argumentation seems to attack and demolish strongly enough: If the serpent was called more cunning than the beasts of the earth on account of the devil's cunning, then it was either on account of the cunning that was in the devil, or on account of the cunning that the serpent received from the devil. But the serpent could not truly be called more cunning than all the beasts on account of a cunning which was in no part in it, but was only in the devil. Nor could the devil impart cunning to the serpent: for either he would have imparted a cunning suited to the serpent's nature—that is, a sensitive one; but this cannot be varied intrinsically in animals unless the specific nature and grade of the soul, and the constitution and temperament of the body, were changed; or he would have given the serpent such cunning as he himself has—that is, an intellective one; but of this a serpent can in no way be capable. Hence, therefore, it is concluded that the serpent was not called more cunning than the beasts of the earth on account of the devil's cunning, whose instrument it was.

Full statement of Tostatus's dilemma demolishing Augustine's reading: the cunning was either the devil's own (then the serpent isn't truly 'cunning') or imparted to the serpent (impossible—neither sensitive nor intellective cunning can be transferred).

The third opinion, which pleases us most, is that Moses said that of a true serpent; but that he called it more crafty than the other beasts, not to signify that Eve was deceived by the serpent's natural craft, but to show that it was not rashly nor without great reason of divine providence brought about that the devil, to deceive man, insinuated himself into a serpent rather than into any other animal—namely, that it might be understood how fitting an instrument was applied to the deceiving of man by the demon's craft, and that from the serpent's craft and the natural enmity which is between it and men, the manifold craft and implacable hatred of the devil against man might be inferred.

Marginal gloss: 'Tertia opinio Auctoris' (The third opinion, the Author's). Pererius's own view on Q.I: Moses speaks of a real serpent, and 'more cunning' signals the fittingness of the devil's choice of a serpent (its cunning and natural enmity toward man emblematizing the devil's craft and hatred).

But the Natural Philosophers press us, objecting against us not a few from the kinds of animals which by natural skill, prudence, and craft far surpass the ser-

Marginal gloss: 'Verum serpens vere sit callidior cunctis animantibus' (Whether the serpent is truly more cunning than all living creatures). A sub-question opens: naturalists object that other animals are cleverer than serpents. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ser' = serpentem).

— p. 654 (PDF) · printed p. 613 —

...serpent by far: of which kind are dogs, wolves, and especially foxes. But it must by no means be doubted that the serpent is more crafty than the beasts of the earth: for Scripture hands this down in this place, and our Lord in the Gospel, wishing to commend the greatest prudence to his disciples, bade them be like serpents in prudence: 'Be,' he says, 'prudent as serpents.' But one must distinguish a twofold kind of prudence and cunning of serpents: one is that which they use for guarding their safety and life,

and for pursuing and acquiring the things useful and advantageous to them; the other is that which they employ for lying in wait for and harming man.

Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 10.' (Matthew 10:16, 'Be prudent as serpents'). Reply to the naturalists: Scripture and Christ affirm the serpent's cunning; it is twofold—self-preserving, and aggressive against man.

Of the former prudence and cunning, many and notable proofs and arguments exist. The first proof of the serpent's cunning is that which it uses against charmers, and it is beautifully described by David, Psalm 57, in these words: 'Like the deaf asp, and stopping up its ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers, and of the sorcerer enchanting wisely.' For, as Augustine writes upon those words, the serpent, perceiving that it is about to be caught by the charmers' spells, lest it hear them, presses and applies one ear to the ground or a rock, and stops up the other with its tail. The second proof, common and known to all, is that the serpent, when it is attacked by a man with a stone or iron, in order more safely to defend and guard its head—on which it feels that the safety of the whole body depends—coils its whole body into rings, so as to hide the head and protect it from blows, exposing the rest of its body to danger for the defense of the one head.

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque indicia & argumenta eximia calliditatis & prudentiae serpentum' (Five outstanding proofs and arguments of the cunning and prudence of serpents). First two proofs of the serpent's self-preserving cunning: (1) stopping its ears against charmers (Ps. 57[58]:5-6, with Augustine's explanation); (2) coiling to shield its head.

The third proof is brought forward by Epiphanius in that place where he disputes against the 37th heresy. Those learned in natural things relate, he says, concerning the serpent, that when, wearied by thirst, it comes forth from its lair to the water to drink, it does not carry its venom with it, but as it were spits it out and deposits it in its lair, lest it infect and corrupt the waters with the venom. The fourth proof. Pliny, in book eight, chapter twenty-seven, speaking of the natural prudence of the serpent, writes thus: The snake, its body overspread by a membrane through the winter's torpor,

sheds that hindrance with the juice of fennel, and grows sleek as in spring. It sheds first from the head, rolling itself back no more quickly than in one day and night, so that what had been inside becomes outside. The fifth proof. Because the serpent's sight is wont to grow dim, by natural prudence it procures for itself a remedy for clearing the keenness of its eyes. For it anoints its eyes with the juice of fennel, that it may recover clearness of sight—which is also handed down by Pliny in that same place: The serpent, he says, in its winter lair, its sight dimmed, rubbing itself against the fennel plant, anoints and refreshes its eyes; but if its scales have grown numb, it scratches itself on the thorns of the juniper.

Proofs three through five of the serpent's self-preserving cunning: (3) vomiting out its venom before drinking, lest it poison the water (Epiphanius, Adv. haereses 37); (4) shedding its winter skin with fennel-juice, head first (Pliny, Naturalis Historia VIII.27); (5) clearing its dimmed sight with fennel-juice, scratching on juniper-thorns (Pliny).

From these it appears how great is the natural prudence and cunning of the serpent in those things which conduce to its defense and conservation. Wherefore our Lord wisely exhorted his disciples to imitate the serpent's prudence; and among the Spaniards an old proverb is commonly current: 'He knows more than the snakes' (Sabe mas que las culebras). And of the latter craft of the serpent, which it uses for lying in wait for man, there are also many proofs commonly known, and ascertained by daily experiences, and confir[med] by the testimonies of the Sacred Letters...

Marginal gloss: 'Proverbium Hispanicum' (A Spanish proverb). The vernacular Spanish proverb is printed in italic: 'Sabe mas que las culebras' (modern orthography: 'Sabe más que las culebras')—not a Greek/Hebrew glyph, just Castilian. Transition to the serpent's aggressive cunning against man. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'confir' = confirmata). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. HHH'.

— p. 655 (PDF) · printed p. 614 —

...confirmed. For God, cursing the serpent, said, 'I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed: she shall crush your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel.' Indeed the serpent bites

man secretly, craftily, and treacherously, and with a lethal bite; and it does this not from fear, nor led by any disadvantage or advantage of its own, but from a natural hatred of man, and by the instinct of a nature most prone to harming him. This Scripture signified, Genesis 49: for the patriarch Jacob, prophesying about the tribe of Dan, said: 'Let Dan be a snake in the way, a horned serpent in the path, biting the horse's heels, that its rider may fall backward.' Solomon also, in the tenth chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes: 'If a serpent bite in silence,' he says, 'he is no better who detracts secretly.'

Marginal gloss: 'Altera serpentis ad nocendum homini natura propensio' (The serpent's other natural propensity, for harming man). Continuation (catchword 'confir' = confirmata) of the serpent's aggressive cunning, confirmed by Gen. 3:15, Gen. 49:17 (Jacob on Dan), and Eccl. 10:11 (Solomon).

Finally, many things are handed down in various places in the divine Letters about the serpent's craft and the snares craftily constructed for harming man. Although, therefore, certain of the other animals are perhaps held to be no less crafty than serpents, yet for secretly injuring man without any advantage of its own, no animal will be found more cunning and treacherous than the serpent. The things which Bonaventure writes in the 2nd book of the Sentences, distinction 21, and Hugh of St. Victor in book 3 On the Properties of Beasts, chapter 53, are worth reading.

Marginal gloss: 'B. Bonaventura. Hugo S. Victoris.' For the serpent's secret malice toward man, no animal surpasses it; references to Bonaventure (Sent. II d.21) and Hugh of St. Victor (De bestiis et aliis rebus / De bestiarum proprietatibus III.53).

QUESTION II. How Eve did not shudder at the serpent's approach.

Second question of the disputation on the serpent.

The second question is: how did Eve not shudder at the sight and the approach to her of the serpent, naturally frightful to man? The Master of the Scholastic History, in the History on the book of Genesis, chapter 21, Bonaventure in the second book, distinction 21, and the Carthusian in this place, name Bede as the one from whom it was reported, that the devil, to

tempt Eve, chose a certain kind of serpent having a maiden's countenance: so that, since it is natural to take delight in things like oneself, Eve would not only not be terrified by the meeting of that serpent, but would even be delighted. Painters indeed, following this opinion and representing the history of this matter in painting, depict the serpent with a woman's face. But hear the words of the Master of the Scholastic History. At that time, he says, the serpent was upright like a man, because afterward, by God's curse, it was laid prostrate—and the Pharian serpents, as they relate, still go about upright. He also chose, as Bede says, a certain kind of serpent having a maidenly face, because like things applaud like; and he moved its tongue to speak, though it did not know it—just as the devil speaks through fanatics and the possessed, who do not know what they themselves say. So he. But Lyra rightly derides this opinion: for that such a kind of serpent is found is hitherto unheard of, and handed down by none of the philosophers, or of any to whom credence can be given; wherefore it ought to be hissed off as plainly fabulous and made-up.

Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio: fuisse illi serpenti faciem muliebrem. Petrus Comestor. Bonaventura. Dionys. Carthusianus.' (First opinion: that serpent had a woman's face.) The 'maiden-faced serpent' theory (Peter Comestor's Historia Scholastica citing Bede; Bonaventure; Denis the Carthusian)—followed by painters—is reported and then dismissed by Nicholas of Lyra as a fable (no such species exists).

— p. 656 (PDF) · printed p. 615 —

Basil, in the homily on Paradise (and Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities, chapter one, writes things similar to Basil): The serpent, he says, was not then frightful to man, but mild and tame; nor did it creep terribly along the surface of the earth as if swimming, but went about lofty and erect, standing upon its feet. So Basil. But we have refuted this opinion above. Damascene, in book two On the Orthodox Faith, chapter ten: The serpent, he says, was more familiar to man than the other animals, frequently approaching him and fawning on him with the placid motions of its body: whence, through it, the prince of evil, the devil, instilled the

venom of his impiety into our first parents.

Basil (Hom. on Paradise) and Josephus: the serpent was mild and upright—a view Pererius already refuted (the upright-walking claim). John Damascene (De Fide Orthodoxa II.10): the serpent was the most familiar of animals, through which the devil instilled his venom.

There are those who think that the sight of the serpent began to be frightful and terrifying to man only after the sin of the first man and the curse of the serpent itself—after those words, namely, of God: 'I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed,' etc.

A view that the serpent's frightfulness began only after the curse (Gen. 3:15).

To me certainly, as very consonant with reason, what Chrysostom holds and hands down, in the 16th homily on Genesis, is most of all approved: that Eve did not shudder at the sight and meeting of the serpent because, before sin and in that state of innocence, all animals were peacefully and obediently subject to man, and just as they could inflict no evil on man, so neither any fear or horror—for that could not have happened to man without some trouble; and it had been ordained by divine counsel and reason that no penalty should befall man before his fault.

Marginal gloss: 'Sententia Chrysostomi quae placet Auctori' (Chrysostom's opinion, which pleases the Author). Pererius's preferred answer (Chrysostom, Hom. 16 in Gen.): in innocence all animals were subject to man and could cause neither harm nor fear, since no penalty could touch man before sin.

But see how far man's curious and bold inquiry proceeds. Some have investigated, and, as if they had it ascertained and explored, have even reported in writing of what genus and species was that serpent which deceived Eve. Eugubinus, in his Cosmopoeia, thinks it was a Basilisk: that, just as the devil who tempted Eve is believed to have been the prince of demons, so he used as his instrument that serpent which is held to be, as it were, the king of all serpents; and that this was the Basilisk, both the name itself indicates and what Pliny, in book eight, chapter twenty-one, and Solinus, in chapter thirty, left written about its incredible power and force

for harming. And these indeed are Pliny's words: The province of Cyrenaica produces the Basilisk, of no more than twelve fingers' length, marked with a white spot on the head like a kind of diadem. By its hiss it puts all serpents to flight; nor does it drive its body forward with manifold winding like the rest, but goes lofty and erect, advancing on its middle. It kills shrubs not only by touch but even by its breath, scorches grasses, and bursts rocks. Such is the force of the creature. It was once believed that, a horseman having killed it with a spear, the force coming up through the spear destroyed not only the rider but also the horse. And to this monster (for kings have often desired to see one slain) the venom of weasels is destruction: so true is it that Nature was pleased that nothing be without its match. They cast the weasels into its dens, easily recognized, by their mere decay; the weasels kill it at the same time by their odor, and themselves die, and Nature finishes the fight. So Pliny. I will add also the words of Solinus, very like the foregoing, so that the reader may observe that Solinus copied most things from Pliny, borrowing not only the matter but even the opinions and almost the words. The Basilisk, says Solinus, an evil...

Marginal glosses: 'Serpens ille qui decepit Evam, ex quo genere serpentum fuerit'; 'Opinio Eugubini, fuisse Basiliscum, qui tentavit Evam'; 'Mira descriptio Basilisci ex Plinio & Solino'; 'Solinus pleraque sumpsit ex Plinio.' The 'basilisk' theory of Steuchus Eugubinus (Cosmopoeia), with Pliny's famous description (Naturalis Historia VIII.21) of the basilisk and the weasel. Solinus's parallel quote begins (catchword 'malum').

— p. 657 (PDF) · printed p. 616 —

...a singular evil on the earth, the serpent is of nearly half a foot in length, its head marked as if with a white little mitre. And it is given for the destruction not only of man, or of other living creatures, but of the very earth, which it pollutes and burns up wherever it obtains its baleful lodging. Finally it extinguishes grasses, kills trees, and corrupts even the very air, so that no bird of those flying may pass through the air unharmed, it being infected with a pestilent breath. When it moves, with the middle part of its

body it creeps, and with the middle it is lofty and high. Other serpents too dread its hiss, and when they have caught it, they hasten to flee wherever they can; whatever is killed by its bite, no beast feeds upon, no bird touches. Yet it is overcome by weasels, which men introduce there into the caves where it lurks. Yet its force is not lacking even when it is dead. Finally, the people of Pergamum bought the remains of a basilisk for a large sum, and, so that neither spider should weave nor birds fly into the temple of Apollo, notable for its workmanship, they placed its carcass there, hung in a golden net. Thus Solinus.

Solinus's basilisk description (Collectanea, c.30), parallel to Pliny's. Concludes 'Haec Solinus.'

But it is not credible that the serpent which assailed Eve was a Basilisk, on account of the smallness and deformity of its body, and the pestilent power and force not only of its bite but also of its breath and sight. What, then, was that kind of serpent? If I should say that I know, I plainly lie. But if it is allowed, in matters so uncertain and remote from human conjecture, to suspect something, I for my part will say—divining rather than determining anything for certain—that perhaps that serpent was the one which the Philosophers and the curious writers of natural things called the Scytale, which is a shapely and beautiful animal, glittering with such variegation of its back that it detains onlookers by the sheen and charm of its scales; and because it is rather slow in creeping, it captures by the marvel of itself those who gaze in astonishment.

Marginal gloss: 'Auctoris coniectura' (The Author's conjecture). Pererius rejects the basilisk (too small, deformed, and lethal by breath/sight) and conjectures the tempting serpent may have been the 'Scytale,' a beautiful serpent that transfixes onlookers by its dazzling skin.

Hear Solinus, chapter 30. The Scytale, he says, glitters with such variegation of its back that it slows down those who see it by the charm of its markings; and since it is rather slow in creeping, those whom it cannot overtake it captures, astonished, by the marvel of itself. Thus Solinus.

Marginal gloss: 'Pulchritudo serpentis, qui appellatur scytale, auctore Solino' (The beauty of the serpent called the scytale, on Solinus's authority). Solinus's description of the Scytale supporting Pererius's conjecture.

QUESTION III. Why Eve was not astonished on hearing the serpent speaking and disputing with her.

Third question of the disputation on the serpent.

The third question is: how did Eve not become astonished on hearing the serpent conversing with her in human fashion? There are three opinions. Rupert, in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 3, setting forth this very question, answers it thus: Either, he says, the woman did not know that the serpent, like the other living creatures, lacks reason and speech—but it seems absurd that the first woman, in Paradise and in the state of innocence, was ignorant of what now, in the state of misery, any woman whatever is not ignorant of; or, if she knew it, how was she not astonished,

Marginal gloss: 'Prima opinio Ruperti' (First opinion, of Rupert). Rupert of Deutz (De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius III.3) poses the dilemma; his answer continues on the next page (catchword 'obstupuit').

— p. 658 (PDF) · printed p. 617 —

...astonished, and suspect that guile and snares lay beneath? But she knew that the serpent could not speak except by another's spirit. Yet in this lay the immensity of the seduction, that the woman marveled, as it were, at the omnipotence of that spirit, which could form human words through an irrational animal. And if this is so—nay, because it is so—it no longer remains in doubt from what root the so vastly bitter tree of idolatry, sprouting up, spread itself into all nations, or whence it became inborn in wretched men to seek out, with such mad and foolish reverence, through innumerable images, articulate voices formed by the craft of demons, and to worship the devil for God, a lie for truth. This, I say, no longer remains in doubt—whence the fault of

so great an error has clung so tenaciously to men: because, namely, our mother, the mother of all the living, Eve the first, was inwardly embittered by the gall of this wickedness, when she marveled at the eloquence of the ill-speaking serpent as if it were the divine wisdom of a diabolical spirit, and foolishly venerated it. So Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert's quotation: Eve's marveling at the serpent-spirit's quasi-omnipotence is made the root of all later idolatry. (Note: this page's running number is misprinted '607'; the true printed page is 617, since the offset of 41 holds—PDF 658 – 41 = 617.)

Nevertheless, according to this opinion of Rupert, it would follow that the first sin of man was idolatry: which is against all the Fathers and Theologians, who affirm that it was a sin of disobedience or pride. Next, since the sin of idolatry is the gravest of all, and most abominated and hateful to God, as may be perceived from many places of divine Scripture, when God rebuked Eve, he would assuredly not so much have rebuked her for eating the forbidden apple as for the impiety of idolatry: of which, however, he made no word, nor does Scripture either ever speak or even hint anything of it, whether expressly, or somewhat obscurely, or directly, or obliquely—so that it sufficiently appears that this is Rupert's own invention.

Pererius's refutation of Rupert: his view makes the first sin idolatry (against all who say it was disobedience/pride), and God's rebuke of Eve says nothing of idolatry—so it is Rupert's invention.

The same Rupert asks, besides, in the second chapter of the same book, how the serpent approached Eve—whether it was within Paradise or outside. He himself answers that the serpent was outside Paradise: for Paradise was man's proper dwelling, given to him as a great grace of the Creator, with the condition of good work and most diligent keeping attached. For if Paradise was common to serpents, it follows that that place of delights would not have lacked wolves and lions and the other beasts; and therefore it would not be reckoned of such beatitude that it should rightly be called the Paradise of pleasure, and be said to have been planted by God himself. Therefore the serpent—especially as possessed by the

devil bodily invading it—was not in Paradise; but the woman, wandering in body and eyes, while she walks about incontinently, perhaps looking out at what the world outside Paradise was like, and while the serpent, being cunning, gapes more closely and more ambitiously after the sweetness of that land, a place was given to the devil and an occasion briefly held out whence he might tempt Eve. Thus Rupert.

Marginal gloss: 'Verum serpens qui tentavit Evam, extra Paradisum fuerit. Rupertus' (Whether the serpent that tempted Eve was outside Paradise. Rupert). Rupert's further claim—the serpent was outside Paradise, Eve wandering out and meeting it at the boundary.

But surely that that serpent was within the place of Paradise is nearly the opinion of the Fathers and Theologians, and the narration of Moses indicates this clearly enough, if one diligently turns his mind to it. The second opinion is that of Bonaventure and St. Thomas, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 21, who say that Eve did not think that it was a serpent alone that was speaking with her, but reckoned that through the serpent some angel[ic] spirit...

Marginal gloss: 'Secunda opinio Bonaventurae & Sancti Thomae' (Second opinion, of Bonaventure and St. Thomas). Pererius rejects Rupert's 'outside Paradise' claim (the Fathers and Moses place the serpent within); then begins the second opinion on Q.III (Bonaventure and Aquinas, Sent. II d.21): Eve supposed some spirit acted through the serpent. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ange' = angelicum). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. III'.

— p. 659 (PDF) · printed p. 618 —

...that some angelic spirit was speaking; and that therefore she was not astonished, because she knew that angelic spirits could do this. And Bonaventure indeed writes that Eve believed that spirit to be good, certainly well-disposed to her, and consulting well for her advantage; or, as St. Thomas says, Eve did not judge whether the spirit was good or evil, being with her whole mind and eagerness intent upon its so magnificent promises. And St. Thomas indicated this too in the First Part, question 94, article last. For when, in the second place, he had set forth this objection from the words of Augustine—that Eve, on the authority of the Master of

the Sentences, did not shudder at the serpent speaking with her, because she had thought it had received the office of speaking from God—he himself, afterward resolving that objection, says thus: To the second it must be said that the woman thought the serpent had received the office of speaking, not by nature, but by some supernatural operation; although it is not necessary to follow the authority of the Master of the Sentences in this part.

Continuation (catchword 'ange' = angelicum) of opinion 2 on Q.III (Bonaventure and Aquinas, Sent. II d.21; ST I q.94 a.ult.): Eve thought the serpent's speech came from a supernatural operation, not nature.

But three things seem to stand against this opinion. First, by that very fact the woman ought to have shuddered at the serpent's speech: for she would have reflected with herself why that angelic spirit had wished to speak through a serpent, and not rather through itself under the appearance and figure of a man—in which appearance, namely, God and the Angels had more than once appeared to her and to her husband; and so she would have been moved and disturbed, and would have suspected that some guile and deceit lay beneath. Next, if the woman had thought that it was an angelic spirit that had spoken with her, and by which she had been deceived, when she was afterward reproved by God, she would have cast the blame not on the serpent but on that spirit: for she answered God, 'The serpent deceived me, and I ate,' whereas she would rather have said, 'That evil spirit deceived me.' Finally, when God wished to punish the one by whom Eve had been deceived, he would assuredly have punished not the serpent, but that impostor and deceiver spirit of Eve.

Pererius's three objections against opinion 2 (Bonaventure/Aquinas): Eve would have been alarmed an 'angel' used a serpent; she blamed the serpent (not a spirit) to God; God punished the serpent.

The third opinion is that of Cyril, the Master of the Sentences, and Tostatus, which seems to us more inclined toward the truth: that Eve was not astonished because she did not know that the faculty of speaking is naturally given to no animal; for both the novelty of things, and her own

inexperience, and the fact that the perfection of the womanly condition by no means required a perfect knowledge of all natural things, were the cause of that ignorance of Eve.

Marginal gloss: 'Tertia sententia Cyrilli, Magistri senten. & Tostati, quae placet Auctori' (The third opinion, of Cyril, the Master of the Sentences, and Tostatus, which pleases the Author). Opinion 3 (Pererius's preference): Eve's non-astonishment came from ignorance (novelty, inexperience) that speech is natural to no animal.

But the opinion of the Authors whom I have named must be more thoroughly explained in this place. Julian the Apostate from Christian teaching, as Cyril relates in the third of those ten books which he wrote against him, mocked this history of Moses about the conversation of the serpent with Eve. 'In what language,' he used to say, 'shall we say the serpent conversed with Eve? Surely not the human one? And how do these fables differ from those which the Greek poets invented?' To this Cyril answers: since there was then no other rational animal, Eve, who was very simple, perhaps supposed that the power of speaking with a human voice had been given to other animals as well. Yet in truth, he says, that conversation between Eve and the serpent came about by the operation of the demon, the serpent veiling the malignity of that one.

Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum, book 3: Julian the Apostate's mockery of the talking serpent (likening it to Greek poetic fables), and Cyril's reply—the simple Eve may have supposed animals could speak, but in fact it was the demon's work, masked by the serpent. Sentence continues (catchword 'Hoc').

— p. 660 (PDF) · printed p. 619 —

This which we have said—that it is most easy for demons to effect and perform—Cyril himself confirms by the testimonies of the most celebrated, among the Gentiles themselves, both Poets and Philosophers. For Homer reported that the horse of Achilles, the faculty of speaking having been imparted to it by Juno, foretold death to Achilles. Porphyry likewise, describing the life of Pythagoras, narrates that, when Pythagoras, accompanied by many, was crossing the river Causus, in the hearing of all

the river spoke to him, and in the manner of those who greet said: 'Hail, Pythagoras.' Philostratus, who wished to ennoble and illustrate the name of Apollonius by eloquently writing of his life and deeds, in book 6, chapter 5, narrates that, when Apollonius had come to the Gymnosophists, by order of their chief Thespesion, the elm tree near which they had sat down greeted Apollonius with a human voice; and that the voice was indeed articulate and distinct, yet thin and slight, and like a woman's. It is moreover handed down that the Dodonaean oak, through which oracles were once given, was wont to utter human voices. Nay, Isigonus of Cithium says that on the island of Rhodes the bull of Jove was not without human speech. If, therefore, a demon could form human voices through a horse, a bull, a river, and trees, why did it seem incredible to Julian that he could speak through a serpent with Eve? Thus far from Cyril.

Marginal gloss: 'Daemones olim solitos per animalia, & res inanimas humano modo loqui, multis exemplis declarat Cyrillus' (Cyril shows by many examples that demons were formerly wont to speak in human fashion through animals and inanimate things). Cyril's pagan parallels (Homer's horse of Achilles; Pythagoras and the river; Philostratus's elm greeting Apollonius; the Dodonaean oak; the bull of Jove on Rhodes) that demon-induced animal/inanimate speech was widely reported.

The Master of the Sentences, in the second book, distinction 21, writes thus: Here it is usually asked why the woman did not shudder at the serpent, and he himself answers, because, since Eve had known that the serpent was created by God, she thought that it had also received the office of speaking from God. Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of Genesis, question 457, judges that Eve believed the serpent was naturally endowed with the faculty of speaking; and that this happened to her because of the novelty of recently created things, and her inexperience.

Peter Lombard (Sent. II d.21): Eve thought the serpent received speech from God. Tostatus (on Gen., q.457): she believed it naturally had speech, owing to the novelty of newly-created things and her inexperience.

For although she was created by God having such rectitude of judgment and such knowledge of things as any woman now of mature age would

have—provided she is not instructed by another in some branch of learning—yet Eve did not receive from God a perfect wisdom. For if she had had it, she could not have been deceived; yet she herself confessed that she had been deceived: she did not, therefore, have a certain knowledge of those things of which she held no experience; and since she lacked it concerning the animals, she could believe about them whatever occurred to her. Either, then, the woman had not previously known the animals—since Eve was created after the animals had been led to Adam—and therefore did not know whether speaking was natural to a serpent or not; or, if she had previously seen them, although she had not heard the serpent speak, yet because in that short time she could not have explored and grasped all the properties and faculties of all the animals, she did not know whether the faculty of speaking was natural to the serpent, even though in that short time she had not seen the serpent use that faculty.

Tostatus's reasoning continued: Eve had sound judgment but not perfect wisdom (else she could not have been deceived); created after the animals were named to Adam, she could not yet know whether speech was natural to a serpent.

But to that which Rupert objects against this opinion—that it seems absurd that Eve, in Paradise and in that perfect state of innocence, was ignorant whether that serpent could speak, which in the state of corrupt nature is known to any little woman—Tostatus answers that the case of Eve and of the women who now exist is dissimilar. For now it has been ascertained and proved by innumerable experiences and examples, and is commonly known among all, that serpents lack the natural faculty of speaking, so that it is no wonder that even little women know it; but at that time no expe[riences] of that matter had preceded...

Tostatus answers Rupert's objection: Eve's case differs from women now, who know from countless examples that serpents cannot speak; at that time no such experience yet existed. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'expe' = experimenta).

— p. 661 (PDF) · printed p. 620 —

...experiences, no report was current. But the perfection of that state of innocence argues that Eve was created perfect—not indeed absolutely and simply, but as the womanly condition demanded; for no one would deny that the perfection in Eve was much less than in Adam. To the perfection of the womanly condition, therefore, it did not pertain to have a most certain and most perfect knowledge of all animals, and of all their properties, virtues, and faculties, but to have knowledge of the things to be done, and of those which pertain to the administration of the household and to all the offices which were to be handled and accomplished toward husband and children. Thus Tostatus.

Conclusion of the Tostatus quotation: Eve's created perfection was proportioned to her womanly condition (knowledge for household and family duties), not encyclopedic knowledge of all animals.

To this opinion of Cyril, the Master, and Tostatus I for my part am carried with a readier assent than to the others. For besides the authority of those learned men, I am led by this reason, that by this interpretation the whole narration of Moses holds together well according to the historical exposition and sense; whereas the other interpretations neither agree aptly enough with the narration of Moses, and are pressed and constrained by great difficulties. But against this opinion there seems to be that most forcible objection which St. Thomas sets, in the First Part, question 94, article last. For the state of innocence was free from all evil, both of soul and of body; but error and deception of mind is no less a fault and evil than is foulness of body, or pain, or disease; and to think that a serpent could speak is a notable error and deception of mind; therefore it is not fitting to suppose that Eve was in so great an error before sin.

Marginal glosses: 'Auctoris opinio' (The Author's opinion); 'Obiectio Sancti Thomae adversus opinionem Auctoris' (St. Thomas's objection against the Author's opinion). Pererius adopts the Cyril/Lombard/Tostatus view (best fits the historical sense), then raises Aquinas's objection (ST I q.94 a.ult.): mental error is an evil incompatible with the sinless state.

But this objection may be repelled thus. The Theologians make a twofold ignorance, one of pure negation, the other of an evil disposition. And this

latter was indeed repugnant to the state of innocence, but the former not at all: for children in that state would have been for a long time ignorant of many things, which, namely, they would have learned in the course of time. But to approve, with firm assent, falsehoods for truths, or truths for falsehoods, would have been a great fault and a great evil, and altogether contrary to the perfection of that state. Eve, therefore, had an ignorance of pure negation, not knowing whether the serpent could speak or not—which ignorance she would soon have shed by asking her husband and being taught by him. Nor did she believe with firm assent that the serpent could naturally speak, but only with a doubtful and, as it were, suspended assent. But she was moved to listen to it, and to believe its words, enticed by its promises, which seemed to her most ample, most beautiful, and most to be desired.

Marginal gloss: 'Solutio obiectionis' (Solution of the objection). The reply to Aquinas: ignorance is twofold (pure negation vs. evil disposition); only the latter is incompatible with innocence. Eve had only ignorance of pure negation, with doubtful, not firm, assent—and was drawn in by the serpent's enticing promises.

QUESTION IV. Whether the curse of the serpent is to be referred to the real serpent or to the devil.

Fourth (and final) question of the disputation on the serpent. The roman numeral is printed 'IIII.'

There remains the fourth question to be treated concerning the serpent: whether the curse and penalty by which God punished the serpent, saying, 'Upon your breast you shall go, and you shall eat earth: I will put enmities between'

Opening of QUAESTIO IIII, citing the curse of Gen. 3:14-15. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'inter').

— p. 662 (PDF) · printed p. 621 —

...between you and the woman: your seed, and her seed: she shall crush your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel': whether, I say, this curse,

by which God censured the serpent, pertains to the real serpent, as the words themselves bear on their face, or whether it is to be taken as said figuratively, and, under the name and likeness of the serpent, to be referred to the devil, who through the serpent contrived that crime.

Completion of the statement of QUAESTIO IIII (catchword 'inter'): does the curse (Gen. 3:14-15) literally concern the serpent, or figuratively the devil?

I find three opinions of the Authors. For Moses Bar Cepha, in the book On Paradise, chapter 27, following Ephraem and very many other Authors, judges that that curse and penalty truly pertained to the serpent itself, although it itself had committed no crime, but the devil had been the author of its outrage, and the serpent was not of free will, as if it had been in its power either to give or not to give itself to the devil for executing that crime. This opinion is proved chiefly by this argument, that the narration of Moses is historical; accordingly, his words are to be understood and interpreted according to their proper signification and as they sound of themselves. And Moses in this whole narration mentions only the serpent, making no word of the devil. If you object to these men that the serpent was an animal devoid of reason, and therefore could not have sinned, nor ought to have been punished—or rather the devil, who had been the chief author of its sin—Josephus would perhaps answer that that serpent lacked neither the faculty of speaking nor of understanding, and that on that account it could have been capable both of sin and of punishment. But this, as most absurd, has been hissed off above.

Marginal glosses: 'Prima opinio Barcephae, Ephraem & aliorum, pertinere ad solum serpentem'; 'Ioseph. lib. 1. Antiquit. cap. 1.' First opinion (Moses Bar Cepha, De Paradiso c.27, following Ephraem): the curse literally fell on the serpent, though innocent (the devil being author); proven by the historical character of Moses' narrative. Josephus's rationale (the serpent had speech/understanding) is recalled and dismissed as already refuted.

But Bar Cepha, with the Authors cited by him, answers that, although the serpent did not sin, it was nonetheless justly punished for four causes. First, God detested the serpent, so that this very thing might fall out grievous to

Satan, who had used it as an instrument: just as if someone should break a musical instrument, to afflict with grief the one who used it for singing; or lay low a horse with its feet cut off, to harm its rider; or sink a ship, so that he who is carried in it perishes by shipwreck: so God struck the serpent with curses, that he might torment with grief the devil who had spoken through it—just as he also afflicted the legion of demons by destroying the swine. For as soon as Satan saw the snake rolling on the ground with its feet lost, he was tortured with bitter grief. Besides, he cursed the serpent for this reason too, because it had been the cause or occasion of man's sinning: just as by the divine law (as it is in Leviticus, chapter 20) it had been sanctioned that a beast with which someone had lain be overwhelmed with stones and killed.

Marginal glosses: 'Quatuor causae cur Deus secundum Barcepham, maledixerit serpenti, licet is nihil peccasset' (Four causes why, according to Bar Cepha, God cursed the serpent though it had not sinned); 'Matth. 8.' Bar Cepha's first two causes: (1) to grieve Satan who used it as an instrument (broken-instrument / lamed-horse / sunk-ship analogies; cf. the swine of Matt. 8); (2) as cause/occasion of man's sin (cf. Lev. 20:15-16, the beast stoned).

Next, God cursed the serpent on account of Satan in the same way as he cursed the earth on account of Adam; and in the same manner the beasts of burden and the birds perished in the flood on account of men's sins, though they had not transgressed; nay, living creatures were daily, though innocent, slaughtered in sacrifices for the offenses of men. David too, in 2 Kings (2 Samuel), chapter 1, cursed the mountains of Gilboa, because on them had fallen Saul

Bar Cepha's third and fourth causes: (3) the curse on the serpent parallels the curse on the earth for Adam, the animals perishing in the Flood, and the (innocent) sacrificial victims; (4) David's curse on Mt. Gilboa (2 Sam. 1:21). Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'Saul'). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. III'.

— p. 663 (PDF) · printed p. 622 —

Saul and Jonathan slain by the Philistines. What of this—that God wished to curse the serpent for this cause too, that Adam and Eve, seeing how great

a penalty that serpent bore from the divine curse—deprived of feet, and creeping forward upon its belly—might observe and understand into how grave an error they had fallen, and how great an outrage they had committed by obeying the serpent, and so be held in great fear thereafter. If someone should object to these men that the serpent naturally walked upon its breast, and that therefore this was not, as it were, a penalty for a committed crime, they would answer that that serpent had formerly gone not upon its breast, but with feet, of which it was afterward deprived on account of that crime.

Continuation (catchword 'Saul' from the previous page) of Bar Cepha's four causes: (3) David's curse on Gilboa where Saul and Jonathan fell (2 Sam. 1:21); (4) the curse instructs Adam and Eve (the serpent was once footed and lost its feet for the crime, so it is a real penalty).

Ephraem, then, and likewise Bar Cepha and others, judged that that snake was formerly of the genus of four-footed beasts, but that, because it was Satan's instrument, and therefore the divine execration clung to it, from a beast walking on feet it became a reptile creeping forward on its prone belly: just as Satan too, because he had transgressed, turned from an Angel into a demon, and Lot's wife, looking back against God's command, was transmuted from a woman into a statue of salt. Nor ought it to seem incredible that that serpent was once endowed with feet, since Pliny, in book 11, chapter 46, reports that serpents have been seen with goose-feet, and does not mention it in the place of a portent.

Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 19.' (Lot's wife, Gen. 19:26); 'Serpentes auctore Plinio aliquando visas anserinis pedibus' (Serpents, on Pliny's authority, sometimes seen with goose-feet). Ephraem/Bar Cepha: the serpent was a footed quadruped that became a belly-creeper (parallels: Satan from Angel to demon, Lot's wife to salt); Pliny (NH XI.46) on goose-footed serpents as no prodigy.

But, in very truth, someone will say: why did not God execrate Satan himself together with the serpent, at least? They answer that God did not curse Satan, lest Adam and Eve should perceive that some incorporeal spirit was within the serpent, and thereby be carried into far graver errors; for they did not yet know that there was anything besides God that could

not be discerned by the eyes. To this, on account of the weakness of the Hebrews too, Moses did not wish to disclose the spirit that had lurked within the serpent: lest, namely, they should suppose there was some power adverse to God, which, relying on greater strength, could do something against God's will, or at least resist his counsels, and hinder the things he had appointed from being carried through to their issue and end. Thus these men. And Tostatus, on the 13th chapter of the book of Genesis, question 688, followed this opinion too.

Why God did not openly curse Satan: lest Adam and Eve grasp an incorporeal spirit and fall into worse errors, and (for the Hebrews' weakness) lest they imagine a power rivaling God. Tostatus (on Gen., q.688) follows this.

But this opinion is refuted by a most forcible argument. For though we grant that that serpent, because it had been Satan's instrument for committing that crime, was thus punished by God, yet there was no reason why the whole genus of serpents—both those that then existed and those that were thereafter to be procreated in every age—should be smitten with the same penalty, since they had neither been partakers of that crime nor been begotten from the one which had been the instrument of accomplishing the crime. Add that God, on account of sin, took away what is natural neither from the demon nor from man, much less from the serpent. And if that serpent by its own nature lacked feet, how is it consonant that this was inflicted on it as a penalty, which was previously in it according to nature? Tostatus answers that, although these things naturally bel[onged]...

Marginal gloss: 'Confutatio primae opinionis' (Confutation of the first opinion). Pererius's refutation: the whole innocent serpent-species should not share the penalty; God does not strip the natural for sin; and crawling, if natural, cannot be a penalty. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'conven' = convenirent).

— p. 664 (PDF) · printed p. 623 —

...belonged to the serpent naturally, yet they were said to it for this reason, that God might in some manner make satisfaction to the woman for the

harm she herself had received from the serpent; for that woman thought that God's curses were not natural to the serpent, but were imposed on it as penalties and punishments of its crime. But this is a very frivolous and futile answer, and by no means worthy of so great a genius as Tostatus's. For who could bring himself to believe that God wished to make satisfaction to the woman, who had sinned against him so foolishly, proudly, and injuriously? And of what sort, I pray, would such a satisfaction have been—empty, indeed, painted, and feigned, and which would rest not on truth, but on the false opinion of the woman? And if the serpent, when it approached the woman, did not have feet, then the woman had already before seen that it was natural to a serpent to lack feet; nor indeed could that pretense have escaped Adam, most knowing of the nature of animals. Wherefore it could have seemed ridiculous to her, that that be imposed on the serpent as a punishment which nature had given to it.

Pererius's refutation continued (catchword 'conven' = convenirent): Tostatus's notion of God 'making satisfaction' to the sinful Eve is frivolous and feigned; and Eve and Adam would have known the serpent naturally lacked feet, making the supposed 'penalty' absurd.

The second opinion was that of Didymus, who was the teacher of Blessed Jerome, who, as he is cited in Lippomani's Catena, reported this: Some, from the fact that the serpent was cursed, have judged that the serpent was once lofty of face and erect of body—not noticing that God had not made that one alone, of the genus of serpents, upright and going on feet. But because the devil, about to address the woman, reared it up, therefore it was commanded that it should fall onto its breast and belly. Didymus, therefore, thought that that serpent really lacked feet, but was for the time in which man was to be deceived, by the demon's work, reared up, and went lofty and high; and that therefore God said to it, 'Upon your breast you shall go': as if he said, although the devil has reared you up and made you go with lofty body, yet you shall return to your former nature.

Marginal gloss: 'Secunda opinio fuit Didymi' (The second opinion was Didymus's). Opinion 2 (Didymus the Blind, teacher of Jerome, via Lippomani's Catena): the serpent really lacked feet, but the devil reared it up to deceive Eve; the curse means it returns to its former lowly nature.

I do not assent to Didymus, for what he says is propped on the foundation of no approved authority or probable conjecture. Nor indeed would it have been a penalty for the serpent to return to the natural condition and motion of its body. What of this—that, if the demon had reared up the serpent, the temptation accomplished, the serpent would have returned to its natural state, and so have appeared before God? Wherefore that curse of God would have been by no means fitting to it. Finally, this could not have escaped Adam, since he knew the natures and properties of the animals, and when the animals were led to him, he had seen the serpent creeping on the ground.

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Didymus' (Didymus is refuted). Pererius's refutation: returning to its natural state is no penalty; the serpent would have reverted after the temptation anyway; and Adam already knew the serpent crawls.

The third opinion, plainly contrary to the first, is that of very many of the learned. It is that of Augustine (book 2 On Genesis against the Manichees, chapters 17 and 18, and book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 36), likewise of Bede, Rupert, Hugh of St. Victor, Cajetan, and very many others on this place of Genesis, who judge that those curses which God spoke against the serpent pertain not to the real serpent, but, under its name and figure, to the devil alone. For the devil is called a 'serpent' for the causes set forth by us above. He is called 'cursed among the beasts of the earth,' because he is condemned to eternal punishments; and whatever in

Marginal glosses: 'Tertia opinio Augustini & aliorum, maledictionem serpentis ad solum diabolum pertinere'; 'Augustin.'; 'Beda in Hexameron.'; 'Rupertus lib. 3. de operibus Trinit. c. 18.'; 'Hugo de S. Victore.' Opinion 3 (Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos II.17-18 and De Genesi ad litteram XI.36; Bede, Rupert, Hugh of St. Victor, Cajetan): the curse refers to the devil alone. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'bestiis').

— p. 665 (PDF) · printed p. 624 —

...beasts is discerned bodily as obscene, fraudulent, or savage, that is found much more in the demon spiritually. The demon goes upon its breast and belly, because it sets about to seduce men by two ways—namely by pride, which is figured by the breast, and by lust, which is shadowed forth by the belly. Or because in the breast is the irascible, in the belly the concupiscible appetite: which appetites the demon stirs up and inflames, to snatch man away to the gravest outrages. Or, according to Gregory, in book 21 of the Morals, chapter 2, by the belly is signified the execution of the work of lust; but by the breast, its thought and desire: for the demon strives to pollute by inner thought those whom it cannot lead to the effect of lust.

Marginal gloss: 'Quid significet super pectus, & super ventrem gradi' (What 'to go upon the breast and upon the belly' signifies). Spiritual reading of the curse: breast = pride / the irascible appetite / lustful thought; belly = lust / the concupiscible appetite / the execution of lust (Gregory, Moralia XXI.2).

The same Gregory, in the third part of the Pastoral Care, Admonition 20, explains the aforesaid words thus: Whence also to the crafty enemy, who opened the first man's sense to the desire of the apple, and bound it in the snare of sin, it is said by the divine voice: 'You shall creep upon your breast and belly': as if it were said to him openly, 'By thought and gluttony you shall have dominion over human hearts.' That lust follows those given to gluttony, the Prophet testifies, who, while he narrates open things, announces hidden ones, saying, 'The prince of cooks destroyed the walls of Jerusalem.' For the prince of cooks is the belly, to which great care of service is paid by the cooks, that it may be delightfully filled with food. But the walls of Jerusalem are the virtues of the soul raised to the desire of supernal peace. The prince of cooks, therefore, casts down the walls of Jerusalem, because, while the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed through lust. Thus Gregory.

Marginal gloss: '4. Reg. 25.' (2 Kings 25:8-10, Nebuzaradan, 'prince of cooks,' destroying Jerusalem's walls). Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis III, Admonition 20, allegorizing the curse: breast/belly = thought/gluttony; gluttony (the 'prince of cooks') destroys the soul's virtues (the 'walls of Jerusalem').

That phrase, 'You shall eat earth all the days of your life,' signifies men fixed on earthly desires, who are, as it were, the food of the devil, which he most greedily snatches at; and at the same time it indicates how greatly the devil hungers for the ruin of men, so that St. Peter rightly said that of him: 'Like a roaring lion he goes about, seeking whom he may devour.' Hear what, to the same purport, holy Gregory writes, explaining that little verse of the hundred-and-first Psalm, which is numbered the fourth among the penitential psalms, 'And they shall have pity on its earth.' By 'earth,' says Gregory, we understand sinners: whence it was said to the serpent by the Lord, 'You shall eat earth all the days of your life.' For the ancient enemy eats earth, because he hides sinners too in the belly of his malice; and, desiring the perdition of men through them, he is in a manner refreshed, while he is delighted by their depraved deeds. But that phrase, 'All the days of your life,' designates the whole time of this life until the consummation of the age, in which time it is permitted to the demon to tempt, deceive, and ruin men—which he holds for his life and great pleasure. Wherefore the demons begged Christ not to send them into the abyss, and others said to him:

Marginal glosses: 'Quid sit, Terram comedes cunctis diebus vitae tuae'; '1. Petri 5.' (1 Pet. 5:8, the roaring lion); 'Matthaei 8.' 'You shall eat earth' = earthly-minded sinners as the devil's food; 'all the days of your life' = until the end of the age (Gregory on Ps. 101[102]; the demons of Matt. 8). Sentence continues on the next page (the Gerasene demons' words).

'You have come here before the time to torment us.' I will not omit—that is, I will not here pass over in silence—how Rupert interprets the aforesaid words, in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 18. What does it mean, says Rupert, that it was said to the serpent, 'Upon your breast you shall go'? Surely, before the demon had spoken through it, it walked on feet, with its breast raised from the

ground; but afterward, its feet being taken away, it began to go upon its breast, using its scales and ribs for feet and legs, and with pressed

The Gerasene demons' cry (Matt. 8:29, 'before the time'). Then Rupert (De sancta Trinitate III.18) begins his literal reading: the serpent once walked upright but, its feet removed, crept on scales and ribs. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword '& presso' = & presso ventre).

— p. 666 (PDF) · printed p. 625 —

...with pressed [belly], creeping in its going? Had not God, before he made man, brought forth the beasts of burden of the earth and the wild beasts, and all the reptiles—among which without doubt were serpents? How, then, is that inflicted on it as a penalty which had previously been bestowed on it by nature? Therefore, under the name of the serpent which the devil invaded, the devil himself is struck by those curses: and he who in pride desired to become like the Most High is, on account of his malice, judged to be made penally like to the lowest creature which he himself corrupted. Therefore this is the sense of that curse: Just as this reptile, whose cunning you have abused, goes upon its breast and presses itself into the earth, so you, though you are a rational spirit, will always burden your reason with grievous folly, and wherever you turn yourself, you will always bend your intention downward and press it down with contrary deeds. For by envying you emptied out the merit of man; but by this deed you opened a place for the grace of God, which you will envy the more, since man becomes higher above himself by as much as the grace of God is greater than the merits of any creature. While you willingly oppose God, you unwillingly cooperate with God; and in a wondrous manner, when you intend evils, you do goods; and while, like a little hammer, you wickedly beat the gold of God, by beating you extend it the more to glory. 'You shall eat earth and not heaven'—that is, not those whose conversation is in the heavens, but those who are wise in earthly things shall be your food. A bad workman and a worthless servant, yet useful to God, you will console the weariness of your

wrath by the devouring of such men. Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert's quotation (catchword '& presso'): the curse, literally fitting no real serpent (which always crawled), refers to the devil—made penally like the lowest creature, and even his malice turned by God to good (the 'little hammer' beating God's gold to glory).

But from what follows—'I will put enmities between you and the woman'—Hugh argues that Eve did penance for her sin and was saved. For if Eve was thereafter an enemy to the devil, then she was pleasing and a friend to God. But this argumentation is not very firm: for here by 'the woman' is understood not Eve alone, but the whole race of women that was thereafter to be in all ages; just as by 'the serpent' not that one alone, but the entire race of serpents, ought to be understood.

Hugh of St. Victor's inference from Gen. 3:15 (that Eve repented and was saved); Pererius judges it weak, since 'the woman' = all womankind and 'the serpent' = all serpents (the demons/their followers).

By the 'seed of the serpent,' some interpret the lesser devils who followed Lucifer in sinning; others understand evil men, the devil's disciples, foster-children, and ministers. Wherefore the Lord said of the Jews, 'You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you wish to do.' But the 'seed of the woman' signifies her offspring, both male and female: for there were to be among men and women very many who, by bravely fighting with the devil, were to vanquish him, and to triumph with a most glorious victory won over him.

Marginal glosses: 'Quid sit semen mulieris, & semen serpentis' (What the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent are); 'Ioan. 8.' (John 8:44). 'Seed of the serpent' = lesser demons or evil men (the devil's followers); 'seed of the woman' = her offspring (male and female) who will conquer the devil.

That phrase, 'You shall lie in wait for his heel,' signifies that the devil is said to lie in wait for the heel of man—which is the last part of the body—because he chiefly desires to corrupt man's intention and the good end of his actions; and to this all his temptation and assault are directed, that he may draw man back from the attainment of his ultimate end. And

although he lies in wait for man throughout his whole life, he does this most of all at the end of life; at which time, indeed, he lies in wait more craftily, and presses and harasses more insistently, and assails man more powerfully. I will set down here what, to the same purport, treating this very place of Genesis, St. Gregory writes on the first chapter of Job, upon those words, 'Lest perhaps my sons have sinned, and have blessed God in their hearts': When the ancient enemy, he says, neither at the outset of [our] inten[tion]...

Marginal gloss: 'Quid sit serpentem insidiari calcaneo hominis' (What it is for the serpent to lie in wait for man's heel). 'You shall lie in wait for his heel' = the devil attacks man's end (the final intention and end of life), especially at death. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (on Job 1:5), is quoted; sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tionis' = intentionis). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. KKK'.

— p. 667 (PDF) · printed p. 626 —

...of our intention, nor intercepts on the way of action, he stretches harder snares at the end, which he besieges the more wickedly the more he sees that this alone has remained to him for deceiving. For the Prophet had beheld these snares set against his own end, when he said, 'They will watch my heel.' For since in the heel is the end of the body, what is signified by it but the term of action? Whether, then, malign spirits, or any depraved men, the followers of their pride, watch the heel, when they desire to corrupt the end of a good action. Whence it is also said to that serpent, 'She will watch your head, and you her heel.' For to watch the head of the serpent is to look upon his suggestion at its beginning, and with the careful hand of consideration to root it utterly out from the entrance of the heart. Yet he, when he is caught at the beginning, sets about to strike the heel: because, even if by suggestion he does not strike the first intention, he aims to deceive at the end. But if once the heart is corrupted in its intention, the middle and the term of the following action are securely possessed by the crafty enemy, since he sees the whole tree bearing fruit for himself,

which he has corrupted at the root with the tooth of his venom. Thus Gregory.

Marginal gloss: 'Psal. 55.' (Ps. 55[56]:7, 'they will watch my heel'). Conclusion of Gregory the Great's exposition (Moralia in Iob, on Job 1:5) of the heel/head imagery of Gen. 3:15: the devil attacks the end of a good action; one must crush his 'head' (the first suggestion) at the outset. (Catchword 'tionis' = intentionis from the previous page.)

There follows, 'And she shall crush your head.' This many refer to the Blessed Virgin, who, as no one of human beings (with our Lord alone excepted) was more pleasing and dear to God, so no one was more hostile and more hateful to the devil. She without doubt—to use the words of Bernard which are in his second Homily on 'Missus est'—crushed the venomous head, who brought to nothing every kind of the malign serpent's suggestion, both of the flesh's enticement and of the mind's pride. The seed of this woman was Christ. And rightly: for he alone of human beings was generated from a woman only, without male intercourse. And he it was who crushed the head of the serpent (for in Hebrew that pronoun 'he' refers not to the woman but to the seed); and the head of the devil was the power of sin and death which he had over all: and this Christ crushed and destroyed.

Marginal gloss: 'Quid sit conterere caput serpentis' (What it is to crush the serpent's head). On Gen. 3:15b: the Marian reading (Bernard, Homilia II super Missus est) and the Christological one—the woman's 'seed' is Christ. Pererius notes that the Hebrew pronoun (ipse/hu') refers to the seed (Christ), not the woman; the serpent's 'head' = the power of sin and death.

It has been reported by many that already in this place, and in the very beginning of the world, the Gospel began to be preached concerning the Messiah to come, the Savior of the world and the overthrower of the diabolical empire; and that for that cause he is called in the Apocalypse 'the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,' because, namely, his most precious death began to be signified from the very origin of the world, and to exert its power, and to have its salutary effect. The Doctors add, moreover, that Adam knew this mystery, and believed in Christ to come,

who was to be the expiator of his sin and the redeemer of the whole human race, and hoped that he himself would be freed from his sin by his grace and the efficacy of his future passion.

Marginal glosses: 'Evangelium Christi ab exordio mundi manifestari coepit. Apoc. 13.' (The Gospel of Christ began to be manifested from the world's beginning; Apoc. 13:8, the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world); 'Adam credidit in Christum ut mundi Redemptorem' (Adam believed in Christ as the world's Redeemer). The protoevangelium as the first preaching of the Gospel; Adam's faith in the coming Redeemer.

And this is the opinion of many, and their interpretation of the divine curse of the serpent. Which we, as allegorical and mystical, most of all approve; but as historical, not altogether: and as we gladly embrace it in part, so we do not follow it in every respect. For God cursed the serpent which was seen by Eve and Adam, and cursed it by comparing it with the beasts of the earth: 'Cursed,' he says, 'are you among all living things and the beasts of the earth'; but the devil was neither seen by the first human be[ings]...

Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur tertia opinio' (The third opinion is refuted). Pererius approves the allegorical reading but denies it as the literal/historical sense: God cursed the visible serpent, comparing it to beasts—but the devil was unseen. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'homini').

— p. 668 (PDF) · printed p. 627 —

...beings, nor did they cast the blame of their error upon him, but upon the serpent. And it is too harsh and violent for the devil to be compared with the beasts of the earth; nor indeed would God, in cursing the devil, have called him precisely and simply a 'serpent.' Although Hugh of St. Victor says that God, in cursing the devil, called him perpetually by the word 'serpent' for this reason, because he had put on the figure and appearance of a serpent. As if someone, he says, in order to steal something from a monastery, should put on a monk's habit, and, caught in that habit, should be condemned by a judge, and the judge should say to his ministers, 'Hang that monk'—on account of the monk's habit, namely, which that man had wrapped around himself, and with which he had been caught and brought

to the judge. But the example is ridiculous. And indeed, according to Hugh, God would have said these things to the devil by way of mockery, calling him a serpent—and neither Adam nor certainly Eve would have understood that mystery.

Continuation (catchword 'homini') of the refutation of the third (purely figurative) opinion: it is too harsh to compare the devil with beasts; Hugh of St. Victor's 'monk's habit' analogy (the devil called 'serpent' because clothed in serpent-form) is dismissed as ridiculous, since then God would be merely mocking, unintelligibly to Adam and Eve.

There remains the fourth opinion, which seems to us more like the truth—that is, more fitting and congruent with the narration of Moses. We judge that that curse of the serpent, according to the historical sense, pertained to the real serpent; but according to the mystical sense—principally intended by God, however (both when he pronounced that curse against the serpent, and when he willed it, set down in writing by Moses, to be commended to the immortal memory of posterity)—is to be referred to the devil. For to accomplish that crime there came together both the devil, the chief author of the crime, and the serpent, as the devil's instrument.

Marginal gloss: 'Quarta sententia, quae prae ceteris placet Auctori' (The fourth opinion, which pleases the Author above the others). Pererius's adopted view: the curse pertains literally to the real serpent, but mystically (and as principally intended by God) to the devil—both having concurred in the crime (the devil as author, the serpent as instrument).

But because the serpent alone was seen and heard, while the demon, lurking within the serpent, who wrought that evil deed, escaped all the senses, therefore those curses were pronounced in the historical mode concerning the serpent, and ought to be understood of it; but of the devil figuratively and μυσικ■ς (mystically). For example, that we may confirm this matter by another like it: it is written in the book of Numbers, chapter twenty-one, that, to heal the lethal bites of the serpents by which the Hebrews had been struck, Moses, by God's command, set up a bronze serpent, raised on high, for the Hebrews to look upon; by the sight of which

they were freed from so great an evil. That narration, therefore, according to the historical and literal sense pertains to the bronze serpent; according to the allegorical and mystical sense, it is to be referred principally to Christ the Lord, as the Lord himself indicated in John, chapter three, applying that deed to himself as a distinguished image of his passion and death.

GLYPH verified by magnification: Greek μυσικ■ς (= μυστικ■ς, mystik■s, 'mystically')—paired with Latin 'figurate' ('figuratively') and echoing 'sensum mysticum' on this same page; the τ of μυστικ■ς is dropped/ligatured in the print. The bronze-serpent typology (Num. 21:8-9) as a parallel: literally the bronze serpent, mystically Christ (John 3:14).

But that that curse of the serpent ought to be understood of the real serpent becomes manifest from those things which we disputed above, when we were confuting the third opinion. For since this narration of Moses is no less historical than all the preceding ones, it is necessary to understand and interpret it according to the proper signification of the words by which it is described. Nor indeed will this be difficult for the Reader to believe. Yet that will seem hard to explain, and dif[ficult] to persuade...

The curse must be understood of the real serpent, since Moses' narrative is historical throughout. A difficulty is raised (how the curse, natural to the serpent, can be a penalty), continued on the next page (catchword 'diffi' = difficile). Running footer: 'KKK 2'.

— p. 669 (PDF) · printed p. 628 —

...difficult: for since the things which God said to the serpent in cursing it had been in it before that temptation—nay, are even natural to it—how could or ought they to have been inflicted on it in the place of punishment and penalties? For on account of that curse no new penalty accrued either to the serpent or to the devil. Concerning the serpent we have already spoken; and the same is manifest in the devil: for from the beginning the devil, on account of his sin, was condemned to the eternal punishments of hell, and from that time he merits no new penalty any more, just as neither can the Blessed merit new essential glory. For both are already at the term to which they have arrived, and are capable of meriting neither well nor ill.

The difficulty stated (catchword 'diffi'): since the curse-conditions were natural to the serpent (and the devil already eternally damned), no new penalty was added—just as the Blessed merit no new essential glory, both being at their final term.

But if the demon had merited a new penalty on account of that temptation of Eve, then assuredly, by a like reasoning, on account of the innumerable temptations by which he daily deceives and ruins men, he would be smitten daily with new and innumerable penalties. To declare, therefore, how the things that were said to the serpent both were natural to it, and nevertheless were inflicted on it as penalties and punishment of the crime—'this is the task, this the labor.' But we will strive to accomplish this too, as far, namely, as the obscurity of the matter and the slenderness of our faculty allows.

The difficulty sharpened (else the devil would earn new penalties daily for each temptation). 'Hoc opus, hic labor est' echoes Virgil, Aeneid VI.129. Pererius undertakes the explanation.

It must be known, therefore, that those curses of the serpent, simply and absolutely speaking, were natural to the serpent, as has often been said; yet in a certain manner, after that temptation and the sin of the first human beings, they were to it as penalties and punishment—not, indeed, with respect had to the serpent, which felt none of those as a penalty, but with respect had to man. For the things which had previously been natural to the serpent, after sin became to it, among men, a matter of great disgrace, reproach, hatred, and execration: for the serpent which previously would not have been hateful and execrable to man on account of those things, after sin came to be infamous, odious, and abominable.

Marginal gloss: 'Quemadmodum maledictio illa serpentis fuerit ei in poenam & supplicium' (How that curse of the serpent was a penalty and punishment to it). The resolution: the curse-conditions, natural in themselves, became a 'penalty' only relative to man—the serpent becoming hateful and abominable to him after the Fall.

There is indeed, as between other animals, so between man and the serpent, a certain natural and vehement antipathy, for each naturally hates and shuns the other; but this was restrained, before sin, by the singular

providence and power of God, and was to be restrained equally for all the time in which that most happy state of innocence should have endured: it was restrained, lest it break out into a second act—that is, into mutual hatred and the zeal and endeavor of harming; whereby it came about that at that time neither did man shudder at the serpent, nor did the serpent assail man with snares. But after sin, original justice being lost, and that singular providence and protection of God being taken away, that natural antipathy of the serpent and of man was left free to come forth into act: from which it came about that afterward man naturally shudders at the serpent, just as the sheep at the wolf, the chick at the kite, and the mouse at the cat; and the serpent itself, by a certain natural instinct, pursues man with hatred and snares. These things, then, which are indeed natural in themselves, but before sin were held repressed by the singular gift of God, after sin were loosed and left to their own nature. And it is a sort of penalty and punishment of the serpent, that from that time man, over...

Marginal gloss: 'Naturalis antipathia inter hominem, & serpentem' (The natural antipathy between man and the serpent). The natural man-serpent antipathy (like sheep/wolf, chick/kite, mouse/cat), restrained by God's providence in innocence, was let loose after the Fall. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'per').

— p. 670 (PDF) · printed p. 629 —

...above the other animals, hates it, shuns it, abominates it, and in every way strives to injure and destroy it. This can be declared and confirmed by the example of death, which befell man on account of sin. For death is natural to man, and was indeed natural even before sin; for man is naturally mortal: but by an excellent and admirable benefit God, in the state of innocence, drove off and warded death away from man, so that, if man had never sinned, he would never have died. But on account of sin, man, despoiled of original justice and deprived of that singular protection of God, and left to his own nature, ran into death. And so it came about that, although death is natural to man, yet—on account of sin—we find it reported and attested in the sacred Letters that it befell man as his penalty

and punishment.

Continuation (catchword 'per'). The parallel of death: natural to man, yet—after the loss of original justice—it befell him as a penalty, exactly as the serpent's natural conditions became its 'penalty.'

God willed, therefore, that that should be a punishment to the serpent which previously was nature: just as the heavenly bow had existed before the flood, and comes about naturally, yet God willed it to be a sign that there would never be a flood in time to come. The same too was the serpent's nature after sin as had been before; but whose form was taken and accommodated to the evil deed, it was condemned to punishment, and the pronouncement was to disgrace and reproach—because it was previously natural, and, if sin had not occurred, would not have seemed infamous and execrable. And this was the condemnation: that that whose nature had been employed for fraud should be confirmed unto disgrace, so that it should be shameful for it to be such, to which to be such had previously been natural and seemly: God willing that what he himself had previously made the serpent's nature should thereafter, by his own decree—to whose counsel all nature submits—be the same thing for reproach and punishment.

Marginal gloss: 'Genesis 9.' (the rainbow as a sign, Gen. 9:13). The rainbow analogy: a natural thing made a divine sign; so the serpent's natural form, used for fraud, was by God's decree turned to its disgrace and 'punishment.'

No harm, therefore, befell the serpent: only it was commanded to be infamous, which, if it had not been commanded, would have been natural. For as the cross of the Lord is venerable and lovable, on which the human race was redeemed, so the serpent, through which the fraud and ruin of the human race was perpetrated, is cursed and abominable. Nor indeed was there need of a new punishment for the serpent, for it has enough and more than enough of evils: it lives creeping on the ground over the earth, and with labor is moved by dragging its body; it dwells in deserted and dark and abominable places, and serves the worst of men for their evil deeds: only these things were to be demonstrated, and by the divine decree referred to its disgrace and execration. How, therefore, that which is

contained in the serpent's curse, although it be natural to it, nonetheless in some way pertains to its penalty and punishment, the reader will easily understand, as I think, from the things we have very briefly taught.

The serpent suffered no real harm—only its natural form was decreed 'infamous,' as the Cross (the instrument of redemption) is venerable while the serpent (the instrument of ruin) is abominable. It needed no new penalty, already creeping in desert places and serving wicked men. This concludes QUAESTIO IIII.

QUESTION V. Why the devil assumed the form of a serpent rather than any other.

Fifth question of the disputation on the serpent. Sentence/exposition continues on the next page (catchword 'SUPER'). Running footer: 'KKK 3'.

— p. 671 (PDF) · printed p. 630 —

There remain two questions to be untangled in this place, before we pass to the explanation of the Mosaic history. One is, why the demon wished to attack Eve and accomplish that crime under the appearance and form of a serpent, rather than of a man or of any other animal. The other question is, why Moses spoke only of the serpent, making no word of the devil, who spoke through the serpent and wrought that evil deed.

Statement of the two remaining questions of the serpent-disputation (QUAESTIO V and VI): why serpent-form, and why Moses names only the serpent.

First, then, it is asked: Why did the demon assume the appearance of a serpent rather than of a man or of the greater beasts—such as camels and elephants? Or why did he not, himself invisible to Eve's eyes, yet through human voices formed by him in the air which could be heard and understood by Eve, tempt her? Augustine answers this question in two ways. For in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 3, he writes in this manner: It must not be thought that the devil chose the serpent through which to tempt; but, since he desired to deceive, he could not do so except through that animal through which he was permitted by God. For the desire of harming is in each one from himself, but the power

is from God alone. Augustine signifies, therefore, that the demon used no other animal than the serpent, because the use of the serpent alone, for carrying out that temptation, was permitted to him by God.

Marginal gloss: 'Duplex responsio Augustini ad quaestionem propositam' (Augustine's twofold answer to the proposed question). First answer (Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI.3): the demon used the serpent because only the serpent's use was permitted him by God (the will to harm is the demon's own, the power is from God).

But the same, in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 11, brings forward another and indeed more probable cause: The devil, he says, with ill-persuading craft striving to creep into man's sense—whom, since he himself had fallen, he envied for standing—chose, to speak through it, a snake in the corporeal Paradise, where, with those two human beings, the other earthly animals also dwelt, subject and harmless—a slippery animal, namely, mobile in tortuous windings, suited to his work; and using it, made subject to his spiritual wickedness by his angelic presence and more excellent nature, and as an instrument, he spoke deceitfully to the woman. Thus Augustine.

Augustine's second, 'more probable' answer (De Civitate Dei XIV.11): the slippery, winding serpent was the fittest instrument for the devil's creeping craft.

> *The Master of the Sentences adds besides, in book 2, distinction 21: Lest the demon's fraud should be too manifest, he did not come in his own appearance, lest, being openly recognized, he should at once be repelled. Lest, his fraud being too hidden, it could not easily be guarded against, he was not permitted to come in any other form than the serpent's—which, indeed, was quite suited to the detecting of his malice, so that through that which was outward the woman could easily perceive the craft of the tempter. The demon would indeed have wished to come in the appearance of a dove: for this, as a harmless and simple animal, would have been a most fitting instrument for the devil to deceive the woman; but it was not consonant and fitting that, through an unclean and malign spirit, the dove should be made hateful*

and odious to man—in whose appearance the Holy Spirit was afterward to appear to men. Thus far from the Master.

Peter Lombard (Sent. II d.21): the serpent-form was a mean between too-manifest and too-hidden fraud; the demon would have preferred the (harmless, simple) dove, but that form was reserved for the Holy Spirit.

But Moses Bar Cepha, in the book On Paradise, chapter 27, treating this question more thoroughly, reports that the demon did not appear in human form, because he knew that Eve was not ignorant that there was no man besides herself and her husband; nor did God permit the demon to feign a man, lest Eve should have a just, or at least probable, excuse for her error—namely, that by a hu[man being]...

Moses Bar Cepha (De Paradiso c.27): the demon did not take human form (Eve knew there was no man but Adam), and God forbade it lest Eve have an excuse. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'ab homi' = ab homine).

— p. 672 (PDF) · printed p. 631 —

...she had been circumvented by a man like herself. But he did not appear in the figure of the greater beasts, because these appearances of vast animals would have struck and disturbed the woman with too much fear. And if the woman had heard the words of one whose appearance or figure she saw none, would she not have been the more dismayed, and not have lent ear or assent to its words? Above the other animals, the devil chose the serpent for his instrument—or rather put on the one animal altogether permitted by God. First, so that his malice could the more easily be detected. Then, because the serpent is the most tortuous of all animals, and the most cunning and treacherous for harming man, and the most desirous of harming: namely with its ton[gue]...

Bar Cepha continued: not human form (Eve would suspect a fellow man), not great beasts (too frightening), not invisible (she would be more alarmed); the serpent was chosen as tortuous, cunning, and venomous. Sentence continues (catchword 'lin' = lingua).

...tongue, and deadly to man by its venomous bite. Next, so that it might be understood to how great vileness and misery the demon was cast down on account of sin, from the likeness of the serpent, which goes not lofty and erect, but creeps humbly, prostrate on the ground. Lastly, so that, just as between man and the serpent there is a natural enmity and hatred, so we should reckon that there is between the demon and man a perpetual spiritual discord. Thus, in the main, Bar Cepha.

Bar Cepha's remaining reasons: the serpent figures the demon's vile abjection (creeping on the ground) and the perpetual man-demon enmity.

QUESTION VI. Why Moses made no mention of the devil in this history.

Sixth question of the serpent-disputation.

But why does Moses, in this history, perpetually make mention of the serpent, but nowhere of the devil, who was nevertheless the architect and effecter of that crime? We answer that Moses acted as a writer of the deed done, not as an interpreter; and therefore, of what sort the thing appeared, of that sort it was described by him—not, however, explained how it really was. Now Eve saw the serpent, and heard the serpent speaking with her; the devil, although he lurked within the serpent, was yet hidden from Eve, escaping the sense of her eyes and ears. This, then, Moses set down in his writing: just as also, in this very book of Genesis below, chapter 18, he named as 'men' the three men whom Abraham saw and received in hospitality, although they were not men but Angels; and in chapter 32, he likewise called 'a man' the Angel who wrestled with Jacob.

Answer to Q.VI: Moses wrote as a narrator (not interpreter), describing what appeared—Eve saw/heard the serpent, the devil being hidden. Parallels: the three 'men' of Gen. 18 (angels) and the 'man' wrestling Jacob in Gen. 32 (an angel).

But if Paul, who followed Moses at so great an interval of time, when the matters had by then been explained, attributed the imposture to the serpent and not to Satan—writing thus in chapter 11 of the latter Epistle to the

Corinthians: 'I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his craft, so your senses be corrupted and fall away from the simplicity that is in Christ'—why should not Moses, who preceded Paul by so many ages, with reason seem to have ascribed the fraud to the serpent? For it belongs to a writer to narrate the deeds done; but the task of an interpreter is to explain the things set forth by the writer. Wherefore Moses, who wished to be a writer, not an interpreter, rightly narrated that the serpent conversed with Eve; but did not say that Satan was hidden within the serpent. But, the explanation of those questions and difficulties being now completed, which we had undertaken to treat concerning the serpent and the devil upon those words of Moses, 'The serpent...'

Even Paul (2 Cor. 11:3) ascribed the deceit to the serpent; so Moses, as narrator, rightly does too. The transition closing the serpent-disputation begins (catchword 'Serpens'). Running footer (implied) for this gathering 'LLL'.

— p. 673 (PDF) · printed p. 632 —

...'The serpent was more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth,' we must now return again to the interpretation of the history and words of Moses.

Conclusion of the transitional sentence (catchword 'Serpens' from the previous page): with the serpent-disputation finished, Pererius returns to the running exposition of Genesis 3.

Genesis chapter 3, verse 1. Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?

The lemma: the serpent's question to Eve (Gen. 3:1).

It is likely that more words than those which are here narrated were exchanged back and forth between Eve and the serpent; but to Moses, studious of brevity, it seemed enough to record in his history the chief statements of that conversation, which, namely, served to declare in what manner those first human beings transgressed the command of God. By these words the demon shows that he wishes those human beings well, and

takes care for their advantage and good. But he attacked the woman by a question, to provoke her to answer him. The end of his questioning was to bring it about that that precept should seem to Eve grave, harsh, and unjust, and on that account vehemently displease her. 'Why,' he says, 'has God commanded you,' etc.—as if he said, 'Was it not enough to have given you the natural law, and over and above to have added the supernatural law of faith, hope, and charity, unless he should also impose on you—alone of all living creatures—the yoke of a positive law?' There are two kinds of things in which the demon tempts man: the one pertains to faith, the other to morals and the precepts of doing or not doing. In the latter he tempts by saying, 'Why? To what end?'; in the former, 'How can it come about?'

Exposition of Gen. 3:1: Moses recorded only the chief exchanges; the demon, feigning goodwill, attacks by a question to make God's precept seem harsh and unjust. The devil tempts in two areas—faith ('how?') and morals ('why? to what end?').

That phrase, 'That you should not eat of every tree,' can yield a twofold sense: either so that it means the same as 'From no tree,' and so it is generally expounded (for the demon designedly misreported God's precept, to draw the woman to answer him); or so that it means the same as 'Not from every tree,' and thus Tostatus and very many others take it. Rupert, weighing this question of the serpent: Because, he says, the devil is a most worthless tavern-keeper, he polluted his question with a lie, saying, 'Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?' For although what is put forward under a question is neither true nor false, yet here the serpent manifestly hissed a lie, feigning not to know the matter as it was, that little by little he might poison the wretched listener's soul with his gall. He did not say, 'Why has God commanded you not to eat of that one tree,' but 'of every tree of Paradise.' Why, then, did he speak thus, except that, creeping little by little, he might more and more inject into man the venom of the hatred with which he himself burned against the Creator, and, by exaggerating as if the precept were unworthy,

establish indignation, and stir up the boldness of rebelling?

Marginal gloss: 'Ruper. lib. 2. de Trinit. & operibus eius. cap. 4.' The phrase 'ex omni ligno' read as either 'from no tree' or 'not from every tree' (Tostatus). Rupert of Deutz (De sancta Trinitate II.4) on the serpent's lying, exaggerating question, designed to inject hatred of the Creator.

And see how great was the subtlety of the deceiver's fraud. For God had said three things: 'Eat of every tree of Paradise'—this is one; the second, 'Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil do not eat'; the third, finally, 'On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death.' This last the devil, as if he did not know it, says, 'Why has God commanded you?' The two former he confounds and mixes together, and out of two true things he completes one false, saying, 'That you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?' Truly indeed did the Truth say, 'Because he was a murderer from the beginning, and in the truth he did not...'

Marginal gloss: 'Ioan. 8.' (John 8:44). Rupert continued: the serpent's subtlety in confounding God's three sayings into one falsehood; the devil 'a murderer from the beginning' who 'did not stand in the truth.' Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'non' = non stetit).

— p. 674 (PDF) · printed p. 633 —

...stand. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own: because he is a liar, and the father of it—namely, of the lie which he speaks. In which saying the Lord, present, undoubtedly had regard to this chapter, as if he said: From the beginning of his conversation with man, the devil is a murderer and a liar: because, namely, at the outset of his speech he is found a liar, and threatens murder. O, then, ancient sinner, O aged murderer, and first father of the lie, truly a wily and worthless serpent. Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert's quotation (catchword 'non' = non stetit), applying John 8:44 ('a murderer from the beginning... a liar and the father of it') to the serpent's first speech.

Concerning that word 'Why,' the Hebrew scripture varies a little, which has ■■■■ (Aphchi), which is expounded in various ways. Some render it, 'So,

entirely?'; others, 'Truly?'; some, 'Even so?'—which seems to agree with the Chaldean translation, which renders this sentence word for word: 'In truth, has God said to you?' The Latin interpreter followed the Septuagint, who have word for word, 'What,' or, 'Why has God said to you.' Oleaster says that that 'Aph' sometimes signifies wrath, and thinks that this signification suits this place most of all, so that the reading is: 'Wrath, because God has said, You shall not eat of every tree of the garden': as if he said more openly, 'There is wrath in God against you,' or, 'God is angry with you'; of which wrath this is the sign, that he has forbidden you to eat of every tree of Paradise.

Marginal gloss: 'Varia lectio circa illud, Cur' (Variant reading concerning 'Why'). GLYPH verified by magnification: Hebrew ■■■■ (Aphchi = ■■■ ■■■■, 'aph ki'—the opening words of Gen. 3:1 in Hebrew), variously rendered. The Chaldee (Targum), Septuagint, and Oleaster's reading (taking ■■ 'Aph' as 'wrath') are given.

Rabbi David, for that 'Why,' interprets 'How much more?'; and he says that the serpent, before these words, said other things to the woman—these, namely, or others like them: 'God hates you, although you excel all animals in nobility; for he did not give you the beauty of peacocks, the strength of lions, the swiftness of stags: how much more, when he has said to you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?—from which you can recognize that you are hateful to God.' Nor ought this addition, says Rabbi David, to seem harsh: both because the particle ■ (Chi) always adds something over and above what is said; and because it is the custom of divine Scripture to make the beginnings of words to be understood from their end—as is clear concerning the spies in the book of Numbers, who said, 'The Lord has given into our hand the whole land, and also because the inhabitants of the land are melted away from before our face.' Nor is it right that this should have been the beginning of the words: because the particle ■, that is, 'Because,' renders the reason of the things which he had said before. So says that Rabbi.

Marginal glosses: 'Mos divinae Scripturae' (The custom of divine Scripture); 'Num. 13. & 14.' GLYPH verified by magnification: the Hebrew particle ■ (Chi/Ki = ■■■■, 'ki'), appearing twice—it 'adds something' and renders a reason ('because'). Rabbi David Kimchi reads 'Cur' as 'how much more?'; the spies' words (Num. 13-14) illustrate Scripture's idiom of explaining the start from the end.

Genesis chapter 3, verse 2. To whom the woman answered: We eat of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat, and that we should not touch it, lest perhaps we die.

The lemma: Eve's reply to the serpent (Gen. 3:2-3).

From these words it is clearly known that the woman's sin was inexcusable. For by these words she declares that she did not sin as one ignorant or forgetful of the divine precept: for she confesses that that precept was imposed by God on herself and her husband; and at the same time she indicates that the precept was not grave and harsh, nor difficult to observe. For she says that, with one tree only excep[ted]...

Exposition of Gen. 3:2-3 begins: Eve's reply shows her sin was inexcusable (she knew and acknowledged the precept, which was neither harsh nor hard). Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'exce' = excepta). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. LLL'.

— p. 675 (PDF) · printed p. 634 —

...one tree only excepted, the power of eating, granted to them by God, from the rest of the trees of Paradise, which were almost innumerable. That word 'We eat' seems to signify that they were previously accustomed to eat from any tree whatever: from which it could be concluded that they tarried in Paradise for no short time. But perhaps that word 'We eat' was said for this, that is, 'We are permitted to eat,' or 'it is lawful and free for us to eat.'

Continuation (catchword 'exce' = excepta) of Eve's reply (Gen. 3:2): all trees but one were permitted; 'we eat' (vescimur) may imply long residence in Paradise, or merely 'we may eat.'

But two things which Eve adds give the interpreters no little trouble as to how they are to be understood. For she adds that God had commanded them not to touch the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: which, however, is not expressed in the precept that God gave to Adam. Some think that this really was commanded, but was passed over by Moses above, and therefore is now added; and that the touching of that tree was forbidden them for the sake of greater caution, namely so that by that means they might the more be recalled from eating of the tree. So Eugubinus opines.

Marginal gloss: 'Cur Eva dixerit tactum arboris sibi esse interdictum, cum Deus esum tantummodo vetuerit' (Why Eve said the touch of the tree was forbidden her, though God forbade only the eating). First difficulty/opinion (Eugubinus): the touch was really forbidden (Moses having omitted it) as an extra precaution.

Which pleases neither Tostatus nor me: for both above and below, when Moses recounts that precept of God, he makes no mention of touching, but only of the prohibition of eating. Nor is it consonant to suppose that Moses recounted that precept of God not whole as it was, but maimed and diminished; nor did God, when he rebuked man for the violated precept, reprove him for the touching, but only for the eating. Nor indeed, in the state of innocence, did man have need of that caution: for he was not immoderately inclined more to the eating of the tree than to the touching. And if for that cause the touching of that tree was forbidden them, for the same reason surely the sight ought to have been forbidden—since it was for Eve the enticement to eating, Scripture saying: 'The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit, and ate.'

Marginal glosses: 'Opinio Eugubini, quae refellitur' (Eugubinus's opinion, which is refuted); 'Tostatus q. 4. in 3. cap. Gen.' Pererius refutes Eugubinus: Moses elsewhere mentions only eating; the 'touch' precaution was needless in innocence; else the sight (the actual enticement, Gen. 3:6) should have been forbidden too.

Ambrose, in the book On Adam and Eve, reports that some said that what Eve said about the touch of the tree had been forbidden her not by God but by Adam: which, however, is not credible. For it is probable, as Cajetan and certain others judge, that God himself gave that precept to Eve as well as to Adam at the same time: which Eve confirms in this place, saying, 'God has commanded us,' etc. Nor would Adam, in God's name, have ordered Eve not to touch the tree, since it had not been commanded by God. Therefore it is the opinion of Ambrose, and of nearly all the Theologians, that Eve added that 'lest we touch it' of her own, to exaggerate the more the gravity of the precept: for already, being inwardly corrupted by the serpent's persuasion, that precept had begun to displease her. Just as, says Cajetan, a woman forbidden by her hus[band]...

Marginal glosses: 'Secunda opinio' (Second opinion); 'Caietanus in Genesim.' Second opinion (Ambrose, De Paradiso; Cajetan): God gave the precept to both Adam and Eve ('God has commanded us'); Eve added 'lest we touch it' herself, exaggerating the precept's gravity out of incipient displeasure. The Cajetan analogy begins (catchword 'ma' = marito).

...band not to leave the house, being asked why she does not go out of the house, answers: 'It is not permitted me, because of my husband, to set foot outside my chamber'—exaggerating, namely, because her husband's command displeases her. So Eve, by exaggerating the divine precept, said that it was not lawful for her even to touch the fruit of that tree: and an exaggeration of this kind is a witness of inward displeasure. And so the devil had now truly crept into the woman's mind: first, indeed, by exciting in her the desire of a most vain liberty; then by injecting so great a [weariness] of that pre[cept]...

Cajetan's analogy (a wife exaggerating her husband's ban betrays inner displeasure): Eve's exaggeration witnesses that the devil had crept into her mind, stirring desire for vain liberty. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'cepti' = praecepti). Running footer: 'LLL'.

— p. 676 (PDF) · printed p. 635 —

...weariness and hatred of that precept, that the woman burst out into a false exaggeration of it.

Completion of the sentence (catchword 'cepti' = praecepti): the devil's injected hatred of the precept drove Eve to her false exaggeration.

But it is well to transcribe to this place the words of Ambrose pertaining to what we have said, from his book On Adam and Eve, or On Paradise (as it is entitled in other volumes). Thus, then, he writes in the 12th chapter of that book: In the command of God indeed there is no fault, for God said, 'Of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat'; but the fault was in the reporting of the command: for the woman added, 'Lest we touch it.' For, as far as the present reading teaches, we learn that we ought to add nothing to a command, even for caution's sake: for if you either add or subtract anything, it seems to be a kind of transgression of the command: for the pure form of the command must be kept, or the series of the testimony must be conveyed intact. Often a witness, while he adds something of his own to the series of the deeds, discolors the whole credit of the testimony by the falsehood of a part. Nothing, therefore, even that seems good, is to be added. For here, what offense, at first sight, has what the woman added, 'Neither shall you touch it at all'? For God had not said 'You shall not touch,' but 'You shall not eat'; yet nevertheless the lapse begins to have its beginning. For what she added, either she added superfluously, or by adding of her own, she understood God's command to be half-complete. The series of the present reading, therefore, teaches us that we ought neither to subtract anything from the divine commands, nor to add. For if John indicated this of his own writings—'If anyone shall add to these things,' he says, 'God will add upon him the plagues that are written in this book; and whoever shall take away from the words of this prophecy, God will take away his part from the book of life'—how much more is nothing to be subtracted from the divine commands? Hence, then, the first transgression of the command began.

Marginal gloss: 'Apoc. ult.' (Apocalypse, last chapter, Rev. 22:18-19). Ambrose, De Paradiso c.12: nothing may be added to or subtracted from God's command; Eve's addition ('lest we touch it') was

the beginning of the lapse (with the warning of Rev. 22).

And very many think that this fault was not the woman's but Adam's: that Adam, while he wished to make her more cautious, so spoke to the woman as to add that God had commanded, 'You shall not touch it at all.' For we have it that Adam, not Eve, received the command from God; the woman had not yet been formed. The reading does not, indeed, set forth the very words of Adam by which he tells the woman the form and series of the command; but we understand that the series of the command passed to the woman through the man. Yet let others see what they think: for although it may seem uncertain as between the two, nevertheless the sex betrays which could the sooner err. Add that she is bound by this prejudgment, that the prior error was afterward found to be hers. For man is to the woman the author of error in one direction, not the woman to the man. Whence Paul too says: 'Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose continued: some attribute the addition to Adam (who alone received the command, before Eve was formed); but the 'sex betrays which could sooner err' (cf. Paul, 1 Tim. 2:14, 'Adam was not deceived, but the woman'). Concludes 'Haec Ambrosius.'

Similarly too the woman adds of her own that 'Lest perhaps we die,' reporting doubtfully what God had pronounced assertively: by which Eve declared that she thought that sentence of God about death had been pronounced by him not absolutely but as a threat. Concerning which Cajetan writes thus in his commentary on this place: Although in these words of the woman a manifest diminution of the divine precept appears at first sight—for God had asserted, 'You shall die the death,' but the woman reports that God said doubtfully, 'Lest perhaps you die'—yet, if the intended sense be considered more closely, it will appear that Eve inserted her own interpretation, reporting God's precept according to the sense in which she herself understood it. And an interpretation of this kind...

Eve also added 'lest perhaps we die' (doubtful) where God spoke assertively ('you shall die the death'). Cajetan: she inserted her own interpretation. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'autem'). Running footer: 'LLL 2'.

— p. 677 (PDF) · printed p. 636 —

...this reporting sprang from displeasure with the precept: for what displeases us is also estranged from our believing; for we believe less the things that displease us. And hence it came about that the woman hesitated whether God had appended the penalty of death to that precept merely with the intent of threatening, or with the fixed purpose of inflicting it. The woman, therefore, added that 'perhaps' not with the intent of falsely reporting the divine precept, but by manifesting her hesitation concerning the sense of the divine precept. And this sense fits well with the suggestions cast in by the serpent. The diabolical venom, then, crept into the woman's affect and intellect at once: into the affect, indeed, through displeasure with the precept, whence at once came forth the exaggeration of its bond and obligation; but into the intellect through hesitation about the future penalty, whence came forth her report, and that adverb, 'Lest perhaps.' Thus from Cajetan.

Conclusion of the Cajetan analysis: the diabolical venom crept into Eve's affect (displeasure → exaggeration of the precept) and intellect (hesitation about the penalty → the doubtful 'lest perhaps').

Rupert hands down that Eve perverted God's words in three ways: by adding, when she said, 'Lest we touch'; by diminishing, when she says, 'Lest perhaps we die'; by changing, when she says, 'Of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise'—for God had said, 'Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'; for in the midst of Paradise was also the tree of life, by no means forbidden them. But this last I do not approve: the name 'of the knowledge of good and evil' was afterward attributed to that tree—namely, from the serpent's false promise—as we taught in the third book, which is On Paradise, when we disputed about that name of the tree. The words of Rupert, in the 5th chapter of the 3rd book On the Trinity, run thus:

Marginal gloss: 'Tribus modis depravatur divina Scriptura, secundum Rupertum' (In three ways divine Scripture is corrupted, according to Rupert). Rupert: Eve perverted God's words by addition, diminution, and change. Pererius rejects the third point (the name 'tree of knowledge of good and evil' was applied later, from the serpent's promise; cf. his own book 3, De Paradiso).

These words of the woman are now signs of a corrupted mind: for as far as in her lay, the woman corrupted the words of the Lord her instructor in three ways, by which, to this day, everyone who is on the devil's side strives to corrupt holy Scripture: namely by addition, diminution, and change. For she added, by saying, 'Lest we touch it'—because, namely, the Lord God had said only this, 'But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil do not eat.' She diminished, in that, although God had said with a certain and affirmative declaration, 'For on whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death,' she, wishing that to be doubtful or trivial, says, 'Lest perhaps we die.' And by change, in that, although the Lord had said, 'Of every tree of Paradise eat,' and had forbidden only the one tree of the knowledge of good and evil, she says, 'But of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise, he commanded us,' etc.—and she lied. For the tree of life too was in the midst of Paradise, which the Lord God did not forbid. Therefore she now bore it impatiently and murmured, that God, as if sparing or stingy, was reserving the precious things of the middle of Paradise, and granted the baser things, to be gathered round about, for man's food. Thus, I say, in three ways—that is, by addition, diminution, and change—the foolish woman strove to corrupt the holy precept of God. Moreover, how great a damnation it is to add anything to, or diminish from, the word of God, John testifies in the Apocalypse, when he said, 'If anyone shall add to these things, God will add upon him the plagues written in this book. If anyone shall diminish from the words of the prophecy of this book, God will take away his part from the book of life, and from the holy city, and from the things that are written in this book.' Therefore, truly, before the devil began to speak through the corporeal or visible serpent, he had

already spoken within, of himself, to the ear of the heart, and a willing inclination or consent to carrying out the external work of sin was at hand. Accordingly the rest of what follows, thus by us...

Marginal gloss: 'Apocal. 22.' (Rev. 22:18-19). Verbatim Rupert (De sancta Trinitate III.5): the threefold corruption of Scripture (addition, diminution, change), Eve's murmuring against God as 'stingy,' and the note that the devil had already spoken inwardly to Eve's heart before the serpent's outward speech. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'sic nobis').

— p. 678 (PDF) · printed p. 637 —

...are to be taken by us as the consummated work of a diabolical defilement or adultery; for before these things, as it were certain preliminary conditions had been brought about by a hidden inspiration or suggestion, with the mind taking delight. Thus far are the words of Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert's quotation (catchword 'sic nobis'): Eve's words are the consummation of a 'diabolical adultery,' the devil having first worked inwardly with delight.

With whom indeed I do not agree, that Eve, before the meeting and the conversation held with the serpent, had already been inwardly vitiated by the devil and corrupted by some spiritual venom: but this we shall show more openly a little below.

Pererius dissents from Rupert's claim that Eve was already inwardly corrupted by the devil before the serpent spoke (to be argued below).

Genesis chapter 3, verses 4 and 5. But the serpent said to the woman: You shall not die the death by any means; for God knows that on whatever day you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.

The lemma: the serpent's reply and false promise (Gen. 3:4-5).

With marvelous artifice the demon makes the woman in two ways bold and eager to violate God's precept: both by removing the fear of the penalty which God had threatened; and by promising a certain great good, and one

to be desired by man above the rest—namely, that they should be made, like God, most knowing of all things. For by these two sharpest spurs men are wont to be goaded and incited to sin.

Marginal gloss: 'Artificium daemonis' (The demon's artifice). The demon's twofold device: removing the fear of punishment, and promising god-like knowledge—the two 'spurs' to sin.

Saint Gregory treats this place admirably, in book 24 of the Morals, chapters 7 and 8, explaining those words of Job which are in chapter 33, 'He will render to man his justice': God, he says, will render to man that justice for which he was created, so that it may please him to cleave to God, that he may dread his threatening sentence, that he may not believe the now-flattering promises of the crafty serpent. For what he did in Paradise, this the ancient enemy does not cease to do daily. For he strives to tear God's words out of the hearts of men, and to root in them the feigned blandishments of his promise: daily he makes light of that which God threatens, and invites men to believe what he falsely promises. For he falsely promises temporal things, that he may make light, to the minds of men, of those punishments which God threatens as eternal. For when he pledges the glory of the present life, what else does he say than, 'Taste, and you shall be as gods'? as if he said openly, 'Touch temporal concupiscence, and appear lofty in this world.' And when he tries to remove the fear of the divine sentence, what else does he speak than what he said to the first human beings, 'Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?' But because man, redeemed by the divine gift, has received back the justice which long ago, when created, he lost, he now exercises himself more robustly against the blandishments of crafty persuasion, because he has learned by experience how much he owes obedience to the precept: and him whom then guilt led to punishment, now his punishment restrains from guilt, so that he fears to offend the more, the more, under the compulsion of his suffering, he himself now accuses what he committed. Thus Saint Gregory.

Verbatim Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XXIV.7-8 (on Job 33:26), on the devil's daily method—uprooting God's words, making light of his threats, falsely promising temporal goods ('taste and you shall be as gods')—and how the redeemed man, schooled by punishment, resists.

Now the serpent's speech contains five things not only false but also impious, absurd, and incredible. The first is, that God is a liar; for he wished to signify this by saying, 'You shall not die the death by any means'—as if he said, 'It is not true, what God told you, that if you eat...'

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque falsa, impia, & absurda, in verbis ipsius serpentis' (Five false, impious, and absurd things in the serpent's very words). Pererius begins enumerating the five falsehoods of the serpent's speech; the first: that God is a liar (Nequaquam moriemini). Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'tis' = comederitis). Running footer: 'LLL 3'.

— p. 679 (PDF) · printed p. 638 —

...that, if you eat, you shall die the death. The second is, that God envied them a certain highest good and felicity: which that phrase declares—'For God knows that if you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil'—as if he said, 'He therefore forbade it, because he did not wish you to become, by excellence of knowledge and wisdom, like himself.' The third was, that that tree had the power of making them knowing of all things. Finally, the fourth and fifth were, that men could, by knowledge, turn out like God—and that indeed on account of eating the fruit of that tree.

Continuation (catchword 'tis' = comederitis) of the five falsehoods of the serpent's speech: (1) God a liar; (2) God envies man a good; (3) the tree confers omniscience; (4-5) men can become like God by knowledge through eating.

How false and absurd these very things were, the woman would easily have understood, had she not already, puffed up and elated by an inner vanity of mind, and swelling with pride, and burning with an immoderate desire of the thing forbidden her, been out of her mind and senseless. For what more repugnant, or what more ■λογον (irrational) or ■δ■νατον (impossible) can be said, than that either Truth itself should lie, or Goodness itself should envy, or that, by the bodily eating of any thing, the wisdom and

likeness of God could be acquired? The woman would have said to the serpent: 'If it is as you say, why do you yourself not eat of that tree, so that what you promise me, you yourself may obtain? Go, eat first, that I may make trial from you whether the things you speak and promise me are true.' 'If God, envying us so great a good, forbade the eating of that tree, why did he not rather not create that tree, or why did he not destroy it?'

GLYPHS verified by magnification: Greek ■λογον (alogon, 'irrational/unreasonable') and ■δ■νατον (adynaton, 'impossible')—the absurdity of the serpent's claims (that Truth lies, Goodness envies, or godhead is gotten by eating). Eve, but for her pride, would have seen through it and challenged the serpent to eat first.

Rightly, therefore, Augustine, in chapter 30 of book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter: How, he says, would the woman believe the words of the serpent, that she had been divinely forbidden from a good and useful thing, unless there were already in her mind a love of her own power, and a certain proud presumption about herself, which by that temptation was to be convicted and humbled?

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI.30: Eve could not have believed the serpent unless a love of her own power and proud self-presumption were already in her mind.

Those words, moreover, 'Your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,' look to the same point: for it is signified that, on account of eating that tree, there would be as great a difference between the state in which they then were and the state to which they would be advanced, if they ate that fruit, as is the difference between one who with open eyes sees all things and one who with closed eyes sees nothing, and as great as is the difference between God and men.

The promise 'your eyes shall be opened... you shall be as gods': the supposed gulf between their present and promised state, like that between the seeing and the blind, or between God and men.

But before I pass to the explanation of what follows, it is well here to add an excellent opinion of Bernard, pertaining to the things just said and expounded. In a certain sermon On the Fourfold Debt, Bernard

writes in this manner: I do not fear for you, brethren, from the strength of Satan, since I know his strength to have been drawn and reduced to nothing through the wounds of our Redeemer. From his wiles and craft there is fear for me on your behalf: in which, trained partly by the subtlety of his nature, partly by the experience of the ages, through so many thousands of years, he is not ignorant which way the frailty of human nature turns itself. So that insatiable murderer assigned to our first parents neither bears, nor lions, nor the strong animals of the earth, but the tortuous and cunning serpent, which through its sinuous coils is wont now to touch its head with its tail, now its tail with its head. Finally, 'the serpent too was not stronger, but more cunning than all the living creatures of the earth,' says Scripture. Whence he began with a question, exploring the woman's mind, knowing that he must labor by wit, not by strength. 'Why has the Lord God commanded you,' he says, 'that you should not eat of the tr[ee]...'

Marginal gloss: 'Egregia sententia B. Bernardi' (An excellent opinion of Blessed Bernard). Bernard of Clairvaux (Sermo de quadruplici debito): we should fear the devil's craft, not his strength; he chose the cunning serpent and began with a question, working by wit not force. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'de li' = de ligno).

— p. 680 (PDF) · printed p. 639 —

...of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil?' To which she answered, 'Lest perhaps we die.' What God had set down as certain, saying, 'On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death,' she puts under doubt, saying, 'Lest perhaps, if we eat, we die.' And hear the wit and malice of the serpent. 'You shall not,' he says, 'die the death by any means.' God affirms, the woman doubts, Satan denies. So I too fear, lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his craft, so your senses too be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ Jesus. Thus Bernard.

Conclusion of Bernard's quotation: 'God affirms, the woman doubts, Satan denies' (with the echo of 2 Cor. 11:3).

For that which follows, 'You shall be as gods,' in Hebrew it is ■■■■■ (Elohim), signifying in the plural 'gods,' although not seldom it is found set down in the singular for 'God.' By that word are also signified both the Angels, and, among men, those who are princes, magnates, and judges: wherefore some think it is here taken for the Angels. But that signification does not seem to fit this history: for the demon said that God had forbidden the fruit of that tree out of envy—namely, lest they should turn out like God; but it was not credible that God envied man the likeness of the Angels, but rather of himself. And a little below God said, 'Behold, Adam has become as one of us': which without doubt ought to be referred to the divine Persons, not to the Angels. Therefore in this place the word ■■■■■ (Elohim) is set down to signify God. Yet the demon did not promise man equality with God—for that was too absurd and incredible—but a certain eminent and singular likeness of divinity, namely an excellent knowledge and wisdom of all things.

GLYPH verified by magnification: Hebrew ■■■■■ (Elohim), occurring twice—the plural 'gods' (also used of angels, princes, judges), but here = God (since 'Adam has become as one of us,' Gen. 3:22, refers to the divine Persons). The serpent promised not equality with God but a singular likeness of divinity (excellent knowledge).

But this whole speech of the serpent is ambiguous, and flexible to diverse senses: of which kind were the responses of Pythian Apollo, which seemed able to be accommodated and to fit any outcome. For that 'You shall not die' can be referred either to the sudden and present death which would follow the eating of that fruit, or to the inevitable necessity of dying. That too, 'Your eyes shall be opened,' can be accommodated either to the knowledge of all things and man's glory, or to his disgrace and confusion. And that 'as gods' can signify either the likeness of the true God and of the good Angels, or even of demons. Finally, that 'knowing good and evil' signifies either the perfect knowledge of all things, or the knowledge of good through its privation and the awareness of evil through its experience—which kind of knowledge is the most wretched and most unhappy for man. The demon, therefore, spoke sophistically, and was the

prince of all Sophists. But he who speaks sophistically, as is written in chapter 37 of Ecclesiasticus, is hateful to God.

Marginal gloss: 'Ambigua serpentis oratio' (The ambiguous speech of the serpent). The serpent's speech, like Delphic oracles, is ambiguous at every clause; the demon spoke 'sophistically' (cf. Sir. 37:23[?], 'he who speaks sophistically is hateful').

It is well said, what Rupert writes—that the demon first desired to become like God; for those words are his which, swelling with pride, he spoke in Isaiah: 'I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of God I will set my throne, I will be like the Most High.' But because this did not succeed for him, he afterward wished to make God like himself—that is, a liar and envious; and this he tried to prove and persuade to man. The same Rupert, in chapters 7 and 8 of the same third book On the Trinity, weighing those words of the serpent, 'You shall not die the death by any means,' eloquently the fallacies and am[biguities]...

Marginal glosses: 'Diabolus Sophista, & princeps omnium Sophistarum. Esaia 14.' (The devil a Sophist, and prince of all Sophists; Isaiah 14:13-14, 'I will ascend into heaven'); 'Praeclara Ruperti oratio' (Rupert's distinguished discourse). Rupert: the devil, failing to become like God, sought to make God like himself (a liar, envious). His quotation begins (catchword '& am' = & ambages).

— p. 681 (PDF) · printed p. 640 —

...and ambiguities of the serpent, artfully framed for mocking and deceiving man, he sets forth in these words: Now the serpent is a mocker, and answers ambiguously: so that, when God's truth shall have been fulfilled, he may nonetheless affirm himself, with a hostile guffaw, to be truthful. For since there are two deaths, one of the soul and the other of the body, by a certain death they were not to die at once—namely, by that which divides the soul from the body. For not because they ate did they therefore die bodily on the same day; but because, by eating, they consigned themselves on the same day to the death of the soul, therefore, by the mercy of God, they were made mortal in body, lest, like the devil himself, they should be irrecoverable, living wickedly and miserably forever.

Verbatim Rupert (De Trinitate III.7-8), continued (catchword '& am'): the serpent's ambiguity exploits the two deaths (of soul and body); the first parents died at once in soul, and bodily mortality was God's mercy (lest they be irrecoverable like the devil).

Therefore, just as Delphic Apollo is said to have been wont to play with uncertain ambiguities, so now this same enemy of God and men was playing, wickedly abusing the equivocation of 'death'—the greatest of hateful Sophists. For he who speaks sophistically is hateful, as a certain Wise man says. Nonetheless, the rest too of what follows he confounds and disturbs entirely by equivocating, speaking in one sense and wishing his words understood in another. 'For God knows,' he says, 'that on whatever day you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened.' This indeed he wished to be understood—that God, envying man the clarity of all wisdom, and also divinity and the wisdom of all things, forbade him such a tree. This, I say, he wished to be understood in his speech, while he himself felt that it would turn out otherwise—his own meaning, however, being engaged about these very words with an almost unspeakable aversion. 'Your eyes shall be opened,' he says—namely, to the recognition of your confusion. For there is a certain unhappy opening of the eyes, when the eyes of the impious shall be revealed, when, as the book of Wisdom testifies, 'Seeing, they shall be troubled with horrible fear, and shall wonder at the su[ddenness]...'

Marginal glosses: 'Ecclesiastes 37.' (Sir. 37:23); 'Sapientia 5.' (Wisd. 5:2). Rupert continued: the serpent equivocates like Delphic Apollo; 'your eyes shall be opened' really means opened to the recognition of confusion (the 'unhappy opening' of the impious, Wisd. 5). Sentence continues (catchword 'su' = subitatione).

...suddenness of unhoped-for salvation, and, groaning from anguish of spirit, shall say within themselves, doing penance: These are they whom we once held in derision, and for a likeness of reproach.' But also in the distinguished Poet, according to this opening of the eyes, the tyrant of the lower world speaks, taunting amid his torments:

'Learn justice, being warned, and not to despise the gods.' Likewise, when he said, 'And you shall be as gods'—as false gods, that is—he intended to make them like himself and his followers, the apostate angels: while he wished, as has been said, something else to be understood in this promise of his, to which, of course, sweetly sounding, he had mixed, as it were into wine, the venom of death. Nonetheless, by also adding, 'Knowing good and evil,' he was contriving this, that he might make them have both the memory of the good they had lost, and the experience of the evil they had found: while he wished something else to be understood—that they would attain, through that food, all knowledge, and that nothing would be hidden from them, which knowledge is indeed God's alone. Consider now how great is the lifting-up according to the sense of him who is deceived; how great the casting-down according to the sense of him who deceives.

Marginal gloss: 'Virgil. lib. 6. Aeneidos.' (Virgil, Aeneid VI.620, 'Discite iustitiam moniti...'). Rupert continued: the 'opened eyes' = the impious recognizing their ruin (Wisd. 5); Virgil's hell-tyrant; 'as gods' = like the apostate angels; 'knowing good and evil' = memory of lost good and experience of found evil—the deceiver casting down while the deceived feels lifted up.

Under the same promise, when it is said, 'Your eyes shall be opened,' she thinks of the height of wisdom, he thinks of the confusion of conscience. Under the same expression, when it is said, 'And you shall be as gods,' she thinks of seizing the loftiness of God, he thinks of finding a damnation like his own. Likewise under the same promise of the knowledge of good and evil, she thinks of the fullness of knowledge, he thinks of the experience of misery. Most troublesome is this kind of fallacy, in which he who deceives both wins the palm of lying, and boasts that he is truthful and has spoken truth; but he who is deceived has no ground from which he can convict of falsehood the one who taunts him, however most deceitful that one may be. Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert's quotation: under each clause the deceived hears one thing, the deceiver intends another—the worst kind of fallacy, where the liar can even boast of truthfulness. (The lemma Gen. 3:6 'Vidit' follows—catchword 'Vidit'.)

— p. 682 (PDF) · printed p. 641 —

Genesis chapter 3, verse 6. The woman therefore saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit and ate, and gave to her husband.

The lemma: Eve's eating and giving to Adam (Gen. 3:6).

The woman had seen that tree before, but with a simple and innocent gaze; she saw it then, but now burning with the desire of eating that fruit. That tree appeared to her by far most beautiful—which same tree, however, she soon, when God's precept was now violated and the fruit of heavenly goods cast away, saw and hated and detested. So Amnon, the son of David, first most ardently loved his sister Thamar; but when he had gained her embraces, more vehemently than he had loved her, he loathed, hated, and shunned her. In these words three vices of Eve are denoted: curiosity, pleasure, and vanity. 'She saw,' that is, she considered too curiously the beauty of the tree: behold, curiosity. 'She saw that it was sweet to eat': behold, pleasure. Finally, 'She saw that it was delightful to behold'—or, as the Hebrew and Greek sound, 'desirable for understanding, or for contemplation'—that is, that it could conduce very much to understanding and contemplation: behold, vanity. By this threefold cord the demon drags man, bound and tied, to all outrages. These are those three enticements of all evils, by which the world allures men to itself, of which John says: 'All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.'

Marginal glosses: '2. Reg. 13.' (2 Samuel/2 Kings 13, Amnon and Thamar); 'Tria Evae vitia' (Eve's three vices); '1. Ioan. 2.' (1 John 2:16). Eve's three vices in Gen. 3:6—curiosity, pleasure, vanity—correspond to the three concupiscences of 1 John 2:16. (The Hebrew/Greek give 'desirable for understanding/contemplation' for 'delightful to behold.')

But let us illustrate what we have said by the elegant explanation of the same words which is in Rupert, in the ninth chapter of the third book On the Trinity. Not idly, he says, was it said, 'The woman saw,' as if she had not seen that tree before. And in truth she had not yet seen it in that manner, because she had not yet considered it with that presumption with which she now gazed at it. For it is to be noted that Scripture did not say, 'The woman therefore saw the tree, and took of its fruit and ate,' but, 'The woman saw,' he says, 'that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and took of its fruit and ate.' 'She saw, therefore'—that is, she considered, diligently gazed, attended too curiously, and herself wished to be the judge of the things she had heard. She had heard what God had said, 'On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death'; she had heard the serpent saying the contrary, 'You shall not die the death by any means.' Wavering between these, she wished to judge the nature of the tree by her own senses, that she might know to whom especially—to God, namely, or to the serpent—she should grant the palm of truth. But those inner eyes which ought to have judged of this were now hampered by the concupiscence of the outer ey[es]...

Rupert, De Trinitate III.9: 'the woman saw' marks a new, presumptuous gaze; wavering between God's word and the serpent's, Eve made herself judge by her senses—her inner eyes hampered by the outer eyes' lust. Sentence continues (catchword 'concupi' = concupiscentia).

...of the eyes, so that they saw neither even the death of the body alone, nor that it was not the nature of the tree but the transgression of the command that would bring a twofold death. And so, with the outer eyes alone, she considered and discerned the nature of the tree, ill-cautious that in the fruit of the tree there was no venom of death: for it was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, delightful to behold. These things she judged to be repugnant to all the speech which God had spoken, and rather to agree with the serpent's speech, and to demonstrate the truth of his assertion. So she saw, and so with

sacrilegious ra[shness]...

Rupert continued (catchword 'concupi'): with only the outer eyes, Eve judged the tree harmless (good, fair, delightful), concluding (wrongly) that this contradicted God and confirmed the serpent. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'te' = temeritate). Running footer: 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1. MMM'.

— p. 683 (PDF) · printed p. 642 —

...with no merit on his part [she trusted] the devil more than God, the serpent more than the Creator, and she took of the fruit of the tree and ate. Nor was it enough for her that she had eaten, but in addition she gave it also to her husband. Thus far Rupert.

End of the Rupert (of Deutz) quotation carried over from the previous page (printed 641). Running head misprinted '632'; true printed page is 642 (gathering misprint, PDF 658-686: the compositor dropped the tens digit; confirmed by offset 41 and unbroken catchwords).

Consider further that the woman first heard the serpent; then saw the tree; afterward plucked the fruit; next ate it; and finally led her husband to eat. In exactly the same manner, and in the same order, it comes to pass by experience that we advance in sinning: for first is the devil's suggestion, then the dwelling upon it, then delight, next deliberate consent, after that the doing of the wicked deed, and finally the communicating of the same crime to others, like the contagion of one and the same disease and plague. Bernard treats this passage admirably in his treatise On the Degrees of Humility. For weighing Eve's harmful curiosity and vanity, he writes in this manner:

Marginal gloss: 'Per quos gradus hominem daemon ad summa flagitia devolvat' (By what stages the demon rolls a man down into the gravest crimes). The six stages of sin: suggestio, consideratio, delectatio, deliberatus consensus, operis effectio, communicatio.

You too, O Eve, are placed in Paradise that you may work with your husband and keep it: if you complete what is enjoined, you will one day pass over to a better state, where there will be no need for you to be occupied in any task, nor to be anxious about keeping watch. Every

tree of Paradise is granted you for food, except that one which is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For if the rest are good and taste of good, what need is there to eat of the tree that tastes also of evil? Do not be wise beyond what one ought to be wise: for to be wise as to evil is not to be wise but to be foolish. Keep therefore what is entrusted, await what is promised, beware what is forbidden, lest you lose what is granted. Why do you gaze so intently upon your own death? Why do you cast there your so often wandering eyes? Why does it please you to look at what it is not lawful to eat? 'I stretch out my eyes,' you say, 'not my hand. It was not forbidden me to see, but to eat. Is it not lawful even to lift up with zeal the eyes which God placed in my power?' To which the Apostle replies: All things are lawful to me, but not all are expedient. And even if it is no fault, it is still a token of fault. For unless the mind kept itself less than curious, your curiosity would have no empty time. And even if it is no fault, it is still an occasion of fault, and a token of fault committed, and a cause of fault to be committed. For while you are intent on something else, meanwhile the serpent secretly glides into your heart, speaks flatteringly, with flatteries lulls your reason, with lies stills your fear. 'By no means,' he says, 'shall you die.' He increases concern while he stirs appetite. He whets curiosity while he suggests desire. At last he offers the forbidden and carries off the granted. He holds out the apple and steals away Paradise. He draws in a poison that is to perish, and a poison that will bring forth those who are to perish. Salvation perishes, yet bringing-forth did not cease. We are born, we die, and so we are born to die, because first we die to be born. Therefore a heavy yoke lies upon all your children unto this present day. Thus far the words of Bernard.

Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara D. Bernardi sententia' (The excellent opinion of St. Bernard). Bernard of Clairvaux, De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae, addressing Eve. 'Omnia mihi licet sed non omnia expediunt' = 1 Cor 6:12. The famous epigram 'Porrigit pomum, & surripit Paradisum' (He holds out the apple and steals away Paradise).

From this passage there comes to us a most wholesome lesson, how carefully, cautiously, and conscientiously we ought to guard the sense of the eyes, since we see that the beginning of Eve's evils was a careless guarding of the eyes. 'She saw,' says Scripture, 'the beauty of the tree': whence at once there blazed up in her mind the desire of eating, and the boldness of plucking the forbidden fruit, and of eating it against the divine command. It is incredible to say, but too well known and proved by daily experience, how many and how great disgraces enter through the eyes into the mind...

Marginal gloss: 'Quanta mala ex incuriosa oculorum custodia permanent ad homines' (How great the evils that reach men from a careless guarding of the eyes). Catchword: 'animum' (the sentence continues at the top of the next page).

— p. 684 (PDF) · printed p. 643 —

...fly into the mind, so that David rightly prayed earnestly to God, 'Turn away my eyes that they may not see vanity' (Ps 118), and Job 31: 'I made a covenant,' he says, 'with my eyes, that I would not so much as think upon a maiden.' Treating these words, Gregory in Book 21 of the Morals, chapter 2, disputes with most luminous reflections and examples about this guarding of the eyes; and I thought I would do the reader a favor if I set forth at present, in the very words in which it is delivered by him, a matter so useful and so accurately and diligently explained by Gregory. He writes thus:

Continues the sentence from page 642 (catchword 'animum'). Scriptural references in margin: 'Psal. 118' (Averte oculos meos ne videant vanitatem) and Job 31 (Pepigi foedus cum oculis meis). Marginal gloss: 'Egregia Gregorii sententia de custodia oculorum' (The outstanding opinion of Gregory on guarding the eyes). Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, lib. 21, cap. 2. Running head misprinted '633'; true printed page 643.

Since the soul is invisible, it is by no means touched by delight in bodily things except insofar as, clinging to the body, it has the senses of that body as so many openings for going out. For sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch are as it were a road of the mind, by which it

may go forth and covet the things that are outside its own substance. For through these bodily senses, as through certain windows, the soul looks out upon all external things; and looking, it covets. Hence indeed Jeremiah says, 'Death has climbed up through our windows.' For death climbs up through the windows and enters the house, when desire, coming in through the bodily senses, enters the dwelling of the mind. Against which, as we have often said concerning the just, it is said through Isaiah, 'Who are these that fly like clouds, and as doves to their windows?' For the just are said to fly like clouds because they are lifted above earthly contagions; and they are as doves to their windows because, through the bodily senses, they do not look upon outward things with the aim of grasping, and carnal desire does not snatch them outward. But whoever incautiously looks outward through these windows of the body is for the most part carried off, even unwilling, into the delight of sin, and bound by his desires begins to will what he did not will. For the headlong soul, while it does not beforehand provide against seeing incautiously what it may covet, then blindly begins to desire what it saw. Hence too the Prophet, a mind that, exalted, was often present at inner mysteries, because he incautiously looked upon another's wife, was darkened and afterward joined her unlawfully to himself. But the holy man, who as a most just judge presides over the bodily senses received as subject ministers, sees faults before they come, and as against death lying in ambush shuts the windows of the body, saying: 'I made a covenant with my eyes, that I would not so much as think upon a maiden.' For that he might chastely keep the thoughts of his heart, he made a covenant with his eyes, lest he should first incautiously look upon what he would afterward unwillingly love. For it is very grievous that the flesh drags downward, and the appearance of a form once bound to the heart through the eyes is scarcely loosed by the hand of great struggle. Lest therefore we turn over certain slippery things in thought, we must provide against it, because it is not fitting to gaze upon what it is not

lawful to covet. For that the mind may be kept pure in thought, the eyes must be repressed from the wantonness of their pleasure, as certain ravishers to fault. For Eve would not have touched the forbidden tree had she not first incautiously gazed upon it. For it is written: 'The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold: and she took of its fruit, and ate.' Hence then it must be weighed with how great restraint we ought to hold back our sight from things unlawful, we who live mortally, if even the mother of the living came to death through the eyes. Hence too, under the voice of Judah, which by looking upon outward things and coveting them had lost the inner goods, the Prophet says, 'My eye has plundered my soul.' For by coveting visible things, she lost the invisible virtues. The soul, therefore, which betrayed its inner fruit through...

Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 21.2, quoted at length on the senses as 'windows' of the mind. Marginal references: 'Via mentis sensus exteriores' (The outward senses are the road of the mind); 'Hier. 9' (Jer 9:21, Ascendit mors per fenestras nostras); 'Esaiae 60' (Isa 60:8); '2. Reg. 11' (2 Sam 11, David and Bathsheba); 'Gen. 3'; 'Thren. 3' (Lam 3:51, Oculus meus depraedatus est animam meam). The quotation continues onto page 644 (catchword: 'per').

— p. 685 (PDF) · printed p. 644 —

...the outward sight, lost through the eye of the body the prey of the heart. Whence, for the guarding of the heart's purity, the discipline of the outward senses too must be kept by us. For however great the virtue with which the mind is strong, however great the gravity with which it is vigorous, the carnal senses nevertheless make a kind of childish outward clamor; and unless they are reined in by the weight of inner gravity and by a kind of youthful vigor, they drag the enfeebled mind to fleeting and earthly things. Thus Gregory.

Conclusion of the Gregory (Moralia 21.2) quotation begun on page 643. Running head misprinted '634'; true printed page 644.

GENESIS, chapter 3, verse 6. She took of its fruit and ate.

New lemma. Marginal reference 'Gen. c. 3. / vers. 6.'

In this way Eve's sin was consummated, the sin, I mean, of disobedience, namely by the violation of God's command, by which eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil had been forbidden her. But concerning Eve's sin we must discourse a little more subtly.

Pererius's transition from the running exposition to the disputation that follows.

A DISPUTATION ON THE SIN OF EVE.

Major structural divider (set off by a horizontal rule). Begins the formal disputation on Eve's sin, which will be divided into Quaestiones.

Before all else, it must be laid down as certain that Eve did not sin before the encounter and the discourse of the serpent. Scripture plainly indicates this, when in the last words of chapter 2 it said that Adam and Eve were naked, and yet were not ashamed. By which it meant to signify that they were in the happy state of impassibility and innocence; and immediately afterward it weaves in the history of the serpent, who tempted Eve. From which it is permitted to understand, from the very sequence and context of the narrative, that the first human beings remained in that state of innocence right up to the temptation of the serpent.

Marginal gloss: 'Evam non peccasse ante congressionem serpentis' (That Eve did not sin before her encounter with the serpent).

And this is confirmed by the opinion of the Fathers, who set up a distinction between the sin of the first man and the sin of the first Angel: namely, that the former was committed through the suggestion and persuasion of another, and was therefore worthy of pardon; whereas the latter was perpetrated by its own malice, by no one's counsel, persuasion, or impulse, and for that reason was irremissible. Rupert, however, in chapter 5 of book 3 On the Trinity, and following him Johannes Ferus in his Commentary on this chapter 3, held the contrary: whose opinion certain men wished to make probable on this ground; 'unless Eve had sinned

beforehand,' they say, 'God would by no means have allowed her to be tempted by the devil' — namely, knowing that by that temptation she would be conquered and ruined. But the argument is weak. For God, by the knowledge of simple intelligence (as the Theologians speak), saw that Eve could resist the temptation and conquer it without effort; and therefore he permitted her to be tempted, because temptation befits the state of the wayfarer for the exercise of free will, for the proof of virtue, for the occasion and matter of richer merit and greater reward; especially since that temptation was not an inner one afflicting the mind, but an outward one without any trouble to the human being. Indeed, by this kind of temptation God the Father permitted even our Lord Jesus Christ to be tempted by the devil.

Marginal glosses: 'Refellitur Ruperti, & Ioannis Feri sententia' (The opinion of Rupert and Johannes Ferus is refuted); 'Deus cur tentari Evam permiserit quam sciebat peccaturam. Matth. 4.' (Why God permitted Eve, whom he knew would sin, to be tempted; cf. Matt 4, the temptation of Christ). Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate 3.5; Johannes Ferus (Wild). 'Scientia simplicis intelligentiae' = God's knowledge of simple intelligence (a scholastic distinction). Catchword: 'QUAE' (= QUAESTIO, beginning on the next page).

— p. 686 (PDF) · printed p. 645 —

QUESTION V. What Eve's first sin was.

First Quaestio of the Disputatio de peccato Evae. The heading is printed 'QUAESTIO V' but this is a misprint for QUAESTIO I: this is the disputation's first question ('What Eve's first sin was'), and the next question (printed page 646) correctly reads QUAESTIO II. Running head misprinted 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VI. 635'; true printed page 645.

This being laid down, then, we hold that Eve's first sin was pride: for as soon as the serpent said to Eve, 'Why has God commanded you,' etc., and (as Cajetan well noted upon these words) we must suppose that the serpent did not say only these words to Eve, but a good many others, which Moses for the sake of brevity forbore to record; by which the serpent showed that by that command of God man's liberty was greatly burdened and oppressed, and his dignity diminished. At once, therefore, after these words

a certain movement of elation arose in Eve's mind, resenting that she was held bound by that law, and desiring to live freely by her own judgment, subject to no one, and self-sufficient for living: and this is pride. Divine Scripture confirms this judgment, which in Sirach 20 and Tobit 4 makes pride the beginning of all sin and ruin.

Marginal gloss: 'Primum peccatum Evae, superbia' (Eve's first sin: pride). Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) cited. 'Cur praecepit vobis Deus' = Gen 3:1. 'Initium omnis peccati superbia' echoes Sir 10:13/Sir 20 and Tob 4.

Augustine declares this same thing in most elegant words and sentences in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 13, writing in this manner: But they began to be evil in secret, so that they slipped into open disobedience. For the evil deed would not have been reached, had not an evil will gone before. Now what could be the beginning of the evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of all sin; and what is pride but the appetite for a perverse loftiness? For it is a perverse loftiness, when the soul, forsaking the principle to which it ought to cling, becomes and is in a manner its own principle. This happens when it is too pleased with itself, when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to have pleased it more than it pleases itself. This falling away is voluntary: for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of the higher unchangeable good, by which it was enlightened that it might see and kindled that it might love, it would not have turned away thence to please itself, and from this grow dark and cold, so that either she might believe the serpent had spoken the truth, or he might prefer his wife's will to God's command, and think himself a venial transgressor of the precept if he did not forsake the partner of his life even in the partnership of sin. Therefore the evil deed was not done — that is, that transgression, the eating of the forbidden food — except by those who were already evil; for that fruit would not have become evil except from an evil tree. After this, with some things interposed, he adds: By the manifest and

open sin, then, where there was done what God had forbidden to be done, the devil would not have caught man, had not man already begun to please himself. For hence too what was said gave delight, 'You shall be as Gods': which they could better be by cleaving through obedience to the highest and true principle, than by being their own principle through pride. For created gods are gods not by their own power, but by participation in the true God; but man, by seeking more, becomes less, for while he chose to suffice for himself, he falls away from him who truly suffices for him. That evil, then, by which a man is pleased with himself as if he too were a light, turns him away from that light which, if he is pleased with it, makes him also to be a light: that evil, I say, had gone before in secret, so that this evil might follow which was perpetrated in the open. For it is true what is written, before ruin the heart is exalted...

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.13, quoted at length on pride as the root of the Fall. 'Eritis sicut Dii' = Gen 3:5. The closing citation 'ante ruinam exaltatur cor' = Prov 16:18 (margin: 'Prover. 16'). Marginal glosses: 'Superbia est peccati initium' (Pride is the beginning of sin); 'Superbia, quid' (What pride is); 'Opus malum non nisi a malis sit' (An evil deed is done only by the evil); 'Dii creati participatione veri Dei, Dii sunt' (Created gods are gods by participation in the true God). Catchword: 'cor' (the Prov 16 citation continues on the next page); page footer signature 'MMM 3'.

— p. 687 (PDF) · printed p. 646 —

...the heart, and before glory it is humbled. That ruin, which happens in secret, altogether precedes the ruin which happens openly, while the former is not thought to be a ruin. For who reckons exaltation a ruin, when there is already there a falling-away, by which the height has been forsaken? But who would not see it to be a ruin, when there is an evident and unquestionable transgression of the command? For this reason God forbade that thing, which, once committed, could be defended by no imagining of justice. And therefore I dare to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, that they may become displeasing to themselves who had already fallen by being pleased with themselves. For more wholesomely did Peter

become displeasing to himself when he wept, than he was pleasing to himself when he presumed. This too the sacred Psalm says: 'Fill their faces with shame, and they shall seek your name, O Lord' — that is, that you may please them who seek your name, who had pleased themselves by seeking their own.' Thus far the words of Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Civitate Dei 14.13) carried over from page 645. Marginal gloss: 'Notabilis admodum sententia B. Augustini' (A most noteworthy opinion of St. Augustine). References: 'Matth. 26' (Peter's weeping, Matt 26:75); 'Psal. 82' (Ps 82:17 Vulg., 'Imple facies eorum ignominia'). Running head misprinted '636'; true printed page 646.

QUESTION II. What other sins, besides pride, Eve had.

Second Quaestio of the Disputatio de peccato Evae (set off by a horizontal rule).

Eve's second sin was a certain spiritual sloth, by which it came about that, on hearing the serpent's words, the divine command, by which she was forbidden the eating of that tree, at once began to be displeasing and wearisome to her. The third sin was lying: for she said that God had forbidden them the touching of the tree, whereas he had forbidden only the eating. The fourth was the sin of infidelity: for if anyone is doubtful in faith, he is unfaithful; and Eve was assuredly unfaithful, because she doubted the truth of the divine pronouncement, by which it had been said to Adam, 'If you eat of this tree you shall die the death'; whereas she said doubtingly, 'Lest perhaps we die'; and besides she preferred to believe the serpent rather than God. The fifth sin was pride: for besides that first one which we have recalled, again, on hearing that promise of the serpent, 'You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil,' she was inflamed with desire of so excellent a power and knowledge; for she immoderately coveted an excellence of power such as God has, and a knowledge of all things without any manner or measure. The sixth sin was gluttony: for the higher part being corrupted by pride, the lower part was at once perverted and corrupted by most ardently desiring the fruit forbidden her — which Scripture signified not obscurely in those words, 'The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and beautiful to the eyes,' etc. The seventh sin was

disobedience, namely by the violation of God's law, by which the eating of that tree is forbidden.

Marginal glosses keyed to each sin: 'Accidia spiritualis Evae' (Eve's spiritual sloth); 'Mendacium' (Lying); 'Infidelitas' (Infidelity); 'Iterum superbia' (Pride again); 'Gula' (Gluttony); 'Inobedientia' (Disobedience). Scriptural echoes: Gen 2:17 ('Si comederis... morte morieris'), Gen 3:3 ('Ne forte moriamur'), Gen 3:5 ('Eritis sicut Dii'), Gen 3:6 ('Vidit mulier...'). Pride was the first sin (treated in Quaestio I).

And here was made the consummation of iniquity, on account of which both those first human beings and all their posterity were deprived of the heavenly gift of original justice, and were punished with innumerable evils and miseries. I said the sin of disobedience, because the eating of that tree, setting aside God's law, was naturally good, but morally indifferent, to good or to evil. It was therefore so greatly evil and harmful for this one reason only, that it was against the obedience of the divine command, by which...

The eating was 'naturally good, morally indifferent' apart from God's law; its evil lay wholly in the disobedience. Catchword: 'quo' (the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 688 (PDF) · printed p. 647 —

...it had been forbidden to human beings: not indeed for any other reason than that man's obedience might be tested and proved, as we disputed above in the third book. The eighth was the sin of scandal: for by her own example, and by her coaxing and importunate entreaties, she moved, enticed, and impelled Adam to the same sin. The ninth sin was the foolish and shameless excusing of the crime committed: for when the woman was rebuked by God, she did not confess the crime, did not accuse herself, nor in penitence grieve over the offense, groan, and ask for pardon; but transferred the blame for the error onto the serpent by whom she had been deceived.

Continues the sentence from page 646 (catchword 'quo'). Marginal glosses: 'Scandalum' (Scandal — the eighth sin); 'Excusatio' (Excuse — the ninth). Eve blames the serpent (cf. Gen 3:13) rather than confessing.

In this whole sequence and order, then, as is probable, were the crimes perpetrated by Eve at that time. I do not, however, wish it understood that the aforesaid sins were all distinct in reality: but either they were distinct sins, or different circumstances and disordered movements and affections of a mind tending toward one and the same sin. But someone may ask, how could Eve bring herself to believe that the serpent's words and promises could be true, when they were utterly absurd and incredible? To this it can be answered: that Eve at that time, as Augustine says in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 42, was very simple and of small understanding, and was ignorant of many things which she afterward learned and came to know from Adam. Or it can be said that Eve was so blinded in intellect by the sin of pride that either she thought the serpent's words possible, or at least did not notice and consider whether they were possible or not; but with her whole mind and desire was intent upon his promises, which were very specious and seemed most greatly to be desired.

Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo Eva tam absurdis dictis, & promissis serpentis credere potuerit' (How Eve could believe such absurd words and promises of the serpent). Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.42.

And she gave to her husband, who ate.

Lemma continuing Gen 3:6; marginal reference 'Ibidem' (same place).

Why did Eve solicit Adam to eat that fruit? Was it because she loved him exceedingly, and therefore desired him to become a partaker of her joy and good? For since, after eating the forbidden fruit, she had experienced that she had not died, she believed it had been true what the serpent had said to her, 'By no means shall you die': whence she also conceived the hope that the other promise of the same serpent would prove true, 'You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.' Or is this too credible, that the serpent persuaded the woman to bring her husband to eat? For he spoke in the plural, saying, 'If you eat,' and 'You shall be': declaring that so great a good could not befall the one without the other.

Scriptural references: Gen 3:4 ('Nequaquam moriemini'); Gen 3:5 ('Eritis sicut Dii'). Note Pererius's point that the serpent's plural address implies Adam was meant to be drawn in.

And hence it is plain that it is truly written in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 25, that from a woman was made the beginning of sin. 'From a woman,' it says, 'was the beginning of sin made, and through her we all die.' Now the demon tempted Eve before Adam, because he knew her to be easier to believe anything, and weaker to resist, and more prone to a fall. This was known to him from the feebler and less noble constitution of her body and the nature of her sex, from the lesser excellence and perfection of the gifts...

Marginal gloss: 'Cur diabolus prius tentaverit Evam quam Adamum' (Why the devil tempted Eve before Adam). Citation: Sirach 25:33 ('A muliere initium peccati, et per illam omnes morimur'). Catchword: 'norum' (= donorum, the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 689 (PDF) · printed p. 648 —

...of natural gifts, and because God had made the woman for the sake of the man. But Adam himself he knew to be better equipped in all respects, and firmer to resist. Yet, the woman being persuaded and deceived, he thought it would not be hard, through her — as one most dear to Adam — to impel even Adam himself to sin. This Augustine confirms in these words, in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 11: 'He began from the woman, namely the inferior part of that human couple, so as to arrive gradually at the whole, not reckoning the man easily credulous, nor able to be deceived by erring, but [deceivable] while he yields to another's error.' Thus Augustine: and indeed, it came about just as the demon had contrived.

Continues from page 647 (catchword 'norum'). Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.11.

But if through Eve Adam's constancy had not been shaken, the demon would nonetheless have entered upon other means of assailing Adam, and would have left nothing unattempted and untouched by which he could cast him down from that most happy state. To this he was driven by hatred of God, whom he did not want to be glorified through Adam and the human

race; then pride goaded him, taking it ill that he, who was by nature more excellent than man, should not rule over and preside over him, but rather that man should be preferred to himself. But most of all envy burned him, and he could not bear that man should attain the present happiness in which he beheld him placed, and the future happiness which had been promised and prepared for him — which he himself had lost. And since envy was the proximate cause that more vehemently incited the demon to destroy man, therefore divine Scripture records this one alone, when in the book of Wisdom, chapter 2, it says, 'By the envy of the devil death entered into the world.'

The devil's three motives: hatred of God, pride, and above all envy. Citation: Wisdom 2:24 ('Invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum').

But it is not likely that Eve related to Adam the serpent's words and promises. For if she had disclosed them, Adam would easily have noticed the wiles and frauds of the demon, and would have guarded himself. But if any of us should ask by what things Adam was led to eat, we shall answer briefly: not by faith and belief in the serpent's promises, which either were not set forth to him, or were not believed by him; since Paul, in the second chapter of the first epistle to Timothy, openly and positively says that Adam was not deceived. Just as Aaron did not cast the golden calf for worship, nor did Solomon sacrifice to idols, out of error of judgment and opinion: but the one struck by fear of the people, the other to comply with the women whom he most ardently loved. Adam's mind, therefore, was inclined to eat, partly by Eve's excessive blandishments, partly by her importunate entreaties, by which she signified that unless he gratified her in this, she would, out of sadness and grief, never be...

Marginal gloss: 'An Eva narraverit Adamo promissa serpentis' (Whether Eve related the serpent's promises to Adam). References: 1 Tim 2:14 ('Adam was not deceived'); 'Exod. 32' (Aaron's golden calf); '2. Reg. 11' (printed; the Solomon reference is properly 3 Reg./1 Kings 11). Catchword: 'quillo' (= tranquillo, the sentence continues on the next page).

...of tranquil and cheerful mind. In the same way Delilah acted with Samson: for thus we read in the book of Judges, chapter 16: 'When she was troublesome to him, and clung to him continually for many days, allowing no time for rest, his soul fainted, and was wearied even to death. Then, disclosing the truth of the matter, he said to her' — and what follows. Next, this moved Adam, that he saw Eve, after the eating of the forbidden fruit...

Citation: Judges 16:16 (Delilah wearing down Samson). Catchword: 'veti' (= vetiti, the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 690 (PDF) · printed p. 649 —

...had not died, on account of which he began to doubt, or even perhaps to believe, that that sentence of God had been pronounced for the sake of threat and terror, not as something that would have effect. Besides this, because he was inexperienced of the divine severity, he could be deceived in this, so as to believe it an excusable, venial matter, if he should eat against the command from that tree; and he reckoned that he would bring to God, when rebuking and chastising him, a just excuse, and one which God would readily accept: if he should say that he had done it to gratify his consort, not [a consort] whom he had taken for himself, but whom God had given to him. Perhaps, too, bold curiosity struck his mind...

Continues from page 648 (Adam saw Eve had not died after eating). Catchword: 'riositas' (= curiositas, the sentence continues below). Running head misprinted '639'; true printed page 649.

...and an eagerness to experience what lay hidden in that fruit, and what would follow from touching it: especially since that tree bore such fruits as he had perceived to be harmless to him on other trees of the same kind. Thus Augustine philosophizes, in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 11, and in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 31. And the words of the former testimony run in this manner:

Pererius introduces two Augustine passages: De Civitate Dei 14.11 and De Genesi ad litteram 11.31.

For just as Aaron did not, when led on, consent to the erring people's making of the idol, but yielded under constraint; nor is it credible that Solomon by error thought that idols were to be served, but was compelled by feminine flatteries to those sacrileges: so it must be believed that this man [Adam], by his woman — one by one, man by man, spouse by spouse — was [led] to transgress God's law, not seduced as one believing a speaker of truth, but yielded out of social attachment. For not in vain did the Apostle say, 'Adam was not seduced, but the woman was seduced' — except because she accepted what the serpent spoke to her as if it were true; whereas he was unwilling to be severed from his sole consort, not even in the partnership of sin, nor for that reason less guilty, but sinned knowingly and prudently, yet was not seduced. For he certainly shows that Adam sinned, where he says, 'Through one man sin entered into the world'; and a little later more openly, 'after the likeness,' he says, 'of the transgression of Adam.' But he wished those to be understood as seduced who do not think that what they do is a sin; whereas Adam knew. Otherwise, how will it be true, 'Adam was not seduced'? But, inexperienced of the divine severity, he could be deceived in this, so as to believe the deed was venial. And so, in that very respect in which the woman was seduced, he was not seduced: but it deceived him as to how the thing was to be judged, which he was going to say, 'The woman whom you gave me as companion, she gave me, and I ate.' Why then is there need of more words? Although in believing both were not deceived, yet in sinning both were captured and entangled in the devil's snares. Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.11. Marginal references: 'Exod. 32' (Aaron); '3. Reg. 11' (Solomon); '2. Tim. 2' (printed; properly 1 Tim 2:14, 'Adam was not seduced'); 'Rom. 5' (Rom 5:12, 'Per unum hominem intravit peccatum'); 'Ibid.' (Rom 5:14, 'in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae'); 'Gen. 3' (Gen 3:12, 'Mulier quam dedisti mihi...').

I will not, however, disguise that it may perhaps seem possible to someone that Adam knew the serpent's words and promises and believed them true;

and that God indicated this not obscurely, who, when speaking of Adam, said: 'Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil.' For by these words he charges him with an affected likeness and equality with God in the knowledge of good and evil: signifying that Adam gave faith and assent to that promise of the serpent, 'You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.' But how could Adam, who was wise, believe that he could attain equality with divine knowledge? St. Thomas answers in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 25, and Cajetan in his Commentaries...

Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo Adam expetierit similitudinem & aequalitatem Dei' (How Adam sought likeness and equality with God). References: Gen 3:22 ('Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis'); Gen 3:5 ('Eritis sicut Dii'). Aquinas, Sentences II d.25; Cajetan. Catchword: 'suis'; page footer 'Com. in Gen. Tom. 1.' and signature 'NNN'.

— p. 691 (PDF) · printed p. 650 —

...his [Commentaries] on the Secunda secundae of St. Thomas, question 163, article 4: that Adam coveted that thing not with an absolute appetite, but with a conditional one, reckoning with himself in this manner: 'I would wish to be as God is, if it could be done.' Or it can be answered otherwise, that Adam did not covet equality with the divine power and knowledge, but only a certain likeness of God's power and knowledge, which indeed of itself and simply was not impossible for Adam, yet was not possible for him because of God's contrary law and ordinance. Now that likeness of God's knowledge and power consisted in three things: first, to be free from the subjection and obligation of law, at least positive law; then to have knowledge of all goods and evils without any exception, both present and future; and finally, not to be extrinsically determined to do this rather than that, or to know this and not that.

Continues from page 649 (answer to how wise Adam could expect likeness to God). Authorities: Cajetan (Commentary on Summa 2a2ae) and Aquinas (Summa 2a2ae q.163 a.4). Marginal gloss: 'Similitudo Dei quam concupivit Adamus, in quo consistebat' (The likeness to God that Adam coveted, in what it consisted). Running head misprinted '640'; true printed page 650.

But to this opinion that seems plainly contrary which Paul writes in the second chapter of the first Epistle to Timothy: 'Adam,' he says, 'was first formed, then Eve; and Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression.' By which words Paul plainly teaches that Adam was not deceived; but he would have been deceived, if, believing the serpent's words and promises, he had thought that he could turn out to be like God in knowing good and evil. Therefore what these words of Paul mean, and how much force they have to prove that for the persuading of which they are cited, must next be weighed and considered a little more accurately.

Citation: 1 Tim 2:13-14 ('Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit').

A DISPUTATION WHETHER ADAM WAS TRULY DECEIVED.

Major structural divider (set off by a horizontal rule), opening a new disputation within the treatment of Eve's and Adam's sin.

Many, and especially grave and noble authors, seem to have judged — and they have set it forth in writing — that Adam, foolishly credulous of the serpent's promises and inflamed with desire of divine likeness and power, was deceived with most grievous error of mind and loss of faith. This Ignatius the martyr hands down in his Epistle to the Trallians: 'The devil,' he says, 'through Eve seduced Adam, the father of our race.' Irenaeus, book 3 Against Heresies, chapter 35: 'Seduced by another under the pretext of immortality,' he says, 'he is at once seized with fear and hides himself,' etc. Hilary, Canon 3 on Matthew: 'The serpent had enticed Adam, and by deceiving had led him into error.' Epiphanius, disputing against heresy 38: 'The devil himself,' he says, 'by a lie deceived Eve and Adam, saying one thing for another, and showing friendship with the Creator, when he said, You shall be as Gods, and you shall by no means die.' Augustine, on Psalm 68, explaining those words, 'What I took not away, then did I pay': 'Who, he says, took away? Adam. Who took first? he himself who seduced Adam.

How did the devil take? I will set my seat to the North, and I will be like the Most High: he usurped to himself what he had not received, and by the very cup of pride...'

Catena of Fathers holding that Adam WAS deceived: Ignatius (Ep. ad Trallianos); Irenaeus (Adversus Haereses 3.35); Hilary (on Matthew, Canon 3); Epiphanius (contra haeresim 38; 'Eritis sicut Dii' = Gen 3:5); Augustine (on Ps 68; quoting Isa 14:13-14 'Ponam sedem meam ad Aquilonem, et ero similis Altissimo', margin 'Isa. 14'). Catchword: 'superbia' (the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 692 (PDF) · printed p. 651 —

...gave his own pride to drink to the one whom he wished to deceive, saying, Taste, and you shall be as Gods: they wished to seize divinity, and lost felicity. The same in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 17: 'This,' he says, 'our first parents came to know after the transgression, which they would more happily have been ignorant of, had they, believing and obedient to God, not committed what forced them to experience what infidelity and disobedience harm.' And in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 34: 'What wonder,' he says, 'if the proud, wishing to be as Gods, vanished in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened?' Leo, in a sermon on the Lord's Nativity: 'The devil,' he says, 'boasted that man, deceived by his fraud, was deprived of divine gifts, and, stripped of the endowment of immortality, underwent the hard sentence of death.' And sermon 3: 'Those things which the deceiver brought in and deceived man admitted had no trace in the Savior.' And sermon 4: 'The first man, because he rashly and unhappily believed the envious deceiver, and acquiescing in the counsels of pride, preferred to seize the increase of honor rather than to merit it.'

Continuation from page 650. Augustine: on Ps 68 (the 'cup of pride'; 'Gustate, et eritis sicut Dii'); De Civitate Dei 14.17; De Genesi ad litteram 11.34 (echoing Rom 1:21, 'evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis'). Leo the Great, sermons on the Nativity (incl. serm. 3 and 4).

Prosper, at the end of his book against Cassian: 'Adam,' he says, 'learned beforehand, by God's warning, from how great an evil he ought to beware; and forgot in how great a good he was set, when he believed the devil.' And

in book 2 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 19: 'Unless,' he says, 'the first parents, who had already fallen from the love of God, had loved the three vices of the world, they would never have believed the ill-advised counsel of the serpent; for they believed that they could become what God is.' Cyril, book 3 against Julian, has a similar opinion. And Ambrose, in his book On Paradise, chapter 21: 'The woman's error,' he says, 'was found first: for the woman was the author of error to the man, not the man to the woman. Whence Paul also says, Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression.' The same, in his book On Elijah and Fasting, chapter 4: 'God said, Behold, Adam is become as one of us. God said this mockingly, surely, not approving, as if to say: You thought you would be like us; therefore, because you wished to be what you were not, you ceased to be what you were.' Finally Ambrose himself, on those words of Luke chapter 10, 'who also stripped him'; and Prosper in the book which he wrote against Cassian, chapters 19 and 21, did not hesitate to say that Adam lost faith, namely because he believed the serpent's words and promises more than the words of God.

Further authorities: Prosper of Aquitaine (Contra Collatorem / against Cassian; De vita contemplativa 2.19); Cyril of Alexandria (Contra Iulianum 3); Ambrose (De paradiso 21, quoting 1 Tim 2:14; De Elia et ieiunio 4 on Gen 3:22 'Ecce Adam factus est quasi unus ex nobis'; on Luke 10:30, the man stripped by robbers).

It appears, therefore, from these things which we have recalled as it were in passing, how many and how distinguished authors have judged that Adam was deceived. But since it is not credible that these authors did not read what Paul said, that Adam was not seduced, and much less that they wished to disagree with his judgment, therefore various reasonings have been devised for interpreting that passage of Paul. That passage of Paul, then, the authors have interpreted in various ways, whose interpretations I shall here review very briefly. The first interpretation is that of Epiphanius (in [his treatment of] the heresy of the Quintillians), and of Peter Lombard, Haymo, the Glossa Ordinaria, Oecumenius, and St. Thomas in his Commentary on that same passage of Paul, which the very context of Paul's

words suggests. For it goes thus: 'Adam was first formed, then Eve'; then he adds, 'but Adam was not seduced, but Eve.' Here that word 'first' must be supplied, so that the sense is this: Adam was not seduced first, but...

Marginal gloss: 'Quinque interpretationes illorum verborum Pauli, Adam non est seductus' (Five interpretations of those words of Paul, 'Adam was not seduced'). FIRST interpretation (Epiphanius, Peter Lombard, Haymo, Glossa Ordinaria, Oecumenius, Aquinas): supply 'first.' Catchword: 'Eua' (the sentence continues on the next page); page footer signature 'NNN 2'.

— p. 693 (PDF) · printed p. 652 —

...Eve, who was afterward the author of seduction to Adam. The second interpretation is that of Jerome, book 1 against Jovinian, and of Chrysostom and Ambrose (or him who is falsely thought to be Ambrose), in their explanation of that passage: that Adam is said by Paul not to have been deceived because he was not seduced by the serpent, as Eve was; for Adam did not sin seduced by the serpent, but indulging the will and desire of Eve. Chrysostom's words run thus: 'The account of Adam's and Eve's seduction is not equal: he was seduced by the woman who had been given to him by God and joined to him by fellowship of kind; but she was deceived by a beast which had been made subject to man's service.' Paul, therefore, in comparison with the woman, says that Adam was not deceived: for she was seduced by an irrational animal, but he by a free woman.

Closing clause of the first interpretation, then the SECOND interpretation. Marginal glosses: 'Secunda interpretatio'; 'Chrysost. hom. 9. in episto. ad Corinth.' Authorities: Jerome (Contra Iovinianum 1), Chrysostom (Hom. in 1 Cor.), Ambrose / pseudo-Ambrose. Running head misprinted '642'; true printed page 652.

The third interpretation is that of Theophylact, and is reported by Oecumenius and hinted at by Chrysostom, and it pleased Hugh of St. Victor (in question 16 on Paul's first epistle to Timothy) beyond the others: that Paul said Eve was seduced, but not Adam, because in the sacred writings the deception of Eve is recorded, but the deception of Adam is not narrated. For Eve confessed her deception, saying, 'The serpent deceived

me'; but of Adam nothing of the sort is read, for he answered God: 'The woman whom you gave me as companion gave me, and I ate.' Therefore, because in the sacred writings Adam is not handed down as having been deceived, as it is reported that Eve was seduced, for that reason Paul said that Eve was seduced, but Adam not at all. Paul used a similar manner of speaking, indeed, in the epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 7, writing that Melchizedek had neither father, nor mother, nor genealogy, nor beginning, nor end of days — because Scripture was silent about these things for the sake of a certain mystery.

THIRD interpretation. Marginal glosses: 'Tertia interpretatio'; 'Genes. 3' (Gen 3:13 'Serpens decepit me'; Gen 3:12 'Mulier quam dedisti mihi'). Authorities: Theophylact, Oecumenius, Hugh of St. Victor. The Melchizedek parallel: Heb 7:3.

The fourth interpretation is drawn from a reading of that passage which Ambrose indicates in his book On Paradise, chapter 21, and Chrysostom in this place, and Jerome in book 1 against Jovinian, and also Augustine in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, in the last chapter; which reading goes thus: 'But the woman, being seduced, was made into transgression.' So that the meaning of those words is this: Adam was not seduced in such a way as to become to the woman an occasion of transgression — that is, to be the author to the woman of transgressing; but the woman was so seduced as to be made into transgression to Adam — that is, to induce him to transgress.

FOURTH interpretation, from a variant reading. Marginal gloss: 'Quarta interpretatio.' Authorities: Ambrose (De paradiso 21), Chrysostom, Jerome (Contra Iovinianum 1), Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 11, final chapter).

'Nor is it in vain that the Apostle says, Adam was first formed: but the woman, being seduced, was made in transgression — that is, that through her the man too should transgress. For he calls him too a transgressor, where he says, In the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is the figure of him who was to come; yet he denies that he was seduced. For even when questioned he did not say, the woman

whom you gave me seduced me, and I ate; but, She gave me, he says, of the tree, and I ate; whereas she said, The serpent seduced me. So Solomon, with such great wisdom — is it indeed to be believed that in the worship of idols he believed there was anything of use? But he was not strong enough to resist the love of women drawing him to this evil, doing what he knew ought not to be done, lest he sadden his deadly delights by which he was perishing and dissolving...'

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11 (final chapter), quoted at length. Marginal references: 'Roma. 5' (Rom 5:14, 'in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri'); '3. Reg. 11' (1 Kings 11, Solomon led by his wives into idolatry). Gen 3:12-13 echoed. Catchword: 'ret' (= contristaret, the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 694 (PDF) · printed p. 653 —

'...So too Adam, after the woman, being seduced, had eaten of the forbidden tree, and gave it to him, that they might eat together: he did not wish to sadden her, whom he believed could waste away without his consolation, if she were alienated from his mind, and altogether perish by that discord. Not indeed conquered by concupiscence of the flesh, which he had not yet felt in the law of the members resisting the law of his mind, but by a certain friendly benevolence, by which it often happens that God is offended, lest a man become an enemy out of a friend: which that he ought not to have done, the just outcome by the divine sentence showed. Therefore in another way he too was deceived: but by that serpentine guile by which the woman was seduced, in no way do I think he could have been seduced in the manner in which she could. This properly the Apostle called seduction, by which what was urged, though it was false, was thought to be true — that is, that God forbade them to touch that tree because he knew that if they touched it they would be as Gods, as though he who had made them men envied them divinity. But even if some desire of experiencing solicited the man, on account of some elation of mind by which he could not be hidden from God the searcher of inner

things, when he saw the woman, having taken that food, was not dead, according to those things we treated above: yet I do not think, if he was already endowed with a spiritual mind, that he could in any way believe that God had forbidden them the food of that tree out of envy. But why more? That sin was urged, as such things could be urged; and it was written down, as all ought to read it, even if these things were understood by few as they ought.' Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Genesi ad litteram 11, final chapter). Augustine's famous view: Adam sinned not from concupiscence but from a misguided 'friendly benevolence' toward Eve. Running head misprinted '643'; true printed page 653.

The fifth interpretation can be gathered from the very history of Moses: Eve could truly say, 'The serpent deceived me'; but Adam, properly speaking, could not truly say, 'The woman deceived me,' although at the woman's urging he believed a falsehood. For he properly deceives someone who persuades him of a falsehood with the intention of deceiving; and so the serpent deceived Eve. But one who, thinking that what he says is true (even though in fact it is false), persuades it to another, is certainly not said to seduce, just as he is not rightly called crafty or fraudulent. Truly, therefore, and as it is said in the Schools, formally speaking Eve did not deceive Adam, although materially speaking she may be thought to have deceived him. And this interpretation, which Augustine too seems to touch in the aforesaid place, agrees very well with Paul's purpose: who in that place argues that a woman ought not to teach, for this reason — that even while she was whole and uncorrupted, she was nevertheless judged so weak and frail that the devil approached not to deceive Adam, but to deceive the woman, and deceived her with little trouble. It is clear, therefore (which we intend to prove in this disputation) that from that passage of Paul it cannot be concluded that Adam was in no way deceived.

FIFTH interpretation (Pererius's own, with the scholastic formal/material distinction). Marginal glosses: 'Quinta interpretatio'; 'Quomodo Adam deceptus proprie non fuerit' (How Adam was not, properly speaking, deceived); 'Mulier cur docere non debeat' (Why a woman ought not to teach; cf. 1 Tim 2:12). Gen 3:13 ('Serpens decepit me'). The disputation's conclusion: Paul's text does not prove

Adam was wholly undeceived.

But let us return to the explanation of those words of Moses, 'And she gave to her husband, who ate': That phrase, 'who ate,' denotes the sin of Adam, which he committed by the supreme crime of disobedience, the command of God being violated about not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, to the ruin of himself and of all his posterity. But that sin was not of one mode and simple, but manifold, and as it were by a numerous and multiform [iniquity]...

Returns to the lemma Gen 3:6 ('Deditque viro suo, qui comedit'). Adam's sin = the supreme crime of disobedience, and (like Eve's) manifold rather than simple. Catchword: 'iniqui' (= iniquitatis, the sentence continues on the next page); page footer signature 'NNN 3'.

— p. 695 (PDF) · printed p. 654 —

...most fertile in the offspring of iniquity. For if anyone should carefully examine and weigh the disordered and depraved movements and affections by which Adam's mind and spirit were then vitiated and corrupted, he will find that Adam sinned in at least eight ways. The first sin was pride, born from Eve's words, who told him that if he ate that fruit he would become most like God in excellence of power and knowledge: hence his mind was inflated with the spirit of pride, and lifted up with desire of attaining that excellence.

Continues from page 653 (Adam's sin as manifold). The eight sins of Adam begin; the first is pride. Marginal glosses: 'Octo modis Adami animum fuisse vitiatum atque depravatum' (That Adam's mind was vitiated and depraved in eight ways); 'Primum Adami peccatum fuisse superbiam' (That Adam's first sin was pride). Running head misprinted '644'; true printed page 654.

That Adam's first sin was pride, Scripture declares, which in Tobit chapter 4 says thus: 'Never let pride hold sway in your thought or in your word: for in it the destruction of man took its beginning.' And in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 10: 'The beginning of man's pride is to fall away from God: because his heart departed from him who made him: for pride is the beginning of all sin.' And this is the judgment of the Fathers, as one

may see in Augustine (book 14 of the City of God, chapters 13 and 15; and book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapters 30 and 42; in the Dialogue of 65 Questions, question 4; on Psalm 68, 70, and 82); of Chrysostom (Homily 16 on Genesis, and Homily 11 to the people of Antioch, and book 1 On Providence); of Gregory (book 34 of the Morals, chapter 17); of Damascene (book 2, chapter 10); of Bernard (sermon 1 on Advent); of the Master of the Sentences (in book 2, distinction 22), and there nearly all the Scholastics; finally of St. Thomas (in the Secunda secundae, question 163).

Scriptural proofs (Tob 4:14; Sir 10:14-15, 'initium omnis peccati superbia') plus a long roll of Fathers and Scholastics holding that pride was Adam's first sin. Marginal gloss: 'Primum Adami peccatum fuisse superbiam.'

Without cause, therefore, does Scotus deny this (in book 2, distinction 21, question 2), and judge that Adam's first sin was inordinate love of his wife, as Augustine too seems to think (book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 42). True, Adam was indeed led to eat by excessive love of his wife: but that love had been preceded by elation of mind and pride, as Augustine signifies in that very place. Surely that Adam sought through pride a certain excellent likeness to God, God clearly declared, when he said of him, 'Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil': doubtless charging him with the divine excellence that he had sought and affected.

Scotus (Sentences II d.21 q.2) dissents — Adam's first sin was inordinate love of his wife (citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.42) — but is refuted: that love was preceded by pride. Gen 3:22 ('Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis').

For proving this too, no weak reasoning is at hand. For Adam's first sin was either about sensible goods, or about spiritual goods. Not about sensible goods, for either he coveted these from a disordered inclination of the sensitive appetite, or of the rational appetite, which is the will: not from the depraved inclination of the former; for since the sensitive appetite was subject to reason as long as reason was subject to God, it could not...

Marginal gloss: 'Primum hominis peccatum superbiam fuisse demonstratur' (That man's first sin was pride is demonstrated). A dichotomy: was the first sin about sensible or spiritual goods? Catchword: 'potuit' (the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 696 (PDF) · printed p. 655 —

...the sensitive appetite could be depraved unless reason was first depraved. Nor could Adam at first sin about sensible goods from a vicious propensity of the will: for the will is not usually accustomed to seek sensible goods inordinately and viciously, unless instigated and enticed by the sensitive appetite, which, as we said, was not vitiated in Adam. Next, the will by natural order is borne first to that toward which it has the greater propensity, and that it inordinately covets first: but the will has a more vehement propensity toward spiritual goods — such as knowledge, glory, power, liberty — since these are more principally the object of the rational will than are sensible goods. Therefore it is most likely true that man's will was vitiated and corrupted by inordinately and immoderately coveting goods of this kind: and the immoderate desire of such goods blazes up in the minds of men out of pride.

Continues the argument from page 654: the first sin was not about sensible goods (the sensitive appetite was not yet corrupt) but about spiritual goods (knowledge, glory, power, liberty), the immoderate desire of which springs from pride. Running head misprinted '645'; true printed page 655.

I should like to add here, for confirmation of what we have taught about Adam's first sin, the words of Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard. In book 14 of the City of God, chapter 13, Augustine writes thus: 'But they began to be evil in secret, so that they slipped into open disobedience. For the evil deed would not have been reached, had not an evil will gone before. Now what could be the beginning of the evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of all sin. And what is pride but the appetite for a perverse loftiness? For it is a perverse loftiness, when the soul, forsaking the principle to which it ought to cling, becomes and is in a manner its own principle. This happens when one

is too pleased with himself: and one is so pleased with himself, when he falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to have pleased him more than himself. This defect is voluntary: for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of the higher unchangeable good, by which it was enlightened that it might see and kindled that it might love, it would not have turned away thence to please itself, and from this grow dark and cold, so that either she might believe the serpent had spoken the truth, or he might prefer his wife's will to God's command, and think himself a venial transgressor of the precept, if he did not forsake the partner of his life even in the partnership of sin. Therefore the evil deed was not done — that is, that transgression, the eating of the forbidden food — except by those who were already evil; for that fruit would not have become evil except from an evil tree.'

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.13 (the same passage cited earlier for Eve's pride, now applied to Adam). Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara sententia B. Augustini de superbia Adami' (The excellent opinion of St. Augustine on Adam's pride).

In the same author, in chapter 15 of the same book, it goes thus: 'Because, therefore, God commanding was contemned — God who had created man, who had made him to his own image, who had set him over the other animals, who had placed him in Paradise, who had furnished an abundance of all things and of welfare, who had burdened him with precepts neither many nor great nor difficult, but with one most brief and most light had given him support toward the wholesomeness of obedience, by which he reminded him that he was Lord over that creature for whom free service was expedient — a just condemnation followed: such a condemnation indeed, that man, who by keeping the command was going to be spiritual even in his flesh, became carnal even in his mind; and because by his pride he had pleased himself, by God's justice he was given over to himself; nor, as he affected, was he in his own complete power, but, dissenting also from himself, under him to whom by sinning he consented, in place of

the liberty which he coveted...'

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.15. Catchword: 'cupie' (= concupierat, the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 697 (PDF) · printed p. 656 —

...he should lead a hard and miserable servitude, dying in spirit willingly, and about to die in body unwillingly: a deserter of eternal life, condemned also to eternal death, unless grace should set him free. Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Civitate Dei 14.15). Running head misprinted '646'; true printed page 656.

Of St. Gregory, in chapter 17 of book 34 of the Morals, explaining that passage of Job chapter 41, 'He is king over all the children of pride,' these are the words: 'That this Leviathan, that is, the devil, might fall in all the things said above, pride alone struck him down; for he would not have withered through all those branches of vices, had he not first rotted through this in the root. For it is written, The beginning of all sin is pride: by this he himself succumbed, by this he laid low the man that followed. For with that dart he assailed the salvation of our immortality, by which he extinguished the life of his own blessedness. But the Lord inserted this at the end of his speech, so that, when after all evils he spoke of this Leviathan's pride, he might show what was worse than all evils. Though also by this, that it is placed lowest, it is shown to be the root of the vices. For as the root below is hidden, but from it the branches are spread outward: so pride hides itself within, but from it open vices at once sprout. For no evils would come forth into the open, unless this constrained the mind in secret. This is what makes this Leviathan's sense seethe like a pot: whence it shakes human minds in a kind of fervor of madness, but shows by open deeds how it overturns the soul it has shaken. For within it first boils up in elation, what afterward foams outwardly in deed.' Thus Gregory.

Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 34.17, on Job 41:25 ('Ipse est rex super universos filios superbiae'): pride as the hidden root of all vices. Marginal gloss: 'Egregia sancti Gregorij sententia de peccato superbiae.'

Finally, in Bernard, in the first Sermon on the Advent of the Lord, these things are read concerning Lucifer: 'Why are you proud, O earth and ashes? If God did not spare the proud Angels, how much more you, rottenness and worm? He did nothing, wrought nothing, only thought pride, and in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, was irreparably cast down: because, according to the Evangelist, he did not stand in the truth. Flee pride, my brothers, I beseech you, flee it greatly. The beginning of all sin is pride: which so swiftly darkened with eternal gloom even Lucifer himself, shining more brightly than all the stars; which changed not only an Angel, but the first of the Angels, into a devil. Whence, at once envying man, the iniquity which he had conceived in himself, he brought forth in him, persuading that by tasting the forbidden tree he would become as God, knowing good and evil. For what do you promise, what do you pledge, wretch? when the Son of the Most High has the key of knowledge — nay, is himself the key of David, who shuts and none opens — in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge: will you wickedly steal them, to give them to man? You see that truly, according to the Lord's word, he is a liar, and the father of it: for he was a liar, saying, I will be like the Most High; and the father of lying, when into man too he poured the poisoned seedbed of his falsehood, saying, You shall be as Gods. You too, O man, if you see a thief, will you run with him? You have heard, brothers, what was read this night in Isaiah, the Lord saying, Your princes are unfaithful (or as another translation has it, Disobedient), companions of thieves. For truly our princes, Adam and Eve, the beginnings of our stock, were disobedient and companions of thieves, who attempt to steal away, by the serpent's — nay, the devil's — counsel through the serpent, what belongs to the Son of God.' Thus far St. Bernard.

Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 1 on Advent, on Lucifer's pride and the Fall. Marginal glosses: 'Insignis de vitio superbiae Bernardi sententia'; 'Adam & Eva nostrae originis duces vere principes furum.' Scriptural references in margin: John 8:44 (the devil 'in veritate non stetit'), Sir 10, Apoc 4 / Isa 22 (the key of David), Col 2:3 ('thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi'), Ps 49:18 ('si vides furem curres cum eo'), Isa 1:23 ('socii furum'), Isa 14:14 ('Similis ero Altissimo'), Gen 3 ('Eritis sicut Dii').

The second sin of Adam was an inordinate affection and love — nay, an immoderate [love of his wife]...

The second of Adam's eight sins begins. Marginal gloss (continuing onto the next page): 'Secundum peccatum Adami, amor inordinatus uxoris.' Catchword: 'immo' (the sentence continues on the next page).

— p. 698 (PDF) · printed p. 657 —

...an immoderate love of his wife; not indeed the love of carnal concupiscence, which had not yet been aroused in his members, but a certain social love, and as it were of friendship; namely, lest he sadden her, he made little of God's command. And by this love it often happens, as Augustine says (book 14 of the City of God, chapter 11, and book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 42), that a man offends God lest he offend a friend: 'It must be believed,' says Augustine, 'that that man, by his woman — one by one, man by man, spouse by spouse — [was led] to transgress God's law, not as though seduced into believing a speaker of truth, but yielded out of social attachment.' And in another place: 'Adam did not wish to sadden Eve, whom he believed could waste away without his consolation, if she were alienated from his mind, and altogether perish by that discord. Not indeed conquered by concupiscence of the flesh, which he had not yet felt in his members, but by a certain friendly benevolence, by which it often happens that God is offended, lest a man become an enemy out of a friend: which that he ought not to have done, the just outcome by the divine sentence showed.'

Continues from page 656. The SECOND sin of Adam: inordinate (social/friendly, not carnal) love of his wife. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.11 and De Genesi ad litteram 11.42 (passages cited earlier). Marginal gloss: 'Secundum peccatum Adami, amor inordinatus uxoris.' Running head misprinted

'647'; true printed page 657.

The third sin was a certain wicked eagerness and pestilent curiosity to experience what lay hidden in that fruit, which God had so greatly forbidden him, and what would follow from tasting it. The fourth sin: because he saw that Eve, having taken the fruit, had not died, he began to doubt about the meaning of that sentence of the Lord, 'On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death' — namely, whether those words were spoken properly or figuratively, and whether they contained a definitive sentence, or only a threatening one.

Marginal glosses: 'Tertium peccatum, curiositas' (Third sin, curiosity); 'Quartum, dubietas' (Fourth, doubt). The fourth sin concerns Gen 2:17 ('In quacumque die comederis, morte morieris') — whether it was proper or figurative, definitive or merely a threat.

The fifth sin: because he was inexperienced of the divine severity in punishing sins, he thought that his sin would be excusable and worthy of pardon; either on account of the lightness of the matter (for how little it was to have eaten one little apple?), or on account of the dignity of his person and his intimate familiarity with God, or because he had done it to gratify his wife, whom God had given him as companion. For Adam loved Eve with the highest love, because she was supremely lovable for the excellent ornaments of body and mind; because she was the only woman in the whole world; because she was his wife, from whom he was to receive offspring and propagate the whole human race; because she had been given to him by God as companion; finally because she had been formed from his own flesh and bones. He thought, therefore, that this reason would be a strong enough pretext for excusing the sin committed; and indeed we see that Adam used this one excuse alone when he was rebuked by God: 'The woman,' he said, 'whom you gave me as companion, she gave me, and I ate.'

The FIFTH sin: presumption / contempt of God — thinking the sin excusable (the lightness of the matter; his own dignity; that he did it to please his wife). Marginal glosses: 'Quintum, contemptus Dei'; 'Cur Adamus Evam tantopere diligeret' (Why Adam loved Eve so greatly). Citation: Gen 3:12

('Mulier quam dedisti mihi sociam, dedit mihi, et comedi').

The sixth sin was gluttony: for, seeing the beauty of the apple, and hearing from his wife that it was of the sweetest taste, he most ardently desired to eat it. The seventh was the sin of disobedience: for by eating the fruit forbidden him by God, he was disobedient to God. Yet that sin of Adam's was not formally and specifically disobedience, but only materially and generically: that is, Adam did not sin will[ing disobedience as such]...

Marginal glosses: 'Sextum, gula' (Sixth, gluttony); 'Septimum, inobedientia' (Seventh, disobedience). The distinction: Adam's act was disobedience only 'materially and generically,' not 'formally and specifically.' Catchword: 'lens' (= volens, the sentence continues on the next page); page footer 'Com. in Gen. Tom. 1.' and signature 'OOO'.

— p. 699 (PDF) · printed p. 658 —

...willing to be disobedient, or through contempt of the divine command, but willing to eat the fruit forbidden him by God, he was disobedient to God. Paul indeed, certainly, disputing of Adam's sin in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, seems to recognize nothing other than disobedience, or at least this most of all: for when he had said that through Adam's sin death entered the world, and that by the contagion of his sin all men are infected and corrupted, declaring what that sin was, he adds, 'As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just.' And although, as regards Adam's mind and affection, the principal and for[mal]...

Continues the seventh sin (disobedience) from page 657. Paul, Rom 5:19 ('Sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis...'). Catchword: 'formale' (= the sentence continues on the next page). Running head misprinted '648'; true printed page 658.

...his formal sin was pride, since he was moved to sin from the object of pride; nevertheless, as regards the offense against God, and the harm that befell all his posterity from his sin, the principal sin was disobedience. For God was most gravely offended because Adam had not kept his command: wherefore, rebuking him, 'Because,' he says, 'you have eaten of the tree, of

which I had commanded you not to eat,' etc.

Formally Adam's sin was pride, but as regards the offense to God and the harm to posterity, the principal sin was disobedience. Citation: Gen 3:17 ('Quia comedisti de ligno...').

His eighth sin was the excusing of the sin committed by him, which was more detestable in him than in Eve; for she transferred the blame onto the serpent, but Adam onto God, saying, 'The woman whom you gave me as companion, she gave me, and I ate' — as if he said, 'You, by giving me the woman as companion, provided me the occasion of sinning.' But about this so wicked and impious excuse of Adam we shall say more below.

The EIGHTH sin: self-excusing, more detestable than Eve's — she blamed the serpent, but Adam in effect blamed God himself. Marginal gloss: 'Octavum, excusatio peccati.' Citation: Gen 3:12.

I will not pass over in silence what Augustine reported in the third Sermon on the feast of the Annunciation of the Lord (which is the 19th among those on the Saints): for he signifies that if Adam, when rebuked by God for his sin, had not excused himself, but with humble confession of the crime committed and with penance had sought pardon from him, it would have come about that he would not be exiled from Paradise. Augustine writes thus: 'When Adam was charged by the Lord with the disobedience he had committed, he did not humbly accuse himself, as the fault demanded, but proudly accused the author, saying, The woman whom you gave me, gave me the fruit, and I ate. By saying this, he thought himself excused: and thus he accused the creator of the woman who had drawn the man into the fault of sinning. Who, if he had humbly accused himself, and had not turned the blame back upon his author, would not have been exiled from Paradise.' Thus Augustine. But since the dwelling of the first man in Paradise was joined with the power of eating the fruit of the tree of life, and this in turn with the immortality of the body — for God, as Moses narrates a little below, cast Adam out of Paradise for this reason: lest, namely, remaining...

Augustine (the attribution is later doubted by Pererius), Sermon 3 on the Annunciation (= Sermon 19 'de Sanctis'): had Adam humbly confessed instead of excusing himself, he would not have been exiled. Marginal gloss: 'Notabilis Augustini sententia excutitur, Utrum si Adamus statim humiliter confessus esset peccatum a se commissum, exulasset a Paradiso necne.' Catchword: 'ille in Paradiso' (continues on the next page).

— p. 700 (PDF) · printed p. 659 —

...he, remaining in Paradise, could eat that life-giving fruit and perpetuate life on earth: and since the immortality of the body could not be separated from original justice and the company of the other goods of that happy state — it would plainly follow that if Adam, according to Augustine, had by confession of his sin obtained a remaining in Paradise, he would likewise have recovered the immortality of the body, original justice, and the other goods of that state. Which, however, I cannot easily be brought to believe: for I see that God said to Adam absolutely, 'On whatever day you eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you shall die the death.' That sentence of God was therefore absolute, fixed, and immutable — that if Adam ate the forbidden fruit, he would be subject to the necessity of dying, that is, would lose the promised immortality of the body (with which was joined also the loss of the other goods), whether Adam afterward did penance for his sin or not. Although it is no slight conjecture of some that that sermon is not Augustine's, so that his authority ought to move no one very much. These things, for the present, to have touched on...

Pererius's own doubt about the preceding view: God's sentence (Gen 2:17) was absolute and immutable; and some judge the sermon spurious (not genuinely Augustine's). Running head misprinted '649'; true printed page 659.

...let it suffice — things which the learned and prudent reader of the sacred letters will weigh more subtly and diligently, and will himself pass judgment on our judgment.

Closes the digression on the Annunciation sermon.

A DISPUTATION ON THE GRAVITY OF THE SIN OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEINGS.

Major structural divider (set off by a horizontal rule).

There follows another disputation on the gravity of the sin of the first human beings, both absolutely and comparatively, but to be treated very briefly. For it must be disputed whether that sin of the first human beings was the gravest of all that were afterward committed at any time and by any human; and likewise of which human, Adam or Eve, the sin was graver.

Scope of the disputation: the gravity of the first sin both absolutely (the gravest of all?) and comparatively (Adam vs. Eve?).

QUESTION I. Whether the sin of the first human beings was the gravest of all sins.

First Quaestio of the disputation.

The gravity of a sin is usually estimated from many things: either from the very species of the sin (thus adultery is graver than simple fornication); or from the intention of the sinner's affection (as when someone is carried off to sin with more vehement zeal and more intense affection); or from the effect of the sin, that is, the harm that follows the sin (thus homicide is graver than theft); or from various circumstances attached to the sin, which amplify its gravity, such as the quality of the person, the place, the time, and other things of that kind. If, therefore, the species of the sin of the first human beings be considered, it was certainly not the gravest of all: for it would have been graver if they had sinned through blasphemy, through infidelity, through contempt or hatred of God. Nor...

Gravity of sin estimated in four ways (species, intention, effect, circumstances). By species, the first sin was not the gravest. Marginal glosses: 'Unde aestimetur gravitas peccati'; 'Quomodo peccatum primorum hominum, & fuerit, & non fuerit omnium gravissimum.' Catchword: 'dubitanter' (continues on the next page).

...would I hesitatingly say that Judas, Arius, and Luther sinned more gravely, according to the species of the sin, than Adam: for he sinned against positive law, not against natural law, and against a precept concerning an indifferent thing, not concerning a thing evil in itself. Nor was the affection of sinning in them more intense, more vehement, and more depraved than in any of those who afterward sinned. But that sin was indeed the gravest, if you weigh the harm that followed from it — that is, the loss of so many and so great goods...

By the species of sin, even Judas, Arius, and Luther sinned more gravely than Adam (who sinned against positive, not natural, law, over an indifferent thing). But by its effect the first sin was the gravest. Catchword: 'nunquam' (continues on the next page); page footer signature 'OOO 2'.

— p. 701 (PDF) · printed p. 660 —

...goods never afterward to be recovered, and the necessity of so many and so great evils which that sin brought forth. Nor was that harm only proper to those human beings, but to the whole human race: for those first parents, by their own fall and ruin, dragged all their posterity, however many were afterward and shall be, into the destruction of sin and death. Wherefore Paul, weighing this great harm, in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: 'By one man,' he says, 'sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned.'

The harm of the first sin = the loss of irrecoverable goods, affecting the whole race. Citation: Rom 5:12. Running head misprinted '650'; true printed page 660.

This too greatly aggravates and magnifies Adam's sin, that he excelled in wisdom and in the grace of God, and had no proclivity to evil, but on the contrary a most keen propensity to good, so that with the greatest ease he could repel any temptation whatsoever and avoid all sin without effort: wherefore his iniquity in sinning was the greater, the greater was his ease of not sinning — as Augustine writes (chapter 15, book 14 of the City of God) in these words: 'If anyone thinks the condemnation of Adam either excessive or unjust, he surely does not

know how to measure how great the iniquity in sinning was, where there was so great an ease of not sinning.' And Augustine declares this by the contrary, namely from a comparison with the obedience of Abraham and of our Lord Jesus Christ. 'As,' he says, 'the obedience of Christ was the more praiseworthy because he became obedient unto death: so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable, because he became disobedient unto death. For where the disobedience is great, the punishment set forth, and the thing commanded by the Creator easy — who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, and at the command of so great a power, and with so terrifying a punishment?' Thus Augustine.

Aggravation: Adam's wisdom and ease of not sinning made his sin the greater. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.15. Marginal glosses: 'Peccatum Adami qua ratione ceteris gravius'; 'Augustinus.' The margin 'Phil. 1' points to Phil 2:8 ('obediens usque ad mortem').

Moreover the place of Paradise, which Adam dishonored and disgraced by his crime, argues his sin to have been the more detestable: since in that place there was no occasion of sinning and no incitement to ill-doing — nay, very many and most keen incentives to praising, worshiping, and loving God, and to obeying his commands. What shall I say of the circumstance of time, which not a little amplifies his crime? For God had made Adam such that at all times he could, with the greatest ease, persevere innocent and holy, avoid all sin, and overcome any temptation whatsoever of the demon without trouble. But he — how easily? how quickly? — like an unarmed, feeble, and cowardly soldier, was conquered and laid low by the enemy's first and least grievous assault. Surely, as easy as victory could have been for him, so signal was it, to his perpetual disgrace and ignominy, to have been conquered.

Further aggravating circumstances: the place (Paradise, with no occasion to sin) and the time (Adam was made able to persevere with the greatest ease) — yet he was conquered like a feeble soldier at the first assault.

QUESTION II. Whose sin was graver, Adam's or Eve's.

Second Quaestio of the disputation (set off by a horizontal rule). Catchword: 'Sed' (the answer begins on the next page).

— p. 702 (PDF) · printed p. 661 —

But come, let us compare Adam's sin with Eve's. Indeed, if regard is had to the person of each and to the harm that followed from the sin of each, there is no doubt that Adam's sin was much graver than Eve's: for Adam was far wiser than Eve, and more perspicacious in distinguishing good from evil, and in discerning and scrutinizing all even the most hidden arts and frauds of the devil; he was likewise stronger in overcoming all temptations; and since he was bound to God by more and greater benefits, he ought to have been the more observant of the divine precepts and the more obedient; finally, God had appointed him as it were the head of Eve, whom he was to instruct when ignorant, correct when erring, confirm when wavering, and raise up when fallen.

QUAESTIO II answered: Adam's sin was graver — he was wiser, stronger, more obligated, and was appointed head of Eve. Marginal gloss: 'Peccatum Adami fuit gravius peccato Evae.' Running head misprinted '651'; true printed page 661.

Now indeed, the loss of original justice and immortality, the necessity of dying and of suffering innumerable evils, the contagion of sin transfused into all posterity, and finally the corruption of the whole nature, followed not on account of Eve's sin, but on account of Adam's. For if Adam had not sinned, Eve's sin would have harmed nothing — neither Adam himself nor his posterity. For what is reported in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 25, 'On account of the woman' (that is, on account of Eve) 'all men die,' must be understood, as we say in the schools, occasionally, not causally or meritoriously. For Eve provided Adam the occasion of sinning, from whose sin death came about, as Paul said (Romans 5): 'By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.' And this very thing is not obscurely indicated in that same passage of Ecclesiasticus, when first it is

said, 'From a woman is the beginning of sin,' and then is added, 'For through her we all die.'

The ruin of the race followed from Adam's sin, not Eve's. Sirach 25:33 ('Propter mulierem... omnes homines mori'; 'A muliere initium peccati... per illam omnes morimur') is read 'occasionally, not causally.' Rom 5:12. Marginal gloss: 'Si Adamus non peccasset, peccatum Evae non nobis nocuisset.'

The author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament — commonly, but falsely, thought to be Augustine, among whose writings that volume is reckoned — in question 83 writes that Adam sinned with the sin of idolatry, because he wished to make himself God: which is certainly false. Adam cannot be said to have sinned with the sin of idolatry otherwise than as anyone whatsoever who sins mortally: namely, in the sense that he set up for himself as his ultimate end something other than God, which he loves above all and to which he refers all his affairs — just as Paul said of some, 'Whose God is the belly,' and in another place called avarice 'the service of idols.' For Adam did not so covet likeness to God as to wish to become God, and to be worshiped and adored as God. St. Ambrose, in his book On Paradise, chapter 13, thinks that the devil wished to lead Eve into idolatry, by injecting into her mind the opinion and belief of many gods, when he said, 'You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.'

Pseudo-Augustine (Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, q.83) wrongly claims Adam sinned by idolatry; refuted (he sinned by idolatry only in the sense any mortal sin sets up a false ultimate end: Phil 3:19 'Quorum Deus venter est'; Col 3:5 avarice = idolatry). Ambrose, De paradiso 13. Marginal glosses: 'Adam non peccavit... peccato idololatriae'; 'Philipp. 3.'

His words run thus: 'In which one may note that the serpent is the author of idolatry, in that he seems to have introduced many Gods into the error of men, by a certain craft of the serpent,' etc. But that word 'Dii' (Gods), or as it is in Hebrew ■■■■■ (Elohim), is put for the one and true God — taken, namely (as sometimes happens in the sacred letters), in the plural number for the singular, or to denote the divine Persons, to which pertains what God said a little below, 'Behold, Adam is become as one of us.'

Ambrose (De paradiso 13) on the serpent as author of idolatry, refuted: 'Dii' / ■■■■■ (Elohim) denotes the one true God in the plural of majesty, or the divine Persons (cf. Gen 3:22, 'Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis'). HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: reads right-to-left ■-■-■-■-■ = ■■■■■ (Elohim, 'God'); printed immediately followed by its Latin transliteration 'Elohim' (the same word seen earlier on printed p. 639). Marginal gloss: 'Ambrosius censuit serpentem voluisse inducere Evam in errorem & impietatem idololatriae.' Catchword: 'HUGO'; page footer signature 'OOO 3'.

— p. 703 (PDF) · printed p. 662 —

Hugh of St. Victor said that Adam sinned with the sin of avarice. But he took the name 'avarice' broadly, namely for the immoderate desire of having any good whatever more than one ought. Paul sometimes uses the word 'avarice' with this signification, as toward the end of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and in the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians — in which places the Greek word is πλεονεξ■α (pleonexia), derived from πλεονεκτε■ν (pleonektein), that is, from 'having more': signifying the vice by which one arrogates or affects to himself more than is right, or seizes the better portions, defrauding others, or at least strives to seize, as much in riches as in honors and other things. Now the Latin translator renders the word πλεονεξ■α in one place as 'rapine,' in another as 'fraud,' often as 'avarice.' On that word the commentary of Jerome should be read, on those words of Paul (Ephesians 4): 'In the working of all uncleanness, in avarice'; and again, 'Nor let avarice rule among you.' It is plain, therefore, how much graver Adam's sin was than Eve's.

QUAESTIO II continued. Hugh of St. Victor held Adam sinned by 'avarice' (taken broadly = Greek πλεονεξ■α, covetousness), as in Paul (Rom 1:29; Eph 4:19; cf. Eph 5:3). GREEK GLYPHS verified by magnification: πλεονεξ■α (pleonexia, π-λ-ε-ο-ν-ε-ξ-■-α, 'covetousness/greed', appears twice) and the verb πλεονεκτε■ν (the print shows the early-modern form πλεονεχτε■ν, 'to have more'). Marginal glosses: 'Hugo S. Victoris, quomodo dixerit Adamum peccasse per avaritiam'; 'Πλεονεξ■α quid' (What pleonexia is). Jerome on Eph 4:19 / 5:3. Running head misprinted '652'; true printed page 662.

But Cajetan makes Eve's sin quite light: for, explaining those words of the third chapter, 'The woman took of the fruit of the tree, and ate,' he affirms that that first sin of Eve was very small — both from its root (that is, the

affection of liberty); from the reason of the sinning (namely the appetite of divine likeness); from the thing desired (which was the knowledge of good and evil); from the species of the external act (which was to eat a fruit beautiful to the eyes and sweet to eat); from the cause of sinning (namely the seduction of the serpent); and finally from the condition of the sinner, because she was a woman. Thus Cajetan.

Cajetan (Thomas de Vio), on Gen 3:6, judged Eve's first sin very light, on six counts (root, reason, object, species, cause, condition). Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus de levi peccato Evae cur existimet.'

Nevertheless, if we weigh the sin of each of our parents simply and absolutely, we shall understand not only that Eve's sin was grave, but even that for three reasons it was graver than Adam's. For first she sinned by infidelity, that is, against faith, which is a supernatural and theological virtue: believing the serpent as he spoke false and impious things about God — indeed, accusing God of lying and of envy. She sinned likewise with enormous folly and madness, hoping that she could attain the knowledge of good and evil, and likeness to God, by eating a bodily fruit. Finally she sinned against her own husband, enticing and impelling him with flattering words and importunate entreaties to eat the forbidden fruit. And so the first occasion of all sin and death, which pervaded the whole human race, was from Eve.

Against Cajetan: considered simply and absolutely, Eve's sin was graver than Adam's in three respects — (1) infidelity (against the theological virtue of faith), (2) enormous folly, (3) corrupting her husband. Eve was the first occasion of all sin and death. Marginal gloss: 'Tripliciter gravius peccatum Evae, quam Adami.' (Note: this nuances QUAESTIO II — by person and effect Adam's sin was graver, but considered in itself Eve's was graver in these three ways.)

But if anyone should on that account contend that the sin of the first human beings was the gravest of all, because it was punished with the gravest penalty — that is, the loss of so many and so great goods, and the necessity of being subjected to so many and so great evils of soul and body — let him know that such a penalty did not correspond to Adam's sin according to the magnitude of its own species (for in that respect the eternal penalty

of hell corresponds, which was not the greatest of all), but only in this respect, that it was the first sin, through which, namely, original justice was taken away and that happy state of innocence lost: to which evil the other consequent and connected harms were necessarily attached. Read St. Thomas in the Secunda secundae, question 165, article 3.

The penalty's severity reflects not the species of the sin but that it was the FIRST sin (which removed original justice and entailed all the consequent harms). Citation: Aquinas, Summa 2a2ae q.165 a.3. Marginal gloss: 'Peccatum primorum hominum cur non fuerit omnium gravissimum, gravissima tamen poena sit mulctatum.' Catchword: 'Aperti' (the next lemma begins on the next page).

— p. 704 (PDF) · printed p. 663 —

Their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked. (Verse 7.)

New lemma: Genesis 3:7. Running head misprinted '653'; true printed page 663.

Their eyes were not opened as if they had previously been closed: for how would Adam, with closed eyes, have seen the animals brought to him, and the woman formed from his side? How would the woman have seen the serpent, and that the fruit of the forbidden tree was beautiful to the eyes? Nor were their eyes opened as if they had then for the first time begun to be strong in the use of reason and free will: for what we read that Adam and Eve said before sufficiently declares that they had the perfect use of reason. Nor are their eyes said to have been opened then because, by eating the forbidden fruit, they had (as Josephus signifies) acquired greater sharpness of wit and a keener power of understanding: since neither could that be brought about by eating that fruit, nor, if it had been, would the eating of that fruit have been to their harm, but to their great gain. Nor is the opinion of Rabbi Solomon to be approved, that those first human beings before held the knowledge of good only, but after eating that fruit the knowledge of evil also befell them: for the discipline of contraries is one and the same. And so they knew good and evil both before and after, but in a different manner. Before, they knew good by possession, and evil by its opposition

to good; afterward they knew good by privation, and evil by experience — by an unhappy and execrable knowledge, indeed.

Three wrong readings of 'their eyes were opened' rejected: (1) not literal prior blindness; (2) not that they then first got reason, nor (against Josephus, Antiquities 1.1) sharper wit; (3) not Rabbi Solomon's (Rashi's) view that they knew only good before and evil after. They knew good and evil both before and after, differently. Marginal glosses: 'Quomodo intelligendum sit apertos fuisse primis hominibus oculos'; 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquit. c. 1.'

How, then, did Moses say that their eyes were then opened? Namely, then for the first time they began to notice that the nakedness of the body was base and shameful to them, on account of the disordered and obscene motions of the flesh rebelling against reason. For as soon as they sinned, they burned with mutual lust, which, raising itself immoderately through the bodily members against the judgment and will of reason, they judged ought to be suppressed, yet could not suppress: wherefore they blushed exceedingly, and hastened to hide and veil those parts of the body. But the nakedness of those parts before the sin had been no more a cause of shame to them than the nakedness of our hand or face is to us. Therefore it happened to them somewhat as to children, who, before they reach the use of reason, are not at all ashamed of the nakedness of those parts; but when reason begins to exercise its power of discerning good from evil, and they begin to use free will, at once they blush at the nakedness of those parts. What therefore befalls children on account of their age, this befell them on account of the presence or absence of original justice.

The true sense: at the Fall they first perceived their nakedness as shameful, through the now-rebellious concupiscence of the flesh — like children before the age of reason, but here owing to the presence or absence of original justice. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo Adamus & Eva se nudos esse cognoverint.'

This interpretation, like very many others, we have drawn from the sources of Augustine, in whom, in book 14 of the City of God, chapter 17, it goes thus: 'They were naked, and were not confounded: not because their nakedness was unknown to them, but because it was not

yet shameful, since lust did not yet move those members beyond the will...'

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.17 (quotation begins). Marginal gloss: 'Augustinus.' Catchword: 'commovebat' (continues on the next page).

— p. 705 (PDF) · printed p. 664 —

'...moved them: not yet, to convict man's disobedience, did the flesh by its own disobedience in some way bear witness. For they were not created blind, as the ignorant crowd supposes: since he saw the animals, on which he imposed names, and of her it is read, The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasing to the eyes to behold. Their eyes therefore were open, but not yet opened — that is, not attentive to recognize what was furnished them by the garment of grace, when their members did not know how to resist their will. When that grace was removed, so that the disobedience might be punished by a reciprocal penalty, there arose in the motion of the body a certain shameless novelty, and it made them attentive and rendered them confused. Hence it is that, after they had violated God's command by open transgression, it is written of them: And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves, and made themselves aprons. The eyes of both were opened, he says, not to seeing — for they saw before too — but to discerning between the good which they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. Whence the tree itself, because it would produce that discernment if it were touched for eating against the prohibition, took its name from that fact, so that it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For having experienced the trouble of illness, the pleasantness of health becomes the more evident. They knew, therefore, that they were naked: stripped, namely, of that grace by which it came about that the nakedness of the body did not confound them, no law of sin resisting in their members. This, then, they came to know, which they would more happily have been

ignorant of, had they, believing and obedient to God, not committed what forced them to experience what infidelity and disobedience harm.' Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Civitate Dei 14.17). Running head misprinted '654'; true printed page 664.

The reader will find very similar things in the same Augustine, in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 31: 'How,' he says, 'were the eyes of both opened, except to coveting one another? For they were not made with closed eyes, nor did they wander blind and groping in the Paradise of delights, so as to touch the forbidden tree even unknowingly, and, groping, pluck the prohibited fruits in ignorance. For how were the animals brought to Adam, that he might see what he would call them, if he did not see? How was the woman brought to the man, that he might say of her, whom he did not see, This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh? How did the woman see that fruit to be beautiful to the eyes, if her eyes were closed? And yet Scripture says their eyes were opened, using a transferred word and a figurative narration — opened, namely, to looking at and thinking of something which they had never before noticed. For when bold curiosity was moved to transgress the command, eager to experience what hidden thing would follow upon touching the forbidden fruit, and delighting with harmful liberty to break the reins of the prohibition, it more probably judged that the death which it had feared would not follow. Soon therefore, as they transgressed the command, inwardly deserted by grace — which by a certain pride and proud love of their own power they had offended — completely stripped, they cast their eyes upon their own members, and coveted them with a motion which they had not known. To this, therefore, their eyes were opened, to which before they were not open, although they were open to other things.'

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.31: 'their eyes were opened' is a figurative expression; they plainly saw before (Adam named the animals, Gen 2:23 'Hoc nunc os de ossibus meis'). Marginal gloss: 'Augustinus.'

The same Augustine, in book 1 of the Locutions on Genesis, number 9: 'What is finally written of Adam and Eve, Their eyes were opened — since it would be absurd to believe that they wandered blind in Paradise, or with eyes previously closed — is a manner of speaking, the same by which it is also written of Hagar, She opened her eyes, and saw a well; for she was not sitting with eyes previously closed. And as for what at the breaking of bread was open[ed]...'

Augustine, De Locutionibus in Genesim 1.9: 'their eyes were opened' is an idiom, the same as Hagar's 'she opened her eyes and saw a well' (Gen 21:19), and the Emmaus disciples (Luke 24:31). Marginal glosses: 'Gen. 21'; 'Luc. 24.' Catchword: 'aperti' (continues on the next page).

— p. 706 (PDF) · printed p. 665 —

'...were opened the eyes of those who recognized the Lord after the resurrection. For they were not walking along the way with him with closed eyes.' Thus Augustine.

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation (De Locutionibus in Genesim 1.9), referring to the Emmaus disciples (Luke 24:31). Marginal gloss: 'Luc. 24.' Running head misprinted '655'; true printed page 665.

It could moreover be said that their eyes were opened, because they then clearly saw what before, blinded by the lust of sinning, they had not seen: namely, that God is truthful, but the devil a liar and deceiver. And at the same time they knew how true was that which David sang many ages later, 'It is good for me to adhere to God, to put my hope in the Lord God'; and that, 'They who go far from you shall perish: you have destroyed all who fornicate away from you.' And they saw this, how not light a thing it is, nor to be slighted, to fail to obey the will of God.

A further sense of 'their eyes were opened': they then saw clearly that God is truthful and the devil a liar. Citations: Ps 72:28 ('Mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est'); Ps 72:27 ('Qui elongant se a te peribunt').

Marginal glosses: 'Quomodo aperti sunt eorum oculi'; 'Psal. 72.'

'It happens indeed daily,' says Serapion, the Greek writer, 'in us, what happened in those first human beings: when we sin, then we are blind; when we have sinned, then at last we recognize how much evil we have committed, and we are ashamed, wearied, and repentant of our deed.' 'Divine Scripture,' says Theodoret, 'calls the opening of the eyes the sense of sin and the shame of the crime committed: for when the disgrace has been perpetrated, conscience at once rises against us, and vehemently rebukes and condemns us.' Whence is that saying of Paul, 'What fruit had you in those things, of which you are now ashamed?'

Two further authorities: Serapion (a Greek writer) and Theodoret (Quaestiones in Genesim, q.33) — 'the opening of the eyes' = the awakened sense of sin and the shame of conscience (Rom 6:21).
Marginal glosses: 'Theodoretus q. 33. in Genesim'; 'Rom. 6.'

I wish the reader also to know how Rupert interpreted this very passage, namely quite piously, gravely, and eloquently. For in book 3 On the Trinity and its works, chapter 10, he writes in this manner: 'How, finally, was it said, And the eyes of both were opened? Were they blind before they ate, and by eating were they illuminated? Not at all, for the woman had already seen that the tree was good for food, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold. And the Lord had already brought all living things to Adam, that he might see what he would call them. Therefore not the exterior, but the interior eyes of both — which they had closed against God — were opened: namely, because they recognized God as truthful, but the serpent, in his misery, as most false. For at once it follows, And when they knew that they were naked, they sewed fig leaves, and made themselves aprons. Therefore what was said, And the eyes of both were opened, clearly has a double sense. For if you look to their expectation, which they had conceived from the serpent's promise saying, Your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil — it is too bitter an irony, and the groaning complaint of the writer saying, and

the eyes of both were opened: which is the same as if it were said, and not according to the serpent's promise were the eyes of both opened — except that it is now said more bitterly under an ironic affirmation, as if it were denied with an open voice. But if you await the true outcome, it is a great demonstration or recognition of confusion, about which there is at once subjoined what was already said, And when they knew that they were naked, etc. When, he says, they knew that they were naked: that is, when they perceived themselves to be despoiled of the honor in which they had been placed and created, and compared to the beasts, stripped naked without any protection of God. For such also is that which this same truthful Scripture — which calls things by their true names and recounts deeds in fitting words, as is proper — declares: Moses, therefore, seeing the people that it was naked, for Aaron had stripped it.'

Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate (et operibus eius) III.10, on the 'double sense' of 'their eyes were opened': (1) bitter irony against the serpent's promise (Gen 3:5); (2) a true recognition of their being stripped of honor and confounded — likened to Israel stripped naked by Aaron (Exod 32:25). Catchword: 'pro'; page footer 'Comm. in Gen. Tom. 1.' and signature 'PPP'.

— p. 707 (PDF) · printed p. 666 —

'...because of the ignominy of dishonor, and had set the people naked among their enemies,' etc. There is therefore indeed a double sense in what was said, 'And the eyes of both were opened.' But the true groan in both is the great reproach, on every side, of their mutual confusion: God angry, the devil expanded with laughter and cackling, each sex struck with ignominy; and amid all these, the souls of the guilty were tormented, and their eyes confounded. For at once the genital part of the body began, with unbidden motions, to buffet each sinner alike, on account of the desert of pride. That the ignominy of this passion is shameful, nature recognizes of its own accord, understands without a teacher, and confesses by spontaneous flight. Why is this? Because it ought not to have been in a rational creature, but was imposed by

God, offended, upon man who did not understand his own honor, so that he might be compared to the beasts. For whatever has been appointed for man by God, whether propitious or angry, the nature of man cannot at all be ignorant of. Therefore, just as he cannot lack the reason which propitious God gave, so it is impossible for him to be ignorant that this passion of lust is confounding. It blushes in the spouses themselves, and each flees the mutual gaze of nakedness — just as those first spouses, who, having nothing yet to blush at except their very selves, who were one flesh, sewed fig leaves and made themselves aprons, that is, girdles. Thus far the words of Rupert.

Conclusion of the Rupert of Deutz quotation (De Trinitate III.10). The closing allusion is to Exod 32:25 (Israel set naked among enemies, stripped by Aaron). Running head misprinted '656'; true printed page 666.

GENESIS, chapter 3, verse 7. And when they knew that they were naked, they sewed fig leaves, and made themselves aprons.

Continuation of the Gen 3:7 lemma (set off by a horizontal rule). Marginal reference 'Gen. c. 3. / vers. 7.'

Why did God want those first human beings to be naked in Paradise? Namely, they needed no garments, either to ward off the injuries of the sky, or to veil any baseness and obscenity of the body. For they were impassible in body, and likewise in soul and in body wholly lacking all motion and sense of lust. Hear what Basil, disputing on this matter, writes in this manner, in the homily entitled 'That God is not the author of evils': 'They ate,' he says, 'and their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked. For they ought by no means to have known themselves naked, lest the mind of man be drawn to the desire of those things in which they seemed to be lacking. For he reckoned the covering of nakedness to be a consoling defense; and altogether, through care of the flesh, he was [drawn] away from the observance of God...'

A new question: why did God will the first humans to be naked in Paradise? They needed no clothing, being impassible and free of all lust. Basil of Caesarea, homily 'Quod Deus non sit auctor malorum' (quotation begins). Marginal gloss: 'Cur in Paradiso nudi fuerint primi homines.' Catchword: 'abstractus' (continues on the next page).

— p. 708 (PDF) · printed p. 667 —

'...drawn away. Why, you ask, were garments not prepared for them at once from the beginning? Because it was fitting that these be neither natural nor produced by art. For natural coverings are proper to the brutes — such as feather, bristle, the thicknesses of skins, which both resist cold and bear heat, in which one does not differ from another, the nature being equal in all. But to man, according to the proportion of his charity toward God, the distribution of goods was fitting. But works that come from art generate toil, which, as most harmful to man, was to be avoided. Wherefore God, recalling us to the life of Paradise, tries to pluck cares from our living, saying, Be not solicitous for your soul what you shall eat, or for your body what you shall put on. Therefore it was fitting for him neither from nature nor from art; but other things were prepared, if man had kept virtue: marks which, by the grace of God, were to make him resplendent — as it were certain splendors, such as those of the Angels, which would surpass all the variety of flowers and all the brightness of the stars. For this cause, then, garments were not at once provided him, since the rewards of virtue were stored up in those things, which the diabolical force of temptation did not permit him to attain.' Thus Basil.

Conclusion of Basil's homily ('Quod Deus non sit auctor malorum'). Citation: Matt 6:25 ('Nolite... cogitare quid edatis'; the margin labels it 'Matth. 7'). Running head misprinted '657'; true printed page 667.

To the explanation of the same words pertain those words of Ambrose, which are in chapter 13 of his book On Paradise: 'And before,' he says, 'they were naked, but not without the coverings of the virtues. They were naked because of the simplicity of their manners, and

because nature knew no garment of deceit. But now the human mind is veiled with many wrappings of dissimulation. Therefore, after they saw themselves, with nature whole and uncorrupted, stripped of that sincerity and simplicity, they began to seek worldly and manufactured things with which to cover the nakedness of their mind — sewing delights to delights, and the shadowy pleasures of this world like leaves to leaves, with which to overshadow the genital secret. For how did Adam have the eyes of his body closed, who saw all living things so as to impose a name upon them? How then did they know — that is, by an interior and higher knowledge — that not a tunic, but the veils of the virtues, were lacking to them?' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose, De paradiso 13: they were naked in the simplicity that knows no deceit; after the Fall they sought worldly coverings for the nakedness of their minds.

But why did they procure a covering for the baseness they had then first felt from fig leaves, rather than from elsewhere? Not, indeed, because that was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (as it seemed to some) — which was refuted by us above, in the third volume, which is On Paradise, when we treated of that tree — but perhaps because of the size of the leaves; for, says Pliny (book 16), the leaves of that tree are very broad: or because, to them — vehemently moved and perturbed in mind by the consciousness of the crime committed, and by the unwonted sense of lust — that tree first occurred, and was more at hand to them. 'For I do not think,' says Augustine (book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 32), 'that they thought anything about those fig leaves, that it was fitting that their now-itching members be covered by such things; but, compelled to this by a hidden instinct, in that perturbation, so that even such a penalty might become its own signification — produced by those who did not know it — which would convict the man become a sinner, and Scripture would teach the reader.' The Master of the Scholastic History (Peter Comestor), in the history of Genesis, chapter 23, hands down that if fig leaves are rubbed, and the flesh of a man is anointed with their juice, a

certain itch of pleasure is at once aroused: wherefore by that deed it was signified that those first human beings, after sin, felt an itch of pleasure in their flesh.

Why fig leaves? Not because it was the tree of knowledge (refuted in Pererius's third volume On Paradise); perhaps the broad leaves (Pliny, Nat. Hist. 16), or because nearest at hand. Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 11.32): a hidden instinct, not deliberation. Peter Comestor (Historia Scholastica, Genesis ch. 23): fig juice causes an itch, signifying the post-Fall itch of pleasure. Marginal gloss: 'Cur primi homines folijs ficus potius, quam aliarum arborum verenda sua tegere voluerint.'

But Irenaeus thinks that they did not rashly or by chance come upon that tree, nor without counsel and reason make themselves a covering from its leaves; but that they did it in order to give a manifest signification of the penitence which they were performing in their mind for the crime committed, and that they also wished to declare the mortification of the body. For fig leaves, applied to the flesh, prick and afflict it; and that garment indeed, [like a hairshirt]...

Irenaeus held the fig-covering was deliberate — a sign of penitence and bodily mortification (the leaves prick the flesh). Marginal gloss: 'Succinctorii ficulnei Irenaeus putat fuisse signum poenitentiae Adami.' Catchword: 'quam' (= the simile 'tanquam cilicium,' continues on the next page); page footer signature 'PPP 2'.

— p. 709 (PDF) · printed p. 668 —

...like a hairshirt, Adam would have worn perpetually for the sake of humility and penitence, had not the Lord, who is merciful and sweet and benign, given them, in place of the rough fig-garment, tunics of skin — namely, a more useful and softer covering. The words of Irenaeus in chapter 37 of book 3 Against Heresies are these: 'By the girdle which Adam put about himself, he showed by the very deed his penitence, covering himself with fig leaves, though there were many other leaves which could have vexed his body less. Yet, terrified by the fear of God, he made a covering befitting his disobedience, and blunting the wanton impulse of the flesh; because he had lost his disposition and childlike sense, and had come into a worse thinking.

He put a bridle of continence about himself and his wife, fearing God and awaiting his coming, and signifying as it were something of this kind: Since (he says) the stole which I had from the Spirit of holiness I have lost through disobedience, and now I recognize that I am worthy of such a covering, which affords indeed no delight, but bites and pricks the body. And he would indeed have kept this garment forever, humbling himself, had not the Lord, who is merciful, clothed them with tunics of skin instead of fig leaves.' Thus Irenaeus.

Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 3.37: the fig-girdle was a deliberate sign of penitence and a 'bridle of continence'; God later mercifully replaced it with softer tunics of skin (Gen 3:21). Running head misprinted '658'; true printed page 668.

But other Fathers, carrying that fig-covering of Adam over to a tropological understanding, argue that Adam sinned in many ways by that deed. First, he wished to cover his sin by himself, but in vain; for it can be covered — that is, blotted out — by no other than God, as David testifies, 'Blessed are they whose sins are covered'; but by whom, he himself declares, immediately adding, 'Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin.' Then, they also erred in this, that they supposed their sin could be covered with leaves. They cover their sins with leaves who either deny them, or excuse them, or hide them, or judge that they can be blotted out by their own force and power. But these things not only do not take away sin, but even augment it the more. Wherefore we read that the Lord (in Matthew 21) cursed the fig tree that had nothing but leaves.

A tropological reading: covering sin 'with leaves' = denying, excusing, hiding, or presuming to blot it out oneself — which only augments it; sin is covered (blotted out) by God alone (Ps 31:1-2, 'Beati quorum tecta sunt peccata'). Cf. the cursed barren fig tree, Matt 21:19. Marginal glosses: 'Psalm. 31'; 'Tegere folijs peccatum quid sit.'

Excellent is the mystical interpretation of this passage in Ambrose, which I have thought it wrong not to set down here. Thus he says in his book On Paradise, chapter 13: 'And they sewed fig leaves and made themselves girdles. For what species we ought to take the fig here, the

series of the divine readings teaches us. Since Scripture has recorded that they are holy who rest under the vine and the fig; and Paul said, Who plants a fig, and does not eat of its fruit? And the Lord came to the fig, but was offended because he found no fruit, but only leaves. Adam, therefore, teaches me what leaves are, who, after he sinned, made himself a girdle from fig leaves — he who ought rather to have tasted of its fruits. The just man chooses the fruit, the sinner the leaves. What is the fruit? The fruit, says the Spirit, is charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, modesty, continence, love. He had not the fruit, who had not joy. He had not faith, who had transgressed God's command. He had not continence, who had tasted of the tree forbidden him. Therefore whoever transgresses God's command is despoiled and made naked, and becomes base to himself. He wishes to cover himself with certain fig leaves — perhaps with certain empty and shadowy speeches, which, sewing together with composed lies, and building word upon word, [he weaves] to cover...'

Ambrose, De paradiso 13 (mystical interpretation): the fig's FRUIT = the fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22-23, charity, joy, peace...); Adam, lacking the fruit, chose mere leaves (empty words and lies). Scriptural allusions: Mic 4:4 (resting under vine and fig); 1 Cor 9:7 ('Quis plantat ficum...'); Matt 21:19 (the leaf-only fig). Marginal glosses: 'B. Ambrosius'; 'Corint. 9'; 'Galat. 5'; 'Quicumque mandatum Dei praevaricatur, spoliatur.' Catchword: 'riendam' (= operiendam, continues on the next page).

— p. 710 (PDF) · printed p. 669 —

'...to cover the conscience of his mind, the sinner weaves a veil for the deed, that he may cover his shame. For he casts leaves against himself, who, desiring to veil his fault, either names the devil as the author of the offense, or pretends the enticements of the flesh, or betrays some other persuader of his error. And from the divine Scriptures he frequently puts forward examples by which he alleges that the just fell into fault, saying — if perchance he be caught in debaucheries — And Abraham lay with the handmaid, and David loved another man's wife, and took her to himself as wife. For certain

examples from the series of the prophetic Scriptures were at hand to him; he does not think their fruit should be sought. Do not the Hebrews too seem to you to sew leaves, while they interpret the words of the spiritual law carnally? Whose interpretation loses all the fruit of its greenness, condemned by the curse of eternal dryness. The good interpretation, therefore — that is, the spiritual fig — is fruitful, under which the just and holy rest. Whoever plants it in the souls of individuals (as Paul says, I planted, Apollo watered, etc.) shall eat fruit from it. But a bad interpretation cannot bear fruit, cannot keep its greenness. What therefore is more grievous, Adam girded himself with this interpretation in that place where he ought rather to have girded himself with the fruit of chastity. For in the loins, with which we are girded, certain seeds of generation are said to be. And therefore Adam was ill girded there with useless leaves, where he signified not the future fruit of generation, but certain sins, which remained until the coming of the Lord and Savior. But after the Lord came, he found the fig untilled, and, being asked not to order it cut down, he permitted that it be tilled. And therefore now we are girded not with leaves, but with the divine word, since the Lord himself says, Let your loins be girded, and your lamps burning, etc. Whence he also forbids carrying money in our girdles: for our girdle ought to keep not secular things, but eternal.' Thus Ambrose.

Conclusion of Ambrose, De paradiso 13. Covering 'with leaves' = excusing one's fault (blaming the devil or the flesh, or citing the falls of the just); even the Hebrews 'sew leaves' by interpreting the spiritual law carnally. The fruitful fig = a sound (spiritual) interpretation (1 Cor 3:6, 'Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit'); the unfruitful fig is given a reprieve to be tilled (Luke 13:6-9); now we are girded with the divine word (Luke 12:35, 'Sint lumbi vestri praecincti'). Marginal glosses: '1. Cor. 1'; 'Luc. 23'; 'Luc. 12.' Running head misprinted '659'; true printed page 669.

Moreover, that Greek word περιζ■ματα (perizomata), which the Seventy translators used, signifies in Latin 'girdles' or 'loincloths.' For although it universally signifies everything that surrounds and girds about, here it properly signifies girdles of the loins. The Latin translation which

Augustine had, in this place had 'campestria' (aprons) instead of 'girdles.' For thus he writes (book 14 of the City of God, chapter 17): 'And they made themselves campestria for their genitals: for some translators put girdles.' Now 'campestria' is indeed a Latin word, but so called from this, that young men who exercised naked in the field (campus) covered their shameful parts; whence those who are so girt the common people call 'campestrati.' And so, what the libido was moving disobediently — against the condemned fault of disobedience — modesty prudently covered. From this, all nations, since they are descended from that stock, hold it so deeply implanted to veil the shameful parts, that some Barbarians do not have those parts of the body naked even in the baths, but are washed with their coverings. Also, through the shady solitudes of India, when certain men philosophize naked (whence they are named Gymnosophists), they nevertheless apply coverings to the genitals, which they go without for the other members. Thus Augustine.

The Greek περιζ■ματα is the Septuagint word for the 'aprons' of Gen 3:7 = succinctoria / subligacula (girdles/loincloths). GREEK GLYPH verified by magnification: περιζ■ματα (perizomata, π-ε-ρ-ι-ζ-■-μ-α-τ-α, 'aprons/girdles'), printed immediately glossed in Latin as 'succinctoria, vel subligacula.' Augustine's Latin text had the variant 'campestria' (De Civitate Dei 14.17, quoted); the universal custom of veiling the shameful parts (even Barbarians and the naked Indian Gymnosophists). Marginal glosses: 'De vocabulo Perizomata'; 'Cur pudenda velare omnibus etiam Barbaris insitum.'

Cicero also testifies (book 1 of the Offices) that there was among the Romans so great a zeal and observance of modesty, that not even actors came forth in public without loincloths. 'The custom of actors, indeed,' he says, 'is...'

Cicero, De officiis 1 (the Roman actors' modesty). Catchword: 'mos' (continues on the next page); page footer signature 'PPP 3'.

— p. 711 (PDF) · printed p. 670 —

...the custom [of actors] has so much modesty from ancient discipline, that no one comes onto the stage without loincloths. For they fear, lest, if it

should by any chance happen that certain parts of the body be uncovered, they be seen unbecoming. Nor, even among the most barbarous nations, was there no great and scrupulous care of veiling the shameful parts. Nicolaus of Damascus, in Strabo book 15, affirms that he saw at Antioch the ambassadors of Porus, the most powerful king of the Indians, sent to Augustus with letters and gifts. Among them were eight servants naked in the whole body, except the shameful parts covered with loincloths. Diodorus Siculus, writing of the Ethiopians in book 4, narrates that they go about naked indeed in the rest of the body, yet veil the shameful parts either with fox-tails, or with loincloths woven from hair.

Continuation of the Cicero quotation (De officiis 1, the modesty of actors) from page 669, with ethnographic examples of veiling the body: Nicolaus of Damascus (in Strabo, Geography 15; the Indian envoys of Porus to Augustus); Diodorus Siculus (Bibliotheca 4, on the Ethiopians). Running head misprinted '660'; true printed page 670.

It seems, therefore, that this care of covering the shameful parts spread to all nations from that example of the first parents, as it were by a certain hereditary and natural discipline. Julius Pollux hands down that there were once three parts of the human body which they reckoned shameful and therefore to be veiled, and that each of them had its own proper covering: but the first two were of women, the third indeed of men as well as of women. One, of women, girding the breasts, was called fascia (a band); another, covering the belly, was called περ■ζωμα (perizoma) or 'veil'; the third, by which the shameful parts were veiled. Some report that the use of perizomata prevailed among the Assyrians by the example of Queen Semiramis, who, weary of the womanly sex and putting on a manly habit as a manly mind, began not only to cover her head with a tiara, but also to put coverings about her legs; which she also ordered her people to do, lest she alone should seem to conceal anything by the new habit, as Justin hands down (book 1).

The care of veiling spread to all nations from the first parents (a hereditary, natural discipline). Julius Pollux's three coverings: fascia (breast-band), περ■ζωμα/velamen (belly), and a third (the genitals). GREEK GLYPH verified by magnification: περ■ζωμα (perizoma, π-ε-ρ-ι-ζ-■-μ-α, 'girdle/wrapper';

the singular of περιζ■ματα seen on p.669), glossed 'sive velamen' (or veil). The custom of perizomata traced to Semiramis (Justin, Epitome 1). Marginal gloss: 'Tres hominis partes velandae.'

GENESIS, chapter 3, verse 8. And when they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in Paradise at the breeze after midday, Adam and his wife hid themselves from the face of the Lord God in the midst of the tree[s] of Paradise.

New lemma: Genesis 3:8.

The voice of God, by which Adam, terrified, hid himself in the grove of Paradise — very many think it was that by which God addressed him saying, 'Adam, where are you?' But not rightly: for when God said this, Adam was already hidden; for God spoke thus precisely because by this voice not only was Adam not hidden, but rather, being hidden, he came forth from his hiding place into the open, and came into God's sight. It is therefore likely that that voice was nothing other than a certain huge and terrific sound and crash, by which God wished to presignify his coming to Adam. For Scripture is wont to call certain huge sounds 'voices': as when it says, 'the voice of the waters, the voice of the cataracts, the voice of the cloud, the voice of thunder, the voice of the trumpet' — as may be seen in the Apocalypse more than once, and in Psalms 28, 41, 46, 76, and other places. Therefore God, who before had been wont to appear to Adam peacefully and gently, then presented himself to him...

The 'voice of God' Adam heard was not 'Adam, where are you?' (Gen 3:9, which came after he hid) but a terrific crash announcing God's coming; Scripture calls great sounds 'voices' (waters, cataracts, cloud, thunder, trumpet; Apocalypse; Pss 28, 41, 46, 76). Marginal glosses: 'Vox Dei, qua Adamus perterritus se abscondit, qua fuerit'; 'Vox pro sono saepe in Scriptura usurpatur.' Catchword: 'praesentavit' (continues on the next page).

— p. 712 (PDF) · printed p. 671 —

...presented himself formidable and terrible, and as if coming from abroad, and as it were swelling with anger and watching, and shaking the earth by his entrance, and making the very trees of Paradise tremble with his

pressing footsteps — namely, so that they, perturbed and fearful by that thing, might recognize their crime, and confess it, and implore God's mercy and pardon.

Continued from page 670: God presented himself terrible and earth-shaking, to drive Adam and Eve to confess. Running head misprinted '661'; true printed page 671.

But that phrase, 'At the breeze after midday,' is variously read: for some Latin codices, which Jerome cites and Augustine followed, had only 'At evening,' others 'After midday.' Jerome's words, in the Hebrew Questions on Genesis, are these: 'In most codices of the Latins, for that which we here put, At evening, After midday is found: because we cannot translate to the word the Greek expression τ■ δειλιν■ν *(to deilinon, the late-day time); for which in Hebrew is written* ■■■■ ■■■■ *(Leruah haiom): which Aquila interpreted* ■ν τ■ ■ν■μ■ τ■ς ■μ■ρας, *that is, In the wind of the day; but Symmachus,* δι■ πνε■ματος ■μ■ρας, *that is, Through the breath of the day. And Theodotion more clearly,* ■ν τ■ πνε■ματι πρ■ς κατ■ψυξιν τ■ς ■μ■ρας, *so as to show, the midday heat being past, the refreshment of the breathing breeze.' Thus Jerome.*

Jerome, Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim, on the textual variants of Gen 3:8 ('At the breeze after midday'). GLYPHS verified by magnification: Hebrew ■■■■ ■■■■ (Leruah haiom, 'at the wind/breeze of the day'; read right-to-left, lamed-resh-vav-chet / he-yod-vav-mem); Greek τ■ δειλιν■ν *(the Septuagint phrase, 'in the late-day/evening'); Aquila's* ■ν τ■ ■ν■μ■ τ■ς ■μ■ρας *('in the wind of the day'); Symmachus's* δι■ πνε■ματος ■μ■ρας *('through the breath of the day'); Theodotion's* ■ν τ■ πνε■ματι πρ■ς κατ■ψυξιν τ■ς ■μ■ρας *('in the breath, toward the cooling of the day'). Marginal glosses: 'Aquila Ponticus'; 'Symmachus'; 'Theodotion.'*

The Chaldaic Paraphrase has 'At the rest of the day,' doubtless signifying evening: namely, at that time the heat of the day begins to rest and slacken. Pagninus and Vatablus have 'At the breeze of the day,' that is, toward evening: for at that time the wind is wont to blow, especially the Zephyr. Now the 'wind of the day' is so called, which after midday and before sunset is wont to blow in maritime places. For Egypt and the land of

Canaan, in which the Hebrews — to whom Moses wrote this volume — had dwelt and were to dwell, are maritime regions, bounded on the West side and enclosed by the Mediterranean sea; in which regions, from the evening approach of the sun, daily a wind or breeze from the sea was wont to be stirred up and to blow: which wind the Hebrews named 'the wind of the day.' It is therefore a periphrasis of the afternoon or evening time, at which time God came into Paradise. There are besides those who think these words signify that a certain wind went before, as it were a herald of God's coming, as happened to Elijah on Mount Horeb.

Further renderings: the Chaldaic (Targum) Paraphrase, Pagninus, and Vatablus ('the breeze of the day') — the evening sea-breeze (Zephyr) of maritime Egypt and Canaan, called by the Hebrews 'the wind of the day.' Some take the wind as a herald of God's coming (Elijah at Horeb, 1 Kings 19). Marginal glosses: 'Aura diei quid sit'; '3. Reg. 19.'

Nor is it void of mystery that God came — to rebuke Adam's sin, and to promise the author of blotting out that sin and the Redeemer — after midday and at evening: namely, by that thing he wished to adumbrate the coming of Christ to redeem the human race, which would be at the evening of the world, as Irenaeus interprets (book 5 Against Heresies). At evening too the dove returned to Noah, which, carrying a green olive branch in its mouth, announced the cessation of the flood of waters. Gregory (book 28 of the Morals, chapter 2), explaining this passage with an elegant mystical interpretation, says thus: 'What is it that, after the sin of man, the Lord no longer stands in Paradise, but walks about, except that, the fault rushing in, he shows himself moved away from the heart of man? What is it that He came at the breeze after midday, except that the more fervent light of truth had departed, and her own fault was binding the sinful soul with cold? He rebuked Adam, therefore, by walking about, so that to blind minds he might reveal their own wickedness not only by words...'

Mystical sense: God's coming at evening foreshadows Christ's coming at the world's evening (Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5); the dove returning to Noah at evening (Gen 8:11). Gregory the Great, Moralia 28.2 (quotation begins). Marginal glosses: 'Interpretatio mystica. Genes. 8'; 'D. Gregorij Moralis horum verborum expositio.' Catchword: 'sermonibus' (continues on the next page).

— p. 713 (PDF) · printed p. 672 —

'...but reveal it even by things: insofar as sinful man might both hear through words what he had done, and through the walking-about — the state of eternity being lost — perceive the inconstancy of his mutability, and through the breeze — the fervor of charity being expelled — notice his own torpor, and through the declining of the sun, know that he was drawing near to darkness.' The same (Morals 33, chapter 3): 'The first man, after the fault, is found hidden among the trees of Paradise at the breeze after midday. For because he had lost the midday heat of charity, he now, under the shadow of sin, grew torpid as under a cold breeze. This Behemoth, therefore, because in them he found as it were a certain rest — those whom, by withdrawing them from the heat of the true sun, he made cold — is said by holy Job to sleep under the shade.' Thus Gregory.

Conclusion of the Gregory quotations (Moralia 28.2 and 33.3): the mystical reading of God walking 'at the breeze'; the Behemoth (the devil) resting in souls made cold by sin (Job 40:21). Running head misprinted '662'; true printed page 672.

But that Adam wished to hide himself from the face of God, some interpret in a bad sense, as if he thought something could be hidden from God. One must not flee from God, but flee to God; but the sinner, if it could be done, would wish himself and all his crimes to be hidden and concealed from God. But Augustine (book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 33) writes that Adam did this, vehemently disturbed in mind, through excessive shame and fear, not knowing what he was doing: for disturbed men sometimes do certain things similar to the insane. Augustine's words are these: 'When God turns away his face inwardly, and a man becomes disturbed: let us not wonder that these things happen which are similar to madness, through excessive shame and fear. That hidden instinct also not resting, so that they unknowingly did things which would signify something one day to posterity, who would come to know them, on whose account these things were written.' Thus Augustine.

Why Adam hid: some read it in a bad sense (as if hiding from God were possible — vain); Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram 11.33): he acted in disturbed shame and fear, 'like the insane.' Marginal gloss: 'Cur Adamus voluerit se abscondere a facie Dei.'

Irenaeus, however, takes that flight and Adam's attempt to hide in a good sense, referring it to a certain pious and salutary fear and dread of a humble and penitent mind. For in book 3 Against Heresies, chapter 37, he writes in this manner: 'Adam, seduced by another under the pretext of immortality, is at once seized with fear and hides himself: not as if he could escape God, but, confounded because he had transgressed God's command, he thought himself unworthy to come into his sight and conversation. But the fear of the Lord is the beginning of understanding; and the understanding of the transgression produced penitence.' Thus Irenaeus.

Irenaeus (Adversus Haereses 3.37) takes Adam's hiding in a GOOD sense — the salutary fear of a humble, penitent mind (Ps 110:10, 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of understanding'). Marginal gloss: 'B. Irenaeus.'

As I think over and reflect in my mind upon the things which Adam did after the crime was committed, there comes the recollection of that which Paul writes (Romans 6): 'What fruit therefore had you then in those things, of which you are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death.' That this was most truly said, the example of Adam and daily experience confirm. But in the example of Adam I seem to myself to notice five fruits of sin...

Pererius's own analysis: reflecting on Adam's deeds after the Fall, he recalls Rom 6:21 ('What fruit had you...; the end is death') and finds FIVE fruits of sin in Adam's example. Catchword: 'fructus'; the marginal gloss begins 'Quinque a-' (continues on the next page).

— p. 714 (PDF) · printed p. 673 —

...fruits, and all of them indeed most bitter and most pernicious. The first fruit of sin is the opening of the eyes: for before sin, or even in sinning, man is plainly blind, by no means seeing how much evil is in sin; but

immediately after the sin his eyes are opened, for he sees most clearly that for a slight and brief pleasure of sin he has procured for himself the greatest and everlasting evil. The second fruit is nakedness: for because of sin we are despoiled of very many and the greatest ornaments of God, and of the most precious garments of the heavenly virtues. We read (Exod 32) that the Hebrew people, after the adoration of the calf, was naked: 'For Aaron had stripped it,' says Scripture, 'because of the ignominy of dishonor, and had set it naked among the enemies.' Wherefore God in the Apocalypse, chapter 3, said to a certain sinner: 'You know not that you are wretched and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked: I counsel you to buy from me gold tried by fire, that you may become rich, and be clothed with white garments, that the confusion of your nakedness may not appear.' And Joel: 'Stripping,' he says, 'it has despoiled it, and cast it down.' But in Hosea, chapter 2, God, speaking to the sinful soul: 'Lest perchance,' he says, 'I strip her naked, and set her according to the day of her birth, and make her like a solitude, and set her like a pathless land, and kill her with thirst.'

The five fruits of sin (continued): the FIRST = the opening of the eyes (seeing too late the everlasting evil bought for brief pleasure); the SECOND = nakedness (being despoiled of God's ornaments — Exod 32:25; Apoc 3:17-18; Joel 1:7; Hosea 2:3). Marginal glosses: '...mari & pestilentes peccati fructus'; 'Primus est apertio oculorum'; 'Secundus, nuditas'; 'Ioel 2.' Running head misprinted '663'; true printed page 673.

The third fruit is shame and confusion of mind, and a refuge to the empty consolations of the world, to suppress the pain contracted from sin: for this is to sew oneself loincloths for the shameful parts from fig leaves. And this one fruit of sin, among very many, Paul expressed in the aforesaid place: 'What fruit had you then in those things, of which you are now ashamed?' To this also pertains that which is in Jeremiah, chapter 31: 'After you converted me, I did penance; and after you showed me, I struck my thigh. I was confounded and blushed, because I bore the reproach of my youth.'

The THIRD fruit = shame and confusion of mind, and flight to the world's empty consolations (= sewing the fig-leaf loincloths). Citations: Rom 6:21; Jer 31:19 (the margin reads 'Hier. c. 33,' but the text is Jer 31:19). Marginal gloss: 'Tertius pudor.'

The fourth fruit is the judgment and testimony of conscience, vehemently accusing and condemning a man of the crime committed: which appeared in Adam and Eve, who, as Moses narrates, when they had heard the voice of the Lord God, hid themselves from his face; and Paul, to the Romans, chapter 2: 'Their conscience bearing testimony to them, and their thoughts between themselves mutually accusing, or also defending.' This vexation of conscience, and (as they call it) the gnawing, although it is a grave penalty to a man, is nevertheless useful and salutary to him: otherwise we would rush into more crimes; for it draws us back from sinning, and stimulates us to do penance.

The FOURTH fruit = the judgment and testimony of conscience accusing the sinner (Rom 2:15). The 'gnawing' (morsus) of conscience, though a grave penalty, is salutary, drawing us from sin to penance. Marginal gloss: 'Quartus, conscientiae testimonium.'

The fifth fruit is fear and trembling, and the dread of divine judgment and vengeance: which is signified of Adam and Eve by those words, 'They hid themselves from the face of the Lord God in the midst of the tree[s] of paradise.' For as it is written in the book of Wisdom, chapter 17: 'Wicked men frequently anticipate the worst, conscience reproving them. For since wickedness is timid, it gives testimony of its own condemnation; for a savage, disturbed conscience always presumes the worst.' And this perpetual stimulus and torment of conscience is so great a penalty that even Philosophers and Poets have handed down that, although no other penalty followed sin, this one alone ought to seem the gravest and most bitter — so that truly death would be a thousand times preferable to a sin which is chastised with so great a penalty. Whence is that of Juvenal, Satire 13: 'By whatever example anything is wickedly committed, it displeases the author himself; this is the first vengeance, that with himself as judge, no guilty man is acquitted.' Known from the Greek tragedians is that Orestes the matricide, whom the crime committed against his mother [caused] to take no part of rest, to be able to stand still in no place...

The FIFTH fruit = fear and trembling, the dread of divine judgment (Wisd 17:10-11). The perpetual torment of conscience is so great that even the philosophers and poets held death preferable; Juvenal, Satire 13 ('prima est haec ultio, quod se iudice nemo nocens absolvitur'); and Orestes the matricide from the Greek tragedians. Marginal glosses: 'Quintus, est pavor & trepidatio'; 'Iuvenalis.' Catchword: 'consistere'; page footer signature 'QQQ.'

— p. 715 (PDF) · printed p. 674 —

...to stand still, nowhere let him breathe, but the appearance of his bloody mother, and her flame-vomiting eyes, drove him wandering and fugitive, and as it were an exile, through a great part of the world. The same thing Moses also narrates below of Cain, who after the fratricide lived his whole life fearful, trembling, and a fugitive.

Conclusion of the fifth fruit of sin (from page 673): Orestes hounded by the bloody image of his murdered mother; Cain the fugitive fratricide (Gen 4:12-14). Running head misprinted '664'; true printed page 674.

I will not hide from the reader here what Rupert wrote excellently (book 2, On the Victory of the Word of God, chapter 14), treating this very passage of Moses which we are now handling. I will put his whole passage here: 'For a little while,' he says, 'the Lord God had, as it were, slept, while meanwhile a thing happened by which that serpent thought himself the victor — that is, thought he had thwarted God's purpose. For unless he had in some way slept, his adversary could have effected nothing. This very thing, namely that he slept with a certain sleep — on account of which we are wont to say, Arise, why do you sleep, O Lord? — Scripture intimates when it says, And when they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in Paradise at the breeze after midday. For to walk about at the breeze after midday is a human custom, that after a warm nap someone who had perhaps fallen asleep surfeited may breathe in the warm breeze, and cool and relieve his body. He had therefore slept with a certain sleep, that is, with silence, by permitting the serpent to approach, the woman to converse with the serpent, and the man too likewise to die by disobedience with the

death of the soul. Now that God should so sleep came from the fault of men, because they did not rouse God either by giving thanks or by invoking him. What, then, had been done by the devil, but a certain robbery? As a thief is wont to boast when he has departed after stealing, so that deceiver could boast for an hour over his crime. But as, at a far later time, it was done and written, And the Lord was awakened as one sleeping, and as a mighty man surfeited with wine, and he struck his enemies — so also of that time it can rightly be said. For then he was awakened as a mighty man surfeited with wine, that is, as having become negligent of man on account of the daring of pride by which man had aspired to become like God. He was awakened, I say — that is, he sought out the lost, and struck his enemies, namely the serpent, the man, and the woman. With what did he strike them? Namely with his word, his victorious word, each indeed according to their merits, but he did not strike them with the same severity. For as one strikes his enemy to kill him, so he struck the ancient serpent, so as to condemn — nay, to confirm the sentence of condemnation upon him. And as one strikes his son or servant to correct him, so he struck the proud man, so as to lead him back to the humility which is the beginning of salvation.' Thus Rupert.

Rupert of Deutz, De Victoria Verbi Dei 2.14, quoted at length: God 'slept' (kept silence) while the serpent triumphed like a boasting thief, then 'awoke as a mighty man' and struck his enemies with his victorious word — the serpent to condemn, the man to correct and lead to humility. Scriptural allusions: Ps 43:23 ('Exurge, quare obdormis Domine?'); Ps 77:65 ('excitatus est tanquam dormiens Dominus'). Marginal gloss: 'Explanatio huius loci secundum Rupertum.'

Verse 9. And the Lord God called Adam, and said to him, Where are you?

New lemma: Genesis 3:9.

Thus, for the first time, man is set before the tribunal and judgment of God, so that he who did not worship God as a father may experience him as a judge and avenger. How formidable it is to undergo the judgment of God,

David sufficiently indicated by those words: 'Lord, enter not into judgment with your servant: for no living thing shall be justified in your sight'; and Job says, 'If a man wishes to contend with him, he cannot answer him one for a thousand.' Adam had hidden himself from the face of God, but by his summons he is drawn into the open, that it may appear how true is that saying: ...

Adam is set before God's tribunal — he who did not worship God as father now experiences him as judge (Ps 142:2, 'non intres in iudicium'; Job 9:3). Yet (as the next page shows) God's judgment is joined with mercy. Marginal glosses: 'Dei iudicium... sed cum misericordia coniunctum'; 'Psal. 142.' Catchword: 'illud' (continues on the next page).

— p. 716 (PDF) · printed p. 675 —

...that saying: 'Nothing is covered that shall not be revealed, and hidden that shall not be known'; and Amos, chapter 9: 'There shall be no flight for them,' he says. 'They shall flee, and he that flees of them shall not be saved. If they descend even to hell, thence my hand shall bring them out; and if they ascend even to heaven, thence I will draw them down.' But most truly it was said by the prophet Habakkuk, chapter 3: 'When you are angry, you will remember mercy'; and by David, Psalm 76: 'Will God forget to be merciful forever? or will he in his anger shut up his mercies?' For in this very judgment of God his mercy wonderfully shone forth: because he did not, as he did the devil, immediately condemn and destroy Adam, but gave time and place for repenting; because he first sought him out, and provoked him to seek pardon; because he did not treat him too harshly and roughly, but, to one perturbed and dismayed with shame and fear at once, he gave the confidence of speaking and beseeching. Most true, therefore, is what he himself said through Ezekiel 18: 'I do not wish the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live.' Let Christian judges learn by this example — but especially ecclesiastical ones — not to be too swift to condemn, nor to terrify the accused with harsh and menacing words, nor to condemn anyone not first summoned or heard; and, as much as in them lies, to be more inclined to mercy than to punishing.

Nothing is hidden from God (Matt 10:26; Amos 9:1-4); yet his judgment is joined with mercy (Hab 3:2; Ps 76:10; Ezek 18:23) — he gave Adam time to repent, sought him first, treated him gently. A lesson for judges (especially ecclesiastical) to lean to mercy. Marginal glosses: 'Iob. 9'; 'Matt. 12.' Running head misprinted '665'; true printed page 675.

But let us weigh how God addressed Adam. 'Adam,' he says, 'where are you?' These are not the words of one ignorant of where in the world Adam was — for in every place the eyes of the Lord behold the good and the evil — but of one inviting him to appear confidently and to converse intrepidly. They are the words of a father seeking his lost son. They are the words of a physician asking the sick person the place of the wound, that he may apply to it the fitting and salutary medicine; for although bodily medicine can be applied and be of profit to a sick person even unknowing and unwilling, spiritual medicine cannot.

'Where are you?' is not ignorance (Prov 15:3, 'In omni loco oculi Domini') but an invitation — a father seeking his lost son, a physician asking the wound's place (spiritual medicine requires the patient's will). Marginal gloss: 'Quid significaverit Deus, dicens Adamo, Ubi es? Proverb. 15.'

They are the words of one declaring that Adam, because of the crime committed, is of the number of those to whom the Lord will say, 'I know not whence you are'; and of those who are far from God, of whom David said, 'Salvation is far from sinners,' and again, 'They who go far from you shall perish.' They are the words of one indicating that Adam was not in his place: for as the natural place of a stone is the center, so of man it is God, outside of whom nowhere is it well with man. For through sin man becomes wandering, fugitive, standing still in no place. Whence is that of Juvenal, Satire 13: 'Changeable and various is generally the nature of the wicked, when they commit a crime.'

'Where are you?' declares Adam among those to whom God will say 'I know not whence you are' (Luke 13:27), far from God (Ps 118:155, 'Longe a peccatoribus salus'; Ps 72:27); man's natural 'place' is God, outside whom he wanders (Juvenal, Satire 13). Marginal glosses: 'Luc. 13. & Matt. 25'; 'Psalm. 18'; 'Psalm. 72.'

Finally the words are of one recalling to Adam's memory what he then was, and how much changed from him who he had been before sin — namely, from how great a felicity he had been cast down into how great a misery. As if he said: 'Where now are those so magnificent promises of the serpent? Where is that former tranquility of your mind? the security of your soul? the peace of conscience? the possession of so many and so great goods? and the freedom from all evils?' Let the reader hear Ambrose, in his book On Paradise, chapter 14, writing these things to the same purpose: 'But by saying, Where are you? he does not seek the place...'

'Where are you?' recalls Adam's change from felicity to misery ('Where now are the serpent's promises?'). Ambrose, De paradiso 14 (quotation begins). Catchword: 'quaerit'; page footer signature 'QQQ 2.'

— p. 717 (PDF) · printed p. 676 —

'...he seeks, who knew the secret; for God did not have his eyes closed, so as not to see him hiding. Finally, therefore, he said, Adam is become as one of us, because he opened his eyes. And here indeed he opened his eyes, to see his own fault, which he could not avoid; for after we have sinned, somehow we recognize our offenses the more, and then we understand that to be a sin which, before we sinned, we did not think to be a sin. Certainly we did not think it, as it were, a sin to be condemned; for if we condemned it, we would not commit it. But God sees the faults of all, and knows the offenses of all: over every soul, over the hidden things of all, he has his eyes. What, then, is, Adam, where are you? That is: not in what place, but in what things are you? It is therefore not a question, but a rebuke. From what goods, he says, from what beatitude, from what grace, into what misery have you fallen? You have forsaken eternal life, and are heaped up for death, buried with error. Where is that confidence of yours, so well conscious of itself? That fear confesses the fault; the hiding-place, the transgression. Where, then, are you? that is, I ask not in what place, but in what state. Whither have your sins led you,

that you flee your God, whom before you sought?' Thus Ambrose.

Conclusion of Ambrose, De paradiso 14: 'Where are you?' is a rebuke, not a question — 'not in what place, but in what state; whither have your sins led you?' Marginal gloss: 'Peccata magis cognoscimus postquam peccavimus.' Running head misprinted '666'; true printed page 676.

But, that Moses narrates in this place that God called Adam and said to him, 'Where are you?' and soon weaves in the various discourse of God with Eve and the serpent — this involves a question by no means to be crushed with silence at present: namely, how one ought to understand that God spoke. Whether only in a spiritual and intellectual manner? Whether through human voices formed in the air? Or rather through himself, or through some Angel, yet under a human appearance and figure? Nor indeed does this question touch the interpretation of this passage only, but, extending very widely, it pertains to very many passages of divine Scripture in which we read that God spoke either with Angels or with men. St. Augustine treated that question both in other books, and more than once in the books On Genesis according to the Letter.

The question of HOW God 'spoke' (spiritually? through human voices in the air? through himself, or an Angel in human form?) — pertaining to many Scripture passages. Augustine treated it (De Genesi ad litteram). Marginal gloss: 'Quemadmodum oporteat intelligi, Deum esse locutum cum Adamo, Eva, & serpente.'

In the eleventh volume of that work, chapter 33, he writes in this manner: 'And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise at evening. For at that hour it had now suited him to visit them, who had fallen from the light of truth. For perhaps in other inward or ineffable ways God spoke with them before, as he also speaks with the Angels, illustrating their minds by that very immutable truth, where there is an understanding to know at once whatever things, even through times, do not happen at once. Perhaps, I say, he spoke with them thus, though not with so great a participation of divine wisdom as the Angels receive; yet according to the human measure, however much less, but by that very kind of visitation and

speech — perhaps even by that which is made through a creature, whether in an ecstasy of the spirit by bodily images, or by some appearance presented to the bodily senses themselves, either for seeing or for hearing, as God is wont to be seen in his Angels, or to sound through a cloud. Now, however, that they heard the voice of God walking in paradise at evening was done only through a creature, visibly, lest that invisible substance, wholly everywhere, which is of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, be believed to have appeared to their bodily senses with local and temporal motion.' Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.33: God perhaps spoke to them before by ineffable inward ways (as to the Angels); but here 'the voice walking in paradise at evening' was done only 'through a creature, visibly,' lest the invisible Trinity be thought to move with local and temporal motion. Marginal glosses: 'Deus loquitur modis ineffabilibus'; 'Deus locutus est per creaturam.'

But as I think, and recall to memory, the things which the Fathers [handed down] about the manner...

Pererius begins his survey of the Fathers' views on the mode of God's speaking. Catchword: 'do' (= modo, continues on the next page).

— p. 718 (PDF) · printed p. 677 —

...the manner by which God speaks to the intellectual creature, it comes to mind that St. Gregory discoursed excellently on this matter in book 28 of the Morals, chapter 2 and the following ones up to chapter 7. And unless my memory or my judgment deceives me, none of the Fathers disputed on this question either more diligently, or more clearly, or more eloquently, or more copiously and brilliantly with sacred examples and arguments, than Gregory. Indeed, I think it will seem neither alien, nor superfluous, nor troublesome to the reader if I set forth at present the so excellent doctrine of so great a Father — most useful for illustrating very many passages of the divine letters — in the same words in which it was set forth by him. That disputation of Gregory is somewhat long, I confess, and for that

reason perhaps, in the judgment of some, by no means to be inserted in these commentaries; but it will be inserted nonetheless: for the prolixity of the discourse (if there be any) is abundantly compensated by the gravity and utility of the doctrine, and also by the piety and pleasantness of the diction.

Continued from page 676. Pererius names Gregory (Moralia 28.2-7) as the best patristic treatment of how God speaks, and will quote it at length despite its length. Running head misprinted '667'; true printed page 677.

Explaining, therefore, those words of Job which are in chapter 38, 'But the Lord, answering Job from the whirlwind, said,' Gregory disputes upon these words in this manner: 'It must be known that divine speech is distinguished in two modes: for either the Lord speaks through himself, or his words are formed to us through an angelic creature. But when he speaks through himself, the internal force of inspiration alone is opened to us. When he speaks through himself, the heart is taught of his word without words and syllables, because his power is known by a certain inward lifting-up — to which the full mind is suspended, the empty is weighed down. For there is a certain weight which lifts up every soul that it fills. It is an incorporeal light, which both fills the inner parts and, having filled them, circumscribes them without. It is speech without noise, which both opens the hearing and knows not how to hear a sound.'

Gregory the Great, Moralia 28 (on Job 38:1, 'Respondens Dominus de turbine'): divine speech is in two modes — through himself, or through an angelic creature. Speaking through himself: the heart is taught without words or syllables, by 'an incorporeal light' and 'speech without noise.' Marginal gloss: 'Valde notabilis & observanda B. Gregorij doctrina de variis modis, quibus Deus creaturis suis loqui solet.'

After these things, Gregory, weighing that in the Acts of the Apostles, chapters 8 and 10, the Spirit said certain things to Philip and to Peter, adds: 'For the Spirit of God, as it were saying certain words to us, is to intimate by a hidden power the things that are to be done, and to

render the ignorant heart of man suddenly expert about hidden things, without the due noise and slowness of speech. For since the hearing does not comprehend at once all the things that are said to it — inasmuch as it perceives both the causes through words, and words piecemeal through syllables — whereas our sight, in that to which it directs itself, apprehends the whole suddenly and at once. God's speech to us seems rather to be made inwardly than to be heard, because, while he insinuates himself without delay of speech, he illuminates the darkness of our ignorance with a sudden light. Whence Baruch the son of Neriah, when, being asked, he explained how he had heard the words of Jeremiah prophesying, said, From his mouth he spoke as if reading, and I wrote. But he who speaks while reading attends to one thing, yet makes a word of another, because what he sees, he says. The prophets of God, therefore, because they see his words in the heart rather than hear them, speak as if reading.'

Gregory (continued): the Spirit 'speaking' (Acts 8:29, 10:19, to Philip and Peter) = intimating by hidden power, illuminating with a sudden light; the prophets 'see' God's words in the heart (Baruch on Jeremiah, Jer 36:18). Marginal glosses: 'Quid sit spiritum dicere'; 'Hier. 36.'

'But when the Lord indicates his will through an Angel, sometimes he shows it by words, sometimes by things; sometimes by words and things at once; sometimes by images shown to the eyes of the heart; sometimes by images assumed for a time from the air before the bodily eyes; sometimes by heavenly substances, sometimes by earthly, sometimes by earthly and heavenly at once. But sometimes God even speaks to human hearts through an Angel, when...'

Gregory (continued): the SECOND mode — through an Angel: by words, by things, by images (of the heart, or assumed from air before the eyes), by heavenly or earthly substances. Catchword: 'cum' (continues on the next page); page footer signature 'QQQ 3.'

— p. 719 (PDF) · printed p. 678 —

'...when nothing is shown in an image, but the supernal words of the speech are heard, as when the Lord said, Father, glorify your name, it is at once answered, And I have glorified it, and I will glorify it again. For God, who without time cries in the innermost parts by the force of impulse, did not in time by his own substance utter that voice which, circumscribed by time, he distinguished through human words; but, doubtless speaking of heavenly things, he formed his words, which he wished to be heard by men, with a rational creature administering. Sometimes God speaks by things through Angels, when nothing is said by word, but the things which are to come are announced by an image assumed from the elements: as Ezekiel, hearing nothing of words, saw the appearance of electrum in the midst of the fire, so that, namely, while he looked at the appearance alone, he might perceive what things would come in the last days. For electrum is mixed from the metal of gold and silver, in which mixture the silver is indeed made brighter, yet the brightness of the gold is tempered. What, then, in the electrum, but the Mediator of God and men is shown? who, when he composed himself for us of divine and human nature, both made the human brighter through the deity, and tempered the divine to our sight through the humanity. For because by the power of his divinity the humanity shone with so many miracles, from the gold grew the silver; and because God could be known through the flesh, and through the flesh endured so many adversities, the gold was as it were tempered from silver. Which is also well shown in the midst of the fire, because the flame of the following judgment accompanies the mystery of his incarnation. For it is written, The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son.'

Gregory the Great, Moralia 28 (continued): God speaking through himself (John 12:28, 'Pater clarifica nomen tuum'); through Angels by 'things'/images — Ezekiel's 'electrum' in the fire (Ezek 1:4) read as the Mediator, gold (divinity) tempered with silver (humanity); John 5:22 ('Pater non iudicat quenquam'). Marginal glosses: 'Ioan. 12'; 'Ezechiel. 1'; 'Expositio visionis Ezechielis'; 'Ioannis 5.' Running head misprinted '668' (= true 678 minus 10); true printed page 678.

Sometimes God speaks through Angels by words and things at once, when by certain motions he insinuates that which he narrates by words. For Adam, after the fault, could not see the Lord in the substance of divinity, but heard the words of rebuke through an Angel, of which it is written: When he heard the voice of the Lord God walking in Paradise at the breeze after midday, he hid himself among the trees of Paradise. Sometimes God speaks through Angels by images shown to the eyes of the heart: as Jacob, sleeping, saw a ladder leaning against heaven; as Peter, caught up in ecstasy, beheld a sheet full of reptiles and quadrupeds — who, unless he perceived these with bodily eyes, would not have been in ecstasy; as to Paul in a vision of the night a Macedonian man appeared, who asked him to cross over into Macedonia.

Gregory (continued): God speaks by words and things (Adam heard the rebuke through an Angel, Gen 3:8); by images shown to the heart's eyes (Jacob's ladder, Gen 28:12; Peter's sheet, Acts 10:11; Paul's Macedonian, Acts 16:9). Marginal glosses: 'Gen. 3'; 'Genes. 28'; 'Actor. 10'; 'Actor. 16.'

Sometimes God speaks through Angels by images assumed for a time from the air before the bodily eyes: as Abraham could not only see three men, but also receive them in an earthly dwelling; and not only receive them, but even apply food to their use. For unless the Angels, announcing certain inward things to us, took bodies for a time from the air, they would certainly not appear to our outward gazes, nor would they take food with Abraham — unless, for our sake, they carried something solid from the heavenly nourishment. Nor is it a wonder that those very ones who were received are called now Lord, now Angels: because they are expressed by the name of Angels, who ministered externally, and by the appellation of Lord is shown he who presided over them internally — so that by the former the command of the one presiding, and by the latter the office of the ministers, might shine forth.

Gregory (continued): God speaks by images assumed from the air (Abraham's three visitors, Gen 18 — why Angels take bodies; called now 'Lord,' now 'Angels'). Marginal glosses: 'Gen. 18'; 'Angeli cur assumant corpora.'

Sometimes God speaks by heavenly substances through Angels: as, when the Lord was baptized, it is written that a voice sounded from the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Sometimes God speaks by earthly substances through Angels: as when he rebuked Balaam, in the mouth [of the ass]...

Gregory (continued): God speaks by heavenly substances (the baptismal voice from the cloud, Matt 3:17); by earthly substances (Balaam's ass, Num 22:28). Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 3.' Catchword: 'ore' (continues on the next page).

— p. 720 (PDF) · printed p. 679 —

...in the mouth of the ass he formed human words. Sometimes God speaks through Angels by earthly and heavenly substances at once: as to Moses on the mountain, when he uttered the words of his command, he joined fire and bush, and linked the one above, the other below. Which, however, is only then done, when something is signified by that very conjunction: for by speaking to Moses through the kindled bush, what else is shown, but that he would become the leader of that people, who would both receive the flame of the law, and yet by no means avoid the thorn of sin? or that from that people would come forth he who, in the fire of the deity, would take up the pains of our flesh like the thorns of the bush, and would preserve the unconsumed substance of our humanity even in that very flame of divinity?

Gregory (continued): God speaks by earthly and heavenly substances at once (Balaam's ass, Num 22:28; the burning bush, Exod 3:2 — a type of Christ's Incarnation, the flame not consuming the bush). Marginal glosses: 'Num. 22'; 'Exodi 3'; 'Expositio loci Exodi.' Running head misprinted '669' (= true 679 minus 10); true printed page 679.

But sometimes God, even through Angels, by their secret presence, infuses into human hearts the power of his inspiration. Whence Zechariah says, And the Angel who spoke in me said to me. While he

says the Angel spoke indeed to him, but yet in him, he plainly shows that he who made the words to him was not outside through a bodily appearance. Whence a little after he added, And behold, the Angel who spoke in me went forth. For often they do not appear externally, but, as they are angelic spirits, they make known the will of God to the senses of the Prophets, and so lift them up to sublime things, and demonstrate the things that are to come in things, as present in their original causes. For the human heart, weighed down by the very weight of corruptible flesh, sustaining this its own corpulence as it were an obstacle, does not penetrate inner things, and lies heavy externally, because it has not within a hand lifting it up. Whence it comes about, as was said, that to the senses of the Prophets the angelic power itself, as it is a subtlety, appears, and their mind is lifted up by the subtle spirit by which it is touched, and no longer lies sluggish and torpid in the depths, but, filled with inmost inspirations, ascends to the heavenly things, and thence, as from a certain summit of things, sees what is to come below it.

Gregory (continued): God infuses inspiration into human hearts through the Angels' secret presence (Zechariah, Zech 2:3, 'the Angel who spoke in me' — hence internally, not through a bodily form). Marginal gloss: 'Zach. 2.'

But lest anyone, in the aforesaid words of Zechariah, should think the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit designated by the name of Angel: if he considers the text of sacred Scripture, it quickly corrects what he thinks — for it never calls the Father, never the Holy Spirit, and only through the preaching of his Incarnation calls the Son an Angel. Whence in those same words of Zechariah it is openly shown that in that prophet truly an Angel — that is, a creature — spoke, when he said, And behold, the Angel who spoke in me went forth. And at once it is added, And another Angel went forth to meet him, and said to him: Speak to this boy, saying, Jerusalem shall be inhabited without a wall. And so the Angel who is sent, to whom the words that he must say are

commanded by an Angel, is not God. But because in the sight of the Creator the angelic ministries are ordered, distinguished by the disposition of grades — so that both, for the common felicity of blessedness, seeing their Maker at once they may rejoice, and yet, according to the disposition of dignity, some may serve others — an Angel sends an Angel to a Prophet; and him whom it beholds rejoicing in common with itself about God, it both teaches and directs, because it exceeds him both by superior knowledge in the power of cognition, and by more excellent grace in the height of power. These things, therefore, have been said, that it might be demonstrated by what modes God speaks to men. And thus far, indeed, have been the words of St. Gregory.

Conclusion of the Gregory quotation (Moralia 28): the 'Angel' in Zechariah is a creature, not God (the Father and Holy Spirit are never called 'Angel' in Scripture, only the Son by reason of his Incarnation; Zech 2:4); the ordered angelic hierarchy — an Angel sends an Angel to a Prophet. Marginal gloss: 'Pater & Spiritus sanctus nunquam Angeli in Scripturis vocantur, nec filius nisi ratione susceptae humanitatis.' Catchword: 'Vocem' (the next lemma begins on the next page).

— p. 721 (PDF) · printed p. 680 —

Verse 10. I heard your voice, Lord, in Paradise, and I feared, because I was naked, and I hid myself.

New lemma: Genesis 3:10 (set off by a horizontal rule). Running head misprinted '670' (= true 680 minus 10); true printed page 680.

Someone will say: Had not Adam already covered his shameful parts with fig-leaf loincloths before he heard God's voice? How, then, did he say that he, moved and struck by God's voice, feared because he was naked, and hid himself? Some respond that Adam did not cover himself until after he heard God's voice. But this manifestly contradicts the context of Moses's words and the order of the narration, which has it that immediately after the crime was committed, Adam, his nakedness being perceived, covered it. Then, if when Adam heard God's voice he was naked, surely, terrified by his coming and presence, he could not have made himself loincloths —

partly because of the shortness of the time, partly dismayed by the excessive perturbation of mind and by terror. Therefore it must be said that Adam, even with his shameful parts covered, blushed to come into God's sight; both because he was naked in the rest of his body, and because he blushed to appear before God naked, as he formerly used to before the sin was committed; and so he was ashamed before God on account of that very thing, for the sake of which he had judged that the nakedness of his body must be veiled.

How could Adam fear his nakedness if he was already covered? Not (as some say) that he covered himself only after hearing God's voice — that contradicts Moses's order, and terror would have prevented it. Rather: even covered, he blushed to appear before God as he never had before the sin. Marginal gloss: 'Adamus cur nudus in Dei conspectum venire ausus non fuerit.'

But that Adam assigns the cause of his fear not to his sin, but to the nakedness of his body, sufficiently indicated that he had not yet recognized the gravity of his crime — namely, that he ought to blush and grieve more on account of that [sin] than on account of the nakedness of his body. So it happens by experience, that men are anguished about the crimes done by them, not so much on account of God's offense, or the loss of the heavenly goods, as on account of the inconveniences and evils of fortune or of the body that befell them from sin: for example, on account of public disgrace or infamy; on account of the offense of men, among whom they wish to be in favor; finally, on account of the detriment of the family estate, or some harm of the body.

By assigning his fear to his nakedness rather than his sin, Adam showed he had not yet grasped the sin's gravity — as men commonly grieve more over worldly harms (disgrace, loss of favor, estate, bodily harm) than over God's offense.

Verse 12. And Adam said, The woman whom you gave me as companion, she gave me of the tree, and I ate.

New lemma: Genesis 3:12 (set off by a horizontal rule; verse 11 is passed over).

By the example of Adam and Eve it is clearly seen what the difference is between a just man and an unjust one. For the just man, as it is written in Proverbs 18, is first the accuser of himself. For the beginning of the goods which God is to give to man — as Augustine said in a certain place — is the confession of the evils which man has committed. But the denial, or the excuse and defense, of sin, ...

The difference between the just and the unjust: the just man 'is first the accuser of himself' (Prov 18:17); the beginning of good is the confession of one's evils (Augustine). The denial or excuse of sin, by contrast, is detestable (continued on the next page). Marginal gloss: 'Excusatio peccati detestabilis.' Catchword: 'peccati' (continues on the next page).

— p. 722 (PDF) · printed p. 681 —

...of sin, there is not only no lightening or diminution of the crime, but on the contrary a more detestable aggravation and exaggeration of it. Hear what Augustine writes, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 14: 'Worse and more damnable,' he says, 'is the pride by which, even in manifest sins, a refuge of excuse is sought — as those first human beings, of whom she said, The serpent seduced me, and I ate, and he said, The woman whom you gave me, she gave me of the tree, and I ate: nowhere here does a petition for pardon sound, nowhere an imploring of the medicine. For although these do not, like Cain, deny what they committed, yet still pride seeks to refer to another what it did wrongly: the pride of the woman onto the serpent, the pride of the man onto the woman. But it is rather an accusation than a true excuse, where there is an open transgression of the divine command. For they did not fail to do this because the woman committed it at the serpent's persuasion, and the man at the woman's imparting — as if anything were to be preferred to God, to whom either it should be believed, or yielded.'

The denial or excuse of sin does not lighten but aggravates it. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 14.14: worse is the pride that seeks a refuge of excuse in manifest sins (Adam and Eve shift the blame, with no plea for pardon; though they do not deny, like Cain). Where there is open transgression, it is

accusation, not a true excuse. Marginal gloss: 'Superbia damnabilis qua in manifestis peccatis suffugium excusationis inquiritur.' Running head misprinted '671' (= true 681 minus 10); true printed page 681.

But this thought, and this passage of Moses, St. Gregory treated with most grave and eloquent words in book 22 of the Morals, chapter 13: 'These are the true testimonies of humility,' he says, 'both that each recognize his own iniquity, and, having recognized it, open it by the voice of confession. But on the contrary, it is the accustomed vice of the human race both to commit sin by hiding, and to hide the committed sin by denying, and to multiply the convicted sin by defending. For from that lapse of the first man we derive these increases of wickedness, from whom we drew the very root of fault. For thus he, when he had touched the forbidden tree, hid himself from the face of the Lord among the trees of paradise. In which hiding — because he could not hide from God — not the effect of hiding is described, but the affection is noted. Who, when he was reproved by the Lord that he had touched the forbidden tree, at once responded, The woman whom you gave me as companion, she gave me of the tree, and I ate. The woman too, when questioned, responded, saying, The serpent deceived me, and I ate. For to this end had they been questioned, that the sin which they had committed by transgressing, they might blot out by confessing; whence that serpent, the persuader, who was not to be recalled to pardon, was not questioned about the fault. Man was therefore asked where he was, that he might look upon the perpetrated fault, and by confessing recognize how far he was from the face of his Creator; but they chose to apply to themselves, both of them, the solaces of defense rather than of confession. And when the man wished to excuse the sin by the woman, the woman by the serpent, they increased the fault which they tried to protect: Adam obliquely touching the Lord, that he himself was the author of their sin, who made the woman; and Eve referring the fault to the Lord, who had placed the serpent in paradise. For those who had heard

from the mouth of the deceiving devil, You shall be as Gods — because they could not be like God in divinity, to the heap of their error they tried to make God like themselves in fault. So therefore, while they strive to defend their guilt, they added [to it], so that their fault, when examined, became more atrocious than it had been when perpetrated.'

Gregory the Great, Moralia 22.13: true humility recognizes and confesses one's iniquity; the human vice is to hide sin, deny it when committed, and multiply it by defending. Why God questioned Adam and Eve (to lead them to confess) but not the serpent (not to be recalled to pardon). Adam obliquely blamed God (who made the woman), Eve blamed God (who set the serpent in paradise) — trying to 'make God like themselves in fault.' Marginal glosses: 'Humilitatis vera testimonia'; 'Cur Deus Adamum & Evam interrogaverit non serpentem.'

'Whence now also the branches of the human race still draw bitterness from this root, so that when anyone is reproved for his vice, he hides himself under the words of defenses as if under certain leaves of trees, and, as if to certain secret works of his own excuse, flees the face of the Creator, while he does not want what he does to be known. In which hiding, namely, he hides not himself from the Lord, but the Lord from himself. For he acts so that he may not see the all-seeing One, but not so that he himself may not be seen. Against which...'

Gregory (continued): still today men, when reproved, hide under the 'leaves' of defenses and flee the Creator's face — in that hiding they hide not themselves from God but God from themselves. Catchword: 'cuique' (continues on the next page); page footer signature 'RRR.'

— p. 723 (PDF) · printed p. 682 —

'...to each sinner, the beginning of illumination is now the humility of confession: because he refuses to spare himself, who does not blush to confess the evil which he did; and he who by defending could have been accused, by accusing himself most swiftly defends himself. Whence to dead Lazarus, who was pressed by a great mass, it is by no means said, Come to life, but Come forth. By which resurrection, which was wrought in his body, is signified how we are raised up in

the heart, when, namely, it is said to the dead man, Come forth — so that the man dead in his sin, and now buried by the mass of evil habit, because he lies hidden within his conscience through wickedness, may go forth from himself through confession. For to the dead man Come forth is said: that he may be provoked to go forth, from the excuse and concealment of sin, to his own accusation by his own mouth. Whence David the prophet, reviving from that great mass of so great a crime, went forth as it were at the voice of the Lord, when, rebuked by Nathan, he accused what he had done. Because, therefore, this fault of concealment vehemently grew in the human race, well did blessed Job, when he said, If I have hidden my sin, add, as a man. For he perceives it to be proper to man, which descends from the imitation of the old parent.' Thus Gregory.

Conclusion of the Gregory quotation (Moralia 22.13): confession is the beginning of illumination (Lazarus's 'Come forth,' John 11:43 = the sinner going forth by confession; David rebuked by Nathan, 2 Sam 12; Job 31:33, 'If I have hidden my sin... as a man'). Marginal glosses: 'Quanti momenti sit, peccata sua cui oportet sincere aperire, & humiliter confiteri'; 'Ioan. 11'; '2. Reg. 12.' Running head misprinted '672' (= true 682 minus 10); true printed page 682.

Nor is it to be passed over what St. Bernard said to the same purpose in the first sermon on the feast of All Saints: 'It must be considered,' he says, 'that Adam was as cruel toward his wife afterward, in undergoing the penalty, as he had been indulgent to her in the fault. For by transferring the fault from himself onto his wife, he wished to transfer also the deserved penalty onto her alone. O perversity! You flee to undergo the penalty for her, and did not refuse to admit the fault? You were perniciously merciful, where you ought to have been severe; but you were more perniciously cruel, where you ought to have shown mercy. For never ought one to sin on account of another, which is justice; yet it is fitting willingly to bear the sins of others, which is mercy. There are four degrees of sinning: the first, interior consent; the second, exterior completion; the third, habit; the fourth, the excuse or defense of sin — and to this supreme degree the first

humans came. And these four increases of sin Job, mystically deploring, says: Why did I not die in the womb? having come forth from the belly, why did I not at once perish? why was I received upon the knees? why suckled at the breasts? For sin first hides in thought; then goes forth into deed; then is confirmed and strengthened by habit; finally is suckled and nourished by excuse and defense.' Thus Bernard.

Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 1 on All Saints: Adam was as cruel to Eve in shifting the penalty onto her as he had been indulgent in the fault; the FOUR degrees of sinning (interior consent, outward completion, habit, excuse/defense — the first humans reached the fourth), figured in Job 3:11-12. Marginal glosses: 'S. Bernardus'; 'Quatuor peccati gradus ex beato Bernardo'; 'Iob 3.'

Verse 14. And God said to the serpent, Because you have done this, you are cursed among all living things and beasts of the earth: upon your breast you shall crawl, and you shall eat earth all the days of your life.

New lemma: Genesis 3:14 (set off by a horizontal rule).

Many things which pertained to the explanation of these words, by which Moses narrates that God cursed the serpent, we set forth above, when we treated that question, Whether this curse of the serpent pertained to the true serpent, or rather to the devil. Now, therefore, [we shall add] only some [interpretations] of Rupert, of those words by which...

Pererius refers back to his earlier treatment (whether the curse of Gen 3:14 falls on the true serpent or on the devil); he will now give some of Rupert's interpretations. Catchword: 'bus' (= quibus, continues on the next page).

— p. 724 (PDF) · printed p. 683 —

...by which the curse of the serpent was expressed, we have thought interpretations should be added — pious indeed, and eloquent, and by no means unlearned — which we judged that to read would be as most pleasant, so, if they were omitted, would be troublesome to the reader. And so Rupert (book 2, On the Victory of the Word of God, chapter

15), explaining the aforesaid words: 'Certainly,' he says, 'neither to the woman did he say, You are cursed, nor to the man, You are cursed, but only this, Cursed is the earth in your work; of which earth the curse is nothing other than the manifold and frequent affliction by which, through various events, the earth being corrupted and worsened, man is afflicted. To the serpent alone he said, You shall be cursed — by which saying, indeed, the firm and immutable sentence of eternal damnation is to be understood. For although the letter so sounds that it can be understood of the living serpent, yet nonetheless, and much more, the whole ought to be understood of the serpent the devil. Otherwise, how will it be reckoned to him as a curse, or as the penalty of a curse, what was said to him, Upon your breast you shall crawl — since he had this very thing from nature before the devil used it for the perdition of man? More, therefore, to that ancient serpent was this set as a curse: that he crawl upon his breast, and eat earth all the days — that is, that upon men only, who are so earth that they do not desire or look to heaven, he seek and devour with insatiable hatred, with an impenitent heart; so given over to a reprobate sense that, against his own intention, always, while he strives to hinder the good of God concerning the elect, he rather furthers and helps the purpose — which is, in a wonderful way, to crawl upon his own breast. Moreover, whatever was said to the woman and to the man — even the very death of the body, which the merciful God, imposing, says, Because you are dust, and to dust you shall return — are the words of one rebuking and desiring to save, and yet [the words directed] to that man turned away, wise with thorns, so that at least the vexation alone may give understanding to the hearing, and make man mindful of his condition, that, humbled, he may be able to be corrected and saved.' Thus Rupert.

Rupert of Deutz, De Victoria Verbi Dei 2.15, on Gen 3:14: only the serpent (= the devil) is cursed absolutely (an eternal sentence); the earth is cursed for man's sake (Gen 3:17); 'crawl upon your breast' understood of the devil given over to a reprobate sense (who, striving to hinder God's good,

unwittingly furthers it); even the death imposed on Adam (Gen 3:19, 'dust you are') is God rebuking yet desiring to save. Marginal glosses: 'Rupertus'; 'Cur serpenti dicatur, Maledictus eris.' Running head misprinted '673' (= true 683 minus 10); true printed page 683.

Verse 15. I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed.

New lemma: Genesis 3:15 (set off by a horizontal rule).

Upon these words Rupert, in book 3 On the Trinity and its works, chapter 19, disputes excellently in this manner: 'In this do enmities differ from frauds, that frauds pretend the peaceful surface of speech, or of any thing; but enmities have a manifest intention of contrariety. Now it is clear that the crafty devil, in the serpent, met the woman not as an armed adversary, but joined himself to her side on the way as a faithful counselor. When, therefore, God says, I will put enmities between you and the woman, he certainly promises a great work of his grace: that the victorious devil, who had conquered by fraud, this woman — [though herself] conquered — should one day conquer by fortitude. Moreover, these enmities are to be exercised not through the woman herself, but through her seed, and to be carried through to victory. Accordingly, when he had said, I will put enmities between you and the woman, he at once added, And your seed and her seed. For of what seed are these things said, but of the one who is Christ? For he alone is so the seed of the woman that not...'

Rupert, De Trinitate (et operibus eius) 3.19, on Gen 3:15: enmity differs from fraud (the devil came as a false counselor, not an armed foe); 'I will put enmities' promises a great work of grace — the conquered woman shall one day conquer by fortitude; and 'her seed' is the one who is Christ. Marginal gloss: 'Quid fraus & inimicitiae differant.' Catchword: 'non' (continues on the next page).

— p. 725 (PDF) · printed p. 684 —

'...is not also the seed of the man: wherefore it is a right addition, since it was said by the Lord God, I will put enmities between you and the woman, and her seed — where Christ is understood. For he

plainly exercised himself strongly with that ancient serpent, and was never in anything consenting to him. Whence he was freer and more unencumbered: girded with a sword upon his thigh, most powerful, comely, and beautiful, he aimed prosperously, proceeded, and reigned; and crushed and wounded the public enemy brought forth before his feet, according to the Psalmist saying, You have humbled the proud one as one wounded, in the strength of your arm. Then was fulfilled to the woman, in that her seed, what had here been foretold: She shall crush your head. Whence in another Psalm the prophet says, You have crushed the heads of the dragons in the waters, and you have broken the heads of the dragon.'

Rupert (continued): 'her seed' is Christ alone (of the woman, not the man), who alone waged perfect enmity with the serpent and crushed the dragon (Ps 88:11, 'Tu humiliasti sicut vulneratum superbum'; Ps 73:13-14; 'she shall crush your head,' Gen 3:15). Marginal glosses: 'Solus omnium hominum Christus in terra perfectas inimicitias exercuit cum diabolo'; 'Psal. 88'; 'Psal. 73.' Running head misprinted '674' (= true 684 minus 10); true printed page 684.

'Who of us all — whoever we are, the mingled seed of man and woman alike — will boast that he has whole enmities with that deceiver? Were we not all rather enemies of God, except that through this one seed of one woman we were reconciled? Therefore, according to his grace, we are now sons or friends of God, and have enmities with that dragon; but according to ourselves, or according to our first parents, we were partners and consenters in his rebellion, and not yet, with perfect faith, have we spat out his adulterous blandishments. For as often as we are drawn to some sin, he first flatters us with the head, then delights us with the belly, and finally binds us with the tail: because, namely, all his temptation is completed in three ways — by suggestion, by delight, by consent. Amid these, doubtless, we by no means have true enmities against him. Most certainly, therefore, here is promised the seed of the woman, which is Christ, through whom the same sex which was deceived crushed the whole head of the deceiver: sometimes for the destruction of sin, the blessed Virgin, without sin,

brought forth to the world this new and heavenly man. And you, he says, shall lie in wait for his heel — that is, you shall thrust yourself in at the end of his life. You shall lie in wait, he says, but you shall not be able also to bite. This may plainly be understood, which the same son of the woman evidently establishes with other words, when, about soon to be led to the passion, he says, For the prince of this world comes, and in me he has nothing.'

Rupert (continued): by ourselves we are still partners of the devil's rebellion; his temptation is completed in THREE modes — suggestion, delight, consent (figured as head, belly, tail). Christ is the promised seed, through whom the same sex (the sinless Virgin) crushed the serpent's head; 'you shall lie in wait for his heel' but cannot bite (John 14:30, 'the prince of this world comes and has nothing in me'). Marginal glosses: 'Quomodo cum daemone perfectas inimicitias non geramus'; 'Tres modi tentationis diabolicae'; 'B. Virgo contrivit caput serpentis'; 'Ioan. 14.'

Treating the same words, Rupert (book 2, On the Victory of the Word of God, chapter 16): 'What first,' he says, 'in this word does gracious faith merit? what does it especially praise? The truth of the Word, or the goodness of his Father? Let it praise both, let it desire to proclaim both worthily, because he truly spoke thus in goodness: his speech was fulfilled with great and constant truth. I will put enmities, he says, between you and the woman — as if he said: Now the woman and the man at once are allied with you, and have made a pact with you, and struck a covenant with death; inasmuch as, fugitives from my face and hidden, when they are sought by me why they did this, they despise the voice of the one warning, and by defending their sin they make plain that they favor you, that, consenting to you, they are your friends. But I will dissolve friendships of this kind: I will put enmities between you and the woman. Why did he not say this to the woman herself? For he could, where he said to the woman, I will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions, etc., have said this very thing thus to her: I will put enmities between you and the serpent, and your seed and her seed. Why, then, did he not say it? Doubtless for a double reason: first, because on account of...'

Rupert, De Victoria Verbi Dei 2.16, on Gen 3:15: 'I will put enmities' dissolves the friendship the man and woman had made with the devil (by defending their sin they showed themselves his friends); and the question — why God said it to the serpent, not to the woman. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Deus se inimicitias positurum inter ipsam, & serpentem mulieri non dixerit.' Catchword: 'propter' (continues on the next page).

— p. 726 (PDF) · printed p. 685 —

'...on account of sin, and the defense of sin, the woman did not merit this, that God should then make such promises to her — promises of so great grace. Then, because he who spoke intended not Eve herself, but another person of the same sex, namely the Blessed Virgin Mary. Rightly, therefore, the promise of helping grace was made not to the ill-deserving woman, but rather a hostile and warlike threat was made to the serpent. But what did God testify by this saying, except that he willed to remain in his own purpose? For the serpent lay in wait, that it might not come to pass which God had proposed by saying, Let us make man to our image and likeness. He boasted to have conquered, and to have thwarted this purpose: but God, having in his power the victory of that same purpose, threatened the serpent.'

Rupert (continued): why God addressed the serpent, not the woman — she (in sin) did not merit such promises, and he intended the Blessed Virgin Mary; by the saying God testified that he would remain in his purpose (Gen 1:26, 'Let us make man') against the serpent's boast. Running head misprinted '675' (= true 685 minus 10); true printed page 685.

The same [author], in the following chapter: 'Indeed,' he says, 'principally the Blessed Virgin Mary is that woman, between whom and the serpent God said he would put enmities, and did put them; and her seed is her own son Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, because "woman" is the universal name of the female sex, by "woman" we understand all the elect persons of the male sex too — of all of whom, namely persons of each sex, Jesus Christ, together with the same woman from whom he was made, is prince and head. But if a reason is sought why by the seed of the woman persons of the male sex ought to be understood: those who have written of natures say that from the paternal seed girls

are born, and from the maternal, boys; and because every birth consists of a double seed, whichever part prevails takes possession of the likeness of the sex. Therefore, when he says, I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed: by "the woman and her seed" we understand all the elect, both of female and of male sex. And on the contrary, as by the serpent the devil, so also by the seed of the serpent all wicked and malign men, his imitators, are rightly understood, although he begot or created no one. For if wicked and impious men were not the seed of the serpent — that is, of the devil — the Lord would by no means say to the Jews, And you do what you have seen with your father; and again, You do the works of your father — clearly wishing the devil to be understood: for immediately in the same discourse it follows, You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you will do. Of those who are so constantly called the seed of the serpent — that is, sons of the devil — the cause that they should be born was sin, God saying, after she sinned in consenting to the devil, I will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions. But of those who are understood by the seed of the woman, the cause that they should be born was the blessing of God, by which before the transgression he blessed the first humans, as it is written, Male and female he created them, blessed them, and said: Increase and multiply.' Thus far the words of Rupert.

Rupert (next chapter): 'the woman' = principally the Virgin Mary, her seed = Christ, but 'woman' also = all the elect of both sexes (with the ancient double-seed theory of sex determination). The 'seed of the serpent' = all wicked men, sons of the devil (John 8:38, 41, 44), born through sin's multiplied sorrows (Gen 3:16), vs. the seed of the woman, born through God's blessing 'increase and multiply' (Gen 1:27-28). Marginal glosses: 'Virgo Maria mulier est, & Christus mulieris semen, de quo hic Deus loquitur, sed omnes etiam utriusque sexus electi hoc loco designantur'; 'Ioan. 8'; 'Omnes iniqui semen sunt diaboli.'

But the cause why God put enmities between man and the devil, St. Basil treats excellently in the homily entitled That God is not the author of evils, writing in this manner: 'You ask whence the devil has

war against us? Because, since he himself was the storehouse of all evil, he received the disease of envy, and envied us the honor conferred [on us], and did not easily bear that we should lead a blessed life in Paradise. Wherefore, attacking man with wiles — with the same desire of ambition which he himself had from the beginning, to wish to be like God — using this again to deceive us, he showed the tree, through the tasting of which...'

St. Basil, homily 'Quod Deus non sit auctor malorum,' on the CAUSE of the enmity: the devil's envy of man's honor and blessed life in Paradise, attacking man with the same ambition (to be like God) and showing the tree. Marginal gloss: 'B. Basilius disputat, cur Deus posuerit inimicitias inter hominem, & serpentem.' Catchword: 'tionem' (= degustationem, continues on the next page); page footer signature 'RRR 3.'

— p. 727 (PDF) · printed p. 686 —

'...he promised that man would be like God: If you eat, he says, you shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil. Not, therefore, was he constituted our enemy by God, but he himself from envy opposed himself to us. For, noticing that he had been expelled from the orders of Angels, he did not bear that an earthly creature should be exalted to the dignity of the Angels through the advance of virtue. Since, therefore, he became an enemy, God put an enmity against him for us: as he said to the serpent, which that evil one had abused — but so that he referred the threats to the serpent [the devil] — I will put enmities between you and her seed. For truly harmful are the friendships which are contracted with malice. For this is the law and force of such friendship, that it brings malice, through likeness, to those joined [in it]. Wherefore the proverb rightly says, Evil communications corrupt good manners. For just as in pestilent places the air, gradually drawn in, injects a hidden disease into bodies, so likewise in evil habit and conversation the greatest evils are drawn into us, even if the harm is not immediately felt. Therefore an irreconcilable enmity has been implanted in us against the serpent. But if this instrument [the serpent]

is worthy of so great a hatred, how much more must we oppose him who drove the serpent [to it]?' Thus Basil.

Conclusion of the Basil quotation (homily 'Quod Deus non sit auctor malorum'): the devil, from envy at his expulsion from the angelic orders, opposed man; God set an enmity against him. Harmful friendships spread malice by likeness (1 Cor 15:33, 'Corrumpunt bonos mores colloquia prava'; likened to pestilent air). Marginal glosses: 'Amicitiae noxiae quae cum malitia contrahuntur'; '1. Corinth. 15.' Running head misprinted '676' (= true 686 minus 10); true printed page 686.

Verse 15. You shall lie in wait for his heel, and she shall crush your head.

New lemma: the second part of Genesis 3:15 (set off by a horizontal rule).

A learned and elegant interpretation, in the treatment of these words, is found in Rupert (book 3, On the Trinity, chapter 20): 'Great enmities are set between the woman and the serpent: on both sides, not so much the judgment of reason as the perpetual hatred of natural sense keeps [them]. For she, though not always in act, yet always by a certain power, shall crush his head; but he, being pressed to the ground and not lofty, lies in wait for her heel. For if the bare sole of the woman anticipates the serpent's tooth, and even lightly presses his most vivacious head, at once the whole body, together with the head, suddenly perishes — so that no motion at all, no sense, remains in any part; which cannot certainly be effected quickly or lightly with hammers or levers, nor with cutting swords, since [the serpent's] head, cut off with [a length of] two or three little fingers, is said to live and go away. That this too, which was said, is so, we have learned by the faithful report of those who explored it by diligence. Whence it is also related that [the woman] did not dare to touch his bare body. On the contrary, he, however small he be, if he fixes even a little tooth in the tip of the sole, kills; for by the bite the infused plague, increased by the vegetative force of the body, runs through the veins, and takes away life: so grave are the enmities set between the two natures, exhibiting a monument of the ancient evil upon the new. As soon as the

poison injected by the bite touches the blood of man, it gradually creeps, and kills the animal inimical to its nature. Whence someone says thus: Harmful is the plague of serpents with the mingled blood; by the bite they hold venom, and threaten fate in the tooth. For all poison is cold, and therefore the soul, which is fiery, flees the cold poison. But of serpents, as many kinds, so many venoms; as many species, so many banes; as many colors, so many pains are found. For it is a cursed animal, from which...'

Rupert, De Trinitate 3.20, on Gen 3:15b: the perpetual natural enmity between woman/man and serpent — the woman crushes his head (a light press kills the serpent instantly, unlike hammers or swords), while the serpent lies in wait for the heel (his bite injects a poison that runs the veins and kills). The verse quoted ('Noxia serpentum est admixto sanguine pestis...') is from Lucan, Pharsalia (bk 9). Marginal glosses: 'Notabile dictum Ruperti de potentia mulieris adversus serpentem'; 'Lucan. libr. [9] Pharsal. Serpens animal maledictum, & homini naturaliter inimicum.' Catchword: 'ex quo' (continues on the next page).

— p. 728 (PDF) · printed p. 687 —

'...from which [cursed animal] it has, by its own cunning, favored the devil for the ministry of death, and thence is naturally inimical to man. But what wonder that this evil is permitted to man by God — since man himself, for the killing of his neighbor, arms himself with the venoms of serpents, and the venom which nature does not have, acquires by obstinacy, procures by money? For this the same Author as above [Lucan] declaims with such an execration: But what shame of gain will there be to us? Thence are sought hither the Libyan deaths: we have made the asp a merchandise. Accordingly, because men themselves in a way become serpents, when they suffer the venom of asps not only spiritually under their lips, but really too in their [purses], and they neither murmur that they are poisoned, and so many men perish by the plagues of serpents.'

Rupert (continued), with a second Lucan verse (Pharsalia 9): men arm themselves with serpent venom and become 'serpents' spiritually (cf. Ps 139:4, 'the venom of asps under their lips'). Marginal gloss: 'Idem ibidem.' Running head misprinted '677' (= true 687 minus 10); true printed page 687.

The same Rupert (book 2, On the Victory of the Word of God, chapter 18) teaches that, on account of these continual and implacable enmities between the woman and the serpent, and between her seed and his seed, sacred Scripture is called 'the book of the wars of the Lord' (Numbers 21) and 'the book of the Just' (2 Samuel, chapter 1). For what else is contained or done in the sacred Scriptures, but the war and contest of the Word for the destruction of sin and death? From this beginning, then, of the book of the Just and the book of the wars of the Lord — where it was said, I will put enmities between you and the woman, etc. — let us contemplate, as from a high mountain, the power of the Word of God, descending as it were into the plain of a field, [and see] how it fought against the malice or the lie of the devil, the ancient serpent, how it conquered and triumphed; so that, his purpose being completed — in which he blessed the first humans at the constitution of the world — at its end he may say to the elect, the victors over the serpent: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the constitution of the world.

Rupert, De Victoria Verbi Dei 2.18: sacred Scripture is called 'the book of the wars of the Lord' (Num 21:14) and 'the book of the Just / Jasher' (2 Sam 1:18) because of this warfare — from Gen 3:15 to 'Come, blessed of my Father' (Matt 25:34). Marginal glosses: 'Scriptura sacra liber bellorum Domini & Iustorum'; 'Matth. 25.'

Verse 16. To the woman also he said, I will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions; in sorrow you shall bring forth children, and you shall be under the power of the man, and he shall have dominion over you.

New lemma: Genesis 3:16.

Rupert writes (book 3 On the Trinity, chapter 22) that the female sex is perpetually tormented by three [strokes], as it were, of this divine sentence. And the woman is punished with a triple penalty, because her sin was three times greater than Adam's. First, because by believing the serpent more than God, she was seduced. Then, because she delightfully coveted the

beauty and sweetness of the forbidden tree. Third, because, not content with her own transgression, she also led the man into transgression. Deservedly, therefore, for the triple sin a triple vengeance — besides the death common to her with the man — was rendered. For because she believed the serpent saying, You shall be as Gods, justly, against this — that God is the God of the living and not of the dead — she deserved to be the mother not of the living but of the dead, God saying, I will multiply your conceptions. For all her conceptions die, in soul and body, in sin, and none of them lives, unless he be given life through Christ. Likewise, because, the beauty of that tree being seen, she intemperately desired its fruit, for that delight of sight, a contrary [penalty]...

Rupert, De Trinitate 3.22, on Gen 3:16: the woman is punished with a TRIPLE penalty for her triple sin (she believed the serpent over God; she coveted the forbidden fruit; she led the man into transgression) — becoming 'the mother of the dead' (her conceptions die in sin unless vivified through Christ). Marginal gloss: 'Cur triplici poena mulier sit mulctata.' Catchword: 'contrarius' (continues on the next page).

— p. 729 (PDF) · printed p. 688 —

...a contrary [penalty] is rendered — the pain of the womb. In sorrow, he says, you shall bring forth. Third, because she enticed the man to eat by feminine importunity: therefore, Under the power of the man, he says, you shall be, and he shall have dominion over you. Thus, for the seduction, the multiplicity of conceptions; for the delight of gluttony, the pain of the womb; for the rash command and scandal which she exhibited to the man, the penalty of servitude to the man was rendered to her. Thus far from Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert, De Trinitate 3.22: the three penalties matched to the woman's three sins (multiplied conceptions for the seduction; the womb's pain for gluttony; servitude to the man for her rash command). Running head misprinted '678' (= true 688 minus 10); true printed page 688.

But the multiplication of offspring is a great good, and a great joy of parents — it would even, had man not sinned, have been [so] in Paradise and in the state of innocence. How, then, is it denounced to the woman for

the crime committed, as it were a certain great evil, in the place of a penalty? Hieronymus Oleaster, in this place, by a new interpretation, refers that phrase, I will multiply your conceptions, not to the multiplication of offspring, but to the time in which, after conception, the fetus is carried in the womb until birth: for he judges that, had the first man not sinned, it would have come about that the offspring, once conceived, would immediately be brought forth into the light; but as a penalty of sin, that time was multiplied and prolonged over nine months.

The problem: if multiplying offspring is a good (even intended for Paradise and the state of innocence), how is it a penalty? Hieronymus Oleaster (Jerónimo de Azambuja) reads 'multiply your conceptions' as the nine-month gestation — which, but for sin, would have been instant. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo multiplicatio conceptus, sit poena mulieris.'

But this is not only false, but even absurd and ridiculous. For the long stay of the fetus in the womb is natural, and proceeds from natural causes; wherefore it ought not to have been varied on account of sin. For just as the place of the fetus in the womb, so the mode of its nourishment, its accretion, and its bodily growth are natural, and therefore the same things would have been before sin as are after sin; so also so great a stay of the fetus in the womb is natural, and not a penalty of sin. For the conceived one is not immediately mature and strong for birth, but, gradually growing, gaining strength, and maturing, becomes fit to be brought forth from the womb — just as, not immediately after birth, does it attain the just mass of body, or the use of reason.

Oleaster refuted: gestation is natural (like the fetus's place, nourishment, and growth), and so was not a penalty introduced by sin. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Oleaster.'

The multiplication of conception, therefore, is understood to be, after sin, a penalty of the woman and a certain great evil, for four causes. First, because many conceived, before they come to maturity and perfection, perish by miscarriage in the mother's womb. Then, because many are generated depraved and monstrous — in the mass, or number, or figure, or position of the bodily parts, or by weakness and deformity, or by a defect

of the senses, or by a defect of mind and reason — which is the greatest grief to parents. Moreover, of those who are generated, few are elect and predestined, but most, on account of their crimes, are destined to eternal punishments. To these is added that the multitude of offspring is wont to be a most bitter torment and misfortune to parents — often either on account of the parents' poverty (for whose rearing they do not suffice), or on account of the wicked and shameful life of the children, or on account of most miserable accidents and deaths.

Four reasons the multiplied conception is a penalty after sin: (1) miscarriage; (2) monstrous/deformed births; (3) few are elect, most are damned; (4) the torment of parents through poverty, or the children's wicked lives, or miserable deaths. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor ob causas multiplicatio conceptus, poena fuit post peccatum.'

'This multiplication,' says Rupert in this place, 'is not of blessing, but of damnation; not of grace, but of wrath; not of clemency, but of vengeance. Whence he did not only say, I will multiply your conceptions, but in addition added, And your sorrows. For a woman is as sorrowful as she is fruitful. After each conception, sorrow torments her; through each birth: her own blood wearies her, inasmuch as she, even when she seems healthy...'

Rupert, De Trinitate 3.22 (quotation resumed): this multiplication is of damnation, wrath, and vengeance, not of blessing — hence 'I will multiply your conceptions AND your sorrows'; the more fruitful the woman, the more sorrowful. Catchword: 'sana' (continues on the next page).

— p. 730 (PDF) · printed p. 689 —

'...seems healthy, labors with the menstrual flowers. For woman is the one and only menstruating animal. How great, do you think, is this wrath, how great the vengeance, that so many humans should be conceived or born who exceed the number [of the elect] — who do not pertain to the Lord, or to eternal life, for whom therefore it were better had they not been born? Indeed, had our earth remained in uncorrupted nature, had it not superinduced upon God's blessings the plague of the cursed serpent, it would have germinated only good

trees — that is, only good men — and by the abundance of its sap would have produced none of the wild woods, which are born for this, that they be cut down and cast into the fire, because they do not bear fruit. This is the severity of the divine judgment, strong and too terrible, and more to be feared than discussed.' Thus Rupert.

Conclusion of Rupert (De Trinitate 3.22): woman as the only menstruating animal; the wrath that so many are born who are not for eternal life; had nature stayed uncorrupted, only good men would have grown (the barren trees fit for the fire). Marginal glosses: 'Mulier unum & solum est menstruum animal'; 'Si Adam non peccasset omnes fuissent boni.' Running head misprinted '679' (= true 689 minus 10); true printed page 689.

Or that phrase, I will multiply your conceptions and your sorrows, was said thus by a manner of speaking of divine Scripture not infrequent, as if it had been said, I will multiply your conceptions with sorrows, or, In your conceptions I will multiply for you sorrows — or, as the Hebrew word sounds [the Hebrew word is ■■■■■ (Itsbonech)], pains, straits, compressions, and the other evils by which the woman is afflicted while she carries the fetus in the womb. For at that time many things very troublesome and bitter happen to the woman: loathing of food, frequent sighing, slow movement, an unhealthy color, dangers of miscarriage, a notable perturbation and vexation of mind and body. Hear Pliny, writing on this matter most elegantly (book 7, chapters 6 and 7): 'From conception,' he says, 'on the tenth day, headaches, vertigos and darkenings of the eyes, loathing in food, a redundancy of the stomach, are the signs of a man begun. A better color for her carrying a male, and an easier birth; the motion in the womb on the fortieth day. All contrary things in the other sex: an unbearable burden, a slight swelling of the legs and groin. But the first motion, on the ninetieth day...'

The phrase 'multiply your conceptions and your sorrows' explained as a Hebrew idiom for the pains and afflictions of pregnancy. HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■■■ (Itsbonech; read right-to-left, ayin-tsadi-bet-nun-final kaf; = 'your sorrow/pain/toil'; the Gen 3:16 word, here in defective spelling without the vav). Marginal gloss: 'Vox Hebraea est ■■■■■, Itsbonech.' Then Pliny (Naturalis Historia 7.6-7) on the signs and troubles of pregnancy (with the male/female

differences). Marginal gloss: 'Incommoda mulierum gestantium in utero. Plinius.'

'But the most languor in each sex is when the birth is sprouting hair, and at the full moon — which time especially afflicts also the born infants. If they have drawn breath, they are brought forth with more difficulty; yawning indeed in labor is lethal, as to have sneezed after coitus is abortive.' And in the following chapter: 'It moves to pity, and even to shame, one considering how frivolous is the origin of the proudest of animals, since often the cause of miscarriage is the smell from the extinguishing of lamps.' Thus Pliny. That these words of Pliny are for the most part taken from Aristotle, so that the reader may clearly recognize it, it has pleased [us] to transcribe here the very words of Aristotle, from chapter 4 of book 7 of the History of Animals: 'It comes to pass indeed,' he says, 'that women, from conception, are weighed down in the whole body, and darkenings of the eyes and headaches are stirred up. Which to some happen earlier, and about the tenth day, to others later, according as they are more or less afflicted by superfluous matter. Nausea likewise and vomiting very many take, and especially those whose purgations have ceased. Some labor more at the beginning, others afterward, when the fetus has now grown more fully...'

Pliny (concluded, Nat. Hist. 7.6-7, on the languor and hazards of pregnancy; 'how frivolous is the origin of the proudest of animals'), then Pliny's source, Aristotle (Historia Animalium 7.4), transcribed on the same symptoms of pregnancy. Marginal gloss: 'Superbissimi animalium hominis origo vilissima.'

'...has grown more fully. Often also many are afflicted, toward the last, by a dripping of urine; but for the most part those who carry a male get through more easily, and are less pale. Contrary [is the case of] those who [carry] a female: for they are paler, and pass [the time] more heavily; to many also tumors and swellings of the flesh occur in the legs. Various appetites are wont to come to pregnant women, and to be quickly changed — which some call "picare," from the bird Pica

[the magpie]. And indeed, when they carry a fetus of the female sex, they crave more greedily, and can less enjoy the thing now present than they had desired; for they at once loathe what they just vehemently craved...'

Aristotle (continued, Historia Animalium 7.4): the differing symptoms for carrying a male vs. a female; the changeable cravings of pregnancy (called 'picare' from the magpie). Catchword: 'ter appe' (= appetierunt, continues on the next page); page footer signature 'SSS.'

— p. 731 (PDF) · printed p. 690 —

'...they craved; but especially then they loathe [food] and grow slower and weary, when the fetus's hair begins to grow. The pain, too, is continuous from a female [fetus], but duller; from a male, sharp and far more troublesome.' These things Aristotle and Pliny have handed down about the troublesome pains and afflictions of pregnant women.

Conclusion of the Aristotle/Pliny material on pregnancy (loathing of food when the fetus's hair begins; the pain duller from a female fetus, sharper from a male). Running head misprinted '680' (= true 690 minus 10); true printed page 690.

Now indeed, how foul, how harmful and pestilent is the force and nature of the menstrual blood, which nature prepared as material for forming the fetus — if the reader wishes to know, let him hear the marvels Pliny tells of it (book 7, chapter 15): 'But nothing,' he says, 'could easily be found more monstrous than the flux of women. At its approach new wines turn sour, crops touched become barren, grafts die, the germs of gardens are burnt up, and the fruits of the trees on which they sit fall off; the brightness of mirrors is dimmed by the very sight, the edge of iron is blunted, and the shine of ivory; the hives of bees die; brass and iron rust seizes at once, and a dreadful smell [seizes] the air; and dogs, having tasted it, are driven to madness, and their bite is infected with an incurable poison. Moreover, the nature of bitumen, otherwise clinging and sticky, in the lake of Judea called Asphaltites, floating at a certain time of year, cannot be torn from

itself, adhering to every contact, except by a thread which such a virus has infected. They say too that ants, the smallest animal, have a sense of it, and cast away the grains they have tasted, and afterward do not seek them again. And this so great and so much an evil exists in a woman every thirty days, and more abundantly at three-month intervals; but to some more often than once a month, as to some never — but such do not bear children, since this is the material for generating a man, the seed from males glomerating it into itself in the manner of rennet, which then in due time is animated and formed into a body. Therefore, when it has flowed in pregnant women, weak or non-viable births are brought forth, or bloody ones, as Nigidius is the author.' Thus Pliny.

Pliny, Naturalis Historia 7.15, on the ancient (mistaken) beliefs about the 'monstrous' power of menstrual blood (souring wine, blighting crops, dimming mirrors, rusting metal, maddening dogs, the Dead Sea/Asphaltites bitumen, ants); it is held to be the material of generation (citing Nigidius Figulus). Marginal gloss: 'Plinius de foeditate menstrui mulieris.'

There follows: In sorrow you shall bring forth children. It is natural for a woman to bring forth children with labor and pain. For the natural passage of the womb is narrower than that a fetus can go out through it: wherefore the barriers of the womb must be vehemently loosened and dilated beyond their natural constitution, which cannot be done without a great sense of pain. Hear Basil, who, explaining those words of Psalm 114, 'The sorrows of death surrounded me, the perils of hell found me,' writes in this manner: 'Sorrows are properly said of women in labor, when the belly, rising to a swelling, pushes the fetus outward; then those genital parts, torn apart, and stretched by convulsions around the fetus coming forth from the womb, and by the contractions of the fibers, generate most acute pains and vehement torments for those giving birth. But David transferred the pains of birth to the penalties of death, threatening about the living being, in the division of soul and body.' Thus Basil.

On 'In sorrow you shall bring forth children': the pain of birth is natural (the narrow passage of the womb must be forcibly dilated). Basil, on Psalm 114:3, on the pangs of labor. Marginal gloss: 'De acerbitate dolorum mulieris in partu.'

If, then, it is natural for a woman to bring forth with pain, how did God inflict the pains of birth upon Eve as a penalty for the crime committed? But in the state of innocence, God, by a certain singular and supernatural reason, would have freed the woman from all labor and pain of birth, and would have made it that she should carry the fetus in the womb without labor and trouble, and bring it forth into the light without any sense of pain; of which grace and benefit of God, deprived on account of sin, the woman became subject to the pains of birth. Which pains, indeed, are simply natural to the woman; but with regard had...

If birth pain is natural, how is it a penalty? In the state of innocence God would have freed the woman supernaturally from all pain; deprived of that gift by sin, she became subject to the pains — which are natural in themselves, but a penalty in respect of the lost gift. Catchword: 'habito' (continues on the next page).

— p. 732 (PDF) · printed p. 691 —

...to the state of innocence, in which Eve would have been immune and free from such pains, they ought to be reckoned a penalty of sin. But how could it come about that in the state of innocence a woman should bring forth without pain? Augustine answers (book 14 of the City of God, chapter 26): when the fetus in the womb was already mature for birth, it would then come about that the maternal viscera would spontaneously be loosened so far as to afford the fetus a convenient passage without the mother's pain. Thus, for giving birth (says Augustine), not a groan of pain, but the impulse of maturity would relax the feminine viscera — just as, for conceiving, not the appetite of lust, but a voluntary use would join the nature of both spouses. But it must be known that that freedom from pains in birth could not have proceeded from any natural cause, nor from any supernatural power inhering and remaining in the body and members of the woman

herself; but as often as it happened, it happened by a new miracle of God's power — although, because it would have been usual and perpetual in that state, it would not have been held for a miracle.

How a painless birth would have been possible in innocence — Augustine (De Civitate Dei 14.26): the mature viscera would relax spontaneously; conceiving by a voluntary use, not lust. The painlessness would have been not from a natural or an inherent supernatural power, but a continual miracle of God (not held a 'miracle' because it would have been perpetual). Marginal gloss: 'Quemadmodum in statu innocentiae mulier sine dolore peperisset.' Running head misprinted '681' (= true 691 minus 10); true printed page 691.

How great, moreover, and how manifold is the penalty of women in childbirth, besides daily experience, divine Scripture sufficiently declares, when, wishing to exaggerate the magnitude of some pain, it likens it to the pains of women in labor; and our Lord in the Gospel says, 'A woman, when she gives birth, has sorrow, because her hour has come.' And besides the pain, often also danger of life befalls the one giving birth, not a few dying in the bringing forth of offspring — as happened to Rachel in the birth of Benjamin; and many, as Pliny hands down, are born with the parent killed. Thus was the elder Scipio Africanus born, and the first of the Caesars was so named from his mother's womb being cut, for which cause they were also called 'Caesones.' In a similar way was born also Manlius, who entered Carthage with an army.

How great the childbirth penalty: Scripture likens great pain to labor (John 16:21). The danger of death (Rachel in the birth of Benjamin, Gen 35:18); Caesarean births ('from the cut womb'), whence Scipio Africanus, the first 'Caesar,' the Caesones, and Manlius (Pliny 7.9). Marginal glosses: 'Ioan. 16'; 'Genes. 35'; 'Plin. lib. 7. cap. 9.'

But about the pains of women in childbirth, Aristotle writes thus (book 7 of the History of Animals, chapter 9): 'When women give birth, the pains bear indeed upon many parts, but for most upon one or the other thigh. Those in whom the gripings vehemently exercise the belly give birth most swiftly; those who feel pain in the loins give birth with difficulty; those [who feel it in] the lower belly, more easily. If a male is born, a thin, somewhat pale discharge flows; but if a female, a

bloody one — yet that too is very moist; but it can also happen to some that theirs is otherwise. To other animals births come not laborious, for they seem to be less troubled when they give birth; but to women most vehement pains occur, and especially to the sedentary and chair-bound, and to those whose sides are not good, nor is the faculty of retaining the breath at hand: they also give birth with more difficulty, if meanwhile, while they retain [the breath] by force, they have forcibly burst forth their breathing. First that water, poured out below, flows out through the motion of the fetus, the membranes being ruptured; then the fetus, the womb being inverted, and the afterbirth loosening the internal parts, comes forth into the light.' Thus Aristotle.

Aristotle, Historia Animalium 7.9, on the pains of labor (the site of the pain — thigh, loins, belly; the male vs. female discharge; sedentary women; the breaking of the waters and the afterbirth). Marginal gloss: 'Non ut hominis partus sic ceterorum animalium esse laboriosos.'

It remains to explain that which is placed last among Eve's penalties: And you shall be under the power of the man, and he shall have dominion over you. The woman would have been under the power of the man in the state of innocence too, but not by compulsion, nor troublesomely, nor with any repugnance of will: for since the woman was of an intact mind...

The last of Eve's penalties, 'you shall be under the power of the man' — she would have been subject to the man in the state of innocence too, but freely, not by compulsion (so how is it a penalty?). Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo poena fuerit mulieris esse sub viro, cum ita fuisset etiam in statu innocentiae.' Catchword: 'animo' (continues on the next page).

— p. 733 (PDF) · printed p. 692 —

...of an intact and upright mind, seeking nothing but what was honest and right, she would willingly and gladly have been under the command of the man, because she understood it to be consonant with the divine will and with reason. The command of the man too would have been full of equity and charity; nor would the wife have been held as a slave and handmaid, but as the dearest companion of life, and a partaker of her husband's counsels and duties, and a helper for the generation and education of

offspring. But after sin it is a grave penalty for the woman to be under the man: both because of the levity and vanity of the female disposition, and the pride of a mind that bears with an unjust spirit the husband's being set over her; and also because usually men, treating their wives proudly, angrily, and harshly, make their command over them burdensome, bitter, and odious.

In the state of innocence the woman would have obeyed the man freely (his command of equity and charity, she a dear companion, not a slave); but after sin it is a grave penalty, both because of her disposition (which resents his rule) and because men often rule harshly. Running head misprinted '682' (= true 692 minus 10); true printed page 692.

Blessed Jerome, in the Hebrew Traditions on Genesis, gives a variant reading of these words. For the Seventy rendered, 'And your turning [shall be] to the man'; Aquila, 'To the man your fellowship'; Symmachus, 'To the man your appetite, or impulse.' Certainly the Hebrew, if one render it word for word, sounds thus: 'To the man your desire, or your concupiscence' [the Hebrew word is ■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■■■ (Ischeth teshukatec)]. And the meaning of these readings seems to be this: 'Although in the bringing-forth of offspring you will suffer the greatest torments, yet soon, as if forgetful of the pains, you will again turn to the man, and desire his union, that from him you may again conceive offspring' — so great, indeed, is either the madness of lust implanted in women, or rather the desire of generating offspring. Or it can be understood otherwise: 'All your wishes, all your thoughts, and care and duties will be turned to your husband; namely, you will look to him...'

Jerome, Quaestiones (Traditiones) Hebraicae in Genesim, on the variant readings of 'your turning shall be to the man' (Gen 3:16b): LXX 'conversion/turning'; Aquila 'fellowship'; Symmachus 'appetite/impulse'; the Hebrew literally 'desire/concupiscence.' HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■■■ (ve-el ishekh teshukatekh, 'and to your husband [shall be] your desire'; the two clear words are ■■■■ 'your husband' and ■■■■■■ 'your desire'), transliterated in the margin as 'Ischeth teshukatec.' Interpretations: she returns to the man despite the birth pains (from lust or the desire of offspring); or all her care depends on the man. Marginal gloss: 'Varia lectio huius loci. Hebraea sunt ■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■■■.' Catchword: 'spectabis' (continues below).

...you will look to him, and will wholly depend upon his zeal, his speech, and his nod. For a woman, since from the man she receives food, clothing, offspring, and almost everything she can wish for, is compelled, willing or unwilling, to depend on the man.

The woman wholly depends on the man (for food, clothing, offspring) — willing or unwilling.

But this passage, on the subjection of the woman under the man's power, must be illustrated by two excellent opinions — one of St. Augustine, and the other of Rupert. In book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 27, Augustine has thus: 'It must be seen how that can properly be taken which was said to the woman, And your turning [shall be] to the man, and he shall have dominion over you. For neither before sin is it fitting to believe it was otherwise, than that the man should have dominion over the woman, and she should turn to him by serving. But it can rightly be said that this servitude was signified which is of a certain condition rather than of love — so that even that servitude, by which men afterward began to serve men, is found to have arisen from the penalty of sin. Paul indeed said, Through charity serve one another; but the Apostle does not permit the woman to have dominion over the man: for this the sentence of God rather conferred on the man; and that she should have the husband as lord, not the woman's nature, but her fault, deserved — which, however, unless it be kept, nature will be further depraved, and the fault increased.' Thus Augustine.

First opinion — Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.27: a subjection existed before sin, but of love; after sin, of a servile 'condition' (whence all human servitude arose); that the woman should have the husband as lord is deserved not by her nature but by her fault (Gal 5:13, 'per charitatem servite invicem'; 1 Tim 2:12, the woman not to have dominion over the man). Marginal glosses: 'Mulieris servitus conditionis potius est quam dilectionis'; 'Galat. 5'; '1. Timot. 2.'

But Rupert, in book 3 On the Works of the Trinity, chapter 21, thinks it is of a graver domination for the wife to be under the man as under a lord, than to be under the man's power. For he writes in this manner:

'But it can still rightly be asked, What that is — for the woman to be under the man's power, and the man to be the woman's lord...'

Second opinion — Rupert, De operibus Trinitatis 3.21: it is of a graver domination for the wife to be 'under a lord' than 'under the power.' Marginal gloss: 'Rupertus.' Catchword: 'Dominum' (continues on the next page).

— p. 734 (PDF) · printed p. 693 —

'...the woman's lord — since he said both, And you shall be under the man's power, and he shall have dominion over you. To this it must be answered, that it is of a stronger domination for the woman to be under a lord than to be under the power of the man. For according to the Roman laws too, the woman is under the man's power before she comes into the hand of the man — under the power of the man, I say, yet not as of a lord, but as of a guardian, so that without his authority she may not make a will. But she who comes into the hand of the man, much more, as long as the man lives, may not make a will without the man; whence the woman who comes into the hand of the man is said to be capite diminuta (diminished in civil status). So much so that among the Gentiles too, who had not read this Scripture, or did not observe the precepts of this true God, this law naturally prevailed, which the Lord of nature imposed, saying to the woman, And you shall be under the power of the man, and he shall have dominion over you.'

Rupert (De operibus Trinitatis 3.21): being 'under a lord' is a graver domination than 'under the power' — illustrated from Roman law (a woman is under the man's power as a guardian's, and may not make a will without him; entering his manus she is 'capite diminuta'); this law prevailed even among the Gentiles. Marginal gloss: 'Viri in muliere potestas quanta iure civili.' Running head misprinted '683' (= true 693 minus 10); true printed page 693.

'Yet certain barbarous nations, as [they confused] other things, so confused this order of nature, that a woman without a head — that is, without her husband — should exercise power and dominion over men. Whence also, in a Roman advocate, a woman defends her cause by saying, among other things: I, a woman, shall not be the first to

hold the cities of the Nile; with no distinction of sex, Pharos knows how to bear a queen. But nevertheless it must be called not so much a right or law as a usurpation. Rightly, therefore, he did not only say, You shall be under the power of the man — for a little male boy too is under the power of the man, that is, of a guardian — but added, And he shall have dominion over you: namely, that the woman is never free from under the yoke of the man, but both her age and her condition [is] first under the power of the man as guardian, and then, when she comes into the hand of the man by the lawful tablets of marriage, under the dominion of the man.'

Rupert (continued): certain barbarous nations let women rule (with a verse from Lucan, Pharsalia 10, on Egypt's willingness to be ruled by a queen) — but this is usurpation, not right; 'you shall be under the power' is like a boy under a guardian, while 'he shall have dominion' means she is never free from the man's yoke (first the guardian, then the husband's dominion). Marginal glosses: 'Feminam viris imperare contra naturae ordinem est'; 'Luc. lib. 10.'

'But to chaste and faithful women, benevolence makes this third penalty null, or very light; and it not only does not harm, but is even a matter of praise. Wherefore Peter the Apostle too, exhorting women to spontaneous subjection, says, Likewise let women also be subject to their own husbands. For so also, sometimes, holy women, hoping in God, adorned themselves, subject to their own husbands, as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him Lord,' etc. Thus Rupert.

Rupert (conclusion): for chaste and faithful women, benevolence makes this third penalty null or very light, and even praiseworthy (1 Pet 3:1, 5-6, 'let women be subject to their own husbands'; Sara obeying Abraham and calling him lord, Gen 18:12). Marginal glosses: '2. Pet. 3' (properly 1 Pet 3); 'Genes. 18.'

Verses 17, 18, and 19. But to Adam he said: Because you have heard the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree, of which I commanded you that you should not eat, cursed is the earth in your work: in labors you shall eat of it all the days of your life: thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you, and

you shall eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and to dust you shall return.

New lemma: Genesis 3:17-19 (set off by a horizontal rule).

This sentence of God, as most just, so most true, both Adam then, and afterward all his posterity, recognized and felt by the perpetual weighing of those evils which God threatened. For that phrase, In your work, Jerome, in the Hebrew Traditions on Genesis...

Adam and all his posterity recognized this sentence (Gen 3:17-19) as most just and most true, by the perpetual experience of the threatened evils. Jerome (Traditiones Hebraicae in Genesim) on the phrase 'In opere tuo' begins. Marginal gloss: 'Hieronym.' Catchword: 'Genesim'; page footer signature 'SSS 3.'

— p. 735 (PDF) · printed p. 694 —

...[Jerome] reads on Genesis, 'In your works'; in which way too the Seventy rendered it. But Jerome thought that 'works' here signifies not the tilling of the field, but sins. Whence in the Hebrew it is 'Cursed is the earth for your sake' [[illegible], arurah hadamah baaburecha]. The Chaldaic paraphrase has it similarly, and so Aquila rendered it; but Theodotion translated it more clearly: 'Cursed,' he says, 'is the earth in your transgression.' But if we follow the literal history, this is signified by these words: that man, by tilling and working the earth, will find it cursed to himself — that is, sterile of useful things, but on the contrary fruitful of useless and noxious ones, nor producing what is necessary for sustenance without great labor and sweat of man. For in Sacred Scripture, as the word of blessing signifies plenty and abundance of goods, so the word of cursing signifies the lack and sterility of goods, and the abundance of evils and miseries.

Continuing Jerome (Traditiones Hebraicae in Genesim) on Gen 3:17 'in opere tuo': the LXX 'in your works'; Jerome takes 'works' as 'sins,' whence the Hebrew, Chaldaic, Aquila and Theodotion read

'Cursed is the earth for your sake / in your transgression.' HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification (three stacked words in the margin): ■■■■■ ■■■■■ ■■■■■■ (arurah hadamah baaburecha, 'cursed is the earth in your labor,' Gen 3:17), transliterated in the margin 'arurah / hadamah / baburecha.' Marginal gloss: 'Verba Hebraea sunt' + the three words. Running head misprinted '684' (= true 694 minus 10); true printed page 694.

Nor must it be thought that the natural fertility of the earth was either wholly removed or diminished on account of man's sin: it was the same before and after man's sin. But it was said so because before sin there would have been no need for man to till the earth to gain the fruits necessary for living out life, or at least it would have been cultivated without labor and trouble. For the earth of Paradise, in which man dwelt, most fertile of itself, would have supplied of its own accord and most abundantly whatever pertained to man's food; but after sin, man, exterminated from the most happy soil of Paradise, and multiplied far more than he would have been before, and dispersed through all lands, was compelled to seek his food from many and diverse lands, most of them sterile or barely bearing the desired fruits. Before sin, therefore, the earth also generated thistles and thorns, but not for Adam — rather for the brutes, or on account of the fullness and universality of the species of the world.

How the earth was 'cursed' on account of sin: not that its natural fertility was removed or diminished, but that after sin man must gain his food by toil, dispersed over sterile lands; even before sin the earth bore thorns, but for the brutes, not for Adam. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo terra fuerit maledicta propter peccatum.'

That which follows, 'Earth you are, and to earth you shall return,' openly signifies that death befell man on account of Adam's sin. This Josephus did not understand, writing in this place that, if Adam had not sinned, he would have had a very long life and a very late old age, but that on account of sin his life was diminished and his old age hastened. This, many centuries later, was the heresy of the Pelagians, affirming death to be natural to man and not arisen from sin, and that Adam, even if he had not sinned, would nevertheless have died. Into which opinion Eugubinus too went, in the

book of his Annotations on Genesis, in the digression on Paradise. But that opinion contains an error manifestly contrary to divine Scripture, which teaches — both in the book of Wisdom chapter 2, and also to the Romans chapter 5 — that God made man imperishable, but that death invaded the human race on account of sin and the envy of the devil; condemned also by the Church, and recently in the Council of Trent, session five on original sin, and formerly in the Council of Milevis chapter 1; refuted also by Augustine, book 13 of the City of God, chapter 15, where he says that among Christians who truly hold the Catholic faith it is agreed also...

'Earth you are, and to earth you shall return' (Gen 3:19) proves death came from Adam's sin. Refutes the error (Josephus, Antiq. 1; Eugubinus; the Pelagians) that death is natural, not from sin, so that Adam would have died anyway — contrary to Wisd 2 and Rom 5 (God made man imperishable, death from sin and the devil's envy); condemned at Trent (sess. 5) and the Council of Milevis (c. 1); refuted by Augustine, De Civitate Dei 13.15. Marginal glosses: 'Falsa opinio Iosephi, Eugubini & Pelagianorum de morte corporali. Iosephus lib. 1 Antiquit.'; 'Conc. Trid.'; 'Concilium Milevitanum.' Catchword: 're etiam' (constare etiam; continues on the next page).

— p. 736 (PDF) · printed p. 695 —

...[it is agreed also] that even the death of the body itself did not befall us by the law of nature, but was deservedly inflicted by the law of sin, because God, avenging sin, said to the first man, in whom we all then were, 'Earth you are, and to earth you shall go.' And some indeed escape the other aforesaid penalties, either wholly or at least for the greatest part — as those who are not in the labor of men, and are not scourged along with men (Ps 72:5). But by the penalty of death all are held commonly and equally: for Death, as that Poet said, 'strikes with equal foot the huts of the poor and the towers of kings.'

End of the Augustine quote (De Civitate Dei 13.15): bodily death is penal, not natural ('Terra es, et in terram ibis'). Some escape the other penalties (Ps 72:5 'in labore hominum non sunt'), but death holds all equally — Horace, Odes 1.4 'aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas Regumque turres.' Marginal glosses: 'Psalm. 72'; 'Hor. lib. 1. Carminum.' Running head '685'; true printed page 695.

But although death was a penalty of sin, it was nevertheless most useful and salutary: lest both the malice and the misery of man should become immortal; and that the fear of impending death might both recall from doing evil and prompt to doing good. I shall certainly not fail to recall in this place the excellent opinion of Rupert, demonstrating in weighty and eloquent speech that the penalty of death, by which man was mulcted by God, was most useful to man after sin. For thus he writes in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapters 24 and 25, treating this very passage of Moses in which we are engaged:

Although death was penal, it was most useful and salutary (lest man's malice and misery become immortal; the fear of death recalls from evil, prompts to good). Introduces Rupert, De Trinitate et operibus eius 3.24-25, on the usefulness of mortality. Marginal gloss: 'Egregia Ruperti sententia, quod post peccatum fuerit homini utilissimum, obnoxium esse morti.'

'At least by this stroke of death he had to tame the pride of ashes, and at some time to bend down to the mud necks that must be brought low. Already before, indeed, wretched man was truly dead, because he was dead to God — namely by the death of sin, which separates the soul from God. But God had said, that on whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death. Yet he, smeared over with the sudden wantonness of the flesh, did not feel the bitterness of that death: just as we too today, when we see so many dying daily in the flesh as well, still, with wanton blood, jest and laugh; and, already deprived of eternal joys and soon to be deprived of temporal ones too, we are nonetheless merry. What if we were never going to die in the flesh? How would we pass over with deaf ears the death of the soul and the coming judgment at the end of the age — we who, though to die tomorrow, are proud today? What, I say, if meanwhile, while we live, every man were to eat his bread without labors and without the sweat of his face, when even always in the anxiety of hunger, and the alternating scarcity of diverse things, and moreover ever uncertain of impending death — our flesh still, from pride, does not know itself, and dissolves in lusts? Well, then, the good God, lest man be ignorant of the evil death of his

soul, and, secure until the dawn of the last judgment, sleep in his pleasures, strikes him with the death of the flesh, that at least by fear of its imminence someone may awake. And meanwhile, because fullness of bread and leisure could abolish this anxiety too, he willed him to eat his bread not without labors and the sweat of his face; nay even, though laboring stoutly, to be robbed sometimes in barren years of the greatest part of his fruit. That this is not useless to man is so true that even a distinguished Poet of the Gentiles says: The Father himself willed that the way of tillage should not be easy, and first stirred the fields by art, sharpening mortal hearts with cares, nor suffered his realms to grow sluggish in heavy torpor.' He testified that torpor, which he said was Jove, was useless to a kingdom...

Rupert (De Trin. 3.24-25) at length: this stroke of death tames the pride of ashes; man was already dead in soul by sin but felt not death's bitterness; if we never died in the flesh we would ignore the soul's death and the final judgment; God struck man with bodily death that some might awake; willed him to eat bread by labor and sweat, sometimes robbed of harvest in barren years. Quotes Virgil, Georgics 1.121-124 ('Pater ipse colendi haud facilem esse viam voluit...'), that torpor (which Virgil called 'Jove') is useless to a kingdom. Marginal glosses: 'Vtile esse hominem laboribus exerceri'; 'Virg. 1. Geo.' Catchword: 'porem' (torporem; continues on the next page).

— p. 737 (PDF) · printed p. 696 —

'...torpor or leisure — though, as a Gentile, he passes over the fact that from leisure is born sin. Yet the same [poet], boastful, in another place, indulging in the flattering blandishments of a certain little infant, promises among other things, as a great felicity, spontaneous riches: The field will slowly grow golden with the soft ear of corn, and the reddening grape will hang from the untended brambles, and the hard oaks will sweat dewy honey — and the rest. But this is no wonder in this pagan, a man of no good profession, since even many professors of the Christian name have there been who, not ignorant that fullness of bread and leisure was the sin of the Sodomites, yet preached that a thousand years were to come for Christ [on earth], saying that then a hundredfold of all the things we have given up were

to be restored to us carnally — not considering that, if in other things the recompense be worthy, in the case of wives a foulness would appear, so that whoever gave up one wife for the Lord should receive a hundred in the future.'

Rupert (continued): Virgil (Ecl. 4.28-30, 'Molli paulatim flavescet campus arista...') promising a golden age of spontaneous riches — the millenarian/chiliast error, also held by some Christians who, forgetting that ease was Sodom's sin, preached a carnal thousand-year kingdom with a hundredfold restored (the absurdity of a hundred wives). Marginal glosses: 'Eccle. 33'; 'Virgil. Egl. 4'; 'Ezech. 16'; 'Haec sumpta sunt ex Hieronymo in Matthaeum cap. 19.' Running head '686'; true printed page 696.

'And in the following chapter: Therefore it is not of angry justice but of merciful grace, that God willed vitiated man to be mortal, and meanwhile, while he lives, to eat his bread in labors — namely, that before the day of judgment comes, on which, together with the ancient sinner, all the wicked are to be condemned, some may come to their senses, taught by labors and pains and at last by death itself, so that even vexation alone may give understanding to the hearing. Which a certain philosopher of the Gentiles too, Plotinus, perceiving, and reasonably judging mortality useful to men, says: Then the merciful Father was framing for them mortal bodies. So deeply did he perceive this to be expedient, that he asserted God to be merciful in this, that he willed men to be mortal. Furthermore, of those who, not even afflicted with so many stripes of fatherly discipline, come to their senses, the damnation is just, because the fault is inexcusable. For what more should God do to restrain them from evils? Concerning which he says: Wherein shall I strike you further, you who add transgression? Your land is deserted, and your cities burned with fire; strangers devour your region before you, and it shall be made desolate as in hostile devastation. When he says these things through the Prophet, he plainly hints at this: that he has struck the whole human race, and struck it at last with death itself, so that they might not, like the immortal devil, add transgression, but rather flee from the pride of the ancient transgression through the humility of penitence.'

Rupert (continued): God's making man mortal and to eat bread in labor is of mercy, not wrath — that some may repent before judgment, taught by toil, pain, and death ('vexatio dabit intellectum auditui,' Isa 28:19). Even the pagan Plotinus judged mortality merciful ('Then the merciful Father framed for them mortal bodies'). Those unmoved by such discipline are justly damned (Isa 1:5-7, 'Super quo percutiam vos ultra...'). God struck the race with death lest, like the immortal devil, they add transgression. Marginal glosses: 'Esaia 28. Deus est misericors in eo quod diu nos vivere non sinit'; 'Esaia 1.'

'To this end serves also that he willed the day or hour of this same death to be unknown to man, so that, while it is not known when it will be — which without doubt will be — it may always render him solicitous, and, always apprehensive, not suffer him to be proud. For he said indefinitely, Until you return to the earth from which you were taken; and he did not say, up to so many years, or so many days, which passed you shall at once return to the earth from which you were taken. Thus, therefore, he willed man to live as if to be judged the next day, and to render an account of his own deeds. And see how terribly he rebukes the man who unjustly reckoned himself to be like God, and sets him against his own face by saying, Because you are dust, and to dust you shall return. By the stroke of this sentence nature is so affected that among men of old, in the utmost affliction, it was customary, as the greatest instrument of grief, to sprinkle their heads with ashes. But this recollection of one's own condition then usefully discloses itself, when it proceeds from wise humility, after the example of father Abraham saying, I will speak to my Lord...'

Rupert (conclusion): God left death's day/hour unknown ('Until you return to the earth,' not a fixed term) to keep man ever solicitous and humble, living as if to be judged the next day; 'Because you are dust' rebukes the man who thought himself like God; hence the ancient custom of sprinkling ashes on the head in affliction. Such recollection is useful when from wise humility — as Abraham, 'I will speak to my Lord, though I am dust and ashes' (Gen 18:27). Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 25.' Catchword: 'num' (Dominum; continues on the next page).

— p. 738 (PDF) · printed p. 697 —

'...my Lord, since I am dust and ashes.' For when we humbly recall these things, mercifully he too recalls, as it is written: As a father pities his children, the Lord has pitied those who fear him, for he knew our frame, and remembered that we are dust. Thus far are the plainly golden words of Rupert.

End of the Rupert quote (Gen 18:27, 'cum sim pulvis et cinis'; Ps 102/103:13-14, 'As a father pities his children... he remembered that we are dust'); 'the plainly golden words of Rupert.' Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 18'; 'Psal. 102.' Running head '687'; true printed page 697.

And Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living.

New lemma: Genesis 3:20 (set off and centered).

The name of Eve is read corruptly both among the Greeks and among the Latins: nor does that word contain the etymology which divine Scripture hands down in this place. Wherefore, for 'Eva,' it ought to be said ■■■ Chavah; for it is derived from ■■ Chai, which signifies living or animate. But ■■■ Chavah is put for ■■■ Chaiah: for the reason of the name is that she was to be the future mother of all the living. Now ■■■ Chavah does not signify 'to live,' but 'to announce'; whereas ■■■ Chaiah signifies 'to live'; and the letters ■ ■ ■ ■ (A, E, V, I) are mutually interchangeable, as is clear from grammar. And the corruption of this name among the Latins brought it about that many said 'Ave' was said from 'Eva' by inversion of the letters; and on that account that Gabriel the archangel, in saluting the Virgin Mother of God, said to her 'Ave,' as if she were to bring to the world goods plainly contrary to those evils which Eve had brought in.

The etymology of 'Eve' (Gen 3:20). HEBREW GLYPHS verified by magnification: ■■■ (Chavah, 'Eve'; chet-vav-he) appears three times; ■■ (Chai, 'living'; chet-yod) once; ■■■ (Chaiah, 'to live'; chet-yod-he) once; and the four permutable/quiescent letters ■ ■ ■ ■ (aleph-he-vav-yod = the transliterated 'A, E, V, I'). Pererius: the name should be Chavah, from Chai/Chaiah ('living'); the letters are interchangeable; whence the Latin corruption made many derive the angelic 'Ave' from 'Eva' by inversion (Gabriel's salutation of Mary bringing goods contrary to Eve's evils). Marginal

gloss: 'De Etymologia nominis Evae.'

It is not sufficiently clear whether this imposition of the name is narrated by Moses in inverted order, and whether that name was imposed on the wife by Adam either before sin, or after they were cast out of paradise: for it is not likely that Adam, when he was vehemently pressed by God's judgment, amid penalties and scourges and the most bitter announcement of death, should, as if with tranquil and empty mind, have thought about imposing a name on his wife. Nor are there lacking those who think that Adam, stupefied with immense grief because he had been stripped of such goods, and consigned to such evils and to death, the last of all evils, called his wife — the author of those evils and the cause of death — 'Mother of the living' as if by a bitter jest and harsh irony: just as the Greeks call the infernal Furies 'Eumenides,' that is, 'the kindly and mild,' by contraries, since they are hard and inexorable. Those words, 'That she was the Mother of all the living,' are Moses's own; and that 'she was' is said for 'she would be.' Eugubinus laughs at Lyranus, who interprets the name of Eve as signifying the mother of all — not simply, but of those living wretchedly and miserably. There are those who think that Adam so called his wife with regard to the coming Messiah, from whom alone he awaited the remedy of his sin, who was to be born from a woman alone without the intercourse of a man; and for that reason the woman was called Mother of all the living, but Adam was not called Father of all the living.

When and how the name was imposed: unclear whether before sin or after expulsion (unlikely amid God's judgment). Some hold Adam, grief-stricken, called her 'Mother of the living' by bitter irony (as the Greeks call the Furies 'Eumenides,' the kindly ones, by contraries). 'That she was the mother of all living' is Moses's own gloss ('was' for 'would be'). Eugubinus mocks Lyra (Nicholas of Lyra), who took it as mother of those living wretchedly. A Messianic reading: Adam named her with regard to the coming Messiah, to be born of a woman alone without a man — hence she, not Adam, is called parent of all the living. Marginal glosses: 'Quando nomen Evae sit impositum primae mulieri'; 'Cur Eva non Adamus mater omnium viventium dicta sit.' Page footer signature 'TTT'; catchword 'ERGO.'

— p. 739 (PDF) · printed p. 698 —

Therefore, in my judgment, the interpretation and opinion of these words which is in Rupert (in chapter 26 of the third book On the Trinity and its Works) has more of novelty and wonder than of credibility. For Rupert thinks that Adam, out of immense pride and obstinacy of mind, either not at all believing or making light of this divine sentence of death pronounced against himself, called his wife 'mother of the living': as if he said, 'I do not fear death; nay rather, I believe I shall live nonetheless, just as if I had not sinned; and therefore I wish my wife to be called Eve, because she will be the mother of the living.' But let the reader hear Rupert himself explaining this opinion in his own words:

Pererius introduces (and finds 'more wondrous than probable') Rupert's reading (De Trinitate et operibus 3.26) of the naming of Eve: that Adam, from pride and disbelief in the death-sentence, named his wife 'mother of the living' as a defiant boast ('I do not fear death... I wish her called Eve'). Marginal gloss: 'Mirabilis, sed non probabilis Ruperti sententia.' Running head '688'; true printed page 698.

'What,' he says, 'is more insane than, in the judgment of such a cause, to name her Eve, that is, life — she who did not have life in herself; and to call her mother of all the living, who is rather the mother of all the dying? For all die in her sin, and none of her children lives, except those who are made alive through the one man Christ. It is therefore marvelous that, where the sentence of bodily death was being pronounced, he — already dead by spiritual death, and afterward about to die bodily too — there called his wife Eve, that is, life. Therefore, when Moses narrated this, that Adam, having received the sentence of death, called his wife by the name of life, he doubtless wished to signify this: just as, when God said above, On whatever day you eat of this tree, you shall die the death, he did not believe, but ate — because he saw that the woman who had first eaten did not immediately die bodily — so now too, when God says, Because you are dust, and to dust you shall return, he so far did not believe, that on the contrary he called his wife's name Eve, that is, life, because she was the mother of all the living.' Thus Rupert.

Rupert's own words (De Trin. 3.26): it is 'insane' that Adam named her 'life' (mother of the living) when she is rather mother of all the dying — all die in her sin, none lives but through Christ; Adam, dead in soul and doomed to bodily death, still disbelieved the sentence 'you are dust' (as he had disbelieved 'you shall die the death,' seeing Eve not die at once), and so defiantly called her Eve = life.

Verse 21. The Lord God also made for Adam and his wife garments of skins, and clothed them.

New lemma: Genesis 3:21 (set off by 'VERS. 21.' and centered).

Concerning these words: first, what those garments of skins were, and how made; then why God willed to clothe those first men with such garments — this is now to be disputed. Origen, in his commentaries on Genesis (as Methodius and Epiphanius in the Ancoratus report of him), judged that what is said of the garments of skins is to be understood not properly, but metaphorically and figuratively; and that it signifies that the first men, after sin, were clothed with a mortal and perishable body, fragile and subject to innumerable evils and miseries. For it is ridiculous, [he says], to think that God, like some cobbler or leather-worker, from dead animals flayed, fitted and dressed their skins for the use of human garments. Similar is the interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa and certain others. But if these think this is the genuine and historical sense of Moses's words, I should say without doubt that they are mistaken. For it belongs to this passage, as to the previous ones...

Opens the disputation on Gen 3:21 (what the garments of skins were, how made, why God gave them). The figurative reading — Origen (via Methodius and Epiphanius, Ancoratus) and Gregory of Nyssa: the 'garments of skins' = the mortal, fragile body man put on after sin (God as 'cobbler' being ridiculous). Pererius: if they take this as the literal sense, they are mistaken. Marginal glosses: 'Quales fuerint, & quomodo confectae illae tunicae pelliceae'; 'Tunicas pelliceas proprie esse intelligendas.' Catchword: 'rum' (superiorum; continues on the next page).

— p. 740 (PDF) · printed p. 699 —

...an historical narration of things; and on that account, as the words themselves sound, it is so to be taken. Nor should it seem a wonder that

God procured garments for man, since he also appointed and assigned him certain food. Nay, Origen himself, in homily 6 on Leviticus, seems to have understood that those were true garments of skins, suitable, namely, for clothing sinners, so as to be signs and witnesses of the mortality to which man had been subjected on account of sin, and of the fragility which arises from the corruption of the flesh.

The passage is historical (literal), as the words sound; no wonder God procured garments, since he also assigned man food. Even Origen (Homily 6 on Leviticus) seems to grant they were true garments of skins, fit to clothe sinners as signs of their mortality and fragility. Marginal gloss: 'Genes. 1.' Running head '689'; true printed page 699.

Augustine, in the 39th chapter of book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, judges that what is written of the garments of skins was said and is to be understood historically, although it was done and written to figure and signify something. For thus he says: 'And this too — namely of the garments of skins — was done for the sake of signification, but nevertheless done: just as those things which were said for the sake of signification were nevertheless said. For this, which I have often said and am not ashamed to say again, must be required of a narrator of things properly done: that he narrate those things to have been done which were done, and those to have been said which were said. But as in deeds it is asked what was done and what it signifies, so also in words, what was said and what it signifies. For whether it was said figuratively or properly, what is narrated to have been said must nevertheless not be thought merely to have been figured [and not really said].'

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.39: the garments of skins are historical/literal, though also signifying something. A narrator of real events must be taken to report that things were really done and said; in deeds one asks both what was done and what it signifies, so in words. Marginal gloss: 'Vestes pelliceae & vera fuerunt, & aliquid significaverunt.'

But whence or how were those garments made? Some think that those garments were made not from the skins of animals, but from the bark of

trees, adapted to the composition and use of human garments, God suggesting to those first men the method of making them. As author of this opinion, Barcepha, in his book on Paradise, praises Gregory Nazianzen; of which [opinion] the approvers and defenders too were Theodore of Heraclea and Gennadius, bishops of Constantinople. But, as the more common, so the more probable is the opinion that the garments were made from the skins of animals. For nowhere in Scripture does the Hebrew word which is in this place [■■■, 'or] signify the bark of a tree, but everywhere the skin of an animal. Nor is it to be curiously inquired how the garments were made: for they could have been made either from nothing, or from some matter suddenly changed by God's power into skins, or the skins stripped from slaughtered animals could have been fitted to the form and use of garments.

How the garments were made: the 'tree-bark' view (Barcepha, in his De Paradiso, crediting Gregory Nazianzen; approved by Theodore of Heraclea and Gennadius of Constantinople) versus the more common and probable view that they were animal skins. HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■ ('or, 'skin/hide'; ayin-vav-resh), transliterated 'or' in the margin — the word here 'never means tree-bark, but everywhere the skin of an animal.' How made: from nothing, or matter transmuted, or skins stripped from slain animals. Marginal glosses: 'Vocabulum Hebraeum est' + ■■■ (or); 'Quo modo pelles factae sunt.'

For as to what Theodoret objects to this interpretation — that it could not have been done without the destruction of some species of animals, since (as he thinks) only two of each species of animals, namely one male and one female, were created by God at the beginning of the world — it is neither true, nor likely, nor can be proved from divine Scripture. Nay rather, that many animals of each sex according to each species were made is more consonant with reason, and was demonstrated by us in the earlier books. But what Theodoret really thought of those garments of skins, even if the reader read and weigh with care what was written by him in explaining the thirty-ninth question on Genesis, he will scarcely be able to divine: so obscure and involved in ambiguity are his words. He narrates, mixes, and confounds various opinions, and the same...

Refutes Theodoret's objection (that skins would require destroying a species, since only two of each were made): it is false — many animals of each species were created (proved in the earlier books). Theodoret's own view (Quaest. 39 in Genesim) is too obscure and ambiguous to make out. Marginal gloss: 'Theodoretus quaest. 39. in Genesim.' Catchword: 'pri' (continues on the next page).

— p. 741 (PDF) · printed p. 700 —

...[Theodoret] first indeed approving, then disapproving, and at last neither approving nor disapproving, but leaving it in the middle and uncertain. Hugh of St Victor interprets that those garments were made either from the elements, or by the ministry of Angels, or that God taught those first men the method of procuring garments for themselves from the skins of animals. Rupert believes that the word 'He made' is said for 'He commanded it to be made by them,' and gave and declared [them] the power of slaying animals — if not for food, at least for clothing — the human body having been made, on account of sin, very fragile and passible, and they being about to dwell outside Paradise, so that they had need of such garments. Treating these words of Moses in this manner, Rupert writes, in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 27:

Theodoret wavers (approving, disapproving, then leaving it uncertain). Hugh of St Victor: the garments made from the elements, or by Angels' ministry, or God taught the method. Rupert: 'He made' = 'He commanded them to make'; God gave the power to slay animals for clothing, the post-sin body being fragile and they about to live outside Paradise. Introduces Rupert, De Trinitate et operibus 3.27. Marginal gloss: 'Rupertus.' Running head '690'; true printed page 700.

'And this too seems lightly said, and almost next to laughter — that the Lord God made garments of skins for Adam and his wife. For it is not of the same dignity to sew together the little skins stripped from dead animals and to make garments, [as] whose are those things which have hitherto been said of the Lord God — for example, to stretch out the heaven like a skin, to found the earth, to set the sun, moon, and stars in the firmament, and finally to establish the natures of the very animals whose skins they are. Whence some so shrank from ascribing this workmanship to God, that they said the bodies were then first made for them, and therefore that "garments of skins" were said for

"bodies" — because, as now bodies are clothed with garments, so then God, on account of sin, clothed the souls with bodies. But this error, worthy of all mockery, was long ago exploded. It behooves us to know better: that earthly bodies are indeed a kind of garment of the souls, yet that they themselves were made before the souls, for so it is written above — that first the Lord God formed man from the mud of the earth, and then breathed into his face the breath of life. What then, you say — Was the Lord God a cobbler, or a skinner, and made garments of skins with lavish work of art? He did indeed make garments of skins, because the present Scripture so testifies; yet it does not compel us to confess that he made them in the way at which [some] laugh, but in the way over which all the clothed ought to weep. For "He made" means that he imposed on them the necessity of making [them]. For he willed the bodies to be, on account of sin, so wretched that without garments of skins they cannot endure. And it must be noted that he made for them not just any garments, but garments of skins: this was most excellently said. For the naked bodies of both sexes are not only shameful and to be blushed at on account of lust, but also weak for enduring cold. Well, therefore, is the Lord God said to have made for them not only garments, but garments of skins: because he justly willed their bodies to be such as needed not only to be covered on account of shame, but also to be warmed on account of weakness. You have therefore two solaces for [these] miseries, set before man along with labor and want: namely food and clothing. Food, where he said a little before, In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread; clothing, where it is now said, The Lord God also made for Adam and his wife garments of skins, and clothed them.' Thus Rupert.

Rupert (De Trin. 3.27) at length: it seems 'almost laughable' that God, maker of heaven and earth, sewed skins — whence some (Origen) shrank and said 'garments of skins' = bodies (God clothing souls with bodies). This error is exploded: the body is a 'garment' of the soul, but was made BEFORE the soul (Gen 2:7, first formed from mud, then breath of life). God was no cobbler: 'He made' =

'imposed the necessity of making'; and he made not just garments but garments OF SKINS (to cover shame AND warm against cold). Two solaces amid labor and want: food ('In the sweat of your face...') and clothing (Gen 3:21). Marginal glosses: 'Origenis error'; 'Secundum Rupertum, prius formatum est corpus primi hominis quam creata sit anima'; 'Genes. 2.'

From this passage of divine Scripture it is clearly understood that the first garments of men were of skins, and that their use lasted many centuries, until, namely, the art of making garments from wool and flax was invented. Fables, therefore, are the things which Lucretius wrote in book 5, from the teaching of his [master] Epicurus...

Pererius: this passage shows the first human garments were skins, in use for centuries until spinning from wool and flax was invented. Refutes as 'fables' the Epicurean account Lucretius gives in De rerum natura 5 (continues on the next page). Marginal gloss: 'De antiquissimo usu vestitus hominum ex pellibus.' Catchword: 'tius' (Lucretius).

— p. 742 (PDF) · printed p. 701 —

...[Lucre]tius, that the first men had naked bodies, and only after a long time began to use garments. His verses run thus: 'Not yet did they know to handle things with fire, nor to use the skins and spoils of wild beasts to clothe the body; but they dwelt in groves and hollow mountains and woods, and among the bushes hid their squalid limbs, compelled to avoid the lashings of the winds and the rains.' The most ancient of mortals indeed, as Plato says in the Protagoras, slew animals not only that they might feed on their flesh, but also that they might be covered with their skins.

Refutes Lucretius (De rerum natura 5), who held the first men naked, using garments only long afterward (quoting his verses 'Nec dum res igni scibant tractare...'). Against this: Plato (Protagoras) says the most ancient mortals slew animals both for flesh and for skins. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Lucretius.' Running head '691'; true printed page 701.

Cicero indeed, certainly, in the first Tusculan [Disputation], recognizes a fourfold use of beasts, for which beasts were created by God for man's sake: partly, namely, for eating, partly for the tilling of fields, partly for carrying, and partly finally for clothing bodies. Strabo in book 15 relates that among the Indians there were Philosophers who were covered with the

skins of stags and deer; for which cause too the Scythians were once called 'pelliti' (skin-clad), as may be seen in Jerome in the Epitaph to Nepotian. By this name too Propertius calls those first Senators of the Roman curia, and founders of so great an empire, in these verses: 'The Senate-house, which now, lofty, shines with the toga-clad Senate, had skin-clad Fathers, rustic hearts.' There was, moreover, this garment of skins once, among the people of God, of great veneration, because men most notable for piety and sanctity used it, as is handed down of Elijah and John the Baptist in the sacred writings; and, speaking of these and other most holy men, Paul to the Hebrews 11 says, 'They went about in sheepskins, and in goatskins.'

Further evidence that skins were the first clothing: Cicero (Tusc. 1) on the fourfold use of beasts (food, tillage, carrying, clothing); Strabo 15 on Indian philosophers in deerskins; the Scythians called 'pelliti' (Jerome, Epitaph. Nepotian.); Propertius on the early Roman Senate's 'skin-clad Fathers'; and among God's people Elijah and John the Baptist (Heb 11:37, 'in sheepskins and goatskins'). Marginal glosses: 'Pelliti Senatores cur dicti'; '4. Reg. 4.' (Elijah); 'Matth. 3.' (John the Baptist).

It follows that we should open up why God willed to clothe the first men with garments of skins after sin. Manifold indeed is the cause and reason of that thing which can be brought forward. The FIRST cause was: that thus provision might be made for modesty and continence, since the nakedness of the body, to a man not insane, is most shameful, and the sight of the naked body is a great enticement to lust. The SECOND cause: the first men, made subject on account of sin to death and to all the injuries of the sky, and to many afflictions and inconveniences, and soon to be cast out of Paradise, are fortified and protected by such garments against the intemperance of the sky under which they were thereafter to live. The THIRD cause: that he might show that it would thereafter be lawful for them to kill animals — if not for eating (which before the flood was not customary to men), certainly for the use of garments from their skins. The FOURTH CAUSE: that God might demonstrate that they too, though sinners and exiles of Paradise, would nevertheless not be bereft of his providence and care, as far as concerns those things necessary to them for food and clothing. For it is not on account of sin that the things which are

natural are taken away from man; nor are the general and natural benefits of divine providence, and its helps, withdrawn from sinners. For God, as the Lord said in the Gospel, 'makes his sun to rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust.' And below: 'Be not solicitous, saying, What shall we eat...'

Begins the EIGHT causes why God clothed the first men in skins after sin. (1) FIRST: for modesty/continence (nakedness is shameful, an enticement to lust). (2) SECOND: to protect them, soon to leave Paradise, against the elements. (3) THIRD: to show it lawful thereafter to kill animals — if not for food (not customary before the flood), at least for skins. (4) FOURTH: to show God's providence still cares for sinners' food and clothing (natural benefits are not withdrawn for sin — Matt 5:45 'Solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos'; Matt 6:25 'Nolite soliciti esse'). Marginal glosses: 'De octo causis, cur Deus primos homines post peccatum vestiri tunicis pelliceis voluerit'; 'Matth. 5.' Page footer signature 'TTT 3'; catchword 'ducab' (manducabimus).

— p. 743 (PDF) · printed p. 702 —

'...shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or with what shall we be clothed? For your Father knows that you have need of all these things.' And Paul, Acts 14, when he had said that God in past generations allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways, next added: 'And indeed he left not himself without witness, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.' The FIFTH cause was this: for God, in bestowing on the first men garments not of silk, nor purple, nor soft or delicate, but of skins, signified what kind of clothing is to be procured for an upright and honorable man: namely, such as makes not for luxury, softness, and pride, but suffices for protecting and guarding the body. The SIXTH cause: that he might declare how much better he had covered and clothed Adam with this garment of skins, than Adam had wished to veil and cover himself with the fig-leaf covering. For that garment of fig-leaves could neither be well applied to the body, nor everywhere protect its nakedness, nor sufficiently defend from external injuries and inconveniences, nor warm the body itself; nay, by pricking the flesh, it brought trouble and pain; and though it had been good and convenient, yet, because it was fragile and easily dissolved, it could not be

lasting. Whereby one may understand how weak, perishable, and of no help are the defenses and solaces which men fetch and take to themselves from earthly things. But the garment of skins, with which God clothed the first men, provided to man the plain opposite of that fig-leaf garment.

Continuation of the eight causes of the garments of skins. End of the FOURTH cause (God's providence still cares for sinners — Matt 6:31-32 'What shall we eat...'; Acts 14:17 'he left not himself without witness'). FIFTH cause: skins, not silk or purple, show what clothing befits an honest man (not luxury, but protection). SIXTH cause: to show how much better God's skin-garment was than Adam's fig-leaf covering (which pricked, did not protect or last — earthly defenses are weak). Running head '692'; true printed page 702.

The SEVENTH cause: God willed by that garment to indicate how Adam, and every sinner, ought to cover the nakedness of his soul and the foulness of sin. For the skins of dead animals figured the virtue of penitence, through which one must die to sins, and all carnal and earthly desires must be subdued and mortified by the vigor of the spirit. For penitence alone, duly performed, can be a fit covering of sins, of which one may understand what David said: 'Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.' So indeed the matter stands: the ship of innocence broken, and shipwreck made, only one plank of penitence remains to man, which, seized at once and held fast with the teeth, the sinner may escape the dreadful vengeance of God and the eternal punishments of hell. The EIGHTH cause: that Adam, thus clothed, might be a kind of figure of the second Adam, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, though he was holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens, yet willed to be clothed with the skins of dead animals — that is, to be clothed with our sins, found in habit as a man, and made in the likeness of the flesh of sin. And so, as Jacob clothed with the skins of Esau, he obtained for us the blessing from God the Father; and what God said to Adam by irony, 'Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil,' could most truly be said of him, insofar as he was man. For that man, through the personal union of the human nature with the Word, became as one of the divine persons, that is, the Son of God. Nor does that particle 'Quasi' (as)

diminish the truth of the matter, but declares it. As it is said in another place,

SEVENTH cause: the skins figure penitence (dying to sin), the only fit covering of sins (Ps 31/32:1 'Blessed are they whose sins are covered'); the famous image of penance as the 'one plank after shipwreck.' EIGHTH cause: Adam's skin-garment prefigures the Second Adam, Christ (Heb 7:26, holy yet clothed with our sins; Phil 2:7 'in habit as a man'; Rom 8:3 'likeness of the flesh of sin'); like Jacob in Esau's skins winning the blessing (Gen 27); 'Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis' (Gen 3:22) truly said of Christ, whom the hypostatic union made 'as one of the divine persons' = Son of God ('quasi' declaring, not diminishing). Marginal glosses: 'Psal. 31'; 'Poenitentia unica post naufragium tabula'; 'Hebr. 7'; 'Philip. 2'; 'Genes. 27'; 'Christus quasi unus ex divinis personis factus est.' Catchword: 'dicitur' (continues on the next page).

— p. 744 (PDF) · printed p. 703 —

...as it is said, 'We saw his glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father.' Nor does that phrase, 'Knowing good and evil,' fail to fit most aptly to this interpretation: for Isaiah had foretold of Christ, 'He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to reject the evil and choose the good.' For he was tempted in all things in like manner, without sin.

Continues the Christ-figure reading of Gen 3:22: 'quasi' declaring not diminishing (John 1:14, 'glory as of the only-begotten'); 'knowing good and evil' fits Christ (Isa 7:15, 'butter and honey, that he may know to reject evil and choose good'; Heb 4:15, tempted in all things without sin). Running head '693'; true printed page 703.

Verse 22. And he said, Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil.

New lemma: Genesis 3:22 (set off by 'VERS. 22.' and centered).

Almost all interpreters judge that it was said by God by irony, that it might be understood with how much mockery and derision the sinner is worthy. Whence in Proverbs chapter 1 God says to sinners: 'I too will laugh at your destruction, and will mock, when that which you feared shall come upon you.' Nor indeed do some wish it to be concluded from these words of God that Adam coveted and aimed at equality with God (for so he would have been seduced by a most foolish and impious error of opinion) — but that he

was seduced, Paul denies in the first Epistle to Timothy chapter 2. But this matter was diligently disputed by us above in this very book. Wherefore they think these words of God are to be referred either to refuting the folly and madness of Eve, who hoped for that equality with God for herself and her husband, or to demonstrating how lying and deceitful the serpent was in promising them that. But Augustine seems to refer those words of God chiefly to Adam: since, explaining them in book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 39, he thus says:

Almost all read 'Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis' as God's irony, mocking the sinner (Prov 1:26, 'I too will laugh at your destruction'). Not that Adam truly coveted equality with God (Paul denies Adam was seduced, 1 Tim 2:14 — discussed earlier in the book): the words refute Eve's folly (who hoped for that equality) and show the serpent's mendacity. But Augustine refers them chiefly to Adam.

'This,' he says, 'is not to be understood otherwise than that, on account of the Trinity, the plural number is taken, as was said before, Let us make man; and the Lord says of himself and his Father, We will come to him, and make a mansion with him. It was therefore turned back upon the head of the proud one, by what outcome he had coveted what was said by the serpent, You shall be as gods: Behold, he says, Adam has become as one of us. These words are of God not so much insulting this one, as deterring the others lest they be so proud — for whose sake these things were written. For what else is to be understood, than that an example of striking fear was set forth: that he not only did not become such as he wished to be, but did not even preserve that which he had been made?' Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 11.39: the plural 'one of us' is taken on account of the Trinity (as 'Let us make man'; John 14:23, 'We will come to him'); the serpent's promise 'You shall be as gods' is turned back upon the proud one's head; the words deter others from pride — an example of fear, since Adam did not become what he wished, nor kept what he had been. Marginal glosses: 'Trinitas personarum ut sit hic designata'; 'Ioan. 14.'

But that phrase, 'He has become as one of us': Hieronymus Oleaster, following rather the ravings of the Hebrews than the truest interpretations

handed down by the holy Fathers at the prompting and incitement of the Holy Spirit, thinks it must be referred not to the Trinity of the divine persons, but either to the Angels, to whom God said those words, or that God spoke with himself in the manner of great men and supreme princes, who, for the sake of expressing greater authority and majesty, speak of themselves in the plural number. But this is an absurd and ridiculous fabrication, and was sufficiently confuted by us above in book 4, when we were engaged in the treatment of those words, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness.' It was indeed incongruous, and very foreign to God's majesty, [to associate God] with the Angels, who are his ministers and servants, as if with his companions and equals...

Refutes Oleaster (Hieronymus ab Oleastro), who — following 'the ravings of the Hebrews' rather than the Fathers — referred 'one of us' not to the Trinity but to the Angels, or to a royal/majestic plural (God speaking of himself as princes do). Pererius: an absurd fabrication, already confuted in book 4 (on 'Faciamus hominem'); incongruous to make the Angels, God's servants, his 'companions and equals.' Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Oleaster.' Catchword: 'aequal' (aequalibus).

— p. 745 (PDF) · printed p. 704 —

...[to associate God, with the Angels his servants, as if] with consorts of equal condition and of the same dignity, authority, and majesty, and to say, 'Behold, Adam has become as one of us.' Therefore those words, said by irony, seem to render this sense: namely, that Adam, believing the grand promises of the serpent and his wife, after eating the forbidden fruit has become 'as one of us' — that is, He has become omnipotent, as I, God the Father, am; or omniscient and wise, as is my only-begotten Son; or altogether good, pure, and holy, as is the Holy Spirit, who proceeds equally from me and from my Son. Or he has become, by his own power and nature, immortal, depending on nothing, needing nothing, and blessed in himself, as we are — one God in the Trinity of persons.

Pererius's ironic paraphrase of 'as one of us': Adam, trusting the serpent's and Eve's promises, supposedly become omnipotent as the Father, omniscient as the Son, holy as the Spirit, immortal and self-sufficient — one God in the Trinity. Marginal gloss: 'Per Ironiam Dei verba dicta sunt.' Running head '694'; true printed page 704.

But the explanation of these words handed down by Rupert (in the third book of his Commentaries on Genesis, chapter 28), because I judged it would please the reader, I have thought fit to add in this place. Thus he says:

Pererius introduces Rupert's exposition of Gen 3:22 (Commentaria in Genesim 3.28). Marginal gloss: 'Rupertus.'

'So then, the man being now spiritually dead, and about to die bodily too, and made needy also of food and clothing alike, the same Lord God exclaims, Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil. "Behold" — which is the adverb of one pointing out — when the Lord God said it, strikes a great crash in the present to all who have ears for hearing. For what does he point out? Adam, he says, has become as one of us. In "Adam," which is interpreted "earthy," understand both the man and the woman together, because it is the common name of man and woman alike, as has already been said. What is, "He has become as one of us"? He has become as God. For the same Trinity here speaks, which also above spoke plurally to itself, saying, Let us make man to our image and likeness. The same Trinity, I say, here shows of what sort Adam has become by his own fault, as it had above proposed of what sort it wished to make him. It says therefore, As one of us: namely, of the three persons of the Trinity, one is the Father, one is the Son, one is the Holy Spirit; and these three are one. For the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another. Adam therefore, says the Lord God, has become as one of us: so that we are now not a Trinity but a Quaternity — although not as God with God, but against God, did he aim to be God. This is a most grave, and (in the manner of the Lord God) too bitter, irony. For who, or of what sort, is Adam? Adam, already dead in soul and soon to die in body too, needy of food, and necessarily covered and to be covered with clothing. But any of us, whether Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit, is neither dead, nor will die, nor needs food for hunger, nor clothing for

shame or cold. Therefore it is said, or to be said, not truly but ironically, that Adam has here become such — as if he has become one of us — and with such irony he is to be mocked. Namely, because foolishly and proudly he believed the most deceitful devil saying, And you shall be as gods: Behold how he has become "like God," or "as one of us"; how he has become "knowing good and evil." Not in the way he himself hoped, but this was done in the way the deceiver willed. He does not know good and evil in the way that God, foreseeing all things, does; but having now experienced the good, so now having experienced the evil too — in the way that not-God does. Said in this manner, as if by an affirmative statement, with the gravity of the speaker aiding, it is much more bitterly denied than if he had exclaimed with a negative expression...'

Rupert (Comm. in Gen. 3.28) at length on 'Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis': 'Ecce' a crashing adverb; 'Adam' (= 'earthy') means man and woman together; 'as one of us' = as God — the same Trinity that said 'Faciamus hominem' (three persons, 'hi tres unum sunt,' 1 John 5:7); Adam did not really become a fourth person ('Quaternitas'), aiming to be God against God. Bitter irony, since Adam is dying, needy of food and clothing, unlike the Father/Son/Spirit; he foolishly believed 'Eritis sicut dii'; he knows good and evil not as God but 'as not-God' (having now experienced both). The affirmative form, with the speaker's gravity, denies more bitterly than a negation. Marginal glosses: 'Tres Trinitatis personae'; '1. Ioan. 4'; 'Homo quam Deo dissimilis post peccatum'; 'Deo dissimilis post peccatum.' Catchword: 'masset' (exclamasset; continues on the next page).

— p. 746 (PDF) · printed p. 705 —

'...had exclaimed, saying thus: Behold, Adam has by no means, as had been promised to him, become as one of us. And indeed he had become not only by no means like God, but almost like the devil: but the merciful Lord God hastened and forestalled it, lest man, dead to God, should so remain immortal, like the devil.' Thus Rupert.

End of the Rupert quote (Comm. in Gen. 3.28): far from becoming like God, Adam had become almost like the devil; but the merciful God forestalled his remaining immortal in that state (as the devil is). Running head '695'; true printed page 705.

Verse 23. The Lord God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure, to till the earth from which he was taken.

New lemma: Genesis 3:23 (set off by 'VERS. 23.' and centered).

A DISPUTATION: HOW LONG ADAM and Eve remained in Paradise.

Major section divider: a new disputation on the length of Adam and Eve's stay in Paradise.

From these words arises a question neither easy to explain, and most worthy and most pleasant to know: for how long a time Adam and Eve remained in Paradise — whether their stay in Paradise was long, or brief, and indeed not even of one day.

States the question of the disputation: how long Adam and Eve stayed in Paradise — long, or brief, or not even a single day.

QUESTION I. Whether on the same day on which Adam was created he was cast out of paradise.

Heading of Question I of the disputation.

It is a very common opinion, and that of many, and confirmed especially by the consensus of noble and illustrious authors, that on the very same day on which Adam was created, he was brought into paradise, and there tempted and fell, and was cast out from that place; and that he did not remain in paradise one whole artificial day, that is, twelve hours, but only, as some hold, six hours; as it seemed to others, seven; as some hand down, ten. For (led by I know not what conjectures) these think that Adam was created in the first hour of that sixth artificial day outside paradise; then at the third hour placed in paradise; afterward, about the sixth hour, ate the forbidden fruit; and at the ninth hour God came into Paradise, and rebuked Adam and Eve, and mulcted each with their penalties; but at evening, and before sunset, they were cast out of paradise. That opinion seems to have pleased Irenaeus in the fifth book against Heresies, of which the approvers

too are cited as Cyril and Epiphanius. Moses Barcephas, in his book on Paradise, both approves it and confirms that many others held it — both many others, and especially Philoxenus in the oration which he wrote on the Tree of Life, and Ephraem too in the Commentaries which he wrote on Genesis,

The first (very common) opinion: on the same sixth day Adam was created, brought into paradise, tempted, fell, and was cast out — staying not a full twelve-hour day but only about six (some say seven or ten) hours. The hour-by-hour scheme: created 1st hour (outside paradise), placed in it 3rd hour, ate the fruit 6th hour, God came and rebuked/punished 9th hour, expelled by evening before sunset. Authors: Irenaeus (Adversus Haereses 5), Cyril, Epiphanius, Moses Barcephas (De Paradiso), Philoxenus (on the Tree of Life), Ephraem (Commentaries on Genesis). Marginal glosses: 'Prima opinio multorum, Adamum eodem die quo est creatus, fuisse paradiso eiectum'; 'Auctores huius sententiae.' Page footer signature 'VVV'; catchword 'necnon.'

— p. 747 (PDF) · printed p. 706 —

...and also James of Sarug in his Oration on the Passion of the Lord: to whom can be added Diodorus, Bishop of Tarsus, as he is cited in the Catena on Genesis on those words of the third chapter, 'Of every tree of Paradise we eat.' Nor are there lacking arguments to produce credence for this opinion. In the first place, it seems to be clearly signified by those words which the serpent said to Eve, 'Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise?' — that is, that you should eat of no tree of paradise. From which words one may understand that up to the time when the serpent said this, Adam and Eve had eaten nothing: for if the serpent had seen them eating before, he certainly would not have said this; but now, if they had been created long before and had lived in paradise, they could by no means have endured life so long without hunger and food.

Continuing the authors of the first opinion (Adam expelled the same day he was created): James of Sarug (Oration on the Passion), Diodorus of Tarsus (via the Catena on Genesis). First argument FOR: the serpent's 'Why do you not eat of every tree of paradise?' implies they had eaten nothing yet — had they been long there, they could not have gone so long without food. Marginal gloss: 'Argumenta pro supradicta opinione.' Running head '696'; true printed page 706.

Then, the first men could much more easily be deceived at the very beginning than if they had inhabited Paradise for a long time. For if Adam had for a longer time weighed by meditating in his mind the law commanded him by God, having become more cautious, he would by no means have fallen. But because he spent only a small space of time there, his mind — namely, in those beginnings incautious and improvident — could more easily be inclined to evil. Besides, it is credible that God, whom he was about to drive from paradise, did not wish him to enjoy so great a felicity for a long time, lest afterward, bereaved of its possession, he should be too greatly tormented, but should bear more gently, and less grievously, being stripped of such delights. For God is accustomed to temper and exercise clemently his chastisement and animadversion to the weakness of those whom, by punishing, he wishes to amend, not to destroy.

Second and third arguments FOR same-day expulsion: the first men were more easily deceived at the very start (had Adam meditated the law longer, he would have been more cautious); and God did not wish Adam to enjoy such felicity long, lest the loss torment him too much (God tempers punishment to weakness, to amend not destroy).

Finally, since Christ our Lord suffered death to take away Adam's sin, it comes about that the things which he himself suffered correspond marvelously to the amending and expiating of Adam's fault. For on the sixth day Adam was created, and on the same day too Christ suffered. At the beginning of that day, the one [Adam] was composed from mud; the other [Christ] likewise was dragged to the tribunal and defiled with the foulest spittle. At the third hour of that day Adam was brought into paradise; and Christ, at the third hour, the sentence of death received, was dragged out of the city of Jerusalem to punishment. Between the sixth and ninth hour Eve and Adam stretched out their hands to pluck the forbidden fruits, from the taste of which they took wicked pleasure; at this time Christ stretched out his hands upon the wood of the cross, and was given the most bitter gall to drink. Finally, after midday the Lord cast Adam out of paradise, but Christ introduced the thief, as he had promised him, into paradise. By these arguments, therefore, the aforesaid opinion is fortified

and propped up.

Fourth (and strongest) argument FOR: the marvelous analogy between Adam and the Second Adam, Christ — both on the sixth day (Friday): Adam formed from mud at dawn / Christ dragged to trial and spat upon; Adam into paradise at the third hour / Christ led out to Calvary at the third hour; Adam and Eve reach for the fruit between the sixth and ninth hour / Christ's hands stretched on the cross, given gall; after midday Adam cast out / Christ brings the good thief into paradise. Marginal gloss: 'Analogia inter Adamum & Christum Dominum.'

But of other Doctors the opinion is contrary: that those first men stayed in paradise more than one day. For not all the things which Moses narrates of them, before they were driven from paradise, seem to have been accomplished in the space of one day. For if Adam had not yet tasted any fruit of paradise except that forbidden one, nor had sufficiently experienced the amenity of that place, or the sweetness and delights of the things which were in it, and had departed from it, how could he have, by comparison from...

Begins the contrary (second) opinion: the first men stayed in paradise more than one day, since Moses's narrative cannot all fit in one day; and if Adam had tasted no fruit but the forbidden one and had not experienced paradise's delights, he could not [by comparison feel the loss]. Marginal gloss: 'Altera sententia, plus uno die fuisse primos homines in Paradiso.' Catchword: 'eius' (continues on the next page).

— p. 748 (PDF) · printed p. 707 —

...the felicity of that land from which he had fallen, esteem that [land] into which he was thrust down as hard, horrid, and unhappy? In this opinion seem to have been Josephus in the first book of Antiquities, Basil in the homily on Paradise, and Damascene in the second book On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 10 — inasmuch as they left it written that the serpent, beyond the other animals, was accustomed frequently to approach those first men in paradise, and to converse with them blandly and as it were familiarly; and that thence afterward the devil seized the occasion of deceiving the woman. That Augustine held the same, his words in chapter 31 of book 11 on Genesis according to the Letter declare: 'Such a fruit,' he

says, 'is to be believed to have been on that forbidden tree, of which kind of fruits they had already felt others, on other trees, to be harmless to them.'

The contrary opinion's authors (they stayed more than one day): Josephus (Antiq. 1), Basil (homily on Paradise), John Damascene (De Fide orthodoxa 2.10) — the serpent conversed familiarly with them (whence the devil's opportunity); Augustine (De Gen. ad litt. 11.31 — they had already found similar fruits on other trees harmless, implying prior experience). Marginal gloss: 'Basilius homilia 11.' Running head '697'; true printed page 707.

The same [Augustine] also, in book 20 of the City of God, chapter 26, although he judges that the first men did not stay a long time in paradise, yet not obscurely indicates that they were in that place for more than one day. More openly, blessed Gregory signifies this very thing in book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 1: 'In paradise,' he says, 'man had been accustomed to take part in the words of God, and, by purity of heart and loftiness of vision, in the spirits of the blessed Angels.' Tostatus, although on the third chapter of Genesis, question 14, he had written that Adam was in paradise not more than one day, and not even that a whole one, yet afterward, his opinion recalled, disputing on the thirteenth chapter of Genesis from question 606 to 611, felt and wrote the contrary. And these are about the things which have been disputed, contended, and produced in writing by others about this question.

More authorities for the second opinion: Augustine (De Civ. Dei 20.26 — not long, yet more than a day); Gregory (Dialogues 4.1 — man had grown 'accustomed' to God's words and the Angels' company, implying time); Tostatus, who first said one day (or less), then reversed himself (on Gen 13, qq. 606-611). Marginal glosses: 'Gregorius'; 'Tostatus mutavit sententiam de mansione Adami in paradiso.'

QUESTION II. Whether Adam was in paradise more than one day, and how much more.

Heading of Question II of the disputation.

I, that I may open up my opinion the more briefly, distinctly, and clearly, will subjoin it in this place explained in five propositions. FIRST proposition. On the same day on which Adam sinned, he was cast out of

paradise. This is manifest from the narration of Moses, narrating that after sin they blushed on account of the nakedness of the body, and to veil it made themselves loincloths, and, hearing the voice of God, struck at once with shame and fear, hid themselves in the midst of the grove of Paradise; and thence, at God's command having gone out, were rebuked by him and exterminated from paradise. Nor indeed was that place of paradise, prepared for the happy state of innocence, and assigned to man so long as he guarded rectitude and integrity of mind and body, fitting for him, now that that state was lost, corrupted for him on account of disobedience, and he made an enemy of God. What of the fact that, if he had stayed longer in paradise after the sin committed, he would doubtless have had intercourse with his wife, since they were already burning with mutual lust? But Moses, after Adam was cast out of paradise, first mentions that Eve was known by him; and the opinion of Augustine and the other Fathers...

Pererius's own view, in FIVE propositions. FIRST proposition: Adam was cast out the same day he sinned (from Moses's sequence — blushing, loincloths, hiding, rebuke, expulsion; paradise, made for innocence, was unfitting for now-corrupted man; had he stayed he would have known Eve, but Moses places that after the expulsion). Marginal glosses: 'Eodem die quo peccavit Adam Paradiso pulsus est'; 'Paradisus hominis conveniens post peccatum locus non erat.' Page footer signature 'VVV 2'; catchword 'senten.'

— p. 749 (PDF) · printed p. 708 —

...the opinion is that the first men, while they were in paradise, were virgins. SECOND proposition. They were cast out of paradise toward the end of the day on which they sinned, that is, a little before sunset. For Moses narrates that God came into paradise after midday, 'to the breeze' — that is, at the time when in maritime places a cooling wind is accustomed to be stirred up and to blow, the Sun namely inclining toward its setting.

End of the FIRST proposition (the first men were virgins in paradise). SECOND proposition: they were cast out toward the end of that same day, a little before sunset — since Moses says God came 'after midday, to the breeze' (Gen 3:8), the time of the cooling evening wind, the sun setting. Marginal gloss: 'Adam sub vesperam paradiso eiectus est.' Running head '698'; true printed page 708.

THIRD proposition. It is most likely that they were not a long time in paradise. Since it is very credible that the demon, whom envy of human felicity burned, and a most flagrant desire of driving man from that happy state and destroying him vehemently urged, could not contain himself for long from setting about to attack man, and trying to circumvent him by guile and fraud. It also could not but have happened that Adam, if he had stayed there a long time, would have eaten the fruit of the tree of life, whereby his life would have been much longer than it afterward was.

THIRD proposition: they were not a LONG time in paradise — the envious demon could not long refrain from attacking; and had Adam stayed long, he would have eaten of the tree of life and lived longer than he did. Marginal gloss: 'Non fuisse longo tempore primos homines in Paradiso.'

FOURTH proposition. The first men were not in paradise for one day only; for if so small a time had flowed between their creation and the serpent's temptation, there was no reason why the serpent should say to Eve, 'Why do you not eat of every tree of Paradise?' For it could have been answered: Because neither necessity nor desire of taking food had yet come upon them. But because the serpent had observed them accustomed to eat of the fruits of all the trees, except the one fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, from which he saw them religiously abstaining, from that he began to take occasion of so attacking Eve, who confirmed that very thing by her response when she said, 'Of the fruit of the trees which are in paradise we eat: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God has commanded us not to eat.' What is 'We eat'? but 'we are accustomed to eat'? — although it does not escape me that this can also be taken for 'we are able to eat,' or 'it is lawful for us to eat.'

FOURTH proposition: yet they were NOT there just one day — if the interval were so short, the serpent's 'Why do you not eat of every tree?' would make no sense (they could have answered they had no need or desire of food yet). Rather, the serpent had observed them habitually eating of all the trees but the one; Eve confirms this ('we eat' = 'we are accustomed to eat,' though it could mean 'we may eat'). Marginal gloss: 'Non fuisse primos homines uno tantum die in paradiso.'

Nor indeed does it seem consonant that so many and various things, which are narrated to have been done between the creation of Adam and his ejection, should be compressed into scarcely half of one day. For on the sixth day, first the terrestrial animals were created, then man was created outside paradise; then, introduced into paradise, he received the precept from God of abstaining from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. After these things the animals were led to him, on each of which, their fitness considered from each one's force and nature, names were imposed by him; and when none suitable was found among them for a helper for the fellowship of life and the generation of offspring, from the deepest sleep of Adam lulled asleep, Eve was formed from his side; besides this, both dwelt naked in paradise without any shame of their nakedness, or endurance of external inconvenience or trouble. After these things followed the conversation held back and forth between the serpent and Eve, namely (as is credible) much longer than is mentioned by Moses. Eve, moreover, deceived by the serpent's promises, went to the forbidden tree, and its beauty curiously beheld and considered, plucked the fruit, ate, went on to her husband, and by her blandishments enticed him...

FOURTH proposition (cont.): the many events between Adam's creation and expulsion cannot be crammed into half a day — the animals created and man outside paradise, the precept given, the animals led up and named, Eve formed from Adam's sleep, both dwelling naked without shame, the long serpent-Eve conversation (surely longer than Moses records), the plucking and eating. Catchword: 'lexit' (pellexit; continues on the next page).

— p. 750 (PDF) · printed p. 709 —

...enticed him to eat; which done, since they were forthwith ashamed of their nakedness, to cover it they made themselves loincloths; and hearing the voice of God coming to them, they hid themselves in the midst of Paradise, a place shaded by the densest trees: whence, at God's command going out, each separately was interrogated by him, rebuked, punished, and at last cast out of Paradise. So great a mass of events, therefore, the mind refuses to believe could conveniently be included in half of one day. This,

moreover, is made more probable by the authorities of the Doctors who so judge, brought forward a little above for the confirmation of the second opinion.

End of the FOURTH proposition: the whole mass of events (the eating, shame, loincloths, hiding, God's coming, the separate interrogations, rebukes, punishments, expulsion) cannot fit in half a day — confirmed by the Doctors of the second opinion cited above. Running head '699'; true printed page 709.

FIFTH proposition. How long they were in Paradise cannot be precisely and definitely established: for neither can it be gathered from divine Scripture, nor has it been handed down as certain by approved authors, nor is it known by ancient and sure tradition of our ancestors, nor persuaded by likely conjectures. Some have handed down that they were in Paradise as many years as the years Christ the Lord spent a mortal and afflicted life on earth: but that is in no way probable. Others, for forty days: for so many days Christ fasted in the wilderness, that by this remedy of fasting he might heal the sin of their intemperance. But neither has this any appearance of probability. Tostatus, in the aforesaid place, thinks they were cast out of Paradise on the day after they were created, which indeed was the sabbath day: which certainly does not seem to agree with the history of Moses. For since God sanctified and blessed that sabbath day, resting from all his work which he had done, it did not seem fitting on that day to exercise so severe a judgment of divine vengeance.

FIFTH proposition: how long they stayed cannot be precisely determined (not from Scripture, authors, tradition, or conjecture). Rejected guesses: as many years as Christ's earthly life (improbable); forty days (= Christ's fast, to heal their intemperance — no probability); Tostatus's 'day after creation = the sabbath' (rejected — God blessed and rested on the sabbath, so exercising severe judgment then is unfitting). Marginal glosses: 'Quandiu primi homines commorati sint in Paradiso'; 'Tostati sententia reiicitur.'

If it be permitted me to divine, I will say that they were in Paradise for eight days, and that on the eighth day from when they had been created — which day was the sixth day (Friday) of the week — they were cast out of Paradise. For the space of eight days was sufficient for experiencing a little

of the felicity of that state; and it has a fitness and consonance with what happened concerning the second Adam, that is, Christ the Lord: inasmuch as he is believed by many to have been conceived in the womb of the most blessed Virgin on a Friday, and on the same day died on the cross; whereby it will be permitted truly to interpret what has been handed down by the Fathers — that on the same day Adam was created and sinned and was cast out of Paradise — on the same day, I say, not in number, but on the same day of the week. O how brief, and scarcely as it were tasted with the tips of the lips, was the felicity of the first men on earth; and so the more bitter to them was the loss of so blessed a state, when they estimated how great goods, and how quickly, by their own fault they had lost — which they themselves could have enjoyed perpetually, unless they had been plainly stupid and foolish, with no labor of their own, and with the utmost tranquility and pleasantness of body and mind.

Pererius's own conjecture ('if I may divine'): they were in Paradise eight days, cast out on the eighth day from creation — a Friday (feria sexta). This fits the Second Adam, Christ (believed by many conceived and crucified on a Friday); so the Fathers' 'same day' (Adam created, sinned, expelled) = the same day of the week, not the same numerical day. A lament on the brevity of the first felicity and the bitterness of its loss. Marginal gloss: 'Auctoris coniectatio.'

Rupert, in chapter 30 of the third book of his Commentaries on Genesis, treating those words, 'Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live forever,' hands down two things not very probable, and certainly by no means approved by me. For he says that the tree of life was by God...

Introduces Rupert (Commentaria in Genesim 3.30) on the second half of Gen 3:22 ('Nunc ergo ne forte mittat manum suam... et vivat in aeternum'): Rupert hands down two improbable claims (which Pererius rejects), the first being that the tree of life was [unknown] to Adam by God('s design). Marginal gloss: 'Secundum Rupertum arborem vitae fuisse in Paradiso ignotam Adae.' Page footer signature 'VVV 3'; catchword 'a Deo' (continues on the next page).

— p. 751 (PDF) · printed p. 710 —

...[the tree of life] created by God in Paradise, that Adam was ignorant of it, nay even that the devil was unaware: for if he had known the power of that tree, as he persuaded them to eat the forbidden fruit of the knowledge of good and evil in order to make them wretched, so he would have persuaded them to eat the fruit of life, in order to make them eternally wretched, and wretchedly eternal. He thinks also that the tree of life had the power, even by tasting its fruit once, of perpetuating man's life. The words of Rupert are thus: 'Now this must be noted, that he did not say only, Lest he put forth his hand, but, Lest perhaps, he says, he put forth his hand. Plainly by this it is clear that that tree of life was not such as is some herb, a medicament of health. For a medicinal herb, taken perchance, does not confer perpetual health, but, provided by care, is kept against an infirmity perhaps about to return. But of this tree he says, Lest perhaps he eat, and live forever. Therefore by no means (as some think) was the tree necessarily to be frequented, as a transitory medicament for perpetuating life, but, this being taken once, the body would live forever. Nonetheless, by this too it is understood that Adam hitherto did not know that tree to be the tree of life, when it is said, Lest perhaps. For that man is said perchance to have done or found something, who did not have in his consciousness that this very thing which follows was in the place or in the thing: as one who turns the earth wishing to sow, intending nothing else, and finds a treasure. But God said, Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, though certain that he would not put it forth knowingly, although as if doubting or solicitous, like a man, lest by chance it should come to pass. Therefore neither did Adam know, nor did the serpent-devil himself know, that the Lord God had also planted the tree of life in the midst of Paradise. For if even he had known, he would never have so halved the counsel of his malignity: but as he rashly persuaded them to that tree, to make them wretched, so he would have persuaded them to snatch this too, to make them eternally wretched, and wretchedly eternal.'

Rupert's first improbable claim (which Pererius rejects): the tree of life was unknown both to Adam AND to the devil (else the devil would have urged them to eat of it too, to make them eternally wretched). The 'Ne forte' ('lest perhaps') of Gen 3:22 shows Adam did not know it was the tree of life — like one who finds a treasure while digging to sow. Continuation of Rupert, Comm. in Gen. 3.30. Running head '700'; true printed page 710.

'Nor indeed (Rupert adds) should it happen to anyone as a wonder, or seem incredible, that an inanimate and insensible tree could bring forth the fruit of eternal vivacity. For do not, even in this exile of our poverty, many things spring up, which by a natural power are proved to change the nature of our mortality into a somewhat better state? Is it not especially concerning those things which are rooted in the earth that medicine is engaged, which is not except from God? To say nothing of the rest, was not, by the powerful help of Mandrakes, the sterile womb of Rachel so improved that she conceived and bore, first Joseph and secondly Benjamin, though she bore him with peril of death? But even today physicians, for the commendation of their art, contend that it was not fabulous but true, what is read in the books of the Gentiles, that Aesculapius by the medicines of herbs raised the dead, and on this account was struck by lightning — namely, lest men should grow accustomed to an art by which they might escape the decree of death useful to themselves. Why therefore should it seem incredible to anyone that there could have been a material tree of life, which by its power would defend the man eating it from bodily death, until, having served his time after obedience, he might more fully enjoy, with the blessed Angels, in delight, the vision of the divine Majesty?' Thus Rupert.

Rupert's second claim (also rejected by Pererius): it is not incredible that a material tree could give eternal life, since many earthly things (medicinal herbs, from God) alter our mortal nature — e.g. mandrakes healing Rachel's sterile womb (Gen 30, bearing Joseph and Benjamin), and Aesculapius raising the dead by herbs (struck by lightning lest men escape death). So a tree could defend the eater from bodily death until, after his term of obedience, he enjoyed the beatific vision with the Angels. End of the Rupert quote. Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 30'; 'Aesculapius dicitur poena medicinae mortuum revocasse ad vitam.' Catchword: 'Eiectique' (leads to the Gen 3:24 lemma on the next page).

— p. 752 (PDF) · printed p. 711 —

Verse 24. And he cast out Adam, and placed before the Paradise of pleasure the Cherubim, and a flaming sword, turning every way, to guard the way of the tree of life.

New lemma: Genesis 3:24 (set off by 'VERS. 24.' and centered). Running head '701'; true printed page 711.

These words have a most obscure sense, and are most difficult to explain: it must therefore be striven and effected that we bring some light to this passage. And this first it is fitting to know: that those words, 'And he placed before Paradise,' the Seventy Interpreters in their translation of this passage joined with what preceded, 'And he cast out Adam,' wishing them to be understood of Adam — whom, although God had cast out of Paradise, he yet willed to dwell over against Paradise: namely, that by the frequent sight of Paradise, and by the continual recollection of the felicity he had lost, he might be more vehemently pained in the inmost senses of his mind, and pursue with greater hatred the devil, who had been to him the author of so many evils, and pursue his own sin as the cause of so great unhappiness; and, repenting from his heart of the crime committed, might earn pardon from God. And the Fathers, following this reading of the Seventy Interpreters, and interpreting it, magnify and exaggerate this providence of God, and proclaim it as a great benefit bestowed on man. But the reading of the Seventy Interpreters, if you render it word for word into Latin, has thus in this place: 'And he cast out Adam, and placed him over against the Paradise of pleasure, and set the Cherubim, and a flaming turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life.' But the Hebrew scripture [■■■■■ ■■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■■■■■ ■■■■ ■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■■■], likewise the Chaldaic Paraphrase, and our Latin version, join that phrase, 'And he placed before Paradise,' with the Cherubim and the flaming turning sword: which being placed before Paradise by God, the approach for man to the tree of life is altogether shut off.

Opening the exposition of Gen 3:24: the LXX joined 'And he placed before Paradise' with 'he cast out Adam' — making God settle Adam OVER AGAINST paradise (so that the sight and memory of lost felicity would pain him, deepen his hatred of the devil, and move him to penitence and pardon); the Fathers following the LXX magnify this providence. But the Hebrew, the Chaldaic Paraphrase, and the Vulgate join the phrase with the Cherubim and flaming sword, which bar man's access to the tree of life. HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification (the whole second half of Gen 3:24, given in the right margin with transliteration): ■■■■■ ■■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■■■■ ■■■■ ■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■■ *(vayyashken mikkedem legan eden eth ha-kerubim ve-eth lahat ha-cherev ha-mmithappecheth lishmor eth derech ets ha-chaim, 'and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden the Cherubim, and the flame of the turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life'), transliterated in the margin 'vaieschen mikkedem legan eden... hachereb hammittaphecet lischmor... ets hacchaim.' Marginal glosses: 'Lectio huius loci secundum Septuaginta Interpretes'; 'Scriptura Hebraica, si quis eam desiderat, talis est' + the Hebrew verse.*

A DISPUTATION ON THE CHERUBIM and the turning sword placed before the entrance of Paradise.

Major section divider: a new disputation on the meaning of the Cherubim and the flaming turning sword (Gen 3:24).

But what Moses signified and wished to be understood by 'Cherubim,' and what likewise by 'a flaming turning sword' — to interpret and assert this is the work, this is the labor. I shall therefore first set forth and weigh the opinions of others; then I shall open my own opinion too to the reader.

Sets up the disputation: the crux is what Moses meant by the Cherubim and the flaming turning sword. Pererius will review others' views first, then give his own. (Echoes Virgil, Aeneid 6.129, 'hoc opus, hic labor est.')

QUESTION I. Whether what is said of the Cherubim, and of the flaming and turning sword, is to be taken historically, or only figuratively and mystically.

Heading of Question I of the disputation. Catchword 'QUIDAM' (the answer begins on the next page).

— p. 753 (PDF) · printed p. 712 —

Some think that this speech of Moses is not historical, nor to be interpreted as the words properly signify, but is figurative and metaphorical; and that

by it is signified that God fortified the approach of paradise with a most firm garrison, lest anyone could enter into that place — that is, that he took away from man all faculty and hope of leading a happy and immortal life on earth.

The first view answering Question I: the passage is only figurative/metaphorical — signifying that God cut off man's every faculty and hope of an immortal life on earth. Marginal gloss: 'Mystica huius loci interpretatio.' Running head '702'; true printed page 712.

But it does not please me to contract to one allegorical interpretation only those things which in this place, similarly to all the preceding, are narrated historically by Moses. For if it helped to follow allegorical commentaries, we could say, as has been handed down by some who took care to pursue such things, that Moses by these words signified the great impediments by which men after sin are held back from entering the heavenly paradise. Of which impediments there is a twofold kind: One is invisible, proceeding from the demons themselves here signified by the Cherubim. For as Paul says, 'Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against the spiritual wickednesses in the high places.' The other is visible, both of bodily goods and of evils, by which men, either allured, or deterred and broken, are drawn back from the attainment of heavenly goods: which was shadowed forth by Moses through the flaming and turning sword. Although this too could be insinuated by that thing — that the approach to heaven cannot lie open to us without perpetual struggle, for 'the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent bear it away'; and that what Job said is true, that 'the life of man on earth is a warfare.'

Pererius: one should not reduce to allegory alone what Moses narrates historically. Yet he grants the allegories that COULD be made: the impediments to the heavenly paradise are twofold — invisible (the demons signified by the Cherubim; Eph 6:12 'our wrestling is not against flesh and blood') and visible (bodily goods and evils, signified by the flaming sword); heaven requires perpetual struggle (Matt 11:12 'the kingdom of heaven suffers violence'; Job 7:1 'the life of man is a warfare'). Marginal glosses: 'Impedimentorum ad aeternam vitam genus duplex'; 'Ephes. ulti.'; 'Matth. 11.'; 'Iob. 7.'

This besides can be added to such mystologies: that three kinds of things are denoted which are a great impediment to men for attaining eternal life. For the word 'Cherubim' signifies fullness of knowledge; but the curious study of knowledge, and the pride of a mind refusing to be humbly subjected to discipline and to the Christian faith, prohibits many from entering heaven. But by the flaming sword are signified all the desires and vices which arise from the sensitive appetite; and this is twofold — the Concupiscible, signified by the flame, and the Irascible, by the sword. But the turning of that sword denotes the instability and inconstancy of human affairs, and of men themselves, most of whom, if ever they begin to do well, yet soon, wearied, fail, and do not persevere in good pursuits, purposes, and undertakings. These things, therefore, and others like them, could be disputed by us allegorically upon these words of Moses. Which, as acutely, learnedly, and piously thought out and handed down, I do not deny; so I contend that another, historical and literal sense of Moses's meaning is to be sought.

A further allegory: three impediments to eternal life — Cherubim ('fullness of knowledge') = curiosity and intellectual pride refusing the faith; the flaming sword = the sensitive appetite's desires and vices (concupiscible = flame, irascible = sword); the sword's turning = the inconstancy of men who begin well but fail to persevere. Pererius grants these allegories are pious but insists on seeking the literal, historical sense. Marginal gloss: 'Tria rerum genera, quae magno sunt hominibus ad consequendam vitam beatam impedimento.' Catchword: 'QUAE' (QUAESTIO II, on the next page).

— p. 754 (PDF) · printed p. 713 —

QUESTION II. Whether by those words is signified the situation of paradise under the equator and the torrid zone.

Heading of Question II of the disputation. Running head '703'; true printed page 713.

Some think that Moses by these words wished to signify the situation of Paradise, which was under the Equator: for before it was the torrid zone, which is here described by Moses in metaphorical words. For the flaming sword insinuates the most burning heat of the torrid zone, striking, like a sword, those approaching it; which is therefore called 'turning,' to denote

the perpetual revolution of the Sun over the torrid zone, whence the magnitude of that heat is produced. That sword the Cherubim held, that is, the Angels, since the motion of the heavens and of corporeal nature (on Augustine's authority) is arranged and effected by God through the Angels. Therefore it is signified by this speech of Moses, that paradise, on account of the torrid zone by which it is surrounded, is inaccessible to mortals. Blessed Thomas follows this opinion in the Secunda Secundae, question 165, last article; in which [opinion], many centuries before blessed Thomas, was also Tertullian, who — [and] would not, in my judgment, say it rashly. For in the Apologeticum Tertullian affirms that the place of paradise is segregated from the common knowledge of our world as if by a certain wall of the fiery zone. But this opinion, and interpretation of Moses's words, is refuted by this argument: It is clear from the narration of Moses that, after the sin of the first men and their ejection from paradise, God placed at the entrance of paradise the Cherubim and the flaming turning sword; but the situation of the torrid zone, and the heat which the Sun produces in it, was not made by God on account of man's sin, but such as it is now, such it was from the beginning of the world — inasmuch as it necessarily follows the natural construction and establishment of the world itself, and the plan of the celestial motions.

Answering Question II: some hold that Moses signifies paradise's location under the equator, girdled by the torrid zone — the flaming sword = the zone's burning heat, 'versatilis' = the sun's perpetual revolution over it, the Cherubim/Angels 'holding' it because the heavens' motion is arranged by God through Angels (per Augustine); so paradise is inaccessible. Held by Tertullian (Apologeticum — paradise walled off by the fiery zone) and Aquinas (ST 2a2ae q.165, last art.). Refuted: Moses says the Cherubim and sword were placed AFTER the sin, but the torrid zone's heat was not made because of sin — it existed from the world's beginning, following the natural order of the celestial motions. Marginal glosses: 'Opinio Tertulliani & S. Thomae de Cherubim & flammeo gladio'; 'Caelorum motus a Deo per angelos disponitur'; 'S. Thomas'; 'Tertullianus refellitur.'

QUESTION III. Whether by those words is signified a fire surrounding Paradise like a wall.

Heading of Question III of the disputation.

Nicholas of Lyra, who thought that Paradise was placed on the highest mountain of the earth, judges in this place that, from that highest mountain of paradise, at God's command, on every side a very great force and abundance of fire erupted, and, in the manner of a crown or wall, the whole entrance of paradise was enclosed by God. This is not approved by Tostatus, because if such a force of fire were perpetually belched forth from that mountain, the interior of that mountain would necessarily be sulphurous, and that land utterly burned up — which...

Answering Question III: Nicholas of Lyra (who placed Paradise on the earth's highest mountain) held that fire erupted from that mountain at God's command, enclosing paradise's entrance like a crown or wall. Rejected by Tostatus: such perpetual fire would make the mountain's interior sulphurous and the land utterly burnt (an absurdity). Marginal gloss: 'Opinio Lyrae, Tostati, & Magistri Historiae scholasticae.' Page footer signature 'XXX'; catchword 'locum' (continues on the next page).

— p. 755 (PDF) · printed p. 714 —

...would have made the place of paradise unfruitful, sterile, and unpleasant. He himself thinks (which is also the opinion of the Master of the Scholastic History) that that fiery sword was nothing else than a certain huge force and abundance of fire — not flashing forth from the earth of paradise, but either brought thither from elsewhere, or there recently created by God — which was like a wall around paradise, or was placed like a bulwark before the entrance of paradise: which two impediments Epiphanius thinks lasted only so long as Adam lived. But that fire was called a 'turning sword,' or a 'sword cutting on both sides,' to indicate the force and efficacy of the most penetrating fire, whose nature is engaged in perpetual motion and agitation, and, ending in a point like a sword, vibrates flames as it were. But the explanation of these interpreters is both mutilated, because they make no word about the Cherubim, and is improper and not literal: inasmuch as, twisting the words of Moses from their proper signification elsewhere, it does not express the historical sense.

Conclusion of Question III: Peter Comestor (Master of the Historia Scholastica), following Lyra, held the fiery sword to be a huge fire (brought or newly created by God) forming a wall/bulwark before

paradise; Epiphanius: these two impediments lasted only as long as Adam lived; called a 'turning'/'two-edged' sword for its penetrating force in perpetual motion. Pererius rejects it as 'mutilated' (it says nothing of the Cherubim) and non-literal. Running head '704'; true printed page 714.

QUESTION IV. Whether by those words was signified the fire of purgatory.

Heading of Question IV of the disputation.

Saint Ambrose, in explaining that verse of Psalm 118, 'Reward your servant, that I may live, and keep your words,' interprets this fire, placed at the entrance of paradise, as the fire of purgatory: in which the souls of the just, who in this life have not fully wiped away the stains of sins, or for the sins forgiven them have not fully satisfied God, are wholly purified, and, every debt paid, are expiated. For nothing defiled, as it is written in the Apocalypse, can enter into that heavenly city. But Ambrose thinks that a twofold baptism was constituted by God for purging the sins of men: one in this life, which is done by the water of baptism, by which sins are washed away; the other after this life, by which sins are entirely burned away, so that the just can truly say to God, 'We have passed through fire and water, and you have led us out into refreshment.' The words of Ambrose are thus: 'There is also a baptism in the vestibule of paradise, which before was not: but after the sinner was excluded, there began to be the fiery sword which God placed, which before was not, when sin was not. Fault began, and baptism began, by which those might be purified who desired to return into paradise, that returning they might say, We have passed through fire and water. Here through water, there through fire. Through water, that sins may be washed; through fire, that they may be burned. But, which is more grave, we sustain both fire here and there. Who is he who baptizes in this fire? Not a presbyter, not a Bishop, not John who says, I baptize you unto penance; not an Angel, not an Archangel, not Dominations, not

Powers, but he of whom John says, He who comes after me is stronger than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear: he will baptize you in the Holy Spirit and fire. He has his fan in his hand, and will thoroughly cleanse his floor, and will gather the wheat into his barn, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire. Not of this baptism...'

Answering Question IV: Ambrose (on Ps 118[119], 'Retribue servo tuo') interprets the fire at paradise's entrance as purgatory, where the imperfectly purified just are cleansed (nothing defiled enters the heavenly city, Rev 21:27). A twofold baptism: water in this life, fire after (Ps 65/66:12, 'Transivimus per ignem et aquam'). The Ambrose quote begins: the fiery sword = a baptism begun with sin — both water and fire; who baptizes in this fire? — Christ (Matt 3:11-12, 'ipse vos baptizabit in Spiritu sancto et igni'). Marginal glosses: 'Ambrosii, & Ruperti de Igne purgatorio valde observanda sententia'; 'Apocal. 21.'; 'Psal. 65.'; 'Duplex ex Ambrosio baptismus'; 'Matth. 3.'; 'Ibidem.' Catchword: 'baptisma' (baptismate; continues on the next page).

— p. 756 (PDF) · printed p. 715 —

'...is that baptism which is done by the priests of the Church spoken, the Lord himself testifies, since after the consummation of the age, the Angels being sent to separate the good and the evil, this will be the baptism, when through the furnace of fire iniquity shall be burned away, that in the kingdom of God the just may shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father; and if anyone, like Peter or John, is baptized by this fire. There will come a great Baptist (for so I name him, as Gabriel named him, saying, He shall be great): he will see many standing before the vestibule of paradise, he will move the turning sword, he will say to those on the right who have no grave sins, Enter, you who presume, who fear not the fire. For I had foretold to you, Behold, I come as fire. And through Ezekiel I had said, Behold, I will set out to Jerusalem, and I will breathe upon you in the fire of my wrath, that you may melt like lead and iron. Let therefore the consuming fire come, let it burn out in us the lead of iniquity, the iron of sin, and make us pure gold. Let it burn my reins and my heart, that I may think good things, that I may desire the things of chastity. But because he who is purged here has need to be purified there again, let

it purify us there too, when the Lord shall say, Enter into my rest: that each of us, singed by that flaming sword, not burned up, having entered into that pleasantness of paradise, may give thanks to his Lord, saying, You have led us into refreshment. He therefore who has passed through the fire, enters into rest. He passes from material and worldly things to those incorruptible and perpetual. This is one fire, by which are burned away sins not voluntary but fortuitous, which the Lord Jesus prepared for his little servants, that he might cleanse them from that sojourn by which one is mingled with the dead; and that other fire is another, which he assigned to the devil and his angels, of which he says, Go into eternal fire: by which that rich man burned, who begged for himself a drop of moisture from Lazarus's finger. But Lazarus, reclining in Abraham's bosom, enjoyed eternal life, which the Prophet promises himself, saying, I shall live and keep your words.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose (continued): this purgatorial fire is not the sacramental baptism done by priests (that is the final separation of good and evil, Matt 13:41-43); the coming great 'Baptist' who moves the turning sword (Isa 66:15, 'Ecce venio sicut ignis'; Ezek 22:19-22, melting lead and iron; making us pure gold; singed but not burned, we enter and say Ps 66:12, 'Induxisti nos in refrigerium'). Two fires after this life: the purgatorial (for fortuitous, not voluntary, sins) and the eternal (assigned to the devil, Matt 25:41 — the rich man, Luke 16:24; vs. Lazarus in Abraham's bosom). End of the Ambrose quote. Marginal glosses: 'Matth. 13.'; 'Ibidem'; 'Luca 1.'; 'Isaia 66.'; 'Ezech. 21.'; 'Psalm. 65.'; 'Duplex ignis post hanc vitam, infernus & purgatorius. Matth. 25.'; 'Luca 16.' Running head '705'; true printed page 715.

Rupert writes similar things in the third book of his Commentaries on Genesis, chapters 32 and 33, affirming that the fire was placed before paradise for this reason: that those who depart from this life not wholly pure and immaculate, purified by that examining fire, may be admitted into the blessed fatherland; so that they can most truly say what is in Psalm 65, 'You have proved us, O God, you have tried us by fire as silver is tried.' And because by the ministry of Angels the souls of the just are led into heaven, and, according to each one's merits, some sooner, some later, are transferred by the Angels from the

purgatorial fire into eternal rest: therefore the Cherubim too are said to have been before paradise. To these Rupert adds that that fire, which is placed at the entrance of paradise, is inaccessible to all mortals: for the blast of it, vehemently burning far and wide, is felt beforehand as intolerable, before anyone could approach nearer to it; wherefore where the place of paradise is, can be known to no one — of which thing let this too be an argument, that those who advanced against the course of the Nile, inquiring into its sources and origin, the farther they proceeded, the more fervent regions and the hotter waters of the Nile they experienced. Which they indeed referred to the torrid zone through which the Nile passes; but it is more true and more credible to say that this happens on account of...

Rupert (Comm. in Gen. 3.32-33) similarly interprets the fire before paradise as the examining/purgatorial fire (Ps 65/66:10, 'igne nos examinasti sicut examinatur argentum'); the souls of the just are led to heaven by Angels, sooner or later per their merits — hence the 'Cherubim' before paradise. He adds that this fire is inaccessible to all mortals (its scorching blast felt intolerable before one can approach), so paradise's location is unknowable — argued from Nile explorers, who found ever hotter regions and warmer waters the farther upstream they went (which they ascribed to the torrid zone, but more truly...). Marginal gloss: 'Ruperti de eodem igne sententia.' Page footer signature 'XXX 2'; catchword 'pro' (propter; continues on the next page).

— p. 757 (PDF) · printed p. 716 —

...on account of the fire which God placed before the doors of Paradise: since divine Scripture hands down that from Paradise itself the Nile flows forth. But, to satisfy curious readers desiring to read and know new and admirable opinions of grave authors expressed and handed down in their own words, I shall here add Rupert's entire discourse and disputation on this matter. In this manner, then, he says:

Pererius: paradise's location is unknown because of the fire — though Scripture holds that the Nile flows from Paradise. He now transcribes Rupert's whole discourse on the flaming sword and Cherubim for curious readers. Running head '706'; true printed page 716.

'And here a great wrath does not leave off fellowship with the mercy necessary to us. For it is of the wrath of the just God, that he placed a flaming sword before Paradise; but of mercy, that he willed that sword to be turning. The turning sword is the sentence of the divine judgment, which is such that it can turn — that is, does not always with the same severity close the approach of Paradise to men. But it is said to be flaming, because in truth the judgment of the Lord, the judgment is a flame of fire, according to the Apostle, giving vengeance in a flame of fire to those who have not known God. Moreover, Cherubim is the name of Angelic fortitudes. That these were placed at Paradise to guard the approach of the tree of life, when we read, we wonder — although we hold and confess by public faith that we are to pass through fire, and shall not enter Paradise except examined by the ministry of Angels. It is very terrible, what is conceived from this passage compared with other passages of the Scriptures — for example, with that which the Apostle says: If anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each shall be manifest. For the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire. And the fire shall try the work of each, of what sort it is. If anyone's work remains which he has built upon, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work burns, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. For what do we gather from such sayings, except that for this the flaming and turning sword was placed before Paradise, that whoever are thereafter to be admitted may pass thither through the examining fire? As if he said: Because the conceptions of Eve were to be multiplied, and there would be a confused or mingled multitude of good and evil, and the Lord God wished to admit many only whom he knew by name, and thus shaken out, so that they can say, Because you have proved us, O God, you have tried us by fire as silver is tried, etc.: therefore he placed before Paradise the Cherubim, and the flaming and turning sword. And rightly the Angels who preside over such things are called

Cherubim, that is, fullness of knowledge. For they have full knowledge of judging, for they know what is written in the book of each of us — that is, they have well committed to memory what good or evil each of us has done. Daily they read singly, and at the last they shall universally recite those books, of which in Daniel it is written, The judgment sat, and the books were opened. Rightly, therefore, the Cherubim are so called not so much for their praise, as for our terror, because our hidden things are to be published to them.'

Rupert's discourse (Comm. in Gen.): the flaming sword = God's wrath, its 'turning' = his mercy (not always closing the way with equal severity); 'flaming' because the Lord's judgment is a flame of fire (2 Thess 1:8). Cherubim = Angelic fortitudes/powers; all pass through the examining fire (1 Cor 3:12-15, 'saved yet so as by fire') — because Eve's offspring would be a mingled multitude, God admits only those he knows by name, tried like silver (Ps 66:10). The Angels who preside are 'Cherubim' = fullness of knowledge (they know each one's 'book,' Dan 7:10, 'the judgment sat and the books were opened'); named for our terror. Marginal glosses: 'Ruperti verba'; '2. Thess. 1.'; '1. Corint. 13.' (properly 1 Cor 3); 'Daniel. 7.'

'But it must be known that that fire is most troublesome both to souls and to bodies, and inaccessible to all mortals. But to the dead — that is, to the souls of the dead faithful — it is surmountable from the time of the Lord's passion, and to their bodies too it will be passable in the resurrection. But before that same passion of our Lord, it was passable to none at all of the sons of Adam, until, poured out from the body...'

Rupert (continued): that fire is most troublesome to souls and bodies, inaccessible to all mortals; but surmountable to the faithful dead from the time of Christ's passion (and to their bodies in the resurrection). Before the passion it was passable to no son of Adam, until [Christ's blood was poured out]. Marginal gloss: 'Ignis purgationis fidelibus exuperabilis est.' Catchword: 'corpore' (continues on the next page).

— p. 758 (PDF) · printed p. 717 —

'...his blood, poured out from the body, with water, surmounted that fire: not that they extinguished the substance of that same fire, but because it conferred this power on those who had awaited him, that

that fire could not harm them; there immediately followed that venerable thief, whom, confessing on the cross, the faith of the blood of Christ immediately fortified against that fire, lest it should oppose him. And we all follow, having the foundation which is Christ — some gold or silver, some precious stones, some wood, hay, stubble; that is, bearing sins each of diverse weights or measures. And as some of these are consumed by fire more easily or more difficultly than others, so each of us, according to the diversity of sins, some sooner, some later, being purged, shall enter the felicity of Paradise. This fire is called a sword not only in this place, but in most passages of Scripture — as there, For in the fire of the Lord shall all the earth be devoured, and in his sword all flesh. Therefore, when this divine Writer says, And he placed before Paradise the Cherubim, and a flaming and turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life, he touched the matter more briefly and more secretly — namely, the judgment of fire through which we are to pass — than is found in most passages of Scripture; but to those diligently gazing he announced more terribly the difficulty of the return, by which the sons of blessing, begotten in this exile, are recalled thither by the grace of God.'

Rupert (continued): Christ's blood (with water) surmounted the fire, giving those who awaited him immunity; the good thief followed at once, fortified by faith in Christ's blood. We all follow, bearing sins of diverse weights (gold/silver vs. wood/hay/stubble, 1 Cor 3), purged sooner or later before entering paradise. This fire is called a 'sword' in Scripture (Zeph 1:18/Isa 66:16, 'in his sword all flesh'). Moses touched the fire-judgment briefly, but announced terribly the difficulty of the return. Marginal glosses: 'Luc. 3'; 'Sopho. 3.' Running head '707'; true printed page 717.

'And in the following chapter: Less, he says, than the things which have been said, seems to sound that which is placed at the end, To guard the way of the tree of life: for this same thing, it is agreed, could have been said, if each was not to be kept from that tree of life except so long as he lived in this body, for the causes already said above: for this the flaming sword would surely suffice, nor would it be necessary that the Cherubim too should be placed before Paradise. For that fire

is inaccessible to all the living, and beforehand the blast of it is intolerable, before it can be at all known where Paradise is. For so it has been found out by men who, following up the Nile to find its head, were able to drink it warm, and could not reach its origin. For so the Roman author says: The ruddy zone of the pole, scorched, prevented them from seeing the warm Nile. It does not pertain to us here what such men say about the five zones of heaven, because they have no foundation from the Scriptures of truth, since they are the opinions or conjectures of worldly men; but this, with their confession, we prove certain: that on account of the intolerable vapor of fire, no mortal could ever reach the source of the river Nile, whose origin, it is agreed according to this Scripture, flows from Paradise. Therefore, even if the Cherubim were not placed before Paradise, the flaming sword would have sufficed to drive away men.'

Rupert (continued): the closing 'to guard the way of the tree of life' would need only the flaming sword (to bar the tree while man lives in the body); but the Cherubim too are placed because the fire is inaccessible to all the living and its blast intolerable, so paradise's location is unknowable — proved by the Nile explorers who could drink it warm but never reach its source (Lucan, Pharsalia 10, 'Illos rubicunda perusti / Zona poli tenuit Nilum videre calentem'); no mortal reached the Nile's source, which Scripture holds flows from Paradise. Marginal gloss: 'Lucan. li. 10.'

'But if it be objected to these things, that Enoch and Elijah, still living, were translated into Paradise: we say that the Lord God could indeed have translated them unharmed through the fire already mentioned — inasmuch as, in translating Elijah, he raised him by a fiery chariot. But Scripture nowhere gives to understand that he bore them into Paradise itself, where they might eat of the tree of life and live forever; but they were so taken up, that they were led into a certain secret region of the earth, where they might live in great quiet of flesh and spirit, until at the end of the world they return, and pay the debt of death.'

Rupert (conclusion): to the objection that Enoch and Elijah, still living, were translated into Paradise — God could have carried them unharmed through the fire (as Elijah by a fiery chariot), but Scripture

nowhere says into Paradise itself to eat of the tree of life; rather into a secret earthly region, in great quiet, until they return at the end of the world to pay the debt of death. Marginal gloss: 'Secundum Rupertum neque Henoch, neque Elias translati sunt in Paradisum ex quo eiectus est Adam.' Page footer signature 'XXX 3'; catchword 'IGI' (Igitur; continues on the next page).

— p. 759 (PDF) · printed p. 718 —

'Therefore not only the repulse of men — which alone the letter seems to sound by saying, To guard the way of the tree of life — but also judgments to be made, with rational discretion, about those to be admitted and not admitted, does the very name of "guard" signify, on account of which not only the flaming sword, but also the Cherubim, is said to keep watch. Some of the Doctors so distinguish, that they understand the flaming sword (that is, the fiery wall around Paradise) to have been placed on account of men, but the guard of Angels on account of the malignant spirits. To these we assent only so far as not to deny that a corporeal penal fire exists also for the malignant spirits. For the eternal fire, according to the Gospel truth, is prepared for the devil and his Angels. But the fire does not harm the holy Angels, inasmuch as justice made them impassible; nor the just souls, which the faith of the blood of the just God and man Jesus Christ commended and fortified.' Thus far are the words of Rupert.

End of the Rupert quote: the 'guard' implies not merely repelling men but discerning judgments (who is admitted); some Doctors distinguish the fiery wall (against men) from the Angel-guard (against evil spirits). Pererius assents only that penal fire exists for evil spirits too (Matt 25:41, eternal fire for the devil), but holy Angels and just souls are unharmed. 'Thus far Rupert.' Marginal gloss: 'Matth. 5.' Running head '708'; true printed page 718.

But indeed, this interpretation of Ambrose and Rupert, by which it approves and confirms the fire of purgatory, is most true, and cannot be denied or called into doubt by any Catholic; but insofar as that fire which was before Paradise is accommodated to this purgatorial fire, according to the allegorical and mystical sense, it is an excellent and highly praiseworthy interpretation. But if anyone contends that this is the historical and literal meaning and understanding of Moses's words, to him I

shall not easily assent. For that fire was placed before the terrestrial Paradise, but the purgatorial fire must be passed before entrance into the heavenly Paradise. And that one was placed at the entrance of Paradise, lest anyone penetrating into that place, and eating the fruit of the tree of life, should live forever: but this does not at all fit the purgatorial fire. Moreover, the purgatorial fire is placed by the Theologians within the earth, not far from the center of the earth, but the fire of which Moses speaks was placed above the earth and before the terrestrial Paradise. Finally, now in those regions where Paradise is believed to have been, nowhere is such a fire found. It must therefore be said (according to that opinion) that the purgatorial fire was either taken away from the midst, or translated into other places.

Pererius's assessment: the purgatory doctrine of Ambrose and Rupert is most true and undeniable by any Catholic, and excellent as an allegorical/mystical accommodation; but he will not accept it as the LITERAL sense of Moses — for (1) that fire was before the terrestrial paradise, whereas purgatory is passed before the heavenly; (2) it barred access to the tree of life, which does not fit purgatory; (3) purgatory is within the earth near its center, but Moses's fire was above the earth before the terrestrial paradise; (4) no such fire is now found in the region believed to be Paradise (so one would have to say it was removed or translated). Marginal gloss: 'Existimatio opinionis Ambrosii & Ruperti.'

QUESTION V. What the word Cherubim signifies, according to Theodoret.

Heading of Question V of the disputation.

Theodoret, in the Questions on Genesis, question 40, thinks that the Cherubim placed for the guard of Paradise were not incorporeal and invisible virtues of Angels, as most think, but certain powerful and terrible visions, and horrific figures of animals, which by terrifying might keep Adam off from the entrance of Paradise. But whenever Scripture calls [something] 'Cherubim,' it signifies not either animals or any invisible natures, but everything which is strong with great force and power — as David said, 'You who sit upon the Cherubim,' that is, 'You who reign

powerfully'; and elsewhere, 'He ascended upon the Cherubim, and he flew, flying upon the wings of the winds.' This is, 'he came with great power and virtue.' These are the very words of Theodoret: 'It is not to be believed that Cherubim means certain virtues...'

Question V: Theodoret's view (Quaestiones in Genesim 40) — the Cherubim guarding Paradise were not incorporeal invisible Angelic virtues but powerful, terrible visions and horrific animal-figures to frighten Adam off; 'Cherubim' signifies whatever has great power (Ps 79/80:2 'Qui sedes super Cherubim' = 'who reign powerfully'; Ps 17/18:11 'Ascendit super Cherubim... super pennas ventorum'). Pererius then begins to quote Theodoret's own words. Marginal glosses: 'Psalm 79.'; 'Psalm. 17.' Catchword: 'quasdam' (continues on the next page).

— p. 760 (PDF) · printed p. 719 —

'...certain invisible [virtues], as some think, since an invisible nature would have contributed nothing there — whereas it ought to have been a sensible vision, by which it might terrify Adam himself. Therefore that flaming sword was not naturally fiery, but such in appearance; nor were the Cherubim animals, but seemed such. Since Ezekiel too saw Cherubim having four faces — although an invisible nature does not have a fourfold face; but he calls "Cherubim" everything which is endowed with power. So he says, He who sits upon the Cherubim, that is, who reigns powerfully; and He ascended upon the Cherubim, that is, he came with much power. That, therefore, And he set Cherubim, he said, that you might understand a certain powerful and terrible vision and form, just as if he had placed certain animals at the entrance of Paradise, by which Adam might thence be kept off.' Thus Theodoret.

The quoted words of Theodoret: the Cherubim were not invisible virtues (which would not have frightened Adam), but a sensible terrifying vision; the flaming sword only appeared fiery, and the Cherubim only seemed to be animals (as Ezekiel's four-faced Cherubim); 'Cherubim' names whatever is endowed with power ('Qui sedet super Cherubim' = reigns powerfully). 'And he set Cherubim' = a powerful and terrible apparition, as if animals were placed to keep Adam off. Marginal gloss: 'Ezechiel. 1.' Running head '709'; true printed page 719.

The same was the opinion of Theodore, Bishop of Heraclea, and of Procopius of Gaza, explaining this passage of Moses in their Commentaries which they wrote on Genesis. Therefore these think that the Cherubim which were before Paradise were nothing else than certain specters, and images of terrible form, placed to strike horror and fear into the first men in the vestibule of paradise — after the manner of farmers, who in gardens and sown fields fix wooden stakes wrapped in torn rags of human garments, that by that kind of scarecrow they may keep off the birds, frightened from feeding on the seeds and crops. But if these wish to deny that the name Cherubim sometimes signifies in the sacred writings a certain order of celestial spirits, they are by no means to be heard, for that is contrary to the most approved doctrine of the Theologians, handed down by blessed Dionysius in that little book on the Celestial Hierarchy; and therefore one may see it in Athanasius, in the sermon upon those words, 'All things are delivered to me by my Father'; in Chrysostom, sermon 3 on the incomprehensible nature of God, and in the Liturgy; nay, in Theodoret himself, in the book of the Divine Decrees, chapter 7. The Hebrews hand down that this word Cherubim properly signifies a picture or figure, almost always of men, except in Ezekiel chapters 9 and 10, where it signifies figures of animals. Blessed Dionysius and Jerome interpret the word Cherubim as a multitude or fullness of knowledge.

The same view held by Theodore of Heraclea and Procopius of Gaza (the Cherubim = specters/scarecrow-like images to frighten the first men). But Pererius: if they deny that 'Cherubim' ever signifies an order of celestial spirits, they are not to be heard — contrary to Dionysius (De Coelesti Hierarchia), Athanasius, Chrysostom, and Theodoret himself (De divinis decretis 7). The Hebrews take 'Cherubim' as a picture/figure (usually of men, except the animal-figures of Ezek 9-10); Dionysius and Jerome as 'fullness of knowledge.' Marginal glosses: 'Cherubim unus est coelestium spirituum ordo'; 'Cherubim quid proprie significet.'

QUESTION VI. What is the true and genuine meaning of those words.

Heading of Question VI of the disputation.

But far more probable is the opinion, certainly approved by the assent of many and grave authors, that these words of Moses are to be taken and interpreted as they sound. Therefore God fortified the entrance of Paradise with a twofold guard, and as it were garrison — both of Angels, and of those things which are most formidable and terrible to man, such as fire and sword. For God willed to close the entrance of Paradise both against the devil and against man. To keep off the devil, he set up many Angels, which is signified by the word Cherubim: for although that name is properly attributed to the eighth order of Angels, yet it is extended to all the orders of Angels. Those...

Question VI (the true meaning): Pererius's own view — Moses's words are to be taken as they sound. God fortified paradise's entrance with a twofold guard (Angels, and things terrible to man like fire and sword), against both the devil and man. To keep off the devil, many Angels — signified by 'Cherubim' (properly the eighth Angelic order, but extended to all the orders). Marginal gloss: 'Cherubim nomen extenditur ad omnes Angelorum ordines.' Catchword: 'ILLA' (continues on the next page).

— p. 761 (PDF) · printed p. 720 —

For that is the true opinion of Dionysius, that all the properties of all the angelic orders are found also in each, but with this distinction: the properties of the superior orders are found also in the inferior, but through a diminished participation of those properties; but the properties of the inferior orders are likewise in the superior, but eminently and excellently. Cherubim, therefore, signifies fullness of knowledge, which by excellence is in the eighth order, but by participation is communicated with the inferior orders. And so in this place the name Cherubim does not signify the celestial spirits of the eighth order, but the Angels of inferior orders, for the spirits of the supreme Hierarchy are not sent by God to external ministries. Moreover, the Angels to whom the guard of Paradise was assigned were rightly named Cherubim from abundance of knowledge: that from it might be understood that a most vigilant and most wise guard of Paradise was set by God, whom, namely, no one, either deceiving by wiles or conquering by force, could pass to enter Paradise.

Pererius's view continues, with Dionysius's principle: all angelic properties are in each order (superior in inferior by diminished participation, inferior in superior eminently). 'Cherubim' = fullness of knowledge, by excellence in the eighth order but shared with lower orders; here it means the lower-order Angels (the supreme Hierarchy is not sent to external ministries). The guard-Angels are aptly 'Cherubim' from abundance of knowledge — a most vigilant, wise guard none could deceive or overpower. Marginal gloss: 'Vere Theologica Dionysii sententia.' Running head '710'; true printed page 720.

But someone may ask: Why was there need of a guard of Paradise against the demons, whom no desire of entering Paradise could assail? For to what end would they wish to enter? Was it that they might attack men? But there was no man there. Or rather that they might take pleasure from the amenity of the place? But an incorporeal nature cannot be affected and delighted by corporeal pleasures and delights. It must be answered that the demon had to be kept off from the entrance of Paradise, lest, penetrating into that place, he should pluck the fruit of the tree of life — by the promise and gift of which he might deceive mortals most avid and curious of prolonging life, and lead them to his own worship and obedience.

Objection and answer: why a guard against demons, who have no desire to enter Paradise (no men there to attack; an incorporeal nature takes no corporeal pleasure)? Answer: to keep the demon from plucking the fruit of the tree of life, by whose promise he might deceive mortals eager to prolong life and draw them to his worship. Marginal gloss: 'Cur arcendus fuerit daemon ab ingressu Paradisi.'

But by the flaming sword I understand nothing else than those same Angels, under the appearance and figure of men, holding in their hands swords most sharp with keenest edge, and most flashing from their vibration. For a sword, when it is vehemently brandished, is wont to shine forth with scattered sparks and flashing. For similarly we read in Numbers 22 that an Angel was seen by Balaam with a drawn sword; and it is handed down in the second book of Kings, when an atrocious plague raged at Jerusalem, that David, lifting up his eyes, saw an Angel holding a sword in his hand, and eager to strike like one about to smite. But as to its being called a 'turning sword,' those skilled in the Hebrew tongue hold that it signified that the sword was two-edged (anceps), that is, endowed on both

sides with a most sharp edge, and most keen for striking.

The flaming sword = those same Angels in human form, holding sharp, flashing swords (a brandished sword flashes with sparks); compare the Angel with a drawn sword seen by Balaam (Num 22) and by David during the plague at Jerusalem (2 Sam 24). 'Turning sword' (versatilis): according to Hebrew experts, it means the sword was two-edged (anceps), sharp on both sides. Marginal glosses: 'Quid significetur per flammeum gladium ac versatilem'; 'Capite ultimo'; 'Quid gladius versatilis significet.'

But let this be the end of this sixth book, which we have written on the most unhappy and ever-lamentable fall of the first men. Next, the rest of [their] life, which they, exterminated from Paradise, spent in affliction and misery for many years, up to the supreme penalty of death, which — decreed for and due to their disobedience — they paid; and also their progeny, and the propagation of the human race up to the flood, we shall pursue in the seventh book. THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

Epilogue and close of Book VI (the fall of the first men). The seventh book will pursue the rest of the first men's afflicted life up to their death, their progeny, and the propagation of the human race to the flood. 'FINIS LIBRI SEXTI.' Marginal gloss: 'Epilogus sexti libri & transitio ad septimum.'

— p. 762 (PDF) · printed p. 721 —

BENEDICTUS PERERIUS'S COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS, BOOK SEVEN. Which is on Cain and Abel, and the rest of the progeny of the first men up to the flood.

Book title: the opening of Book VII (Genesis 4, Cain and Abel and the antediluvian generations), set beneath a decorative headband. Running head '711' (misprinted for true 721); the running header from here is 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' Running head '711'; true printed page 721.

PREFACE.

Heading of the preface to Book VII.

The first part of this book has been completed, described and explained by Moses in the three preceding chapters. I would call that the first, and the chief, part of this volume — by the antiquity of [the world's] origin, by the marvelousness of the divine power and the variety of its operation, and the

excellence of so many and so great works of God, of which the universe of things consists; by the sublimity of doctrine; by the depth and obscurity of the many questions which are involved with that doctrine; by the gravity and majesty of the discourse; and finally by the difficulty of treatment and explanation. But in this part two things especially were handed down by Moses: one is, that God, from the beginning of time, from nothing, by no necessity, but by the highest freedom of will, with infinite power and wisdom, created the world; the other is, that in this world he established man as, so to speak, its prince and lord, and, furnishing and adorning him with an abundance of all goods, placed him in a most happy state; but soon, by his own will, God's law being violated, cast down from so great a felicity, he became subject to innumerable evils and calamities. The knowledge of the former matter confers much toward man's having clearly seen whatever things are in existence, whether great or...

Opening of the Preface to Book VII: the first part of the work (Genesis 1-3, treated in the six preceding books) is complete — the chief part of the volume, for the antiquity of the world's origin, the marvel of divine power, the sublimity of doctrine, and the difficulty of the questions. Moses there handed down two chief things: that God created the world from nothing by the freedom of his will; and that he established man as lord of the world in a happy state, from which man soon fell by violating God's law, becoming subject to innumerable evils. Marginal gloss: 'Primae partis libri Geneseos commendatio.' Page footer signature 'YYY'; catchword 'sive' (continues on the next page).

— p. 763 (PDF) · printed p. 722 —

...whether small, whether mortal, whether immortal, whether agreeable and useful to man, whether contrary and harmful, did not exist by chance and fortuitously, nor of their own nature, nor were made from many principles, but were established by one God, and from the beginning, and are at all times preserved and governed; and by that reason there might become known to all the incomparable goodness, power, and wisdom of God, which shines forth marvelously in the construction of this world, and in the most fitting and most beautiful disposition of all its parts.

Preface to Book VII (continued): the value of knowing the creation — that all things (great or small, mortal or immortal, useful or harmful) were made not by chance nor from many principles, but by one

God, and are preserved and governed by him; thereby God's incomparable goodness, power, and wisdom shine in the fabric of the world. Running head '712'; true printed page 722.

But the knowledge of the latter matter conduces very much, namely, that it may be explored by mortals what was the origin and cause of those evils and afflictions by which the whole human race is miserably tormented — namely the disobedience of the first man — lest anyone perhaps think that man, such as he now is, was created such by God from the beginning; and at the same time that there might be understood the greatest necessity of the coming of the Messiah, whom, as its goal, all divine Scripture regards and seeks. But in the following chapters of this book up to its end, the propagation of the human race is described: first indeed from Adam up to Noah, in the two next following chapters; then, all men being destroyed by the flood except eight, it is narrated how after the flood the human race was sown from the three sons of Noah, and multiplied into various nations and tongues, and dispersed through all the shores of the sea and lands; and that narration is carried up to the birth of Abraham, set forth by Moses in the eleventh chapter of this volume. From which place thereafter up to the end of the book, it is commemorated how the people of God was segregated from the other nations, and gradually increased, and introduced into Egypt.

The value of knowing the fall: the origin of human evils is the first man's disobedience (lest one think man was created as he now is); and the necessity of the Messiah's coming, the goal of all Scripture. Summary of the rest of Genesis: the propagation of the race (Adam to Noah, Gen 4-5); the flood sparing eight; from Noah's three sons the nations and tongues, dispersed (to Abraham's birth, Gen 11); then the people of God segregated and brought into Egypt. Marginal gloss: 'Summa libri huius & reliquorum Geneseos capitum quae in hoc opere explicantur.'

But in the fourth and fifth chapters, which we are about to explain in this seventh book, one may contemplate two cities being born: one of God, arisen in Abel; the other of the devil, begun from Cain, with the various and marvelous progress and success of each — in expounding subtly which two cities Augustine consumed twenty-two books, those most noble books, and never sufficiently to be praised by anyone, On the City of God. But the city of the devil, having its origin from Cain, was prior, and therefore is

described first by Moses, but is dispatched in few words. For the principal purpose of divine Scripture is to treat of the City of God and its citizens; but of the city of the devil...

The theme of Book VII (Genesis 4-5): the birth of two cities — the City of God (in Abel) and the city of the devil (from Cain), the subject of Augustine's twenty-two books De Civitate Dei. The devil's city (from Cain) is prior, so described first by Moses but briefly, since Scripture's chief aim is the City of God. Marginal glosses: 'De duabus civitatibus, altera Dei, & altera diaboli'; 'Augustini libri de Civitate Dei commendantur.' Catchword: 'diaboli' (continues on the next page).

— p. 764 (PDF) · printed p. 723 —

...of the devil, and of the inhabitants of his city and the ministers of the devil, who is the people of the impious, sacred history does indeed treat, but only for this reason: because the evil, while life is lived on earth, are mingled with the good, and by persecuting and afflicting them exercise them in a greater degree to the advancement of virtue and the increase of glory; and because in the divine animadversion of all the impious, and in the defense and protection of the good against them, the justice and mercy of God shine forth marvelously. But I return to those two cities which I set forth above: the diverse properties of the citizens of each of these are expressly represented by the two first brothers — not only their dissimilar dispositions, characters, pursuits, and institutions, but also their very names Cain and Abel. For the name Cain, in Latin, signifies 'possession': but the citizens of this world seek for themselves possession and inheritance in this life, and are eager to acquire them; for worldly goods are the object of their wishes, cares, and finally all their hopes: by the attainment and possession of these goods they measure and define their felicity, by the loss and privation of the same, their utmost misery. Nor do those things not fit well with this, which a little below Moses hands down — that Cain first of all mortals built a city. So indeed it is: those who belong to the city of the devil seek for themselves a seat, rest, and felicity on earth. But the word Abel, if you interpret it into Latin, signifies mourning, or vanity, or nothing. Doubtless, such is the disposition, such the mind, such the pursuit and

institution of pious men, whose custom it is to mourn their own and others' sins alike, and the injuries and offenses against God, and to reckon all the goods of this world as empty, perishable, of no moment, and like nothing.

Scripture treats the city of the devil (the people of the impious) only because the evil, mingled with the good, exercise them in virtue and manifest God's justice and mercy. The two brothers represent the two cities even by their names: 'Cain' = possession (worldly citizens seek earthly possession and felicity; Cain built the first city), 'Abel' = mourning/vanity/nothing (pious men mourn sins and reckon worldly goods as nothing). Marginal gloss: 'Scriptura principale institutum est agere de Dei civitate.' Running head '713'; true printed page 723.

But I wish to confirm and illustrate this by two opinions of Augustine. In the beginning of book 15 of the City of God, Augustine writes in this manner:

Pererius introduces two passages of Augustine (De Civitate Dei 15.1 and 14.28) to confirm the theme of the two cities. Marginal gloss: 'Augustinus De distinctione duarum civitatum, quarum altera est Dei, altera diaboli.'

'We distribute the whole human race into two kinds of men: one of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God; which we also mystically call two cities, that is, two societies of men, of which one is that which is predestined to reign eternally with God, the other to undergo eternal punishment with the devil. Their rise was either in the Angels, whose number is unknown to us, or in the two first men: but the progress and course of those cities...'

Augustine, De Civitate Dei 15.1 (beginning): the human race is two kinds — those who live according to man and those according to God — 'mystically' two cities/societies, one predestined to reign with God, the other to eternal punishment with the devil; their rise in the Angels (of unknown number) or in the two first men. Catchword: 'est' (continues on the next page). Page footer signature 'YYY 2.'

— p. 765 (PDF) · printed p. 724 —

'...is, from the time those two men began to generate, until men shall cease to generate. For this whole time, in which the dying give place and the born succeed, is the course of these two cities. Cain therefore was born first from those two parents of the human race, belonging to

the city of men; afterward Abel, to the city of God. For as in one man we experience what the Apostle says, That not first is what is spiritual, but what is animal, and afterward what is spiritual — so in the whole human race, when first those two cities began to run their course by being born and dying, first was born a citizen of this world, but afterward one who is a pilgrim in the world, and belonging to the city of God, predestined by grace, elected by grace, a pilgrim below by grace, a citizen above by grace. And so it is written of Cain, that he founded a city; but Abel, as a pilgrim, did not found one. For the city of the saints is above, although here it brings forth its citizens, among whom it is a pilgrim, until the time of its kingdom comes, when it will gather all rising again in their bodies, when the promised kingdom will be given them, where with their Prince, the King of the ages, they shall reign without any end of time.' Thus Augustine there.

Augustine, De Civ. Dei 15.1 (continued): the whole time of the dying and the born is the course of the two cities; Cain born first (city of men), Abel after (city of God) — as 'not first the spiritual but the animal' (1 Cor 15:46); Cain founded a city, but Abel as a pilgrim did not, for the saints' city is above, its pilgrims destined to reign forever with the King of the ages. Marginal glosses: '1. Cor. 15.'; 'Genes. 4.' Running head '714'; true printed page 724.

But the same Augustine, in the last chapter of book 14 of the same work, excellently expounds in these words whence these cities have their origin, and how far they have their progress:

Pererius introduces the second Augustine passage (De Civitate Dei 14, last chapter — 14.28), on the origin and progress of the two cities.

'Two loves made two cities: the earthly, namely, self-love unto the contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God unto the contempt of self. And the former glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. The former seeks glory from men, but to the latter God, the witness of conscience, is the greatest glory. The former in its glory exalts its own head; the latter says to God, my glory, and the one who exalts my head. In the former, the lust of domination dominates, in its princes or in the

nations it subjugates; in the latter, they serve one another in charity, both the rulers by counseling and the subjects by obeying. In the former, its wise men, living according to man, have pursued either the goods of the body, or of the mind, or of both; or those who were able to know God, yet did not honor him as God, nor gave thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened — for they were either leaders or followers of the people in worshiping images. But in this [heavenly] city there is no human wisdom except piety, by which the true God is rightly worshiped, awaiting the reward in the society of the saints, not only of men but also of Angels, that God may be...'

Augustine, De Civ. Dei 14.28 — the celebrated definition: 'Two loves made two cities — the earthly by self-love unto contempt of God, the heavenly by love of God unto contempt of self.' The earthly glories in itself, seeks glory from men, is ruled by lust of domination; the heavenly glories in the Lord (Ps 3:4), serves in charity. The earthly's wise men pursued bodily/mental goods or, knowing God, did not honor him (Rom 1:21, worshiping images); the heavenly city's only wisdom is piety, worshiping the true God, awaiting the reward with saints and Angels. Marginal glosses: 'Amores duo duarum civitatum auctores'; 'Psalm. 3.'; 'Rom. 1.' Catchword: 'Deus' (Deus omnia in omnibus; continues on the next page).

— p. 766 (PDF) · printed p. 725 —

'...God all in all.' Thus Augustine.

End of the Augustine quote (De Civ. Dei 14.28): the heavenly city awaits that God may be 'all in all' (1 Cor 15:28). Running head '715' (the digit misprinted; misprint = true 725 minus 10); true printed page 725.

But let us, approaching the explanation of the fourth chapter, diligently examine and weigh the history of Cain and Abel handed down by Moses.

Transition from the Preface to the commentary: Pererius turns to a careful examination of the history of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4).

CHAPTER FOUR OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS.

Chapter divider: the beginning of the commentary on Genesis chapter 4 (Cain and Abel).

And Adam knew his wife Eve, who conceived and bore Cain, saying, I have gotten a man through God. And again she bore his brother Abel. And Abel was a shepherd of sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground. And it came to pass, after many days, that Cain offered of the fruits of the earth gifts to the Lord. Abel also offered of the firstborn of his flock, and of their fat. And the Lord had respect to Abel and to his gifts; but to Cain and to his gifts he had no respect. And Cain was exceedingly angry, and his countenance fell. And the Lord said to him, Why are you angry? and why is your face fallen? If you do well, shall you not receive? but if ill, shall not your sin at once be present at the doors? but its appetite shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it. And Cain said to his brother Abel, Let us go forth abroad. And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel, and slew him. And the Lord said to Cain, Where is Abel your brother? He answered, I know not: am I my brother's keeper? And he said to him, What have you done? the voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth. Now therefore you shall be cursed upon the earth, which has opened its mouth and received the blood of your brother from your hand. When you shall till it, it shall not give you its fruits: a vagabond and a fugitive shall you be upon the earth. And Cain said to the Lord, My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon. Behold, you cast me out this day from the face...

Lemma: Genesis 4:1-14a (given as a block, with verse numbers 1-14 in the margin; the birth of Cain and Abel, their offerings, God's respect to Abel not Cain, Cain's anger and God's warning, the murder of Abel, God's questioning and curse, and Cain's despairing reply). Page footer signature 'YYY 3'; catchword 'a facie' (continues on the next page, 'a facie terrae').

— p. 767 (PDF) · printed p. 726 —

...from the face of the earth, and I shall be hidden from your face, and I shall be a vagabond and a fugitive upon the earth: everyone therefore that finds me shall kill me. And the Lord said to him, By no means shall it be so: but everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold. And the Lord set a mark upon Cain, that whoever found him should not kill him. And Cain, having gone out from the face of the Lord, dwelt a fugitive in the land at the eastern region of Eden. And Cain knew his wife, who conceived and bore Henoch; and he built a city, and called its name from the name of his son Henoch. And Henoch begot Irad, and Irad begot Mauiael, and Mauiael begot Mathusael, and Mathusael begot Lamech, who took two wives, the name of the one Ada, and the name of the other Sella. And Ada bore Iabel, who was the father of those dwelling in tents, and of shepherds. And the name of his brother was Iubal: he was the father of those who play on the harp and organ. Sella also bore Tubalcain, who was a hammerer and smith in every work of brass and iron. And the sister of Tubalcain was Noema. And Lamech said to his wives Ada and Sella, Hear my voice, you wives of Lamech, hearken to my speech: For I have slain a man to my own wounding, and a young man to my own bruising; sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times sevenfold. Adam also knew his wife again, and she bore a son, and called his name Seth, saying, God has appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew. But to Seth also was born a son, whom he called Enos: he began to call upon the name of the Lord.

Lemma continued: Genesis 4:14b-26 (Cain's fear and the mark; his exile east of Eden; his line — Henoch, Irad, Mauiael, Mathusael, Lamech and his two wives, Iabel, Iubal, Tubalcain, Noema; Lamech's song; the birth of Seth and of Enos). Verse numbers 15-26 in the margin. Running head '716'; true printed page 726. Catchword 'Adam' (the commentary begins on the next page).

— p. 768 (PDF) · printed p. 727 —

And Adam knew his wife Eve, who conceived and bore Cain, saying, I have gotten a man through God.

Lemma repeated at the head of the commentary: Genesis 4:1 (marginal 'CAP. 4. VERS. 1.'). Running head '717'; true printed page 727.

Both for other reasons, and even on this account, the Hebrew tongue which divine Scripture uses is rightly called holy: because it signifies the union and carnal copula of man and woman so honorably and chastely, calling it 'the knowing of the woman.' The Latins indeed said it honorably, 'to give attention to children'; and the Greeks, 'to have communion with a woman': but in Hebrew more honorably, 'the man to know his wife.' But why the intercourse of the man with the woman is named 'the knowing of the woman,' Lyra and Oleaster bring various reasons; but which, as somewhat trivial and not to be forced upon chaste ears, it will be better to pass over in this place.

The Hebrew tongue is rightly 'holy' — it names carnal union chastely as 'knowing' (more decorously than the Latin 'dare operam liberis' or the Greek 'communicare mulieri'). Pererius passes over Lyra's and Oleaster's trivial explanations of why it is called 'knowing.' Marginal gloss: 'Honestas & sanctitas linguae Hebraeae.'

From this passage it sufficiently appears that the first men, so long as they were in Paradise, were virgins, since Moses indicates their first union to have been after they were cast out of Paradise. And this is the opinion of the Fathers, the more probable because they were in Paradise for a very short time before sin; and immediately as they sinned, on the same day, I say, they were driven from Paradise. Well known, therefore, is that saying of Jerome against Jovinian: 'Marriage,' he says, 'fills the earth, virginity Paradise.' Nor do we say this because we deny that the generation of offspring was to be in Paradise; but because in that short time in which they were in Paradise, they kept their virginity unspotted — which bore a shadow and a certain image of that virginity which is to be preserved by the saints for all eternity in the heavenly Paradise after the resurrection of

bodies. But indeed, someone will say, God had commanded those first men to give attention to the generation of offspring, saying, 'Increase and multiply, and fill the earth': therefore it must be thought that they, at once obeying the divine commands, gave attention to the generation of offspring. But that command of God was affirmative — that is, binding always, but not unto always [obliging at all times, but not for every moment]. And, as Augustine says, 'those men were awaiting the divine mandate of devoting themselves to the generation of offspring, which was not given to them while they were in Paradise.'

The first men were virgins in Paradise (their first union came after the expulsion; they were there only a short time before sin — Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum: 'Marriage fills the earth, virginity Paradise'). Not that generation was not destined for Paradise, but they kept virginity there — a shadow of the saints' eternal virginity. Objection: God said 'Increase and multiply' — answered: that affirmative command binds always but not for every moment (Augustine: they awaited the mandate to generate, not given in Paradise). Marginal glosses: 'Primos homines fuisse in Paradiso virgines'; 'Hiero. lib. 1. adv. Iovin.'; 'Cur primi homines in Paradiso simul commixti non fuerint.'

From the interpretation of the word Cain it is sufficiently clear that the language which the first men used was Hebrew, as being the only one of all languages in which such interpretations of these words have place. At the same time this too is understood, that Eusebius, in book eleven of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter four, interpreting the word Cain, did not rightly say that by that word is signified 'envy,' namely because Cain, burning with envy of his brother Abel, killed him. But as to 'I have gotten a man through God,' Rupert (in book 3 of his Commentaries on Genesis, chapter 34) thinks it is an oath; but not rightly. In Hebrew it is [■■■■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■, Kanithi isch eth Adonai], 'to God' or 'to the Lord'; but to complete the sense the preposition ['through'] must be joined...

From the etymology of 'Cain' the first language is shown to be Hebrew (only Hebrew supports such name-etymologies). Eusebius (Praeparatio Evangelica 11.4) wrongly derived 'Cain' from 'envy.' Rupert (Comm. in Gen. 3.34) wrongly takes 'Possedi hominem per Deum' as an oath. HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification (Gen 4:1b, given in the right margin with transliteration): ■■■■■ ■■■ ■■ ■■■■ (Kanithi isch eth Adonai — qaniti ish eth-YHWH, 'I have gotten a man with the LORD'; the legible words are ■■■■■ 'I have gotten,' ■■■ 'a man,' ■■, and the divine name),

transliterated in the margin 'Kanithi isch eth-Adonai'; Pererius glosses the last word 'Deo vel Domino' ('to God or to the Lord'). Marginal glosses: 'Prima omnium linguarum, Hebraea'; 'Verba Hebraica sunt' + the phrase. Catchword: 'sitio' (praepositio; continues on the next page).

— p. 769 (PDF) · printed p. 728 —

...some preposition. The Seventy Interpreters, and our Latin Interpreter following them, added the preposition 'Per' (through), by which it is signified that that offspring was given to Eve by the power, gift, and favor of God. And a similar meaning is in the Chaldaic paraphrase, which has thus word for word: 'I have acquired a man from before the Lord'; although some think this meaning underlies this reading: 'I have acquired a man before the Lord,' that is, one who, when we are dead, may fear and worship the Lord God, and walk before him.

The LXX and the Vulgate added the preposition 'per' ('through' God) — the offspring given by God's power, gift, and favor. The Chaldaic paraphrase: 'I have acquired a man from before the Lord'; some take it as 'one who, when we are dead, may fear and worship God, and walk before him.' Running head '718'; true printed page 728.

But was Cain the firstborn of Adam? or rather did he beget other children before Cain, whom in its manner Scripture passed over in silence, because nothing memorable was to be published about them? But without doubt Cain was the firstborn: for the narration of Moses indicates this, that Eve, when first she was known by the man, bore Cain; and the same is demonstrated by the etymology of the name Cain: for, he being begotten, Eve said, 'I have gotten a man through God' — which she would not have said if she had begotten other sons before Cain, for that name would rather fit them than Cain.

Was Cain the firstborn? Yes, without doubt — Moses's narrative (Eve bore Cain at her first union), and the etymology ('Possedi hominem,' which would fit an earlier son if there were one). Marginal gloss: 'Utrum Cain fuerit primogenitus Adami.'

But someone of us might perhaps ask, how long after the first men were expelled from Paradise, Cain and Abel were begotten. The author of the Scholastic History, in the history of the book of Genesis, chapter 25, relates

that it was handed down to memory that to Methodius the Martyr, when he was in prison for the confession of the faith, a certain revelation of this kind happened: For it was divinely disclosed to him that the first men, when they were cast out of Paradise, were virgins, and afterward for fifteen years abstained from carnal union — during all that time mourning the sin committed by them, and deploring the loss of so many and so great goods with which they had been endowed by God; but in the fifteenth year after they had been exterminated from Paradise, they begot the first son Cain, and his sister by name Calmana; then fifteen years after, that is, in the thirtieth year after the first men were expelled from Paradise, Abel and his sister Delbora were begotten; moreover, in the hundred and thirtieth year of Adam, Cain killed Abel, whom Adam and Eve mourned for a hundred years; and, the mourning finished, they begot in his place another son by name Seth — for he, as the translation of the Seventy Interpreters has it, was born when his father Adam was in his two hundred and thirtieth year. And these things indeed are reported as revealed to Methodius.

How long after the expulsion were Cain and Abel begotten? Peter Comestor (Historia Scholastica, on Genesis, ch. 25) reports a 'revelation' to Methodius the Martyr in prison: the first men, virgins at their expulsion, abstained fifteen years in mourning; begot Cain and his sister Calmana in the 15th year, Abel and his sister Delbora in the 30th; Cain killed Abel in Adam's 130th year; Adam and Eve mourned a hundred years, then begot Seth (born, per the LXX, when Adam was 230). Marginal gloss: 'Quanto tempore post eiectionem primorum hominum e Paradiso, Cain & Abel generati fuerint.'

But great indignation comes upon one reading and considering these things — that so unlearned and futile a fabrication should be foisted upon a most holy man and Martyr, under the specious pretext of revelation. Is it indeed to be approved that those first men — when they were created of mature age and fit for generating, and when God had commanded them 'Increase and multiply,' and they themselves were held by the natural desire of offspring, and moreover after sin the force of lust and carnal concupiscence had been sharper and more ardent in them — should have waited fifteen years to give attention to children? Nor indeed did devoting themselves to the generation of offspring conflict with their purpose and institution...

Pererius indignantly rejects the Methodius tradition as an unlearned, futile fabrication foisted on the martyr under pretext of revelation: is it credible that the first men — mature, fit for generation, commanded 'Increase and multiply,' held by natural desire, and after sin with sharper lust — waited fifteen years to have children? Marginal gloss: 'Commentitia revelatio falso afficta Methodio martyri refellitur.' Catchword: 'instituto' (continues on the next page).

— p. 770 (PDF) · printed p. 729 —

...their institution of doing penance — since the thing was honorable, commanded by God, and at the beginning of the world most necessary for the propagation of the human race. But what probability does it have, that fifteen years intervened between the generation of Cain and Abel? — when from the narration of Moses it may be reckoned that Abel was the second son of Adam, and born immediately after Cain. Unless anyone should think that Eve, having brought forth Cain, was barren for fifteen years, which is the mark of a foolish man to suppose. For to the first men God attributed the greatest fecundity: namely, that scarcity of men, and the multiplication of the human race, demanded it at that time for the conservation of the human species.

Refuting the 15-year interval: generation did not conflict with penance (it was honorable, commanded, necessary). Abel was the second son, born immediately after Cain; Eve was not barren fifteen years (a foolish supposition); God gave the first men the greatest fecundity, which the scarcity of men demanded. Running head '719'; true printed page 729.

But as to what is said, that Adam mourned the death of his son Abel for a hundred years, and during all that time abstained from carnal union — who would bring himself to believe it? For neither would Adam, being a most prudent man, mourn his dead son so long, nor for that cause so long shrink from the generation of offspring; nay, on account of the death of Abel, he would more vehemently desire to beget another son in his place. Which he himself not obscurely indicated, when, Seth being procreated, he said, 'God has appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain killed.' The falsity of that tradition is also convicted by this reason, that in it Seth is said to have been born in the two hundred and thirtieth year of Adam's age — whereas the Hebrew Scripture and the Latin Vulgate version have him

begotten in the hundred and thirtieth year of Adam. For although in the translation of the Seventy Interpreters it is [said] that Adam was two hundred and thirty years old when he begot Seth, yet that translation, in that number of years, and in some other following numbers, is by the fault and blame of others depraved and corrupted, as we shall show below.

Refuting the 100-year mourning and abstinence: incredible — the prudent Adam would not mourn so long nor shrink from generation; rather, he desired another son (Gen 4:25, 'God has appointed me another seed instead of Abel'). The tradition's falsity is also shown by its dating Seth's birth to Adam's 230th year, whereas the Hebrew and Vulgate give the 130th; the LXX's '230' is a corrupted number (to be shown below). Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 4.'; 'Septuaginta interpretum versio corrupta.'

But Abel was a shepherd of sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground.

New lemma: Genesis 4:2 (marginal 'VERS. 2.').

After the sin of Adam, the first of all men who is called just and innocent in divine Scripture was Abel. And this one was the first of all a shepherd, and by his example in great degree honored and ennobled this pastoral art, so that thereafter all the Patriarchs and princes of the Hebrew people cultivated it above other pursuits with the highest zeal — and indeed not without cause. For the pastoral art is the simplest of all, and least laborious or artificial, nor does it so occupy the mind of man as not to leave him leisure for the meditation of natural things and the contemplation of divine things; nor does it need fixed dwellings, or require stable and fixed seats, but can be practiced and exercised even by wanderers; and its usefulness is manifold for the use of human life and of divine worship. For it supplies food and clothing, and likewise the material of offerings and sacrifices, which ought to be made to God. It presents besides a certain image...

Commentary on Gen 4:2: Abel is the first man called 'just and innocent' in Scripture, and the first shepherd, who ennobled the pastoral art (thereafter cultivated by all the Patriarchs and Hebrew princes). Praise of the pastoral art: the simplest and least laborious, leaving leisure for contemplation of natural and divine things; needing no fixed dwelling; practiced even by wanderers; supplying food, clothing, and the material of sacrifices. Marginal gloss: 'Laus pastoritiae artis.' Page footer signature

'ZZZ'; catchword 'dam' (quandam; continues on the next page).

— p. 771 (PDF) · printed p. 730 —

...[a certain image] of royal administration and governance: for such it behooves a king to be toward his subjects, as a shepherd rules his flock; wherefore among those ancients, good kings were called nothing else than shepherds of the peoples [Homer calls kings ποιμ■νες λα■ν, 'shepherds of peoples']. What more? This art and practice of shepherds represents the providence of God toward men, and especially toward the elect: wherefore God and Christ the Lord delight in the appellation of shepherd, and by that name are frequently named in the sacred writings.

Praise of the pastoral art (continued): it images royal governance (a good king rules like a shepherd) and God's providence toward men and the elect (God and Christ delight in the name 'shepherd'; John 10, Ezek 34). GREEK GLYPH verified by magnification: ποιμ■νες λα■ν (poimenes la■n, 'shepherds of peoples' — Homer's epithet for kings; the legible portion 'μ■νες λα■ν' with 'ποι-' hyphenated at the previous line). Marginal gloss: 'Homerus vocat reges ποιμ■νες λα■ν. Ioannis 10. Ezech. 34. & alibi.' Running head '720'; true printed page 730.

But whence did Abel, at the beginning of the world, learn to offer sacrifices to God? He learned it certainly either from his father Adam, who, taught it by God, had likewise taught his sons; or even, with no one teaching, Abel could have known it by natural reason, and been led to do it by a certain silent instinct and impulse of nature. For just as natural reason teaches that there is one God, founder and lord of all things, so it teaches and prescribes that this God is to be worshiped and venerated by man with all worship, both interior and exterior. For just as among men, those who are subject to the power and rule of others both pay tributes and offer gifts to their lords — because this is a proof of their dominion and of their own subjection and servitude — so all men ought to venerate God exteriorly and interiorly, by that thing professing and testifying that he is Lord of all and that they are his servants, who — except by his power and kindness — can neither be freed from the evils by which they are pressed, nor attain the goods they wish, nor come to eternal life and felicity. For illustrating this history of

Abel's sacrifice, many things from those which blessed Thomas treats in the Secunda Secundae, question 85, disputing about sacrifice — which ought to be made to God alone, even according to the natural law, by all men — can be aptly accommodated.

Whence Abel learned to sacrifice: either from Adam (taught by God) or by natural reason and instinct — for natural reason teaches there is one God, to be worshiped inwardly and outwardly (as subjects pay tribute to their lords, so all must venerate God, professing him Lord and themselves servants). Aquinas, ST 2a2ae q.85 (on sacrifice due to God alone by natural law) applies. Marginal glosses: 'Unde Abel cognoverit sacrificandum esse Deo'; 'Omnes homines lege naturali obligatos esse ut Deum tam interiori cultu venerentur, in signum eius dominationis, suaeque subiectionis, servitutis'; 'S. Thomas.'

This will perhaps seem wonderful to someone: since sacred history mentions that the other Patriarchs sacrificed to God, why is it nowhere handed down in the sacred writings that the two most notable Patriarchs, Adam and Isaac, sacrificed to God? And it increases the wonder more, that Adam is believed to have been the first of all men to sacrifice, and to have been the first teacher and author of sacrificing to his descendants; but Isaac — who would doubt that so holy and religious a worshiper of God as anyone very much sacrificed to God many times? But it must be believed, without any doubt, that those two Patriarchs sacrificed to God; yet Scripture was silent about Adam's sacrifice for this reason, that since in him had been the origin of sin, it did not seem fitting and decent that in the same [person] should be shown the origin of sanctity and religion — but that rather was expressed in Abel, who was the first of all mortals called just and innocent. But Isaac, since by that thing he was the most illustrious figure of Christ the Lord — that he was, as far as depended on him [his father], immolated and sacrificed by his own father, that the force of his figure and the full mystery might remain entire — therefore Scripture does not bring him in offering external sacrifices to God. Although it would be simpler, and nearer and more fitting to the truth of history...

A puzzle: why does Scripture never record the sacrifices of Adam and Isaac, though the other Patriarchs' are recorded? Both surely sacrificed (Adam the first author of it); but Scripture is silent

about Adam because, having the origin of sin in him, it was unfitting to show in him the origin of sanctity — shown rather in Abel (first called just and innocent). Isaac, the great figure of Christ (immolated by his father Abraham, Gen 22), is not shown offering external sacrifices, that the figure remain entire. Marginal glosses: 'Cur nusquam Scriptura memoret Adamum & Isaac sacrificasse Deo'; 'Genes. 22.' Catchword: 'fuerit' (continues on the next page).

— p. 772 (PDF) · printed p. 731 —

...it would have been answered, that only those sacrifices are recorded in sacred history in which something happened divinely quite marvelous and memorable; of which kind, because nothing happened in the sacrifices of these [Adam and Isaac], therefore nothing was handed down about them either.

The simpler explanation why Adam's and Isaac's sacrifices are unrecorded: Scripture records only sacrifices at which something marvelous occurred, and nothing marvelous happened at theirs. Running head '721'; true printed page 731.

And it came to pass, after many days, that Cain offered of the fruits of the earth gifts to the Lord: Abel also offered of the firstborn of his flock, and of their fat.

New lemma: Genesis 4:3-4a (marginal 'VERS. 3.').

Why did Abel offer the firstborn of the flock and the fat? Was it because the firstborn are wont to be better and dearer to their masters, and on that account more pleasing and acceptable to God — which God himself afterward declared, in the law given through Moses, commanding the firstborn to be offered to him? But that phrase, 'Of their fat,' can have a twofold meaning: either that Abel burned the fat of the animals and consumed it to God (in that manner in which God afterward commanded to be done through Moses); or it signifies that Abel offered to God from the fattest and most fleshy of the cattle — so that from this passage one may understand that the things which many centuries later were prescribed and commanded to the Hebrews through the law of Moses, were already in use from the beginning of the world among pious men. From this narration,

therefore, it appears that Abel's oblation was better and more praiseworthy than Cain's for three reasons. For it was richer and more copious; it was likewise more choice and more excellent, that is, of the choicest and best things; and it was finally made to God with great faith and singular piety of mind.

Commentary on Gen 4:3-4a. Why Abel offered firstborn and fat: the firstborn are better and dearer (God later commanded them, Exod 13); 'of their fat' = either burning the fat to God (as Moses later commanded, Exod 29, Lev 3), or offering the fattest — showing the Mosaic law was already in use among pious men. Abel's oblation was better than Cain's for THREE reasons: richer/more copious; choicer/more excellent; made with great faith and piety. Marginal glosses: 'Cur Abel obtulerit primogenita & adipem'; 'Exod. 13.'; 'Exod. 29.'; 'Levit. 3.'; 'Abelis oblatio melior oblatione Cain tribus de causis.'

Wherefore Paul rightly praised that oblation, writing thus in chapter 11 of the epistle to the Hebrews: 'By faith Abel offered to God a fuller sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained testimony that he was just, God bearing testimony to his gifts; and by it, being dead, he yet speaks.' Which passage of Paul, Rupert luminously treating in book four of his Commentaries on Genesis, chapter two, says in this manner: 'Rightly [says] Paul that by faith Abel offered a fuller sacrifice: for by worship or religion each offered the more excellent sacrifice — since each offered to him to whom he ought, but not rightly did each divide. For Cain, when he offered his things to God, had retained himself for himself, keeping [it] laid up in earthly desire. Such a portion God does not accept, but, "Give," he says, "my son, your heart to me": but Cain retained his heart for himself, and offered the fruits of the earth to God. But Abel, offering first his heart, then his thing, offered a fuller sacrifice by faith — namely, believing that it would come to pass that that sword should be turned aside, or removed, which the Lord had placed before Paradise to guard the way of the tree of life; believing, I say, that there would be that seed of the woman which should crush the head of the ancient serpent. Having merited by this faith, it must not be doubted that he also received the spirit of prophecy, so that he might know that that seed of the woman — between which and the seed of the serpent he had

heard that God placed enmities — would be not only the seed of the woman but also the Son...'

Paul praises Abel's oblation (Heb 11:4, 'By faith Abel offered a fuller sacrifice... being dead, he yet speaks'). Rupert (Comm. in Gen. 4.2): each offered to the right one, but Cain 'divided' wrongly — retaining his heart in earthly desire (Prov 23:26, 'Give, my son, your heart to me'); Abel offered his heart first, then his thing, by faith — believing the flaming sword would be removed and the seed of the woman would come to crush the serpent; and, by that faith, receiving the spirit of prophecy to know that seed would be the Son [of God]. Marginal glosses: 'Explicatur locus Pauli qui est 11. cap. epistolae ad Hebraeos'; 'Egregia Ruperti sententia'; 'Proverb. 23.' Catchword: 'lium' (Filium; continues on the next page). Page footer signature 'ZZZ 2.'

— p. 773 (PDF) · printed p. 732 —

'...the Son of God, who, the true Lamb of God, by his innocence should trample the serpent's malice, and by his blood extinguish the flaming sword.' Thus Rupert.

End of the Rupert quote (Comm. in Gen. 4.2): Abel by faith foresaw that the seed of the woman would be the Son of God, the true Lamb, who by his innocence would crush the serpent and by his blood quench the flaming sword. Running head '722'; true printed page 732.

Verses 4 and 5. And the Lord had respect to Abel and to his gifts: but to Cain and to his gifts he had no respect.

New lemma: Genesis 4:4b-5a (marginal 'VERS. 4. & 5.').

For 'He had respect [Respexit],' the Hebrew word which Moses here used [■■■■, vaischa, from the root ■■■] signifies to look upon, to attend, to notice, and with fixed and intent gaze to discern something. But according to Oleaster it properly signifies to cease, to rest, and to be at rest — which notion of the word suits this place well. The Chaldaic Paraphrase has thus word for word: 'There was complacency with God toward Abel,' that is, Abel's gift pleased the Lord; or, as sacred Scripture is wont to say elsewhere, God was well pleased, or it was pleasing to God in Abel's gift. But Scripture is wont to signify in two ways that some sacrifice pleased God: either by saying that God 'had respect' to that sacrifice, as in this place

— and 'to have respect' is nothing else than to approve and to hold accepted; or by saying that God 'smelled' that sacrifice 'as an odor of sweetness,' which Moses writes below in chapter 8 of this book about the first sacrifice which Noah offered to God after the flood.

On 'Respexit' (Gen 4:4). HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■■ (vaischa = va-yisha', 'and he had regard,' Gen 4:4), from the root ■■■ (sha'ah, 'to look/regard'); the margin reads 'Hebraeum verbum est ■■■■ vaischa a radice ■■■.' The word signifies to look upon, attend, discern; Oleaster: to rest. Chaldaic: 'complacency toward Abel.' Scripture signifies God's pleasure in a sacrifice in two ways: 'had respect' (= approved and accepted), or 'smelled as an odor of sweetness' (as of Noah's sacrifice, Gen 8). Marginal glosses: 'Quid sit Deum respexisse ad Abel, & quo signo id cognosci potuerit'; 'Hebraeum verbum est ■■■■ (vaischa) a radice ■■■.'

But Cain understood that Abel's oblation pleased God, and not his own, by a certain external sign — which was nothing else, as Jerome teaches in the book of Hebrew Traditions on Genesis, than that God, fire being suddenly sent from heaven, burned and consumed Abel's sacrifice, Cain's oblation being wholly untouched. Which Theodotion, following, thus rendered this passage: 'And the Lord inflamed [it] upon Abel.' Nor does this conjecture lack credibility. Since by that sign we read that God afterward often declared that the sacrifices of some men pleased him: as is handed down of the sacrifice of Aaron's consecration (Lev 9), of Gideon's sacrifice (Judg 6), of David's (1 Paralip. 21), of Solomon's (2 Paralip. 7), of Elijah's (3 Kings 18), of Nehemiah's (2 Maccabees 1). That the demon was accustomed to display some similar prodigy somewhere in the sacrifices offered to him (so ever a most wicked rival of divinity, and a most cunning imitator, was the demon) Solinus relates, chapter 11: 'Not far from there,' he says, 'is the Vulcanian hill, on which those who perform divine rites pile vine-wood upon the altars, nor is fire applied to this heap when they have brought the offerings. If God is present, the sacred rite is thus proved: green twigs, though they be, conceive fire of their own accord, and with no one kindling, from the propitiated deity a burning arises. There the flame plays about the feasters, which, wandering with winding excursions, does not burn whomever it touches, and is nothing else than an image

announcing the vow rightly perfected.' Thus Solinus.

Cain knew that Abel's oblation pleased God, not his own, by an external sign: fire suddenly sent from heaven consumed Abel's sacrifice, leaving Cain's untouched (Jerome, Traditiones Hebraicae in Genesim; Theodotion rendered it 'And the Lord inflamed upon Abel'). The same sign is recorded for Aaron (Lev 9), Gideon (Judg 6), David (1 Chr 21), Solomon (2 Chr 7), Elijah (1 Kgs 18), Nehemiah (2 Macc 1). The demon imitated this prodigy (Solinus 11 — the Vulcanian hill where vine-wood on the altars ignites spontaneously if the deity is propitiated, a harmless wandering flame signaling the vow accepted). Marginal glosses: 'Quo signo sibi Abelis sacrificium placuisse Deus ostenderit'; 'Prodigiosa daemonum fallacia ex historia Solini.'

But why Moses, in describing the generation of these two brothers, names Cain before Abel; yet soon, in narrating the oblation of each, and the divine approbation of the gifts...

Raises the next question: why Moses names Cain before Abel in the account of their birth, but soon [names Abel first] in the account of their offering and God's approval. Marginal gloss: 'Cur in generatione prior nominetur Cain.' Catchword: 'Abel' (continues on the next page).

— p. 774 (PDF) · printed p. 733 —

...names Abel, but not Cain — [why] he mentions Abel before Cain — blessed Ambrose, in the first book on Cain and Abel, chapter 3, expounding the reason, writes in this manner: 'It is not idle, that although Cain was generated before, as the reading teaches, Abel is preferred in this place, nor is the order of names the same as the order of nature. What does the change of order mean, that it mentions the younger first, where the state of life and the practice of work is written? Let us inquire into the difference of the offices, that we may gather the cause of the precedence. To work the earth is prior in use, inferior in grace, to feeding sheep; for this is like a kind of teacher and prince. And deservedly the elder began himself from more ancient things, the younger preferred more recent ones, which would sprout no thorns, no thistles, and be subject to no penalty. Finally, Adam, guilty of sin, was sent from the Paradise of pleasure, to work the earth. Rightly, therefore, where these brothers are born, the order of nature is preserved even in the telling; but where the discipline of living is

expressed, the younger is preferred to the elder — because, although younger in time, he is more excellent in virtue. For innocence is later in time than malice, and of a nearly equal age, but more ancient in the nobility of merits. For old age is venerable not gray with years, but with morals; and "age," he says, "is the immaculate life of old age." For where generation is expressed, let Cain come first; where the proclamation of disciplines is made, let Abel run before. Who then would deny that adolescence, and youth itself in its beginnings, boils with the enticements of various passions? But when a riper age has succeeded, [the mind] is, as it were, the storm of pubescent wantonness dispelled, restored to tranquility, and the weary soul draws its ship into certain quiet ports. And so the grave motions of our adolescence are calmed by the faithful station of old age.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 1.3): why Abel is named before Cain in the oblation — the change of order marks the difference of offices. Tilling the earth is prior in USE but inferior in GRACE to shepherding (which is like a teacher and prince); in birth the order of nature is kept (Cain first), but in the discipline of living the younger, more virtuous, is preferred; innocence is later than malice but nobler in merit; old age is venerable by morals not years (Wisd 4:9, 'the immaculate life'); youth boils with passions, calmed by mature age. Marginal glosses: 'In oblatione autem prior memoretur Abel'; 'B. Ambrosius'; 'Sapien. 3.' NOTE: the running header on this page misprints 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VI.' for LIB. VII. Running head '723'; true printed page 733.

And the Lord said to Cain, Why are you angry? and why is your face fallen? If you do well, shall you not receive? but if ill, shall not your sin at once be present at the doors? but its appetite shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it.

New lemma: Genesis 4:6-7 (marginal 'VERS. 6. & 7.').

This passage is read in four ways: for our Latin version has one reading, the Chaldaic paraphrase another, the Hebrew scripture another, and finally the Greek translation of the Seventy Interpreters another. Treating and interpreting each of these four readings properly and distinctly, we wish to

illustrate, adorn, and enrich the meaning and doctrine of this place from the luminous commentaries and writings of the Fathers: for this is a most noble passage, and frequently employed by the Fathers and Theologians, and wonderfully celebrated. First, let us interpret the Latin reading which we set forth above. 'Why are you angry?' said the Lord to Cain, 'and why is your face fallen?' Cain was vehemently angry, because by the divine regard and approbation his brother's gift had been preferred to his own; whence at once he burned with envy together and with hatred of his brother; and this was immediately manifest from the effects, because...

Commentary on Gen 4:6-7: this famously difficult passage is read four ways — the Vulgate, the Chaldaic paraphrase, the Hebrew, and the LXX; Pererius will treat each. First the Latin (Vulgate): 'Why are you angry, and why is your face fallen?' Cain was vehemently angry that God's regard had preferred Abel's gift to his own, and burned with envy and hatred of his brother, shown at once by the effects (his fallen face). Marginal glosses: 'Quadruplex lectio huius loci'; 'Explicatur lectio vulgata versionis Latinae secundum Rupertum.' Page footer signature 'ZZZ 3'; catchword 'conci' (concidit; continues on the next page).

— p. 775 (PDF) · printed p. 734 —

...his face fell: namely, anger turned into hatred (as Rupert says, book 4 of the Commentaries on Genesis, ch. 3) inclined his face and eyes to the earth with beam-like weight; for those who meditate cruel things look at the earth. Whence is that saying in the psalm: 'Casting me forth, they have now surrounded me; they have set their eyes to bend down to the earth.' God requires both from him. For he said, 'Why are you angry?' and added, 'and why is your face fallen?' Since, even if he did not wish to kill, that he was already angry for such a cause is a crime, a diabolical sin, because he who envies another's justice imitates the devil. But to be otherwise moved or angry is human, provided the anger subside before it generates the work of sin. Wherefore it is said in the Psalm, 'Be angry, and do not sin: the things you say in your hearts, be sorry for them in your beds.' As if he said: Although for an hour, as men, you are moved, yet do nothing through anger, and for this very thing, that you were moved or angry, quickly

repent. But this anger, with which Cain was angry, Scripture nowhere permits: for it is the envy of the devil. Well, therefore, does God require both, saying, 'Why are you angry? and why is your face fallen?' — namely because he had been angry by envying, and his face had fallen by meditating parricide. So by questioning, [God], mild, calls him to mercy, to his own conscience; invites him to his own heart, that he himself may see what he is thinking, whether it be good or evil. But by further subjoining, 'Shall you not, if you do well, receive?' etc., he strikes him with a strong rebuke, that he may lift his face from the earth, that he may raise the eyes of his mind from the earth — namely, that he may cast the beam from his own eye, and look afar, and prudently see what is more expedient, what will happen, what end, what fruit will follow, if he carries out in deed the evil he deliberates in thought.

The Vulgate reading of Gen 4:6-7 continued (Rupert, Comm. in Gen. 4.3): 'his face fell' = anger turned to hatred (Ps 16/17:11, those who meditate cruelty look earthward); God requires both (why angry / why the fallen face); anger from envy of another's justice is diabolical, but ordinary anger is human if it subsides before generating sin (Ps 4:5, 'Be angry and sin not'); Cain's anger (the devil's envy) is not permitted; God mildly calls him to conscience and, by 'Shall you not, if you do well, receive?', bids him lift his face and weigh the consequences. Running head '724'; true printed page 734.

'"Shall you not," he says, "if you do well, receive? but if ill, shall not your sin at once be present at the doors? but its appetite shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it." Which is to say: Because you deliberate in mind to perpetrate the work of sin, behold, before you do it — lest afterward, when you have done it, you excuse yourself as if from ignorance — I tell you: Do you not know that if you do well, you shall receive? but if ill (understand also "you shall receive it"), for at once at the doors sin shall be present, so that wherever you turn, whatever you wish to do, it may be your companion on the way, your prince in the work. And then indeed it will be over you, and will have dominion over you, because, namely,

"Everyone who commits sin is the servant of sin." But now, before you do it, while it is still in the appetite, that appetite of it will be under you, and you shall have dominion over it: for example, just as he who is not yet made king is under the people, and the people has dominion over him, so that it may receive him if it wishes.' Thus far Rupert.

Rupert (end): 'sub te erit appetitus eius, et tu dominaberis illius' — before Cain acts, sin is still only in the appetite, so he has dominion over it; but once committed, it dominates him ('Everyone who commits sin is the servant of sin,' John 8:34); the simile of a man not yet made king, still under the people. 'Thus far Rupert.' Marginal gloss: 'Ioan. 8.'

But from this Latin reading it is clearly understood that God is a most just judge of men, both in rewarding their good deeds and in punishing their evil deeds. 'If,' he says, 'you do well, you shall receive' — namely the reward and wage of your good deeds; 'but if you do ill, at once at the doors your sin shall be present' — that is, the penalty and punishment of your sin will be at hand, nor will it let you live with a tranquil and quiet mind: for you will have your conscience as an adversary within you, which, accusing you day and night, and terrifying you with fear of the divine judgment and punishment, will never suffer you to be of a peaceful and glad mind. Similar to this place is what Paul wrote to the Romans, chapter 2: 'God,' he says, 'will render to each according to his works: to those indeed...'

Pererius's conclusion from the Vulgate reading: God is the most just judge, rewarding good deeds and punishing evil ('you shall receive' the reward; 'sin at the doors' = the penalty, the accusing conscience). Compares Paul, Rom 2:6 ('God will render to each according to his works'). Marginal gloss: 'Quanta sit Dei iudicis aequitas.' Catchword: 'dem' (quidem; continues on the next page).

— p. 776 (PDF) · printed p. 735 —

'...to those indeed who, according to the patience of good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption — eternal life; but to those who are of contention, and who do not acquiesce to truth, but believe iniquity — wrath and indignation. Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man working evil, of the Jew first and of the Greek; but glory and honor and peace to everyone working good, to the Jew first and to the Greek: for there is no

respect of persons with God.'

Completion of the Paul quotation (Rom 2:7-11): eternal life to those who seek glory by good work, wrath to the contentious; tribulation to the evildoer, glory to the doer of good — 'for there is no respect of persons with God.' Running head '725'; true printed page 735.

This too can be concluded from this Latin reading, and from the Greek and Hebrew reading (which I shall subjoin a little below) one may argue the same — and it avails very much against the heretics of our time: that man is of free will, and is drawn by no necessity to sin, but that it is in him to sin and not to sin, and to have dominion over sin (by warding it off from himself), or, by admitting it, to be subjected and enslaved to it in a most base servitude.

The passage argues (against the Protestant heretics of Pererius's time) that man has FREE WILL — drawn by no necessity to sin, able to sin or not, and to have dominion over sin or be enslaved to it. Marginal gloss: 'Libertas humanae voluntatis.'

'Under you,' the Lord said to Cain, 'will be its appetite, and you shall have dominion over it.' Which passage, excellently treating, Bernard (sermon 5 on Lent): 'Great,' he says, 'is the danger, and grave the struggle, against the domestic enemy — especially since we are the newcomer, and he the citizen: he inhabits his own region, while we are exiles and pilgrims. A great peril too, to have such frequent — nay, continuous — conflicts against the cunning of diabolical fraud: an enemy whom we cannot even see, and whom both a nature so subtle and the long exercise of his malice has made too cunning. But nevertheless it is in us, if we do not wish to be conquered; and none of us is cast down in this contest unwilling. Under you, O man, is your appetite, and you shall have dominion over it. Your enemy can stir up the motion of temptation, but it is in you, if you wish, to give or refuse consent. It is in your power, if you wish, to make your enemy your servant, so that all things may work together for you unto good. For behold, the enemy inflames desire of food, of vanity, or of impatience, brings in thoughts, or stirs up the motion of lust: do you only not

consent, and as often as you resist, so often you shall be crowned. But nevertheless we cannot deny: these things are troublesome and dangerous; yet even in the contest itself, if we manfully resist, a certain pious tranquility is born from a good conscience. I believe also, if we do not suffer those thoughts to linger as soon as we notice them in us, but the mind is roused with vehement spirit against them, that the enemy, confounded, will depart from us, nor return so willingly at once. But who are we, or what is our fortitude, that we should be able to resist so many temptations? This certainly was what God was seeking, this was that to which he busied himself to lead us: that, seeing our defect, and that there is no other help for us, we might run with all humility to his mercy.' Thus Bernard.

Bernard (Sermon 5 de Quadragesima) on 'sub te erit appetitus eius': the grave struggle against the invisible, cunning 'domestic enemy' (the devil, the 'citizen'; we the exiles); yet victory is in us (none cast down unwilling); the enemy stirs temptation, but consent is ours — resisting, we are crowned, and a pious tranquility comes from a good conscience; but our weakness shows we must run to God's mercy. Marginal glosses: 'Libertas humanae voluntatis'; 'Cum daemone lucta periculosissima.'

The Chaldaic Paraphrase has this reading of this passage: 'Shall it not, if you amend your works, be remitted to you? but if you do not amend your works, your sin is reserved to the day of judgment, on which it will come to pass that punishment is taken from you, if you do not do penance; but if you do penance, it will be remitted to you.' For that word, 'Works,' the Chaldaic word [■■■■■, Guadach] signifies not only 'to work,' but also 'to worship'; therefore some in this place interpret it as the worship of God — that is, the sacrifice which Cain had offered to God — as if the Lord wished to warn him that, by the example of his brother Abel, he should thereafter offer his sacrifices with greater faith and piety, if...

The SECOND reading — the Chaldaic Paraphrase (Targum): 'if you amend your works... if not, your sin is reserved to the day of judgment.' HEBREW/CHALDAIC GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■■■ (Guadach = ‘uvdach/‘ovadecha, 'your work/service' — the Aramaic word for 'opera,' from the root ‘avad 'to work/serve/worship'), which means both 'to work' and 'to worship'; hence some read it as the worship (sacrifice) Cain offered, God warning him to offer with greater faith like Abel.

Marginal glosses: 'Declaratur lectio, quam habet paraphrasis Chaldaica'; 'Vocabulum Chaldaicum quod hic designatur est ■■■■■ (Guadach).' Catchword: 'ret, si' (continues on the next page).

— p. 777 (PDF) · printed p. 736 —

...if he desired them to be pleasing and accepted by God. But others refer it to good works and the amendment of life: as if the Lord had said, If you amend your works, and correct your life, your sacrifices will please me — which I count as nothing, if they do not proceed from a faithful, pious, and innocent mind. So it is indeed: the dignity and merit of external works is regarded and estimated from the interior faith, piety, and charity of the heart. And most true is that saying of Solomon in the book of Proverbs: 'The victims of the impious are abominable to the Lord, the vows of the just are pleasing.' But by no means must it be here passed over in silence, how the Jerusalem Targum interprets this passage. For thus it is in it: 'Shall it not, if you amend your works in this age, be pardoned and remitted to you in the age to come? but if you do not amend your works in this age, your sin is reserved to the day of the great judgment, and at the door of the heart it will rest. Yet into your hand I have delivered the power of your concupiscence, and you — have dominion over it, whether unto good, or unto evil.'

Others take 'opera' as good works and amendment of life (external works valued by inner faith and charity; Prov 15:8, 'The victims of the impious are abominable to the Lord'). The Jerusalem Targum's fuller paraphrase: amend your works in this age and be pardoned in the next; if not, your sin is reserved to the great judgment — 'yet into your hand I have delivered the power of your concupiscence.' Marginal glosses: 'Externa opera ex interiori fide & charitate pensantur'; 'Proverb. 15.'; 'Notabilis interpretatio huius loci, quam habet Thargum Hierosolymitanum.' Running head '726'; true printed page 736.

There follows the Hebrew reading of this passage, which blessed Jerome briefly explains in the book of Hebrew Questions on Genesis. 'We are compelled by necessity,' he says, 'to dwell longer on the individual words, since now too the sense is much other in the Hebrew than in the Septuagint translators. For the Lord says to Cain: Why are you angry, and why is your face fallen? Shall it not, if you do well, be

remitted to you? and if you do not do well, before the doors your sin shall sit: and to you shall be its fellowship? but do you rather have dominion over it. But what he says is this: Why are you angry, and, tormented with envy of your brother by ill-will, do you cast down your face to the earth? Shall it not, if you do well, be remitted to you every sin of yours? or, as Theodotion says, it will be acceptable — that is, I will accept your gift, as I accepted your brother's; but if you do ill, at once sin will sit before your vestibule, and you will be accompanied by such a doorkeeper. But because you are of free will, I warn you, that sin should not have dominion over you, but you over sin.' Thus Jerome.

The THIRD reading — the Hebrew, explained by Jerome (Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim): 'if you do well, it shall be remitted; if not, sin sits before the doors... but do you rather have dominion over it.' Theodotion: 'it will be acceptable' (I will accept your gift). The stress on FREE WILL: 'sin should not have dominion over you, but you over sin.' Marginal glosses: 'Tractatur lectio Hebraica huius loci'; 'Homo est liberi arbitrii.'

But because the Hebrew word [■■■] Seeth, for which the [Latin] Interpreter renders 'you shall receive,' also signifies 'to pardon and remit,' and likewise 'to raise and lift up': therefore some render thus from the Hebrew, 'Shall not, if you do well, God pardon' — understand — 'you your sin?' Others thus, 'Shall you not, if you do well, lift up' — understand — 'your face,' that is, 'Shall you not walk with upright face, and live in joy and gladness?' Nor are there lacking those who interpret in this manner, 'Shall there not, if you do well, be exaltation for you?' — as if he should say, 'You seem to grieve that your brother is exalted and raised above you: but if you too study to do well, you will be lifted up and exalted like him' — and they contend that this explanation agrees more with the Hebrew truth.

The variant renderings of the Hebrew word ■■■ (Seeth = se'eth), which the Vulgate translates 'recipies' ('you shall receive'): it also means 'to pardon/remit' and 'to raise/lift up.' Hence: 'God will pardon your sin'; or 'you shall lift up your face' (walk with upright face in gladness); or 'there shall be exaltation for you' (be exalted like your brother if you do well). HEBREW GLYPH: ■■■ (Seeth). Some contend this last accords best with the Hebrew truth.

But of those who have studied to interpret and treat the sacred writings according to the truth of the Hebrew reading, no one seems to have examined this passage more subtly and clearly than Hieronymus ab Oleastro; whose full commentary and probable opinion on this passage, that the reader may desire nothing, I shall here add. 'The word,' he says, '[■■■] Seeth, has its origin from [■■■] Nassa, which signifies many things, but properly seems to signify to carry, to lift, and to raise up. But the word [■■■■] Chattah, [meaning] "sin," signifies...'

Introduces Oleaster's full commentary. HEBREW GLYPHS: ■■■ (Seeth) derives from the root ■■■ (Nassa = nasa', 'to carry/lift/raise'); the word ■■■■ (Chattah = chatta'th, 'sin') begins to be analyzed. Marginal gloss: 'Oleaster.' (The Oleaster quotation continues on the next page.)

— p. 778 (PDF) · printed p. 737 —

'...[the word Chattah] signifies also the penalty inflicted for sin, as in Zechariah 14: This will be the [■■■■] Chattath — that is, the penalty of the sin of Egypt; [■■■■■] Vechattath — that is, the penalty of the sin, or the punishment of all the nations. It signifies also the oblation for sin, frequently in Exodus and Leviticus: as in Leviticus 4, All the fat of the [■■■■■] Hachattath — that is, of the sin, or of the sin-offering — in which chapter it is taken three or four times in the same signification. But the following word, namely [■■■] Robes, which we render "lying," signifies to lie down, to crouch, as is clear below, Genesis 49: He bowed himself, [■■■] Rabas — that is, he lay down or lay like a lion. So Job 11: [■■■■■] Verabastha — that is, and you shall lie down, or lie, and there will be none to terrify. Therefore [■■■■] Chattath here can signify the punishment of sin, and sin itself.'

Oleaster's philology (continued): the word ■■■■ (Chattath/Chattah) signifies sin, the penalty for sin (Zech 14:19, 'Vechattath' = the punishment of the nations), and the sin-offering (frequent in Exod/Lev — e.g. Lev 4:8, 'Hachattath'). The next word ■■■ (Robes/Rabas = robetz/ravatz, 'crouching/lying') means to lie down (Gen 49:9, Jacob's blessing, 'he lay like a lion'; Job 11:19, 'Verabastha,' 'you shall

lie down'). HEBREW GLYPHS: ■■■■ (Chattath), ■■■■■ (Vechattath), ■■■■■ (Hachattath), ■■■ (Robes/Rabas), ■■■■■ (Verabastha). So ■■■■ can mean both the punishment of sin and sin itself. Running head '727'; true printed page 737 (running header correctly 'LIB. VII.').

'And if it signifies the penalty or punishment, then the sense is: Shall you not, if you do well, carry — that is, you shall carry a reward? But if you do not do well, sin lies at the door — that is, on your account is the punishment of sin; and to you [is] its desire — that is, the penalty of your sin desires to hold you; but you, if you will, shall have dominion over it — that is, it will lie with you to turn aside its penalty or punishment. But here the Lord speaks metaphorically, comparing sin, or the punishment of sin, to a dog which lies at the door desiring to enter: but it is in the Lord's power to shut the door, that it may not enter, or to open it, that it may come in. For the searcher of hearts knew that Cain was thinking wickedly against his brother, therefore he tells him that the punishment lies at the door. For it seems that, as soon as anyone commits sin, penalty or punishment desires to hold him: and this, in my judgment, is the sense of this place.'

Oleaster: if 'Chattah' means punishment — 'if you do well you shall carry a reward; if not, the punishment of sin lies at the door, desiring to hold you, but you may turn it aside.' God speaks metaphorically: sin/punishment is like a dog crouching at the door wishing to enter, but it is in the Lord's power (and Cain's) to shut or open. The searcher of hearts knew Cain plotted evil, so tells him the punishment lies at the door — the sense Oleaster prefers.

'But if you take "sin" for sin, and not for punishment, then the sense will be: if you do well, [there will be] a lifting — that is, there will be a lifting of sin, or a pardon; that is, If you do well, easy will be the pardon of sin. Others: if you do well there will be a lifting of the spirit and of the fallen countenance — as if to say, there will be cheerfulness. If you do not do well, sin lies at the door — that is, the desire of killing your brother is near you, and wishes to enter to you, namely to execute the homicide; but it will be in your power to accept it. But the context, in its letter, prefers the former sense to the latter: for there precedes, Shall you not, if you do well, carry — namely a

reward; where the discourse is not of the good work, but of its reward. When, therefore, there follows, But if [you do] ill, sin lies at the door, it seems the discourse is also of the penalty or punishment of sin; as if to say, If you do well, you shall carry a reward, but if ill, a penalty — since punishment follows sin at once,' etc.

Oleaster: if 'sin' means sin (not punishment): 'if you do well, there will be a lifting/pardon of sin' or 'a lifting of the fallen countenance = cheerfulness'; 'if not, sin (the desire to kill the brother) crouches at the door wishing to enter for the murder, but it is in your power [whether] to accept it.' Yet the letter of the context prefers the punishment-sense (since the preceding clause concerns the reward, so the following concerns the penalty — 'punishment follows sin at once').

There remains the Greek reading of this passage, according to the translation of the Seventy Interpreters, which most of the Fathers followed. It, as Jerome cites it in the book of Hebrew Traditions on Genesis (as may be seen in Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Augustine), was thus: 'The Lord said to Cain, Why is your face fallen? Have you not sinned, if you offer rightly, but do not rightly divide? Be still: to you is its turning, and you shall have dominion over it.' Of which reading, in place of a most copious and exact commentary and interpretation, there ought to be for the reader those things which the three excellent Doctors of the Catholic Church — Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Augustine — treating this passage, handed down in their writings. Ambrose indeed, in the last chapter, the sixth, of the second book on Cain and Abel, and through the whole seventh chapter, in this...

The FOURTH reading — the Greek/LXX (followed by most Fathers; as Jerome cites it, and as seen in Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine): 'Why is your face fallen? Have you not sinned, if you offer rightly but do not rightly divide? Be still: to you is its turning, and you shall have dominion over it.' On this reading Pererius will give the commentaries of Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 2.6-7), Chrysostom, and Augustine. Page footer signature 'AAAA'; catchword 'modum' (continues on the next page).

— p. 779 (PDF) · printed p. 738 —

...he writes in this manner: 'Not, therefore, the quantity of the oblation, but the mind of the one rendering it, and the quality, and the affection, is considered. Rightly, therefore, did Cain offer, because an

oblation is a mark of devotion and a sign of thanksgiving; but he did not rightly divide, because before all things he ought to have offered the firstfruits to God, that he might begin from the grace of the Author. For this is the order of dividing, that the first should precede the second, not the second the first; and that heavenly things be preferred to earthly, not earthly to heavenly. But because Cain confounded this order, it is said to him, You have sinned, be still. God teaches all things: first, that you sin not, as he warned in Adam; second, if you have sinned, that you be still, as you are taught in Cain. For we ought to blush, and to condemn sin, not to defend it, because by shame the fault is diminished, by defense it is heaped up. And by being silent we are corrected, by contention we slip further. Let there at least be shame, where there is no absolution. Whence that saying, The just man in the beginning of his speech is his own accuser; and by Isaiah the Lord: Tell you your iniquities first, that you may be justified. How great the grace of shame, that shame should hold the justice which the guilt of the crime has taken away! And therefore he says, Be still, since you have nothing to excuse. Its fault's turning is to you: for the brother is not joined to it, but the error is ascribed of which he himself is the author; In you, he says, will the crime return, which began from you. You have nothing in which you may accuse necessity rather than your own mind. Upon you the wickedness is turned back; you are its prince. Well he says, You are its prince. For impiety is the mother of misdeeds; and he who has sinned more gravely, easily slips into the rest. For how can he refrain from human wrongs, who has violated divine ones, and be good to men, who has injured God? Therefore vices of every kind follow the guilt of more atrocious crimes, since whither the shameful deeds have inclined, thither the rest lean. You, therefore, are the prince of your work, you the leader of the crime: error did not draw you unwilling, nor imprudent, but a voluntary offender; by judgment, not by a slip, you wrought guile, by which you yourself convict yourself guilty of injury to the divine.' Thus Ambrose.

The Greek/LXX reading expounded by Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 2.6-7): not the quantity but the mind of the offerer matters; Cain 'did not rightly divide' — he should have offered the firstfruits first (the order: first before second, heavenly before earthly). 'You have sinned, be still': God teaches first not to sin (in Adam), then to be still if one has sinned (in Cain); we must blush and condemn sin, not defend it (shame diminishes, defense heaps up; Prov 18:17, 'the just is his own accuser'; Isa 43:26, 'tell your iniquities first'). 'Quiesce' because Cain has nothing to excuse — the crime returns upon its author; Cain was a voluntary, not a deceived, offender. Marginal glosses: 'Interpretatio huius loci secundum Ambrosium'; 'Proverb. 18.'; 'Isaia 43.'; 'Iuxta 70.' (the LXX reading). Running head '728'; true printed page 738.

Explaining this same passage in ample and eloquent speech, as is his wont, Chrysostom (homily 18 on Genesis) writes in this manner: 'Weigh the ineffable mercy of God, and, in teaching, the humility fitting for us. For after he saw Cain himself assailed by the affection of envy, out of his kindness he applies fitting remedies to him, that he may at once emerge and not be covered by the waters: Why, he says, are you become sad? why is your face fallen? because in your face too you show the greatness of your grief; why has anger invaded you? why did you not consider from yourself what ought to be done? Have you offered a sacrifice to a man, who could be deceived? Do you not know that I have no need that anything be offered, but I want the sound mind of the offerers? Why is your face fallen? Have you not, if you offered rightly, but did not rightly divide, [sinned]? This indeed, that you took to mind that something was to be offered, is worthy of praise; but that you do not rightly divide, that wrought the repudiation of the thing offered. For it behooves one offering to God to apply great diligence in discerning. And as much as those differ, who offers and who receives, so great a diversity also in the discretion to be made. But of these things you thought nothing, but as it happened by chance, you offered; and therefore your gifts could not be accepted. For just as your intention, with which you made the oblation, reckoning nothing to differ, made the things offered by you rejectable, so your brother's mind, which was upright and had a worthy zeal in discerning, made his gifts accepted. But nevertheless, not even so do I demand the

penalty of the offense, but I only show the offense, and bring counsel; which...'

Chrysostom (homily 18 on Genesis) on the same passage: God's ineffable mercy and humility in teaching; he applies remedies to Cain lest he drown in the waters of envy. 'Have you offered a sacrifice to a man, who could be deceived? I want the sound mind of the offerers.' The offering was praiseworthy, but 'not rightly dividing' caused the repudiation — one must exercise great discernment in offering to God; Cain, thinking nothing of this, offered by chance, so his gifts were not accepted, while Abel's discerning mind made his accepted; yet God does not demand the penalty but shows the offense and brings counsel. Marginal glosses: 'Interpretatio eiusdem loci secundum Chrysostomum'; 'Offerentem Deo in discernendo magnam oportet adhibere diligentiam.'

— p. 780 (PDF) · printed p. 739 —

'...which counsel, if you are willing to receive it, you will both amend the sin, and not involve yourself in graver evils. How? You have sinned, and gravely sinned, but I do not punish you for the offense: for I am merciful, and I do not wish the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live. Therefore, because you have sinned, be still: make tranquility of your thoughts, and free your mind from the storms of inundating waves; restrain those tumults of yours, lest you add another graver one to the prior sin; do not seize a counsel such that medicine may thereafter avail nothing. Do not deliver yourself captive to the malign demon: You have sinned, be still. He knew from the beginning that he was here about to attack his brother, and therefore beforehand he restrains him with words. For God, to whom even hidden things are known, because he knew the motions of his heart, by much admonishing and by uttering words suited to his weakness, brought forth a fitting narration to him, doing all his own part, even though he, the medicine being repulsed, cast himself into the depth of fratricide. You have sinned, be still. Do not think, he says, that although I have opposed your sacrifice on account of the depraved mind, and have held your brother's oblation accepted on account of the sound intention, that therefore I deprive you of the primacy, and take away from you the dignity of the firstborn. For although I have

pursued him with honor, and his gifts have been accepted, yet nevertheless his turning is to you, and you shall have dominion over him. And after this sin I permit that you enjoy the privileges of the firstborn, and I command that he be under your power and dominion. See the mercy of the Lord, how he strives to soothe his fury and madness, and by these words to take away his impetus. For seeing the motions of his mind, and knowing his cruel and bloody will, he now wishes to pre-mitigate his reason, and to induce serenity into his mind, by subjecting his brother to him, and diminishing nothing of his power. But nevertheless, after so great care and so great remedies, he felt no further advantage from it.' Thus Chrysostom.

Chrysostom (continued): God's mercy — 'I do not wish the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live' (Ezek 18:23,32); 'Peccasti, quiesce' — do not add a graver sin, nor deliver yourself captive to the demon. God foreknew Cain would attack his brother, and forestalled it with fitting words, though Cain plunged into fratricide anyway. God assures Cain he does not lose his primacy/birthright: 'his turning is to you, and you shall have dominion over him' (over Abel) — the Lord's mercy soothing his fury by subjecting the brother to him; yet Cain gained nothing. Marginal gloss: 'Ezechiel 18.' Running head '729'; true printed page 739.

But these same words, according to the reading of the Seventy Interpreters which we set forth above, Augustine most diligently and accurately interpreted, book 15 of the City of God, chapter 7. 'God spoke,' he says, 'to Cain in that manner in which he spoke to the first men through a subject creature, or as their companion, in a fitting form. But what did this profit Cain? did he not fulfill the crime conceived in killing his brother, even after the word of the divine admonition? For when he had distinguished the sacrifices of both, having respect to the one, despising the one of this [Cain] — which, it must not be doubted, could be known by some visible attesting sign — and God had done this because the works of this one were evil, but those of his brother good: Cain was greatly saddened, and his face fell. For so it is written. And the Lord said to Cain, Why are you become sad, and why is your face fallen? Have you not, if you offer

rightly, but do not rightly divide, sinned? Be still, for to you is its turning, and you shall have dominion over it. In this admonition which God brought forth to Cain, that indeed which was said — Have you not, if you offer rightly, but do not rightly divide, sinned? — because it is not clear why or whence it was said, its obscurity has given birth to many senses, since each treater of the divine Scriptures tries to express it according to the rule of faith. For a sacrifice is rightly offered, when it is offered to the true God, to whom alone one must sacrifice. But it is not rightly divided, when they are not rightly discerned — either the places, or the times, or the things themselves which are offered, or he who offers, or he to whom it is offered, or those to whom what is offered is distributed to eat...'

Augustine (De Civitate Dei 15.7) on the LXX reading: God spoke to Cain 'through a subject creature' (as to the first men); it profited Cain nothing — he killed his brother anyway. God distinguished the sacrifices by a visible sign because Cain's works were evil, Abel's good. The phrase 'if you offer rightly, but do not rightly divide, [you have] sinned' is obscure and has bred many senses; a sacrifice is rightly offered only to the true God; 'not rightly divided' = failing to discern rightly the places, times, things offered, the offerer, the recipient, or those to whom the offering is distributed. Marginal glosses: 'Diligentissima huius loci secundum Augustinum explanatio'; 'Deus quomodo cum patribus loqueretur'; 'Sacrificium recte offertur cum vero Deo offertur.' Page footer signature 'AAAA 2'; catchword 'ut di' (continues on the next page).

— p. 781 (PDF) · printed p. 740 —

'...so that by "dividing" we here understand discretion: whether when it is offered where it ought not, or that not there but elsewhere it ought; or when it is offered when it ought not, or that not then but at another time; or when that is offered which nowhere and never at all was owed; or when a man keeps for himself the choicer things of the same kind, than those he offers to God; or when a profane person, or anyone whom it is not lawful, becomes a partaker of the thing offered. But in which of these Cain displeased God cannot easily be found. But since John the Apostle, when he spoke of these brothers, said, Not as Cain, who was of the wicked one, and killed his brother; and for what

cause did he kill him? because his own works were wicked, but his brother's just — it is given to understand that God did not have respect to his gifts for this reason: that by this very thing he divided badly, giving to God something of his own, but to himself his very self. Which all do, who, following not God's but their own will — that is, living not with an upright but a perverse heart — nevertheless offer God a gift, by which they think him to be bribed, so that he may aid them not in healing their depraved desires, but in fulfilling them. And this is proper to the earthly city: to worship God or gods by whose aid it may reign in victories and earthly peace — not from the charity of consulting [their good], but from the desire of dominating. For the good use the world for this, that they may enjoy God; but the evil, on the contrary, that they may enjoy the world, wish to use God — who nevertheless now believe either that he exists, or that he cares for human affairs; for far worse are those who do not even believe this. And so, Cain having learned that God had respect to his brother's sacrifice, not to his own, ought surely, being changed, to have imitated his good brother, not, being puffed up, to have envied him. But because he was saddened, and his face fell, this sin God chiefly reproves — sadness over another's goodness, and that a brother's. For, reproving this, he interrogated, saying, Why are you saddened, and why is your face fallen? For because he envied his brother, God saw it, and reproved it. For to men, from whom another's heart is hidden, it could be ambiguous and altogether uncertain whether that sadness grieved for his own malignity (in which he had learned he displeased God), or for his brother's goodness (by which he pleased God, when he looked upon his sacrifice). But God, rendering the reason why he was unwilling to accept his oblation — that Cain should rather deservedly displease himself than undeservedly the brother, since he was unjust by not rightly dividing (that is, by not rightly living), and unworthy that his oblation should be approved — showed how unjust it was that he hated his just brother without cause.

Yet not dismissing him without a holy, just, and good mandate: Be still, he says, for to you is its turning, and you shall have dominion over it. Over the brother? Far be it. Over what, then, but sin? For he had said, You have sinned; then he added, Be still, for to you is its turning, and you shall have dominion over it. It can indeed be understood thus, that the turning of sin ought to be to the man himself, so that he may know he ought to attribute what he sins to no other than himself. For this is the wholesome medicine of penitence, and a not-incongruous petition for pardon; so that where he says, For to you is its turning, "Will be" is not understood, but "Let it be" — in the manner of one commanding, not predicting. For then will each have dominion over sin, if he sets it before himself not by defending but by repenting and subjecting it; otherwise he will also serve it, as it dominates, if he lends patronage to it as it approaches.'

Augustine (De Civ. Dei 15.7, continued): 'not rightly dividing' = the discretion in offering (wrong place/time/thing/offerer/recipient); which fault was Cain's is hard to say, but by 1 John 3:12 (Cain's works were evil, his brother's just), he 'divided badly' — giving God something of his own but keeping himself. This is proper to the EARTHLY CITY (using God to enjoy the world) — the famous contrast: 'the good use the world to enjoy God, the evil use God to enjoy the world.' God chiefly reproves Cain's sin of grieving at his brother's goodness, and gives the reason he rejected the oblation (Cain unjust 'by not rightly dividing = not rightly living'). 'Tu dominaberis illius' = dominion over SIN, not the brother; 'ad te conversio eius' is a command ('let it be'), not a prediction — each rules sin by repenting and subjecting it, not defending it. Marginal glosses: '1. Ioan. 3.'; 'Boni utuntur mundo, ut fruantur Deo'; 'Invidentiam charitatis fraternae maxime Deus arguit'; 'Homo nulli alii quam sibi peccatum suum debet tribuere.' Running head '730'; true printed page 740.

'But that sin may be understood as carnal concupiscence itself, of which the Apostle says...'

Augustine (continued) turns to another sense: sin = carnal concupiscence, of which the Apostle speaks. Marginal gloss: 'Concupiscentia... peccatum suum appellatur.' Catchword: 'Apostolus' (continues on the next page).

— p. 782 (PDF) · printed p. 741 —

'...the Apostle, The flesh lusts against the spirit; among whose fruits of the flesh he also mentions envy, by which Cain was certainly goaded and inflamed to his brother's destruction. "Will be" is well understood — that is, for to you will be its turning, and you shall have dominion over it. For when that carnal part has been moved, which the Apostle calls "sin" where he says, It is not I who work it, but the sin that dwells in me — which part of the soul even the Philosophers say is vicious, not such as ought to draw the mind, but which the mind ought to command and restrain from illicit works by reason — when, therefore, it has been moved to commit something wrongly, let there be such acquiescence and obedience to the Apostle saying, Do not present your members as arms of iniquity to sin, [that the carnal part], tamed and conquered, is turned to the mind, so that reason, being subjected, may rule. This God commanded to him who was inflamed with the torches of envy against his brother, and desired to take away him whom he ought to have imitated: Be still, he says — that is, restrain your hands from crime. Let not sin reign in your mortal body, to obey its desires, nor present your members as arms of iniquity to sin. For to you is its turning, while it is not aided by relaxing, but is bridled by [your] being still. And you shall have dominion over it, so that, when it is not permitted to work outwardly under the power of the ruling and benevolent mind, it may grow accustomed not to be moved even inwardly. Something similar is said in the same divine book about the woman too, when, after sin, God interrogating and judging, they received sentences of damnation — the devil in the serpent, and she and her husband in themselves. For when he had said to her, Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows and your groaning, and in sorrows you shall bring forth children, he then added, And to your husband shall be your turning, and he shall have dominion over you. What was said to Cain about sin, or about the vicious concupiscence of the flesh, [is said] in this place about the sinful woman: where it must be understood that the man ought to rule the wife, [as] a soul

ruling the flesh similarly. Wherefore the Apostle says, He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever had his own flesh in hatred. For these things are to be healed as our own, not to be condemned as another's. But that command of God, Cain received as a transgressor. For, the vice of envy growing strong, he lay in wait for and killed his brother. Such was the founder of the earthly city. How Cain also signified the Jews, by whom Christ was killed — the shepherd of the sheep of men, whom Abel, the shepherd of the sheep of cattle, prefigured, since it is a matter of prophetic allegory — I spare now to say, and I recall that I said some things hence against Faustus the Manichean.' Thus Augustine.

Augustine (conclusion, De Civ. Dei 15.7): sin = carnal concupiscence (Gal 5:17, 'the flesh lusts against the spirit'; envy among the fruits of the flesh, Gal 5:21; Rom 7:17, 'not I, but the sin that dwells in me'; the philosophers' 'vicious part' the mind must command; Rom 6:12-13, 'Let not sin reign... nor present your members as arms of iniquity'). 'Tu dominaberis illius' = restrain the hand from crime. The parallel with the woman (Gen 3:16, 'ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse dominabitur tui'): man rules the wife as the mind rules the flesh (Eph 5:28-29, 'He who loves his wife loves himself'). But Cain received the command as a transgressor and killed his brother — 'the founder of the earthly city'; how he prefigured the Jews who killed Christ (the shepherd of men, prefigured by Abel the shepherd of cattle) Augustine defers (treated against Faustus the Manichean). Marginal glosses: 'Rom. 7.'; 'Rom. 6.'; 'Genes. 3.'; 'Ephes. 5.'; 'Lib. 22. c. 17.' Running head '731'; true printed page 741.

And Cain said to his brother Abel, Let us go forth abroad. And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel, and killed him. And the Lord said to Cain, Where is Abel your brother? He answered, I know not: am I my brother's keeper?

New lemma: Genesis 4:8-9 (Cain murders Abel; God's question and Cain's evasion). Marginal 'VERS. 8. & 9.'

For that phrase 'Let us go forth abroad,' in Greek it is 'Into the field,' or, as Ambrose reads, 'Into the plain.' But in Hebrew and Chaldaic it is neither, but precisely it is, 'Cain said to his brother Abel': but what [he said is not

expressed]...

Commentary on Gen 4:8: 'Egrediamur foras' — the Greek (LXX) has 'Into the field' (Ambrose 'Into the plain'), but the Hebrew and Chaldaic have neither; there it is precisely 'Cain said to his brother Abel' (with the content of what Cain said left unexpressed). Marginal gloss: 'Varia interpretatio huius loci.' Page footer signature 'AAAA 3'; catchword 'autem' (continues on the next page).

— p. 783 (PDF) · printed p. 742 —

...but what he said is not explained. Jerome thinks it must be supplied that Cain said to his brother Abel those things which the Lord had spoken to him. 'Superfluous, therefore,' says Jerome, 'is what is found in the volume of the Samaritans, and in our volume, "Let us pass over into the field."' But by the volume of the Samaritans, Jerome understands the Pentateuch of Moses, which the Samaritans had, using as many letters as the Hebrews, differing only in figures and points, as he has it in the Prologue commonly called 'Galeatus.' But Ezra, after the return of the Hebrews from the Babylonian captivity, invented other letters, in which the Hebrew tongue is fixed to the present day; whereas up to that time the characters of the Samaritans and of the Hebrews had been the same. According to blessed Jerome, therefore, Cain said to his brother Abel whatever things God had spoken to him in admonishing. Others think he spoke blandly and lovingly with Abel, dissimulating the hatred which he bore in his breast, that he might the more easily lead him where he wished, and oppress him off his guard.

What Cain said to Abel is unexpressed. Jerome (Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.): supply that Cain repeated God's admonition; 'Transeamus in campum' (in the Samaritan Pentateuch and the Vulgate) is superfluous. On the Samaritan letters (differing from the Hebrew only in figures) vs. the new Hebrew script Ezra devised after the Babylonian captivity (Jerome, Prologus Galeatus). Others: Cain spoke blandly to trap the unwary Abel. Marginal glosses: 'Hieronym. in lib. Traditionum Hebraicarum in Genesim'; 'Hieronym. in Praefatio in lib. Reg. Esdras Hebraeorum litteras reperit.' Running head '732'; true printed page 742.

Cajetan writes that it is uncertain whether Cain's speech was peaceful, or provocative to anger. 'For if,' he says, 'it be regarded with respect to the

preceding divine admonition, it could be that Cain spoke peaceably with Abel, yet feignedly simulating reverence for the divine admonition; but if it be regarded with respect to his subsequent deed, it could be that he began with hard and contumelious words, provoking Abel, that from this too he might take occasion of raging against him.' But the former sense fits the text and context more. The text indeed, for since it is not narrated what he said, it is insinuated that Cain was not so hindered by anger as not to converse familiarly with his brother as he was wont; but the context, because it is subjoined that they were together engaged in the field, from which conversation Abel would have abstained if he had felt his brother angry against him; and for the confirmation of this sense it is added that, when both were in the field, Cain rose up against Abel and killed him. For by saying he 'rose up,' it signifies that unexpectedly — namely, while [Abel] was lying or sitting — he rose up against Abel, or, as it is in Hebrew, 'to Abel' — namely to attack, or perhaps to seize him sitting or lying — that he might more easily, and himself wholly unharmed, kill him.

Cajetan: uncertain whether Cain spoke peaceably (feigning reverence for God's warning) or provocatively (to seize a pretext). Pererius prefers the peaceful sense: it fits the text (nothing said is narrated) and context (they were together in the field, which Abel would avoid if he sensed anger). 'Surrexit' = rose up unexpectedly on Abel sitting or lying (Hebrew 'to Abel' = to attack/seize him), that he might kill him easily and unharmed. Marginal gloss: 'Caietanus.'

The author of the Jerusalem paraphrase, more clearly narrating what Cain said to his brother Abel — which in Hebrew had not been expressed — has thus in this place: 'Cain said to Abel, Come and let us go out into the field. And it happened, when both had gone out into the field, Cain answered, There is no judgment, nor judge, nor another world, nor good reward for the just, nor penalty for the impious; nor by God's mercy was the world created, nor by God's mercy is it governed — because your oblation was received with good pleasure, but mine was not received with good pleasure. Abel answered and said to Cain: There is a judgment, there is a judge, there is another world, there is likewise a reward for the good, and a penalty for the

impious; by God's mercy too the world was created, and by God's mercy it is governed; but because my works were better than yours, my oblation was received with good pleasure, but yours was not received. And when those two contended in the field, Cain rose up against Abel and killed him.' Thus it is in the Jerusalem paraphrase.

The Jerusalem Targum's fuller (haggadic) narration of the field-dialogue: Cain's denial of providence and the afterlife ('no judgment, no judge, no other world, no reward or penalty; the world neither created nor ruled by mercy') versus Abel's affirmation of them; then Cain kills Abel. Marginal gloss: 'Observanda interpretatio huius loci secundum paraphrasim Hierosolymitanum.'

Saint Ambrose, interpreting these words which Cain said to his brother Abel,

Introduces Ambrose's exposition of Cain's 'Let us go out into the field.' Catchword: 'Exeamus' (continues on the next page).

— p. 784 (PDF) · printed p. 743 —

'"Let us go out into the field," book 2 on Cain and Abel, ch. 8. Admonished by God, Cain, that he should be still, increases his insolence, heaps up the outrage. What, then, does he mean by saying, Let us go into the field? unless because a place bare of things generating is chosen for parricide? For where ought the brother to be killed, but where fruit was lacking? As if foreboding, nature had denied germination to the place of so great a crime, because it was not fitting that the same soil should both receive the contagions of parricidal blood against nature, and germinate fruits according to nature. Rightly he himself says, let us go into the field. He does not say, let us go into Paradise, where fruits flourish, nor into some cultivated and fruitful place. To parricides themselves it is indicated that they cannot have the fruit of the crime, nor does fruit remain with those who have lent service to such impiety. For they flee the very kindness of the elements — as this Cain, who seems to have feared lest a more bountiful produce of the good earth should hinder the sad

deed, and [feared] by the accustomed liberality of the generative earth, by which it makes fetuses and various fruits germinate for itself, in this preparation of the crime too, or by the mute appearance of it, to recall his fraternal affection. The robber flees the day as a witness of his crime, the adulterer blushes at the light as conscious of adultery, the parricide flees the fecundity of the lands. For how could he see the associations of common birth, who slaughtered the partner of his own blood? Joseph is sent into a dry pit. Amnon is killed within the house. Nature, therefore, imparted a just judgment, by depriving of the dowry of their gift those places in which parricide was going to be, that by a certain condemnation of the innocent soil it might show the future punishments of the guilty: on account of the crime of men, therefore, the very elements are condemned. Finally, David wished a penalty of perpetual sterility on the mountains in which Jonathan was slain with his father, saying, You mountains of Gilboa, let neither dew nor rain fall upon you, you mountains of death.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 2.8) on 'Exeamus in campum': a bare, fruitless place is chosen for parricide (nature denies fruit to the site of such crime; the same soil cannot both receive parricidal blood and bear fruit). The robber flees the day, the adulterer the light, the parricide the earth's fecundity; the elements are condemned for man's crime — Joseph's dry pit (Gen 37), Amnon killed indoors (2 Sam 13), David's curse of sterility on Gilboa where Jonathan fell (2 Sam 1). Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 37.'; '2. Reg. 13.'; '2. Reg. 1.' Running head '733'; true printed page 743.

But by what kind of death Abel was killed, Moses did not explain. But that his death was joined with the shedding of blood, the Lord indicated by those words, 'The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth'; and our Lord, in Matthew ch. 23, says, 'From the blood of Abel the just,' etc. Therefore he was not killed by strangulation, or by drowning in water. Some of the Hebrews hand down that he was torn to pieces by Cain's bites: which was fabricated by them, not because it is true, but that they might the more vehemently exaggerate Cain's hatred and rage against Abel. Either, therefore, by iron, or by clubs, or by stones was he slain. Catharinus thinks in this place that the devil instigated and incited Cain to the hatred and

killing of his brother Abel, fearing, namely, lest — because Abel was holy and innocent and most pleasing to God — he himself should be that seed of the woman, or certainly [the seed] should be about to be generated from him, by whom it had been foretold by God that the serpent's head would be crushed.

By what death was Abel killed? Moses does not say, but it involved shedding blood ('Vox sanguinis,' Gen 4:10; Matt 23:35, 'from the blood of Abel the just') — so not by strangling or drowning; the Hebrews' story of Cain 'biting' him is an exaggeration; he was slain by iron, clubs, or stones. Catharinus: the devil incited Cain, fearing lest holy Abel be the seed of the woman (or its ancestor) foretold to crush the serpent's head. Marginal gloss: 'Quo genere necis interemptus sit Abel.'

But before hurrying on to other things, it is pleasing in this place to set down how Josephus narrates the history of these brothers up to this point, in the first book of the Antiquities. 'To Adam and Eve,' he says, 'were born male sons, [and] two daughters were also born. The first son born was Cain, which is interpreted "acquisition." Abel was born later: that word signifies mourning. And these indeed were each intent on his own pursuits. Abel cultivated justice, and, reckoning God present in all his actions, gave attention to virtue, leading the pastoral life; but Cain was most wicked, and, gaping after gain, first devised to plow the earth. And when both sacrificed to God, Cain [offered] of the field and of the trees...'

Josephus (Antiquities 1) on the brothers: to Adam and Eve were born sons and two daughters; Cain ('acquisition') born first, Abel ('mourning') later; Abel just, cultivating virtue and the pastoral life, Cain wicked and greedy, the first to plow the earth. Marginal glosses: 'Expositio Iosephi'; 'Frivola ratio Iosephi, cur sacrificium Abel potius quam Cain acceptum Deo fuerit.' Catchword: '& arbo' (continues on the next page).

— p. 785 (PDF) · printed p. 744 —

'...and of the trees offered the fruits, but Abel the firstborn of the flock. Whose sacrifice was more acceptable to God, because it consisted of things generated by the spontaneity of nature, than those which a greedy and industrious man had by a certain force extorted from

nature. Therefore Cain killed his brother, and, his corpse being hidden, thought the matter would be secret.' Thus Josephus.

End of the Josephus quote: Abel's sacrifice (the firstborn of the flock, spontaneous natural products) was more acceptable than Cain's (fruits 'extorted from nature' by labor) — a reason Pererius has flagged as 'frivolous.' Cain hid Abel's corpse, thinking the deed would stay secret. Running head '734'; true printed page 744.

Verses 9 and 10. And the Lord said to Cain, Where is Abel your brother? He answered, I know not: am I my brother's keeper? And he said to him, What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth.

New lemma (repeated): Genesis 4:9-10 (marginal 'VERS. 9. & 10.').

This dialogue between God and Cain, says Cajetan, seems to have been made in some sensible form, from the many conversations passing between the two, and moreover from the sensible sign which Cain obtained from God. Yet above, when God first spoke to Cain, saying, Why are you angry? and why is your face fallen? the same Cajetan thinks that God spoke, not through external speech, or any sensible form, but by an interior and spiritual locution — in that manner, namely, in which, according to the gentle governance of the human race, God is wont to address men after sin, reproving them that they may repent, through the interior accusation and reproof of synderesis. But here God begins the inquiry into the murder of Abel from the place, saying, Where is Abel? — that, because Abel appeared nowhere, Cain might begin to recognize that his crime was detected. He inquires, moreover, that he may teach the judges of men to summon the accused, however certain, before they judge him; nor does he use any contumely, that judges too, in exercising judgments, may abstain from all injury and reviling.

Cajetan: this dialogue (Gen 4:9-10) was made in a 'sensible form' (from the many exchanges and the sensible sign); whereas the earlier 'Quare iratus es?' was an interior/spiritual locution (God reproving through the accusation of synderesis). God begins the inquiry 'from the place' ('Where is Abel?') so Cain recognizes his crime is detected; and to teach judges to summon the accused before

judging, without contumely. Marginal glosses: 'Caietanus'; 'Indices ex hoc Dei facto quid dicere debeant.'

According to Ambrose (book 2 on Cain and Abel, ch. 9), God interrogates Cain about his brother Abel, that he may lead him to confession of the crime and to penitence. 'For the confession of crimes,' he says, 'is an abridgment of punishments: hence in secular judgments those who deny are set on the rack and tortured, and a certain compassion for the one confessing touches the judge. There is a certain shame in sins, and it is a portion of penitence to confess the crime, not to transfer the guilt, but to acknowledge it. The shame of the guilty mitigates the judge, but the pertinacity of the deniers rouses him. God wishes to provoke you to penitence; he wishes indulgence to be hoped from him; he wishes to demonstrate by your confession that he himself is not the author of malice, nor do men sin compelled by necessity. For those who refer their sin to a certain necessity of decree or of their work, as the Gentiles assert, seem to accuse the divine, as if [God's] force were the cause of the sin. For he who kills, compelled by some necessity, kills as it were unwilling. But those things which are from us have no excuse; those which are beyond us are excusable. But how much graver than the sin itself, to refer to God what you have done, and to transfer the odium of your guilt to the author, not of the crime, but of innocence?' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 2.9): God interrogates Cain to lead him to confession and penitence — 'confession is an abridgment of punishments' (deniers are racked; the confessor moves the judge to mercy). God wishes to provoke penitence and to show that he is not the author of malice, nor do men sin by necessity — against the Gentiles' fate-excuse (what is from us has no excuse); how much graver to blame God, the author not of the crime but of innocence. Marginal glosses: 'Praeclarum Ambrosii dictum, de voluntaria confessione peccatorum'; 'Deus non est auctor mali'; 'nec necessitate coacti homines peccant.'

But weigh Cain's response — lying, indeed, impious, finally inhuman...

Pererius turns to weigh Cain's answer ('I know not: am I my brother's keeper?') — lying, impious, inhuman. Catchword: 'inhuma' (inhumanum; continues on the next page).

— p. 786 (PDF) · printed p. 745 —

...inhuman and savage. 'I know not: am I my brother's keeper?' — lying, because he denies that he knows what he himself nevertheless had done; impious, because he denies it to God, as if what he himself had done could be hidden from him. For he had hidden the body of Abel, killed by himself, in some place, or covered it with earth, and had thought that this could escape God's notice. Why, therefore, did there not happen to him at once what [happened] to that Ananias, to whom, when Peter had said, 'You have not lied to men, but to God,' immediately fell down lifeless? But God, such is his clemency, spared Cain's life for a time. That too — 'Am I my brother's keeper?' — spoken as if indignant, declared his irreverence and impiety toward God. But how great the inhumanity and savagery, to have put off and cast away all affection of fraternal love? Was it not equitable that the elder-born brother should exercise the guardianship and care of the younger? But God presses the one dissimulating the crime: 'What,' he says, 'have you done?' Do not deny, he says: the crime is most known to me. But how did you dare to conceive in mind and perpetrate so monstrous a crime? What have you done? Do you not yet acknowledge the enormity of your crime? Recognize and weigh what you have done, that by the recognition of so great a crime you may come to confession and penitence of it, whereby you may be able to obtain pardon and indulgence from me.

Pererius weighs Cain's answer: LYING (denies knowing what he did), IMPIOUS (denies it to God, as if the hidden corpse could escape him — cf. Ananias, Acts 5:4, who fell dead; but God spared Cain for a time), IRREVERENT and INHUMAN ('am I my brother's keeper?' — casting off fraternal love; the elder should have guarded the younger). God presses 'Quid fecisti?' not to learn but to lead Cain to acknowledge, confess, and repent his crime, that he might obtain pardon. Running head '735' (the running header misprints 'LIB. VI.' for LIB. VII); true printed page 745.

But that the Lord might uncover all Cain's dissimulation, and cut off all tergiversation, he indicates to him the crime of fratricide: 'The voice,' he says, 'of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth' — as if he said, There is no need of witnesses, nor of your confession: the very blood which you cruelly shed betrays your crime, testifies, and with the loudest cry

demands from me vengeance for you. In Hebrew it is in the plural number, [■■■ ■■■, Kol demé] 'The voice of the bloods': either to declare the abundance of the shed blood; or because, on account of the many wounds which Cain had inflicted, the blood had been shed from Abel's body in many ways; or because Abel had been killed before he generated any offspring, wherefore, he being killed, all his posterity, who could have been procreated from him, were in a certain manner killed together with him.

God cuts off Cain's evasion by naming the crime: 'The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth' (Gen 4:10) — no need of witnesses; the shed blood itself demands vengeance. HEBREW GLYPH verified by magnification: ■■■ ■■■ (Kol demé = qol deme, 'the voice of the bloods of' — ■■■ 'voice' + ■■■, the plural construct of ■■ 'blood'); so the Hebrew has the plural 'bloods,' which signifies either the abundance of shed blood, or the many wounds Cain inflicted, or that Abel was killed before begetting offspring (so his whole potential posterity was killed with him). Marginal note reflects the plural.

We read, moreover, in the sacred writings, that there are four kinds of sins which, beyond the rest, cry to God — that is, demand his great and swift vengeance. One is the sin of homicide, of which God said in this place: 'The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth.' Another is the unspeakable sin against nature, of which, in ch. 18 of this book, God said: 'The cry of the Sodomites and Gomorrhaeans is multiplied, and their sin is exceedingly aggravated. I will go down, and see whether they have completed in deed the cry which has come to me.' The third sin is the oppression of the weak, whence in the book of Exodus, ch. 3, [God] says: 'The cry of the sons of Israel has come to me, and I have seen their affliction, by which they are oppressed by the Egyptians.' The fourth is the withholding of the wage of workers, of which blessed James, ch. 5 of his Epistle, has thus: 'Behold, the wage of the workers who reaped your regions, which has been defrauded by you, cries out: and the cry of them has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.' Therefore the blood of Abel cried to God, namely demanding vengeance — just as the souls of the holy Martyrs, which...

The FOUR kinds of sins that 'cry to God' for swift vengeance: (1) homicide (Gen 4:10, Abel's blood); (2) the unspeakable sin against nature (Sodom, Gen 18:20-21); (3) oppression of the weak (Exod 3:9, Israel's cry in Egypt); (4) withholding workers' wages (James 5:4, 'the cry has entered the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth'). So Abel's blood cried for vengeance, like the souls of the martyrs [under the altar, Rev 6:9-10]. Marginal gloss: 'Quatuor genera peccatorum, quae clamant ad Deum.' Page footer signature 'BBBB'; catchword 'quae' (continues on the next page).

— p. 787 (PDF) · printed p. 746 —

...which are in heaven, John heard, as he himself writes in the Apocalypse, ch. 6, crying with a loud voice, and saying: 'How long, O Lord (holy and true), do you not judge, and not avenge our blood on those who dwell on the earth?' But because the blood of Christ, shed by the Jews, cried to God not for vengeance, but for mercy and indulgence, therefore Paul, to the Hebrews ch. 12, wrote: that the blood of Christ speaks better to God than the blood of Abel.

Continues the martyrs'-souls comparison (Rev 6:9-10, 'How long, O Lord... do you not avenge our blood?'): Abel's blood cried for vengeance, but Christ's blood, shed by the Jews, cried for mercy — so Paul says Christ's blood 'speaks better than Abel' (Heb 12:24). Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM,' number '736'; true printed page 746.

Verses 11 and 12. Now therefore you shall be cursed upon the earth, which has opened its mouth and received the blood of your brother from your hand. When you have tilled it, it shall not give you its fruits: a wanderer and a fugitive you shall be upon the earth.

New lemma: Genesis 4:11-12 (marginal 'VERS. 11. & 12.'), God's sentence on Cain.

THREE evils by these words God pronounces will befall Cain on account of his fratricide. One is, that he will be cursed upon the earth. Another is, that his labor in tilling the earth will be vain and unfruitful. The third is, that he will thenceforth lead the life of a wanderer and fugitive. That 'You shall be cursed upon the earth' — or as it is in Hebrew, [■■ ■■■■■] 'min hadamah,' 'And [from] the earth' — signifies that, as long as he lived on earth, he would be cursed by the men who dwell upon the earth. For not

only those who lived in Cain's time, but also those who would be in all after ages, were going to curse Cain on account of the execrable crime of fratricide, and to abominate him as a monster and plague of the human race. In this too Cain was going to be unfortunate, that, laboring much in tilling the earth, he would yet reap little or no fruit. For he fell upon barren ground; or if the ground bore crops, yet a locust or some other animal, or an adverse storm of the sky, destroyed them. Although for what we read, 'It shall not give you its fruits,' in Hebrew word for word it is: [■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■] 'lo thoseph theth, cochah lac,' 'It shall not give you its strength, or its powers' — that is, the fruit which is born from the force and faculty of the earth. Or, 'it shall not give fruit according to its powers,' that is, not as much as it could itself bear, God namely restraining and repressing the force of its fecundity as a punishment to Cain. Finally, that 'A wanderer and a fugitive,' signifies his most unhappy life to come hereafter, since he would have no fixed dwelling, but ever wandering here and there, and a fugitive, would lead a life more detestable than death. For that word 'Wanderer,' the Hebrew word [■■] 'na' signifies moved, wavering, and trembling — so that the sense is: You shall live, moved in mind and body alike, and always as if wavering and trembling, fleeing the sight and judgment of men, who execrate your crime and judge you most worthy of the extreme punishment.

The THREE evils God pronounces on Cain for the fratricide: (1) cursed upon the earth; (2) his tilling to be vain and unfruitful; (3) a wandering, fugitive life. GLYPH 1 (Gen 4:11) verified: ■■ ■■■■■ (min ha-adamah, 'from the ground'; translit. 'min hadamah') — cursed by all men on earth, in Cain's time and all after ages, as a monster of the race. GLYPH 2 (Gen 4:12) verified: ■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■ (lo toseph teth kochah lach, 'it shall not again give its strength to you'; translit. 'lo thoseph theth, cochah lac') — the earth withholding its full vigor/fruit by God's restraint. GLYPH 3 (Gen 4:12) verified: ■■ (na, 'wanderer') = moved, wavering, trembling — Cain to live restless in mind and body, fleeing men's judgment.

There seems, therefore, a threefold evil to be foretold to Cain: one in the soul, when it is said, 'You shall be cursed upon the earth'; another in external things, when it is said, 'The earth shall not give you its fruit'; the

third in the body, when it is said:

Pererius summarizes the threefold evil predicted for Cain — in soul ('cursed upon the earth'), in external things ('the earth shall not give its fruit'), in body ('[a wanderer and fugitive]'). Marginal gloss: 'Triplex malum praedictum & inflictum Caino.' Catchword 'tur' (continues on the next page).

— p. 788 (PDF) · printed p. 747 —

...[when it is said]: 'A wanderer and fugitive you shall be.' And to Adam indeed God had said, 'Cursed is the earth in your work'; but to Cain he said, 'Cursed are you upon the earth' — which is much graver than that. Doubtless he said similarly to the serpent, 'Cursed are you among all living things and beasts of the earth.' For just as the serpent, that is, the devil, had destroyed man by envy and hatred, so Cain, the first minister of the devil, had slain his brother by envy and hatred. And that curse of Adam pertained to the whole human race, and of that curse many, even the good and holy, would be partakers. Wherefore it was not said to Adam, 'Cursed shall you be,' but 'Cursed is the earth in your work'; but Cain himself is cursed, as was the devil above too. For the same sentence remains for the devil and his members: for the Lord is going to say on the day of judgment, 'Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.' This, then, is the difference between the good and the wicked: for the former, if any curse befalls, it is wholly outside the soul; but for the latter, the curse touches the soul, not only the body and external goods.

Cain's curse ('Cursed are you upon the earth') is far graver than Adam's ('Cursed is the earth in your work') — like the serpent's/devil's curse, since Cain, the devil's first minister, killed by envy and hatred. Adam's curse touched the whole race (even the holy), so it was laid on 'the earth,' not on Adam personally; but Cain is cursed personally, like the devil ('Go, you cursed, into eternal fire,' Matt 25:41). For the good, a curse stays outside the soul; for the wicked, it touches the soul. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Cain eadem maledictione qua diabolus maledicitur.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '737'; true printed page 747.

MOREOVER, since Abel, killed by his brother Cain, was an illustrious figure of Christ the Lord killed by the Jews, and the curses which befell Cain prefigured the evils which were to befall the Jews — how

Rupert sets forth this figure according to the allegorical interpretation, aptly indeed, piously, and lucidly, must be recalled in this place. He, therefore, in book 3 of the Commentary on Genesis, ch. 6, treating all the aforesaid words which God said to Cain, and applying them most fittingly to Christ's death wrought by the Jews, and to the calamities which befell the Jews on account of that murder, writes thus: 'And of him, of whom this history is woven, both the folly and the insolence, as great as no one could attain in words, is denoted; and by a worthy punishment the crime of fratricide is struck; and beyond the mystery which has now been made plain to all the world, it is prefigured in the Jews the killers of Christ. For truly, what he said then to the one lost Cain, "The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth," is now rightly said of that people, there is no one who does not know. For what earth is there of which, not in figurative but in proper speech, it may rightly be said, that it opened its mouth and received from the hands of the Jews the blood of their brother? Surely it is the holy Church of Christ, an earth truly good, a fruitful earth, which, according to the Apostle, often drinking the rain that comes upon it, germinates herb useful to those by whom it is tilled, and thereupon receives blessing from God; just as, on the contrary, an earth bringing forth thistles and thorns is reprobate and near to cursing, whose end is unto burning. This earth, since it is rational, is so much more excellent than an inanimate and insensible earth, as the blood of this Abel [Christ], which it received, opening its mouth in a voice of exultation and confession, cries better than the blood of that Abel could cry: as the same Apostle who [was quoted] above says: "But you have come to Jesus the mediator of the new testament, and to the sprinkling of blood that speaks much better than Abel." For that blood, crying [for] only one man, accused a nefarious crime, and (which is true) announced something to come, yet was still hateful or intelligible to God alone; but this [blood], from the mouth of the faithful earth such as we...'

Pererius introduces RUPERT's allegory (Comm. in Gen. bk 3, ch. 6): Abel slain by Cain prefigures Christ slain by the Jews, and Cain's curses prefigure the Jews' calamities. Rupert: 'Vox sanguinis fratris tui clamat' is now rightly said of that people; the earth that received the brother's blood from the Jews' hands is Christ's Church — a good, fruitful earth (Heb 6:7-8: drinking rain it bears useful herb → blessed; bearing thorns → reprobate, near cursing, its end burning). This rational earth is nobler than inanimate earth, as Christ's blood ('this Abel') cries better than Abel's (Heb 12:24, 'the sprinkling of blood that speaks better than Abel'): Abel's blood, of one man, accused a crime and foretold something, hateful to God alone; Christ's blood, from the faithful earth... Marginal glosses: 'Heb. 6.'; 'Heb. 12.'; 'Huius historia de caede Abel, & malis quae propter eam Cain acciderunt, allegorica interpretatio, & accommodatio ad Christi necem, eiusque auctores Iudaeos secundum Rupertum.' Page footer signature 'BBBB 2'; catchword 'sumus'.

— p. 789 (PDF) · printed p. 748 —

...are, intercedes for the whole world, and excuses the sins of all, invites even those who shed it to penitence, openly announces the coming judgment to the impenitent. Upon this [earth], subject to the curse, this Cain is a wanderer and fugitive, more grievously than that [Cain] was upon the earth — on which he also first built a city, which he named after his firstborn Henoch: but neither is that clear according to the letter, that the earth did not give its fruits to him tilling it, but germinated thorns and thistles for him. But about this [Cain, the Jewish people] it is well enough known that, though it thinks it cultivates the Church of the Patriarchs and Prophets, by reading the same law and observing the same ceremonies as they, it does not give its fruits — that is, the usefulness which, imperfect though it was, it conferred before the Lord's passion, it can now confer on none, but on the contrary germinates thorns and thistles, since not only is no one justified, but he thereby accumulates his own damnation.

Rupert's allegory continues: Christ's blood (the faithful earth/Church) intercedes for the world, invites even its shedders to penitence, warns the impenitent. This Cain (the Jewish people) is a wanderer on 'this earth' (Christ's Church) more grievously than the literal Cain — who at least built a city (named Henoch) and whose curse of barren ground is not even clear literally. The Jewish people, cultivating the old Church by law and ceremonies, now yields no fruit but thorns: no one is justified, and each accumulates his own damnation. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '738';

true printed page 748.

MOREOVER, that it [the Jewish people] is a wanderer and fugitive upon this earth — that is, on account of Christ's Church — is manifest, that being fulfilled which, speaking of that people, [Christ] himself [said]: 'And they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and be led captive into all nations.' This, I say, was done 'upon the earth,' that is, on account of Christ's Church. For the blood itself demanded that this be done, in the psalm, where, when it had said, 'God has shown me over my enemies: Slay them not, lest at any time my people forget,' — but what? 'Scatter them,' it says, 'in your strength.' Therefore, that this itself might avail to increase the memory, or knowledge, of the ruin among the peoples, Christ himself willed this people to be a wanderer and fugitive; because, namely, both their scattered captivity, and their captive Scripture with them, bear witness that this their brother whom they killed was just, and that the Christian faith invented none of these things which we preach. And so the letter too treats this matter manifestly, and strikes this [Cain, the Jew] no less evidently than that [Cain]; because that one was not so much a wanderer or fugitive upon the earth as not to have his own city, nor did the earth so refuse to give its fruits to him tilling it, or so germinate thorns and thistles for him, that he found no means to build a city. Thus far Rupert.

Rupert: the Jewish people's wandering fulfills Christ's word (Luke 21:24, 'they shall fall by the edge of the sword and be led captive into all nations'). The blood demanded it in the psalm (Ps 58/59:11-12): 'Slay them not, lest my people forget; scatter them in your strength' — so their scattered captivity and their captive Scripture bear witness that the brother (Christ) they killed was just, and that Christians invented nothing. The letter strikes this Cain no less than the literal one, who at least kept a city and building-means. 'Thus far Rupert.' Marginal glosses: 'Luca. 21.'; 'Psalm. 58.'

Verses 13 and 14. And Cain said to the Lord: My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon. Behold, you cast me out today from the face of the earth, and from your face I shall be hidden, and I shall be a wanderer and fugitive upon

the earth: everyone therefore who finds me shall kill me.

New lemma: Genesis 4:13-14 (marginal 'VERS. 13. & 14.'), Cain's response to his sentence.

THESE WORDS Cain said, struck and terrified by those evils which God had foretold would befall him. Of these words of Cain there is a threefold reading and interpretation. The first is that of the Hebrews, who read these words as a question, in this sense: 'Is my iniquity greater than that I may deserve pardon?' And they are the words of Cain complaining of the punishment with which God struck his sin, as if it were beyond the desert of the sin. 'My crime,' he says, 'was not so monstrous that pardon could not easily [be obtained] from you...'

Cain speaks struck and terrified by the foretold evils. THREEFOLD reading of his words; the FIRST (the Hebrews'): read as a question — 'Is my iniquity greater than that I may deserve pardon?' — Cain complaining that the punishment exceeds the sin's desert. Marginal gloss: 'Triplex interpretatio huius loci.' Catchword 'a te' (continues on the next page).

— p. 790 (PDF) · printed p. 749 —

...I could merit and obtain pardon from you. Undeservedly, therefore, do you punish my sin so severely and harshly.

Conclusion of the first (Hebrew, interrogative) interpretation: Cain, on this reading, protests that his sin is not so great as to be beyond pardon, and that God punishes it too harshly. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '739'; true printed page 749.

The SECOND interpretation is drawn from the proper sense of the Hebrew reading, which word for word has thus: [■■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■] 'gadol Enoni minscho' — 'Great is my iniquity to bear, or to lift up' — that is, it is greater than that I could sustain and endure it by my strength. For the Latin word 'Iniquity,' in Hebrew it is [■■■] 'Havon,' properly signifying curvature. Now one walks bent either from the sense and grief of a crime committed by himself — as David walked, who said of himself, Psalm 37, 'I am made wretched and am bent down to the end, all the day I went about mourning.' But Baruch beautifully expressed the gait and bearing of a man vehemently grieving his sin, in ch. 2, in those words: 'The soul that is sad

for the greatness of the evil, and walks bent and infirm, and the failing eyes, and the hungry soul, give you glory and justice, O Lord.' Or one walks bent on account of the bitter sense not so much of guilt as of punishment: as king Ahab, as it is written in the third book of Kings, ch. 21, terrified by the divine threats denounced to him through Elijah, tore his garments, and covered his flesh with sackcloth, and fasted and slept in sack, and, humbled before the Lord, walked with lowered head. In this place, therefore, those who religiously strive to translate and interpret the Sacred writings from the Hebrew judge that the word [■■■] 'Havon' signifies not so much guilt as punishment: wherefore Pagninus renders this place thus: 'My punishment is greater than that I may bear it.' The sense, therefore, is: 'My iniquity is greater' — that is, the punishment of my iniquity is greater — than that I could bear it alive. This interpretation is favored both by what immediately preceded concerning the evils foretold to Cain, and by what Cain immediately subjoins: 'Behold,' he says, 'you cast me out today from the face of the earth, and from your face I shall be hidden, and I shall be a wanderer and fugitive upon the earth; everyone therefore who finds me shall kill me.'

The SECOND interpretation, from the literal Hebrew. GLYPH 4 (Gen 4:13) verified: ■■■■ ■■■■ ■■■■ (gadol avoni minneso, 'my iniquity is greater than can be borne'; translit. 'gadol Enoni minscho') — greater than my strength can sustain. GLYPH 5 verified: ■■■ (avon / 'Havon,' 'iniquity'), properly signifying 'curvature/bentness' — one walks bent from grief of sin (David, Ps 38:6 'curvatus sum'; Baruch 2:18) or from sense of punishment (Ahab humbled in sackcloth, 1 Kgs 21:27). The Hebraists take 'Havon' as punishment rather than guilt; hence Pagninus: 'My punishment is greater than I may bear.' Sense: the punishment of my iniquity is greater than I can bear alive — favored by the foretold evils and by Cain's next words. Marginal glosses: 'Secunda interpretatio'; 'Translatio huius loci secundum Pagninum.'

The THIRD interpretation agrees with the translation of the Seventy interpreters, which in Latin sounds thus: 'My offense is greater than that it should be remitted to me.' Which reading the Latin translator, doubtless following it, rendered thus: 'My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.' Following this reading, all the Fathers, Greek and Latin, interpreted these words of Cain as having been almost the words of a man

plainly despairing of God's mercy and pardon, and thinking his sin utterly irremissible: which was a greater crime than the fratricide, for that was against a neighbor, but this directly against God's infinite mercy and clemency, which, as Scripture says, is prevailing above malice. CAJETAN does not entirely assent to this interpretation and approved opinion about Cain's despair, confirmed by the consensus of almost all. For, explaining this place, he says: 'With what affect Cain said [it], is not written: let each interpret as the Holy Spirit suggests to him; the context, however, offers nothing else than that Cain, recognizing the gravity of his sin, from that very gravity of the sin doubted whether it would be lawful for anyone to kill him — for to this tend the words he subjoins: "Behold, you cast me out," etc.' It seems...

The THIRD interpretation, agreeing with the LXX/Vulgate ('My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon'). On this reading, followed by all the Fathers (Greek and Latin), Cain's words are those of a man despairing of God's mercy, thinking his sin irremissible — a graver crime than the fratricide (that against a neighbor, this against God's infinite mercy, which 'is prevailing above malice,' Joel 2:13). CAJETAN dissents from this near-universal reading of despair: with what affect Cain spoke is not written; the context yields only that Cain, recognizing his sin's gravity, doubted whether anyone might lawfully kill him — as his next words ('Behold, you cast me out,' etc.) suggest. Marginal glosses: 'Ioel 2.'; 'Tertia interpretatio'; 'Ambigit Caietanus, dixerit haec verba Cain desperans veniam, necne.' Page footer signature 'BBBB 3'; catchword 'igitur'.

— p. 791 (PDF) · printed p. 750 —

It seems, therefore, that Cajetan (as far as one may conjecture from his words) was more inclined to the second interpretation of this place than to the third.

Conclusion of the Cajetan discussion: Cajetan leaned to the SECOND reading (Cain fearing lest anyone might lawfully kill him) rather than the third (despair). Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '740'; true printed page 750.

St Chrysostom (homily 19 on Genesis) is so far from thinking this speech of Cain was a despair of divine pardon, that on the contrary he affirms it was a full and absolute confession of the crime committed by him, but that nevertheless it was not useful to him, because it was untimely and too late

— such as, in men damned to the tartarean punishment after the day of judgment, will be the confession and penitence of sins, which is described in the book of Wisdom, ch. 5. But if Cain had used that confession in time — namely, when God, interrogating him about his brother Abel, wished to lead him to confession of the perpetrated crime and to penitence — he would doubtless have obtained pardon from God. But I do not know whether this interpretation and opinion of Chrysostom is to be approved: both because it agrees least with the antecedents and consequents of this place; and because to no mortal, while he passes this life, can true confession and penitence of sins be too late and useless. For God did not, by those words 'Now therefore you shall be cursed upon the earth,' and the rest that follow the extreme sentence against Cain, pronounce his eternal reprobation and condemnation, such that after it Cain's confession was void, as Chrysostom thought; but he only foretold the evils which were going to befall him. For neither is the supreme judgment and sentence of God, of the reprobation and condemnation of men, passed in this life, but after death.

Chrysostom (hom. 19 on Genesis): Cain's words were NOT despair but a full confession — yet useless because too late, like the confession of the damned after judgment (Wisd 5); had he confessed in time (at God's 'Where is Abel?'), he would have obtained pardon. Pererius DISPUTES this: it fits neither the context, nor the truth that no mortal's true penitence is ever too late in this life; God's words to Cain were not a final sentence of eternal reprobation (so a later confession would still avail), but only foretold temporal evils — for God's supreme sentence of reprobation is passed not in this life but after death. Marginal gloss: 'Animadversio in singularem quandam & miram interpretationem & sententiam quam super hoc loco habet Chrysostomus.'

I WILL SET DOWN here the words of Chrysostom, that from them the reader may plainly know and judge what we have said. He writes thus: 'And Cain said, My sin is greater than that I should be dismissed [pardoned]. Behold, an absolute confession: for he so confessed his crime that it exceeded all diligence, but he got no profit from it, for the confession was untimely; for this ought to be done at the fitting time, when mercy could still be obtained from the judge. Be mindful now, I

pray, of what I said a short time ago, that on that terrible day, that judgment cannot be corrupted, and each one of us will despair for [his] sins, seeing before his eyes those terrible torments and inevitable punishments, getting no use thence, destitute of time. For penitence, before the punishment is inflicted, has time and ineffable force. Therefore I beseech, while this wonderful medicine is still effective, let us receive the advantages and fruits thence; and while we are still in the present life, let us not spurn the medicine of penitence, knowing clearly that repentance will then profit us nothing, when the spectacle is dissolved and the time of the contests taken away. But let us return to the subject. For Cain ought then, when he was interrogated by the Lord, "Where is Abel your brother?", to have confessed his sin, and fallen down, and prayed, and sought pardon. And then indeed he rejected the medicine; but now, after the sentence, after the end, after everything, after being accused with a clear voice by the blood lying on the ground, he confesses, and gains nothing thereby — whence the Prophet said, "The just man is the accuser of himself in the beginning of his speech." And here too, if he had anticipated the Lord's rebuke, [he would] altogether [have obtained] mercy...'

Pererius sets down Chrysostom's own words verbatim (so the reader may judge): Cain's 'My sin is greater than that I should be dismissed' was an absolute but profitless confession, because untimely — like the damned's at judgment. Chrysostom's exhortation: use the 'medicine' of penitence now, in this life, while it avails. Cain ought to have confessed at God's 'Where is Abel?'; instead he confesses only after the sentence, gaining nothing (Prov 18:17, 'the just is his own accuser at the outset'); had he anticipated the rebuke, he would have obtained mercy... Marginal gloss: 'Proverb. 18.' Catchword 'cordiam' (misericordiam; continues on the next page).

— p. 792 (PDF) · printed p. 751 —

...mercy would he have obtained, on account of the Lord's immense benignity. For there is no sin, however grave it be, that overcomes his mercy, provided at the due time we do penitence and seek pardon. And Cain said, My sin is greater than that I should be dismissed — a sufficient confession, but untimely.' Thus Chrysostom.

End of the Chrysostom quote: Cain would have obtained mercy, for no sin, however grave, overcomes God's mercy if we repent in time; his confession was sufficient but untimely. Marginal gloss: 'Peccatum nullum irremissibile' (no sin is irremissible). Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '741'; true printed page 751.

Whose opinion perhaps someone could not inconveniently interpret concerning the remission of sin — not indeed as to the guilt and eternal punishment, but as to the temporal punishment which God, by an absolute and immutable will, appointed to be paid in this life by him who sinned.

Pererius's charitable re-reading of Chrysostom: his view could apply not to remission of guilt/eternal punishment, but of the temporal punishment God had fixed by immutable will for Cain to pay in this life (which no later penitence would lift).

Behold, you cast me out today from the face of the earth, and from your face I shall be hidden, and I shall be a wanderer and fugitive upon the earth: everyone therefore who finds me shall kill me. Verse 14.

The lemma Genesis 4:14 repeated (marginal 'VERS. 14.') as Pererius turns to expound it phrase by phrase.

These words I would thus interpret: 'Behold' — as if he says, not without cause have I despaired of pardon for my crime; or, not rashly did I say that the punishment inflicted on me is greater than I could endure alive, for the evils with which you afflict me prove it. 'For you cast me out' — or as it is in Hebrew, [■■■■] 'guerastha,' 'you have driven out' — 'from the face of the earth,' that is, you banish me from my native soil, dearest and sweetest to me, in which I was born, raised, and to this day dwelt with my parents and kinsmen. You cast me out from a most fertile and most pleasant land, near to Paradise, which you consecrated to yourself, that in it sacrifices and oblations might be made to you, and in which you are wont to manifest yourself to men and render oracles and responses to them. 'And from your face I shall be hidden,' that is, having you angry, hostile, and inimical to me, I shall live in every place and time with fearful and trembling mind, always fearing something from you; or, 'I shall be hidden from your face,'

that is, you will not look on me with the eyes of your mercy, but will hide your face from me, depriving me of your singular benevolence, care, guardianship, and protection. For God's showing his face to someone, in the sacred writings, signifies that God declares by manifest signs that he wishes him well, favors him, is present, and holds him under his guardianship and protection; but on the contrary, God's hiding his face from someone is to desert and cast him off, and to deprive him of his patronage and protection. 'And everyone who finds me shall kill me,' that is, all will turn from me and execrate me, and judge me worthy of death, and will think they render service to God if they kill me.

Pererius's phrase-by-phrase paraphrase of Cain's lament (Gen 4:14). GLYPH verified: ■■■■ (gerashta, 'you have driven out'; translit. 'guerastha, eiecisti') — 'you cast me out from the face of the earth' = banishment from his dear native soil (fertile, near Paradise, consecrated to God's worship/oracles). 'Hidden from your face' = God's anger, or the withdrawal of his protective favor (a Scriptural idiom: God's 'showing his face' = favor/guardianship; 'hiding his face' = desertion). 'Everyone who finds me shall kill me' = all will execrate him and think killing him a service to God. Marginal gloss: 'Quid significet in Scriptura Deum alicui faciem suam vel ostendere vel abscondere.'

But that, 'Everyone who finds me,' is not referred to the beasts, but to men. Since immediately it is subjoined, 'Everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold' — which applies not to beasts, but to men. For since Abel's death (as is quite credible) happened around the hundred-and-thirtieth year of Adam, and through those hundred and thirty years the human race was now most numerously multiplied, and most widely...

'Everyone who finds me' refers to men, not beasts — proved by the next clause ('Everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold,' Gen 4:15), which applies to men. Abel's death happened c. Adam's 130th year, by which time mankind had multiplied numerously and spread widely. Catchword 'latissime' (continues on the next page).

— p. 793 (PDF) · printed p. 752 —

...dispersed through the lands, not without cause did Cain fear lest, wherever he went, he might find someone by whom he himself would be

killed.

Conclusion: the race being widely dispersed, Cain rightly feared being killed by someone, wherever he went. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '742'; true printed page 752.

But Ambrose treats this whole place most elegantly (book 2 on Cain and Abel, ch. 9), writing thus: 'There is an evident and general reason, because to every wicked man evils are present, and will be to come. Those that are present work sadness, those to come [work] dread. But present things solicit the wicked man more than future ones. Whence also Cain said to God: "My cause is greater than that it be dismissed to me; if you forsake me today, I shall hide myself from your face." For nothing is graver than for one erring to be deserted by God, so that he cannot recall himself. The death of a sinner brings an end of sinning, but a life destitute of the divine governance is precipitated and slips into graver things: as, if a shepherd leaves the flock, the beasts rush upon it, so, when God deserts a man, the devil rushes in. It is grave, especially for the foolish, not to have a ruler. Malice creeps on; the wound grows where medicine is lacking. He hides himself who wishes to veil his fault and cover his sin. For he who does evil hates the light, and loves the darkness of his own [deeds] and the hiding-places of his crimes. But the just man is wont not to hide from his Lord God, but rather to offer himself, saying: "Behold, it is I," who has no criminal conscience which he fears to be caught. Deservedly, therefore, does he [Cain], evil-conscious, hide himself, and says: "Everyone who finds me shall kill me." The man of narrow mind fears present death, neglects the perpetual [death], and does not dread the divine judgment. He deprecates only the destruction of the body. But from whom did he fear to be killed, who had only [his] parents on earth? He could indeed fear the attacks of beasts, he who had violated the laws of the divine law, and not presume upon the other subject animals, he who had taught that man could be killed. He could also fear his parents as parricides, he who had taught that parricide could

be committed; for parents too could learn from a son what descendants learned from a parent.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose (De Cain et Abel 2.9): the wicked are beset by present evils (sadness) and future (dread), but moved more by the present. Nothing is graver than to be deserted by God past self-recall; a sinner's death ends sinning, but a godless life falls into worse — as beasts attack the flock a shepherd leaves, the devil rushes on the man God deserts. The evil-conscious hide (hating the light); the just offer themselves ('Behold, it is I'). Cain's 'everyone will kill me' shows a narrow mind fearing only bodily death, not eternal or divine judgment. He feared beasts (having broken divine law) and even his own parents as parricides, since he himself had taught that killing/parricide was possible. 'Thus Ambrose.' Marginal gloss: 'Pulcherrima super hoc loco Ambrosii sententia.'

From this place it is sufficiently apparent what the mind of wicked men is, on account of the crimes committed by them — what the feeling, what the care, what the fear: namely, they do not grieve over the baseness of the fault, or the offense of God, nor do they so dread the future punishments of hell, as the miseries and calamities of the present life, and the torments of the body, and finally the bitterness of imminent death.

Pererius draws the moral: wicked men do not grieve over their sin's baseness or God's offense, nor dread hell so much as present miseries, bodily torments, and the bitterness of imminent death. Marginal gloss: 'Qualis sit metus ac dolor improborum hominum.'

Of which it is well known what Bernard writes, treating those words of Peter to Jesus, 'Behold, we have left all things,' not far from the end of his sermon: 'He is convicted unworthy of the heavenly blessing, who seeks it with a doubtful affect, asks with a double intention, preparing for himself another refuge, if perchance he should not obtain it. "My iniquity is greater" (says the first fratricide) "than that I may deserve pardon." What then? Let your soul refuse to be consoled, if it does not deserve pardon. This alone deplore, this alone bewail: do not even think of anything else. But now, says Cain, everyone who finds me shall kill me. A grave loss indeed, a heavy damage, if the body be destroyed — since the soul has perished! But the unhappy one pleaded that he was to be killed, as if he would count it a great benefit if he were forbidden to be killed: which also was done. He obtained the

wretched consolation he sought, and forgot the greatest consolation, for which he ought much more studiously to have supplicated and sought a remedy. Have you not read the same about Saul too? For where holy Samuel persisted in the sentence, "Now," he [Saul] says, "honor

Bernard (on Peter's 'Behold, we have left all,' Matt 19:27): the man is unworthy of heaven's blessing who seeks it half-heartedly, keeping another refuge in reserve. Cain (the first fratricide) said 'My iniquity is too great for pardon' — but if so, one should bewail that alone and think of nothing else. Instead Cain feared only bodily death (though his soul had perished), even pleading to be killed as a benefit — obtaining the wretched consolation he sought, forgetting the greatest. So too Saul (1 Sam 15:30), when Samuel persisted in the sentence, cared only for worldly honor ('honor me...'). Marginal glosses: 'Matth. 19.'; '1. Reg. 15.' Catchword 'honora' (continues on the next page).

— p. 794 (PDF) · printed p. 753 —

...honor me at least before the people." To what end is this honoring for you, wretch? Was that the whole of that supplication, "I have sinned; pray to the Lord for me"? By a false supplication he could not be moved. Scarcely had David said, "I have sinned," and the answer was given him, "The Lord has taken away your sin from you." So indeed, so to this day, most beloved, whoever's mind gapes after other consolations, and does not refuse to be consoled utterly in fleeting and transitory things, he certainly withdraws from himself the grace of heavenly consolation.' Thus Bernard.

End of the Bernard quote: Saul's supplication ('I have sinned; pray for me,' 1 Sam 15:30) was hollow — he cared only for honor before the people; a false supplication could not move [God/Samuel]. Contrast David: scarcely had he said 'I have sinned' when he was told 'The Lord has taken away your sin' (2 Sam 12:13). Whoever seeks fleeting consolations withdraws from himself the grace of heavenly consolation. 'Thus Bernard.' Marginal gloss: '2. Reg. 12.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '743'; true printed page 753.

Verse 15. And the Lord said to him, It shall not be so, but everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold.

New lemma: Genesis 4:15 (marginal 'VERS. 15.'), God's protective mark and sevenfold penalty.

That 'shall be punished sevenfold' is variously read, according to the various readings which St Jerome mentions in Epistle 125, which he wrote to Damasus, answering the first of the questions proposed to him. But the variety of reading, and the very obscurity of expression, made this place most difficult to explain. Our translator, then, renders 'shall be punished sevenfold'; the Seventy interpreters, and Theodotion, 'shall pay seven vengeances'; Aquila, 'shall be avenged, or vindicated, sevenfold,' as Pagninus also renders; finally Symmachus, 'the seventh shall be avenged.' In such a variety of reading, though it is not easy to attain the genuine sense of these words, this at least can be said for certain, that by that speech it is not signified that he who killed Cain would be punished seven times. For if God does not twice punish the same crime — as is [said] in the prophet Nahum, ch. 2, according to the translation of the Seventy — how much less seven times?

The 'sevenfold' phrase (Gen 4:15) is read variously (Jerome, Ep. 125 to Damasus): Vulgate 'punished sevenfold'; LXX and Theodotion 'shall pay seven vengeances'; Aquila (and Pagninus) 'avenged sevenfold'; Symmachus 'the seventh shall be avenged.' Amid this variety, one thing is certain: it does not mean Cain's killer would be punished seven times — for if God does not punish the same crime twice (Nahum 1:9, per LXX), much less seven times. Marginal gloss: 'Varietas lectionum huius loci.'

That too is quite credible, that by those words it is not signified that Cain's killer would be punished with a graver punishment than Cain himself for the murder of his brother; for that would not seem equitable, since the measure of the stripes ought to be according to the measure of the sin. But who would doubt that a graver sin was the murder of most innocent Abel, done knowingly and maliciously by Cain, than the killing of Cain himself, a most wicked man, done through ignorance and error, as is reported, by Lamech? It does not escape me that this very opinion is most keenly defended by Paul of Burgos, in a certain Addition of his to Lyra's Postil on this place; but I rather assent to Lyra, Tostatus, and the Carthusian, who refuted that opinion in their Commentaries on this place.

Nor does it mean Cain's killer would be punished more gravely than Cain himself — inequitable, since punishment should match the sin (Deut 25:2), and Abel's knowing, malicious murder by Cain

was graver than the killing of wicked Cain by Lamech through ignorance/error. Paul of Burgos defends this (killer punished more) in an Addition to Lyra's Postil, but Pererius sides with Lyra, Tostatus, and the Carthusian (Denis), who refuted it. Marginal glosses: 'Deut. 25.'; 'Refellitur Paulus Burgensis.'

Nor do I much approve the interpretation of this place which is in Rupert, ch. 8 of the third book of the Commentaries on Genesis. For he thinks that 'to be punished sevenfold' is the same as to be punished with eternal punishments; for by the number seven is signified universality, not only among the ecclesiastical writers, but also among the Gentile philosophers. And so 'shall be punished sevenfold,' says Rupert, is the same as 'shall be punished with full and consummated vengeance.' But one must understand [the qualification], 'unless he do penance.' For so too must that be understood which is in Ezekiel, ch. 18, 'The soul that sins, it [itself shall die]...'

Pererius also disapproves Rupert's reading (Comm. in Gen. bk 3, ch. 8): that 'sevenfold' = eternal punishment (seven signifying universality among both church writers and pagan philosophers), i.e. 'full and consummated vengeance.' But this must be qualified 'unless he does penance' — as also Ezekiel 18:20 ('The soul that sins, it itself shall die') must be understood. Marginal gloss: 'Discutitur explanatio Ruperti.' Page footer signature 'CCCC'; catchword 'ipsa' (continues on the next page).

— p. 795 (PDF) · printed p. 754 —

'...it itself shall die,' and what is in Matthew ch. 5, 'He who says to his brother, Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna' — for in both places one must understand 'unless he does penance.' But it is agreed that he who killed Cain, namely Lamech, did penance. For he said to his wives, 'Hear my voice, wives of Lamech, hearken to my speech, for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt.' Thus Rupert. But it seems an interpretation more allegorical than historical, and not a little forced. For nowhere in the sacred writings (as far as I recall) do I find 'to be punished sevenfold' put for 'to be punished with eternal punishments after this life.' And in the Old Testament, especially before the Law and the Prophets, and at the beginning of the human race, God was wont to threaten wicked men not with eternal punishments that remain after this life, but with the evils

and calamities of the present life.

End of Rupert's reading: Ezek 18:20 and Matt 5:22 must be qualified 'unless he does penance'; Cain's killer Lamech did penance (Gen 4:23, 'I have slain a man to my wounding'). Pererius rejects it as more allegorical than historical and forced: nowhere does Scripture use 'sevenfold' for eternal punishment; and in the Old Testament (especially before the Law) God threatened the wicked with present-life evils, not eternal ones. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '744'; true printed page 754.

There are, therefore, three more probable explanations of this place, according to its threefold translation. The first interpretation rests on the translation of the LXX interpreters, who rendered this place thus: 'Everyone who kills Cain shall pay seven vengeances' — of which translation there can be a threefold sense. The first: that after that 'Everyone who kills Cain' a period be placed, and the speech be left suspended by reticence [aposiopesis], like that in Virgil, 'Whom I —: but it is better to calm the stirred waves'; and one must understand, 'shall be most gravely punished by me.' But that which follows, 'shall pay seven vengeances,' pertains not to Cain's killer, but to Cain himself. As if he said, I do not wish Cain to perish so soon, for he must first pay seven vengeances for the seven sins which he committed. For he sacrificed badly; he envied his brother; he despised God's admonition; he spoke to his brother by fraud and deceit; he cruelly killed him; he insolently denied his murder to God; finally, by despairing of pardon for the crime committed, he condemned himself. But if we refer that 'shall pay seven vengeances' to Cain's killer, it can be understood in two ways: that either it signifies Cain's killer would be afflicted with seven vengeances, that is, with many and great punishments; or that, by killing Cain, he would pay off and free Cain himself from the seven vengeances and punishments which Cain had to pay for the seven sins done by him and just mentioned.

Three explanations by threefold translation. FIRST (on the LXX 'shall pay seven vengeances'), with a threefold sense: (a) read with aposiopesis — 'Everyone who kills Cain —' [understood: shall be most gravely punished by me] (like Virgil's 'Quos ego —,' Aeneid 1.135), while 'shall pay seven vengeances' refers to CAIN paying for his SEVEN SINS: sacrificing badly, envying Abel, despising

God's warning, speaking deceitfully, the cruel murder, insolently denying it to God, and self-condemning despair; or (b) referred to the killer — either the killer suffers seven punishments, or by killing Cain he frees Cain from those seven penalties. Marginal glosses: 'Triplex interpretatio huius loci'; 'Prima interpretatio'; 'Lib. 1. Aeneid.'; 'Septem peccata Cain.'

The second interpretation is that which Rabbi Solomon hands down, and which Lyra, Tostatus, and the Carthusian followed: that 'Everyone who kills Cain' ends the sentence, and 'shall be most gravely punished by me' is to be understood, which was omitted by reticence. Then what follows, 'Sevenfold shall he be punished by me,' or, as Symmachus renders, 'The seventh shall be punished,' is referred to Cain himself, who was not destroyed before he reached his seventh generation, which was terminated in the sons of Lamech, by whom he is believed to have been killed. The third interpretation, according to our Latin version, is easy and quite probable: that 'shall be punished sevenfold' signifies nothing else than that he [the killer] will be afflicted with a most grave and most severe punishment — not only because he kills a man, but because, against the public faith given him by God...

SECOND interpretation (Rabbi Solomon/Rashi, followed by Lyra, Tostatus, the Carthusian): 'Everyone who kills Cain' ends the sentence (with 'shall be gravely punished by me' understood by aposiopesis); 'sevenfold,' or Symmachus's 'the seventh shall be punished,' refers to Cain himself, destroyed only in his seventh generation (in Lamech's sons, by whom he is believed killed). THIRD (the Vulgate): 'punished sevenfold' simply means the killer will suffer a most severe punishment, not only for homicide but for [violating] the public pledge God gave [Cain]... Marginal glosses: 'Secunda interpretatio Rabbi Salomonis'; 'Tertia interpretatio.'

— p. 796 (PDF) · printed p. 755 —

...given him, he kills him. And by this example and document God wished to show how horrendous a crime it is to kill a man, and by this reason vehemently to deter all from homicide. But why did God wish Cain's death to be deferred so long? This was indeed of severer justice, that his torment might be longer and bitterer. It was nevertheless also of singular clemency, granting him so long a space for doing penance. It was finally of salutary providence and divine counsel, that by the example of Cain — who

prolonged for so many years a most wretched life of mind and body in perpetual fear and torment — men might learn how much to be feared it is to despise God's warnings and documents; how wicked, to envy others the divine grace; how execrable, to harm others by deceit and fraud; finally, how horrendous, to imbrue and contaminate one's mind and hands with the blood of men, especially of one's own kinsfolk.

The third reading concluded: the killer is punished severely for violating God's public pledge to Cain. By all this God shows how horrendous homicide is, to deter everyone from it. WHY God deferred Cain's death so long, three reasons: (1) severer justice (a longer, bitterer torment); (2) singular clemency (a long space for penance); (3) salutary providence — Cain as a warning example, teaching men to fear despising God's warnings, envying grace, harming by deceit, and staining their hands with kindred blood. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Deus tandiu mortem Cain distulerit.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '745'; true printed page 755.

And the Lord set a mark upon Cain, that no one who found him should kill him. Verse 15.

The lemma Genesis 4:15b (marginal 'VERS. 15.'): God's protective mark on Cain.

Why did God set that mark on Cain? Namely, that, recognized by it, all might turn from and abominate him, and pursue him with curses and imprecations as a fratricide and despiser of God — which God had foretold would be, 'Cursed shall you be upon the earth.' Then, that whoever saw him rest in no place, as if agitated by furies, but trembling and fearful in body and mind, always a wanderer and fugitive everywhere and fearing men, counting nothing safe, taking no rest at any time — considering the cause why he was perpetually afflicted with such evils — might, by his example, learn to worship God piously, to give attention studiously to virtue, and to restrain hands, tongue, and mind not only from the murder of men, but even from all harm and injury. Finally, lest anyone should either kill him by chance through ignorance, or through zeal for justice dare to kill him knowingly — Cain, whose life God had prolonged (by the pledge given him and the mark imposed) unto his longer vengeance and punishment.

Why God set the mark: (1) so all would recognize, abominate, and curse Cain as a fratricide and despiser of God (fulfilling 'Cursed shall you be'); (2) so his restless, trembling, fugitive misery would teach onlookers to worship God and restrain hand, tongue, and mind from all harm; (3) so no one would kill him — by chance or by zeal for justice — since God, by the pledge and mark, had prolonged his life for a longer punishment. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Deus signum posuit in Cain.'

But what was that mark? That it was visible and conspicuous to all, so that by it he could be recognized by everyone, is not to be doubted. But precisely what it was, Cajetan thinks unascertained; yet from it appears God's great clemency, not only diminishing the punishment due to the fratricide, but also benignly preserving him, lest he be killed by others. But among the Hebrews, and most of our Doctors, the widespread opinion is that that mark was nothing else than a certain huge and horrible tremor of the whole body — but especially of the head — and a terror of mind, as of a man everywhere and by all fearing that snares were being laid against his life. Lyra moreover adds that a certain notable mark was impressed on his face.

What the mark was: certainly visible so all could recognize him; its exact nature Cajetan thinks uncertain, but it shows God's clemency (both diminishing the penalty and preserving Cain from being killed). The common view among the Hebrews and most Doctors: a huge, horrible tremor of the whole body (especially the head) and a terror of mind, like a man dreading ambush everywhere; Lyra adds a notable mark impressed on his face. Marginal glosses: 'Quale fuerit illud signum impositum Cain a Deo'; 'Communis opinio de signo illo Cain.'

St Jerome seems to have followed that widespread opinion in Epistle 115, which was written to Damasus, since, treating those words of Cain,

Jerome seems to follow the 'tremor' opinion in his Epistle to Damasus (here cited as Ep. 115; cited as Ep. 125 on the preceding printed page 753 — the print is inconsistent), treating Cain's words. Catchword 'Ecce' (continues on the next page).

— p. 797 (PDF) · printed p. 756 —

'Behold, you cast me out today from the face of the earth,' etc., he writes thus: '"I am cast out," says Cain, "from your sight, and, trembling with the conscience of my crime, unable to bear the light

itself, I shall hide that I may lurk; and it shall be that everyone who finds me shall kill me" — while, from the tremor of his body, and his mind agitated by fury, [everyone] will understand him to be one who deserves to be killed.' Thus Jerome.

Jerome's text (Ep. to Damasus) on Cain's lament: cast from God's sight, trembling with a guilty conscience and unable to bear the light, Cain will hide; and whoever finds him will kill him — recognizing, from his bodily tremor and frenzied mind, one who deserves death. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '746'; true printed page 756.

Perhaps the LXX interpreters gave occasion for so thinking, since in this place, for what we read 'You shall be a wanderer and fugitive upon the earth,' they rendered, 'Sighing and trembling you shall be upon the earth'; and a little after, for what the Latin version has, 'I shall be a wanderer and fugitive,' their translation has, 'I shall be groaning and trembling.' Josephus writes that God, appeased by Cain's sacrifice, remitted to him the punishment of the fratricide: which is neither true nor probable. For how could the sacrifice of an impious and bloodthirsty man please God? If before the fratricide his sacrifice did not please God, how much less after? But God remitted the punishment of the fratricide [only] in so far as he did not punish him immediately with death — but he did that for his longer and bitterer vengeance.

The LXX may have prompted the 'tremor' view: for the Vulgate's 'a wanderer and fugitive' (Gen 4:12, 14) it renders 'sighing/groaning and trembling.' Pererius REFUTES Josephus (that God, appeased by Cain's sacrifice, remitted the fratricide's penalty): impossible, since an impious man's sacrifice could not please God (and less after the murder than before); God 'remitted' it only by not killing Cain at once — and that for a longer, bitterer vengeance. Marginal gloss: 'Refellitur Iosephus.'

I will set down here the moral treatment of this passage, which is in Ambrose (ch. 10, book 2 on Cain and Abel), where he writes thus: 'But that he set a mark upon Cain, lest anyone should kill him, he wished to turn back the erring one, and by his benefit to invite him to correction. For we are wont to entrust ourselves more easily to those whose favor we have. Nor yet does he grant great things, but in that very thing he

punishes the imprudence of the foolish man. Who, when he was liable to perpetual punishments, demanded not that the penalty be remitted to him, but thought that the life of this body should be preserved — in which there is more misery than pleasure. For death is one, in the separation of soul and body; and at the end of this life, which, as soon as it comes, is wont to take away all bodily pains, not to increase them. But the fears which frequently assail those living this life, the sorrows, pains, and groans, and diverse torments, the wounds of grievances and sicknesses, inflict very many deaths too on the human race, so that that [final] death seems to be a remedy, not a punishment. For it is not destructive, since by it life is not taken away, but transferred to better things. For if the guilty die, who would not, even unwilling, recall their step from sins — yet they attain their end not by nature but by fault, lest they sin more, to whom life is the usury of crimes. But if they are possessed of good hope, they are to be believed rather to migrate than to fail.' Thus Ambrose.

Ambrose's moral reading (De Cain et Abel 2.10): God's mark, forbidding Cain's killing, aimed to turn the erring one back and invite him to correction (we trust more easily those whose favor we have); yet it grants no great thing, but even punishes his folly — Cain sought not remission of his penalty but preservation of this bodily life, which holds more misery than pleasure. Death (the soul-body separation) removes bodily pains rather than increasing them; the fears, sorrows, and sicknesses of this life inflict 'many deaths,' so that final death seems a remedy, not a punishment — not destructive but a transfer to better things. The guilty die (by fault, not nature) lest they sin more; the hopeful 'migrate rather than fail.' 'Thus Ambrose.' Marginal glosses: 'Moralis interpretatio ex D. Ambrosio sumpta'; 'Mors remedium malorum non poena.'

Verse 16. And Cain, having gone out from the face of the Lord, dwelt a fugitive in the land, at the eastern region of Eden.

New lemma: Genesis 4:16 (marginal 'VERS. 16.'), Cain's departure and dwelling in the land of Nod, east of Eden.

Cain went out from the face of God — not that he could depart from God's knowledge and power and presence, by which he is everywhere. 'Whither

shall I go,' says David (Psalm 138), 'from your spirit? and whither shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are present. If I take my wings at dawn, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea — even there your hand shall lead me, and your right hand shall hold me.' And showing that no one can depart from God's sight, or [conceal] himself...

'Cain went out from the face of God' — not a departure from the omnipresent God's knowledge and power, as David attests (Ps 139:7-10, 'Whither shall I flee from your face? ... even there your hand shall lead me'). No one can depart from God's sight or hide himself... Marginal gloss: 'Quid significet Cain egressum esse e facie Domini.' Catchword 'sese' (continues on the next page).

— p. 798 (PDF) · printed p. 757 —

...or to hide and conceal himself from his eyes by darkness or hiding-places, [David] subjoins: 'And I said, Perhaps the darkness shall trample me, and the night [shall be] my illumination in my delights. Because the darkness shall not be darkened from you, and the night shall be lit up as the day: as its darkness, so also its light.' For how (as Paul well argues, Acts 17) can God be far from each one of us, since in him we live, move, and are? Therefore Cain did not go out from the face of God as if fleeing his knowledge and power, but he went out from that land and place where God was wont to show his face — that is, to declare his presence by uttering oracles, rendering responses, and by speaking familiarly, under a visible form of human nature, with those first men. Or, as we interpreted a little above, he went out from the face of God, that is, he was renounced and destitute of the grace and protection of that singular benevolence, care, and protection which God bears toward his servants and friends.

God's omnipresence: darkness cannot hide from him (Ps 139:11-12); 'in him we live, move, and are' (Acts 17:27-28). So Cain's 'going out from the face of God' is not fleeing the omnipresent God, but leaving the land/place where God manifested himself (uttering oracles, rendering responses, speaking familiarly under human form with the first men); or (as earlier interpreted) being renounced from the grace and protection God bears toward his servants and friends.

Catharinus thinks those first men, cast out of Paradise, came into Judaea, and dwelt there; indeed he even thinks it probable that Abel too sacrificed in the place where Jerusalem later was. I wonder that he did not add besides that Abel was killed by Cain in the place later called Mount Calvary, where Christ was killed by the Jews. Cain therefore, according to Catharinus, having gone out from Judaea, went elsewhere. But these things have not even a shadow of probability; indeed that they are false can easily be understood from what we disputed above (book 3) concerning the place and situation of Paradise.

Catharinus's improbable view: the first men, expelled from Paradise, came into Judaea; Abel sacrificed where Jerusalem later stood (Pererius sardonically wonders he did not add Abel was killed on Mount Calvary, where Christ was killed by the Jews); Cain then left Judaea for elsewhere. Pererius: this has not a shadow of probability, and is shown false by his earlier disputation (book 3) on the location of Paradise. Marginal gloss: 'Opinatio Catharini minime probabilis.'

For that word 'Fugitive.' In Hebrew it is the word [■■■] 'Nod,' which the Seventy thought to be the proper name of a place; and therefore they rendered this place thus, 'And he dwelt in the land of Naid.' Following them, Josephus writes that Cain, having traversed many regions together with his wife, at length founded the town of Naida, and there fixed his seat and procreated children. But Jerome, in the Hebrew Traditions, judges that [■■■] 'Nod' is a common noun, signifying in Latin 'wandering, fluctuating, unstable, and of uncertain seat.' For thus was God's sentence against Cain explained — that he would wander here and there, a vagabond and fugitive.

On 'Fugitive.' GLYPH verified (appears twice on the page): ■■■ (Nod, Gen 4:16). The LXX took it as a place-name — 'the land of Naid' — and Josephus followed (Cain traversed many regions with his wife, founded the town Naida, settled, and had children). But Jerome (Hebrew Traditions/Quaest. Hebr.) takes ■■■ (Nod) as a common noun meaning 'wandering, fluctuating, unstable, of uncertain abode' — matching God's sentence that Cain would wander as a vagabond and fugitive.

But what Cain was like after he went out from the face of God — that is, how impious, impure, and polluted and lost in all crimes — Josephus expounds in these words (book 1 of the Antiquities, ch. 11):

'But so far was he from changing his life for the better by this chastisement, that he was made even worse, indulging his pleasures, or [indulging himself] with injury to others, and accumulating domestic resources by force and rapine; and, summoning from everywhere companions of robbery and wickedness, he became a master to them for a life of crime. Besides, he changed the hitherto simple manner of living, by devising measures and weights, and depraved the pristine sincerity and generosity, ignorant of such arts, into a certain new cunning.' Thus Josephus.

Josephus (Antiquities 1.11) on how wicked Cain became after his exile: far from improving under chastisement, he grew worse — indulging pleasures, harming others, amassing wealth by force and rapine, gathering bandits as their master in crime; and he corrupted the simple old way of life by inventing weights and measures, depraving the pristine sincerity into cunning. 'Thus Josephus.' Marginal gloss: 'Qualis fuerit Cain post fratricidium.'

Rightly does Ambrose warn us, treating this place (ch. 10, book 2 on Cain and Abel), that from the fortunes and outcomes of these two brothers it is made manifest that the evils which befall the good, and the goods which happen to the wicked in this life, are, to those judging prudently, truly to be judged neither goods nor evils. For...

Ambrose's lesson (De Cain et Abel 2.10): from the two brothers' fortunes it is manifest that, to the prudent, the evils befalling the good and the goods befalling the wicked in this life are truly neither goods nor evils. Marginal gloss: 'Egregium documentum ex Ambrosio: Nec vere mala esse quae viris bonis adversa accidunt.' Page footer signature 'CCCC 3'; catchword 'da. Nam' (continues on the next page).

— p. 799 (PDF) · printed p. 758 —

...neither goods. For evils are turned for good men into an eternal and immortal good and glory, but goods for the wicked are for everlasting disgrace and destruction. Behold, Abel, an innocent and holy man, on account of that very excellence of sanctity and the grace of piety and religion toward God, in the flower of his age, with no joy of offspring received and no consolation of future posterity, was killed by his brother

through the greatest injury and cruelty. But now Cain, the author of the atrocious crime, an impious and most wicked man, lived a very long life, took a wife, procreated sons, saw a numerous and long-lasting posterity, founded cities, and, prince and lord of many, lived many years unpunished. But indeed the premature death of Abel quickly took him away from the many and great labors, miseries, and calamities with which this our life is filled. But the prolongation of Cain's life was a prolongation of vengeance and torment, for equally with his life the anguish and conflict of mind and body was prolonged. And every age will speak Abel's praises; but the memory of Cain's impiety and cruelty men of all ages will recall with the greatest hatred and detestation.

Ambrose's lesson applied: evils turn to eternal glory for the good, worldly goods to everlasting disgrace for the wicked. Abel (innocent, holy) was killed young and childless; Cain (wicked) lived long, married, had a numerous posterity, founded cities, prospered unpunished — yet Abel's death freed him from life's miseries, while Cain's long life prolonged his torment; and every age praises Abel but detests Cain. Marginal gloss: 'Nec vere mala esse quae viris bonis adversa eveniunt, nec bona quae improbis prospera contingunt.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '748'; true printed page 758.

This too must be noted, that one ought not to judge of men's virtue and wickedness, and likewise misery and felicity, from the good or evil events of this life. For very often virtue is oppressed and buffeted by many adversities and great calamities; but on the contrary, in prosperous circumstances flowing to its wish, wickedness exults, lively and glorious and as it were blessed — so that from these things it cannot be judged whether anyone is worthy of hatred or of love with God, as Solomon said in the book of Ecclesiastes ch. 9. But if we are wise, this very thing compels us to believe that the soul is not extinguished together with the body, but that, when it has departed the body, another life remains for it, another judgment of good and evil, and another distribution of rewards and punishments according to each man's merits is to be expected — unless perhaps someone is so mad or impious as to think there is no distinction of good and evil with God, or that human affairs are conducted with no regard

and care of God.

One must not judge virtue or wickedness by this life's fortunes (virtue is often oppressed, wickedness prospers — 'no man knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love,' Eccl 9:1). Rightly weighed, this proves the soul survives the body: another life, judgment, and distribution of rewards/punishments must follow — unless one madly denies God's providence over human affairs. Marginal gloss: 'Aliam post hanc superesse vitam quomodo probari possit.'

But it pleases me here to set down Ambrose's words, worthy indeed to be read by all, and pondered with frequent recollection. 'They are refuted,' he says, 'in this place, who think this life, which is in this world, is the only one. All things are full of falling, full of grief, and are refuted by the simple series of deeds. For behold, a just, innocent, pious man, incurring his brother's hatred on account of the grace of devotion, was taken away by parricide while still immature in age; and an iniquitous, wicked, impious man, even polluted by fraternal murder, led a long age, took a wife, left posterity, founded cities, and merited this by divine permission. Does not in these things the voice of God openly cry, You err who think that here is all the grace of living? You do not understand, you do not notice, that this old age is a veteran procession of miseries and of age, the wages of troubles; and that we are surrounded, as by a Scylla-like experience, by daily shipwrecks, are beaten by waves, dwell in rocky habitations, and take delight in these — like that [life which is] not so much an eternal living-being as an immortal evil. Therefore even for this Cain the long life granted was a vengeance, in that he lived in fear, and...'

Ambrose (De Cain et Abel) refuting those who think this the only life: all is full of falling and grief, refuted by the plain series of events — the just (Abel) taken young by parricide, the wicked (Cain) granted a long life, wife, posterity, and cities. God's voice cries, 'You err who think here is all the grace of living': this old age is a 'veteran procession of miseries,' daily shipwrecks amid rocks — life more an 'immortal evil' than an eternal good. So even Cain's long life was itself a vengeance, since he lived in fear, and... Catchword 'metu' (continues on the next page).

— p. 800 (PDF) · printed p. 759 —

...in fear, and ran through a long space with much and fruitless labor — than which punishment nothing is graver, than that anyone should himself be the cause of greater punishments to himself. See, therefore, how perpetual is the life of the just, and how none is that of the wicked. The blood of the just cries out, even [when they are] dead; but the life of the sinner is hidden.' Thus he [Ambrose].

End of the Ambrose quote: Cain's long, fearful, fruitless life was itself the gravest punishment (to be one's own cause of greater penalties). The life of the just is 'perpetual,' that of the wicked 'none' — the just's blood cries even after death, but the sinner's life is 'hidden.' 'Thus Ambrose.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '749'; true printed page 759.

And he built a city, and called its name from the name of his son Henoch. Verse 17.

The lemma Genesis 4:17b (marginal 'VERS. 17.'): Cain builds a city and names it after his son Henoch.

This place has a great question: how Cain was able, or to what end he wished, to build a city. For then, when Cain begot his firstborn Henoch, there were not in the world but five men — I mean Adam and Eve, Cain and his wife and [their] son. Indeed, those who might inhabit that city were not but three: for Cain had departed far from the fellowship and society of his parents.

The great question: how or why Cain built a city, when at Henoch's birth there were only five people in the world (Adam, Eve, Cain, his wife, their son) — and only three to inhabit the city, since Cain had gone far from his parents. Marginal gloss: 'Quomodo, aut quorsum Cain, cum tres, vel summum quinque tunc in mundo essent homines, civitatem aedificaverit.'

St Augustine (in book 15 of the City of God, ch. 8) explains this question in two ways. First he answers that Henoch was not Cain's firstborn, but begotten by him in old age, and for that reason beloved and dear beyond the other sons, as Joseph was to his father Jacob; and, in testimony of the singular love with which Cain embraced this son, he called the city founded by him 'Henochia' from his name. Nor does it stand in the way that

in Scripture the succession and posterity of Cain is described through Henoch: for that deduction of Cain's posterity was made not through firstborns, but through those who were in order the leaders of that city, or through those who in Cain's family were the most illustrious and memorable of all; or, finally, Moses wished to review these generations because in the last of them Cain was killed, and indeed by Lamech, who was of the stock of Henoch. Then Augustine answers, secondly, that Henoch was indeed Cain's firstborn (and this Josephus thinks, and it seems more probable), yet that the city was not built by him then, when Cain begot him, but much later — namely when Cain himself was already old, that is, in his five-hundredth or six-hundredth year. And that through five hundred years (the greatest fecundity of human nature at the beginning of the world) Cain's offspring could be multiplied so much that it sufficed not only for a city but even for a province to be cultivated and inhabited, a manifest proof can be the propagation of the Hebrews from the one Abraham, made in a little more than four hundred years, to six hundred thousand warriors, excepting women, children, old men, and those who during those past forty years died.

Augustine (City of God 15.8), two answers: (1) Henoch was NOT the firstborn but a late-born, specially beloved son (like Joseph to Jacob), for whom Cain named the city 'Henochia' — the genealogy runs through Henoch not as firstborn but as leaders/notables of the city, or because Cain was killed in its last generation by Lamech (of Henoch's line). (2) Henoch WAS the firstborn (so Josephus, more probably), but the city was built much later, when Cain was ~500-600 years old; in 500 years of that early fecundity, Cain's offspring could fill a whole province — as the Hebrews multiplied from Abraham to 600,000 warriors (besides women, children, elderly) in ~400 years. Marginal gloss: 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquitatum.'

St Augustine's words, if the reader desires to know them, are thus: 'As for what is written, "Cain knew his wife, and, conceiving, she bore Henoch, and he was building a city in the name of his son Henoch," it is not indeed consequent that he be believed to have begotten this [Henoch as his] first son. For neither is this to be thought from the fact that he is said to have known his wife, as if he had then first

mingled with her in intercourse. For also concerning the father of all, Adam himself, this was said not only then, when Cain was conceived, whom he seems to have had as firstborn, but also later the same Scripture...'

Augustine's words verbatim (City of God 15.8): that 'Cain knew his wife and she bore Henoch, and he was building a city' does not prove Henoch the firstborn; 'knew his wife' need not mean the first intercourse — for even of Adam this idiom was used not only at Cain's conception (his apparent firstborn) but also later in the same Scripture... Marginal gloss: 'Augustini verba.' Catchword 'Scriptura' (continues on the next page).

— p. 801 (PDF) · printed p. 760 —

'...the same Scripture says, "Adam knew his wife, and she conceived and bore a son, and called his name Seth" — whence it is understood that that Scripture is wont so to speak, though not always, when in it is read that the conceptions of men were made, [that it is] not only when the two sexes first mingled together. Nor is that a necessary argument, that we should reckon Henoch the firstborn to his father, because that city was named by his name. For it is not beside the point that, for some reason, though he had others too, the father loved him more than the rest. For neither was Judah the firstborn, from whom both Judaea was named, and the Jews. But even if that son was born first to the founder of that city, it is not therefore to be thought that the name was imposed on the city founded by the father then, when he was born, because a city could not then be constituted by one man — a city being nothing else than a multitude of men bound together by one bond of society; but when that man's family grew to such numerousness that it now had the quantity of a people, then it could indeed happen that he both constituted it, and imposed on the constituted city the name of his firstborn. For so long was the life of those men that, of those mentioned there — whose years are not passed over in silence — he who lived least before the flood reached seven hundred and fifty-three years. For more even passed nine hundred years, though no one

reached a thousand. Who, therefore, would doubt that through the age of one man the human race could be so multiplied that there was material whence not one but very many cities could be constituted?' Thus Augustine.

Augustine continues: 'knew his wife' is a general idiom (used also of Seth's conception, Gen 4:25), not implying first intercourse or a firstborn; naming a city after Henoch no more proves primogeniture than Judah (not the firstborn) proves it for Judaea/the Jews. And even a firstborn could not found a city at birth (a city being a 'multitude bound by society'); only when his family grew into a people. Given the vast lifespans before the flood (the shortest was 753 years, many over 900, none reaching 1000), one man's lifetime sufficed to multiply the race enough for many cities. 'Thus Augustine.' Marginal gloss: 'Civitas quid.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '750'; true printed page 760.

Very similar things the same [Augustine] writes in the book of Questions on Genesis, question 1. Ludovicus Vives, in his commentaries on blessed Augustine's books on the City of God, on the eighth chapter of book 15, relates that there was in Spain, within the memory of his fathers, a village of nearly a hundred houses, whose inhabitants were all descended from a certain old man who was still living — so that the name of kinship was lacking by which he might be called by the youngest-born.

Augustine writes similarly in Quaestiones in Genesim q.1. Ludovicus Vives (Juan Luis Vives, commenting on City of God 15.8) reports a Spanish village of nearly 100 houses, all descended from one still-living old man — so numerous that no kinship-term remained for the youngest to call him by. (An analogue for how one long-lived man could populate a city.)

This too was noted by blessed Augustine in ch. 5 of the aforesaid book: that as the founder of the first city of all the world was a fratricide, so the founder of that city which was the head of earthly empire — Rome, I mean, whose founder Romulus killed his brother Remus — was a fratricide; and, as Lucan sang, 'The first walls were wet with a brother's blood.' From this place one may refute several errors of the ancients concerning the eternity, or excessive antiquity, of cities. The first error was that of Aristotle and the Chaldeans, and of all who thought the world was eternal, and therefore that there was no first beginning of the building of cities.

Augustine (City of God 15.5): as the first city's founder (Cain) was a fratricide, so was the founder of Rome, the head of earthly empire — Romulus killed Remus (Lucan, Pharsalia 1.95, 'The first walls were wet with a brother's blood'). Pererius then begins refuting five ancient errors on the eternity/antiquity of cities. FIRST error: Aristotle and the Chaldeans (the world eternal, so no first beginning of cities). Marginal glosses: 'Ut Cain primae civitatis conditor fratricida fuit, sic fuit Romul. conditor Romae'; 'Lucanus lib. 1. Pharsaliae'; 'Refelluntur quinque veterum errores circa vetustatem civitatum.'

The second error was that of the Poets, who feigned that in the golden age, in which Saturn reigned, there were no cities, but that they afterward began to be built under the reign of Jove — who, however, is agreed to have been after Noah's flood. The third was the error of the Egyptians. For, as Plato relates at the beginning of the Timaeus, a certain Egyptian priest affirmed to Solon that the city of Athens was founded nine thousand years before Solon's age — when yet, from the beginning of the world to the age of Solon, less than three thousand five hundred years is found to have passed.

SECOND error: the Poets (the golden age of Saturn had no cities; they began under Jove — who came after Noah's flood). THIRD error: the Egyptians — the priest in Plato's Timaeus told Solon that Athens was founded 9,000 years before him, though fewer than 3,500 years passed from creation to Solon. Marginal gloss: 'Mendacium Aegyptiorum apud Platonem de vetustate Athenarum.'

— p. 802 (PDF) · printed p. 761 —

...The fourth error was that of the Greeks; and of others, some saying that the first city of all was built by Cecrops, and for that reason first called Cecropia, later Acropolis; but others saying that the first city was Argos, founded by Phoroneus. But Cecrops was almost contemporary with Moses himself; and the age of Phoroneus plainly coincides with the age of the patriarch Jacob. The fifth error was that of the Egyptians, falsely boasting that Diospolis — that is, Thebes — was the most ancient, and the first of all the cities which were in the world. But indeed Mizraim, grandson of Noah, when the tower of Babel had already been overthrown, and the division of tongues made, first of all cultivated the land of Egypt, and was the author and founder of the Egyptian nation; wherefore Egypt is called by the Hebrews by his name, [■■■■■] 'Miseraim.'

FOURTH error: the Greeks (first city built by Cecrops — Cecropia/Acropolis — or Argos by Phoroneus; but Cecrops was ~contemporary with Moses, Phoroneus with Jacob). FIFTH error: the Egyptians (Thebes/Diospolis as the oldest, first city) — but Mizraim, grandson of Noah, founded the Egyptian nation only after Babel and the division of tongues. GLYPH verified: ■■■■■ (Mitsraim / 'Miseraim' = Egypt), so named by the Hebrews after Mizraim. Marginal glosses: 'Error Graecorum'; 'Error Aegyptiorum de antiquitate Thebarum.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '751'; true printed page 761.

The first city of the world, therefore, was Henochia, built by Cain. Berosus Annianus — that is, the spurious and fictitious [Berosus] — in his book On Times, related that the city Henochia was founded near Mount Lebanon, which is to the East in comparison with the region of Damascus; and that it was a very large city, and a habitation of giants. To these Annianus adds that even in his own time the foundations of that ruined city, of the greatest and most enormous mass, are seen on Mount Lebanon; and that the city is commonly called 'Cain' by the inhabitants of that region; and that he had received this from merchants and travelers who had been in Lebanon and Damascus.

So the world's first city was Henochia, built by Cain. The (pseudo-)Berosus 'Annianus' (the spurious Berosus of Annius of Viterbo), On Times, claimed Henochia was founded near Mount Lebanon (east of Damascus), a huge city and a dwelling of giants; and that its enormous ruined foundations were still visible on Lebanon in his day, the locals calling the city 'Cain' — reported to him by merchants and travelers from Lebanon and Damascus. (Pererius flags Berosus Annianus as spurious/fictitious.) Marginal gloss: 'Ubi condita fuerit, secundum Berosum Annianum, civitas Henochia.'

But what reason impelled Cain to build a city? Was it that he might be safer and more secure? — for he perpetually feared death for himself; as Adam wished to hide himself among the dense trees of Paradise, so Cain enclosed himself with walls. Or rather, that his whole family, gathered into one place, might coalesce into one people, of which he himself would be head and lord? Or that he might plunder far and wide more unpunished, and seize others' goods, and exercise tyranny? For, as we said above on Josephus's authority, Cain first of all tried to increase his domestic resources by force and rapine, and, having summoned companions of robbery and wickedness, stood forth as their master and leader to crimes.

Why Cain built a city — three possible motives: (1) safety/security, from perpetual fear of death (as Adam hid among Paradise's trees, Cain walled himself in); (2) to gather his family into one people under himself as head and lord; (3) to plunder and tyrannize more freely — for (per Josephus, cited earlier) Cain amassed wealth by force and rapine and led bands of robbers in crime. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Cain aedificaverit civitatem.'

Plato, in the Protagoras, thinks the cause why men fenced and enclosed themselves in built cities was that they might protect and defend themselves against the fury of wild beasts. But Aristotle, in the first book of the Politics, finds the beginnings of cities from the nature of man, affirming that man is a political animal, much more sociable than bees, cranes, and any other gregarious animal. Since, therefore, both reason taught and experience confirmed that for men to live together and to have society and communion of things among themselves is both more convenient for the uses of human life and more pleasant for every kind of pleasures, that cause chiefly first led men to found cities. The same Aristotle relates that men came to the building of cities in this order: that first men dwelt in private houses; then from these villages arose; from villages cities were built. Whether in this order in...

On the origin of cities: Plato (Protagoras) — men enclosed themselves in cities to defend against wild beasts. Aristotle (Politics 1) — cities arise from man's nature as a 'political animal,' more sociable than bees or cranes; reason and experience show communal life is more convenient and pleasant, which chiefly led men to found cities. Aristotle's order: private houses → villages → cities. Marginal gloss: 'De prima causa aedificandi urbes, secundum Platonem, & Aristotelem.' Page footer signature 'DDDD'; catchword 'exor' (continues on the next page).

— p. 803 (PDF) · printed p. 762 —

...whether at the beginning of the world it was come to the building of the first city in this order, is uncertain. Moreover, I desire the reader in this place to notice how skillful, prudent, diligent, and solicitous wicked men are toward all things which pertain to the utilities, pleasures, and honors of the present life — whether to be found out, amplified, completed, or in any way procured for themselves — with the love and care of heavenly and eternal things utterly cast off, and those things which conduce to the

medicine and salvation of their soul held for nothing; finally, with no regard and no thought of the future life, all their counsels, vows, efforts, and labors look and are directed to the sole acquiring, augmenting, guarding, and possessing of this world's goods, and they fear no evil nor hope for any good after this life. Behold: Cain first of all built a city; and of his descendants Lamech first, for the sake of lust, took several wives; whose three sons invented various arts, by which the things that conduce to the culture of human life might be supplied more abundantly and conveniently to men. For of these, one greatly aided and adorned the pastoral art, another music, the third the smith's art (which is occupied in working bronze and iron), with many and great useful inventions.

A moral lesson: wicked men are keen and diligent about all that serves the present life's utility, pleasure, and honor, but cast off the love of heavenly/eternal things and give no thought to the future life. So the Cainites: Cain built the first city; Lamech was the first polygamist (out of lust); his three sons invented the arts of herding, music, and metalworking (Jabal, Jubal, Tubalcain — Gen 4:20-22). Marginal gloss: 'Morale documentum.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '752'; true printed page 762.

But that Cain's descendants were like Cain in outrages and crimes, Josephus confirms, writing that, while Adam was still alive, Cain's most wicked offspring emerged: 'for,' says Josephus, 'each later one becomes worse, and not only imitates the vices of his predecessors, but far surpasses them with new crimes newly invented, sparing neither wars nor robberies; but if any abstained from murders, they lived their life greedily and proudly.'

Josephus (Antiquities 1) confirms that Cain's line grew ever more wicked (even while Adam still lived): each generation worse than the last, adding new crimes, sparing neither war nor robbery; and those who abstained from murder lived greedily and proudly. Marginal gloss: 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquit.'

But the things which we said a little above about the talents and pursuits of wicked men, who think nothing of heavenly and eternal goods, but serve only earthly desires, and pursue with their whole heart and greed the goods of the present life (fleeting indeed and soon to perish) — these things, I

say, which we touched cursorily above, that they may fall more pleasantly on the reader, are to be seasoned with the sweetness of Gregorian speech.

Transition: what Pererius said about the wicked's earthly pursuits he will now 'season' with Gregory's eloquence.

Treating this place, therefore, Gregory (in book 16 of the Morals, ch. 6, on those words of Job which are in ch. 22, 'Who were taken away before their time, and a flood overthrew their foundation') writes in this manner: 'The iniquitous, while they neglect to pass over in heart to the eternal, and do not perceive all present things to be fleeting, fix their mind in the love of the present life, and as if of a long dwelling construct for themselves a foundation in it: because in earthly things they are solidified through desire. So Cain is described as the first to have built a city on the earth; who, namely, is openly shown to be a pilgrim, because he himself placed a foundation on the earth, being estranged from the solidity of the eternal fatherland. For a pilgrim from the highest things placed his foundation in the lowest, who set the station of his heart in earthly delight. Whence also in his stock, Henoch — who is interpreted "dedication" — is born first. But in the progeny of the elect, Henoch is recorded to have been the seventh: because, namely, the reprobate, in this life, which comes first, dedicate themselves by building; but the elect await the dedication of their building at the end of time, that is, in the seventh age. For you may see very many think only of temporal things, seek honors, gape after ambitious things, and seek nothing after this life. What, therefore,'

Gregory (Moralia 16.6, on Job 22:16, 'taken away before their time, a flood overthrew their foundation'): the wicked, neglecting the eternal, fix their hearts in the present life as if a long dwelling. So Cain, the first city-builder, is shown a 'pilgrim' estranged from the eternal fatherland — placing his foundation in the lowest, his heart in earthly delight. Hence in his line Henoch ('dedication') is born FIRST (the reprobate dedicate themselves now, in this prior life), whereas the Sethite Enoch is the SEVENTH (the elect await their dedication at the end, in the seventh age). Marginal gloss: 'Praeclara Gregorii sententia.' Catchword 'itaque' (continues on the next page).

— p. 804 (PDF) · printed p. 763 —

'...do these [reprobate] do, unless they dedicate themselves in the first generation? You may see the elect seek nothing of present glory, willingly bear want, patiently endure the world's evils, that they may be crowned at the end. To the elect, therefore, Henoch is born in the seventh generation, because they seek the dedication of their joy in the final glory of the resurrection. And because by the daily lapse of time the very mortality of the present life runs down, and destroys the dedication of the reprobate by taking away those same reprobate: rightly is it said of the iniquitous, "And a flood overthrew their foundation" — that is, the very course of mortality subverted in them the state of [their] perverse construction.' Thus Gregory.

Gregory concludes: the reprobate dedicate themselves in the 'first generation' (now); the elect seek no present glory, bear want, and endure evils to be crowned at the end — so their Henoch is the seventh (the resurrection glory). And the 'flood' that 'overthrew their foundation' (Job 22:16) is the very course of mortality, sweeping away the reprobate and their earthly building. 'Thus Gregory.' (Marginal variants noted: 'retributionis' for 'resurrectionis'; 'mutabilitatis' for 'mortalitatis.') Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '753'; true printed page 763.

And Lamech said to his wives Ada and Sella: Hear my voice, wives of Lamech, hearken to my speech: for I have killed a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt: sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times sevenfold. Verses 23 and 24.

New lemma: Genesis 4:23-24 (marginal 'VERS. 23. & 24.'), Lamech's song to his wives.

So obscure and perplexed is this place, that in interpreting it Origen consumed the twelfth and thirteenth book of his Commentaries on Genesis (as Jerome testifies in Epistle 125, which was written to Damasus). Indeed Catharinus thinks this place utterly inexplicable, and that no mortal can attain the true and proper understanding of it by human reason and investigation. Certainly, its obscurity is sufficiently declared by the huge variety and disagreement of the Doctors' interpretations and opinions in

explaining it. Doubtless, here happens what is wont to happen in most doubtful and uncertain matters: that those who treat them, since they have nothing explored and certain to follow, led by various conjectures, are drawn into quite diverse and contrary opinions. Wherefore we must apply the greater study and diligence to the explanation of this place, that what seems nearer the truth, and more congruent with the sense of Moses's words, may be indicated to the reader openly and briefly.

Lamech's song is the most obscure passage — Origen spent two books (12-13 of his Genesis Commentary) on it (per Jerome, Ep. 125 to Damasus); Catharinus thinks it inexplicable by human reason. Its obscurity shows in the Doctors' vast disagreement; Pererius will apply extra diligence to give the likeliest, most Mosaic sense briefly. Marginal gloss: 'Locus in Scriptura difficillimus.'

I find four interpretations of this place. The first is widespread, and approved by many interpreters both Hebrew and Christian, which is also approved by me beyond the others. It is handed down from ancient Hebrew tradition that Lamech was given to hunting, and up to his extreme old age was studiously and assiduously engaged in it. Since therefore, now dim of sight from old age, and using the guidance of a youth (whom the Hebrews say was the son of Tubalcain himself), he nevertheless still had leisure for hunting: once he came upon Cain himself wandering in the dense woods in the manner of wild beasts; whom Lamech, at the warning of his director and guide, thinking him to be a wild beast, transfixed with an arrow and killed. But soon, the error being recognized, so great an anger blazed up against the boy, that he killed him with a heavy and vehement blow and stroke. So then they expound the words: [Lamech] addresses...

FOUR interpretations; the FIRST (Pererius's preferred, from ancient Hebrew tradition): blind old Lamech, still hunting with a boy-guide (said to be Tubalcain's son), came upon Cain wandering in the woods like a beast; guided by the boy, he shot and killed Cain (mistaking him for a beast); then, realizing the error, in rage he killed the boy too — explaining 'a man' (Cain) and 'a young man' (the boy). Marginal glosses: 'Quatuor interpretationes huius loci'; 'Prima interpretatio quae praeter caeteras auctori probatur.' Catchword 'Alloqui-' (Alloquitur; continues on the next page).

— p. 805 (PDF) · printed p. 764 —

...Lamech addresses his wives, greatly penitent for the double killing done by him, and confessing his crime to them: 'I have killed,' he says, 'a man' — that is, Cain — 'to my wounding,' that is, by my wound, or by a wound inflicted on him by me; 'and a young man to my hurt,' because, striking him vehemently with the bow, he had made his whole body livid. But since this killing fell in the seventh generation from Adam himself, it appears that the death of Cain and the vengeance for his fratricide was deferred until the seventh generation — which some thought was signified by those words of God, 'Everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold,' as we declared above. This interpretation is quite probable for two reasons: because, although the generation of Cain is continued up to the flood, Moses nevertheless terminates it in Lamech and his sons — for no other reason indeed than because in Lamech's generation the life of Cain, killed by Lamech, was terminated; and also because there was no reason why Moses should wish to narrate the homicide which Lamech had done, unless to indicate the most wretched end and death of Cain.

First interpretation continued: penitent Lamech confesses to his wives the double killing — Cain ('a man,' by a wound) and the boy ('a young man,' by a bruise, his body made livid by the bow-blow). This fell in the SEVENTH generation from Adam, so Cain's death fulfilled 'Everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold.' Two supports: (1) Cain's line, though continuing to the flood, is terminated by Moses at Lamech (because Cain's life ended there); (2) Moses would narrate Lamech's homicide only to mark Cain's wretched end. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '754'; true printed page 764.

I am not unaware that it pleases neither Paul of Burgos, nor Catharinus, nor Jerome of Oleaster, that Cain was killed by Lamech: because God, they say, had promised him impunity from killing, and had made him secure, and indeed had decreed that he who killed Cain would be punished sevenfold. But that Lamech was so punished is nowhere read. And Paul of Burgos thinks Cain died by no other death than through the flood. But by these reasons I shall not indeed be led away from the common opinion. For God only signified that Cain would not be killed at once, nor by just anyone who found him, as he himself fearfully said. Indeed, as we said

above, many interpreted that saying of the Lord to mean that God signified that Cain would live until his seventh generation, and in it was to be killed. But whether Lamech — because he killed Cain through ignorance and error, and because he confessed his crime — escaped the penalties which God had threatened against Cain's killer, or not, is uncertain: for Moses did not take care to record in writing all the things that were then done. That certainly which Burgos said — that Cain lived until the flood — can be proved to no one who is not entirely ignorant of the sacred writings. For from it, it would be concluded that Cain lived more than sixteen hundred years: since from the fifth chapter of the book of Genesis it is manifest that from Adam to the flood one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years passed.

Objectors (Paul of Burgos, Catharinus, Oleaster) deny Cain was killed by Lamech: God promised Cain impunity and 'sevenfold' vengeance on his killer, yet Lamech's punishment is nowhere recorded; Burgos says Cain died in the flood. Pererius answers: God only said Cain would not be killed at once or by just anyone (many take it as living to the seventh generation, then killed); whether Lamech (who killed by error and confessed) escaped the threatened penalty is simply unknown, since Moses did not record everything. And Burgos's claim (Cain alive till the flood) is refuted by Scripture: it would make Cain over 1,600 years old (Adam-to-flood = 1,656 years, Gen 5). Marginal gloss: 'Cur Paulus Burgensis, Catharinus & Oleaster negent Cain esse occisum a Lamech.'

This first interpretation, which pleases us most of all, Cajetan treats subtly and clearly; for, explaining this place, he writes thus: 'Lamech expressly confesses that he killed two men: both from the diversity of age — the one a man, the other a boy; and from the diverse manner of killing — the one namely by a wound, the other by a bruise. And "bruise" (livor) is the name of an effect, which comes from a blow without a wound: for there happens a gathering of blood under the skin, and the struck part is rendered livid. But who the man or the boy was that was killed, the letter does not openly signify; yet it introduces a conjecture, that the man killed by a wound...'

Cajetan confirms the first interpretation: Lamech confesses killing two — distinguished by age (a man, a boy) and by manner (one by a wound, one by a 'bruise' = livor, blood gathering under

unbroken skin). Who the two were the text does not state openly, but suggests a conjecture — that the man killed by a wound [was Cain]... Marginal gloss: 'Probatur haec prima interpretatio primum ex Caietano suam interpretationem confirmante.' Catchword 'vulnere' (continues on the next page).

— p. 806 (PDF) · printed p. 765 —

'...by a wound was Cain: both because the progeny of Cain alone is reviewed, and only up to Lamech as the killer of Cain (for Moses mentions his wife and three sons, that he might explain who, what sort, and how great this Lamech was, from his fame, and bigamy, and sons); and because this whole history of Cain terminates in the words of the homicide as its principal intent; and from the comparison of Cain's penalty to Lamech's own penalty; and because the letter fits — that Lamech, being blind, at the boy who directed him saying, "Shoot the arrow there," thinking a beast was moving there, wounded the hidden Cain; and after he noticed that he had killed the father of his ancestor, he flogged the boy, who died from the bruise of the flogging. For a great bruise, unpurged, is deadly. That the letter fits, the ages of the slain and the modes of killing attest. And reading "Cain avenged sevenfold," you have, by joining it to what precedes, that Cain's killer was to be avenged sevenfold. But that which is added, "and Lamech seventy-seven," signifies that he was to be punished with a far greater penalty, as being guilty of parricide and of filicide (if that boy was his son), or at least of homicide, and guilty of contempt for the divine justice by which he knew Cain was punished for homicide. But the greater penalty is signified, in the Hebrew manner, by the two first sevens — seven, and seventy. For the first septenary number is called "seven"; but the second, "seventy"; for from seven up to seventy there is no number denominated from seven. Alluding, therefore, to Cain's vengeance by the septenary number, namely sevenfold, he infers that his own would be by a double septenary, namely seven and seventy. But why he did not say adverbially "seventy times and seven times," but nominally "seventy and seven," I do not know — unless perhaps it be true, what Josephus says, that Lamech had seventy-seven sons and

daughters, and therefore said he was to be punished in [his] seventy-seven children.' Thus Cajetan.

Cajetan's grounds that the 'man' was Cain: (1) only Cain's line is reviewed, ending at Lamech his killer (Moses names Lamech's wife and sons to characterize him); (2) the whole Cain-history ends at this homicide; (3) the comparison of Cain's and Lamech's penalties; (4) the 'letter fits' the blind-Lamech story (guided by the boy's 'shoot there,' he shot the hidden Cain thinking him a beast, then flogged the boy to death — a great unpurged bruise is deadly). On the numbers: 'sevenfold' (for Cain's avenger) vs. 'seventy-seven' (a far graver penalty for Lamech, guilty of parricide/filicide/homicide and of contempt for divine justice); the Hebrew idiom uses the two first sevens (seven and seventy). Why 'seventy and seven' (nominal) not 'seventy times seven' (adverbial) is unclear — unless (per Josephus) Lamech had 77 children, and meant he would be punished in them. 'Thus Cajetan.' Marginal gloss: 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquitatum.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '755'; true printed page 765.

But whence is this history of Cain killed by Lamech ascertained? Tostatus, in question 15 on this chapter, makes Josephus its author. But he certainly slipped in memory. For Josephus writes only two things very briefly about him in book 1 of the Antiquities, ch. 2: one is that Lamech, from his two wives Sella and Ada, begot seventy-seven children; the other is that, since he was not unskilled in divine law, and saw that he would pay penalties for the parricide perpetrated on Cain (perhaps because he understood that its vengeance had been deferred by God to the seventh generation), he indicated this to his wives. Only that much [says] Josephus. But I think Tostatus followed the Historia Scholastica, in ch. 28 of the history of Genesis, and, not considering well what is handed down in it, slipped either through forgetfulness or through inadvertence. There was, therefore, this old tradition among the Hebrews; and because it fits the history of Moses very well, and because it brings great light to the understanding and explaining of this place concerning Lamech's homicide, it was therefore willingly received by many and vehemently approved.

The source of the Lamech-killed-Cain story: Tostatus (q.15) credits Josephus, but misremembered — Josephus (Antiq. 1.2) says only two things briefly (Lamech had 77 children by Ada and Sella; and, knowing he must pay for the parricide of Cain — perhaps grasping the vengeance deferred to the seventh generation — he told his wives). Pererius thinks Tostatus really followed Comestor's Historia

Scholastica (Genesis ch. 28) and slipped through carelessness. It is an old Hebrew tradition, widely received because it fits Moses's narrative and greatly illuminates Lamech's homicide. Marginal glosses: 'Unde compertum sit Cain esse occisum a Lamech'; 'Lapsus Tostati'; 'Traditio vetus Hebraeorum a Lamech Cainum interfectum.'

Which [tradition] Jerome seems to hint at in the epistle which he wrote to Damasus: 'This,' he says, 'is the opinion of our elders, that they think Cain was killed in the seventh generation by Lamech'; and a little below, 'Lamech, who was the seventh from Adam, killed Cain not willingly, as is written in a certain Hebrew volume,'

Jerome (in his epistle to Damasus) hints at the tradition: 'our elders' opinion is that Cain was killed in the seventh generation by Lamech; and 'Lamech, the seventh from Adam, killed Cain not on purpose, as a certain Hebrew volume writes...' (The epistle is cited here as '225'; earlier on this passage it is cited as '125' — a print inconsistency.) Page footer signature 'DDDD 3'; catchword 'sicut' (continues on the next page).

— p. 807 (PDF) · printed p. 766 —

'...just as he himself afterward confesses, saying, I killed a man in my wound and a young man in my bruise,' etc. But let us pursue the remaining three interpretations.

End of Jerome's quote (from the previous page) on Lamech killing Cain unwittingly; Pererius turns to the remaining three of the four interpretations of Lamech's song. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '756'; true printed page 766.

The second is the interpretation of Theodoret (in the book of Questions on Genesis, question 44), who says that Lamech killed not two men, nor killed Cain himself, but some other man of adolescent age; yet that he escaped the punishment of the homicide, because he vehemently grieved for his crime, and judged himself worthy of a greater punishment than Cain himself, as his words declare. Theodoret, therefore, when he had posed this question, 'Whom did Lamech kill?', himself answers it thus: 'Not two, as some thought, nor Cain himself, as others have fabled, but one, and him a youth. For, he says, I killed to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt — that is, a

man of youthful age; yet he escaped punishment on account of the confession of his sin, and, by bearing sentence against himself, avoided the divine sentence.'

SECOND interpretation — Theodoret (Quaest. in Gen. 44): Lamech killed only ONE man (a youth), not two, and not Cain; but he escaped punishment through confession and self-condemnation, thus avoiding God's sentence. Marginal gloss: 'Secunda interpretatio: quae est Theodoreti.'

The third interpretation is Suidas's (in the entry 'Lamech'), who thinks these words signify that two men were killed by Lamech, one of manly age, the other of youthful age; and that these were brothers of holy Henoch, who was translated into Paradise; and that, because they were men distinguished by the praise of piety and sanctity, therefore Lamech grieved so greatly for their death. Suidas writes thus: 'Two Lamechs are mentioned, one the Cainite, the other who was the father of Noah himself. That one killed a man and an adolescent, and married two wives, who accuses himself, who pronounces himself worthy of the penalty seventy times seven. "Cain," he says, "paid sevenfold penalties, but Lamech seventy times seven." He is therefore punished more gravely, because by the misfortune of him who had first transgressed he was not made more cautious. He also took away the brothers of the just Henoch, who therefore prayed by faith that he might not see such a death; and, being granted his wish, was translated.' Thus Suidas.

THIRD interpretation — Suidas (the Suda, s.v. 'Lamech'): Lamech killed TWO men (one grown, one youth), who were brothers of the Sethite Enoch/Henoch (the one 'translated,' Gen 5:24); their piety made Lamech's grief great. The Suda distinguishes the two Lamechs (the Cainite and Noah's father); Cain paid sevenfold, Lamech seventy-sevenfold (graver, since Cain's fate did not make him cautious); and Enoch, whose brothers Lamech killed, prayed not to see such a death and was translated. Marginal glosses: 'Tertia interpretatio: quae est Suidae'; 'Duo Lamechi in Scriptura memorantur.'

The fourth interpretation is that of certain Hebrews, who think Lamech's words are to be read as a question, so that they yield a negative sense. And they hand down this history: that Lamech in his old age was badly treated

by his wives, either on account of his excessive lust and lasciviousness, or on account of the truculent dispositions of his sons — who, having invented the use of arms, made slaughters of men everywhere. Wherefore his wives repeatedly threatened Lamech, the parent of such sons, with death, as if God would take the gravest penalties from him and his sons. Lamech, therefore, by comparing himself with Cain, shows his wives that he need not fear death: 'Have I,' he says, 'killed a man, and this a young man, as Cain did — who killed his brother Abel, flourishing in youthful age, by wound and bruise, that is, partly by iron, partly by clubs? If, therefore, God forbade that anyone should dare to kill Cain, even though he was a fratricide: with how much graver a punishment will God punish, if anyone should dare to bring death upon me?' And these are the four interpretations of those words of Lamech, of which we judge the first to be more probable than the rest.

FOURTH interpretation (certain Hebrews): read Lamech's words as a rhetorical question with a negative sense. Lamech, badly treated by his wives (who feared God's vengeance because of his lust or his sons' violence), reassures them by comparison with Cain: 'Have I killed anyone, as Cain killed innocent Abel? If God forbade even the fratricide Cain to be killed, how much more will he avenge me!' Pererius reaffirms the FIRST interpretation as the most probable. Marginal gloss: 'Quarta interpretatio quae est Hebraeorum.'

— p. 808 (PDF) · printed p. 767 —

It follows that we should unfold the sense of those words, 'Sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times seven.' I pass over reviewing here the interpretations which St Jerome mentions in Epistle 125 to Damasus, as being allegorical rather than adhering to the sense of Moses's words. A fourfold interpretation, then, of this place is reported. The first is that Lamech said these words, vehemently penitent for the crime committed by him, and grieving, and exaggerating it above Cain's sin, and judging it worthy of a greater punishment. So that this is the sense of those words: 'My sin,' says Lamech, 'is worthy of a greater punishment than the sin of Cain; therefore if Cain was worthy to be punished sevenfold, I [am worthy] seventy times sevenfold.' For by a

phrase quite frequent in Scripture, just as 'sevenfold' signifies 'much,' so 'seventy times seven' signifies 'much more.' To this that gives credence which the Lord said to Peter (Matthew 18), 'I do not say to you until seven times, but until seventy times seven.'

Now the second clause of Lamech's song ('sevenfold for Cain, seventy-sevenfold for Lamech'). Pererius skips Jerome's allegorical readings (Ep. 125 to Damasus) and gives four interpretations. FIRST: Lamech, penitent, exaggerates his sin above Cain's — 'if Cain deserved sevenfold, I deserve seventy-sevenfold'; here 'seven' = 'much' and 'seventy-seven' = 'much more' (cf. Matt 18:22, 'not seven times but seventy times seven'). Marginal glosses: 'Quid significet, Septuplum ultio dabitur de Cain: de Lamech vero septuagies septies'; 'Quadruplex interpretatio. Prima interpretatio.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '757'; true printed page 767.

According to this interpretation, one may here distinguish three grades of men. The first is of innocent men, such as Abel was; of whom there are three properties: that they and their works please God; that they are envied among men, and hated by the wicked; that they suffer great and frequent persecutions, and not rarely have sad ends. These the word 'Abel,' signifying 'mourning,' well denotes; for what the Lord said to his disciples (John 16), 'You will weep and lament, but the world will rejoice,' can be said universally of pious and just men. The second grade is of impenitent sinners, such as Cain was; of whom it is mostly proper to perpetrate any crimes, and either to excuse or deny them, and at last to despair of pardon and salvation. The life of these is most wretched, for they are always wanderers and fugitives: for they wander through all crimes, and flee God and whatever things can conduce to the salvation of their soul. To whom the name 'Cain,' signifying 'possession,' well fits; for they long to possess goods only in this life and in this world, wishing here to be joyful, rich, powerful, and blessed and so regarded; what awaits them after death, they take no thought. The third grade is of penitent sinners, whom Lamech expressed: these, if they have done anything either through error, or perturbation of mind, or by the persuasion and impulse of others' evil, immediately acknowledge it, grieve, detest it, confess it, and pronounce themselves worthy of any punishment.

The interpretation yields THREE grades of men: (1) the innocent (Abel — pleasing God, envied and persecuted, often coming to sad ends; 'Abel' = 'mourning,' cf. John 16:20 'you will weep but the world rejoice'); (2) impenitent sinners (Cain — perpetrating and denying crimes, despairing; restless wanderers fleeing God; 'Cain' = 'possession,' craving only this world's goods, heedless of the afterlife); (3) penitent sinners (Lamech — who, having sinned through error or the impulse of others, at once acknowledge, grieve, confess, and condemn themselves). Marginal glosses: 'Tres gradus hominum, Innocentium, paenitentium, & impaenitentium'; 'Ioan. 16.'

That this Lamech was such, Chrysostom confirms with many and eloquent words (homily 20 on Genesis). For, carefully explaining these words of Lamech, he writes in this manner: 'Consider, I pray, how much from the very beginning the punishment inflicted on Cain profited him [Lamech]; for he not only does not wait to be accused by another, because he had fallen into the same and a graver sin; but, with no one accusing or rebuking, he himself makes it manifest, and confesses what was done, and narrates to his wives the magnitude of the offense — as if fulfilling that which was said by the Prophet, "The just man is the accuser of himself in the beginning of his speech": for confession avails very much for the amending of sins. And so, just as it is graver than the sins themselves, after sins committed, to deny the sins: which'

Chrysostom (homily 20 on Genesis) confirms that Lamech was of the penitent grade: Cain's punishment profited Lamech, who — without waiting to be accused — confessed his crime unprompted to his wives (fulfilling Prov 18:17, 'the just is his own accuser at the outset'), for 'confession avails very much for amending sins.' To deny sins after committing them is graver than the sins themselves — which [Cain did]... Marginal glosses: 'Confessio Lamech secundum Chrysostomum'; 'Proverb. 18.'; 'Confessio ad emendanda peccata plurimum valet.' Catchword 'id quod' (continues on the next page).

— p. 809 (PDF) · printed p. 768 —

'...which that fratricide [Cain] did; and, being asked by the merciful God, not only did he not confess the crime which he had dared to perpetrate, but he even dared to lie to God, and did this that his life might be prolonged. But this one [Lamech] too had fallen into those same sins; yet, weighing in his mind that denial would prepare a

graver punishment for him, having called his wives, with no one rebuking or accusing, he himself with his own tongue makes confession of his sins, and, comparing what had been done by him with those [done] by Cain, he defines the punishment for himself. You have seen the providence of the Lord: how his [Cain's] punishment is an occasion of mercy, and that his mercy reaches not only him who is punished — but how would they [wish to] take some fruit from it? For whence else, tell me, pray, would Lamech have been led to this confession, unless he had memory of those things which befell him [Cain], which continually struck his mind?'

Chrysostom continues: Cain, asked by God, denied and even lied (to prolong his life); but Lamech, having fallen into the same sins, weighed that denial brings a graver penalty, and so confessed unprompted to his wives, defining his own punishment by comparison with Cain. God's providence: Cain's punishment became an occasion of mercy — profiting not only Cain but others (for it was the memory of Cain's fate that led Lamech to confess). Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '758'; true printed page 768.

And a little below, the same [Chrysostom], declaring it more clearly, subjoins: 'A great thing was said, and very great. Manifold and pious is the prudence of the man; for he not only confessed the deed which he had done, but also inflicted the punishment upon himself, comparing his sin to Cain's sin. "For what pardon," he says, "would he be worthy of, who is not amended by another's punishment, and is perpetually mindful of that matter, and is admonished, and moreover perpetrated a double homicide: because," he says, "I killed a man to my wounding, and a young man to my scar. Not so much," he says, "did I harm those whom I killed, as myself: for I cast myself into a punishment which I cannot escape, having wrought sins so great that they do not merit pardon. For if he, for one killing, was made liable to seven punishments, I would be worthy to pay the penalty seventy times seven. For what reason, and why? For although he wrought the killing of a brother, yet with no one ever before seen who had done this, nor any other seen who had suffered the punishment of such a crime, and

tempted by so great anger — both of which increase my penalties. Because, having before my eyes what was perpetrated by him, and seeing the punishment to be incurable, I was not made more cautious. Therefore, although I should be punished seventy times seven more than he, yet not even so would I pay a worthy penalty."' Thus Chrysostom.

Chrysostom's fuller reading: Lamech's prudence was pious — he both confessed and imposed the penalty on himself, comparing his sin to Cain's. Self-condemning: he committed a DOUBLE homicide, having Cain's example and punishment before his eyes yet not made more cautious (whereas Cain had no prior example and was carried by anger — both of which aggravate Lamech's guilt); so if Cain merited sevenfold for one killing, Lamech merits seventy-sevenfold, and even that is too little. 'Thus Chrysostom.' (Marginal variant: 'cicatricem' for 'livorem'; and a note that Cain's punishment 'was good and useful' to Lamech.)

The second interpretation is that by that 'seventy times seven' is signified the seventy-seven children, or descendants, whom Lamech had procreated from his two wives, [and] that (as Josephus writes), on account of the homicide of their father Lamech, they all perished in the flood. So that this is the sense: 'Cain for his sin was punished in the seventh generation, but I am punished with a far graver punishment, having lost seventy-seven sons by a most wretched destruction.' But this interpretation is not very probable: for it neither adapts well to the words of Scripture itself, nor was that destruction of Lamech's seventy-seven sons in the flood the proper punishment of Lamech's sin, but the general [punishment] of all men; indeed, it pertains no less to Cain than to Lamech, for that offspring and posterity was Cain's own.

SECOND interpretation of the numbers: 'seventy-seven' = Lamech's 77 children (from his two wives), who all perished in the flood as punishment for his homicide (per Josephus) — 'Cain punished in the seventh generation, but I lose 77 sons.' Pererius rejects it: it fits the text poorly, and the flood was the general punishment of all men (not Lamech's proper penalty), pertaining no less to Cain (whose posterity they were). Marginal glosses: 'Secunda interpretatio'; 'Iosephi lib. 1. Antiquitatum.'

The third interpretation is contrary to the preceding. For it refers those two punishments, which are denoted by 'sevenfold' and by 'seventy times

seven,' not to Cain and to Lamech, but to their killers. For it is not signified...

THIRD interpretation (contrary to the rest): the 'sevenfold' and 'seventy-sevenfold' refer not to Cain and Lamech themselves but to their KILLERS. Marginal gloss: 'Tertia interpretatio.' Catchword 'ficatur' (significatur; continues on the next page).

— p. 810 (PDF) · printed p. 769 —

...signified by those words that Cain would be punished sevenfold, [and] Lamech seventy times seven; but that he who kills Cain would be avenged with a sevenfold punishment, and he who kills Lamech, seventy times seven — that is, with a far graver punishment. As if Lamech said: Although I have committed homicide, you, my wives, ought not therefore to fear lest I myself be killed by anyone. For if God forbade Cain, who had killed an innocent brother, to be killed by anyone, threatening a sevenfold punishment against his killer, with how much graver a punishment, if anyone kills me, will God punish him — since I killed a most wicked and harmful man through ignorance and error?

The third interpretation completed: 'sevenfold' and 'seventy-sevenfold' denote the penalties for the KILLERS of Cain and Lamech, not for Cain and Lamech themselves. So Lamech reassures his wives that he need not fear being killed: if God protected even the fratricide Cain (sevenfold vengeance on his killer), how much more will God punish anyone who kills Lamech, who killed a wicked man (Cain) only by ignorance and error. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '759'; true printed page 769.

The fourth interpretation is Rupert's (in book 3 of the Commentaries on Genesis, ch. 8), who thinks that by the sevenfold punishment of Cain is signified an insoluble and eternal punishment, which he [Cain] paid, because he did not do penance; but that by 'seventy times seven' is indicated a soluble and temporary punishment, which Lamech, paying in this life, expiated his crime — since he, when he acknowledged his offense, confessed it, and vehemently grieved, must be believed to have done worthy penance. Wherefore the punishment and vengeance of his crime had to be not eternal but temporal. I will set down here Rupert's

words: for they contain an explanation of some places of Scripture that is plainly new, and diverse from the common interpretation of the Doctors, yet not to be despised by the reader, on account of that man's reputation and authority both of piety and of doctrine.

FOURTH interpretation — Rupert (Comm. in Gen. bk 3, ch. 8): Cain's 'sevenfold' = an insoluble, ETERNAL punishment (which he paid, having not repented); Lamech's 'seventy-sevenfold' = a soluble, TEMPORAL punishment (which the penitent Lamech expiated in this life). So Lamech's penalty had to be temporal, not eternal. Pererius will quote Rupert's words — 'plainly new' and diverging from the common view, yet respectable given his piety and learning. Marginal gloss: 'Quarta interpretatio Ruperti, sane nova & mira.'

So then Rupert writes in this place: 'It is agreed that he who killed Cain, namely Lamech, did penance. For he said to his wives, "Hear my speech, wives of Lamech, for I killed a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt." Accordingly, and far otherwise, he immediately pronounced concerning his own punishment, saying, "Sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times seven." It seems indeed, according to the quantity of the number, that "seventy times seven vengeance shall be given" is more than "sevenfold shall be punished," but truly it is less. For not the quantity of each number, but the nature, is here to be attended to. And indeed, both the seven and the seventy is an odd number, but the nature of all odd numbers is not the same. For of odd numbers, some are simple or uncompounded, others compounded, others intermediate. About the compounded and uncompounded only is what now pertains to the matter. An uncompounded odd number is called that of which no part is found except unity; but a compounded number is called that which another number besides unity measures — as are the nine, the fifteen, and with unity the twenty-one. For three threes, nine; five threes, or three fives, fifteen; seven threes, or three sevens, twenty-one. In this, therefore, the seven and the seventy-seven differ: that the seven is uncompounded, and through this is held insoluble; but the seventy-seven is compounded, and through this is held more soluble.

For no number besides unity measures seven; but of seventy-seven, both seven and eleven are measurers. For eleven sevens, or seven elevens, make seventy-seven. When, therefore, God says, "But everyone who kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold," an insoluble punishment ought'

Rupert's argument (verbatim): Lamech did penance (his confession to his wives). Though 'seventy-sevenfold' seems numerically MORE than 'sevenfold,' it is really LESS — attend to the nature, not the quantity, of the numbers. Both seven and seventy-seven are odd, but seven is 'uncompounded' (prime — no divisor but unity), hence 'insoluble'; seventy-seven is 'compounded' (7 × 11), hence 'more soluble.' So Cain's 'sevenfold' means an insoluble (eternal) punishment... Marginal gloss: 'Imparium numerorum divisio.' Page footer signature 'EEEE'; catchword 'debet' (continues on the next page).

— p. 811 (PDF) · printed p. 770 —

...an insoluble punishment ought to be understood and supplied — unless preceding penitence has made [it] a soluble, that is, a remissible sin. But when Lamech said, 'Sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain, but for Lamech seventy times seven,' an insoluble vengeance for Cain, and a soluble vengeance for Lamech, ought to be understood. And rightly indeed, because Cain did not do penance, but Lamech did penance, since he confesses his sin. And note that Scripture manifestly contradicts those who think Cain's sin was blotted out by his final death, when it says of him, already dead, 'Sevenfold vengeance shall be given for Cain.' To this place pertains that: when Peter said to the Lord, 'Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? until seven times?' He who speaks all things according to the Scriptures answered, 'I do not say to you until seven times, but until seventy times seven.' For to sin 'until seven times' is to sin incessantly and insolubly — that is, without penitence, like Cain; but to sin 'seventy times seven' is indeed to commit a sin, and to loose it by penitence, which Lamech did. But that which the same Lord says in Luke, 'And if your brother sins against you seven times a day, and seven times a day is converted to you, saying, I

repent, forgive him,' is to be taken of our own injuries: which 'seven times' — that is, however often they are committed — we ought to forgive, lest we hear that from the Lord, 'Wicked servant, I forgave you all the debt, because you asked me: ought you not, then, also to have had mercy on your fellow-servant?' For of those things which are committed against God, that must be understood which was foretold from Matthew's Gospel, and that which the same Luke had said before these things: 'If your brother sins, rebuke him; and if he does penance, forgive him.' Thus Rupert.

End of Rupert's fourth interpretation: Cain's 'sevenfold' = an insoluble (eternal) punishment (he did not repent); Lamech's 'seventy-sevenfold' = a soluble (temporal) one (he confessed). Scripture, speaking of dead Cain ('sevenfold shall be given for Cain'), refutes those who think death blotted out his sin. He ties in Matt 18:21-22 (Peter's 'seven times' / 'seventy times seven') — 'seven' = sinning incessantly without penitence (Cain); 'seventy-seven' = sin loosed by penitence (Lamech); and Luke 17:3-4 (forgiving personal injuries however often, cf. the unforgiving servant, Matt 18:32-33). 'Thus Rupert.' Marginal glosses: 'Locus Matth. 18. explicatur'; 'Luc 17.'; 'Matth. 18.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '760'; true printed page 770.

Chapter 4, verse 25. Adam also knew his wife again, and she bore a son, and he called his name Seth, saying: God has appointed me another seed for Abel, whom Cain killed.

New lemma: Genesis 4:25 (marginal 'CAP. 4. VER. 25.'), the birth of Seth.

A little below it is written that Adam, when he was a hundred and thirty years old, begot a son to his image and likeness, whom he named Seth. And rightly, from both places compared with each other, Cajetan argues that Abel was killed around the hundred-and-thirtieth year of Adam — that is, either in the same year in which Seth was generated, or one or two years before. For if Abel had been killed some years before Seth's birth, during those years Adam would have procreated some other son, and that one could more truly be said to have been given to Adam for Abel than Seth, who would have been born after him.

From Gen 4:25 and Gen 5:3 (Adam begot Seth in his 130th year) compared, Cajetan dates Abel's death to ~Adam's 130th year — the same year as Seth's birth, or one or two years before (else another son, born in between, would rather be the 'seed given for Abel'). Marginal gloss: 'Abel fuisse occisum paulo ante generationem Seth.'

That too seems quite credible, that before Abel's death Adam had begotten several sons. For if Abel was killed near the hundred-and-thirtieth year of Adam's age, who would believe that, through all those nearly a hundred and thirty years, only two sons — Cain, I say, and Abel — were generated by Adam? since Adam and Eve...

It is credible that Adam had many sons before Abel's death — for it is incredible that in nearly 130 years he begot only Cain and Abel, since Adam and Eve [were created perfect and fertile]. Marginal gloss: 'Ante caedem Abel fuisse alios filios Adamo praeter Abel & Cain.' Catchword 'Eva' (continues on the next page).

— p. 812 (PDF) · printed p. 771 —

...Eve were created by God perfect in body and age, and strong for generating, and had received from God the greatest force of fecundity — namely, as was needful at the beginning of the world for propagating and multiplying the human race. That, therefore, which Adam said, that Seth was given to him for Abel, does not signify that before Seth's generation Adam had no other son but Cain; but rather this, that God did not wish Adam to be defrauded in any part of the number of his sons. For although he had been bereaved of his son Abel, yet immediately in his place he had received another son, Seth — and one very similar to Abel himself in piety and religion toward God, in reverence and observance toward [his] parents, and finally in integrity of life and sanctity of morals.

Adam and Eve, created perfect and fertile for peopling the world, surely had many children; so 'Seth given for Abel' does not mean Adam had only Cain before, but that God did not let Adam be defrauded of his tally of sons — replacing the lost pious Abel at once with Seth, who resembled Abel in piety, filial reverence, and holiness. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '761'; true printed page 771.

But how is it to be understood, what Moses says, that Adam begot a son Seth to his image and likeness? For why is this said properly of Seth, and not also of Cain and Abel? For either Moses speaks of a likeness according to nature, and by this reason Cain too had been generated to the image and likeness of Adam; or of a likeness according to piety and probity of morals, and by this reason likewise Abel had been begotten to the likeness of Adam. It must be said that this was said properly of Seth for this reason: that in him alone was preserved the posterity of Adam, and the species of human nature, and through him it was to be preserved and propagated unto every age. For the posterity of Cain was all destroyed by the flood; but of Abel, no offspring being left, there was no posterity. But the posterity of Seth alone remained, and from it the people of God was propagated, and the whole human race propagated.

Why 'begotten to his image and likeness' (Gen 5:3) is said properly of Seth, not Cain or Abel: not merely natural likeness (Cain had that too) nor moral likeness (Abel had that too), but because Adam's posterity and human nature survived only through Seth — Cain's whole line was destroyed in the flood, Abel left no offspring, but from Seth's line alone came the people of God and the whole human race. Marginal gloss: 'Cur Seth dictus sit ad imaginem & similitudinem Adami generatus.'

But what sort and how great a man this Seth was, let the reader briefly know from those things which Suidas and Josephus handed down about that man. Suidas, in the entry 'Seth,' writes: Seth was called 'God' by the men of that age, because he had invented both the Hebrew letters and the appellations of the stars; and, on account of the admiration of his notable piety, he was first of all surnamed and called 'God' — just as later Moses too was called the 'God' of Pharaoh, and Judges and Princes of peoples are named 'gods' in the Sacred writings. For this Moses wished to signify when he said that the sons of God went in to the daughters of men — that is, the sons or descendants of Seth [went in] to women of the stock of Cain. Thus Suidas.

Praise of Seth from Suidas (the Suda): Seth was called 'God' by his contemporaries, both because he invented the Hebrew letters and the names of the stars, and for his notable piety (as Moses was 'God'

to Pharaoh, Exod 7:1, and judges/princes are 'gods' in Scripture); and the 'sons of God' who went in to the 'daughters of men' (Gen 6:2) means the Sethites [going in] to Cainite women. Marginal glosses: 'Praeconium Seth ex Suida & Iosepho'; 'Exod. 7.'; 'Genes. 6.'

But Josephus, in book 1 of the Antiquities, writes in this manner: One of Adam's several children was Seth; who, brought up by his father, when he came to that age that he was now able to discern what is right, gave himself wholly to the study of virtue. And when he himself had turned out a most excellent man, he left after him descendants like himself; who, since they were all endowed with a good disposition, and inhabited their fatherland without sedition, passed their life in perpetual felicity, and devised the science of the stars and the knowledge of heavenly things. But lest their inventions should slip away from the knowledge of men, and perish before they were fully known — knowing that Adam had foretold a general destruction of men, one by fire, the other by flood — having erected two pillars, they inscribed their inventions on each: so that, if the brick one happened to be destroyed by the flood, the stone one...

Josephus (Antiquities 1) on Seth: one of Adam's many children, raised to virtue, a most excellent man who left descendants like himself — of good disposition, dwelling without sedition in perpetual felicity, who devised astronomy and knowledge of heavenly things. To preserve their discoveries against Adam's foretold twofold destruction (by fire and by flood), they inscribed them on two pillars (one brick, one stone), so that if the brick one perished in the flood, the stone one [would survive]. Marginal gloss: 'De duabus columnis posterorum Seth.' Page footer signature 'EEEE 2'; catchword 'superstes' (continues on the next page).

— p. 813 (PDF) · printed p. 772 —

...surviving, might afford men the means of learning, and display for viewing the things which it contained inscribed. For they say that that stone one was dedicated by them, which even in our times exists in the land of Syria. Thus Josephus.

End of the Josephus quote on the two pillars: the stone pillar would survive the flood to preserve the Sethites' learning; and Josephus says it still stood in his day in the land of Syria. 'Thus Josephus.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '762'; true printed page 772.

Chapter 4, verse 26. But to Seth also was born a son, whom he called Enos; he began to invoke the name of the Lord.

New lemma: Genesis 4:26 (marginal 'CAP. 4. VERS. 26.'), the birth of Enos and the beginning of invoking the Lord's name.

The Seventy interpreters translated this place thus: 'This one hoped to invoke the name of the Lord God.' Why they put that word 'hoped,' when it is not in the Hebrew Scripture, I do not know; just as I cannot sufficiently divine what sense this speech renders, 'He hoped to invoke the name of the Lord' — unless perhaps this: 'He hoped, through invocation (that is, through the religious worship of God), that he would be freed from all evils, and would easily obtain from God whatever goods he desired and sought.' But for that pronoun 'This one' (Iste), which both the Greek and the Latin translation has, denoting the person of Enos, as if he himself were the first who began to invoke the name of God — in both Hebrew and Chaldaic it is an adverb of time, signifying that in the time of that Enos it was begun to invoke the name of God. And so Pagninus renders this place thus, 'Then was begun to be invoked the name of the Lord'; and so Aquila once translated.

On the reading of Gen 4:26b: the LXX has 'This one HOPED to invoke the name of the Lord God' — Pererius cannot see whence the word 'hoped' comes (it is not in the Hebrew), unless it means Enos hoped, through worship, to be freed from evils and obtain goods. Moreover, the 'Iste' ('this one' = Enos), in both the Greek and Latin, treats Enos as the person who first invoked God's name; but in Hebrew and Chaldaic the word is an adverb of TIME — 'in the time of Enos it was begun to invoke the name.' So Pagninus (and formerly Aquila): 'Then was begun to be invoked the name of the Lord.' Marginal gloss: 'Pagnini & Aquilae interpretatio huius loci.'

But in whichever way it is read, a question arises: how is it true that, either by Enos himself, or in his time, the name of the Lord first began to be invoked? For Seth too, the father of Enos, is handed down to have been a man notable in piety and religion; and before him Cain and Abel were wont to invoke God by oblations and sacrifices, as was said above by Moses; nor should it be doubted that Adam, first of all, was accustomed to invoke God

by frequent prayers and oblations, and taught his sons to do so. Cajetan, in the explanation of this place, says that it was not Enos who first simply and absolutely invoked the name of God, but that he was the first who began to invoke God under that name [■■■■] 'Jehovah,' which the Hebrews worship as incomprehensible and ineffable, with the highest reverence, and venerate rather by silence than by speech and pronunciation; and they affirm it to have admirable and unspeakable powers and effects. This interpretation does not please me. For whatever be [the case] about that name [■■■■] 'Jehovah' — concerning which I see there is at this time a great dispute among learned men — certainly in the book of Exodus, ch. 6, it is not obscurely indicated that that name [■■■■] 'Jehovah' was manifested by God to none of the Fathers before Moses. For thus in that place God speaks with Moses himself: 'I am the Lord, who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in God Almighty, and my name Adonai I did not indicate to them.' For that word 'Adonai,' which the Latin translator put there, the Hebrew name is said to be [■■■■] 'Jehovah.'

The question: how could Enos (or his time) be the first to invoke the Lord's name, when Seth was pious, Cain and Abel sacrificed, and Adam himself invoked God and taught his sons? Cajetan: Enos was not the first to invoke God simply, but the first to invoke him under the name YHWH. GLYPH verified (appears four times on the page): ■■■■ (the Tetragrammaton, 'Jehovah' / YHWH), which the Hebrews revere as ineffable, venerating it by silence and ascribing to it wondrous powers. Pererius REJECTS Cajetan's reading: Exodus 6:3 indicates that the name YHWH was revealed to no Father before Moses ('I am the Lord... my name [Adonai =] YHWH I did not make known to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob'). So Enos cannot have first invoked God under that name. Marginal glosses: 'An Enos primus omnium coeperit invocare nomen Domini'; 'Opinio Caietani.'

— p. 814 (PDF) · printed p. 773 —

It would therefore be truer to say that Enos is said first to have invoked the name of the Lord, because he was pious and religious toward God above all the earlier ones — not only by cultivating piety and religion toward God, but also by preaching it, divulging it, and teaching other men. Or because this one first established certain fixed formulas of prayers to God, and devised certain fixed rites and ceremonies of divine worship — of which

kind perhaps was the erection of altars, and the designation and dedication of certain places for invoking God and administering his worship. Or, finally, because he began to congregate the people to hand down at the same time the worship of God, as if beginning and uniting a Church of the faithful.

Pererius's own (truer) reading of why Enos was 'first to invoke the Lord's name': (1) he surpassed all earlier men in piety, and publicly preached and taught it; or (2) he first established fixed prayer-formulas, rites, and ceremonies (e.g. erecting altars, dedicating places of worship); or (3) he began to gather the people for common worship — as if founding and uniting a Church of the faithful. Marginal gloss: 'Probabilior ratio, cur Enos dicatur coepisse invocare nomen Domini.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '763'; true printed page 773.

But the reader must not be ignorant that in the Chaldaic paraphrase the reading of this place is far different, indeed contrary. For thus it is in it: 'Then, in his days, the sons of men began, that they should NOT pray in the name of the Lord.' This diversity of readings arose from the ambiguity of the Hebrew word [■■■■] 'Huchal,' which, as Jerome of Oleaster demonstrates by manifest testimonies of Scripture, signifies three things: first, to pollute or profane; then, to kill; finally, to begin. The author of the Chaldaic paraphrase, therefore, following the first signification, translated this place as I said. Of which version this is the sense: 'Then was profaned the invocation of the divine name.' The Complutensian Chaldaic edition, however, agrees with the Hebrew text; for thus, word for word, if rendered in Latin, it has: 'Then men began to pray in the name of the Lord.'

The Chaldaic paraphrase (Targum) reads Gen 4:26 in the OPPOSITE sense: 'Then in his days the sons of men began NOT to pray in the name of the Lord' / 'Then the invocation of the divine name was profaned.' GLYPH verified: ■■■■ (Huchal), the ambiguous Hebrew verb, which (per Jerome of Oleaster) has three senses — to profane, to kill, to begin. The Targumist took the first ('profane'); but the Complutensian Chaldaic edition agrees with the Hebrew ('to begin'): 'Then men began to pray in the name of the Lord.' This ends the commentary on Genesis chapter 4. Marginal gloss: 'Diversa lectio paraphrasis Chaldaicae.' Page footer signature 'EEEE 3'; catchword 'CAPUT' (the commentary on Genesis chapter 5 begins on the next page).

— p. 815 (PDF) · printed p. 774 —

CHAPTER FIVE OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS.

Major divider (with decorative border): the commentary on Genesis chapter 5 (the genealogy from Adam to Noah) begins. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '764'; true printed page 774.

This is the book of the generation of Adam. In the day in which God created man, he made him to the likeness of God. 2. Male and female he created them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam, in the day in which they were created. 3. And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begot a son to his own image and likeness, and called his name Seth. 4. And the days of Adam, after he begot Seth, were eight hundred years, and he begot sons and daughters. 5. And all the time that Adam lived came to nine hundred and thirty years, and he died. 6. Seth also lived a hundred and five years, and begot Enos. 7. And Seth lived, after he begot Enos, eight hundred and seven years, and begot sons and daughters. 8. And all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years, and he died. 9. And Enos lived ninety years, and begot Cainan. 10. After whose birth he lived eight hundred and fifteen years, and begot sons and daughters. 11. And all the days of Enos were nine hundred and five years, and he died. 12. Cainan also lived seventy years, and begot Malaleel. 13. And Cainan lived, after he begot Malaleel, eight hundred and forty years, and begot sons and daughters. 14. And all the days of Cainan were nine hundred and ten years, and he died. 15. And Malaleel lived sixty-five years, and begot Jared. 16. And Malaleel lived, after he begot Jared, eight hundred and thirty years, and begot sons and daughters. 17. And all the days of Malaleel were eight hundred and ninety-five years, and he died. 18. And Jared lived a hundred and sixty-two years, and begot Henoch. 19. And Jared lived, after he begot

Henoch, eight hundred years, and begot sons and daughters. 20. And all the days of Jared were nine hundred and sixty-two years, and he died. 21. And Henoch lived sixty-five years, and begot Mathusala. 22. And Henoch walked with God, and lived, after he begot Mathusala, three hundred years, and begot sons and daughters.

The block lemma of Genesis chapter 5, verses 1-22 (verse-numbered in the print), giving the genealogy and lifespans from Adam through Seth, Enos, Cainan, Malaleel, Jared, and Henoch (Enoch).

— p. 816 (PDF) · printed p. 775 —

And all the days of Henoch were three hundred and sixty-five years. 24. And he walked with God, and was seen no more, because God took him. 25. Mathusala also lived a hundred and eighty-seven years, and begot Lamech. 26. And Mathusala lived, after he begot Lamech, seven hundred and eighty-two years, and begot sons and daughters. 27. And all the days of Mathusala were nine hundred and sixty-nine years, and he died. 28. And Lamech lived a hundred and eighty-two years, and begot a son, and called his name Noe, saying: 29. This one shall comfort us from the works and labors of our hands, in the land which the Lord has cursed. 30. And Lamech lived, after he begot Noe, five hundred and ninety-five years, and begot sons and daughters. 31. And all the days of Lamech were seven hundred and seventy-seven years, and he died. 32. But Noe, when he was five hundred years old, begot Sem, Cham, and Japheth.

The remainder of the Genesis 5 lemma, verses 23-32: Henoch's translation ('God took him'), Mathusala (Methuselah, 969 years — the longest), the Sethite Lamech and his son Noe (Noah), and Noah's three sons. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '765'; true printed page 775.

And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begot a son to his own image and likeness, and called his name Seth. And the days of Adam, after he begot Seth, were eight hundred years, and he begot sons and daughters. And all the time that Adam lived came to nine hundred and thirty years, and he died. Verses 3, 4, and 5.

The sub-lemma repeated for commentary: Genesis 5:3-5 (marginal 'VERS. 3. 4. & 5.'), Adam's begetting of Seth and his death at 930.

Ten generations are enumerated from Adam to the flood, which comprise one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years — namely, the time that passed from the creation of Adam to the flood. Although, according to the translation of the LXX interpreters, from Adam to the flood, and from the flood to Abraham, many more years are numbered than there are in the Hebrew Scripture and in our Latin version. But of this variety of computations we will dispute below. Now this is to be noted: that in this series of generations three are found of longer life than Adam was — namely Jared, who lived nine hundred and sixty-two years; and Noe, who was of nine hundred and fifty years; and above all Mathusalem, who prolonged his life to the nine hundred and sixty-ninth year.

Commentary on Gen 5 begins: ten generations from Adam to the flood = 1,656 years (Hebrew/Vulgate reckoning; the LXX gives many more years — a chronology discrepancy to be treated later). Three lived longer than Adam (930): Jared (962), Noah (950), and above all Methuselah (969).

But if the age be considered in which Adam was created — namely, a perfect [adult one]...

Pererius begins the argument that Adam, created already at a mature (adult) age, effectively lived longest of all. Catchword 'perfe-' (perfecta; continues on the next page).

— p. 817 (PDF) · printed p. 776 —

...perfect and fit for generating, it will appear that Adam lived a longer time than Mathusalem. For since the manly age of men who live a hundred years

is the age of thirty years, it is consonant that the manly age of men who live nearly a thousand years was at least sixty years. For you will find no one in this first age of the world, and in this series of generations, who is not recorded to have begotten after the sixtieth year; for those who begot most quickly were sixty-five years old. If, therefore, Adam was created at the age of sixty years, and after that lived nine hundred and thirty years, his whole life ought truly to be estimated and reckoned at nine hundred and ninety years. And this indeed fits reason: that the first man, formed by the hands of God, led a longer life than any other mortal.

Pererius's argument that Adam effectively lived longest: since maturity for those living ~100 years is ~30, for those living ~1,000 years it would be ~60 (indeed none in the genealogy begot before the 60th year; the quickest, Malaleel and Enoch, at 65). So Adam, created already ~60 years old and then living 930 more, had an effective life of ~990 years — fittingly the longest of all, as the first man formed by God's hands. Marginal gloss: 'Longissimam omnium mortalium vitam quodammodo vixisse Adamum.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '766'; true printed page 776.

Adam died seven hundred and twenty-six years before the flood, and fifty-seven years before the rapture of Henoch; but he reached to the fifty-sixth year of Lamech, the father of Noe. Mathusalem died at the beginning of the year in which the flood occurred, before which Lamech had departed from life by five years. And so Adam saw eight of his generations. And because, according to Josephus, the corruption of the human race, on account of which God sent the flood, occurred in the seventh generation, Adam saw that too; on account of which, and on account of the future destruction of the human race by the flood — doubtless foreshown to Adam himself — it must be believed that he passed his last life in great grief and sorrow.

Adam's chronology: died 726 years before the flood, 57 years before Henoch's translation; reached the 56th year of Lamech (Noah's father). Methuselah died at the start of the flood-year; Lamech died five years before that. Adam saw eight of his generations; and since (per Josephus) the race's corruption came in the seventh generation, Adam saw it too — and, foreknowing the coming flood, passed his final years in great grief. Marginal glosses: 'Quando Adam obiit'; 'Iosephus lib. 1. Antiquitatum.'

A DISPUTATION ON THE LENGTH OF LIFE of the ancient men before the flood.

Major divider: a disputation on the longevity of the antediluvians, vindicating Moses's history against the pagans who found it incredible.

But, because the longevity of those men of the first age of the world seemed to the Gentiles incredible and fabulous, we must vindicate this history of Moses from their calumnies. But to what extent the life of man can naturally be prolonged, the Mathematicians dispute from the reasons and observations of the sidereal science; yet they are drawn into various opinions, whose variety and discrepancy declares the matter to be uncertain.

The pagans found the antediluvians' longevity incredible; Pererius will defend Moses's history. How far human life can naturally be extended is disputed by the 'Mathematicians' (astronomers/astrologers) from the stars, but their disagreement shows the matter is uncertain.

QUESTION I. To what extent the life of man can naturally be prolonged.

Quaestio I of the disputation: the natural limit of the human lifespan.

Epigenes denied that a hundred and twenty-two years can be completed; Berosus, that a hundred and seventeen can scarcely be exceeded; others believed it could be extended even further. There were those who thought that not the same [limit] is to be observed everywhere, but variously through different regions, according as in each is the [inclination] of the sky...

Opinions on the natural life-limit: Epigenes — a man cannot reach 122 years; Berosus — scarcely past 117; others — further still; and some held the limit varies by region, according to the disposition of the sky (climate). Marginal glosses: 'Epigenes'; 'Berosus.' Catchword 'ad' (continues on the next page).

— p. 818 (PDF) · printed p. 777 —

...the inclination toward the bounding circle [the horizon], which is called in Greek 'clima.' Read Censorinus in the book On the Birthday, of the Romans, and Pliny book 7, ch. 49; among whom [is found] that which, to others indeed, seems wonderful, but to me most ridiculous, [namely] what is handed down about the Egyptians. I will set down here Pliny's words from ch. 37 of book 11: 'The Egyptians think,' he says, 'that the human heart is increased, from the birth of a man, each year by two drachms of weight up to the fiftieth year; and that from it the same is subtracted; and therefore a man does not live beyond the hundredth year, by the failing of the heart' — the Egyptians, whose custom it is to preserve corpses embalmed.

The natural life-limit varies by 'clima' (the latitude/climate — the sky's inclination to the horizon); cf. Censorinus (De Die Natali) and Pliny (NH 7.49). Pererius calls 'most ridiculous' the Egyptian theory Pliny reports (NH 11.37): the heart grows two drachms a year to age 50, then declines equally, so no one lives past 100 — a theory of that embalming people. Marginal glosses: 'Ridiculum Aegyptiorum figmentum de corde hominis'; 'Plinius lib. 7. cap. 49.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '767'; true printed page 777.

But that these things are false, Pliny confirms by a manifest argument — or, to speak more truly, by experiment. 'There are added,' he says, 'the experiments and examples of the most recent census, which within a four-year period the emperors, the Caesars, Vespasian father and son, conducted as censors. And, to omit many, two were found — one at Bologna, another at Rimini — of a hundred and fifty years. But in the eighth region of Italy, fifty-four men were registered of a hundred years; of a hundred and ten years, fifty-seven men; of a hundred and twenty-five years, two men; of a hundred and thirty years, four men; of a hundred and thirty-five or a hundred and thirty-seven years, the same number; of a hundred and forty years, three men.'

Pliny refutes the '100-year limit' by the census under Vespasian and Titus (NH 7.49): two men of 150 (at Bologna and Rimini); and in Italy's eighth region, 54 men of 100 years, 57 of 110, two of 125, four of 130, some of 135-137, three of 140. Marginal gloss: 'Homines longaevi Plinii aetate in Italia, quot.'

But that it was also handed down to memory by ancient and Gentile writers that some lived to five hundred and six hundred years and more, Josephus is the author, who in book 1 of the Antiquities, in the last words of ch. 3, cites as witnesses of this matter Manetho, writer of Egyptian affairs, Berosus of Chaldaic affairs; and likewise Mochus the Sidonian, and Hieronymus the Egyptian, who handed down the affairs of the Phoenicians in writings; indeed also that Hesiod, Hecataeus, Hellanicus, Agesilaus, Ephorus, and Nicolaus narrate that those ancients prolonged life to a thousand years. Pliny likewise, in the place just named, mentions Alexander, Cornelius, and Xenophon, who handed down that some lived to five hundred and six hundred, and even eight hundred years. But soon Pliny subjoins these words: 'All of which,' he says, 'happened through ignorance of times [reckonings]: for some determined one year by summer and another by winter; others by the four seasons, like the Arcadians, whose years were of three months; some by the waning of the Moon, like the Egyptians. And so among them some are reported to have lived even single thousands of years.' Thus Pliny. Nearly the same things Victorinus hands down, and Solinus (ch. 3), and, from Varro, Lactantius (book 2, ch. 12).

Ancient pagan witnesses to great longevity: Josephus (Antiq. 1.3) cites Manetho, Berosus, Mochus the Sidonian, Hieronymus the Egyptian, Hesiod, Hecataeus, Hellanicus, Agesilaus, Ephorus, Nicolaus (some ancients lived to 1,000 years); Pliny cites Alexander [Polyhistor], Cornelius [Nepos?], Xenophon (500-800 years). But Pliny explains this away as confusion of time-reckoning: some counted a 'year' as a season (summer/winter), or a quarter (the Arcadians' three-month years), or a lunar month (the Egyptians) — hence 'thousand-year' lifespans. So too Victorinus, Solinus (ch. 3), and Lactantius (2.12, from Varro).

QUESTION II. Whether the years, which Scripture narrates that men lived before the flood, were equal to ours.

Quaestio II: whether the antediluvian 'years' of Scripture were true solar years (like ours) or shorter periods.

Some have thought that, when Scripture narrates that the men of the first age lived to nine hundred years, it is not to be understood that those years were such as ours are, but that they were a little more than monthly — that is, of thirty-six days...

Quaestio II begins: some held that the antediluvian 'years' were not solar years but roughly lunar months — 'a little more than monthly,' about 36 days each (so that 900 such 'years' would be far fewer solar years). Page footer signature 'FFFF'; catchword 'rum' (dierum; continues on the next page).

— p. 819 (PDF) · printed p. 778 —

...days, which is a square number, for that number is produced from the number six multiplied six times. And so one of our years contains ten of those years: even if those years were divided into twelve months, to each month only three days would be assigned. But how this is not only false but even openly contrary to Scripture itself, anyone can easily understand of himself. For if we follow this reckoning of years, it will result that Cainan and Henoch, when they were six and a half years old, begot sons — for Scripture hands down that they begot them when they were sixty-five years old. If, therefore, ten of those years made one of ours, it would necessarily result that they begot sons when they were not yet seven years old. Then, since none of those men reached the thousandth year, if the years had been such as these people wish, no man of that age would have reached the ninety-seventh year — whereas even today not a few are found who have passed a hundred years. Besides, Scripture says that Abraham died, full or sated of days, in a good old age, having lived a hundred and seventy-five years, which according to these people make only seventeen and a half years. Who would not laugh at such an old age? Finally, below in ch. 7, in that one year in which the flood lasted, mention is made of the first, second, seventh, and tenth month. And lest anyone could pretend those months were only of three days, there are mentioned there the 17th day of the second month, the 27th of the seventh month, and of the second month the 7th and 20th days. Indeed, if the days which Moses mentions in the description of the flood, through that one six-hundredth year of Noah's life,

be counted, they will be found to amount to three hundred and sixty. Therefore those years of 900 and more, which the men of that age are recorded to have lived, were not monthly, or three-month, or six-month years, but were equal to ours.

Pererius refutes the 'short-year' theory (that antediluvian 'years' were ~36-day lunar months, so ten = one of ours): (1) then Cainan and Enoch, who begot at 65, would have begotten at 6½ years; (2) then none would have reached even 97 years, though people today pass 100; (3) Abraham's 175 years would be only 17½ (absurd for 'a good old age'); (4) the flood-year (Gen 7-8) names the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 10th months and days like the 17th and 27th — proving real ~360-day, 12-month years. So the antediluvian years were true years, equal to ours. Marginal glosses: 'Opinio affirmantium annos quos hic memorat Moses, fuisse menstruos, certe longe minores nostris, confutatur'; 'Genes. 25.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '768'; true printed page 778.

QUESTION III. On the seven causes of the so-long life which men lived before the flood.

Quaestio III of the disputation: the seven causes of the antediluvians' longevity.

But someone will ask: what were the causes of the so-long-lived life of those men who were before the flood? We answer that they were many and various; but of the very many, it will be enough to mention seven at present. The first was the goodness of the constitution and tempering of the human body, in which those men flourished; for then nature, recently made by God, was whole, firm to preserve itself, strong to resist contrary things, and not yet broken and vitiated by so many diseases. That vigor, therefore, and strength of the natural constitution remained a long time — namely, until the flood, through which we see that the life of men was diminished by a notable brevity. The second cause was sobriety and continence in food and drink, and all moderation of life; for the food and drink were natural and simple; but variety, mixture, and seasoning...

The seven causes begin. (1) The good constitution and temperament of the body: nature, freshly made by God, was whole and disease-free, and this vigor lasted until the flood (after which lifespans sharply shortened). (2) Sobriety and a simple, natural diet — whereas variety, mixture, and seasoning [shorten life, continued next page]. Marginal glosses: 'Prima causa longae vitae, bonitas constitutionis'; 'Secunda sobrietas.' Catchword 'condi' (condimentum; continues on the next page).

— p. 820 (PDF) · printed p. 779 —

...the seasoning of foods weaken and diminish life, as Hippocrates and Pliny teach. Whence Horace the Poet: '— if at once you mix roast with boiled, at once shellfish with thrushes, the sweet things will turn themselves into bile, and the sluggish phlegm will bring a tumult to the stomach.' And Ecclesiasticus, ch. 37, affirms that many have perished by gluttony. Finally, daily experience shows that those who eat and drink elegantly, sumptuously, and largely are of short life. The third cause was the excellence of the foods, on account of the exceeding goodness and fertility of the earth before the flood — after which the things born of the earth are much weaker and made worse, on account of the salt waters of the Ocean, which, flooding the earth, made it sterile; wherefore certain places are wont to be sown with salt, so that, perpetually sterile, they may never bear anything good, as is to be seen in the ninth chapter of Judges. And an argument of this thing is the concession of flesh for human eating, made by God to man after the flood. The fourth cause was that Adam perfectly knew the natural forces and faculties of herbs, fruits, metals, stones, and other things, and which things had the force and power of well preserving and most-long prolonging human life; which things he himself used, and taught his descendants to use, up to the flood. For Adam lived, as we taught above, until the fifty-seventh year of Lamech, the father of Noe, who was not more than five years distant from the flood.

Continues the causes: (2) sobriety — seasoning and gluttony shorten life (Hippocrates, Pliny; Horace Sat. 2.2; Ecclus 37:34; and daily experience of the sumptuous). (3) The excellence of pre-flood food, from the earth's great fertility — ruined afterward by the flood's salt ocean-waters (hence barren places 'sown with salt,' Judg 9:45); a sign of this is that God allowed meat-eating only after the flood (Gen 9:3). (4) Adam's perfect knowledge of the life-prolonging virtues of herbs, fruits, metals, and stones, which he taught his descendants down to near the flood (Adam living to Lamech's 57th year). Marginal glosses: 'Horat. lib. 2. Saty. 2.'; 'Tertia, alimentorum praestantia'; 'Quarta, scientia virium herbarum & aliarum rerum. Genes. 9.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '769'; true printed page 779.

The fifth cause was: that in that first age (God, who founded the world and all things that are in it, and from its beginning to its end perpetually rules it, so disposing) — over that region in which those men dwelt, the aspects of the stars were very benign, propitious, and salutary, and [likewise] the celestial influxes and effects. These, however, do not properly come nor happen according to the general motion of the heavens (for this is daily completed wholly and absolutely); nor according to the proper motion of the planets (which are traversed in a short time, for Saturn, the slowest of all the planets, completes his circle in thirty years); but according to the proper motion of the eighth sphere — or, as it pleased others, the ninth — on which, according to natural causes, death and life are thought chiefly to depend. And of this [sphere's] motion the slowness is so great that in a hundred years only one degree is completed; wherefore in the whole first age, which was of one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years, the aspect of the stars, according to that motion, was varied through sixteen and a half degrees and over that two minutes. And from this motion certain wonderful changes are wont to come in this lower world: as that some part of the land is flooded by the sea, and part of the sea [is turned to land], and land that was habitable and fertile becomes uninhabitable and sterile, or the contrary.

(5) Favorable astral influences: over the antediluvians' region the star-aspects and celestial influxes were benign — not from the general daily motion, nor the swift planetary motions (Saturn, the slowest, circles in 30 years), but from the very slow proper motion of the eighth (or ninth) sphere, on which life and death are thought chiefly to depend (only 1 degree per 100 years, so ~16½ degrees over the 1,656-year first age). From this slow motion come great terrestrial changes (land flooded by sea and vice versa; fertile land turned barren, or the reverse). Marginal gloss: 'Quinta, syderum influentia.'

The sixth cause was, that through the long life of those men the human race could be greatly multiplied, which at the beginning of the world was necessary. The seventh cause was, that men living long could...

(6) Long life so the human race could multiply greatly, as was needful at the world's beginning. (7) So that long-lived men could [discover the arts and sciences — continued next page]. Marginal glosses: 'Sexta, generis humani multiplicatio'; 'Septima, artium inventio.' Page footer signature 'FFFF 2';

catchword 'possent' (continues on the next page).

— p. 821 (PDF) · printed p. 780 —

...could discover the arts and sciences conferring greatly to the necessities and utilities of human life, and to the perfection of the human intellect — which, nevertheless, can be found only by the experiments and observations of a very long time. For it was rightly said by Aristotle that Time is both the inventor and the promoter of the arts and sciences. But especially the length of life was necessary for the invention of Astronomy and Geometry, whose certitude they could not attain (Josephus being the author, ch. 3 of the first book on the Antiquities) if they had lived less than six hundred years — for of that many the Great Year consists.

(7, continued) Long life was needed to discover the arts and sciences (found only by long experiment and observation) — as Aristotle says, 'Time is the inventor and promoter of the arts.' Especially astronomy and geometry required it: per Josephus (Antiq. 1.3), their certainty could not be reached unless men lived at least 600 years — the span of the 'Great Year.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '770'; true printed page 780.

Why Josephus defines the Great Year as six hundred years, I confess I do not know — although it does not escape me that of the space and magnitude of the Great Year the ancients had various opinions, which Macrobius treats on the Dream of Scipio, and Lilius Giraldus in the book on years and months. But it seems to make for Josephus's opinion what Pliny teaches (ch. 2, book 10), writing about the Phoenix, which he hands down to live six hundred and sixty years. And he subjoins: 'Manilius reports that with the life of this bird the completion of the Great Year takes place, and that the same significations of seasons and stars return; and that this begins around midday, on the day on which the Sun enters the sign of Aries.'

On the 'Great Year': why Josephus makes it 600 years, Pererius does not know — the ancients gave various figures (Macrobius on the Dream of Scipio; Lilius Giraldus). Pliny (NH 10.2) supports Josephus: the Phoenix lives 660 years, and (per Manilius) with its life the Great Year is completed and the same seasonal/stellar configurations return, beginning at midday on the day the Sun enters

Aries. Marginal gloss: 'De magno anno.'

QUESTION IV. Why no one before the flood reached the thousandth year.

Quaestio IV: the significance of no antediluvian reaching 1,000 years.

But that none of those men reached the thousandth year is not empty of mystery and instruction. For first it is signified that, however long a time those Fathers lived, yet their very longest life does not obtain even the likeness of one day in comparison with the divine eternity — David saying in Psalm 89, 'A thousand years before your eyes are as yesterday, which has passed.' Irenaeus, near the end of book 5 against the heretics, mentions that some said that for this reason it was said to Adam, 'In whatever day you eat, you shall die by death' — because so it really happened: for, after eating the forbidden apple, Adam did not complete one whole day by living, because he did not reach the thousandth year. The life of man, therefore, however long it be, is like one day: whose morning is the time from birth to youth; midday, the youthful and manly age; evening, old age until death. To which fits that saying of David: 'In the morning let it pass like grass, in the morning let it flourish and pass, in the evening let it fall, harden, and wither.' Cicero, in the first Tusculan Question, estimating the longest life of man as one day, says thus: 'At the river Hypanis, which from the European side flows into the Pontus, Aristotle says that certain little creatures are born which live one day. Of these, therefore, one that has died at the eighth hour has died at an advanced age; but one [that dies] at sunset [is] already decrepit — the more so, if it was also the solstitial day.' Compare our longest age...

Quaestio IV: no one reaching 1,000 years is meaningful. (1) Even the longest life is less than a single day compared to God's eternity (Ps 90:4, 'a thousand years as yesterday'); Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 5) reports that some explained God's 'in the day you eat you shall die' (Gen 2:17) thus — Adam, not reaching 1,000 years (= one 'day'), did not live one whole 'day.' (2) Man's life is like one day: morning (birth to youth), midday (prime), evening (old age to death) — cf. Ps 90:5-6 ('like grass... in the evening it withers'); and Cicero (Tusc. 1) on the one-day mayflies of the Hypanis, where one dying

at the eighth hour is 'aged' and at sunset 'decrepit.' Marginal glosses: 'Cur nullus hominum millesimum attigerunt'; 'Psal. 89.'; 'Bestiolae unum tantum diem victitantes.' Catchword 'tem' (aetatem; continues on the next page).

— p. 822 (PDF) · printed p. 781 —

...with eternity, and we shall be found in almost the same age as that little creature. Thus Cicero.

End of the Cicero quote: compared with eternity, our longest life is scarcely more than the mayfly's single day. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '771'; true printed page 781.

QUESTION V. Why Moses, to each of the generations mentioned, subjoined that clause, 'and he died.'

Quaestio V: why Moses appends 'and he died' to each patriarch in the genealogy.

But in all the aforesaid men, whose so-long age is described, this clause is added, as it were [at the end]: 'And he died' — with only Henoch excepted — so that it may manifestly appear that God was truthful, who had said, 'If you eat, you shall die by death,' but the demon a liar, who had promised, 'You shall not die at all.' Then, that the distinction may be manifest between the present life, which is ended by death, and the future, which, equally with eternity, is endless. Third, because nothing is lasting whose end there is; for whatever has passed, however much it was, is counted as nothing — as Cato philosophizes in Cicero, near the end of the book On Old Age. Besides, that from this it may be permitted to know how long life would have been in Paradise; for as Henoch, living, was carried off, and, untried by death, was translated into a better state, likewise, in the state of innocence, it would have been done with all men.

Quaestio V answered: 'and he died' is appended (except for Henoch/Enoch) — (1) to show God truthful ('you shall die,' Gen 2:17) and the devil a liar ('you shall not die,' Gen 3:4); (2) to distinguish this death-ended life from the endless future one; (3) because nothing with an end is truly lasting (Cicero, De Senectute, Cato); (4) to show how long life would have been in the state of innocence — for Enoch, translated alive without tasting death into a better state, is the model of what would have been for all in Paradise. Marginal glosses: 'Cur addatur singulis patribus, & mortuus est'; 'Genes. 3.'

On the longevity of other animals it is variously handed down. Aristotle, in the book On the Length and Brevity of Life, says that man and the Elephant are the longest-lived of all animals; and in the fourth book On the Generation of Animals he affirms that no animal is longer-lived than man, except the one Elephant. But the Greek and likewise Latin writers handed down far otherwise. I will set down here Pliny's words from ch. 48 of book 7: 'Hesiod, who first handed down something of this, reporting fabulously (as I think) many things about the age of men, attributed to the crow nine of our lifetimes, four times that to stags, and that tripled to ravens; and the rest more fabulously in the Phoenix and the nymphs.' The same [Pliny], in ch. 2 of book 10, writes, as handed down by many, that the Phoenix bird lives to six hundred and sixty years. And in book 8, ch. 32: 'The life of stags is by common consent long, some being caught after a hundred years with the golden collars which Alexander the Great had put on, their skin now grown over [the collars] in great fatness, who yet did not show a sign of old age' — whence Juvenal calls the stag's old age vivid and vigorous, when he says: 'Now a long and stag-like old age torments the young man.' Aristotle, in the books On the History of Animals, says that Elephants live up to the three-hundredth year. But of these things, enough.

An appendix on animal longevity: Aristotle (De Long. Vitae; De Gen. Anim. 4) — man and the elephant are the longest-lived, no animal outliving man except the elephant. But Greek and Latin writers differ: Pliny (NH 7.48) reports Hesiod's fabulous ages (the crow nine human lifetimes, stags four times that, ravens thrice more; and the Phoenix and nymphs still more fabulous); the Phoenix living 660 years (NH 10.2); stags caught after 100 years with Alexander's golden collars overgrown by their flesh, yet showing no age (NH 8.32) — whence Juvenal (Sat. 14.251), 'a long, stag-like old age.' Aristotle (Hist. Anim.): elephants live to 300 years. 'But of these things, enough.' Marginal gloss: 'De longaevitate animalium.' Page footer signature 'FFFF 3'; catchword 'DIS' (a new DISPUTATIO begins on the next page).

— p. 823 (PDF) · printed p. 782 —

A DISPUTATION. Whether Adam is saved.

Major divider: a disputation on whether Adam attained eternal salvation. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '772'; true printed page 782.

This question is not to be passed over in this place: whether Adam, his sin purged by penitence, at length attained eternal salvation, or not. Tatian, who was a disciple of Justin Martyr, and the master and leader of the heretics who are called Encratites, held that Adam was damned to eternal punishments. This about Tatian is handed down by Irenaeus (book 1 against Heresies, ch. 31), Eusebius (book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, ch. 27), Epiphanius (disputing against heresy 46), Philaster (in the Catalogue of Heresies), and St Augustine (in the book On Heresies, number twenty-five).

The question: whether Adam, having repented, was ultimately saved. Tatian — disciple of Justin Martyr and leader of the Encratite heretics — held that Adam was eternally damned. This is reported of Tatian by Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 1.31), Eusebius (Eccl. Hist. 4, ch. 27), Epiphanius (against heresy 46), Philaster, and Augustine (De Haeresibus 25). Marginal gloss: 'Error Taciani.'

But Rupert (book 3 of the Commentaries on Genesis, ch. 31) writes that some formerly doubted, and many in his own time also doubt, whether Adam is saved or damned — because nowhere does any canonical Scripture testify that he did penance, nor mention any good work of his, but only narrates his sin, by whose diffusion into all men, and as it were contagion, the whole race of men is vitiated and corrupted. Indeed Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans (ch. 5) and in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (ch. 15), opposes Adam to Christ, making the former the author of sin, death, and condemnation, but the latter the effecter of justice, life, and immortality.

Rupert (Comm. in Gen. bk 3, ch. 31): some formerly, and many in his day, doubt Adam's salvation — because no canonical Scripture records his penitence or any good work, only his sin, whose contagion corrupted the whole race; and Paul opposes Adam to Christ (Rom 5, 1 Cor 15) as author of sin/death/condemnation vs. Christ the author of justice/life/immortality. Marginal gloss: 'Rupertus inclinat in opinionem Taciani, sed refellitur.'

And although Rupert does not dissimulate that those who first affirmed Adam perished were heretics, nor does he himself state or define anything certain, yet he sufficiently indicates that this opinion seems

to him the more probable — but undeservedly indeed. For on the contrary is the concordant opinion of the Fathers, and the common sense of the whole Church, and, what is chief, the manifest testimony of divine Scripture. And these things briefly said by me, Augustine, writing more clearly in Epistle 99 (which is to Evodius), says thus: 'About that first man, the father of the human race — that Christ, when he descended to the lower world, liberated him thence — almost the whole Church agrees; which it must be believed did not believe in vain, from wherever this was handed down, even if the express authority of the canonical scriptures be not brought forward from here. Although that which is written in the book of Wisdom, ch. 10, "She (namely divine wisdom) guarded him who was first made by God, the father of the world, when he was created alone, and led him out from his sin, and gave him the power of ruling all things" — this, I say, which is written there, seems to make for this opinion more than for any other understanding.' Thus Augustine.

Pererius rebuts Rupert (who leans, undeservedly, to the damnation view): against it stand the Fathers, the whole Church, and Scripture. Augustine (Ep. 99 to Evodius): almost the whole Church holds that Christ, descending to hell, freed Adam — not believed in vain, however handed down, even without express canonical proof; and Wisdom 10:1-2 ('wisdom guarded the first-formed father... led him out of his sin... gave him power to rule all') best supports this. Marginal gloss: 'Locus libri Sapientiae. cap. 10.'

But Rupert rejects this testimony, taken from the book of Wisdom, too boldly indeed, affirming that that book is not canonical, and that of the things narrated in that very chapter, some are plainly...

Rupert boldly rejects the Wisdom testimony, denying the book's canonicity and calling some of its statements plainly [false — continued next page]. Catchword 'plane' (continues on the next page).

— p. 824 (PDF) · printed p. 783 —

...plainly false, such as that: that the power of ruling all things was given to Adam, which can befit no man except our Lord Jesus Christ. But I indeed wonder that Rupert was ignorant that, many centuries before his age, the

book of Wisdom was reckoned in the number of the canonical books by the Church, in the Councils of Carthage and Laodicea, and also by certain supreme Pontiffs, and by blessed Augustine himself. But that phrase 'to contain all things,' if anyone consults the Greek Scripture of that place, he will understand to signify nothing else than to have dominion and command over all: for instead of that word 'to contain' the Greek is [κρατ■σαι] 'kratesai,' which is 'to have dominion.' For allusion is there made to what was handed down by Moses (Genesis ch. 1) and by David (Psalm 8): that God gave Adam the principate, dominion, and command over all living things.

Rupert's objection (that giving Adam 'power to rule all' fits no man but Christ) fails, and his denial of Wisdom's canonicity is answered: Wisdom was canonized by the Councils of Carthage and Laodicea, by popes, and by Augustine himself. GREEK GLYPH verified: κρατ■σαι (krat■sai, 'to have dominion/to master' — the LXX word at Wisdom 10:2, which the Vulgate rendered 'continere omnia'); it alludes to Adam's God-given dominion over the animals (Gen 1:28; Ps 8:6-8), not to divine omnipotence. Marginal gloss: 'Liber sapientiae canonicus esse monstratur.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '773'; true printed page 783.

We, therefore, persuaded by so open a testimony of the Sacred writings, and moved by the common sense of the Fathers and of the whole Church, let us believe without any doubt that Adam was saved. To prove which, the Fathers bring many and not-to-be-slighted reasons, which the reader — [they being] presently omitted by us for the sake of brevity — will find in Irenaeus (book 3, where he disputes on this matter from ch. 34 to 40), and in Epiphanius (where he disputes against heresy 46), and finally in Alphonsus de Castro (in book 2 against heresies, in the entry 'Adam' and in the confutation of the first error).

Conclusion: Adam was saved (the plain testimony of Scripture, the Fathers, and the whole Church). Further proofs are in Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 3.34-40), Epiphanius (against heresy 46), and Alphonsus de Castro (Adv. haereses, bk 2, s.v. 'Adam'). Marginal gloss: 'Vera sententia, Adamum esse salvum.'

But among the other reasons, that one, in my judgment, is not to be held among the least: that formerly very many Fathers were persuaded, and it was handed down to memory, that Adam was buried on Mount Calvary —

on which, after three thousand years, our Lord was crucified — so that he who had first been the author of sin might also first experience the power of the salutary medicine of sin, that is, of the blood of Christ. This we have received from Origen (treatise on Matthew, 35), Athanasius (in the book on the Passion of the Lord), Cyprian (in the sermon on the Resurrection), Ambrose (book 5 of the Epistles, Epistle 19, and on ch. 23 of Luke), Augustine (in sermon 71, which is on the immolation of Isaac), Theophylact (on ch. 27 of Matthew, 15 of Mark, 23 of Luke, and 19 of John), Euthymius (on ch. 27 of Matthew), and other learned men. But although St Jerome contradicts this opinion, as if mocking it (on ch. 27 of Matthew, and on those words of Paul in ch. 5 of the Epistle to the Ephesians, 'Rise, you who sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you'), opposing this as a great argument — that in the book of Joshua, ch. 14, it is written that Adam was buried in the city of Hebron — yet that this argument of Jerome is weak, and that in that place of the book of Joshua it is not handed down that the first man was buried in the city of Hebron, we showed above in the fourth book of these Commentaries, when we treated that question, 'Whether Adam was a giant and the tallest of all mortals.'

A further argument for Adam's salvation: the tradition (Origen, Athanasius, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophylact, Euthymius, etc.) that Adam was buried on Mount Calvary, where Christ was crucified 3,000 years later — so the first author of sin first felt the power of its remedy, Christ's blood (cf. Eph 5:14). Jerome mocks this (Adam buried at Hebron, Josh 14:15), but Pererius calls Jerome's argument weak — that Joshua text does not say the first man was buried at Hebron (as he showed in book 4 of these Commentaries, on whether Adam was a giant). This ends the disputation 'Whether Adam is saved.' Marginal glosses: 'memoria sepultum fuisse, multorum Patrum fuit sententia'; 'Defenditur opinio multorum Patrum de sepultura Adami adversus S. Hieronymum.' Catchword 'DISPU' (a new disputation begins on the next page).

— p. 825 (PDF) · printed p. 784 —

A DISPUTATION. On the chronology of sacred Scripture from Adam to the flood, which Moses set forth in the fifth chapter of the Book of Genesis.

Major divider: the disputation on the Genesis-5 chronology (Adam to the flood) that Pererius had earlier deferred ('de hac varietate supputationum infra disputabimus'). Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '774'; true printed page 784.

To the established and designated plan by which we interpret this book, it pertains that we should here briefly set forth the Chronology which contains the time that passed from the creation of Adam to the flood of Noah. For because there is some difficulty in it, that matter desires and demands our explanation, and at the same time our judgment and opinion.

Pererius's plan requires setting forth the chronology from Adam's creation to Noah's flood; because it has difficulties, it needs his explanation and judgment.

QUESTION I. How many years passed from the creation of Adam to the flood.

Quaestio I: the total number of years from Adam to the flood.

From the creation of Adam to the flood — which occurred in the six-hundredth year of Noah's life — are numbered, according to the Hebrew Scripture and our Vulgate edition, one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years. And there intervened ten generations. This sum of years is easily gathered from the years which Scripture (Genesis ch. 5) assigns to each generation. But it must be noted here — which blessed Augustine rightly warns, and the same, long before him, Josephus had warned (book 1 of the Antiquities, ch. 3) — that, in gathering the years of these generations, only those years are to be taken which the father had lived when he begot the son, but all the rest, which he lived after the son was begotten, are to be rejected. For the former are proper to the father, and distinct from all the rest; but the latter are common to the father with the son, which, if they were placed in the father's chronology — since it is necessary that they be counted in the son's chronology — the same years would have to be taken and numbered twice. Therefore, from the nine hundred and thirty years which Adam lived, we will admit only a hundred and thirty into this chronology — namely those he had lived when he begot

Seth; but the remaining eight hundred, in which he survived after Seth was procreated, we will pass over, and we will do the same in the other generations.

Answer: 1,656 years from Adam to the flood (in the 600th year of Noah), across ten generations (Hebrew and Vulgate). The method (per Augustine, City of God 16.10, and earlier Josephus, Antiq. 1.3): count only each father's years up to begetting the next patriarch (Adam's 130, not his 930), since the later years belong jointly to father and son and would be double-counted. Marginal gloss: 'Observatio in Chronologia. B. August. libro 16 de Civit. Dei. cap. 10.'

But the series and order of the generations from Adam to the flood, and likewise the number of years which properly belongs to each generation, is as follows: Adam, when he begot Seth, was 130 years old. Seth, when he begot Enos, was 105 years old. Enos...

The chronological table begins (each father's age at begetting the next): Adam 130, Seth 105, Enos... (continued next page). Catchword 'Enos'.

— p. 826 (PDF) · printed p. 785 —

Enos, 90. Cainan, 70. Malaleel, 65. Jared, 162. Henoch, 65. Mathusalem, 187. Lamech, 182. Noe at the time of the flood, 600. Sum: 1,656.

The chronological table concluded (each patriarch's age at begetting the next, or Noah's age at the flood): Enos 90, Cainan 70, Malaleel 65, Jared 162, Henoch 65, Methuselah 187, Lamech 182, Noah 600 — plus Adam's 130 and Seth's 105 from the previous page, totaling 1,656 years. Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '775'; true printed page 785.

Moreover, the last year of each generation, in which the father is said to have begotten the son — for example, the hundred-and-thirtieth year in which Adam begot Seth — can be understood in three ways: either that that year was only begun (and, as commonly said, 'running'); or that it was already completed and, besides, contained some months of the following year; or, finally, that it was precisely completed, so that nothing was lacking to it or left over. And we indeed, following all the ecclesiastical chronographers, have taken the last years of each generation in this last way, and so that sum results which we set down, of one thousand six

hundred and fifty-six years. But if it be taken in the first way, it will come out less; if in the second way, greater — but at most, the whole sum can be greater or less by not more than nine years and some months.

A precision caveat: the 'begetting-year' of each father can be read three ways — barely begun ('current'), already completed (plus some months), or precisely completed. Pererius follows the ecclesiastical chronographers (precisely completed), giving 1,656; the other readings shift the total, but by at most ~9 years and some months. Marginal gloss: 'Observatio Chronologica.'

It could also be doubted in this place whether perhaps from Adam to the flood there are more than ten generations, and whether some generation was passed over. For indeed, in the enumeration of the generations that are from the flood to the birth of Abraham, the Hebrew Scripture and our Vulgate edition omitted the generation of Cainan, which is between Arphaxad and Sale; which nevertheless the translation of the Seventy interpreters interposed, and blessed Luke in the third chapter of his Gospel. For it is not unusual in sacred Scripture, when generations are numbered, for some to be omitted, so that those that are counted may be referred to a certain — namely secret and mystical — number: just as blessed Matthew reckons only forty-two generations from Abraham to Christ, of which nevertheless it is agreed there were more. But indeed, since neither from other places of Scripture, nor from the translation of the LXX, nor from the tradition of the Church, nor from the writings of the holy Fathers, can it be conjectured in any way that any generation from Adam to the flood was omitted (for it would already have become known to the holy Church by some way and reason), there is certainly no cause why anyone should suspect it, or call it into doubt.

A further doubt: were more than ten generations (one omitted) between Adam and the flood? There is a precedent — the Hebrew/Vulgate omit Cainan (between Arphaxad and Shelah), whom the LXX and Luke 3:36 include; and Scripture does omit generations for a mystical number (Matthew's 42 from Abraham to Christ, though there were more). But since no Scripture, nor the LXX, nor Church tradition, nor the Fathers suggests any generation was omitted before the flood (else the Church would know), there is no cause to doubt it. Page footer signature 'GGGG'; catchword 'QUAE' (Quaestio II begins on the next page).

— p. 827 (PDF) · printed p. 786 —

QUESTION II. How that computation of years which is in the Septuagint interpreters differs from this one.

Quaestio II: the comparison of the Hebrew/Vulgate chronology with the Septuagint's. Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '776'; true printed page 786.

But in the aforesaid reckoning of years from Adam to the flood — just as also in the other, which is after the flood to the birth of Abraham — the Greek translation of the Seventy interpreters partly agrees with the Hebrew Scripture, and partly differs from it. It agrees in two ways: First indeed, because it makes nearly the same total sum of the years which are ascribed to each generation. For although it attributes to Adam 230 years before he begot Seth, and 700 years after begetting him, yet it makes all the years of Adam's life, similarly to the Hebrew Scripture, 930. And it keeps nearly the same in the rest, except Lamech, whose total sum of years in the Hebrew is 777 years, but in the LXX 753. Then, because in two generations — one before the flood, which is Jared's, and the other after the flood, which is Thare's [Terah's] — and in Shem too, it in no way differs from the Hebrew Scripture, neither in the years before the begetting of the sons, nor after.

The LXX partly agrees with the Hebrew: (1) it makes nearly the same TOTAL lifespan for each (Adam 930, though begetting Seth at 230 not 130) — except Lamech (Hebrew 777, LXX 753); (2) three generations (Jared before the flood, Terah after, and Shem) match the Hebrew exactly, both before and after their begetting. Marginal gloss: 'In computatione annorum, Septuaginta interpretum partim consonam, partim dissonam esse Scripturae Hebraicae.'

But it differs from the Hebrew Scripture in many things. First, because in many generations, both before and after the flood, it attributes to the Fathers, before they beget sons, 100 years more than the Hebrew Scripture: namely, before the flood, to Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Malaleel, Enoch; but after the flood, to Arphaxad, Cainan, Sale, Heber, Reu, Saruch. Then, because to some it adds more than 100 years: for after the flood, to Phaleg [Peleg] before he begets a son it adds more years than the Hebrew Scripture, namely 104; but to Nachor [Nahor], 150. Afterward, because to

certain others it adds indeed more years than the Hebrew Scripture, but much fewer than 100: for although the Hebrew codices have that Lamech, when he begot Noe, was 182 years old, the codices of the Seventy interpreters, adding six years to these, say that he was then 188 years old. Finally, because to Mathusalem himself, before he begot Lamech, it attributes 20 years fewer than the Hebrew Scripture: for according to the Seventy interpreters Mathusalem was then 167 years old, but according to the Hebrew Scripture he was 187 years old. The years, therefore, at which the Fathers in each generation before the flood were [when] they begot their sons, are thus according to the Seventy interpreters.

How the LXX differs: (1) it adds 100 years to the begetting-age of six pre-flood patriarchs (Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Malaleel, Enoch) and six post-flood (Arphaxad, Cainan, Sale, Heber, Reu, Serug); (2) it adds more than 100 to Peleg (104) and Nahor (150); (3) it adds fewer than 100 to some (Lamech +6, begetting Noah at 188 not 182); (4) it subtracts 20 from Methuselah (167 vs. 187). A table of the LXX begetting-ages follows.

— p. 828 (PDF) · printed p. 787 —

Before the flood, Adam begot Seth when he was 230 years old. Seth, 205. Enos, 190. Cainan, 170. Malaleel, 165. Jared, 162. Henoch, 165. Mathusalem, 167. Lamech, 188. Noe, when the flood began, was 600. Sum: 2,242.

The Septuagint begetting-age table (each father's age at begetting the next; Noah's age at the flood): Adam 230, Seth 205, Enos 190, Cainan 170, Malaleel 165, Jared 162, Henoch 165, Methuselah 167, Lamech 188, Noah 600 — summing to 2,242 (compared with the Hebrew's 1,656). Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '777'; true printed page 787.

The codices of the Seventy Interpreters, therefore, have from Adam to the flood 586 years more than there are in the Hebrew. And we indeed, in these reckonings of years which are in the LXX interpreters, have followed the codices which now exist as the most emended of all — especially that Greek codex which was recently published at Rome by the singular care of the most illustrious Cardinal Carafa (to whom all lovers and cultivators of the divine letters owe very much), and rendered into Latin by the excellent

labor of the learned man most friendly to me, Flaminius Nobilius, and illustrated with accurate annotations. For that the Greek codices of the LXX Interpreters were formerly quite various and discrepant is proved by the fact that ancient writers who followed them handed down a far different number of years.

So the LXX exceeds the Hebrew by 586 years (2,242 vs. 1,656) from Adam to the flood. Pererius follows the best current LXX — especially the recent Roman (Sixtine) edition sponsored by Cardinal Carafa and translated into Latin with notes by Flaminio Nobili. The old LXX codices were discrepant (shown by the divergent year-totals ancient writers drew from them). Marginal gloss: 'Codices 70. interpretum omnium emendatissimi Romani.'

For Josephus, in the first book of the Antiquities, ch. 3, numbers from Adam to the flood 2,656 years. But that place of Josephus (unless my mind deceives me) is plainly corrupt and depraved. For there Josephus's computation of years differs both from the Hebrew Scripture and from the translation of the Seventy interpreters; indeed it utterly destroys itself. For Josephus makes the sum of years 2,656, but from the years which he assigns to each generation, a far smaller sum results — namely, containing only 2,193 years, as is clearly seen from those which I will subjoin. Josephus assigns to Adam, before he begot Seth, 230 years; to Seth 205; to Enos 190; to Cainan 170; to Malaleel 162; to Jared 162; to Enoch 105; to Mathusale 187; to Lamech 182; and finally to Noe, up to the flood, 600. From all these the aforesaid sum of 2,193 years is produced. Without any doubt, therefore, it must be thought that that place of Josephus is faulty. I for my part would believe that Josephus, in this computation of years, [followed] not the transla[tion of the LXX]...

Josephus (Antiq. 1.3) states 2,656 years from Adam to the flood, but his own figures (Adam 230, Seth 205, Enos 190, Cainan 170, Malaleel 162, Jared 162, Enoch 105, Methuselah 187, Lamech 182, Noah 600 — a mix of LXX-like and Hebrew-like numbers) sum to only 2,193 — so the text is self-contradictory and corrupt. Pererius will argue Josephus followed [the Hebrew, not the LXX — continued next page]. Marginal glosses: 'Varietas codicum 70. Interpretum'; 'Iosephus corruptus ostenditur.' Catchword 'transla' (translationem; continues on the next page).

— p. 829 (PDF) · printed p. 788 —

...the translation of the LXX Interpreters, but the Hebrew Scripture, with which the Latin version agrees. I am led to think this by this conjecture: that a little below, Josephus, in enumerating the years that passed from the flood to the birth of Abraham, both in the sum itself and in the years which he attributes to each generation individually, in no way agrees with the translation of the LXX interpreters, but wholly agrees with the Hebrew Scripture. It becomes therefore quite credible that also in the computation of the years which he there reviews from Adam to the flood, he followed the Chronology of the Hebrew Scripture. Therefore, that faulty place of Josephus I think must be restored and emended to the truth of the Hebrew Scripture thus. First, from the sum itself, that 'twice' must be subtracted, and it must be read thus: 'After the one-thousand-six-hundred-and-fifty-sixth year from Adam' — for the Chronology of the Hebrew Scripture has this sum of years from Adam to the flood. Then, from each generation, one must subtract the 100 years [added] before the father begot the son, which someone — an unskilled person, namely — rashly added, after the form and likeness of the translation of the LXX interpreters. But I except two generations, one Malaleel, the other Jared, to each of which Josephus ascribes 162 years: for from each one must not only subtract 100 years, but instead of 62 in each put 65, for so it is in the Hebrew Scripture. And in this way that place, corrected, will yield the true sense, wholly congruent with the Hebrew Scripture and our Latin translation.

Pererius argues Josephus really followed the HEBREW, not the LXX: for Josephus's post-flood-to-Abraham figures (sum and details) agree wholly with the Hebrew, not the LXX — so his Adam-to-flood figures should too. Hence he emends Josephus's corrupt text to the Hebrew: change the total 2,656 → 1,656 (deleting the 'twice'/2000); strip the 100-year additions (a rash accretion imitating the LXX); and fix Malaleel and Jared from 162 to 65. Corrected, it agrees with the Hebrew and Vulgate. Marginal glosses: 'Iosephus in annorum numero Hebraicam veritatem secutus est'; 'Iosephi locus ab auctore emendatus.' Verso running head 'COMMENTARIORVM' number '778'; true printed page 788.

But this being indicated as if in passing — lest that faulty place of Josephus should perhaps impose on anyone or make trouble — let us return to what we had set out to teach: that formerly the codices of the LXX interpreters varied very much in this computation of years. For Eusebius, from Adam to the flood, reckons in the Chronicles 2,242 years — which number Severus Sulpicius and Isidore also hand down. But after the flood to Abraham there are, according to Eusebius, 1,720 years; according to Augustine, 1,072; according to Sulpicius, 1,070; according to Isidore, 942.

Returning to the main point (that the LXX codices varied greatly): from Adam to the flood, Eusebius (in the Chronicle), Severus Sulpicius, and Isidore give 2,242 years. From the flood to Abraham, the totals diverge widely — Eusebius 1,720; Augustine 1,072; Sulpicius 1,070; Isidore 942. Marginal glosses: 'Severus Sulpitius libr. 1. Sacra Historia'; 'Isidorus lib. 5. Etymolog. ca. ultimo'; 'Augustinus li. 16. de Civit. Dei cap. 10.'

QUESTION III. Whether in this computation of years one should stand by the translation of the LXX interpreters, or rather by the Hebrew Scripture.

Quaestio III: whether to follow the Septuagint's or the Hebrew's chronology.

But someone will say: in so great a variety of years as we see there is between the Hebrew codices and those of the Seventy interpreters, what must we follow? I answer, with blessed Augustine (book 15 of the City of God, ch. 13), with blessed Jerome (in the book of Hebrew Questions on Genesis), with Bede...

The answer to Quaestio III: follow the Hebrew — with Augustine (City of God 15.13), Jerome (Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim), Bede... Marginal gloss: 'Veritati Hebraicae potius quam 70. interpretationi standum.' Catchword 'Beda' (continues on the next page).

— p. 830 (PDF) · printed p. 789 —

...and Bede (in the book on the Six Ages of the world): that not only in this matter now treated, but wherever the Greek codices so differ from the Hebrew that they can by no reasoning be reconciled, one must rather believe and stand by these [the Hebrew] than those [the Greek] —

especially since the Hebrew Scripture, unlike the Greek, does not use number-symbols, which are easily perverted and corrupted, but properly uses the names of the numbers themselves. For if we wish to follow the Greek codices of the Seventy interpreters, it is necessary for us to make Mathusalem survive the flood by sixteen years — which the Scripture itself teaches to be false, since it hands down that only eight souls escaped the destruction of the flood: Noe with his wife, and his three sons with their three wives. For the Greek codices have that Mathusalem, when he was 165 years old, begot Lamech; and from the birth of Lamech to the six-hundredth year of Noah's life, in which the flood happened, they number 788 years; but to Mathusalem, after Lamech was begotten, they attribute 804 years: according to which reckoning it is necessary that Mathusalem lived sixteen years after the flood. But this inconvenience does not touch the Hebrew codices, according to which — since Mathusalem, born 187 years, begot Lamech, and Lamech himself, when he was 182 years old, begot Noe — it results that at the beginning of the year in which the flood happened, Mathusalem died. For from the birth of Lamech to the six-hundredth year of Noe and the beginning of the flood there are 782 years; and the Hebrew Scripture makes Mathusalem survive for the same number of years after Lamech's birth.

Bede (De sex aetatibus mundi): wherever Greek and Hebrew irreconcilably differ, follow the Hebrew — especially since the Hebrew spells out number-NAMES (hard to corrupt), whereas the Greek uses numerals (easily corrupted). Decisive proof: on the LXX figures Methuselah would survive the flood by 16 years (his 804 years after begetting Lamech vs. the 788 years from Lamech's birth to the flood) — impossible, since only eight souls survived (Gen 7:13; 1 Pet 3:20). But on the Hebrew figures (Methuselah begets Lamech at 187, Lamech begets Noah at 182), Methuselah dies exactly at the start of the flood-year (782 years each way). Marginal glosses: 'Genes. 7.'; '1. Petr. 3.'; 'Mathusalem quomodo non supervixerit diluvio.' Odd-side running head 'IN GENESIM, LIB. VII.' number '779'; true printed page 789.

What I said about the reckoning of Mathusale's years according to the Greek codices, I wish the reader to understand of those which now exist. For the ancients, whom Augustine cites (book 15 of the City of God, ch. 11) and Jerome (on the Hebrew Traditions in Genesis), attribute to

Mathusale before the begetting of Lamech 167 years, and to Lamech himself before the begetting of Noe 188 years: whereby it happens that Mathusale has fourteen years remaining at the time of the flood — although Augustine, in the aforesaid book (ch. 13), reports that in three Greek codices, and one Latin, and one Syriac, Mathusale is similarly found dead six years before the flood.

The Methuselah figures vary among the LXX witnesses: the currently-extant Greek gives him 16 years past the flood; the ancients cited by Augustine (City of God 15.11) and Jerome give 167 (before Lamech) and 188 (Lamech before Noah), yielding 14 years past the flood; and Augustine (15.13) reports three Greek, one Latin, and one Syriac codex where Methuselah dies 6 years BEFORE the flood. Marginal gloss: 'Cum his codicibus consentit Graecus codex Septuaginta novissime editus Romae' (the recent Roman/Sixtine LXX agrees with these).

Let us therefore follow the Hebrew Scripture and our Vulgate edition — especially since that addition of years is empty and faulty, not only not pertaining to Scripture, but (as Augustine widely disputes in the aforesaid place) not proceeding from the LXX interpreters themselves, but from him who first copied the translation of the LXX interpreters from the book that was in Ptolemy's library — feigned, and inserted into the Scripture. And since all the other codices were copied from that book, it is no wonder that this fault flowed to all the codices, as if from one source. But what first moved that scribe to devise such an addition, blessed Augustine investigates and discusses in the place we cited above; whose conjectures — since this pertains somewhat to the explanation of our Chronology, and because perhaps not to all [they are known]...

Conclusion: follow the Hebrew and Vulgate. The 100-year additions are an empty, faulty accretion — not from the LXX translators, but (per Augustine) from the first copyist of the LXX from the book in Ptolemy's library, whence the error spread to all codices from one source. Augustine investigates why that scribe devised the additions; Pererius will give his conjectures (relevant to the chronology). Marginal glosses: 'Editio vulgata sequenda'; 'Disputatio Augustini, unde in translatione LXX additio annorum orta sit.' Page footer signature 'GGGG 3'; catchword 'fortasse' (continues on the next page).

— p. 831 (PDF) · printed p. 790 —

...since perhaps Augustine's volume will be ready at hand to those who read these things, I have been pleased to record his entire disputation, here transcribed.

Completes the catchword 'fortasse' carried over from the previous page; Pererius frames the verbatim transcription of Augustine that follows.

Augustine, then, writes thus in book 15 of the City of God, chapter 13: But when I have said this, at once the reply will be made that this is a Jewish lie -- a charge already sufficiently dealt with above. For that the Seventy translators, men deservedly celebrated, could have lied is hard to believe. And if I ask which is the more credible -- that the Jewish nation, so far and wide dispersed, could have conspired with one accord to write down this falsehood, and, grudging others the authority, robbed themselves of the truth; or that seventy men, who were themselves also Jews, gathered in one place (since Ptolemy king of Egypt had drawn them together for this work), grudged the very truth to foreign nations and did this by common agreement -- who does not see which is the readier and easier thing to believe? Far be it, then, that any prudent person should believe either that Jews of whatever perversity and malice could have done so much across codices so many and so far and widely scattered, or that those memorable Seventy men shared one plan to begrudge the nations the truth. It is more credible, therefore, that when these texts first began to be copied from Ptolemy's Library, something of this kind could have happened in a single codex -- the one first copied from the source, whence it then spread more widely -- where indeed even a scribe's error could have occurred. And it is not absurd to suspect this in that question about the life of Methuselah, and in that other place where, with twenty-four years left over, the sum does not agree. But in those cases where a like corruption runs continuously -- so that before the begetting of the son who is entered into the line a hundred years are in one place present and in another lacking, while after the begetting,

where they were lacking they are present and where they were present they are lacking, so that the total agrees (and this is found in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh generation) -- the error itself seems to have, if one may say so, a certain consistency, and smells not of chance but of design. And so let that diversity of the numbers, standing otherwise in the Greek and Latin codices and otherwise in the Hebrew -- where there is no such continuous evenness of a hundred years first added and afterward subtracted through so many generations -- be assigned neither to the malice of the Jews nor to the diligence or prudence of the Seventy translators, but to the error of the scribe who first received the codex to be copied from the aforesaid king's Library. For even now, where numbers do not bear on anything that can be easily grasped or that seems useful to learn, they are both carelessly copied and still more carelessly corrected. For who would think he must learn how many thousands of men each tribe of Israel could severally have had, since it is reckoned to be of no use? And how few men are there to whom the usefulness of this appears? But here, where through so many woven generations a hundred years are in one place present and in another lacking, and after the son who was to be commemorated is born they are lacking where they had been present and present where they had been lacking, so that the sum harmonizes -- surely because he who did this, wishing to persuade that the ancients lived such very numerous years because they reckoned them as the shortest, and trying to show this from the maturity of puberty at which sons fit for begetting were engendered, and so thinking that in those hundred years ten of ours were to be suggested to the incredulous, lest men refuse to accept in faith that men lived so long -- he added a hundred where he did not find an age suited to the begetting of sons; and the same hundred, after the sons were begotten, so that the total might agree, he subtracted.

Augustine, De civitate Dei XV.13. Marginal glosses: 'lest a translator's error crept in concerning the reckoning of the years, which run from Adam to the flood and from the flood to the birth of Abraham';

'The codices of the Seventy translators corrupted by a copyist'; 'Why an error is especially wont to creep in in copying numbers.' Augustine's thesis: the LXX/Hebrew chronological discrepancy stems not from Jewish falsification nor from the translators, but from a single scribal error in the first codex copied out of Ptolemy's Library, whence it spread. The regular +100 (before begetting) / -100 (after begetting) pattern 'smells of design': the copyist inflated the too-young begetting-ages to make the long antediluvian lifespans credible, then restored the totals. Continues on the next page (catchword 'detraxit').

— p. 832 (PDF) · printed p. 791 —

...subtracted. For thus he wished to make the fitting begetting-ages credible, yet so as not to defraud the individual lives of any of their total years. But that in the sixth generation he did not do this is the very thing that more strongly shows he did it deliberately when, as we said, the matter demanded it -- because he did not do it where it was not demanded. For he found that in that same generation among the Hebrews Jared lived, before he begot Enoch, one hundred sixty-two years, which by that reckoning of short years come to sixteen years and a little less than two months -- an age already fit for begetting; and so there was no need to add a hundred short years to make ours twenty-six, nor after Enoch's birth to subtract those he had not added before it: thus it came about that here there was no variance between the two texts. But again it gives pause why in the eighth generation, before Lamech was born of Methuselah, whereas among the Hebrews one hundred eighty-two years are read, twenty fewer (or as another reading has it, twenty-two) are found in our codices, where a hundred is rather usually added; and after Lamech is begotten they are restored to complete the sum, which does not differ in the two texts. For if he wished the hundred seventy years to be understood, on account of the maturity of puberty, as seventeen, then just as he ought to add nothing, so now he ought to subtract nothing, because he had found an age suited to the begetting of sons -- for which reason in other cases he added those hundred years where he did not find it. This matter of the twenty years we might rightly suppose could have

happened by chance corruption, were it not that he took care afterward to restore them, as he had first subtracted them, so that the integrity of the total should agree. Or is it rather to be thought done more cunningly, so that the design by which a hundred years are usually first added and afterward subtracted might be concealed -- since even there where it had not been necessary, not indeed by a hundred years but by however small a number first subtracted and afterward restored, some such thing was done? But however this be taken -- whether it be believed to have been done so or not, whether finally it be so or not so -- I should in no way doubt that it is rightly done that, when something different is found in the two codices, since for the credit of the events both cannot be true, credence should rather be given to the language from which the translation into the other was made by the translators. For in certain codices too -- three Greek, one Latin, and one Syriac agreeing among themselves -- Methuselah is found to have died six years before the flood. Thus far the words of Augustine.

Continuation and close of Augustine, De civitate Dei XV.13. Marginal gloss: 'A lesson of Augustine much to be observed.' Augustine's conclusion: where the texts differ, one must trust the source language (Hebrew) from which the translation was made; and three Greek, one Latin, and one Syriac codex agree that Methuselah died six years before the flood (removing the apparent difficulty of his surviving it).

It does not escape me (as Caesar Baronius -- a truly learned, pious, and diligent writer of ecclesiastical matters -- also recently noted at the end of his Apparatus to the Ecclesiastical Annals) that most of the ancients, both Greek and Latin, preferred to follow the chronology found in this passage in the translation of the Seventy, because they saw that translation to have been for many ages reverently used and religiously honored in the Church of God, and for that reason counted it a matter of religious scruple to alter it in any part or not to follow it. But with me (as far as concerns the chronology now in question) the authority of the Hebrew Scripture and of the Latin Vulgate version, and likewise the judgment and verdict of the two

chief Doctors of the Church, Jerome and Augustine, outweighs it.

Marginal gloss: 'Caesar Baronius, author of the Ecclesiastical Annals -- who he is.' Reference: Baronius, Apparatus ad Annales Ecclesiasticos. Pererius acknowledges the ancients' reverence for the LXX chronology but sides with the Hebrew, the Vulgate, Jerome, and Augustine.

— p. 833 (PDF) · printed p. 792 —

QUESTION IV. How so great an inequality of age in the begetting of sons could have existed among men before the flood.

Fourth quaestio of the chronology disputation on Genesis 5, in Book VII.

It may perhaps strike the reader as wonderful that, in these generations which Moses numbered from Adam to Noah, there was so great a diversity of age in the begetting of sons on the part of their fathers. For Cainan at seventy years begot Mahalalel; and he, when he was sixty-five, begot Jared; Enoch too, when of the same age, begot Methuselah. But Jared at one hundred sixty-two years begot Enoch; Methuselah, older still, that is at one hundred eighty-seven years, begot Lamech; and he at one hundred eighty-two years begot Noah, from whom, when he himself was five hundred years old, three sons were procreated, Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Since, then, at that time an age of seventy years was already mature and firm for begetting, as is clear from the example of Cainan, Mahalalel, and Enoch, how did it come about that others begot so late -- that is, more than a hundred years late, and Noah more than four hundred years -- their sons? For it is not likely that those who begot late chose from a zeal for continence to abstain long from their wives. For at that time the very work of generation, in the age when the human race ought to be multiplied, was honorable and praiseworthy; and Enoch, who for his surpassing and singular holiness was translated by God, is read to have devoted himself to generation and procreated sons before his seventieth year. But that Noah, before his five-hundredth year, either abstained from marriage or was impotent to beget, the mind refuses to believe.

Marginal gloss: 'Resolution of the difficulty. Moses did not number the firstborn but those through whom [the line] was carried down to Noah.' Sets out the puzzle: Cainan, Mahalalel, and Enoch begot at 65-70, yet Jared, Methuselah, Lamech begot at ~180 and Noah at 500.

What, then, shall we answer to this? Saint Augustine has a long and careful disputation on this matter in chapter 20 of book 15 of the City of God; but I shall indicate to the reader in a few words what I think. To me indeed it seems most like the truth that that series of ten generations from Adam to Noah was not throughout described by Moses through firstborn sons, but in some generations was woven together through other, later-born sons -- namely those through whom the direct line of Seth's posterity was carried down to Noah, to whom above all Moses meant to conduct that series of generations. Enoch, therefore, was not the firstborn son of Jared, nor was the first son whom Methuselah begot Lamech, nor is Noah to be thought the firstborn of Lamech, who it is credible begot several other sons before his five-hundredth year; but because those, cut off by either natural or violent death, did not survive the flood, as did the other three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, through whom after the flood the human race was multiplied, therefore,

Cross-reference: Augustine, De civitate Dei XV.20. Pererius's own solution: the genealogy names not firstborns but the sons who carried Seth's direct line to Noah; the earlier-born sons perished and left no post-diluvian posterity. Continues on the next page (catchword 'propterea').

— p. 834 (PDF) · printed p. 793 —

therefore, those others being passed over, Moses chose to record only these. Nor is it unusual in Scripture, when some series of generations is woven together down to him whose birth is chiefly intended, to describe that series not through firstborn sons but only through those from whom he whose descent is principally undertaken to be described drew his origin. For an example and proof at once there is the genealogy of our Savior, which Matthew carried down from Abraham, not always through firstborn sons, but only through those from whose stock our Lord was born. And for this very reason he was silent about Ishmael and named Isaac; and, Esau

omitted, he recorded Jacob; of Jacob's sons, the three elder by birth -- Reuben, Simeon, and Levi -- being passed over, he employed Judah only; finally he commemorated Solomon, David's other sons prior to him being set aside. This same thing, then, I judge that Moses regarded and observed in weaving through the generations that ran from Adam to Noah.

Marginal gloss: 'Matthew 1 and the following [chapter].' Pererius supports his solution from Matthew's genealogy of Christ (Matt 1), which likewise selects line-bearers -- Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau, Judah over his elder brothers, Solomon over David's elder sons -- rather than firstborns.

And Henoch walked with God. And all the days of Henoch were three hundred sixty-five years. And he walked with God, and was seen no more, because God took him.

Lemma: Genesis 5:22-24 (marked in the margin 'VERS. 22, 23, & 24').

In this history Saint Jerome seems to have slipped in memory (a thing which happens not rarely to great men, whether from too much confidence in memory or when they are vehemently intent with zeal and care upon other matters): for what Scripture here relates of Henoch, who was seventh from Adam, he attributes to Enos, the son of Seth and grandson of Adam. For he writes thus in the first book against Jovinian: 'I do not think Henoch was translated for the reason that he had a wife, but because he first invoked God and believed in the Savior.' Yet that the first of all who began to invoke the name of the Lord was not Henoch but Enos, Moses relates in the fourth chapter of Genesis.

Marginal gloss: 'A slip of Jerome.' References: Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum I; Genesis 4:26. Jerome mistakenly ascribes to Enoch (seventh from Adam) what Genesis says of Enos (grandson of Adam) -- that he first invoked the name of the Lord.

But let us weigh the aforesaid words of Moses about Henoch. That phrase, 'He walked with God' (or 'before God') -- as also 'to walk in the way of the Lord,' 'in his commandments' -- is a Hebraism signifying that a man lives rightly and blamelessly, obeys the will and commands of God, and is dear

and acceptable to God. Rightly, therefore, did the Seventy translators put for it, 'He pleased God.' That phrase, 'And he was not seen,' signifies that he was taken away from the society and company of men; for which the Septuagint has, 'And he was not found.' In Hebrew it is precisely [■■■■■■] veennenu, 'And [he is] not himself,' which some Jews refer to his death -- though the Chaldee (Targum) paraphrase cries out against it, which runs thus in Latin, 'And he was not, because the Lord did not make him die.' This manner of speaking appears more clearly from Psalm 36: 'I have seen,' he says, 'the wicked highly exalted and lifted up like the cedars of Lebanon; and I passed by, and lo, he was not; and I sought him, and his place was not found.' For that phrase, 'Because God took him,' which the Jews interpret of his death, the Septuagint has, 'And God translated him.' But the verb 'to translate' does not signify dea[th]...

Marginal gloss: '"He walked with God" is a Hebraism, and what it signifies.' Hebrew glyph: ■■■■■■ (ve'ennennu, 'and he [is] not / and he was not'), transliterated by Pererius 'veennenu' -- Genesis 5:24. Some Jews read it of Enoch's death; the Chaldee/Targum paraphrase denies this ('because the Lord did not make him die'). Cf. Psalm 36[37]:35-36 (Vulgate numbering). Where the Hebrew has 'God took him' (read of death by the Jews), the LXX has 'God translated (transtulit) him.' The sentence breaks off at the page foot with the catchword 'mor-' (mortem).

— p. 835 (PDF) · printed p. 794 —

...death, but a withdrawal from the society and company of men, and a change into a certain better manner of life and state. To this passage of Genesis the author of Ecclesiasticus looked when he wrote, in chapter 44, that Enoch pleased God and was translated into paradise. Finally this passage about Enoch is rendered roughly thus in the Jerusalem Targum: 'And Enoch served in truth before the Lord, and he was not, because he was taken away by [God's] word from the Lord's sight.' But because Enoch is said to have walked with God not before but after the begetting of offspring, Procopius of Gaza thinks it is thereby signified that Enoch was formerly wicked and shameful, but afterward, through a worthy and perfect penitence for his crimes, not only amended his life but so pleased God that he deserved, exempt from death, to be transferred into a happy state of life.

This to me is truly not likely, since Scripture nowhere signifies any such thing, nor is it fitting to think it of so great a man. Rather Cajetan, from the fact that here Enoch is twice said to have walked with God, judges it to be signified that he was, throughout his whole life and from boyhood on, holy and dear to God.

Completes the exposition of Gen 5:22-24 begun on the previous page. References: Ecclesiasticus 44:16; the Jerusalem Targum. Procopius of Gaza inferred from Enoch's walking with God only after begetting that he had been wicked and was reformed by penitence -- which Pererius rejects as unwarranted by Scripture; Cajetan takes the doubled 'walked with God' to mean Enoch was holy his whole life.

A DISPUTATION ON THE TRANSLATION AND THE WRITINGS OF ENOCH.

Major divider: a new disputation on Enoch's translation and on the writings attributed to him.

But truly, concerning this translation of Enoch, many things can be asked and disputed, most worthy to be known and apt to bring to a reader not incurious of obscure and abstruse matters no small pleasure. But that this disputation, which we have now set ourselves to explain, may be handled more clearly and distinctly, we have distributed it into several questions to be briefly unraveled.

Pererius opens the disputation and announces its division into quaestiones.

QUESTION I. Whether Enoch is dead, or even now lives on earth.

First quaestio of the disputation on Enoch.

Before all else it must be asked whether Enoch is dead, or lives even now and will live until the consummation of the age. Aven-Esra (Ibn Ezra), with certain other Jews, holds that Enoch died, and he confirms it with three arguments. First, because Moses wrote of him in Genesis chapter 5, 'And all the days of Enoch were three hundred sixty-five years'; therefore he lived no longer, and so is dead: for if he were still alive, his days would be

not merely three hundred sixty-five years but would be beyond five thousand. Next, the phrase said of him here in the Hebrew, 'And he was not' (Et non ipse), according to the idiom of Scripture signifies that he departed this life -- as may be seen from Psalm 36 in the words we recalled a little above, and from chapter 42 of Genesis, where Jacob, speaking of his son Joseph whom he believed dead, says, 'Joseph is not, Simeon is held in chains,' and so on. Lastly he argues the same from that phrase, 'Because God took him':

Ibn Ezra (Aven-Esra) and some Jews hold Enoch died, with three arguments: (1) 'all his days were 365 years' -- else they would exceed 5000; (2) the Hebrew 'and he was not' is a Scriptural idiom for departing life (cf. Ps 36[37]; Gen 42:36, Jacob of the presumed-dead Joseph); (3) 'because God took him.' Argument continues on the next page (catchword 'tulit').

— p. 836 (PDF) · printed p. 795 —

'God took him'; for according to the idiom of Scripture, 'to take away' someone, or 'to take away someone's soul,' is the same as to remove him from life. For both Elijah and Jonah, longing for death, prayed to God saying, 'Take away my soul'; and Job, 'I know not how long I shall subsist, and whether after a little my Maker may take me away'; and the Jews before Pilate cried out against Christ, 'Away with him, crucify him.' And playing on the ambiguous meaning of this verb, the Poet wittily jested it upon Nero: 'Who would deny Nero of Aeneas's illustrious stock? The one bore off (sustulit) his father, the other made away with (sustulit) his mother.'

Completes Ibn Ezra's third argument: 'to take away' (tollere) in Scripture means to remove from life (1 Kings 19:4 Elijah; Jonah 4:3; Job; John 19:15 'Tolle, crucifige eum'). Pererius caps it with the epigram on Nero punning on 'sustulit' (raised up / did away with): Aeneas bore off (rescued) his father Anchises, Nero made away with (murdered) his mother Agrippina.

But that Enoch is not dead -- besides the most ancient and most faith-worthy tradition of the Church, besides the persuasion of all Christians so fixed in their minds and senses that, as Augustine writes in book 2 of On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, chapter

23, it is not lawful to doubt of it, and finally besides the concordant judgment of the Fathers and theologians -- is made entirely certain and beyond all controversy by the authority of blessed Paul, affirming it in the plainest words in chapter 11 of the Epistle to the Hebrews. 'By faith,' he says, 'Enoch was translated, that he should not see death, and was not found, because God translated him.' I wonder, therefore, that Jerome de Oleaster was not afraid to say, in his Commentary on this passage of Genesis, that although the Hebrews say Enoch is dead, yet to himself it seems more probable that he is not dead: only 'more probable,' then, and not rather wholly true, certain, and beyond doubt? -- especially since he himself at once subjoins the words of Paul we recalled above, plainly and affirmatively handing down that Enoch was not dead.

Marginal gloss: 'Jerome de Oleaster is faulted.' Pererius refutes Ibn Ezra: Enoch is not dead -- proven by Church tradition, all Christians' persuasion (Augustine, De gratia Christi contra Pelagium et Caelestium II.23: not lawful to doubt it), the Fathers and theologians, and decisively by Paul, Hebrews 11:5. He faults Jerome de Oleaster for calling it merely 'more probable.'

Many, to prove this same point, allege those words in chapter 44 of the book of Ecclesiasticus: 'Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise, that he may give the nations penitence'; by which words it is most plainly shown that Enoch is not dead, but was translated into Paradise, and in the last times of the world will preach penitence to the nations seduced by Antichrist. But indeed in the Greek there is not that phrase 'into Paradise'; and for 'that he may give the nations penitence' it runs thus: 'an example of penitence to the generations.' So that this seems to be the sense of the Greek reading: that God translated Enoch, a most holy man, so that thereby it might be understood that the innocent and pious are in God's heart and care, and that the wicked might be moved by so wonderful an example to do penance. Or it is signified that Enoch was translated because, while he lived, he was to all an outstanding example of penitence -- namely, by the holiness of his life and the innocence of his conduct provoking and inciting the men of his age to penitence for their crimes and to the worship and service of God. Now God willed to withdraw Enoch

from human fellowship because at that time the corruption of human nature, born of Adam's sin, had taken on great force and strength: it had utterly infected and depraved not only the posterity of Cain, but even the descendants of the impious among Seth's line -- impunity of life, wickedness of conduct, and finally the lust of living and doing as each pleased. Wherefore

Marginal gloss: 'The passage of Ecclesiasticus ch. 44 explained.' Ecclesiasticus 44:16 -- Enoch translated to Paradise 'to give the nations penitence' (the tradition that he will preach penitence to those seduced by Antichrist in the last days). Pererius notes the Greek lacks 'into Paradise' and reads 'an example of penitence to the generations.' God withdrew Enoch as the corruption from Adam's sin had by then deeply infected not only Cain's posterity but even the line of Seth. Continues on the next page (catchword 'Quamobrem').

— p. 837 (PDF) · printed p. 796 —

Wherefore God withdrew holy Enoch early from that flood of crimes -- that is, he was caught away, as it is written in the book of Wisdom chapter 4, 'lest malice should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul.' Now Enoch was translated nearly a thousand years after the beginning of the world, and six hundred sixty-nine years before the flood. Moses' narrative, moreover, indicates not obscurely that Enoch is not dead. For whereas of all and each who preceded him and who followed to the flood Moses sets down that clause, 'And he died,' of Enoch alone he did not write it: but if he had died, he would have said it of him as of all the others.

Wisdom 4:11 ('he was caught away lest malice should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul'). Enoch was translated nearly 1000 years from the world's beginning (year 987) and 669 years before the flood. Moses' silence confirms it: he appends 'and he died' to every other patriarch but not to Enoch.

As for what was objected above against this view -- that Moses said all the days of Enoch were three hundred sixty-five years -- this does not conclude that Enoch died, but shows the time during which Enoch dwelt in the society and company of men, passing his life on earth with other men. Withdrawn from human company, since it is quite unknown where he is,

what he does, how he lives, he stands, as regards men's knowledge, just as if he had died: and so all the time after his translation is wrapped in silence. And that which is read in Hebrew, 'And he was not' [Hebr. ■■■■■■ ■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■■■, Veennenu chi lacah otho Elohim], and the phrase 'Because God took him,' are to be understood not as the Hebrews interpret them, but as the Seventy translators and our Latin translator declared and expressed them -- signifying his translation and not his death.

Marginal gloss: 'Resolution of the contrary arguments.' Pererius answers Ibn Ezra: '365 years' marks only the span Enoch lived among men; withdrawn from human company he is, as to men's knowledge, as if dead, so all time after his translation is silent. 'And he was not' / 'because God took him' are to be understood as the LXX and Vulgate render them -- of translation, not death. Hebrew glyph (given in full in the margin): ■■■■■■ ■■ ■■■ ■■■ ■■■■■ (ve'ennennu ki laqah otho Elohim, 'and he was not, for God took him,' Gen 5:24b), transliterated by Pererius 'Veennenu chi lacah otho Elohim'; magnified and verified from the page. Marginal Latin note: 'Hebraea, si cui placent, haec sunt' ('The Hebrew, if anyone likes it, is this').

QUESTION II. Whether Enoch is going to die.

Second quaestio of the disputation on Enoch.

In the second place it must be asked whether Enoch is at some time going to die, or has rather already been translated to immortal life. Procopius of Gaza, on this passage of Genesis, seems to signify that Enoch is no longer to die, but, having died in some wonderful manner of death, has been translated to heavenly life. For he says that Enoch did not die after the manner of men, but was taken up by God by some divine reason unexplored by us; indeed he says he was brought to perfection and beatitude. He adds moreover that Elijah too, when he was translated, was received into eternal tabernacles; and a little before he had said that Abel, slain by his brother, flew to the stars. Something similar about Enoch Saint Jerome seems to hint in the epistle he sent to Pammachius against the errors of John of Jerusalem, writing in this manner: 'Enoch was translated in the flesh; Elijah, a man of flesh, was caught up into heaven; not yet dead, and already dwellers of paradise, they keep the members with which they

were caught up and translated. What we [seek] in this fasting, they possess in the fellowship of God; [they are fed] with heavenly bread, and are satisfied with the one word of God; they have the same lord whom they have also for food.'

Marginal glosses: '2 Kings [4 Regum] 2' (Elijah's translation); 'What Procopius of Gaza thinks about Enoch.' Procopius seems to hold Enoch no longer mortal but assumed by God to heavenly beatitude (likewise Elijah into eternal tabernacles, and Abel's soul flying to the stars). Jerome (Epistle to Pammachius, Against the Errors of John of Jerusalem) similarly speaks of Enoch and Elijah translated in the flesh, dwellers of paradise fed by God's word. Continues on the next page (catchword 'cibum').

— p. 838 (PDF) · printed p. 797 —

food. But truly, that Jerome held Enoch not yet dead but to die at some time is clear from his other writings; nor did he mean anything else in this place than that Enoch, translated into some most pleasant place of the earth (which he called by the general word Paradise), sustains his life not by earthly, ordinary, and our own foods and nourishments, but by the word of God -- as Moses on the mountain for forty days: 'For man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.' It is therefore beyond doubt to be believed that Enoch both is not yet dead and will at some time die. So holds the tradition of the Church, the sense and opinion of the faithful, and the judgment of the Fathers and theologians. Hear what blessed Thomas writes on this matter in his Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, upon those words of chapter 11, 'By faith Enoch was translated that he should not see death': 'Enoch is not yet dead, yet he will die at some time. The sentence which the Lord inflicted upon our first parents when they sinned -- On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death -- comprehends all who are in any way born of Adam. Whence in Psalm 88 it is said, What man is he that shall live and not see death? and Paul to the Hebrews 9, It is appointed, he says, for all men once to die. But the death of the two, Enoch and Elijah, has been deferred. And the reason is that the doctrine of the Old Testament is ordered to the promises of the New, in which the hope of eternal life is promised to us:

Matthew 4, Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. And therefore, the sentence of death having been given, the Lord willed to lead men into the hope of life: which he did in the Fathers of each state, namely of Nature, of Law, and of Grace.'

Marginal references: Exodus 24 & 34; Deuteronomy 8 (Moses fasting 40 days, 'not by bread alone'); Genesis 2 (the death-sentence). Jerome's other writings show he held Enoch not yet dead but to die eventually. Pererius's conclusion: Enoch both is not-yet-dead and will die eventually -- the tradition of the Church, the faithful, the Fathers and theologians. He cites Aquinas (Commentary on Hebrews 11): the sentence of Gen 2:17 comprehends all born of Adam (cf. Ps 88[89]:48; Heb 9:27); the death of Enoch and Elijah is deferred because OT doctrine is ordered to the NT promise of eternal life.

'Whence in the first state he gave hope of escaping the necessity of death in Enoch; in the Law, in Elijah; in the time of grace, in Christ, through whom the effect of this promise is given to us. But the first two will die by Antichrist: Christ, however, having died once, rising from the dead, dies now no more; death shall no longer have dominion over him.' Thus Saint Thomas.

Marginal reference: Romans 6 (v.9, 'Christ rising from the dead dies now no more'). Aquinas's schema: God gave hope of escaping death's necessity in Enoch (state of Nature), Elijah (Law), and Christ (Grace); Enoch and Elijah will yet die (by Antichrist, cf. Rev 11), but Christ dies no more.

But this very point Saint Augustine handles and confirms most learnedly and eloquently in book nine of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter six, writing thus: 'For neither is it to be thought that Elijah is even now such as the saints will be, when, the day's work done, they shall alike receive the denarius; nor such as are the men who have not yet departed from this life, from which he nonetheless departed not by death but by translation. So then he has now something better than he could have in this life -- although he does not yet have what he will have at the end from this life rightly lived; for they provided better things for us, that they should not be perfected without us. Or if anyone thinks that Elijah could not have merited this, had he taken a wife and begotten sons (for he is believed not to have had them, because Scripture did not say it, although it said nothing of his

celibacy either): what will he answer about Enoch, who, having begotten sons, pleasing God, was translated not dead but alive? Why then could not both Adam and Eve, if, living justly, they had chastely begotten sons, have given place to their successors by translation and not by death? For if Enoch and Elijah, dead in Adam and bearing the propagation of death in their flesh, are believed even to be going to return to this life so as to pay that debt, and what has so long been deferred,'

Marginal reference: Matthew 20 (the parable of the denarius). Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IX.6, on the intermediate state of Enoch and Elijah: translated not by death, they have something better than this life yet not the final reward (they await it with us). Even Enoch, who begot sons, was translated alive. Enoch and Elijah, still bearing mortality in their flesh, are believed to return to this life to pay death's debt, so long deferred. Sentence continues on the next page (catchword 'mori-').

— p. 839 (PDF) · printed p. 798 —

will die: yet now they are in another life, where, before the resurrection of the flesh, before the animal body is changed into a spiritual one, they fail neither by disease nor by old age. How much more justly and probably would it be granted to those first men, living without any sin of their own or of their parents, that -- their children begotten -- they should pass into some better state; indeed, the age being ended, that they should, with all the posterity of the saints, be changed into the angelic form far more happily, not through the death of the flesh but through the power of God?

Conclusion of the Augustine quotation from De Genesi ad litteram IX.6 (continued from the previous page, catchword 'mori-'): Enoch and Elijah are now in another life, free of aging; the sinless first parents would all the more have passed to a better state without death.

The same Augustine, in book 1 of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, to Marcellinus, chapters 2 and 3, not only teaches that Enoch is not dead, but also declares how he sustains life on earth for so many thousands of years. For he writes thus: 'Accordingly, had Adam not sinned, he would not have had to be stripped of his body, but to be over-clothed with immortality and incorruption, so that the mortal

might be swallowed up by life -- that is, that he should pass from the animal to the spiritual. For there was no fear that, living here longer in an animal body, he would be weighed down by old age and by gradual aging come to death. For if God provided that the garments and shoes of the Israelites were not worn out through so many years, what wonder if the same power were granted to an obedient man, that, having an animal and mortal body, he might have in it a certain state whereby without decay it should be full of years, destined to come, at the time God willed, from mortality to immortality without an intervening death? For just as this very flesh which we now have is not un-woundable merely because it is not necessary that it be wounded, so that flesh was not un-mortal merely because it was not necessary that it die. Such a condition, I think, still in an animal and mortal body, was granted also to those who were translated hence without death. For neither did Enoch and Elijah wither by old age through their long age, nor yet do I believe them already changed into that spiritual quality of body which is promised in the resurrection, which preceded in the Lord: unless perhaps these need not even those foods which restore by their own consumption, but from the time they were translated live so as to have a satiety like those forty days in which Elijah lived without food on a cup of water and a cake of bread; or, if they do need such supports, perhaps they are fed in Paradise as Adam was before he deserved for his sin to depart thence. For he had, as far as I judge, both refreshment against decay from the fruits of the trees, and from the tree of life stability against age.' Thus Augustine.

Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione I.2-3 (to Marcellinus): had Adam not sinned he would not have been stripped of the body but 'over-clothed' with immortality (2 Cor 5:4), passing from animal to spiritual without death; as God kept the Israelites' clothes and shoes from wearing out (Deut 8:4/29:5), so an obedient man's body could be kept ageless until translated without death. Enoch and Elijah did not wither with age; they perhaps need no consuming food, living as Elijah did on the 40-day journey (1 Kings 19:6-8), or are fed in Paradise as Adam was by the tree of life. Marginal notes: 'Had Adam not sinned, he would not be stripped of the body but over-clothed'; '2 Corinthians 5'; a variant reading ('lest perhaps he live here longer'); '1 Kings [3 Regum] 19'; 'It is

one thing to be mortal, another to be subject to the necessity of death.'

QUESTION III. Into what place Enoch was translated.

Third quaestio of the disputation on Enoch.

But someone may ask into what place Enoch was translated, and why God willed to withdraw him from the fellowship and society of men by so singular a plan, and to preserve him alive so many thousands of years in so wonderful a manner. To the former question Chrysostom answers thus, in homily 21 on Genesis: 'If anyone should wish too curiously to ask into what place God translated Enoch, or whether he lives to the present, let him learn not

Marginal gloss: 'What St. Chrysostom wrote about Enoch's translation.' Chrysostom, homily 21 on Genesis. Continues on the next page (catchword 'non').

— p. 840 (PDF) · printed p. 799 —

that it is not fitting for human minds too curiously to search out the things done by God, but to believe the things said by God. For when God pronounces anything, his words are not to be contradicted, but held worthy of faith, since they were pronounced by God, even if they are not seen by our eyes. For truly Scripture said that God translated him, and that he translated him alive, and that he did not experience death, but on account of the favor he had with God was made superior to the divine sentence pronounced against the human race. But into what place he translated him, and how he now fares, it did not add.' Thus Chrysostom.

Chrysostom's answer: it is not fitting for human minds to inquire too curiously into what God does, but to believe what God says. Scripture says God translated Enoch alive and that he did not taste death; but where and how he now lives it did not add.

In the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 44, according to our Latin translation, it is written that Enoch was translated into Paradise. I said 'according to the Latin translation,' because in the Greek there is not, in that place, that phrase 'into Paradise'; but it is thus commonly current, and it is

believed that Enoch and Elijah are in Paradise. Rupert, in book 3 of his Commentaries on Genesis, chapter 33, hands down that Enoch and Elijah were led into a certain secret and most pleasant region of the earth, where they live in great quiet of flesh and spirit, until they return at the end of the world and pay the debts of death. This Rupert took from blessed Gregory. But whether Enoch dwells in the terrestrial Paradise from which Adam was cast out, or not, has been treated by us above in book 3, On Paradise, in the first disputation, which is on the Place and Situation of Paradise, question 5, where it is asked whether Paradise even now exists. And a little below, in treating the seventh question of this disputation, the same will be discussed more fully.

Marginal gloss: 'Where he now dwells.' Ecclesiasticus 44:16 (Latin) has Enoch translated 'into Paradise,' but the Greek lacks 'into Paradise'; it is commonly believed Enoch and Elijah are in Paradise. Rupert (Comm. in Gen. III.33, from Gregory) places them in a secret, most pleasant region of earth, living in quiet until they return at the world's end to pay death's debt. Whether Enoch is in the terrestrial Paradise Pererius treats in his own book 3, De Paradiso, disp. 1, q.5, and more fully in q.7 below.

QUESTION IV. Why God translated Enoch in this way.

Fourth quaestio of the disputation on Enoch.

But why God willed to translate Enoch in this way we can, answering briefly, bring forward three causes. First, that he might give assurance of the immortality promised to Adam and to be granted him, had he not himself violated God's law. For such as Enoch now lives for so many thousands of years, and will live until the last time of the world -- namely with a vigorous body, unimpaired health, full strength, and free from all evil and trouble -- such altogether would Adam have been, had he obeyed God's commands, for all the time he passed on earth. Next, God willed in Enoch to furnish us a certain specimen of that immortality which we shall obtain after the resurrection, when our bodies are recalled to life and raised from earth into the heavenly seats, blessed and immortal. For why should we not believe that God will grant this to the saints, whom we read to

preserve Enoch on earth for so many thousands of years not only from death but also from all trouble and discomfort of body, and perhaps even without any food or drink? To these may also be added this: that Enoch was so translated by God, and is to be preserved in this mortal life until the consummation of the age, because in the last time of the world, as ancient tradition holds and as is believed by the persuasion of the faithful,

Marginal gloss: 'Three causes for which God translated Enoch.' (1) To give assurance of the immortality promised to Adam had he not sinned -- Enoch's ageless, healthy life is what Adam's would have been in obedience; (2) to furnish a specimen of the immortality we shall gain after the resurrection; (3, beginning) because in the last times, by ancient tradition, [Enoch will return as champion against Antichrist]. Continues on the next page (catchword 'creditum').

— p. 841 (PDF) · printed p. 800 —

it is believed, he will be a preacher and champion of the faith of Christ and of Gospel doctrine against the assault and persecution of Antichrist. But this matter has been diligently and accurately disputed by us in book 15 of our Commentaries on Daniel, upon those words of chapter 12 of the book of Daniel, 'In that time Michael shall arise,' etc. To these it is fitting to add certain other causes why God willed thus to translate Enoch, set forth by Chrysostom and Theodoret. Chrysostom, then, writes thus in homily 21 on Genesis: 'Because after Adam's transgression a man was found who ascended to the height of virtues and reversed the first parent's sin, on account of the grace he had with God (behold the excellent mercy of the good God) -- because, I say, he found one who could reverse Adam's sin, showing in very deed that, not willing to bring death upon the human race, he had condemned for the transgression of the command the one who had received the command, he now translates him alive. And it says, Enoch pleased God, and was not found, because God translated him. Do you see the Lord's wisdom? He translated him alive; he did not bestow immortality, that he might nourish the fear of sinning, but kept his own right of death over the human race. For this reason again he wishes, obscurely, so to speak, and secretly, to revoke the sentence he pronounced against Adam;

but he does not do this openly, that fear may preserve amendment: and therefore he translated Enoch, since he pleased him greatly.' And a little after: 'You have seen the Lord's kindness, how he did not defraud the man he found -- who had wrought by virtue -- of the dignity he had bestowed on the first-formed before the transgression of the command, teaching us that him too, had he not by the devil's deception committed a greater fault than the command, he would have deemed worthy of the same or greater honor.' Thus Chrysostom.

Marginal gloss: 'Why Enoch was translated, from St. Chrysostom.' Completion of the third cause: Enoch will be preacher and champion of Christ's faith against Antichrist -- treated fully in Pererius's Commentary on Daniel, book 15, on Dan 12:1 ('In that time Michael shall arise'). Then Chrysostom (hom. 21 on Genesis): because after Adam's fall a man reached the height of virtue and reversed the first parent's sin, God translated him alive -- showing he did not willingly bring death on mankind -- yet did not grant immortality, lest the fear of sinning be weakened; he keeps his right of death but obscurely revokes Adam's sentence in Enoch.

Theodoret, in question 45 on Genesis, having asked both into what place and for what cause God translated Enoch, answers thus: 'The things handed down in silence are not to be inquired into, but the things that are written are to be venerated. For my part I think that the God of all did this to console the athletes of virtue. For since Abel, the first fruit of justice, had been cut off at the root while yet unripe, and no hope of resurrection then consoled men, the God of all translated Enoch himself, most pleasing to him, and separated him from the life of mortals, so that whoever resolves to live piously may consider in how great honor he is to be held: since the God of all, who is just and governs all things justly, has attended Enoch with honor, he will not permit Abel either to lack his adornment. For this cause he beheld the one indeed slain, but translated Enoch, that by this he might indicate the future resurrection. For whoever has not obtained the reward of virtue in this life will certainly attain it in the other life.' Thus Theodoret.

Theodoret, Questions on Genesis 45: what is passed over in silence is not to be inquired into. He holds God translated Enoch to console the athletes of virtue: since Abel, the first fruit of justice, was

cut off young with no hope of resurrection then, God translated his most-beloved Enoch as a sign that virtue is honored and that the reward not received in this life is certainly obtained in the next -- and to indicate by it the future resurrection.

— p. 842 (PDF) · printed p. 801 —

QUESTION V. Whether Enoch, living on earth, now sees the essence of God.

Fifth quaestio of the disputation on Enoch.

But this is not easy to explain, though it seems most beautiful for knowledge: whether Enoch, after he was translated, sees God, enjoying the beatific vision of the divine essence. For although he passes his life in the body and on earth, and will at some time die, this nonetheless does not prevent him from having been able to be endowed with this singular gift and benefit of God -- namely in the manner in which some believe Moses and Paul saw God in rapture, and just as our Lord, while he lived on earth, was according to the higher part of his mind blessed and a comprehensor, but according to the lower part a wayfarer. Gregory Nazianzen, in the second Oration on Theology, leaving this in doubt and uncertainty, says: 'Although Enoch was translated hence, yet it is not established whether he has already comprehended the nature of God, or is still to comprehend it.' Blessed Jerome, in the epistle he wrote to Pammachius against the errors of John of Jerusalem, saying that Enoch enjoys the fellowship of God and feeds on heavenly food, that is on God himself, seems to indicate that he enjoys the beatific sight of God.

Marginal references: Exodus 33; 2 Corinthians 12 (Moses and Paul seeing God in rapture). The question: whether Enoch now enjoys the beatific vision, though still living in the body and destined to die -- as Moses and Paul are believed to have seen God in rapture, and as Christ on earth was 'comprehensor' (blessed) in the higher part of his soul and 'viator' (wayfarer) in the lower. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration on Theology II) leaves it uncertain whether Enoch has yet comprehended God's nature; Jerome (Ep. to Pammachius) seems to imply Enoch enjoys the beatific vision.

This question can indeed be argued and disputed on both sides with fair probability. For that Enoch, after his translation, has seen God, one may

argue in this way: If Enoch does not see God, then he is a wayfarer and in the state of meriting; and since he is most holy and most dear to God, and lives in great quiet of spirit and flesh, and is free, wholly loosed and unencumbered from all those things which can recall or retard a man from acting well, it is fitting to reckon that he loves God with most ardent love and exercises the most perfect and most frequent acts of charity. Since therefore he has now lived so many thousands of years and will live until the consummation of the age, it would plainly follow that his merits would be so multiplied and increased that at the last he would surpass all the Saints -- even, it seems, the Blessed Virgin -- in the multitude and greatness of his merits. But this seems in no way to be granted. For it is certain among the theologians and all the faithful that the most blessed Virgin has by far surpassed, in the excellence of grace and glory, all the Saints and heavenly spirits. Indeed it is quite probable that the great forerunner of Christ, John the Baptist, and the most blessed chiefs of the Apostles, Peter and Paul, were endowed with greater merits than Enoch will be; for as the grace of the New Testament was greater than that of the Old, so it is credible that the Fathers and chiefs of the New Testament were superior in abundance and excellence of grace to the Patriarchs and Prophets and the other Fathers of the Old Testament. If, then, it is absurd that Enoch should be superior in merit and reward to all the Saints -- and this follows from positing Enoch to be in the state of meriting -- this therefore must be denied, and what follows from it must be affirmed without doubt: that Enoch, after he was translated, was, according to the higher part of the soul, blessed and a comprehensor, seeing God's essence by the beatific vision. This opinion Catharinus, in his little book On the Consummate Glory of Christ, very much approves, yet confirms it by no arguments, no authorities, and finally by his own assertion alone. On the contrary, however, that Enoch does not see God's essence is [supported] by many and strong

Marginal glosses: 'The argument that Enoch sees God'; 'That Enoch does not see [God].' The argument for Enoch's vision: if he does not see God, he is still a wayfarer 'in the state of meriting,'

and given his holiness and thousands of years of ardent charity his merits would surpass all the Saints -- even, it seems, the Blessed Virgin. But this cannot be granted: theologians and all the faithful hold the Virgin far surpasses all Saints and angels; likely too John the Baptist, Peter, and Paul exceed Enoch (New Testament grace being greater than Old). So, the wayfarer premise being absurd, Pererius affirms that Enoch after his translation is blessed and a comprehensor in the higher part of the soul, seeing God's essence -- an opinion Catharinus (De consummata gloria Christi) strongly approves but supports by mere assertion. The opposite view (that Enoch does not see God's essence) is then introduced. Continues on the next page (catchword 'validis').

— p. 843 (PDF) · printed p. 802 —

can be proved by strong arguments. First, it was wisely said by Saint Thomas, in the third part, question 1, article 3: Of things that are above nature, and cannot be brought about without a great miracle of the divine omnipotence, nothing is to be affirmed except what has become known to us by divine revelation -- namely, either because it is handed down in divine Scripture, or can be easily gathered from it, or is established by a certain tradition of the Church, or rests on the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians; but none of these is available to prove that Enoch sees God's essence; therefore it cannot be affirmed without rashness. Rather, divine Scripture seems to contradict that opinion in many places. For in John, chapter 1 of the Gospel, and 1 [John], chapter 4, it is written, No one has ever seen God; and our Lord in John chapter 6 said, Not that anyone has seen the Father, except him who is from God, he has seen the Father; and Paul, in his first Epistle to Timothy, last chapter, speaking of God, says, Whom no man has seen, nor can see. And in chapter 33 of Exodus it is related that, to Moses asking God to show him his face, he answered, You cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live. Nor indeed is it credible that Enoch is in a better condition and a happier state of life than Adam was in the terrestrial Paradise before sin, and would have been had he not sinned: but Adam in that state neither saw nor would have seen God's essence; therefore neither does Enoch see it.

Marginal gloss: 'That Enoch does not see God's essence is proved by many reasons.' The contra case: Aquinas (Summa III q.1 a.3) -- of things above nature nothing is to be affirmed but what divine revelation makes known; none of these supports Enoch's seeing God's essence. Scripture opposes it:

John 1:18 / 1 John 4:12; John 6:46; 1 Tim 6:16; Exod 33:20. Nor is Enoch better off than sinless Adam, who did not and would not have seen God's essence in the earthly Paradise.

That Moses and Paul saw God for a brief time Scripture seems to hint. For it is written in chapter 33 of Exodus that Moses was accustomed to speak with God face to face, as a man speaks with his friend; and in the book of Numbers chapter 12 it is said that God was accustomed to appear and speak to Moses, not through riddles and figures, but openly and mouth to mouth. Paul too, in 2 Corinthians chapter 12, affirms that he was caught up to the third heaven and heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Wherefore Basil (homily 1 on the Hexaemeron), Ambrose (Hexaemeron book 1, chapter 2), Augustine likewise (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 12, chapter 27, and Epistle 112, chapter 12), and also Saint Thomas (part 1, question 12, article 11, and 2-2, question 174, article 4, and question 175, article 3) seem to have judged that Moses saw God.

Marginal gloss: 'Authors who said Moses saw God.' Scripture seems to hint Moses and Paul saw God briefly: Exod 33:11 (face to face); Num 12:8 (openly, not in riddles); 2 Cor 12:2-4 (Paul caught to the third heaven). Authorities that Moses saw God: Basil (Hexaemeron hom. 1), Ambrose (Hexaemeron I.2), Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram XII.27; Ep. 112.12), Aquinas (ST I q.12 a.11; II-II q.174 a.4, q.175 a.3).

Nevertheless most theologians and Fathers have constantly denied that God was seen according to his essence either by Moses or by Paul. Chief among these is to be reckoned Dionysius the Areopagite, in his book On the Celestial Hierarchy chapter 4, and in his book On Mystical Theology chapter 1, whom Gregory Nazianzen followed (in Oration 6, on Theology), Jerome (on chapter 6 of Isaiah), Cyril (book 1 of his Commentaries on John), Gregory (book 18 of the Morals, chapter 6); indeed Augustine himself, in Tractate 2 on the Gospel of John, explaining those words, No one has ever seen God, affirms in the plainest words that God was not seen by Moses, and argues it from the very words of Scripture. Blessed Thomas too (1-2, question 98, article 3) says that Moses is said to have seen God

and to have spoken with him face to face according to the opinion of the common people and of the Hebrew nation, which thought thus of him; or that by that manner of speaking is signified the most excellent knowledge and contempla-

Marginal gloss: 'Authors who said Moses did not see God.' On the other side, most theologians and Fathers deny Moses or Paul saw God's essence: Dionysius the Areopagite (De caelesti hierarchia 4; De mystica theologia 1) -- their chief -- followed by Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome (on Isa 6), Cyril, Gregory (Moralia XVIII.6); even Augustine (Tractate 2 on John, on 'No one has ever seen God') plainly denies Moses saw God. Aquinas (ST I-II q.98 a.3) reads the 'face to face' either per the common Hebrew opinion or as the most excellent knowledge and contemplation. Continues on the next page (catchword 'templa-').

— p. 844 (PDF) · printed p. 803 —

tion of God, such as can be granted to a man living on earth below the clear vision of the divine essence. If, then, most theologians and Fathers deny that God was seen by Moses and Paul -- which Scripture nonetheless seems to hint, and which was held and handed down by great Doctors -- how much less may it be held of Enoch, of whom divine Scripture nowhere signifies any such thing, nor has it been handed down by any of the Fathers?

The vision that could be granted to a man living on earth is below the clear vision of the divine essence. If most theologians and Fathers deny even Moses and Paul saw God's essence (though Scripture hints it and great Doctors held it), far less may it be held of Enoch, of whom Scripture says nothing and no Father hands it down.

Add that to be at once a comprehensor and a wayfarer on earth seems to have been proper to Christ our Lord, and therefore rightly granted to him, because he alone of all men was at once man and God, and the head of all the elect and of the whole Church both militant and triumphant, and finally because he was to be the author of grace and glory to all men. To this looks that saying of the same Lord recorded in chapter 3 of John's Gospel: No one has ascended into heaven except him who descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven. Finally, this avails very much to confirm this

view: that both sacred Scripture signifies and the Fathers most emphatically hand down that our Lord Jesus Christ opened to men the entrance into Heaven, closed to all before him, and led men into the sight and glory of God the Father; which would not be true if Enoch had seen God through so many thousands of years before Christ. For it does not matter, as to the truth or perfection of the vision of God, whether God be seen by a man or by an angel, in the Heavens or on earth: for the holy angels see God no less perfectly and blessedly when they are on earth than when they are in the Heavens; nor did our Lord, while he was on earth, see God less perfectly than afterward when he ascended into the Heavens. And this view, on account of the aforesaid reasons, ought to be held far the more probable.

Marginal glosses: 'God is seen equally perfectly by the blessed on earth as in heaven'; 'The more probable view.' To be at once comprehensor and viator on earth was proper to Christ alone, since he alone was at once man and God, head of the whole Church (cf. John 3:13). Christ opened heaven, closed to all before him -- which would be false if Enoch had seen God for millennia before Christ. (Vision-perfection does not depend on place: angels see God as perfectly on earth as in heaven; even the Lord on earth saw God no less perfectly than after his ascension.) This view is far the more probable.

But to that which was above objected against this view -- that if Enoch, after his translation, were not blessed and a comprehensor according to the higher part, but had remained in the state of a wayfarer and of meriting, it would come about that at the last he would surpass all the Saints in the multitude of his merits -- it can be answered in two ways. For let that be said which has pleased certain men of famous name in Theology: that human merit before God grows not only by the intention and frequency of the meritorious act, but also by the greater holiness of the person acting and by the more abundant and more excellent grace given to him by God -- just as the theologians say that the grace of Christ's union infinitely increased the dignity and the force of his merits. Since therefore so great a grace and holiness was granted by God to the Blessed Virgin as no pure creature ever has or ever will have, hence it comes about that no man, however much he

multiplies meritorious acts, will equal the grace of the Blessed Virgin and her merits. God therefore knew how great Enoch's future merits would be, and because he willed to exalt his mother above all, as was fitting, he intensively poured into her so great a grace, and most frequently, while she lived on earth, [moved her] to acts so perfectly meri-

Marginal glosses: 'Whether Enoch, living until judgment day, will surpass all the Saints in the multitude of his merits'; 'Why no one can ever approach the merits of the Blessed Virgin.' First reply to the objection: merit grows not only by intention and frequency of acts but by the greater holiness of the person and more abundant grace (as Christ's grace of union infinitely raised the worth of his merits). Since the Virgin received grace beyond any pure creature, no man can equal her merits; God, foreknowing Enoch's merits and willing to exalt his mother above all, infused into her such grace that her merits far exceed all Enoch's. Continues on the next page (catchword 'ritorio').

— p. 845 (PDF) · printed p. 804 —

torious, that the merits of the most blessed Virgin were far greater and more excellent than all Enoch's merits will ever be. Let this besides be answered: that Enoch was in the state of meriting only until his translation; but after that time, until the last time of the world when he will again appear to men and bear witness against Antichrist to the truth of Christ's doctrine, he has merited nothing nor will he merit. For God willed that that translation should be for him what death is for other men -- namely the terminus of meriting well or ill. Yet Enoch merited greatly at the time of his translation, by approving and embracing with a most ready and joyful mind so long a deferral of his glorification (since he understood it to pertain to God's great glory and the benefit of the Church). He will also merit greatly at the last time of the world, by testifying, preaching, and defending the faith of Christ against Antichrist, and (as is believed) undergoing death for it; but in the intermediate time he is without merit. And although he lives in the greatest quiet and delight of body and soul, yet he does not see God, but enjoys the greatest goods and joys in both body and soul. And so we must think of Enoch, not yet dead, what many and very grave Fathers thought (though not truly) of just men who had died: affirming that their souls, gone out of their bodies, possess the fullest and

most delightful goods, yet do not see the face of God before the day of judgment.

Marginal glosses: 'Enoch has merited nothing after his translation'; 'At the world's end he will merit greatly.' Second reply: Enoch was in the state of meriting only until his translation, which for him is what death is for others. He merited greatly in accepting the long deferral of his glory with joyful will, and will merit greatly at the end by preaching against Antichrist and (as believed) dying for the faith; but in between he is without merit. Living in great quiet and delight, he yet does not see God -- as many grave Fathers thought (wrongly) of the just dead: their souls enjoy the fullest goods but do not see God's face before judgment day.

And to this opinion Moses too seems to lend credit in this place, saying that all the years of Enoch were three hundred sixty-five -- recording only his time before the translation, and passing over in silence what followed, as though he ought to be reckoned as a dead man. That is, Enoch is set outside the state of meriting, not only as regards the knowledge of men (to whom his dwelling, manner of life, and mode of seeing are utterly unknown), but also as regards the 'way' (as a wayfarer). If neither of these answers pleases learned men, let them themselves think and devise something by which this knot may be better untied. For at present nothing more probable than what I have said comes into my mind, and I stand firm in by no means assenting to those who say that Enoch sees God's essence.

Pererius's resolution: Moses supports this by giving only Enoch's 365 years before his translation and passing over the rest in silence, as if he must be reckoned a dead man; thus Enoch is set outside the state of meriting both as to men's knowledge and as to the 'way.' If neither reply satisfies the learned, let them devise a better solution; for the present nothing more probable occurs to him, and he stands firm in not assenting to those who say Enoch sees God's essence.

But someone may ask to what end God preserves Enoch alive on earth by so great a miracle for so many thousands of years. For if he is preserved by God so that he -- who lived nearly at the beginning of the world (for he passed nearly three hundred years with Adam the first man) -- may at the end of the world, and in the persecution of Antichrist, be a great help and comfort to the sorely-laboring Church, by his testimony and preaching most stoutly championing and defending the faith of Christ and the Gospel

doctrine against the fury and rage of Antichrist: it would seem to have been more fitting that, at that time when there shall be need, he be recalled by God from the dead to life, as many rose from the dead to bear witness to the resurrection of Christ; for the accomplishing of this, therefore, there seems no need

Marginal gloss: 'Whether it would have been better for him to die and afterward rise than to be kept alive so long.' A new sub-question: why does God keep Enoch alive by so great a miracle? If it is to aid the Church against Antichrist at the world's end, it would seem more fitting to recall him from the dead when needed -- as many rose to testify to Christ's resurrection -- so there seems no need [of so great a miracle]. Continues on the next page (catchword 'opus').

— p. 846 (PDF) · printed p. 805 —

of so great a miracle. But surely, if one attends, he will easily understand that it would have been less fitting to thrust Enoch -- now blessed in the heavens and enjoying God -- back again into a mortal and passible body, and to subject him to the most bitter torments and to a death inflicted through the utmost cruelty of Antichrist.

Resolution of the sub-question: yet, rightly considered, it would have been less fitting to thrust Enoch -- were he already blessed in heaven and enjoying God -- back into a mortal, passible body and subject him to the bitterest torments and to death by Antichrist's utmost cruelty; hence God keeps him alive rather than raising him from the dead.

QUESTION VI. Whether Enoch wrote any book, and whence [Jude] drew the prophecy of his which Jude cites.

Sixth quaestio of the disputation on Enoch: on the writings ascribed to Enoch and the Enoch prophecy cited in Jude 14-15.

In the sixth place, concerning the writings of Enoch, this must be disputed: whether Enoch wrote any book. For if he left anything written, we must without doubt confess him to be the most ancient and the first of all writers whosoever were after the founding of the world. The occasion for disputing on this matter was given to learned men by Saint Jude the Apostle in his canonical epistle, when he mentions a certain prophecy of Enoch which

Enoch is believed to have committed to writing and transmitted to posterity. It is asked, then, whence Jude knew and brought forth that prophecy of Enoch: from some book of his that was extant in Jude's time, whether canonical or apocryphal? From tradition alone? Or did Jude publish to the Church and confirm by his own authority that oracle, unknown to the rest of mortals and disclosed to himself alone by a revelation of God?

If Enoch left any writing, he must be the most ancient of all writers. The occasion is Jude (Jude 14-15), who in his canonical epistle cites a prophecy of Enoch believed transmitted in writing. The question: whence did Jude know it -- from some book extant in his day (canonical or apocryphal), from tradition alone, or by revelation to Jude alone?

It is the common opinion that the prophecy which Jude cites was drawn from a certain apocryphal book entitled with the name of Enoch, which of old existed and was in circulation. But what apocryphal Scripture is, Augustine declares in these words, in chapter 23 of book 15 of the City of God: 'Let us pass over the fables of those Scriptures which are called apocryphal, because their hidden origin was not clear to the Fathers, from whom the authority of the truthful Scriptures came down to us by a most certain and well-known succession. In these apocrypha, although some truth is found, yet on account of many false things there is no canonical authority.' Thus Augustine. Now that apocryphal Book of Enoch is often cited by Origen and Procopius of Gaza. Origen indeed, in his last homily on the book of Numbers, attests that Enoch left to posterity certain prophetic writings, from which Jude the Apostle drew that testimony about the last judgment. In those writings were contained many things, partly true and partly fabulous -- such as about the names and hidden powers of the stars, about the giants procreated from the mingling of Angels with women, and finally about the last judgment. Origen is to be read in homily 28 on Numbers and in tome 6 of the Commentaries on the Gospel of John. There was once in circulation a very ancient volume, as it seemed, whose title was The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, often cited by Origen and Procopius, into which many oracles were inserted from the Book of Enoch

-- for instance,

Marginal glosses: 'The common opinion'; 'What apocryphal Scripture is, according to Augustine'; 'Origen and Procopius often cite the Book of Enoch'; 'The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs.' The common view: Jude's prophecy came from an apocryphal book titled 'Enoch' once in circulation. Augustine (City of God XV.23) defines apocryphal Scripture: writings whose hidden origin was unknown to the Fathers, containing some truth but, because of much falsehood, no canonical authority. Origen (last homily on Numbers; hom. 28 on Numbers; tome 6 on John) and Procopius often cite the Book of Enoch, containing things partly true, partly fabulous -- the names and hidden powers of the stars, the giants born from angels mingling with women, and the last judgment. A very ancient volume, the 'Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs,' drew many prophecies from the Book of Enoch. Continues on the next page (catchword 'verbi').

— p. 847 (PDF) · printed p. 806 —

for instance, of the things that would befall the sons and grandsons of the Patriarchs, of the world's Savior to be slain by the Hebrews, of the future perpetual captivity of the Hebrews and their dispersion among all nations. Saint Jerome, in his book On Ecclesiastical Writers, where he writes about Jude, relates that Jude's epistle was for that reason not received of old by many, because in it is cited a testimony of Enoch drawn from apocryphal books. The same author, on chapter 1 of the Epistle to Titus, says that Jude, in citing Enoch's testimony from an apocryphal book, did not approve the whole book, but only that testimony which he had ascertained to be true. Therefore, not because that book was apocryphal were all the things in it to be judged apocryphal; nor, because the testimony cited by Jude was true, did it follow that the whole book was true. For a book is not called apocryphal because everything in it is apocryphal, but because many things in it are of that kind. Bede writes things similar to Jerome upon that passage of Jude. Dionysius the Carthusian, on that very passage, says that Jude cited not the book of Enoch but the prophecy of Enoch, which, although it was contained in that book, he nonetheless (God revealing it to him) knew to have been uttered by Enoch by a prophetic spirit -- just as Moses relates many sayings of Adam, Cain, Lamech, and others, which it had been divinely disclosed to him had been uttered by them.

Marginal refs: 'Blessed Jerome, vol. 1'; 'vol. 9'; 'Bede, vol. 5, on Genesis 2, 3 & 4.' (Continuing the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs:) it foretold things to befall the Patriarchs' descendants, the Savior slain by the Hebrews, and their perpetual captivity and dispersion. Jerome (De viris illustribus, on Jude) reports that Jude's epistle was for a time not received because it cites Enoch from apocryphal books; on Titus 1 he says Jude approved not the whole apocryphal book but only the true testimony. A book is called apocryphal not because all in it is false but because much is; hence a true cited testimony does not make the whole book true. Bede writes similarly; Dionysius the Carthusian holds Jude cited not the book but the prophecy of Enoch, which Jude knew by revelation to be genuinely Enoch's (as Moses knew divinely the sayings of Adam, Cain, and Lamech he records).

Tertullian, in his book On the Attire of Women, meeting those who denied that that book of Enoch (if it had been written by Enoch before the flood) could have come down safe to posterity after the flood, shows that this is not incredible. For either Noah preserved it in the ark, or, it having been destroyed by the flood, Enoch, afterward illumined by the Holy Spirit, restored it -- just as the Sacred volumes, which had perished in the Chaldean overthrow and burning of Jerusalem, were afterward restored through Ezra. Tertullian judges, moreover, that the authority of that book of Enoch is not to be cast off. I shall set down here the words of Tertullian, which run thus: 'I know that the Scripture of Enoch, which assigned this rank to the Angels, is not received by some, because it is not admitted into the Jewish cupboard [canon]. I suppose they did not think that it, published before the cataclysm, could have survived safe after that catastrophe which destroyed all things of the world. If that is the reason, let them remember that Noah, Enoch's great-grandson, survived the cataclysm; and surely by household name and by hereditary tradition he had heard, and remembered, of his forefather's grace with God and of all his preachings -- since Enoch charged his son Methuselah with nothing else than that he should hand on the knowledge of these things to his posterity. Therefore without doubt Noah could have succeeded to the delegation of the preaching; or, because he would not otherwise have kept silence, both about the disposition of God his preserver and about the glory of his own house. If it were not so readily held, this too would defend the assertion of that Scripture: accordingly it could, when destroyed by the violence of the cataclysm, be

reformed again in the spirit -- just as, when at Jerusalem all the records of Jewish literature had been destroyed in the Babylonian conquest, it is agreed they were restored by Ezra. But since Enoch, in that same Scripture, preached also concerning the Lord, nothing at all that pertains to us is to be rejected by us. And we read that all Scrip-

Marginal gloss: 'Tertullian's words about the book of Enoch.' Tertullian (De cultu feminarum I.3) defends the book's survival: either Noah preserved it in the ark, or, destroyed by the flood, Enoch restored it by the Holy Spirit -- as Ezra restored the Scriptures lost in the Chaldean burning of Jerusalem. His quoted words: the Scripture of Enoch is rejected by some as not in the 'Jewish cupboard' (canon); but Noah, Enoch's great-grandson, could have preserved and handed on the preaching (Enoch charged Methuselah to transmit it), or Enoch could have restored it 'in spirit' after the flood, as Ezra restored the Jewish records. Since Enoch there prophesied also of the Lord, nothing pertaining to us is to be rejected. Continues on the next page (catchword 'pturam').

— p. 848 (PDF) · printed p. 807 —

ture apt for edification is divinely inspired. It is now seen to be rejected by the Jews for that reason, like nearly everything else that sounds of Christ. Nor indeed is this to be wondered at, if they did not receive certain Scriptures that spoke of him whom, even speaking in person, they were not going to receive. To this is added that Enoch possesses a testimony with Jude the Apostle.' Thus Tertullian. Saint Augustine affirms that Enoch wrote some things concerning divine matters, and gives a sufficiently probable reason why his writings were not entered into the canon of the Sacred Scriptures. For he writes thus in book 15 of the City of God, chapter 23: 'That Enoch, that seventh from Adam, wrote some divine things we could not deny, since Jude the Apostle says this in his canonical epistle. But not without reason are they absent from that canon of Scriptures which was kept in the temple of the Hebrew people by the diligence of the succeeding priests. And why this? except that on account of their antiquity they were judged suspect as to trustworthiness, nor could it be found whether these were the things he had written, since they were not brought forth by such persons as would be found to have duly preserved them by a succession. Whence those things which are brought forth under his name,

and which contain those fables about the giants (that they did not have men for fathers), are rightly judged by the prudent not to be believed his. Just as many things are brought forth by heretics under the names of other prophets also, and more recent ones under the names of the Apostles: all of which, under the name of apocrypha, have been removed from canonical authority by diligent examination.' Thus Augustine.

Marginal gloss: 'Augustine gives the reason why the book written by Enoch is not reckoned among the canonical books.' Tertullian concludes (2 Tim 3:16, 'all Scripture apt for edification is divinely inspired'); the Jews reject it as they reject nearly all that speaks of Christ; and Enoch's testimony stands with Jude. Then Augustine (City of God XV.23): Enoch, seventh from Adam, wrote divine things (as Jude says), but they are rightly absent from the canon because their great antiquity made them suspect and no sure succession preserved them; the writings under his name (with the fables of the giants) are not to be believed his -- like the many pseudonymous prophetic and apostolic books heretics circulate, all removed from canonical authority as apocrypha.

The same author has a similar view in book 18 of the same work, chapter 38, writing in this manner: 'What of Enoch, seventh from Adam? Is he not, even in the canonical epistle of the Apostle Jude, declared to have prophesied? whose writings, that they should not have authority among the Jews and among us, their too-great antiquity brought about, on account of which they seemed to be held suspect, lest falsehoods be brought forth for truths. For there are also brought forth certain things which are said to be theirs by those who, according to their own fancy, believe here and there whatever they wish: but the purity of the canon has not received them. Not that the authority of those men who pleased God is rejected, but that these things are not believed to be theirs. Nor should it seem strange that things brought forth under the name of so great an antiquity are held suspect,' and so on. Thus far are the words of Augustine.

Augustine, City of God XVIII.38: Enoch, seventh from Adam, is said in Jude's canonical epistle to have prophesied; but his writings lacked authority among Jews and Christians because their too-great antiquity made them suspect (lest falsehoods pass for truth). The 'purity of the canon' did not receive them -- not that the authority of these God-pleasing men is rejected, but that the writings are not believed genuinely theirs.

Michael Medina, in book 6 On Right Faith in God, chapter 24, is of the opinion that that prophecy of Enoch cited by Jude was not set forth in any book or committed to writing, but was kept by tradition alone among the Jews, and, as it were, handed down by hand from the elders to posterity. For that neither in the time of Bede nor of Augustine, nor even before or after, was there any book of Enoch, even apocryphal, he thinks a great argument to be that Pope Gelasius, who in distinction 15 (which begins, 'The Holy Roman Church') subtly and diligently reviewed and rejected all the apocryphal books, made no mention of a book of Enoch. But the most ancient and most weighty Fathers contradict Medina -- Jerome, Augustine, Origen, Tertullian, Bede, and very many others -- by whom the book of Enoch, as being at that time in circulation, is not only named but even cited; nor is it necessary to believe that all the apocryphal books which existed at that time were either known to Gelasius, or by him removed in that cen-

Marginal gloss: 'Michael Medina is refuted.' Michael Medina (De recta in Deum fide VI.24) held the Enoch prophecy Jude cites was never in any book but preserved by oral tradition among the Jews; his chief argument: Pope Gelasius (Decretum, dist. 15, 'Sancta Romana Ecclesia') carefully reviewed and rejected all apocryphal books yet said nothing of a Book of Enoch. But the most ancient Fathers -- Jerome, Augustine, Origen, Tertullian, Bede, and many others -- not only name but cite the Book of Enoch as then in circulation; nor need all the apocrypha of that time have been known to or listed by Gelasius. Continues on the next page (catchword 'sura').

— p. 849 (PDF) · printed p. 808 —

-sure comprehended. There are not lacking those who think that the book of Enoch was, in the time of the Apostle Jude, whole and uncorrupted, but that afterward, spattered and contaminated with many fables and errors, it was rejected by the Church as apocryphal; since indeed it is agreed that a similar calamity befell even the canons and constitutions of the Apostles, and the other books mentioned in the aforesaid place by Gelasius. But let me set forth briefly what I myself think. I for my part judge that in the time of the Apostle Jude there was no book of Enoch. For if there had been, it would doubtless have been very noble and celebrated among the Jews, both

on account of the author's antiquity and fame, and because in that book very memorable and admirable matters would be contained: wherefore we should find some mention of that book in Philo or Josephus, most diligent and most curious writers of Jewish Antiquities. But it seems to me most like the truth that, the Apostles being now dead, heretics circulated various books under their names (partly fashioned about true matters, partly about false and fabulous ones); and, seizing occasion from the history of Michael contending with the devil, and from the prophecy of Enoch mentioned by Jude the Apostle, published books about matters of this kind as though anciently written.

Marginal gloss: 'The author's opinion: that a Book of Enoch did not exist in the Apostles' times.' Some think the Book of Enoch was whole in Jude's day but later corrupted with fables and rejected as apocryphal (as befell even the apostolic canons Gelasius lists). Pererius's own view: there was no Book of Enoch in Jude's time -- else it would be famous among the Jews and mentioned by Philo or Josephus. Rather, after the Apostles died, heretics circulated books under ancient names, taking occasion from the story of Michael disputing with the devil (Jude 9) and the Enoch prophecy Jude cites.

Nor am I easily led to believe that the Apostle Jude wished to derive that prophecy of Enoch from some apocryphal book, or even a non-apocryphal one that was nonetheless not canonical: for it would have no more credit than the book from which it was taken. But since Jude simply calls it the prophecy of Enoch, it was without doubt most certain to Jude both that it was a prophecy and that its author was Enoch -- which he could not know for certain otherwise than by divine revelation. And to those to whom Jude wrote that epistle, that prophecy could have been known either from some book of approved trustworthiness among them, or from ancient and widespread tradition, or from the narration of Jude the Apostle alone, on account of whose authority they would in no way have doubted the truth of that prophecy.

Pererius doubts Jude drew the prophecy from any non-canonical book (it would then have no more authority than its source). Since Jude simply calls it 'the prophecy of Enoch,' Jude was certain both that it was a prophecy and that Enoch was its author -- knowable only by divine revelation. His

readers could have known it from a book of approved authority among them, from ancient tradition, or from Jude's own narration, whose authority removed all doubt.

QUESTION VII. Whether Enoch is in the terrestrial Paradise from which Adam was cast out.

Seventh quaestio of the disputation on Enoch. Marginal gloss: 'Whether Paradise perished in the flood.'

But this seems the most probable view: that Enoch is not in that Paradise, because that Paradise, destroyed by the flood, does not now exist. Now this opinion can be built up and confirmed by many arguments; but, omitting the others which we treated at length above in book 3, which is On Paradise, it is fitting here to press more forcibly this one argument alone, drawn from sacred Scripture. In chapter 7 of the book of Genesis it is written that in Noah's flood the whole earth was covered with waters and laid waste, so that the waters [covered] all the mountains of the earth

Marginal gloss: 'Whether Paradise perished in the flood.' Pererius's view: Enoch is not in that Paradise, because Paradise, destroyed by the flood, no longer exists. Omitting the arguments given at length in his own book 3 (De Paradiso), he presses one from Scripture: Genesis 7 says the whole earth was covered and laid waste by Noah's flood, the waters covering all the mountains. Continues on the next page (catchword 'terrae').

— p. 850 (PDF) · printed p. 809 —

surpassed, and even exceeded by fifteen cubits the highest mountains of the whole earth. The words of Scripture are these: The waters flooded violently, and filled all things on the surface of the earth, and prevailed exceedingly over the earth, and all the high mountains under the whole heaven were covered. The water was fifteen cubits higher than the mountains it had covered; so it stands in chapter 7 of Genesis. From which words of Scripture it is plain that that flood was most universal over the whole earth, and that thereby the whole earth was laid waste and (to use Scripture's word) 'deleted.' But the terrestrial Paradise was in this our world and a part of our earth; therefore it was laid waste and destroyed by that

flood; wherefore those who deny this and contend that it was untouched by the flood and still exists seem to contradict so evident an authority of Scripture.

Marginal gloss: 'The passage of Genesis 7 examined.' The argument: Genesis 7:19-20 -- the waters prevailed, covering all high mountains under heaven, 15 cubits above them; so the flood was wholly universal and 'deleted' the whole earth. But the terrestrial Paradise was part of this earth; therefore it too was destroyed. To deny this and hold Paradise untouched and still existing contradicts evident Scripture.

To this argument it can be answered in three ways, which ways we wish here to discuss. First, it can be answered that that general statement of Scripture is to be understood of all lands, with only one excepted, namely the land of Paradise. Just as the same Scripture, in the same place and elsewhere, says that all men were destroyed by the flood except the eight who were saved in the ark: from which general statement, however, we must except Enoch himself, who lived before the flood and is believed still to live, and yet was not in the ark, but it is likely that he was in Paradise, which the waters of the flood by no means reached. But this answer is refuted in three ways. First: to diminish and restrict that general statement of Scripture about the flood by an exception which cannot be gathered from any place of Scripture, and which is adduced without any necessary reason, is not only not lawful but even very dangerous: for in this way the faith and truth of all the general propositions and statements of divine Scripture would be rendered doubtful and weak, since they would be liable to various exceptions at anyone's whim. For as these except the land of Paradise from that general statement about the flood, so another might except the Islands, saying that Scripture's statement is to be understood of the whole continental earth, but not of the islands; and another might say it is to be understood not of all the earth simply, but of all the earth which before the flood was inhabited by men; and thus it would be made out that that flood was not general over the whole earth -- which is against the doctrine of Scripture and of all the Fathers.

Marginal gloss: 'Three replies to the aforesaid Scripture authority are refuted. 1 Peter 3; Genesis 5.' Three responses can be made. First response: the general statement means all lands except only Paradise -- as Scripture says all men died except the eight in the ark, yet Enoch (alive, not in the ark) must be excepted, being likely in the untouched Paradise. First refutation: to restrict a general statement of Scripture by an exception drawn from no Scripture passage and adduced without necessary reason is dangerous -- it would make every general statement doubtful; for so one might likewise except islands, or restrict the flood to inhabited lands, making it not universal, against Scripture and all the Fathers.

If anyone should answer that that exception about Paradise is gathered from Scripture itself, namely from chapter 44 of Ecclesiasticus, where it is handed down that Enoch was translated into Paradise: we say that this answer is very weak, as we shall show a little below. Nor does the example of Enoch avail: for that he is to be excepted from the general destruction of men brought about by the flood is evidently gathered from Scripture itself, which indicates that he was not dead but was translated and is kept alive, as is plain from Genesis 5 and elsewhere; but nowhere does Scripture indicate that Paradise was not destroyed by the flood and still exists: wherefore the reason for excepting Enoch from the flood is not similar to that for excepting Paradise itself. Add that Enoch was translated seven hundred years before the flood, and did not afterward ap-

Marginal ref: Wisdom 14. If one answers that the Paradise-exception is drawn from Ecclesiasticus 44 (Enoch 'translated into Paradise'), Pererius calls this very weak (to be shown below). The example of Enoch does not help: that he is excepted from the flood is plain from Scripture (he was translated and kept alive, Gen 5), but Scripture nowhere says Paradise was undestroyed and still exists; so the two exceptions are not parallel. Moreover Enoch was translated 700 years before the flood and did not afterward appear. Continues on the next page (catchword 'appa-').

— p. 851 (PDF) · printed p. 810 —

appeared on earth: whence he stood, as regards his dwelling and manner of life, just as if he were not on earth; wherefore Scripture says he was translated and taken away from the earth, and Augustine says he is in another life than this of ours. Whence it comes about that, when Scripture says all the men who were on the earth perished in the flood, it understands of men whose dwelling and manner of life on earth is known, and who live

on earth in the human and ordinary way and manner: for which reason there was no need to except Enoch, who was not living so, nor was on earth [in that sense].

Marginal gloss: 'Augustine.' Completing the first refutation: Enoch did not afterward appear on earth, so as to dwelling and way of life it is as if he were not on earth (Scripture says he was translated and taken away, and Augustine says he is in another life than ours). Hence when Scripture says all men on earth perished in the flood, it means those whose earthly life is known and ordinary -- so Enoch needed no explicit exception, unlike the fabricated Paradise-exception.

Let a second argument against this first answer be this: If Paradise was utterly untouched by the flood, then in that place Noah could have been preserved with the animals; it was therefore superfluous, over so long a time and with such labor, to build so laborious an ark to preserve them. Nor can it be said that that ark was built not for the sake of necessity, but to signify some mystery (which mystery Saint Peter indicates in the first Epistle, chapter three): for Scripture, in Genesis 6 and 7, shows in plain words that those men and the animals entered the ark that they might live, lest they perish in the flood, as though there were no other escape from that destruction, nor could they be saved by any other means. Let a third argument against the same answer be this: The waters of the flood, according to Scripture, exceeded the highest mountains of the earth by fifteen cubits; therefore it was necessary that the whole surface of the earth be covered and overwhelmed by them -- unless we are willing to believe that Paradise was of such height that it overtopped the highest region of the air, or even touched heaven, which is nonetheless utterly incredible and absurd, and was refuted by us above in the third book. For such a loftiness of Paradise could have had no pleasantness, nor healthfulness, nor a habitation convenient for man.

Second argument: if Paradise were wholly untouched, Noah and the animals could have been saved there, making the laborious ark superfluous -- yet Scripture (Gen 6-7; cf. 1 Pet 3) shows they entered the ark as the only escape from the flood. Third argument: the flood rose 15 cubits above the highest mountains, so the whole earth's surface was covered -- unless Paradise were so high as to overtop the air or reach heaven, which is absurd (refuted in Pererius's book 3); such height would give it no

pleasantness, health, or fit habitation.

But if it be said that the waters of the flood were miraculously prohibited by God from touching Paradise, and stood immovable beside it (as happened in the Red Sea and in the Jordan), not for a short time as there, but for nearly a whole year, that is, as long as the flood lasted: this not only does not help that opinion, but renders it very improbable, inasmuch as they cannot defend it except by miracles fashioned at their own whim. But to have recourse without cause to miracles, and to the omnipotence of God, is reprehended by the Fathers and theologians, and especially by Augustine, both elsewhere and chiefly in the books On Genesis according to the Letter, in more than one place. In another way one could answer the aforesaid authority of Scripture, which says the whole earth was covered by the waters of the flood, by conceding, namely, that the land of Paradise too was flooded and covered by the deluge, yet denying that on that account Paradise was destroyed and deleted, but [affirming] that it remained whole under the waters -- as concerning that olive whose green branch the dove brought to Noah (which is believed to have lasted under the waters the whole time of the flood not only whole but even green). But of those who would so answer, I would ask whether they think this was done miraculously

Marginal refs: Exod 14 (Red Sea); Josh 3 (Jordan); 'To resort to miracles and God's omnipotence without necessity is reprehended by the Fathers'; Gen 8. If one claims the flood waters were miraculously kept from Paradise, standing beside it for nearly a year (as at the Red Sea and Jordan), that only makes the view more improbable, defended only by invented miracles -- and needless appeal to miracle is reproved by the Fathers, especially Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram). Second response: concede Paradise was flooded but deny it was destroyed -- it remained whole under the waters, like the olive whose green branch the dove brought to Noah (Gen 8). Continues on the next page (catchword 'factum').

— p. 852 (PDF) · printed p. 811 —

was done, or without a miracle? If they should say miraculously, they would sufficiently betray the improbability of their opinion, since indeed they could not defend it except by fictitious miracles. If they should say it

was done without a miracle, surely it would be no less incredible than the things we refuted a little above: for who would believe (except one who can believe anything, however incredible) that the most delicate, most adorned place of Paradise, laid out and perfected with the utmost elegance and most polished art, overwhelmed and oppressed on every side by the deepest waters for nearly a whole year, could have lasted without detriment to its beauty, grace, magnificence, and loveliness? -- when in so long a time even the firmest and largest building, submerged in the waters, could not endure without its beauty and elegance gradually falling away and perishing, the joining of its parts dissolving, its integrity being corrupted, and finally its firmness being weakened and shaken. For how, under such waters for so long a time, could Paradise preserve that loveliness and beauty of the place, the dimensions of its paths, the ranks of the trees, the most beautiful arrangement of places and of plants, the variety of so many herbs and trees, and finally the goodness and fertility of the soil? -- since it has been handed down by the Fathers and Doctors that the earth was made, on account of the flood, more sterile and worse than it had been before, and for that cause God, immediately after the flood, granted to man the eating of flesh, and then the life of men began to be diminished to a great degree.

Marginal gloss: 'He proves that the place of Paradise perished in the flood.' The second response refuted: whether miraculous (betraying the view's improbability) or not (equally incredible) -- for who could believe Paradise, the most delicate and elegantly-arranged place, overwhelmed by the deepest waters for nearly a year, could survive without harm to its beauty? Even the firmest building submerged so long would decay. How could Paradise keep its loveliness, paths, tree-ranks, plant-arrangement, and fertility -- when the Fathers teach the earth was made more sterile and worse by the flood, whence God then granted the eating of flesh (Gen 9) and human life began to shorten?

Nor does that example of the olive help the opinion of these men -- the olive which under the waters of the flood retained its green fronds: for it is one thing to speak of the whole place of Paradise and of all the things that were in it, and another of one or another tree which, whether because of the nature of the place where it was, or because of its own strength and firmness, could last under the waters of the flood: such as is the olive,

whose leaves never fall, and which Pliny reports to live for two hundred years. In a third way one could answer that authority of Scripture, by conceding that Paradise was covered and destroyed by the waters of the flood, but affirming that it was afterward remade by God and restored to its former loveliness and magnificence. But since this is said gratuitously and rashly, with the same ease with which it is said, it is denied and rejected. From this disputation, then, it appears that Scripture, in saying the whole earth was covered and laid waste by the flood, strongly supports the view of those who think Paradise was destroyed by the flood, and does not now exist on earth: which testimony of Scripture those who think otherwise could not escape except by asserting incredible and absurd things about the height of Paradise -- reaching up to the highest region of the air, or even to the vicinity of heaven. Who, then, would dare to call that opinion rash, or suspect, or improbable, which rests and is supported by so evident a testimony of Scripture? -- especially since with that opinion History, both sacred and profane, wonderfully agrees; from which it is clear that Paradise was on this side of the Persian Gulf and about Mesopotamia, and it is agreed that all those places are inhabited and explored; in which

Marginal ref: Pliny bk 16 ch 44 (the olive lives 200 years, never sheds its leaves). The olive-example does not help: one tree may survive by the nature of its place or its own strength, unlike the whole Paradise. Third response (Paradise destroyed but afterward remade by God) is rejected as gratuitous. Conclusion: the Genesis-7 testimony strongly favors those who hold Paradise was destroyed and no longer exists on earth; the contrary view escapes it only by absurdly placing Paradise as high as the air or heaven. History sacred and profane agrees, locating Paradise near the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia, in explored, inhabited lands. Continues on the next page (catchword 'bus').

— p. 853 (PDF) · printed p. 812 —

in which, nevertheless, no trace of Paradise has at any time yet appeared. But against this opinion two things could be objected. One is that, in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 44, according to our Vulgate translation (whose authority we must uphold and defend), it is written that Enoch was translated into Paradise; therefore Paradise even now exists, since Enoch is

in it. The other is that it is the view of many Fathers and very many theologians that Paradise even now exists: and to contradict this view might seem rash. But these are not of such weight that they ought to deter us from the contrary view as if it were rash or improbable, since they can be most easily dissolved, as they were discussed and routed by us above in the third book.

Marginal gloss: 'Two objections.' Yet no trace of Paradise has ever appeared in those explored lands. Two objections against Pererius's view: (1) Ecclesiasticus 44 (Vulgate) says Enoch was translated 'into Paradise,' so Paradise still exists since Enoch is in it; (2) many Fathers and theologians hold Paradise still exists, and to contradict them might seem rash. But these are easily dissolved (as done in Pererius's book 3) and do not deter him.

Now to the former objection we answer briefly thus. First we say that the word 'Paradise' (which the Greek Scripture does not have in that place, but the Latin Vulgate translation does have, which it is not right to make light of) does not properly signify that Paradise in which Adam was, but signifies in general -- both among profane Greek and Latin writers and among sacred authors -- any garden and most pleasant place, most elegantly arranged for the delight of man: which we demonstrated above, at the beginning of the third book, by many examples from profane and sacred Scripture. We concede, therefore, that Enoch is in Paradise, yet not in that of Adam, but in some secret, most pleasant place, in which (with great tranquility and pleasantness of body and spirit, God wonderfully preserving him) he lives, and will live until the consummation of the age.

Marginal glosses: 'Solution of the first objection'; 'The passage of Ecclesiasticus 44 examined.' First answer: the word 'Paradise' (in the Vulgate, though absent from the Greek there) does not properly mean Adam's Paradise, but any garden or most pleasant place elegantly arranged for man's delight (shown by many examples in Pererius's book 3). So Enoch is conceded to be 'in Paradise' -- not Adam's, but some secret, most pleasant place where, God wondrously preserving him, he lives in great tranquility until the world's end.

Certainly Rupert -- a learned, Catholic, and pious man -- in book 3 On the Trinity and its Works, chapter 33, affirms in express words that nowhere in sacred Scripture is it handed down that Enoch was translated into the

Paradise in which Adam was; nay, this he himself openly and constantly denies. Saint Chrysostom too, in homily 21 on Genesis, writes that it is not to be curiously searched out and asked into what place God translated Enoch: since, that is, Scripture does not say it, it is over-curious to wish to investigate and know. And yet if Chrysostom had either read that word 'Paradise' in that passage of Ecclesiasticus, or had thought that by that word the terrestrial Paradise was signified, he surely would not have said that it is not handed down by Scripture where Enoch was translated, and that therefore this is uncertain and not to be curiously sought by us. Nor can it be supposed that Chrysostom had not read the book of Ecclesiasticus, seeing that he frequently uses very many sentences of that book in his writings. Fully agreeing with Chrysostom, Theodoret, in his Questions on Genesis, when he had posed this question, which is number 45, Into what place God translated Enoch, answered it thus: 'The things that are handed down in silence are not to be inquired into, but those that are written are to be venerated.' These are his words: indicating by them that it is not handed down in Scripture where Enoch was translated, and that therefore this is not to be investigated by us.

Marginal glosses: 'Rupert denies Enoch was translated into [Adam's] Paradise'; 'Chrysostom says he does not know where Enoch was translated.' Rupert (De Trinitate et operibus eius III.33) expressly denies Scripture anywhere says Enoch was translated into Adam's Paradise. Chrysostom (hom. 21 on Genesis) says it is over-curious to ask where God translated Enoch, since Scripture does not say -- which he could not hold had he read (or so understood) 'Paradise' in Ecclesiasticus (a book he often cites). Theodoret (Questions on Genesis 45) agrees: what is passed over in silence is not to be inquired into.

— p. 854 (PDF) · printed p. 813 —

Next, to the same objection I answer thus: in that passage of Ecclesiasticus the Vulgate translation does not have that Enoch is now in Paradise (which, however, is what the present question treats), but only has that Enoch was translated into Paradise -- which in no way opposes our opinion, nor pertains to the present question. For since that translation of Enoch was made more than six hundred years before the flood, as can be gathered

from chapter 5 of the book of Genesis, it could be that Enoch was then led into that terrestrial Paradise, which we do not deny lasted until the flood. Yet from this it is not permitted to argue that that Paradise was untouched by the flood, and even now exists, and that Enoch and Elijah dwell in it: for this is what we deny can be concluded from that passage of Ecclesiasticus. Certainly blessed Gregory, in homily 29 on the Gospels, did not dare to say that Enoch and Elijah were led into Paradise, or dwell in it, but writes of Elijah (and it must be believed he thought the same of Enoch, since the reasoning for both is equal, and the authors of the contrary opinion think and say the same of both) -- writes, I say, that Elijah dwells in some secret region, and lives in great tranquility of body and spirit, and will live until the consummation of the age.

Marginal gloss: 'St. Gregory does not dare to assert that Enoch dwells in Paradise.' Second answer: Ecclesiasticus 44 does not say Enoch is now in Paradise (the present question), but only that he was translated into Paradise -- which fits Pererius's view. Since the translation was more than 600 years before the flood (Gen 5), Enoch may then have been led into the terrestrial Paradise, which lasted until the flood; but it cannot be argued from this that Paradise was untouched and still exists with Enoch and Elijah in it. Gregory (hom. 29 on the Gospels) does not dare say they were led into Paradise, but writes that Elijah (and by equal reasoning Enoch) dwells in some secret region, living in great tranquility until the world's end.

But blessed Augustine, in book 2 On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, writes that this question -- whether Elijah and Enoch are in the terrestrial Paradise or elsewhere -- is among the number of those questions which, with the Christian faith safe, are disputed on both sides: such as these too: How many heavens are there, into the third of which Paul records that he was caught up; or whether the Elements of this world are four or more. Thus Augustine. And if he had thought that anywhere in Scripture it was signified that Enoch is in the terrestrial Paradise, or that in his time this was certain and undoubted in the Church and among the doctors of that time -- as it was that Enoch and Elijah were not dead but still live -- Augustine surely would not have spoken thus. Nor let it enter anyone's mind to suspect that perhaps Augustine had not read, or did not

hold as sacred Scripture, the book of Ecclesiasticus: seeing that from very many chapters of that book, as from canonical Scripture, he cites very many sentences and employs them to prove or refute something. Wherefore either he himself did not read, in that passage of Ecclesiasticus about the translation of Enoch, that word 'Paradise,' which the Greek Scripture does not have, or, if he read it, he by no means thought that the terrestrial Paradise was signified by it. It is clear, therefore, that that passage of Ecclesiasticus in no way opposes our view, and brings no help to the contrary opinion -- so that even on this account this opinion may seem more probable than the contrary. For this opinion has manifestly for itself that testimony of Scripture from the seventh chapter of Genesis, which we treated at length above: but the contrary opinion can have for itself no defense or testimony from divine Scripture. Wherefore I greatly wonder at the judgment of Sixtus of Siena, who in book 5 of his Library, Annotation 36, did not fear to write this: To say that Enoch and Elijah

Marginal glosses: '...does not pertain to the Faith'; '2 Corinthians 12'; 'Animadversion on the censure of Sixtus of Siena.' Augustine (De gratia Christi contra Pelagium et Caelestium II) ranks the question -- whether Enoch and Elijah are in the terrestrial Paradise or elsewhere -- among those disputable on both sides without harm to faith (like 'how many heavens?' [2 Cor 12] or 'are the elements four or more?'). Had Augustine thought Scripture placed Enoch in the terrestrial Paradise, or that this was certain in his day (as Enoch and Elijah's still living was), he would not have spoken so -- and he surely read Ecclesiasticus as canonical (citing it often); so either he did not read 'Paradise' there (absent from the Greek) or did not take it of the terrestrial Paradise. Thus Ecclesiasticus does not oppose Pererius's view nor help the contrary, making his view the more probable, since it alone has the Genesis-7 testimony. Pererius then marvels at Sixtus of Siena (Bibliotheca Sancta V, Annotation 36), who did not fear to write 'To say that Enoch and Elijah...' (continued on the next page, catchword '& Eliam').

— p. 855 (PDF) · printed p. 814 —

'and Elijah were not translated into that terrestrial Paradise and do not dwell there, is against divine Scripture, and departs from the right rule of faith.' Is it so against Scripture? Shall we then think that Rupert, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Augustine, and Gregory -- who either denied it, or said it was undetermined, or handed down that, with faith safe, it could be either

denied or affirmed -- thought and wrote against Scripture and against the rule of faith, with Sixtus as their censor? But against what Scripture, I beseech, is it that Enoch is not in that Paradise? Against that, he says, of Ecclesiasticus 44: 'Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise'; but that this Scripture can in no way support Sixtus has been shown more than sufficiently. And if this is against Scripture, then it is against the Faith. Yet blessed Augustine teaches, in book 2 against Caelestius and Pelagius, chapter 23, that to think Enoch and Elijah are not in that Paradise is not only not against faith, but does not even pertain to faith. Whom, then, shall we rather believe -- Augustine, denying that it pertains to faith, or Sixtus, asserting that it is against Scripture and departs from the rule of faith? You see, reader, into what Sixtus has cast himself by imprudence, in condemning the most illustrious Fathers of the Church, by so hasty a judgment and so harsh a censure, unknowingly.

Completes Sixtus of Siena's censure (begun on the previous page): 'To say that Enoch and Elijah were not translated into the terrestrial Paradise and do not dwell there is against divine Scripture and departs from the rule of faith.' Pererius's rebuttal: that would condemn Rupert, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Augustine, and Gregory. Against what Scripture? Only Ecclus 44, already shown not to support Sixtus. And Augustine (contra Caelestium et Pelagium II.23) says the question does not even pertain to faith -- so Sixtus rashly condemned the most illustrious Fathers.

To the other objection, drawn from the multitude of the Doctors who think against us, we answer in this manner. The consensus of the Doctors (as Vincent of Lerins prudently warns, and it is certainly true) must be diligently observed and religiously followed, not in any questions whatever, but in those which pertain to the rule of the Catholic faith. But this question -- whether Paradise does not exist -- in no way pertains to faith; even less, indeed, than that other, whether Enoch is in that terrestrial Paradise, which nonetheless Augustine teaches can, with faith safe, be disputed on both sides, either by suspending a definitive judgment, or by conjecturing otherwise than it really is, with a human and weak surmise. Nor indeed is it new and unusual among the Doctors, in matters that do not pertain to faith, to depart from an old and common view, if on the opposite

side some very probable opinion exists -- that is, one fortified by great supports of either Sacred Scripture or human reasons. I could bring forward many examples of this thing; but, lest I be too long where there is least need, I shall be content with only one example. That the waters which are said in Sacred Scripture to be above the heavens are really located above the celestial orbs, and consist either of an elemental nature or of a celestial substance, is the old and common view of both earlier and later Doctors. Yet the contrary opinion -- that those celestial waters are to be understood as none other than those which, generated in the middle region of the air, fall down by natural power, manner, and order to cool and fertilize the earth -- has not only never been held rash or improbable, but blessed Thomas, in the first part, mentions it among the most probable opinions about those waters; and Saint Augustine, in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter four, judges that opinion most worthy of great praise, since it is neither against faith,

Marginal glosses: 'Solution of the latter objection'; 'Whether it is ever lawful to depart from the common opinion of the Doctors'; Gen 1; Ps 148; Daniel 3; 'St. Thomas, part 1, q. 68, art. 2.' Answer to the second objection (the multitude of Doctors): their consensus (Vincent of Lerins) binds only in matters of the rule of faith. Whether Paradise still exists does not pertain to faith (even less than whether Enoch is there, which Augustine calls disputable both ways). Doctors may depart from the common view in non-faith matters when a very probable opinion opposes it -- e.g. the 'waters above the heavens': the old view places them literally above the celestial orbs, but the contrary (that they are waters generated in the middle air, falling to cool and fertilize the earth) is reckoned most probable by Aquinas (ST I q.68 a.2) and praised by Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram II.4). Continues on the next page (catchword 'sit').

— p. 856 (PDF) · printed p. 815 —

and is made credible by a document set ready at hand. How much more would Augustine say this of this opinion, that Paradise does not now exist? -- since it is not only not against faith, but is even most in accord with the faith of Scripture, which affirms, in chapter 7 of Genesis, that the whole surface and all the mountains that were under the whole heaven were covered by the waters of the flood, and the whole earth laid waste and

deleted. Next, in debating and deciding questions not pertaining to faith, one must regard not only who the authors are or what they think or say, but the weight of the reasons must also be assessed and examined, and how they argue and prove what they say. Very many and most weighty authors have said that the terrestrial Paradise now exists. They said so indeed, and for that cause alone that view ought to be to all not only probable but venerable. But this they confirmed by no probable authority of Scripture, nor by history, nor by experience, nor by human reason or conjecture. Rather, when they were strongly urged and pressed by the aforesaid testimony of Scripture from chapter 7 of Genesis, they could find no other escape than either by introducing new miracles, or by fabricating incredible and absurd things about the height of Paradise above the waters of the flood. Moreover, it is fitting to consider to what end or use these doctors would have Paradise preserved by God by so great a miracle. Certainly most of the ancients thought that Paradise was preserved for this, that it might be a fit and worthy receptacle of the holy souls dwelling there until the day of judgment: which indeed is not only false,

Marginal gloss: 'How one ought to conduct oneself in questions not pertaining to faith.' Augustine would all the more hold that Paradise does not now exist, since that is most in accord with Gen 7 (the whole earth covered and 'deleted'). In non-faith questions one must weigh reasons, not just count authors. The many who said Paradise still exists confirmed it by no Scripture, history, experience, or reason; pressed by Gen 7, they escaped only by inventing miracles or absurd height-claims. And to what end would God preserve it by so great a miracle? Most of the ancients thought it a receptacle for the holy souls until judgment day -- which is not only false,

but has long since been condemned by the Church. To very many others it has seemed that Paradise was preserved for the habitation of Enoch and Elijah, whom they do not doubt are now in that place. But this many doctors either deny, or say is undetermined, or hand down, as doubtful and uncertain, that it can, without any injury to faith, be either denied or affirmed. By no probable argumentation, then, can it be persuaded that Paradise now exists. For the rest, let this be the conclusion of this disputation: that nothing favors the old view except its antiquity and the

consensus of the doctors -- which two things, however, even by themselves ought to be held of great weight, and can, in questions not pertaining to faith, make a view very probable, and, in those that pertain to faith, even certain. But to this opinion, that Paradise does not exist, there are present both the supports of Sacred Scripture and the buttresses of human reasons, and nothing seems lacking to it except antiquity and a multitude and renown of followers. And these indeed are the things which I chose, for the present, to add to those which were disputed on this question in the third book.

The view that Paradise is a receptacle for holy souls until judgment day is not only false but long since condemned by the Church. Others hold it preserved for Enoch and Elijah's habitation -- but many doctors deny this or call it uncertain and disputable without harm to faith. So no probable argument shows Paradise now exists. Conclusion of the disputation: the old view has for it only its antiquity and the Doctors' consensus (weighty, and enough for probability in non-faith questions, certainty in faith-questions); but Pererius's view has Scripture supports and rational buttresses, lacking only antiquity and famous followers. This supplements his third book.

But it would not be out of place, on occasion of this question which we have treated, to admonish the reader in general in this place, that in questions of this kind newly arising -- which do not pertain to faith and yet seem quite probable and plausible -- great caution must be used,

Marginal gloss: 'A useful lesson to be observed concerning new opinions, even very probable ones.' Pererius adds a general admonition on newly-arising, non-faith questions that seem quite probable: great caution must be used. Continues on the next page (catchword 'cautione').

— p. 857 (PDF) · printed p. 816 —

and that it will be safest not at once to publish them as plainly true and certain, and to defend them stubbornly and tooth-and-nail, with the old view of the doctors not only set aside but even fastidiously and proudly rejected. But those opinions ought to be examined and tested hesitantly, slowly, and scrupulously, and be brought forth only as probable, and one ought to await the judgments and votes of the doctors and of pious men and of the most flourishing Academies -- so that, if they be repudiated and

condemned by them, they may be utterly cast off and buried in eternal silence; but if they be praised and approved and published abroad, then they may, without offense and safely, be not only privately approved but also publicly taught and defended, yet in such a way that nonetheless the due honor and reverence be always shown to the old view.

The lesson concludes: it is safest not to publish such opinions at once as certainly true, defending them stubbornly with the old view proudly rejected, but to test them slowly and bring them forth only as probable, awaiting the judgment of the doctors, pious men, and the flourishing Academies (universities) -- so that if condemned they be buried in silence, but if approved they may be safely taught and defended in public, always with due honor and reverence to the old view.

For my part (for with these last words, and with this testimony of my counsel and purpose, I wish to end this former volume of my Commentaries on Genesis) I wished to treat the probability of this opinion with care and diligence -- not from any zeal for novelty, nor for the display of talent or learning (the Lord knows, the conscious witness of my mind and thoughts), but from a most ardent love of investigating and finding the truth, and especially from a certain zeal for Sacred Scripture: namely, that the things handed down in these Scriptures about the place of Paradise, about its four rivers, and other like matters, as they have been explained by us, might not only not seem to anyone fictitious, incredible, and absurd, but, as being most agreeable to reason and most probable, might be able to be approved by anyone, even of the unbelievers. But if in this too anything has been erred, it was certainly an error not of arrogance or rashness, but of a certain piety and zeal: which I trust will seem to the prudent and fair reader worthy of easy pardon. THE END. In the year from the Lord's birth 1589, but of the Author's age 53, these seven books of Commentaries on Genesis were first published at Rome; three years before, the same Author's sixteen books on Daniel the Prophet, and thirteen years before, his fifteen books of Philosophy, had been published. Issued a second time at Lyons at the press of the Giunta, in the year 1590; a third time again at Lyons, 1594; a fourth time and

more corrected, 1599, at the press of Horatius Cardon. Praise be to God, and to the God-bearer and ever-Virgin Mary.

Marginal gloss: 'Why the author has discussed these things so accurately.' THE END OF THE VOLUME. Pererius's closing testimony: with these last words he ends this first volume of his Commentaries on Genesis; he treated this opinion not from love of novelty or display of talent, but from ardent love of truth and zeal for Scripture -- and any error was one of piety and zeal, worthy of pardon. Colophon: first published at Rome 1589 (Pererius then aged 53; three years after his 16 books on Daniel, thirteen after his 15 books of Philosophy); this edition issued at Lyons by the Giunta press, 1590; again at Lyons 1594; and, corrected, 1599, at Horatius Cardon's. 'Praise be to God and to the ever-Virgin Mary.' This completes the seven books (Vol. I) of the commentary.

— p. 858 (PDF) · printed p. 817 —

INDEX OF THE THINGS AND WORDS CONTAINED IN THIS WORK.

Back-matter. The commentary proper ended with FINIS on the previous page (PDF 857 / printed 816). From here (PDF 858) to the end of the volume runs the alphabetical subject-and-word index -- a finding aid keyed to folio numbers (e.g. 'Abel... folio 719.a'; 'Adam...'), beginning with the letter A. It is reference apparatus, not commentary prose; the translation of Pererius's Genesis commentary (Prior tomus, Books I-VII) is complete through the FINIS. The index entries themselves are not translated as running text.