

ADAM CONTZEN

TEN BOOKS OF POLITICS

BOOK EIGHT

On the Power of the State

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CHAPTER I

The Definition of Human Power; Its Weakness

§ 1. Power is the faculty, furnished with suitable means, for preserving one's own things and obtaining another's; thus the Roman orator describes power for us. That thing is constituted by many things: resources, arms, men, provisions, cities, citadels, and prudence rightly using all these.

§ 2. All human power is spoken of comparatively. For whoever is powerful by comparison with inferiors will perceive himself to be weak if he wishes to assail one greater than himself. Rams rush together and contend for mastery of the flock; yet before the wolf victor and vanquished alike become prey. He too, when he has filled his maw with the tender flock, will perish by the tooth of a lion or bear. Adonibezek saw seventy mutilated kings crawling beneath his table; but he suffered from one more powerful what he himself had inflicted as an evil upon the weaker. The stronger Carthaginians oppress Messana and the Sicilians, but they provoke the more powerful Roman enemy, until, after the seas and islands had been taken away, they paid tribute, and then lost their city also and their liberty. Philip the Macedonian--not the ancient one, but he whom the Romans conquered--harasses Athens with tyrannical domination, having abused his power against that noble city; but Roman power, already the conqueror of Carthage, shattered it, so that Macedonia became a modest possession of so great an empire.

Nor, for the most part, could those who seemed more powerful than their neighbors recognize their own strength until some greater monarch restrained them as they raged fiercely. For nearly all those have been the fates of nations: while they devote themselves to increasing power, they lose liberty. In the time of our grandfathers also, while all the cities of Italy attacked one another in war, contended about power, and led forth their proud *carrocci*, they passed into the power of a few.

§ 3. Great power can exist only in a great state. Yet the greatest kingdoms are frequently weak, and moderate ones more powerful. For just as those bodies whose mass is taller are not the strongest, but those which possess symmetry and vigor, so also those vast bodies of lands must be estimated by their character, position, and other circumstances, not by their extent. In great kingdoms this very greatly breaks their power: when one part is weakened or rebels. Just as the pain of one limb not only torments the sick man with its own evil but also casts down the mind, the ruler of the body, and corrupts the functions of the other limbs, so also, in this vast mass, the estrangement or tumult of one province disturbs even faithful cities. We have heard that this occurred formerly, and in our own time we experience that by the rebellion of one province, which is scarcely the hundredth part of a kingdom, the peace of all parts is disturbed and all expenditure is devoted to one.

§ 4. But what is powerful? What is not powerful? Who is worthy of so great a name that he is not only powerful but even most powerful? "Because I have not known letters, I shall enter into the powers of the Lord." ספרות ידעתי כִּי־לֹא, "I have not known γραμματεῖαν," as the Seventy render it, or, as others, "σοφισματεῖαν"--human and crafty wisdom, which seems to itself to govern empires--"I shall enter into the powers of the Lord," which have made every power. "I shall declare his wonders, the power and justice of God even unto the highest places." For this is true power; the power of men is wretched, since it depends upon the slightest moments.

If it is confined within narrow borders, it is wholly concentrated in itself, and when war arises in the neighborhood, it fights concerning its entire safety and its head. If it has peoples subject to it under a broad dominion, it lies open to a wound in many parts and is entangled in perpetual labor and innumerable dangers; for what region is added which does not bring new dangers with it? Do you command many? Yet you displease many; many hate you, and many are permitted many things against you and yours, without whom you cannot be safe. Demosthenes is reported to have said that, if two roads lay open, one to the lower regions and the other to the throne, he would choose that which leads to

the lower regions. I believe that he did not speak sincerely; nevertheless, he showed that the ambition of those men is most wretched who through labors, dangers, and wounds climb a slippery, tottering summit, buffeted by thunderbolts and winds, where they can neither stand nor depart thence without a most conspicuous ruin, over which Fortune delights to exercise her command. For how many, not only kings but even peoples, have stood upon a lofty summit so that they seem to have obtained no other advantage than that the sound of their regal collapse might be heard farther?

For although power may be great, it is not certainly lasting. While Epaminondas lived, the Thebans' quasi-dominion over the Lacedaemonians was brief. When they boasted of it, Cotys used to say that the power of the Thebans was like a torrent which quickly dries up, while that of the Spartans endures after the fashion of a perennial river. This was said truly of the Thebans; of the Spartans, more by comparison than according to the truth. For although that torrent endured longer than the Boeotian, it nevertheless did not flow for long. The Eurotas saw Sparta rising, endangered, ruling, enslaved, finally destroyed, and now sees tamarisks where Sparta was.

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The names of the ancient kingdoms have long since ceased; and where they are retained, the peoples are different. No power is fixed; great empires migrate. Monarchy began in the East and reached its summit in Nebuchadnezzar: the head of gold ends in the breast and arms of silver; these are followed by the belly and thighs of bronze, which end in legs of iron and clay. Daniel 2. Meanwhile not Fortune, but God, turns this wheel; whoever holds the higher places upon it necessarily now descends: there is no rest, or only a brief one. But while entire kingdoms change more slowly, how many kings perish in the meantime? How few fulfill their own fate? And is he powerful whom fever burns, quinsy strangles, dropsy suffocates, and--to speak briefly--as many hundreds of diseases as there are members kill? Zoroaster seemed powerful, but is killed while his power looks on; Ninus, after conquering him, was pierced by an arrow; Cyrus drank blood from Tomyris's skin-bag. Artabanus killed Xerxes, his friends Darius, domestic enemies Alexander, and his fellow banqueters Antiochus. Indeed, in our own time Henry IV, a king great in wisdom, in war, and--what is chief--in clemency, after he had assembled a great army and filled all Europe with fear or hope, was slaughtered by a fanatic among his bodyguards.

§ 5. Since, therefore, every power is brief and weak, it must be used sparingly--not so that it may be lasting, as Cato advised, but lest it be most brief. Golden is the saying of Pertinax: "It is holier, Conscript Fathers, to govern a needy state than to arrive at a heap of riches through dangers and the footprints of disgrace." The first good of power, therefore, is its moderate use. The second is that you not attempt things greater than your strength and hope for Fortune as helper--something which, although it sometimes does not turn out badly, is nevertheless never undertaken without the fault of rashness. Finally, do not consume power without cause upon those things which do not increase it, as Cyrus did when he divided the Gyndes into 365 streams and consumed the season for waging war in digging channels; as Caesar did when, neglecting the main issue, he wore down his army at Massilia:

Although we hasten toward the western axis of the world,
there is leisure to destroy Massilia.

Yet surely there would not have been leisure if Pompey the Great had been able to use that opportunity. I give this warning because it has always happened: great things rush against themselves. Consider Roman power: after it ceased to have an equal, it was divided against itself. That Rome--

than which the aether embraces nothing higher upon earth,
whose extent no sight, whose beauty no hearts,
whose praise no voice contains; which, with the gleam of metal,
joins roofs rivaling the neighboring stars;
parent of arms and laws, which pours dominion upon all

and first gave the cradle of law.

She it is who, sprung from narrow bounds, stretched
toward the twin poles, and, setting forth from a small seat,
spread her hands together with the Sun. Meeting the fates,
while she waged innumerable wars at one time,
laid low the Gaul on land and the Carthaginian on the sea,
she never succumbed to losses; terrified by no
wound, after Cannae and the Trebia she raged greater.

Nevertheless, she consumed all her strength, not upon the winds--which is foolish--but upon her own entrails--which is most monstrous--until she went to serve barbarians, Heruli, Alans, Goths, Vandals, and Lombards.

§ 6. There is no surer sign of how weak the pillars are upon which human power rests, and how worn its strength is, than that the greatest empires have always fallen, not by a violent hand, but through slight circumstances and a trivial occasion. But what depends upon a changeable occasion is weak. Curio transferred the Roman Empire from the Senate to the Caesars, and he had no other cause for war than the magnitude of his debt. Thence it passed to Augustus because Cicero, they said, had repeatedly said that the boy must be praised and raised up. Offended by that expression, Octavian estranged himself from the Senate, because he declared that he would not permit himself to be removed. Claudius was then made Emperor when a few soldiers dragged him from hiding. And thus the bloody tragedy continued throughout the Roman world, with the greatest battles inclining to one side at a single word or gesture. There scarcely seems, therefore, to be any place for power which upon so many occasions ceases to be power.

§ 7. As I consider all these things, it comes to my mind that nothing in human affairs is more wonderful than the providence of God governing occasions; for the power of human affairs, even when greatest, is overthrown by a small occasion. Hannibal came into Italy. His army, coming from the sun and the south after breaking through the Alps, could easily have been conquered by the Romans, but every opportunity was let pass. Through no one's care was he prevented from crossing the river, entering Italy, and refreshing his army. Hannibal seizes every opportunity: he chooses a cold day; he conceals his cavalry with fog and brushwood; finally at Cannae he even fought with dust, wind, and sun. Behold, power and army would have availed nothing unless he had conquered by the occasion of thorn-thickets, fogs, rains, cold, wind, and dust. Rome was now in the greatest alarm, and it would have been her last day if Hannibal had wished to use his victory; but he neglected the opportunity, and Rome was saved not by her own strength but by the enemy's imprudence.

The empire of the Turk seems formidable to many, but in truth it grew strong by opportunity alone, and even now protects itself by our discord. Heraclius gave an opportunity to Muhammad when, in place of pay, he inflicted insults upon the Saracen soldier whose faithful service he had used. The Saracens then grew, and the Turcomans subdued them. At last the family of the Ottomans occupied Asia while two Andronici, grandfather and grandson, contended with one another; it was easy to conquer the divided. Then the dissensions of those same Greeks, and of Cantacuzenus and Palaeologus, made Orchan powerful. Palaeologus all but delivered Greece into the hand of Amurath. The rebellious Greeks hated their Emperor; in order to restrain them, he called in Amurath, who came as avenger of the sedition and obtained the empire of Greece--a robber in place of a helper. Tamerlane subdued Bayezid. When Calepinus had recovered himself from flight, the nobles of the Greeks aided the desperate affairs of the Ottomans, although that empire could have been destroyed in one battle; and so Muhammad soon turned the strength of the Greeks against themselves. But while Amurath II was reigning, those Greeks first equipped his uncle and then his young brother as an adversary. Such was the madness and softness of the Constantinopolitans that they preferred to

equip barbarians with arms, money, and men rather than arm themselves. Thereafter, although they abounded in resources, they were conquered because they were unwilling to expend them upon enlisting soldiers.

That enemy is now feared by us because we provide him opportunity through seditions, civil wars, and heresies.

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We also provide him opportunity through distrust. Nor does he lack spirit, but he is wearied by the Persians. Nothing is readier than that he be called in as an ally by one of those at discord. The Greeks did this; the Hungarians did this; and they paid the penalty of destruction. Earlier Alfonso II and Ludovico Sforza called in Bayezid against the French and Venetians. Indeed, in the time of Francis I, King of France, and Henry II, they summoned his fleet--and its plunder--to the Ligurian Sea through our discord. There survives a speech of the British ambassador before the Turk in which he exhorts him, together with his queen, to turn his arms against the Spaniard. Therefore, a kingdom exposed to so many occasions of adversity cannot be called powerful.

§ 8. But neither is the Turkish kingdom powerful. If the Hungarian war had been continued, the Turk could easily have been driven from his kingdom with moderate preparation. The Hajduks defend themselves against him in Pannonia; the Cossacks in Poland voluntarily bring arms against him; the Arabs keep everything hostile. At present nothing sustains him in Europe except our sloth, because we do not use the opportunity.

CHAPTER II

The Prince Ought to Study the Acquisition and Increase of Power

§ 1. In matters so uncertain and fluid, counsel and reason must be employed. For although states never perish except when their counsels are corrupt, even good counsels can nevertheless be ineffectual and lack success. But, as I have said, no state has perished except through corrupted counsels; for I have not yet found an example to the contrary. Hence it belongs to the prince and senate always to think about stabilizing, strengthening, and increasing power, and to contrive that there be no day upon which something is not added to the strength of the state. For although most things depend upon occasions, the weak are nevertheless struck most severely; the less powerful you are, the more is exacted from you. The blow which casts down the languid rouses the strong, and that which extorts prayers from the sluggish awakens the strength of the angry. Nothing among mortal things is so fluid as power, but it must be held in many ways lest it flow from one's hands. Health too is a fluid thing, which cannot subsist without the proper tempering and integrity of so many limbs and humors, and, besides these, the wholesomeness of air and food; yet it is not therefore neglected, but is preserved with great care and expense.

§ 2. A just method of acquiring power must be entered upon. For those who inflict injury upon inferiors and then, increased by their strength, subjugate others to their dominion, act altogether unjustly. And they build power upon a fragile foundation--that is, upon injustice. For unbridled power commits many evils, and therefore easily collapses.

§ 3. The reason why power must be acquired is evident: because without it we cannot protect our fatherland. For since the number of the covetous and wicked is very great, the state cannot break injustice without power. Subjects, therefore, will be prey, exposed to the insolence, rapacity, violence, and cruelty of all; nor will the princes themselves be safe, but they will be objects of contempt and will reign on sufferance. For the right of rule without power is like a body without a soul: it is a statue, not a living thing. Therefore, since government has been instituted to defend all and each from injury and, if they have been harmed, to avenge and restore them to their former condition, and to preserve the society of citizens, a nerveless and powerless prince can by no means attain this end. Those men, therefore, do not act prudently who so establish a state that it cannot be safe from neighboring princes, pirates, and robbers except by the power of another. Justice surely requires a strong patron and an unconquered champion.

Let that king according to the heart of God, King and Prophet David, be for us an example of acquiring power. His power in a kingdom not very great seems to me almost greater than the forces of all kings. For in addition to the people he maintained a great number of soldiers. Thus it is described in 1 Chronicles, chapter 27: "Now the sons of Israel according to their number, the princes of families, tribunes and centurions, and officers who ministered to the king according to their companies, entering and departing month by month throughout the year, were each set over twenty-four thousand. Over the first company in the first month was Jesboam, the son of Zabdiel, and under him were twenty-four thousand. Of the sons of Perez, he was chief of all the captains in the army in the first month. The second month had the company of Dudia the Ahohite, and after him another named Macelloth, who governed a part of the army of twenty-four thousand. The captain also of the third company in the third month was Benaiah, the son of Jehoiada the priest, and in his division were twenty-four thousand. This is that Benaiah who was the mightiest among the thirty and over the thirty; and over his own company was Amizabad his son. The fourth, in the fourth month, was Asahel the brother of Joab, and Zebadiah his son after him; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The fifth, in the fifth month, was the captain Shamhuth the Izrahite; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The sixth, in the sixth month, was Ira the son of Ikkesh the Tekoite; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The seventh, in the seventh month, was Helez the Pelonite, of the sons of Ephraim; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The eighth, in the eighth month, was Sibbecai the Hushathite, of the stock of Zerah; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The ninth, in the ninth month, was Abiezer the Anathothite, of the sons of Jemini; and in his

company were twenty-four thousand. The tenth, in the tenth month, was Maharai, also a Netophathite, of the stock of Zerah; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The eleventh, in the eleventh month, was Benaiah the Pirathonite, of the sons of Ephraim; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The twelfth, in the twelfth month, was Heldai the Netophathite, of the stock of Othniel; and in his company were twenty-four thousand.”

Behold, a guard for the royal court--twenty-four thousand, in addition to the ordinary attendants, ministers, and throng. To what end was this multitude? First, to uphold royal dignity; for who would rebel when he saw so many garrisons in the cities and an army in the palace? Second, that he might be feared by his neighbors, for they were very brave men; for whatever brave and industrious man he saw, he associated that man with himself. Third, by this means he made the royal city illustrious. Fourth, he conciliated for himself the love of the tribes. Fifth, he fostered the study of arms, for in that splendor of the kingdom, in the sight of the brave, they exercised themselves in that battle line of the praetorian soldiery. And zeal for military affairs was kindled in a wonderful manner when the tribes contended concerning the adornment of arms and skill. Sixth, by this occasion also, in the royal city, where there was an abundance of priests and learned men, they were most easily instructed in religion. Nor did David sin against the divine precept; for he had gathered resources and a bodyguard for the protection of his subjects and the restraint of peoples whom he had subjugated by war, without injury to the Israelites.

But why do I speak of David? Behold Jehoshaphat, king of two tribes, Judah and Benjamin. His power is described in this manner in 2 Chronicles 17:14: “There were also warriors and strong men in Jerusalem, whose number by the houses and families of each was this. In Judah, the captains of the army: Adnah the captain, and with him three hundred thousand very strong men. After him Jehohanan the captain, and with him two hundred and eighty thousand. After him also Amasiah the son of Zichri, consecrated to the Lord, and with him two hundred thousand brave men. He was followed by Eliada, strong for battles, and with him two hundred thousand bearing bow and shield. After him also Jehozabad, and with him one hundred and eighty thousand soldiers equipped for war. All these were at the king’s hand, besides others whom he had placed in walled cities throughout all Judah.”

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Who would not marvel at 1,160,000 men in that kingdom? Nor was that soldiery in garrisons, but at the king’s hand; for by turns it attended the court and was sent upon sudden business. The text expressly excepts the garrison soldiers--those in the cities and throughout all Judah.

In the same chapter, verse 2, there are other garrison soldiers in the captured cities: “And he stationed numbers of soldiers in all the cities of Judah which were fortified with walls.”

When I consider these things, they would seem to me almost incredible if Scripture did not say them; and then what is said about Roman greatness seems small. For the king maintained these soldiers without tyranny and did not exhaust his subjects with tribute, but filled them with an abundance of all things. “Moreover, he built in Judah houses after the fashion of towers and walled cities.” God bestowed so great a power upon a single kingdom which afterward was an appendage of a single province of Syria--how small a part of the Roman Empire? But he who is truly powerful displayed such great power in so small a kingdom. For so far was he from emptying the treasury with so great an army, contracting debt, attacking towns, and selling rights and immunity that he accumulated treasures besides. For verse 13 says: “And he prepared many works in the cities of Judah.” The Hebrew has, “and he had much work”; καὶ τὰ ἔργα πολλὰ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ. It calls the buildings בִּירֵנוֹת, for they are palaces, temples, edifices. Thus in Ezra 8:2, ἐν τῇ βάρει τῶν Μήδων, and Daniel 8:2, “I was in Susa, in the palace,” ἐν βάρει בִּירָה also frequently signifies a city, 1 Chronicles 29. “For the palace is not for man.” Therefore it is just as though he said that he built palatial buildings, lofty and towered. They think that בִּירֵנוֹת is said from אָבַר, because they are strong. Then “walled cities,” ὀχυράς; the Hebrew has מִסְכְּנוֹת, “of treasures,” because treasures were stored in fortified places. Then those soldiers were not barbarians or unwarlike, but חֵיל גְּבוּרִי, “of robust strength,” verses 14 and 16; and in verse 17, two hundred thousand armed with bow

and shield. Verse 18 has צבא הלוצי, “girded or equipped for war,” words by which brave, trained, and well-armed soldiers are designated.

What, therefore, if he had been obliged to fight against Alexander the Great or the most powerful Romans? Surely he would have been equal or superior; for he was more powerful than all of them in this respect: although fortified by so great a soldiery, he was nevertheless rich. Verse 5: “And riches and glory were made infinite for him.” Indeed, he gave his sons many gifts of silver, gold, and precious things, with fortified cities--מצורות ערי--“with cities of fortifications.” He was therefore continually able, in addition to the garrisons of the cities, to maintain 1,160,000 brave men; and he did this in time of peace, while he gathered resources. What, then, in time of war? Yet, when he heard that neighboring nations were rising up, he was afraid, proclaimed a fast, and conquered by prayer. 2 Chronicles, chapter 20. This is what I warn: so powerful a king set, not his treasury as his power, but his face to seek God, who fought for him and left to him only the labor of gathering the spoils for three days. He feared that, if the Lord were not with him, all that force would collapse upon itself, just as happened in the enemy camps. Thus Scripture, 2 Chronicles, chapter 20, verse 22.

§ 4. Concerning power, this must especially be warned: that its timely use not be delayed until it is diminished; that if an enemy attacks, he be repelled with the whole effort; if wicked citizens rebel, they be restrained at the very onset, while their counsels still waver in uncertainty. The Romans formerly erred gravely in estimating their strength during the Second Punic War, but at last, with great spirit, they corrected the error for which they paid with much blood. Florus weighs the matter well in book 2, chapter 6:

Meanwhile the Roman began to breathe again and, as it were, to rise from the dead. There were no arms: they were stripped from the temples. Youth was lacking: slaves were freed into the military oath. The treasury was in need: the Senate willingly brought its wealth into the common stock, and, beyond what was in their amulets, belts, and rings, they left themselves nothing of gold. The equestrian order followed the example, and the tribes imitated the knights; finally, the tablets and the hands of the scribes scarcely sufficed, when, in the consulship of Laevinus and Marcellus, private wealth was conveyed into the public treasury.

And in electing magistrates, what wisdom of the centuries there was, when the younger sought counsel from the older concerning the creation of consuls! For against an enemy so often victorious and so crafty it was necessary to fight not only with courage but also with his own counsels. Fabius was the first hope of a returning and, so to speak, reviving empire: he devised a new victory over Hannibal--not to fight. Hence came that new surname, salutary to the state, “the Delayer”; hence that saying from the people, that he should be called the shield of the empire. Thus throughout all Samnium, through the Falernian and Gauran passes, he so wore down Hannibal that the man who could not be broken by courage was diminished by delay. Thereafter, under the leadership of Claudius Marcellus, Rome even dared to engage him: it came to close quarters, drove him from its Campania, and struck him away from the siege of the city of Nola. Then, under the leadership of Sempronius Gracchus, it dared to follow him through Lucania and press upon the rear of the retreating man, although at that time--O shame!--it fought with a servile hand.

O dreadful confidence amid so many adversities! O singular spirit and courage of the Roman people! When its affairs were so constrained and afflicted that it was doubtful about its own Italy, nevertheless it dared to look in different directions; and while enemies flew at its throat through Campania and Apulia, and were already making Africa out of the middle of Italy, at the same time it both sustained this enemy and sent arms in diverse directions through the world--to Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. Sicily was entrusted to Marcellus and did not resist for long. For the whole island was conquered in one city. That great head, Syracuse, undefeated before that time, although defended by the genius of Archimedes, at length yielded. Its triple wall, its equal number of citadels, its marble harbor, and the celebrated fountain of Arethusa--what did they avail except this much, that the beauty of the conquered city was spared?

Gracchus seized Sardinia. The fierceness of its people and the savagery of its “insane” mountains--for so they are called--availed it nothing. Violence was inflicted upon the cities and upon Cagliari, the city of cities, so that a stubborn people, holding death cheap, might at least be subdued by longing for its native soil. Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, sent into Spain, had taken almost all of it from the Carthaginians; but, crushed by the ambushes of Punic fraud, they lost it again. They indeed had cut down Punic resources in great battles, but Punic ambushes overwhelmed the one with the sword while he was laying out his camp, and the other, after he had escaped into a tower, by surrounding him with firebrands. Therefore Scipio, sent with an army to avenge his father and uncle--he for whom the fates had decreed so great a surname from Africa--recovered all that warlike Spain, renowned for men and arms, that nursery of the enemy army, that instructor of Hannibal, from the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules and the Ocean--an incredible thing to say. You would not know whether he did it more quickly or more easily. Four years attest how quickly; even one city proves how easily: for on the same day on which it was besieged it was captured, and the fact that Spanish Carthage was conquered so easily was an omen of the African victory.

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Yet it is certain that the singular chastity of the commander contributed especially to subduing the province; for he restored to the barbarians captive boys and girls of surpassing beauty, and did not even permit them to be brought into his sight, lest he should seem to have touched the integrity of their virginity even with his eyes.

Amid these operations in diverse lands stood the Roman people; yet for this reason it could not dislodge Hannibal, who clung to the entrails of Italy. Most cities had defected to the enemy, and that very fierce commander used Italian strength too against the Romans. Yet by now we had struck him out of most towns and regions. Tarentum had now returned to us; Capua too--the seat, home, and second fatherland of Hannibal--was held. Its loss caused the Carthaginian commander such grief that thence he turned all his strength against Rome. O people worthy of command over the world, worthy of the favor and admiration of all men and gods! Driven to the extremity of fear, it did not desist from its undertaking; anxious about its own city, it nevertheless did not abandon Capua, but, leaving part of the army under the consul Appius and sending part with Flaccus to the city, it fought at once absent and present.

Why, then, do we marvel? When Hannibal moved his camp from the third milestone, the gods themselves--for a second time, the gods, I say, nor shall it shame me to confess it--gave testimony. For at each of his movements so great a force of rain was poured down, so great a violence of winds arose, that the enemy seemed to be driven off by divine agency, not from heaven but from the very walls of the city and from the Capitol. And so he fled, yielded, and withdrew into the farthest gulf of Italy, leaving the city all but assaulted. A small matter to tell, but sufficiently effective to prove the greatness of spirit of the Roman people: during those very days in which it was besieged, the field which Hannibal occupied with his camp was offered for sale at Rome and, placed under the spear, found a buyer. Hannibal wished in turn to imitate their confidence; he offered the bankers' shops of the city for sale, but no buyer was found, so that you may know that even the omens were sufficient.

Nothing had been accomplished by such courage and such favor even of the gods. For Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, was coming from Spain with a new army, new strength, and a new weight of war. It was undoubtedly all over if that man had joined himself to his brother; but Claudius Nero, together with Livius Salinator, conquered this man too as he was pitching camp. Nero had driven Hannibal into the farthest corners of Italy. Livius had turned the standards toward an entirely opposite region and the very jaws of nascent Italy. With so great--that is, with the entire length of Italy--an expanse of soil lying between, it is difficult to say by what plan and speed the consuls joined their camps and, after bringing their standards together, crushed an unsuspecting enemy. Certainly, when Hannibal learned the matter and saw his brother's severed head thrown before his camp, he said, “I recognize the misfortune of Carthage.” This was that man's first confession, not without a certain foreboding of impending fate. But nothing was more wonderful than that, while Hannibal still clung to Italy, Scipio was sent into Africa.

These things Florus says, fully and truly, in praise of his Romans. But if at the beginning they had expended even half the care and expense, it would have been easy for them to rout Hannibal--indeed, to occupy Africa. Saguntum was captured; armies were lost at the Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae; cities of Italy were alienated, captured, and turned against the Romans; fields were devastated and villas burned. Only then did they fight in earnest and send armies into Africa. Ought this not to have been done at the beginning? Upon hearing that Saguntum was being besieged, they ought to have prepared a strong army for Spain, a stronger one to meet Hannibal, and the strongest to attack Africa. This was easy while their affairs were intact; after they had been cut down it was arduous, but nevertheless it was done.

Greater was the error of the Constantinopolitan emperors throughout the time when Turkish power was growing. They never resisted it in earnest, though the error could still have been corrected around the time of the siege of Byzantium. For if Palaeologus had been willing to spend even the tenth part of his gold, he could have made from the Christian kingdoms an army equal to the Turkish one. But they brooded over buried gold, of which they were afterward not only stripped, but many were also cut to pieces by tortures so that they might reveal it. Nor was the error of the Christian kings smaller. There were six thousand Greek soldiers and three thousand Venetians and Genoese; in the harbor were seven Genoese ships, three Cretan, and some from Chios. The Venetian fleet looked on, as did all the Christian princes, who afterward paid great penalties for their negligence by the loss of so many kingdoms. But then, if each king had sent three ships, each prince one ship, and each city two soldiers as aid, we would still hold Greece, Macedonia, the islands, and Hungary. Yet we continue in the same error: we do not give a part of our resources in time to ward off the enemy, soon to give all. How slowly, how meagerly, and not without harsh conditions were subsidies decreed for the Hungarian war some years ago? I do not speak of those who secretly conspired with the Turk. And yet no one now doubts that, if Pannonia is occupied and the Hajduks and other Hungarians are let loose into Germany, we shall fight for all our fortunes and our liberty.

For if the power now necessary for the frontier princes is not assembled, after their provinces have been occupied they will oppress us by means of the resources seized and the nations conquered. Nor will those nations be gentler toward us, but will exact penalties for the aid denied them; and those who were first the shield of the German Empire will begin to be thorns in our sides. Let these observations suffice in general concerning the necessity of power and its just and timely use.

CHAPTER III

Power Is Twofold: Domestic and External

§ 1. Political writers distinguish a twofold power: domestic and external. Domestic power is directed against seditions, conspiracies, and rebellions of citizens which are against the state, the prince, the senate, or one part against another part. External power is directed against neighboring states or kings, either to repel or to inflict force.

§ 2. There cannot be firm power against an external enemy unless there is also power against an internal one. For every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate, and house will fall upon house. For only a united city has strength against an enemy. For this reason the Romans, who were always unwarlike at home, if danger threatened, created a dictator and reduced everyone to order. But I have dealt with this subject when I treated monarchy and concord.

§ 3. Domestic power is acquired and preserved with greater difficulty than external power, because you will much more easily find one who conquers an enemy than one who governs a citizen. An enemy can be overcome by strength, stratagem, anger, vigilance, or fraud; a citizen is governed only by prudence and virtue.

§ 4. Hence there is no domestic power unless you are feared and loved. It is necessary to be feared, because no one will perform his duty from love

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if he loves himself more; but each person is more attached to himself than to another. Therefore, when the matter so falls out that your prosperity must be sought at his own danger, expense, and labor, each will begin his affection from himself and put the prince second. Yet it is necessary to be loved. For if the prince, the senate, or the state is in danger, no one will be afraid; for we do not fear those who themselves are afraid and are placed amid great difficulties. Therefore, when fear has been removed through contempt, if love is absent they will wholly desert the man whom they neither love nor fear; and if by chance they hate him, they will pursue him.

§ 5. If I must speak the truth freely, the thought of all those who court power seems most foolish. For if they desire to be powerful solely for the public safety or the divine glory, so that they may protect the good and restrain the wicked, I praise their royal spirit, because it devotes its life to justice. For every dominion is of brief life. Ecclesiasticus, chapter 10, verse 11. Few non-Christian princes were safe from their own people; most were killed. There has been absolutely no one, among those who have merely tasted command, who did not endure many plots and conspiracies. Since I have demonstrated this by many examples, let us now treat of acquiring and increasing power.

CHAPTER IV

In What Power Consists, and Concerning Its Head, Which Is Authority

§ 1. The strength of the state consists in piety and the virtues; next, in those things which follow the virtues in government. The first of these is authority, or reputation and majesty; next, the love of the citizens; third, resources, arms, men, citadels, and cities--for the most prudent kings established these things as defenses of their subjects. Let us now treat of authority.

§ 2. When *auctoritas* is taken in its strict sense among the Romans, it is a judgment of the Senate made when, either because of the small number of senators, or because of tribunician intercession, or for some other cause, a senatus-consult could not be made. They deny that it has a Greek name, for αὐθεντία is something greater, and αὐθέντης is more than an author. For both in civil law and in common speech those things are called αὐθεντικά which possess no half-complete authority, or which have been confirmed and ratified by the supreme magistrate. For in truth αὐθεντία in law, unless it is ἐκ τῆς αὐτεξουσίας, from plenary power, is empty. Written authority, if I may so speak, has no authority today.

Majesty is akin to authority. For we are not treating strictly of majesty, which embraces five heads: the right of enacting and repealing laws, of war and peace, of tributes, of coinage, and of conferring magistracies. Rather, we take the authority and majesty of a prince for the esteem in which he is held, his reputation, and, as they now say, his good repute. This indeed is opposed to contempt, but nevertheless embraces many things: love, reputation, praise, fear, reverence, and the goods by which these are produced. That prince is most powerful who holds his subjects devoted to him by paternal power, and foreigners by reputation and esteem.

§ 3. Even a private man who neglects his reputation is cruel; but a prince is the guardian alike of his reputation and of his safety. It was truly said to this effect: "The resources of a ruler then become richer when he remits and acquires treasures of reputation, neglecting the utility of money." And Augustine says, "He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation is cruel." For in truth to attack a person's reputation is a kind of homicide; but he who corrupts the reputation of the state is held guilty of a crime against majesty. You must therefore be solicitous for reputation if you delight to act as prince. "Praise is not to be blamed, but acting for its sake," says the Bishop of Hippo. But I shall remove this scruple for you, O prince. A prince ought to act even for the sake of praise--not so that he may stop at an empty thing, for why would so great a man grasp at a shadow?--but so that he may use good reputation for the salvation of the people. For if we can gather money and kill men for the public good, why should the prince not seek reputation for that use? A field does not become better by being praised, and a shadow, the companion of the body, does not make it safer; but reputation alone nevertheless often makes a prince safe and the state secure.

More things are accomplished by opinion than by reality. What if there is so great an opinion of you that you disperse present battles, that an enemy does not dare provoke you, and that by terror alone you bring wars to an end? When Curios and popular agitators undermine and overthrow the state by disparaging the lives of kings and nobles, why will you not preserve it by your praise? Nor is it secret that the reputation of princes is burned by the flames of hatred and obscured by the cloud of envy. For there are always some whom a prince necessarily offends, and those men are not accustomed to speak well of one against whom they think themselves rightly angry. A prince must therefore labor so that public reputation overwhelms the little voices of private men. It is most quickly acquired; once lost, it is not rekindled; once firmly established, it endures even against vices. Solomon, already degenerate, nevertheless retained his kingdom through his reputation for wisdom; and if Rehoboam had wished to learn the first precepts of ruling, he would have handed it intact to his son also. Reputation is the companion of virtue, a benefit of God, with regard to which kingdoms are generally given and taken away. For the care of majesty belongs as much to virtue as does political order, which cannot exist without majesty.

§ 4. Therefore let the prince protect and increase his own greatness and loftiness, which the Greeks are accustomed to call σεμνότητα, so that in very fact he may be σεβασίος, venerable. For this dignity of the state is not removed without loss to its safety. Unless a veneration of majesty, and an opinion that the prince is worthy of it, has been implanted in the minds of those who obey, the city has already received a wound greater than opinion; for soon those voices will resound: “Can this man save us?” Thus they neither desire him to be safe, since they hope their own affairs will be better through his death, nor undergo dangers for him, since they prefer themselves to him. By every means let him be so approachable that he nevertheless preserves dignity, provided that swelling does not pass under the name of dignity. Such swelling is in those who stride toward empty glory through their own and others’ disasters--men of whom I have spoken elsewhere--who do not shudder to destroy entire nations for a few laurel leaves.

§ 5. You will acquire the reputation for power--which is almost as necessary as power itself--by the method which I shall transmit in this book: namely, that the things which you acquire for the public be known. Conscience will make you tranquil; virtue, good; reputation, known as excellent and venerable. The first thing, therefore, is that your life be such as the reputation you desire; for it is difficult in a prince, who stands in the sight of many, to wish to appear one thing and to be another. Although he may perhaps deceive some at some time, he will never deceive all. Hence no wicked man has long possessed a good reputation. Reputation is a great bridle upon those about to act badly when laws are neglected.

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Alexander valued reputation more highly than his deeds, yet he obtained a reputation as bad as it was great. What did Augustus not do for reputation? He fostered the talents of his age in every way, though he was offended if anything was composed about him except seriously and by the most excellent writers, as Tranquillus relates. Yet what was accomplished? Those encomia of Augustus by the most excellent writers have perished; more survives concerning his vices and disgraces. Therefore, even this part of reputation belongs to the prince: to cultivate virtue and not court reputation except insofar as it is salutary to the fatherland. For it is as dishonorable for virtue to be the slave of glory as of pleasures, unless through glory it serves the fatherland or God.

Nor do I approve Themistocles, whom the trophy of Miltiades roused. I would prefer that the love of his citizens had done it; but because he was far from a vain heart, he was incited to dangers by a tree trunk when he could not be incited by Athens, the nurse of virtues. This very substance of glory also must be avoided, as a mark of a petty spirit. By it Trajan, an emperor otherwise not numbered among the bad, made himself contemptible; for he inscribed his own name upon the buildings of the ancients whenever they had been restored, so that, not without reason, by the judgment of a great emperor he was called wall-pellitory. This, therefore, is the foundation of reputation, as it is of command: to follow virtue without the reward of reputation, and to pursue reputation only as an instrument of the public safety.

§ 6. Divine providence conciliates this esteem among subjects and foreigners. For it is a gift of God, like every kind of power; so too is this part which consists in another’s opinion. With it God fortified his servant Abraham amid the fiercest and strongest nations, for the people of Heth said to him, “You are a prince of God among us.” Thus he protected Israel after the slaughter of the Shechemites, Genesis 35: “And when they had departed, the terror of God invaded all the cities round about, and they did not dare pursue those who were departing.” Thus Joshua also grew strong, chapter 5:1: “Therefore, after all the kings of the Amorites who dwelt beyond the Jordan toward the western region, and all the kings of Canaan who possessed the places bordering the great sea, heard that the Lord had dried the streams of the Jordan before the sons of Israel until they crossed, their heart was dissolved and no spirit remained in them because they feared the entry of the sons of Israel.” Thus Jehoshaphat too was safe, 2 Chronicles 20:29: “And the dread of the Lord rushed upon all the kingdoms of the lands when they heard that the Lord had fought against the enemies of Israel. And the kingdom of Jehoshaphat was quiet, and God gave him peace round about.”

On the contrary, the greatest kingdoms, when deprived of God’s protection, and their kings lived in perpetual fear. Consider the Roman Empire: plots at home, wars abroad; the most wretched peoples--the Triballi, Thracians, and

others--plucked at it. Now the Turkish Empire is ravaged by Hajduks, Cossacks, Arabs, Cilicians, and pirates. The Persian Empire, and indeed its national capital, Babylon, the wonder of the world, was attacked by the Persians, a people hitherto servile and rustic. The Macedonians, a foul nation known only through contempt except insofar as it had grown under King Philip by brigandage and fraud, cast down the Persians after they had been placed at the summit.

§ 7. In order that the prince may also protect his own esteem, it will greatly contribute that he judge and enact laws in such a manner that he retracts nothing. In this matter Justinian, however much he benefited others, greatly harmed himself, since his jurists set up and took down laws. Next, in public let him always act gravely and in accordance with his dignity. For it contributes greatly to authority when magnates, whom the people admire and regard with awe, serve the prince so humbly. Third, whether in public, in the senate, or even in private council, let him rarely speak unless after reflection, but in such a way that he does not incur a reputation for pride or stupidity. Let them not imitate Pallas, who from the basest slave became the proudest master and did not deign to speak to any of his household. At home he never signified anything except by a nod or his hand, or, if more things had to be indicated, in writing, lest he associate his voice with theirs. Fourth, if his countenance is not venerable, let him nevertheless contrive always to be serious and never readily moved to laughter. Fifth, let his voice be grave, his jest nonexistent unless sharp, and his clothing without fastidiousness, costly beneath the measure of his dignity. Let his gait be grave and slow; his riding attended by austere dignity, so that even among his ministers the manner of doing all things may be deliberate, without disorderly running about.

Sixth, let him have few intimate familiars, joke with some, and reveal secrets--and this cautiously; for most such men either disclose them to others and boast of their familiarity with the prince, thus procuring envy for themselves and a reputation for imprudence for the prince, especially if they are not good men. Rare is the good fortune by which princes have many good men around them. King Attalus said that images must be viewed from a distance; and surely rarity produces admiration, while satiety with familiarity makes men less revered. Seventh, let him take the greatest care--something few even good princes have taken care to do--not to seem to be governed by one or two men. For people venerate such a man as prince and hold the prince for a statue. Hence came the hatred of all kings against those kings--Sejanus, Plautianus, and those whom in our own age we see to have paid the penalties of power. For whatever is administered, even rightly, is hateful to the nobles because the author of the counsel is hated. Eighth, in receiving embassies too, let there be splendid modesty, so that he may seem to shun luxury and love dignity. It belongs to petty women to shine with the whole treasury. Augustus was content with his customary clothing and dwelling. Alexander Severus sold his gems because he said that command was situated in virtue, not adornment. Let him in no way display his treasures to visiting ambassadors, for they interpret it as pride and conceive envy if it is immense; if moderate, they despise it. And they judge the prince a fool who values small things greatly.

CHAPTER V

That Riches Must Be Sought for the Prince

§ 1. I have already detested an avaricious prince above, when I was treating liberality, and I detest him now also. Nevertheless, I require a provident and well-funded prince; indeed, I affirm that industry in accumulating riches is one of the principal virtues of princes. Nor do those men offend slightly who establish such a government that the treasury is always empty. This, therefore, must now be demonstrated by me: that this is pious and holy, and the duty of the prince and of the state, so that in the discussions which follow I may treat the method of gathering resources.

§ 2. At the outset I establish this as fixed and ratified: rich men who are devastated by desires, scattered by cupidities, tormented by fears, and consumed by sorrow are not to be approved. For these are vices of men, alike in the poor, the man of moderate means, and the rich. But I assert that riches are necessary to the prince and the state. They are a gift of God, as Augustine teaches: welcome when given to private persons, necessary when given to a prince. And so the prince will desire them “for the supplements of necessity,” as Augustine speaks on Psalm 66.

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The slothful man is sent to the ant and warned of timely labor, lest he hunger in winter; where is the state to be sent, lest it abandon itself? Those who have money do not sin, but those who love it excessively. Indeed, riches are possessed more safely and better in proportion as they are loved less. Nor let them set before me the apostolic threat: “They who desire to become rich fall into temptation.” Augustine answers for me in book 1, chapter 10 of *The City of God*: “Surely he censures cupidity in riches, not the means themselves.” For although private persons with difficulty hold resources without loving them, the state can more easily employ them as instruments of virtue and defenses of protection. “I do not know,” says Augustine, “how it is that, when superfluous and earthly things are loved, they bind more tightly once obtained than when desired.” But this arises from the fact that money is sought by private persons to fulfill their own desires, by the prince for the safety of the state.

§ 3. From the foundation of the world we have David, Solomon, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah as the wisest of all kings. What was gathered for the temple demonstrates the resources of David, 1 Chronicles 22:14: “Behold, in my poverty I have prepared for the expenses of the house of the Lord one hundred thousand talents of gold and one million talents of silver; but of bronze and iron there is no weight, for number is overcome by magnitude; timber and stones I have prepared for all the expenses.” Concerning his manifold treasuries, 1 Chronicles 27:25: “Over the king’s treasuries was Azmaveth the son of Adiel. But over those treasuries which were in the cities, villages, and towers was Jonathan the son of Uzziah.” Behold: first, the king’s treasuries; second, in the cities; third, in the villages; fourth, in the towers. Add the fields and livestock. Behold a king possessing so many treasuries and nevertheless not avaricious, but liberal and gentle, who was accustomed to sing before the Lord: “Blessed is he who understands concerning the needy and poor; in the evil day the Lord will deliver him.” For the treasure was preserved for the needy, the poor, and the whole people.

It is fruitless to say a few things about Solomon because many are found everywhere. 1 Kings 10:26: “And Solomon gathered chariots and horsemen, and he had one thousand four hundred chariots and twelve thousand horsemen.” And in 2 Chronicles 9 he is said to have been richer than all kings and to have furnished in Jerusalem an abundance of silver as great as that of stones.

I have spoken above about the riches of Jehoshaphat and about his army.

Scripture proclaims the riches of Hezekiah, 2 Chronicles 32:27: “But Hezekiah was rich and exceedingly renowned, and he gathered for himself very many treasures of silver and gold, precious stones, spices, arms of every kind, and vessels of great price; storehouses also of grain, wine, and oil, stalls of all beasts of burden and folds of cattle. And he

built cities for himself; he also had innumerable flocks of sheep and herds, because the LORD had given him exceedingly great substance.”

The piety and zeal of Josiah, indeed, are praised in Scripture more than his resources; nevertheless, the power by which he removed every abomination from the land and even the high places--something no king before had done--shows that he was rich. And he restored such a Passover as had never been, in which from the king's substance he himself gave thirty thousand head of small livestock and three thousand oxen. Nor is it a small sign of power that he met Pharaoh Necho as he proceeded against the Assyrians. For without doubt Necho's army, which he was leading against a most powerful king, was immense; yet Josiah did not think himself unequal to it, and perhaps would have conquered if the Lord had not disapproved the expedition.

It is madness to accuse such men of bad administration, and those greatly err who think it royal to give gold but not to preserve it. It must be given and preserved; both are necessary. But it cannot be given with reason unless it is preserved. Yet if one pleases to accuse these men, what shall we do with Joseph, who furnished Pharaoh's palace with immense revenues? For he received money, livestock, and fields, and finally the fifth part of the annual crops. Why did he furnish the king with so great an abundance of resources if those riches did not belong to the art of ruling? I truly judge that the entire public revenue of the Romans was a small part of Pharaoh's resources, if every kind of crop is considered. For, first, six hundred thousand men dwelt in the land of Goshen, and those men were Israelites. There were as many Egyptians, so that altogether they were 1,200,000. Add as many adult women: they will be 2,400,000. You will double this number by the young boys and girls and by servants, so that in Goshen alone there were 4,800,000. The fifth part of these would be at least 900,000, whom Pharaoh could maintain from the fifth part of the land of Goshen alone. For if the whole land suffices for the whole people, then a fifth part suffices for a fifth. Indeed, very much grain was exported into neighboring and distant kingdoms. If, therefore, so great was the revenue from the land of Goshen alone, how great was it from all Egypt?

§ 4. Nor does reason advise otherwise: “You are worth as much as you have.” If resources are lacking, friends will be lacking; no one readily inclines himself toward an unhappy lot. For many avoid meeting needy and indebted princes because they fear that loans of money may be sought from them. Mucianus truly said that money is the sinew of command. Resources are needed; without them nothing will be done which must be done. All things are purchasable with money, and Rome found a buyer, as Jugurtha predicted. If you possess money in the enemy camp and in his councils, you will have friends, if not sincere, at least useful. For what is wiser than that saying?

Ἀργυρέαις λόγχαις μάχου, καὶ πάντα κρατήσεις.

“Fight with silver spears, and you will conquer all things.” Therefore, he who has not gathered money deprives himself of the short way to victory. Nor let the speech of ancient simplicity move you: “Not trafficking in war, but waging war.” Rather, redeeming war--for why should I not conquer by the expenditure of money rather than blood? If an ass laden with gold can capture a citadel, I shall preserve the army intact.

But riches are necessary not only in war but also in peace. Of those who attach themselves to a prince, many desire to be honored, most to be gilded. Therefore, a prince ought to give; and because he needs the faithful service of many, to give lavishly. But the fountain of liberality is thrift.

§ 5. Those who say that they rely upon virtue alone and deny that gold should be trusted employ a specious but fallacious speech. It is not a prince's virtue to strip himself of means and the state of defenses. Gold is not to be trusted, but used; and in order that you may use it, it must be possessed. For since the services and fidelity of many are necessary to a prince, and they place virtue after gold, they must be held by gifts. And this belongs to virtue: to draw each man by his own pleasure, as though by bait, to perform his duty.

An old saying of Cyrus and of others who flourished in the praise of prudence is also circulated and pronounced amid the applause of young men: "Friends are treasures." Thus Alexander too answered Darius that Darius had enclosed his treasures within a citadel, but that he himself possessed no treasures except the hearts of his friends.

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Yet the event shows that these words were spoken for appearance, from a display of generous confidence, and more to conciliate the hearts of friends than from the heart. For Alexander gathered gold in that madness: "Thirty thousand mules carry your captive gold," the noble defendant casts against him. And although he plundered so much, it is wonderful that he gave so little. But let us examine his treasures. Which of his friends did not plot against him? Which prince did not participate in extinguishing his stock? Not to speak, indeed, of those whom the king's vices had provoked: he did not retain the hearts of his soldiers when the hope of resources had collapsed. Let the turning-back from the journey out of India be read in Curtius. Everyone will understand that without the hope of money he accomplished absolutely nothing, and without money little. What then? Do you think that anyone from Macedonia would have followed without that lure, when we so often read that his soldiers, after squandering their gifts and their own plunder, demanded a return? When the Argyraspids, in order to redeem their baggage, delivered their own commander Eumenes to the enemy?

The same thing which is done among the standards is sought in the forum and senate house. Few defend a needy man. The soldier must bring arms into the field, the prince money. Among so many peoples scarcely one fidelity is found; minds must be retained by coin. In order that this may be done, the treasury must be cared for. If anyone is a friend without hope of money--and surely he is rare--he nevertheless must be enriched: both because it is expedient for the prince that a man of so faithful a spirit should be as powerful as possible, and because poverty ought not to be the penalty for so generous a will. Friends, therefore, are treasures, but they must be fostered and raised up, lest the condition of enemies seem better with the prince. "But when I have enriched my friends, they themselves will succor me when I am needy." Julian was never desirous of increasing money, which he thought was kept more securely among its owners. But these things can persuade only boys. I seek serious things. I believe neither Marcellinus when he praises Julian nor Constantine when he prosecutes him. I shall not believe that Julian was not desirous of money, since I know that he stuffed his coffers through the persecution of Christians and confiscations. At times he feigned philosophy in words and deeds; at other times he was accustomed to mock Christians when they complained of injury, saying that Christ had commended poverty and that they would be blessed by it.

But if we consider the state as it is ordinarily constituted, a prince in danger will not easily seek protection from the friends to whom he gave riches in prosperity. For even then he made them friends only by giving; and now by asking or plundering he will make them enemies. He will also find many who would prefer that the prince should not exist rather than that they should be poor for his sake. Caligula and Nero squandered all things through largesses and luxury; did they therefore find a friend? If we speak of good and just princes, I seek one example thus far of a prince whom friends mindful of a benefit restored to his former condition, unless either the hope of greater gain enticed liberality or fear of greater loss extorted their money. Hope must therefore be placed in friends with the knowledge that there is more protection in those who hope for new benefits than in those from whom gratitude is requested.

§ 6. The care of gathering resources rests not only upon the prince but also upon him to whom the succession looks, who by some right can come to the principate. For since all things obey money, it is certain that there is nothing which does not obey, except virtue. All things, I say, obey money--even money already received obeys that which is hoped for, the former money the future; all things obey, even the enemy's arms and even the money of the enemy treasury, if more is hoped for from you. Hence many have attained the principate by money. "Queen Money bestows both birth and kingdom." Thucydides, book 1, relates that Pelops, by the Asiatic money which he had brought as a foreigner, obtained among poor men first reputation and favor, then a kingdom. Didius Julianus purchased the empire from the soldiers, Herodian, book 2. Manlius formerly attempted the same; and, something at which you will marvel, the sons of Brutus were made Tarquin's men by hope of rewards. Tarquinius Priscus obtained command, although the sons of

Ancus were disregarded, by an honorable use of money. Nor did anything different thereafter occur in the state: canvassing for office, although suppressed by so many laws, trials, and punishments, was absent from no elections.

The annual contests return venal to the Field.

The reason is that all seek a prince for themselves rather than for the state. They most desire that man to have power from whom they hope for most.

Virtue, reputation, honor, things divine and human obey
splendid riches. He who has amassed them
will be renowned, brave, just, wise, even a king;
and whatever he wishes, he will hope that this, as though procured by virtue,
will redound to his great praise.

Even prudent men judge thus. For if he enlarged his estate while in a private station, and was kind and generous to friends, what will he do in the principate? Consider that, in proportion as each man's estate is well provided, so his friends are firm; if his estate totters, his friends likewise collapse. An estate finds friends; an estate advances a man to kingship. I do not say these things in order to teach that command must be sought by evil arts and largesses, but to impress upon a prince how great is the force of an estate well arranged at home for obtaining his right. Moreover, command is retained and acquired by the same arts. Resources are an eminent instrument of civil affairs.

Thus Aristotle, *Politics* 1.8. After saying τὴν κτητικήν, the art of acquisition, to be a part of household management which supplies things necessary for life and useful to the community of the city, he adds:

καίτοι κἄν οὐδ' ἀληθινῶς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἴη· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας·

Πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

κεῖται γὰρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης, οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει· ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πληθὺς ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

True riches seem to consist of these things, for the sufficiency from such possession for a blessed life is not infinite, as Solon expressed in verse: "No limit of riches has been established for men." Yet there is a limit, as in the other arts; for no instrument of any art is infinite, either in multitude or magnitude. Riches, however, are a multitude of household and political instruments. But the state has need of very many instruments; therefore, unless it prefers to be prey, they must be acquired in due season.

§ 7. I contend not only that the prince or the state ought to be rich, but also its administrators--not because I judge that unfit rich men should be admitted to the helm, for thence follow those evils which Gregorio Tolosano prudently noted in book 5, chapter 1, §25. Plato, he said, called the constitution of the few that polity in which magistracies are distributed to citizens according to the valuation of their property, and in which the rich rule, while the poor have no participation in the state. Thus, the more money and property qualifications bestow honors, the more base virtue becomes; and men, following one another's example, are more intent upon amassing money than upon good morals, while the good poor are excluded. Hence also follows

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the corruption of that state, no differently than a ship is not safe from danger of shipwreck when a rich man ignorant of the art is placed over its navigation, while a needy man more skilled in governing is by no means admitted. Soon thereafter one state begins to become two: one of the rich, the other of the poor; and it always happens that men dwelling within the same walls plot against one another. Another evil follows: the rich always gape after the means of

the poorer, oppress them by usuries, compel them to sell, and make them altogether beggars, thieves, robbers, plunderers, and finally seditious conspirators who seize the state. But I would have administrators instructed and chosen, for they can aid the state; and because they are participants in honor and government, they also wish to aid it.

CHAPTER VI

Various Methods of Acquiring Riches

§ 1. Since the zeal for acquisition is natural, and many princes are more readily found who fall into avarice and cupidity than those who incline toward liberality--even those who desire to be considered liberal and magnificent, for such men exact more importunately what they do not bestow well--it is nevertheless wonderful that it frequently happens that the greatest empires lack money. Perpetual complaints are read concerning the straits of the Roman treasury. Amid mountains of gold the kings of the Persians lacked money in the war against the Greeks; and in the one thing in which they were superior, in that one thing they were conquered. In our time too we see the same thing happen to the very wealthy kings of the Spains: many opportunities lost, many defeats received, and various mutinies of soldiers because their stipends were delayed or unpaid, while meanwhile the States of Holland generally kept their soldiers at their duty.

In the Roman Empire also we have learned by experience that certain princes, although ruling no great territories, gathered treasures, while others whose dominions were many times broader struggled with perpetual want. Let the deeds of two distinguished German prelates and princes be considered: Julius of Würzburg and Theodore of Paderborn. Each erected citadels, academies, and a church; furnished his treasury with money and storehouses with provisions; recovered mortgaged possessions and added new ones. For the increases of each bishopric are so great that another prince could be maintained from what they added. Meanwhile, others, neither exceeding them in greater splendor of court nor oppressed by war, burdened richer dominions with debt.

It is greatly to be marveled at that around the year of Christ 800, when the Eastern Empire was already considerably diminished and Basil was reigning, nevertheless there were riches so great that they were scarcely found in the whole Roman Empire except when it flourished greatly. Zonaras relates that he filled the whole treasury, and even its approaches and passages, with money heaped densely together. "He had," he says, "in the treasuries two hundred thousand talents of gold. For the sum of the other money could not be reckoned, so that he buried it in the earth, the treasuries or repositories being everywhere filled. Indeed, he also had small chests full of precious stones and gems, among them those which shine and which we properly call pearls." What do those two hundred thousand talents of gold amount to? Precisely twelve hundred million. If any king now possessed twelve hundred million, he would easily obtain command of the world if he wished to use it.

Benjamin the Jew saw Constantinople around the year 1200 and relates: "In that city," he says, "I saw things and resources beyond telling. For tributes are brought annually into the Prince's palace, with which towers are filled with scarlet and purple clothing and with gold, so that nowhere upon earth can a comparable example of accumulated money be found." It is even affirmed that the tax of that city alone, collected from markets of merchandise for sale, the harbor, and the dues of merchants, amounted to twenty thousand gold pieces every day. Considering these things, it is my intention to transmit a method of χρηματοποιίας, the production of wealth--not because the treasurers and counselors of princes know no more methods, but because they know no better ones. For while they hasten to enrich the treasury and themselves, they disarm the state. For since the expenditures are great, and since the state needs very great support, just as a vast body needs abundant nourishment, they seek to accelerate this and, by their voracity and gluttony, produce diseases far more dangerous than those arising from abstinence and thrift. The tenth penny was the occasion of rebellion in Belgium; and now, if you ask the Confederates about the tenth penny, they will answer truly that it is well with them if they retain the tenth penny.

§ 2. A method of increasing the treasury is either honorable or dishonorable. The honorable is likewise threefold: honorable and burdensome to subjects, as tribute; honorable and not burdensome to subjects, as an accurate account of receipts and expenditures; honorable and useful to subjects, as sumptuary laws, agriculture, and lending. A wicked and

fraudulent χρηματιστικήν, art of acquiring money, is likewise threefold. One kind is openly unjust and public theft, such as usury and unjust oppressions. Another is not indeed unjust, yet is hateful and unbecoming to a prince: as if you should enact a law that no one should wear a silk garment, and then dissemble until the law begins freely to be violated, meanwhile punishing the transgressors with a fine through informers whom you have assigned. Another kind is neither unjust nor hateful, but sordid and productive of contempt, as when Vespasian collected a tax upon urine. In an honorable tribute and in other measures there can also intervene some things which introduce injustice; indeed, even in measures which are not burdensome and are useful, certain hateful things can occur and appear, as it were, sordid.

Hence general rules must be observed by the prince. First, never is even a three-ounce coin to be exacted from subjects by injustice, for both the prince and the counselors who advised it are bound to restitution. Second, when money is justly exacted, but in a hateful manner and with infamy and some mark of disgrace, that method must be used only from necessity; for more harm is done by hatred than advantage gained by profit. Third, when a gain is sordid, let a moderate necessity make it honorable. For why should you not sell urine so that a subject may be defended and a poor man not die? Fourth, among the honorable kinds of enriching the treasury, that must be embraced first which benefits publicly and privately, so that by the same operation the prince and subjects become rich. Fifth, secondly, that method must be embraced which benefits the state and harms no private person, such as that concerning the auditing of accounts. Sixth, only at the last must one come to this: that even subjects be burdened, lest the state suffer loss, but in such a way that all recognize that the money is expended, not upon the prince's kindred or his pleasures, but upon the advantages of each person. Barneveldt advised the gravest exactions in Holland when he said, "It is better that the fatherland be burdened than lost," as he admits in his *Apology*, although amid and from those burdens both he and others gathered immense resources. But let us now examine each kind.

CHAPTER VII

That Tributes Are Lawfully Paid, and Their Measure

§ 1. The ancients ingeniously appointed Saturn as guardian of money--sluggish, slow, morose,

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scarcely opening the coffer once in the great year; but over collection, as over every gain, they appointed Mercury. For he, equally welcome to those above and those below, swifter than the rushing east wind when he puts on his winged sandals, runs over lands, seas, and the lower regions themselves, and sometimes even puts the heavens themselves up for auction; from everywhere he gathers what the never-sated greed of Saturn may store away. So it is: greedy courtiers repeatedly prescribe tributes at every movement and every opportunity, and run about with their Mercury's wand. Let us therefore speak of this defense, not of the spoliation of the state.

§ 2. The power of imposing tributes is granted to the state, that is, to the authority which is supreme. At Rome the Senate exercised the right of striking coin, and therefore there was also the inscription S.C., that is, *senatus consulto*, "by decree of the Senate." The matter was then entrusted to the monetary triumvirs, who marked the coin by their own authority and indicated it by these letters: III VIRI A.A.A.F.F.--*triumviri auro, argento, aere flando feriundo*, "the triumvirs for casting and striking gold, silver, and bronze." To this faculty was formerly added this right of majesty: no one except the supreme magistrate could impose tributes or exactions. Law 3, Code, *On the Establishment of New Taxes: It Is Not Permitted*. This right was formerly by no means communicated to cities. Now almost all princes and free cities use it. But I must treat not the right, which is clear, but the manner.

§ 3. Customary and moderate customs duties, revenues of public land, and tributes are not to be remitted, although they annually yield ten times more than is expended upon roads, bridges, magistrates, and rewards for brave men. For the preparation for a single war will consume more than the peace of many years. Cicero complains to Atticus of the diminution of taxes: the port duties of Italy removed, the division of the Campanian land impending, and even the twentieth part to be taken away. Honorius and Arcadius, Theodosius and Valentinian, provided that taxes not be diminished. Nero attempted it with youthful impulse, but was restrained by prudent men, Tacitus, *Annals* 13; for they repeatedly said that the strength of the empire would be broken. But the freedmen easily shook that thought from him, since they inflamed him toward plunder.

§ 4. The cause of taxes ought to be just. Thus Novel 149:

If any of them--that is, of the magistrates--has conducted himself negligently in the exaction of public tributes, or has involved our taxpayers in losses or insulting injuries, he shall at once fall from his goods and be subjected to the supreme punishment. For, with God as our guide, this one concern is ours: that the provinces be governed by good laws, inhabited in safety, enjoy the justice of their governors, and that public tributes be paid without complaint. For otherwise it is impossible that the state be preserved if the sacred tributes are not paid. The military forces, receiving thence the salary assigned them, resist enemies and vindicate the taxpayers from the incursions and savagery of barbarians; finally, by keeping watch they defend fields and cities from the incursions of robbers and others who pursue a disorderly manner of life. From these tributes the remaining cohorts also receive what has been assigned to them; walls and cities are likewise restored; the heating of public baths proceeds thence; finally spectacles and all other things invented for the delight of individuals are cared for from the same source, so that what is contributed by them is expended and laid out partly upon them, partly on their behalf. But it falls to us to possess nothing except the care of these things, yet not without reward, since that great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, from the greatness of his clemency, rewards us with very many goods on this account.

And Novel 16, title *On Provincial Governors*, chapter 2:

The thought of securing these things by law came to us because the wealth and well-being of our subjects is of greater value to us than the revenues which are thereby brought into the empire. For together with the largesses of the governors we also reduce the fees paid into the imperial accounts, which produced a great heap of money, in order that this cause and the state may obtain a better outcome and return richer, freed from the payments devised by certain persons some time ago. For this one matter is the concern of our power: that the provinces be governed by good laws and inhabited safely, and also obtain the fruit of the justice of their governors, and that public tributes be paid without complaint. For otherwise it is not possible to preserve the state unless the payments are most dutifully brought into the public treasury; from them military forces are maintained so that enemies may be resisted and watches kept throughout fields and cities; likewise the other orders are furnished with the salaries assigned them, walls and cities are repaired, and finally all the other things arise which preserve the common utility of the subjects.

For since the prince presides over the body like its head, he ought to employ reason and love when receiving sustenance from the other members, and to remember that he is carried by the members and will fall when they languish.

Hadrian certainly remitted debts owed to the treasury. Spartianus.

Cato restrained embezzlement, as Plutarch relates in his life.

Tiberius answered that gold collected with the affliction of subjects and offered to him was adulterated and poisoned.

Masinissa made all Numidia exceedingly abundant from being uncultivated.

Philip, the father of Perseus, increased the revenues of the kingdom by agriculture and the digging of mines.

Through the harshness of contributions the English lost Aquitaine, and Alfonso's heirs Naples.

Hybicas used to say to Antony: "If you want two collections, grant two harvests." Plutarch, *Antony*.

For subjects are bound to contribute nothing other than what suffices for the honorable maintenance of the prince and the defense of the state. Magistrates receive tribute so that they may be guardians and defenders of justice. Nor is it the will of the people, nor can it prudently be, that they contribute so great resources for no or slight advantage of their own.

John de Salas, most learned in theology and law, rightly warns in *On Laws*, treatise 14, disputation 15, section 10, that it is most difficult to judge concerning the justice of a tribute:

It is exceedingly difficult to judge that a tribute imposed upon non-exempt subjects by a legitimate prince is unjust, because all private persons cannot judge the cause which moved the prince to impose the tribute. For it is often hidden and just. Often also it can seem to have ceased because it was temporary, or certainly because it is not put into execution as had been decreed or promised; and nevertheless the tribute is not immediately unjust, either because another cause has arisen or because the prince, beset by other actions or burdens, is compelled to cease from one work so that another more urgent one may be accomplished. Next, it is difficult to condemn a tribute from a defect of distribution alone: both because the manner of distributing can scarcely be established when a tribute is imposed simply upon some kind of thing and it is incidental whether it is sold or bought by these or those persons; and also because, if some greater burden from a tribute falls upon certain persons, it is customarily compensated through other means, such as by increasing the price of other things.

Hence mere uncertainty concerning the cause and the other conditions required for the justice of a tribute is not sufficient for the obligation of paying the tribute to cease, because knowledge of these matters does not

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belong to every particular person; and the prince, who possesses universal prudence, can be moved by many just reasons which cannot readily become known to others. Hence I say that a merely negative doubt is not of itself

sufficient to excuse one from payment of tribute. For it is often founded solely upon ignorance of the reasons or conditions of the tribute, which is not sufficient against the action performed; and because in doubt the presumption favors the prince, unless it is otherwise established that he is a tyrant. Otherwise ordinary people could never be bound, because of themselves they would always doubt unless they rested upon the good faith of their superiors.

Therefore Julian not unsuitably took care that tributes not be granted away through indulgences. For if people never contribute anything, war can scarcely be waged.

§ 5. When a new tribute is needed, let it rather be divided into small sums, for thus it is neither burdensome nor does it furnish astute ministers so great an occasion for theft. Cypselus had bound himself by an impious vow that he would sacrifice all the fortunes of the Corinthians; yet he did it by a mild command, for he sacrificed a tenth and thus only in the tenth year discharged his vow. Therefore the tribute paid to Antony by Asia was unjust also from the manner of demanding it, when he said: “Lest you be driven from your cities and fields”--Appian, *Civil Wars* 5--“money must be given for the use of the soldiers, and not the greatest sum, but one at the hearing of which you may willingly be at rest. In two years you gave our enemies, Cassius and Brutus, the tributes of ten years. Let these suffice for us also, except that they must be given in one year.” Gaius Sulla had furnished the example, for in the Mithridatic War he commanded that the taxes of five years be given immediately. Here the proportion of years is not observed, and the poor must necessarily be overturned from all their goods.

Golden is the judgment of Suárez, book 5, chapter 16, §1: “For if a tax is imposed upon immovable property, it ought not to exceed a moderate amount, with its fruits and the labors and expenses made upon it taken into account; for if the tribute becomes too burdensome in this respect, it will plainly be unjust. But if it is imposed upon movable things which are sold and bought or made by craft, care must be taken that such things are not of this sort, or that the tribute is small and not great, lest it redound to a greater burden upon the poor, craftsmen, or merchants than they can conveniently sustain while maintaining life and family.”

§ 6. A tax must be exacted in proportion to each person’s property and means. Otherwise the poor must necessarily be flayed, not shorn, something not even Tiberius--the cruelest of the avaricious, the most avaricious of the cruel--desired. For such men cut out the roots so that the plants do not grow again. Hence Servius established the census among the Romans, as is found in Livy, Florus, and others. The first class possessed one hundred thousand *asses*; the second, seventy thousand; the third, fifty thousand; the fourth, twenty-five thousand; the fifth, eleven thousand. A smaller valuation, or the sixth class, contained the remaining multitude. The equestrian valuation was different. The same method existed among the Athenians. Demosthenes, *On the Public Services*. Cato conducted the census avariciously, Livy 39, though he did certain things rightly, as when he assessed ornaments. For even now that man will act rightly who assesses ornaments and women’s clothing rather than the little fields and stones of countrymen; for those things too belong to their means.

Here account must also be taken of the things upon which the tax is imposed. For taxes imposed upon things conveyed for the sake of trade are unjustly extended to things intended for use, which is prohibited in the laws *Universi* and *Omnium*, Code, *On Taxes*. The Turk exacts an apparently small tribute when he plans war against Christians--one ducat from each person--but burdens his own people with another burden.

§ 7. The treasury is the collection of public goods; it is sometimes called the fisc. For the private patrimony of the prince is rarely called the treasury. The public treasury is not properly the prince’s patrimony, nor can he use it with full right except for public use. It is great praise for a prince to take from his private fisc and increase the public treasury. Thus Hadrian, according to Spartianus, forbade the goods of condemned persons to be brought into the private fisc, the whole sum being received into the public treasury. King Minyas, as Pliny, book 33, chapter 3, and Pausanias, *Boeotia*, book 9, attest, is said to have been the first to build a treasury--but among barbarians; treasuries had long before been constructed in Egypt. Thus our Suárez rightly judges in *On Laws* 5.13 that tributes must be paid

even by commutative justice. Indeed, he rightly teaches in §9 of the same place: because the debt of maintaining the king and sustaining public burdens is natural, and tribute imposed by a just law is the means of justice.

Those who doubt whether a treasury is to be possessed and increased are not worthy of the name “political writers.” Yet questions have been published concerning this matter.

§ 8. When the immense and uncertain expenditures of war must be sustained, it is better to impose men, horses, and ships; for people tolerate all these things more easily than a contribution of money. They call this kind of tribute *angaria*, when the labor of persons, horses, and oxen is demanded. Yet care must be taken in this matter that public works not be exacted at the time of plowing, harvest, vintage, or fairs, something ministers frequently do in order to elicit money. Next, they must not be compelled to carry wine, grain, and other things to a distant place. Verres used this practice, and now the mercurial agents of princes are not ignorant of it. For example, one hundred wagonloads of wine are owed to the prince; they are valued at the highest price; the subjects wish to deliver wine, not money, but they are ordered to carry it a long distance at the busiest or a rainy season.

§ 9. Care must be taken that thefts by officials do not intervene; nowhere is wrongdoing more serious. Antony and Dolabella commanded Asia to pay two hundred thousand talents; avarice and the frauds of the tax-farmers added as much again. Today also, when people consent to a contribution, additions for the collectors are appended that are far too large. Our eyes teach how great an error is committed in these matters. For most officials who are put in charge of money, although at first they are thin and juiceless like the driest sponges, and, like the cows Pharaoh saw, misshapen and wasted by leanness, such that he had never seen their like in Egypt, nevertheless soon grow fat, although the prince is reduced to the last extremity.

Lipsius thinks that in the age of the princes there were no tax-farmers in the provinces of the Caesars, for they raged too violently. Julius removed both their injuries and the injurious men themselves, permitted the fruits to be collected from the farmers, and introduced tributes. There are many examples concerning Verres which today are repeated with greater ruin.

§ 10. An even greater error occurs when revenues are pledged or given to nobles. Henry III, king of Castile, corrected this practice. Because the same execution is necessary today, take the history as follows from Mariana, book 3, chapter 7.

Henry, the third king of Castile by that name, a man of lofty spirit, followed this course: when he was older and possessed of prudence, he freed the revenues seized by the nobles, in a memorable example. While still a minor he was staying at Burgos, a city in Old Castile, and was accustomed to amuse himself by hunting quail. It happened once that he returned to court very late in the day, exhausted by the delay and by his labor, and no food had been prepared. When the royal provisioner was summoned about the matter, he reported that not only the king’s money but also his credit had been exhausted. The king, concealing his present distress, ordered mutton to be bought after his cloak had been pledged, and a meal to be prepared entirely from it and the quail that had been caught.

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During the meal he heard that the nobles were in a better condition: every day they attended the most sumptuous feasts among themselves; free from every other care, they vied in the luxury and splendor of their tables. That night there was to be a dinner at the house of Pedro Tenorio, archbishop of Toledo. The king came with his head wrapped. He saw everything overflowing with festivity and delights. When dinner was finished, each was to report for himself how much revenue he received annually from hereditary towns and how much from royal revenues.

On the following day the king, eager and resolved upon vengeance, pretended that he was confined by a grave illness and wished to give his final commands. At this announcement the nobles, hurried and afraid, came from different directions to the citadel. Their servants were excluded, as had been ordered; the nobles were admitted and remained in the dining hall until late in the day, wondering at the cause of the delay. At last the king entered among the nobles

armed with iron and with drawn sword. When he had seated himself among them, all terrified by that sight, he asked the nobles with a stern expression, as though angry, how many kings each had seen in the province. Some answered two, others three or four, according to each man's age. "Indeed," he said, "what you say is true, although at my age I have nevertheless known twenty kings in Castile." Wondering at the reason for the statement, with anxious minds awaiting the issue of the affair, they listened. "You," he said, "all of you--you, I say--are kings. Having occupied the strongholds and resources of the kingdom, you have left me an empty title, squalor, and want. Does that seem an adequate cause for treating us as a mockery? But lest you do it any longer, I shall make a decree upon all your heads." At the same time he ordered the things required for their punishment to be prepared and brought forward. In a loud voice he summoned the lictors and six hundred soldiers whom he had secretly held ready.

While the others were stunned with fear, the archbishop of Toledo, as he was a man of great spirit, fell upon his knees and, with tears streaming over his whole face, begged pardon; following his example, the others did the same. He granted pardon to those filled with fear of death and making supplication. Nevertheless, he decided not to release them from the citadel before one or two months had passed. During that interval they were compelled to deliver the strongholds and revenues to the king. Thus did he bear a spirit beyond his years, and manly care. It is no less shameful for public revenue to be appropriated for the pleasures of the prince than for the luxury of nobles. For it is public patrimony, not the prince's.

§ 11. It is the counsel of many, including the most prudent, that revenues be established for the advantage of the country; this can be done with such moderation that, even if they are great, they nevertheless burden or trouble no one. Let no or very small customs duties be established upon common, necessary, and useful goods, but many and heavy ones upon useless, harmful, and costly things without which this life, whatever it is, is lived well--indeed, upon the craftsmen themselves. Bodin, book 6, *On the State*, chapter 2, says truly: "The tribute most pleasing to God, most honorable to the king, and most useful to subjects is that which is imposed upon those things that tend to corrupt morals."

I remember seeing, in places where beer is used and wine is scarce, a third part of the wine paid to the state, because they deny that wine is necessary for their citizens. Therefore, it is in the interest of the polity to press with a heavy tribute those who sell sugar, unnecessary spices, and enticing preserves of Indian delicacies. It is likewise just to reduce by exactions confectioners, sellers of delicacies, and innkeepers dealing in foreign wine, since they are exceedingly harmful to morals. Indeed, a state will readily impose a tax, never unjust, upon purple, cotton cloth, silk trimmings, Attalic coverlets, and gilded vessels, since money is better expended in aiding the public welfare than in corrupting morals by luxury.

The Romans certainly imposed immense duties on Arabian wares, pearls, and precious pearls. This was accomplished by the Romans. Cicero, *Against Verres*, complains that the allies lost sixty thousand sesterces through Verres's exports--according to Lipsius, 1,500 *Philippei*--and this from the twentieth part at the port of Syracuse alone. Behold a twentieth as a customs duty. In Justin an eighth is given, and those who exact it are called *octavarii*. In the speech *For Quinctius* and in Symmachus, a fortieth occurs. Lipsius rightly says that things imported more for delights and display than for use paid a heavier duty. Caesar established a duty upon foreign merchandise; I believe one existed before, but the customs duties were increased by Caesar. Alexander Severus had this intention when he established a tax upon makers of armlets, linen-workers, citron-wood workers, furriers, wagon-makers, bankers, goldsmiths, and other trades--rightly, if they were useless trades. Would that he had done the same to cithara-players and others who corrupt youth.

§ 12. They should also impose greater duties upon all foreign goods that are unnecessary, although not useless. In this way money will remain in the province--for example, duties on English cloth, Sarmatian skins, Gascon wines, and the like. For if we wish to hear and speak the truth, what do foreign regions bring to Germany without which it cannot live, except perhaps Dutch fish and cheeses? Why, therefore, do importers of foreign wares carry so many millions away from here? I seek a spirited prince who will abolish these things, or a frugal one who will grow rich from them.

Pliny, book 11, chapter 1, says that Arabia, India, and the Seres take one thousand million sesterces--two and one-half millions--from the empire; and in book 6, chapter 23, that those wares sell for a hundred times their cost. There are several causes, but the chief is the size of the customs duty. For if they sold for a hundredfold, were not two hundred and fifty millions produced from them? If they spent fifty millions upon the journey and gained one hundred from two and a half, what great thing is it if they contribute one hundred millions to the state? The luxury of those who buy them at a hundredfold for ostentation cannot complain of this, nor can the wicked toil of merchants who supply foreign nourishment to the vices of fools. Luxury has brought them to those prices.

§ 13. Since tributes are frequently increased through the harpies and swallows of the people, since they turn the labors and sweat of the people into their rewards and stir up hatreds and curses against the prince, care must be taken that the prince learn the complaints of his people, demand an account from the procurators, and cause it to be described item by item what has been spent by each. If anyone is found to have exacted more, let him be punished as a traitor to the prince.

I understand this not only of the amount of money and goods, but also of coin, which they demand disdainfully as unworn and exact to the standard, and not at its common price, so that poor people can scarcely find among the coins they possess any fit for those thieves. Yet all kingdoms cry out against them, and still they grow rich. Therefore my counsel is that everything be delivered to certain men of unimpaired fidelity chosen by the people, and that they, in the magistrate's presence, deliver it to the king.

The whole kingdom of France approved this counsel, as Bodin reports. He says that he was present at the estates among the Tectosages when a petition was made to Henry II, king of the French, that he remove fraudulent men and money-scrappers. They promised that they would faithfully present all tributes on the appointed day and would even carry them to whatever part of the kingdom the king designated; this would benefit both king and people. The king approved the counsel, but, drawn away from his judgment by specious arguments, left the treasury

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and his subjects to be harassed by coercive collectors. For they not only exacted more but also returned less, equally faithless to king and kingdom.

Richard, king of Britain, acted with much greater spirit, inflicting the supreme punishment upon those convicted of guilt. Antoninus Pius prescribed that moderation to his officials. He ordered his procurators to receive tributes moderately and commanded those who exceeded the limit to render an account of their deeds. He never rejoiced in gain by which a provincial had been oppressed, and willingly heard complaints against his own procurators.

Caligula, in keeping with his character, did the contrary. He administered new and unheard-of revenues, first through tax-farmers and then, because the profit was abundant, through centurions and tribunes of the Praetorian Guard, omitting no class of things or persons upon which he did not impose some tribute. A fixed and established charge was exacted upon foods sold throughout the whole city; a fortieth of the amount at issue was exacted for lawsuits and judgments wherever undertaken, with a penalty if anyone were convicted of having settled or relinquished the case; an eighth part of the daily earnings of porters; and from the takings of prostitutes, as much as each earned in one act of intercourse. It was added to the heading of the law that those who had practiced prostitution or procuring were liable to the public revenue, and that marriages were also liable.

A harsh and unjust exaction gave rise to the great war concerning which Tacitus writes in book 4 of the *Annals*. Drusus had ordered a moderate tribute from them, in view of their straitened circumstances: they were to supply ox hides for military uses. No one took care what strength or dimensions they possessed, until Olennius, formerly a chief centurion and appointed to govern the Frisians, selected the hides of aurochs as the pattern according to which they should be accepted. This was difficult for other nations and still harder to endure among the Germans, who had forests productive of immense beasts but small herds at home. At first they surrendered the oxen themselves, then their fields,

and finally the bodies of their wives or children into servitude. Hence came anger and complaint. When no relief came, they sought a remedy in war: the soldiers present for the tribute were seized and fastened to the gallows. Olennius anticipated their hostility by flight and was received into the fortress called Flevum, where a by no means contemptible force of citizens and allies guarded the shores of the Ocean.

Claudius was in no less danger. Suetonius Tranquillus says of Claudius Caesar: “He ordered all orders to contribute a part of their assessed property, and in addition required tenants of private houses and apartment buildings to present a year’s rent to the treasury. With great disdain and severity he demanded unworn coin, refined silver, and purified gold, so that many openly refused the entire contribution and, by agreement, demanded that the rewards which the informers had received should rather be recalled from them.”

§ 14. I approve the wisdom of the ancient Romans in providing against the difficulties of the times. They had three treasuries. The first, which they also called sacred, was in the temple of Saturn, a most strongly fortified place; they praise Valerius Publicola as its founder. In the same place records, military standards, laws, and decrees of the Senate were preserved. They brought twentieths into this treasury, and it was reserved for the final emergencies of the state. It was opened in the Second Punic War, when Fabius was consul for the fifth time and Flaccus for the fourth; then again during the civil war. It was an enduring treasury appointed only for a Gallic war, Appian, book 2, *Civil Wars*.

The third was the richest, and into it were brought the tributes and revenues of citizens and allies, spoils, and the census of the people. Caesar plundered it, as Lucan relates:

Then from the lowest depth of the temple is dug out
 The census of the Roman people, untouched for many years,
 Which the Punic wars had given, which Perseus,
 Which the spoil of Philip had given to you;
 What Pyrrhus left to you, Rome, when he fled in terror;
 That for which Fabricius did not sell you to the king for gold;
 Whatever the customs of frugal ancestors preserved;
 The tribute which the rich peoples of Asia sent;
 And what Minoan Crete gave to victorious Metellus;
 What Cato carried over distant seas from Cyprus.
 Then the wealth of the East, and the last treasure of captured kings,
 The treasure displayed before Pompey’s triumphs,
 Is carried out; the temples are despoiled in mournful ruin.

But he did not spare even the more sacred treasury when he needed money and knew that the greatest dangers were imminent; for the Spanish and Pharsalian battle, the African war, and the final battles at Munda remained. States will have acted entirely rightly if, in a fortified place which not even the prince may enter without the consent of the nobles, they store away a treasure for the last emergencies.

It is therefore vainly disputed by newly fledged political writers whether it is expedient for a treasure to be preserved in a state. For just as in a household it is very advantageous, when money is at hand, to purchase everything at the proper time and not miss opportunities, so it is necessary in a state. For this reason we read of David’s treasuries not only in the citadel but in cities, villages, and towers; likewise those of Hezekiah and others. The Hebrews built for

Pharaoh, who did not know Joseph, cities of tents, or treasuries; for in the same places in which the treasuries were situated were the military garrisons or tents.

The objection that public wealth can be seized by an enemy or sedition, and that the country can be oppressed by its own riches, is refuted. For no one therefore neglects money because his house is exposed to thieves. By that argument they would prove that neither towns, fortresses, nor ports ought to be fortified; indeed, that wealth ought not even to be possessed privately, lest an enemy or evil citizen have the means to harm his country. Vigilance is required; and when dangers threaten, the cities of the treasuries must be fortified, which ought to be strong and trustworthy.

I do not approve the counsel of the Athenians, who had a treasury at Delphi, protected by superstition alone, which an enemy, atheist, or witty man could easily borrow from Apollo. A Brennus, Dionysius, or certainly a Diagoras was needed. For the common treasury of Greece on Delos was meager; the individual cities provided for themselves.

Augustus very prudently established a separate military treasury. Suetonius, chapter 99: whatever soldiers there were anywhere, he bound them to a fixed schedule of pay and rewards, defining according to each man's rank both his period of service and the benefits of discharge, lest through age or want after discharge they could be stirred to revolution. And so that funds for maintaining and rewarding them might always be available without difficulty, he established a military treasury together with new revenues.

This was prudent counsel, for the other expenditures upon magistrates, works, and ordinary gifts were regular and perpetual, whereas war demands great, sudden, and uncertain expenditures; and because the empire extended widely, war was being waged in different regions at the same time. This treasury at first consisted of the collection of twentieths paid from legacies and inheritances, unless the heirs were blood-relations or poor. This was a great tribute in so great an empire, but unjust, because the other revenues sufficed to support the army, but were consumed upon games, the fattening of the people, and the cruelty of the arena.

A twenty-fifth part of slaves sold was added, an altogether great sum amid so many myriads of saleable slaves, their frequent transfer, and their price--matters which Lipsius considers excellently in book 2, *On the Greatness of Rome*. To these was added a hundredth part of goods

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sold. The separation of that treasury is to be approved, but the new exactions were not necessary. The kings of the Persians poured molten gold and silver into earthen vessels, Herodotus, book 3, and did not have different treasuries for war and peace. Yet lest accounts be confused and so that what is destined for extreme emergencies remain intact, it is expedient that those things which must be expended extraordinarily be separate.

§ 15. Lipsius teaches that Roman revenues consisted of tithes, pasture, and customs duties. First, they received a tenth part of grain--Appian, book 1, *Civil Wars*--and this is evident from the speeches against Verres. This was generally imposed upon conquered peoples and lands. From plantations and orchards they took a fifth. For pasture they agreed upon a fixed price, for the tax-farmer leased out the land and drew up the accounts; therefore the land was called *scripturarius*, and that revenue *scriptura*. A great profit was also made from goods imported or exported. These were just if imposed upon the lands of enemies conquered in a just war.

Among these, the Spaniards and Africans, and even the Gauls, were in the worst condition: both their lands and their persons were assessed more heavily. They called the latter a poll tax, and it is evident that it was severe. Lampridius says that those who under Heliogabalus had paid ten gold pieces paid a third of one gold piece under Alexander. From that census they knew the number of persons. Josephus says that there were 750 myriads of people in Egypt, and that this was clear from the tribute which individuals paid per head. Augustus arranged and increased all these; Vespasian increased the tributes of all the provinces and doubled them for some, as Suetonius says. These were for the most part exceedingly unjust, since not only were such amounts given, but they were exacted with the utmost harshness.

§ 16. A Christian prince, therefore, must act so as to abolish some tributes, moderate others, and reduce them to the ancient rule. Under Servius's institution the tribute was slight; Tarquin increased it, but it was again reduced to its original form. Thereafter it was long observed that the rich contributed according to their census and the poor by their labor. Now tributes grow in Germany because, amid great mutual distrust, each fortifies himself. But if with united minds they spent against the Turk the money with which they frighten one another, they could all procure territories twice as extensive for themselves. Thus subjects are burdened and yet treasuries are not filled, although the sole end of tributes is that the poor not be burdened in time of war.

§ 17. But when tributes are exacted lawfully, it is unjust to refuse them. Accordingly, the penalty established by Servius was chains and death, as Livy says. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that it was provided by law that those who evaded their declaration or wished their goods to be valued at less should be flogged, their goods confiscated, and themselves sold. Zonaras says that those who did not report themselves or their goods for assessment were sold--the persons by the consuls and their goods by the censors. Herodotus testifies in book 3 that the Persians acted with the same precaution. For Darius apportioned the tributes and collected 14,560 Euboean talents annually, perhaps not a great sum for maintaining the army. But those who impose tribute upon nations conquered in a just war are readily excused. Thus Jotham commanded the Ammonites to pay one hundred talents of silver and ten thousand *cors* each of wheat and barley.

§ 18. There are three conditions of a tribute for it to be just: authority, cause, and proportion. If any one of these is absent, the tribute will not bind. Authority resides in the supreme prince; the cause is public necessity; proportion means that the tribute corresponds to people's means. With these conditions posited, I judge with our John de Salas, treatise 14, disputation 15, section 10, that all are bound to pay tributes. Those whom he cites think thus: Gabriel, book 4, distinction 15, question 5, article 2; Antoninus, part 2, title 1, chapter 13; Sylvester, under the word *gabella*, question 8; Medina, *On Restitution*, question 13 and those following; Castro, book 1, *On Penal Law*, chapter 10, toward the end; Córdoba, *Summa*, question 95; Hostiensis, book 3 of the *Summa*, title 1, chapter 13, *On Assessments*, § *For What Causes*; Panormitanus with others upon the chapter *We Renew*, *On Assessments*; Covarruvias, rule *Sin*, part 2, §5, no. 5. There he therefore binds merchants who sell, buy, and transport goods to declare themselves and make their tender to tax-farmers and exactors.

The foundation is that tribute is not a penalty but a true debt founded upon a true title of justice. But whoever is bound to pay a debt without any compulsion or exaction is bound--even if it is concealed--to disclose it to the creditor or to pay it. Hence Matthew 17: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," namely tributes, as all understand; and Romans 13: "To all their dues: tribute to whom tribute," and so forth. Likewise, tributes are as it were a just stipend given to the king for his service and for the expenses necessary to defend and govern the state. But the hired laborer is worthy of his wages, nor is the mouth of the ox threshing grain to be muzzled. For the same reason tithes are owed even if not sought, because they are a just stipend and the owed maintenance of ministers; but the king is God's minister for the state, Romans 13.

And manifest reason proves it. The prince has the right of commanding; therefore, when the command is legitimate, it must be obeyed. Many contend that payment is required only when it is rigorously exacted, because, since penalties are attached, the laws seem to be merely penal, and because otherwise a great snare would be cast upon consciences. These reasons, I say, accomplish nothing. For even if a penalty is established with the law, the law nevertheless binds conscience. It would indeed be absurd for a legitimate prince to bring just revenues for the necessities of the state to such a condition that he is not obeyed unless he exacts them rigorously, with armed hand and severe threats. This is to be unwilling for princes to be mild and gentle.

No honor sufficiently great can be shown to a good prince, and will you abandon him as he keeps watch for you, and not aid him unless compelled by evil? Next, if you lawfully owe it, rigorous exaction is therefore not to be awaited. For by resisting you cause him to exact it rigorously, and, as though you were a bad debtor, you do not permit the debt to be canceled unless force or law is employed. Finally, delay often carries danger; when aid does not come promptly,

others who are ready are offended. Accordingly, authors who think otherwise err dangerously, and perhaps seditiously, if the question concerns right. But I believe rather that they think thus concerning tributes which are everywhere imposed without necessity; the counselors of princes, the swallows of the people, are accustomed to be accused of these, although the princes themselves are truly condemned.

§ 19. Exemption from just tributes must in no way be granted without a just cause. This can happen in two ways. First, the prince may remit the tribute to someone. When he does this without just cause, he sins partly by prodigality and partly by injustice, because he deprives the state of the protection owed to it. This latter kind of offense has its greatest place in revenue that must be expended not upon the prince but upon the state. But if a fixed sum has been commanded from the whole state or city, the prince cannot exempt some and incline the burden upon the rest. For even if individuals feel little loss, all are nevertheless injured; indeed, contrary to right a sum is imposed upon all, and from this arises mortal sin.

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For if someone extorts one hundred gold pieces by fear from the inhabitants of a territory, although the multitude is such that individuals pay only one denarius, the injury is nevertheless grave, and he is bound to restore the one hundred gold pieces. Here, so far as the obligation is concerned, the reasoning is the same. For the prince exacts from the others what one man is bound to pay. It is certainly of great importance that exemptions of this kind not be granted. If a prince is pressed by the importunity of certain persons, let him either show them his own obligation or satisfy it from his private patrimony.

I give this warning because of certain men who always incite princes to collect tributes, yet when the matter comes to action most shamelessly demand immunity for their own estates. Although they redeem the infamy of this crime by another wickedness: in collecting tributes they contrive that something always remains over as an honorarium for the prince; it is then given to those very men, who boast that they have paid the revenues from their own possessions.

§ 20. Tributes which are given for the public cause not only require a cause; they also cease when the cause ceases, unless another cause has succeeded it. Those which are given to the prince for expenses and labors remain free. The continuation of a tribute when its cause has ceased is altogether damnable. Our Suárez defines the matter thus, book 5, *On Laws*, chapter 15, §§5--6:

Concerning this condition, it must be considered that, if we speak of tributes which are paid to the king himself for his expenses and because of his labors and vigils, the justice of such tributes does not depend upon their use. For whether the king later spends such revenues badly or well, he will not be unjust in receiving the tributes, because he is truly their owner and can freely dispose of them without injustice, provided that he fulfills his office by governing and defending the state as he is bound. Otherwise, if he fails in this, he will unjustly receive and retain these tributes, which are given on account of his office and are like wages for work, which one who does not labor receives unjustly.

But if we speak of tributes imposed for the common works of the state, it is clear that they must be expended upon such works; otherwise fraud and injustice are committed, which lies rather in the reception and retention of that tribute than in its imposition. For the imposition could have been just if a real cause was present, but afterward reception or retention becomes unjust from the lack of the required use. It is therefore necessary that the tribute be expended upon the work for which it was imposed; for the king does not properly become owner of that tribute, but its steward. Hence at most he will sometimes be able, when a true necessity arises, to transfer it to another work which also pertains to the common utility of the kingdom or people; for with respect to this he possesses supreme power and administration.

From this it is further inferred that tribute depends, so to speak, upon its cause both in coming to be and in being preserved. For if the cause is necessary for the justice of the title, the tribute cannot last longer than the cause, because when the cause--which is certainly necessary and adequate in its own kind--ceases, the effect ceases:

chapter *When It Ceases, On Appeals*. The Gloss explains it in almost this way, citing various laws in the chapter *After the Translation, On Renunciation*, at the word *ceasing*; and the Doctors note it on law *When the Father, § Sweetest, Digest, On Legacies*, book 2. But in the present matter, the cause is necessary for the justice of the tribute, as has been said. Therefore, when it ceases, the justice ceases, and consequently the tribute ought to cease.

This is confirmed because, if tribute is exacted after the cause has ceased, more is now exacted than is necessary; therefore equity and justice are not observed in it. For, as we have said, the proportion between the amount of tribute and the demand of the cause is necessary for the justice of the tribute. Therefore, if the cause is perpetual, the tribute will be able to be perpetual; but if the cause is temporal, the tribute ought also to be temporal, so that when the cause ceases, it too ceases.

Nevertheless, the cause is just if, by consent, the contributions are useful for increasing the treasury, are brought into it, and are not expended upon other uses. Therefore it is expedient that they be brought in before the eyes of all. Thus Aristotle, *Politics* 5, chapter 8: "Therefore, lest the treasury be plundered, let public money be delivered in the presence of all the citizens; and let copies of the accounts, diligently compared with the exemplar, be distributed and deposited among the wards, centuries, and tribes. And so that magistracies may be administered without gain, honors ought by an enacted law to be decreed to those whose fidelity and diligence in office have been proven and observed. Now in democracies the wealthy must indeed be protected, not only by not dividing their farms and estates, but also by not dividing their fruits individually and transferring them to others--a thing which occurs in some forms of governing the state, yet is not noticed."

§ 21. The last counsel is to warn all rulers to take the least possible amount in tributes. For through them they burden themselves with hatred, diminish commerce, destroy agriculture, and render the prices of things--especially estates--very low. And although the prince is armed with persuasion and violence, poverty is nevertheless unconquerable. Indeed, it cries freely with the Roman people: "May the devil take the new revenues, and their authors with them."

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, when he saw ancient towns in ruins and their inhabitants few, restored everything by remitting revenues. What prince's quaestor now does not favor the treasury more than justice? How many make the treasury a place of spoliation and a receptacle of bloody plunder? Danger is never greater than when the ignoble crowd riots because of tributes. When Hannibal threatened, the Romans withheld tributes and did not aid the state until the Senate set the example, although necessity stood before their eyes. How much more will they do so if they understand that the arrogance of courtiers is supported at their loss, as the city of Paris objected to Charles VI? The Lydians hanged Achaesus when he had exhausted everything by tributes.

For the benefit of those who suggest to princes new methods of exacting money--that is, of plundering--I shall append from Erasmus a tale, whether history or fable, that is certainly pitiable. In Paris, he says, in the grain market, there is shown a sewer in which a certain man ordered himself to be buried, because he repented too late of an evil counsel. He had seen the king sad and anxious; the cause of his grief was a straitness of money. In order to relieve the king, he advised that one or two small bronze coins be exacted even upon the small goods which countrymen brought into the city, and that this be done for only two years. When they saw that no small quantity of money was collected from this in a very populous city, more exactions were devised according to this example. When the man who had given the counsel saw that he did not possess the same authority in dissuading it that he had possessed in advising it, he fell into the greatest sorrows of mind, so much so that he despaired even of his salvation. In order both to exact punishment from himself for his ill-considered counsel and to warn others not to strike against the same stone, he provided in his will that he be buried in that sewer into which the filth of the whole market flows. The enforcement of the exaction remains there even to this very day.

But these things move little those whom avarice has blinded, who have reached such madness that sometimes they are administrators of the most filthy gains. The *Chrysargyron*, as Cedrenus says, was a payment of such a kind that every

beggar or poor person, every prostitute even if retired, and every slave and freedman paid into the treasury for urine and dung--also the dung of beasts of burden and dogs--

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whether they lived in the country or in towns. Men and women each paid a silver coin; a horse, mule, or ox the same amount; an ass and a dog, six *folles*.

Yet men sought the office of collecting this tribute no differently from a military command or civil magistracy, as Evagrius says. The jurists call the contractors for the same right *foricarii*. O how those whom wealth commands consider nothing shameful! Those who are blinded by avarice never lack their nightingale's song; those greedy for gold never lack the pretext that security is sought for the kingdom. Princes who were rapacious and greedy of their own accord and had no need of teachers nevertheless always learned more from us against us. But after the prince has done everything, he will correct some things, not all; many, when open dangers of theft arise, will turn their minds to cunning and impostures.

The necessity of revenues is shown in law 1, § *In the Cause* 20, π., *On Examinations*: a city cannot be sustained without expense. See Bulenger, *On the Revenues of the Roman People*. A city without a treasury is fragile.

Egypt paid a fifth part, Genesis 47; Sicily a tenth, Cicero, *Against Verres*; the Indians a fourth, Strabo, book 11, to their kings. Babylon paid an *artaba* of silver each day, Herodotus, book 1; see also Herodotus, book 3. Lipsius thinks the Gauls gave Caesar four millions; others, one million. The latter is truer, for they also supplied grain, labor, soldiers, and other things. And at that time one million was worth more than ten are now.

Tacitus, book 13: the Senate prevented Nero when he wished to remit tribute, lest the empire be dissolved.

Nicephorus collected a tax from smoke, as Zonaras says, which he called *καπνικόν*.

A tax was given upon shade, with Pliny, book 12, as witness.

Michael the Paphlagonian scraped money together from the air; Cedrenus calls it *ὑπὲρ ἀερικόν*, and Chrysostom says, ἀὴρ ὡναῖς ὑποβάλλεται. "Air is for sale."

There was also another tax called *ἀλληλέγγυον*, the obligation of the rich on behalf of the poor. It was called *chartiaticum* when they paid two *folles* to officials for documents. The twentieth of Augustus is well known--altogether a tolerable tribute, and one which I would recommend. Those who were neither the nearest agnates nor poor gave a twentieth part of an inheritance or legacy. His invention too was the twenty-fifth part of slaves sold, altogether a great revenue at a time when they had armies of slaves and slave-dealers. All owed a fortieth to tax-farmers, Quintilian, *Declamation* 359. Caligula exacted a fortieth of lawsuits, Suetonius. A fiftieth of wild beasts was added.

Augustus instituted a hundredth part of goods sold; Tiberius converted it to a two-hundredth, but afterward restored the hundredth; Caligula remitted it for Italy. Appian, in the *Syrian Wars*, says that the Syrians and Cilicians paid a hundredth of assessed property.

The urine tax of Vespasian was exacted from fullers who used urine; jars stood in alleys. Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.17. Another was the *foricarium*.

I have spoken of the *Chrysargyron*; I have no intention of stirring further controversy about it.

A tenth was deducted from legacies made between spouses. Alexander Severus instituted a tax upon craftsmen, but for the most part upon those who were unnecessary. Lampridius.

Caligula also wished marriages to be taxable, although what he exacted is not stated individually; some understand it of those who were procurers of their wives at home. A brothel tax existed in the time of Claudius.

In the Triumvirate an eighth part was exacted from freedmen in Italy, Dio, book 10; from freeborn men, a fourth of annual income. Isaac Comnenus imposed a tribute upon villages; Pertinax received revenue from lakes and rivers. There was also a ground rent, when houses had been built upon public soil. More severe was the tax of thirds, when a third part was paid from fields. A tribute for the dead was as profitable as it was wicked. Cicero, book 2 *To Quintus His Brother*, admits that the tribute of the aediles was unjust and heavy. The *siliquaticum* was imposed upon all merchandise. The *sextarius* paid in Apulia and Calabria seems to belong here. The tribute for the furnishing of recruits was great. Tenants also brought twelve drachmas into the treasury.

Add to these all revenues, tithes, pasture-dues, poll taxes, the income of the meat market, and saltworks, and an immense quantity of money will result. There are so many other names which I have omitted that in a short time the state drew everything to itself.

CHAPTER VIII

Personal Services Are No Less Useful Than Tribute

§ 1. There is another kind of tribute, little used but nevertheless more useful than a monetary contribution, and not very burdensome if applied moderately. For by labor that is not difficult, subjects accomplish what would otherwise have to be done at great expense through hired workers.

The customary works are chiefly these: 1. that for restoring public buildings, fortresses, hospitals, and churches, and for building new ones when necessary, they convey the materials; in this matter care must be taken that the labor is divided among many. 2. That they repair roads, banks, and bridges. 3. That each group repair the walls in its own cities. 4. That they cut down forest. 5. That they plant forests. 6. That they cultivate common land, or the land of the state. 7. It is harsh to employ them in mines, but nothing prevents imposing the easier operations, such as removing the earth that lies upon the surface.

§ 2. Legitimate causes are also required for these impositions when labor is exacted: they must proceed from a legitimate prince, from public necessity, and without great burden upon the subjects. Samuel shows the right of the king chiefly in these matters, 1 Kings 8:11:

This will be the right of the king who is to rule over you. He will take your sons and place them in his chariots; he will make them horsemen and runners before his four-horse chariots; and he will appoint for himself tribunes and centurions, plowmen of his fields and reapers of his crops, and makers of his weapons and chariots. He will also make your daughters perfumers, cooks, and bakers for himself. He will also take your fields, vineyards, and best olive groves and give them to his servants. He will also take a tenth of your crops and the revenues of your vineyards, to give them to his eunuchs and servants. He will also take away your male and female servants, your best young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will likewise take a tenth of your flocks, and you will be his servants.

Many formerly abused this right or power. And it has been shown above that this very right is unjust. Many kings, I say, used this labor tyrannically, and, so far as I know, no one surpassed Pharaoh, except perhaps the Rasuani, who oppressed not only the children of Israel but also the Egyptians; for they too were compelled to build the pyramids. But the work was deliberately contrived so that it might appear like a miracle.

First, from its sheer size: the Pyramid covered eighty *iugera*, as Herodotus reports. Pliny and Theodorus assert that 360,000 men were assigned to this work and completed it in twenty years. It was made from the hardest stones, intended to remain forever, yet dressed with the greatest art although difficult to handle, and joined together with the utmost firmness. He says that none was less than thirty feet. They were cut from the Arabian mountains, dragged over land for a very long journey as far as the Nile, placed upon boats there, carried to the African mountain, and built there in earth sandy on every side.

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Afterward no trace either of the embankment or of the fragments of the cut stones appeared, as though the gods themselves had heaped together so great a mass. The money expended in building it upon parsley, onions, and garlic alone exceeded 1,600 talents, which amount to 9,060,000 crowns. Herodotus relates that this was inscribed upon the mass in Egyptian letters. At the bottom was a mound upon which these great structures were imposed; the Nile was let into it through a trench.

Asychis, the fourth king of Egypt after Cheops, wishing to surpass his predecessors in the glory of achievements, built a pyramid of brick. Herodotus testifies that he inscribed these words upon its side: "Do not compare me with the other

pyramids; I surpass them as greatly as Jupiter surpasses the other gods. For men struck the bottom of a lake with a pole; gathering the mud which adhered to the pole, they formed me and brought me to such a size.”

The hanging gardens of Babylon and walls of immense size were made by compulsory labor, although an innumerable multitude of laborers was driven to it. For it is said of Nebuchadnezzar that he did not open the prison to those who were bound. But he so enlarged and fortified Babylon that he could be considered its builder. Therefore, formerly the first part of tyranny was to oppress subjects with works and to exact the performance of labors as though from slaves.

In the statue of Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian kingdom is gold, the Persian silver, the Greek bronze, the Roman iron. The comparison among the monarchies is not such that the Roman is as much worse than the Babylonian as iron is worse than gold; nor indeed is the distinction between the Persian and Babylonian the same as that between gold and silver. For gold is tenfold, as Pollux teaches from Menander and the letter to Commodus, or twelvefold, as Plato in the *Socrates*, and as our Villalpandus attempts to prove from 2 Kings 24 and 1 Chronicles 21:24--25. But the Babylonian monarchy could not equal twelve Greek monarchies. The principal point, therefore, was that in its manner of ruling or its power, the Babylonian was greater, more powerful, more glorious, and, as it were, more imperious.

In that barbarism this was sought above all: not so much that they might collect gold as that they might hold nations in servitude. Nor did Nimrod, author of the tower of Babylon, seek money, but the glory of a name from so celebrated a monument. Individual families did not depart to found houses and cities, but remained intent in mind upon that most insane substructure. They therefore thought that this was truly to reign: to possess the labor and bodies of subjects. Hence Sesostris drove his chariot upon the necks of kings, and in no other spirit that Roman rustic emperor said that he preferred to command the rich rather than to be rich. Hence Nebuchadnezzar rendered the lands of the nations desolate and gathered captivity as the sand of the sea.

I indeed think false the things which Berossus, Abydenus, and others report concerning the works, but those very hyperboles indicate that the greatest things were accomplished by them. Berossus relates that Nebuchadnezzar added a new Babylon to the old, placed three περιβόλους within and the same number without, of brick and bitumen, and adds:

πλὴν ὄντα γε ὑπερβολὴν ὥς μεγάλα, καὶ ὑπερήφανα

“Except that they were exceedingly great and lofty.”

He then describes the hanging gardens, in which he had made mountains, forests, and rivers, for the sake of his wife, who, born in Media, desired upon the plain of Shinar a likeness of the hills of her homeland. They say that Babylon was laid out in a square, each side of which was 120 stadia, that is, fifteen German miles. The width of the walls was fifteen royal cubits and their height two hundred; the royal cubit exceeds the common cubit by three digits. Now, considering the size of present empires, all the kings of Europe could not build so great a city, much less in so short a time. For the work required three million craftsmen, besides carriers, diggers, and others, who must have been twice as numerous, where there was so great a height of walls and mountains and the diversion of streams and rivers. Others employed people in mines; the Romans employed them both in other works and in hunting, namely the most dangerous hunting of lions, tigers, and leopards.

But Tarquinius Priscus, vainly numbered among the good kings, surpassed the cruelty of all tyrants. Pliny, book 36, chapter 15, says of him:

But then the elders marveled at the vast area of the embankment and the insane substructures of the Capitol; besides these, the sewers, the greatest of all works to describe, with mountains tunneled through and, as we related a little above, the city suspended and navigated beneath. When Marcus Agrippa was aedile after his consulship, seven rivers were diverted through channels and, being forced by their headlong course to seize and carry away everything after the manner of torrents, and in addition being stirred up by the mass of rain, they beat their beds and sides. Sometimes they receive the waves of the Tiber poured backward. The opposing currents of the waters fight within, and yet the stubborn strength resists. Internal masses of such size are dragged along, while the fabric of the

work does not yield. Collapses that fall of themselves or are caused by fires strike it; the ground is shaken by earthquakes; nevertheless, for eight hundred years from Tarquinius Priscus they have endured almost impregnable.

A memorable example must not be omitted, especially because it was omitted by the most celebrated founders of histories. When Tarquinius Priscus made the work by the hands of the plebs, and the labor was uncertain whether it was longer or more dangerous, weariness was aroused everywhere, and the Roman citizens escaped it by suicide. The king found a new remedy, never devised before or afterward: he fastened to crosses the bodies of all who had died in this way, to be viewed by the citizens and at the same time mangled by beasts and birds. For this reason the shame proper to the Roman name, which often saved desperate battles, then too brought assistance; but at that time it imposed a constraint, since the living were ashamed when they thought that the dead would feel shame. He is said to have made the size of the passages such that a wagon heavily laden with hay could pass through.

That tyranny was excessively cruel and unjust, and no prince ought to imitate it.

§ 3. A prince will act humanely and piously if, where an exaction of money is just, he converts it into labor, but on this condition: those who are unwilling to perform the labor should pay a fixed amount as its price, which should go to those who labor. That is the mildest form of tribute and is frequently employed in fortifying cities. It is easy for the rich to pay something and for the poor to labor with some profit.

Although Valens and Valentinian decreed that care must be taken lest anyone think this personal service should be assessed at a price, Code, book 10, title 47: “This precaution is fitting: let no one think that this service, which is personal, should be assessed at a price. The pinnacles of the greatest dignities, also the counts of the consistory, our notaries, all chamberlains and former chamberlains, are to be freed from all base services. But a similar privilege is then to cover the rest, who are protected by a palatine or military prerogative within the palace, only if they have shown under the earlier statutes that they belong to an exemption of this sort; so that such benefits may be shown to have been granted not to individuals but commonly to a dignity or body, while the ancient custom concerning rhetoricians and grammarians of both branches of learning remains in force.”

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§ 4. Formerly many private persons took care of public works at their own expense, and therefore inscribed their names upon them. The magnificence of Pericles and the Athenian people in this matter is well known. They rightly honor the man who confers honor upon the state itself.

“One who, through generosity and not the necessity of a debt, has granted his own revenues in the interim for completing works is not through envy to be prevented from receiving the fruit of his munificence through the inscription of his name upon any works he has made. The superintendents of works have dealings with the contractors, but the state with those whom it has appointed for accomplishing the work. Therefore how far, who, and to whom one is bound is for the governor of the province to assess. And lest the name of the man through whose generosity the work was built be erased and the names of others inscribed, and for that reason similar generosity by citizens toward their native lands be withdrawn, let the governor of the province interpose his authority.”

What may cause still greater wonder is that sometimes that generosity had to be restrained. Thus in the same place: “A private person may make a new work even without the prince’s authority, unless it pertains to rivalry with another city, supplies material for sedition, or is situated around a theater or amphitheater. But the constitutions declare that a new work may not be made at public expense without the prince’s authority. It is not permitted to inscribe upon a public work the name of anyone other than the prince or the person by whose money that work was made.”

A law in the same place shows that money was also bequeathed for public works, and prefers that it be converted to the maintenance of those already existing: “The deified Pius rescribed that money bequeathed for new works should rather be converted to the maintenance of works which exist than expended upon beginning a new work--namely, if a city has enough works and money cannot readily be found to repair them. If someone, with the consent of the people,

has promised to adorn with marble or in another manner a work made by someone else, and to inscribe the title of his own name while the titles of the earlier men who made those works remain, the Senate decreed that this ought to be done. But if private persons add any sum of their own to works made with public money, it is provided by the same commands that they should use the title of inscription in such a way that they write how great a sum they contributed to that work.”

If the prince could stimulate this manner of public benefit, so that private persons would contribute for honor’s sake toward building and maintaining towers, bridges, fortresses, and other structures, the state would be relieved of great expense. He will attain this if he is sparing in tributes and receives only so much as is given through persuasion. Now great riches are spent upon those works and the labor of very many is exacted.

Much greater vigilance must be used lest he employ the labor of farmers in hunting. For they weary themselves and their beasts of burden; farmers are harshly treated by nobles and curse the prince. But how can a recreation please a prince amid the groans of the wretched and the curses of the angry?

§ 5. Meanwhile, exemption cannot be granted except to one who has deserved well, and rank does not exempt, Code, book 8, title 12: “All must strive through a contribution of labor to restore or construct harbors, aqueducts, and walls; nor may anyone be excused from a share of this kind by privileges of rank.” Those who use common goods will rightly all assist in their preservation.

This must be done now, for formerly they were maintained from the estates of the state, as the emperors Arcadius and Honorius decreed, Code, book 8, title 12, *Lest the Most Splendid*. Yet soldiers are exempted even after the completion of their service by Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius, Code, book 10, title 48, *On Exemptions*; likewise illustrious persons, but only from base services; likewise students, those older than fifty-five years, Code, book 10, title 49; and, in title 50 of the same book, a blind father and those suffering from disease of the ears or gout.

CHAPTER IX

Good Household Management Is an Honorable Road to Wealth and Troublesome to No One

§ 1. Kings and all princes are rich enough if they are good household managers, and if they employ frugality, but royal frugality. The saying of Chilon in Laertius, book 1, is prudent: “One who does not rightly govern his own house cannot govern the state.” For a household is exceedingly like the city that is governed.

But here Megalonymus Parophaeus stands ready as a formidable adversary. He removes all household management from a generous prince. “Why do you make a money-changer out of a king, so that he looks around anxiously like Euclio and offends all his friends? Will you lead him to the granaries, the wine cellar, and the valuation of onions and garlic? Let the prince’s mind be free for the loftier heights of affairs. Let him administer wars, peace, treaties, and justice; let him rejoice that there are many things which perish to his loss. From his sublimity let him cast the lower cares upon others. Let there be a distinction between the prince and his procurator.”

§ 2. That flattery brings more evil to the state and ruins the prince more than can be imagined. I wish the prince to be great-minded and, as follows from this, liberal. But it belongs to liberality not that he pour out wealth rashly, but that he receive from those from whom he ought, at the place, time, and manner in which he ought; that he preserve, expend, and give according to right reason. I say that no prince can do these things unless he possesses an exact system of household management.

For if he neglects his affairs, these disadvantages arise. 1. When he has himself been reduced to the last extremity, the cleverest thieves lend him money at interest. 2. Then, unknowingly, he enriches enemies and makes them most hostile. Beware of believing that those who, abusing your sloth, have committed various forms of embezzlement ever wish you well; as long as they fear, they wish you dead.

Nor do I occupy the prince with private labors, but show him the necessity of attending to them. Amid so many eyes of petitioners, hands of plunderers, and tongues of liars, you set the prince like a golden sheep and order him not to know by whom he is plundered. Nor do I listen when you say that good men should be placed over the household management. For the prince’s sloth will make them evil: great gains and greater impunity recommend nothing moderate.

Third, the prince’s household management is easy; neglected, it increases his cares and, what is unworthy of a prince, makes them anxious. For he who has abundantly enough upon which to live and from which to give to others passes his life pleasantly. He whose debt increases daily is compelled to submit his mind to biting anxieties. Indeed, if he knows that very many things are being lost to him, yet neither grieves nor commands them to be spent better, he is scarcely worthy of the name of man. If you do not know what he has received, what he possesses, or what has been given to each, but know only the bread he eats and that which he gives to a parasitic embezzler, he is a prince only in title, a laughingstock to foreigners, a burden to subjects, a source of profit to ministers,

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the slave of his own slaves and the prey of purple-clad thieves.

§ 3. Since I have seen and known men who, while apparently doing the same things and using the same care, administer their affairs with very different results, I began to consider within myself why this should happen. I learned from Scripture to refer increases in household property to the divine blessing and losses to the curse. Yet because miracles are not ordinary, I discovered that such contrary effects proceed from the means and diligence of men.

Gaius and Titius practice agriculture and animal husbandry: one accumulates wealth, while the other’s estate always slips backward. Two men trade: one man’s affairs increase, the other’s decrease. Two possess instruments for carrying

on their affairs: one immediately draws out for use what has been placed in order; the other spends the time for acting in searching. Some build at great expense houses which are useless because the principles of architecture have been neglected; others at lesser expense arrange houses suited to every use, in which no corner is not most suitably adapted.

The reason, therefore, is that some conduct affairs by a certain art, order, and method, while others complete everything rashly, just as it comes to hand. Those who learn to play upon organs scarcely produce a slight harmony with great labor and readily damage the very instruments which they do not know how to tune. In the same way private persons injure their patrimony, and princes their province, with great losses while they are ignorant of or despise household management.

§ 4. Household management is fourfold, as Aristotle distinguishes in book 2 of the *Oeconomica*:

Οἰκονομίαι τέσσαρες δὲ εἰσὶν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ διελευστέον· τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιπτούσας εὐρήσομεν· βασιλική, σατραπική, πολιτική, ιδιωτική. τούτων δὲ μεγίστη μὲν καὶ ἀπλουστάτη, ἡ βασιλική· ποικιλωτάτη δὲ καὶ ῥάστη, ἡ πολιτική· ἐλαχίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη, ἡ ιδιωτική. ἔστι κοινωνεῖν μὲν τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκαῖον· ὅσα δὲ μάλιστα δι' αὐτῶν ἐκάστη συμβαίνει, ταῦτα ἐπισκεπτέον ἡμῖν ἔστιν.

There are four forms of household administration, so that the matter may be distinguished by a certain outline, for we shall find the others falling within these: royal, satrapic, civic, and private. Of these, the royal is the greatest and simplest. The civic is more varied than the others and the easiest. The private is indeed the smallest, but it too is exceedingly varied. It is necessary that there be many things common among them; but those things which occur by themselves in each must be considered by us.

He divides the royal into coinage, ἐξαγώγιμα καὶ εἰσαγώγιμα, καὶ ἀναλώματα--exports and imports, and expenditures. Those things which are imported and exported were treated in the chapter on tributes; expenditures will now be discussed.

But if it is royal to establish a standard for denarii and gold pieces, to impose tributes upon all things great and small, and if not even the buyer of roasted chickpeas or the poor man selling trifles can defraud him, why should it be contrary to his dignity to guard what has been collected in this way, demand an account, and know where it goes?

They therefore betray themselves as impostors who suggest to kings every pocket and every name for plunder: hundredths, fiftieths, fortieths, twentieths, tenths, fifths, taxes on columns, taxes on doors, the *Chrysargyron*, and smoke taxes; yet, after these have been collected with so many cares, they forbid the king to attend to them, repeatedly saying that it is unworthy for Jupiter to be present at small matters. As though it were worthy for Jupiter to be present when poor men are scraped together door by door and handful by handful, his granaries stuffed from all their baskets and his treasuries from all their purses, and then, lest those griffins, who are ἀρπακτικώτεροι γαλῶν, “more rapacious than cats,” lack an opportunity for seizing, to close his eyes.

But what of Aristotle? Does he not expressly posit τὰ ἀναλώματα, expenditures and expenses? Unless I am mistaken, these men will lead their prince under the appearance of magnanimity to be mad by calculation. For they consume him in the most foolish labor: that he should strain every sinew to collect, but not preserve what has been collected. This is just as if he poured water into a perforated cask with wicked labor. What the poets feigned to be the punishment of the Danaids in the lower world, these men interpret as dignity, so that no one can doubt that they desire this: that the prince, at his own danger, labor, and odium, should squeeze money from his subjects, which they afterward, without the prince's knowledge, turn to their own profit.

§ 5. Satrapic management also pertains to the king, that is, as Aristotle warns, those things which arise ἐκ τῆς γῆς, “from the land,” concerning which he should calculate the most exact account. When all matters have been brought together into one, this is the sum of household management: no more should be spent than is received. From exceeding that limit come borrowed money and pledges, and all the ornament of majesty is surrendered to the ostentation of the rich.

But it is too little not to spend more than you receive if you do not diligently set aside something to be taken up for the uncertain emergencies of the times. Since they possess great revenues, they can also heap up great treasures without diminishing princely splendor, provided order is established. Once order has been brought into use, it makes the accounts balance without any labor. Xenophon says many things about order in λόγῳ οἰκονομικῷ, “the discourse on household management”; if order is applied, the numerous phalanx of a palace will be governed as easily as a small house.

§ 6. First, effort must be made to have faithful ministers. This indeed will be attained in few, for amid so many peoples there is scarcely one fidelity. Yet the faithful hearts of a few will be able to resist the rapacity of many. Next, let no one be idle; let his own duties be assigned to each, an account of which most should be bound to render on the same day, and very many in the same week. Third, let the prince purge and contract his court, and free it entirely from a useless crowd of men who neither benefit the prince, defend him, nor increase his splendor.

Great kings and princes did this, preferring to have a great, dignified, royal court rather than a populous one. I judge useless a crowd such as exists at the court of the Turkish emperor. First, there are three hundred court tailors in the palace, a sign of great luxury in clothing; likewise three hundred smiths; five hundred new Janissaries assigned to cleansing the citadel and base services; four hundred who care for dogs and falcons; and thirty wrestlers. He could reduce these and other refuse of men to a moderate number.

Antoninus Pius formerly did this. Julius Capitolinus says: “He withdrew salaries from many whom he saw receiving them in idleness, saying that nothing was more sordid, indeed more cruel, than for those who contributed nothing to the state by their labor to gnaw it away. Hence he also diminished the salary of Mesomedes the lyric poet. He knew particularly well the accounts of all the provincials and revenues. He transferred his private patrimony to his daughter, but gave its fruits to the state. He sold superfluous imperial furnishings and estates, and lived upon his own farms, differently according to the seasons. He undertook no journeys except that he went to his estates in Campania, saying that the retinue even of an exceedingly frugal prince was burdensome to provincials.”

Golden words: “The retinue even of an exceedingly frugal prince is burdensome.” For a retinue is costly, and that concerning which magnificent cruelty is practiced publicly is tyranny in private. What is poured out splendidly is exacted with the utmost bitterness.

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Alexander Severus used to say that it was an evil thing for a prince to feed from the entrails of provincials men who were neither necessary nor useful to the state. Let the prince look around his court, and let him persuade himself that, in proportion to the number of men whom he maintains for idleness and delights, he is maintaining a plague for the state.

§ 7. In every matter let him avoid immoderate expenditures, as upon gems, building, and similar things. Let him despise gems like childish locks of hair. Alexander Severus acted excellently, as Lampridius reports: “Whatever he had in gems, he sold, and brought the gold into the treasury, saying that gems were of no use to men; that royal matrons ought to be content with one hair-net, earrings, a necklace set with pearls, a crown with which they performed sacrifice, a single cloak sprinkled with gold, and a ceremonial robe which did not contain more than six ounces of gold.” In his own times he plainly performed a censorship based upon his own morals. Great men imitated him, and most noble matrons imitated his wife.

Caligula, on the contrary, neglected nothing upon which money is customarily squandered. Accordingly, when he had found two hundred and thirty hundred-thousands of gold pieces, he dissipated them before the third year, as Dio says in his *Caligula*. These amount to sixty-six millions of our gold pieces, for the Roman pieces were twice as large. This was the more marvelous because money at that time was rarer and dearer, and one gold piece accomplished more than ten now do; for they could buy an ox for a gold piece.

Some also deliberately lost everything, like that monster of whom Cornelius speaks: “He himself, from the sole concern of wasting, built stables for charioteers; filled the environs with spectacles of gladiators and beasts; as though amid the greatest abundance of money he made sport of it.” Indeed, Caecina and Valens celebrated the birthday of Vitellius by exhibiting gladiators district by district throughout the whole city, with immense preparation unprecedented before that day.

But this occurred under that fourth beast, that is, the Roman Empire, so that it might break in pieces and trample the remainder underfoot. Therefore there was always public want, both of men and of money. Take an example from Vopiscus in his *Probus*:

The kind of spectacle was as follows. Strong trees, torn up by the roots by soldiers, were fastened to beams joined far and wide; earth was then thrown over them, and the whole circus flourished like a forest through the charm of new greenness. Then through all the entrances were let in a thousand ostriches, a thousand stags, a thousand boars, a thousand fallow deer, ibexes, wild sheep, and other grass-eating animals, as many as could be fed or found. Then the common people were admitted, and each seized what he wished.

On another day he added in the amphitheater, in one release, one hundred maned lions whose roars aroused thunder. All of them were killed from the rear gates; they did not afford a great spectacle when they were killed, for they did not possess that onset of beasts which they customarily have when emerging from their cages. Moreover, many beasts which the people were unwilling to seize were killed with arrows. Then one hundred Libyan leopards, one hundred lionesses, and three hundred bears were exhibited together. The spectacle of all these beasts is known to have been greater than it was pleasing.

In addition, three hundred pairs of gladiators were exhibited, most of them Blemmyes of enormous size who had been led in triumph, many Germans and Sarmatians, and some Isaurian robbers.

But I shall speak later of the expenses fabricated for gifts and donations. Now let us look at other things.

CHAPTER X

Commerce Must Be Increased

§ 1. A twofold question is raised concerning trade. Some would prefer commerce to be prohibited altogether in a state, for it imports vices; others prohibit only the state itself from trading. They have their reasons. It is excellent not to seek foreign things, but to be content with one's own. Cicero, *Brutus*. Next, when things pertaining to luxury have been imported, spirits grow languid and virtue is relaxed. Caesar, book 2, *Gallic War*. It is agreed that:

πλούτου κακίας μᾶλλον, ἢ καλοκάγαθίας ὑπηρέτιν εἶναι.

Wealth is the handmaid of vice rather than of virtue.

Next, commerce makes a city poorer because it makes it more extravagant. A great mass of gold and silver is brought from Spain and Peru, yet nothing else has resulted than that, from the abundance of money, the prices of things have risen. For this reason, after Indian gold reached us, the ancient tables of rents which prescribed the payment of grain and wine were changed.

Next, before cochineal, anil, xylon, sandarac, sugar, cassia fistula, pearls, and quicksilver, we felt no want; now ambition has made it a law that cities must be filled with those delights and poisons. Guevara, book 3, chapter 4 of the *Dial of Princes*, beautifully introduces a Danubian farmer speaking about this question:

That you say there is no state in our country, no polity, but that we live like wild beasts, rests upon no greater reason than those statements above. For in our land we scarcely endured lying and turbulent traders, or those who import from foreign places the instruments of vice and luxury. Therefore, since we were honorable in clothing and rejoiced in sobriety in food, we had no need of much commerce.

Although there are in our country no Carthaginian merchants, no oil of Mauritania, merchants of Tyre, Cantabrian steel, Asiatic spices and ointments, Spanish gold, British silver, Sidonian amber, Damascene silk, Sicilian grain, Cretan wine, or Arabian purple, nevertheless we are not beasts in that land, nor are we wholly without a state. For those things, and others of that kind, are incitements to vice rather than spurs to virtue for men.

The same Guevara, book 3, chapter 28, introduces Marcus Aurelius severely reproaching a nobleman because, having abandoned public honors, he had cast himself down to plebeian trade: "I cannot wonder enough, Cincinnatus, why you have ceased to attack enemies in the manner of a Roman knight and have become a merchant, as though made one of the plebs."

He indeed judges it unbecoming, but nevertheless speaks of unjust trade, by which, while foreigners are left unharmed, fellow citizens are injured. For he says thus:

Hold this as certain, Cincinnatus: commerce and merchants are not condemned by me, nor are the contracts of buyers and sellers censured. For just as war cannot be well conducted without cavalymen, so a city cannot stand without merchants. But I find no other cause for abandoning military service and undertaking trade than that, sitting at leisure, you may plunder in the market-place because through old age you can no longer rob in the forests.

Therefore, most wretched Cincinnatus, buy cheaply and sell for more; promise many things and perform few; use one measure in receiving and another in giving; keep watch--indeed, be exceedingly watchful--lest anyone deceive you, as is customary for those who practice commerce in matters of this kind. But I affirm upon oath that the measure by which your life will be measured will be more just than the ell of your shop.

§ 2. I judge that legitimate trade, of the kind divine and human laws permit, must be preserved and increased with every effort. In Genesis 37:23 the Ishmaelites trade without censure, carrying resin, stacte, and other spices into Egypt.

Indeed, in Genesis 34:21, the Israelites also do so: “Those men are peaceable and wish to dwell with us. Let them trade in the land and cultivate it, for it is spacious and broad and needs cultivators.” Although this can be understood of cultivation, the Hebrew word nevertheless signifies trade; therefore even the patriarchs were merchants.

Indeed, in 1 Kings 10:16, merchants and sellers of wares bring gold to Solomon. In 2 Chronicles 1:16 they are called the king’s merchants. In 2 Esdras 3:32 craftsmen and merchants build at the Sheep Gate. At Tyre, however, the merchants were princes, and the traders were renowned men of the earth, Isaiah 23:8. Babylon also was a merchant, Isaiah 47:15. In Ezekiel 17:4, a city of merchants in Canaan is mentioned. Yet rich Tyre surpassed all of them. Ezekiel 27:8:

The inhabitants of Sidon and Arvad were your rowers; your wise men, Tyre, became your pilots. The elders of Gebal and its wise men had sailors for the service of your various equipment; all the ships of the sea and their sailors were among the people of your commerce. Persians, Lydians, and Libyans were warriors in your army; they hung shield and helmet in you for your adornment. The sons of Arvad with your army were upon your walls round about; and the Pygmies who were in your towers hung their quivers upon your walls on every side; they themselves completed your beauty.

The Carthaginians, your merchants, from the multitude of every kind of riches, filled your markets with silver, iron, tin, and lead. Greece, Tubal, and Meshech were your traders; they brought slaves and bronze vessels to your people. From the house of Togarmah they brought horses, horsemen, and mules to your market. The sons of Dedan were your merchants; many islands were the commerce of your hand; they exchanged ivory teeth and ebony for your price.

The Syrian was your merchant because of the multitude of your works; they offered gems, purple, embroidered cloth, fine linen, silk, and *chodchod* in your market. Judah and the land of Israel were your traders in the finest wheat; they offered balm, honey, oil, and resin in your markets. Damascus was your merchant in the multitude of your works, in the multitude of various riches, in rich wine and wool of the finest color.

Dan, Greece, and Mosel offered wrought iron in your markets; stacte and cane were in your commerce. Dedan were your traders in carpets for sitting. Arabia and all the princes of Kedar were the merchants of your hand; your merchants came to you with lambs, rams, and kids. The sellers of Sheba and Raamah were your merchants; with all the choicest spices, precious stone, and gold they offered their goods in your market.

Haran, Canneh, and Eden were your merchants; Sheba, Asshur, and Chilmad were your sellers. They were your merchants in many kinds of things, with wrappings of violet cloth, embroidered work, and precious treasures which were wrapped and bound with cords; they also had cedars in your commerce. The ships of the sea were your princes in your commerce; and you were exceedingly filled and glorified in the heart of the sea.

Indeed, vast Nineveh made its merchants more numerous than the stars of heaven. Therefore, those who seek renowned cities and kingdoms must increase commerce.

I admit that morals suffer loss through commerce and riches, but these are vices not of things but of men. Otherwise it would be wrong to seek the fertility of the earth, for it too is a fertile mother of vices; nevertheless God gave his people the most excellent land, not unaware that very many would abuse that liberality for wickedness. I report these things as though the reasoning of those men were certain, because they attribute those evils to commerce; nevertheless, in this matter they seem to me to err not slightly.

For no less deceit and fraud--and even more envy and spite--are found in the huts of the poor. The vices of barbarous peoples to whom merchants did not travel were not lighter, nor are they found lighter even today. For above all they departed farthest from humanity, destroyed natural law, sanctioned man-eating and other horrors by laws, and, as now appears among the Brazilians and other peoples of America and histories teach, almost became brutish. Yet there is no less hatred, arrogance, and lust among them than among all the richest people: those beneath rags are inflamed no less than these beneath silk.

§ 3. Acquisition, or χρηματιστική, is twofold. One kind agrees with nature and arises from nature itself. For ἡ κτητική is the faculty, implanted in us by nature, of procuring what is necessary for life, just as in all animals both appetite and the acquisition of food are innate in most diverse ways, and instruments are given by which each may feed itself, as Aristotle demonstrates in *Politics* 1, chapter 8.

Beasts possess one method of obtaining a necessary thing: they pursue and seize the thing itself, as an ox hay, a dog bones, a lion a stag. But another method has also been given to human beings: when one has a surplus of what another lacks, they exchange with one another. This occurs in two ways. First, when one thing takes the place of another: a shoe is exchanged for a cap. If Spain exchanges wine for Polish grain, that is simple exchange. Second, when one thing is exchanged not for another thing but for money. This was invented from necessity and by the law of nations, because things cannot always be transported; money was therefore created, which by a moral law contains the power of all things.

Next, it rarely happens that one man has, in the same number and value, what another needs; thus money makes all those things liquid. Nor does it differ from other things because the use of other things is twofold: we use wine to extinguish thirst and exchange it for other merchandise, whereas every use of money is perceived in exchange.

Τὸ νόμισμα γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας ἐστὶ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.

For money is the element and end of exchange, as Aristotle says in *Politics* 1, chapter 9.

From this it is evident that artificial commerce is also very close to nature. For just as a Pole sows wheat not only to bake bread but also to exchange it for money and with that money procure other safeguards of life, so also a merchant carries wine bought in Spain into Poland in order to purchase other necessities with the money. Each expends labor; each undergoes danger. There is less labor but more danger in the merchant. Nature, therefore, taught this method of sustaining life.

For my part, I do not at all doubt that Abraham was a merchant. He had sheep and camels, silver and gold. I do not believe that, while wandering continually, he mined the latter, but that he acquired them through the exchange and sale of livestock. Therefore he raised livestock for this purpose: to sell it, purchase a household, and accumulate money.

§ 4. That method is therefore honorable, just as when sustenance is sought from a mechanical art, from labors upon the earth, or from the pasturing of livestock, which is movable and living agriculture. Nor is there disgrace in selling at a higher price a thing bought more cheaply, although it has not been made better. For it is in the interest of the state that this be done, and therefore a thing is ordinarily considered better by reason of place, time, and other circumstances, especially by reason of expenses. If none of these exists, the trade will not be legitimate, as when money is given and received no worse than before, yet its price is nevertheless increased.

It is honorable to sell a thing for a price; all kings also do this when they possess something in abundance. It is no less honorable to sell for a higher price a thing bought and made better, as when you raise foals and sell them dearly. But this is the work of merchants; therefore their art and practice are honorable.

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A thing must be considered better even if it has sometimes been made worse. For the price of every thing is found where its use is. Rhine wine in Sweden is better by moral valuation, although, having endured transport and the sea, it is physically worse than in its native soil. For the expense and dangers of carriage are valued at a great price. As in truth he who seeks profit must incur expense, so he who has incurred expense deservedly receives profit. This is true profit because it is just; that iambic poet therefore said prudently:

Τὸ κέρδος ἡγοῦ κέρδος, ἐὰν δίκαιον ᾖ.

Regard profit as profit if it is just.

But you will say that it is shameful to risk oneself from desire of profit and that this does not befit a great man. Then look at an army for me, and from thirty legions select one cohort of men who do not daily put on the garb of death in hope of profit and plunder. Why do you praise these men and censure merchants?

§ 5. Therefore those who removed merchants from the state did not act prudently. The Thebans did not admit men to the helm of the state unless they had abstained from trade for ten years. This was also received in the customs and laws of the Lacedaemonians, but through the error of both cities. It is not worth the trouble to summon the Thebans to counsel concerning the state:

You would swear that a Boeotian was born in the thick air.

Through the courage of Epaminondas alone they gained strength in a short time like a torrent, and with him they ceased. The Lacedaemonians, who at first professed military courage and poverty alone, became the most avaricious of robbers. Although that city possessed some good things, it possessed very many evils, so that they could not readily resist a powerful adversary.

I demonstrate that merchants must be admitted to counsel concerning and administration of the state. First, from the nature of the thing: exchange is a part of money-making, τῆς χρηματιστικῆς; ἡ μεταβολικὴ, καὶ τῆς μεταβολικῆς μέγιστον ἡ ἐμπορία. The greatest means of producing wealth is exchange, and the principal part of exchange is commerce. It follows that this is a principal instrument for establishing a household, and thus also a state, which arises from well-established households. If anyone considers these things, he will see that Venice, Florence, Messina, Nuremberg, and other commercial cities both abound exceedingly and possess a very well-established state. Formerly merchants were held in such honor that they were inviolate even in time of war. Indeed, in our own times, when war raged between the Belgians and the Spaniards, commerce was nevertheless not abolished.

Second, the more numerous and powerful merchants are in a city, the more numerous are the resources of the state and the methods of preserving the city. For it is exceedingly useful to possess an abundance of various things against every event. It possesses profit, but profit is an aid to need, as Aristotle warns in *Ethics* 8: profit, that is, with benefit to the state, without another's loss, or even with his profit.

Third, merchants are also more useful to the state if rich and distinguished merchants preside over it. For thus judged the Tyrians, Carthaginians, and other exceedingly wealthy states. 2. Their diligence brings great benefits, both because they know the characters, resources, and conditions of various nations and because with easy business and at a moderate price they obtain the things pertaining to the defense of the state, including arms, gunpowder, and engines of war. 3. They also excel in dexterity of action and civility; for wherever they go, they introduce these too. Among the reasons why the ancient Belgians were less civilized, Tacitus adduces the fact that merchants rarely migrated among them.

§ 6. Among humane and civilized peoples--that is, those who employ true prudence and moderate sustenance, as all must live, and who retain the true worship of God--commerce is necessary. For what now protects the Christian state and the dignity of kings except the diligence of merchants? Seville alone brings together the wealth of one kingdom; Lisbon alone, the wealth of a great kingdom. Therefore, where there is commerce, there are also great cities, such as Seville, Lisbon, London, Antwerp, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Amsterdam. Hence, when the multitude of people overflows, many can be retained and hired for the defense of the country.

Indeed, if we wish to confess the truth, without merchants kings can neither wage war nor even conveniently maintain a court. Merchants also conciliate foreign nations by importing things pleasing and opportune. Three things acquired the Indies for the king of Portugal: religion, war, and commerce. Religion was the head; God deigned to employ the others as instruments. Meanwhile, the Indies themselves are now held by their tribute. Innocent VIII said that the Spaniards were born to govern, so that they might commit no error in this respect; therefore they now hold so many

nations in obedience. But that is public praise; after that saying they perhaps committed private errors, not by public counsel but through the desires of governors.

For my part, I think that they were born to trade. For princes, marquises, and nobles trade through others with such decorum that they preserve their dignity above all nations and increase their estate. Indeed, when I compare everything with the flourishing Roman Empire, I assert that that kingdom stands more through opportunities for commerce than through force of arms. Rome too could not stand without trade; its foremost citizens traded throughout the world, and now the Spaniards pursue the same path.

§ 7. Not only must individual merchants be fostered, but it is also honorable, according to ancient custom, for kings, states, nobles, senators, and distinguished and wealthy citizens acting in their name to trade publicly and privately. Sidon, Tyre, Nineveh before them, Babylon, and afterward Carthage teach that this was customary among the ancients. Yet they do not equal the Romans, a martial people whose rank depended upon the census, while the census of merchants is ordinarily the greatest.

Let us look at the Roman state. The Senate held the first place--the council of the world, judged even by hostile testimony to be an assembly of kings. At first there were one hundred, then three hundred, finally six hundred through the action of Livius Drusus, and at last one thousand in the time of the civil war; Augustus reduced them to six hundred. They were the heads of the empire and lights of the provinces, chosen by the censor. Although they were not free of the reproaches of enormous vices, they nevertheless compensated for these by many virtues, until the vices conquered and abolished liberty.

In the second place stood the equestrian order, certainly noble and in great part drawn from senators. It was itself also a nursery of senators, as Emperor Alexander called it. But a great part of these men traded. Crassus, who possessed a name derived from his riches, had as many as five hundred architects and craftsmen among his slaves; he hired out their labor in a city exposed to collapses and fires.

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Livy is the authority that a guild of merchants was established at Rome; it was formed when Appius Claudius and Publius Servilius were consuls. At Rome there was a most powerful association of tax-farmers. They were Roman knights because they possessed influence in a province. Cicero, in letters to Lentulus, Appius, and Quintus his brother: these same men were merchants and traded throughout the province.

What of Caecina, a man of such rank, birth, and ability? Does he not write to Cicero, *Letters to Friends* 6.7: "As to the journey to Asia, although the greatest necessity pressed, I did as you commanded"? Cicero's letter indicates that he sought counsel whether he should remain in Sicily or proceed to the remnants of his Asian business. Caecina was therefore an Asiatic merchant. Cicero also commends Cuspius to Valerius, a man who had presided over the greatest affairs of the association in Africa, book 13, letter 6.

But why do we doubt concerning the Romans? Let us venture to hear Cicero *For Fonteius*:

They say that, while this man was praetor, Gaul was overwhelmed with debt. By whom do they say the refinancing of such great sums was made? By Gauls? Nothing less. By whom, then? By Roman citizens who trade in Gaul. Why do we not hear their words? Why are none of their account-books produced? I pursue them of my own accord and press the accuser, judges; I pursue him, I say, and demand witnesses. I consume more labor and effort in this case in demanding witnesses than other defenders do in refuting them.

I say this boldly, judges; I do not affirm it rashly. Gaul is filled with merchants; it is full of Roman citizens. No Gaul conducts any business without a Roman citizen; no coin is moved in Gaul without the account-books of Roman citizens. See how far I descend, judges, how far I seem to depart from my custom, caution, and diligence. Let one account-book be produced in which there is any trace signifying that money was given to Fonteius. Let them produce one witness from the whole number of merchants, colonists, tax-farmers, farmers, and stock-raisers.

Here he puts merchants in the first place, and Roman merchants at that. What happened in the other provinces? Were the affairs of the Romans fewer? Mithridates, by a single edict, killed 80,000 Roman citizens in Asia, among whom the foremost were knights; nevertheless, not all were killed, for hiding places protected many and friends many. Plutarch in *Sulla* numbers 150,000 men killed; Appian is authority that their children too were killed. These men, therefore, traded and turned every gain to their own advantage, and for this reason they were hated by the provincials.

Cicero, seventh speech *Against Verres*, greatly commends the affection of the Sicilians toward Rome because they did not hate tax-farmers and merchants: "Indeed, they so love our men that among them alone neither a tax-farmer nor a merchant is hated." Why "among them alone"? Therefore they were hated by all others. They were hated because they enjoyed the greatest liberty, because they had magistrates who were citizens and those whom they had favored by their votes, and because they had been commended to them through friends, so that it was difficult to obtain justice against a Roman.

Anyone who considers these things will find that there was more commerce than warfare in the provinces. For what does it mean that no business was conducted without a Roman citizen and that no coin was moved? In these affairs plebeians, knights, and senators engaged; and, what was most serious of all, they practiced usury. The case of Seneca is well known. Verres lent public money at interest. Pompey oppressed the provinces more through interest than through war. Nor could the immense wealth of the Romans have stood in any other manner, for how could the luxury and splendor of so many knights and patricians have endured without commerce?

§ 8. Let us also consider the trade of great princes in our own time. The first is in Portugal, concerning which Botero writes, book 7, discourse 12. Each year immense heaps of pepper are carried from the East Indies. These and all spices were customarily the king's, for he was accustomed to buy them together at a fixed price in Malacca and other islands. Their price is increased in the House of India at Lisbon so greatly that what is bought for three gold pieces is sold for forty.

Ginger, cinnamon, mastic, cloves, and nutmegs, to a sum of 200,000 gold pieces, are brought at every arrival of ships. They are carried to the fulling-house of Eudolius for a sum of about 100,000 gold pieces; and because in Spain they began not long ago to use them in dyeing cloth, they are sold at a dearer price, equal to that of spices. Borax, camphor, sandalwood, aloe, ebony, condiments, and other spices are brought severally for 40,000 ducats. Bales of various kinds of cotton are leased to private persons for a price of 60,000, from which a profit of eighty for every hundred is made. Ambergris and musk are brought for 20,000 gold pieces.

No moderate quantity of pearls, gems, amethysts, and diamonds is brought, but how much is unknown, because private persons hold them secretly so that they may not pay the king the duty of five for each hundred. From China, Malacca, the Moluccas, Bengal, Pegu, Lambaca, and other places in those regions are brought white silks, porcelain wares, and many most delicate trifles, which at Lisbon are called *brincos*, in great number. Small pearls are also brought from China, and most delightful and minute works which at Lisbon are sometimes valued at one hundred gold pieces each and are worn by the Portuguese like upper garments, as Italian priests are adorned with their rochets and dalmatics.

From China are brought certain couches, tables, chairs, and stools made from a certain wood black and shining like ebony, skillfully worked and gilded, and other most beautiful objects. From this we understand that the Chinese peoples abound in delights and possess the keenest ability. From Persia are brought most elaborate carpets worked from silk, gold, and the finest wool. The ships which come from the Indies carry in place of ballast certain small white shells found upon particular shores; these are afterward sold at Lisbon to certain merchants trading within the kingdom.

How great a profit could be prepared if the king possessed faithful ministers and drew the whole profit publicly to himself? What shall I say of exceedingly wealthy Venice? Do not both the state itself and its citizens and nobles trade? That state certainly owes to commerce the fact that it has often resisted the most powerful monarchs, for it possessed at

home the sinew--money. If the power of others did not stand in the way, it would long ago have prepared a great empire; but it is difficult to rise against such powerful men.

The States of Holland protect commerce as the life and blood of their provinces, and defend voyages to the Indies with no less care than their native walls, although with great losses to private persons. For if they cease, the sailors will go elsewhere and die off, so that it will be necessary to cease altogether. The cities of Germany either trade or are partners of those who trade. The fact that some practice usury through Jews is certainly an execrable crime. I do not know whether any cities are governed more rightly than those marts, especially those in which all citizens can be participants in the public council.

§ 9. There is nothing among these things which cannot be done most honorably. If the treasury is exhausted, if debt has also been contracted, will money not be collected more honorably through commerce than through urine and other things? Nor is the question difficult for a wise man: is it more honorable to press subjects with tributes, or through diligence in trading to assist the state and spare the poor? But who will be a faithful trader for the prince? What does this matter? Who is a faithful exactor of tributes?

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No one, by Hercules, no one--either two men, or no one. Trading requires less care than collecting everything individually. The rapacity of collectors is constrained by so many laws, yet no force sufficiently opposes their desires. Let the prince employ the tax-farmers whom he now employs.

But what is worse than tax-farmers? Chrysostom asks: "What is worse than a tax-farmer? Tell me. He is the minister and trader of the misfortunes of others. He divides the labors of others and, although he has no part in the sweat, receives profit from another's labor. For a tax-farmer is nothing other than violence raging under license, a lawful injury, avarice beneath an honorable pretext."

Now all the chests and bundles of merchants are searched so that part of great riches may be brought into the treasury; by the same labor, complete profits can also be acquired. Τελώνης, says Suidas:

ἄλλοτρίων πραγμάτων μεριστής, πεπαρρησιασμένη βία, ἀνεπιτίμητος ἀρπαγή, ἀναίσχυντος πλεονεξία, παραγγελίας λόγον μὴ ἔχουσα, ἀναιδὴς ἐμπορία.

A tax-farmer is a participant in and divider of the business of others; free and permitted violence; unpunished plunder; shameless avarice; business lacking reason; commerce without modesty. Let him exchange this for a somewhat more modest trade and carry the prince's merchandise. Employ him, therefore, in merchandise. He will be capable of less evil in trade than in collection, for there he prevails by cunning alone, but here also by force; there he deals with Cretans, here with Boeotians.

§ 10. The end of commerce is to procure necessary things and sell superfluous things without fraud or deceit. If a prince does this through his agents, I do not see why he does not preserve his dignity. The merchant despises everything beneath the burning sun and sea-monsters, and

The African wind wrestling with Icarian waves.

The merchant, fearing them, praises the leisure and fields

Of his own town; soon he repairs his shattered ships,

Unable to endure poverty.

It also belongs to kings and princes to undertake dangers for their country; to die is not the part of the timid. To stand in the first battle-line, move among weapons, keep watch, dig a rampart, walk through frosts, and commit life to a fragile ship which enemy beaks will soon assail is judged the highest honor amid such majesty. To feed the soldier from enemy territory and establish colonies belongs to a provident commander. This appears greater, but in truth it is

wiser and more right if through diligence he acquires wealth and protects the kingdom, if India and Asia increase the treasury.

Solomon's ships certainly went to Tarshish, and they did not bring back royal merchandise without commerce. "For his fleet went by sea with the fleet of Hiram once every three years to Tarshish, bringing thence gold and silver, elephants' teeth, apes, and peacocks. King Solomon was therefore magnified above all the kings of the earth in riches and wisdom," 1 Kings 10:22.

Without doubt the gold and silver were bought by the commander of the fleet with other merchandise carried there. Next, why would elephants' teeth be enumerated unless they were brought in great number? Nor do I see why the king should convey so great a quantity of ivory. Therefore the ivory was sold through royal traders, just as pepper and Indian spices once were in Portugal. Why too would apes and peacocks be mentioned if they were procured for the royal household alone and not for the whole kingdom, into which they were sold? I will not believe that playful animals were brought without profit, but that those flocks were sold throughout the richest marts of Asia.

But if some think it sordid to increase resources through commerce, they are mistaken. For wherever it is not sordid to receive revenues from merchants, countrymen, gardeners, and poor people, neither is it sordid to make a profit by exchanging things, provided that the public good is sought.

They carry the magnanimity of Theophilus in their mouths. When a cargo ship arrived with his wife's merchandise, Theophilus, although he had commanded that the property of private persons be exempted, burned it with Greek fire, pursuing the empress with insults and curses. Commerce, he said, belonged to private persons; their profits were not to be snatched away by princes but permitted to men of slender fortune. An illustrious speech in appearance, in reality empty.

Let us therefore consider Theophilus, and we shall assess his deed. Curopalates wrote his life, and the others drew from that source. 1. He feigned justice:

After Michael's death his son Theophilus, who had now reached manhood, received his father's empire in the month of October, in the eighth indiction. In words he sought to be called a vehement lover of justice and a perfect observer of the civil laws; but in truth, guarding himself from outsiders who were hostile to him, lest anyone perhaps venture some crime against him, he feigned these things.

Therefore, immediately at the beginning, he took care that all who had conspired with his father in the murder of Leo be removed from their midst and put to death. He accordingly issued an edict that all who had received any benefit from the emperor, and in addition all who had been made participants in any imperial dignity, should assemble in the Magnaura or the Pentapyrgium. When this had been done and all had assembled as he ordered, as though he had previously hidden his savagery in darkness, he addressed those gathered together in a mild and submissive voice:

"My father, O people," he said, "wished and intended to bestow many benefits and other honors upon those who had assisted him and undertaken the contest for obtaining the empire. But overtaken by fate, and lest he seem ungrateful to those who had deserved well of him, he left me, his successor in the empire, as their debtor. Therefore let each man separate himself from the multitude and show himself openly to us, so that, once our friends are known, we may reward them with worthy prizes."

Deceived by these words and led out of their minds, the wretched men, each of whom had devoted his effort to Leo's murder, identified themselves.

That statement, therefore, belonged to a dissembler, and to an avaricious dissembler who hunted for the reputation of magnificence. For in truth he was an iconoclast and a most bitter and avaricious persecutor. Thus the *Acts of Saint Joannicius the Anchorite* relate:

Theophilus held the scepter of the Romans. But he was wholly intent upon heaping up gold and was overcome by it; moreover, unable to bear being a Christian and behaving impiously toward the divine images, surpassing others both in power and in the dogma of the icon-fighters, he concealed such a snare for all Christians. With scribes and exactors he occupied an entire village at once, wishing to do two things which are the worst: both to gratify his avaricious spirit by exactions of tribute and to make manifest to himself every person who followed orthodox doctrine, so that he might seize them by force and cause them, even unwillingly, to be joined to the heresy of the icon-fighters.

Do you not wonder that so rapacious an exactor of the poll tax was so severe toward commerce? But he was angry with his wife Theodora, an excellent woman. Her mother Theoctista also did not consent to iconoclasm, as Cuiropalates relates. Hence came his anger, and from any cause he sought an opportunity for vengeance. Cuiropalates tells the story concerning Bender, a new Thersites.

Therefore Theodora must be praised, a heroic empress of great virtue and the wife of that monster, who bore up under servitude to a husband who stripped all temples of images and filled all prisons with bishops, pastors, and monks. Mountains and caves were full of men killed by hunger and thirst. He enclosed Saint

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Methodius alive in a tomb; delighted with magic himself, he made John the Magician patriarch of Constantinople. A cruel and avaricious man, raging even at death itself, ought not to have been brought forward as an example of liberality and magnificence. These things had to be warned because many writers judge serious affairs from some single ambitious or even feigned statement.

Greater authority resides in an edict of the emperors Honorius and Theodosius: "We prohibit those more noble by birth, conspicuous in the splendor of honors, and richer in patrimony from practicing merchandise pernicious to cities, so that the intercourse of buying and selling may occur more readily among plebeians and merchants." Code, book 4, title 63, law 3. They are not excluded because commerce is unlawful, but because it is more difficult for men of slender means to contract with them in the same city; there is now no danger of this.

Commerce, however, seems afterward to have been permitted to nobles, rich men, and those holding magistracy. For Harmenopulus, book 2, title 5, §19, testifies that it is lawful for all to practice commerce. Certainly law 1, title 63, book 4 of the Code, teaches that it was formerly customary among the powerful: "Merchants, if any belong to our household, and the men of powerful persons, are to be admonished to acknowledge the obligation of payments owed, as honor demands, so that among all who take profits from commerce the disposition of acknowledging a tolerable duty may arise."

In the time of the Henries and afterward, a great part of the German nobility had turned to robbery and plunder, as histories and the castles still lying in ruins teach. The cause of so great an evil was that commerce was either prohibited to nobles or made a reproach to them. Even now many among the nobility prefer to be in need and defraud their creditors rather than trade, although the magnates of Spain and Italy, as also those of Belgium, practice commerce with great zeal and continually. They do this in rivalry with the marts in which they live, for they see that they are despised if only birth is in their possession and property is in the possession of others. Birth and virtue, unless joined with property, are viler than seaweed in the opinion of men--an evil opinion indeed, but one which possesses very great weight in governing a state.

The imperial laws make it manifest that commerce is not condemned in a noble and military man. For it is prohibited to soldiers, who possess a particular military oath, title 35, Code, law 12. But the reason is added in book 15:

Soldiers, who are armed and maintained by the state, ought to be occupied with public utilities alone, and ought to labor not for the cultivation of fields, the care of animals, or profit from merchandise, but at the duties of their own military service. Let your greatness not allow any soldier hereafter to be free from the aforementioned services, but

order them to be present frequently in their own unit, so that through daily exercise in arms they may prepare themselves for wars.

But if any military judge believes that any soldiers should be assigned to divine, royal, or private households or possessions, or to various other services, contrary to the prohibition of our serenity, let him know that from the one who acted contrary to the prohibition and from the one who dared to receive the soldier, one pound of gold for every soldier is immediately to be exacted.

Behold, it places merchandise and agriculture in an equal position and prohibits both, because soldiers are maintained by the state and must be prepared for wars through daily exercise in arms.

§ 11. Various goods are prohibited. At the present time all things by which the Turks could be aided against us are prohibited from being sold to them, such as every kind of weapon and things pertaining to weapons. Formerly it was also unlawful to export gold. Thus Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, title 63:

Not only is gold by no means to be furnished to barbarians, but even if any is found among them, let it be taken away by subtle ingenuity. But if gold has moreover been carried to barbarian lands by merchants in exchange for slaves or goods of any kind, they shall be subjected not so much to losses as to punishments. And if a judge does not reclaim what is found, he hastens to conceal it like an accomplice in the crime.

Now in Sicily and Spain the export of military horses is prohibited.

§ 12. Let goods by which those of the country and native goods become cheaper not be permitted to be imported. Thus in Germany princes should not permit Cretan or Spanish wine except with an immense customs duty, nor English cloth, since the Germans themselves weave so great a variety of garments. Since the French possess much silk, they will readily permit domestic silk to be sold but burden foreign silk with customs duties.

§ 13. Finally, that prince seems to me likely to act most prudently who incites every most honorable man to commerce rather than permits him to be idle; who summons those who increase wealth through business to public duties; who furnishes merchants not only with immunities and privileges but also steadfastly provides for their safety; who orders his own people, when they travel to various kingdoms, to learn everything; who administers justice accurately and swiftly to foreigners; who grants them their own consuls and magistrates if they are numerous; and who diligently prevents frauds, monopolies, and other things which obstruct the public good.

§ 14. This too has often been asked: is it lawful for clerics to trade?

First, unlawful trade is forbidden by canon law and divine law not only to clerics but to all Christians. Thus Distinction 88, chapter 11:

By casting those who sold and bought out of the temple, the Lord signified that a merchant can scarcely or never please God. Therefore no Christian ought to be a merchant; or, if he wishes to be one, let him be cast out of the Church of God, as the Prophet says: "Because I did not know commercial dealings, I shall enter into the powers of the Lord." For just as one who walks between two enemies, wishing to please both and commend himself to both, cannot avoid much speaking--for it is necessary that these men speak evil of that man, and those men evil of this one--so one who buys and sells cannot avoid falsehood and perjury.

And canon 13:

What else is trade but to wish to sell more dearly what can be bought more cheaply? Those merchants, therefore, are considered abominable who, paying no regard to the justice of God, are polluted by an immoderate pursuit of money, burdening their merchandise more with perjuries than with prices. The Lord cast such men out of the temple, saying: "Do not make my Father's house a house of trade."

Second, dangerous commercial dealings are dissuaded for all, *On Penance*, distinction 5, canon 2:

The character of the profit either excuses or accuses the trader, because there is both honorable and shameful gain. Nevertheless, it is more useful for a penitent even to suffer losses than to be bound by the dangers of trade, because it is difficult for sin not to intervene in the intercourse of buyer and seller.

Third, trade is prohibited to clerics just as other secular affairs are. Thus Distinction 88, chapter 2, *Consequent*; chapter 8, *Useless*; and chapter 9: “Flee as a kind of plague a clerical merchant who becomes rich from poverty and glorious from obscurity.” And chapter 10: “Fornication is never lawful for anyone; trade, however, is lawful at one time and unlawful at another. For before someone becomes an ecclesiastic, it is lawful for him to trade; once he has become one, it is not lawful.” And Cause 14, question 4: “Let clerics know that they must abstain from unworthy gains and cease from every design or desire for any kind of commerce;

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or, if, in whatever rank they have been placed, they are unwilling to cease, let them immediately be compelled to abstain from clerical offices.”

Fourth, a cleric can expend some time upon business if he acts not from cupidity but with the intention of aiding the wretched. Thus Distinction 88, chapter *The Holy Synod Decreed*:

The holy synod decreed that henceforth no cleric should lease estates or involve himself in secular business, except for the care of wards, orphans, and widows, or if perhaps the bishop of the city commands him to have concern for ecclesiastical affairs.

Here it is plainly evident that some affairs are secular and others ecclesiastical. Was not Moses in the world when he repeatedly entered and left the tabernacle--one who, within, was carried away in contemplation, but outside was pressed by the affairs of the weak? And chapter 7: “Let the bishop conduct the administration of widows, wards, and strangers not by himself but through the archpriest or archdeacon.”

Just as in the preceding book we spoke about the secular dominion of clerics and their hearing of cases, so we must reason about commerce. Nor is there danger in this respect. For one who involves himself in business in order to relieve the poor, since the matter is indifferent by nature, makes it holy by a good end; nor will one whom piety rather than avarice has led to commerce readily commit fraud or lie.

Fifth, if commerce is permitted for the cause of wards and the poor, much more is it permitted for a cleric’s own cause if he is poor; it is better for him to trade than to burden others by begging. Hence it is evident that Plato, when he thinks cities must be removed farther from harbors lest an unregulated crowd rush in and they be deformed by vices, is ἀεροβατεῖν--walking on air--and constructing separate Ideas, Chimeras, and Utopias. He does not accommodate himself to human pursuits and affections or teach that which can be put into practice.

For if a city is situated at a convenient harbor, so that cargo ships can enter the bridges and be brought into the middle of the city, why should I withdraw it to a mountain, so that ships must be unloaded with great labor and merchandise conveyed at great expense? Aristotle rightly reproaches this in his teacher, for convenience in human affairs is not to be neglected.

For my part, I think that such a city, situated rather far from a harbor, will be more vicious than one which receives into its bay fleets laden with wealth. For that more distant city needs an immense supply of sailors, boatmen, carriers, grooms, beasts of burden, and wagoners, who infect the city with great vices and receive those arriving at their very first approach. This counsel for excluding commerce seems to me like one by which someone should attempt to persuade our inhabitants of the Rheingau, who inhabit the happy hills beside the Rhine, to migrate to the neighboring mountains and carry their wines there, lest their morals be corrupted through the easy arrival of foreigners. But these things belong not to one who wishes to establish a state, but to one contemplating metaphysics.

I approve the action of an emperor who in his time was considered the best. For he had previously governed four consular provinces, lived moderately, and was most skilled in military discipline; men judged him most worthy not only of honor but also of veneration. When he was designated, the barbarians, through fear of his tested courage and confidence in the justice they knew to be in him, voluntarily surrendered themselves to him. In the greatest danger he said or did nothing that was not worthy of an emperor. When he was killed by the injury of the Praetorians, the people and Senate bore it so bitterly that they ran about like madmen and filled everything with tumult and mourning. Herodian and others relate these things concerning him.

This was Pertinax, who as a private man taught grammar, led military units, and was considered rather frugal--a fact which was also a cause of his death. Julius Capitolinus relates of him: "He was so frugal and so desirous of profit that, at the fords of Sabaria, as emperor he practiced commerce through his agents no differently than he had been accustomed to do as a private man."

Capitolinus says this with little sincerity, for he is plainly convicted of falsehood when he says that Pertinax "was nevertheless not greatly loved." How was one not greatly loved at whose elevation as emperor the Senate and people so rejoiced that there had been no altogether so sincere rejoicing over anyone? Whom they mourned as greatly as any mother mourned a son? Capitolinus himself says that the people bore his death with the greatest indignation. The soldiers and courtiers indeed hated him, and the cause of their hatred was most unjust: because he restrained their plunder and lusts. Finally, his successor Severus adopted the name Pertinax so that he might seem likely to emulate the morals of a good prince. He would not have done this unless Pertinax had been dear.

I do not excuse him from avarice. He himself defended himself when he was refusing the empire:

Besides, all those who have become accustomed to the enormous and immense largesses of tyrants, if you begin to act a little more frugally or temperately because of a lack of money, do not attribute it to moderate administration and prudence, but immediately reproach you with avarice and sordidness. Nor do they consider that no one can distribute great gifts to everyone if he abstains from violence and plunder. But one who administers rightly and according to each person's rank not only unjustly takes nothing from anyone, but also teaches others to be frugal and to spare what has been acquired.

His deeds were performed according to this rule. Herodian says:

He entirely remitted all the revenues which tyrants had devised for collecting money upon riverbanks, in city harbors, and along roads and journeys, and restored them to their ancient liberty. He seemed likely to do many other things according to the same example. For he had also driven informers from the city and commanded that they be punished wherever they were found, taking care that no one suffer injury or have danger raised against him from empty accusations.

The deed was excellent if rightly weighed. Commodus had squandered everything; Pertinax found ten hundred-thousands of sesterces, that is, scarcely 30,000. Nevertheless, he had to distribute donatives, govern the state, and establish a court. Amid these things he abolished tyrannical revenues and sought lawful methods of acquiring wealth. Among them he included commerce, which he had practiced as a private man; nor was it charged against him as a fault that, after so many wars successfully completed and provinces administered, already a senator of the highest rank and sixty years old, he traded. He was venerable to the people and Senate and dear to emperors and the army--worthy to become an emperor from a merchant.

This history sufficiently shows what I said above: that martial people cultivated Mercury even more zealously than Gradivus, whom they thought the father and founder of their race.

Hence came the wealth of Crassus, with which he could maintain an army. Pliny nevertheless records that freedmen were richer than Crassus. Lucius Domitius promised the soldiers four *iugera* each, which, according to the number of

soldiers, were forty-eight thousand. Pliny, book 18, says that six landowners possessed half of Africa. Therefore the Romans were not only soldiers but also plowmen and merchants, and both amid arms.

Guilds rightly established are bonds and supports of democracy. Therefore Solon established and strengthened them. For they prepare wealth, possess counsel, are bound together by a certain hidden compact, and accomplish everything in order. Therefore they are like certain legions or cohorts, not a crowd,

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and are most tenacious of their rights and privileges. From them arise practical experience and prudence that are not subject to tribunes and agitators. Nor do they harm monarchy: since they possess privileges from the king, practice requires them always to seek new ones and to have the old confirmed. Let there be among them men who preside in the king's name and report everything. Let there also be a fixed time at which statutes and rights must be reread and approved afresh. A certain jurisdiction and power of correction are customarily granted, final law, Code, *On Jurisdiction*. See Gaill, book 2, observation 2; Hippolytus, singular law 560, no. 2.

The preservation of guilds and associations therefore pertains greatly to commerce, since an association of several persons who do and profess the same things is established; they also call it one body. See law 4 at the beginning, π., *On Guilds*. Bodin has much concerning guilds, *Politics* 3.7. See also book 11 of the Code. It was an institution of Numa; Plutarch, in his life; Dionysius, Book 2. Solon likewise had this care; Plutarch.

CHAPTER XI

Agriculture Must Above All Be Cared For and Honored

§ 1. Agriculture holds first place among all arts, for the first-formed man was placed in Paradise to cultivate the garden, and Noah, a husbandman, began after the Flood to till the earth and planted a vineyard. The reason is that agriculture is the foundation of all arts. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, says Aristotle, *Politics* 7.8, ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας. Food must first be supplied, then arts.

He discusses it more explicitly in book 1, chapter 2 of the *Oeconomica*: “This, then, is the provision that must be made, and what its character ought to be. The first care concerning possessions is that which follows nature. In the order of nature agriculture is first, and those things which bring forth something from the earth hold the second place, such as the art of mining and any other of that kind. Agriculture is certainly especially just, for it does not depend upon men--either willing men, as do innkeeping and those who hire out their labor, or unwilling men, as does all warfare. Moreover, it is especially natural. For nourishment is naturally supplied to all by their mother, and therefore to men by the earth. In addition, agriculture contributes very greatly to courage.”

This part, therefore, must be cared for in every kind of state, whether it possesses fertile land or very little; for even sterile land becomes useful by cultivation and is loved by its own people. Therefore Ulysses, who is represented as prudent, loved rugged and rocky Ithaca. Agriculture must therefore be pursued because it is especially natural and just.

Aristotle, *Politics* 1.10: “Therefore that method of acquiring money which proceeds from fruits and animals is consonant with nature for all. Since it is twofold, as we have said, one part is commercial while the other pertains to maintaining the household; and since the latter is necessary and praised, while the former, which consists in the exchange of money, is deservedly censured--for it is not consonant with nature, but in it one man hunts profit from another--the method of lending at interest is with the best reason hated by all, because gain is made from money itself and it is not used for the purpose for which it was prepared. For it was created for the sake of exchange, but interest increases and multiplies it. Hence it also found this name among the Greeks--for τόκος derives from giving birth, which they call τίκτειν.”

Turkish barbarism has also judged thus. For although the Ottomans render life unlivable for farmers--concerning which error I shall speak later--they nevertheless value agriculture greatly. This is evident from the accepted custom that the emperors live from their garden. Leoniceus relates it thus, *Turkish History* 1.20:

In the emperor's palace there is a very large and pleasant garden. Those who care for it are called *Bostangierler*, that is, gardeners, and there are two hundred of them, young men from their fifteenth through their twentieth year. Their office is to cultivate and irrigate the garden by digging and watering. They receive a daily stipend of three or four aspers and annual clothing. The first who offers to the prefect a fruit when it has ripened, to be presented to the emperor, is given one thousand aspers.

The prefect of the gardeners is called the *Bostangi Bascia*. His stipend is two hundred aspers each day. He is by no means equal in rank to the other eunuchs but is merely the emperor's slave. The fruits collected from that garden are sold by the prefect of the gardeners; the money is offered to the emperor and is applied to no other use than that food for the emperor's own table be purchased from it.

For the emperor judges profit received from the fruits of the earth honorable and divine, precisely because it is collected not from the burdens of subjects but from the divine blessing. Therefore he forbids food for his table to be purchased from the money acquired through revenues, tithes, and exactions.

§ 2. All who prudently established or governed a state gave first place to agriculture. I shall begin with those whose glory is secure. Joseph enriched Pharaoh through cultivation. David himself took the greatest care of this matter. For after Scripture enumerated his riches and power, it also described his care for rural affairs, 1 Chronicles 27:26:

Over rural labor and the farmers who tilled the earth was Ezri son of Chelub; over the cultivators of vineyards, Shimei the Ramathite; over the wine-cellars, Zabdi the Shiphmite. Over the olive groves and fig groves in the plains was Baal-hanan the Gederite; over the storehouses of oil, Joash. Over the herds that grazed in Sharon was Shitrai the Sharonite; over the cattle in the valleys, Shaphat son of Adlai; over the camels, Obil the Ishmaelite; over the asses, Jehdeiah the Meronothite; and over the sheep, Jaziz the Hagrite. All these were chiefs of the property of King David.

Josiah seems to have been no less zealous for agriculture. He gave the people for a feast 30,000 head of small livestock and 3,000 oxen from the king's property. The princes of the temple gave 2,600 head of livestock and 300 oxen. Then Conaniah and his other brothers gave the Levites 5,000 head of livestock and 500 oxen.

It is not lawful to doubt concerning Hezekiah, 2 Chronicles 32:28: "He also built for himself storehouses of grain, wine, and oil; stalls for every beast of burden; folds for livestock; and cities, for he possessed innumerable flocks of sheep and herds, because the Lord had given him exceedingly great substance."

Uzziah also devoted himself to agriculture amid the cares of war, 2 Chronicles 26:10: "He also built towers in the wilderness and dug very many cisterns, because he possessed much livestock both in the plains and in the expanse of the desert. He also had vineyards and vine-dressers in the mountains and in Carmel, for he was a man devoted to agriculture."

He was plainly an excellent king, to be compared with the best, had he not fallen through the arrogance familiar to powerful men and lost his kingdom while grasping at the priesthood. The Romans also were farmers from the beginning, for Romulus prescribed to them the laws of cultivation and warfare. Hence consular and triumphal farmers: the Cicerones, Fabii, Marcii, Dentati, Catones, Serani,

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and even, among emperors, Diocletian and others.

§ 3. God himself commanded that land be divided among his people. He established laws lest possessions be confused, and made sacred the fiftieth year, in which they returned to their original owners, lest a few men seize great estates and the poor be driven out. For it is expedient that a field be divided into small parcels so that it may be cultivated better.

Aristotle, *Politics* 6.4, reports the praiseworthy custom of the Aphytans: "Now we must direct all these things by the law of the Aphytans. It is useful for what we are saying. For although they are numerous and possess narrow land, all are nevertheless farmers. Whole possessions are not assessed, nor do they report entire estates in the census, but divide them into so many parcels that even the poor can surpass the rich in assessments." After that multitude which consists of farmers, that people is best in which there are shepherds and those who sustain life from livestock.

This was also the rationale of the agrarian laws among the Romans, by which they contended that public lands should be divided individually, both to assist the necessities of citizens and so that the fields might be cultivated more diligently. Lycurgus also divided fields among all, so that each might share in the labors and fruits of the earth; the Athenians followed the same method.

The Romans gave lands to their veterans as a support for life. Many used this occasion for sedition, and Caesar for stirring up the soldiers, when he complained that the lands which our veteran plows were denied, although Pompey the Great had given lands to conquered pirates:

Will pirates, Magnus, become better colonists?

Hence they also ordered conquered peoples to depart from their lands. There are innumerable examples. Cicero testifies concerning the Gauls in *For Fonteius*:

Marcus Fonteius--as I said--presided over this province, which consisted of such a variety of peoples. Those who had been enemies he subdued; those who had been near them he compelled to depart from the lands of which they had been deprived; from the others, who for this reason had often been conquered in great wars, so that they should always obey the Roman people, he demanded large bodies of cavalry for the wars then being waged by the Roman people throughout the whole world, large sums of money for their pay, and a very great quantity of grain for sustaining the Spanish war.

Colonies were established after lands were divided. We know only the Thracians and Thespians as haters of agriculture. Herodotus relates concerning the Thracians that among them it was considered praiseworthy to be idle and that the cultivator of fields was most despised. But it is evident that they were barbarians and robbers and possessed no state, but lived by slaughter and plunder.

§ 4. Beyond the fruit which the earth returns at great interest, the state should promote cultivation of fields and vineyards first by reward and punishment. Among the Romans, if anyone permitted his field to become squalid, he was made a treasury-class citizen. Gellius, book 4, chapter 12. I would certainly advise that fields, gardens, and vineyards be inspected twice each year; that praise and sometimes remission of part of the tribute be given to diligent cultivators; that the idle be censured; and that good but negligently cultivated land be burdened more heavily.

Valentinian and Valens acted prudently when they established thus, Code, book 11, title 58:

Whoever shall have obtained deserted estates under a fixed immunity shall not be permitted to enter into possession of what has been granted before they have firmly secured by a suitable guarantee--either by giving suitable sureties at the risk of the decurions or by obligating the most productive lands of their own patrimony--that the possession undertaken by them will be relinquished with no public loss.

This latter provision arose from distrust. Formerly it was enough to be a cultivator, when farmers were publicly favored. Thus, to have cultivated a field well was held in great glory; to maintain a great household was royal. Abraham and the other patriarchs, and that rich Job, exemplar of patience, possessed pastoral armies of remarkable strength.

It was therefore a matter of great honor. Eumolpus Petronianus is said to have possessed so great a household scattered through Numidia, according to Roman custom, that it could capture Carthage. Why scattered? Was it not for agriculture and pasturage? The Romans assuredly plowed, grazed livestock, lent at interest, and traded. By these arts they sustained war.

§ 5. New fields, or newly broken lands, should be established by cutting down thorn-brakes, draining marshes, sometimes felling forests, and conducting streams and drainage channels. Formerly this was easy, when spacious land offered a choice of itself to few inhabitants; now, when the best places have been occupied, it is difficult to sweat upon sterile soil. But I exhort the prince to look about for what is neglected and what can be cultivated.

For through the sloth of cultivators and discontinued use, much fertile land lies uncultivated and rough. What was more cultivated than Egypt? Yet Augustus, by cleansing the channels of the Nile which had become silted, made it more fertile, so that he might possess a more certain grain supply at Rome.

Cultivated lands were not always assigned even to veterans. Thus the seditious soldiers in Tiberius's time complained that swampy pools were assigned to them under the name of fields. In this way he should assign deserted fields with immunity, as Constantine did, Code, book 11, title 58, law 1:

Since the deified Aurelian, our father, ordered the councils of cities to be summoned concerning deserted possessions and, for those estates for which owners could not be found, commanded those who had received them

under a three-year immunity from the same possessions to satisfy the customary obligations, we command that this rule be preserved: if it is established that the councils are insufficient to undertake those possessions, the burdens of those fields are to be divided among the possessions and territories accepted.

§ 6. Above all, let the prince himself do this: following Uzziah's example, let him dig cisterns in the desert, build towers, raise flocks, and cultivate fields. Pertinax is a distinguished example among rare princes. Herodian writes thus concerning him:

At last, before two months of his rule had been completed, after he had already given an undoubted specimen of his integrity and raised all men to the best hope, evil fortune, which overthrew everything from its foundations, suddenly envied him, so that those excellent undertakings, which would have greatly benefited all, fell as it were in the middle of their course. For first he assigned to occupation and cultivation whatever uncultivated land lay vacant in Italy or among the other nations, even under kings, and granted farmers ten years' immunity and perpetual liberty of ownership.

A golden law is that of Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius, Code, book 11, title 58, law 8:

One who hastens to cultivate, for private and public advantage alike, fields deserted because their owner has ceased, fields lying far away, or fields situated along the frontiers, shall know that our rescript supports his will, yet on this condition: if a new cultivator has settled upon vacant and abandoned soil and the old owner wishes within two years to recall it to his own right, after first restoring what is established to have been expended, he shall obtain possession of his own place. But if the period of two years has elapsed, the man who kept silent shall lack every right of possession and domicile.

With such care good and prudent emperors insisted upon the cultivation of fields.

§ 7. Our Germany teaches how greatly it matters to be zealous for agriculture. Formerly rough in cultivation, it possessed neither cities nor bread; its people used porridge. Caesar, Tacitus, and Strabo, book 7, may be consulted.

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Procopius writes that deserted regions are watered by the Danube. The Suebi regarded it as a source of praise that the regions all around should lie vacant for the greatest distance. Thus, in Caesar's time, six hundred miles lay squalid without a cultivator--Caesar, *Gallic War* 4. Now, however, Germany is so thoroughly cultivated and possesses so many cities that it yields to no region.

Nor can it be said that all the best places are occupied, for this also seemed to be the case formerly, when Germany was one single forest. What some have said concerning plants can even now be applied to Germany: the best are trodden upon. The best clods are trodden upon, not cultivated. I have seen private men, nobles, prelates, and others who, after clearing hills, planted vines or sowed crops and made luxuriant pastures. How great a wealth could a prince prepare for the state if he either caused such lands to be cultivated at his own expense or assigned them to private men for cultivation in exchange for tithes?

What prince is there who could not collect several thousand *iugera* in a territory of moderate size? Let him grant liberty to his subjects so that, if they occupy in suitable places land fit for cultivation, they may retain it for themselves and transmit it to their heirs after paying an annual rent to the state.

The ancient Germans did not pursue agriculture. Strabo, book 7: "The nation of the Suebi, as I said above, inhabits partly within and partly beyond the Hercynian forest, adjoining the nation of the Getae. The nation of the Suebi is exceedingly extensive, for it reaches from the Rhine as far as the River Elbe. A portion of them also grazes the places beyond the Elbe, as do the Hermunduri and Langobardi; but now those beyond the river have been driven into flight and destroyed.

“It is common to all who inhabit this region that they migrate readily elsewhere, both because of the scantiness of sustenance, because of their sloth in cultivating fields, and because of their poverty of money. Since they inhabit huts, they possess furnishings only for the day and draw most of their nourishment from livestock. Like nomads, carrying their household implements upon wagons after their manner, they turn with their herds wherever fortune and opinion have carried them. There are also other peoples of Germany suffering still greater want: the Cherusci, Chatti, Gambrii, Chattuarii, and, reaching to the Ocean, the Sugambri, Chaubi, Bructeri, Cimbri, Chauci, Chaulei, Gampsiani, and very many others.”

They also changed fields every year, which supplied a cause of great negligence. Thus Julius, book 6: “The Germans do not pursue agriculture, and the greater part of their sustenance consists in milk, cheese, and meat. Nor does anyone possess a fixed measure of field or his own boundaries; but the magistrates and princes assign each year to peoples and kindreds of men who have assembled together as much land, and in whatever place, as seems good to them, and in the following year compel them to move elsewhere. It is the greatest praise for states to possess around themselves habitations as widely as possible with the borders laid waste. They consider this proper to courage: that neighbors driven from their fields depart and no one dare settle nearby.” Cultivated peoples must hold the contrary method, so that fields for cultivation are sought everywhere.

§ 8. We can readily see and enjoy what the diligence of earlier men accomplished. Caesar, book 3, speaks thus concerning our Belgians: “Where the Rhine approaches the Ocean, it flows into several branches and forms many immense islands, a great part of which is inhabited by wild and barbarous nations, among whom there are some who are thought to live upon fish and birds’ eggs.” But could one now find in the whole world a more cultivated place? Cultivation accomplished this. Formerly the whole territory of Fulda was forest; now it yields to no part of Germany except the regions of the Rhine and Danube.

Sustenance in Belgium and Germany was formerly most wretched, nor was it thought that another kind was possible. Tacitus, *Germany*:

In every household they grow up naked and filthy into those limbs and bodies which we admire. Each is nourished at his own mother’s breasts and is not delegated to maids and nurses. You could not distinguish master and slave by any delicacy of upbringing. They live among the same livestock, upon the same ground. The covering of all is a cloak fastened with a brooch or, if that is lacking, a thorn; otherwise uncovered, they spend whole days beside the hearth and fire.

I doubt whether I should assign the nations of the Peucini, Veneti, and Fenni to the Germans or Sarmatians. Although the Peucini, whom some call Bastarnae, act like Germans in language, cultivation, settlement, and dwellings, there is squalor and lethargy among all. Through mixed marriages of the nobles they are somewhat deformed into the appearance of the Sarmatians.

And soon afterward: “Among the Fenni there is astonishing savagery and foul poverty: no weapons, no horses, no household gods; grass for sustenance, skins for clothing, the ground for a bed.”

There were scarcely any houses, but caves and caverns. Tacitus: “Each surrounds his house with an open space, whether as a remedy against accidents of fire or from ignorance of building. They do not even use rubble or tiles. They use rough material for everything, without appearance or delight. They coat certain places more carefully with earth so pure and shining that it imitates painting and outlines of colors. They are also accustomed to open underground caves and heap much dung over them, as a refuge from winter and a storehouse for crops.”

And Seneca: “The Germans wander with no fixed habitations. There are perpetual winters among them, infertile soil, and no houses; they live by hunting. Wherever night overtakes them wearied by labor, they lie beneath branches, or in caves and pits. They do not possess houses, but huts covered with leaves and stalks. The inhabitants are driven about in the manner of dancers upon the frozen sea, living on the flesh of wild beasts, a naked nation clothed only in the skins of beasts, and therefore cheap and despised by all.”

These things remained until Christian times, until Charles and Boniface, when cultivation showed that every soil is fertile. I have introduced these things so that we may learn that places for cultivation still remain. For just as those places which are now most cultivated and fertile were formerly thought unproductive, so even now there are remarkable fields which plows have not yet violated; there are marshes which the diligence of many has shown can be drained.

§ 9. Not only weather and war but chiefly civic burdens render fields sterile. In some places herds of deer graze them; in others, a friendly but extortionate soldier; in very many, tributes also, so that cultivation gives no pleasure. Indeed, compelled by the magnitude of tributes, the cultivators themselves feign sterility so that they may avoid exactors. We gather that this occurred from a law of Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, Code, book 11, title 57:

Whoever has cut down a vine or damaged the growth of fruitful branches in order to evade the good faith of the census and feign the character of cunning poverty shall, as soon as he is discovered, be subjected to suitable indignation. That person, however, shall avoid accusation who is perhaps discovered to have labored for abundance and the restoration of the produce of the fields, and not to have procured sterility or poverty. Given the day before the Nones of January at Constantinople, in the consulship of Eucherius and Syagrius.

For what care will there be for fields if sterility is considered better than the cruelty of thieves who rage under evil but specious law? Hence by law *Those Who Are Burdened* and law *Equalizers*, assistance is kindly given to the wretched. In civil wars great care was also taken for farmers, but later times turned everything for the worse.

§ 10. The ancient law concerning the peace of farmers, which Xenophon attributes to Cyrus in book 5, must be recalled:

When he had considered that those who had defected to him, because they were neighbors of Babylon, would be afflicted by evil unless he himself were always present, he ordered all the enemies whom he released to tell the Assyrian, and he himself sent a herald to say this to him: that he was prepared to permit the farmers to cultivate the earth and afflict them with no injury, if the Assyrian likewise wished to permit the farmers of those who had defected to Cyrus to cultivate their land.

“Although you,” he said, “even if you could prohibit it, would prohibit only a few men--for the land of those who have defected to me is small--I shall permit a large region to be cultivated for you. As to gathering the fruit, if there is war, the one who is superior will gather it; but if there is peace, it is evident that you will gather it. If any of my soldiers carries weapons against you, or any of yours against me, we shall each take vengeance upon them to the extent of our strength.”

When he had commanded the herald to say these things, he sent him. When the Assyrians heard all of them, they urged the king to concede these things and leave as little of the war remaining as possible. The Assyrian, whether persuaded by his people or because he himself wished it, conceded them; and a treaty was struck so that there should be peace for those cultivating the earth, but war for those bearing arms.

The Belgians, at least by public counsel, also imitated this policy. For many farmers who lived upon the borders possessed the protection of both parties, but by public counsel; for they suffered losses from the soldiers of both. Indeed, kings used this humanity even before Cyrus. Nebuzaradan, prefect of the Babylonian king, left vine-dressers and farmers. Arrian, book 5 *On the Deeds of Alexander*, and Diodorus Siculus, book 2, chapter 10, are authorities that the Indians also possessed this custom. For the labor of farmers is necessary to victor and vanquished alike.

This class of men is now exposed first of all to plunder. Therefore, at the rumor of war, the dearness of grain increases. Farmers, compelled by necessity, take up war themselves or turn to robbery.

§ 11. It will also be an act of great prudence to preserve farmers immune from the injuries of courtiers, nobles, powerful men, and pettifoggers. Those injuries cause them neither to cultivate their fields diligently nor to consider increasing their property, like that man while

There was neither hope of liberty nor care for private property.

Therefore, let them not feel several masters in their villages, nor be dragged from the country into the city. Let provision also be made for their simplicity when they bring necessary goods into ungrateful cities. Clement V and Pius V thus established it; the latter forbade revenues to be exacted from farmers importing grain. Hence those excellent rules: that it is not lawful to take an ox used for plowing as a pledge, and that it is not lawful to molest farmers by way of reprisals.

Formerly powerful city-dwellers transferred their burdens to countrymen. Emperor Constantine prohibited this, Code, book 11, title 57: "Since the account-keepers of cities, through collusion with the more powerful, transfer the burden to their inferiors, we command that whoever proves that he has been burdened shall acknowledge only his former possession. Given on the fifteenth day before the Kalends of February at Rome, in the third consulship of Constantine Augustus and the consulship of Licinius."

Farmers are also vindicated from the harassment of soldiers, Code, book 11, title 60:

It is pernicious or dangerous for the meadows of our provincials, and especially those of our private estate, to be wearied by the harassment of soldiers. Therefore, by a law promulgated to the most ample prefecture, we decree that this practice shall not be employed hereafter. Let your Magnificence not delay to summon all whom the matter concerns, and let it not permit possessors or tenants to be harassed by any importunity on account of their meadows. Given on the Nones of September, in the tenth consulship of Honorius Augustus and the sixth of Theodosius Augustus.

§ 12. It is very expedient that each person cultivate his own property and not another's. Among the Romans the amount of field beyond which no one might possess was so often defined, yet those laws were always violated, even by the legislators themselves. For from this farmers are oppressed, and afterward, when farmers have been driven out, workhouses occupy all possessions; when servitude has been introduced into noble land, sterility follows, such as now exists among the Turks.

For there is so great a sterility and lack of cultivators throughout vast expanses of fertile land that their emperor can in no way sustain a war at home. Because the subjects of the Turks have been persuaded that all their property belongs to the emperor, and because he employs this right, the land is deprived of agriculture and therefore of people, that is, the foundation of strength. First, the Europeans are treated tyrannically and live in the greatest despair. Nothing except an opportunity is lacking to stir them to rebellion against so great a tyranny. This empire, therefore, is uncultivated, waste, solitary, and weak. It is said in a proverb that where the Ottoman horse plants its foot, grass never grows. There are many causes, but the principal one is that either the people are removed from their estates or the estates from them, at the judgment of those who rule.

§ 13. Pasturage is simpler and easier than agriculture; shepherds lead the easiest life. Aristotle, *Politics* 1.8: "For sustenance comes to them without labor from tame animals, even while they rest. Since it is moreover necessary for livestock to change place because of pastures, they themselves are compelled to follow with them, as though devoting their labor to living agriculture. Others live from hunting, but in different ways. For example, some from robbery, others from fishing--those who dwell near lakes, marshes, rivers, or a sea suitable for fishing--others from fowling or the capture of wild beasts. But most men live from the earth and from cultivated fruits."

This received the greatest care among eastern peoples and is plainly royal. It is now most despised; but the prince will add dignity to it if he desires to become rich easily and without injury.

§ 14. It is suitable for rural peace and pertains to security that people in farms and villages possess their own judges. Many advantages arise from this: they are not compelled to go into cities, are not called away from labor, settle a dispute more easily, and justice is administered by a shorter course. Nor can inexperience be objected. Their lawsuits

are not intricate, and they possess few laws from which they pronounce sentence; but if a more difficult matter is agitated, it is sent to neighboring cities for counsel.

It is just that, as merchants' cases are entrusted to merchants, so countrymen's should be entrusted to countrymen and craftsmen's to craftsmen, provided that they are directed by a skilled person so that they do not depart from the common law. For in truth many now shake down the wretched διασείσει, by extortion, and terrify them by the authority and threats of magistrates. Formerly governors, tax-farmers, their staff, and soldiers, when they could not openly plunder peaceful soil, customarily oppressed people through calumny. This was formerly the cause of the Varian disaster, when the Germans accepted Roman rule but could not endure Roman customs. They raged especially against advocates. Holding the tongue cut from one of them in his hand, a German said, "Aha, viper, even now you hiss."

§ 15. The fertility of all fields would indeed be desirable; but because God for a just cause was unwilling to give it, even dry land must be plowed. Every state would choose for itself land such as Aristotle describes in *Politics* 7.5: "The reasoning is similar concerning the nature of the land. As to what character it ought to possess, certainly all would praise land which is filled and furnished with an abundance of all things and is content with its own goods. Such land must be productive of all things. For to abound in all things and lack nothing is to be content with one's own goods and to be filled and furnished with an abundance of all things. In population and size, however, let it be such that those who inhabit it can live liberally and at the same time temperately while free from every labor."

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But land of this kind is rare; not every soil bears everything, and some bear very few things. Therefore the laws which established agriculture commanded that lands be mixed, so that one who disdained infertile land should be deprived of fertile land. Thus the laws concerning public lands, Code, book 11, title 58:

Whoever is found to be the lessee and possessor of a fertile estate which descends from public or temple ownership shall have a less useful field joined to it. But if he thinks that he must resist this, let another possessor be sought under the same payment. Or, if no voluntary lessee is found, then let the places of the aforesaid ownership, with the useless parcels attached, return to their ancient possessors--that is, the decurions or any others--after suitable sureties have been furnished.

§ 16. Indeed, sagacious antiquity also provided that the borders could be fortified and cultivated lest the fields lie uncultivated. If soldiers wished to cultivate them, the law ordered them to be immune. Thus Theodosius and Valens, Code, book 11, title 59:

We will that all frontier lands, together with marshes and every right, which frontier soldiers under the ancient arrangement were accustomed to tend and plow for their own advantage, free from every service, shall, if they are cultivated at present, be firmly retained by them without any burden from an extortioner; and, if they are possessed by others--with prescription from any lapse of time ceasing--shall be reclaimed from all possessors and assigned to the same soldiers without any burden whatever of contribution, as was anciently established. Against those who attempt to oppose our commands, the penalty of proscription shall also prevail. For if anyone perhaps possesses the lands of the aforesaid right under a title of purchase--a thing he ought by no means to have dared--his competent action against the seller shall be preserved unimpaired.

Imitate this with spirit, Prince; you will strengthen your wealth and kingdom. Behold, the masters of nations cultivated through soldiers the frontier lands exposed to incursions by enemies. Nor were veterans then ashamed of plowing: they awaited fields as their final reward and knew that the greatest emperors had returned after the *trabea* to the triumphal plow-handle. In short, act so that everywhere the field and livestock may appear yours.

I marvel at Roman diligence. In the reign of Augustus, when Gaius Asinius Gallus and Gaius Marcius Censorinus were consuls, Gaius Caecilius Claudius Isidorus declared in his will, as Pliny says in book 33, chapter 10, that although he had lost much in the civil war, he nevertheless left 4,116 slaves, 3,600 yoke of oxen, 250,000 head of other

livestock, and in ready money six hundred fifteen hundred-thousands of *Philippei*, according to Lipsius's calculation. These were the possessions of a private man who had suffered war. Why could a prince not attain the same if he sought every opportunity?

I refer to agriculture fishponds, forests, and everything produced by earth and water. If the prince pursues their fruits, there will be no need to impose new revenues and new tributes every day. The earth itself will be fertile enough to maintain dignity and repel an enemy. If the Turk, who possesses so much deserted and fertile land, undertook seriously to cultivate even some thousandth part in Greece, Asia, or Palestine, he could readily raise such flocks as Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and Jonah possessed for the expense of his army. But God was unwilling to add political prudence to so great a savagery, lest through his strength he occupy the whole world.

CHAPTER XII

That the prince must seek out the valuable products of things dug from the earth

§ 1.

Tacitus doubts whether the gods, propitious or angry, denied silver and gold to our Germans. Certainly they now possess a very great quantity of gold, silver, and gems. Many also greatly censure the grievous labor--τὸν μετὰ πόνου, “that accompanied by toil”--of those who search for mines. They say that gold, had it not been discovered, would have been better placed, and they grieve when

Riches, the incitements of evils, are dug out.

Pliny, in Book Thirty, assails the same pursuit that they condemn: “Now mines themselves, and wealth itself, and the values of things, shall be spoken of, while anxious care searches the earth within in many ways. For in one place it is dug for riches, as life seeks gold, silver, electrum, and bronze; in another for luxuries, gems and pigments for walls and fingers; in another for rashness, iron, more welcome even than gold amid wars and slaughter. We pursue all its fibers and live above an excavated earth, marveling that at some time it yawns open or trembles, as though this too could not be expressed as the indignation of our sacred parent. We go into its entrails, and in the abode of the Manes we seek wealth, as though it were insufficiently kind and fertile wherever it is trodden. Amid these things we search for the sake of remedies least of all. For to how many is medicine the cause of digging? And yet it has given these too on its highest surface, being nowhere sparing and readily accessible in all things that are beneficial. The things that crush us, the things that drive us to the lower world, are those which it concealed and submerged, those which do not come into being: so that a mind suddenly soaring into emptiness may reflect what at length will be the end of exhausting it through all the ages, how far avarice will penetrate. How innocent, how blessed, indeed how luxurious life would be, if it desired nothing except what is above the earth and, to speak briefly, nothing except what is with it!

“Gold is dug out, and chrysocola beside it, so that it may appear more precious by retaining a name from gold. For it was too little to have discovered one plague of life, unless even the corruption of gold were held at a price. Avarice was seeking silver; meanwhile it counted it a good thing to have found minium, and devised a use for red earth. Alas, monstrous talents! In how many ways have we increased the values of things? The art of painting was added, and by engraving gold and silver we made them dearer. Man learned to challenge nature. Incitements of vices also increased art. It pleased men to engrave lusts upon drinking-vessels, and to drink through obscenities. Thereafter these things were cast away and began to be regarded as sordid; and there was too much gold and silver. From the same earth we dig murrhine and crystal vessels, to which fragility itself was to give value. This was judged a proof of riches, this the true glory of luxury: to possess what could immediately perish altogether. Nor was this enough: we drink amid a host of gems and weave our cups with emeralds; for the sake of drunkenness it is pleasing to hold India, and gold is now merely an accessory.”

§ 2.

All these things are reproaches against avarice, not against resources, as I said at the beginning. For God gave these things also for the use of the human race, which he wished to abound and to shine. Nor are subterranean riches censured in any way different from those which the earth itself brings forth outside: wine and crops, the delights of animals, and the beauty of forms; for folly abuses all these things. Therefore a wise prince will seek out the wealth of mines, and with it will assist the state. To seek gold through wars is wickedness; through seas, danger; through falsehoods, disgrace; but in its own natural place it is justice, as Cassiodorus admonishes.

There is a threefold method of finding it. “Among us,” says Pliny in Book Thirty, chapter 4, “it is obtained in three ways: from the scrapings of rivers, as in the Tagus of Spain, the Padus of Italy, the Hebrus of Thrace, the Pactolus of Asia, and the Ganges of India; by another method it is dug out through shafts of pits, or by the collapse of mountains. Although that found in rivers is said to be the most excellent and most perfect, polished by the very current and friction, nevertheless it is now no longer found--or rather, it is not sought.”

Since, however, enormous advantages arise from mines, gems, marbles, every kind of mineral, and the exudation of metals, they must not be neglected, but must be employed with thanksgiving as benefits given to the state. But if veins appeared long ago, they must be investigated further; new ones too must be considered diligently. Nor must it be thought that God distributed matters in such a way that the ancients dug everything out. Immense riches lie hidden beneath the masses of mountains, some in deep places, others almost in the open. So great is their variety that they appear to contend with those things which grow. “In the uppermost earth, during Nero’s principate, gold was found in Dalmatia which yielded as much as fifty pounds on individual days, although it was found in the very topmost turf,” says Pliny.

§ 3.

It must be established without qualification that very many veins of metals, which are neglected, lie scattered throughout Europe and Asia. A sign of this is the golden sand of rivers, which indicates that the neighboring banks abound in gold. Nor do I think there is any prince who does not possess those riches, but diligence in searching for them is lacking. I do not affirm that gold is everywhere, but that there is some kind of metallic or fossil substance: gold, silver, electrum, bronze, iron, tin, lead, quicksilver, sandarach, minium, cadmia, alum, sulfur, bitumen, Samian, Eretrian, Elian, Selinusian, Pignitis, Ampelitis, Cimolian, Sardian, and Umbrian earth, and so many kinds of stones. For new things of this sort are found every day, which is a sign that they exist. In ancient times none of these was present in this northern Europe of ours; now very many exist in several places, because the cares of mortals were formerly directed elsewhere, whereas now these things are sought. Tacitus denies that silver exists in Germany, but now both it and gold are found.

There is no part of Germany in which some such things are not dug out. Those endowments are present in the County of Tyrol, Bohemia, Saxony, Pannonia, Transylvania, Poland, Hesse, and the Eifel. Indeed, in Norway itself, beneath the arctic cold, there are veins of silver near Ringarike and an abundance of copper in Sunnhordland. In Sweden also mountains of gold, silver, copper, and lead are counted beneath the sixty-second degree. Britain itself produces tin that is almost the rival of silver. Prussia sends electrum, and the Hercynian Forest gems. The cause why less effort is expended in this class of things is either a change of masters and governors, wars, or certainly the magnitude of the expenses. Hence it is scarcely a work for private persons; formerly public contractors leased them, several together, and wealthy men.

There is now rarely a digger for gold in Spain, because New Spain and Peru are more fertile. We nevertheless cannot deny that there are metallic mountains in Spain, since Scripture and experience have shown it. Near New Carthage no fewer than forty thousand men were continually occupied in the work, as Polybius is the authority. Who would believe that the neighboring mountains contain no gold, or that the Carthaginians exhausted them altogether?

Nevertheless, I think that no prince possesses more mines of metals than the emperor of the Turks. Although he is most thirsty for gold, he does not use that advantage, both because of a scarcity of skilled men and by the providence of God, lest he be furnished with such great resources against the remnants of the Christians.

In Deuteronomy 8:9 God promises “a land whose stones are iron,” ברזל אבניה (*abaneha barzel*), “and from whose mountains metals are dug,” נחשת תחצב ומהרריה (*umeharareha taḥṣob neḥosheth*). He indicates a great abundance when he says that its stones are iron, as though its abundance of iron were equal to that of stones; and although this is remarkable, the same reasoning applies to silver, as I said above. He also signifies a multitude of bronze when he says “you shall hew out,” as though bronze were hewn from the mountains in the manner of rocks.

That there was an abundance of gold is shown by Deuteronomy 1:1: “These are the words that Moses spoke to all Israel beyond the Jordan, in the level wilderness, opposite the Red Sea, between Paran and Tophel and Laban and Hazeroth, where there is very much gold.” Here our translator and the Chaldaic translate זָהָב וְרִי (wedi zahab) as “an abundance,” or “a sufficiency, of gold”; the Septuagint has καὶ καταχρύσεια, or, as others read, καὶ κατὰ χρύσεια, “toward the gold mines.” Whether one truly understands it as a sufficiency of gold or rather as the name of a place makes little difference against what I have said. For if it is the name of a place, the name was imposed from its abundance of gold; or if Scripture says that gold is very plentiful, we prove that there is a multitude of mines.

In that tract is the city concerning which Genesis 36:39 says מֵי זָהָב (*me zahab*), “waters of gold,” although it can be the name of a woman. And in Deuteronomy 33:25 iron and bronze are called its “footwear,” or ὑπόδημα, which they interpret as mines of bronze and iron--as though it said, “iron and bronze are your treading-place”; that is, mines of iron and bronze are everywhere beneath your feet. Hence Zarephath of the Sidonians is named from צִרְפָּת (*tsaraph*), “to smelt.”

But let us return to the καταχρύσεια, concerning which the Christian Adrichomius writes as follows in his *Theater of the Holy Land*, under Pharan, number 16: “The gold mines, called *Dizahab* in Hebrew and *catachrysea* in Greek, are the place where there is very much gold. They are gold-bearing mountains in the desert, an eleven-day journey from Horeb, near which Moses is said to have written Deuteronomy. But they also think that the mine of bronze which collapsed in our own time, and mountains formerly full of veins of gold, were nearby.” Deuteronomy 1; Jerome on the Hebrew place and in his Letter to Fabiola, Station 42.

It is also agreed that Arabia is exceedingly rich in gold. “It so abounds,” says Adrichomius under Manasseh, number 12, “in veins and lumps of gold and silver that almost all the furnishings of this nation shine, some with gold, others with silver. They also sell gold to their neighbors at three times the price of bronze, and silver at twice the price; and once, as Ezekiel teaches us, they used to offer in the markets of Tyre wares of the most excellent spices, gold, and precious stones, which were carried from there into the whole world. For the soil of this fortunate Arabia is exceedingly fertile in the most precious and select gems, namely sardonyxes, diamonds, pearls, beads, and other stones of different color and shining brightly. Nor does the land alone, but also the sea adjacent to it, abound in stones of this sort. For here oysters or shells are caught in which pearls are born and mature. Because no two of them are found indistinguishable, they are also called *uniones*. Their nature is so noble that it cannot be equaled by any price. Hence it is read of Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, that she purchased a pearl found here for two hundred and fifty thousand gold pieces.”

Yet now there is neither great concern nor power to procure those riches, for everything is full of brigandage, devastation, and fear of tyranny.

§ 4.

It is appropriate for every kind of mineral substance that it indeed be administered by suitable men, but that the greatest part of the labor be completed by persons condemned to the works. Thus it was done wisely in former times by the Romans and others, and there was no sin except in the unjust sentence of a judge, by which Christian bishops, priests, and faithful laymen were condemned to the mines for their piety. Those who through crimes have deserved such treatment by right and justice are to be subjected to this punishment; and it is often lawful for the penalty of death to be commuted to this one.

As the Egyptians accomplished the barbarous works of the pyramids and the channels of the Nile through condemned persons and captives, so also they assigned the wicked to dig for gold. Diodorus writes in Book One: “All their kings assigned to the digging of gold persons condemned for a crime, likewise those captured from enemies, or, if anyone had offended the king, sometimes both him and his whole kindred; at once exacting the penalty for their crimes and receiving a rich profit from their labor.”

I am not unaware that very many innocent persons, crushed by great tyranny, underwent every dreadful thing. But I admonish the prince to banish into those dark places persons truly guilty, not truly innocent, either for their whole life as slaves under punishment, or for a fixed time according to the measure of their offenses. For it is remarkable how greatly that exercise assists modest conduct, when complete exhaustion must be exacted from the body. Nor is guarding them difficult, both because they are confined in caverns and because this whole class is held in irons. What then? Let the punishments of those whose crimes harmed the state benefit it.

At present many are kept in prison for many years at public expense; they are mutilated in their ears, publicly scourged, and punished with exile. Meanwhile, since the opportunity to live a civil life is denied them, they again equip themselves for thefts and brigandage; for nowhere can they establish themselves because of their infamy. Other men must nevertheless be placed among them, both supervisors and persons hired for wages, so that there may be no opportunity to flee. Prisons today contain many hundreds of wretched persons who have not committed offenses so atrocious that they are to be punished with death.

§ 5.

To this industry I refer all the other workshops, such as those for crystal, glass, stone, and other things. For it is superfluous to name saltworks and other works, since even the use of acidulous springs has now begun to bring profit and water is drunk for a price. Ancus Marcius first established saltworks at Rome; he also gave six thousand modii to the people in a distribution. Pliny, Book Thirty, chapter 7. Once this was a rare and difficult thing; now it is readily available. Yet nowhere, so far as I remember, is there that abundance which exists in Italy, where the Tarentine lake is dried by the summer suns and is transformed wholly into salt.

CHAPTER XIII

Thrift Is the Greatest Revenue

§ 1. Where I discussed the prince's liberality, I also commended thrift, which is the source and support of liberality. The same matter had to be discussed where household management was treated. Now, however, thrift itself must be treated, which is necessary τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, “for the art of acquiring wealth,” and bestows gifts with judgment and moderation. For many princes pour out everything in certain largesses which they have scraped together by care, household management, and agriculture. I should like them to weigh these things with themselves and dispense everything according to right reason.

§ 2. Let them consider the nature of men, greedy to receive and to possess, and let them establish this as certain: gifts will never satisfy avarice. It is an oracle of Aristotle, *Politics* 2.7:

Furthermore, the wickedness of men is something insatiable. At first they consider it enough to receive only two obols; but when this has become ancestral and hereditary, they always desire more than it, until they have advanced into immensity. For the nature of desire is infinite and immeasurable, and most men direct every effort, and indeed all the plans of their lives, toward satisfying it.

§ 3. No prince, indeed, seems sufficiently liberal to flatterers; yet no one gives equal offense to the prodigal man, who, as they say, gives with his eyes closed and weighs neither the merits nor the dignity of those receiving. For one who is unworthy of a benefit is also ungrateful, while more worthy persons who have received equal or lesser things think themselves injured.

§ 4. Prodigal men have generally perished badly. Galba promised enormous things to the courtiers and Praetorians and destroyed himself and many others. Plutarch writes wisely:

And for this reason he promised to the courtiers and to the soldiers whom they call Praetorians seven thousand denarii individually, and to those serving in the provinces 1,250. He could in no way have procured this money unless he had afflicted the whole human race with more crimes than Nero.

That promise first destroyed Nero and soon afterward Galba: they betrayed the former in hope of receiving it, and killed the latter because he did not pay it. Afterward, while seeking a man who would give the same amount, they themselves perished amid defections and betrayals before obtaining their desire.

§ 5. If the prince wishes to give something liberally, let him rather take it away from unjust and unworthy persons--for example, Jews, moneylenders, and similar Christians--and give to those who deserve well the fines exacted from wicked men. For thus there will be not only rewards but also punishments and examples for cultivating virtue. Galba acted splendidly, as Plutarch relates: “He ordered the gifts which Nero had given to actors and athletes to be exacted rigorously, leaving them only a tenth part.” If he had done this with most of Nero's largesses, he could have collected money to maintain a great army.

§ 6. I have said that many princes go astray in this matter; nor is it remarkable. Solomon himself, the richest of kings, who made silver like stones in Jerusalem, after he had already been corrupted in old age by women, afflicted the province by this matter alone. He had seven hundred queens and three hundred concubines. What largesses shall we say were necessary to adorn seven hundred queens, furnish their courts with annual revenue, and build temples for them? Hence those complaints were deserved: “Your father placed a very hard yoke upon us,” 1 Kings 12:4. For no wealth could have been sufficient for the courts of seven hundred luxuriant queens. Therefore he unjustly exacted what he spent most wickedly; those two things are accustomed to accompany one another: to have been acquired badly and to be spent badly.

§ 7. This also occurred in the Roman state. For however politically its other things may have been established, certainly the wealth of so great an empire was spent most disgracefully. Justus treats this matter in Book Two *On Roman Greatness*, chapter 10 and the following chapters. He divides expenses into necessary and discretionary. The necessary expenses were for the soldier and the magistrates. To Piso, when he was going into Macedonia, one hundred eighty hundred-thousands were given under the name of traveling allowance. One hundred hundred-thousands of sesterces are 50,000 *Philippei*. Grain was given to the people first at a lower price, then free under the Clodian law, from which arose a great corruption in the state. Those receiving it were at one time 320,000. From Egypt each year they carried two hundred hundred-thousands of modii of grain, and twice that amount from Africa: therefore six hundred hundred-thousands of modii, or 164,383 each day.

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These were such great expenses that the greatest armies could have been maintained by them, yet they were expended for the most part upon the wicked and seditious rabble beneath the rostra; sixteen hundred thousand men could have been maintained by it. Aurelian also distributed pork, as Vopiscus says, and Severus oil.

Next came individual largesses, not merely marvelous but astounding, as Lipsius says. Suetonius relates that Caesar sometimes gave individual slaves and estates to the soldiers, man by man. As to slaves, I do not wonder: eleven hundred thousand. Τέρας, that monster, killed that number and reduced more to servitude. As to estates, it is a great thing; nevertheless he assigned the possessions of idlers to his own men. In this way he was liberal toward the Senate. Suetonius writes:

With a great part of the Senate bound to him by gifts or loans at light interest, he also followed with a most abundant distribution persons of the remaining orders who came to him either when invited or of their own accord.

With no less zeal he enticed kings and provinces throughout the world: offering some thousands of captives as a gift; sending to others auxiliaries wherever and as often as they wished; and adorning the most powerful cities not only of Italy, the Gauls, and Spain, but also of Asia and Greece, with principal works.

These things came from plunder. For in Gaul he despoiled shrines and temples of the gods filled with gifts and sacked cities, more often for the sake of booty than because of an offense.

Hence fifteen hundred talents were given to Lucius Paulus the consul, that is, nine hundred thousand *Philippei*. More was given to Curio, as Appian relates: he received six hundred hundred-thousands of sesterces, that is, fifteen hundred thousand *Philippei*. Beyond their pay, Caesar expended fifteen millions upon soldiers in the civil war, as Lipsius proves. To each member of the grain-receiving populace he gave ten modii of grain, the same number of pounds of oil, three hundred coins, and a further hundred because of the delay. At that time those who were fed from the public store numbered 320,000. In a single donative Augustus, when he had prepared arms against Antony and the issue of supreme power was already at stake, promised one hundred and fifty millions, as Lipsius calculates. There were many largesses of other emperors. Those donations overturned the whole empire and transferred the wealth of entire nations to others.

The Roman Empire was prefigured by that horrible beast which is the fourth in Daniel. It is called “devouring and breaking in pieces and trampling the remainder under its feet.” The last pertains to the games. It consumed and devoured by plundering, collecting revenues, and founding colonies; it trampled with its feet when it wasted wealth through wantonness and luxury. So much money was expended upon stage shows, circuses, and gladiators that the whole empire could have been defended by it.

What apparatus was there upon the stage? In the *Agamemnon* there were six hundred mules. Nero covered the theater of Pompey with gold for one day. Caesar made the apparatus of the stage silver at his father's funeral, and at that time he was not yet Caesar. Pliny also teaches in Book Thirty-three that there were silver stages everywhere in towns and colonies. Heliogabalus, according to Lampridius, exhibited circus games in canals full of wine; and since ships raced

in unmixed wine, I wonder whether one year's wine sufficed for such madness. Add next the awnings floating above the full theater, and Arabians drenched at Rome by showers of their own produce.

Add also the gifts thrown among the people--of every sort of thing on every day: each day a thousand birds, a manifold store of every kind, grain-tokens, clothing, gold, silver, gems, pearls, painted panels, slaves, beasts of burden, and even tame wild animals; finally ships, islands, and fields. Not even the Ocean appears capable of sufficing for donations so blind and so harmful, and every most wicked man received these gifts.

The greatest resources of the empire were also poured out upon gladiators alone. Lipsius thinks there were two hundred or three hundred thousand. I think there were altogether more, if we join to them the beast-fighters and the beasts; and these were properly called *munera*, "gifts." Let us now consider the cause of the Roman treasury's repeated exhaustion. First, most gladiators had to be bought; next, fattened; third, trained; fourth, guarded; fifth, nobly armed.

For the hunting, guarding, and feeding of beasts I reckon sustenance sufficient for a hundred million men. Gordian supplied one hundred Libyan beasts and a thousand bears in one day; others supplied other things; Severus supplied four hundred beasts from a collapsible ship. Let us establish that ten thousand beasts were always fed: they consume as much as thirty thousand men. Let us suppose that five thousand were captured each year. How many thousands of men shall we judge to have been occupied in hunting lions, bears, and tigers? I do not ask how many perished, since it is difficult to capture even one lion.

But the work of hunting was more laborious and dangerous because the beasts were not to be killed with arrows and hunting-spears, but captured alive in pits and nets, placed upon ships, and sent to Rome across long distances, with keepers and tame animals on which they might feed added. Thus so great expenses appear to have been made upon the capture and sustenance of beasts that they would have sufficed for an entire army. Hence came the public poverty of the treasury, and very often the wealth of entire nations was exhausted and the nations themselves sold, but the money was poured out in largesses and *munera*.

Thrift, therefore, does not suffer want. Xenocrates received Alexander's envoys, who brought fifty talents, with a slight supper in the Academy. When they asked the following day to whom he would order the money to be counted out, he said: "What? Did you not understand from yesterday's supper that I do not need money?"

Thrift fills the treasury with the greatest speed. Antoninus Pius drove away useless men; Alexander Severus did the same, as Lampridius and Capitolinus testify. It follows, therefore, that nothing better happened to Heliogabalus than that Alexander Severus was justly his heir.

CHAPTER XIV

Power Is Marvelously Increased by Sumptuary Laws

§ 1. I call those laws sumptuary laws by which moderation in expenditure is prescribed. I reduce them to three heads: for some command modesty in banquets, which Cato called alimentary laws; others regulate the prices of clothing; others regulate building and the household. I judge that not only the most useful part of thrift but also the safety of the state is contained in these laws. For if the prince fixes laws for himself and his own people, and his subjects follow them, abundance and riches must arise publicly from the thrift and frugality of all, and there must be fewer disputes and crimes, very many of which arise from prodigality, while that which is poured away through wantonness is sought through injustice. By these laws, moreover, peace and tranquility, the distinction of orders, and propriety are preserved, and poverty, the counselor of evil, is averted. For in truth most men go beyond their means in expenditure and cast themselves into extreme necessity. There was great foresight in former times, when expenditures were defined.

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Numa, otherwise exceedingly superstitious, enacted a law: “Do not sprinkle wine upon a funeral pyre,” lest the gods be worshiped by expense rather than by disposition. For since luxury always increased and found no limit, there was need of the barriers of laws, by which men might be contained within bounds and a fixed course.

§ 2. We should with the best right marvel at the most malicious complaints of the human race, if they were not by now customary. Whatever adversity befalls a man according to his deserts, each accuses the times, the magistrate, sometimes God--in short, everything rather than his own vices. If blight has burned the crop, if the meadows have withered, if frost has struck the vine-shoots, if a soldier has driven away the cattle, if the prince has imposed taxes, everything resounds with querulous, bitter, mournful, and sometimes seditious voices: the times are hard; everything is falling; life is scarcely supportable; no citizen can rise; farmers are oppressed and drained on every side; the nobility is near destruction.

Yet in the lands where such frequent complaints are repeated, who are they that cry that they are oppressed and drained? The very men who themselves bring about the cause of their losses. The fact itself speaks; at this very hour I shall show a hundred examples. The farmer whose grandfather furnished his private table, banquets, and weddings with provisions that were not bought is no longer content with beef, lamb, veal, goose, and chicken: he heaps together foreign fish, exotic wines, Italian and Spanish fruits, preparations and adulterations made from every spice, and he teaches rustic hearts, unaccustomed to delicacies, to consume the plow together with the very clod of earth.

Citizens who seek their livelihood by their hands indulge in banquets; they omit none of the costly things which they have seen upon the tables of the rich and noble; at a wedding banquet they contract a debt upon which their children, when already grown, are compelled to pay the interest. What shall I say about clothing? The sons of villagers and craftsmen, who carry all their goods upon themselves, imitate and surpass the attire of the rich and noble.

They do these things in large part through perverse rivalry, so that they may appear rich. I do not yet dare to accuse that madness as it deserves and ask why, by feigning opulence, they hasten toward want, when by frugality they could acquire an estate. I am not yet treating that point, but I rebuff the impudence of those who disparage their own times when they themselves are a great stain upon the times. The rustic, the citizen, the tailor, and the smith complain that they cannot rise because of the difficulty of the times. Yet the same man is clothed like a nobleman, feasts like a rich man, builds like a prince, maintains a household like a magistrate, and does not perceive that the cause of his poverty has been derived from his habits.

You praise past years, despise the present, indeed curse them, and enumerate the causes of poverty; but, rustic though you are, arrayed in silk and rings, in a painted house, amid pheasants, thrushes, partridges, costly wines, tortoise shell, and courtly music, and perhaps drunk as well, you lay down your complaints. I do not listen unless your habits are changed. No times are so happy that they can make such a man prosperous; not even prosperity itself could preserve you.

My most reverend prince, Johann Schweikhard, Archbishop of the Holy See of Mainz, published sumptuary laws in the year 1615 and stated their causes in the preface: that he had already learned by the experience of several years that his subjects in the upper and lower diocese, in towns and villages, especially at baptismal banquets, feasts of godparents, and wedding banquets, were burdening themselves with great expenses in this matter; that no one wished to hold the last place; that those of slender means emulated the wealthier; and that many were consequently sometimes so oppressed and burdened by debt that they could not rise, nor render the services owed to the magistrate.

It is plainly so: they contend with one another in expense; all are defeated; whoever has surpassed the others is most gravely harmed. Then, when their own affairs have become desperate, they are neither faithful to their country nor obedient to the magistrates. Those vices are ancient, and unless the ruler's severe hand resists, they break loose. Sammonicus Serenus, speaking of the Fannian law, relates nearly the same things:

The Fannian law came before the people with the great agreement of all the orders; and it was not the praetors or tribunes, as with most other laws, but the consuls themselves who proposed it upon the counsel and opinion of all good men, since the state was suffering greater losses from the luxury of banquets than can be believed. For matters had come to such a pass that very many freeborn boys, enticed by gluttony, sold their chastity and their liberty, and very many of the Roman plebs came to the Assembly soaked in wine and, while drunk, deliberated upon the safety of the state.

Thus Sammonicus. The law of our prince also was enacted to the applause of all. Frugal heads of households rejoiced that they could be sober and frugal without disgrace and the objections of gourmands, and that not only had the danger of profusion been shaken off by law, but the necessity of thrift had also been imposed. Yet there are not lacking those who strive against it: rich only in luxury, poor in assisting the state.

§ 3. The laws of Mainz defining expenditure consist in prescribing the number of guests and dishes, the time, and gifts; certain banquets, however, they abolish altogether.

Concerning these things the edict reads as follows.

I. At the making of a betrothal contract, no banquet shall be held in villages; but those who were present to settle the contract shall be given a slight refreshment of bread and wine. In cities, however, if the bridegroom and bride are wealthier, ten or twelve guests may be invited at the expense of both families, provided that the banquet is not prolonged beyond three hours. The penalty for transgressors is ten pounds of denarii, article four, §3.

II. Fifty wedding guests are permitted to citizens and craftsmen; seventy-four to academics, those who belong to a council or serve in courts, and also wealthy merchants; ninety-four to court counselors and assessors of the court tribunal, article 4, §§4 and 5. A fine of four pounds of denarii is prescribed for each person exceeding the number. In villages, however, only forty are permitted even to the wealthier and thirty to the rest.

III. The power of dispensing anyone from this law is removed from all; it must therefore be sought from the prince alone, or, in his absence, from the one holding his place, §7, article 4.

IV. The measure of dishes at a baptismal banquet is defined in the following manner. First, those who are of the first or middle station may send the woman in childbed, upon the first day of the baptism, a breakfast--that is, one measure of wine and two white loaves, or as much bread of fine flour--where breakfasts are customary. Where it is not customary to take them, it is lawful to send two measures of wine and two white loaves; this, however, is not permitted to craftsmen and hired laborers. A fine of ten pounds of denarii is imposed upon the transgressor, article 3, §7.

V. If anyone after the baptism wishes to invite the midwife or other women who attended the childbirth, he shall set before them nothing except broth with meat, roast meat, and cheese, not cakes or anything else. The fine is six pounds of denarii. Nor shall the women spend more than two *Batzen* upon the refreshment.

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VI. These are the wedding dishes. Citizens and craftsmen shall set out only four dishes: first, broth with boiled meat or a hen; second, vegetables with boiled meat, or ham, or sausages, according to the season; third, fish; fourth, roast meat, to which may be added either gudgeons, or crabs, or curds--one of these, not several. A second roast is permitted to persons of the middle station, such as academics and rich merchants; but two other dishes to court counselors and assessors of the court tribunal. The fine is ten pounds of denarii. But if someone of great dignity is present, somewhat more may be set upon his table alone by way of honor, provided, nevertheless, that molded representations of foods are altogether abolished, article 4, §19.

VII. When the baptism is finished, there is no banquet for men, article 3, §10.

VIII. The time also is defined. In villages they must rise from the table about the second hour; in cities, at the fourth or fifth--not because more license is granted to townsmen, but because they are accustomed to sit down later. All, however, are ordered to return home honorably and decorously.

IX. On the following day they may assemble again, but at the eleventh hour; in villages, however, at the fourth hour after noon, provided that everything is ended at the eighth hour. Meanwhile neither children nor other uninvited members of the household shall be brought, nor shall anything be sent outside.

X. The measure of gifts is as follows. Citizens and craftsmen may give godparents only half a *Philippicus*; academics and the richer, a whole *Philippicus* or a gold florin; court counselors, a ducat. Other little gifts shall be omitted altogether, under a penalty of ten pounds of denarii. If anyone gives gilded or silver cups, he shall be fined four hundred pounds of denarii.

They shall offer the midwife two white coins as her honorarium, and the same amount to the sacristan. The rich may give four and one-half.

XI. Presents or New Year's gifts among godparents shall not exceed an eighth of a florin. Cakes and all other sweets are abolished altogether, under a penalty of five pounds of denarii.

XII. At confirmation also, a gift shall not exceed three *Batzen*. If they prefer to give a prayer book, its price shall not exceed five or six *Batzen*, and this shall be granted only to persons of the first rank.

XIII. At weddings, shirts shall be given only to parents, and handkerchiefs only to the best man and the nearest agnates. The penalty is five pounds.

XIV. Guests shall not exceed the appointed value, nor shall young men and maidens exceed half a *Philippicus*.

A pair of spouses of the middle station: an imperial thaler.

Persons of higher rank: a gold florin.

Prelates of the second rank of the clergy, and secular persons in honorable offices: a ducat. Whoever gives more shall be fined ten pounds of denarii.

XV. It is permitted to the very wealthy to give a silver cup as a memorial, but only to parents, brothers, and sisters, and to no one else, under a penalty of fifty pounds of denarii.

XVI. Free weddings, at which nothing is paid, are abolished altogether. If, however, one of the principal counselors wishes to hold one, he shall invite only fifty or sixty guests; he shall furnish the meal not in a public house but in a

private one; and he shall receive gifts only from parents, brothers, and nearest agnates. Whoever acts otherwise shall be fined one hundred pounds.

XVII. To the inviter, where there are six tables, two florins shall be given; where there are more tables, three florins. No other little gifts shall be given.

To the musicians, two florins; if they demand more, a fine of ten florins is prescribed. Badges shall not be given to the young men, under a penalty of eight florins. To the cook, where there are six tables, five florins; where ten, seven florins; to the dishwashers, three white coins; to the one turning the spit, two white coins. For one demanding more, a fine of four pounds is established. If an orator, musician, or cook is unwilling to serve at that price, he shall not be employed at weddings for an entire year; if obstinacy appears in them in these matters, they may even be deprived of civic rights and banished from the city. The sacristan shall be given broth with a portion of meat and two measures of wine. The same food, with one measure of wine, shall be given to the trumpeter who keeps watch in the tower. Those who carry the wedding wine into the cellar shall receive nothing beyond their ordinary wages; only one measure may be given to them. To the watchmen also they shall give only two measures of wine and two loaves.

Finally, costly gifts, handkerchiefs, and other things between the bridegroom and bride are prohibited. Accordingly, citizens and craftsmen shall not exceed five florins; persons of the middle station, eight; persons of greater dignity, ten. A fine of forty pounds of denarii is prescribed for offenders.

§ 4. And those are laws concerning weddings, which it would be worthwhile to extend also to other banquets. Our ancestors acted in this way.

For first they prescribed thrift in common foods and condemned costly and exotic ones. “There survive censorial laws,” says Pliny in Book Thirty-six, chapter 1, “forbidding sweetbreads, dormice, and other things too insignificant to mention from being set upon dinners.” And in Book Eight, chapter 57, he says that mice were removed from dinners, which the censorial laws--the princeps Marcus Scaurus being consul--removed from dinners no otherwise than shellfish and birds conveyed from another world.

What then? They forbade as delicacies things which now are despised as rustic food. Pliny, treating of swine in Book Eight, chapter 51, says:

Nor does any other animal supply more numerous material for the eating-house: nearly fifty flavors, whereas the others have one apiece. Hence the pages of censorial laws and the prohibition from dinners of belly, sweetbreads, testicles, wombs, cheeks, and boar-meat; nevertheless, after Publilius, the poet of mimes, had cast off slavery, no dinner of his is recorded without belly, and even the name “udder” was imposed by him. Late-farrowing sows also found favor. Already the speeches of Cato the Censor reproach people for the calloused flesh of boar. Nevertheless, when it had been divided into three parts, the middle part, called the boar's loin, was set out. Publius Servilius Rullus was the first of the Romans to set out a whole boar at banquets; he was the father of that Rullus who promulgated the agrarian law in Cicero's consulship. So recent is the origin of a thing now daily. And the Annals noted this, evidently for the correction of the morals of those for whom, though the dinner was indeed noted at its beginning, two and three boars together are now commanded.

He relates the same concerning hens in Book Ten, chapter 50:

The Delians began to fatten hens; thence arose the plague of devouring plump birds and birds made fat with their own bodies. I find this first excepted in ancient prohibitions of dinners, already by the law of the consul Gaius Fannius, eleven years before the Third Punic War: that nothing belonging to birds should be set out except one hen, and one that was not fattened. This provision was afterward transferred and passed through all the laws; and an evasion of them was devised by also feeding cockerels with food soaked in milk, by which they are approved as much more pleasing.

Will you persuade our age that after the Punic War, when Italy, Sicily, Spain, Greece, and a great part of Asia served the Romans, there was such thrift that they enacted by law that nothing belonging to birds should be set out except one hen, and one that was not fattened? O men worthy to be masters of the world, who, though ruling most widely, did not even taste the delicacies of our rustics! The same author shows that the law was observed, because this provision passed through all the laws and because cockerels were substituted in place of their mothers.

As for Pliny's mention of the Fannian law, it was added to the Orchian law, which prescribed the number of guests; for the Fannian law regulates expense. At the Roman and Plebeian Games, the Saturnalia, and certain other days it permitted one hundred asses to be spent on each single day; on ten other days in every month, thirty; but on all other days, ten. Because it permitted one hundred asses, the law, which was received with the enormous favor of all the orders, was called the "hundred-as law" by Lucilius.

But how much did the law permit when it permitted ten or one hundred asses? An *as* is the smallest thing: "I do not value you at an *as*" occurs in the proverb of those expressing contempt. Thus the *as* is the smallest coin when the matter concerns counted money. Epicurus boasted that he was fed for less than an entire *as*; Metrodorus, who had not yet made so much progress, for an entire one. Seneca, Epistle 18. But he ate, as he himself boasts, only bread, ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ χρώμενος, using water and bread. Seneca indicates that the bread was barley bread; for water and porridge, or a piece of barley bread, is not a pleasant thing. Epicurus calls it μᾶζαν, which Pliny calls *polenta*. The same Seneca shows that this was great thrift: "The provisions of a prison are more liberal; a man who is going to kill those set apart for capital punishment does not feed them so narrowly." The provision of a prison was a pound of meal for each day.

It was scanty, however, as Sallust says: it prevented death, but nevertheless strength grew feeble upon it. Seneca says: "You will exult when filled for two asses." They therefore spent two asses to fill the belly with bread. From this appears the severity of the Fannian law, which upon a feast day permits only one hundred asses to be set out at banquets--a sum that appears incredible, for one hundred asses make an imperial thaler less its fifth part; they make approximately nineteen *Batzen*.

At this price, for the whole day--two parts upon food and drink, three upon seasoning--not only citizens but the leading men of the Senate were ordered to be content on the greatest festivals. We cannot restrict banquets in that fashion, but it is nevertheless useful to know what was done. I am not ignorant that there was at that time great cheapness of commodities; but by any valuation the thrift is great and the law severe. Let us grant a head of household five guests, so that he is the sixth and his wife the seventh. I reckon fourteen asses for bread, so that each may be filled for two asses; for wine--which was rare at that time, since vine-dressers had been driven away by wars--twenty-eight asses: now you have forty-two asses. Nor can it be less. For those who were most frugally filled with barley bread spent an *as*, and Seneca requires two asses, that is, a dupondius, at a banquet, where bread matching the festival in whiteness and bright with fine flour was required. Wine also easily exceeded twice the price of bread; nor were the sons of Romulus ignorant of drunkenness, for the Quirites came drunk to the Assembly and cast their votes. From this fact I also conclude that drunkenness at that time was not exceedingly disgraceful, since it was public and thrust itself into the assembly. For the remaining provision there are fifty-eight asses, of which twenty-nine must be spent upon the remainder of the midday meal and as many upon dinner.

But what were ten asses for one day? They are not two of our *Batzen*. If some similar law were now in use, how many thousands of annual revenue would it bring? Yet I do not approve one so severe and stringent, because it is not easily observed.

Didius enlarged the Fannian law so that all Italians were bound by it; then he enacted that not only those who had made lunches or dinners at greater expense, but also those who had been invited to them, should be subject to the penalties of the law.

Licinius Crassus, who was called Rich, himself also enacted a sumptuary law not very different from the Fannian. It differed from it in this: on the Kalends, Nones, and Roman market days, each man was permitted to consume only

thirty asses on each day for the sake of eating; but on other days, which were not excepted, no more was to be set out than three pounds of dried meat and a pound of salted fish. Those things, however, which were born from the earth, vine, or tree it granted without restriction. This was received with the greatest zeal and agreement; but soon it was relaxed by the dictator Sulla, who permitted thirty sesterces for dinner on the Kalends, Ides, Nones, games, and festivals, and on other days no more than three. Antius followed, but the obstinacy of luxury resisted his law.

Augustus attempted somehow to restrain luxury after morals had been corrupted. For two hundred sesterces were permitted on ordinary days, three hundred on festivals such as the Kalends, Nones, and Ides, and one thousand at weddings and the feast on the following day. See Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.17, and Aulus Gellius 2.24 concerning these matters.

After these things luxury grew powerful; poverty and the destruction of all followed, until the scepter was taken away and necessity taught sobriety. The same will happen to us also unless the license of ruining oneself is restrained by laws. For if we consider the things set upon the tables of private persons, they will easily equal the dinner of Metellus the pontiff, which Macrobius treats as sumptuous in *Saturnalia* 3.13.

§ 5. The second part of sumptuary laws is that luxury of dress be removed. It is now so great that it removes the distinction of all orders and confounds everything. Lest we suppose it a slight madness or a slight injury to the state, I have seen hired laborers and craftsmen diligent for an entire year, defrauding their own bodily comfort, so that they might be clothed like nobles. Now a village dresses at greater expense than a great city formerly did. I said something about this matter in Book Six; but now I require a courageous prince who will provide paternally for his subjects, lest they exceed their means in expense. For many millions are spent upon accessories and the adornment of clothing which can be applied to useful things.

The prince can attain this in two ways. First, if he himself is dressed modestly and shows that the prices, variety of colors, and other such things displease him. For since all courtiers wish to please the prince, and many also flatter him, without any command he will see the court decorous and grave, without extravagance of clothing. Once it is thus ordered, if nobles and others come there for business, at first they will feel shame when they perceive that they are more ornate than everyone else; afterward they will incur the jests and mockery of the courtiers.

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For pride in clothing is the vilest pride, because it is womanish and shows a mind occupied with little things. Hence, if you unexpectedly catch a youth or a man arranging himself elaborately and studiously, he blushes, as though he had committed something shameful and had unbecomingly cast aside a manly spirit, no less than if he were found playing with nuts or riding upon a long reed. Satraps and praetors will imitate the prince, and those among the subjects whom they observe to exceed the limit they will punish with contempt. Who, indeed, will not blush to be more ornate than his lord? Who, his fingers burdened with costly gems and rings, will dare to shine at a banquet when he perceives the governor's hands to be bare? No one can be ignorant of how important this is, for so much gold is now worn away upon the fingers of craftsmen, hired laborers, and rustics as is sufficient to maintain great armies. And in this matter rivalry is most destructive, and the evil flies over to everyone with the greatest speed.

The second method is easy and profitable: the prince should prescribe to each order the material and manner of clothing and sanction the law with a heavy penalty. First, those who violate the law should be subject to a monetary penalty. Then, if the right of wearing a ring or a linen garment is granted to anyone, let him purchase that privilege with a definite sum of money.

Both are equitable, for no one will violate the law except a boaster of his riches; for that very reason the adornment will be despised and shunned by prudent men. From this the prince will have one or the other of two advantages: either pride will assist the treasury, or obedience will enrich the city. Let there be, to be sure, a city containing one hundred thousand souls. All are clothed more expensively than accords with their station, and indeed ostentation exults in the

cradle and amid infant cries. I reckon ten florins for each person, which they spend beyond what respectability requires; nor does that luxury cost less, although some do not offend, for most lose greater sums and some squander hundreds and thousands. Behold: if that city were governed by laws, it would now be richer by a whole million. Let the prince therefore sanction discipline by sumptuary laws.

§ 6. The Roman emperors displayed great severity in forbidding costly clothing. For first Valentinian, Valens, and Gratian did not wish such garments to be woven for private uses, Code, title 8, chapter 11:

We prohibit the weaving and making, for private uses, of men's gold-embroidered garments or silken borders interwoven with gold, and we command that they be made only in our imperial weaving establishments.

He specifies only men's garments here, for the Theodosian Code also forbade women's garments, which Justinian permitted. But afterward Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius mitigated this same law--or rather made it harsher--when they granted those garments to the prince's ministers; for the concession invited others. The law reads:

Let no one have golden borders either upon tunics or upon linen garments except only those to whom this has been conceded because of imperial service. For whoever has not divested himself of a forbidden and undue garment will be punished by no light chastisement.

Theodosius forbade purple, as owed to the prince alone, and all silken garments:

Let all persons, of whatever sex, dignity, craft, profession, and family, refrain from possession of a material of this kind, which is dedicated to the prince alone and his household; nor let anyone weave or make silken cloaks and tunics at home. Let those garments which have been dyed with the purple shellfish and which have been woven without any admixture of another material be brought forth from houses; and let tunics or cloaks whose texture has been infected throughout with the blood of the shellfish be handed over. Let no threads dyed with the shellfish be woven beneath, nor let fibers of the same dye run down to be compacted by the sounding comb. Whole-purple garments must be returned to the treasury; men's garments must immediately be offered. Nor is there cause for anyone to complain about the forfeited price, because impunity for the violated law is sufficient. But lest anyone now incur the snares of the new constitution by concealing a thing of this sort, otherwise he will sustain danger after the likeness of injured majesty.

Here purple is forbidden to private persons, and there is a grave penalty, namely danger after the likeness of injured majesty. Then it must be returned to the sacred treasuries without receipt of a price. Under the same title the markets in purple also are prohibited, and Theodosius and Valentinian command that the workshops of the Tyrians or Phoenicians be inspected.

It is equitable, however, that the law forbids counterfeiting purple, for purchasers are defrauded at great prices. Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius forbade "dipping fleeces painted with a counterfeit color into an imitation of the sacred murex." If, therefore, to wear clothing similar to the prince's was the crime of majesty, punished by laws and death, why should the prince not prescribe modesty to his subjects, so that he may cut away a cause of debt, poverty, disturbances, and rivalries?

§ 7. Nor is there need of new laws. Laws which ought to have been observed were decreed long ago, provided that soul and vigor against vices be imparted to the laws by the magistrate.

The matter of clothing has been treated in many diets of emperors and princes, already for one hundred and fifty years; but luxury has always increased in opposition to all the edicts. The very senate of the princes is witness. In the year 1500 it was decreed under the emperor Maximilian as follows:

Since in past diets the superfluous luxury and prices of clothing have been treated in many ways, especially in the assembly at Freiburg, and laws and constitutions have been made but not yet published, we have now again renewed and accepted these through ourselves and the orders of our empire, while we have also more fully explained, enlarged, and corrected them, as the things following indicate.

We ordain, command, establish, and will, earnestly commanding all and singular princes, electors, dukes, and other magistrates, of whatever dignity, family, and estate they may be, under penalty of our indignation and punishment, that they themselves, and each of them, command their subjects and those belonging to them to observe this constitution of our empire and the law written below concerning the superfluous prices of clothing after mid-Lent, upon the next Sunday *Laetare*, and to bring it into constant use. But if any of the electors, princes, or magistrates shall be slow and negligent in the business or penalty of this matter, then, after the royal fiscal officer has admonished the electors, princes, and magistrates concerning that cause, he shall have power to summon and punish the violators; nor shall the magistrates to whom the transgressors of the law are subject have a right to interpose or obstruct. We also, as authors of the law, shall be the first to institute this constitution in our court and hereditary provinces, and shall take care that it is firmly observed.

The laws themselves are these:

First, therefore, we judge, ordain, institute, and will that which was also decreed and sanctioned in the Diet of Freiburg: that the common sort of rustics and laborers, both in towns and elsewhere in villages, shall not put on cloth whose ell exceeds half a florin. Furthermore, we forbid every kind of gold, silver, gems, velvet, silk, and embroidered clothing to all of them, their wives, and their children. By this decree, however, we will that princes, prelates, counts, lords, and nobles, together with their satraps or officials, be exempt; indeed, let it be lawful and right for them to clothe these annually according to custom, as also their other servants.

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Likewise, craftsmen, together with servants and all other hired laborers, shall use for hose or bands cloth whose ell does not exceed three quarters of a florin. For gowns and cloaks they shall be content with native cloth whose ell does not exceed half a florin. Nor shall they wear gold, silver, pearls, silk, velvet, watered, or embroidered clothing. Let the same rule concerning clothing apply to the wives and children of craftsmen.

Likewise, knights shall have neither gold, silver, nor silk, indeed neither a breastpiece nor anything interwoven with gold and silver, nor shall they distinguish their garments with silk.

Likewise, we prohibit to all and singular persons pleated shirts, breastpieces ornamented with gold and silver, and both silver and golden bands, excepting princes, magnates, counts, lords, and nobles, whom we will to be free from this decree. But let each cherish moderation or modesty according to his station, and avoid superfluous luxury. And especially let nobles who have not obtained the name of knight bachelor or doctor not cover their shirt-fronts with pearls or gold. We grant, however, to nobles distinguished by the title of knight bachelor or doctor that they may display upon their caps two ounces of silver and no more.

Likewise, to citizens in towns who are not nobles, knights, or doctors, we prohibit the use of gold, pearls, velvet, purple, and linings of costly furs; we permit, however, silken and velvet doublets or damask cloth as clothing. Similarly, let it be lawful to ornament the clothing of their wives and children with velvet and silk, but not with golden and silver borders. Furthermore, let their unmarried daughters not be forbidden circlets, gems, and various pearls, yet under this law: that they not transgress the laws of modesty and moderation.

Likewise, nobles not yet made knights bachelor or inaugurated with the title of doctor shall wear neither gold nor pearls openly, nor clothing of diverse colors, nor clothing excessively worked with the needle; yet if they have a mind to procure such work, let there be nothing excessive.

Likewise, nobles, knights bachelor, and doctors shall abstain from Attalic cloth; nevertheless, we give even them the opportunity to use doublets of this kind.

In the year 1530, during the reign of Charles V, it was established as follows:

CONCERNING THE IMMODERATE SPLENDOR OF CLOTHING

Since it is honorable, becoming, and equitable that everyone, of whatever order and family he may be, use clothing and attire suitable to his station, dignity, fortune, and wealth, so that each man's station may be discerned more easily and certainly, it has pleased us to confer, agree, and conclude with the electors, princes, and estates concerning the following ordinance of clothing, which we will to be observed in every respect under the chastisement and penalty annexed.

CONCERNING RUSTICS DWELLING IN THE COUNTRY OR IN VILLAGES

And first we sanction, ordain, and decree that the common sort of rustics, laborers, and hired workers dwelling in villages or the countryside shall employ for clothing not foreign cloth, but cloth woven within Germany and customarily used of this kind--excepting London, Mechlin, and Lierre cloth. Let their tunics not reach the ankles and not be gathered, but extend only as far as the calves and have no more than six pleats. Hose of London, Mechlin, or Lierre cloth shall, however, be suitable; indeed, it shall be lawful to procure a cotton doublet without looser sleeves, provided that slashed and cut garments are always avoided.

Furthermore, we decree that they shall not wear gold, silver, gems, silk, embroidered collars sewn to their undergarments and worked either with gold or silken thread, nor breastpieces, plumes, silken bands, slashed shoes, or doctoral caps, but hats and bands.

Likewise, nothing more or further is granted to their wives and children; and we forbid them all collars, breast-coverings, caps bordered with golden fringes, gold, silver, or linen girdles, corals, all gold, silver, gems, and linen. Only to daughters and unmarried women let a silken hairband be conceded.

Likewise, wives may make and wear an outer garment at most from London cloth and no other, but mantles from linings of lambskin, goatskin, and skins of this sort of a cheaper quality and price, without coverings and fringes.

CONCERNING CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS OF CITIES

Likewise, since in cities and towns there are principally three classes of citizens and inhabitants--namely common citizens and craftsmen; merchants and traders; and others of the senatorial and patrician order, or of more honorable family and descent, living from their own property, revenues, and substance--we establish, ordain, and decree that the common people, craftsmen, and merchants shall not use gold, silver, gems, velvet, silken, eyeleted, slashed, cut, or bordered garments, nor a doctoral cap; nor shall they line their attire with marten or shrew furs, or the costly furs of animals of that kind, but shall be content with the cheaper furs of ferrets, foxes, lambs, and that sort, in moderate and becoming apparel.

The same rule applies to their wives and children. Nevertheless, there is permitted to them a gold ring worth only six florins without a gem; a collar bordered with linen; a cap with a small golden fringe two fingers wide; a damask or silken outer garment; and a girdle worth not more than ten florins, ornamented only with silver bosses, not gilded. It shall be lawful for unmarried women to display a velvet hairband ornamented with silver, not gold.

Likewise, we forbid apprentices of craftsmen and servants already discharged from apprenticeship the use of gold, silver, linen, a plume, a cushion, or a slashed garment; nor shall they carry themselves in any other attire than was most recently stated concerning craftsmen and mechanics in cities.

But if anyone from the tribe and number of craftsmen should be chosen into the senate, it shall be lawful for him to use no other apparel than that of the merchants which will next be described.

CONCERNING MERCHANTS AND TRADERS

Urban merchants and traders shall not put on gowns of velvet, damask, silk, or linen. Let them avoid gold, silver, gems, and golden and silver ornaments for the hair. Watered gowns, silken doublets--not of velvet and not dyed with murex, and not bordered--and likewise gold rings, are permitted.

Let them not use cloth exceeding two florins in price. Let them, together with their wives, abstain from marten, shrew, or other furs of that kind that are more noble and rare.

Likewise, let their wives have equal ornament in clothing, and let them spend no more than two ells of velvet, linen, silk, or damask upon any garment; it is not forbidden to sew fringes upon its upper part.

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Likewise, there is forbidden to them a girdle exceeding twenty florins in price.

Likewise, a fringe or fold in a veil or cap more than five fingers wide.

Likewise, a velvet or linen outer garment with a golden clasp or brooch exceeding twenty florins.

URBAN CITIZENS WHO ARE OF THE SENATORIAL OR PATRICIAN ORDER, OR OF A PRINCIPAL FAMILY, AND LIVE FROM THEIR OWN REVENUES AND PROPERTY

Let all these be in precisely that clothing and apparel which was indicated above for merchants and traders, except that they may use watered gowns bordered with three ells of silk, and likewise marten furs--but not the choicer kinds--as well as doublets of velvet and linen, not dyed with murex, and linen hairbands.

We likewise permit them gold rings, but not exceeding thirty or forty florins in price.

Let their wives be in attire not unlike that of merchants' wives, except that it is lawful to spend four ells of velvet or linen not dyed with purple in distinguishing and varying their garments. We likewise grant a gold necklace worth thirty, forty, forty, or fifty florins, and a girdle worth thirty florins.

NOBLES

Furthermore, we forbid nobles velvet or silk dyed with murex; at most damask cloth or linen of this sort is conceded, which they may variegate with no more than six ells. Similarly, it shall be lawful for them to display gold rings, ornaments for parting the hair, and a necklace not greater than two hundred florins in price, but let them wrap or distinguish the latter with a band, according to ancient custom and usage.

One who is prefect of the court, chancellor, marshal, or counselor of some prince, yet not noble, may use attire not different from that of nobles.

Knights bachelor, however, are excepted. Let it be lawful and right for them to wear necklaces publicly without a band, but let no necklace exceed four hundred florins in price.

We do not prohibit them the furs of shrews and of that kind.

Wives of nobles may procure for themselves four linen tunics and use them openly: namely, one of velvet and the other three of damask cloth or linen of that kind, and no more than four apiece. Yet let them be without gems, silver, and gold. But if it pleases them to ornament these with borders and fringes, this indeed shall be lawful with gems or silver upon the upper part, and not beyond the width of a quarter of an ell.

The wife of a knight bachelor may sew this fringe with gold upon the upper part, but with the same width. And if any have a greater number of garments than we have just mentioned, let them keep them with their daughters and children; it shall not be forbidden.

It shall be lawful for them to use golden bands or caps whose circlets and ornaments do not exceed forty florins.

Likewise, a noblewoman may wear necklaces, brooches, clasps, pendants, and female ornaments of that kind, all of which--rings excepted--shall not exceed two hundred florins.

Likewise, golden borders and girdles shall not be greater than forty florins.

CONCERNING DOCTORS

Doctors and their wives may display ornate clothing, gold rings, and other insignia according to their station.

CONCERNING COUNTS AND BARONS

Counts and barons shall not use Attalic clothing, but only velvet, purple, and other linen and silk, not interwoven with gold, unless they are knights bachelor.

It shall be lawful to wear necklaces worth five hundred florins.

§ 8. The last subject of a sumptuary law is the construction of houses and the household; for to build houses and maintain many persons, εἰς πενίαν ἄτροπος ἐστὶν ὁδός. It is a straight road to poverty. The prince must take great care that citizens do not so contend in the splendor and magnificence of houses that they are reduced to want. For since the expenses of building are uncertain, accounts are never drawn so exactly that greater expenditures than those intended need not be made. And this is the customary error of those who build ostentatiously: that they are compelled to abandon their houses and move away. It is therefore expedient that a fixed rule for public buildings exist, lest, while men dwell spaciouly and magnificently, they restrict their patrimonies and their means of subsistence.

§ 9. If laws of health can be prescribed for this error or disease also, the following must be observed.

1. Let the prince and the state restrain themselves. Let the council-house, palace, and all things be beneath their majesty, lest they kindle rivalry among the citizens.

2. Let them omit harmful, temporary, and useless works. Such are theaters, circuses, pyramids, colossi, hanging gardens, triumphal arches, and whatever of that kind barbarous ostentation has devised. In this matter the Romans certainly offended. What benefit was the theater of Scaurus, concerning which Pliny writes in Book Thirty-six, chapter 15?

We shall not suffer the two Gaiuses or the two Neros to enjoy even this glory of fame; and we shall teach that even their madness was surpassed by the private works of Marcus Scaurus, whose aedileship, I know not whether, most of all overthrew civic morals, and whether Sulla's evil was greater in the power of so mighty a stepson than in the proscription of so many thousands. In his aedileship this man made the greatest work of all that were ever made by human hand, not for a temporary stay but even with a view to permanence. This was a theater. Its stage had three stories in height and 360 columns, in that city which had not endured six Hymettian columns without reproach to a most eminent citizen. The lowest part of the stage was of marble, the middle of glass--a kind of luxury unheard of even afterward--and the highest of gilded panels, as we have said. The lowest columns were thirty-eight feet high. The bronze statues between the columns, as we have indicated, were three thousand in number. The seating area itself held eighty thousand persons, although Pompey's theater, after the city had been multiplied so many times and its population had become so much greater, amply sufficed for forty thousand. But the remaining equipment also, of Attalic fabric, painted panels, and the rest of the theatrical apparatus, was so great that, when those things which remained for the luxury of daily use had been carried back to his villa at Tusculum, the villa was burned by angry slaves and property worth one hundred million sesterces was consumed.

What benefit was Curio's theater, except to make citizens suspended in the air? What benefit was Heliogabalus' bridge? All those things were made for the destruction of resources. If that money had been spent upon fortification, could Rome not have been made invincible?

3. Useful works--such as fortifications, mills, aqueducts, harbors, and navigable channels of rivers--he shall make with judgment and in proportion to expenditure. Such are the works which Quintus Marcius Rex made, which Pliny recounts in the same place:

Ordered by the Senate to repair the conduits of the Appian, Anio, and Tepula waters, he introduced a new aqueduct, called from his own name, by driving tunnels through mountains within the term of his praetorship. Agrippa, however, in his aedileship, after adding the Aqua Virgo and bringing together and repairing the others, made seven hundred basins; in addition, 105 fountains and one hundred and thirty distribution reservoirs, very many also magnificent in ornament. Upon those works he placed three hundred statues of bronze or marble and four hundred marble columns, all of them within the space of one year. He himself adds in his commemoration of his aedileship that games were held for fifty-nine days and one hundred and seventy baths were supplied free, which have now

increased at Rome to an infinite number. The most recent costly work, begun by Gaius Caesar and completed by Claudius, surpassed the preceding aqueducts. For from the fortieth milestone the Curtian and Caerulean springs flowed in at such an elevation that they might be raised to all the hills of the city. Three hundred million sesterces were expended upon that work. But if anyone should estimate more carefully the abundance of water in public places, baths, pools, houses, canals, gardens, suburban properties, and villas, together with the length of its approach, the arches constructed, mountains pierced, and valleys leveled, he will confess that nothing in the whole world was more marvelous. I should indeed reckon among the most memorable works of the same Claudius--although abandoned through the hatred of his successor--the mountain pierced in order to discharge the Fucine Lake, certainly at an indescribable expense and with a multitude of laborers through so many years: since either the collecting of the waters, while a four-mile mountain was being excavated from its summit by machines, or the cutting of flint, and all things within being done in darkness, are things which can neither be conceived in the mind except by those who saw them nor recounted in human speech. For I pass over the work of the harbor at Ostia; likewise roads cut between mountains; the Tyrrhenian Sea shut off from Lake Lucrinus by breakwaters; and so many bridges made at such expense. And among the many other marvels of Italy, Papirius Fabianus, most experienced in nature, is authority that the very marble grows in the quarries; the contractors also affirm that those wounds of the mountains are filled spontaneously. If these things are true, there is hope that luxury will never be wanting.

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4. Let there be a fixed measure for private houses. Augustus restrained ambition in building; for since men raised them too high, so that they constructed the danger of collapse, intercepted the air, and excluded the light, he defined the limit as seventy feet, according to Strabo. Nero also did the same; Trajan permitted sixty.

5. Let him altogether prohibit expenditure upon useless features of buildings, which contribute neither to stability nor convenience. For the madness of building has no end. The house of Marcus Lepidus was the most beautiful; but within thirty-five years it was not among the first hundred. Thus Pliny in Book Thirty-six, chapter 15:

Let whoever wishes reckon in this valuation the mass of marbles, the works of painters, the royal expenditures, and the hundred houses contending with the most beautiful and most celebrated, and afterward those houses surpassed by innumerable others down to this day. Fires certainly punish luxury; yet it cannot be brought about that morals understand anything to be more mortal than man himself. But two houses surpassed all those.

By this law three things especially are restrained: foreign marbles, sculptures, and paintings.

Pliny's complaint concerning marble in Book Thirty-six, chapter 1, is hardly empty:

We cut mountains and drag them away for no cause other than delights--mountains which it was also a marvel merely to have crossed. Our ancestors considered it almost a prodigy that the Alps were surmounted by Hannibal and afterward by the Cimbri; now they themselves are cut into a thousand kinds of marble. Promontories are opened to the sea, and the nature of things is reduced to a level. We carry away the things which had been established as boundaries for separating nations; ships are made for the sake of marbles, and across the waves, the most savage part of the nature of things, mountain ridges are carried this way and that, with even greater madness than when a vessel is sought from the clouds for cold drinks and rocks closest to heaven are hollowed out so that one may drink with ice. Let each consider within himself what prices he hears for these things and what masses he sees carried and dragged.

Scaurus brought 360 marble columns together for a theater lasting one month, but from his father's plunder of the provinces and Sulla's proscription lists. Lucullus gave his name to a marble as a memorial of vanity, and some of those columns were thirty-eight feet high. We see the swift triumph of vices. Lucius Crassus the orator was the first to possess columns of foreign marble, but they were Hymettian, only six in number, and no longer than twelve feet--and not without reproach, for Brutus therefore called him the Palatine Venus.

Much greater care must be taken that the workmanship not exceed the material. Sculptures, paintings, incrustations, and gildings must be forbidden. For to what purpose are such expenses and care? Why is clay polished with gold? Or what more can be bestowed upon royal palaces than that they be adorned with marble, bronze, ivory, electrum, silver, and gold? Deservedly will the prince make such great ostentation by private persons liable to servitude, so that they may be compelled to receive ambassadors or foreigners and, just as elsewhere tax is paid from hearth and tiles, so here it may be paid from gold.

The ancients had households that were armies, and retinues reduced many to solitude. Even now provision must be made lest those whose station is middling maintain a useless household at home. Gaius Caecilius Claudius Isidorus had 4,116 slaves, but most of them useful; others had more without cause. At Rome there was so great a passion in this matter that both private persons and the state suffered extreme things from it. The Servile War arose from herds of slaves; Rome was in perpetual danger.

“An opinion was once delivered in the Senate,” says Seneca in *On Clemency* 1.23, “that slaves should be distinguished from free men by their dress; then it appeared how great the danger would be if our slaves began to count us.” Demetrius, Pompey’s freedman, who was not ashamed to be richer than Pompey, had a great household, as Seneca says in *On Tranquility of Mind*, chapter 9: “The number of his slaves was reported to him daily as that of an army to a commander; yet two deputy slaves and a somewhat more spacious cellar ought long since to have been riches for him.”

Plutarch relates the following about the parade for Demetrius in his *Cato the Younger*:

Cato was going to Antioch and saw outside the gate, standing in orderly ranks along both sides of the road, men, youths, and boys, divided according to age, all in festive attire and clothing; in addition there were magistrates in white robes and even priests themselves wearing crowns. Cato was vexed and thought that this had been done for the sake of honoring him; he was angry with those whom he had sent ahead, as though they had given notice. And so, when he drew nearer, he descended from his vehicle and ordered his men to do the same and go on foot, as though he were to be greeted and led in by that procession. But behold, a certain old man, distinguished by a crown and staff--for he was the master of ceremonies--without even offering a greeting, asked where they had left Demetrius and when he would come. This Demetrius was Pompey’s freedman and had great influence with him, upon whom all mortals then had their eyes fixed. Therefore Cato’s companions were both indignant and dying with laughter; Cato said nothing other than, “O wretched city!” and entered it.

A multitude of slaves, clients, and attendants is the rock of destruction for nobles and princes. Yet foreign nations generally desire that petty glory more eagerly, such as the Turks; for the more barbarous any nation is, the more it delights to command many persons at home. And these things suffice concerning sumptuary laws.

CHAPTER XV

Other Honorable Means, Useful to Subjects, by Which the Resources of the State Are Strengthened

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§ 1. I have taught that resources are necessary to the state. They are gathered honorably either with inconvenience to the citizens, or without detriment to them, or, finally, with advantage to them. I treat the last method, and shall present certain other means, each of them indeed not of great consequence by itself, but several together powerful and abundant.

§ 2. The purchase of slaves and their lawful use tempered by humanity contributes greatly to gathering resources. Paul exhorts slaves to obey their masters, “not serving to the eye.” Nor is it contrary to Christian gentleness to use the labor of slaves. Abraham certainly had very many slaves, as did other holy men, for whose slaves that subjection was even more useful than dangerous liberty. Indeed, the laws of Moses concerning servitudes are most equitable, Exodus 21:2 and the following verses, and Leviticus 25:6, 42, and 44. For if they can lawfully be killed, they can therefore also be reduced to servitude.

Next, the civil laws and the perpetual practice of Christians attest this, nor does Paul command Onesimus to be manumitted, but restores him to Philemon. For servitude is nothing other than to be in another's power, to be governed by his counsel and will, to furnish labor to him, and to possess nothing of one's own unless the master concedes it. Servitude, however, ought to arise from a just cause and to be equitable and mild, according to that maxim:

What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another.

This is useful in common. For since many persons are by nature, through neglect of instruction, or by the efficacy of seduction wicked and stubborn in vices, it is plainly useful for those who cannot bear liberty to serve in servitude. How many myriads of vagabonds and wanderers burden the state and betray it when there is an opportunity? Would it not have been better for them to serve moderate masters, be exercised by labors, gather a private fund, and await manumission by the praetor's rod? If they are not well-behaved, let them be ruled by δεσποτικῇ command; if they are prudent and moderate, like Abraham's servant, let them acquire liberty. For Christian laws long ago abolished that harsh and cruel servitude of the ancients, who usurped the right of life and death over the wretched, cast the sick or old out of the house, and sold them to the beasts. It is therefore a just and lawful means, and it burdens no one in the state except him who deservedly is a slave; indeed, it also strikes fear into enemies, while they flee wars through fear of servitude.

Furthermore, the advantages which arise from it are several.

1. Great works can be completed publicly and privately with the greatest speed. For what would Clodius not do with his laborers, or Crassus the Rich with five hundred workmen? The cause is that they are subject to power: they can be pressed, compelled, and flogged, although in this matter account must be taken of justice and clemency. Nor were cities and great substructures formerly made in any other way than by servile hands. Thus the children of Israel built Pithom and Rameses for Pharaoh, cities of tabernacles. Those who are free come and go at their pleasure, drink, and neglect their work.

2. They accomplish everything at lesser expense. Hired labors are costly, undertake the work more slowly, and live more lavishly. Therefore one who uses slaves gains half the price. He pays them no wages and feeds them more cheaply than free men.

3. In mines, trenches, aqueducts, laying walls, cutting wood, and cultivating fields, even private persons can conveniently accomplish many things through slaves; and it is expedient for the prince to have public slaves, or for there to be certain rich men who hire out the labor of slaves to private persons.

4. Pharaoh teaches us that very many advantages are attained from this, since after so many plagues he still preferred the useful to the honorable: “Why have we released Israel, so that it should not serve us?” With what great savagery do the Turks press on, so that they may carry off Christian captives? Why do we not in turn use their servitude? I always speak of just and mild servitudes. Why should it not be lawful or advantageous for us, when we see the Italians and Spaniards gather riches from slaves?

5. Past ages have taught how many slaves were talented and suited to great arts, to governing the state, in necessity to military service. Manlius, Antiochus, Taberius, Eros, and others were learned. Others were trained in every kind of craft; indeed, they can also be instructed so that they may be useful to their masters and sold at a higher price.

§ 3. The cultivation of all mechanical arts which are necessary or useful. The state will accomplish this if it renders craftsmen honored and confers privileges, and that in imitation of the ancient laws. For thus Constantine to Maximus, Code 10, title 64:

We command that craftsmen of the arts comprised in the list appended below, residing throughout the individual cities, be free from all public duties, since leisure must be afforded for learning the arts, so that they may desire all the more both to become more skilled themselves and to instruct their sons.

From the *Notitia*, however, he enumerates them thus: architects, physicians, painters, makers of statues, marble-workers, makers of couches or chests, locksmiths, chariot-makers or stone-squarers, whom they call by the Greek term *πῆκταις*; masons, that is, builders; wood-carvers, mosaic-workers, gilders, white-metal workers, whom the Greeks call *κοιλῆται*; silversmiths, embroiderers, openwork craftsmen, braziers, founders, seal-makers, workers in iron, makers of armlets, makers of beams, and levelers; potters, who in Greek are called *κεραμεῖς*; goldsmiths, glass-workers, plumbers, mirror-makers, ivory-workers, furriers, fullers, wagon-makers, sculptors, plasterers, coiners, makers of three-horse chariots, makers of light carriages, and beaters of leaf, that is, *πεταλουργοί*.

Constantius and Constans confirm the same immunities under the same title:

By our pronouncement we summon mechanics, geometers, and architects, who preserve the divisions and sections of all parts and bind those making works to measures and rules, and those who reveal the conduits of waters and the methods discovered by skillful leveling, to an equal zeal for teaching and learning. Accordingly, let them enjoy immunities and receive persons to be taught, those who are capable of teaching.

Aristotle indeed excludes them from the state, but unjustly, since they possess practice and prudence and have the means necessary for life. For today their condition is such that they do not break their bodies by labors but strengthen them, at least those guilds of craftsmen that are most honorable in cities; and this has been instituted according to the standard of the ancients and of the sacred state. For in the Israelite state God himself honored craftsmen, Exodus 31:

Behold, I have called by name Bezalel, son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah, and I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge in every work, to devise whatever can be skillfully made from gold, silver, bronze, marble, gems, and different kinds of wood. And I have given him as companion Oholiab, son of Ahisamach, of the tribe of Dan. And in the heart of every learned man I have placed wisdom, so that they may make all things which I have commanded you: the tabernacle of the covenant and the ark of the testimony, and the mercy seat which is over it, and all the vessels of the tabernacle, the table and its vessels, the most pure lampstand with its vessels, and the altars of incense and holocaust, and all their vessels, the laver with its base, the sacred vestments for the ministry of Aaron the priest and his sons, and so forth.

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Once this foundation of the arts had been laid, the dignity of craftsmen was always great, as also were their resources. This very time of calamities shows it, for when the Babylonian carried away the princes, the strong men, and the craftsmen with King Jehoiachin, he left only the poor, 2 Kings 24:14:

And he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the princes, and all the strong men of the army, ten thousand into captivity, and every craftsman and smith; and nothing was left except the poor of the people of the land. He also carried Jehoiachin away to Babylon; and he led the king's mother and the king's wives, his eunuchs, and the judges of the land into captivity from Jerusalem to Babylon. And all the robust men, seven thousand, and craftsmen and smiths, one thousand, all strong men and warriors; the king of Babylon led them captive to Babylon. And he appointed Mattaniah, his uncle, in his place, and imposed upon him the name Zedekiah.

Smiths and craftsmen, therefore, were among the rich and the princes, to such an extent that he is said to have carried away all Jerusalem because he led the principal men into captivity. The Hebrews call a smith *המסגר*, and the Septuagint *συναγλιόντας*; some call him a doorkeeper, others a guardian, others one who fastens swords, and others men skilled in laying out a camp. The same things are found in Jeremiah 24:1 and 29:2. But I prefer that a skillful craftsman be called this, one who makes *מסגרות*, artful joints of buildings, columns, and instruments. Thus some interpret it as a metalworker. Those, however, who call them great or highly esteemed, as Rabbi David in the *Book of Roots*, although they seem to derive it from *סגור*, which is refined, pure gold, or from *מרוק*, which is melted gold, nevertheless take it in the same way; for such men were held at a great price. Therefore Rabbi David also calls them wise men and counselors in his commentary; nor is this remarkable, for God calls Bezalel such. What we see done here, Isaiah had already foretold: that God would “take away the wise man from among the architects,” chapter 3, verse 3. Solomon also esteemed these things, 1 Kings 7:14:

King Solomon also sent and brought Hiram from Tyre, the son of a widowed woman of the tribe of Naphtali, whose father was a Tyrian, a worker in bronze, full of wisdom, understanding, and learning, to make every work of bronze.

The descendants of Othniel, a most noble and brave man, through his son Seraiah and grandson Joab, were craftsmen. For “he was the father of the Valley of Craftsmen, for craftsmen were there,” 1 Chronicles 4:14, where the Hebrew has simply *היו חרשים כי*, and the Septuagint *ὅτι τέκτονες ἦσαν*, “because craftsmen were there.” Craftsmen also build Jerusalem, Isaiah 2:3, 33. Nor were they less esteemed at Rome, for they were both admitted to magistracy and, after the faction of the patricians had been overcome, obtained the right of citizenship, which was the highest right. Romulus distributed the citizens into curiae or brotherhoods; Numa Pompilius, as Plutarch says, in order to remove the hateful distinction of nations, instituted a division of arts and associations and colleges of craftsmen and architects.

Craftsmen bring the greatest supports to the state, for they attract merchants, flee idleness, import riches, and are useful in war.

If their industry is honored, they will flourish much more. For since there are economical methods of conducting affairs which prevail in the arts, they will assist the state with less care and labor.

§ 4. The first thing, therefore, is that the arts be honored; the second, which follows from this, is that certain arts be regarded as so honorable that even the rich and nobles practice them. Plato says that the arts are deserted for two causes: riches and excessive poverty; for the rich dissolve in idleness and luxury, while the poor lack instruments and material.

Nor will arts be lacking, provided the prince wills it. In the East the pastoral life was considered most honorable and royal; agriculture and the planting of groves and vines were held in great esteem. Now equestrian exercise and hunting almost entirely occupy the nobility. Other pursuits, however, can also be added, especially those which are liberal, such as painting, sculpture, architecture, the polishing of muskets, bows, axes, and swords, and everything pertaining to distillations of medicinal waters and the treatment of herbs. For if so many labors are expended upon alchemy with

fruitless endeavor, why should they not rather be expended upon useful things with certain outcome? Finally, whatever pertains to the polishing of gems, gold, and silver befits the wealthy. I spoke above about the liberal arts.

As for the poor and those of middling means who cannot live from their annual revenues, I repeat the law which I stated elsewhere: all must be examined as to the art by which they seek their livelihood; no place must be given to idleness. Boys must immediately be applied to lighter crafts, so that no one is idle; vagabonds must be restrained; those, however, who lack not the ability but the will to labor must be compelled to work. If this is done, the number of the poor will be ten times smaller. Some of them, although weak, will nevertheless be able to perform certain sedentary occupations. The rest, who are truly poor, will be maintained by alms without difficulty. And what was formerly said to the Israelite people will be capable of observance: "There shall be no beggar among you." Work, however, will never be lacking if the prince cultivates fields and establishes newly broken lands. The things that are done teach what can be done. The Belgians engage in wool-working and weave woolen and linen cloths and tapestries, with which they clothe Germany, Gaul, Spain, Africa, Asia, and both Indies. Why do the princes of Germany not imitate both this and other things? From here they buy up wool, carry it away, and bring it back, and double the expenses of customs and carriage. This, finally, is a great disadvantage in a state: because things made by art are bought from foreigners, everything is sold at a higher price and the city is drained.

Next, an abundance of craftsmen easily devises marvelous things, such as Curio's invention when he made a suspended theater. Pliny, Book Thirty-six, chapter 15:

He made two very spacious theaters next to one another out of wood, each suspended upon the revolving balance of hinges. In both of them, after a spectacle of games had been exhibited before midday while they were turned away from one another, lest their stages disturb each other, they were suddenly revolved so that they stood opposite; afterward, while the panels were now descending and the corners were coming together, he made an amphitheater and exhibited spectacles of gladiators, carrying around the Roman people itself, bound by a still greater gladiatorial contract. For what should one first marvel at in this affair: the inventor or the invention? The craftsman or the author? That anyone dared to devise this, or to undertake it? To obey, or to command? Above everything will be the madness of the people: that they dared to sit upon so untrustworthy and unstable a seat. Behold, here is that conqueror of lands and master of the whole world, who distributes nations and kingdoms, sends laws to foreign peoples, a certain portion of the immortal gods for the human race, hanging upon a machine and applauding at his own danger. What worthlessness of lives is this! Or what complaint about Cannae! How great a calamity could have occurred!

Lead these men into camps if a town must be defended by machines: what will they not accomplish? Let their talents exert themselves upon useful things.

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Contempt for the mechanical arts arose from the pride of the Greek philosophers and orators. And now also they are regarded by many as contemptible and sordid, although they were the first occupations of the human race after agriculture. The industry of the Indians pleases me more. They permitted individuals to practice individual arts, but permitted several to philosophers in honor of wisdom. From this we gather that Indian philosophy was not a follower of idle subtleties, but wisdom taking counsel for common and civil life.

§ 5. The method of collecting money in necessity which Sabellicus, Books Six and Seven, says the Venetians followed was also honorable and useful. For they publicly proclaimed that from those who had assisted the state with money, thirty would be chosen into the number of senators and that this dignity, once ratified, would remain for their descendants; to the rest, when the war was ended, five thousand coins apiece would be distributed each year. The wealthy gave in competition, and the treasury increased through rivalry. This was done prudently by the state, and there is no public rivalry between the old and new families. Why should kings not imitate it? Certainly the king of Spain, a few years ago, while ennobling some of the richest Italians, obtained great subsidies for wars. The honor of

nobility, however, must be conferred upon men of resources, ability, and industry, lest, if they fall back into want, they be a reproach to the order. No injury is inflicted here upon the state or upon private persons. But if it is objected that nobility ought to be a matter only of virtue, the reply is easy: those who assist their country with money are not inferior to others who boast of smoke-darkened ancestral images; for account is taken not of money alone but also of virtue. We learn that those men are of great spirit even from this: that they value great sums of money less than a moderate honor. I would recommend this to those princes to whom the nobility is subject and where it also conducts commerce. But if the old nobility becomes cheapened by the multitude of new men, that is a lesser evil, since it can recover dignity through virtue. This was also done in Gaul, and men purchased immunity with a great sum. It was also done formerly, when the right of Roman citizenship was given or sold to entire nations: an immense increase for so great an empire. Acts 22:28: ἐγὼ πολλῷ κεφαλαίῳ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἐκτησάμην. “I obtained that citizenship with a great sum.” If many thousands were given citizenship, but for a great sum, there is no doubt how much money many thousands of great sums made. Thus the prince will also be able, for some moderate sum of money, to grant the right of citizenship and other things which are honorable, yet do not prejudice the advantages or liberty of others.

Not unlike this is what the Byzantines did in necessity. For since there was a law that no one should enjoy the right of citizenship unless born of two citizen parents, they proclaimed that if anyone contributed thirty pounds to the state, although born of only one citizen parent, he would be regarded as a citizen with the same right as the man who possessed citizenship upon the best terms.

§ 6. Tamerlane's device was one of barbarous cunning. He sent merchants with costly furs into a city which he intended to besiege, and commanded them to sell them at an easy price so that they would be bought; then, when he had occupied the city, he recovered the furs, which could not conveniently be concealed. An honorable method: for thus he maintained his army from the enemy's money and afterward recovered the merchandise to be sold to others. Thus Hayton the Armenian.

§ 7. Edward IV, king of Britain, asked his friends voluntarily to contribute money to him for military expenses, saying that he would measure his goodwill from the deed of each; wherefore the contribution itself was named “benevolence.” Henry VII imitated the same thing. Polydore, Books 26 and 27. If great necessity presses, it is a proper method; but care must be taken that he in turn benefits them. Otherwise nothing is harsher than the prince's private entreaties among friends; for if they refuse or give sparingly, they think ruin has been prepared for them. If anyone either is unwilling or unable to give, he becomes the prince's enemy because the prince judges that he has been gravely offended by him.

§ 8. Antoninus the Philosopher, in order to obtain money, publicly sold all his vessels of gold, silver, murrine, and crystal, his gems--in a word, all his household furnishing--and his wife's ornaments, so that he might raise money. Not unlike this was the act of the Ephesians, who, as Aristotle relates in *Economics* 2, when they were in need of money, enacted by law that women should not wear gold, and then that they should lend it to the city. Some consider these things sordid; I judge it magnificent, for to despise external adornment is royal. Then the subjects are spared, and the spirits of the nobles and powerful are inflamed to assist the state. For who will drink from a rich jeweled vessel if he sees the prince's earthenware furnishing?

The matter turned out less in accordance with expectation for the Venetians when they wished to extort money from the citizens. For they proclaimed that whatever wrought gold or silver there was should be carried to the two commissioners so that coins might be struck; that those who brought it would receive the profits of a tenth part; and that the goods of those who did not bring it would be sold. But when they delayed, they were compelled by the seizure of pledges and by prisons. This was done in the war against Julius II. Bembo, Books Seven and Ten of the *History of Venice*. This indeed would have been less harsh if there was good faith, for a great profit was promised, and they could not refuse the state if it could furnish sufficient security. But they, cursing the war and the causes of the war and holding the Senate's good faith suspect, clung to their property. Nevertheless, the prince can use this method and must not be reckoned among the hateful if provision is made concerning the principal and the profit. For it does not befit

anyone to be so pleased with himself that, while the prince is in danger, he wishes to drink only from gold, especially when it is lawful to expect profit from the benefit.

CHAPTER XVI

Methods of Collecting Money Recounted by Aristotle in Book Two of the Economics, and Other Similar Methods

§ 1. Aristotle judges it worthwhile to know how the ancients raised money. I have determined to pursue his narrative in the order in which it is presented by him. Some methods must be condemned; some, but few, are worthy of praise; necessity renders several just.

When Cypselus of Corinth had made a vow to Jupiter that, if he gained possession of that city, he would dedicate all the resources of the Corinthians, he ordered a census to be recorded. When they had declared their property, he took away from each a tenth part of his goods, and ordered them to trade and acquire property with the remainder. When the year had turned, he did the same. It therefore happened that in ten years he himself possessed all the goods of the Corinthians and dedicated them, while the Corinthians in the meantime sought and acquired others.

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A wicked man's vow ought not to have been fulfilled; yet it was fitting that it should be carried out humanely. Julius acted similarly when, after swearing that he would crucify the pirates, he first killed them.

§ 2. Lygdamis of Naxos, after driving certain men into exile, when no one wished to buy their property except at a very low price, sold it to the exiles themselves. He also sold, both to the exiles and to others, those things which lay in workshops, not entirely finished, so that they might be consecrated as gifts to the gods, permitting the purchaser's name to be inscribed upon each.

The reason why men wished to buy at a low price was that possession assigned by a tyranny appeared uncertain and hateful to the common people. The exiles preferred to redeem it at a moderate price rather than lose everything. If he expelled them justly, he was not unjust in the sale; the sale also brought it about that the exiles were set against one another, while one bought another's goods.

§ 3. The Byzantines, in want of money, sold public groves and sacred places: productive ones for a fixed time, but unproductive ones as perpetual property. Likewise they sold both the things which associations possessed and those which belonged to ancestral rites, including those situated in private fields. For these were bought at a high price by the men who possessed the remainder. They gave the associations other public properties which were around the gymnasium, forum, or harbor, and also market places where something was sold. In addition, they sold the sea saltworks and the trade in salt. Likewise they ordered sleight-of-hand performers, diviners, sellers of drugs, and others of this kind, wherever they made profit, to pay a third part of their profit. They then leased out only one counter for exchanging money. It was not lawful to buy anything from one person or sell anything to another with any other coin. If anyone did so, he was fined that money. Since there was a law among them that one who had not been born of two citizen parents was not to be regarded as a citizen, when they needed money they enacted that one born of only one citizen parent should be regarded as a citizen if he paid twelve thousand coins. During a scarcity of grain, when they suffered from want of money, they brought ships down from the Pontus. When the merchants bore this with resentment, they paid them interest of a tenth. Those who then bought from them exacted that tenth from them beyond the price itself. When certain inhabitants had placed money at interest upon security of goods, and there was no source from which those loans could be repaid, they enacted that whoever contributed a third part of the debt or loan as tribute should retain those goods as his own.

Many things in these χρηματιστείας of the Byzantines are worthy of note, and some perhaps of imitation in necessity. First, they sold τὰ τεμένη, that is, all places consecrated to the gods, such as groves, open areas, temples, and chapels.

Second, they sold productive places, such as groves and fields, for a fixed time; unproductive ones, such as open areas and chapels, in perpetuity. Otherwise they would not have found a purchaser; for who would buy unproductive properties, only to render them productive and surrender them again? Third, they sold τὰ θιασωτικά, that is, places which belonged to sacred assemblies or associations; for those who entered an association for the sake of religion, such as Bacchic and Eleusinian initiates, are called θιασῶται, and θιασωτικά are the things which belong to them, especially houses and banqueting places. The rites were either πατριωτικά, ancestral, or, as some read, φρατριωτικά, rites of a brotherhood; and then τὰ ἐν τοῖς ιδιωτικοῖς, those situated in private fields. Pollux in Book Six calls the houses themselves φωλητήρια, caves and dens in which they drank deeply. There were many things of this kind in private gardens and fields which nevertheless belonged to the associations, not to the men in whose possessions they were found. Therefore the owners bought them at a high price so that they might have their fields free. Fourth, they gave the associations other things which were not productive publicly. Fifth, they sold the saltworks. Sixth, when there was need of exchanging money, they appointed only one man to do so at a fixed price, namely to pay out coin at a high price and receive it at a low price. This was manifestly unjust, especially since they could not use another coin. It was therefore easy to exchange gold pieces for a single denarius. The law concerning interest was no less unjust. All these measures took their beginning from the bad administration of the state.

§ 4. Hippias of Athens sold upper projections of houses extending into the public roads, likewise stair-steps, fortified vestibules, and doors which turned outward when opened. The owners of the properties therefore bought these things, and thus a plentiful sum of money was collected.

These things could have been done lawfully if the projections and steps were contrary to law; for since they occupied public space, and it was contrary to law for private buildings to make roads more obstructed, the state could lawfully have claimed them for itself. The cunning of Hippias was conspicuous in this: that he punished a concealed transgression of law under the supreme pretext of justice; for the owners of the houses were compelled to redeem these things at a high price unless they wished, by alteration and deformation of the whole building, to incur greater expenses. What Aristotle calls καὶ θύρας τὰς ἀνοιγομένας ἔξω--doors which open outward--was also forbidden formerly among the Romans. This was not readily granted to anyone, not even to triumphal houses, except those whose triumph had been attended by exceptional glory. Pliny, Book Thirty-six, chapter 35:

The thought arises, however, what portion of these were those sites upon which they decreed that houses should be built publicly for unconquered commanders. Their highest honor, as in the case of Lucius Valerius Publicola, who was the first consul with Lucius Brutus after so many merits, and his brother, who twice defeated the Sabines in the same magistracy, was that it was added to the decree that the doors of their houses should open outward and the doorway should be thrown back into public space. This was the most illustrious distinction even among triumphal houses.

Hippias acted dangerously and hatefully, however, for this appeared to belong to a malicious and crafty tyranny. He sold προφράγματα, or, as another reading has it, περιφράγματα--although I prefer προτεράσματα, for these are places before a stage or an enclosure, and in this place defenses of houses and enclosures extending into public space--which, unless they were redeemed, as I said, would have required the houses to be entirely destroyed.

§ 5. He ordered the coin then in use at Athens to be declared invalid, and commanded that all money be brought to him at an established price. When those who wished to mint with another device had assembled, he leased the same silver back to them.

Here there was pure fraud and deception by the tyrant, so that he might gather money by fraud and then approve anew what he had previously rejected. Even now many frauds are practiced in minting and reminting money, but generally under some pretext of justice.

§ 6. Furthermore, from those who were obliged to furnish the expenses of a trireme or a tribe, or the games, or to make expenditure upon another public service of this kind, he ordered that, upon establishment of a moderate sum, whoever wished to pay it should be enrolled among those who had discharged their office.

This was badly established concerning triremes and necessary things, but orderly and rightly concerning games, banquets, and other things. For if a thousand drachmas were to be spent upon games, it was better that six hundred should be given to the public and the games omitted. Here is a great opportunity for imitation, so that our princes may turn all expenditures made upon empty displays toward true and useful things. Nor did the man act foolishly, although avariciously, who, when crowns, statues, and empty honors were being considered, showed his hollow hand and wished them to be placed in it.

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§ 7. He also commanded that two sextarii of barley, the same amount of wheat, and one obol--that is, two asses--be brought to the priestess, ἱερεΐα, of Minerva who was consecrated on the citadel, for each dead person, and the same amount from those who had been increased by offspring.

The translator renders χοίνικας as two sextarii; more correctly, our Villalpandus, in his apparatus on Ezekiel, shows from Fannius that χοίνικα contains four sextarii:

This measure, taken four times, is called a *choenix* in Greek.

He judges, however, that five pounds of bread are contained in it.

In a populous city this produces a great contribution, but one that is tyrannical and sordid: to assess the dead and those being born. Yet it is not unlike the Roman poll tax, which brought it about that many did not rejoice that sons were born to them, as certain cities have also done.

§ 8. When the Athenians at Potidaea needed money for war, they ordered everyone to declare the valuation of his property, not all together in his tribe, but so that each possession should be declared in whatever place it was situated, so that the poor might submit an assessment. If anyone possessed absolutely nothing, the valuation of his person was two minae. From this, therefore, the tribute exacted from each was contributed in full. Nothing unjust was done in this matter; precaution was taken against the fraud of those who did not make a true declaration.

§ 9. A citizen of Antissa, when his city was oppressed by want of money and they had a custom of celebrating the Dionysia or Bacchanalia splendidly--upon which they made great expenditures from the provision of the entire year, on other things and on costly victims--and that feast day was then at hand, persuaded them to make a vow that they would render double things to Liber in the following year and to sell all the things which they had prepared together. Thus no small amount of money was collected for their present use. He acted rightly; and what was promised to an idol can also be done in the cause of God, for in a public necessity the ornaments of temples can be torn away and sold; those of idols ought to be. Saint Maternus admonishes the emperors to convert the ornaments of all temples consecrated to demons to the use of the state.

§ 10. When the arrival of many triremes was expected, and six modii of barley-meal sold for four denarii, the Lampsacenes ordered the men trading in the market to sell those six modii for six denarii. To a *congius* of oil which sold for four denarii, they ordered three obols, or six asses, to be added. They ordered the same to be done with wine and other things. Private persons therefore received the former price; the city, retaining what exceeded it, thus obtained an abundance of money.

This was an immense and inimitable tax, for they received a third part of all things offered for sale. Although they did not bring ruin upon the sellers, they nevertheless increased the losses of the citizens and of those who were in the triremes.

§ 11. When the Heracleots sent forty ships against the tyrants in the Bosphorus and did not abound in money, they bought up from the merchants all the grain, oil, wine, and other goods offered for sale. A time was appointed at which the price would be paid; and since it was advantageous for the merchants not to have their wares distributed by the *hemina*, but to have them sold all together, the Heracleots themselves, since they would pay when opportunity permitted, carried not pay but merchandise in cargo ships, and placed one quaestor in charge of each ship. When they had now arrived in the enemy's land, the soldiers bought everything from them. Money was collected, and the commanders gave the pay. Thus it happened that the same money was given repeatedly until they returned home.

That commerce was just if they paid the merchants at the appointed time. From the trade they maintained the army until they could dissolve it altogether. For the state did what was difficult for the merchants, namely κολλυβίζειν, that is, to sell by retail.

§ 12. When the Samians asked the Lacedaemonians to contribute money to them for the recovery of their country, they decreed that on one day both masters and household, and the beasts of burden, should fast, and that each should contribute to the Samians as much as he would have spent if they had not fasted.

This was a small but just subsidy, by which they showed that the state can easily be defended if each person is prepared to assist. Nor do I doubt that, if a thousandth part of the things which perish through luxury were expended upon the Turkish war, the Pannonias, together with Greece and Thrace, could be recovered in two years.

§ 13. When the number of foreign soldiers among the Carthaginians increased and they had no source from which to pay the wages owed them, a proclamation was made that, if any citizen or inhabitant had a right to seize either the city or any private person, and wished to make a seizure, he should declare it. Since very many made declarations, they thus seized ships sailing into the Pontus, putting forward some plausible cause and appointing a fixed time at which they affirmed that they would plead the cases. When a great abundance of money had then arisen, they dismissed those soldiers and adjudicated concerning the seizure. The city made satisfaction from its revenues to those upon whom injury had been inflicted by the seizure.

It was a Libyan deed and Punic fraud, which can nevertheless be excused by necessity. First, the foreign mercenary soldiers were numerous and, unless they received their pay, would have plundered the city and even the harbor. Second, they seized the ships and ἐσύλων, plundered them, as the Greek has it, not in the manner of brigands, but with witnesses brought in and a written record of how much each man had taken--indeed, with it deposited with the state. Third, judges or recoverers were then appointed; and to those from whom property had been unjustly taken it was restored gradually from the revenues of the treasury, namely by giving a loan for the present.

§ 14. When sedition arose among the Cyzicenes and the plebs was victorious, and the rich had been oppressed and captured, because money was owed to the soldiers they decreed that the captives should not be killed, but that after money had been exacted they should go into exile.

Here also mercy intervened, if the city could justly have killed the rich.

§ 15. Since there was a law among the Chians that debts should be registered publicly, when they needed money they enacted that the debtors themselves should pay their loans to the city, while the city should pay the creditors interest from the revenues until the amount paid equaled the principal. Injury was inflicted upon the debtors because they were compelled to pay at their own loss. The moneylenders were deservedly punished in this way, for it would have been lawful to take away the principal itself.

§ 16. Mausolus, tyrant of Caria, when the king of Persia requested through ambassadors that he pay tribute, summoned the wealthiest men in that land and showed them that the king was requesting tribute, but that he himself by no means abounded in money. Certain men who had been suborned then immediately promised that they would contribute and stated the sum. When this had been done, the wealthier men, partly from shame and partly from fear, both promised and contributed more.

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There was nothing unjust here, if tribute was truly being exacted, if the matter was not conducted by armed entreaties, and, finally, if Mausolus was not able to pay.

§ 17. Again needing money, he summoned the Mylassans and showed them in a speech that their city, the chief city of the kingdom and the one from which he himself had arisen, was not enclosed by walls, while the king of Persia was bringing an army against it. He therefore ordered the Mylassans to contribute as much money as each could, affirming strongly that by means of the things which they contributed then, they would preserve the rest of their resources. When great resources had been contributed, he himself retained the money, but declared that the god did not wish the walls to be constructed at that time. Now he openly plays the impostor and brings it about that no one will thereafter believe anything from him, even when he is placed in true dangers.

§ 18. Condalus, the prefect of Mausolus, if anyone brought him a gift of a pig or calf when he was making a journey through his province, ordered that the name of the giver and the day be recorded and that the animal be led to his house and fed until he returned. When a sufficiently long time seemed to have passed, he demanded back what the other man had fed, with an account of its produce also calculated. A slave like his master. Τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν λογιζόμενος: that is, calculating the produce--if a sheep had given birth, if it had been shorn, he exacted all these things. But the man played the impostor and stage-player, as is clear from what follows.

§ 19. Likewise he sold the fruit of trees overhanging or falling into the royal roads. If any soldiers had died, he also sold for a denarius the opportunity to carry the body outside the gate. From this he at once received silver and was not deceived by the commanders' report of the time at which any soldier had died. That man would gather coins from the lower regions themselves and from Pluto.

§ 20. What he judged concerning the Lycians is witty: that they could be milked of their coins by a jest. Aristotle relates the matter thus. Seeing that the Lycians delighted in wearing long hair, he said that royal letters had been brought in which it was commanded that their hair be brought to the locks. He therefore said that he had commands from Mausolus that they be shorn. He promised that, if they wished to contribute a fixed sum per head, he would take care that hair was brought from Greece. They gladly furnished what he demanded, and a plentiful sum of money was collected from a great multitude.

The translator renders τριχοκομίαν or τριχοτροφίαν, "locks," which has either no meaning or an obscure one. Aristotle says in Greek that they wore Τρίχωμα, that is, that they were long-haired; then that Condalus said that it was necessary ὑποστείλαι εἰς ἀκροκόμια, or προκόμια. What κόμας ὑποστείλαι εἰς τὰ προκόμια means--whether it is to let the hair down to the forelocks, or where it was to be sent--is not very difficult to conjecture, since he says that they ought τὸ κείρασθαι, to be shorn. The cut hair was therefore sent to προκόμια, or perhaps προκομεῖα, places where it was dedicated; for no one is ignorant that there was enormous superstition in this matter. In place of their hair he promises to bring from Greece artificial locks in exchange for the Lycians' hair. Their hair, therefore, was to be sent somewhere; but where would it be sent except to certain places where it was customarily consecrated to the gods?

§ 21. Aristotle of Rhodes also acted wickedly. Aristotle relates the following about him. Aristotle of Rhodes, holding authority at Phocaea, when in want of money and seeing that there were two factions of the Phocaeans, secretly spoke to one of them, indicating that the others were offering him money so that he would incline affairs toward them, but that he preferred to receive it from themselves and to deliver the administration of the city to them. Upon hearing these things, they immediately gave him as much money as he had ordered. But he in turn showed the other faction what he had received from the first. These men gave no less. Having thus received money from both parties, he reconciled favor between them.

Not a few imitate this, and a Roman arbiter also did it formerly.

§ 22. When the same Rhodian observed that there were many controversies among the citizens, and great injuries in them because of the war, he established a court and proclaimed that, if any had not proceeded at law within the prescribed time, judgments concerning their earlier charges would no longer be granted them. Then, drawing to himself the collection and appeals in a great many causes and disputes, after many terms had been proposed, and receiving something from both parties through different persons, he amassed no small amount of money. Another fraud, and one also too customary. For why is the matter conducted with such vehemence that cases are drawn to specified tribunals, unless because advantages also are drawn there?

§ 23. When the Clazomenians lacked money during a scarcity of grain, they decreed that those who possessed oil should lend it to the state at interest. This produce was plentiful in their region. When the oil had thus been lent, they hired ships and arranged that it be carried to places where markets were held, from which grain came to them, the price of the oil having been given as security. That commerce--the exchange of oil for grain--was lawful; but it was unjust that they commanded those who possessed oil to make a loan to the state.

§ 24. Their other device was much more ingenious. When, Aristotle says, they owed the soldiers forty and eighty sesterces in the name of pay and could not discharge it, each year they paid the commanders ninety-six sesterces in interest. But because by this agreement nothing was deducted from the principal and they themselves continued to make expenditure in vain, they struck iron coin to the value of silver, in the amount of 480 sesterces. They then gave this money to the wealthiest men in the city, in the proportion suitable to each, and received the same amount of silver from them. Private persons therefore had what they might spend upon daily uses, and the city was freed from debt. Then from the revenues they both paid them interest and, always dividing it, distributed it to each according to his share, and received the iron coins back. Aristotle says that they owed twenty talents but paid φόρον τέτταρα τάλαντα, four talents as interest. The citizens could trade with the iron money no less than with silver, since it had force by command of the magistrate, while the Senate exchanged the coins themselves for silver until it received all of them within the fifth year.

Many in necessity have followed this method. Enicus Lupides did so, as Tolosanus relates from Nebrissensis, Book Three, chapter 6, number 26. Thus Enicus Lupides, count of Tendilla, a distinguished commander placed in charge of the city of Alhama in the war of Granada, in extreme desperation concerning money, while awaiting money from King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, made little notes from cardboard with his own hand and marked them with his signature, calling some gold pieces, others silver coins, bronze asses, halves, thirds, and quarters. Purchases and commerce were conducted among them with these, after he had promised that he would give true money for those fictitious pieces after its receipt.

At number 27, Sabellus relates that Domenico Michiel, doge of the Venetians, did the same when he was far from home, besieging Tyre with a fleet in the Asiatic expedition. Since because of a lack of money pay could not be rendered to the rowers and naval allies, he marked leather money with the public stamp; distinguishing it by fixed symbols as gold and silver, he paid it as wages to the naval companies, promising that soon at home gold and silver coins would be presented in equal number to the possessors in exchange for the leather ones. This also was done.

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Since this form of money is held valid not by the value of the metal but by valuation alone, which arises from the faith placed in the one establishing it, it must not be used if everything is in doubt; for in that case it introduces despair, much less if no faith is placed in him, for men think themselves mocked. Accordingly, if Mausolus or Conдалus should strike coins from leather or lead, no one would accept them. For that money is not properly money but rather a token that true money is to be given, or a promissory note, which we value at nothing if it is given either by an impostor or by a needy man.

§ 25. When the Selymbrians were in want of money, and there was a law that grain should not be exported in time of famine, while old grain remained to them, they decreed that private persons should deliver their grain to the state at an

established price, so that each retained sustenance for himself for one year. Afterward they granted to anyone who wished the power of exporting at an established price, which appeared equitable.

There was already famine. Therefore, since it was not lawful to export it, they appeared with a certain right to be able to demand that what remained beyond necessity be sold to the state. The state itself then exported it and sold it at a higher price, which was unjust, for it received the property of private persons, traded with it, and took from them the opportunity of making profit.

§ 26. Because the land of the Abydenes was uncultivated through sedition, and the inhabitants spent nothing further upon it because other debts were still owed, they decreed that whoever lent money to farmers so that they might perform work in the country should receive the fruits produced first, and the others only those which remained.

The zeal for agriculture is praiseworthy, in which those who furnish expenditure to the cultivators are preferred to the owners.

§ 27. When the Ephesians needed money, they enacted a law that women should not be permitted to wear gold, and that whatever gold they had at that time they should entrust to the city. After also establishing a sum of silver which was to be paid, they permitted the name of the man who had paid that silver to be inscribed upon the columns of the temple as though he had consecrated the column.

This was equitable, for they ought to lend to their country rather than, by loving their ornaments excessively, lose both their country and the ornaments themselves. The provision concerning inscription of the name upon the columns was certainly prudent, for by it defense of the country was obtained without injury to anyone--unless perhaps the names of others had already been inscribed.

§ 28. Dionysius possessed various arts of defrauding and gathering money; Aristotle recounts them. Dionysius of Syracuse, wishing to heap up money, summoned an assembly and said that Ceres had appeared to him and commanded that women's ornaments be brought to her shrine, and that he himself had done this with the ornaments of his own women. He therefore demanded that the same be done by others also, lest the goddess be angered. He pronounced that whoever did not do it would be guilty of sacrilege. When all had brought the things they possessed, both out of regard for the goddess and for him, after the sacred rite had been performed he took away the ornaments as though they had been lent by the goddess herself.

This was a foul deception unworthy of a king, abusing the superstition of wretched women for profit.

§ 29. But the device that follows for chastising female φιλοκαλίαν, love of adornment, was not incapable of imitation, provided superstition were absent. "When some time had passed," says Aristotle, "and the women again wore ornaments, he proclaimed that the woman who wished to wear gold should dedicate in the temple something of equal value."

§ 30. When he was about to build triremes, he knew that he would need money. He therefore summoned an assembly and said that a certain city was being betrayed and that he needed money for that affair. He demanded that the individual citizens contribute two gold pieces. They contributed this money. After an interval of two or three days, as though the affair had been frustrated, he praised the citizens and returned to each what he had contributed. By doing this he reconciled their goodwill to himself. Afterward, in the same hope that they would receive it back, they contributed again. Dionysius, however, retained what he then received for building the triremes.

Thus they build up trust in small things so that they may deceive in great ones.

§ 31. When he did not abound in silver, he struck a coin from tin and, summoning an assembly, commended that coin in an abundant speech. The Syracusans, although unwilling, approved it by their decree, and each preferred to regard himself as possessing silver, not tin.

Since neither he himself nor others afterward accepted the tin coins, private persons necessarily suffered this loss contrary to right. For it was just as if he had exchanged χρύσεια χαλκείων ἐκατόμβια ἑπταβοείων: gold for bronze, things worth a hundred oxen for things worth seven.

§ 32. This also belonged to a crafty defrauder mocking his citizens. Again, when in want of money, he asked the citizens to contribute to him. When they denied that they possessed any, he brought out his own utensils and offered them for sale, as though he were doing this through want. When the Syracusans bought these things, what each had bought was recorded. But when the price had been paid, he ordered each man to carry back to him the utensil which he had bought.

§ 33. This too was tyrannical. Because of frequent tributes the Syracusans had ceased to raise livestock. Then Dionysius affirmed that enough had been contributed to him for that use, and that those who thereafter acquired livestock would be exempt. But when many had acquired many animals in hope of immunity, he seized the opportunity, ordered an assessment of what each possessed, and imposed a tribute or payment. Then the Syracusans, resentful that they had been deceived, began to slaughter and sell their livestock. When Dionysius had by edict fixed the number of animals to be slaughtered each day, they claimed when slaughtering them that they were sacrificing. Then Dionysius prohibited the killing of a female animal.

§ 34. This, however, was cruel, although it found imitators. Again, when in want of money, he ordered a declaration to be registered with him of the property of every household whose children were bereft of parents. Once this had been done, he himself used the money until each came under his own guardianship.

§ 35. There is also what he did at Rhegium. After occupying Rhegium, he summoned an assembly and said that he could lawfully plunder their city, but that he wished to release them if only he recovered the expenses made upon that war and three minae for each person. Then the Rhegians brought into view whatever they had concealed. Even the needy borrowed money from wealthier persons and foreigners, and thus they paid that sum. But after Dionysius had received it, he nevertheless both sold them all under the auctioneer's spear and took away all the household furnishing which they had brought out from concealment.

Here he was a thief and breaker of treaties. But nothing is sacred to avarice.

§ 36. He had borrowed money from the citizens which he was to repay. When they demanded it back, he ordered each to bring him as much silver as he possessed, under penalty of death if they did not do so. When the silver had been brought, he struck coin in such a way that one denarius was valued at two, and with it paid both what he owed and what they had brought to him.

§ 37. When he had sailed with one hundred ships into Tyrrhenia, he took from the shrine of Leucothea a very great quantity of gold and silver and no small quantity of other ornaments.

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But because it did not escape him that the sailors also possessed much, he ordered a proclamation to be made that half of what each had taken should be brought to him, and that the man who had taken it could retain the other half. He proposed the penalty of death for anyone who did not bring it. The sailors, judging that if they brought half they would safely retain the rest, brought it. But when Dionysius had received these things, he ordered them again to bring half of what remained.

Thus did that tyrant use not only power but falsehood and frauds to milk men of money.

§ 38. The Mendaeanes used the proceeds rendered by the harbor and other taxes for the administration of the city. But they did not exact what was received from land and buildings, and recorded only the names of the occupiers. Whenever the city needed money, these men paid what was owed. They therefore made profit from the past time, having used that money without interest.

That method was most just, for those who occupied the buildings could use the money and thus become rich. If money was not needed for a period of twenty years, they paid nothing; and even then they paid not as much as they owed, but as much as the city needed. Nor did the state suffer loss from this, for they leased those properties at a price higher by as much as they saw that they could profit from the proceeds not paid. Nevertheless, lest they become bankrupt, everything was recorded each year.

§ 39. When the same people needed money in a war against the Olynthians and abounded in a great number of slaves, they decreed that each should retain only two, a male and a female, and sell all the rest, so that private persons might possess money which they could lend to the city.

Without doubt a great sum of money was collected from the numerous and costly slaves. Yet the cause of the edict was that, while the Mendaeanes were occupied with war, the multitude of slaves should not be dangerous and occupy the city after expelling their masters, as they had done elsewhere and attempted elsewhere; and then that resources might remain for sustaining the burdens of war.

§ 40. Callistratus, when the customs duty in Macedonia generally sold for 280 sesterces, brought it about that twice as much was received. For when he observed that the wealthier men always bought it because sureties were required, and that sureties worth a talent had to be appointed for those 280, he proclaimed through a herald that whoever wished was given power to buy it and to appoint sureties for a third part and for whatever sum anyone could show that he possessed.

I judge that a prince should frequently employ this method, so that properties are leased in various ways; for in truth men are often persuaded that a thing is of less advantage although it can bring an immense sum.

§ 41. Timotheus of Athens, waging war against the Olynthians, when in want of money, struck a bronze coin and distributed it to the soldiers. When they bore this with resentment, he showed that all things offered for sale by merchants and in the marketplace would be sold to them for the same coin. He showed the merchants, however, that with the bronze coins they received they must in turn buy things offered for sale in that region and booty that had been taken. If any bronze remained, they were to bring it to him and receive silver for it.

We have seen the same practices of creating money above. Here only the difficulty arising from it is removed. From this it is clear that the method has no force unless the money is accepted and there is hope that it can be redeemed.

§ 42. But when he was waging war at Corcyra, suffering from want, while the soldiers demanded pay, refused his command, and threatened that they would pass over to the enemy, he summoned their assembly and said that storms had prevented silver from being carried to him. For he abounded in such plenty that he wished to give them as a gift three months' pay now, before its time. The soldiers, judging that he would by no means have undertaken so great a loss unless he truly expected the money to reach him, thus acquiesced concerning their pay until Timotheus completed the things which he wished to accomplish.

Aristotle does not explain whether he gave it afterward. Certainly the soldiers believed him, and it was dangerous not to give. A man who refuses just things to one bearing arms gives him everything.

§ 43. His method during the siege of Samos was excellent. When he was besieging Samos, he sold the crops and whatever was in the fields to the Samians themselves, whence an abundance of money was available for paying the soldiers' wages. But afterward, when many persons came and money for necessities began to circulate in the camp, by edict he forbade the sale of grain or flour in a measure smaller than six *modii*, and of all liquids in a measure smaller than ten *congi*. The centurions, therefore, and those who led companies, buying all things in quantity, distributed them to their soldiers. Those arriving brought their own sustenance with them, and when departing sold whatever remained, so that the soldiers now abounded in a plentiful supply of food.

The first point worthy of praise is that, since he could not conquer them by famine, he voluntarily sold them crops which they bought dearly from fear of scarcity, since the field lay uncultivated because of the war. This is an example for illustrious commanders: things captured from enemies which cannot be of use to themselves can be sold back even to the enemies so that pay may be obtained for the soldier. Then, since those who came to the camp wished to procure provisions for only one or two days and could not buy small amounts, they brought them with them, and somewhat more than they needed; when departing they gave the remainder away or sold it cheaply in the camp. Yet merchants and retailers were not thereby turned away from the camp, since they sold many things together without κολλυβισμῶ, minute division.

§ 44. The Persian Didales could furnish daily sustenance to the soldiers whom he had from the enemy's land, but he did not possess money to pay them. When the day of payment arrived, he devised the following. Summoning an assembly of the soldiers, he said that he was not destitute of money, but possessed money in a certain place, which he also indicated. Breaking camp, he proceeded there. Then, when he approached that region, he advanced into the place itself and took from the shrines there whatever silver vessels he found. Soon he loaded the mules and made the journey as though they carried nothing but silver, while those vessels that projected could be seen. Observing this, the soldiers, judging that whatever the mules carried was all silver, were of good courage, as though about to receive their pay. But he said that they had to reach Amisus and that the silver had to be coined there. The road to Amisus was several days long and difficult because of the cold. During that entire time, therefore, he made use of the army while furnishing nothing except sustenance. Likewise he kept with him in the camp all craftsmen, innkeepers, and exchangers, nor was anyone else permitted to practice any of these occupations.

A stratagem not unworthy of a great commander, provided that he afterward discharged the debt in good faith from the royal treasury.

§ 45. Chabrias of Athens taught Taos, king of the Egyptians, various methods of raising money. Aristotle recounts them thus. When King Taos of the Egyptians was leading out an army and lacked money, Chabrias advised him to show the priests of both sexes that, because of the expenses of the war, it was necessary for him to reduce their number. Upon hearing this, both those priests and each person wishing the administration of the rites to remain his own gave money individually to the king. When he had received it, Chabrias advised the king to order in addition that the priests should thereafter spend only a tenth part of the expenses which they had hitherto made upon the rites and themselves, and lend him the remainder until the war against the king of the Persians was ended. He also advised him to impose a fixed sum upon each settlement as tribute, and likewise upon individual persons. As to grain brought to market, two asses beyond the price were to be exacted from both buyer and seller for each *artaba*; and upon ships, workshops, and every other business in which profit was made, a tenth part of that profit. When the king was now about to lead the forces outside the land, he advised him to command that each person bring to him whatever uncoined silver or gold he possessed. When it had been brought, he likewise advised the king to use it and to commend those who had lent it to the naval commanders, who would discharge the debts from the tributes.

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§ 46. Iphicrates of Athens gave Cotys better advice: that he should command all subject to his dominion that each should recognize a portion of his own land exempted for the king, sufficient for eighteen modii. When this had been done, a great abundance of grain was collected. When it was exported to those places where markets were held, an abundant sum of money was obtained.

Thus he bore the expenses of war from agriculture. If he had listened to Iphicrates beforehand in peace, he would have prepared heaps of grain and money for the uses of war.

§ 47. The deed of Cotys the Thracian was full of treachery. He sought a loan from the Perinthians to enlist soldiers. The Perinthians were unwilling to give it. He therefore asked them at least to send to him some of their citizens to serve as garrisons in specified places, so that he might use elsewhere the soldiers who were then guarding them. The

Perinthians quickly did this, judging that those places would thereby be in their own power. But Cotys detained as captives those who had been sent to him, ordered the money sought as a loan to be sent to him, and thus ordered them to receive their citizens back.

§ 48. Mentor, after capturing Hermias and also occupying the places which he had held, did not remove the administrators appointed by Hermias. Accordingly, when all were now secure and again possessed whatever they had long concealed or deposited with foreigners, he captured them also and took away everything which they possessed.

§ 49. Memnon of Rhodes, after gaining possession of Lampsacus, in want of money prescribed a great sum which the wealthiest were to pay, and showed that they themselves would recover it from the tribute of the other citizens. But when the others also had contributed, he ordered that this sum likewise be lent to him for a time, and fixed the time at which the money would be restored. Needing money again, he ordered them to contribute and to recover from the revenues what they had given. They, hoping that they would recover it quickly, contributed. The time was now at hand for the revenues to be received, but Memnon showed that he still needed money then and that he would afterward return what had been received with interest. From those whom he had in the army he also deducted grain and pay for six days in each year, assuring them that on those days they would undertake neither watches nor marches and would spend nothing, because those duties had of course been removed from them.

§ 50. At an earlier time also, when he measured grain to the soldiers on the second day after the new moon, in the first month he passed over three days, in the next five, and proceeded in this manner until he reached thirty. Those who in our time made a military month of five or seven weeks have imitated this.

§ 51. Charidemus of Oreus, holding certain places in Aeolis, when Artabazus was bringing an army against him, lacked money to be paid to the soldiers. At first they contributed something. Soon they said that they possessed nothing more. But Charidemus ordered the inhabitants of the place which he judged richest to send elsewhere any coins or costly vessels they possessed, saying that he would add escorts. It was manifest that he was doing this very thing.

Accordingly, when they trusted him, once they had been led not far outside the city he searched them for anything they possessed, took as many things as he needed, and led them back to the same place. He also proclaimed through a herald that no one in that city subject to his dominion should possess weapons in his house; whoever possessed them was to pay a stated sum of silver. But immediately he himself neglected the matter and showed no concern for it. The men, judging that the proclamation had been made rashly, retained in its place what each had possessed before. But Charidemus, suddenly searching their houses, exacted the established fine from those with whom he found any weapon.

The first had been plunder, the second fraud. For a law ought not to be enacted so that a fine may be imposed upon transgressors. Our princes could collect plentiful money daily in this way, for their laws are generally neglected. Accordingly, if those who violate sumptuary laws concerning meals or clothing were secretly noted, and penalties were exacted when they thought everything safe, the treasury would be increased with great advantage. But it does not belong to a good prince to place laws like snares and traps for his subjects.

§ 52. A certain Philoxenus, a Macedonian satrap in Caria, when in want of money, showed that he was going to celebrate the Dionysia. He enrolled the wealthiest inhabitants of Caria to furnish the choruses, prescribing the things to be prepared by them. Seeing that they were burdened, he suborned certain men to ask what they would give to obtain exemption from the office. They promised that they would give even more than they appeared likely to spend, so that they would not be interrupted and drawn away from their business. When he had received what they gave, he enrolled others until he received from these also what he wished; thus he received something from each.

This mockery was indeed shameful, but nevertheless profitable and customary in another sphere, when those who desire in every way to avoid military service are summoned to it and therefore buy exemption at any price.

§ 53. Euaeses also added avarice and mockery to cruelty. This Syrian satrap in Egypt, when he perceived that the governors of the provinces wished to revolt from him, summoned them to the palace and hanged them all. He ordered their households and relatives to be told that they were being kept in custody. Each therefore labored for his own man and wished to redeem the captive with money. After bargaining over each and receiving the amount agreed upon, he returned each man dead.

§ 54. Cleomenes, the Alexandrian satrap in Egypt, when there was a great famine in other places but a moderate one in Egypt, prohibited permission to export grain. The governors of the provinces said that they could not pay tribute unless it were lawful to export grain. Then he permitted exportation but imposed a great tax upon the grain. It therefore happened that, although not much grain was exported, a great tax was received and the governors were deprived of the pretext which they had put forward.

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When famine pressed Egypt, he rightly prohibited the exportation of grain; but when tribute was refused, he found a method by which there would be no pretext for refusing, and nevertheless little grain would be exported.

§ 55. What he determined concerning crocodiles was ridiculous. When at one time he was passing by ship through the province in which the crocodile was regarded as a god, one of his boys was seized by a crocodile. Then, summoning the priests, he showed that, since he had first been injured, he wished to avenge himself upon the crocodiles responsible for it, and gave orders that they be captured. But the priests, lest their god be despised, gathered as much gold as they could and gave it to him.

§ 56. But what he next did was malicious. King Alexander had given him commands to found a city at Pharos and to transfer there the market for merchandise from Canopus. He himself then approached Canopus by ship and showed the priests and wealthy men in that place that he had come for the purpose of transferring them elsewhere. The priests and citizens gave him money which they had contributed so that he would leave the market among them. After receiving it, he departed at that time. Later, when everything had been prepared for building, he again approached Canopus by ship and demanded a vast quantity of money from them, for the difference between having the market there and elsewhere was now so great. When they affirmed that they could by no means pay so much, he transferred them.

§ 57. He nevertheless ingeniously circumvented an unfaithful trader. After sending a certain man away to make a purchase, when he perceived that the man had found cheap goods and wished to enter as expenditure a greater price, he told the man's associates that he had heard that their friend had bought merchandise at an excessively high price and that he would therefore not approve it. At the same time, with feigned anger, he attacked the man's idleness. Upon hearing this, they said that he ought not to trust those who said something against an absent man until he returned and rendered his account in his presence. When he returned, they related to him what they had learned from Cleomenes. Wishing to demonstrate everything both to his own associates and to Cleomenes, he reported the price which he had expended in trading.

§ 58. The following was similar. When grain sold in that region for ten denarii, he summoned those who made profit by selling grain and asked how much they wished to receive from him. When they said that they would give it to him for less than to other merchants, he ordered grain to be delivered to him at the same price as to others; but he himself fixed the price of grain at thirty-two denarii and sold it for that amount.

§ 59. Summoning the priests, he said that very unequal expenses were made upon sacrifices in that region, and that therefore the number both of shrines and priests ought to be diminished. The priests gave him both their private and public sacred monies, judging that he would truly do what he said, since each wished his own shrine to be safe and himself to remain a priest.

§ 60. Antimenos of Rhodes, after Alexander had entrusted to him the oversight of the roads around Babylon, obtained an abundance of money in the following manner. There was an ancient law in the region of Babylonia that a tenth part

of the things imported had to be paid. No one had used it for a long time. But he observed the time when the arrival of all the satraps was expected, and likewise of soldiers and not a few ambassadors, as well as craftsmen summoned and bringing others, and men traveling in a private capacity, at which time many gifts also were customarily brought. He then exacted the tenth according to the law which existed.

§ 61. Again suffering from want, he ordered that the names of the slaves in the camps be registered by those who wished, and that they be valued at whatever amount seemed proper; they were to pay him eight denarii for each for one year. If anyone's slave fled, he promised that the slave's price would be restored. When the names of many slaves had therefore been registered, no small amount of silver was raised. But if any slave fled, he ordered the satrap into whose territory it had come either to arrange its return to the camp or to pay its price to the owner.

§ 62. Ophellas of Corinth, after a procurator of the province of Athridis had been appointed, when the governors of that place's districts approached him and promised that they would pay much more tribute and asked that he remove the appointed procurator, asked whether they could fulfill their promise. When they affirmed that they could, he did not remove the procurator from his place, but ordered the tributes which they had submitted according to their own valuation to be exacted. Thus he seemed neither to detract honor from the man appointed by him nor to impose greater tribute upon the governors than they themselves had established, while manifold money came to him.

§ 63. Pythocles of Athens gave the Athenians counsel that the state should receive Tyrian lead from private persons at the price for which it sold, namely two denarii, and that the city should then sell it at the established price of six denarii.

That fraud belongs to forbidden monopoly; for the state ought not to trade in such a way that private persons are compelled to buy.

§ 64. Chabrias, having compelled a number of men sufficient for 120 ships to assemble, although he needed no more than sixty, ordered the remainder to pay two months' wages to those who were in the sixty ships or themselves to sail. Desiring to remain with their own affairs, they gave what he had commanded. Antimenes ordered the supplies customarily stored for the royal roads to be furnished by the satraps according to the law of that region. Whenever either the army or another multitude suffered want in the king's absence, he sold some of the supplies that had been stored for a little less than half price.

§ 65. Cleomenes defrauded the soldiers of one month. When the new moon approached and pay was to be given to the soldiers, he deliberately arrived by ship. Then, when the month departed, he sailed away after paying the wages. Afterward, in the following month, he deferred payment until the next new moon. Because the soldiers had received their pay a little before, they remained quiet. Thus, by passing over one month in a year, he withheld one month's pay from the soldiers.

§ 66. Stabellius, when he owed the soldiers pay, summoned the commanders and said that he had absolutely no need of them personally; and that whenever he needed soldiers, if he gave each of them silver, they could thus be sent away to hire foreign soldiers. He said that he would more willingly give them the wages which he was compelled to pay to the soldiers. He therefore ordered each to dismiss his men, so that they would depart from that region company by company. The commanders, judging that they would make some profit from the affair, dismissed the soldiers as Stabellius had commanded. After a short interval, when they had assembled, he said that neither a flute-player without a musical company nor a commander without soldiers was of any use, and ordered them to leave that region.

§ 67. Dionysius, going around the shrines, whenever he saw a little golden or silver table set out "of Good Fortune," ordered wine to be poured into it and commanded that it be carried away. As for statues of such a kind that they held out a bowl in an extended hand, he ordered it to be removed, saying that he accepted it. He also stripped golden cloaks and crowns from the statues, saying that he wished to give them things both lighter and more fragrant; and thus he wrapped them in a linen cloak and crowns of violets.

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CHAPTER XVII

Unjust Methods of Amassing Money

§ 1. Everything that has thus far been said about gathering wealth tends to this end: that equitable methods should be approved and inequitable ones rejected; for to grow rich through injustice is the greatest evil. Indeed, nothing is so sacred that wickedness does not violate it. Every industry which is occupied in so slippery a business easily totters and is made unjust from just. For, as I have shown, there are many exceedingly inequitable things among taxes, as in the *chrysargyron*, in the tax upon lions, and in Caligula's brothels. Nor is it sufficient to have abolished former taxes unless you refrain from imposing new ones. Anastasius indeed abolished the *chrysargyron*, but introduced the *χρυσотέλειαν*, a tribute much heavier than the former one, Nicephorus, book 16, chapters 40 and 41.

And so we shall now recount other methods by which the poor and the rich are oppressed in the state.

§ 2. The first method, in addition to those already stated, consists in diminishing and increasing the public coinage--not by that ancient fraud, which was evident, but by a new and subtler one. For who imitates Hippias, or Leucon, concerning whom Polyaeus relates in book 6 of the *Stratagems* that he ordered everyone to bring coins to be struck with another design? When they had brought them, he restruck them and ordered the new coinage to be worth twice as much, and thus retained half for himself. But he inflicted loss upon the citizens, because among foreigners the coins were accepted only at their customary value; nor could an ordinance so far removed from the common valuation endure for long.

Necessity compelled the Roman state sometimes to deprive its citizens of almost half, and sometimes of precisely half, Pliny, book 33, chapter 3.

No one now attempts such things, and the attempt would be vain; for among so many minters account is taken not merely of the stamp but also of the weight and fineness. There is therefore need of an artful fraud in mingling metals in various ways.

They also gather pure silver, even through the agency of Jews, and mingle it in such a way that they sometimes make the value greater by half. Hence there are so many adulterated coins and petty coins, which are everywhere prohibited and forced upon people. Yet our Mariana, in chapter 22 of his book *On Weights and Measures*, says that the kings of Castile imitated the Romans. And indeed I found that want of money in the treasury was the cause of so great a variety; for, in order to replenish it, kings often diminished the weight and fineness of the coin while retaining its old value. This is inequitable and should not be employed except in the harshest times of the state, especially since trade is impeded by adulterated coinage, and there is no lasting respite but only the briefest one from the value of the new money, since its weight or fineness is soon diminished as well. We observe that this has happened in every age and among every nation.

But, to speak about the coinages of our own people, many laws enacted against continual frauds do not so much prevent them as reveal that they are evil. Nor perhaps do they accomplish anything else than that one may very freely censure certain magnates' ἀδόκιμα τέχνα (*disapproved devices*). Concerning these matters there were laws of the diets at Frankfurt in the year 1442; at Augsburg in 1512; at the same place in 1500; at Cologne in 1512; at Worms in 1511; at Nuremberg in 1521; at Speyer in 1526; at the same place in 1529; at Augsburg in 1530; at Regensburg in 1532; at the same place in 1555, and in 1559 and 1566 and 1582; at Speyer in 1570, and in 1570. The following are approximately the points worthy of notice:

1. In the Golden Bull, the right of striking coinage is granted to the king of Bohemia and the electors.

2. In the year 1442, Frederick III at Frankfurt ordered only gold coin of one weight to be struck. He ordered silver coin to be struck correctly, and imposed penalties upon those who acted otherwise or received such coins.
3. In the year 1500 it was decreed that a fixed and constant system of coinage should be instituted at Nuremberg, and that meanwhile all mints should cease working.
4. In the year 1512 it was decreed that neighboring peoples should strike coinage of the same kind.
5. Since great frauds were committed in striking *Batzen*, and bad coins were mingled with good, it was decreed at Nuremberg in the year 1524 that no new ones should be struck before a system of coinage had been established.
6. In the year 1551 many things were rightly established at Augsburg, and the values of the coins were defined.
7. Those who possess the right of coinage are not to entrust the mints to others.
8. The adulteration of coinage is prohibited under penalty of being burned alive.
9. After various delays, a system of coinage was at last established by Ferdinand in the year 1559, by which precautions are taken against all frauds. Yet they remain in practice even today, so that there is now need only of penalties to restrain subtle thefts.

§ 3. Allied to this is the fraud and wickedness of usurers. This has been an ancient evil of the state, and is now a very great one; it rages most freely under the name of profit ceasing, loss arising, and the cloak of money-changing.

It must, however, be established that all usury, when

Coin begets coin through interest,

is illicit. Yet the purchase of an annuity is not usury; for the ownership of the money is transferred to another, and the right to an annual return is received. A loan for consumption, however, exists when the right of demanding repayment of the sum remains with the lender; whatever is exacted on account of it is theft. Something may nevertheless be exacted when a loss arises from a benevolent concession made to another--a true loss which cannot be met in another way. Or it may be exacted if a true and legitimate profit, which the person was about to make, ceases. For no one is bound to care for another's advantages to his own detriment; and here there remains that equality and justice which does not wish what is profitable to another to be injurious to me.

§ 4. Usury is altogether forbidden in Exodus 22, Deuteronomy 25, Leviticus 25:3, Psalm 15:5, and Ezekiel 18:17. In canon law, 14, question 3, and question 4, *If Any Cleric*, usury does not consist in money alone but in every kind of thing, 14, question 3, *They Think*; even in commerce itself, 14, question 3, *Of the Canons*. Whether one lends at interest through oneself or through another, let those who practice usury through Jews not think themselves less disgraceful. Finally, it is forbidden to everyone. A clerical usurer is not to be admitted to orders, distinction 33, *A Husband*, and distinction 46, *Seditious Men*, and throughout distinction 47. If he possesses orders, he is to be deposed, distinction 47, *A Bishop*, and what follows. Indeed, to accept a loan at usury is not free from crime except in a time of necessity, distinction 83, *He Errs*; 24, question 3, *Not to Be Inflicted*; 26, question 1, *He Who*. Finally, one who has received usuries does not truly repent unless he restores the usuries. One who denies this is judged a heretic, chapter *It Has Determined*, chapter *Upon*.

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§ 5. They are also prohibited by the civil laws, concerning which the very learned Gregory Tolosanus should be consulted in his *Syntagma of Universal Law*, as should others--a matter which I do not think I must debate. For not many now defend usuries, but more practice them.

Thus, among so many thousands of thieves and embezzlers, you would scarcely find one who approves the deed:

But they approve the better and follow the worse.

I must therefore admonish the prince to abolish them. The first reason is his office; for he ought to prevent brigandage, robbery, theft, calumnies, and the wrongs of tribunals, and therefore also the thefts of usury. The Romans punished a moneylender more severely than a thief, for they condemned the latter to twice the amount, but the former to four times the amount. From this cause, therefore, the prince will justly collect money; for if he condemns Jews and Judaizers to fourfold restitution, money cannot fail him. The vices of the times will make him rich.

From this it is evident that those princes and cities which thus protect Jews or Christian usurers, and permit subjects to be oppressed so that Jews have easy access to them and are managers of their financial affairs, bind themselves by a grave crime. Indeed, they are liable for the losses contracted through their neglect. This obligation of office therefore arises from the nature of princely rule, but much more in Germany. For all magistrates have been commanded not to permit moneylenders. In the year 1500 at the Diet of Augsburg, Maximilian issued the following decree with the consent of all the Estates, in the section *Concerning Usurious Contracts*:

Since, moreover, through usurious and other dangerous and unbecoming contracts which, as we have learned, Christians and Jews have hitherto practiced, great losses have been inflicted upon provinces and peoples, we establish, ordain, and will, seriously commanding all Estates of the Empire, that they prohibit contracts of this kind--usurious and dangerous--within their duchies, provinces, dominions, territories, and everywhere else, under an appropriate penalty, and that they also punish violators seriously. By these presents we likewise command ecclesiastical and secular judges, arbiters, and benches of judges that, if usurious, unsuitable, and dangerous contracts of this kind are brought before them, they adjudge and declare them invalid, void, and in no way binding, and permit or assist no execution of them.

Nor can an excuse be advanced: in the year 1530 everything is repeated in the same words, the enormity of the crime is demonstrated, and this is added:

Since we have learned that manifold usurious contracts, not only immoderate but also contrary to the Christian religion, have been conducted and are still being conducted in the Holy Empire against divine and civil laws--as when eight hundred florins are lent, a sum of one thousand florins is entered in the instruments of annuity, and thus they pay more than five per hundred; while others, for the delay of a short time, receive immoderate interest, increase the sum, and change the contract.

These provisions, then established and renewed in the years 1532 and 1548, did not have sufficient strength to remove so great a wrong; for in the year 1576 the same complaint remains:

The laws have not been observed; the common people have for a long time, by inequitable contracts and dealings in usury, contrary to divine and imperial laws, and especially in contempt of the political order, been reduced, distressed, and driven in many ways to extreme poverty.

The same things were again inculcated in the year 1577, so that no magistrate can excuse himself.

The second evil is sedition born of poverty and the weakness of princes. For although bodies are firm and full of nourishment, if the feet are weakened by gout or for another reason, we cannot stand. In the same way the state is weak when the people lie oppressed by usuries. When the people withdrew to the Sacred Mount, the state was weak; if it had had even a trifling enemy, its dominion would have been finished. But the cause of the secession was that the people were exhausted by the robberies of usurers and one part of the citizen body oppressed another. Many examples are readily available, nor do we lack examples from our own day. I shall touch upon the matter briefly; let the magistrate weigh it according to its own importance.

In the Roman Empire there are free cities and princes. The free cities are not only afflicted by the wrongs of usurers, but have citizens so disposed that, if they did not fear the emperor, they would either cast out the Jews, the Christian usurers, and those magnates whom they regard as their patrons, or even deprive them of life if there were an instigator. And although the people would do this neither in orderly fashion nor by any right, the magistrate would nevertheless

be judged to have given the occasion by not restraining usuries--indeed, by urging their execution against divine and human laws and against so many laws of the imperial diets. Nor are those princes safe whom they know to receive money from Jews in return for protection, and especially those whose treasurers are seen to be intimate with those usurers.

§ 6. When usuries are approved, this occurs by reason of some legitimate contract, but not by reason of a loan for consumption; when they are permitted, this occurs in order to avoid greater evils. Thus Tolosanus, book 22, chapter 3, §20:

Moreover, throughout all law we find that usuries have sometimes been permitted in certain matters, causes, persons, and methods of doing business. Yet for that reason it is not proper to say that they have been approved, just as God permitted divorce to the Jews because of their stiff neck, but did not approve it. For the wickedness of men is so great that it cannot be so thoroughly amended or purged by the lawgiver that some dross does not perpetually remain; or, if he wishes to remove it altogether, he cannot do so without its degenerating into a worse vice. In this danger the worse evil must be avoided and shunned.

In this way, in the matter of usuries, if they are altogether forbidden, the worst avarice and cruelty, or mercilessness, of the rich causes them to prefer to consign their coins in a chest to rust rather than to aid the needy without charge; or, if they lend without charge, they demand repayment so savagely that they harass their debtors with every kind of unrest. Consequently, a certain manner of lending at interest has been permitted because of the obstinacy of creditors and in order to assist the poverty of debtors. We therefore consider, in the permission of usuries, the things, the persons, and the assessment. The things in which usuries are said to be permitted are comprised in these verses:

Fiefs, a surety, for a dowry, stipends of the clergy;

The sale of fruits, one whom you would wish to suffer loss by law;

A seller under uncertainty, one paying the price after a time;

A penalty, and not in fraud, a forfeiture clause, one giving without charge;

Partners, pomp: in these ways more than the principal is given.

All these things are explained and proved at length by the gloss and by Henry Bohic, on chapter *A Complaint, On Usuries*; John Faber; Angelus de Clavasio; Baldus; Fulgosius; Jason; Hostiensis; and Chassanaeus. Nevertheless, these cases do not properly pertain to a loan for consumption, and therefore neither to that illicit usury of money from such a loan, but either to just commerce and the reckoning of that which is of interest, or to a penalty, that is, to punishing the delay of debtors in a way other than by a loan for consumption.

§ 7. Remedies for so great, ancient, common, and pernicious an evil were sought long ago and established by laws; but the power of the usurers, the conflicts of others, the wars and dissensions of princes, and the poverty of certain nobles and leading men prevailed against the laws. Yet laws and penalties must nevertheless be opposed to it. First, usurers must be driven from the fatherland. This is the most efficacious method. Provision was made in the laws of the Twelve Tables that no interest should be paid except the *unciaria*, that is, the hundredth part, as Tacitus says; afterward the rate returned to the two-hundredth, the half-*unciaria*.

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Afterward it was entirely forbidden, and it was resisted by many decrees of the Senate. The hundredth was regarded as the highest rate, because on each Kalends a hundredth part of the principal sum was given--that is, the whole in one hundred months. But if ἀνατοκισμός occurred, so that unpaid usuries were reckoned into the principal, the principal sum would be recovered much more quickly. But this is a matter which scarcely admits moderation: the evil must be cut out. And so I judge that the Jews must either be expelled or occupied in other matters, and that they must not be permitted to receive even the smallest interest. But I myself think that the Jews must be expelled; nor am I moved by

the fact that many princes retain them, because many have most justly expelled them. I therefore do no injury to those who retain them, because those who judge that they should be retained do not offend those who have dismissed them.

The reasons are many and grave.

1. Those whose one and only pursuit is to live from thefts, robberies, frauds, and impostures, and who have no manner of living honestly--or can have none while that condition of the state remains--must be cast and driven out from the entrails of the state as poison and plagues. But the Jews are such persons; therefore they must be removed from the state. The major premise is most true and is denied by no one, except when a greater danger arises from their exile, as if they should be so strong in multitude and power that they could stir up sedition or war. But here that danger is so far from existing that the prince, whoever should expel the Jews, would attain the greatest glory, and the people would carry him in their eyes and hands. Experience teaches the minor premise. For, first, they persecute Christians with so bitter a hatred that, in whatever matter they can, they are detrimental to them. Next, they judge it lawful for themselves to circumvent Christians with every kind of fraud; and although they sometimes benefit them, they nevertheless do this so that they may harm them more grievously, just as condemned spirits also offer certain apparent advantages to most wretched men so that they may cast them headlong into true destruction. Third, the ability to live honestly or to make a profit from lawful work is denied them in Germany. They cultivate neither fields nor vineyards; they practice no crafts; they do not trade. What, then, remains except frauds? Hence they are intent upon every opportunity for defrauding; and, as Johannes Pfefferkorn says, "They examine everything and, like dogs, smell out profit from anything whatsoever." Johannes Pfefferkorn, who had dealings with them, sets forth their methods and practices; he not only saw them but also practiced them.

2. Those who by their own wickedness are the objects of the greatest hatred among everyone, and who also make their princely protectors hated if they furnish protection to their contracts, must be cast out. The experience of every age has taught that the Jews are such. Nor are the present examples different: the most renowned cities have risen against the Jews. Nor was the magistrate safe except through fear of Caesar. When that fear is removed through civil wars and other occasions, the Jews are in the most immediate danger not only of their fortunes but also of their lives. Indeed, a hard necessity falls upon the magistrate either to abandon them contrary to the agreements made, or to defend them against every hatred. If therefore he is wise, he will promptly drive out public usurers; he will restore to their true owners those of their goods which consist of usuries, and will retain the rest for himself as belonging to the fisc. For theft is punished by restoration and confiscation.

3. Further, the reason why that plague is retained to so great a detriment of the state can be threefold: (1) the advantage of princes and of the treasury, because the Jews are burdened with taxes; (2) the advantage of subjects, because they have need of borrowed money; (3) the advantage of the Jews themselves, so that they may be converted to the true religion.

But princes are deceived in every reason. For, first, if the Jews and moneylenders were absent, the citizens could contribute more assistance; for even that which the Jews contribute now comes from the injury of citizens whom they exhaust by deceit and fraud, and the citizens are compelled in addition to support and enrich the Jews themselves. For what city is there which would not willingly furnish twice the amount that the Jews pay to the fisc, if the magistrate were to expel the Jews? It therefore does not pertain to the public advantage to nourish those cunning thieves so that, when they have contributed ten gold pieces, they may steal a thousand--and in a thousand ways. This, therefore, is an enormous error of government: to connive at the robberies of public moneylenders, that is, at weekly, monthly, and annual returns, and by this method to extort their fortunes from subjects so that they pass into the possession of the moneylenders and the treasury is sprinkled with some portion. Let all things pass away, I say, as formerly at Rome. And what Gregory Tolosanus warns is most true: "Thus the mercilessness of the rich rages, interest is piled upon interest and profit upon profit, so that, if the matter were conducted at the discretion of the moneylenders, it would soon come about that all resources and inheritances, and the persons themselves, would pass into their ownership." Hence prudent men, not estimating their own advantages but judging truly concerning these men, were severe toward

moneylenders. Agis, an Athenian leader, burned their account-books, Alexander ab Alexandro, book 1 of *Genial Days*. Oh, would that we now had many men like him! Gaul was more severe: it formerly expelled the Jews from the boundaries of the kingdom and cut off the thieving right hands of monstrous moneylenders. Cato expelled all usurers from Sardinia, Livy, book 32. I certainly cannot in any way disapprove the opinion of those jurists who judge that usurers should be punished criminally; thus Molinaeus, *On Usuries*, number 156, and others. I would not wish their condition to be better than that of a manifest thief. The injury is the same, except that this one assumes the appearance of law. A poisoner is punished more severely than a robber; why, then, are artful thieves retained? Nor is it sufficient that all usurers and their assistants are infamous, for they think that infamy is well compensated by riches. Now

Very great honor comes from gold.

Through the people and reputation they gather coins, and they applaud themselves when they contemplate them in the chest.

Therefore not even those who receive money at a lower rate of return and then place it with the Jews at a higher rate provide for their treasury. For there are said to be Christians whose brokers and retailers of usuries are Jews. They receive money from Christians under a lawful rate and security, five per hundred each year; then they place the same money with Jews and receive eight or ten, while the Jews also claim their own small profit for themselves, so that fifteen or twenty per hundred are often given. Yet they do not thus escape infamy, for the Jews openly and clearly confess that the monies belong to Christians and that they themselves are only administrators of the usuries. Those men do not provide for their own treasury, because they oppress cities and gather hatreds, although they could make more profit through honorable commerce. Nor is their method dissimilar to that which belonged to the emperor Tiberius. He appointed needy, cunning, avaricious, and rapacious governors, whom he afterward slaughtered when they had grown rich with the spoils of provincials, and he brought the spoils into the fisc. In this affair he long remained concealed at first as a just and severe emperor; but when the fraud had been perceived and people saw that everything returned to Tiberius, they said that he used governors like sponges: he sent them dry into the resources of the provinces and squeezed them when full. In the same way, certain men of our Germany freely permit Laverna's men and rapacious raiders--the Jews--to range about, and afterward squeeze those same men in order to furnish the treasury with unjust wealth.

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The second reason, that they provide for the necessities of the poor, is not merely false but plainly contrary to the truth. For the poor are overthrown together with all the goods which remain to them. Nor do I hesitate to affirm that every year in Germany several thousand citizens are exhausted by interest, and that this evil is greater than if some notable city were destroyed each year. For now they are gradually consumed, as if by a fever. Lucullus removed usury from Asia because he saw that a most fertile province was about to be reduced to the possession of a few. How, therefore, is that useful to subjects by which there is introduced

Poverty prone to crime?

More than one hundred thousand Jews in Germany harass Christians with every kind of fraud. Among them there is scarcely anyone who does not reduce someone to extremity; and though a particular person may not do so, many nevertheless afflict several persons. Therefore one hundred thousand are circumvented by them. How, then, are the poor provided for through the Jews?

How was the payment of interest useful to Otto, when he publicly confessed that he could not stand unless he were prince, and that it made no difference whether he fell in battle under the enemy or in the forum under his creditors?

But the savagery of the ancients did not equal the monstrousness with which the marrow of Christians is sucked out today. Hence those complaints of many: the Jews therefore lend at interest because no one offers gifts to princes so that they may prohibit this crime. Julius Clarus, *Received Opinions*, book 5, § *Usury*, number 7. Covarruvias, book 3,

chapter 1, number 8, should also be consulted. This too is the opinion of the canons: the resources of Christians are exhausted through the usuries of the Jews.

The third cause was that they might be converted to the faith. But by this method they are rendered most obstinate. There are three causes of this.

The first is hatred, which separates the human race and excites wars and quarrels. This endures perpetually between Christians and Jews because its cause is not removed. The cause of hatred among the Jews is that they hate Christ above all things and curse him each day; next, because they see that they are hated by Christians. But it is natural to hate one's enemies. And every day that fire is kindled by new torches, since they are received and harassed by Christians with scoffs, jeers, and abuse. Nor do the hatreds of Christians cease. For when every day they see before their eyes men exulting, grown sleek from the spoils of the poor, and gaping after their own possessions, they can no more love them than a lamb loves a wolf or a dove a hawk. And so Christians do not speak of their conversion, nor do the Jews endure hearing of it. If they are exercised by other labors, both they themselves will return to a sound mind and Christians will attend them with mercy.

The second cause is that now, by the permission or connivance of princes, they have the crimes of lending at interest, deceiving, and plundering unpunished. Indeed, the greater the hatred and the opinion of wickedness in which they are held among Christians, the more they glory among their own people. Just as that soldier is most pleasing to the emperor and his fellow-soldiers who harms the enemy most, from this comes that most atrocious deed which histories relate concerning the capture of Jerusalem: that Jews bought Christian slaves from the victors, not for use and service, but so that they might delight themselves with the most cruel pleasure in torturing them and killing them by a lingering death. Hence their monstrous cruelty toward Christian boys, when in the year 1236 at Fulda, in 1380 at Hall in Swabia, in 1429 at Ravensburg, in 1475 at Trent, and at other times elsewhere, they cut innocent boys with many small wounds, so that they might show that their hatred was not directed against our vices, which are surpassed by their crimes, but against our race and religion. Although Christian princes do not tolerate these things, other acts are nevertheless not punished when, by lingering hunger and shameful wasting, they kill not only the poor but even noble families. Reputation, disgrace, separation, and excommunication at least recall a Christian from a public crime; all these things incite the Jews to daring, and they even rejoice that the crimes of lending at interest are in public view, because they see that the crimes bring them glory among wicked men.

The third cause is the gravest of all. If it were removed, a great multitude of them would receive the Christian rites: namely, the restitution of ill-gotten goods. Neither baptism nor religion permits the retention of things belonging to others. "If I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore fourfold," says the converted Zacchaeus. It therefore seems a hard condition to the Jews to surrender the treasures which they have amassed either in great part or altogether through injustice. If they gained everything by lawful works, after receiving the religion they would retain their own possessions, and only unbelief would have to be put off; but now the wealth on account of which many fall away from faith and piety must be cast aside. Here, therefore, is the hindrance which holds back a great part of them. Those who permit this consequently bind them with more chains of unbelief and obstinacy. For the Church cannot concede that they need not restore what was taken away, because this is God's commandment.

Alexander III truly says to the bishop of Palermo, in the appendix to the Third Lateran Council, part 16, § *On Usuries*, chapter 1:

Concerning what your discretion has asked of us--whether a dispensation can be made in receiving money at usury, so that the poor who are held in Saracen captivity may be freed by means of that same money--we have judged that you should be answered by the present letter that, since the page of each Testament detests the crime of usuries, we have not seen that any dispensation should be admitted in this matter. For, since Holy Scripture prohibits even lying for the life of another, much more must it be prohibited that anyone should become involved in the crime of usuries in redeeming the life of a captive.

In the same way, the Council of Basel, session 19, nevertheless permits a Jew in favor of conversion to retain goods whose owner is uncertain, when in good faith he does not know to whom they are to be restored:

If any of them wishes to be converted to the Catholic faith, let whatever movable and immovable goods he possesses remain intact and undisturbed for him. But if goods of this kind were acquired from usury or illicit gain, and the persons to whom restitution ought by law to be made are known--because the sin is not forgiven unless what was taken is restored--they must altogether be restored to those persons. But if those persons do not exist, because such goods would have to be converted to pious uses through the hands of the Church, this holy synod, acting in the place of the universal Church, grants in favor of the baptism received that they ought to remain with those persons as for a pious use. Under penalty of divine anathema, it forbids both ecclesiastical and secular persons to inflict any disturbance upon them in these matters under any pretext sought, or to permit it to be inflicted; rather, let them judge that they have made a great gain when such persons have been gained for Christ. And since it is written, "Whoever has the substance of this world and sees his brother have need, and closes his bowels to him, how does the love of God remain in him?" if at the time of their conversion they are poor or needy, through the bowels of the mercy of our God this holy synod exhorts everyone, both ecclesiastical and secular, to extend helping hands to the converts.

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Let the diocesan bishops themselves also not only exhort Christians to assist them, but, as they are able, let them not neglect to support neophytes of this kind both from the revenues of churches and from those things which devolve upon them to be converted to the uses of the poor; and let them defend the converts with paternal affection from disparagements and insults. And since through the grace of baptism they are made fellow citizens of the saints and members of the household of God, and it is far more worthy to be regenerated by the spirit than to be born by the flesh, by this edictal law we establish that they enjoy the privileges, liberties, and immunities of the cities and places in which they are regenerated by sacred baptism which others obtain solely by reason of birth and origin. Furthermore, let the priests who baptize them, and those who receive them from the sacred font, diligently instruct them both before and after baptism in the articles of the faith, the precepts of the new law, and the rites of the Catholic Church.

§ 8. I shall add what the holy canons further establish in this practice, for the sake of magnates and those who serve them as counselors.

1. No one can without crime compel anyone to pay usuries. The reason is natural: because, when no legitimate cause has been given, I am not bound to deliver to another what is mine. The ecclesiastical law is as follows, in the appendix to the Third Lateran Council, part 16, chapter 4. Alexander III says:

Debtors ought not to be compelled to pay the usuries by which they had bound themselves, unless they are bound by an oath to pay them. But if they have made an oath concerning their payment, they must be compelled to fulfill their oath to the Lord, so that they may be released by their creditors; and when the usuries have been paid, the creditors, if necessary, must be compelled by ecclesiastical severity to restore them.

And chapter 15:

Since, as you assert, you have ordered manifest usurers--that is, those who died in that sin--to be deprived of communion at the altar and ecclesiastical burial, in accordance with our decree recently promulgated in the Council, until they restore what they wickedly received, some of them say that their own resources are insufficient to pay the usuries received. Others promise that they will restore the portions of the usuries which they have at hand, but declare that they cannot restore other usuries which they extorted, since possessions were acquired from them and delivered to their sons or parents. Others, in order to make excuses for excuses in sins, imprudently affirm that only those usuries which were received after our prohibition must be restored, and that no one should be compelled to pay the usuries which he received before the prohibition. Concerning these matters we answer your discretion that, whether they received usuries before or after our prohibition, they must be compelled, under the

penalty which we established in the Council, to restore them to those from whom they extorted them or to their heirs; or, if these do not survive, to distribute them to the poor, provided that they possess the resources from which they can restore them, since, according to the word of blessed Augustine, the sin is not forgiven unless what was taken away is restored. But those who do not possess resources from which they can restore the usuries ought not to be punished with that penalty, since their known poverty excuses them. Possessions which were acquired from usuries must, however, be sold, and the prices themselves restored to those from whom the usuries were extorted, so that they may thus be freed not only from that penalty but also from the sin which they incurred through the extortion of usuries.

And chapter 6, to the bishop of Winchester:

Concerning the matter upon which you wished to consult us--whether a cleric should be compelled to pay usuries to a creditor--we answer your prudence in this manner: since it is dangerous for all the faithful of God to receive usuries, no Christian is to be compelled to pay them unless he is bound by oath or pledged faith to pay them; rather, creditors ought to be restrained from exacting usuries by an ecclesiastical sentence.

Finally, more extensively, to the archbishop of Canterbury:

You should know that it has come to our hearing that, when Peter of Ursiton, during the war which occurred between our dearest son Henry, the illustrious king of the English, and his sons, had lent a fixed sum of money to certain men for the protection of the kingdom of the Franks, he received from them certain possessions and revenues as a pledge. He also bound them to himself by the sanctity of an oath that they would inflict no disturbance or burden upon him concerning those possessions and revenues until they paid him the money lent. Although the aforesaid Peter, as he asserts, has not yet received his principal from those possessions and revenues after expenses have been deducted, nevertheless, brother archbishop, because you bound him with the bond of excommunication on this account, we are consequently compelled to direct our letters to you, especially since he himself, as he asserts, perhaps wishes to be content. Hence it is that, in answer to your consultation, etc., after receiving sufficient security from the aforesaid P. that he ought thereafter to obey your command, you are, by our authority, to absolve him completely from the sentence under which he is held, all contradiction and appeal ceasing. Then, if it is so, you are by ecclesiastical censure to compel the debtors, who are said to have taken the aforesaid possessions and revenues from him contrary to their oath, to restore those possessions and revenues to the said Peter, all appeal ceasing; and they are thereafter to inflict no disturbance upon him contrary to their oath until the money is paid to him. For it is not safe for anyone, but rather dangerous, to violate the sanctity of an oath. But when they have paid the aforesaid P. his money, as they swore, you are to take care diligently to admonish and induce him to restore whatever it is established that, after expenses have been deducted, he received beyond the principal. If, when admonished, he does not do this, you are to return him to the same sentence of excommunication, the obstacle of appeal being removed; for just as it is dangerous for debtors to violate their oath, so it is no less dangerous for creditors to retain what they have received as usuries, since the crime of usuries is most detestable and horrible and condemned by the page of each Testament.

It is most certain that these penalties apply to magistrates and states which compel usuries to be paid. Indeed, the magistrates themselves are bound to restitution. For whoever, contrary to my law, gives what is mine to another, or by his power defends another from being compelled to restore it, is liable to compensate the loss. But princes have been commanded not to permit Christians to be burdened, by the civil laws and by the command of the entire Church. The Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter 67:

The more the Christian religion is restrained from the exaction of usuries, the more grievously the perfidy of the Jews grows strong in these matters, so that in a short time they exhaust the resources of Christians. Wishing therefore in this respect to provide for Christians, lest they be monstrously burdened by Jews, we establish by synodal decree that, if henceforth under any pretext Jews extort grave and immoderate usuries from Christians, Christian participation is to be withdrawn from them until they have made suitable satisfaction for the immoderate burden. Christians also, if necessary, are to be compelled by ecclesiastical censure, all appeal set aside, to abstain

from commerce with them.

But we enjoin princes not to be hostile to Christians on this account, but rather to endeavor to restrain Jews from so great a burden.

And we decree that by the same penalty Jews are to be compelled to make satisfaction to churches for the tithes and offerings due which the churches were accustomed to receive from Christians from houses and other possessions before they passed to Jews under any title, so that the churches may thus be preserved unharmed.

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This command is also repeated in the Council of Vienne under Clement IV:

Adding that, if henceforth under any pretext Jews extort grave or immoderate usuries from Christians, Christian participation is to be withdrawn from them until they have made suitable satisfaction for the immoderate burden. Hence Christians, if necessary, are to be compelled by ecclesiastical censure to abstain from commerce with them. But we enjoin princes not to be hostile to Christians on this account, but rather to endeavor to restrain Jews from so great a burden. If, however, the Sacrament of the altar happens to be carried before their houses, upon hearing the preceding sound the Jews themselves are to withdraw within their houses and close their windows and doors; they are also to be compelled by the prelates of the Church to do this on every day of the Parasceve. They are not to presume to dispute concerning the Catholic faith with simple persons; nor are they to dare to detain against their will the sons and wives of Jews coming to the Christian faith. They are not to entice Christians to Judaism or circumcise them by any rash attempt; nor are they to visit sick Christians or practice the works of medicine upon them. They are not to erect a new synagogue; and if they have erected any, they are to remove or take them down. If necessary, they may repair an old one, but are not to make it larger, more costly, or higher. During Lent, when Christians abstain from meat and fast, they are not openly or publicly to carry meat. We command the bishops to compel the Jews, by withdrawal of the communion of Christians, to observe every article of all these provisions. We also admonish their princes and judges more strictly not to extend the favor of any protection or defense to Jews unwilling to observe our statutes, but faithfully to execute whatever may be enjoined upon them by ecclesiastical prelates; otherwise, let them know that entry into the church and participation in divine offices are forbidden them. We also will and command under penalty of excommunication that the lord-elect of Salzburg and his suffragans, and also the bishop of Prague, possess these our constitutions sealed with our seal; that they cause them to be recited each year in episcopal synods and in the provincial council, and to be observed more diligently; and that they cause those provisions which concern the laity to be published through the parish churches of their dioceses.

But John XXII pursued all these matters even point by point in the Fourth Council of Ravenna, rubric 15:

Wishing to restrain in our province the abyss of usuries, condemned by the page of each Testament, we announce or declare, with the approval of this holy council, that all manifest usurers, until they have made full satisfaction for usuries as their resources permit, or have furnished suitable security for making satisfaction according to the strength of their resources, shall be deprived of communion at the altar and ecclesiastical burial; that their offerings ought not to be received, nor can they themselves be absolved; and that their testaments are not valid but void by the law itself. We also decree or declare that all who deliver communion at the altar and the body of Christ to usurers of this kind, or admit them to ecclesiastical burial before they have made satisfaction according to the judgment of the ordinary of the place, are suspended from the execution of their office. We add that all who absolve such usurers, admit them to communion at the altar, or participate in their testaments or burial are subject to penalties of this kind. Notaries also who knowingly compose or receive instruments concerning loans and usurious contracts, or contracts entered into in fraud of usuries, are by that very fact subject to the penalties imposed upon usurers.

Moreover, in receiving from penitent usurers the aforesaid security concerning the restoration of usuries, we will the following precaution to be employed and observed. First of all, through the confession of the usurer, his book or books of accounts, witnesses, an instrument, or some other method, let the quantity of usuries received be made

certain and manifest, if it can be--not only those which were extorted from unknown persons but also those from fixed communities and persons. If this is not possible, let the person who by force of the present constitution is to receive security of this kind assess and moderate the amount of it according to a right conscience, to be informed by report, the testimony of neighbors, or other probable conjectures.

Where, however, it does not appear through entries in the usurer's book that usuries were paid by the person seeking their restoration, if the petitioner possesses original instruments, or copies taken from the originals of the community of the city or of the place in which the debt of a loan received from the usurer was contracted, or of another obligation contracted with him or with another on his behalf, and an instrument of payment, release, or acknowledgment, payment of usuries is to be presumed and adjudged. From the loan itself or obligation, from the day on which the debt or obligation was contracted until the day on which the instrument of payment was drawn up, the usurer is to be adjudged to have extorted from him as usuries for each month as many denarii per pound as the diocesan bishop, his vicar, or penitentiary may wish to declare, if the usurer himself did not declare in the said security and state how many denarii per pound he received each month. But when no instrument or writing of payment appears, the usurer is then to be adjudged to have extorted usuries from him for six months from that loan or obligation, according to the aforesaid reckoning and assessment for each month, provided that it appears through entries in the book or by another lawful method that the loan or obligation was contracted.

When this has been done, let the usurer solemnly promise and swear to the person who, as is permitted, has received this security for the court of the ordinary of the place where the usurer resides, in the name of all whose interest it is or will be, that he himself, personally if he can, or through another or others, and in the presence of the aforesaid ordinary's vicar, his penitentiary, or another person with the court's permission, without any difficulty, will make satisfaction, up to the assessed amount--and even a greater amount if a greater is established--for the usuries received by himself, by his party, and by other persons whose inheritance has passed to him, and for other things wrongly taken and illicitly acquired through usurious wickedness, to those from whom he or they received them, or to their heirs, if they can be found. The remainder, concerning which it is not established to whom it ought to be restored, he will freely assign to the ordinary, the vicar, or the ordinary's penitentiary, to be distributed to the poor according to the ordinary's judgment, without the noise and formality of a trial.

He shall say, allege, or do nothing, personally or through another, by which the proceedings, sentences, or commands of that court may be impeded or in any way delayed concerning the restoration, in the aforesaid manner, of the usuries and things illicitly acquired; binding himself, his heirs, and his goods to the aforesaid provisions by a special compact, and expressly renouncing, specifically and generally, all exceptions, rights, and defenses according to the will and expression of the person receiving security of this kind. But for attending to these matters and making the restitution and assignment, as set forth above, let him bind all his goods, constituting himself as possessing them at sufferance in the name of the said court; granting every license and free power to that court and to the recipient of the aforesaid security on its behalf, by their own authority and notwithstanding anyone's opposition, freely and without penalty to seize, sell, and alienate from his goods whatever, how much, and wherever the court wills, until full restitution and satisfaction of the aforesaid matters.

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On their account, let him also renounce usuries, remit those promised to him, and release, return, or at least promise to return the oaths made to him for paying them, or for not recovering or demanding them back. Let him swear that, without deceit or fraud, diminution or removal, he will personally or through others give and consign to the ordinary, his vicar, or a specified messenger the books and registers of his accounts and the usurious instruments which he possesses or can possess for the same matter. Let him also assign the money which he possesses, or make a deposit, if he can, according to the judgment of the ordinary, his vicar, or his penitentiary; and we judge that this provision is to be included in the security itself.

Let him also bind his future heirs, under penalty of forfeiting the inheritance, to do the same things. If those heirs are present, let them promise and swear under penalty and under the sanctity of an oath that they will do the same.

Furthermore, if he can, let him give pledges, or at least suitable sureties, who in the same manner and under the same penalties and terms shall bind themselves and their goods principally to the aforesaid matters, constituting themselves principal debtors in them, renouncing the epistle of the Divine Hadrian, the benefit of the new constitutions concerning sureties, and every other defense and right, according to the judgment of the recipient of that security, by a special compact, and furnishing a similar oath. We command these things to be done before the parish priest, trustworthy witnesses, and a public notary, by command of the ordinary, his vicar, or his penitentiary. The notary is to receive the aforesaid promise, obligation, renunciation, security, and the other things stated above, and draw up an instrument concerning them.

Finally, throughout the individual dioceses of the ordinaries, where the ordinary or vicar is not present, let the rector of the parish church in which the usurer lived receive the security itself, or, in the absence of a priest, a public notary, who shall be bound to report these matters within a month to the ordinary of the place or his vicar. But in a city let no one at all, without special permission of the ordinary, his vicar, or his penitentiary--except perhaps the parish priest when, upon the sudden occurrence of a case of death, the ordinary's attention cannot be sought for these matters--presume to involve himself in receiving that security; otherwise he shall incur the penalty of ten Ravenna pounds, not to be remitted without due satisfaction. For with respect to the aforesaid matters we declare those persons manifest usurers concerning whom there is a report throughout the parish in which they lived or where they died that they extorted usuries, or for whom this appears through their own confession, suitable proofs, or another lawful means. Let all rectors of parish churches, even if they are collegiate, possess, read, and understand the present constitution, publishing more frequently in their churches the aforesaid penalties of usurers and more cautiously avoiding their own penalties, if they desire to escape divine vengeance and ours.

Many things concerning these matters were also established in Germany. The Council of Salzburg under Bishop Eberhard in the time of Martin V established the same things and renewed the notable statute of Lord Bishop Pilgrim. Usurers, after they have been admonished by name three times by their rectors, incur by that very fact the sentence of excommunication if they do not desist within a month. Rectors and prelates of churches are bound to admonish and induce their subjects who are manifest usurers to desist from wickedness of this kind within a month and to make effective satisfaction for what they received. If they do not do so, the rectors are to announce them as excommunicated, nevertheless informing them that, if they die in this sin, they will lack ecclesiastical burial. If the rectors knowingly bury them, they likewise are by that very fact bound by the sentence of excommunication. Those are called manifest usurers concerning whom there is public voice and report, and certain indications and proofs, that they lend money at usury and receive the usuries, or by agreement or otherwise put into their own purse the fruits of the pledged property and do not reckon them toward the principal of the money lent.

It also relates and condemns a new method of lending at interest:

We know sufficiently that usurious acts are reprov'd by divine and human law, and the most recent constitution of the Council of Lyon established carefully devised penalties against those who practice usuries; we do not see that anything must be added to them. But because, under a newly devised appearance of lending at interest, some persons practice usuries under the title of sale, buying a pledge for the quantity sought as a loan and selling it at the same time of redemption for a quantity increased by the amount of the usuries, we have provided that this fraud be met in the following manner. Let the constitution of Pope Gregory X of holy memory, issued against usurers in the Council of Lyon, together with these present constitutions of ours, be published in every cathedral and collegiate church, once each year in Lent, publicly before the people immediately after the Gospel has been read. Then let moneylenders of this kind, and others who practice usuries contrary to the tenor of the said Council of Lyon, and those who retain them in their own houses, be publicly announced by name as excommunicated. If the prelates of churches are negligent or remiss in this publication, which they ought to make personally and through others, and the publication itself is not made at the appointed time, we consign them to the vengeance of the eternal Judge. If a usurer who secretly practiced usuries closes his final day, and it is established by the testimony of three or two trustworthy witnesses that he practiced usuries, let no one receive him for ecclesiastical burial unless satisfaction has been made on his behalf for the usuries received. Otherwise, if the contrary is done, in addition to the penalty

enacted against such persons in the Council of Lyon, we will that the place or church in whose cemetery the bodies of such persons were buried by the will of the prelate or chapter shall by that very fact lie under ecclesiastical interdict for as long as those bodies have not been exhumed by them.

§ 9. These laws also seem to me to aim at this result: that the Jews should be expelled altogether. For, first, those who foster their unbelief are excommunicated by the Fourth Council of Toledo and the Council of Meaux, chapter 58:

So great is the cupidity of certain men that some, pursuing it, according to what the Apostle says, have even wandered from the faith. For until now many priests and laymen, receiving gifts from the Jews, fostered their unbelief by their protection. These men are known, not without cause, to belong to the body of Antichrist, because they act against Christ. Therefore, henceforth, whatever bishop, cleric, or secular person gives them support by gift or favor against the Christian faith, let him, as profane and sacrilegious, be struck with anathema and made a stranger to the Catholic Church and the kingdom of God; for it is fitting that one who becomes a patron of the enemies of Christ should be separated from the body of Christ.

But one who assists and defends their usuries, takes a portion from them, and compels others to pay, fosters their unbelief--if not another form of it, certainly this one by which they persuade themselves that lending at interest is lawful. For why should they regard as unlawful for themselves what they have observed to be conceded so liberally by the highest authority?

Next, the laws forbid a Christian to serve Jews, as Gregory, book 7, letters 13 and 111, and the Council of Meaux, chapter 56. Pope Gregory to Theuderic and Theudebert, kings of the Franks, and Queen Brunhilda:

We have wondered that in your kingdom you permit Jews to possess Christian slaves. For what are all Christians except members of Christ?

And a little later:

In this especially we ask that you show yourselves worshipers of God: that you release his faithful from his enemies.

Likewise the same Gregory to Bishop Fortunatus:

Christian slaves who are brought in or possessed by Jews are either to be delivered to agents, or certainly sold to Christian purchasers within forty days; and when this number of days has elapsed, let them not remain among the Jews in any manner. But if any of those slaves should perhaps incur such sickness that they cannot be sold within the appointed days, care must be employed so that, when they have been restored to their former health, they are likewise sold by every means, and thus every occasion of fraud is removed, lest Christian slaves be permitted to dwell in the house of a Jew.

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Christian slaves bought by Jews are therefore to become free. Thus Constantine Flavius, Emperor Augustus:

If any Jew buys and circumcises a Christian slave, or one of any other sect, let the slave be removed from the power of that Jew and remain in freedom.

Theodosius and Valentinian, Augusti:

We deny Jews or pagans permission to litigate or serve in public office, since we do not wish persons of the Christian law to serve them, lest through the occasion of a master they change the sect of the venerable religion. We therefore command that all persons of that unhappy error be excluded, unless timely amendment assists them.

Likewise the same Emperors Augustus:

By this law, which shall endure for all time, we decree that no Jew may attain honors and dignities, that the administration of civil service shall be open to none, and that none may discharge even the office of defender. For

we do not believe it right that enemies of the supreme Majesty and of Roman laws should dare, under the appearance of any office, to harass Christians or even priests with injuries under any pretext, or presume either to condemn or adjudicate anyone under our law. Nor are they to preside over the custody of prisons, lest Christians who are sometimes shut away, as commonly happens, suffer a second prison through the hatreds of their guards. Let them not dare again to build any synagogue; for if they do, let them know that it will profit the building of the Catholic Church and that the authors of the building are to be fined fifty pounds of gold, permission being granted them only to repair the ruins of their synagogues. Any Jew who turns a slave or free person, against his will or by punishable persuasion, from the worship of the Christian religion to an impious sect or rite shall, after losing his resources, be punished capitally and consigned to the most just penalty of blood, since by perverse doctrine he attacked the faith of another. Whoever of these has crept into honors is to be regarded, as before, as belonging to the lowest condition, lest we seem to have furnished to execrable men the insulting benefit of immunity.

Childebert, king of the Franks:

From the Lord's Supper until the first Easter, Jews are to be denied permission to walk through the streets or forum as if for the sake of insult.

These provisions too are renewed in the same Council of Meaux. Priscus, bishop of the Church of Lyon; Artemius of Sens; Remigius of Bourges; and Saint Syagrius, bishop of Autun, with many others, renewing ecclesiastical statutes, determined as follows:

Jews are not to be appointed judges over Christian peoples or permitted to be tax collectors, through which Christians might seem--may God avert it--to be subject to them. From the Lord's Supper until the first Easter, according to the pronouncement of the lord King Childebert of good memory, Jews are to be denied permission to walk through the streets or forum as if for the sake of insult. They are to show reverence to all priests and clerics of the Lord, and they are not to presume to have a seat before priests unless ordered to do so. If they should perhaps presume to do this, let them be constrained by the judges of the places according to the person's condition. No Christian is to presume to participate in the banquets of Jews. If any cleric or secular person should presume to do this--which it is impious even to say--let whoever has been polluted by their impieties know that he is to be restrained from the fellowship of all Christians.

And although it was long ago established, not only by canonical provisions but also by the benefits of the laws, what rule ought to be observed concerning Christians who, either by an incursion of captivity or by any frauds, become entangled in service to Jews, nevertheless, because the complaint of certain men has now arisen that some Jews dwelling throughout cities or towns have broken out into such insolence and wantonness that Christians, even when protesting, cannot be released from their service even at a price, therefore, by the authority of God, we decree in the present Council that henceforth no Christian ought to serve Jews. Upon payment of twelve solidi for any slave, any Christian shall have permission to redeem that slave either into free status or into service. For it is impious that those whom Christ the Lord redeemed by the shedding of his blood should remain entangled in the chains of persecutors. If any Jew is unwilling to acquiesce in what we have established, for as long as he delays accepting the established money, the slave himself shall be permitted to live with Christians wherever he wishes. We also specially decree that, if any Jew is convicted of having persuaded a Christian slave to adopt the Jewish rite, he shall both lose that slave and be punished by legal condemnation.

Third, familiarity and banquets with Jews are forbidden. Thus in the same Council the pronouncements of the ancients are recounted. Saint Alcimus Avitus, bishop of the Church of Vienne; Saint Apollinaris of the Church of Valence; Saint Gregory, bishop of the Church of Langres; and Saint Viventiolus, bishop of the Church of Lyon, assembled in the name of the Lord with twenty other bishops, enacted as follows:

If a cleric of superior rank participates in the banquet of any heretic, he shall not possess the peace of the Church for the space of a year. If junior clerics presume to do this, they shall be beaten. Our constitution has also prohibited laymen from the banquets of Jews; and whoever has been polluted by a Jewish banquet is not to eat bread with any

of our clerics.

The same precaution is taken by the Council of Basel, session 19:

Further renewing the sacred canons, we command both diocesan bishops and secular powers to prohibit by every means Jews or other unbelievers from possessing Christian men or women as household members or servants, or as nurses of their children; and to prohibit Christians from associating with them at their festivals, weddings, banquets, or baths, or through excessive intercourse. They are not to appoint them as physicians, public matchmakers for marriages, or mediators of other contracts; nor are they to place them over other public offices or admit them to any scholastic degrees. Estates or other ecclesiastical revenues are not to be leased to them. They are also to be prohibited, under penalty of loss of the object, from buying ecclesiastical books, chalices, crosses, and other ornaments of churches, or, under penalty of loss of the money lent, from receiving them as pledges. Under grave penalties they are also to be compelled to wear some manner of dress by which they can be plainly distinguished from Christians. In order that their excessive concentration may be avoided, they are to be compelled in some places in cities and towns to live separately from Christians, and as far as possible at a greater distance from churches. On Sundays and other solemn feast days they are not to presume to keep their shops open or to work in public.

The same provisions are established in the Council of Vienne under Clement IV.

Fourth, a distinctive dress and residence are prescribed for them, so that it may be evident that they do not belong to the state. The Council of Salzburg:

It is not a matter of doubtful law that the Hebrew nation ought to be separated from the faithful people of the Crucified by some outward mark of distinction. Hence Guido of holy memory, cardinal priest with the title of Saint Lawrence in Lucina and legate of the most holy Apostolic See to this our province, prudently decreed and established that Jews appearing in public ought to wear a horned hat. We command those who do not wear it to be punished with a monetary fine. But we, wishing so far as lies in us to bring the good intention of the aforesaid legate into effect, command and strictly enjoin, under sentence of excommunication, all secular powers, of whatever condition and preeminence they may be and by whatever name they may be called--whether they are communities or individual presidents of a state--that, personally or through their own servants, they immediately punish with a monetary penalty, to be assessed according to their judgment, every Jew who does not wear such a hat in public, notwithstanding any condition, appeal, or frivolous excuse.

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This cannot be a matter of doubtful law, because it had already been decreed in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter 68:

In some provinces a diversity of dress distinguishes Jews or Saracens from Christians, but in certain places such confusion has grown up that they are distinguished by no difference. Hence it sometimes happens that through error Christians have intercourse with the women of Jews or Saracens, and Jews or Saracens with Christian women.

And the Council of Vienne under Clement IV:

Likewise, since the Jews have grown to so great an insolence that the purity of Catholic holiness is already said to be defiled through them among very many Christians, we strictly command--not so much coining new provisions as renewing the ancient statutes of the Supreme Pontiff--that Jews, who ought to be distinguished in dress from Christians, resume the horned hat which some in these regions were accustomed to wear and which they have presumed to set aside through their own obstinacy, so that they may be plainly distinguished from Christians, as was formerly determined in a general Council.

The Council of Vienne prescribed a horned hat; Ravenna, according to rubric 23, prescribed that men wear a wheel of yellow color upon their outer garments and that women wear the same sign upon the head. Paul IV confined the Jews

to one part of the city and forbade them to practice usury. He willed that they wear a hat of yellow color by which they could be distinguished from the rest. Thus in his life.

I can by no means omit setting forth the most salutary statutes concerning Jews of the First Council of Milan under the most holy man Charles Borromeo:

In order that, as far as we can, we may take from Jews the opportunity to corrupt the morals of Christians and to take their goods from them by fraud, and endeavor to lead the Jews themselves to the way of salvation, we decree, also from the ordinances of the sacred canons:

That Jews, always and wherever they make a journey, shall wear--the men a hat or cap of yellow color; the women a cloth of the same color placed upon the rest of the covering of the head.

That Christians are not to attend the banquets, weddings, feast days, or synagogues of Jews; nor are they to play with them or, what is more detestable, dance with Jews.

That Christians cannot be in the service of Jews.

That if Christians hire their labor to Jews for a day or an hour, they are not to take food among them.

That Christian women cannot under any agreement be nurses of Jews in their houses; nor outside their houses unless necessity, to be approved by the ordinary, demands it.

That Christians are not to summon Jews to themselves for the sake of medical treatment.

That they are not to employ their services in joining marriages among themselves.

That Christian women are not to employ Jews for the sake of cosmetics, pigments, or arranging their appearance.

That fields or ecclesiastical estates may not be leased to Jews, nor vestments, vessels, or other sacred objects or things destined for the use of the Church be sold or given to them as pledges.

That Jews are not to dwell in houses situated near a church; and if any now dwell in them, they are to be compelled to move altogether within a fixed time.

That Christians are not to dare to contract with Jews on feast days, whether in the name of purchase, sale, or anything else.

That during the three days before Easter Jews are not to go out in public or dare to do anything openly or secretly in contempt of the Christian religion.

That Jews are not to possess any dignity or public office which can in any way concern Christians.

Let bishops, princes, and magistrates, each according to the function of his authority and after establishing more severe penalties against Christians and Jews, take care that these and the remaining provisions which are established by the sacred canons concerning the intercourse of Christians with Jews are preserved inviolate.

We also earnestly ask princes to establish in each city a fixed place where Jews may assemble to dwell separately from Christians. If Jews possess any houses of their own in the city, let them order that within six months they be sold to Christians by a true and not a pretended contract.

In addition, princes, in accordance with their piety, will have to establish that Jews, in recording in their books any contracts and transactions which they have with Christians, use the letters and vernacular language of our people, and not Hebrew language or characters. If they act otherwise, let them be severely punished, and let no right of action or defense arise for them from it.

Finally, it will be equitable for them to exert every diligence to repress and restrain the fraudulent and treacherous manner in which Jews contract with Christians, and the avarice which gapes after their resources.

But we admonish bishops to take care that the Christian faith and doctrine be preached to Jews by pious men skilled in the Hebrew language and Jewish rites, or, if such men cannot be found, by other learned and good men.

Let all Jews be ordered to assemble for those sermons; but let the boys and girls hear the preacher separately from their parents and from those who are older. Let him instruct them familiarly and respond kindly to those who ask questions.

Let anyone in whom some sign of conversion is recognized be separated from the others and led into a house of catechumens prepared for this purpose, where he may be taught more diligently everything which a Christian ought to know.

Let catechumens not be baptized unless they have first been diligently instructed and examined, especially if they are older.

After they have been baptized, let them be entrusted for at least a year to the care of some upright man, who may rule and regulate their life by these provisions:

That on feast days they attend Mass, sermons, and Vespers.

That on other days they employ some craft by which they can seek sustenance.

That they have no association whatever with Jews.

Nor with Christians whose life is disgraceful.

Let the bishop take care that a Jew who converts to the faith possesses all his goods; and, if he is a son under paternal power, that the legitimate and every other part of the goods due to him by law be given to him even while his father lives.

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Or, if the convert is a woman, let her dowry be restored to her by her husband or established by her father, from which she can be supported according to the prescription of the constitution of Pope Paul III, especially in those matters which he established concerning resources acquired by usuries.

Fifth, public offices also are forbidden to them. This is a sign that they are altogether foreign to the state. Thus the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter 69:

Since it is exceedingly absurd that a blasphemer of Christ should exercise the force of power over Christians--a matter concerning which the Council of Toledo made prudent provision--we renew it in this chapter because of the boldness of transgressors, prohibiting Jews from being preferred to public offices, since under such a pretext they are exceedingly hostile to Christians.

But if anyone commits such an office to them, after an admonition has first been made, let him be restrained by the provincial council--which we command to be celebrated every year--with the constraint which is fitting. But let communion with Christians, in commerce and other things, be denied to an official of this kind until whatever he acquired from Christians through the occasion of the office thus assumed is converted to the use of poor Christians according to the providence of the diocesan bishop; and let him relinquish with shame the office which he irreverently assumed. We extend this same provision to pagans.

Since, therefore, their clothing, habitation, and all the other things collected here tend to this end, that Christians should have no dealings with Jews; and since all judge that this concerns the state and the Church, this cannot be obtained better than if they are entirely expelled. Poisonous beasts are never in a house without danger, even if they do not always bring forth their poison; for they do not do so either because they fear or because they are torpid. I do not believe that one can be indebted to Jews, associate familiarly with them, banquet with them, or have them move about in the courts of princes, consuls, and senators without great detriment to public safety, honor, justice, and morals.

CHAPTER XVIII

Those Who Need a Loan Should Be Assisted in Another Manner

§ 1. In a great multitude of rich and beneficent men there would be no lack of one who would liberally offer money as a loan to the needy, but negligence and the removal of trust make everyone timid.

If anyone makes a loan, it is lost as though it were his own;

When you now seek repayment, through your benefit you find a friend an enemy.

Nothing is easier than to make enemies from a benefit.

For the greatest part of mankind possesses this custom:

While they seek what they desire for themselves, they are good; but when they now possess it,

From good men they become the worst and most fraudulent.

Plautus, *Trinummus*.

The obstinacy, perfidy, and ingratitude of certain debtors cause all those whom poverty oppresses to suffer punishment. A creditor is sometimes troublesome and burdensome, premature and savage, which is forbidden by law. More often, however, the debtor is fastidious and a defrauder. For those to whom something is owed generally ask for it humanely; but debtors, however gently you address them and whatever delay you grant, are indignant. If they are poor, they proclaim the creditor a tyrant; if they are magnates, they threaten as if by their own right. Especially in this matter, nothing so closes the fountain of doing good as the abuse of benefits. Nor can sufficient precaution be taken, nor is it customarily taken, although there is a mortgage and there are judges. Yet is it not burdensome to recover by force of arms what you gave to a friend? These matters must therefore be established seriously by the magistrate; clear debts must be judged quickly and summarily, and an obstinate debtor must be punished.

§ 2. Let the prince, or each city, make a loan from the treasury to its citizens, after fixing the day upon which it must be repaid and receiving a mortgage. This is exacted without envy and hatred; it does not permit the debtor to be negligent through hope in judicial proceedings, and it binds those who are in need. Many princes have attained great praise from this and fortified themselves with the firmest defense of majesty, that is, love.

§ 3. A perpetual remedy for usuries is the institution which they call a mount of piety. This, therefore, was also a special object of care for Charles, archbishop of Milan, in the First Council:

Let bishops apply all their care and labor to erecting and instituting, by authority of the Supreme Pontiff, in each city and more notable town, the pious establishments which are called mounts of piety, from which the poor can receive borrowed money. Let them take care that both these and those already established are administered diligently and faithfully. We beseech princes and magistrates to assist the zeal and diligence of the bishops in this matter by every means. In them let nothing beyond the principal be received except for the maintenance of the ministers and other necessary expenses, and this by authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

Leo X ended the controversy which had arisen concerning the mounts. His edict reads as follows:

Leo, bishop, servant of the servants of God, for perpetual remembrance of the matter, with the holy Council approving. Among the manifold cares of our solicitude, in accordance with our pastoral office we ought especially to undertake this one: that those things which in our time are salutary and praiseworthy, consonant with the Catholic faith and conformable to good morals, should not only be unfolded but also propagated to posterity; and that things which could furnish material for scandal should be completely cut down and torn out by the roots, and

not permitted to sprout anywhere. Thus we permit only those things to be cultivated in the field of the Lord and the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts by which the minds of the faithful can be spiritually fed, after the tares have been eradicated and the sterility of the wild olive cut away.

Indeed, since we have learned that formerly a certain controversy arose, not without scandal and murmuring among the peoples, among some beloved sons, masters of sacred theology and doctors of both laws, and that it has recently been renewed in these days concerning the relief of the poor by loans made to them under public authority, which are commonly called mounts of piety; these have been established in many cities of Italy by the magistrates of cities and other faithful of Christ to relieve by such a loan the poverty of the poor, lest they be swallowed by the abyss of usuries, and they have been praised and advocated by holy men who preach the divine word, and have also been approved and confirmed by some Supreme Pontiffs, our predecessors. The question is whether the aforesaid mounts disagree with Christian doctrine or not, with each party thinking and preaching differently.

For some masters and doctors say that those mounts are not lawful in which, after a fixed time has elapsed, something beyond the principal is exacted per pound by the ministers of the mount from the poor themselves to whom the loan is given; and that consequently they do not escape the crime of usuries or injustice, or some certain appearance of evil, since our Lord, as Luke the Evangelist bears witness, has bound us by an open command that from a loan given we ought to hope for nothing beyond the principal. For this is the proper interpretation of usuries: namely, when one endeavors from the use of a thing which does not beget to acquire profit and offspring without any labor, expense, or danger.

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The same masters and doctors also added that in these mounts neither commutative nor distributive justice is satisfied, although a contract of this kind ought not to exceed the limits of justice if it is to be approved. They also endeavored to prove this because the expenses owed by many, as they say, for the preservation of mounts of this kind are extorted only from the poor to whom the loan is given; and because sometimes several things beyond the necessary and moderate expenses are furnished to certain other persons, not without an appearance of evil and an incentive to offend, as they seem to imply.

But many other masters and doctors assert the contrary, and in many schools of Italy proclaim by word and writing, in favor of so great a good and one so necessary to the state, that, provided nothing is sought or expected by reason of the loan, nevertheless, for the indemnity of those mounts--that is, for the expenses of their ministers and of all things pertaining to their necessary preservation, without profit to mounts of this kind--something moderate and necessary may lawfully be exacted and received beyond the principal from those who receive an advantage from a loan of this kind; for the rule of law holds that one who receives an advantage ought also to bear the burden, especially if apostolic authority is added. They show that this opinion was approved by the Roman Pontiffs of happy memory Paul II, Sixtus IV, Innocent VIII, Alexander VI, and Julius II, our predecessors, and was also preached by holy and God-fearing preachers of evangelical truth who were held in great esteem because of their reputation for holiness.

Wishing to make suitable provision in this matter, as has been granted to us from on high, and commending the zeal of each party--the former from zeal for justice, lest an abyss of usuries be opened; the latter from love of piety and truth, so that the poor might be assisted--since these things seem to pertain to the peace and tranquility of the whole Christian state, with the holy Council approving we declare and define that the aforesaid mounts of piety, established by states and hitherto approved and confirmed by authority of the Apostolic See, in which, for their expenses and indemnity, something moderate is received beyond the principal solely for the expenses of ministers and of other matters pertaining to their preservation, as stated above, and solely for their indemnity, without profit to those mounts, neither display an appearance of evil nor furnish an incentive to sin; nor are they to be disapproved in any way. Rather, such a loan is meritorious and is to be praised and approved, and is by no means to be regarded as usurious. It is lawful to preach their piety and mercy to the peoples, even with indulgences granted for that reason by the holy Apostolic See; and henceforth other similar mounts may also be erected with the approval of the

Apostolic See.

Nevertheless, it would be much more perfect and much holier if such mounts were established altogether free of charge; that is, if those who erect them assigned certain annual revenues from which, if not all, at least half of the expenses of the ministers of mounts of this kind might be paid, so that through this means the poor would happen to be burdened with a lighter portion of the money to be paid. We decree that the faithful of Christ are to be invited by greater indulgences to erect mounts for them, with the assignment of revenues of this kind for bearing the expenses. But we will that all religious, ecclesiastical, and secular persons who henceforth dare to preach by word or writing contrary to the form of the present declaration and sanction shall incur the penalty of excommunication already pronounced, notwithstanding any privilege whatever, the aforesaid matters, apostolic constitutions and ordinances, and all other things whatsoever to the contrary. Therefore let no one at all be permitted to infringe this page of our declaration, definition, decree, and excommunication, or to oppose it by a rash attempt. If anyone should presume to attempt this, let him know that he will incur the indignation of Almighty God and of his blessed apostles Peter and Paul.

In those mounts, therefore, the following things are necessary:

1. The loan must be given altogether without charge.
2. Something is to be given for the maintenance of the ministers, who do not render their services without charge.
3. A house must also be established and pledges preserved, which cannot be done without some expense.
4. Those expenses must be equalized, so that the poor are not burdened more than the rich.
5. There is nothing usurious in these things. For if a person gives a loan, employs witnesses and a notary, and orders a pledge to be inspected or brought in, it is not equitable that these things be done at the expense of the person who gave the loan.
6. Nevertheless, one must endeavor to establish the mounts altogether free of charge, for thus every cause of suspicion will be removed. This can be done by either of two methods, or by both. First, let an annual revenue be purchased by which the necessary expenses may be borne. Second, let great, trustworthy, and rich men discharge without charge the offices of scribes, tellers, and custodians. Nor, in so pious a matter, is the labor beneath anyone's dignity. For if in Italy and Spain, and now also in Gaul and Germany, noble and senatorial men go to seek alms for the poor, and it is not contrary to their reputation to be ambassadors of the poor, but adorns their dignity more than any purple; indeed, if it redounds to the great glory of Christ that men clothed in purple and the rich of this age are vicars and procurators of his poor, that they are not high-minded but fear, and that they do not regard poverty, preferred in the life of their Lord to every scepter, as disgraceful--if kings and princes minister to the poor, why should a rich man not also act as a scribe and doorkeeper of the poor? What they do for one of the least of these, they do for Christ. Every office rendered to Christ is above every dignity and is altogether royal, because to serve God is to reign.

CHAPTER XIX

Other Methods of Collecting Money, as Customary as They Are Condemned

§ 1. Suetonius relates the following concerning Nero. But when his hope deceived him, and he was abandoned and now so exhausted and needy that it was necessary even to postpone and defer the soldiers' pay and the veterans' rewards, he turned his attention to calumnies and robberies. Before all else, he established that from the goods of deceased freedmen three quarters, in place of one half, should be exacted for him from those who, without a probable cause, bore the name of any family with which he himself was connected.

This was an immense increase of plunder. For whereas the fisc had previously claimed one half, that is, half the inheritance, Nero received three quarters--that is, nine ounces out of twelve. If the inheritance was twelve thousand, the emperor entered upon nine and the heir three.

§ 2. He established that the testaments of those ungrateful to the prince should pass to the fisc, and that the learned men who had written or dictated them should not go unpunished.

An immense abyss under a robber prince. The prince was named in the testaments of all men, especially the wealthy, which was a great thing. Next, no small portion had to be assigned to him, lest he be placed after private persons. Third, he rescinded as ungrateful the testaments of former chief centurions, even of those who had made their wills under Tiberius; thus Suetonius, chapter 38. The chief centurions whose inheritances he seized were rich. From this it is clear that those of whom he was not himself the heir were called ungrateful.

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§ 3. To kill those by whom he had been named heir. This was the invention of Gaius, Suetonius. When fear had thereby been instilled, and he was now openly named heir both by strangers among their friends and by parents among their children, he called them mockers because they persisted in living after naming him, and sent poisoned cakes to many.

§ 4. To take rights away from citizens and compel them to purchase them again. Suetonius. He denied that those whose ancestors had obtained Roman citizenship for themselves and their posterity possessed it by right, unless they were sons, for he said that "posterity" ought not to be understood beyond this degree. When the diplomas of the deified Julius and Augustus were brought forward, he lamented them as old and obsolete.

There was more profit in this than even anyone acquainted with Roman affairs could understand. For in this census there was a part of the Romans which, if not the greatest, was certainly immense and consisted of many myriads who possessed citizenship by gift or purchase, not by birth. It was purchased for a great sum, especially under that robber, and from others by those who already enjoyed it; nor was it safe not to purchase again what they possessed, lest they lose life itself.

§ 5. He also accused those census declarations as falsely made to which any increase whatsoever had afterward accrued for any reason. He rescinded as ungrateful the testaments of chief centurions who from the beginning of Tiberius's principate had left neither Tiberius nor himself heir; likewise, he rescinded as invalid and void those of all others whom anyone said had intended to die with Caesar as heir.

But why did he do this? Because much had accrued to many; and fraud in a submitted census declaration was punished by death, exile, loss of liberty, or certainly confiscation. Consider that among so great a multitude something had accrued to ten thousand men: that monster therefore devoured as many estates through a single calumny--but a most carefully devised calumny.

§ 6. To turn judicial inquiry toward profit. Suetonius. He heard cases of this kind only after first fixing their price; and, impatient of delay, on one occasion condemned more than forty defendants from different charges by a single sentence, and boasted to Caesonia, when she awoke from sleep, how much business he had conducted while she took her midday rest.

For he obtained forty inheritances by one judgment, and apparently splendid ones; for calumnies were contrived against the rich. Next, it is credible that the defendants in whose trials Caligula himself sat were distinguished men.

§ 7. To compel men to buy worthless things at an immense price. Suetonius. After announcing an auction, he offered and sold the remnants of all the spectacles, demanding the prices himself and extending them so far that certain men, compelled to purchase some things for an immense price and stripped of their goods, cut their veins. The affair of Aponius Saturninus is famous. While he was sleeping among the benches, Gaius warned the auctioneer not to overlook a man of praetorian rank who was repeatedly nodding his head to him; nor was an end made of bidding until thirteen gladiators were knocked down to the unaware man for nine million sesterces.

§ 8. To mingle every fraud with a sale. Suetonius. In Gaul also, after he had sold at immense prices the ornaments and household goods, slaves, and even freedmen of his condemned sisters, he was enticed by the profit and demanded from the city whatever belonged to the equipment of the old palace. Even hired vehicles and mill animals were seized for carrying it, so that bread often became scarce at Rome and many litigants, because they were absent and could not appear for their recognizance, lost their cases. In selling this equipment he employed every kind of fraud and allurement: at one time reproaching individuals for avarice and asking why they were not ashamed to be wealthier than he; at another time feigning regret that he was giving private persons the opportunity to possess things belonging to princes.

§ 9. To deduct a portion of sums in litigation. Suetonius. For lawsuits and judgments begun anywhere, he deducted a fortieth part of the sum concerning which the litigation was conducted; nor was anyone without penalty if he was convicted of having settled or given up the business.

How great was that plunder from all the lawsuits in so great an empire? Those times abounded in lawsuits between the greatest and richest men, so that I judge, not without cause, that the sum of all property in litigation was equal to a great kingdom. Indeed, I think it is so even now. By that law, therefore, he seized a fortieth part of some kingdom.

§ 10. To pursue every disgraceful profit. From the daily earnings of porters he took an eighth part; from the takings of prostitutes, as much as each earned from one act of intercourse. It was added to the heading of the law that both those who had practiced prostitution and those who had practiced procuring were held liable to the public treasury, and that marriages also were subject to it.

It is a small matter to relate, but because of the multitude of porters it was a great tax throughout the whole empire. Shame prohibits speaking about the prostitutes' takings. Yet no one ought to doubt that, in blind paganism and amid so great a corruption of morals under Augustus, Tiberius, and Caligula, many legions could have been supported from the lusts of criminals. At Corinth, in the single temple of Venus, four thousand prostitutes earned money. But it is better that this Camarina remain unmoved.

§ 11. To impose these things and not publish them, so that transgression might occur through ignorance of the law. Suetonius. After taxes of this kind had been imposed but not posted, and many offenses were committed through ignorance of the writing, at last, when the Roman people demanded it, he indeed posted the law, but in the smallest letters and in the narrowest place, so that no one could copy it.

These things were imposed but not posted; yet the people's demand shows that enforcement was at hand and that penalties were imposed upon those who violated the law.

§ 12. To establish a domestic brothel. Suetonius. Lest he fail to try any kind of booty, he established a brothel in the palace; and, after a number of chambers had been divided and furnished in accordance with the dignity of the place, matrons and freeborn youths stood in them. He sent nomenclators around the marketplaces and basilicas to invite young and old to lust. Money at interest was furnished to those who came, and men were stationed to record their names openly, as though they were assisting Caesar's revenues.

§ 13. To play at dice and perjure oneself. Not scorning profit even from the game of dice, he gained more by falsehood and even perjury.

§ 14. To confiscate the wealthy. Once, after entrusting his own turn to the player next to him, he went out into the atrium of the house. When he had ordered two wealthy Roman knights who were passing by to be seized and their goods confiscated without delay, he returned exulting and boasted that he had never had a more prosperous throw of the dice.

§ 15. To compel contributions. When his daughter was born, complaining of his poverty and of the burdens not only of an emperor but now also of a father, he received contributions for the maintenance and dowry of the girl. He also proclaimed that he would receive New Year's gifts at the beginning of the year, and stood in the vestibule of the palace on the Kalends of January to catch the contributions which a crowd of every kind poured before him with full hands and folds of their garments.

§ 16. To conduct the harshest levies. Caligula also did this, and it was customary to force onto the rolls those young men who would purchase exemption at a great price. Nor are those who compel countrymen to take up arms now ignorant of these arts.

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§ 17. How great were the robberies produced by that law of Nero. Suetonius says that then all deeds and words for which only an informer was not lacking were held liable under the law of treason, chapter 32.

How monstrous and barbarous that law was! For men were deprived of life for every word, not merely for deeds; and the goods which the avaricious and needy tyrant sought fell to the fisc.

§ 18. He also recalled the rewards of crowns which cities had ever conferred upon him in contests.

Thus he demands back, as though it were a debt, what had once been given in friendship. Lipsius treats most learnedly of crowns and crown-gold in book 2 of *Roman Greatness*, chapter 9. At first it was given to victorious commanders for the sake of honor; afterward it was severely exacted and contributed on various occasions, not for a triumph alone, as is clear from the same Lipsius, for two thousand were contributed for Sulla's funeral. But all the cities had sent Nero crowns of great price for his theatrical contests. He demands these back, or their gold.

§ 19. By calumny to despoil the shops of merchants. Suetonius. When he had prohibited the use of amethyst and Tyrian colors and had secretly sent a man to sell a few ounces on market day, he shut up all the merchants.

How great that spoil was can be considered by one who has estimated the Roman markets.

§ 20. To strip the rich of their goods for a single transgression. Indeed, he is believed, while singing, to have noticed among the spectators a matron dressed in the forbidden purple and pointed her out to his procurators; she was immediately dragged away and stripped not only of her garment but also of her goods.

§ 21. To impel all intermediate magistrates to robberies. Suetonius. He delegated an office to no one without adding, "You know what I need"; and, "Let us see to it that he possesses nothing."

§ 22. Suetonius. At last he took gifts from many temples and melted down images made of gold or silver, among them the images of the household gods, which Galba soon restored.

§ 23. To beg monies from allies; thus Julius in Spain. Suetonius, chapter 54. He displayed self-restraint neither in military commands nor in magistracies. For, as certain men testified in their memorials, when proconsul in Spain he received from the allies monies begged as assistance toward his debt.

§ 24. To plunder towns without cause. Suetonius on Julius. He plundered in hostile fashion certain towns of the Lusitanians, although they neither refused his commands nor closed their gates when he approached. In Gaul he despoiled shrines and temples of the gods filled with gifts; he destroyed cities more often for plunder than for an offense. Hence it came about that he abounded in gold and sold it throughout Italy and the provinces at three thousand sesterces per pound as merchandise.

§ 25. To steal. Suetonius on Julius. In his first consulship he stole three thousand pounds of gold from the Capitol and put back the same weight of gilded bronze.

§ 26. To sell the property of others. Suetonius. He gave alliances and kingdoms for a price, as one who took nearly six thousand talents from Ptolemy alone in his own and Pompey's name.

§ 27. To seize without a pretext. Suetonius. Later, by the most evident robberies and sacrileges, he bore both the burdens of civil wars and the expenses of triumphs and public entertainments.

§ 28. Not to pay creditors. Thus Vitellius, as Dio of Nicaea relates. Then, when a man whom no one had previously been able to see in the forum because of the multitude of his creditors ascended the Capitol with so great a body of soldiers--and when at last everyone worshiped a man whom previously no one had even wished freely to embrace--those who laughed could not restrain themselves. But when those who had lent him a great sum as he was departing for Germany pressed him and scarcely permitted him to depart after sureties had been given, they then not only did not laugh but, moved by pity, even concealed him. Vitellius, however, afterward sought out his creditors, said that he had returned safety in exchange for the money lent, and demanded back the instruments of the contracts.

He frequently came to the theaters in order to attract the affections of the plebs to himself. He dined familiarly together with the leading men so that he might bind them to himself to a greater degree. He often mentioned his old companions and held them in honor. For he did not think it disgraceful or unworthy if he appeared to recognize anyone from among them--a thing which most men do who, raised to the greatest and unexpected honors, hate those by whom they understand that they were known when previously humble and abject.

§ 29. To proscribe the friends of enemies. Thus Severus. For when he had defeated Albinus, he proscribed the friends of Albinus's soldiers and commanders, and left to his sons as much money as no one else.

§ 30. To have the soldier himself as a source of revenue. Tacitus indicates the method. For the common soldier paid as though an annual tribute. Some wandered among the companies; others on furlough or in the camp itself, until they paid the fee to the centurion; and no one gave thought either to the measure of the burden or to the kind of profit. By brigandage and plunder, or by servile services, a soldier purchased freedom from military duty. Then every wealthiest soldier was worn down by labor and savagery until he purchased exemption. When, exhausted by expenses, he had miserably languished in idleness, he returned to the company, poor instead of rich and slothful instead of vigorous. And in turn one after another, corrupted by the same poverty and license, rushed into sedition and dissension and, finally, civil wars.

§ 31. To have a compact and partnership with pirates. The viceroy of Algiers is accustomed to do this.

§ 32. To kill those who have discharged magistracies. The emperor of the Turks possesses this custom. His principal revenues come from confiscations and gifts. Thus the *Political Treasury*, concerning the empire of the Turks:

And although the ordinary revenues in the Turkish Empire do not exceed the sum which we have stated, it can nevertheless scarcely be believed how much accrues extraordinarily to the prince's treasury, especially from confiscations and gifts. For pashas and other Turkish ministers suck out the blood and fortunes of the subjects like

swallows, and accumulate inestimable treasures, which in the end generally pass to the prince's fisc. Ibrahim Pasha is said to have carried away from Cairo sixty times one hundred thousand gold pieces, that is, six million. Mehmed the vizier had acquired for himself a much greater sum. Occhiali possessed, in addition to other immense riches, three thousand slaves. The sultana, sister of Selim II, received each day two thousand five hundred sequins or crowns, and began to conduct an aqueduct for the convenience of pilgrims from Cairo all the way to Mecca--certainly an incredible work. It is easy for the sultan to find some cause for taking away from anyone, at his pleasure, life together with fortune.

The gifts also are great and immense. For no ambassador dares to approach him without a gift. No one can obtain any office or dignity unless money intervenes. No one comes into the sight of so great a prince from a province over which he presided, or from an expedition which he conducted, with empty hands. Nor are trifles or farthings given to so great a prince. The voivodes of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania redeem and preserve their principalities by gifts. The princes of Moldavia and Wallachia are changed very frequently; for those principalities are given to those who offer more. In order to fulfill their promises, these men do not shear but flay their peoples and reduce their provinces to poverty.

Nevertheless, in an earlier period we saw the treasuries of the Turks exhausted by the Persian war and almost all their treasures consumed. In recent years, both at Constantinople and throughout the whole Turkish Empire, the price of gold was increased beyond what can be believed, so that a gold coin was worth twice as much as previously. Moreover, the very substance of the gold and silver was so adulterated that the Janissaries, seizing an occasion from this, set fire to the city of Constantinople and struck immense fear not only into the citizens but also into the sultan himself. At that time, sixty thousand gold pieces had indeed been sought as a loan in the sultan's name from the merchants of Aleppo.

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§ 33. To sell honors and judgments. Thus Vespasian, Suetonius, chapter 16. The only thing for which he is deservedly blamed is his desire for money. For, not content with having recalled the taxes omitted under Galba, added new and heavy ones, increased the tributes of the provinces, and even doubled those of some, he openly practiced dealings which would have been shameful even for a private person, buying up certain things only so that he might afterward sell them for more. Nor did he hesitate to sell offices to candidates and acquittals to defendants, the innocent no less than the guilty.

§ 34. To sell the possessions of the rich. Dio on Caligula. There it was a public crime to be rich; and when he himself sold their possessions, he obtained much more money from them because everyone was compelled to buy for more than the things were worth.

CHAPTER XX

The Defense of the Nobility Makes a Prince Powerful

§ 1. A question much debated both formerly and now is whether it is advantageous for a powerful prince to have no powerful prince beneath him, and to leave nobles and commoners undistinguished, so that the sole nobility is to have been honored by the king; or whether account is indeed to be taken of nobility by birth. Nor is the matter debated only in words, but is conducted in deed, as the disagreement of rulers shows. To leave other things unmentioned, in Europe most affairs are conducted through the nobility, and especially in Germany a strict distinction of marriages is observed. On the contrary, however, the emperor of the Turks holds even all the highest pashas as slaves, nor is any nobility acknowledged except being pleasing to the master--which is properly the good fortune of a slave. For since he belongs wholly to his master, both in use and in ownership, he can rely on nothing other than his master's goodwill. This administration, therefore, has pleased many, and it has seemed safe that after the prince all should be slaves or equals, that no one should be accounted noble--a practice which obtains also among the Chinese. If there are no nobles, let none be made; if there are, let them gradually be reduced to the ordinary rank. I shall therefore also set forth my own opinion concerning this matter, so that it may be made clear what is to be followed amid these varieties of ruling.

A prince is not of great spirit if only ignoble and servile men attend him, nor is he of proven judgment if boorishness and stupidity win men a place among his ministers.

§ 2. I am not unaware that no Appian or Lentulan lineage is to be preferred to virtue, and that virtue is the sole and only nobility. We are all born with an equal lot; we are distinguished by virtue alone, as Minucius admonishes: "He who boasts of his lineage praises what belongs to others." What is best is also noblest. Indeed Euripides rightly says:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες εὐγενεῖς, εἰσὶν κακοί.

Many nobles are wicked. Hence Nazianzen also says most excellently:

Κακὸς δ' ἀκούων, αἰσχύνου, μηδὲ δυσγενῆς,
γένος γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ πάλαι σεσηπότες.

If you hear yourself called wicked, blush; do not blush if you are called ignoble. For the lineage which is esteemed consists of those who rotted long ago--perhaps men who were thieves, adulterers, and robbers.

οὐδὲ ἵππον ταχὺν ποιεῖ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ταχυτάτων φῦναι.

Nor does descent from the swiftest make a horse swift.

Agapetus therefore gives a golden precept:

Ἐπὶ προγόνων εὐγενεῖα μηδεὶς ἐναβρυνέσθω· πηλὸν γὰρ ἔχουσι πάντες τοῦ γένους προπάτορα· καὶ οἱ ἐν πορφύρᾳ καὶ βύσσῳ τρυφώμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἐν πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ τρυχώμενοι, καὶ οἱ διαδήματα περικείμενοι, καὶ οἱ διὰ δώματα προκείμενοι. μὴ τοίνυν εἰς πηλὸν καυχώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ χρηστότητι σεμνυνόμεθα τρόπων.

Let no one insolently exalt himself on account of the nobility of his ancestors. For all have clay as the founder of their lineage: both those magnificently and gloriously clothed in purple and fine linen, and those worn down by poverty and diseases; both those upon whom diadems have been imposed, and those who are stationed before houses for the sake of guarding them. Let us therefore not boast of our clay-born lineage, but let us render ourselves venerable and commendable by innocence and uprightness of conduct.

And indeed Charlemagne preferred the nobility of virtue to smoke-blackened ancestral images; from this comes the nearly most ancient nobility of Germany--he preferred the former.

Henry Mutius, book 8 *On German Affairs*, and Aventinus, book 4 of the *Annals of the Bavarians*, report that the emperor entered the schools of Paris and, having learned that the poor were making great advances in their studies while the nobles languished in idleness, placed the former on his right, promised them bishoprics and civil dignities, and neglected the nobles--an action truly worthy of a king. For to what purpose is a boorish and idle nobility? There is need of prudence, labor, and vigor.

I therefore do not dispute how highly nobility is to be valued, but rather this point which pertains to the matter: whether it is advantageous for the nobility to be fostered and advanced to dignities while commoners are neglected, or whether the nobility ought instead to be pressed down, commoners raised on high, and all things made equal.

§ 3. In the Turkish state there are only distinctions of offices; all other conditions are servile, so much so that even the emperor's concubines are not accounted free, and the principal strength rests with men of the lowest condition. In the Roman Empire, besides offices, there are hereditary or elective dignities.

The order of nobility is duke, count, baron, noble. I say of nobility, not of dignity or of offices. For the nobility of emperors can rank below that of a duke; furthermore, the dignity of electors and archdukes is not defined by nobility alone. The dignity of counts also varies: some are called counts simply, others margraves, others landgraves. From men noble by birth, and also from others, knights of the golden spur are made when they have conducted themselves bravely in battle; for then they attain that dignity. From these barons are made, in consideration of their virtues and power. One who conducted himself heroically in a first battle is created a noble; in a second, a military tribune; after a third, a baron. Then follow count, margrave, landgrave, duke, and king.

But what they say--that a noble must be wealthy and a knight still wealthier; that a military tribune ought to be able to lead forth at his own expense a troop of fifty nobles; that a baron must possess lower, middle, and basal jurisdiction, together with four castles of nobles; that a count-margrave must possess three baronies; that a landgrave must possess four baronies in one duchy; that a viscount, or princely count, must possess five counties; that a duke must possess four principal counties, and a county or barony annexed to each--this assuredly is not observed. A king is crowned if he has four contiguous duchies, and in each one four cities in which no one else possesses any right; in these cities one archbishop, and under four archbishops forty episcopal provinces. But--

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--these things have been received neither by firm law nor by custom. Among these men there is no equality of nobility, for the emperor is the fountain of nobility, chapter *De decurionibus*, law *Imperatores*, and the lineage of dukes is greater than that of counts. Nobility is therefore, as it were, recognizability, too narrowly called by the Greeks εὐγένεια, because men are well-born; for a man can be noble who by virtue gave a beginning to his own stock, who has borne offices, or who without administration attained nobility through honorary codicils. Nor is nobility solely in descendants; rather, it is often better in its first root. For descendants sometimes possess nothing from their ancestors except their images, empty of virtues and deeds; their nobility is cheaper than seaweed to the ancient poet.

§ 4. Kings and princes must act so that they have lesser princes, petty rulers, counts, and nobles whose continual service they may employ at home and in war; for this is a firm defense of the state. When between the royal summit and the son of the maidservant who sits at the mill there is no one in the middle, there is a great gap advantageous to the enemy. My reasons, insofar as reasons can be given in these matters, are strong.

The first reason. This was the form of all rightly constituted states: that the nobility possessed its own dignity. For one who is engaged in the state and debates concerning it, this consideration ought to be of great weight. I am not establishing a Platonic or ideal city, but one such as can and customarily does exist.

Certainly, in Numbers 1:16 I read that men newly emerged from servitude were called most noble princes, קריאים, "called men"; and in Deuteronomy 1:15, nobles, וידעים, "known men." Nobility therefore arose at once within the same nation and house. In 1 Samuel 9:6 a man is called ἑνδοξος, נכבד, honorable and weighty. So too Psalm 149:8; Job

14:21; Proverbs 31:23; Isaiah 3:5, 5:13, and 34:12; and Jeremiah 39:6. Indeed, Joseph too is praised as a noble councilor in Mark 15:43:

εὐσχήμων βουλευτής.

But let us not labor over the name. Whenever we hear of the princes of Israel, we ought to understand noblemen and leading men. There were also princes of Egypt of great dignity, and likewise those of the Persians, and before them of the Medes. The matter is clearer concerning the Roman state, which only late gave way to monarchy. Nebuchadnezzar, after living the life of a beast for seven years, was at last restored to his kingdom. “My leading men,” he says, “and magistrates sought me,” Daniel 4. Those who governed everything for seven years after their king had been lost were not of a servile disposition. The matter is established most clearly concerning the monarchy of the Medes from Daniel 6:12 and 15, and especially verse 7.

The kingdom of the Macedonians had many great princes and nobles. Nor was it generally otherwise in Greece, a region most fond of liberty. At Athens, as Plutarch relates in his *Theseus*, this distinction existed: for he named the nobles εὐπατρίδας and entrusted to them the care of discharging the magistracies. The nobility of Germany is the emperor’s one support; and, if there were concord, he could quickly obtain from it several thousand of the most select cavalymen. Matters have reached such a point that even princes can accomplish nothing without the nobility. In Gaul they wage wars and administer the state; in Spain the principal roles in so vast an empire are also theirs. The nobility has grown to a remarkable degree, increased by the offices of so many dukes, counts, prefects, and admirals, so that, unless newly ennobled men had come to its aid, the ancient nobility would have been unequal to so many affairs.

The kingdom of Britain also stood through the labor and care of the nobility, but especially Poland, where the nobility is very numerous and possesses great eminence in the state. It is not surprising that the Venetians foster nobility, for they have an aristocracy. No voyage is permitted without a company of nobles. By an ancient law of the Venetians, says Gregory of Toulouse, book 4, chapter 2, §13, it has been observed even from antiquity down to the present that the captain of every galley or trireme, wherever he journeys, should take with him eight sons of poor nobles, with a stipend of seventy gold coins. Necessary provisions of the kind nobles ought to have are to be furnished to them; and at the same time he is to permit each of them to import four thousand pounds of spices without payment of any naval duty and free of charge. Nevertheless, by votes of the senate these nobles are chosen from among many poor petitioners.

This is a great privilege of the nobility; for that reason it seems all the more remarkable to me that there should be poor nobles among them when there is so great an opportunity to become rich.

Since these things are so, the nobility must be defended and increased in every way. Nor are those political writers to be tolerated who suggest otherwise, for it belongs to a good man to preserve the condition of the state which exists and, if it did not exist, to recommend it.

The second reason. If, on the contrary, we examine the customs of disordered or perishing states, we shall observe that nobility is hateful to those who contrive to introduce either the tyranny of one man or the confusion of the multitude. To cut down the ears of grain that rise above the rest is an ancient maxim of tyranny. Nor is any concern greater for the Turk than to extirpate the nobility in conquered regions. At Rome also, those who stirred up seditions under the free state made it their policy to oppress the nobility. But after affairs had fallen under the decision of one man through the royal law, no men were more cruel toward the senate than those who proved to be the most oppressive tyrants--so much so that some began attempts to destroy the entire senate.

There are two reasons, arising from the different purpose of each, why a tyrant hates the nobility while a legitimate prince loves it. A tyrant wishes to be feared and considers it equitable that all others should be slaves, in accordance with the maxim: “Remember that everything is permitted to you, and against everyone.” The nobility especially obstructs him in this, and therefore he fears and reveres it. For generous and martial spirits do not suffer themselves to

be subjected slavishly; nor can a tyrant be so shameless that he does not blush for his crimes before weighty, prudent magnates. Since he does not wish there to be any whom he either fears or before whom he blushes, he desires the nobility to be removed from his midst.

A prince, however, because he has resolved to be an observer of law and equity, loves noblemen as the most faithful advocates of justice. He places his government before the eyes of men such as Paetus, Thrasea, Corbulo, and Seneca. Moreover, he judges it more honorable for the principate itself that his administration should be confirmed by the testimony and approval of such great men. Hence that magnificent and royal preface to edicts: "By the judgment of the kinsmen of princes, of the nobility, and of our counselors, we establish," and so forth. Nero killed Seneca lest shame before his teacher burden his disgraceful life. Great is the authority of a good and great man over a ruined spirit. Nero could despise the present and posthumous reputation of the human race; he had learned to suppress his conscience and to hear flatteries of all his vices; before Seneca alone he blushed.

The third reason. Nobility is necessary in war; without it neither fidelity, courage, nor military prudence is furnished. I do not deny that there are some who have obtained nobility for themselves through war, but I deny that this is lasting. A state must be established so that it stands amid the great and moderate vices of the great, the middling, and the lowest, and does not perish through the fall of one man, as happened at Thebes when Epaminondas died.

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Above all nations the Romans exhibited fidelity to their fatherland, and this through the defense of tribunes, chief centurions, and knights--that is, nobles. Servile hands do not readily fight for their master through every danger. First, they acquire nothing for themselves except perhaps a more tolerable servitude. Second, they often experience an even harsher master when, exulting in victory, he treats more bitterly and insultingly those by whose wounds he conquered. Third, those raised in servitude esteem neither the good of a name nor that of a lineage; they are therefore easily conquered by fear or price. In this matter, then, the Turks err most of all: everyone encounters dangers through fear; no one does so through hope or love of his lord.

But where the honor of nobility is held in esteem, men rush into death through the desire to receive, preserve, and increase the distinction of their lineage. The daily pugnacity of the nobility supplies proof of this--vicious indeed, but suitable for demonstrating what I have proposed. If you call a nobleman a liar, faithless to his lord, a scoundrel, unwarlike, timid, or a fugitive, he immediately challenges you to a duel; men decide the dispute by the sword and regard it as disgraceful for the challenged man to evade it. Whence comes so great a desire for reputation and honor? From ancestral training and the discipline of military life, in which faithlessness and timidity are the greatest disgrace. Hence they regard it as contrary to their honor not to stand in battle, to desert the ranks, or not to aid the wounded; and their concern for honor and fidelity is greater than their concern for life.

Nobility therefore preserves fidelity and is consequently courageous, for those two qualities always cling together in war. No one preserves fidelity in difficult circumstances, amid flying javelins, unless he is courageous; and no one fights courageously and rises above dangers unless he has resolved not to violate his fidelity and oath even when death is set before him.

Trained by these rudiments, the nobility also cultivates military prudence above others, for this is, as it were, its craft, by which it renders service to the state. Those who in our age are judged to conduct wars most cautiously, the States of Holland, think no differently: for they place nobles, barons, and counts in command during war, although their domestic and civil council consists of commoners.

The fourth reason. Those who suddenly attain dignities without any hope of permanent nobility are readily carried away by insolence and conduct themselves without restraint in all things. They collect wealth most greedily, as though an opportunity had been granted only once. No men were richer than freedmen. Crassus was regarded as rich. "From the same nation," says Pliny, book 33, chapter 10, "Marcus Crassus declared that no one was wealthy unless he could

maintain a legion from his annual income. He possessed two hundred million sesterces in his estates and was the richest Roman citizen after Sulla. Nor was this enough unless he should hunger for all the gold of the Parthians.” And although he may have secured for himself the very record of wealth--for it is pleasing to assail this insatiable desire for possession--we afterward knew many men released from slavery who were wealthier, including at the same time three under the principate of Claudius: Pallas, Callistus, and Narcissus. Behold, the richest of the Romans were slaves. Whence did their riches come except from robberies? There were many such men, but it was peculiar that three existed under the one Claudius, and while Claudius behaved as he did. There is no need to say anything about Rufinus, Eutropius, and others.

The present times show us the fortunes of ignoble men increased through administration of the state. In order that the matter may be understood, I shall set forth the words of the most famous political figure of our time, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, advocate of the States. In his *Apology* he writes as follows:

From these five royal embassies and negotiations it happened that the aforesaid kings supplied the States collectively with more than twenty-five million pounds. By payment of these, the confederated provinces--chiefly through my foresight--were freed, and the obligations were restored together with the pledged cities and citadels.

And:

When I entered my office, with the greatest labors and difficulties the lords States of Holland and West Friesland could scarcely raise annually one million eight hundred thousand florins for the generality, to sustain the burdens of war. But at present they pay approximately four million two hundred thousand pounds. Here, however, it must be noted that the burdens of war during these thirty-two years in which I have held office have been so great and enormous that at present it is necessary for you to provide more for the burdens of Holland and West Friesland alone than could be collected in 1586 both for the burdens of the generality and for Holland and West Friesland in particular: namely, more than two million florins each year. These nevertheless are deducted and paid from the revenues of the fatherland in addition to the aforesaid four million two hundred thousand pounds. And although it is more expedient to burden the fatherland than to lose it, one must nevertheless observe wisely and providently--as the colleges of the Supreme and Provincial Councils and the prefects of accounts taught in writing in 1604--that, while burdens grow beyond revenues, provinces must necessarily fall at last into utter ruin. And if during the last ten years expenses had been made equal to those made during the preceding ten years, at this time the burdens of Holland and West Friesland alone would easily have consumed about four million florins annually. The conclusion of the truce applied a remedy to this evil, after many other dangers and troubles, foreseen as well as unknown, had passed.

In these difficulties of the fatherland and amid so great a public debt, do you suppose the wealth of its rulers to have been diminished? See what he recounts:

1. He had received so much property from his wife that he could easily support himself.
2. At the beginning he received four thousand annually from his practice.
3. By inheritances he received four hundred Holland acres and two thousand florins annually.
4. He made a profit of four hundred acres by draining marshes.
5. He contributed a little more than five hundred thousand to the Indian Company.
6. He purchased estates.

Observe the swift increase of riches while the burdens of the fatherland grow. But in his case these things were tolerable; consider what follows:

But if it should now please you to inquire into and assess the property of your subjects, I shall readily suffer it. For I have learned that those who in the general assessment of 1599 valued all their goods at no more than fifty or sixty

thousand florins now dare to boast that they are twice as wealthy as I. Yet in that same year those same men, being more hostile, counted me among those upon whom the highest contribution was to be imposed and valued me at two hundred thousand florins.

Behold what ignoble men do in the extreme necessity of their fatherland, and how great the wealth they amass, so that it is not surprising that those for whom war is so fortunate hate peace.

First, Oldenbarnevelt's goods in 1599 were valued at two hundred thousand; those of certain others at fifty or sixty thousand. But those men now possess twice as much as he, namely four hundred thousand. Oldenbarnevelt's goods in 1599 were--

§ 4, continued. --two hundred thousand, valued unjustly, as he himself complains. Meanwhile he acquired many things for himself, so that in 1618 he possessed five hundred thousand besides his lands. But others who in 1599 possessed fifty or sixty thousand made so much profit in the space of seventeen years that they were twice as rich as Oldenbarnevelt. That is, each possessed sixteen hundred acres, a million in gold, and so forth; for Oldenbarnevelt possessed more than lands and Indian gold. Behold: the fatherland bestowed so great wealth not upon one but upon several such men; this is what they obtain by governing it. And this is that splendid liberty of the fatherland which exhausts the citizens and fills those conducting affairs and acting on behalf of affairs. For because the merchants obtained an opportunity from the fatherland, they conducted commerce, afterward intending to live cautiously elsewhere.

The fifth reason. Just as there ought to be a profession for the other arts in a city, so too there ought to be a profession of defending the fatherland from the enemy, governing it at home, and regulating it, and a definite class of men occupied in so distinguished an exercise: namely, nobles educated for wars and for the discipline of ruling. All historical records teach us that this was the perpetual occupation of the nobility.

From this comes the German name by which nobles are called *vom Adel*, from the eagle, because they follow victorious eagles and the Roman standards; and they take the name *Knaben von Schild* from the shield. Indeed, in preceding centuries they were called simply soldiers. Military service, moreover, is twofold: armed service, and the more peaceful service of those who possessed immunities and privileges. Lest they discontinue military exercises in time of peace, they produced imitations of war in various games and called them lance-games or tournaments. These were often forbidden because of their dangers; but if they provide exercise without bloodshed, they can be beneficial and arouse manly spirits.

It can neither be said nor believed how greatly that institution assisted the nobility, especially since most honorable laws were laid down for the contestants. For wicked nobles were excluded by a single word:

1. Enemies of the Christian religion, or transgressors and apostates.
2. One who had been guilty of treason.
3. One who had violated a virgin or widow, and adulterers.
4. Perjurers, deniers of written obligations and agreements, traitors, deserters from military service, and authors of flight in battle.
5. Men injurious to subjects, oppressors, and murderers.
6. The sacrilegious.
7. Despoilers of widows and wards.
8. Robbers, pirates, and assassins.
9. Authors of new taxes.

10. Those who had harmed the state.
11. Moneylenders, merchants, and artisans.
12. Those who were not nobles from their great-grandfather onward.

Those marked by any of these vices were not admitted to the mock battles. This was a great restraint upon audacity, ostentation, and desires; and among the nobles they were in some fashion infamous. Hence those marked with disgrace were called *Schelmen*, and they lost their order. How much it contributes to the defense of the fatherland that there should be many rich and prudent men in whom a great natural capacity for war is advanced toward justice and courage by domestic precepts, exhortations, examples, and the pursuits of their equals becomes apparent only when a soldier is ready at hand against sudden assaults.

The sixth reason. In war there is need of the highest authority. The first cause is that the most difficult things are commanded: to hold the assigned place in battle although certain death presses upon it, to climb the rampart against the enemy's weapons, and to go into death. The second is that great authority is needed in order to command armed men. Noble tribunes and centurions possess greater authority, both because they are of illustrious blood and because their whole family is occupied at home in dignities and command. More is also expected from them as fortunate men. But men who are fellow slaves and who all came forth from the same chamber or workhouse obey their equals--or even those subject to them in peace--more stubbornly. For this reason men generally seek nobles as commanders and centurions.

The incident in the time of Claudius is well known. Narcissus, Claudius's freedman, whom Rome revered and the Senate feared, was sent to mutinous soldiers. As he was already ascending the platform, they shouted: "Io Saturnalia!" So much greater was the liberty in the camp than in the senate-house.

The whole German nobility arose from command, specifically military command, and takes its name from the eagle: *der Adel*, *von Adel*, *Adelingi*. They were formerly soldiers, but noble soldiers, distinguished by the shield. There are two kinds of them: some are subject to the emperor alone; others to the princes in whose territory they dwell. The Swabian, Franconian, and Rhenish nobility possesses the highest liberty; in other places there are very few such men. Swabia came to the empire in 1269 when its heirs died, and thereafter there were no dukes of Swabia; therefore its nobility was not subject to one. In a manner not dissimilar, in eastern Franconia and along the Rhine that liberty was acquired through changes of lords and because many provinces were under the emperors. The Franks once had a secular duke. When the duchy was transferred to the bishopric of Würzburg, they say that the nobility remained subject to the emperor alone--although the immunity of many rests upon the individual grant and privilege of emperors, and prelates possess their own rights.

The seventh reason. When after the prince there is no one of dignity or esteem in the state, the whole state is endangered in one little body; but this is contrary to right reason. The Persian Empire in its old age had a corrupted nobility: all were slaves and all flatterers. Accordingly, when Darius was killed--and indeed by his own men--no one resisted. The Macedonian Empire, however, because it possessed many Alexanders, stood for a long time and had many kings, each of whom was powerful; and unless, having been set against one another, they had worn away their strength, each could have equaled Alexander.

Machiavelli himself, an enemy of nobility, admits that when the emperor of the Turks has been killed, no one remains who must be feared. Experience itself taught this. When Bayezid was captured by Tamerlane, none of the Turks conceived any hope of restoring the empire. For when Çelebi, Bayezid's son, had fled to Adrianople, it was not the Turks but the Greek nobles--hostile in arms to their own emperor Palaeologus--who equipped him with money and troops and, to the destruction and disgrace of their fatherland, gave him the empire when he was despairing. At that time there nevertheless remained some care for nobility; now, since all serve equally, there is none.

But because ancient histories possess great authority, let the political writer weigh the deeds of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. Philip cultivated and adorned the nobility. Hence they accompanied his son into Asia and nevertheless preferred Philip. For when Alexander had rejected his own nobility and attached himself to the Persians and conquered nations, he was tossed amid many dangers; the princes and the whole nobility rejoiced at his death. Nor is there any doubt that, if he had lived longer with those customs, he would have been deserted or killed. Although the stronger authority of the histories relates that he died from Babylonian poison, it is established that his mother, son, and entire family were killed by his princes because he had already provoked them while alive.

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The eighth reason. Machiavelli says that a kingdom in which everyone serves is more easily held, but that a kingdom in which there is a multitude of princes is more easily occupied. Yet his discussion must be set forth and examined, for he mingles true things with false and finally deceives altogether. Chapter 4 of *The Prince*:

Someone could be led to wonder, after considering the difficulties which seem to attend the retention of a newly acquired empire, whence it arose that Alexander possessed Asia within a few years and died almost as soon as he had occupied it--so that it could deservedly have seemed that the whole empire would fall into revolt--although his successors preserved it for themselves and labored under no difficulty in defending it except that which arose among themselves from their own particular ambition.

I answer that the principalities whose memory still remains are found to be administered in two different ways: either at the decision of one prince, by whose favor and permission all the rest, who are slaves by condition, are employed like ministers in the administration of the kingdom; or by the counsel of a prince and nobles who obtain that rank not by favor but by the antiquity of their blood. Nobles of this kind possess dominions and peoples subject to them, who acknowledge them as lords and are affected toward them by a certain natural love.

In principalities governed by the direction of one prince and the ministry of slaves, the prince presides with greater authority. For there is no one in the entire province who acknowledges any other superior besides him; and if anyone obeys another, he does so as a minister and appointed official, and those men are not affected by any particular love.

Examples of these two kinds of governing a kingdom occur in our own times: the Turk and the king of the French. The whole supreme power of the Turkish Empire is governed at the will of one prince; the rest are slaves. Having divided his kingdom into prefectures, he sends different administrators and removes and substitutes them according to the will of his mind. But the king of the French is placed amid an ancient multitude of lords whom the peoples subject to them acknowledge and embrace with goodwill. They retain their authority, which the king cannot take from them without danger.

Therefore, whoever considers the constitution of each kind will encounter difficulties in occupying the empire of the Turk; but once it has been conquered, there is no difficulty in retaining it. The reasons for the difficulty that prevents the Turkish Empire from being occupied consist in this: one who attempts to occupy it cannot be called there by the princes of that kingdom, nor be led to hope that he can more easily bring his undertaking to effect through the defection of those who surround the ruler. This appears to proceed from the reasons I touched upon above. For since they are all his slaves and bound to him, they can be corrupted with much greater difficulty; and even if they were corrupted, little benefit could nevertheless be hoped from it, since for the reasons given above they cannot draw the peoples with them.

Accordingly, one who is to wage war against the emperor of the Turks must consider that he will find him united and that he must be conquered more by his own strength than by the efforts and seditions of others. But when he has been defeated and his battle-line routed so that he cannot restore his army, there is nothing besides the prince's stock which must afterward be feared. When that has been extinguished, no one remains whom anyone need fear, since the rest lack fidelity and authority among the peoples. And just as before victory the victor could place no hope in winning them over to himself, so after victory there is no reason for him to fear them further.

The contrary occurs in the administrator of kingdoms constituted like that of France. For access into it will readily lie open to you if you win over one of the king's leading men. Among them there are always some who, offended in spirit, strive to cause revolutions. For the reasons stated above, these can open the way into that kingdom for you and render victory more expeditious. But afterward almost infinite difficulties arise in preserving it, not only with those who assisted you but also with those whom you oppressed. It is not enough for you to have extinguished the prince's blood; those leading men also survive who make themselves authors of new changes of state. Since you can neither satisfy nor extinguish them, you lose the kingdom whenever an opportunity offers itself.

Now, if you consider to which kind of administration the kingdom of Darius belonged, you will find it very similar to that of the Turk. For this reason Alexander had to make an attack upon the whole of it and strip Darius of his camp. After that victory, when Darius was dead, that empire passed securely to Alexander for the reasons collected above. If his successors had been concordant, they could plainly have enjoyed it altogether at leisure; for no disturbance arose within it except what they themselves excited against one another.

But dominions constituted in the likeness of the kingdom of France cannot possibly be possessed so peacefully. Hence came the frequent revolts of Spain, Gaul, and Greece from the Romans, because the dominions of princes were more numerous in them. As long as the memory of those dominions remained vigorous, the Romans were always uncertain of their possession. But when their remembrance had been erased by the power and duration of the empire, the Romans possessed a secure right of possession. Afterward, according as each of the Romans had acquired authority for himself in parts of the provinces, even when waging war among themselves, they could draw a part of those provinces with them; and this was because, after the line of the former prince had been removed, the peoples acknowledged no one except the Romans.

A kingdom, therefore, in which all besides the king are slaves cannot, once oppressed by an enemy, reclaim liberty for itself. Machiavelli admits this. But a state must be established in such a way that fortune possesses a means of return. In saying that such a kingdom is more difficult to occupy, however, he is mistaken.

Experience refuted this long ago. For regions in which there were many princes not only retain the yoke of a foreign empire with greater difficulty but also receive it with greater difficulty. The Romans attacked Gaul for many years and, after taking it piecemeal--now this part, now that--waged wars with the remainder. But when Antiochus was defeated, they very quickly occupied the principal part of his kingdom and ordered him to reign beyond the Taurus. The same thing also occurred in Greece: now the Aetolians, now the Macedonians resisted; at another time Lacedaemon under its Nabis resisted. In Asia, when Antiochus was defeated, his slaves went forth as degenerate slaves, while their master followed behind their backs. They think it matters little whom they serve; indeed, they desire a change of masters and hope for an alleviation of servitude.

The Turkish forces also, although their emperor was often defeated, did not occupy Greece except over a long period, because its princes, although not sufficiently, nevertheless resisted much. Do we not see the same in Hungary? Its greater part was long ago betrayed to and subjugated by the Turks, yet the remaining portion still resists through the courage of its princes and nobles and even preserves its liberty. Remove these men, and the rest, performing no deed of great praise, after bargaining for their little fields and cottages, will become an accession to that great empire.

Although the tyrant has attempted them in every way, he has nevertheless never conquered them.

But it is easy to entice some one prince to one's party, which is not practicable in a monarchy. Machiavelli therefore means that where there are nobles and princes, betrayals and rebellions are easier.

It seems otherwise to me, unless the king is changed into a tyrant--

§ 4, continued. --for reason and examples have taught that a man of servile disposition, avaricious and joined to his prince by no bond, can be driven to those crimes. Who betrayed Pyrrhus for money? Who wounded Darius? Who destroyed so many emperors? Were they not for the most part petty slaves? I pass over those men who, while the servitude of the state was still fresh, were killed by the lowest of the Romans. The betrayers of empires are men such

as Eutropius, Rufinus, Stilicho, and Andragathius: all slaves, and sprung from slaves or from the most sordid barbarians.

Alas! Alas! By what slight causes great things perish!

An empire sought with so much blood, preserved with so much,

Which the labors of a thousand commanders produced,

Which the Roman hand constructed through so many years,

One idle traitor overturns in a brief time.

Priam was betrayed, and Agamemnon was betrayed--but by a vile adulterer; Pompey the Great by a eunuch; Rome by Curio, and the same city earlier by a girl; Ahasuerus by eunuchs. Phrynus and Philocrates the pimps were traitors. Eurybatus betrayed the king of the Persians, for he took money from him and handed it over to Cyrus. To put on the fox's skin belongs to sordid spirits, not to princes; for slaves possess many causes for infidelity, but princes few. If we weigh the examples, we shall understand that princes, cities, and kingdoms have generally been betrayed by sordid and indebted men.

Those who are entirely subject to masters cannot easily rebel and riot where the government is despotic, because they lack strength and possess no authority. On this account alone, therefore, danger can be created for a king who possesses many powerful princes. But if one is pleased to compare dangers with dangers and defenses with defenses, we shall understand that a multitude of princes and nobles is to be preferred. An emperor or king is one man; his safety, security, and power consist in the spirit and strength of others, and he is always in the power of others. If he does not possess princes chosen from distinguished stock, he is in the power of the lowest men, by whose arms he is surrounded. These are easily moved and watch for revolutions, judging that right is wherever the greatest reward is. If he possesses princes, the lowest men dare nothing. Moreover, the plots of princes are more easily guarded against than those of the lowest. Hence we see that, although there have been various disturbances in Gaul, the murderers of the kings were nevertheless vile men and were not suborned by princes. Finally, plots can be guarded against if men are governed moderately and equably and if everything is not entrusted to one man--a matter treated elsewhere.

The ninth reason. Finally, I judge that not every nobility but an energetic, upright, and uncorrupted nobility is to be admitted into partnership in government. I also judge that this is the support of empire and that it is especially effective against the ancient evil of nobility: pride and injuries. For just as trees fail with age, so do certain families over a long period. They retain neither vigor nor purity and possess nothing except their insignia. Frivolous, languid, and stupid men are often born from courageous and great men. Such was the appearance of the Roman nobility when Marius delivered his speech. Sallust, *Jugurtha*:

You have ordered me to wage war against Jugurtha, a decision which the nobility has borne most grievously. I ask you to consider in your minds whether it would be better to alter this decision and send on this or some other similar enterprise someone from that crowd of nobles, a man of ancient lineage and many ancestral images but no military service--so that, being ignorant of everything in so great a matter, he may tremble, hurry about, and take some man from the people as the instructor of his duty. Thus it generally happens that the man whom you ordered to command seeks another commander for himself.

But I know, Romans, men who, after they had been made consuls, began to read the deeds of their ancestors and the military precepts of the Greeks--men acting in reverse order. For discharging an office is later in time than being appointed to it, but in reality and practice preparation comes first.

Now compare me, Romans, a new man, with their pride. What they are accustomed to hear and read, I have in part seen and have in part performed myself. What they learned from books, I learned by military service. Now judge whether deeds or words are worth more. They despise my newness; I despise their idleness. My fortune is cast as a

reproach against me; their disgraces are cast against them. I indeed judge that nature is one and common to all, but that every most courageous man is also the most nobly born.

And if it could now be asked of the fathers of Albinus or Bestia whether they would rather have had me or those men born from them, what do you believe they would answer except that they wished their children to be the best possible? But if those men rightly despise me, let them do the same to their own ancestors, whose nobility, like mine, began from virtue. They envy my honor; let them therefore envy my labor, innocence, and dangers also, since through these I obtained it.

Yet men corrupted by pride pass their lives as though they despised your honors, while they seek those honors as though they had lived honorably. Truly those men are deceived who expect contrary things at once: the pleasure of idleness and the rewards of virtue. Moreover, when they speak before you or in the senate, most of them extol their ancestors in their speech. By recounting their courageous deeds, they think themselves more illustrious; but the contrary is true. For the more distinguished the life of those ancestors, the more disgraceful is the sloth of these descendants. And assuredly the matter stands thus: the glory of ancestors is a light for their posterity and permits neither their good nor their evil deeds to lie hidden.

I suffer poverty in this respect, Romans. But what is far more distinguished, I am permitted to speak of my own deeds. Now see how unjust they are. What they arrogate to themselves from another's virtue, they do not concede to me from my own--evidently because I possess no ancestral images and because my nobility is new. Assuredly it is better to have produced nobility than to have received and corrupted it.

I am indeed not unaware that, if they now wished to reply to me, they would possess an abundantly eloquent and polished speech. But amid your very great favor, when they lacerate both me and you with reproaches in every place, I resolved not to remain silent, lest anyone interpret modesty as a guilty conscience. Indeed, in accordance with my conviction, no speech can injure me: a true one must necessarily speak well of me; my life and conduct overcome a false one. But because your counsels are accused--you who imposed upon me the highest honor and the greatest undertaking--consider again and again whether you ought to regret it.

To inspire confidence, I cannot display ancestral images, triumphs, or consulships of my forefathers; but, if the matter demands, I can display spears, a standard, horse-trappings, other military gifts, and, besides these, scars on the front of my body. These are my ancestral images; this is my nobility--not left to me by inheritance, as theirs was to them, but what I acquired through very many labors and dangers of my own.

My words are not polished. I make little of that. Virtue sufficiently manifests itself; they have need of artifice in order to cover their disgraceful deeds with speech. Nor did I learn Greek literature. It pleased me little to learn it, since it profited its teachers nothing toward virtue. But I am learned in those things far better for the state: to strike the enemy, to keep watch over defenses, to fear nothing except a disgraceful reputation, to endure winter and summer alike, to rest upon the ground, and to tolerate want and labor at the same time.

By these precepts I shall exhort the soldiers. I shall neither maintain them harshly while maintaining myself lavishly, nor make their labor my glory. This is useful; this is command suitable to citizens. For when you yourself live in softness, to compel the army by punishment is to be a master, not a commander. By doing these and similar things your ancestors brought glory to themselves and to the state. The nobility, relying upon them but itself unlike them in conduct, despises us who emulate them and demands all honors from you, not from merit but as though they were debts. Yet those most arrogant men are far mistaken. Their ancestors left to them everything that it was possible to leave: riches, ancestral images, and a distinguished memory of themselves. They did not leave virtue, nor could they; that alone is neither given nor received as a gift.

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They call me sordid and uncultivated in conduct because I adorn a banquet with little skill and possess neither any actor nor a cook of greater price than my farm steward. I am pleased to confess these things, Romans. For I received this teaching from my father and from other virtuous men: that elegance befits women, labor men, and that

all good men ought to possess more glory than riches; that arms, not household furnishings, are an ornament.

Why then do they not always do what pleases them and what they esteem dear? Let them love and drink. Let them pass their old age where they passed their youth: at banquets, devoted to their belly and the most disgraceful part of the body. Let them leave sweat, dust, and other such things to us, to whom they are more pleasant than feasts. But it is not so. For when the most disgraceful men have dishonored themselves by crimes, they go to seize the rewards of good men. Thus, most unjustly, luxury and idleness--the worst arts--do no harm to those who cultivated them, but are the ruin of the innocent state.

Now, since I have answered them as far as my conduct, not their crimes, required, I shall speak briefly concerning the state.

§ 5. I do not approve this nobility, for it is wicked; but I judge that the counsel of our Mariana must be followed. "Indeed," he says, book 4, chapter 4:

In my judgment the nobility must be protected by the prince, and something must be granted to descendants because of the distinguished merits of their ancestors--but only if they themselves add conduct not unlike the splendor of their birth, together with industry and virtue. Nothing is more disgraceful than an idle nobility: men who, swollen with the glory of their ancestors, consume the wealth received by inheritance in wickedness and frivolity; and who, trusting in the praise of their forefathers, themselves languish in idleness and sloth, striving to obtain the rewards of virtues by vices and, through the disguise of nobility, to occupy in sloth and inactivity the place of courageous men.

They are therefore to be repelled by the prince on two grounds and are foul with a twofold disgrace: because they both contaminate themselves with baseness and stain the distinction of their lineage with baseness. For the more illustrious their forefathers were, the more deserving of hatred are those who obscure the splendor of nobility by lust and impurity. And most especially, many from their number possess such rashness and madness that, proud of the emptiest names, they so despise in comparison with themselves men born in an obscure station, however industrious, courageous, and energetic, that they do not consider them human beings. Having been honored with many honors, they seek greater ones; and, ambitious and senseless through evil arts, they contend that all rewards owed to virtue are owed also to their nobility.

Moreover, not a few concessions must be made to the rich, since men of wealth constitute a great defense for the prince in every part of the state, and they can set many things in motion unless they are bound by the prince's beneficence. But they are finally to be held in esteem only if they devote themselves to good arts and direct their money and wealth toward the pursuit of honor. If the rich, although empty of every virtue, are increased by rewards and honors, avarice, insolence, and idleness will be sanctioned among the people; and they will believe that only those whose fortune is immense and whose possessions are extensive are blessed. The needy will lie perpetually in squalor without any hope of rising. Having therefore conceived despair, they will be incited to make an assault upon the rich. Quarrels, insults, and robberies will arise. The state, torn into opposing parties, will utterly perish.

Therefore, if the prince desires service to be rendered to his dignity and the public safety, he will not regard immense wealth if it is stripped of virtue, nor will he foster nobility of lineage if it is destitute of the light of honor. Rather, he will embrace virtue and industry wherever they are found; and, retaining liberty to establish what he judges, he will fear the empty murmuring of no man. He will not be moved by anyone's displeasure. No one will be supported by such great wealth or illustrious through such great nobility that he may impose laws upon the ruler and assume so much for himself that he dares to draw the prince away from the pursuit of ordering virtue.

The prince will nevertheless not cast aside illustrious families even when they are idle, but will arouse them to virtue by every means; and, just as he cares for the preservation and increase of ancient cities, so will he care for families.

He will especially employ the method which Plato valued most highly: namely, that he graft warlike men into peaceful families. There is a noble family in towns or citadels, a follower of pleasures but nevertheless rich and peaceful; from

it let him seek a wife for a noble admiral, tribune, or courageous and fierce man. He will add spirit to his relations by marriage and draw them with him into labors and the sweet honor of victories. Let him entrust to a military father-in-law a noble youth who hides at home or is occupied with courtly pageants; for thus the virtue of one man will arouse both sons-in-law and grandsons.

Next, let the prince have no nobles around him, and let him indicate that he esteems none, except those who delight in prudence, temperance, and labor. Most importantly, after a careful selection for virtue, prudence, and wealth, every year he will ennoble men who have deserved well and employ them in the state. From this he will obtain two things: first, that he possess nobles; then, that he possess suitable magistrates.

Many of the ancients often ridicule new men, or recently created nobles. Against them Cicero argues in book 3 of his *Letters* and shows that there can be εὐγένειαν--nobility of character--without hereditary nobility, and hereditary nobility without εὐγενεία. Euripides also expressed this excellently:

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς εὐγενὴς ἐμοί γ' ἀνὴρ·

ὁ δ' οὐ δίκαιος, κἂν ἀμείνωνος πατρὸς

Ζηνὸς πεφύκη, δυσγενὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

A good man seems noble to me; but one who is not just, even if he was born from a father nobler than Jupiter himself, I account ignoble.

Let men acknowledge that these nobles are new, since their own ancestors were also new, while the descendants of these men will be called members of an ancient lineage. Seneca speaks prudently in Letter 44:

If there is anything else good in philosophy, it is this: that it does not inspect a pedigree. All men, if recalled to their first origin, are from the gods. You are a Roman knight, and your industry brought you to this order; but, by Hercules, the fourteen rows are closed to many. The senate-house does not admit all; the camp also disdainfully chooses those whom it receives for labor and danger. A good mind lies open to all; we are all noble for this purpose. Philosophy rejects no one and chooses no one; it shines for all.

Socrates was not a patrician. Cleanthes drew water and hired out his hands to irrigate a little garden. Philosophy did not receive Plato as a nobleman but made him one. Why is there reason for you to despair of being able to become equal to these men? They are all your ancestors if you conduct yourself worthily of them. You will do so if you immediately persuade yourself that no one surpasses you in nobility.

All of us have the same number of generations before us. The origin of every man lies beyond memory. Plato says: "No king is not descended from slaves; no slave is not descended from kings." A long succession of changes has mixed all these things, and fortune has turned them up and down. Who, then, is nobly born? One well fashioned by nature for virtue. This alone is to be regarded. Otherwise, if you recall matters to antiquity, every man comes from a point before which there is nothing. From the first origin of the world down to the present time, an alternating succession of illustrious and sordid ancestors has brought us forth.

An atrium full of smoke-blackened ancestral images does not make a man noble. No one lived for our glory, nor is what existed before us ours. The spirit makes a man noble; from any condition it is permitted to rise above fortune. Consider yourself, therefore, not a Roman knight but a freedman.

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You can attain this: that you alone should be free among freeborn men. "How?" you ask. If you distinguish good and evil without taking the people as your authority.

If we examine the whole nobility, few extend their insignia beyond two hundred years, fewer beyond three hundred, and very few beyond four hundred. For how small a proportion of nobles is found celebrated in records and histories

before those years? The little moons of the Arcadians are therefore laughable if they wore them upon their shoes as a boast of antiquity, as though they were older than the moon; they are praiseworthy if worn as a symbol of changes.

The promotion of new men brings a notable advantage to the state. For since the old nobility in part despises them and in part envies their advancement, the new men must necessarily look to two things: that they be beyond contempt and then beyond envy. They will be beyond contempt if in great, honorable, laborious, and costly matters they render faithful and energetic service to the prince and are accepted by him, as were Daniel and his companions in the court of the Chaldeans. These things, however, kindle the torches of envy. So it happened in Darius's court, Daniel 6:1:

It pleased Darius, and he appointed over the kingdom one hundred and twenty satraps, that they might be throughout his entire kingdom; and over them three princes, of whom Daniel was one, so that the satraps might render an account to them and the king might not sustain trouble. Daniel therefore surpassed all the princes and satraps because a greater spirit was in him. Moreover, the king was considering appointing him over the whole kingdom. Hence the princes and satraps sought an occasion by which they might find fault with Daniel on the king's side; but they could find no cause or suspicion, because he was faithful and no fault or suspicion was found in him.

Envy clings to upright successes, but more strongly when others perceive that they are being obscured by their brilliance. They will escape or diminish envy by living modestly and courteously; accordingly, they will make no display either of pomp or expense. Their virtue will spur on the old nobles, as Miltiades' trophy spurred Themistocles, so that by the same path they may strive through good deeds for the prince's favor. Next, they will arouse others from the same family and from other families to dare likewise to raise themselves from the ground.

Nor will the estimation of nobility be cheaper, for men will be chosen who are an ornament to the state--not men whose nobility consists in cicadas or bordered togas, but men who bring learning, prudence, dexterity in action, and magnanimity to government. For them nobility is not a covering for vices and idleness but a whetstone and spur of industry. Thus a new nobility will grow up as a rival of the old and itself will soon become old. The old nobility will diminish; and, just as the most excellent medicines become the most harmful poisons when they have putrefied, so generosity of stock, when corrupted into degenerate conduct, gravely infects the state.

The prince will correct those vices seriously, especially if nobles inflict injuries, for the vices increase through toleration. Otherwise either the nobility, through fear of judgments, will disturb the state, as happened at Rhodes, or the people will rise up, as happened in Switzerland and a hundred years ago in many places of Germany. The same occurred in Hungary in 1514. In 1505 the Genoese expelled the nobility. King Casimir opportunely corrected the tyranny of the Polish nobles when the people were already disposed toward conspiracy. Cromer, book 6, *On the Deeds of the Poles*.

§ 6. Furthermore, for someone to be accounted noble means that he is distinguished from the condition of the common people, of which there are many degrees. Every supreme majesty possesses the right to ennoble. For the ordering of the ranks of citizens, the granting of rewards to virtue, and the exempting of worthy men from the common lot are in its power. This power has been given to certain others either by privilege or by usage.

Men of many pedigrees but degenerate and without virtue, prudence, or knowledge are nevertheless accounted nobles, both by opinion and by common law, which does not examine every particular circumstance.

If, however, a prince ennobles a man possessing no virtue, but solely by grace and favor or because of riches, Arumaeus judges that he does not become noble. Yet since experience teaches that many nobles are inferior in virtue and prudence to commoners, and since nobility is a dignity established by civil law, I judge it valid even when conferred upon an unworthy man. The prince indeed abuses his power when he lavishes the rewards of courageous men upon the unworthy; nevertheless, it does not belong to a private person to accuse the prince's judgment or render it void. Accordingly, just as an office, gift, praetorship, and other things conferred by the prince upon unworthy men are not to be revoked, so neither is nobility. For if the people must acknowledge an unworthy governor because the

prince appointed him, why should they not also regard as exempt the man whom the prince exempted? If an unworthy man receives a fief and transmits it to his descendants, why not nobility also--and its effects, privileges, honor, and immunity from the various burdens to which the common people are subject?

The reasoning is the same if nobility is granted for a crime: because a man devised new taxes, calumniated the innocent, committed slaughter by the prince's command, or pandered to his pleasures. For although the prince sins most gravely when he rewards vices of which he was appointed the avenger by God, and although all detest Tiberius, who willed the prefecture of the city to be the reward of drunkenness, the benefice of even an imprudent prince nevertheless remains unaltered. For if the merits of the recipients are weighed, perhaps few are worthy, and generally the worthier are passed over, since they flatter less. That man will therefore enjoy his nobility to his own and his lineage's everlasting disgrace. He will be exempt from the common people, but foul, infamous, and a reproach to the prince.

Nor ought this to seem surprising: prostitutes securely retain the payments given them for crimes. Many princes have also ennobled their concubines; noble families remain today whose nobility began from fornication. Nor is it surprising that the royal stock of the Israelites arose from incest.

They say that nobility is lost by practicing vile arts. They deny that bakers, smiths, carpenters, cooks, innkeepers, money-changers, pipers, harpists, and merchants remain noble. The laws indeed forbid servile and theatrical crafts, but most have now fallen out of use. Others do not so much deprive a man who practices them of nobility as demonstrate that they are unbecoming to nobles. If necessity drives someone to them, I do not see why he should cease to be noble, if lineage and virtue remain. I do not wish the man struggling with that difficulty to boast meanwhile of his nobility; if he emerges from it, let him defend and display his right and dignity. David assuredly was noble: at home a keeper of sheep, at court Saul's harpist. I have seen serious men of senatorial rank who were innkeepers and were themselves ennobled; elsewhere I have shown that many nobles engage in commerce. Would that idle, drunken, blasphemous nobles--oppressors of farmers, fornicators, adulterers, and unjust men--lost their nobility! Would that they preserved it by sedentary handicrafts rather than by robberies!

CHAPTER XXI

Power Is Stable When Provisions Have Been Collected for Use

§ 1. Men, arms, and other things must be discussed, but I shall more suitably transfer these matters to the book on war. Let us now treat the remaining matters, among which the foremost is that the prince make provision for granaries and the grain supply. Hunger subdues every power; want has handed many cities and kingdoms over to the enemy. Yet even in peace there is no firmer defense for a prince than provisions, and nothing is more dangerous than hunger if the prince cannot appease it. One who does not prepare grain and other foods in good time is conquered without a sword. Indeed, he is endangered even in peace: a hungry soldier is useful to no one; a hungry citizen is restrained by no reverence for majesty.

§ 2. The state will therefore establish public granaries and storehouses of grain, wine, and oil. It can do this without great expense if it possesses public fields and if, when grain is cheap, it buys wheat, as Joseph did in Egypt. A distribution of grain is powerful for attracting the common people. By this method Maelius was aiming more effectively at kingship, and would have drawn the Roman Empire to himself by the gift of bread, had the leading men not opposed him. A prince who neglects that opportunity takes little thought for himself.

It is incredible to relate how much grain was stored at Rome. Lipsius treats this beautifully and learnedly in *Admiranda*, book 2, chapter 10. Distribution of grain at Rome was therefore ancient and was practiced even by the senate itself. In times of scarcity and a restricted grain supply, like a kindly father taking pity on the plebs, the senate sometimes divided grain among them--though not at no price, but for a moderate sum. The tribunes immediately followed and claimed this thoroughly popular measure for themselves, passing various grain laws. Last in this matter, Clodius carried an *annona* law that the grain which had previously been given to the people for half an as and a third of an as for each modius should be given FREE OF CHARGE. Thus Asconius. This was the origin and afterward the continuation of free grain.

The senate had indeed already employed such a distribution immediately after Catiline's conspiracy, at Cato's instigation, but I do not know whether without any price. The matter is related thus in Plutarch, but in words which must be weighed. He says that Gaius Caesar, during his praetorship, had attempted revolution while the people were agitated and unstable because of those Catilinarian disturbances. Cato therefore, in order to forestall him:

ἔπεισε τὴν βουλὴν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἄπορον καὶ ἀνέμητον ὄχλον εἰς τὸ σιτηρέσιον, ἀναλώματος μὲν ὄντος ἐνιαυτοῦ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων καὶ πεντήκοντα τάλαντων.

He persuaded the senate to admit the needy and landless people to the distribution of grain, although the expense was one thousand two hundred and fifty talents. This is thirty million sesterces according to the Roman reckoning; according to ours, seven hundred and fifty thousand Philippics. You therefore see the expenditure made upon this matter in that age.

The institution remained thereafter under the emperors, except that, when during the civil wars the number of recipients had grown beyond measure, Julius Caesar reduced it. Suetonius says concerning him: "From the three hundred and twenty thousand who received grain from the public supply, he reduced the number to one hundred and fifty thousand"; or, if you listen to Dio, to one hundred and sixty thousand, because he says they were reduced by half. The difference is small. But Augustus afterward increased the number and made it two hundred thousand. Did Tiberius also increase it? Although he was very far from being popular, he nevertheless enumerates in the senate, in Tacitus, from which provinces and in how much greater quantity than Augustus he imported the grain supply. Therefore it was to be distributed to more people also, unless I am mistaken.

I have already condemned this type of distribution above. Here I wished only to show that it was always employed for winning the favor of the people. Nor can anyone safely wage war unless provision has been made concerning the grain supply. Caesar Augustus and Antony, because of the hunger of the people, were endangered although they were so much more powerful than Pompey. Dio relates the matter. Then the Romans--because Sardinia was occupied and the maritime region was being harassed--lacked grain. Therefore, when there was an immense famine and they were grievously afflicted by it, they exhorted Caesar and Antony to make peace with Sextus and raised a great clamor for that reason. But when they understood that they were accomplishing nothing, they hastened quickly to kill them. When Caesar perceived this, although his own men had already been wounded, he nevertheless tore his garment and, as a suppliant, began to entreat their good faith and implore their mercy. Antony resisted by employing greater force. At last they were compelled to send envoys to Sextus concerning peace.

Nor was provision made for the city thereafter. For near the end of Augustus's life there was so great a famine that Caesar himself was compelled to dismiss the crowd of his servants, and a greater one occurred under Claudius, although that Claudian famine was universal.

Therefore defenses against famine must be established in every suitable place, so that, when the fields have been devastated or cultivation impeded, the subjects may live from the stored grain supply. For if a kingdom labors under famine, it will be easily captured. For this reason all fortifications are perishable. Accordingly, if the Spaniard could divert the northern grain from Batavia, he would easily subjugate those dominions--even if he did not cut off all provision, but merely made it difficult for them. For no kingdom is secure in which there is not produced a quantity of crops sufficient to feed its inhabitants.

For this reason Roman strength at home was always weak. For if anyone had made the sea dangerous or brought Africa or Egypt under his dominion and power, the eternal city would have had to perish by hunger. The Roman princes knew that internal evil, and Rome herself acknowledges it in Claudian:

Rome, already fearing destruction and wearied by crops denied her,
Was making her way to the threshold of swift Olympus,
Not with her accustomed countenance, nor as when she apportions laws to Britons
Or subjects trembling Indians to the fasces.
Her voice was feeble, her steps slow, her eyes downcast;
Her cheeks had sunk inward; hungry wasting consumed her arms;
On sick shoulders she scarcely sustained
Her rusting shield; her loosened helmet revealed
Her gray hair, and she dragged a spear full of rust.
When at last she reached heaven and fell at the knees of the Thunderer,
Sorrowful she began complaints such as these:
"If my walls, Jupiter, deserved to be born in order to remain;
If the Sibyl's prophecies stand unshaken;
If you do not yet despise the Tarpeian citadel,
I come as a suppliant--not that an exultant consul may tread upon Araxes,
Or that the axes of the rostra may press quiver-bearing Susa,

Nor that we may plant eagles in the red sands.
These things, these things you formerly granted us; now I ask only food.
Have mercy, best of fathers, upon Rome, your own nation.
Ward off this final famine. We have satisfied your anger,
If there was any. We have drained what the Getae must lament and the Suebi bewail.
Parthia herself would shudder at my misfortunes.
Why should I recount pestilence and disease, tombs filled
With carnage, and frequent deaths beneath a corrupted sky?
Or the river wandering through roofs and threatening
The highest hills? Submerged, I carried immense ships,
Heard the sound of oars, and experienced the age of Pyrrha.
Alas for me! To what have Latian strength and the city's power
Fallen? Into what a shadow have we gradually flowed?
Once I flourished through armed peoples and the counsels of the Fathers;

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By my counsels I subdued lands and bound humankind with laws;
Victorious, I ran to each sun.
After fierce Caesar transferred the common laws to himself,
Conduct slipped away; and, unaccustomed to our ancestral arts,
I withdrew into the servile bosom of peace.
For so many merits they gave me Libya and the Nile,
So that they might feed the ruling plebs and the warrior senate
With summer fleets, and so that winds from opposite shores
Might fill my granaries in turn.
My safety stood assured: if Memphis should perhaps refuse,
I balanced an Egyptian year with Gaetolian harvests.
I saw crop-bearing ships contend, and far and wide
Punic canvas meet Nilotic sails.
When a Rome equal to me arose, and the divided Dawn assumed
Equal robes, the fields of Egypt
Passed to a new share. Libya remained our only hope,
And scarcely and painfully sustained us,
Carried by the south wind alone and never secure for the future;

Always needy, it demanded the fidelity of wind and year.
This also Gildo has now seized at the close of declining
Autumn. We measure the sea with a scant prayer:
Whether any ship may come, whether perhaps either shame has wrung anything
From our powerful master or plunder has left anything.
We are fed at the decision of a Moor. He boasts not that a debt is repaid,
But that he grants what is his own; and he rejoices to furnish daily
Food as to a maidservant. He weighs life and famine
With barbarian arrogance, exults in the tears of the crowd,
And holds suspended the fate of so great a ruin.
He sells Roman harvests and possesses fields
Acquired by my wounds.”

Every state, therefore, will estimate its strength from its provisions and grain supply: what it possesses at home, what grows there, what is imported from abroad, and whether it can be impeded. Hence it is especially necessary for the Venetian state to possess a grain supply stored for many years. For the entire seacoast and the islands are so exposed to Turkish arms that, even if they cannot easily be occupied and reduced beneath Turkish dominion, they can at least be devastated, burned, and despoiled. Therefore no grain supply can be obtained from them in time of war. Even if they abounded most greatly, navigation can nevertheless easily be closed or, what is sufficient to produce famine, rendered dangerous; for fear of danger restrains merchants, and the prices of merchandise increase with the dangers.

Their exceedingly populous city cannot be fed from the regions subject to it, but consumes food imported from the fields of its neighbors. The wealth of both the state and its individual citizens consists in commerce. If it is removed or diminished, the multitude must necessarily diminish and the city be deserted; for the associations of artisans are maintained by merchants, and, if the merchants’ profits cease, the industry of mechanical works will collapse for lack of a purchaser. Hence, unless provision has been made publicly and privately for the city’s grain supply for several years, it cannot be powerful, however much it may excel in money, soldiers, or fleet. It can nevertheless prepare power if, while it possesses wealth, it keeps grain stored in public granaries for two years and orders individual senators to possess enough for their household for three years, and likewise the richer citizens, while artisans keep enough for two years or one.

The Belgian dominions are pressed by the same difficulty. If the Dane and the Spaniard enter one alliance, if the Pole is offended, if the Swede joins marriages with the Spanish nation, whence will they feed so great a multitude of populous cities? The enemy besets the Rhine; the regions beyond the Meuse are hostile; bread comes from the north. Are there not many means by which that apparent power can be crushed unless they have made provision long beforehand? And that seafaring people would be equal to the Roman people, which said:

Now without honor and needy, it displays the pitiable punishment
Of peace; although plainly surrounded by no enemy,
It endures the crisis of the besieged. Death hangs over me
At every moment, and a few days prescribe
A doubtful allowance of food. Alas, prosperous fates!

Why did you give me seven hills and a crowd
Which could not be fed by a little? I would be happier
With straitened resources; I would prefer to endure the Sabines
And Veii. I passed a shorter age more securely.
My very mass harms me. Would that it were permitted to return
To my ancient limits and the walls of poor Ancus.
The cultivated fields of Etruria and Campania would suffice for me,
Together with the harvest of Quinctius and Curius; when the fatherland asked,
A rustic dictator would bring in his own ears of grain.

CHAPTER XXII

The Principal Power Lies in Strong and Populous Cities

§ 1. No state is to be judged powerful unless it possesses the lofty and strong defenses of cities. Today, indeed, there is no one who doubts that cities and towns must be possessed and fortified; dispute concerns only the manner and method. For in former times the boast of the Spartans was ridiculed because they called the valor of their young men their walls: if shield should cling to shield and man stand close-packed against man. It was a great and ruinous error, even in the judgment of the Spartans, who afterward encircled their city with walls and then themselves judged those cities powerful which were surrounded by walls, towers, and ditches. For they stripped Athens, their rival city, of its walls: at Lysander's persuasion the ephors judged that this should be done, and, when it had thus been disarmed, they oppressed it with the Thirty Tyrants. They placed a garrison upon the citadel and the Piraeus. Why did they destroy the walls of that most renowned city, unless in order to enervate its strength?

Sparta, ungenerous and ungrateful, gave a notable monument of this same judgment, but one full of envy and injustice, as Nepos is the authority in his *Themistocles*, together with Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus in book 11, and Frontinus in book 1, chapter 1. For when Xerxes had been defeated at Salamis--the foremost glory and command in that victory belonging to the Athenians--and they returned to their fatherland and began to rebuild the walls, or rather to restore everything that had been thrown down, the Spartans, through envy of their glory and fear of their future power, sent ambassadors to explain that it would be contrary to the safety of all the Greeks if they constructed walls; for if the Persians returned and occupied the cities, from them the whole Peloponnese and all Greece could easily be harassed. They would have prevailed, had Themistocles not frustrated the attempts of these concealed enemies by counsel and artifice. I wished to say this on account of the young men in whose mouths that ecstatic oracle is always found:

ἄσπις ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ.

Shield should support shield, helmet helmet, man man. Just as the ancients ridiculed this, so it is harmful even now; for at the present time a few cannon would scatter that wall. Therefore, one who intends to defend great wealth with a small force and without danger will build for himself fortified cities, equipped to the highest degree with every kind of provision and instrument of war. For he who has no defenses of cities is continually tossed about in danger and takes less thought for his safety than wild beasts in the forests and birds, which choose the safest forests and rocks for the protection of their offspring.

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§ 2. The care of building cities is most ancient. Cain built the first and called it Enoch after the name of his son. After the Flood Babel followed--for the times before the Flood are obscure--and very many cities were built thereafter, as is evident from the history of Abraham, who was born not yet three hundred years after the Flood. At that time there were not only cities, but destructions of cities, far-ranging wars of nations, and servitudes imposed by kings, Genesis 13. In the land of Canaan, strong cities walled up even to heaven, which especially terrified the children of Israel, had been founded in the time of Moses. David afterward built and fortified cities; Solomon even built distant ones, such as Palmyra in the desert; and Jehoshaphat, although in his army, apart from the garrisons of the cities, he numbered one million one hundred and sixty thousand most valiant soldiers, nevertheless built walled cities in Judah. If we look to our own times, the Spaniard holds the New World by means of cities that have been constructed. For he plants very many and very large colonies and possesses exceedingly populous cities; yet, if one considers the East Indies, he maintains supremacy in navigation over so vast an extent with very few fortifications.

§ 3. Care for and protection of cities procure for a prince a multitude of people, arts, wealth, and the other things by which power grows and is made secure--and, what is chief, love of the fatherland that is to be defended. In former

times there were no towns in Germany and Britain. The Britons call it a town when they have fortified tangled woods with a ditch and rampart. Strabo says in book 4 that, after constructing huts in groves, they stable themselves there with their herds. Therefore at that time the Germans had no power except when they were borne into battle by a single onrush; and if they were repulsed, they remained quiet. When sought at home, they lay hidden among forests and marshes.

For the same reason they suffered every extremity as the Vandals, Goths, and Huns passed through. When the Empire had been transferred to us, then abundance of wealth and power began to flourish. A German author speaks thus about this condition: "I hold it as most certain that in that age--the age of Caesar--there were no cities, and scarcely anything resembling country houses and villages. For when we read through the records of Strasbourg, endowed with even a modest antiquity, we see that in the times of the Ottos that city had scarcely as much space enclosed within it as an undistinguished town. The same account is commonly given of Mainz, Worms, Speyer, and Nuremberg, which nevertheless received their growth in the times of the Henrys. Trajan, as Dio of Prusa, a Greek author, testifies, began two exceedingly populous cities of Dacia which even today adjoin the Danube; and I am easily led to believe that those were the first cities of the Danube. Thereafter, in the times of Constantine and Julian, as trustworthy annals assert, towns were fortified indiscriminately by the dukes of Swabia; these now obey the Empire, and among their number are Ravensburg, Ulm, and others. Thereafter Attila, the destroyer of all Germany, utterly destroyed Basel, Worms, Strasbourg, Regensburg, Nuremberg, Salzburg, Cologne, Jülich, and other towns. These were restored in part by Saint Rupert the bishop under the auspices of Theodo, duke of Bavaria, and by other bishops. Thereafter Pepin and Charlemagne increased cities to such a degree and endowed them with so many bishoprics, just as Dagobert had done before them. Thus the greater part of all Germany, while it was under their Empire, received its beginning and increase from the kings of the Franks and from the line of Charles, as we shall pursue more fully concerning each city separately when mention is made of it. At the time when the Empire was transferred to us, the cities of Germany were also made more populous."

But now Germany abounds in so many fortified and wealthy cities that it yields utterly to no region and altogether surpasses them all--not only Asia and Africa, but also the rest of Europe. For neither Spain nor Italy could contend with us in the number of great and wealthy cities. For although no city of Germany surpasses Lisbon, Venice, or Paris, German cities nevertheless surpass those of other countries in number. For no kingdom has cities which it could set against these in equal size, wealth, and strength. They are Antwerp, Lille, Ghent, Cologne, Dordrecht, Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Danzig, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Vienna, Basel, and Strasbourg. I know many cities larger than these, such as Leuven, Lüneburg, Brunswick, Brandenburg, Erfurt, and Prague, and many equal to them; but I deny that in any kingdom there can be found as many equal to those fifteen which I named in the first place.

§ 4. In founding and adorning cities, those things which Aristotle advises in book 7 of the *Politics* must always be kept before one's eyes--in founding and arranging them, I say. Today few are founded, both because there are many already and because suitable places have been occupied, so that the preservation of cities must now be the chief concern. Advantageous fields, rivers, and harbors must be sought.

Therefore, when a prince observes opportunities of this kind, he will attend that city with privileges and benefits, so that in a short time it may become a great city. Thus the celebrated city of Lille grew in our time; thus Dunkirk can grow by means of its harbor, thus Gravelines, thus Goa in India. So Koblenz could grow, wealthy through the confluence of two commercially busy rivers; so could our Mainz, advantageously placed for the commerce of the upper and lower regions, filled also with the riches of Gaul and the lands beyond the Rhine, and abounding in wine and grain. Upon these, I say, labor is usefully expended; for cities which lack the advantages peculiar to their locations spend money in vain. Hanau long ago ceased to grow, separated as it is from the Main; and those who first built it paid for their rashness with their own loss. Frankenthal grew rapidly, but now it comes to a halt, being more widely separated from the Rhine; and when Worms and Speyer have increased their commercial enterprise, Frankenthal, caught between them, will lose the hope of growing.

§ 5. We shall easily judge those cities to have been built in an advantageous site which, after having suffered adversity rather often, have flourished again; for the place seizes men's affections and holds them by its advantages. Above all I require a fertile place, because poverty is the fountainhead of sedition, and God willed to give his people a fertile land. Dinocrates the architect foolishly contemplated an Alexandria on Mount Athos, to whom Alexander rightly said: "From where will it be able to obtain food?" As regards the quarters of the heavens, little consideration has been given to this matter in Germany. Although our Mainz faces east and north, consideration was given to its fields, rivers, springs, and mountains.

§ 6. Those two conditions can be obtained only with difficulty: that an advance into another's territory be easy, but an enemy's approach difficult. In former times many cities were situated on mountains: the descent was easy, the entrance difficult. But because the method of warfare, and also that of provisioning, has changed, cities which are on mountains and afford little convenience for provisions and all other things are not strong. Thus now also we see the castles situated on the hills of the Rhine and Moselle for the most part deserted.

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Now as to what some say--that the fortifications of cities are dangerous because enemies, once they have captured them, are secure in them--this has already been refuted above in the treatment of money. For a city ought to be defended by valor and prudence. Who doubts that the single city Tyre resisted Alexander more than the whole kingdom of Darius did? That same city closed its gates to Nebuchadnezzar and detained the conqueror of nations. Thus Ezekiel 29:18: "Son of man, Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon made his army serve a great service against Tyre: every head was made bald, and every shoulder was made bare; yet no recompense was rendered to him or to his army from Tyre for the service which he performed for me against it."

Therefore he took all Egypt--that is, hundreds of cities--more easily than Tyre, because it is easier to receive a reward than to earn it by laboring. Thus in the memory of our fathers one Vienna, but a faithful Vienna, resisted the Ottomans more than half of Hungary and more than the whole Peloponnese.

§ 7. They say that wealthy cities, once they have easily acquired means, rebel; for satiety and riches are followed by the desire for liberty and honor. But a remedy for this evil will be provided by the just and mild government of the prince, the election of trustworthy men to magistracies, and the binding of those same men to him by honors and benefits. Nor is this to be neglected: that those who might be the instigators of disturbances should possess properties in other places, so that through fear of losing them they may prefer the prince's favor to all things. He will also grant those privileges which, if the city should deserve it, he can immediately withdraw.

Aachen, a renowned city and royal seat, received immunity from tolls from Charlemagne--a vast benefit if one considers the citizens, but in turn a close obligation not to offend the emperor, who could overturn their fortunes with one word, one sheet of paper. Therefore citizens of this kind will listen to no Manliuses, no Clodiuses or Curios, not even Brutuses. Thus Frankfurt, a renowned emporium, is protected by the right to hold fairs, which it possesses by the favor of the emperors. That right is great and alone preserves the city; but the same right nevertheless makes it a city faithful to the Empire, for it can be stripped of it by a single edict. In no city of Europe are there greater riches than in Lisbon, which is the emporium of the whole world, distinguished for its harbor, buildings, and number of people. But there is no danger of defection, because by one edict its merchants' wares, dispersed throughout all the royal cities and ports, can be confiscated. For this reason also they detested Antony's rebellion, because they saw that, if they were impeded by a domestic war, they would easily lose the Indies.

CHAPTER XXIII

Fortresses Are Useful and Necessary for Preserving Power

§ 1. Political writers differ concerning the construction of fortresses; indeed, some demolish those which others have constructed. Machiavelli is uncertain. For this is his counsel in chapter 20 of *The Prince*:

A custom had grown strong among princes that, in order to possess their principate more securely, they should erect fortresses which, as though with reins and bridles, would restrain those who contrived something against them, and that against every sudden assault they should have a secure refuge to which they might withdraw. Indeed, I would not wish to condemn this counsel, since it is now very ancient and customary. Nevertheless, in our age we have seen Niccolò Vitelli destroy the two fortresses which were at Città di Castello in order to retain that dominion. Guidobaldo, prince of Urbino, having been restored to the principate from which he had been expelled by Valentino, utterly overthrew all the fortresses of that province. For, when they had thus been overthrown, he judged that the province could be lost again only with greater difficulty. When the Bentivogli returned after Bologna had been recovered, they followed the same counsel. Fortresses, therefore, are or are not useful according to the condition of the times; but in whatever respect some good returns to you from them, in another they harm you exceedingly. This matter can assuredly be examined thus.

§ 2. I judge fortresses useless to free cities, but judge that every expense which would have to be spent separately upon a fortress should be devoted to walls, ditches, and bulwarks. Thus the Romans ought to have leveled the Capitol to the ground, and the Athenians to have demolished the citadel of Minerva; for it is advantageous to wicked citizens and slaves to occupy them and hand them over to the enemy. They must also be guarded in time of peace. When war is raging, it is a miserable consolation for citizens to abandon their houses and flee into the fortress, which nevertheless they cannot defend for long, since their multitude impedes them and there is a lack of provisions and danger of disease among a crowded multitude.

Hence fortresses are demolished as workhouses of slavery and supports of servitude as soon as men aspire to liberty. Simon Maccabaeus destroyed the fortress which the Greeks had occupied for thirty years. Fortresses are therefore hateful to cities as fetters upon liberty. As long as they remain, citizens judge that they have been placed beneath the blow; and although the garrison may do no harm, it is nevertheless an object of fear. A fortress nevertheless saved Rome, but those who preferred to die were men of great spirit. The Messenians also, after being defeated by the Lacedaemonians, defended themselves for twenty years in the fortress of Mount Ithome. Pausanias, *Messenian Affairs*.

§ 3. Those who have added some province to their empire by war ought to keep its people obedient by means of fortresses. Everyone now employs this method throughout the whole world; and if anyone undertakes to advise the contrary, he will appear to be acting so as to be mad with reason--and, if the truth must be said, he is mad. Therefore, when Machiavelli proclaims fortresses useless and harmful, he acts so as to strip his prince of dominion by means of exotic wisdom. The Spaniards would already have lost the West Indies a thousand times, and the Portuguese the East Indies, if they had been without fortresses. For a few fortresses impose a bridle upon so many peoples.

But the entire matter will be understood if we weigh Machiavelli's wisdom. In book 2, chapter 24, of his *Discourses on the Republic*, he reasons thus:

It may perhaps seem remarkable to someone that, although the peoples of Latium, after being conquered and subdued, rebelled so many times, the Roman people did not construct any fortresses either at Privernum or in their other cities in order to restrain them and keep them obedient. For they certainly acted otherwise than our Florentines think one ought to act, since the Florentines judge that their own and other cities must be restrained by fortresses. Indeed, if the Roman people had been like our own men, they would have acted in the same way as ours. But because there was in that people another valor, another power, and another judgment concerning affairs, it

therefore thought that one must act otherwise. While the state was free, it never constructed any fortresses either for restraining cities or for defending provinces; nevertheless, it preserved some of those which it occupied after they had been founded by others. Since these things are so, while the princes of our own time appear to think very differently, I have therefore judged that I would not act amiss if I inquired in this place whether structures of such great mass are useful or useless to their authors.

I reply that those who deny that the Romans possessed fortresses are gravely mistaken, for they held their whole empire by the garrisons of fortresses. I shall easily prove this matter, remarkable though it may be to antiquaries, to be true for political writers. It must be observed that some whom the Romans conquered were received into the city. Florus, book 1, chapter 1: "Thus peace was made and a treaty struck with Tatius. A thing marvelous to relate followed: the enemies abandoned their own seats and migrated into the new city, and joined their ancestral wealth to their sons-in-law as a dowry."

And in chapter 3: "He incorporated the Albans. And so, after the enemy had been conquered, he tore apart Mettius Fufetius, guilty of breaking the treaty, after he had been bound between two chariots drawn by swift horses. He also destroyed Alba itself, although it was a parent city, because it was nevertheless a rival; but first he transferred all the wealth of the city and the people itself to Rome, so that the kindred city seemed not to have perished but in some sense to have returned again into its own body."

They utterly destroyed some, sold others, and received others in surrender, so that they might either enervate them in this fashion and prevent them from rebelling or restrain them with garrisons. These garrisons were of two kinds: colonies and fortresses. They treated them according to the cause of the war, the obstinacy, or the obedience of the besieged. The Falisci surrendered voluntarily; the Fidenates were consumed by their own fire; the Veientes were seized and utterly destroyed; among the Sabines, and where the Nar flows around, a great number of men and a great extent of land were captured; the cities of the Samnites were so destroyed that Samnium had to be sought in Samnium. But I must speak of fortresses.

The first kind consisted of colonies, when in suitable places they fortified ancient towns or constructed new ones. Peoples about to rebel attacked these first of all. At the beginning they were like great fortresses; afterward they grew into great cities. Lipsius describes this custom in book 2, chapter 23, of his *Constancy*: "Let this one example concerning colonies stand for all exactions and robberies. Just as nothing firmer for the strength of empire was discovered, so nothing more grievous to subjects could have been devised. Legions and veteran cohorts were everywhere conducted into fields and towns, and the miserable provincials were in a moment cast down from all their goods and fortunes. They had dared nothing and deserved nothing; their wealth or fertile fields constituted their whole crime. In this there assuredly appears a kind of whirlpool of every calamity. It is miserable to be despoiled of money; what if one is despoiled also of fields and roofs? It is grievous to be driven from those; what if from one's whole fatherland, temples, and altars? Behold, several thousand persons were torn apart: children from parents, masters from their household servants, wives from husbands; and they were scattered into various lands according as each man's lot fell--some 'to the thirsty Africans,' as the poet says concerning this very matter, 'part to Scythia, or to the Britons divided from the whole world.' Octavian Caesar alone planted twenty-eight colonies in Italy alone; in the provinces he planted as many as he pleased. Nor, so far as I know, was any other thing more destructive to the Gauls, to us, and to the Spaniards."

Colonies were towns of Roman or Latin citizens who had been conducted there. Sigonius relates these reasons for colonies: first, that the earlier peoples who had previously inhabited the places might be restrained; the second people was therefore military and was introduced as though into a fortification. Second, that neighboring enemies might be repelled. Third, that the urban plebs might be drained away. Fourth, that the Roman stock might nevertheless be increased. Fifth, that seditions might be removed. Sixth, that veterans might receive rewards. According to their original institution, therefore--for matters were afterward conducted in another manner also--the colonists had to deal with conquered peoples and neighboring enemies. Thus the colonists planted among the Ubii kept perpetual watch

against the unpacified Gauls and Germans. But we must treat of fortresses properly so called, of which I affirm that there were very many.

These were, namely, camps, from which our fortresses or castles also take their name; for in Italian they are called citadels because they are like small cities, as colonies generally were at the beginning. But I speak of camps, which I affirm were fortresses--temporary fortresses and sometimes permanent ones. I call military fortifications fortresses whether they are made of stone or of turf and timber, for even now fortresses of turf are more highly approved. Nicolas Bellus teaches this concerning his Gauls in volume 1 of *Political Matters*:

As regards fortifications, there is no other region in which there is a greater number of them, which results from several causes. One is that, when the kingdom was divided into several dominions and principalities--namely Burgundy, Brittany, the Duchy of Anjou, and Normandy--each ruler fortified his own frontiers. The number of fortifications grew through the wars of the English, who ruled a great part of France. The situation and nature of places suitable for fortification, and no less the diligence and aptitude of the people for these matters, make the fortification of places easier. There is no other nation more industrious in fortifying or one which spares labor and expense less. Nor is France less strong within than on its outermost frontiers. Beauvais, Troyes, Orléans, Angers, the city of Bourges, Limoges, Saint-Flour, Carcassonne, and Soissons yield nothing in strength to Calais, Péronne, Narbonne, and other frontier places. Each part of this kingdom is fitted to serve as a frontier for the rest of the kingdom.

This is also proved in Belgium and Germany. Such were the fortresses of the Romans; for we are not disputing about the material of fortresses but about their purpose and manner. Let us therefore examine Roman fortresses. First, all Roman camps, even for the rest of a single night, were like fortresses. A place most suitable for prospect, watering, and foraging was chosen; it was surrounded with a rampart and ditch; everything was distinguished in the highest order, as Lipsius explains most learnedly. But like these camps were those which were permanent upon the frontiers. Next, there were permanent forces established by Augustus for the protection of the empire. Tacitus, *Annals* 1: "The legions, provinces, and fleets, all things joined to one another"; for the principal part of the soldiers was stationed on the frontiers.

Third, in the time of Augustus there were three legions in Spain, seven in Gaul along the Rhine, two in Africa, two in Egypt, four in Syria along the Euphrates, two in Moesia along the Danube, and two in Dalmatia. But afterward there were three in Egypt--one at Alexandria, according to Strabo--and likewise nine cohorts: three in the city, three at Syene, and three in other places. There were also two legions at Berytus, because it was the barrier of the sea. It is established that there were also cohorts of allies, auxiliaries, wings, and cavalry. In Raetia, Judaea, and other places there were cohorts alone; at Lyons in Gaul there was the Eighteenth Cohort; at Forum Julii of the Ligurians there was a cohort, the ancient auxiliary force of the place. In Gaul there were 1,200 soldiers, Agrippa says in Josephus. Afterward three legions were stationed in Britain by Claudius, two in Cappadocia by Vespasian, and two in Dacia by Trajan. Indeed, at Rome there were ten thousand--or nine thousand--and afterward more praetorians for the protection of the princes and against sudden emergencies. "These men," says Lipsius, "had the Praetorian Camp at the Viminal Gate, so that they might be kept under closer restraint and discipline, separated from the citizens and the city." Besides these there were three Urban and Watch Cohorts; Dio, book 4. Lipsius judges that there were fourteen cohorts.

§ 4. While I weigh all these matters with myself, I at the same time establish what they are accustomed to deny: the fortresses of the Romans. The Praetorian camps were enclosed with a ditch and rampart, and all those along the Rhine in the same manner. They differed in no respect from our castles except that their garrison was larger. Their fortification was of the kind which is now customary in our temporary camps, such as Ambrosius, the greatest of commanders, made along the Rhine. Indeed, those ancient winter camps of the Romans were stronger--stronger, I say, if you consider the times. For since men lacked cannon, it was necessary to climb with their hands, tear apart palisades and embankments, and level the breastwork. Thus at that time they were safer in their camps than men now are in fortresses. For although they were made with little labor, they were nevertheless easily defended.

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Sejanus established a camp at Rome and fortified it with a rampart. Tacitus, *Annals* 4: “He increased the power of the prefecture, previously moderate, by gathering into one camp the cohorts dispersed throughout the city, so that they might receive commands together and, through their number, strength, and the sight of one another, confidence might be given to them and fear to everyone else. He alleged that the soldiers grew wanton while dispersed; that if some sudden event should arise, aid could be brought more powerfully by all together; and that they would act more severely if their rampart were established far from the allurements of the city.”

Although, therefore, the Romans are not thought to have possessed fortresses, there is nevertheless no doubt that the camps themselves were like fortresses. For I define a fortress as a bulwark built for restraining peoples and repelling enemies; fortresses are accordingly named from repelling, and hence many towns have retained the name of camps. But let us hear Machiavelli further:

Let this be the beginning of the discussion: fortresses are customarily constructed either to repel enemies or to restrain subjects and keep them obedient. I declare, however, that they are not necessary for the former use and that for the latter they are useless and harmful. I judge fortresses harmful for restraining subjects because the danger of rebellion which is feared customarily arises from hatred conceived by subjects against their lords. Subjects hate their princes and lords because of injuries received; princes are accustomed to injure their subjects and treat them badly especially when they hope that they can rule them according to their own decision and tame and restrain them according to their mind's desire. They think and hope this most of all when they possess in the subjects' midst exceedingly well-fortified citadels constructed in a vast mass, because they believe that no one will dare anything against them. Since these things are so, fortresses of this kind are not merely useless for keeping subjects obedient but also harmful, since princes, trusting in them more than is fitting, seize an opportunity for mistreating and punishing their subjects and thereby stir up their hatred against themselves, from which rebellions, slaughters, and infinite evils depend.

Machiavelli's argument can be concluded briefly thus: fortresses cause a prince to command securely; tyranny follows from security, by which subjects are harshly and insultingly treated; from this come hatred and rebellion; fortresses are therefore not to be built. But what prince will listen to this counselor? “Lest you become a tyrant, refuse to be powerful”? Rather, labor so that you may be powerful, so that you can protect the good and overthrow the wicked. Security is sought for a prince from a fortress, from resources, and from an army, all of which can give courage no less than fortresses can. I believe that security arises from fortresses. I therefore judge that they must be built, so that the prince, secure in himself, may administer justice without fear and may deter an enemy and a citizen of hostile disposition from rebellion through despair of victory. Otherwise, if security must be avoided, let the soldier be dismissed; let the prince walk alone without bodyguards; let him invite the wicked to parricide, which they will perpetrate without any danger. A prince without attendants and a province without the garrisons of fortifications equally invite the enemy.

I conclude to the contrary. A prince must act so that he is truly a prince, so that, secure in himself, he compels what he has commanded to be done and cuts off hope from those who contrive revolution. He can maintain this purpose especially by fortifying citadels; therefore citadels must be fortified.

Moreover, it is not rightly advised that a prince should not seek security but should pass his life in fear and anxiety in order that he may act more mildly. For in truth nothing is more cruel than a timid prince: he fears everything, believes everything hostile, and indulges suspicions. Hence the timidity of a prince is calamitous to leading men, and far more princes have been cruel through fear than through security. Augustus was most savage while he was afraid, and if he had died within the first twenty years of his rule, he would have been among the most hateful of princes. But when he had gained possession of affairs and dispelled his dangers, he put on gentleness. Let this remain stored deep in the mind: if he is timid, he is also cruel; if he fears, he rages. Claudius is a great example. Therefore, lest he fear and rage, let him build fortresses for his security. Machiavelli continues.

§ 5.

But neither, when wars press upon us, do fortresses possess as much force as men customarily attribute to them. For there are only two methods of keeping subjects obedient and restraining them by force. One is that you should have ready at hand an excellent army, as the Roman people had, by which you may settle the waves once they have been stirred. The other is that you should utterly destroy and extirpate rebels, lest they be able to defect again or take up arms against you. For if you plunder their goods, arms remain to the despoiled. If you take away their arms also, fury supplies arms. If, after killing the commanders, you grant the rest the enjoyment of life, other commanders will immediately be reborn like the heads of the Lernaean Hydra. If you possess fortresses, in time of peace they will make you more audacious and unjust toward your subjects; when war comes, they will be attacked both by enemies and by your subjects, and it will not be possible for you to resist both.

I know that nothing is secure for a tyrant whom subjects and foreigners hate, and whom the very ministers of his cruelty detest.

Those two methods belong to the rich, powerful, and cruel. For to have an excellent army always ready at hand belongs only to a most powerful prince. Next, permanent armies must be maintained with great stipends; and when these are wrung from subjects, then at last they take up arms or flee to any nation whatever, and the cultivation of the province is abandoned. Next, a hundred deaths of emperors demonstrate how readily an army mutinies. Third, two thousand men in fortresses have greater power for restraining enemies than ten thousand in the open. Fortresses are therefore savings of expense.

But what he says--that fortresses do not greatly harm enemies--is false. For no one attacks a strong fortress equipped with soldiers and provisions unless he is prepared for the weariness of a long siege. Meanwhile relief forces can be assembled while the enemy fights against stones, turf, and wickerwork and pours out his strength and resources. But let us consider for a little while the fortresses of the most astute commander. In the year in which Caesar disturbed the Britons, there was a scarcity of crops because of drought, and he was compelled to station his legions in different places: one was led among the Morini, another among the Nervii, a third among the Aedui, a fourth among the Remi, three into Belgium, one among the Eburones, together with five cohorts. Caesar himself meanwhile determined to remain in Gaul until he learned that the legions had been stationed and the winter quarters fortified.

But how well fortified were the camps? The tribunes and centurions of the first ranks judge that forces however great, even those of Germans, could be sustained by fortified winter quarters. The matter itself bore witness, because they most courageously sustained the first assault of the enemy, inflicted many wounds in return, and were not pressed by want of grain. We cannot deny here that there were as many castles or fortresses as there were legionary camps. Caesar did not depart from Gaul until he heard that the winter quarters had been fortified. The fortification was such that the centurions and tribunes judged that it could be defended against forces however great; and Cicero defended his camp for many days against many thousands, although the enemies drove forward shelters and towers and in three hours completed a fortification ten miles in extent, and although on the seventh day they set the camp on fire after fire had been cast within the rampart. But the whole hope lay in fortifying and resisting.

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Caesar writes thus in book 5:

On the next day, after the enemies perceived from the nocturnal noise and watches that the Romans were departing, they placed ambushes in two divisions in the forests, in a suitable and concealed place approximately two miles away, and awaited the arrival of the Romans. When the greater part of the column had descended into a great valley, they suddenly showed themselves on each side of that valley and began to press the rearmost men, prevent the foremost from ascending, and join battle in a place most disadvantageous to our men.

Had they not possessed strong camps, all the legions could have been destroyed in one day. Assuredly the Romans would have acted far more prudently at the beginning by doing what they were afterward compelled to do: fortifying

permanent camps, winter quarters, and even summer camps in fixed places. Hence Trajan placed castles beyond the Danube and built a bridge so that relief could be brought if they were attacked. Indeed, the conquered Decebalus was ordered to destroy his bulwarks.

Only this can be asked in this place: whether it is more advisable to possess temporary or permanent camps. But no prudent man can doubt that permanent ones are more useful. First, they are stronger, having been fortified by long labor. Second, there is no need to repeat the labor every year. Third, a conquered or routed army possesses a refuge. Hence the legions, concerning whose distribution I spoke above, and the cohorts passed their lives in their own fortifications. The regular legion at Alexandria possessed its own separately fortified camp, as though a fortress; the cohort at Jerusalem also possessed its own camp. What else was this than a fortress for restraining the city?

Herod himself, not contrary to Roman discipline, restrained the populous city hostile to him by three fortresses. Nor did the most courageous kings act otherwise. David fortified Zion and from it securely ruled the people. Besides the Cherethites and Pelethites, divisions of twenty-four thousand of the most select soldiers always served him as a garrison, as Holy Scripture testifies, 1 Chronicles 27. But let us consider our own times, concerning which Machiavelli speaks in this manner:

If fortresses were ever useless for restraining subjects, assuredly in our age they are not only useless but also ruinous because of the use of engines of war, whose assault neither fortresses nor any confined places can sustain. To withstand them, it is necessary continually to fall back and to compensate inwardly with new ditches and embankments for the ruins of the walls which they produce. Since these things are so, consider further whether a people which was already previously under your dominion, or one which has recently been added to your empire, should be restrained by fortresses of this kind. Certainly, if you possess a principate received from your ancestors, fortresses will not benefit you in keeping subjects obedient, for the reasons already explained: since they make you and your descendants more audacious in inflicting injuries upon the people, and consequently expose you to their hatred, and cannot afterward defend you. For these reasons, and lest either he himself or his heirs have an opportunity to exercise tyranny, but instead endeavor to win the people's goodwill, a wise prince should never construct fortresses.

This argument repeats the preceding one and adds that fortresses are useless at the present time because they cannot long sustain the assault of engines. If this argument possesses force, no fortification whatever ought to be employed; nor should camps be surrounded with a rampart in the Roman manner, for they cannot long resist cannon. But kings and princes, as well as the most courageous commanders of our time--whom I judge in no way inferior to the ancients in strength of spirit and prudence--think altogether differently. For first, many fortresses fortified by the nature of the place and also assisted by art, if they possess an energetic soldiery, are impregnable and render rivers, harbors, and roads secure. Next, those which at some time yield to the enemy nevertheless, by delaying him, furnish time for assembling soldiers, exhaust the adversaries in expense and labor, and diminish their authority, while at times the treasuries of kingdoms are spent upon a single rock or marsh.

But if the enemy finds everything level and without fortifications, if he has gained one victory, uses it, and raises fortifications in various places, he imposes the bridle of perpetual servitude; for he finds an unarmed province. What prevented Albert of Brandenburg, as he raged with sword, pillage, and fires, from entering lower Germany except the fortress set at Koblenz? He neither dared pass it nor judged that attacking it suited his plans. The fortress was not the reason why the descendants of Sforza lost Milan, but their conduct, the hatred of the people, and the power of the French. If Milan had not possessed a fortress, it would have lost its dominion much sooner; and now for many years that fortress and others have been the protection of this duchy. The French fortified their kingdom with citadels better constructed than those of all other nations. Nicolas Bellus therefore speaks truly in volume 1 of *Political Matters*, concerning France:

As regards fortifications, there is no other region in which there is a greater number of them. This results from several causes. One is that, when the kingdom was divided into several dominions and principalities--namely

Burgundy, Brittany, the Duchy of Anjou, and Normandy--each ruler fortified his own frontiers. The number of fortifications grew through the wars of the English, who ruled a great part of France. The situation and nature of places suitable for fortification, and no less the diligence and aptitude of the people for these matters, make the fortification of places easier.

§ 6. What Machiavelli adds, however, contributes nothing to the matter. He says:

To these considerations is added the fact that fortresses are easily lost, either through the fraud of those who command them, the force of enemies, hunger, or a long siege. But if you wish to recover a city which has been lost by the aid of a fortress which alone has remained faithful, you nevertheless need an army just as though you possessed no fortress, and indeed an army so much larger as it is more likely that the citizens will be more hostile to you because of injuries received from the fortress than they would have been if you had lacked one. Experience itself has taught that the fortress of Milan benefited neither the Sforzas nor the French at all in time of war and harmed them greatly in time of peace, because both, trusting in so great a mass of construction, did not consider some more humane method of preserving that principate.

I have already refuted a similar argument above concerning a treasury. For if fear of thieves means that treasure must not be laid aside, neither should a method of household management be recommended to the head of a household. But it is miserable to be despoiled, and most miserable to possess nothing of which you can be despoiled. I say most miserable in a prince and in a state; for I am not instructing solitary men and pupils of voluntary poverty but a state, which needs resources, fortresses, and the other necessities by which it may terrify and restrain the wicked.

Commanders of fortresses can desert and hand the fortresses over, but unfortified camps, towns, and villages can be handed over much more easily. Consequently, neither camps nor fortresses are beneficial without the fidelity of men. Sometimes a stronger enemy wrests a spear from a soldier and kills him after he has been struck down with his own sword; nevertheless, an army is not for that reason to go unarmed. But Guidobaldo, son of Federico, duke of Urbino, a man most skilled in military affairs, after he had been driven from his dominion by Cesare Borgia, son of Alexander VI, and had afterward recovered that same dominion through a certain chance, demolished all its fortresses and bulwarks. For since he possessed well-disposed subjects, he did not need them for restraining those subjects; and he saw that he could not defend them against enemies without an army.

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I do not deny that it is sometimes fitting for fortresses to be demolished: namely, if the goodwill of the subjects is so great that they are not necessary for restraining them; if money for maintaining a garrison is lacking; or if they cannot be defended. Nor are we disputing about that matter. We know that great commanders have consumed towns, villages, crops, and all other things which they could not defend with flames, lest they benefit the enemy. Guidobaldo did not hold the principate long thereafter, as experience taught. The favor of the people is changed more swiftly than a breeze. Peoples begin most swiftly to hate those princes whom they embraced most eagerly when, contrary to expectation, they see that tributes, taxes, and services are commanded.

He does not reason rightly concerning the fortress of the Genoese. Although that city could not be held, it does not therefore follow that all fortresses must be demolished. Otherwise cities should not be surrounded with walls, since prodigious walls did not defend Babylon and Nineveh; for there were other causes of their destruction. But let us refute Machiavelli from his own words and from history. He says:

The event which occurred at Genoa a few years ago is both the most recent and the most evident example for demonstrating that the construction of fortresses is useless and their destruction useful. For we know that after that city defected from Louis, king of France, in the year of salvation 1506, and he came into Italy with a great army to recover it, the king, after recovering the city, founded a fortress of immense mass, such as it is established that no other then existed. For it seemed impregnable both by the nature of its location and by art. It rested upon the promontory of Gondega, projecting over the sea, so that from there the entire harbor and also a great part of the city

could be struck with missiles. Nevertheless, when afterward, in the year of the Lord 1512, all the French were driven out of Italy, Genoa also, fearing the fortress not at all, defected to Ottaviano Fregoso. He surrounded it with a siege and in the space of sixteen months compelled it by hunger to surrender. After Fregoso had occupied it, despising the counsels of all who advised that he preserve it as a kind of refuge, he caused it to be demolished utterly. He judged the goodwill of the people and his own valor to be a better foundation for his dominion, which he still possesses, than any fortresses or bulwarks.

To me, however, the great usefulness of fortresses seems to be proved most firmly by this very example. For when the French, hated by the Italians and afflicted by diseases, hunger, and innumerable calamities, were being driven from all Italy, it was not surprising that the citizens of Genoa also--long free and princes of Italy--agreed upon liberty. The fortress caused them not to be the first to do so. This ought not to be esteemed a small matter, for the French held the fortress and harbor for sixteen months. If meanwhile they had assembled a strong army, they could have lifted the siege. Add that the fortress was compelled by hunger to surrender. Therefore, if adequate provision had been made for its supplies, a siege of two or three years would have been necessary; during that time the French could both have prepared relief forces and worn down the besiegers, and the dispositions of the peoples could have changed.

But Machiavelli proceeds:

The same reasoning applies also to those fortresses which states are accustomed to found in recently occupied cities in order to keep those citizens obedient. If this is less evident from the example of the Genoese already adduced, it will become better known from the encounter between the Florentines and Pisans. For when the Florentines had seen the Pisans rebel so many times, they judged that by constructing a fortress they could restrain them. They paid too little attention to the fact that a city which had been accustomed to be free and had always been hostile to the Florentine name could be kept obedient by no other method than if, in the Roman manner, they either received it into partnership with themselves or utterly destroyed it. How much the fortresses benefited them toward their intended end became apparent from the arrival of Charles, king of France, to whom they were immediately handed over, without negligence of the commanders and without fear of a greater evil. If the Florentines had not previously founded them and had not attributed so much to them as to suppose that the city was preserved through them, they would assuredly have considered another method by which they could not so easily have been stripped of dominion over the city by the king.

Here too nothing is concluded against fortresses. Pisa and Florence were rival cities for a long time. At last Pisa succumbed; but because it was held neither by a sufficiently strong garrison nor by a fortress, when an opportunity was given it rebelled. They afterward restrained it by a fortress until the arrival of King Charles, to whom everything yielded. Since the fortress was defended by a garrison insufficiently strong, faithless, and feeble, the commanders preferred to surrender themselves to the king's favor rather than run risks without cause. If the Florentines had strengthened the fortress, placed a powerful garrison and provisions within it, and mollified the hostile spirits of the Pisans so that they preferred neighbors and kinsmen to distant masters, they could have sustained and worn down Charles's army for a long time, preventing it from gaining other successes.

The remaining methods were difficult: to transfer Pisa to Florence or to destroy it utterly. For they preferred to rule another city rather than that there should be no city. I do not excuse the Florentines if they sinned through pride of command or avarice. Against great hatreds no power endures, yet fortresses and armies resist for some time. If they had not constructed a fortress at Pisa, the Pisans would already before Charles's arrival have shaken off the yoke and harassed Florence with incursions and depredations.

§ 7. He concedes that cities have been recovered through fortresses but responds in this manner:

If someone should object to us that either Tarentum in ancient times or Brescia in our own age was recovered by means of a fortress after the inhabitants defected, I reply that the fortress was by no means sufficient for recovering Tarentum, since the consul Quintus Fabius was sent with a very great army to occupy it; with that army he could without doubt have captured it even if they had possessed no fortress there. What, therefore, did the fortress benefit

the Roman people if they nevertheless needed a consular army to recover the city? The Romans possessed no fortress at Capua, yet they recovered that same city by the valor of an army. In the rebellion of the city of Brescia something new and rare occurred. For it rarely happens that, when a city defects, those in the fortress remain faithful unless they possess a neighboring army whose aid they can implore. When the Brescian citizens defected, Foilleus, the commander, was at Bologna with the royal army. Having learned of the matter through swift messengers, he immediately prepared for the journey and, arriving there on the third day, recovered the city with the help of the fortress. Therefore Brescia could not be recovered by the fortress alone but needed the royal army; nor, even if it could have been recovered by that alone, [would this example suffice].

I reply that the fortress was of the greatest benefit. For although the city could not be recovered without an army, it could nevertheless be recovered easily because the fortress furnished the opportunity. The disorders of Belgium have shown how much importance lies in fortresses. Indeed, he admits that Brescia was recovered with the aid of a fortress. The very method of wars teaches this. How much danger and labor is expended by commanders so that, while they besiege a city, they may take one tower, one bulwark from the enemies! And when they have obtained this, they judge that their labor has been worthwhile.

When Jerusalem was besieged--and that was the most renowned siege among all those since the world was created--Titus first took the outer wall, then the second, finally the third, and this at intervals of time and with fresh slaughter of his own men; fourth, he took the fortress Antonia constructed by Herod; fifth, the Temple, which possessed the strength and position of a fortress; finally, Mount Zion, an altogether royal fortification. If the Romans had taken timely thought for themselves and occupied one of those fortresses before they were driven out, they would easily have obtained the city. The kings of the Greeks acted more prudently, therefore, because they held the fortress.

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§ 8. Nor do I approve every kind of fortress, but only three kinds. First are those which are separated from cities or possess small cities joined to them but were not constructed for keeping those cities obedient. Their purpose is the protection of rivers, harbors, frontiers, and roads; on this account the advantageous position of their locations renders them useful. Hence the Hermenstein fortress--Ehrenbreitstein--set over the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle, is useful. In the same way there is the fortress which they call Schenkenschanz at the division of the Rhine; for I have already shown above that it is properly called a fortress because it repels the enemy.

Second, fortresses are founded for restraining and defending great cities. There are three modes of these. Some can strike the city and divert provisions, such as the one at Genoa which the king of France constructed. These are to be approved most of all, because they constrain the spirits of the citizens by fear of two things: bombardment and a sortie into the city, and the prevention of provisions. Others prevail through fear of only one of these two disadvantages, such as those of Prague and Luxembourg, which can do harm by battering and invading the cities. Those situated in harbors generally serve to protect or impede imports. Such is the African fortification of Rachia, which the Spaniards brought under their dominion a few years ago by a courageous stratagem and which the Ethiopians besieged for a long time with their utmost strength.

The third kind of fortresses is that which princes and nobles are accustomed to construct, which does not come under the name of a fortification but is a somewhat more honorable dwelling fortified against sudden assaults. There is an innumerable multitude of these in Germany and Gaul. In former times many were very strongly fortified and set upon rocks; now most are deserted.

Machiavelli errs much more gravely concerning fortresses against enemies:

But those fortresses which are constructed to repel foreign enemies and to defend your people and empire are not necessary either. If you abound in courageous men and energetic soldiers, they are not only unnecessary but altogether useless. For without an army they are of no benefit; an excellent army can defend you without fortresses. All who excelled either in political or military arts--such as the Romans and Spartans--understood this sufficiently

from experience itself. The Romans never constructed any fortresses; the Spartans did not even wish the cities occupied by them to possess walls. They believed that the valor of soldiers alone constituted bulwarks. Hence it happened that when a certain Spartan was asked whether the city of Athens seemed furnished with beautiful walls, he replied, "Entirely so, if it were inhabited by women." Therefore, for a prince who possesses a good army, only some fortresses situated upon the frontiers of the empire, especially in maritime locations, can be beneficial for sustaining the enemies for several days until the armies are made ready; but not even these are necessary to him. If he lacks a courageous army, fortresses on the frontiers of the empire either benefit him not at all or even harm him. For they are easily lost, and when the enemy occupies them, he will employ them against you. But if you grant that some fortresses are so strong and fortified that they cannot be occupied, the enemy nevertheless proceeds onward after leaving them behind him; for most powerful armies invade and overrun the enemy's frontiers without taking account of either the cities or the strongest fortresses which they leave at their back. It is established that this is so from both ancient and modern examples. Francesco Maria invaded Urbino a few years ago and was not at all concerned that he had left behind him ten cities, all hostile to him. Therefore, every prince who possesses a powerful army can easily lack fortresses; one who lacks it ought not to construct fortresses but to fortify as strongly as he can the city in which he dwells and to equip the citizens with arms, so that he may at least sustain for some time the assault of arriving enemies until he can either make an agreement with him or summon foreigners to his aid. Whatever other fortresses and bulwarks are built burden both princes and subjects with excessive expenditures in time of peace and are of no benefit in time of war. Therefore, just as in other matters the senate of the Roman people administered everything with the highest prudence, so here also it acted wisely, because it judged that the conquered and subdued Latins and Privernates were not to be restrained by any fortresses but kept obedient by another method, more advantageous and more consonant with valor.

I have already refuted these things above, nor do the Lacedaemonians move me, since in the judgment of all nations they acted with ἀφοροσύνης--that is, with foolish simplicity--in not even surrounding their city with a wall. Nothing could be more foolish than this. For if a place lies open to every injury, watch must be kept with great forces, great labor, and danger. In every place, even one at peace, the Romans fortified their camp. For what wisdom is there in exhausting a citizen with watches when by interposing a small wall you can save so much labor?

But the walls of the Athenians were as though they were inhabited by women. This, however, was the jeer of a Laconian--and of one who feared walled Athens. We know that the most courageous men founded and defended the strongest walls, and that fortresses in Europe and India have in our own time been defended with remarkable valor. If we praise Roman strength, assuredly we ought to admire our own times; for the strength of soldiers who advance against iron cannon is greater than that of men advancing against arrows.

They object that Poland and England lack fortifications. But perhaps it would be better for those kingdoms to receive examples from many others than to give them. How often is Poland invaded with impunity by Turks, Tatars, Muscovites, and Swedes? How many thousands of people are carried away? If there were fortifications and garrisons at suitable places, if the crossings were occupied, the sudden assaults of the enemies would easily be repelled. England is girded by the sea: to have entered it is to have conquered it.

CHAPTER XXIV

Treaties Contribute Very Greatly to Power

A treaty is an agreement between states concerning mutual friendship and partnership in some matter. No kingdom is without a rival; therefore neither ought it to be without an ally, just as a private person ought not to be without a friend. To strike a treaty belongs to supreme majesty and, by its concession, to princes; without its consent, it is a conspiracy. Public defense pertains to the prince alone. Thus Besold, book 2, chapter 5, §12, on the law of treaties.

Treaties which are entered into among those who possess different ends and seek one thing are brief. If two rivals easily exclude a third after entering into a treaty, when that man has been cast out they turn against one another.

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§ 1. By treaties I understand covenants and agreements by which several parties bind themselves by mutual obligation, *συνμαχίαν*, and enter into partnership, so that they judge the same persons friends and enemies. Nothing is more effective than this for power. For more is accomplished by the treaties of allies than by wars, and the Romans performed no fewer deeds with the forces of allies than under their own auspices.

§ 2. Treaties with foreign princes establish security at home and confer authority. For everyone considers that prince great whom kings and magnates court and to whom splendid embassies frequently come.

§ 3. The covenant of treaties ought to be most sacred. For they are sanctioned publicly and by oath. Many forms of an oath accompanied by a curse are found everywhere among the historians. Next, because fidelity publicly pledged binds more than any private promise. Even if no one preserved fidelity, kings nevertheless ought to preserve it. Nothing, however, can harm a kingdom more than violation of treaties. Hence no one is a friend to the Turks, because they measure treaties by utility alone.

§ 4. When several parties enter into one treaty, it must be useful or necessary to both parties; otherwise it is not lasting. Indeed, the most grievous wars arise from the complaints of allies, as when the Rhodians complain that their military service and partnership with the Romans had been without honor. For almost everyone regards his own utility. This consideration so often prevails even over honor that allies oppose allies. When Xerxes had been routed and the victorious fleet of Greece stood at anchor, a wicked thought, worthy of exile, entered Themistocles' mind: that he should burn the fleet of the allies so that, once stripped of maritime power, they would be in the power of the Athenians. When Aristides declared that this was useful but not honorable, the Athenian people forbade it--and rightly, for it would have burdened itself with so much hatred that no equal power could have been imagined by which it might escape.

A most useful treaty was negotiated between the Venetians and the Spaniard in 1571. Agreement was reached later than was fitting, for Nicosia had been captured. It was altogether in the interest of the Venetians that the treaty be hastened and the auxiliary forces be decreed swiftly; for the Venetian could be defended only by a treaty, and if he were conquered all Italy would have been in danger. But the treaty was afterward rendered void for private reasons, because the Venetians saw that their commerce was being cut off and that they were consequently being reduced to poverty. Therefore one must always be vigilant to make an agreement with a man whom sudden necessity does not compel to make an agreement with the enemy. For after the greatest expenditures had been made, the Venetians, afflicted by losses in commerce, made a disadvantageous peace with the Turk.

§ 5. Treaties between dissimilar parties are not very secure--for example, between states and princes. For their interests are different, and for a long time no king was admitted into the city of Rome. Although the Roman people possessed allied kings, it nevertheless oppressed them especially.

Hence neither do the Venetians possess a secure treaty with any king, nor do they appear greatly to desire one; and in the most recent war they were defended more by the Hollanders than by any other prince. Nor do the Hollanders trust treaties with princes. One who in these days flattered the Belgians perceived this truly, although otherwise he was a most mendacious historian:

Great hatreds will follow the alliances of kings, to which we owe a great part of our liberty, and aid from Gaul and Britain will cease when concord ceases. The allied cities toward the east, lest they submit to the factious commands of the Belgians, will soon restore themselves to liberty. Since through their own weakness they will be unable to retain it, they will submit themselves to the savage nation toward the north. The princes of Germany will feign a new endurance of Austrian commands. The Turks, Conscript Fathers, apart from mere commerce in the Mediterranean, and the nobles of Venice--who in these wars have squandered the flower of our blood--will open only their treasuries.

The cause of this matter seems to me to be that democratic or aristocratic states do not wish their magistrates to admire or desire royal splendor. For there is the greatest danger that those who seek annual commands with so much canvassing that they even pour out their entire patrimonies should strive with every effort for perpetual dictatorships and royal stability. I judge that there were scarcely three Romans who, if they had been able, would not have done what Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus did.

No less suspect to kings is the familiarity of their princes with the senators of a free state. For those senators obtain liberty while generally possessing less power, whereas princes are bound in many ways; therefore, from the senators' laws and custom princes can adopt plans for their own liberty. But, all things considered, there is more danger in a state. For those who preside over a state, as at Venice, in Holland, among the Alpine Grisons, and in Switzerland, readily accept gifts from kings and are accustomed to sell them their services. For where would you now find men such as Fabricius? And now in Holland and the Alps proceedings *περί δωροδοκίας*--concerning bribery--are conducted openly. For among equal senators of a state ambition is kindled more greatly as they succeed one another, court the popular breezes, and rescind deeds and laws. Hence comes their concern for resources and power. These are furnished by kings when the senators direct their counsels toward the kings' advantages or impede the counsels of others.

Nor can states so easily bind royal ministers to themselves with gold: private men do not do it because it exceeds their means, and the senate itself cannot conveniently do it because accounts must be rendered. Therefore such largesses cannot be secret and are consequently most dangerous.

§ 6. Honorable marriages with the powerful confer by far the greatest power and authority, which is the foundation of power. Therefore powerful fathers-in-law and sons-in-law, or men suitable for conducting affairs, must be sought for a prince. We see this happen: royal hatreds are ended by loves, and a bridesmaid has been the salvation of nations. Assuredly wars are ended more happily by no means than by marriages.

But care must be taken lest wars arise through the occasion of marriages. This is accustomed to happen when the parties are not joined in good faith. Daniel 2:43 describes such a kingdom for us: "But whereas you saw the iron mixed with earthenware of clay, they shall indeed be mingled with human seed, but they shall not adhere to one another, just as iron cannot be mixed with earthenware." The cause must be sought from the nature of the matter. Metals cannot be mixed with earthenware either by heat or by cold. Earthen vessels are hardened by heat and made firm into stony hardness; by cold they are softened. Metals grow solid by cold; by heat they are dissolved and liquefied. What benefits one, therefore, harms the other. Metals easily coalesce with one another because, when heated, they flow together and, when cooled, are hardened together. This condition of kings must be regarded, so that treaties of marriage may produce the peace of provinces.

Hence a reason must be sought why the minds of kings bound by affinity do not cohere. Daniel speaks thus in Chaldaic: that the kingdom will be *טינא בחסך מערב*,

“mixed with earthenware of clay.” ערב means to make a pledge, give security, conduct business, or mix. Marriages will therefore be mixed in that kingdom in the manner of merchandise, so that treaties are contracted not from conjugal love but for the advantage of ruling. They will also be mingled with human seed, but, as the Chaldaean says:

דנא עם דנא דבקין להון ולא

“But not so as to exist glued one to another.”

καὶ οὐκ ἔσονται προσκολλώμενοι οὗτος μετὰ τούτου,

as the Septuagint translates it. What, therefore, must be considered especially in these marriages?

§ 7. First, in these marriages it must be regarded that the end of marriage be true: marital union, the begetting and education of offspring, the spouses' mutual assistance, and perpetual love. For those who perversely employ this holy covenant, which God instituted, for deceptions acquire greater evils for themselves from it.

In this manner Saul promised his daughter to David, 1 Samuel 18:15: “Saul therefore saw that he was exceedingly prudent and began to beware of him. But all Israel and Judah loved David, for he went in and out before them. And Saul said to David: ‘Behold my elder daughter Merab; I will give her to you as a wife. Only be a valiant man and fight the battles of the Lord.’ But Saul was considering, saying: ‘Let not my hand be upon him, but let the hand of the Philistines be upon him.’”

They did not adhere to one another; for Saul both persecuted his son-in-law and gave his daughter to another, while his other daughter was more faithful to her husband than to her impious father. Marriage therefore could not reconcile these men, since Saul sought nothing other than David's death; hence a dowry of one hundred foreskins of the Philistines was imposed.

Antiochus employed a similar fraud; concerning him Daniel 11:17 says: “And he shall set his face to come and take possession of his entire kingdom, and he shall make equitable terms with him, and shall give him a daughter of women in order to overthrow it; but she shall not stand, nor shall she be for him.” When the guardians of the Egyptian king guarded against the plots of Antiochus, he betrothed Cleopatra to him, feigned peace, and gave her Coele-Syria, Judaea, Samaria, and Phoenicia in the name of a dowry. Yet he did not relinquish those territories altogether, for Josephus says that tribute was paid to each king. He had commanded his daughter to kill her husband by whatever means she could; but she supported the part of her husband more than that of her father. Polybius, to whom perhaps the king's murderous disposition toward his own kin was unknown, supposes another reason for the marriage: namely, that he might bind Ptolemy to himself by affinity, lest Ptolemy oppose him when he was about to fight against the Romans. All these things were the beginnings of immense calamities, while that most criminal man against the whole human race violated a father's right over his daughter, a father-in-law's right, and finally the fellowship of the human race.

§ 8. Marriages cannot establish concord when each party possesses a different purpose, although they do not fight by design. At last matters will reach the point that those treaties are broken. The first sedition of the state concerned marriages; from the mingling of patrician and plebeian blood arose an opportunity for the plebs to seek the magistracies, until all things devolved upon the plebs and, as customarily follows from this, upon one man.

Afterward the same thing was attempted under the triumvirate. Antony married Octavia, the sister of Augustus; Augustus married Claudia, Antony's stepdaughter. But the more powerful desire for ruling shattered all those bonds and set east and west against one another. Afterward Severus wished to stabilize the kingdom for his sons Caracalla and Geta through affinity with Plautianus, but the marriages were ruinous to both parties. The same thing was attempted in Stilicho and others, but with fruitless effort, because he employed marriages with imperial women to transfer the Empire. They could not be glued together because the exceedingly impious and faithless Stilicho sought anything rather than the safety of the Empire. Hence marriages under a dissimilar religious observance cannot long be enduring and useful.

§ 9. Treaties, whether of marriage or of any other kind, entered into with distant parties do not help greatly and offend neighbors. For if, while the state stood, some prince of the Romans had married a daughter of Antiochus or Ptolemy, allied kings, he could neither have been assisted by his father-in-law nor, being utterly hateful to the other citizens, would he have been admitted to any administration. Thus princes must now also beware lest through marriages with the powerful they appear to be contriving some revolution. Treaties with the Frenchman and agreements of betrothal were harmful to Wilhelm, duke of Jülich. The reason is openly known. For when neighboring princes are neglected and the splendor of foreign marriages is sought, hostility and suspicion arise, which always accompany power recently increased. At home, therefore, among his own people he has hatreds, alienation, and distrust ready at hand, but assistance far away.

The other things which contribute to power, since they are military, I shall discuss in their proper place.