

ADAM CONTZEN

TEN BOOKS OF POLITICS

BOOK TEN

On War

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CHAPTER I

That It Is Proper for a Civilian and a Priest to Discuss War

§ 1. “The life of man upon earth is warfare”; wherefore the Apostle commands me to labor like a good soldier of Christ Jesus. But does he enjoin that warfare by which the invader is deprived of life when he commands one to answer at the roll-call and to stand ready for battle? He proclaims spiritual warfare against the powers of the air, the rulers of these darknesses: “Let us therefore cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light” (Romans 13:12), which at 2 Corinthians 6:7 he calls “the armor of justice on the right hand and on the left.” For in truth, “though we walk according to the flesh, we do not wage war according to the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God for the destruction of fortifications” (2 Corinthians 10:4). What, then, has spiritual warfare to do with carnal weapons? What has it to do with those weapons by which an enemy is killed, if one must pray for enemies and do good to those who persecute us? Two objections, therefore, are made against one who treats of war. The first is that a man inexperienced in war cannot give precepts from the shade to those engaged in combat. The other is that this is least becoming to a priest and religious, whose office it is to protect books and temples:

Let men conduct war and peace, whose part it is to conduct war.

§ 2. At the threshold of this book I have set myself to answer these objections, so as to satisfy both the reproach of detractors and the question of the well-disposed.

And indeed, if it is objected that for a civilian to write about war is foreign to his condition and absurd--if they say, “Will you dare these things, you man of the study, who have never seriously seen a camp and have never, in short, touched any part of any military duty?”--Justus Lipsius, greater than envy and above slanders, already answered long ago on my behalf, in Book V of the *Politics*, chapter 1:

I indeed shall dare it, yet not through confidence in my own ability or powers, but in those from whom I have long borrowed and taken. For what is mine here? Some order and arrangement, perhaps. But those men go before me with their words and judgments, whom, I say confidently, any Hannibal, or Caesar himself, would not refuse to hear on this very matter. For what escaped those wise and illustrious men? Why should their judgment not be correct and pure here also? Some of them took part in wars, and indeed commanded them; others lived in that senate and among that people where these matters were the constant subject and activity. They therefore saw and heard and--what is chief--observed with judgment the very causes and origins of things, not only the *προφάσεις* [occasions] of events, but the *αἰτία* [causes] themselves. Alexander, truly Great in military affairs, did not hesitate to take and declare Homer his teacher in warfare: may I not therefore take these men with better right? For what did that poet sing of except one war, and that very war sprinkled with fables? He was certainly an extraordinary poet and more than a human poet, yet a poet nonetheless. Those men of mine--I plainly mean the historians--wrote of wars from almost every age, in a continuous series and with uncorrupted fidelity. Nor did they do only this; often, in the narration itself or outside it in speeches, as though intentionally, they mingled most salutary admonitions and counsels for every part of military affairs. What part or art of it do they not both set before us with examples and also touch upon in words: the army, camps, columns on the march, engagements, the assault of towns, provisions, the making and avoiding of ambushes, and the remaining matters proper to the administration of war? Since I have occupied myself in these matters for so many years, and with that inquisitive eye of the mind wander daily through those broad fields of the histories, why is it not lawful for me also to understand and judge something in them?

“You did not see them,” they say. Certainly; and therefore I claim for myself neither the practice nor the handling of weapons, but only an opinion and judgment, and even these bound to the opinion of another. Behold, in every gathering and even, if it please the gods, at banquets, there are men who command an army: they know where a camp must be placed, what places must be occupied by garrisons, when hands must be joined with the enemy, and

when one must remain quiet. No one censures this. Am I a puppy and shameless if I say a word about these matters from the mind of the ancients? Iphicrates was once asked: *τίς ὢν μεγαφρονεῖς; πότερον ἵππευς, ἢ τοξότης, ἢ πελταστής, ἢ ὀπλίτης; Οὐδεὶς ἔφη, τούτων, ἀλλ' ὁ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπιστάμενος ἐπιτάττειν.* “Who are you, that you assume such lofty airs? Are you a cavalryman, an archer, a light-armed soldier, or a legionary?” “None of these,” he said, “but one who knows how to command all of them.” I shall emulate him in part and say: I am neither a commander nor a soldier, but one who may be able to give some counsel and advice to them at the proper time. I shall therefore proceed boldly and with no wavering step in my undertaking; and from the writings of the ancients, as though from gardens, I shall gather flowers of maxims and weave them into these garlands of chapters.

§ 3. Here, certainly, my case is the same, and so is my defense. For why should that be censured in insignificant me which is praised in that great man? And surely those who attribute everything to experience, but nothing to study, diligence, and ability, depart altogether too far from true wisdom and reason, since reason is the surest guide, whereas experience, although useful, is never so complete in every respect. Even if we listen to a long-lived and successful commander, that principle which soldiers themselves acknowledge nevertheless remains: sound reason is preferred to all examples. Yet I have determined to teach and confirm all my precepts by the examples of illustrious men, so that what is lacking in the author may be supplied by the completeness of the teaching. This ought to appear all the less novel because we read almost all books about war, as well as the histories, written by civilians, who also judge most prudently concerning commanders and the military counsels of kings although they themselves did not conduct wars.

Moreover, the choicest histories are explained to the young in academies for this purpose: not that they may understand the crimes of men and the slaughters stored in the annals, but that they may perceive what is to be followed and what avoided in every matter. No prudent person will judge it foreign to the historian’s office to discuss the manner of conducting war when he has learned at first glance that wars comprise the principal parts of history. Without this treatment, therefore, history can in no way be understood, nor can the more learned youth be properly instructed. Why, then, should anyone blame me if I set before the young the best precepts of peace and war from trustworthy history, when my calling, the inclination of my mind, and the love of my studies have long consecrated and bound me to the advantage of youth? If these precepts are bad, I now order them to be without effect; if they are good, even my enemies will have to praise them. I shall therefore give a history of war arranged in order, composed according to the rule of reason with the supports of examples, and confirmed and brought to completion not by my own ability but by the institutions of kings and great commanders.

§ 4. The second part of the objection is even more readily dissolved, although at first sight it appears absurd for a priest to treat of arms. To me, on the contrary, it seems that, for a good end and for just causes, priests sometimes can and ought to be disputants concerning war. Moses was a priest and an excellent warrior; Joshua, the minister of Moses, although he was not a priest, nevertheless joined piety with every distinction of war. Phinehas, the son of Eleazar the high priest, was appointed commander of the war against the Midianites by Moses. The Maccabean high priests conducted great wars; and why should I not be permitted to speak about war? Waging war is indeed forbidden to clerics by the canons; nevertheless, Saint Bernard advises Eugenius that wars are to be conducted not by his hand, but by his authority.

Clerics can sometimes take part in wars. For they can and ought to instruct the soldier in faith and piety, oppose the soldiers’ license, comfort the wounded, and administer the sacraments to the dying. No sound person doubts this matter.

They can also perform other duties: they may exhort the soldier to fight bravely, even carry the cross before him, and command him to be of great courage, as Maiolus says, Book V, chapter 49. God formerly willed that there be trumpets in the camps which the priests should sound and thereby procure victory for the warriors: “If you go forth to war from your land against the enemies who fight against you, you shall sound with howling trumpets, and there shall be a remembrance of you before the Lord our God, that you may be delivered from the hands of your enemies” (Numbers 10:9). For this reason Balaam also calls it the blast of the king’s victory which was in the tents of Israel. If a priest of

the new law, placed amid the danger of war, kills an invader in necessary defense, he does not become irregular; in this case his condition is better than the soldier's, for the soldier has voluntarily given his name in order to kill the enemy by public authority, whereas the cleric privately defends himself against an invader.

§ 5. Nor is war forbidden to clerics so severely that they cannot fight in a grave necessity or for some great advantage--if the fatherland is in danger, for example, or if the universal peace of the Church is hoped for. See Bañez, II--II, question 40, article 2; Henriquez, Book XIV, chapter 13. All also concede that clerics may fight by permission of the pontiff. A bishop certainly can declare war if this is necessary for recovering or defending his churches; accordingly, he will hold a levy, compel soldiers, and fortify himself with alliances and the assistance of princes. Thus Henriquez, Cajetan, Sylvester, and, before these, Saint Bernard and Pope Saint Leo.

Those judges, therefore, are exceedingly unjust toward us who, in order that they may easily wrench the chalice from us, attack us girded with swords and order us to be content with the breviary as our sole armor, as though it were not lawful for us to fight for our lawful possessions, altars, and temples, when there were two swords in the Lord's household.

§ 6. Saint Thomas rightly teaches, II--II, question 32, article 2, that clerics are not permitted to fight because wars are very repugnant to clerical duties. They are deprived of the exercise of their orders, in *Clerici* and *Quicumque*, cause 13, question 8, and are ordered to be confined in a monastery. Yet because that law is not natural or divine, but ecclesiastical only, it not only can be removed by the legislator, but sometimes its obligation is removed by the very fact when another and graver law binds. For if the state is in grave danger and can be saved if clerics are enrolled among the soldiers, it is a right of nature that they too should fight with their own hands; for the obligation of natural law requires each man to defend his own state. And if in an offensive war the state is in the gravest necessity, a cleric will be able to fight in that war too with his own hand. Concerning defensive war, the opinion is unanimous that this is lawful in the utmost necessity or for the greatest advantage. Concerning offensive war they deny it; but it can happen that an offensive war is equally necessary, for in war it is often necessary to seize the initiative and forestall the enemy.

§ 7. Whatever reasons I set forth at the beginning for having undertaken the treatment of politics have their place here also. For the commander, legates, tribunes, and centurions must rely upon every kind of political prudence in order to govern an army--fierce men bearing arms--and this amid great dangers, from which disturbances and dissensions easily arise, since the men attribute favorable events to themselves and adverse events to their commanders. It therefore belongs to the highest art to govern the soldier; if this is rightly done, it is easy to conquer the enemy. Accordingly, I shall treat these matters with this end and in this manner: that by reading histories and accounts of wars the young may obtain benefit and, when their age has matured, may be able to conduct even necessary wars. Even the ill-disposed man ought to favor the attempt; I myself cannot guarantee its success.

We all owe very much to Lipsius, who, for the understanding of histories, kindled what he calls the *Historical Torch*, a name given not out of arrogance but by design: "That I may bring forward," he says, "Roman customs, public and private--and elsewhere also Greek customs--and illuminate them in such a way that, at the same time, I may illuminate the passages of the ancient writers who allude to or touch upon them. Since this material is diffuse, and indeed confused--I cannot deny it--I resolved first to excerpt from the whole mass whatever bears upon warfare, to present it joined together and in some sequence and coherence of subjects. The reason for selecting what bears upon warfare is that it occurs in history not very frequently, but incessantly, and, so to speak, every page bears upon it. For as our life is public, so too is the writing of it: the former, from age to age, is disturbances and wars; therefore the annals that represent the age are so too. And I say knowingly and advisedly that nothing detains or delays the young more than ignorance of ancient warfare. Before all else we are going to remedy this evil and dispel this darkness with our torch, according to the measure of our ability."

My purpose likewise is to exercise the young not only in understanding the deeds of the ancients, but also in reproducing them by imitation. For counsels are given concerning things that must be done. This pertains to the public good, which soldiers serve above all.

§ 8. Finally, since the studies of all political writers, jurists, theologians, scholastics, and canonists concerning war are extant, and since many questions pertaining to courts and conscience must be explained, it is manifest that I ought not to neglect this part, whether you regard theological or political treatises. To add to these some strategic counsels of great commanders will not be laborious for me, but will be most pleasing and fruitful for the young.

Yet my judgment is not that men accustomed to debate and declaim about wars should therefore be employed to conduct war; perhaps in battle they themselves, forgetful of all their precepts, would turn their backs to the enemy. Rather, let the state employ an experienced soldier who knows how to execute, not judge, the orders of commanders; but let it employ commanders who have also read these things and who can either use them or frustrate an enemy who uses them. For in battles, marches, and sieges various things happen contrary to expectation which demand immediate prudence. Then a commander trained both by reading and by waging war will be ready for sudden counsels. All these things tend to this: that counsel may be present in danger, and that commanders may extricate themselves in unexpected cases or entangle their enemies. For it belongs to a great commander to conquer by prudence, not by bloodshed. Indeed, to have deceived an enemy by a good stratagem is above every triumph.

I shall also add this: I was provoked by the example of an adversary. Machiavelli wrote about war, but did not dare to serve as a soldier, although the Duke of Urbino had urged him to do so. Cardano, *On the Usefulness to Be Drawn from Adversity*, Book III.

CHAPTER II

The Definition and Detestation of War

§ 1. Whole states experience war more readily than a few men define it. War, as Lipsius defines it, is “force and arms directed against a foreign prince or people.” Without doubt he understands force inflicted by a supreme prince or by a state; for if it is inflicted by a faction or by a few persons without public counsel, these are robberies rather than wars. The Hebrews call it מלחמה and מלחמת, from לחם, which means to eat, to devour. For it is ὁ πόλεμος ὁ δημοβόρος--war that devours the people. Hence the divine Spirit in Scripture gives a mouth to the sword, and men are said to perish in the mouth of the sword. Deuteronomy 32:42: “I shall make my arrows drunk with blood, and my sword shall devour flesh.” War, therefore, is a horrible beast which with innumerable arrows sucks the blood of the dying, cuts their flesh with swords, and tries to fill its pierced belly with dismembered flesh, yet is never sated even when drunk.

§ 2. The evils of war are innumerable; none is graver than that such great distinctions and triumphs are sought from the slaughter of men. We behold beasts tearing one another and hunts, but cruelty ceases once it is fed; for a man to have killed a man is glorious. It seems sufficient cause for so sacred an animal to be killed if the killer acquires the name of victor. For how many nations have perished through no fault of their own, but through most cruel ambition? I do not deny that those who have been ministers of just wars and have received wounds for their fatherland are to be adorned with deserved rewards. Yet I deplore this calamity of the human race: that whole nations fall for leaves of laurel; that wars are sown by a desire to triumph; and that there should be greater glory in having killed many men than in having saved many.

We admire Alexander, Caesar, Muhammad, and Tamerlane, and it is held the summit of praise to have killed many guilty and many innocent men without distinction. By the same title you could praise the Nemean lion, the Lernaean hydra, and the Calydonian boar. Caesar’s avowal is foul: that 1,192,000 men were killed by him--and he is not yet speaking of the civil war. Pompey inscribed in Minerva’s shrine that 2,180,000 men had been routed, put to flight, killed, or received in surrender by him. What is this, O my God, that in human society, even among cultivated minds, to have killed many should hold the summit of praise? Such savagery cannot be veiled by the pretext of justice, for those who waged unjust wars also possessed that glory.

We complain of these things in vain. Wars existed when the world was born, and the day of decision will find men still at war. The world was too narrow for two brothers, since Cain thought Abel was going to be more blessed than he. The wars of the Giants followed, and the Flood enclosed the discordant in one abyss. After the Flood, Noah and his sons at first governed one family, until the earth was divided and Nimrod reigned in the plain of Shinar. Indeed, grave wars occurred while Noah, Shem, Japheth, and Ham were still alive; nor could great-grandfathers, grandfathers, and fathers reconcile their descendants to peace. Those wars are narrated in Genesis 14. They occurred 344 years after the Flood, at which time Noah, Shem, Arphaxad, Salah, Eber, Peleg, Reu, Serug, and Nahor were alive, so that it was astonishing that tyrannies had arisen so quickly. For the battle which Moses recounts was not the first. Those kings had already served Chedorlaomer, king of the Elamites, for twelve years; therefore they had been conquered in war twelve years before, and wars were already customary. An indication of this is that Chedorlaomer had kings allied with him and, although he reigned in Elymais, far distant from the Canaanites, nevertheless oppressed them with servitude.

Moreover, these wars were cruel. Genesis 14:5: “Therefore, in the fourteenth year Chedorlaomer came, and the kings who were with him; and they struck the Rephaim in Ashteroth-karnaim, and the Zuzim with them, and the Emim in Shaveh-kiriathaim, and the Horites in the mountains of Seir, as far as the plains of Paran, which is in the wilderness.” Wars have continued in this discipline and sequence down to our own times.

§ 3. Even the most just wars have this common evil: that discipline lies prostrate in them and vices grow strong. For since in war there are the greatest labors and continual dangers, the minds of foolish soldiers are detained by the sweetness of pleasures and of every vice, lest they desert the camp. Hence nothing corrupts morals as much as military service, in which most things are committed with impunity. War therefore makes men savage and desirous of every evil. Deeds that are judged disgraceful in a state and well-ordered city are games in a camp. For what form of evil is usually absent in captured cities? Thus those who contaminate victory with enormous crimes are much more pitiable than those whom they butcher. For greater crimes are usually committed while a city is being captured than those for which it deserves to be captured.

A sure sign of such great impiety is that, amid present danger and the slaughter of the dying, they undertake no serious thought for salvation. They have death upon their lips and experience what that author says:

Κοινὸς Ἐνθάλλιος, καὶ τὸν κτείνοντα κτείνει.

Death is common to all; it kills the killer.

This is what shows a mind hardened by evils and stubborn against divine grace: not to die steadfastly, but to die fixed in one's vices; to be moved by no danger to repentance, but to grow hardened in the very evils. The reason is that riches are the end of such great contests:

To such a degree the love of gold alone knows not how
To fear steel and death. Laws are lost without distinction;
And you, riches, vilest part of things,
Have stirred up the contest.

§ 4. Hence neither superstition deterred pagans from the shrines of their gods, nor religion Christians from violating sacred buildings.

The humanity of Fabius is praised because, when he had overthrown Tarentum, he did not rage against its gods but said that he was leaving the Tarentines their angry gods. Fabius is therefore praised because he preferred to abstain from plundering images rather than carry away many great things. The ancients, however, were more wicked even within the temples of their gods. Troy herself, as I said--Augustine says this in *The City of God*, Book I, chapter 4--"the mother of the Roman people, was unable in the consecrated places of her gods to defend her citizens from the fire and sword of the Greeks, who worshiped those same gods." Indeed, in Juno's asylum:

Phoenix and dire Ulysses, chosen guards,
Watched over the spoil; here from every side was heaped
The treasure of Troy, snatched from the burning sanctuaries,
Tables of the gods and bowls of solid gold,
And captive raiment. Boys and trembling mothers
Stand round in a long line.

Plainly, the place consecrated to so great a goddess was chosen not as one from which it was unlawful to lead captives away, but as one in which it pleased them to shut captives up.

To destroy those idols and brothels was not indeed a crime; but it is monstrous sacrilege when we see that Christians spare not even the churches and sacred things of Christians. Those Athenians, the inventors of all literature and humane culture, waged wars not for justice or piety, but for wealth, as those who sought their aid attest. For this reason the people of Eggesta deceived the Athenians by a notable stratagem: intending to procure auxiliaries by means of

money, they borrowed valuables from their neighbors, adorned their temples and houses, and, by producing a false belief in their riches, obtained assistance.

§ 5. A prince must always fear war, although his enemies are weak and by no means his equals. For the die of war is uncertain. Diogenes the Cynic reproached Philip, saying that he was a spectator of Philip's folly, since, while possessing so many things, he put them all in danger and did so under no necessity. For what more insane thing can be conceived than that the lord of so many kingdoms should be exposed, like a target, to an uncertain missile? All things in human life are uncertain, but nothing is more uncertain than war. A single hour overturns acquired and expected riches and distinctions. What is gravest, in war it is not permissible to err twice. Indeed, it is also customary that those princes to whom the labor belongs do not receive its fruit. Others triumph and say:

Those who, with blood shed, won this fatherland.

But the gravest thing of all in war for a commander or a state is that they are frequently stripped of their goods by their own soldiers and tribunes and fall into great calamities. For very many of the soldiers find it profitable for war to be prolonged, something they easily accomplish through their idleness and negligence. The Carthaginians had ended their war against the Romans; peace and treaties had been made, when suddenly the army that was to be discharged made Matho and Spendius its commanders and brought upon the Carthaginians a war much more dangerous than the one that had been waged against the Romans. The same thing happened in Italy within the lifetime of our grandfathers, when affairs were peaceful: bands of soldiers occupied and plundered towns and citadels. Indeed, the illustrious warrior Francesco Sforza occupied Milan, for which he had fought. Most soldiers in Italy at that time were disposed in the same way, although they did not obtain a duchy. A prince must fear his own forces no less than those of another.

§ 6. Nor do victors obtain the praise they desired. Nothing is so receptive of malice and talk as war. Losses always occur, and princes are always blamed for losses. Seditions therefore readily arise from war, and the prince is unequal to them when enemies arise abroad and rioters at home: the latter withdraw the prince's strength, while the former break it. Marcian therefore used most prudently to say that an emperor should not take up arms as long as he was permitted to cultivate peace. For since, even in a moderate government, it is difficult to satisfy even the modest expectation of a few, how can one man possibly please everyone through the injustices of wars, when he is useful to few, harmful to many, and burdensome to all? These things arise from the nature of war. No one securely enjoys his fortunes; death threatens everyone at every hour, and an enemy brandishes the sword that is now on the point of sticking in his throat. I therefore require the prince to be a guardian of peace. "Peace," as Nazianzen says, "is a good praised by all, but preserved by few."

Experience teaches that those who have triumphed most splendidly have been crushed by victorious envy. When Camillus triumphed after the plunder of Veii with white horses, he appeared to rival the gods; but he experienced that whatever exceeds the common lot is exposed to the envy of others. For all men envy those above them unless they are very good. They even envy friends and those who benefit them. Saul rejoiced in the deliverance given by David's courage, yet envied his glory to such a degree that he appeared to prefer being conquered rather than conquering with praise for his own commander. Envy is blind and knows nothing except how to disparage virtues and corrupt honors and the rewards of labors. Why, then, should you look to praise when you sometimes see the senate and people disparaging a victor? Indeed, the greater the glory appears, the more maliciously they diminish it, speak against it, devise lawsuits, and decree exiles. I recommend these things, yet, as I suspect, I do not persuade. For the sweetness of glory is immense; it is more easily said to be despised than it is despised.

§ 7. War is easily begun and most difficult to settle. A spark struck from flint sets a forest alight; no force can extinguish that forest once the conquering flame exults through the dense trees. A dispute first arose between the Scots and Picts over a stolen dog; then killings arose, and at last they fought a regular battle under King Crachyntus. Hector Boece, *History of Scotland*, Book VI. On account of one fish which had been given to a certain Felestagoras, the Naxians were afflicted by many disasters; they raged with rapes and killings until, through excessive liberty, they fell

into servitude. Athenaeus, Book VIII, chapter 7, and Aristotle, *The Constitution of the Naxians*. For that reason Archelaus, king of the Macedonians, acted neither politically nor civilly when he imposed upon the Thracian people a fine of one talent because they had sacrificed to the gods and eaten his dog, which had by chance strayed from the road. For from a trifling cause they had almost kindled a vast war. The Thracians behaved more moderately, for the present concealing the matter.

§ 8. Therefore, all who advise a prince to maintain peace--provided that a grievous war does not lie hidden under the name of peace--must be heard even amid the trumpets. Nor do I disapprove of Hanno, who, after the victory at Cannae, saw messengers measuring the number of slain cavalymen by the rings they had brought and urged that ambassadors be sent concerning peace. If Carthage had listened to his counsel at that time, it perhaps would have survived Rome. Many certain evils therefore follow, but the good that is sought is uncertain. Orosius, Book I: "What else should wars be called but evils pressing upon either side? Evils of this sort, whether those which have been or those which now are, insofar as they exist, are either manifest sins or hidden punishments of sinners." Proclus, in his commentary on the *Alcibiades*:

ὁ δ' Ἄρης τὴν ὀνομασίαν ἔσχεν, ἀπὸ δ' αἶρειν, ἢ ἀναιρεῖν, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρᾶς, ἥτοι βλάβης, κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν, ὥσανεὶ ἐκμαλισσομένων αὐτῶ τῶν πραγματευόντων, ἀπὸ τὸ ἄρσαι, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀρμόσαι, ἡ γὰρ δραστικὴ δύναμις προσαρμόζει τὰ πράγματα.

Ares--read *Mars*--is said from αἶρειν and ἀναιρεῖν, "taking away"; or from ἀρᾶς, "curse" and "harm"; or, by the contrary sense, as they speak more gently, from ἄρσαι, which is "to fit together," for an effective force fits things together and orders them. Am I mistaken in thinking that the Latin word *arma* also comes from this? The end of war therefore falls somewhere other than men supposed. Carthage refused peace: victorious in battles, but conquered in war, it paid for its pride with destruction. The ruin of victorious Rome was not dissimilar; other ages seized the fortunate and crushed them.

Many things foreign to men's purposes have happened. Augustus appointed the Danube and Euphrates as the boundaries of the empire, but in vain. From one side the Euphrates stirs up war; from the other Germany, and the conspiring Dacian descends from the Danube. The Euphrates indeed floods fertile and soft Asia; the Dacian and the trans-Danubian peoples invade Pannonia, Thrace, Greece, and Italy; those beyond the Rhine exchange Gaul, Italy, Spain, and Africa itself for their frigid Boötes. History has taught us the disasters of the ancients; we shall teach our descendants:

Lately the Getic tyrant attempted to destroy

Italy, coming sworn from his native Danube

To level these citadels to the ground.

All the peoples, Capitolinus bears witness, had conspired from the Illyrian frontier as far as Gaul: the Marcomanni, Narisci, Hermunduri, Quadi, Suebi, Sarmatians, Laringes, and Buri, and others--the Victoriati, Sosibes, Sicobotes, Rhoxolani, Basternae, Alavi, Peucini, and Costoboci. At great labor to himself, therefore, he conquered the fiercest peoples, but without profit. The cause was the diversity of the enemy and of his own men. It matters greatly with what enemies an affair is conducted. When Eudamidas the Spartan was urged to remember the victories obtained against the Persians and to fight the Macedonians, he replied: "You do not understand that this is the same as if one who had conquered a thousand sheep were to fight fifty wolves." Plutarch, *Apophthegms*.

§ 9. War must also be avoided because its companion is the enormous poverty of all. The treasury is exhausted; subjects are despoiled; the soldiers' ill-gotten goods are ill dissipated; and the supports of life are consumed by devastation and fires. Rarely is the victor happier; the conquered is always poorer. That poverty, however, is an evil counselor and an incitement to crimes, since men strive by robbery to recover what was lost through the calamities of

war. “The poor perish in war,” as a defender of wars rightly said to Antisthenes; but Antisthenes also rightly answered, “More men become poor.”

§ 10. Not only war itself, but also the fear of war sends poverty and hunger before it. No honor worthy of the plow remains; the farmers flee, the fields lie neglected, and cities are deserted. Let those about to wage war not imagine that they will inflict many losses but suffer few; for it usually happens that those who inflict many things upon others also suffer many themselves, since it is most difficult to defend oneself but very easy to do harm.

In addition to those losses, there is also added the labor by which citizens are worn away.

By an excellent device Phocion drew the Athenians away from zeal for war against the Thebans. For when his arguments had failed to dissuade them, but war had been decreed contrary to his speech and Phocion himself appointed commander, he said, “Come, follow me after taking five days’ provisions.” When the old men refused, their zeal for war abated.

§ 11. If anything should happen that makes war appear necessary, let the state ponder this with itself: after the war it will obtain nothing better than peace. But peace already exists and can be preserved by acting civilly and overlooking small losses. That maxim of Seneca is surely golden: “Peace never provoked is happier than peace restored by much blood.” Within a few years we have seen wars and peace in Europe; after all were wearied by disasters, they drew breath in peace. Saint Augustine’s judgment on this matter is excellent, *The City of God*, Book IV, chapter 15: “It is greater happiness to have a neighbor in concord than to subjugate one at war.” Rome waged war with its neighbors for four hundred years, inflicted and received disasters; meanwhile so many citizens were slain and wounded, lands were devastated two hundred times, and spoils were driven off. Who is so estranged from all reason that he would not judge that Rome would have been happier if it had not worn away its citizens in continual wars and had lived in concord with its neighbors?

The Athenians desired peace only when they wore mourning; even now princes turn their minds to peace when they see the treasury exhausted and men wounded from battle. Guevara speaks most prudently in Book III, chapter 15 of the *Dial*: “No one is so foolish and uncultivated that he would not pronounce happier the man who uses a handkerchief to wipe the sweat from his face than the man who tears that same cloth to dry the blood from his head.” Accordingly, one who wages an unnecessary war for the sake of peace acts just like a man who prefers a scar to unbroken skin, although a scar is never pleasing except when compared with a wound.

§ 12. But what if we consider nature itself? Nature implanted strength and rage in beasts in place of virtue, but gave justice to man; and even upon the hearts of robbers she engraved that great maxim: “What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another.” Why do we rush into mutual butcheries? No animal rages against its own kind. Juvenal, Satire XV:

Yet serpents have greater concord: a beast of similar
 Markings spares its kindred. When did a stronger lion
 Ever tear the life from a lion? In what forest did a boar
 Ever expire beneath the tusks of a larger boar?
 The Indian tigress maintains perpetual peace with the raging tigress;
 Savage bears agree among themselves.
 But for man it was too little to have drawn forth lethal iron
 From the accursed anvil, although the first smiths, accustomed
 To forging so many rakes and hoes, and wearied by mattock and plowshare,

Did not know how to hammer out swords.

We behold peoples whose rage is not satisfied

With having killed someone, but who have believed breasts,

Arms, and faces to be a kind of food.

But what is accomplished by wars? Subjects are granted license for crimes, men are butchered, and the innocent are despoiled--and these things for the most part without justice. For what will the soldiers possess if each man possesses his own? Seneca, *On Benefits*, Book IV. Princes, therefore, if they wish to be good and to be accounted good, must act so that they do not draw enemies to themselves, but repel the wicked. Plato very properly preferred the Lydians to the Spartans: the former had hands hardened by agricultural labor, whereas the Spartans dragged along arms enervated by brandishing spears. Nature, therefore, which taught us society, also taught us peace and friendship with all with whom it can exist. For without a friend life is the mutual tearing of a lion and a wolf.

Antiquity itself teaches us this, suffusing the warrior with a certain horror as a man acting against nature. Tertullian, *On the Pallium*: "Why do you not look at those garments? Or also at those modes of dress which, through the novelty of their clothing, pretend to religion: when, because of their attire all in white, and because of the mark of their life and the privilege of their headdress, men are initiated into the rites of Ceres; and when, because of the different performance of dark clothing and a grim fleece over the head, they flee to the mountains of Bellona." And in *Against the Nations*: "Today in that place blood consecrated to Bellona, taken from a slashed thigh and caught in a small shield, is given to her initiates." What else do grim fleeces, flight to the mountains, and the drinking of blood signify but that those who rejoice especially in war have departed from human beings and been transformed into a bestial nature?

§ 13. Finally, this is most detestable in war: not only that, when war descends, innocent and guilty fall alike, but that the good suffer even more. For because the wicked value life little and conscience still less, they are prone to every kind of injury; but the good, because they desire neither to inflict injury nor to plunder, are compelled to mutter over and endure their losses. If the wicked clash with the wicked, the injury is usually thought small by some; but these men also err. For although the loss may not be deemed great in the slaughter of the wicked, it is nevertheless itself an injury for a wicked man to fall by another's fury, and for the man who rages to fall as well, when, had he been removed by a bloodless death, he might have been saved. The price of a Christian soul is great; when it casts away temporal life amid slaughter, it often gives up hope of eternal life. Hence it comes about that even the good do not kill an enemy except when necessary. I judge plainly golden that maxim of a pagan man, Tacitus, *Histories*, Book I: "Among good men it is equally wretched to kill and to perish."

§ 14. Advantages and spoils nevertheless arise from wars. So it is--rather, from victory, and indeed a bloodless and successful victory; otherwise spoil is bought dearly with much blood. But let us call a province reduced to servitude and the soldiers' riches from plunder "advantages." Yet they are not advantages unless compared with losses. You prefer to have slaves for neighbors rather than robbers and pirates, but it was better to have friends. Nor are you happier through another's unhappiness unless you made those men unhappy from necessity. Orosius speaks truly: "As happily as Rome conquers, so unhappily is everything outside Rome conquered." Guevara aptly compares this wheel to buckets of a water-raising machine: unless those that have ascended are emptied, the others cannot ascend full. So great, therefore, is another's unhappiness, from which such great profits arise that they are believed to be well purchased by dangers to life.

Yet the victor is not happy even so. Rome seized the riches of the world partly by war and partly through the avarice of governors, but, crushed beneath the spoils of the conquered world, it perished. Nature placed enmity between the dragon and the elephant. The dragon drinks the blood of the conquered elephant with such avidity that it either bursts or is crushed by the bulk of its falling enemy. This usually happens when soldiers' minds, thirsting for plunder, are

suddenly filled by its abundance and are stuffed so full that they can in no way digest their fortune--indeed, can no longer act bravely or live.

§ 15. To this cruel vanity that drags men into wars there is added another arrangement, plainly unjust, which deservedly ought to deter everyone from war. Nearly all the distinctions belong to the commander alone; the name of the prince alone is inscribed upon trophies. Curtius says in Book VIII that the Greeks acted badly in inscribing only the names of kings upon trophies. Let that itch therefore trouble the prince. What do you, O soldier, hope for after victory? So many thousands of comrades lie dead, and they indeed with praise, but nevertheless as a nameless multitude. A much greater part wanders about, needy, mutilated in body, and surviving its own triumph with disgrace. The commander is carried through the city high upon a chariot, seeks applause, and desires to be seen. Yet even that wise Roman Cicero, who desired those things, judges them empty delights and almost the amusements of boys, in the speech *Against Piso*. But if they are judged the greatest things, they certainly do not belong to the soldiers.

Today soldiers are chosen for the most part from the lowest common people. They are fed like sacrificial victims, and certainly not liberally; they are ruled most harshly, yet still aspire to war. Formerly, in order to escape the military oath, men hid in workhouses, cut off their own thumbs, and sought other opportunities of escape. Now those whom desperation or a desire for license does not permit to remain at home run to it voluntarily. From this another and sorrowful evil arises: that they desire wars and repose is hateful to them. The song of Philemon the comic poet displays an ill-disposed suspicion, but in war it is true:

Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς, οὐδὲ εἷς, ἂν εὖ σκοπῇς,

Τοῦς αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ βούλεθ' ὑγιαίνειν φίλους·

Οὔτι στρατιώτης πόλιν ὀρᾷ ἄνευ κακοῦ.

For no physician, if you consider the matter well, greatly desires his friends to be healthy, nor does a soldier desire to see his own city without misfortune. The desire for war holds them because they have learned no other art of passing life honorably. Hence the Italian proverb is commonly repeated: "War sows thieves, whom peace reaps with the sword and the noose." For in truth, wholly devoted to idleness, luxury, and cruelty, they turn to robbery and theft. The cause of these evils is the corruption of our military service. Formerly, such was military discipline that the soldier earnestly desired to lay down his arms, received discharge as a benefit of the highest order, and returned to the fields--even men who had been consuls and celebrated triumphs. Veterans thought themselves so well treated if, when released from service, lands were given to them for their campaigns. Now many place everything in the military art and therefore retain their arms, as though life itself must be broken off together with war.

Kings must guard against nothing more than employing these men as counselors concerning the undertaking of war. For they fill the kings' minds with disturbance and vain hope, with no other end than that, when necessity presses, they themselves may be applied to affairs. It certainly happens that where military service is prolonged, a few tribunes and common soldiers are more powerful than the greatest governments. How small a part of Rome--not to say of the whole empire, but of one city--were the Praetorian soldiers; yet how often did they make emperors and kill the emperors they had made? Therefore, when there is war, affairs at home are uncertain and those abroad are afflicted.

CHAPTER III

That War Is Lawful

§ 1. That old dispute concerns, not indeed whether it is lawful to wage war at all, but whether it is lawful for Christians. For thus Julian the Apostate reproached them in mockery: the other cheek must be given to the man who gives a blow; therefore vengeance must not be taken by war. The Manichaeans also prohibited war altogether; Saint Augustine refutes them in Book XXII, chapter 74, *Against Faustus the Manichaean*: “Nor should he wonder at or recoil from the wars waged through Moses, because in them also he followed divine commands, not raging but obeying; nor did God rage when he commanded those things, but rendered to the deserving what they deserved and crushed those who deserved it. For what is blamed in war? Is it that men who will someday die are sometimes killed, so that those who will live may be subdued in peace? To reprehend this belongs to the timid, not to the religious. The desire to harm, the cruelty of vengeance, an unappeased and implacable spirit, the savagery of rebellion, the lust for domination, and anything similar--these are the things that are rightly blamed in wars. Wars themselves are often undertaken by good men so that these things may also rightly be punished, against the violence of those who resist, when either God or some legitimate government commands them and when those good men are found in that order of human affairs in which the order itself justly constrains them either to command some such thing or to obey in such matters.”

Otherwise John, when soldiers came to him to be baptized and said, “And what shall we do?” would have answered them: “Cast away your arms, abandon that military life, strike no one, wound no one, lay no one low.” But because he knew that, when they did these things in military service, they were not murderers but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries but defenders of the public safety, he answered them: “Extort nothing from anyone; falsely accuse no one; let your pay suffice for you.” But because the Manichaeans were accustomed openly to blaspheme John, let them hear the Lord Jesus Christ himself commanding that this pay be rendered to Caesar, which John says ought to suffice for the soldier: “Render,” he says, “to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” For taxes are paid for this purpose, that pay may be furnished to the soldier for necessary wars. Deservedly, too, he praised the faith of that centurion who said, “And I am a man placed under authority, having soldiers under me; and I say to this one, ‘Go,’ and he goes; and to another, ‘Come,’ and he comes; and to my servant, ‘Do this,’ and he does it”; he did not command him to desert that military service.

Wycliffe is accused of the same error by Thomas Waldensis. Cornelius Agrippa, the arch-magician, held the same opinion. So did Erasmus. Luther judged the matter according to his passion and uncontrollable anger: he forbade war to be waged against the Turks because the Turk himself was the scourge of God; against the Pope and the Catholics he commanded it and caused them to be attacked.

§ 2. The whole of the Old Scripture teaches that war is not unlawful by its nature, nor prohibited by God. Abraham in Genesis 14 conquered in war the kings who had conquered; Moses and Joshua occupied Canaan by the right of war. For although God had given them that land, he nevertheless willed it to be obtained by arms. Indeed, he also dictated the laws of war. Numbers 10:9: “If you go out from your land to war against enemies who fight against you, you shall sound with trumpets of alarm, and there shall be remembrance of you before the Lord your God, that you may be delivered from the hands of your enemies.” And in chapter 21:14 the Book of the Wars of the Lord is cited; these were without doubt deeds performed with the Lord’s approval. And Deuteronomy 20:1: “If you go out to war against your enemies and see cavalry and chariots, and a multitude of the enemy’s army greater than you have, you shall not fear them, because the Lord your God is with you, who brought you out of the land of Egypt. And when the battle is now drawing near, the priest shall stand before the battle line and shall speak thus to the people: ‘Hear, Israel: today you join battle against your enemies. Let not your heart be afraid; do not fear, do not yield, nor dread them, because the

Lord your God is in your midst and will fight for you against your adversaries, to deliver you from danger.’ The officers also shall proclaim before the army, throughout the several divisions: ‘Who is the man who has built a new house?’” And a little afterward: “And when the officers of the army have fallen silent and made an end of speaking, each one shall prepare his own companies for battle. Whenever you approach to capture a city, you shall first offer it peace. If it receives the offer and opens its gates to you, all the people who are in it shall be saved and shall serve you under tribute. But if it is unwilling to enter a treaty and begins war against you, you shall besiege it. And when the Lord your God has delivered it into your hand, you shall strike everything of the male sex in it with the edge of the sword, except the women and children, the beasts of burden, and the other things that are in the city. You shall divide all the spoil for the army and shall eat from the spoils of your enemies which the Lord your God has given you,” and so forth.

The books of Joshua, Judges, Kings, Chronicles, and Maccabees also are full of the history of wars. And in Hebrews 11 the Apostle says that the saints through faith conquered kingdoms and were valiant in war. John the Baptist did not forbid military service; neither Christ nor Peter released the centurions from their oath. For they acknowledged that the license to wage war was given by God. Indeed, the prayers and alms of the centurion ascended before God, and he also had soldiers who feared God. There were also Christian soldiers in wars of old. The Thundering Legion is very well known, which, having obtained rain by prayer, saved the army; so too the Theban Legion, which endured martyrdom through repeated decimations. Tertullian, *Apology*, chapter 42, records that Christians served as soldiers together with the gentiles. But what he himself thought is not entirely clear, for it is certain that he disapproved of the military service of his time under pagan emperors because it was bound up with idolatry.

In *On the Soldier's Crown*, chapter 11, he says: “For, that I may approach the crown itself of the military crown, I think it must first be investigated whether military service is altogether suitable for Christians. What sort of thing is it to reconsider incidental questions when the fault lies in the antecedents? Do we believe it lawful to superimpose a human oath upon the divine one, and to answer to another lord after Christ, and to abjure father and mother and every neighbor, whom even the Law commanded to be honored and loved after God, whom the Gospel also will thus honor, making Christ alone of greater account? Will it be lawful to be occupied with the sword, when the Lord declares that he who has used the sword shall perish by the sword? And will the son of peace engage in battle, for whom it will not be fitting even to litigate? And will he administer chains and prison and tortures and punishments, though he is not the avenger even of his own injuries? And now, will he either stand guard for others more than for Christ, or also on the Lord's Day, when he will not even do so for Christ? Will he keep watch for the temples which he has renounced, and dine there where the Apostle does not approve? Those whom by day he has put to flight by exorcisms, will he defend by night, leaning and resting upon the spear by which Christ's side was pierced? Will he also carry a standard, the rival of Christ, and ask a watchword from a prince, though he has already received one from God? When dead, will he also be disturbed by the trumpeter's trumpet, he who awaits resurrection by the trumpet of the angel? And will a Christian be burned according to military discipline, he for whom it was not lawful to burn, to whom Christ remitted the punishment of fire? How many other things can be observed among the offenses of military duties, to be interpreted as transgressions? The very transfer of one's name from the camp of light to the camp of darkness is a transgression.

“Plainly, if faith comes later and finds some men already engaged in military service, the condition is different--as with those whom John admitted to baptism, and as with the most faithful centurions, the one whom Christ approves and the one whom Peter catechizes--provided nevertheless that, once the faith has been received and sealed, either military service must immediately be abandoned, as has been done by many, or every precaution must be taken that nothing be committed against God, things that are not even permitted outside military service, or, finally, one must suffer for God what the pagan military oath equally prescribed. For military service will not promise impunity for offenses or immunity from martyrdom. Nowhere is a Christian anything else. There is one Gospel and the same Jesus: he will deny everyone who denies and confess everyone who confesses God; he will save the soul lost for his name, but, on the contrary, destroy the soul gained against his name. Before him the faithful civilian is as much a soldier as

the faithless soldier is a civilian. The state of faith does not admit the plea of necessity. There is no necessity of sinning for those whose one necessity is not to sin. For someone is also pressed by the necessity of tortures or punishments to sacrifice and directly to deny; nevertheless, discipline does not connive at even that necessity, because the necessity of fearing denial and undergoing martyrdom is stronger than that of escaping suffering and performing one's duty.

"Moreover, an excuse of this kind overturns the whole substance of the oath, so that it loosens the fastening even for voluntary offenses. For even the will can be maintained to be necessity, since it has something by which it is compelled. Or rather, I will have laid down these principles and the other cases of official crowns, in which that plea of necessity is most familiar, since either offices are therefore to be avoided, lest we fall into offenses, or martyrdoms are also to be endured, that we may break away from offices. Concerning the first form of the question, the unlawfulness even of military service itself, I shall not say more, so that the second may be taken up. Unless I expel military service with every effort, I shall thereafter have challenged the military crown in vain. Suppose, finally, that military service is lawful up to the matter of the crown."

He has the same view in *On Idolatry*, chapter 19: "But now the question is whether a believer may turn to military service and whether military service may be admitted to the faith--even that of the common soldier or any inferior rank for whom there is no necessity of sacrifices or capital judgments. The divine and human oath do not agree, nor the sign of Christ and the sign of the Devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be owed to two, to God and to Caesar. Moses carried a rod, and Aaron a clasp; John is girded with leather; Joshua leads an army; and the people made war--if it pleases one to make sport of the matter. But how will he make war--indeed, how will he serve even in peace--without the sword which the Lord took away? For although soldiers had come to John and received a form of conduct, and although the centurion also had believed, the Lord afterward disarmed every soldier by unbelted Peter. No uniform assigned to an unlawful act is lawful among us."

The very learned Pamelius thinks that Tertullian rejected military service not absolutely, but because it had not been free from idolatry; for he reproves not Christian fellow-soldiers but the placing of the crown upon the head. Yet let this also have been an error of Tertullian. For us it is established by certain reasoning that military service is in itself legitimate and honorable, though dangerous and, for the most part, corruptive of morals. Military service did no harm to the centurion whose faith had no equal faith in Israel. The Church numbers among the saints Alexander, Theodore, Mercurius, Florian, Quirinus, Victor, Ferreolus, Romanus, Julian, Modestinus, George, Exsuperius, Anastasius, Gallicanus, Marcellus, Charlemagne, Arsacius, King Louis, Vitalis, Ursus, Longinus, Marcellus, and Nicostratus. Then she numbers entire legions or cohorts, such as those of Achatius, Maurice, Gereon, Castulus, Cyron, Gregory and Maurus, Theodosius, Callistratus, and others, who were soldiers in such a way that they nevertheless flourished with outstanding praise for piety and martyrdom.

§ 3. If anyone seriously and from his heart condemns every war, I judge him to be not only a heretic but also a traitor to the state; the former belongs to the theologians, the latter to the magistrate. For since all beasts know their own weakness and by what means they can go against an enemy; since we also arm ourselves against lions and tigers; and since nature also planted in us a certain impulse to defend life and repel enemies, without which life cannot be lived, it cannot be denied that there is a just defense against a robber, thief, or adulterer. Neither faith nor any divine law has abolished natural law. Rather, just as it permitted defense against a serpent, against a scorpion, and against other beasts, so it permitted defense against impious robbers. For those who are borne toward injury by malice and desire are worse than those who are borne toward it by nature.

If, therefore, it was lawful for David to rise against the bear and the lion and tear them apart, why should not his sling also pierce the forehead of Goliath when, like a dead dog, he curses the armies of the living God? Because the power to resist unjust violence is given to every private person, much more does it belong to that prince whose office is the protection of his subjects. What father does not crush a snake lying in wait for his son? What shepherd does not snatch a sheep from the mouth of a wolf? And shall a prince not defend a city over which a barbarous enemy is hanging, about to rage against fortunes and bodies with avarice, lust, and cruelty? Wars, therefore, must be undertaken so that

we may live in peace without injury. It is not merely honorable but also necessary when violence offered by force is repelled by force. Nature has imposed this law upon beasts, custom upon nations, reason upon the prudent, and necessity upon all.

§ 4. Therefore, in the state there must be an established ordering both of war and of peace. “It is necessary,” says Aristotle, Book VII, chapter 14, “to be able to conduct affairs and wars, but more to cultivate peace and to enjoy leisure; and to have the capacity to do necessary and useful things, but more to do honorable things.” Other deficiencies may therefore be overlooked in a prince, but to be a commander is a sovereign virtue. No state can endure unless it cultivates the military art. For since men are carried with great desire to seize the possessions of others, where they see no obstacle, there they rush. Therefore, if the prince is not warlike, or if he has cowardly commanders, for that very reason let him expect war. For others will make an attack, as the Danites did upon Laish, and others upon others.

§ 5. Where, then, are the Savior’s commands concerning the offering of the other cheek, Matthew 5? Where is the law of the Apostle, Romans 12, “Not defending yourselves, but give place to wrath”; and Matthew 26, “Put your sword back into its place”? Did not God himself say, “Vengeance is mine, and I will repay”? If, therefore, vengeance is prohibited and endurance of injuries is commanded, war cannot be waged by a Christian.

I answer that the gentiles once abused these passages in order to say that the Christian faith was destructive of the state. Thus the illustrious Volusianus speaks in his letter to Marcellinus, as it appears in Augustine’s Epistle 4: “And then, further, that his preaching and doctrine are in no respect consistent with the customs of the state, inasmuch as, according to many, this is known to be his command: that we ought to render evil for evil to no one; that we should offer the other cheek to one who strikes us; that we should give our cloak to one persisting in taking away our tunic; and that we ought to go twice the distance with him who has wished to compel us to go. He asserts that all these things are contrary to the customs of the state. For who would permit anything to be taken from him by an enemy, or would not wish to repay by the law of war evil deeds to the plunderer of a Roman province? And the other things that can be said to the point, let your Reverence understand.”

Saint Augustine answers in Epistle 5. First, clemency by which enemies are forgiven is useful to the state; for in this way Rome was made great and wealthy from being small and poor, because citizens preferred to forgive an injury they had received rather than pursue it. Cicero too, flattering Caesar, said that he was accustomed to forget nothing except injuries. Second, evil is to be overcome in good when the defeated man is led to repentance, not by the strength of one who rages but by the benevolence of one who endures. Accordingly, the thing must be done when it appears likely to profit the man for whose sake it is done, and it must be done with that intention even if another outcome follows. Third, care must be taken that patience, which is better than anything that an enemy can take away against one’s will, is not carried away by a desire for vengeance. Fourth, those commands pertain more to the preparation of the heart, which is inward, than to the deed performed openly, so that patience with benevolence is maintained in the secret of the mind, but outwardly that is done which appears capable of profiting those whom we ought to wish well.

He adds that neither Christ offered the other cheek nor Paul, but that they further rebuked the unjust judge. Therefore, those commands of patience must always be retained in the preparation of the heart, and that very benevolence, lest evil be rendered for evil, must always be fulfilled in the will. Yet do not suppose that Augustine sophistically approves benevolence in the will but cruelty in the deed. He shows most clearly that, while patience remains, without desire for vengeance--indeed, with a preparation to suffer joined to benevolence--others can be corrected and wars waged. “Many things,” he says, “must be done even to the unwilling, who are to be punished with a certain kindly severity, since regard is to be had for their advantage rather than their will--a thing which their writings have most splendidly praised in the ruler of a state. For in correcting a son, however severely, paternal love is surely never lost. Nevertheless, that which he does not wish and which pains him is done, though he seems to be healed by pain even against his will. And by this reasoning, if that earthly state keeps the Christian precepts, even its wars will not be waged without benevolence, so that the defeated may more readily be provided for within a peaceful fellowship of piety and justice. For he from whom license to commit injustice is taken is usefully conquered, since nothing is

unhappier than the happiness of sinners, by which penal impunity is nourished and the evil will, like an enemy within, is strengthened.”

They say, indeed, that a prince can wish every good thing for his enemies except a good mind; for all good things, if the mind is evil, become hostile. I would wish a good mind especially for enemies, for if they are furnished with it, they will be friends--unless they are enemies by right. Accordingly, those precepts of Christian gentleness neither bind the judge's hands so that he may not punish criminals nor the prince's so that he may not destroy an enemy. Rather, this is their admonition: that neither publicly nor privately should we rage with anger, hatred, or the delight of vengeance; that we should endure adversities; and that if our patience is useful to the aggressor, we should maintain it both in heart and in deed. If by our patience he is provoked to a greater injury, let us maintain benevolence in the heart and apply a harsher medicine in deed, just as a father retains love both when chastising and when indulging.

Each man's right remains to him. A Christian is accustomed to yield in his private affairs; in public affairs a prince is sometimes accustomed to yield, but sometimes to oppose all the strength of the kingdom when he judges that necessary. Nor is it strange that this gentleness of mind is required of us, since neither a city nor a camp can stand unless many men pardon many things in their fellow citizens and fellow soldiers. But even in the struggle and heat of battle, reason, not anger, ought to rule. So even the gentile governors of empires decreed.

Seneca, *On Anger*, Book I, chapter 11: “For what else is it that diminishes the barbarians, though so much stronger in body and so much more enduring of labors, except anger, which is most hostile to itself? The gladiatorial art, too, protects its practitioners; anger lays them bare. Then what need is there of anger when reason accomplishes the same thing? Or do you think that the hunter is angry with wild beasts, either when he pursues those that flee or receives those that tremble? Reason does all things without anger. What else destroyed so many thousands of Cimbri and Teutons poured over the Alps in such a way that not a messenger but rumor carried to their people the report of so great a slaughter, except that anger stood to them in place of courage? As it sometimes strikes down and lays low what is before it, so more often it is its own destruction. What is more spirited than the Germans? What is fiercer in assault? What is more desirous of arms, amid which they are born and nourished, and which alone they care for while neglecting other things? What is more hardened to every endurance, since for the most part they have provided neither coverings for their bodies nor shelters against the perpetual rigor of the climate? Nevertheless, Spaniards and Gauls and the men of Asia and Syria, though soft in war, cut them down before a legion is sighted, for no other reason than their irascibility.”

For the same reason it is also dangerous to mix a drink for men about to fight by which they may in some fashion be deprived of their minds and not perceive their own dangers. The Turks use opium, which arouses a kind of fury in those accustomed to it. This is nevertheless ruinous, since those whom frenzy, not reason, leads are less fit both to administer and to receive command.

Therefore, a spirited prince will wage war, for a robber must be dealt with by arms, not decrees. Soldiers are the fortifications of cities and the sinews of kingdoms. Without the military art, whatever is acquired belongs to the enemy, because it cannot be defended. Cicero shows this sufficiently in *For Murena*: “Military virtue excels all others. It won a name for the Roman people and eternal glory for this city; it compelled the world to obey this empire. All civil affairs, all these splendid pursuits of ours, and this forensic praise and industry lie hidden beneath the guardianship and protection of military virtue. As soon as the suspicion of an uprising has sounded, our arts immediately fall silent. And if this is so, the forum, I think, will yield to the camp, leisure to military service, the pen to the sword, shade to the sun. Finally, let that thing be foremost in the state because of which the state itself is foremost among all.”

David himself teaches how dear military affairs were to brave men and lovers of the state, for he had thirty mighty men besides his armies. It is a divine oracle that kingdoms will perish unless kings cultivate military service: “I shall take away the mighty man and the man of war, the judge, the prophet; and the effeminate shall rule over them, and the

people shall fall.” Accordingly, when several unwarlike princes succeed one another, or one effeminate prince has vigorous adversaries, the state cannot stand for long. It is also a sign that a state is most badly constituted if military practice is neglected in it; for where there are no good laws, there cannot be good arms. Care for military affairs is therefore necessary for the prince. Every region must be traversed; mountains, rivers, cities, and ports must be considered, for the unarmed cannot be safe among the armed. Everyone harasses the unarmed; they fear the armed. Finally, it must be held that not a diadem or scepter but iron is the protection of a kingdom. An unarmed scepter invites robbers. Plato, in Book VII of the *Laws*, commanded that so great care be given to war that he wished even women to handle arms.

CHAPTER IV

That War Must Be Just and Be Declared by One Who Has the Right to Wage War

§ 1. Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II--II, question 40, article 1, requires three conditions for a war to be just. The first is that there be the legitimate authority of the prince; the second, that there be a just cause which impels him to war; the third, that there be a just intention. I shall discuss these questions in order.

§ 2. Since the power of princes varies--some have no superior, while others are sent by kings to govern provinces in such a way that they nevertheless do not touch military affairs--it is rightly asked in whose power it lies to decree war.

It is certain that the right of declaring war resides in the state itself which is complete and does not receive its right from another, superior magistrate. For a complete state is one that is sufficient for itself, or *αὐτάρκης*, so that it can protect itself without another's authority. For this it is necessary that it be able to carry arms against another when it cannot obtain its right in another way. For when the Romans are attacked by the Veientes, their constant and yearly enemies; when the Faliscans and Fidenates make an attack; when allies implore assistance against the Samnites; when the Tarentines insult foreigners and violate ambassadors; when it has been resolved to subdue the Picentes, allies of the enemy--there was need of someone to decree that war must be waged. For those injuries ought not to have been borne, lest the state be lost entirely.

That the right of war belongs to a complete state is taught from the fact that it can bring an action for the recovery of what has been taken and demand satisfaction. Private persons go before a judge; here there is no judge except the injured party, who is therefore superior, because those who inflicted the injury have by that very fact become answerable to the injured: by their crime they have brought it about that they must submit to judgment. For just as a private person who commits a crime in another's territory is subjected to the judge in whose province he sinned, so too, when loss is inflicted upon a state, the state itself can judge the wrongdoers; and therefore it decrees war against others and removes impediments to the common good. But since war is an act *τῆς ἐκδίκητικῆς*, of vindictory justice, and thus belongs to the magistrate, it is altogether certain that the judge of him who inflicted injury is he who suffered it. Otherwise he would have no judge and no protection of justice.

§ 3. Kings ordinarily have the right of waging war, as does the senate or supreme council. Sometimes, however, by the laws of a kingdom they lack that power, and perhaps this is expedient, lest the swift indignation of kings undertake wars afterward to be regretted and to be paid for by the people. The first kings at Rome undertook war by the authority of the senate; afterward the senate used the same power, until, worn out by continual labors, the business devolved upon the people. For unwillingly did the people decree that a war must be endured at its own peril.

The Spartans, who, according to Aristotle and Xenophon, instituted their state very badly because they attended to almost one thing alone--namely war--granted their kings the right of carrying war against anyone whatsoever, and no one possessed the right to interpose or prohibit. This brought them into great calamities, since wars were aroused by the judgment of one man alone. Romulus and the kings who followed did better: they sometimes referred the matter to the Fathers and the people. Tarquin the Proud recalled everything to himself, as did Julius and Augustus; and so that they might appear to do this by right, they obtained the law of which Strabo speaks in Book XV, called the royal law. Certainly, so that war may be decreed more slowly, it is better that the consent of many be required. Yet I judge that such laws should be tempered in this way: that this right be sometimes granted to a king and sometimes denied--granted in sudden emergencies and when there is danger in delay, denied when time for deliberation can be given without danger.

§ 4. Princes who acknowledge a superior, and likewise states dependent upon another, can wage a defensive war under their own auspices and without the permission of the supreme magistrate. For each has no less right to defend himself and his citizens than any private person has; but anyone can arm himself against an aggressor and repel force by force.

§ 5. A prince who is under another and greater prince, or a state which obeys another, ordinarily cannot be the first to declare an offensive war against another. This may happen in two ways, for he declares war either against another prince who is a member of the same state or against a foreigner. He cannot declare war against a prince who is a citizen of the same state, because each has a judge who may decide the matter. Therefore, just as citizens recover what belongs to them not by violence and armed force but at law, so nobles, counts, and dukes ought to hear the supreme judge concerning their controversies. Otherwise the whole state would be disturbed and the stronger would oppress the weaker. The jurist Marcian answered, concerning the Julian Law of Treason, that he who waged war without the prince's command, held a levy, or prepared an army is bound under the law of treason.

§ 6. Nor can a prince carry war against a foreign prince if the supreme magistrate does not consent, although this can be granted more readily. For if the foreigner is absolute and acknowledges no superior, he cannot summon him before his king's tribunal, which the foreigner does not acknowledge. If the foreign prince also has a lord, he can be accused before him and can be compelled by him to give satisfaction; but if that lord is unwilling, not even then can a prince established under another attack his adversary in war without his own king's consent.

The reason is to be sought from the very union and ordering of the members of the state among themselves, which forbids any member to be moved without the consent and will of the whole. For how great would be the losses, and how atrocious the wars, that would arise if some prince of France made war upon a prince of Spain? Would not whole kingdoms immediately be shaken? Charles the Bold declared war upon the Frenchman and moved the whole empire. A great part of wars has taken its origin from private disputes and injuries. Moreover, it is dangerous even to great kingdoms for one prince to pursue foreigners in war, to possess soldiers, and to exercise arms; he who has become accustomed to wars is easily armed against his neighbors.

§ 7. I have denied ordinary power; I grant extraordinary power. The extraordinary power is twofold. The first exists when the circumstances are such that unless war is anticipated, all will be in great danger. The second exists when the superior prince is far away, the cause and opportunity frequently coincide, and the king cannot be consulted; for then he is accustomed to commit to inferiors the right of declaring and waging war. This latter reason has no difficulty: the decision of war and peace belongs to the inferior by commission of the superior. In this way the governors of the Indies can wage war and defend allies, by the common law and power of the office they hold.

There is a difficulty concerning the former manner, for jurists and theologians deny the power of an offensive war. But I except one certain condition: when the state of affairs is such that the enemy must be forestalled. The Turkish enemies drive off booty and give cause for war. The duke to whom the frontier is committed demands the return of the property and is mocked. Meanwhile, a singular opportunity is offered to occupy a certain city which carries great weight for the war and which, if it remains in the enemy's power, can bring Christians into great danger because arms and resources are in it. I say that he will act rightly if he uses the opportunity, for this offensive action is necessary, or certainly most useful, for his defense. Even a private person, for a defense of blameless protection, when he falls among robbers and sees that otherwise he must perish, can forestall them if he sees an opportunity.

§ 8. Against internal enemies many princes and cities have been given power to wage war without the superior's command and knowledge. For they are subjects whom the magistrate can and ought to restrain: first by laws and the penalties of laws; but if they are more powerful than to be held by laws, they must be subdued by war. Further, there is more danger in these men unless they are quickly suppressed. Finally, no external enemy is provoked when a magistrate suppresses his own subjects; rather, he is more provoked if sedition gains strength. Particular magistrates, moreover, if they are compared with the supreme magistrate, are regarded as private persons; if compared with subjects, they are magistrates and bear the sword--not against all, but against those who are subject to them.

§ 9. If two princes contend with one another and the king, for example, neglects justice, does not aid the one who has suffered injury, but allows him to be oppressed, many think that not even then can war be undertaken by those oppressed, but that the injury must be endured. This is without doubt severe, since subjects' bodies and possessions are vexed and carried away, and a prince can thus be stripped of all goods and even of life.

I think otherwise. If a foreign prince inflicts an atrocious injury upon a prince who is under the emperor, and the emperor does not administer justice, nor does anyone else, an offensive war can be waged. The reason appears evident to me: it is lawful to wage an offensive war when, without it, the prince or the part of the state which wages the war cannot be defended. But without such a war the prince or part of the state cannot be defended. There is an example in Julius, Julian, and others, who indeed possessed the power of waging war; nevertheless, the situation itself gives it also to one who does not possess it but is in like fortune. Every year the Germans crossed the Rhine and kept the province under attack. Merely to defend their own territory was too little a protection, either for the dignity of the empire or for the security of the subjects, for before they withdrew they always left the province afflicted by great losses. Accordingly, the Romans crossed the Rhine in turn, burned their huts, and raged with slaughter and bonds. For enemies become very insolent when they see that they are merely repelled and are without danger at home. Therefore, just as a private person, when justice is denied, can repair his loss by another compensation, so too can a prince--and indeed by a stronger right, because the defense of the people rests upon him.

§ 10. Formerly, in the Roman Empire, so vast and powerful, it was not lawful for any subject prince or king to wage war against others, much less for prefects and proconsuls to wage it against their colleagues; and when this was done, it was regarded as a civil and impious war. Nor at the present time is it permitted in either the kingdom of France or Spain, and the Pizarros, who began tumults and civil wars in the West, were deservedly punished. But now in Germany princes frequently wage wars among themselves, and did so formerly, to such a degree that some maintain it is lawful for the princes of Germany to declare war upon their colleagues without the emperor's consent.

Concerning this matter I determine as follows. That power, if it has been given to princes, is destructive. For it is just as if, in slight ailments of the body, before fomentations and the easy services of physicians, iron and fire were applied. Moreover, that conceded right exhausts armies, princes, and cities while they fortify themselves against all their neighbors. It is indeed a sign that the emperor is not sufficiently powerful to decide and settle controversies. Experience teaches how great the losses arising from it have been, and Emperor Ferdinand explains them in the Diet of Worms in the year 1564.

But concerning the power of waging war against colleagues, which is thought to belong to princes, it is best to hear the constitutions of the Empire. The Golden Bull of Charles IV prohibits arsons, spoils, and robberies, which are customarily committed after a declaration of feud, unless that declaration was announced in the customary place three days beforehand. A declaration of feud is the renunciation of friendship and a withdrawal from it. Frederick III established in like manner, in the year 1442, that no one should inflict loss upon another unless he had first summoned him to equitable, just, and customary law; but Frederick complains that immense losses were brought upon the Empire by violation of this law. Clearer still is the constitution made in the year 1495 by Maximilian--or rather by the whole Empire, for very many princes were present in that place. I have thought fit to set those laws down here, that we may understand what has been conceded to the princes of the German Empire.

The first law reads thus:

MANDATE FOR PRESERVING THE PEACE

From the time of this proclamation, let no one, of whatever dignity, estate, or condition he may finally be, attempt to exercise hostilities against another, stir up wars, despoil, capture, attack, or besiege him. Let him do this neither by himself nor through another by furnishing assistance in his own name, nor by detaching any fortress, towns, castles, fortifications, villages, country houses, or territories, nor by taking them away by force without the other's consent, nor by causing harm through fires and similar means. Nor let anyone be present to these transgressors with counsels or

auxiliaries, receive them into his house, sustain them with provisions, or tolerate them. But if anyone wishes to implead them, let this be done only in those places and courts where causes either were formerly, or now have been, decided under the ordinance of the Imperial Chamber, or where they are to be decided.

ABOLITION OF ALL HOSTILITY

Wherefore, by royal power and the force of this edict, we have abolished all public hostility throughout the whole Empire.

PENALTY FOR DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE

And if anyone, of whatever dignity or estate, acts contrary to one or more matters mentioned in the preceding article, or at least presumes to act, by the law itself, in addition to other penalties, he shall be subject to our imperial ban. By this very act we place him under our imperial proscription in such a manner that we make his life and fortunes common to all and every person, nor shall anyone who claims them for himself be deemed to attempt anything rash. Moreover, all his written instruments, obligations, and treaties, upon which he relied, shall lose all force and validity on his part. Fiefs also, however great they may be, shall revert to their proprietor; and for as long as the transgressor survives, the proprietor shall not be bound to confer either the whole or a part of them upon him or his heirs, nor to grant participation in their fruits.

IF THE TRANSGRESSORS ARE CONCEALED, AND SOMEONE IS SUSPECTED

But if the electors, princes, prelates, counts, barons, nobles, cities, or anyone else of whatever estate, dignity, or condition, whether ecclesiastical or secular, and their subjects and associates, have suffered any loss contrary to this peace; and if the transgressor is not manifest but someone is brought under suspicion, while the accusers also do not undertake to convict him, yet do not nourish suspicion from a frivolous report, let it be permitted to the injured parties to appoint a day for the suspect and to demand a clearing of himself confirmed by oath. But if the suspect refuses such a clearing in any way or does not appear on the appointed day, he shall be judged guilty of inflicting the loss and shall be visited with the aforesaid penalties of a disturber of the peace. Nevertheless, an elector, prince, prelate, count, baron, noble, or city must provide the other person, and those who will be in his company, with safe-conduct until he is placed in safety. And if perhaps the letters by which the day is assigned and appointed cannot be delivered to him, it will be necessary to affix and publish them in two or three places where he is thought likely to transact business. And if, indeed, contrary to this mandate of ours, anyone has been despoiled, injured, or affected by another loss, then those who are notified of the matter after the recent crime has been committed, or learn of it in another way, shall pursue the perpetrators with all force, zeal, and diligence, and shall seek them out as though the loss had been inflicted upon themselves.

DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE ARE NOT TO BE RECEIVED INTO ONE'S HOUSE

Nor shall anyone receive transgressors of this kind into his house, or furnish them food and assistance in those places which belong to his superior, or even in his own jurisdictions; rather, he shall detain them and shall seriously take cognizance of their causes even upon the accusation of any person. Nor is there any security, safe-conduct, or privilege which such men may allege, since they are in no way capable of any of these without the consent of the opposing party. For in all privileges and safe-conducts which we have granted, we will that this disturbance of the peace be excepted.

CONCERNING PROTECTION AGAINST DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE

If perhaps these transgressors and disturbers of the peace employ so great a defense, assistance, other aids, and favor that there would be need of a proper army and of leading it into the field; or if anyone comprehended in this general peace, of whatever estate, dignity, and condition he may be, whether ecclesiastical or secular--or anyone not comprehended in it--has been defamed, accused, or affected by some loss, or even fosters and assists these

transgressors, let this be referred by the injured parties or by the judges of the Imperial Chamber to us, or to our legate, and to the annual assembly of the electors, princes, and estates of the Empire. There assistance shall be decreed for the injured party without any delay.

But if it should happen, on account of some invasion or incursion, that that annual assembly cannot be awaited, we give power both to the judge of our Imperial Chamber in our name and to the electors, princes, and estates of the Empire to select some convenient and suitable place to which both we and they, or our and their legates, may come even by force and determine the matter as has been said. Nevertheless, it shall always be lawful for the judgment of our Imperial Chamber, and incumbent upon it, to proceed by law against the guilty, either by virtue of its office or upon the complaints and petitions of the injured parties.

IF ECCLESIASTICAL PERSONS ATTEMPT ANYTHING AGAINST THIS PEACE

If ecclesiastical persons--which we shall never expect--attempt anything against this peace, the prelates who possess immediate judicial power over them shall, at the petition and requisition of the injured parties and without any evasion, exact restoration in full of the losses so far as it can be done, and the guilty themselves shall be heavily fined. And if the prelates are negligent and do not exact penalties from the guilty, we deprive these prelates, just as we do the guilty, of all our favor and that of the Empire, and of grace and protection, as violators of the peace; nor let them hope for any assistance from us in adversity. Nevertheless, a clearing of themselves, as has also been said concerning secular persons, shall not be denied them if there is merely suspicion.

Moreover, during the peace no one shall be bound by any written instruments and treaties against this peace; for by the force and virtue of our royal preeminence we make and declare them all null and void. This, however, insofar as it concerns the remaining provisions of such written instruments and treaties, shall affect nothing at all; nor shall this public and universal peace and quiet of the whole Empire alter anything in other honest and lawful obligations of debts.

THOSE WHO ARE PROSCRIBED FOR DISTURBING THE PEACE

But those who have been proscribed for these offenses shall by no means be absolved by us without the consent and will of the injured parties, unless the law has awarded the cause to them. Hence, by royal power, we also command all and every one of you mentioned above, in accordance with the oaths and obligations made to us particularly for the sake of the Empire, and also the obedience which you promised us as King of the Romans, to observe this prescribed peace and our mandate with all its points, articles, and clauses as steadfastly as possible, unless any of you wishes to incur the loss of all our grace, and of the privileges and rights which have come to you either from us and the Holy Empire or from others. Moreover, throughout your principalities, counties, and dominions, and whatever is finally subject to the jurisdiction of each, we command you to strive, together with all your officials and subjects, by whatever name they may be called, to preserve and advance this established peace, and not in any way to attempt anything against it, whereby you would deserve both the penalties established against transgressors and our displeasure.

ABOLITION OF ALL PRIVILEGES WHICH CAN BE AGAINST THIS UNIVERSAL PEACE

We also set aside and reject all privileges, safe-conducts, customs, and treaties granted by us or our predecessors which can in any way be opposed to this peace, by whatever words, clauses, or intentions they may have been granted. By royal authority and power we declare them all annulled and void, nor do we will that anyone, of whatever dignity, estate, or condition, allege any defense through these privileges, customs, and treaties in any way.

THIS PEACE SHALL PREJUDICE NO OTHER RIGHTS

Nor shall this peace and our edict result in any prejudice, but rather in an increase, to our universal law and that of the Holy Empire, and to other ordinances and mandates issued before this; and absolutely everyone shall be bound to preserve it from the first moment of its promulgation.

These matters were explained more clearly at Augsburg in the year 1500. In the year 1512, however, at Cologne, a league was entered into among the princes and a method established by which violators of the peace could be corrected and punished. The same things were repeated in the same order in the year 1521 by Charles V. These were confirmed in subsequent years: in the year 1522 at Nuremberg; in the year 1526 at Speyer; in the year 1530 at Augsburg; in the year 1542 at Speyer, and in the same year at Nuremberg; in the year 1544 at Speyer; in the year 1545 at Worms; in the years 1566 and 1567 at Regensburg; in the year 1548 at Augsburg, and there in 1551, 1555, and 1559; in the year 1564 at Worms; and in the year 1570 at Speyer. These things were also enacted in other assemblies, but were by no means observed, as the whole Empire complained to Emperor Ferdinand in the year 1564.

Accordingly, an offense against the laws is always committed when an offensive war is undertaken, if it can be avoided, when it is possible to obtain one's cause through the laws. Therefore there remains what was also formerly provided by laws: that to prepare arms, collect money, enroll an army, and invade others is the crime of treason. See Paul in the law *amissione*.

§ 11. When war is waged without the prince's authority, both those who inflicted the losses and their heirs must make the losses good. For although the cause was legitimate, they nevertheless had no right to affect others with such great injuries. Thus it is not lawful for a private person to punish a thief, although caught in the crime, but he must be delivered to the magistrate. Yet they can recover their own property without an obligation to restore it, although not without sin, unless, having pursued the enemies without interruption, they subdue them. Further, if the enemies inflicted harm, they ought not to repair their own losses from spoil taken without the prince's authority; nevertheless, if they have done so, they are not bound to restore it unless the enemies give satisfaction.

§ 12. Tribunes, centurions, and soldiers ought not to attack an enemy on their own authority, nor to rage with arsons and devastations, unless power has been granted by the prince, either specially or generally, to harm the enemy in every way they can. Therefore, they sin gravely when, against the commander's will, they set fire to hostile fields, villages, and towns. For they are not judges but executors of justice, and no more is lawful for them than has been permitted. Thus a soldier who kills an enemy to whom the commander granted life is a murderer, and one who burns a city against the prince's will is an incendiary and is obligated to make good the loss; for a minister of justice cannot rage beyond the measure prescribed by the magistrate.

Formerly commands were so regarded that a soldier could not move his arms without his commander's order. It is the law of Modestinus: "He who in war has done a thing prohibited by the commander, or has not observed his orders, is punished capitally, even if he has conducted the affair well." For this reason Manlius and Postumius were cruel to their own sons. And just as it is a capital crime not to hand over an army to one's successor, or to retain it by force and against the magistrate's will, so too it is a capital crime to fight against the magistrate's will. When challenged by a Gaul, Titus Manlius addresses the dictator nobly: "Commander, without your order I shall not fight outside the ranks, not even if I should perceive certain victory. If you permit it, I shall meet the challenge." The reason is that which has already been explained above, and great disadvantages would follow: for anyone could kill a private enemy as though he were a public enemy.

CHAPTER V

The Just Causes for Which War Can Be Undertaken

§ 1. No crime can be more serious than to declare unjust wars and to wage them once declared. For if one homicide, theft, arson, or adultery is condemned by divine law, of how great a crime shall we judge him guilty who slaughters so many myriads of men, burns and reaps kingdoms, and leaves nothing in whole cities untouched by lust?

There is no purpose in recounting ancient examples. In the year 1599 the very broad and populous kingdom of Pegu was reduced to deserts; yet its king possessed so great a treasure of gold and gems that the victorious king of Arakan loaded from it seven hundred elephants and the same number of horses, and neglected the rest. Bovesius writes of that kingdom, and the account is contained in volume III of the *Thesaurus of Indian Affairs*: “I cannot express the grief I felt when I beheld with my own eyes those banks of the rivers planted with fruitful trees, but deserted and uncultivated, and the elegant and gilded temples overthrown from their foundations. You would think the whole kingdom deserted and uncultivated and inhabited by absolutely no one. The streets, especially those which lead to the temples, lie foul, filled with skulls and corpses: of men killed sometimes by famine, sometimes by domestic steel as they rushed into mutual slaughter, and sometimes also by royal command and cast into the river--which could scarcely be navigated even by smaller boats because of the multitude of corpses. Here I pass over cities, towns, and villages destroyed with all their inhabitants, so that no one may believe a more savage tyrant ever existed.”

The same fortune befell the most flourishing kingdom of Martaban, which was also reduced to desolation by the Siamese, as the same *Thesaurus* testifies. The king retained thirty thousand men with himself; two hundred thousand, stunned by fear of death, wandered through mountains and forests; every field was uncultivated and rough in the year 1599. He who gave counsel for the unjust war furnished the cause of so many evils. Therefore all the souls which perished shall be required from his soul, and the crimes of the soldiers who destroyed them shall be imputed to him.

§ 2. The causes of wars must be weighed with great care, so that the first question may be: Is the war being prepared justly? The second: Can a greater advantage be obtained from a just war than from an unjust peace? The first can be decided by theologians and jurists; the second remains uncertain until the fruit of victory. The Athenians were accustomed to hear philosophers and orators concerning the justice of a war. But if a war is undertaken unjustly, although victory follows, the wicked victor cannot remain fortunate for long.

Οὐδεὶς στρατεύων ἀδίκως σῶς ἦλθεν πάλιν.

No one who wages war unjustly returns safe.

Injustice sometimes prevails for a time, but in the end it is punished more severely. Alexander undertook many wars unjustly and conducted them uncontrollably and proudly; but he himself, together with his mother, wives, children, and whole family, paid the penalties. This would not have happened if he had remained in his own Macedonia and had not raised soldiers and centurions to such great power.

The very magnitude of the matters declares that great diligence is necessary in deciding the case, so that the justice of the war may be established. For the judge sits in the gravest cause, one which involves the fortunes of an entire kingdom and the lives of many in a single crisis.

There is a rule of law, and it is legitimate: proofs in criminal matters ought to be clearer than the noonday light. For no equity allows a defendant to fall by certain death in a doubtful cause. How, then, are so many thousands cut down when it is not clear which party has taken up arms more justly? A judge ought to follow only things proved and to adjudicate only matters which are clear: law *illicitas*, section *veritas*, *On the Office of a Provincial Governor*. If this is

observed for a private defendant where an inheritance and little fields--or indeed the worthless life of one man--are at issue, what shall we judge must be done in great matters and with entire peoples?

But if the reasons for the adversaries and against them have equal weight, the war must now be suspended, or the matter must be investigated more accurately and the rule observed which Tholosanus counsels in his *Syntagma*, Book XLVIII, chapter 9, section 14: "Wherefore, if the defendant and plaintiff prove equally, and the witnesses and other productions are equivalent, the matter returns to doubt and to its first condition, whence the defendant is absolved--unless the plaintiff supports the more favorable cause. For judgment must be given in doubtful matters in favor of things favorable: as for liberty, in an action concerning an undutiful will, for marriage, and for a dowry. Nevertheless, in criminal causes a concurrence of proofs rarely occurs, for in them the defendant is not admitted to prove a negative so long as the plaintiff or accuser can prove his case. For a canonical proof is not introduced against proofs. Yet this is observed: if, while the defendant is heard in a criminal cause, he alleges certain facts, as they call them, or circumstances that attenuate or restrict the quality of the offense, proof is taken concerning these when separately extracted. A new investigation is also made by virtue of the judge's office when the proof on either side is doubtful, so that certain knowledge of the truth may be had."

A much greater investigation is fitting for one about to wage war. A light and perfunctory consideration has no force in this matter, for only an error difficult to avoid excuses its author. He will examine the matter not only through his own counselors but through universities, other friends, and princes. And if the rights of the parties are obscure, judgment must be made for the defendant, not the plaintiff.

§ 3. If war is declared upon some prince or state, the cause must be weighed. If the adversary possesses a just cause, satisfaction must be given to him. If, after all diligence has been applied, the cause remains doubtful, the prince can offer himself for a more exact discussion; if he is attacked by war, he can defend himself, for he is not bound to abandon his right merely because his right is doubtful. Further, he who makes war on the basis of a doubtful right commits an injury; therefore, the man who previously defended a doubtful cause now wages a just war.

§ 4. Here too that principle remains: in doubt, the cause of the possessor is better. For this holds in every cause, but especially in a criminal cause, since sentence concerning life is not rendered from obscure matters; but he who declares war has already pronounced judgment concerning life. Nor do princes here have more right over princes than subjects have over subjects.

§ 5. Nevertheless, the man who does not possess can request a judge and demand by right that, since the cause of each is doubtful, it be judged in common and that a part be given to the one who does not possess, or, if the thing cannot be divided, compensation. This has place, however, if the cause of the nonpossessor is more probable; for they are no longer equal, and therefore the condition of the possessor is not better. Nor is the nonpossessor bound to abandon the more probable right. Otherwise, if the possessor had the slightest doubt and the other the most probable cause, the latter could do nothing, which is unjust. But if in such a cause the possessor is unwilling to give anything, he commits an injury and can therefore be attacked in war by his adversary.

§ 6. Nor do I exempt soldiers, especially tribunes and centurions, from some inquiry into right and equity. For if the war is manifestly just, all can serve in it; if the injustice is clear, no one can give his name for military service. If the cause is doubtful, soldiers who are subjects, bound to fixed pay, and vassals can follow a cause that is doubtful. Thus Saint Augustine, *Against Faustus*, Book XXII, chapter 75: "For if a just man happens to serve under a sacrilegious king, he can rightly fight at his command when it is certain that what is commanded is not against God's command, or when it is not certain whether it is so; in such a way that perhaps the king is made guilty by the injustice of commanding, while the order of servitude shows the soldier to be innocent."

For soldiers, when they execute the sentence of a judge, choose the safer part when they follow the sentence of their prince. Finally, soldiers are bound to follow the prince; for by refusing the oath they would add strength to the enemy and betray the state. Certainly, in doubt one ought to favor one's country rather than its enemies. Finally, it is not

customary to summon an unorganized multitude to judge the cause. The reasoning is different for commanders who, when they are summoned as counselors, are compelled to judge the justice of the cause seriously. But if it is evident to soldiers and vassals that the prince doubts the justice of his cause, they ought not to enroll for military service, because they know that the war is unjust. For it is unjust to judge concerning another's life when the cause is doubtful.

§ 7. Soldiers who are not subjects cannot serve in a doubtful cause, because the war does not concern them and they cannot voluntarily involve themselves in a doubtful matter. Further, without any necessity they expose themselves to the danger of inflicting injury upon another prince, whereas by abstaining they avoid that danger.

Ordinarily, however, soldiers of good conscience do not sin here. For those who wage wars put forward the most specious causes, which appear plainly necessary. Further, when a king or prince is of good name, they rightly presume that he does not undertake unjust wars, that he has examined the cause accurately, and that it has been approved by prudent and upright men. Conrad Lancellotus says that laws existed before arms; but I believe that laws were made for laying down arms or not taking them up. After arms, laws were thus enacted.

CHAPTER VI

The Just Causes for Which Wars Can Be Set in Motion

§ 1. The first cause, and the most just of all, exists if an unjust war is brought upon one. But it is brought unjustly in two ways. First, when war is declared upon the innocent, as the Moabites declared unjust wars upon the Jews, and likewise Antiochus and others--with such men, alas, history is full. In the second way, when a war was just at its beginning but is rendered unjust by satisfaction not being accepted. For example, the Venetians seize an Ottoman ship contrary to a treaty; the Turk declares war; the Venetians restore the ship, merchandise, passengers, and all losses, and promise to make satisfaction for the injured honor and authority of the emperor, either according to his own judgment if he commands equitable terms, or according to that of arbitrators if he wishes to appoint them. But if he moves war absolutely and wishes a most noble state to surrender itself to him, they will rightly resist with all their strength, because the sin is not so great that they ought to deliver themselves to a most cruel enemy and, together with their liberty, ruin themselves also in religion.

This cause is not only just but also necessary. For the prince who does not defend the state sins against justice just as much as he who invades the possessions of another. Therefore, against one who inflicts harm, defense is not only just but necessary. Here I pronounce boldly: he who desires peace should prepare war. Here especially has place that saying of Isocrates:

Οὐκ ἀθυμεῖν δεῖ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας.

Those who are about to incur danger for a just cause ought not to be downcast, but rather those who inflict injury. Chilon used to say that this was the difference between a good prince and a tyrant, and that they were recognized from the matter about which they contended: the tyrant broods over another's possessions; the prince defends his own.

§ 2. The second cause is the detention of things taken away. For just as citizens, who have a judge, when something has been taken away, recover it at law and appoint a day for the adversary, so a state, when it has sent ambassadors to demand back its possessions in vain, prepares and declares war. Moreover, the cause of demanding back possessions is various and as diverse as it is within a city. For something may have been taken away by theft or robbery; what had been deposited may not have been returned; justice may have been denied to citizens; or an inheritance may have been withheld.

A war is just when an enemy carries off and drives away the possessions of neighboring lands by plundering. The Roman people waged such a war with the Illyrians and Gauls, and afterward with barbarian peoples. "For things which they cannot possess together, they fight in unhappy want; laborious wars seek this peace, and glorious victory obtains it." For the great and wealthy are attacked for this reason: the wind overturns the oak because it is laden with acorns and foliage; willows are exempt. Thus the Britons were safer for a long time because they denied that there was an ounce of gold among them.

War is also waged when justice is denied to citizens or merchants are detained. Among the northern peoples there were many such cases in ancient times, and atrocious battles. When an inheritance is divided unjustly, there is the case against Jugurtha, who through adoption had received with Adherbal the right to divide the kingdom and had corrupted Roman ambassadors and commanders with money. War was waged for this reason, because he had joined parricide to it.

§ 3. In these causes, not only the magnitude of the loss must be considered, for sometimes it is not worthy of war, but also the design of enemies who are seeking wars. If their first injuries are not opposed, they will be bolder for second

and third injuries; and then, after greater losses have been received and the spirits of your men weakened, it will be necessary to fight men who are more confident.

§ 4. War is also frequently undertaken for the sake of vengeance, when the enemy has injured one in any matter whatsoever. It is not waged so that things may be recovered, since they either have not been taken away or have been consumed, but so that the wicked may be punished and the state made safer by this means. No one ought indeed to furnish vengeance for himself; nevertheless, a state ought not to leave its own injuries unavenged without cause, whether they are inflicted by private persons or by another state. Because it possesses the sword for vengeance upon evildoers, it ought therefore to use it with reason.

§ 5. War can also be waged when religion is attacked and God is blasphemed. This happens in two ways. The first is when foreigners live wickedly and afflict God with insults but nevertheless do not harm others. The second is when they attempt by deceit, fraud, and violence to draw others into the same sins, and actually do so.

If they are wicked and blasphemous only toward themselves, it is not lawful to wage war against them for that cause alone, because one state is not the judge of another state, while it belongs to a judge to punish sins. Nevertheless, by the express admonition and command of God they can make war. Thus Joshua killed the Canaanites by God's command because their iniquities had now been completed. They did not touch the Moabites and Edomites, who were not much better, because they had no command to punish their crimes.

§ 6. But when by force or fraud they attempt to bring their vices into a state, they also give a just occasion for war. Thus the Maccabees waged most just wars against Antiochus and others who compelled men by force to idolatry.

§ 7. This is so not only when they solicit the minds of subjects to crimes by violence and armed force, but also when they do so by fraud and blandishments. When Moses had occupied Bashan and the neighboring regions, the Moabites and Midianites, seeing themselves unequal in war, received the Israelites hospitably as brothers, gave them gifts, and sent their daughters to take care of the guests, so that under the appearance of friendship and of marriages to be contracted they might entice them to fornication and adulteries, and then, once they had been weakened by lustful love, to idolatry. When this had been done, as Balaam had conjectured, God, being offended, would either destroy them utterly or at least, when they had been deprived of heavenly aid, offer them to their enemies to be conquered.

And the deceit succeeded, Numbers 25: "Now at that time Israel abode in Shittim, and the people committed fornication with the daughters of Moab, who called them to their sacrifices. But they ate and adored their gods. And Israel was initiated into Baal-peor; and the Lord was angry and said to Moses: 'Take all the princes of the people and hang them upon gibbets before the sun, that my wrath may be turned away from Israel.' And Moses said to the judges of Israel: 'Let each one kill his neighbors who were initiated into Baal-peor.'"

For this crime a severe vengeance is exacted in chapter 31: "And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: 'First avenge the children of Israel upon the Midianites, and then you shall be gathered to your people.'" And immediately Moses said: "'Arm men from among you for battle, who can exact the vengeance of the Lord from the Midianites. Let a thousand men from each tribe be chosen from Israel to be sent to war.' And they gave a thousand from each tribe, that is, twelve thousand men equipped for battle. Moses sent them with Phinehas, son of Eleazar the priest, and delivered to him the holy vessels and the trumpets for sounding. And when they had fought against the Midianites and conquered them, they killed every male and their kings, Evi, Rekem, Zur, Hur, and Reba, the five princes of the nation. They also killed Balaam son of Beor with the sword. And they captured their women and little children, all their cattle, and all their furniture; whatever they could possess they plundered. They consumed with flame both cities and villages and castles. And they took the spoil and all that they had captured, both from men and beasts, and brought it to Moses and Eleazar the priest and to the whole multitude of the children of Israel; but the remaining utensils they carried to the camp in the plains of Moab, beside the Jordan opposite Jericho.

“And Moses and Eleazar the priest and all the princes of the assembly went out to meet them outside the camp. And Moses, being angry with the princes of the army, the tribunes and centurions who had returned from the war, said: ‘Why did you spare the women? Are not these the women who deceived the children of Israel at Balaam’s suggestion and caused you to transgress against the Lord in the sin of Peor, whence the people were struck? Therefore kill all who are of the male sex, even among the little children, and slaughter the women who have known men in intercourse.’”

God decreed this war beforehand, Numbers 25:17: “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: ‘Let the Midianites feel you as enemies, and strike them, because they too acted as enemies against you and deceived you by snares through the idol of Peor and through Cozbi, daughter of the prince of Midian, their sister, who was struck on the day of the plague for the sacrilege of Peor.’”

§ 8. Not only must a war be just; for it to be waged rightly, a wise man ought to grieve that a just cause of wars is given. For those who eagerly seize even a just cause and rejoice that an occasion has been given seek anything rather than justice. Both Romans and Carthaginians were disposed in this way before the Second Punic War. For when the ambassador said that he carried peace and war, the Carthaginians ordered him to give whichever he preferred, and he poured war from the fold of his garment, not without terror. Augustus acted better, for, as Suetonius writes in chapter 20, he brought war upon no nation without just and necessary causes. For he watched over the empire not to enlarge but to protect it. Therefore, he was unwilling to bring war upon those at peace and grieved when it was brought upon him.

§ 9. A war is also just against those who have assisted an enemy in an unjust war. For that cause the Romans frequently subdued peoples, and particularly the Picentes and Sallentines, because they had borne arms for the Tarentines. They decreed war against Philip of Macedon because he had allied himself by treaty with Hannibal while the latter held power in Italy, although the prayers of the Athenians also impelled them to it. War was also brought upon the Aetolians because they had stood by Antiochus. For the same cause the Histrians were subjugated because they had assisted the Aetolians. The Gallograeci, who were said to have been in Antiochus’s camp, were in the same position; but the senate did not approve the cause of the war, wherefore a triumph was denied even to the victorious Manlius. Thus many peoples followed the ruin of the Syrian War. The contagion of the Second Macedonian War drew in the Illyrians; and while the Roman pursued all who were privy to it, as though by a chain, he subjected the world to himself, with peoples either furnishing causes or the Roman seeking them out.

But for this war, in which an enemy’s *σύμμαχοι*, or allies, are attacked, to be just, two things are required. First, they must truly have assisted, not merely favored, the enemy. For if the Spartans are enemies of the Athenians, the Thebans are not therefore also bound to withdraw from friendship with the Athenians. Since they are free, they can love those whom the Spartans hate. For this reason the Cretan War was unjust. “The Cretan War, if we wish to confess the truth,” says Florus, Book III, chapter 7, “we made from the desire merely to conquer a noble island. It seemed to have favored Mithridates; it pleased us to avenge this by arms, and, because the act was unjust, savage counsel was taken against the captives, so that very many destroyed themselves with poison.”

The second requirement is that they were not subjects of the enemies and that the cause of the war was not clear to them. For if the cause of war was doubtful, they were bound by treaty to furnish allies, arms, and provisions; since they must be judged innocent, they ought not to be harassed after the war is ended.

§ 10. It is not only a most just but also a most honorable cause of waging war when allies are defended. Thus the Roman people, moved by the prayers of Campania, attacked the Samnites, not on its own behalf but, what is more honorable, on behalf of its allies. In this matter it must also be observed that the cause of the allies be just.

Saint Chrysostom speaks beautifully on Psalm 134: “We have right hands from God so that we may bear aid both to ourselves and to others who have suffered injury, so that we may remove crimes from our midst, and so that we may be a harbor and refuge to those upon whom violence and injury are brought. How, then, shall pardon be given to those who use these arms not for salvation but for the destruction of others?” And this is what Cicero advises in Book IV of

The Republic: “No war is undertaken by the best state except for safety or good faith.” For good faith must be kept with allies, lest they be allowed to be oppressed.

In this matter one must take care not to defend the unjust causes of allies. Some soldiers, for example, are so wicked that they care nothing whether the cause being conducted is just or evil. Having bound themselves for money, they serve the very powers of hell. A prince will not lightly employ them, because if money is displayed on the other side, they will soon migrate as deserters into the enemy’s camp. For this is in their mind:

Right is where the greatest reward is.

§ 11. Although soldiers and princes do not weigh matters in this way according to their proper importance, justice nevertheless requires that in an unjust war the commander and the soldiers make good the losses. In a doubtful case, ordinarily the prince must do so, because he ought to have investigated the matter more accurately, if he doubted through his own fault. Next, the counselors must do so, whose ignorance is inexcusable. Soldiers are bound to restore only that by which they have become richer. If the error of any soldiers was culpable, they are bound to return everything they took away. But through the calamities of war men are generally rendered worse. For they rage against the enemy, and once despoiled they turn to plunder; therefore the cause must be both just and weighty.

CHAPTER VII

Certain Causes of War More Particularly Explained

§ 1. All causes of war can be referred either to defense, to reparation of loss, or to vengeance for injury inflicted upon God and men, both on behalf of one's own state and on behalf of allies. Yet because among these there are various kinds and degrees of injuries, I shall speak of certain causes from which immense wars have arisen.

Injury to ambassadors has been the cause of serious wars, and a most just cause, because it is contrary to the law of nations. For if an ambassador is not safe, the hope of peace and reconciliation is cut off. The Tarentines foully violated the Roman embassy which carried a complaint concerning injured citizens, by an obscene insult shameful to relate. Florus, Book IV, chapter 8. But after being defeated in great battles, while Pyrrhus defended the impious cause in vain, they paid for the crime with slavery. The Picentes and Sallentines at the same time came under Roman dominion. Then the Illyrians cut down the ambassadors with an axe as though they were victims; but after victory, axes drawn over the necks of their princes made expiation to the hands of the ambassadors. Destruction was also brought upon Corinth because Roman ambassadors had been violated--whether by hand is uncertain, but certainly by speech.

King David waged a most serious and most destructive war, to the ruin of the nation, against the Ammonites. The cause was that Hanun had violated the ambassadors sent for friendship and consolation, 2 Samuel 10:4. "Therefore Hanun took David's servants, shaved half of their beards, cut their garments in the middle as far as their buttocks, and sent them away." What was more detestable, they hired Syrian auxiliaries against David and brought war upon him. For besides those who assisted the children of Ammon, who numbered 33,000, Hadadezer brought an immense multitude, of which David struck down 700 chariots and 40,000 horsemen. But after he had conquered Rabbah of the children of Ammon, he was very severe in victory, though by God's command, 2 Samuel 12:31: "And bringing forth its people, he sawed them; and drove iron carts over them; and divided them with knives; and made them pass through the brick-mold. Thus he did to all the cities of the children of Ammon. And David and the whole army returned to Jerusalem."

§ 2. There was no legitimate cause why Rome the daughter fought with Alba the mother; but each people, a kindred people, was afflicted until, weary of evils, they imposed the public decision upon the three Horatii and the three Curiatii. Five fell, and the sixth gave his innocent sister as a victim for himself. "Let the cause of the war be stated," says Saint Augustine in *The City of God*, Book III, chapter 14, "as adultery was stated to be the cause of Troy: no such cause, nor anything similar, is found. It was only that Tullus might stir sluggish men to arms and troops now unaccustomed to triumphs." Therefore, through that vice so great a crime of war between allies and kindred was perpetrated. It is surely shameful brigandage to make war merely for exercise.

§ 3. Some also are moved to arms by no other cause than the weakness and contemptibility of their enemies. They indeed have other causes for wishing it, but the enemies' fortune causes them to dare it. This happens if a prince is weak in age or ability, if the people is rather alienated from him, or if a city has suffered fire or war. Thus, after Camillus had compelled the Gauls, when they had been cut down and put to flight, either to depart from Italy or to die, those who owed the Romans the greatest thanks attacked the wretched city with hostile minds--especially the Latins, when they demanded a share in the right of command and in the magistracies. This is one reason why the Empire deservedly remained unimpaired for the Romans, since they found their neighbors so ungrateful.

§ 4. Ambassadors are indeed inviolable and altogether immune, yet on this condition: that they do nothing beyond the office of their embassy, attempt nothing against those to whom they are sent, and, when ordered to depart, obey immediately. Accordingly, the ambassadors of the Tarquins deserved death when, under the opportunity of carrying away the royal furniture, they were purchasing traitors to the city. Livy, Book II: "Meanwhile, when the opinion which

judged that the goods ought to be returned had prevailed in the senate, and when for that very cause the ambassadors had a reason for delay in the city--because they had obtained from the consuls time to procure wagons in which to carry away the kings' possessions--they spent all that time consulting with the conspirators."

The Romans could have punished them, but, lest they further provoke the Tarquins whom they feared, they dismissed them. The matter was of so great concern even to barbarians that when the Gauls attacked Clusium in war and confessed that they possessed no right except in arms, they nevertheless demanded that the Roman ambassadors be delivered to them because these had been seen in the front line and one had pierced the enemy's commander. When they not only failed to obtain this but also learned that the violators of human law had been given the military tribunate, they immediately flew upon Rome. They valued the ambassadors' deed more highly than their own. The Gauls were wresting land from its possessors by force and injury; the ambassadors, on behalf of innocent allies, were three men who had fought in the battle line, with no fault except that they had not been commanded to do so. Yet Rome paid for this fault with fire and near destruction. Therefore an ambassador must take care not to devise hostilities or have clandestine conversations, lest he appear to act as a spy and scout.

§ 5. The abduction of women and the avenging of violations of chastity have frequently been causes of foreign wars, just as they have been of seditions. The children of Israel, especially Simeon and Levi, avenged the violation of their sister Dinah by the destruction of the Shechemites. For one family made war upon an entire city, impiously and with broken faith; they had made peace and abused the sacrament of circumcision for deceit. The cause of the war was indeed just, but after the treaty the war became most unjust.

The Trojan War also arose from adultery, and the Messenian War, which divided Greece into parties, from fornication. The carrying off of Lavinia also roused Turnus to arms. And the first Roman arms, on account of the virgins abducted at the equestrian games, were employed between sons-in-law and fathers-in-law. The Veientes, Caeninenses, and Sabines justly brought war, but because they waged it with remarkable arrogance, they yielded to Roman arms.

CHAPTER VIII

Unjust Causes of Wars

§ 1. For the most part, either unjust wars are waged or, if they are just, they are administered unjustly. When the fury of war blazes up between two peoples, justice stands on only one side. Whether someone attacks a just cause or defends an unjust one, victory never makes him innocent. No one deceives his own conscience so that the outcome may console it; an unjust cause holds him guilty.

§ 2. Among the unjust causes of war, I place first the corrupt judgment of certain prudent men, by which they think that their own state, because it has been prudently instituted and furnished with excellent morals, deservedly subjects barbarian peoples to itself in servitude.

They make a distinction among men, saying that some are slaves by nature, born, namely, to obey, but others born to command. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I, chapter 5:

Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.

And immediately from birth there is this difference, that some things were born to command and some to obey. He proves this in animals and then proceeds in this way to men who are slaves by nature:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει, τὸ μὲν κρεῖττον, τὸ δὲ χειρόν· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν, ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου--διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον--οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλον εἶναι, διὸ καὶ ἄλλον ἐστίν.

Furthermore, the male, compared with the female, is better, while the latter ought to submit to command. It is necessary that the matter be the same in all human beings. Therefore, all who are inferior and worse than other men by as much as the soul excels the body and man the beast--and such are those whose work is placed in the use of the body and from whom this alone is the best thing that can proceed--are slaves by nature, for whom it is better to submit to this rule, if indeed it is so also for the things stated above. For a slave by nature is one who is capable of belonging to another, and therefore does belong to another.

This opinion is both false and destructive of the human race. For from this the very arrogant wisdom of the Greeks thought it a right to subject barbarian nations to its command, and thought war just so that the worse might obey the better; but they judged themselves the better, although it is established that many barbarian nations lived more innocently and modestly than the Greeks. They thought that they had accomplished some great thing when they reduced the Lydians, Sarmatians, Scythians, and Indians under their power and, as wise men, made themselves masters of men whom they thought foolish.

First, indeed, it is excessively arrogant to raise themselves so high and press others so low. Second, one must first see whether he who undertakes war against barbarians born for servitude, so that he may govern them legitimately, also governs his own mind, house, and state according to virtue; otherwise he is more wicked than the barbarians. Third, the barbarians ought rather to be taught and admonished than subdued in war. For why should they serve you? Why should you possess the right of life and death over them because you are more cunning than they?

All nations have taught that this difference is not one of nature but of education. The Romans at first were barbarians, and afterward the Spaniards, Gauls, and Germans--*πᾶν τὸ χειρίστον*, "the very worst of all"--but now they are regarded as the most cultivated of nations, while barbarism has migrated into Africa and Asia.

§ 3. Many unjust wars have also been waged on account of women, even though there was no abduction. Darius the Persian brought war upon Iantinus, king of the Scythians, because his daughter had been refused to him in marriage. This was tyrannical, since he could not compel even a subject to give him his daughter in marriage against his will. It was indeed customary in ancient barbarism to abduct wives or to bring war on account of them. More subtle was the art of the French nobles, who incited the king to war against Charles the Bold so that, compelled by necessity, he might give his daughter in marriage to someone together with the very ample dowry of the Burgundian dominions. Antony did not indeed wage war on account of Cleopatra, for he enjoyed her love, but was driven into war by the ambition of a woman.

§ 4. Immense wars have often arisen from superstition, just as was said above concerning sedition. The cities of Egypt were accustomed to provoke one another to war on account of their gods. Once, when the Alans and Armenians had assembled for games, a dispute arose concerning the gods: which people had the better gods? That frenzy remained in them as they departed. For since each nation's own divinities appeared sacred and its rites most honorable, after they had returned home, the more each man wished to appear pious, the more hostilely he pressed the war.

For this is the nature of superstition: to ridicule the things of another. "Everyone," says Philo in Book II of *The Life of Moses*, "abhors foreign rites and thinks that so much more honor accrues to his own as he tramples those of others more deeply." The source of this proceeds from innate malice and obstinacy. For men cannot honorably defend their own rites, since these contain many unspeakable and shameful things; but in ridiculing those of others, since they are equally absurd, they can be eloquent and witty. Now there is scarcely any war which is not said to be waged for the sake of religion.

§ 5. It is established that the greatest wars have had the most trifling causes:

Ἡ φαύλη τις αἰτία πολλάκις παρεμπεισοῦσα πολλῶν πραγμάτων ὠδίνησε μεταβολάς, καὶ συμφορὰς ἀπέτεκεν ὑπερόγκους.

And frequently a cause of no importance, intervening, has given birth to changes in many affairs and brought forth immense calamities, as Nicetas admonishes in his account of Manuel Comnenus. The greatest wars have often had the slightest and most contemptible beginnings. Cicero, *On Ends*, Book II, says that Xerxes would have attempted so much in vain if he were said merely to have wished to carry away honey from Hymettus. Yet frequently there is no greater cause or fruit of the bloodiest wars.

§ 6. Most unjust wars arise from a profound desire for wealth and honor. Even if other causes are also just, these nevertheless join themselves as companions. Desire for wealth was indeed more concealed among the earliest Romans, more visible among other nations. When the Persians sent ambassadors throughout Greece to ask for earth and water as a sign of subjection, avarice made them restless and judged it equitable that every land be annexed to their own. When Xerxes had tasted Attic figs, he swore that he would occupy the land which bore that fruit—not from gluttony, for he could have bought them, but from avarice, because although he had as great wealth and power as no one before him had possessed, he nevertheless did not have a mind content with present things.

Avarice and luxury together incited the Gauls to invade Italy. For when those who had been there offered wine to their countrymen, by its sweetness they aroused them all to the expedition; but most poured out their blood upon the land unhappily sought. Those who desired the property of others too eagerly lost all their own possessions and their life.

Afterward the same Italy, by the same pleasantness and felicity, invited the Lombards. For while they were in Pannonia, having heard that Italy abounded in sweet fruits, succulent meat, and fragrant wine and enjoyed, under a temperate sky, a variety of all things, they hastened there in great columns. Spain, however, armed the avarice of two peoples against itself and mutually against those very peoples. For the Spaniards, then a simple nation, were ignorant of the resources and riches that lay well hidden in the depths. Afterward the Romans sought them; but, inflamed by this matter, the Carthaginians moved arms against the Romans, which came to rest with the destruction of Carthage.

Thus, while they gaped after Spanish gold and excavations, they demolished their own walls. For whatever cause they pretended, certainly:

Gold and purple trouble the lives of men with cares

And weary them with war.

Nowhere was this clearer than in the war which the Gauls waged against the Greeks. For Brennus exhorted his men to war by the hope of booty. When he had heard from captives that the Delphic offerings were not of solid gold but iron covered with gold, he ordered them to affirm that they were of solid gold, and thus used his men's avarice for the battle. This cause of fighting seemed so legitimate that in Pausanias they said the Persians were foolish because, though rich, they fought with the poor. For they thought the reward of victory to be not justice but the resources of those oppressed.

Accordingly, in this cause they did not deny themselves to be so unjust that King Antigonus was not ashamed to say to a certain sophist who offered him a book written on justice: "You are foolish: although you see me harassing the cities of others with arms, you nevertheless discourse on justice in my presence." Antigonus laughed at these things, professing injustice and great robberies. But more shamefully, the Roman people occupied Cyprus without any pretext, and lest anything be lacking to the unworthiness of so great a crime, Porcius Cato was the commander.

Florus, Book IX, narrates the matter thus: "The fate of the islands was at hand; therefore Cyprus too was taken without war. Ptolemy ruled the island, which abounded in ancient riches and was for that reason sacred to Venus. So great was the fame of its wealth, and not falsely, that the people which had conquered nations and was accustomed to give away kingdoms, under the leadership of Publius Clodius the tribune, commanded the confiscation of an allied and living king. He indeed anticipated his fate with poison at the report of the matter. But Porcius Cato carried the Cyprian wealth in Liburnian ships through the mouth of the Tiber, and this affair filled the treasury of the Roman people more broadly than any triumph."

With similar desire but greater madness Crassus moved against the Parthians. Florus, Book III, chapter 11: "While it was subduing the Gauls through Caesar in the north, meanwhile in the east the Roman people received a grievous wound from the Parthians. Nor can we complain of fortune. The disaster lacks consolation. With both gods and men opposed, the desire of the consul Crassus, while he gaped after Parthian gold, was punished by the slaughter of eleven legions and by his own head. Metellus, tribune of the plebs, had devoted the departing commander with hostile curses. When the army had crossed Zeugma, the Euphrates swallowed the standards torn away by sudden whirlwinds. And when he had placed camp near Nicephorium, ambassadors sent by King Orodes warned him to remember the treaties struck with Pompey and Sulla. Gaping after royal treasures, he answered that he would make his answer at Seleucia, without even an imaginary right."

§ 7. Avarice is frequently a cause of war, but ambition and the lust for domination joined to the praise of complete victory are more obstinate in it. For when enemies, having bargained for life, are ready to surrender everything, why are their prayers not accepted, but the exactor of vengeance presses on until despair of pardon drives the wretched to prefer destroying their possessions and themselves besides rather than being a cruel mockery to the enemy? Is it not because pride, desiring an absolute victory, outweighs avarice? This, therefore, is a cause of waging war, as all histories show. Lucan, Book I:

You, Rome, made common to three masters, were the cause

Of the evils, and never did the deadly compact of rule

Among a multitude succeed. O men badly united

And blinded by excessive desire, what pleasure is it

To mingle your strength and hold the world

In common?

For although his own causes seize each man and drag him into criminal battles, nevertheless the lust for domination holds first place. Ninus is said to have been the first to do this. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book IV, chapter 6: “Justin, who, following Pompeius Trogus, wrote in Latin, as Trogus had, but also briefly, a Greek--or rather, a foreign--history, begins the work of his books thus: ‘At the beginning of affairs, command over peoples and nations was in the hands of kings, whom not popular ambition but moderation approved among good men advanced to the summit of this majesty. The peoples were held by no laws; the judgments of princes stood for laws. It was customary to guard rather than extend the boundaries of command. Each man’s kingdom ended within his own country. Ninus, king of the Assyrians, was the first of all to change the ancient custom, as though ancestral among the nations, by a new desire for empire. He was the first to bring wars upon his neighbors and subdued peoples still untrained in resistance as far as the boundaries of Libya.’”

And a little afterward, he says: “Ninus confirmed the magnitude of the dominion he had acquired by continual possession. Therefore, after his neighbors had been subdued, when he passed with an accession of strength, now more powerful, against others, and each succeeding victory was an instrument of the next, he subjected the peoples of the whole East.’ And in Book III, chapter 14, Sallust touched in passing upon that vice--of fighting for the sake of exercise and from love of praise--“as a great one. For when in praise he had briefly recalled more ancient times, when the life of men was passed without desire and each man was sufficiently pleased with his own, he said: ‘But afterward, when Cyrus in Asia, and the Lacedaemonians and Athenians in Greece, began to subdue cities and nations, to hold the lust for domination as a cause of war, and to think that the greatest glory lay in the greatest command,’ and the other things he had undertaken to say.”

Let it suffice me to have set down his words thus far. That lust for domination assails and wears down the human race with great evils. Conquered by this lust, Rome then triumphed that it had conquered Alba and called the praise of its own crime glory.

§ 8. Many wars arising from the sudden and unjust ferocity of kings have crushed the world. Seneca, *On Anger*, Book III, chapter 20: “For my purpose is not to write of the cruelty of Gaius but of the evil of anger, which does not rage merely against individual men but rends whole nations, cities, and rivers, and lashes things safe from every sensation of pain. Thus the king of the Persians cut off the noses of an entire people in Syria; hence the name Rhinocolura for the place. Do you judge that he spared them because he did not cut off their whole heads? He delighted in a new kind of punishment.

“The Ethiopians, who are called Macrobians because of the very long span of their life, would have suffered something of this kind. Cambyses raged against them because they had not received slavery with upturned hands and had given free answers through the ambassadors he sent--answers which kings call insulting. Without provisions having been prepared and without the routes having been explored, he dragged the whole multitude useful for war through pathless and arid places. During the first part of the journey it lacked necessities, nor did the barren and uncultivated region, unknown to human footsteps, furnish anything. At first they sustained hunger with the tenderest leaves and the tops of trees; then with hides softened by fire and whatever necessity had made food. After roots and grasses also had failed amid the sands and there appeared a solitude destitute even of animals, they chose every tenth man by lot and had food more savage than famine. Anger still drove the king headlong when he had lost a part of his army, until he feared that he himself might be called to the lot; then at last he gave the signal for retreat. Meanwhile, choice birds were being preserved for him, and the instruments of banquets were being carried on camels, while his soldiers drew lots as to who should perish badly and who live worse.”

This man was angry at a nation unknown and undeserving, though one capable of feeling it; Cyrus was angry at a river. For when he hastened to the war in order to attack Babylon--a war whose greatest moments lie in

opportunities--he attempted to cross by a ford the whole broadly spread Gyndes, something scarcely safe even when it has felt the summer and has been reduced to its lowest level. I spoke of this matter when I treated tyranny and cruelty.

§ 9. I judge it unjust to declare war on account of receiving those who have fled from enemies, unless they themselves are authors of the evils. For why, once their country has been destroyed, should its remnants be pursued? The Israelites indeed spared six hundred Benjaminites and even gave them wives, in the final chapter of Judges.

Florus, Book II, chapter 18, confesses the wicked hatred of his own people: "If it is permitted to confess it, there was scarcely ever a more unjust cause of war. The Segidenses had received allies and kinsmen who had escaped the hands of the Romans. An intercession made on their behalf had no force. Although they removed themselves from every contagion of wars, they were ordered to lay down their arms as the price of a lawful treaty. This was received by the barbarians as though their hands were being cut off. Therefore, immediately turning to arms under Megara, a most courageous man, they attacked Pompey in battle. Nevertheless, although they could have completed the war, they preferred a treaty. Then they attacked Hostilius Mancinus. They so subdued this man too by continual slaughter that no one could sustain even the eyes or voice of a Numantine man. Nevertheless, with this man too they preferred a treaty, content with the spoils of arms although they could have proceeded to annihilation."

It is altogether permissible to confess that an injury was done to the Numantines, not only because the beginning of the war was without cause, but also because treaties were violated and cruelty was repaid for clemency. For they wished to surrender if conditions tolerable to men were commanded. But when Scipio desired a true and unconditional victory, they were reduced to such misery that, after battle, a sortie, and flight had been attempted, they finally killed themselves. I shall conclude with the remarkable answer of a barbarian nation. If war is not just, it is brigandage. The ambassador of the Scythians said this freely to Alexander: "You who boast that you come to pursue robbers are the robber of all the nations you have approached."

CHAPTER IX

If the Enemy Offers Satisfaction, He Must Be Treated More Mildly

§ 1. The dispute in this place is twofold. For it is asked, if an enemy who offered an injury says that he disapproves of the deed and wishes to repair the loss according to an equitable judgment, whether the injured party is compelled to accept that satisfaction and abstain from war. Then, if the prince is free either to accept satisfaction or to pursue them in war, what ought to be advised to him, or what is expedient?

§ 2. The Doctors do not hold the same opinion in the former controversy. Some command men to abstain from war once satisfaction has been offered, when war has not yet been consecrated by bloodshed; but if the battle lines have now clashed and the battering ram has struck the wall, some think that satisfaction may be despised and war continued, while others think that men must abstain from war. It appears to me that a substantial distinction must be used and the matter explained by these propositions.

PROPOSITION I

An injury is inflicted either when possessions are taken away, when violence is brought upon bodies, or when reputation and honor are injured by slander; and sometimes all these are combined. Finally, it is inflicted when the divine majesty is injured by sacrileges or by the crime of unbelief or heresy. Each must be discussed individually. I understand these things, however, as done by a public judgment, that is, by the judgment of the whole state.

PROPOSITION II

Among these, the easiest compensation is for possessions taken away and for honor. For money and livestock can be restored or equal prices repaid. Honor also appears capable of being restored by retracting insults and acknowledging the slander. But two things make this matter more difficult.

The first is that not only must the things taken away be restored, but also the losses which followed must be compensated. For that which is decreed in a civil judgment--that expenses, losses, and loss of profit, absolutely everything, be repaid to equality--is also required in war. The second is that, after everything has been restored, a penalty must nevertheless be inflicted upon the wrongdoer, and indeed a twofold penalty. Namely, he must repay something to the man who suffered the injury for the insult he inflicted when he took things away by force, for the man's fear, and for the anxiety and distress he endured while deprived of his property. For this reason, in Exodus 22:4, 7, and 9, the thief is compelled to render double to his neighbor.

When this has been done, the state also exacts another penalty in order to preserve the common good. Therefore, after stolen things have been returned and slander has been retracted, it punishes the theft by the gallows and the slander by exile, prison, or another means. Accordingly, the state which caused the injury ought to make satisfaction in that manner according to the laws. For it belongs to natural law that equality be established between those who have been made unequal by another's injury. Nor is there one law for private persons and another for kingdoms among themselves. For just as, within the same kingdom or city, equality of justice must be preserved by the judge, so within the fellowship of the human race, of which kingdoms are members, equality must also be established among kingdoms, so that if one has taken anything from another by injury, it may restore it by justice. Yet this must be done with such moderation and mild judgment that satisfaction is received and the other state is not oppressed; for the laws which favor a person making restitution in private causes must be observed.

PROPOSITION III

In violated chastity and life taken away, restitution is most difficult. For since adulteries, abductions, acts of violence, and slaughters are punished by death, there appears to be no other manner of satisfaction than that the whole state which did these things offer itself to death and submit its necks to the axes. For all are murderers, all adulterers and abductors; and satisfaction appears to be nothing other than a full surrender to the victor's free judgment.

There is an example in Sacred Scripture. For when the men of Gibeah had killed the Levite's wife by their lust, the children of Israel from the assembly at Mizpah sent messengers throughout all Benjamin to say: "Why has so great a crime been found among you? Deliver the men of Gibeah who perpetrated this wickedness, that they may die and evil may be removed from Israel." Behold: they demand that the evildoers be surrendered. When this was not done, all the defenders--that is, the whole tribe of Benjamin--were destined for death. One state appears to have the same right against another as all the children of Israel had against one tribe. Hence those who by private authority have injured another state are customarily surrendered.

Although this satisfaction appears capable of being required, it nevertheless ought not to be exacted so that all are punished; nor, if one king has harmed another king, is it necessary that he approach him in order to die or hand over his kingdom.

PROPOSITION IV

Therefore, when dealings are between different states, the moderation of satisfaction, so that justice may be preserved, must be made not according to written laws but according to natural law and the law of nations. In this, first, restitution is rendered easier when reputation and fortune have been injured. For it is not necessary to deliver anyone either to scourges or to the gallows, since by natural law the penalty of death was not established for those offenses; indeed, not even by the laws of all nations will theft be a capital crime.

But when chastity has been violated, although abduction and adultery have received the sentence of death by divine law, it is nevertheless not necessary even then that a state deliver itself to the sword. For those laws are judicial and belong to the Hebrews, not to all nations. Although the injured party can exact the death penalty if it has the guilty person in its power, the guilty state is nevertheless not bound to offer itself to death. The case of the Benjaminites was different, for by divine law they were bound to surrender or kill the guilty. They could have given satisfaction to other nations in another way if so great an injury had been inflicted upon a Canaanite or Moabite woman. David indeed committed adultery and homicide, yet he was not commanded either to die or to withdraw from the kingdom. A father also forgave Absalom the slaughter of his brother.

Accordingly, although some king, by the authority of the senate, the command of the people, and the consent of all, has injured another king through the slaughter of some men or by other means, if he himself and the people and senators truly repent, and if they are prepared to make satisfaction in every way, it ought not to be exacted from them that they all surrender themselves to the judgment of the injured, to death or chains. Rather, because of the multitude and the very many innocent persons, he who was injured ought to be content with some milder penalty, and either judge it himself or refer the matter to arbitrators. Joab indeed thought that a multitude ought to be spared even in battle.

The reason for this matter is that war is then not necessary, but it must not be waged without necessity. For either he will then fight in order to compensate his losses or to avenge an injury. But losses of wealth and honor are restored, while those of chastity and death are irreparable; let compensation be made according to equity and goodness. When they acknowledge the injury and offer appropriate satisfaction, it must be accepted. But because the penalty of death and servitude is most grave and a lesser one can be exacted, the injured party will act unjustly if he wishes to reduce an entire state to such severe conditions.

Moreover, he is a judge in this cause because of the other party's offense; but when satisfaction is offered, he deals as though with a party. And although he still sustains the role of judge, he is nevertheless also bound to hear the party as a party, or as a judge hears a party. I am moved especially to think that the matter must be handled mildly because

otherwise there would be absolutely no end of waging war, since no one readily entrusts himself to the judgment of an armed enemy. These observations concern the whole state.

§ 3. But if the injured king demands that all offer themselves to death, or surrender so that the free judgment of life and death may rest with him, or at least that, their lives having been granted, they all subject themselves to him and change the form of their state, I think that those who inflicted the injury must do this if they caused great losses, devastated fields, and plundered cities; for here there is equality of compensation. In lesser matters they will not do it--for example, if they mocked ambassadors, as the Ammonites did when they sent David's ambassadors away with disgrace. I think that so great a satisfaction ought not to be made in such a case and is unjustly exacted. David's victory was cruel because they additionally prepared war in order to overthrow him. For many innocent men and all their posterity would be compelled to pay for those deeds. Therefore, they will be able to close the gates and defend themselves as against a tyrant who inflicts punishments greater than the offenses.

The whole difficulty, however, lies in this: when a private person has committed something worthy of death, he cannot defend himself against the ministers of justice, but must submit to the judge's pronounced sentence. Here, however, the state is guilty and the injured prince is the judge. Sentence is rendered when war is decreed; death is announced to the defendant when war is declared. Therefore, the state which inflicted the injury is bound to die and serve, and because this sentence is just the king can execute it, whatever satisfaction may be offered.

But in this matter there are so many dissimilarities that the argument is rendered weak. For the sentence of a king declaring war upon enemies is, and ought to be, different from that of a judge condemning a defendant. The judge's intention is that the defendant die on account of his crime. But the king's intention is to compel the enemy by force to give satisfaction for the loss, not that the king upon whom he declares war, and that king's princes and guilty people, should die--much less that everyone, even the innocent, should serve in slavery--but that equitable satisfaction be made for the injury. Accordingly, although death is decreed for those upon whom war is declared, it is nevertheless not decreed absolutely for all, but under this condition: unless they give satisfaction.

Moreover, there is a great difference among defendants. A private person pays for his offense with his own head; his wife, children, and kinsmen are immune. But the death of guilty persons in a state is followed also by the destruction and enslavement of many innocent persons. Therefore, they can first beg pardon and offer wealth and other things which they can give while preserving their own life and liberty and that of their people. If these are despised, they can defend themselves by arms against an excessively harsh sentence.

For what shall we say to citizens who have offended in this manner? They will say: "We have sinned. Money was taken away; it shall be restored. Insults were cast; we grieve at the deed. A slaughter was committed; we are all guilty, some as its authors; we shall surrender them. We shall give satisfaction in another way. If he commands us all to die, to leave wives widowed, children orphaned, and our country bereft of men, this is more grievous than ought to be commanded by a moderate enemy. If he commands us to serve, this very thing is more grievous than death. We are suppliants, and we do not beg off punishment; rather, we ask for punishment, but one short of death and servitude. But if we do not obtain this, now that the cause of war has changed, it is lawful to hope for victory."

It is not lawful to wage war against such men; they can defend themselves. The foundation is that no one is bound by natural law to kill a thief or murderer, but can affect him with another penalty, as I said before. Indeed, laws can be passed in some state that a murderer not be punished by death, especially if he sinned only by consent and assistance. Therefore, he is not compelled to this penalty by the law of nature, nor by the laws of an enemy state to which he is not subject, nor by the law of nations, for this is milder: it is customary to spare very many men conquered even in a most cruel war.

PROPOSITION V

When war is already being waged, if, while the enemy's battle line is giving way, they ask pardon and offer satisfaction, it belongs to charity to spare them; nevertheless, the prince is not bound by justice to do so, for he has now caught the evildoer in the very act, and the latter puts forward prayers only for the sake of escape. If, after some battles have been fought on either side, he still promises to give satisfaction, the prince is bound to hear and accept him, provided this is not done deceitfully, to gain time until auxiliaries arrive. The reason is that he who truly grieves that he has offended and is prepared for satisfaction now begins to be innocent; and therefore, on account of the reasons I advanced before, satisfaction ought to be accepted on behalf of the state.

§ 4. I would give counsel to the injured prince that, as soon as the enemy has acknowledged that he erred and has offered a small satisfaction for a great offense, he should accept it. Indeed, let him act in such a way that by his own clemency he mitigates the penalty and imposes nothing harsh or insulting. So far as can be done, let him provide for the loss of those whose interest is involved; yet rather than pursue war, let him make satisfaction from his own property and teach his subjects that certain disadvantages must be endured for the common good.

For thus he will avoid the most dangerous war of all, namely that which is to be waged against desperate men. If they see the extremity before them, they will resist most fiercely, since they are to fight for life and liberty. Then all men who pity them will come to their aid as they can, and will execrate the man who drives them to such grave necessities. But if all else fails, they will deliver themselves into the dominion and jurisdiction of any more powerful man. When the Fidenates despaired of the victor's mercy, they burned themselves with fire; the Saguntines killed themselves, and more effort was required in one city--and not a populous one--than in subjugating the vast kingdoms of Asia.

Let him also consider this: that many are innocent, many have sinned from necessity, many from levity, and most from error. Let him make a great distinction among the causes. For those who were openly wicked and cruel contrary to the law of nations are punished more severely.

CHAPTER X

One Must Proceed to Wars with Mature and Deliberate Counsel

§ 1. When about to declare war, look around at everything belonging to your enemies and your neighbors; and if you perceive that everything favors you, dread the changes of the times. When about to wage war, first secure all that is your own in common, lest you be harmed; then see how you may conquer. When Hannibal was about to attack Gades, he sent thirteen thousand Spaniards and one thousand horsemen into Africa to protect it; from the cities of Africa he detached four thousand men to guard Carthage, having in them at once hostages and soldiers. When Lysander was about to besiege Athens, he drove everyone into it, so that he might oppress it by a failure of provisions. But this is hazardous: for that multitude could have been equipped and could have overwhelmed camp with camp.

§ 2. Mature counsel, therefore, must be employed, and war must not be undertaken except with the greatest care, so that both the justice of the cause and the forces may be weighed. Again and yet again, therefore, let recourse be had to counsel. For what does everything profit when the state is entangled in the difficulties of war? The savings of all are consumed in wars, and as much cannot be taken from those at peace as is spent upon wars. Anger must be conquered by counsel. There is a wise saying of Nazianzen:

Θυμὸν χαλίνῳ μὴ φρενῶν ἔξω πέσης.

“Bridle your spirit,” or “bridle your anger, lest you fall outside your mind.” I should prefer to adapt it to this place:

Θυμὸν χαλίνῳ μὴ θρόνου ἔξω πέσης.

“Bridle your anger, lest you fall from the throne.” Let the king and the counselors, when deliberating about war beneath a gilded canopy amid tapestries, believe that they are engaged in the battle line, and let them possess the spirit of those around whose ears missiles discharged from cannon whistle. If the repose of those deliberating were sometimes terrified by the ball of a single musket, they would decide upon wars much more calmly.

The Utopian prince acted rightly when, as a great number of counselors were deliberating about war and the decree of the senate in favor of war was now to be signed, he secretly arranged for soldiers to fire from a tower opposite the council chamber through its glass windows into the room, without any danger to those who were present but with immense alarm. When they saw shards of window glass flying, they all fled in different directions and sought safe places. The prince admonished them to stand unafraid amid danger, but in vain: fear overcame shame, and the prince alone was abandoned in what they believed to be danger. Courteously pardoning their fear, he said: “Let no one advise war unless he is also able to endure its dangers. You have abandoned me amid danger--lions in word, hares in deed.” We see these errors daily, and Thucydides teaches that they also existed of old:

μετ’ ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δέους δ’ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

While they are safe, they pronounce bold opinions; while they are in fear, they fail in the midst of the deed. In this matter nothing is more dangerous than a prince who, since he is a man, bears losses and insults in a human manner--that is, with a troubled spirit--and, so that he may seem to possess a lofty mind, bears them wrathfully. A faithful counselor will state his opinion not according to the prince’s passion but according to his safety. For a calm counselor is most necessary to an angry prince, since he will give the counsel which the prince himself, when calm, would approve. Many err in this matter when, in order to seize favor, they flatter the anger of the prince--an anger which the prince himself will soon put away. For the wills of princes are not always the same, as Pliny admonishes, but the wills of angry men vanish most swiftly. I remember having read in Euripides’ *Suppliants* these golden words:

Σφαλερὸν ἡγεμῶν θρασύς.

A bold, or boastful, prince is a precarious thing. If a deceitful flatterer is added to him--one who knows how to excite movement upon a slippery surface--he will cast everything headlong by his impetus; and when everything has failed, they will take refuge in the confidence of fools, which consists in promising fortune to themselves.

I therefore require counsel concerning wars to be slow and mature: one counsel surpasses many hands. Let them remember that none feel the evils of war sooner than those who set it in motion. Peter Gregory of Toulouse, the most prudent of jurists, advises and proves the point exceedingly well in book 11, chapter 2, section *On the State*: "In a few moments the counsel of a state produces results no less great than fortune does." Aimoin also writes that all the Burgundians protected their state more by counsels than by arms. At the least, arms must be governed by counsel. For some men are excessively precipitate: while they wish to bring dangers upon others, they do not guard against them, although the power of fortune and Mars, common and uncertain to both sides, must be weighed; certainties must not be exchanged for uncertainties; and, as Sallust says, every war is easily undertaken but is ended with the greatest difficulty, nor are its beginning and end in the power of the same man. Anyone, even a coward, is permitted to begin it, but it is not laid aside except when the victors will it.

In this consultation about entering upon war, the prince must also weigh the counselors themselves: who they are, who advise it, and who dissuade from it. At court there are Furies and firebrands of war: nobles for whom servitude is harsher in peace, when they are compelled to obey upright laws, and from which they free themselves amid the license of war; there are restless men who neither rest themselves nor permit others to rest; there are exiles who, from fear of punishment, drive the hesitant prince to arms against those by whom they were justly expelled. There are men who, under the pretext of the public cause, desire either to avenge themselves upon their enemies or to become rich from princes' pay and expenditures and from plunder taken from subjects. There are many who readily give counsel about conducting a war but afterward refuse to undergo the danger. There are those who look only to present things and desire to satisfy a blazing anger, but do not consider public and private evils. Yet a prudent prince, or governor of the state, will weigh all these things before he undertakes war. For once war has been instituted, as Thucydides says, princes are ill spoken of and blamed for the losses. I locate counsel concerning war in this: that, by as much as youth abounds in fierce martial spirit, by so much the senate should judge it to be its own duty to foresee and unfold every possible event.

§ 3. Let it consider these things. First: Who is the enemy? Is he a Carthaginian? An Asiatic? Is he strong only in impetus, or also in stratagems and prudence? He is foolish who prepares a war of a thousand rams against fifty wolves. These things deservedly come under consideration, lest anyone rashly turn his own fortune and that of others according to hope and fear. An enemy who was not feared has caused the Romans, although they waged war so providently, and others too, greater trouble. Andiscus, a man of the lowest condition and an imaginary king of Macedonia, slew the praetor Juventius. Numantia, a single city, resisted for fourteen years and, after Roman armies had been slaughtered, afflicted the Romans with shameful treaties. The Cretans defeated Marcus Antonius when, in his confidence of victory, he had more chains than weapons in his men's hands. In the Social War Rutilius and Caepio were slain and routed. Julius Caesar, after losing his army, was brought bloodied into the city, and all Italy was despoiled more grievously than by Hannibal. In the Servile War, under the leadership of Eunus, the camps of Manilius, Lentulus, Piso, and Hypsaeus were cut down; and in the other war, under King Athenion, the camps of Servilius and Lucullus were captured, because they went against a despised enemy with less deliberation. Spartacus also and his allies plundered the camps of Clodius and Glaber, and then other camps. In the Apennines Spartacus cut down the army of Lentulus and destroyed the camp of Gaius Cassius; elated by these victories, he deliberated about invading the city of Rome. At last the forces of the entire empire rose against the *mirmillo*. He had earlier been neglected, and the war had been waged rashly until danger aroused their counsels. I have narrated only a few things; but I do not know whether, during the entire time of the empire--if one excepts the Second Punic War--the Romans were conquered with so much disgrace as in these incidental affairs and by these despised enemies, against whom their commanders cast themselves without mature counsel. But they learned through disasters.

Βουλῆς γὰρ ὀρθῆς οὐδὲν ἀσφαλέστερον.

Ἰερὸν ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἡ συμβουλία.

Nothing is safer than right counsel; counsel is in truth a sacred thing. When wars are undertaken without this sacred thing, men sing that refrain of fools: “I did not think”—a capital fault in war. Then this too must be weighed: no one is more easily oppressed than one who feels secure. Nothing ought to be despised in war. Nor should those who are cautious be called timid:

ἄμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει.

Ignorance brings boldness; reasoning brings fear. Set before yourself everything that is to be feared before war. Second: for this reason the Spartans must be praised, who punished a commander with death if he had conquered rashly and without counsel. The Carthaginians acted more harshly: if he had erred, they drove him to the cross—although this punishment could be excused in rashness alone. For they judged that a commander’s rashness had betrayed the fatherland, even if fortune had averted the mischance. Everything must be foreseen and nothing scorned, since the destinies of kingdoms are moved by small moments. Wars depend upon reputation, and by it they are often concluded.

Among the Romans an account of the deed performed was demanded; but if anyone had managed the matter badly through ignorance or accident, he was in no other danger. Few offended through malice. Sergius and Verginius, through mutual hatred, caused a great disaster at Veii: Sergius refused to ask assistance from Verginius, his rival and colleague; Verginius refused to bring it to Sergius without being asked. One must therefore deliberate slowly, since, although you foresee many things, you will be harmed by countless others from the quarter whence you did not expect it. Let counsels therefore go before. Once counsel has been taken, war must be undertaken zealously, for:

Ἐν γὰρ χερσὶ τέλος πολέμου, ἐπέων ἐνὶ βουλῇ.

The end of war lies in hands; the end of words, in counsel.

CHAPTER XI

War Must Also Be Waged Justly

§ 1. It is not enough that wars be just and necessary unless the laws of war are also observed; for arms too have their laws, although they are opposed to laws. First, indeed, a war is sometimes rendered unjust and execrable from being just when it is waged by soldiers whom it was not proper to summon as auxiliaries. Then it can happen from this that neighboring princes and states can and ought, by right and desert, to assist those who previously supported an unjust cause, and to judge that cause to have been made just by the fault of the other party.

For if a Christian prince wages war with another who is likewise Christian, but brings in Turks, Tartars, or other unbelievers and barbarians as soldiers, there is no doubt that he sins most gravely, although he has a just cause for waging war. The reason is firm: although the other party has sinned and is bound to make satisfaction, it will nevertheless not be bound to deliver itself into the power of barbarians, which certainly occurs to the greatest detriment not only of bodies but also of souls. Nor can any prince or state exact from any prince or state the penalty that it open a gate to the Turk and commit its subjects to the utmost danger. Christian princes can also resist and rise against the man who has summoned unbelievers, contemners of treaties, and public enemies of all Christians. For in this manner they will not champion an unjust cause, but will avert a common danger which is accustomed to turn to the destruction not only of those against whom the barbarians are summoned and of the neighboring princes, but also of the very men who summoned them.

It has been customary in seditions to summon barbarians, and by this road the Heruli, Alans, Goths, Vandals, and Lombards invaded the empire. Palaeologus summoned Amurath against Marcus Craconicus, prince of Bulgaria, relying upon whom his nobles had rebelled. Rejoicing in the opportunity, Amurath first conquered on behalf of Palaeologus, and then subjected a great part of Greece to himself. Palaeologus waged a just war; but after he had employed a barbarous and perjured soldiery, he lost himself and his kingdom, and let into Europe a powerful enemy who now beats upon the barriers of Italy, Germany, and Spain. For this reason one must take care that high-spirited and lofty princes are not reduced by the injuries of their neighbors to attaching themselves to the common enemy. Thus, while Bayezid drove the conquered Christian Palaeologus to utter desperation, the latter was delivered after summoning Tamerlane; and Bayezid paid the penalties of fratricide--for he had killed his younger brother--and cruelty, being enclosed in a cage and led about as a mockery.

But let us return to the arms of barbarians. In 2 Chronicles 16 Asa is commanded to dismiss the army hired from Syria; and indeed, in chapter 19 Jehoshaphat is told: "Do you give aid to the impious and join in friendship with those who hate the Lord?" Nevertheless, arguments arise here which defend those auxiliaries. For no reason occurs why we may not employ every kind of soldier, whether faithful or unbelieving. For why, when we employ horses, elephants, and dogs against enemies, should it not be lawful to employ an unbelieving soldier, since they are ministers of justice, and in them piety is not required, but obedience? The Maccabees entered into an alliance with the Romans, and Jonathan assisted Demetrius. Indeed, in 1 Samuel 18 and 29 David joined himself to Achish, king of the Philistines. Finally, in most soldiers who are called Christians there is no great care for religion and piety. If, therefore, we seek the pious, the camps must be abandoned.

The answer is at hand. Nature has arranged it so that men seek every kind of aid for their own defense and do not attend to the piety or sins of the man assisting them. Therefore, considered in itself and by nature, it is not a crime to employ an immoral or unbelieving soldier; but because so many evils arise from it, the war is rendered altogether unlawful. Accordingly, a Christian prince unjustly driven from his dominion ought rather to live an innocent life in exile than to flee to the Turk in order to be restored by his forces. For in making war he will cast his subjects into servitude and cause slaughters--which indeed is lawful, for by the very fact that they revolted they deserved it. But it is

contrary not only to charity but also to justice and the laws to subject them to unbelievers, so that they may be sold, compelled to Mohammedanism, and so that, by removing one dominion from the Christian world, he may make it weaker and increase the forces of the Turks by the addition; nor is the good he expects from it worth so much. For he will hold a precarious command beneath the proud scepter of the barbarian for so long as it pleases him. But if it were certain that the barbarous unbelievers would act humanely, use the victory according to the prince's intention, not carry away the captured multitude, transport their army away, and claim no right for themselves, he could employ their labor. Yet this is the same as if you denied that barbarous unbelievers are barbarians. It has never yet happened; therefore it is not to be hoped that it will. Consequently, they are never prudently brought into the fatherland and are always lawfully repelled.

§ 2. In order that justice may be preserved in the war itself, it is lawful to inflict all those losses which pertain to punishing the guilty, making satisfaction, and establishing the safety of the state. When vengeance advances beyond those limits, the war is now unjust. The Lord God plainly abominates cruelty in battles. King Ahaz of Judah had offended the Lord and was delivered into the hands of the king of Israel, 2 Chronicles 28: "And Pekah son of Remaliah killed one hundred and twenty thousand men of Judah in one day, all of them men of war, because they had forsaken the Lord, the God of their fathers. And the children of Israel took from their brothers two hundred thousand women, boys, and girls, and immense spoil."

But what did the prophet Oded say amid so great a rejoicing? "At that time," says Scripture, "there was there a prophet of the Lord named Oded, who went out to meet the army coming to Samaria, and said to them: 'Behold, the Lord, the God of your fathers, being angry against Judah, has delivered them into your hands, and you have killed them atrociously, so that your cruelty has reached to heaven. Moreover, you wish to subject the children of Judah and Jerusalem to yourselves as male and female servants, which ought by no means to be done. For in this you have sinned against the Lord your God. But hear my counsel, and lead back the captives whom you have brought from your brothers, because the great fury of the Lord hangs over you.' Therefore men from among the princes of the children of Ephraim--Azariah son of Johanan, Berechiah son of Meshillemoth, Hezekiah son of Shallum, and Amasa son of Hadlai--stood against those who were coming from the battle and said to them: 'You shall not bring the captives in here, lest we sin against the Lord. Why do you wish to add to our sins and heap up our former offenses? For the sin is great, and the anger of the Lord's fury hangs over Israel.' And the men of war left the spoil and everything they had captured before the princes and the whole multitude. And the men whom we mentioned above stood up and, taking the captives, clothed from the spoil all who were naked; and when they had clothed them, shod them, refreshed them with food and drink, anointed them because of their toil, and given them care, they placed upon beasts of burden all who could not walk and were weak in body, and brought them to Jericho, the city of palms, to their brothers; and they themselves returned to Samaria."

Here the remedy exceeded its measure and vengeance the measure of the offense; therefore the immense fury of the Lord hung over them--not because it was unjust at the beginning, but because in a just war there was unjust atrocity. Thus, even when princes undertake just wars, they must beware the savagery of soldiers, lest a nation swift to monstrous deeds provoke God in the very victory.

§ 3. Compensation is not to be valued according to the enemies' losses, but according to the victor's advantage. For the enemies' losses are accustomed to be immense. Whatever a soldier seizes in battle he retains by the law of war, and it does not pertain to satisfaction. It is an altogether equitable law that things captured in battle are considered to belong by right to those who capture them. For the freedom of commanders is necessary for encouraging the soldier. In Deuteronomy 20 all the spoil is said to be divided among the army. This is indeed taken from the enemy, but it is the wages of the soldiers; for in a just war the party which defends the unjust cause is compelled to restore the soldiers' pay and whatever has been expended. It is lawful to kill armed men, to possess cities, and to do other things, because the enemies do and attempt all those things.

§ 4. A war in which innocent persons are killed is also waged unjustly, although it otherwise has a just cause. An innocent person, however, can be killed in two ways. First, one who is known to be innocent cannot be killed in himself and directly without sin. Exodus 23: “You shall not kill the guiltless and innocent”; and Deuteronomy 24: “Children shall not be killed for their parents.” The reason is taken from nature, because he who is free from fault ought not to sustain punishment. Injury is the cause of war; he who is removed from injury ought to be exempt from war. Moreover, the reasoning is the same for a subject city and a foreign one. For if Thessalonica sinned, Theodosius nevertheless could not involve the just and the seditious in the same punishment; nor does he have more power against foreigners, whose judge he has become for no other reason than their guilt. Hence in Deuteronomy 20 God pronounces that little children and innocent persons are to be spared. Children, women, and clerics are presumed innocent unless they have fought or assisted those fighting. Sometimes entire portions of armies can also be innocent: for all who believe that their prince is defending a just cause, although they bear arms, are to be considered innocent if only their ignorance is inculpable. Therefore they cannot be killed in themselves and directly as though lawfully condemned.

§ 5. Innocent persons are nevertheless killed incidentally, as the philosophers say. This occurs, first, because they are presumed guilty, as when, after a victory, all who are of military age are killed, because they are judged to have assisted by arms, counsels, or auxiliaries, and a soldier cannot hear and adjudicate the causes of individuals. Hence God spares only little children and women; without doubt, if men were known to be equally harmless, they would not be in a worse condition.

Second, although it were established that many are innocent, because war cannot be waged without their slaughter, they can be killed. For when a city is battered by artillery, the guilty and innocent are alike in the same danger. Third, when a city is given over to plunder, those who meet the soldiers are struck down everywhere without distinction; yet a commander can grant the spoil of the whole city, although he foresees that many innocent persons will perish. Indeed, if they place innocent persons upon the walls, he can pursue his right.

This occurred in the siege of Nicaea, where cruelty, heroic courage, and skill contended. Andronicus was besieging the city. When he saw the battering rams and machines being broken down, burned, and scattered, he entered upon the cruel counsel of placing upon the ram the mother of Isaac Angelus, who was then at Nicaea, and in this way setting the besiegers free to act. Nicetas narrates the history in his account of Andronicus:

“Therefore Andronicus, when he saw that his counsels lacked success, contrived an inhuman deed practiced by few before him. Euphrosyne, the mother of Isaac Angelus, summoned from Byzantium, he now placed before the machines as a bulwark, now struck the walls with her placed upon the ram. Thus at the same time the novelty of the spectacle, the monstrous anger recoiling from no crime, and the endurance of the poor woman--not deprived of life by fear itself amid so great and dangerous an assault--provoked pity and wonder. Then for the first time mortals saw a tender woman placed before iron for the sake of defense and, by a wonderfully inverted order, the frail body of a human being joined to the strongest machines so that those who fought from them might remain unharmed. Missiles were hurled from the walls just as before, but with so much care that, while the noble woman remained unharmed--as though she turned the missiles away from herself with nods and hands and drove them into the hearts of the enemies--they both struck and terrified the enemy.

“That monstrous deed profited Andronicus so little that the Nicaeans, making a sortie by night, both burned the machines and drew the woman by a rope into the city, leaving him to lament like Phineus despoiled by the Harpies, since he had nothing with which to satisfy the hunger of his anger. Thus the Nicaeans, having obtained praise for courage from the enemies themselves, conceived greater spirits and fought more boldly--not only by strenuously defending the walls and assailing Andronicus with taunts, calling him a butcher, a bloodthirsty dog, a rotten corpse, an immortal evil, a Fury of mankind, a womanizer, a Priapus older than Tithonus and Saturn, and, finally, abstaining from no name for a most shameful thing, but also by leaving the defenses and bursting forth from the gates.”

§ 6. Hence it comes about that sometimes each party wages a just war, when some part of a guilty state is innocent and defends itself justly as innocent, while the other attacks it as part of the guilty state. Hence there is something similar in a man who has been condemned in accordance with the allegations and proofs, but unjustly: he can both defend himself justly, and the judge condemns him justly, because he acts according to the laws; yet the condemnation is unjust because it is the condemnation of an innocent man.

§ 7. Innocent persons can nevertheless be despoiled, because the state has greater power over the property of an innocent person than over his life. For the common advantage, it can take away a private person's property; it cannot take away his life. Nevertheless, the laws which have been enacted must be observed, as in the year 1570, article 69: "Let no one despoil a plough, a mill, an oven, or anything adapted for use, whether it belongs to friends or enemies; without license, let him destroy or break none of these things; let them not wantonly pour out or spoil wine, grain, or flour. Let death be the penalty for a transgressor." By the same penalty it is forbidden for anyone to kill old men, priests, preachers, or unarmed women.

A penalty which consists in the loss of goods and liberty, however, can for weighty causes be inflicted upon innocent persons. This is accustomed to occur in all wars. For when God permits spoil to the soldiers, and when he commands a city to serve under tribute, that penalty is imposed upon all, even upon their posterity. Yet the cause of the loss inflicted is the prince who defends an unjust cause, and he is bound to restore their property to the innocent persons.

CHAPTER XII

The End of War Must Be Lawful and Honorable

§ 1. It is agreed that the end of a war can be good although the war itself is unjust and is waged wickedly; the end can also be evil in a just war. In either manner the war is evil. Generally, the end of war is peace, nor does anyone deny this; but they contend over it because each party endeavors to impose his own peace upon the other--one advantageous to himself and burdensome to his allies. Augustine, in book 19, chapter 12 of *The City of God*, observed this end in most wars:

“For whoever looks in any way upon human affairs and our common nature acknowledges with me what I say: just as there is no one who does not wish to rejoice, so there is no one who does not wish to have peace. For even those who desire wars desire nothing other than to conquer; therefore, by waging war they desire to arrive at a glorious peace. For what else is victory but the subjection of those who resist? When this has been done, there will be peace. Wars, therefore, are waged with the intention of peace, even by those who are eager to exercise martial valor through commanding and fighting. For even those who wish the peace in which they live to be disturbed do not hate peace, but desire it to be changed according to their own judgment. Therefore they do not will that peace should not exist, but that it should be the peace they will.”

No one thinks otherwise: wise men wage war for the sake of peace and sustain labor by the hope of repose. Thus it was also rightly said:

εἰρήνης ὁ πόλεμος πρῶτανις.

War is the fosterer of peace. Cicero likewise commands that war be undertaken in such a way that nothing other than peace may appear to have been sought. For the courage to finish a war ought to serve peace.

§ 2. A war whose end is not right, if it is otherwise just--as when the Romans assist the Greeks in appearance but in intention destine the sovereignty of Macedonia for themselves--is indeed just if the cause of the Athenians is just; nevertheless, desire mingled with virtue makes the war evil and makes it be waged badly. For the advantage of the allies was not so much set before the greed of the Romans as was dominion. Princes, tribunes, and soldiers also sin by no means slightly in this place when, although they have a just cause for waging war, they nevertheless indulge their own hatred and neglect the public advantages.

First, indeed, they sin against charity when they exact deserved penalties from love of vengeance, not from zeal for justice. From this arise cruelty against bodies, burnings, and insults. Rude spirits do not weigh this, but wage war when embittered by mutual rivalry or by disasters.

Second, although they sin, they are nevertheless not bound to restore the losses, because they inflicted them deservedly, though not in a lawful manner.

Third, a man who, in an otherwise just war, inflicted evils upon the subjects of the prince who declared the just war will be bound to restitution.

CHAPTER XIII

War Must Be Waged with the Aid of God and the Greatest Piety

§ 1. It is an impious saying that a commander in war cannot be just because so many things occur which persuade or compel him to be unjust. For once war has been declared, vices are let loose among subjects and soldiers. If you are a diligent exactor of military discipline, if you prohibit plunder from peaceful territory and injury, the soldiers' pay must also be paid, and without delay. If you indulge them a little, if money is lacking, injuries will be inflicted upon the subjects--not slight ones, but as great as military license is accustomed to conceive. The innocence of the commander is therefore placed in this danger. Nevertheless, if he has undertaken a necessary war, since he cannot guarantee its outcome, all the losses rebound upon its author. If he cannot restrain the soldier or sufficiently protect the subjects, his conscience will console him if he has omitted nothing whereby all things might be rightly administered.

§ 2. I demand not only justice in war, but also, amid the greatest dangers, the piety of the soldiers and commander. For since great dangers of death hang over them, those who do not prepare themselves for them sin mortally. Thus a war of Christians ought to be such that the camps are not unlike churches; for camps are assemblies of men going to death. Hence both a prosperous end to the war and victory in individual engagements must be sought from God. Since in war very many things occur contrary to expectation, not only forces but also the will of the Deity must be considered. Nowhere less than in war does the outcome answer to expectation: iron and bodies are on both sides; unseen leaden balls fly, and a man is deservedly laughed at if he appears like one trying to dodge them. War is the contest of men in sound health. Therefore aid must be sought from God and God must be kept before one's eyes: for true courage rests upon God.

§ 3. Wars supported by prayers have ended most prosperously. In Exodus 17 Moses prays while the Israelites fight, and the Amalekites are conquered: "And Joshua did as Moses had spoken, and fought against Amalek; but Moses, Aaron, and Hur went up to the top of the hill. And when Moses raised his hands, Israel prevailed; but if he lowered them a little, Amalek prevailed. And the hands of Moses were heavy. Therefore, taking a stone, they placed it beneath him, and he sat upon it; but Aaron and Hur supported his hands on either side. And it came about that his hands did not grow weary until the setting of the sun. And Joshua put Amalek and his people to flight by the edge of the sword." And in Numbers 21:2: "But Israel, binding himself to the Lord by a vow, said: 'If you deliver this people into my hand, I will destroy its cities.' And the Lord heard the prayers of Israel and delivered up the Canaanite, whom he killed after overthrowing his cities; and he called the name of that place Hormah--that is, anathema."

The Lord also appeared to Joshua and strengthened him; even the sun obeyed him, so that it did not set until he had pursued the enemies of the Lord. God assisted David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and the other pious kings, especially the Maccabees, who gained very many victories against forces of veterans. But it must be observed that they were readily heard when they began war after consulting God. For that each man should stir up wars according to his own desire and endeavor to draw God according to his own judgment has more impudence than piety. For if you did not deign to seek counsel from God, how do you seek aid? God is present as moderator at the beginnings, courses, and ends of wars. Among so many battles waged in such various places, wherever aid was piously and faithfully sought from God, you will scarcely find one in which military prayers were not heard.

We Christians have had few commanders in war equal to Narses. In many battles he defeated the most powerful enemies; he always emerged victor through the power of God, not through confidence in his army. Since he was generous to the poor and merciful to suppliants, he worshiped God with such piety that he spent entire nights in basilicas. Thus everyone believed what was also true: that he obtained victory more by prayers than by arms. Prayers are certainly stronger against enemies than iron; and although a Roman historian calls it folly to believe that war can

be brought to an end by sitting or by vows, Narses nevertheless conquered Totila after he had passed a sleepless night in continuous prayer and had left pools that were almost witnesses to his tears.

Thus he defeated Totila, encountered Theudebert the Frank, and crushed his commanders Buccelin and Amingus. He hanged Suitald, king of the Bretons, from a high beam in peacetime as a traitor. He performed deeds as great as few of the ancients: for he experienced the presence of Christ in every danger and deservedly expected the protection of him whose religion he cultivated. God himself is accustomed to preside over the just cause. “Are you one of ours, or of our adversaries?” Joshua, commander of the Israelites, asked; and by his answer the angel showed to whom victory belonged: “By no means; but I am prince of the army of the Lord, and now I have come.” If this prince is present, for him there is no difference whether he gives aid through few or through many, as Asa, king of Judah, piously and faithfully says. God, moreover, even threatens Amaziah: “But if you think that wars consist in the strength of an army, God will cause you to be conquered by the enemies; for it belongs to God to assist and to turn to flight.”

Therefore battle is waged against enemies from heaven: the stars, remaining in their order and course, fight against Sisera when victory is sought from God with humility in a just cause--a victory which is more often obtained by the faith of commanders and holy men than by the strength of soldiers. Thus Theodosius defeated Maximus and Eugenius when the wind turned their missiles back upon the enemy. It is wonderful and beyond every custom of war that, during the reign of Honorius, one or two hundred thousand men fell with Radagaisus while not even one man in the camps of Honorius was wounded. Mascezel routed his brother Gildo with five thousand men after seventy or eighty thousand had been slain, for Gildo scarcely endured the clash. During the reign of the younger Theodosius, one hundred thousand Persians perished in the Euphrates through panic. Three thousand Burgundians, after being baptized and praying to God, struck down ten thousand Huns.

The Christians besieged at Antioch destroyed one hundred thousand Saracens. The Spaniards too, though few, conquered immense kingdoms in both Indies. The examples are ready to hand.

I make this admonition as well: even the Gentiles especially entreated their gods in battles. Hence the Romans did not march out except after taking the auspices and performing sacred rites. Constantine, founder of the Eastern Empire, and Charles, founder of the German Empire, conquered the enemy chiefly by prayers. Constantine passed nights in prayer; Charles ordered public supplications for three days.

CHAPTER XIV

War Must Be Prepared for Betimes, and in Peace

§ 1. Everything necessary for war must be procured betimes. War must be prepared for a long time so that you may conquer more swiftly, for a long preparation for war makes victory swift. Philopoemen of the Achaeans, praised by the ancients, must be praised and imitated by us: when he traveled in time of peace, he was fixed upon the thought of war--how, for example, the hill which they were passing might be overcome. How far he differed from Vitellius, who concealed his cares beneath luxury: he did not prepare arms, address and strengthen the soldier by exercise, or keep his name upon the lips of the people, but lay hidden in the shades of gardens like slothful animals which, if you furnish them food, lie down and grow torpid; he had dismissed past, present, and future things with equal oblivion.

§ 2. Therefore, the first and most praiseworthy preparation for war is to hold brave and warlike men at a great price and in honor, and to entrust civil dignities to them. Rome was a seedbed of the best commanders and warriors because civil honors were granted to martial valor. For it judged it just that those who had undergone the greatest dangers for their fatherland should possess the highest place within it, and that the city should rightly be entrusted to the government of those by whose blood it had been defended. The nobility of Europe also derives its origin from martial valor. Hence writers of the Middle Ages call them soldiers, and the Germans *Knaben vom Schildt*; hence too they all bear a shield and helmet adorned with hereditary insignia. They also obtain the chief dignities in courts. If the young see these men honored, they will be kindled with the same zeal and will prefer to spend life in camps rather than to be softly educated at home.

§ 3. For this one reason the Greeks gravely afflicted their state: they regarded men brave and ready in counsel like plane trees, which they neglected during peace but, when a storm arose, fled trembling beneath their shade. Thus they were readily conquered by King Philip, for he possessed companies of the best and most circumspect centurions. Therefore, in the midst of peace let counsel concerning war flourish and be heard in the state; let no one who is to be a suitable defender and leader of the fatherland lack his proper honor when danger appears to be absent.

Nicias used to say at Athens that in peace he set many men before himself, but in war he was the foremost. From this fact there arises another evil, and one the more dangerous the more hidden it is. For when men of lofty spirit, swollen by the deserved praise of victories, are treated contemptuously in peace, they either migrate elsewhere, or wish for war and, if they can, persuade men to it--just as physicians in need wish for fevers and wounds--or they turn to brigandage and plunder.

§ 4. When provision has been made for men, arms must also be prepared. For if a man provides many arms and great arsenals without men, he acts in the same way as one who procures the instruments of various arts but has no craftsmen who know how to use them. By the best reasoning the great kings of old founded arsenals, for they obtained two advantages from them: first, that they had arms prepared against enemies; second, that the common people were not armed everywhere and did not abuse arms against themselves or against the state. At Rome arms were kept in public places. For, in his speech for Gaius Rabirius against Saturninus, Cicero says that when Gaius Marius was consul, arms were distributed to the Roman people from public buildings and arsenals. Private persons, however, were forbidden to possess, buy, or sell arms.

Vegetius demonstrates the Romans' industry and expenditures in this kind of matter in book 2, chapter 11: "A legion has, moreover, carpenters, builders, wagon-makers, smiths, painters, and the other craftsmen prepared to construct the buildings of winter quarters, machines, wooden towers, and the other things by which the cities of adversaries are either stormed or their own defended; some made new arms, vehicles, and other kinds of artillery, while others repaired the damaged. They also had shield works, armor works, and bow works, in which arrows, missiles, helmets,

and every kind of arms were formed. For this was the chief care: that whatever appeared necessary to the army should never be lacking in camp. This went so far that they even had miners, who, after the manner of the Bessi, drove a tunnel beneath the earth and dug through walls within their foundations, so that they might emerge unexpectedly to capture the cities of their enemies. Their proper judge was the prefect of the craftsmen.”

They had arms factories not only in the legions but also in towns and provinces, as Gottschalk Stewech, the most learned interpreter of Vegetius, teaches: “Those factories existed not only in the legions for manufacturing arms, but also in towns. Appian, in his *Mithridatic War*, is certainly a witness that Mithridates established them town by town. Caesar, in book 1 of *The Civil War*, says: ‘They had conveyed grain from the neighboring regions and from all the forts into the city, and had established workshops for arms in the city.’ Under the emperors the Roman Empire had a great number of factories, and these by provinces, in which every kind of arms was manufactured for the use of the state by the arms-workers. From the *Notitia Imperii* I shall enumerate where the factories of the East were.

“Five were in the East: a shield and arms factory at Damascus; a shield and arms factory at Antioch; shields and arms at Edessa; a spear factory at Irenopolis in Cilicia. There were three Pontic factories: a mail-armor factory at Caesarea in Cappadocia, and a shield and arms factory at Nicomedia. There was one Asian factory, namely a shield and arms factory at Sardis in Lydia. There were two Thracian factories: a shield and arms factory at Hadrianopolis and a shield and arms factory at Marcianopolis in Haemimontus. There were four in Illyricum: those of Thessalonica, Naissus, and Ratiaria, and the shield factory of Horreum Margi.

“But in the same *Notitia* the factories of the West are of a somewhat greater number. First in Illyricum: at Sirmium a factory of shields, ballistae, and arms; a shield factory at Acincum; a shield factory at Carnuntum; a shield factory at Lauriacum; and an arms factory at Salona. At Mantua there was an armor factory, at Cremona a shield factory, at Ticinum a bow factory, and at Lucca a sword factory. In the Gauls there were a factory of every kind of arms at Strasbourg, an arrow factory at Mâcon, an armor factory at Autun, a shield, ballista, and mail-armor factory at Soissons, a sword factory at Reims, a shield factory at Trier, a ballista factory at Trier, and a sword and shield factory at Amiens.

“Whether the Roman Empire had to be extended or its ancient frontiers defended against invaders, it had its frontier garrison soldiers in various forts, and also Roman legions scattered among various seats, whose number appears to have grown gradually as the empire grew. But whence arms of every kind were supplied to so numerous and dispersed a soldiery you can now have learned from me: namely, from those factories established by provinces. Whenever new arms were required on expeditions, they were sought from those same factories and conveyed by compulsory transport to the camps or designated places. This the constitution of the emperors Leo and Anthemius, in the Code *On Arms-Workers*, taught me.”

Now private persons could not manufacture or sell any other arms apart from short knives, which no one would assume for use in war. But bows, arrows, swords, half-swords, cuirasses, pikes, lances, shields, helmets, and the other warlike arms of that kind Emperor Justinian permitted to be made nowhere except in public factories and by public craftsmen--that is, men maintained by the public grain allowance; his Novel 85, *On Arms*, concerns this matter. In the later books of the Code there is exceedingly frequent mention of the body of arms-workers, their duty, privileges, and so forth; and there is also a title there *On Arms-Workers*.

That even public vehicles were appointed for carrying arms to the camp especially signifies a consummate industry which omitted nothing useful.

Nor were they content with this diligence: there were also custodians of arms, book 49, π , title 16, *On Military Affairs*: “If a soldier has alienated his arms, the fault is generally imputed to the custodian of the arms if he entrusted the arms to the soldier at an improper time.” Hence it appears that there were custodians of arms in the camps. For if any men lost their arms, or if they were broken, new ones had to be provided, besides the fact that an immense supply of arrows and javelins had to be conveyed and was kept in camp. For each man preserved his own lances, spears, bucklers,

shields, small shields, and cuirasses, and men did not seek them from a custodian when about to fight. Nor is there any doubt that there were custodians of arsenals in the cities. Certainly, in time of war and of peace, watches, laws, and arms are deservedly required: law *Qui excubias* and law *Officium, On Military Affairs*, π.

§ 5. It is evident from Sacred Scripture that pious kings had care of arsenals. Song of Songs 4:4: “Your neck is like the tower of David, which is built with bulwarks; a thousand shields hang from it, all the armor of the mighty.” Hence in 1 Kings 14:28 there is an arsenal of shield-bearers. What it was like is shown in 2 Chronicles 9:19: “And also three hundred golden shields of three hundred pieces of gold, with which the individual shields were covered; and the king placed them in the arsenal which was planted with a grove.” It was called the House of Lebanon; its furniture had been golden, and the arsenal was in that palace.

Rehoboam himself, when he had peace during the first three years, fortified cities and made arsenals. In 2 Chronicles 11:5 and 12 the words run thus: “And Rehoboam dwelt in Jerusalem and built walled cities in Judah. And he constructed Bethlehem, Etam, and Tekoa; also Beth-zur, Soco, and Adullam; and Gath, Mareshah, and Ziph; Adoraim, Lachish, and Azekah; also Zorah, Aijalon, and Hebron, which were strongly fortified cities in Judah and Benjamin. And when he had enclosed them with walls, he placed princes in them and storehouses of food—that is, oil and wine. But in each city he also made arsenals of shields and spears; and he strengthened them with the greatest diligence, and ruled over Judah and Benjamin.”

The cause of this new diligence was that a new and indeed more powerful enemy had now arisen, and the cities which in Solomon’s time had been in the heart of the kingdom had, through the secession of the ten tribes, become frontier cities. The remaining arsenals of the ten tribes had also fallen to Jeroboam. In Isaiah 22:8 there is also mention of the arsenal of the House of the Forest.

Exercise produces spirit and confidence. He who wishes his own men to be cowardly so that they may not rise against him is not safe from his neighbors. These things must be cared for in peace so that men may grow accustomed to obeying. The one virtue of a soldier is prompt obedience. Those who are prone to duels are not brave, but bestial.

CHAPTER XV

The Arms for Which Provision Must Be Made

§ 1. A prince who is about to wage war ought principally to prepare these things: alliances, provisions, arms, fortifications, money, and soldiers. The individual matters need not be discussed in this chapter. Alliances, provisions, fortifications, and money were discussed in book 8, for they are works of peace rather than of war.

§ 2. Most of those who have written about war have treated accurately of everything concerning arms and men who are to fight either on land or at sea. Yet they have done so in such a way that some have exhibited ancient things, others new things, but few the reasons and counsels of the ancients and moderns. It is my intention to set forth briefly what I have understood concerning both new and ancient things.

§ 3. Arms are whatever necessity advises: iron, oil, wood, and other things. Arms are, as it were, the limbs of a soldier. For nature gave natural arms to beasts because it denied them prudence, but gives man external things to use, with reason added:

Φύσις κέρατα ταύροις,
 ὀπλὰς δ' ἔδωκεν ἵπποις,
 λέοντι χάσμι' ὀδόντων,
 τοῖς δ' ἀνδράσιν σίδηρον.

Nature gave horns to bulls, hooves to horses, the gaping array of teeth to the lion, but iron to men, with which man conquers bulls, tames horses, hunts lions, and, finally--which is most difficult--conquers other iron. Therefore, a great supply of arms must be prepared in peace, because they are readily obtained. When necessity presses, even all things must be accepted: the bronze of bells can be melted down, so that it may be restored when the war has ended.

§ 4. I define arms as all the instruments of wars by which we are defended from the enemy or strike the enemy. They are therefore twofold. For either we protect ourselves with them, as with a shield, helmet, and greaves, or we harm the enemy with them, as with a sword, spear, and musket. They are also divided in another way: either they are placed around the body and handled by individual men's hands, or they are operated by machines, act more violently, and require the forces of many men, as do the ram, the tortoise, and the greater artillery. Among these I place horses, elephants, camels, dogs, pigs, and serpents in an intermediate class. Some men have sometimes employed them like arms; but they are animate arms, or half arms and half soldiers.

§ 5. Defensive arms, or coverings, are prior to offensive arms. For it belongs to a praised commander first to place his own men in safety, then to harm the enemy. If they fall under mutual blows, there is no victory for either. Therefore, the better protected man is the stronger. He who has provided well for himself does not fear the sound of the hammer, like an anvil. While the helmsman holds the tiller, he despises storms. A well-covered soldier confidently attacks the enemy and fearlessly employs skill; and skill absorbs every difficulty in affairs, as men boast in a military proverb.

§ 6. The head covering of the ancients was the helmet. That of the light-armed soldier was made from a wolf skin or another hide. Polybius says:

προσεπικοσμεῖται δὲ καὶ λιτῷ περικεφαλαίῳ· ποτὲ δὲ λυκείαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιτίθεται, σκέπης ἅμα καὶ σημείου χάριν, ἵνα τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόσι προκινδυνεύοντες ἐρρωμένως καὶ μὴ διάδηλοι γίνωνται.

“He is adorned in addition,” as Lipsius translates, “with a simple covering of the head; and this occurs when a wolf skin or something of that kind is put on, both for protection and as a distinguishing mark, so that those who have fought vigorously or otherwise may become known to the commanders of the units.”

Concerning the material of the helmet Lipsius says: “Not of bronze or iron, but of wool, felt, or leather; the *cassis* was of metal.” *Galea* was named from γαλιῆ, a cat or weasel. They took the hides from wild animals, whence ἰκτιδῆν, κυνέην, ταυρείην, αἰγείην: weasel-skin, dog-skin, bull-skin, and goat-skin helmets. In Homer and Virgil there is also a lion-skin helmet. *Aeneid* 5: “Turning the enormous covering of a lion.” Lipsius notes on Trajan’s Column that everyone in this equipment has a lion skin which covers the head, shoulders, and back. In Propertius there is a wolf-skin helmet in an elegant poem:

And a bristling helmet adorned with a wolf’s mane.

In Statius there is a bear-skin helmet:

He makes his head savage with the jaws of a Lycaonian bear.

Others preferred the fox-skin kind. The Thracians and Macedonians had similar helmets. But this is the point about which the reader of Lipsius remains in doubt: since they wore them for protection and as a sign, did they place them upon a bare head or upon another helmet? Lipsius thinks that the light-armed soldiers put them upon a bare head, for they were not so cautiously and securely armed. I remain even more doubtful. Although lion and bear skins afford protection, I do not see how little weasel, goat, or even fox skins delay arrows or swords. Our felt hats resist much more, especially those thick ones which they are accustomed to call Brunswick hats.

Therefore, that which Polybius calls λιτόν signifies a cheap helmet not made with elaborate workmanship. It does not signify that it was merely a small skin, but that it was supported with linen or wool to break blows; perhaps the hides were also doubled. Statius describes the arms of countrymen:

Their weapons were rough trunks; their helmets, the empty mouths of lions.

Lipsius himself says that helmets were of leather or similar material, with some iron applied in lines or circles. The leather, therefore, was either doubled or supported by another material. Indeed, I approve more the view that skins were placed upon caps, or that the helmets were made from hides doubled or compressed more frequently. For Vegetius, in book 1, chapter 20, calls them caps: “Almost to the present age the custom remained that all soldiers used caps which they called Pannonian and which were made from hides. This was preserved so that a heavy helmet should not seem burdensome in battle to a man who always wore something upon his head.” The caps were therefore heavy in some proportion to the metal helmet.

Furthermore, we learn from Virgil that terrifying shapes were placed upon helmets; Turnus is described in book 7:

Turnus himself, preeminent in body, moves

Among the foremost, holding arms, and towers by a whole head above them.

His lofty helmet, crested with a triple mane, supports

A Chimaera breathing Aetnean fires from its jaws.

The Cimbri were also equipped in this fashion. Plutarch, in his *Marius*, says that the helmets of the Cimbrian horsemen were distinguished by feathers and by the forms of bristling animals. Diodorus Siculus, in book 2, says that the kings of the Egyptians bore the heads of lions, bulls, and dragons upon their own heads as insignia of rule. This gradually ceased in Christian times, and to wish to employ such terrors against a known enemy is childish. These things, if I may say so, have passed into family insignia; hence comes the variety among nobles when they display shield and helmet.

§ 7. The *cassis* was of bronze or iron, sometimes of silver or mixed metals. Camillus manufactured very many helmets entirely of iron and smooth around the circumference, so that swords might either glide upon them or be broken.

At the sides were cheekpieces which covered the cheeks or sides of the face. Servius commands bronze helmets for the wealthy; this sufficiently shows that bronze defenses were used earlier than iron ones.

§ 8. Crests served for ornament and terror. Polybius says: “In addition to all these things they are adorned with a feathered crown and three upright feathers, either purple or black, a cubit in length. When these are added upon the crown of the head to the other arms, the man appears twice as large, the sight is beautiful, and it is terrifying to the enemy.” Lipsius translates στεφάνω as “crest,” for Polybius is not speaking of a crown, although it bears some resemblance to a crown.

That crest, or feathered crown, was fixed to the top of the helmet and was called by the Greeks both λόφος and φάλος. Indeed, there were also tubes into which the crests were inserted. Centurions had transverse and silvered crests so that they might be recognized more readily. Those of the others stood upright; when damaged in frequent battles they hung down and spread out.

Purple crests belonged to distinguished men. The crests of Turnus were red; Hannibal’s were snow-white. Later they also employed the colored feathers of peacocks.

There were generally three crests, for “the lofty helmet was crested with a triple mane.” In Virgil Mezentius is bristling with a horsehair crest. Hence in the helmets and insignia of nobles there are either crests or other signs, such as horns, beams, and fixed colors. That other objects were borne in place of feathers is established by the history of Pyrrhus, who was recognized τῷ τε λόφῳ διαφέροντι καὶ τοῖς τραγικοῖς κέρασιν--by his remarkable crest and goat’s horns. But as regards all these things, and indeed arms generally, men changed them in various ways, and everything had to be changed on account of enemies, because by these and other arms they render ancient arms useless and compel the adoption of new ones.

§ 9. The *cassis*, therefore, was of bronze; Polybius calls it περικεφαλαίαν χαλκῆν:

Their heads covered in bronze, they rise above the battle lines with their crests.

Camillus made helmets of bronze and iron, smooth about their circumference, against the enormous swords of the Gauls. They were bound beneath the chin with a strap, and the face was bare. Now many cover the face so that they are exposed to a wound only where they see out through the eyes. Marcellinus observed such helmets among the Persians. In 1 Samuel 17:38 and 5, and 1 Maccabees 6:35, men use bronze helmets. Our men temper iron by a new method so that it repels balls.

§ 10. Another covering of the body was the *parma*. Polybius says, ἡ δὲ πάρμη, and continues:

καὶ δύναμιν ἔχει τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ μέγεθος ἄρκοῦν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν.

“The *parma* possesses both strength from its construction and sufficient size for safety.” This belonged to the light-armed soldiers.

The strength of the *parma* did not come from its material, for it was not made from metal, but from leather, or leather and wood; and the wood was either solid, woven wicker, or little boards joined and bound together.

The shape of the *parma* was round--περιφερής--according to Polybius and Nonius. On the testimony of Aemilius Probus, Iphicrates gave his men *peltae* in place of the *parma*, from which they were named peltasts.

Polybius writes that the size of the *parma* was τρίπεδον ἔχει τὴν διάμετρον. Thus, Lipsius says, it has nine feet in circumference; but then it is not that short little *parma* and small shield. He doubts whether by the word “diameter” the circumference itself, περιφέρεια, is meant. Then, indeed, it would be a very small *parma*, for the true diameter would be one foot. Marius removed the little *parmae* and substituted *Brutiana*--that is, shields with which the Bruttians were

accustomed to fight. But it cannot be that they were one foot across: for what would this contribute to protection, or ἀσφάλειαν, as Lipsius rightly objects to himself? It appears foolish, since the *parma* occupied the left hand, to have made it so small that it did not defend the man fighting and yet impeded him. Pliny says that the *parma* is what the Greeks call the *pelta*, and that they also call it a *cetra*. But although each was a short shield, their shapes were different: the *pelta* had the appearance of a half-full moon. Virgil, book 1:

She leads the battle lines of Amazons with their crescent-shaped *peltae*.

§ 11. The shield and buckler are related to the *parma*.

The shield was two and one-half feet in width and four feet in length. The larger kind had a palm more.

Polybius says that the material of the shield was ἐκ διπλοῦ σανιδώματος, “from a double planking.” Thus it is agreed that two boards were compacted with linen by means of bull glue. But Lipsius adds that it was woven together from small planks; for Varro derives *scutum* from cutting, as if it were named from being cut because it was made from minute boards. Ammianus likewise says of Julian: “While Julian was still Caesar at Paris, he was exercising in the field and shaking a shield whose round surface was compacted from little boards; when these were shaken loose to no purpose, only the handle remained.” Here, I confess, I hesitate and should wish an ancient shield to be shown to me. For that construction from little slats is laborious and not suited to strength. Accordingly, since the use of shields was so extensive, I do not doubt that they were more readily made.

First, it was much stronger and more resistant to blows if two boards were glued together crosswise than if there were only one. For one board is readily pierced along the dimension in which it is liable to split; but here the lines liable to split run in different directions. What is received into one board is held in the other and suffers delay. For one plank glued to another, with the lines running in a different direction, overcomes and contains it so that it cannot gape with cracks or be split.

Second, it is certain to me that some little planks had to equal the length and others the breadth. For the length could not be made from two or three pieces, because they cannot be glued on the part where the length of the wood is cut off. I do not sufficiently understand how it was made from little boards unless they were rather long, joined to one another and compacted with glue, with a little rod added as a kind of bond, as we learn from Ammianus. Pliny names in book 16, chapter 40 the woods most useful for this purpose: “The coldest are all aquatic woods; they are most pliant, and therefore most suitable for making shields, whose wound draws itself together immediately after a blow and closes; for that reason it transmits iron more stubbornly. In this class are the fig, willow, linden, birch, elder, and both kinds of poplar.” Of these the fig and willow are lightest and therefore most useful. From this we also learn that those shields are now altogether useless.

The shape of the shield was twofold: one was nearly flat and the other curved like a roof tile, of the kind Lipsius exhibits for us.

§ 12. Sometimes nothing was added beyond the little boards. Tacitus says of the Germans in book 2 of the *Annals*: “Not even shields strengthened by iron or sinew, but structures of wicker, or thin boards stained with color.” But the Romans strengthened and covered them with leather, both for firmness and so that the moisture by which willow boards would be loosened might be kept off by the leather; for glue cannot endure moisture.

They also frequently multiplied the hides, for they are light and pliant. Hence the ancients strengthened shields with a sevenfold fabric, even among the Trojans and Greeks. These were the arms used at that time because of the price of bronze and iron, which the common multitude of soldiers in those places could not afford. Certainly, in Sacred Scripture we read of bronze bucklers and shields among the most ancient peoples.

In addition to these there was an iron defense which Polybius calls σιάλωμα and which the Suda interprets σιδηρᾶν περιφέρειαν τῷ ῥωμαϊκῷ θυρεῷ: an iron rim or circumference of the Roman shield. Iron was added late, for Camillus was its originator; nevertheless, he added a bronze plate. Plutarch says in his *Camillus*:

τοῖς θυρεοῖς κύκλῳ περιήρμοσε λεπίδα χαλκῇν, ξύλου καθ' αὐτὸ τὰς πληγὰς μὴ στέγοντος.

“He fitted a bronze plate in a circle to the shields, since the wood alone sustained blows insufficiently.” Against the great swords of the Gauls, brandished with powerful strength, the resourceful commander devised this. That circumference was sometimes silver and sometimes gilded. Sidonius says that the light of the shields was snow-white on the rims and golden-yellow on the bosses. This occurred among the great and powerful.

The boss is the rounded iron projecting in the middle of the shield, called ἄμβων by the Greeks, a word which signifies the prominences of mountains and other things. Tertullian recognizes a boss even in clothing. The Greeks also sometimes call it ὀμφαλὸν ἄσπιδος. Polybius calls it σιδηρᾶ κόγχος and says that it turns aside ὀλοσχερεῖς πληγὰς--the violent blows of stones, sarissas, and every violent kind of weapon.

They also drove enemies back with the boss: “Acilius drives those who meet him with the boss.” Lipsius has excellently observed that the shoulder and the arm itself are sometimes called the boss. They wheeled and shook the shield in such a way as to oppose the boss to every blow.

§ 13. There was little weight in a light shield and more in the larger. Now all those things would be impediments in war rather than aids. But let us consider their use among the ancients.

First, the Romans despised the shields of the Gauls as not strengthened by iron or sinew, but made of woven wicker, or of boards that were thin or stained with color. Therefore, before iron was added by Camillus, Roman shields too were weak.

Second, the boss resisted heavier blows; therefore, the rest of the shield was unequal to those blows and failed under repeated strokes. Thus Ajax also says of his own shield: “A new successor must be obtained.”

Third, it was sometimes so burdened with javelins and arrows that it was heavy for the bearer.

Fourth, its manipulation greatly fatigued the soldier, so that the left arm was wearied no less than the right.

Fifth, in battles themselves we frequently see shields pierced through, even together with the man himself, as many histories show.

If, therefore, we come to the wars of our own time, they would be impediments, not defenses. For, to say nothing of cannon, they would not sustain the blow of even any middling weapon. Since they were pierced by a cast javelin and by an arrow, they cannot resist even lesser forces of arms. Against shields our forefathers, before cannon were invented, employed chiefly three kinds of arms: the lances of horsemen, by which they carried away shield and man together; great swords, which they brandished with both hands, by which they split the shields set against them and struck them from the bearer's hands; and, finally, two-edged axes, whose extremely violent blows rendered every shield useless. This armament took its origin from the Germans, Goths, and Lombards, whose great strength readily dashed shields away.

Shields, therefore, are now useless. In ancient times they too were frequently changed. Before Romulus, men used Argive bucklers, according to Plutarch. Romulus instituted shields, I believe because bucklers could not readily be obtained among a pastoral people. Hence Servius later restored bucklers, but commanded them for men who possessed a greater census. At Veii bucklers were omitted and shields retained. I do not sufficiently conjecture the cause: perhaps, since the soldiers' pay was equal, they judged that the arms of the infantry ought also to be made equal. Lipsius thinks so.

The θυρεός was the shield of the Greeks. It was so called from its likeness to a θύρα, a door, because its length was greater than its width, Athenaeus 4 and 6.

§ 14. The Greeks had bucklers; they called them ἀσπίδας. Homer calls one εὐκύκλος because they were round.

§ 15. The ancients had various kinds of cuirasses, and it is wonderful that so great a care was devoted to them when there were no cannon. Titus is described in Hegesippus, book 3, chapter 14: “We advance into war protected on every side: a helmet covers the head, a cuirass the breast, and a buckler the whole body. The enemy cannot discover where he may strike a Roman soldier.” Nor is this an amplification. Claudian, in book 2 *Against Rufinus*:

Joined together by art,
The flexible plate comes alive upon the limbs it covers,
Terrible to behold: you would believe iron statues to move
And men to breathe through their kindred metal.

Not only a poet but also the historian Ammianus speaks in the same manner: “You would believe them statues polished by the hand of Praxiteles, not men: slender circles of plates, fitted to the bending of their bodies, encircled them and were drawn over every limb, so that wherever necessity moved a joint, the clothing corresponded to it, its connection coherently fitted.”

But let us speak about the kinds of cuirasses.

In an earlier age most Roman soldiers did not cover the whole body with a cuirass, but only the breast with a plate:

οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ προσλαβόντες χάλκωμα σπιθαμιαῖον πάντη πάντως, ὃ προστίθενται μὲν πρὸ τῶν στέρνων, καλοῦσι δὲ καρδιοφύλακα, τελείαν ἔχουσι τὴν καθόπλισιν.

“Most take a bronze plate which measures a span, or twelve digits, on every side and place it upon the breast, and thereby possess complete armor.” They call it καρδιοφύλακα, which Lascaris renders “heart-guard”; Lipsius calls it a breastplate. Polybius says it was a bronze plate; Varro and others say that the breastplate was made from raw leather. But I believe that leather cuirasses ceased to be used because they afforded too little protection and heated those fighting very greatly.

Those who were more honorable and stronger covered the breast, belly, and the parts below with a cuirass, as Pausanias testifies in book 1. They connected the two parts of the cuirass at the sides with clasps, and this was called the proper and full armor. Those men belonged to the first class and were assessed at more than ten thousand drachmas, as Polybius says.

Those cuirasses were threefold. They were either made from a whole plate, as most are today, or ringed and woven from little chains, which the Greeks call ἀλυσιδωτούς. Virgil calls it “a cuirass joined with hooks and triple-woven with gold.” The third kind was of scale armor, λεπιδωτῶν θωράκων:

Clad in a gleaming breastplate,
He bristled with bronze scales.

The scales were sometimes joined by little chains, sometimes to linen, and sometimes spread over leather.

In the Suda the Parthian horsemen, whom the Latins later imitated and call *clibanarii*, are armed as follows: “The cuirass of a Parthian horseman is of this kind. Its front part covers the breast, thighs, extremities of the hands, and legs; the rear part covers the back, neck, and entire head. Clasps are at the sides, by which they join both parts and thus cause the entire horseman to appear iron. Yet the iron neither prohibits nor impedes the extensions or contractions of the limbs; it is so carefully made and divided according to the nature of the limbs. They also arm the horse similarly

with iron, wholly and down to the hooves. They do this because their own armor profits them nothing if the horse is killed.”

This was the strength of soldiery then, and it is so now. Ammianus calls them iron plates “in the manner of a slender feather”; and Virgil:

He drove his foaming horse, which a covering joined

With gold in bronze scales, feather-like, protected.

Ammianus describes the armor more clearly in book 16: “On either side advanced a double line of armed men, bearing shields and crests and radiating with glittering light, clothed in polished cuirasses. Scattered among them were armored horsemen--whom the Persians call *clibanarii*--protected by coverings of breastplates and encircled with iron bands, so that you would believe them statues polished by the hand of Praxiteles, not men. Slender circles of plates, fitted to the bending of their bodies, encircled them and were drawn over every limb, so that wherever necessity moved a joint, the clothing corresponded to it, its connection coherently fitted.”

He teaches in book 25 how men resisted them: “Representations of human faces were so carefully fitted to their heads that missiles falling upon their bodies plated solidly with metal could lodge only where sight was afforded sparingly through minute cavities attached to the circles of the eyes, or where narrow breaths were emitted at the extremity of the nostrils.”

Great men had scales, for they were easy to carry and resisted blows by the very fact that they yielded somewhat. More wonderful is the fact that they made scales from the hooves of horses and other animals. Pausanias describes them in book 1: “They make breastplates as follows. Each man keeps many horses. They use them not only in war, but also sacrifice them to their ancestral gods. Collecting their hooves, cleaning and cutting them, they make from them something like the scales of dragons; or, if someone has not seen a dragon but has seen the green fruit of a pine, he will not err if he likens the work to those segments or little swellings upon the cone. Therefore, piercing these little scales and sewing them together with horse or ox sinews, they have cuirasses for use, inferior to the Greek ones neither in beauty nor in strength. For when struck at close quarters or assailed by a cast weapon, they resist and withstand it.”

Homer shows that linen breastplates were of the most ancient use, for in him Ajax is λινωθώραξ, “linen-cuirassed”; I should believe them to have been among the earliest arms.

They are sometimes used in this age, but they resist iron or balls only slightly. They were suitable for hunters, for they blunt or break teeth. Ringed cuirasses have almost ceased to be used, since when the rings are broken by a ball they cause several wounds; their fragments lodge in bodies and cannot readily be extracted.

They also had woolen breastplates pressed together, or made of felt; they added vinegar so that they would resist iron. A sponge too was a covering for the breast. But lest such things be made heavy by rain, they were covered with hides. Things of this kind are strongly approved even now; for if they are protected by a moderate cuirass, by which the force of a ball is broken, it is arrested by this felt.

Meanwhile, at almost the present time strong, heavy iron cuirasses are in use, like the one in Plutarch’s *Demetrius*, which repelled a missile from a ballista and received only a light scratch, as if from an engraving tool. But such cuirasses were very rare. For even swords overcame the common armor. Diodorus says:

οὔτε θυρεὸς οὔτε κράνος οὔτε ὀστοῦν ὑπομένει τὴν πληγὴν.

“Neither shield, nor helmet, nor bone sustains the blow”--namely, that of the Spanish sword. Plutarch likewise relates in his *Perseus* that the swords of the Romans, by their weight and impact, passed through every kind of armor to the bodies. But now no one would deign to carry armor that did not resist even a sword.

§ 16. Vegetius assigns iron greaves to the legs--one upon the right leg, which comes forward in a stationary battle; but when men fought with missiles, the left leg came forward. The ancients, nevertheless, had both legs covered.

§ 17. Horsemen did not have cuirasses at first, as Polybius reports, for they made it their concern to mount a horse readily, since they did not have grooms, or ἀναβολεῖς, to help them mount. This was strictly exacted. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 18: “The exercise of mounting horses was always strictly exacted not only from recruits but also from soldiers receiving pay. It is evident that this custom has survived to our own age, although even with some concealment. Wooden horses were placed under cover in winter and in the field in summer. At first the younger men were compelled to mount these unarmed until they became proficient by habit, and finally while armed. So great was the care that they learned together not only to leap on and off from the right but also from the left side, even while holding drawn swords or pikes. For they did this by constant practice, namely so that amid the tumult of battle those who were so diligently exercised in peace might mount without delay.”

The shields of the horsemen were made from pure leather, which, if it had not been sufficiently hardened, was rendered useless by rain. They called it the *cetra*, a leather shield without wood. I believe that it was also made from another material, and sometimes from hardened leather which water would not harm. Without doubt it would be ridiculous to advance into our warfare with that defense.

§ 18. As a conclusion I shall add what Vegetius has in book 1, chapter 20 concerning arms:

“The place requires that we attempt to relate with what kind of arms recruits ought either to be equipped or defended. But in this part the ancient custom has been utterly destroyed. For although, after the example of the Goths, Alans, and Huns, the arms of the horsemen have advanced, it is established that the infantrymen have been stripped bare. From the founding of the city down to the time of the deified Gratian, the infantry army was protected both with armored breastplates and helmets. But when field exercise ceased through the intervention of negligence and sloth, the arms which the soldiers wore only rarely began to seem heavy. Thus they ask the emperor first to lay aside the armored breastplates, and then the helmets. In this way, meeting the Goths with breasts and heads uncovered, our soldiers were often destroyed by the multitude of archers. Even after so many disasters, which reached the destruction of such great cities, no one took care to restore either armored breastplates or helmets to the infantry.

“Thus it happens that men who were exposed naked to wounds in the battle line think not about fighting but about flight. For what can an infantry archer do without armored breastplate and helmet, when he cannot hold a shield along with his bow? What will the *draconarii* themselves and the standard-bearers do in battle, who govern the spears with the left hand, when it is established that both their heads and breasts are bare? But a cuirass and perhaps a helmet appear heavy to an infantryman who seldom practices and seldom handles arms. Daily use, however, does not labor even if it carries burdensome things. But those who cannot bear the labor of carrying the ancient defenses of arms are compelled, with bodies uncovered, to sustain both wounds and death; and, what is more grievous and more shameful, either to be captured or certainly to betray the state by flight. Thus, while they avoid exercise and labor, they are slaughtered like cattle with the greatest disgrace.

“Why, then, was the infantry army called a wall among the ancients, unless because the legions armed with javelins shone not only with shields but also with armored breastplates and helmets? This went so far that the archers protected the left arm with sleeves, while the shield-bearing infantrymen were compelled, in addition to armored breastplates and helmets, to receive iron greaves on their right legs. Thus were those men protected who, fighting in the first line, were called *principes*, in the second *hastati*, and in the third *triarii*. But the *triarii*, their knees placed upon the ground, were accustomed to crouch behind their shields lest, while standing, they be wounded by incoming missiles; and when necessity required it, as men who had rested they attacked the enemies more violently. It is established that victory was often achieved by them when the *hastati* and those who had stood before them had perished.

“Among the ancient infantrymen there were also those who were called light-armed troops, slingers, and *ferentarii*. They were stationed principally upon the wings, and the beginning of the fighting was taken from them. The swiftest

and most highly trained men were selected for these troops. They were not very numerous; if the necessity of battle compelled them to withdraw, they were accustomed to be received between the front ranks of the legions, so that the battle line stood unmoved.

“Almost to the present age the custom remained that all soldiers used caps made of hides, which they called Pannonian. This was preserved so that a heavy helmet would not seem burdensome in battle to a man who always wore something upon his head. The missiles which the infantry army employed were called javelins. They were tipped with slender, three-edged iron, nine inches or one foot long; when fixed in a shield, they could not be cut away, and when directed skillfully and forcefully, they readily break through a cuirass. Among us weapons of this kind are now rare. But barbarian shield-bearing infantrymen chiefly employ them. They call them *bebras* and carry two or even three apiece in battles.

“It must be known, moreover, that when missiles are being employed, soldiers ought to put their left feet forward; for in this way the blow is stronger when darts are brandished. But when they come to the javelins, as they call them, and fight hand to hand with swords, then soldiers ought to put their right feet forward, so that their flanks may be withdrawn from the enemies and cannot receive a wound, and so that the right hand which can inflict the blow may be nearer. It is therefore established that recruits must be instructed and protected by every art of fighting and with every kind of arms. For it is necessary that he who, with his head or breast protected, does not fear a wound should acquire boldness for fighting.”

§ 19. At that time the Roman army was neglected. For Valens admitted the Goths and, trusting in their protection, despised his own soldiery--not altogether without reason, since they were accustomed to become more famous for the slaughter of their own emperors than for victory against an enemy. Gratian, through the same error, trusted the Alans and suffered the treachery of his own men. Vegetius calls a defense of the breast and a cuirass *cataphractae*: all the *καταφράξεις*, or defensive coverings, which enclose and protect the body. Stripped bare in this way, they were thrown into confusion by the attack of the Goths, as Paul the Deacon, book 12, and Orosius indicate: “At the first attack of the Goths the companies of Roman horsemen were thrown into confusion and abandoned the naked infantrymen, who were soon surrounded by the enemy cavalry and overwhelmed by clouds of arrows.”

Afterward they protected themselves with the *thoracomachus*, concerning which Stewech writes from the *Notitia Imperii*: “Among all the things which provident antiquity devised against warfare for posterity, it also placed beneath the weight and harshness of the arms the *thoracomachus*, of wonderful usefulness for relieving the body. For anxious concern, with skill as its teacher, composed this kind of garment from soft wools compressed to the measure and protection of the human breast. Thus, after this was first put on, the cuirass, the *clibanus*, or things similar to these would not injure the frailty of the body by the harshness of their weight; and the limbs of the wearer, aided by such relief amid the danger of arms and winter, might suffice for the labor. But lest this same *thoracomachus*, beaten by rains, afflict the wearer with increasing weight, it will be suitable to draw over its surface well-prepared Libyan hides made in the likeness of the same *thoracomachus*. Therefore, as we have said, after the *thoracomachus* has been put on--a Greek appellation which took its name from the protection of the body--and after he has also put on low shoes, that is, footwear, and iron greaves, and a helmet has been placed above, with a shield and sword fitted to his side and lances seized in full array, the soldier about to enter an infantry battle will be armed.”

But this too was changed and did not remain in use for long. Against the force of spears, especially those with a narrow point, the iron could accomplish nothing. Then great expense and labor had to be employed in preparing the hides. Most grievous of all, those wrapped in a woolen fabric flowed with sweat, and it weakened the wearer in the battle line.

Hence it appears that everything depends upon the coverings' being light and impenetrable. If any commander could join these two qualities, he would easily obtain the empire of the world.

Hence came so many changes of arms, continuing even to the present day: first coverings of iron or bronze, then of wood and leather, then once more of iron and bronze--sometimes light, sometimes heavy. Dio says that Macrinus removed the scaled breastplates and shields which were like channels, but curved in the manner of roof tiles, so that he might render the soldiers readier for battle. But as he made them more agile, so he also made them weaker and more exposed.

CHAPTER XVI

Arms with Which We Harm the Enemy at Close Quarters

§ 1. The arms with which we strike the enemy are manifold. For there is no thing which men cannot employ for the destruction of men and have not sometimes employed. We read that men have been killed not only with swords and missiles, but also suffocated with cushions and roses. We also fight with trumpet and drum and put the enemy to flight with sound. Indeed, a part of the enemy supplies arms from his own body. 2 Samuel 2:16: “Each man, taking hold of the head of his companion, drove his sword into the side of his opponent.” Thus the hair, as well as the sword, served as a weapon--so much so that the institution of Theseus appears less ridiculous: he wished the hair to be shaved lest it offer a handle to enemies. Alexander the Great commanded his men to imitate this with respect to the beard. The women of the Thasians and Carthaginians gave their hair for binding machines and for the ropes of ships, Polyaeus, book 8. The women of Aquileia expended theirs upon bowstrings, Fulgus, book 7, chapter 6.

The arms, therefore, with which we strike and crush an enemy are those by which we fight either at close quarters or at a distance. Those with which the matter is conducted at close quarters have not been so greatly changed; the others are very different.

§ 2. The arms by which an enemy is harmed at close quarters are manifold. Most nations had swords. First they carried a single one, then two: besides a long sword, a *paramerium* or *parazonium*--that is, a dagger--sometimes at the right side and sometimes at the left. Polybius mentions the right; Josephus the left, in book 3 of *The Jewish War*. After the Second Punic War, the Romans carried Spanish swords. They used them by thrusting rather than cutting. For the Romans mocked those who fought by cutting, since the wound is rarely mortal and it exposes the flank. Nevertheless, they sometimes cut as well. Seneca, in *On Benefits*, says that a helmet was divided by a Spanish saber. Livy, book 31: “After they saw bodies dismembered by the Spanish sword, with arms cut off or the whole neck severed, and the other hideousness of the wounds.” Now there are different kinds of swords for each mode of fighting.

A long sword was given to the horseman. Josephus, book 3 of *The Jewish War*: “The horsemen have a long sword at the right and likewise a long pike in the hand; a shield lies transversely at the horse’s flank; and in a quiver are carried three or more javelins with broad points and not inferior to spears in size. All have helmets and cuirasses, as do the infantrymen.”

§ 3. One spear is large and used for fighting at close quarters, while another is for casting. Strabo, book 10:

Διτταὶ γὰρ ἦσαν τῶν δοράτων χρεῖται, ἡ μὲν ἐκ χειρός, ἡ δὲ ὡς παλτοῖς· καθάπερ καὶ ὁ κοντὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς χρεῖας ἀποδίδωσι· καὶ γὰρ συστάδην χρῶνται καὶ κοντοβολοῦντες· ὥστε πρὸς ἐκάτερον δύναται ἡ σύνταξις.

For there were two uses of spears: one from the hand and the other as cast weapons; just as the pike serves both uses, for it can be used at close quarters and can be cast, so that the formation is capable of either use.

Our men today employ only these at close quarters; cannon alone have taken away the other missiles.

There were longer axes, which have been succeeded by our two-edged axes or halberds. To this class men refer the *saliba*, the three-bladed ax, or the *martiobarbulus*, with which they broke shields. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 17: “In Illyricum there were formerly two legions which had six thousand soldiers apiece. Because they used these weapons skillfully and bravely, they were called *Martiobarbuli*. It is established that for a long time all wars were most vigorously concluded through them--so much so that Diocletian and Maximian, when they came to the empire, judged that on account of the merit of their valor these *Martiobarbuli* should be named Jovians and Herculians, and they are taught to have preferred them to all the legions. Our soldiers, however, were accustomed to carry five *martiobarbuli* inserted into their shields. If the soldiers cast these opportunely, shield-bearing men appear in a certain manner to

assume the office of archers. For they wound the enemies and horses before they can come not only to hand-to-hand combat but even within range of other missiles.”

In Leo, however, *martiobarbuli* are javelins. Turnebus thinks them named from little barbel fish.

§ 4. The *aclides* were smooth, and when they had been cast against the enemy they were drawn back by a cord. Men think this was also called the *cateia* or *caia*.

§ 5. Horsemen especially were also accustomed to carry hammers, in place of which they now carry broad swords. To this class belong *ρόπαλα*, clubs, and gauntlets.

They also employed nooses, as the *retiarii* used a net or net-like snare. When the Macedonians moved towers forward for an assault upon Tyre, the Tyrians entangled the Macedonians in nets and cast them down, Diodorus, book 17. Olaus Magnus says the same concerning the Finns.

CHAPTER XVII

Arms with Which We Harm the Enemy at a Distance

§ 1. The *pilum*, the missile customary among the Romans, was four and one-half cubits long, or a little less than seven feet, as Lipsius teaches. The iron was equal in length to the wood, but half of it was inserted into or attached to the wood. The iron was sometimes square and sometimes three-edged, with the thickness of a finger. Vegetius says that it often pierced through shield-bearing infantrymen and cuirassed horsemen. Tibullus assigns so great a force to it that “with the pliant *pilum* he broke what stood in his way.” Virgil assigns it a broad iron point: “Brandishing shafts with broad iron.”

Florus compares enormous *pila* with swords. Around the point they were hooked so that they could not be extracted. Thus they lodged in shields and weighed them down. So that this impediment might be greater, Marius arranged for them to bend. Sometimes they pierced two shields and connected them.

The *pila* were different from the spears of the light-armed soldiers. The Greeks call the latter γρόσφοις and the former ὑσσούς. They also called the light-armed soldiers γροσφομάχους. Polybius describes the weapon as follows: “The wood of the *pilum* has a length generally of two cubits and the thickness of a finger. Its point, one span--that is, a greater palm--in length, is thinned and sharpened to such an extent that immediately after the first cast it necessarily bends and becomes unsuitable for casting back; otherwise it would become a weapon common to both sides.”

Seven javelins, each four feet long, were given to each man. The wood was three feet long; the iron was a great palm, or three-quarters of a foot, a little less than one foot. It was therefore easy to carry seven little spears in the hand.

Partly like the *pilum* and partly like the light-armed soldier’s spear was the *sibuna*, or *sybina*, customary among Greeks and Illyrians. They employed it principally in hunting. Although the force of *pila* is sometimes exaggerated, it is nevertheless established that it was ordinarily weak. For most often, when cast from level or lower ground, they fell ineffectually.

Livy, book 7: “In addition to valor, the position too assisted them, so that all the *pila* and spears did not fall ineffectually, as if cast from level ground--as most often happens--but all, balanced by their weights, lodged fast.” But our weapons are effective from any position.

§ 2. Polybius describes for us the old and new spears of horsemen: “Their spears were also useless to them in two ways. They made them slender and pliant, and therefore they could neither aim them correctly nor strike the target; and before they fixed the point into anything, most were broken by the shaking caused by the very motion of the horses. I add that, being made without a point at the lower end, they delivered only the wound and blow of the forward part; when this was broken, the remainder was useless and ineffective for them. But they had a shield of oxhide, very similar to the bossed cakes which they are accustomed to place in sacrifices. It was not convenient to employ these in battle because they had no firmness; and when the leather was loosened or spoiled by rain, they became altogether useless, both then and now. Therefore, since their use was defective, they immediately adopted the Greek preparation of arms. In it, the blow of the spear’s forward point happens to be direct and powerful, since the shaft is stable and immovable; likewise, after the weapon is reversed, the use of the lower point is firm and violent. The same reasoning applies to the shields, for both in attack and resistance they remain stable and firmly stretched. When the Romans saw this, they immediately imitated it.”

Lipsius observes excellently that, when Brutus and Tarquinius fell after being wounded through their *parmae*, the spears were not strong but the *parmae* weak. The armor of the ancients was therefore not of great worth, since even the princes themselves were not safe when protected by it.

§ 3. It is established that horsemen had a long spear with which they charged, as do our lancers. Our men now secure them against their sides so that the blow may be carried through with their whole weight and impetus. Since the ancients also had an iron point at the rear, which they called the *σαυρωτήρ*, Lipsius thinks that they lacked such a support; if they did, the blow inflicted was much weaker. But I believe that there was a nail, hook, or something similar by which the spear was secured to the seated man's body, while the *οὐραχός*, the butt end, remained free. For they could brace it upon their knees, as Silius says:

The weight of the Sarmatian pike, supported upon the knee,

Drove headlong across the field against the opposing enemy.

The other javelins, three or four of which they carried in a quiver, were weak and more suitable for one who cast them than for one fighting at close quarters.

Marcellinus also shows the use of cylinders and stones: "Some, while carrying ladders and preparing means of ascent on every side, were crushed beneath the very burdens, when stones, fragments of columns, and cylinders were driven down the slope."

§ 4. The Romans were accustomed to scatter caltrops against the enemy. Herodian, book 4: "Whenever the Romans joined battle on foot, they readily overcame their adversaries. But afterward, when they were pressed by cavalry and a multitude of camels, they pretended flight and cast down caltrops and other sharpened iron devices. Hidden beneath the sand and visible to no one, these brought destruction upon horsemen and the riders of camels. For when they trod upon them, the horses--and especially the camels, because this kind has the softest hooves--fell down or became lame, throwing their riders from their backs."

CHAPTER XVIII

Living Arms

§ 1. We employ horses for warriors, and other animals as animate instruments; thus they too can be called arms. Indeed, whether a farmer turns the earth with a mattock or with oxen, both the oxen and the iron are instruments.

§ 2. The most ancient arms of early peoples were chariot horses and chariots armed with iron and scythes. Scythed four-horse chariots were formerly an object of the greatest fear. They are frequently mentioned in Sacred Scripture. In Exodus 14 Pharaoh yokes six hundred chosen chariots; Deuteronomy 11:4 and 20:1; Joshua 11:4 and 17:16; iron chariots, Judges 1:19 and 4:13, where Sisera has nine hundred; and in 1 Samuel 13:5 the Philistines have thirty thousand chariots and six thousand horsemen. In 1 Kings 9:19 the cities of the chariots are fortified; likewise 2 Chronicles 8:6 and 9:25. Strength and confidence were placed in them: Judith 9:6; Isaiah 31:1, 36:9, 37:24, and 66:15, “his four-horse chariot is like a whirlwind.” Antiochus and Mithridates also employed chariots. At last they disappeared and are now altogether useless for battle. Vegetius gives the reason in book 3, chapter 24: “As they at first brought great terror, so afterward they were an object of ridicule. For a scythed chariot finds an entirely level field with difficulty and is arrested by a slight obstacle; and when one horse is brought down or wounded, it is brought to a halt. But they perished especially through this device of the Roman soldiers. When battle was joined, the Romans suddenly cast caltrops over the whole field; when the charging four-horse chariots fell upon these, they were destroyed. A caltrop is a defense composed of four stakes which, however it is cast, stands upon three points and threatens with the fourth upright.”

There were also other chariots, or scythed chariots, drawn by two horses or one, of the kind exhibited for us by the learned and diligent commentator on Vegetius, Gottschalk Stewech.

Caesar describes chariot-fighters for us as almost wonderfully bold and nimble, book 4: “This is their manner of fighting from chariots. First they ride about through every part and cast missiles; by the very terror of the horses and the clatter of the wheels they generally disorder the ranks. When they have insinuated themselves among the companies of horsemen, they leap from the chariots and fight on foot. Meanwhile the charioteers withdraw a little from the battle and so station themselves that, if those men are pressed by a multitude of enemies, they may have a ready return to their own men. Thus in battles they display the mobility of horsemen and the steadiness of infantrymen. At length, by daily practice and exercise, they become accustomed to stop their horses upon a sloping and precipitous place, to control and turn them in a short space, to run along the pole, to stand upon the yoke, and from there to betake themselves into the chariots with the greatest speed.”

Curtius describes scythed chariots for us in book 4: “He had scythed chariots before him, all of which, when the signal was given, he poured upon the enemy. The charioteers rushed forward with loosened reins so that they might crush more men by an attack for which sufficient provision had not yet been made. Thus spears projecting far beyond the pole tore some men, while scythes let down from either side tore others.” Again in the same book: “Two hundred scythed four-horse chariots, the only aid of those nations, followed. Spears tipped with iron projected from the highest part of the pole. On each side of the yoke they had directed three swords, and between the spokes of the wheels several darts projected forward. Then other scythes clung to the outer rims of the wheels, and still others, lowered toward the ground, were to cut off whatever met the horses at full speed.” Alexander himself ordered that they be received after the ranks were opened; Sulla fixed stakes.

When the Helvetii had determined to occupy the Gauls, they increased to the greatest possible number of beasts of burden and wagons, made the greatest possible harvests for two years, and entered into an alliance with the

neighboring states. Then, when they were about to depart, they ordered each man to have ground provisions for three months, Caesar, book 1 of *The Gallic War*.

Those chariots served as fortifications, as I shall say in the proper place, and at the same time for conveying necessities.

§ 3. The introduction of elephants into battle was formerly terrifying. Pyrrhus first brought them into Italy.

§ 4. The Romans also rendered elephants useless; now they are generally harmful because they are very readily turned against their own men. Formerly they placed armored men in chariots against the beasts, who directed sarissas--that is, long pikes. Others sent against them armored soldiers fortified on every side with projecting points, so that they could not be seized by the trunk; others sent slingers and archers. They granted them space to attack, then surrounded them and captured them together with their masters. They also assailed them with wheeled ballistae. Now every kind of artillery is effective against them, so that they are scarcely led into battle. Hannibal placed eighty elephants before the battle line; Scipio opposed Numidian horsemen to them. They are considered common enemies, or enemies to both sides, because they are readily turned against friends. Cassiodorus falsely reports in book 10, chapter 30 that they could be wounded by no force; otherwise they are repelled with the slightest trouble.

§ 5. Men were accustomed to oppose camels to horses and elephants. Croesus opposed camels to cavalry; the horses, terrified by their novelty, threw down their riders. Frontinus, book 2, chapter 4. Pliny also mentions camels in wars, book 7, chapter 18. Alyattes the Lydian, the Colophonians, and the Castabalianians employed dogs in battle; this was also customary among the Magnesians. Polyaeus, book 7; Aelian, book 14.

Philip also captured the Arbelans when they fled into dense forests by means of hunting dogs, Polyaeus, book 4.

There is nothing wonderful about noble beasts. Men even led pigs into war--an animal born for banquets, whose life serves in place of salt. For the elephant abominates and shudders at the grunting of a pig and at that unclean animal itself. It was therefore sometimes employed against the tower-bearing beasts.

The Megarians turned aside the elephants of Antigonus by means of pigs which they had smeared with pitch. Others removed the terror by habituation, for everything familiar becomes contemptible. Perseus caused wooden elephants, from which a trumpet shrieked, to be made, so that the horses might grow accustomed to them and learn to despise them.

It is not wonderful that men employed beasts when they even brought statues to an assault. What is said about Sardis when it was captured by Cyrus appears excessively crude. On the side where the mountain was precipitous, he placed armed statues upon poles and applied them to it; then he began the assault from another side. But when the besieged saw the statues, they believed the ridge to have been occupied by armed men, and thus Cyrus entered the city. Therefore, everything that lies between serves as arms for a prudent commander.

With beasts too it belongs to skill to excite their natures in whatever manner is possible. For since they lack skill, they must be governed by another's skill. When the weary horses of Brachius could not be driven by spurs, he sent mares ahead, which they followed, Fulgus, book 7, chapter 4. Victory depended upon occupying the passes of the mountains first.

CHAPTER XIX

Consideration of Engines of War

§ 1. What stratagems are in battles and the actions of war, engines are in works; for in both the former and the latter there is need of ingenuity, prudence, and sagacity, not of strength or expenditure. An engine, therefore, is a work ingeniously devised and made for effects which would otherwise require greater expenditure and strength. They think it was so called, ὅτι δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, “because it is necessary to contrive,” since it is made not by men who yawn idly but by men who direct their mind and art.

In Deuteronomy 20:20 God forbade engines to be constructed from fruit-bearing trees. He calls them מצור, because they fortify, or render strong, those who are besieging. In 2 Chronicles 26:15 Uzziah equips Jerusalem with engines: “And he made in Jerusalem engines of diverse kinds, which he placed in the towers and at the corners of the walls, that they might discharge arrows and great stones.” The Septuagint calls them μηχανὰς μεμηχανευμένας λογισμοῖς, “engines contrived by the calculations of an artificer.” The Hebrew, however, speaks more clearly: הושב מחשבת חשבנות, that is, “engines, the contrivance of one contriving.” חשב is earnest care, and to think by art and turn all things over in the mind. Engines, therefore, were invented in the most ancient times, and new ones are invented daily; nevertheless, if we wish to confess the truth, the engines of engines are the instruments of war--the force of gunpowder in artillery, petards, and mines. Thus now the engines of the ancients have for the most part withdrawn as though thunderstruck.

§ 2. Philologists dispute concerning the antiquity of engines, but nevertheless judge them to come from Moses and those ancient men. Statius attributes them to the Pylans and Messenians in the Trojan War. The Romans used them in the time of the kings, as Lipsius teaches in book 1 of the *Poliorcetica*. Diodorus, book 12, attributes rams to Pericles.

That there were ancient engines Moses teaches in Deuteronomy 20:20, where they are made principally from wood and are called מצור, a word which signifies siege, fortification, and confinement. Accordingly, whatever belongs to besieging and harassing the besieged is so named. But since in the time of Moses, and in the time which preceded it, there were very strongly fortified cities, walled even up to heaven, as Scripture speaks in Deuteronomy 1:28, and since these same cities were taken, as is evident from the wars of the kings Sihon, Heshbon, Moab, and the Palestinians, it is evident that there were engines. For who would believe that walls were demolished merely with axes and mattocks, or that the cities were taken by hunger? They therefore used engines.

Then in Ezekiel 4:2, 21:22, and 26:8 he mentions engines as things commonly used in his own time. His words in 4:2 are these: “And you shall set a siege against it, and you shall build fortifications, and you shall heap up an embankment, and you shall set camps against it, and you shall place rams round about.” And in 21:22: “At his right hand the divination was made concerning Jerusalem, that he should place rams, that he should open a mouth in slaughter, that he should raise his voice in a howl, that he should place rams against the gates, that he should heap up an embankment, that he should build fortifications.” And in 26:8: “Your daughters who are in the field he shall slay with the sword; and he shall surround you with fortifications; and he shall heap up an embankment round about; and he shall raise a shield against you.”

He calls rams כרים, and the Seventy call them βελοστάσεις, because missiles were discharged from them. But in chapter 26:8, what our version calls *vineae* and rams is λόγχας in the Seventy; in the Hebrew it is קבלו מחי, which the Seventy render καὶ λόγχας αὐτοῦ, “and his lances.” A ram is also called מחי, *Mechi*, from destroying, because it casts everything down. קבלו the Seventy render ἐναντίον, “against”; our translator interpreted it as an engine because it is placed against the wall. In whatever way it is taken, it must be understood of engines of war. Kimchi interprets it “the stroke of his engine”; others, a ballista. The Targum has פגזווי ומח, “And the stroke of his engines.” The Chaldaean monarchy therefore had its own engines, and I believe the Assyrians did as well; indeed, I would believe them to have

been used even before the Flood. This also has been observed: those nations which established their state by art and reason generally employ engines, while barbarians employ unconsidered force. When the Romans had formed a tortoise, the Parthians, thinking them exhausted, dismounted from their horses and were slain. Dio, in *Augustus*.

§ 3. Vegetius enumerates these engines: tortoises, rams, hooks, *vineae*, mantlets, mice, and towers. Vitruvius, book 10, chapters 20 and 23.

The tortoise is an engine of joined shields. The use of the tortoise was that men might approach the wall and undermine it. Certain young Romans, turning a spectacle of the Circus to the use of war, seized the lowest part of a wall, Livy, book 44. They also mounted upon it and made a double and triple tortoise. Ballistae and catapults did not harm it because of its proximity. The first men raised shields above their heads; those following lowered them; the last knelt upon their knees. In this way they repelled cavalry and archers. Dio describes it in this manner: "Further, the tortoise is of this sort and is formed in this manner. After the baggage, the light-armed troops, and all the cavalry have been received into the middle, the heavy-armed infantrymen--those who use oblong shields made in the shape of a tube cut in half--are placed on the outermost parts, like brickwork, as a wall, and, themselves looking outward, encompass all the rest. The others who carry broader shields are placed densely in the middle and raise their shields both over themselves and over the others, so that throughout the whole phalanx nothing but shields may be seen, and all may be safe from the cast of missiles because of the density of the formation. Indeed, they make it so firmly compact that several men can walk upon it; even horses and chariots can be driven upon it whenever they are crowded together in some hollow and narrow place." That it supported cavalry and chariots could scarcely have been accomplished unless perhaps they assisted it by fixing javelins in the ground. Now, because shields are lacking, a tortoise cannot be made, nor is it expedient that there be one, since men crowded together can be scattered by artillery. They support cavalry with spears, as I shall say in its place.

Vegetius describes the tortoise, the ram, and the hook in this manner in book 4, chapter 14: "A tortoise is woven together from timber and planks; lest it be burned by fire, it is covered with hides, haircloths, and patchwork coverings. It receives within it a beam which either is furnished at its end with hooked iron and is called a hook, because it is curved so that it may draw stones out of the wall; or else its very head is covered with iron and it is called a ram, either because it has a very hard forehead which may undermine walls, or because, after the fashion of rams, it draws back so that it may strike more violently with an impetus. The tortoise, however, has taken its name from its likeness to a true tortoise, because just as the latter at one time withdraws and at another extends its head, so the contrivance at one time withdraws the beam and at another extends it, so that it may fall more forcefully."

Tortoise, therefore, is a general name which includes the ram and the hook. Vitruvius, book 10, chapter 19, reports that it was an invention of the Carthaginians: "The Carthaginians," he says, "pitched camp to attack Cadiz; and when they had first taken a fort, they attempted to demolish it. After they had no tools for the demolition, they took a beam and, supporting it with their hands and continually striking the top of the wall with its end, cast down the highest courses of stones and thus gradually dispersed the whole fortification course by course. Afterward a certain Tyrian craftsman named Pephasmenos, induced by this method and invention, set up a mast and from it suspended another crosswise like the beam of a balance; and by drawing it back and thrusting it forward, he cast down the wall of the people of Cadiz with violent blows. But Cetras the Chalcedonian first made a base of timber with wheels placed beneath it, and above it framed upright posts, crossbeams, and struts; upon these he suspended the ram and covered it with ox hides, so that those stationed in that contrivance for striking the wall might be safer. Because the device had slow motions, he began to call it a ram-bearing tortoise." But it existed earlier in Palestine.

Lipsius teaches that the tortoise was threefold. The *χελώνη χωστρίς* was for filling ditches and leveling roads; the *χελώνη ὄρυξ* was prepared for digging; the ram-bearing tortoise was that to which a ram was bound. It is called a tortoise from the slow pace of its advance, for it was a great mass and secure against fires, catapults, and great stones.

On the ram, see Lipsius, book 3 of the *Poliorcetica*, dialogue 1.

Two beams are preserved at The Hague, of great length, so that they can easily be thrust forward by two hundred men; for little ropes are attached to them.

The greater tortoise was the Helepolis, which Demetrius, who was called Poliorcetes, employed. Marcellinus, book 23, says: "An immense tortoise is framed, its timbers fitted together with very long axles and iron nails, and it is covered with ox hides and a fresh weave of rods; its upper parts are sprinkled with mud, so that it may ward off fiery and missile blows. To its front are fastened extremely sharp three-forked points, heavy with iron weights, of the kind in which painters or sculptors represent thunderbolts to us, so that with their extended points it may tear apart whatever it assails. A numerous body of soldiers within directs this very strong mass with stakes and ropes, and with roused strength applies it to the weaker part of the walls; unless the strength of the defenders above prevails, it opens enormous entrances by battering the walls together."

§ 4. *Vineae* were brought up for undermining walls, mantlets for driving away defenders. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 15: "The ancients called *vineae* what are now called *causiae* in military and barbarian usage. An engine is joined together from lighter timbers, eight feet high, seven feet wide, and sixteen feet long. Its roof is woven together with a double fortification of planks and wickerwork. Its sides also are fenced with wicker, lest they be penetrated by the impact of stones and missiles. On the outside, moreover, lest it be burned by fire cast upon it, it is covered with raw and fresh hides or with patchwork coverings. When several of these have been made, they are joined in a row; beneath them men, sitting protected, penetrate to the foundations of the walls in order to undermine them. Those are called mantlets which are woven from wicker in the likeness of an apse and protected with haircloths or hides; three small wheels are placed beneath them, one in the middle and two at the ends, and they are brought up after the manner of a cart toward whatever side one wishes. The besiegers apply them to the walls and, protected by their shelter, drive all the defenders from the city's battlements with arrows, slings, or missiles, so that an easier opportunity of mounting by ladders may be furnished." Wickerwork and planks imitated trellised vines; earth, and sometimes bricks against fires, were spread over them. They undermined the foundations with axes.

§ 5. Mice were smaller. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 16. Caesar, book 2 of *The Civil War*: "First, two beams of equal length are placed upon the ground four feet apart; into them small columns five feet high are fixed. These they join to one another by braces with a gentle slope, upon which the timbers that they place for the purpose of roofing the mouse are laid. Upon these they throw two-foot beams and bind them with plates and nails. At the outer edge of the roof of the mouse and at the outermost beams they fasten square strips four inches wide, to hold the bricks which are built over the mice. Thus, when it has been sloped and regularly built as the beams were placed upon the braces, the mouse is covered with bricks and clay so that it may be safe from fire cast from the wall. Hides are drawn over the bricks, lest water sent down through pipes be able to dissolve the stones. The hides in turn, lest they be damaged by fire and stones, are covered with patchwork coverings."

§ 6. Moving towers were a work of greater size. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 17. See Lipsius, *Poliorcetica*, dialogue 4.

§ 7. Now all those things are useless, for our artillery would utterly scatter them with a few blows. Formerly they either burned them by making a sortie or set them afire with a *phalarica* into which they had placed materials that nourished the flames.

They caught hold of the ram with chains.

They placed cushions before it.

They made the wall higher, or drew up another one. If it is lower than the wall, it is rendered useless. But the besiegers deceive them by art. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 19, says: "It is agreed that the contrivance is rendered ineffective if it is found to be lower. But the besiegers are accustomed to employ a device of this sort. First they construct such a tower as seems lower than the city's battlements. Then secretly they make another small tower of planks within it; and when

the engine has been joined to the walls, that small tower is suddenly drawn out from the middle by ropes and pulleys. Armed men, issuing from it, immediately seize the city, because it is found to be higher.”

A Rhodian engineer secretly dug through the earth by a tunnel, and the engine, as he approached it, sank down by its own weight when the ground yielded. Callias drew the Helepolis within the wall. Diognetus impeded the engine by casting refuse upon it. In Marcellinus a *malleolus* is an arrow shaped like a distaff and filled with fire. “The *malleoli*,” he says, “a kind of missile, are formed in this manner. It is an arrow of reed, fitted between its point and shaft with a many-forked piece of iron, which is hollowed into the form of a woman’s distaff upon which linen threads are spun. Its belly, delicately pierced at many points, receives fire together with some fuel in its very cavity; and, discharged slowly from a weak bow--for it is extinguished by a more rapid blow--if it adheres anywhere, it burns tenaciously. When sprinkled with water it excites fiercer heats of fire, and it is put to sleep by no remedy except dust cast over it.”

The *sambuca* is so called, Vegetius, book 4, chapter 21, from its likeness to a cithara. For just as there are strings in a cithara, so in the beam which is placed beside the tower there are ropes which lower the bridge from the upper part by pulleys so that it may reach the wall. Immediately the warriors leave the tower and, passing over it, attack the city walls. It is therefore joined to the tower.

The *exostra* is a bridge which is extended from a tower, Vegetius, book 4, chapter 21. The *tollenon* is so called, Vegetius, book 4, chapter 21, whenever one very tall beam is fixed in the earth, and another longer crossbeam is joined at its highest point, measured at the middle, with such a balance that, if you depress one end, the other is raised. At one end, therefore, an engine is woven together from wicker or planks, in which a few armed men are placed. Then, when one end has been drawn and depressed by ropes, they are raised on the other and placed upon the wall.

On ballistae and the other engines, Vegetius, book 4, chapter 22: “Against these things the besieged were accustomed to defend themselves with ballistae, onagers, scorpions, crossbows, staff-slings, archers, and slings. A ballista is stretched with ropes, sinews, and cords. The longer the little arms it has--that is, the greater it is--the farther it discharges darts. If it is adjusted according to the mechanical art and aimed by practiced men who have first taken its measure, it penetrates whatever it strikes. The onager, however, directs stones, but it hurls weights according to the thickness of its sinews and the size of its rocks. For the larger it is, the larger the stones which it hurls after the fashion of a thunderbolt. No species of engines is found more violent than these two kinds. They called those devices scorpions which we now call hand-ballistae; they were so named because by small and slender darts they inflict death. I think it superfluous to describe staff-slings, crossbows, and slings, which present usage recognizes; nevertheless, by the heavier stones directed through the onager, not only horses and men are struck down, but also the engines of the enemy are broken.”

The catapult hurled spears, the ballista stones, although at times the same engine discharged both kinds of missile. Valerius teaches from the African serpent that their force was not equal even to our smaller pieces of artillery. It could not be pierced by the cast of missiles; but at last, assailed by the engines of the ballistae, it fell beneath repeated and weighty blows of flints. Furthermore, those blows did not readily break wooden towers and hides; our artillery passes through everything. Scorpions discharged smaller missiles and were aimed by one man’s hand. Other kinds of arms remain; because they belong almost exclusively to besiegers, I have deferred them to another chapter.

CHAPTER XX

Great Care Must Be Taken in the Levy

§ 1. Justus Lipsius, book 5 of the *Politics*, chapter 8, openly condemns the crimes of our soldiery. He denies that among us there is any form of selection. Men purchase a soldier; they do not select one. At the sound of the drum there assemble men unknown to one another and ignorant--dregs of their cities who, through poverty and the greatest crimes, have the strongest bond with sin, accustomed to robberies and unaccustomed to wars. I, certainly, would wish the selection of our soldiers to be better. Yet it too was defective in ancient times, and frequently consisted of the worst men, certainly of unwilling men; nor is our own selection so thoroughly to be censured. Let us therefore consider the ancients.

First, it belonged not to volunteers but to men compelled to answer when their names were called. From this cause the entire Roman state experienced so many dissensions, since the sharpest weapon of the tribunes was to obstruct the levies, which they sometimes did at the utmost peril of the fatherland. Indeed, after the fashion of runaway slaves, they were even branded with marks burned into them. The workers in the imperial arms-factories were marked in the same manner, as the constitution of Arcadius and Honorius has it, Code, book 11. Great was the obligation of all who were marked. Julian enacted a law that they should not be admitted into monasteries before their periods of service had been completed. Soldiers and arms-workers were therefore servile; how, then, were they to fight for liberty?

Next, since they were unwillingly bound by the military oath, they fought more timidly and looked back toward home. But volunteers possess greater eagerness. The Roman state--or rather, its calamities--also taught this. In the Second Punic War, Livy, book 22, eight thousand slaves were purchased. Each was individually asked whether he wished to serve. That soldier was of great use and deservedly numbered among the Roman citizens.

The history which Livy recounts in book 24 is not unpleasant. Tiberius Gracchus had legions composed in great part of volunteers, who had already preferred for another year to earn liberty rather than demand it. Yet, when leaving winter quarters, he had perceived that in the column there was a murmur among men complaining whether they were never to serve as free men. He had written to the senate, not so much what they desired as what they had deserved: he had made use of their good and brave service up to that day, and nothing was lacking in them for the model of a regular soldier except liberty. He had been permitted concerning this matter to do whatever he judged to be for the state. Accordingly, before he joined battle with the enemy, he announced that the time had come for gaining that liberty for which they had long hoped. On the next day he would fight with standards brought together in an unobstructed and open field, where the matter could be conducted by true courage without any fear of ambushes. Whoever brought back the head of an enemy he would immediately order to be free; against whoever abandoned his place he would proceed with the punishment of a slave. Each man's fortune was in his own hand. Not only would he himself be the author of their liberty, but so would the consul Marcus Marcellus and all the fathers, who, when consulted by him concerning their liberty, had given him authority. He then read the consul's letter and the senate's decree. At this a shout was raised with immense assent. They demanded the battle and fiercely pressed him to give the signal immediately. After announcing the battle for the following day, Gracchus dismissed the assembly. The soldiers were joyful, especially those for whom liberty was to be the recompense for service rendered in the space of a single day; they spent what remained of the day preparing their arms.

On the next day, when the signals began to sound, they were the first of all to assemble at the praetorium, ready and drawn up. At sunrise Gracchus led the forces into the battle line. Nor did the enemy delay the contest. They were seventeen thousand infantry, for the greatest part Bruttians and Lucanians, and twelve hundred cavalry, among whom very few were Italians, nearly all the others Numidians and Moors. They fought fiercely and for a long time; for four hours the battle inclined to neither side. Nothing hindered the Romans more than the fact that the heads of the enemy

had been made the price of liberty. For whenever a man had vigorously slain an enemy, first he wasted time laboriously cutting off the head amid the crowd and confusion; then, with his right hand occupied in holding the head, every bravest fighter was absent, and the battle had been entrusted to the sluggish and timid. When the military tribunes reported this to Gracchus--that no enemy still standing was now being wounded, that they were butchering the fallen, and that human heads rather than swords were in the soldiers' right hands--he ordered the signal to be given at once that they should cast away the heads and attack the enemy. Their valor was sufficiently clear and distinguished, and liberty would not be doubtful for vigorous men. Then the battle was renewed, and the cavalry was sent against the enemy. The volunteers, therefore--indeed, slaves--preserved the empire.

§ 2. Polybius explains the Roman levy in this manner: "When they are about to hold a levy, the consuls publicly proclaim the day upon which all Romans of military age must be present. They do this almost every year. When the day arrives and all the military youth has been assembled in the city and soon afterward on the Capitol, the junior tribunes divide themselves into four parts in the order in which they were appointed by the people or by the commanders. For four legions constitute among them the entire and principal division of the forces. They assign the first four of those appointed to the legion called the First, the next three to the Second, another four to the Third, and finally the last three to the Fourth. Of the senior tribunes they assign the first two to the First, the next three to the Second, the following two to the Third, and finally the last three to the Fourth. When a division of the tribunes of this kind has been made, so that all the legions now have an equal number of leaders, the tribunes of each legion sit apart and separately, and they draw the tribes by lot one at a time and summon whichever tribe the lot assigns. From it they choose four young men approximately equal in age and readiness. When these have been brought forward, the tribunes of the First Legion make the first choice, those of the Second the second, those of the Third the third, and those of the Fourth the last. When four men have again been brought forward, the tribunes of the Second Legion make the first choice, and so onward, while those of the First make the last. After this, when four have again been brought forward, the tribunes of the Third Legion choose first, while those of the Second choose last. Thus, because the choice always alternates and goes round in a circle, men of very nearly equal quality are taken for each legion."

They conduct this on the Capitol because they needed to be protected by the sanctity of the place. They draw the tribes by lot lest any tribe appear to have been passed over or burdened. Within a tribe even the soldiers themselves were sometimes selected by lot because they refused the oath. When a commander was popular or military service lucrative, they gave their names voluntarily; so Livy, books 10 and 42. Yet what sort of soldiers were these whom they ordered to be led away in chains, Livy, book 3; whose necks they twisted, book 4, while the harshness of the levy was hated because of the injury and mutilation of bodies? This is what men call hunting with unwilling dogs. Indeed, they sometimes sold them; the consuls Valerius and Fabius did this, Livy, book 8. With such a soldier no one now would attack the enemy--or would be slain at the first assault.

But those slaves were not bad soldiers; they were vigorous among the foremost. What if Spartacus or Eunus had led their fellow slaves against barbarians? Would they not have been of the greatest value to the Roman state? For if they had possessed auxiliary forces and resources, they would have accomplished more than all the Romans. As it was, although all the other things were present, expenditure certainly was lacking. Flamininus said of Philopoemen: "He has hands and legs, but no belly," for the resources for war were lacking to that great and vigorous man.

"But wicked men are selected." I admit it. We also use the labor of wicked men to dig mines and construct walls, and their crimes are profitable to the state. Nor are wicked men of no usefulness when they wage wars. First, the cities are cleansed of useless and harmful dregs, and what is purer remains. Next, it is more advisable that wicked, restless men known for crimes should fall in battle than good and quiet men and upright citizens; by the lesser evil, therefore, the worse fall and the better remain, who can defend and preserve the cities. Nor is it true that they cannot be taught discipline. For just as conspicuously wicked men are sometimes the best craftsmen, sailors, and merchants, so too they are warriors. They can preserve the ranks, confront dangers, and endure adversity. Fear of the commander and habit

make them bold; at times they even learn piety in war, when, having received good instructors in morals, they are admonished concerning salvation amid uncertain dangers.

§ 3. But if a choice were given, I would certainly prefer volunteers, and men whose circumstances at home are straitened. Those who answer the roll-call unwillingly, who hide in workhouses and cut off their own thumbs so that they may not be compelled to serve, who always look back toward home, where they prefer to live abundantly and delicately rather than be exposed to danger amid the labors of war--these do not please me. Hence came the veterans' frequent complaints and riots over their discharge. Volunteers, however, have hope in war alone. The most powerful kings, who had the right to compel, nevertheless preferred to have volunteers. Xerxes, that great king, although he compelled so many peoples into wars, was anxious lest they give their names unwillingly, for they remembered that Greece had been fatal to the Persians. He therefore put on the fox-skin and sent men everywhere to spread the report that the leaders of Greece would betray their fatherland and that all were being summoned to spoils, not to a battle.

How great, indeed, was the harshness of levies, when Darius promised the old man Oeobazus, who asked exemption for one of his three sons, that he would leave him all three, and had them slain and cast before their father's eyes. Herodotus, book 4. Xerxes was still more cruel toward a Lydian who was his host and who, of five sons, asked for one as a consolation for his old age. The tyrant cut him in two and placed him upon the road so that the army, passing between the parts, might be consecrated to the infernal gods by a funereal purification. At Rome the path to honors was closed to those who had not served, so greatly did men need to be enticed to military service.

§ 4. Indeed, recruiters were sometimes not far removed from danger when they conducted a levy of unwilling men. Livy, book 21, says that two peoples, dismayed by the harshness of the levy, caused fear of revolt. Triumvirs were sent through the countryside to compel men into military service, Livy, book 23; sometimes senators, as by Attius, and legates, as by Cato. Civilis, when he invites the Batavians to rebellion, certainly adduces the levy among its causes: "A levy presses upon us, by which children are separated from parents and brothers from brothers, as though for the last time."

§ 5. One must labor especially at this: that reinforcements be sent every month. For thus, while a few are received little by little, they come with greater selectivity, and, mingled with the veterans, they learn the military art. In this way the Romans sustained their military strength, for daily even a victorious army becomes smaller. Nothing harms any forces more than time.

§ 6. The first principle of the levy concerns the people from which it is made. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 2, says: "The order of the subject demands that in the first part it be treated from which provinces or regions recruits ought to be selected. It is agreed that in every place both cowardly and vigorous men are born. Yet one people surpasses another in war, and the region of the heavens has very great influence upon the strength not only of bodies but also of minds. In this place I shall not omit those things which have been approved by the most learned men. They say that all nations neighboring the sun, dried by excessive heat, do indeed understand more but have less blood, and for that reason do not possess constancy and confidence for fighting hand to hand, because those who know themselves to possess little blood fear wounds. Northern peoples, on the contrary, removed from the sun's heats, are indeed more unreflecting but, abounding in a copious supply of blood, are exceedingly ready for wars. Recruits, therefore, should be selected from more temperate regions, in whom there may both be a supply of blood sufficient for contempt of wounds and death and no lack of prudence, which both preserves order in camp and is of no small use in combat and counsels."

I certainly shall not deny that the nature of a region is relevant to selecting a suitable soldier; yet history itself teaches that it is of slight importance. For lands once thought barbarous and unsuitable are now fruitful in the bravest men. Vegetius thinks those who are near the heats of the sun are timid because they possess little blood. I do not know how true this is. The Israelites were very brave men and were dried by the heat of the sun. The Carthaginians brought prudence and boldness into battles, yet they were scorched by the African sun; certainly, coming from the sun and the south, they defeated the Romans in the Italian winter, even in a pitched battle.

As for what Vegetius philosophizes concerning an abundance of blood, I do not know whether he would win the approval of philosophers, who locate courage and boldness not in much blood but in heat and spirits. Men fear wounds not so much because of the blood, which can easily be stanchd, as because of mutilation and death.

Nor is it true that northern peoples are devoid of prudence and discipline in camp. It was so formerly, when they were barbarians; but now they are most steadfast in battle and most orderly in camp. Therefore the brave are to be selected from every nation and then formed and strengthened by discipline. For although those who inhabit a fertile land and the south are readily softened, there have nevertheless been many very brave men among them. Divine Scripture bears witness concerning the Anakim, Horites, and Zamzummim. Nor is what Lucan says of all men true, although it is true of many:

Whatever slopes toward the eastern regions
and the warmth of the world, the clemency of the climate
softens its peoples. There you see loose garments
and the flowing coverings of men.

Yet they cast off ferocity and grow in cultivation and prudence. The Romans, indeed, despised the Syrians. When Scipio had heard of the diverse arms of Antiochus and the names of his armed troops, he said: "When I was at Chalcis, my host set diverse meats before me; and when I marveled at their abundance, he added that they all came from a domestic pig, but had been prepared in different ways. Thus their arms are diverse, but they themselves are all Syrians."

But the Jewish War certainly taught that they are by no means to be despised if they are trained. They held dominion for a long time and far and wide, and exhausted both Greeks and Romans.

§ 7. Many are accustomed to ask whether a soldier should be selected from the city or from the countryside. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 3, decides it thus: "It follows that we should inquire whether a recruit from the fields or from cities is more useful. On this point I believe there could never have been doubt that the rustic common people are more suited to arms: they are nourished beneath the open sky and amid labor; enduring of the sun; neglectful of shade; ignorant of baths; unacquainted with delights; simple in mind; content with little; their limbs hardened to the endurance of every labor; and from the countryside accustomed to carry iron, dig a ditch, and bear a burden. Yet necessity sometimes demands that even city-dwellers be compelled to arms. When they have given their names to military service, let them first learn together to labor, run, carry a weight, and endure sun and dust; let them employ a spare and rustic diet; and let them remain now under the open sky, now under tents. Only then let them be trained in the use of arms; and if a longer expedition arises, they should be detained chiefly in country districts and kept far from the allurements of the city, so that in this way strength may be added both to their bodies and to their minds. Nor must it be denied that, after the city was founded, Romans proceeding from the city always went to war; but at that time they were weakened by no pleasures and no delights. The youth washed away in the Tiber the sweat collected by running and exercise on the Campus Martius. The same man was warrior and farmer; he changed only the kind of arms. This is so true that it is agreed the dictatorship was offered to Quinctius Cincinnatus, an excellent man, while he was plowing. Therefore it seems that the strength of the army should be supplied especially from the fields. Somehow, a man who knows fewer delights in life fears death less."

The rustic soldier pleases me because he is better suited to labors. Yet in city-dwellers there are many qualities in which they surpass country youth: they possess a more exact and practiced intelligence and are more capable in all things. Since the smallest part of military service is accomplished by bodily strength and force, while all its highest matters require industry, prudence, and dexterity, and since city-dwellers are more readily educated for this, I would prefer them to be selected. This is now all the more necessary because the kind of arms in present use requires dexterity more than strength: they carry neither shields nor stakes and are not oppressed by so many labors. Rome had

soldiers selected from farmers; Pliny says that they were the bravest men and most vigorous soldiers, and men who thought no evil. Cincinnatus the dictator was also summoned from the plow-handle, and Regulus, cultivator of a poor little field, is adduced in favor of country youth. But when I consider the matter more carefully, I see that there were distinguished commanders, but not very many; for that reason consulships were frequently repeated for the same men. Later, however, when nobles commanded, there were more commanders. Indeed, even in the earliest times many wealthy men conducted affairs vigorously; in the times of Sulla and Caesar, and throughout the entire period following the Second Punic War, they had innumerable very brave men, and those from wealthy and elegant city-dwellers.

§ 8. Vegetius approves the ancient age for enlistment, namely the beginning of puberty, because a man is more quickly imbued with instruction and more perfectly learns what he imbibes from boyhood; his body is more suited to exercise; and he has time to learn everything. Yet they scarcely selected anyone under seventeen years of age unless necessity compelled them, nor did they imbue a recruit older than forty-six with training. Therefore the levy should be instituted with the greatest care, for an army is never weak when the matter has been conducted with a good selection.

§ 9. They institute a levy in two ways. Either they draw the whole army together into one place and display all their strength, in order to strike terror into the enemy; or they display the individual legions and centuries, so that it may remain uncertain how great the multitude is. The latter is much more to be approved, because what is unknown keeps the enemy more anxious, while strength which has been displayed makes the enemy cautious, so that he turns to a stratagem or to foreign auxiliaries.

§ 10. A state which desires to train its citizens as warriors should form them in this manner from boyhood. Only let it preserve a measure; for so should the hardy soldier be trained that he does not cease to be a good citizen. The Spartans educated and hardened their own men to endurance of hunger, thirst, labors, pains, and blows. They especially inflamed them with desire for victory. Cicero, book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputations*: “Companies of young men at Sparta contend with one another with incredible exertion, with fists, heels, nails, and finally teeth, so that they expire before admitting that they have been conquered.” The elders sowed rivalries and suggested contests. Yet in this way they kindled hatreds and civil quarrels, and they obtained neither a great nor a lasting empire. They also gloried excessively in nobility. Agesilaus therefore acted more arrogantly than usefully when the allies complained that many of their own men but few Laconians were serving. He ordered them to sit down, then summoned craftsmen by the names of their trades. When it appeared that most of the allies were craftsmen but none of the Laconians were, this was then esteemed a great matter. Our own times, however, have taught that craftsmen become altogether excellent soldiers.

CHAPTER XXI

Virtues of the Selected Soldier

§ 1. The virtues of soldiers are discerned either in the body or in the mind. The first virtue of a soldier is piety toward God, faith, and hope; for in this the soldier has the foundation of true courage. Wicked men, conscious of evil, cannot with a fearful conscience despise death, for wickedness is always timid. Therefore I would not wish a soldier to be such as Lucan describes:

The peoples whom the north beholds are happy
in their error, whom that greatest of fears,
the fear of death, does not press. Hence in their men
the mind is prone to rush upon the sword, their souls capable
of death, and it is cowardly to spare a life that will return.

Superstition has never had a firm foundation; and therefore their onset was greater than that of men, but their constancy less than that of women. Although superstition, anger, madness, and like things can produce in them what truth can produce, nevertheless constancy cannot exist in them. For this reason Tertullian rightly proves the courage of Christians from the fact that they are so ready to die. For it is impossible that a man should readily cast himself into the danger of death if he thinks that he will die badly. Accordingly, that error of the Gauls concerning a life that would return by no means made them so steadfast that they endured against Roman arms. I am not unaware that most soldiers are impious; but they fight either so as not to lose their life or from some other desire, which readily grows faint when a greater fear approaches. Nevertheless, I do not forbid the selection of wicked men when there is a great scarcity of good men.

§ 2. In a soldier I desire moderate prudence; in a commander, the greatest. At times a battle is restored or a city preserved by the counsel of a single soldier. The Eretrians were bad soldiers, who, like swordfish, did not possess a heart; Themistocles therefore understood that they could easily be conquered. Many things must be done extemporaneously by military prudence which cannot await a commander's present order when he is farther away or when all things are in confusion. Next, unless a moderate degree of prudence exists, soldiers have no hope of military promotions.

§ 3. Let them be strangers to luxuries. A body going from the bedchamber to the battle line, from the shade into the sun, accustomed to a tunic, does not sustain the weight of a cuirass; a head covered with linen refuses a helmet; a hard sword-hilt chafes the hand softened by leisure. A stronger soldier, however, comes from rugged ground. Thus Jerome, to the monk Theodorus. Vegetius orders the limbs to be hardened to endurance by remaining under tents or beneath cold Jove. Delicacies of food were absent: bacon, cheese, and *posca*--vinegar mixed with water--were given. To this end vinegar was customarily distributed to the soldier, so that with it they might correct the taste and rawness of the water. They also wished a soldier to endure the sun and the injuries of the weather. Hadrian destroyed shelters made from branches because he wished the soldier to be enduring of sun and rains. Fulgositius, book 1, chapter 2.

§ 4. They ought also to be spirited and especially confident of victory. They chiefly become so when they judge their commanders experienced and approachable. Nothing gives a soldier equal courage with a good opinion of his commander, if they think that by some singular stratagem or prudence he will preserve his own men and defeat the enemy. When Fabius raised the spirits of his men against the Etruscans and adduced many arguments for victory, he added that one argument remained which could not yet be publicly set forth, lest it become known. Thus, when

soldiers are otherwise brave in spirit, through confidence in their commander they encounter every danger very freely. For if they are hares in helmets, the commander's speech will comfort their trembling in vain. The mention of danger strikes the fearful. All timid living things are useless for battle. In vain will you exhort a deer to fight against dogs when you cannot bear either to see a dog or to hear its barking, but shudder at the mention of a dog.

§ 5. Boldness has frequently given a fortunate outcome. A certain Moorish *cornicularius* of Caesar roused some watchmen and led Pompey's garrison through the midst of Caesar's forces. Let the soldier therefore be bold, but let him employ the prudence and spiritedness of his commander.

§ 6. Let soldiers be strong rather than tall, with watchful eyes and an upright neck. Marius requires a recruit who has six feet, or five feet and ten inches. Meanwhile stature too must be weighed, because it adds strength. Pyrrhus spoke altogether like a commander: "Choose the tall; I shall render them strong by exercise." Brennus brought forward the most contemptible of the Greeks and compared them with the strongest of his own men; and thus he exhorted men so great to fight against men so small. Some tested courage by artifice.

When Chabrias was about to lead an army of recruits into battle, he issued an edict that those who were sick should lay down their arms. The timid pretended sickness. He sent them to preoccupy certain places, so that they might terrify the enemy by their multitude. Polyænus, book 3.

§ 7. Experience itself also, acting as commander, separated the cowardly from the vigorous. When many men sought ranks from Theagenes, commander of the Athenians, he answered that he would grant them at Megara. Secretly, however, he sent cavalry ahead and ordered them to return against his own column in the guise of enemies. Then, as though alarmed, he exhorted them to battle and permitted each man to take his place wherever he wished. At this the brave and eager sprang forward into the first line, while the timid stood behind the standards. Theagenes promoted each man in the place where he found him. And when Iphicrates saw that many timid men were following him, he issued an edict that if anyone had left something behind, he should return in order to go against the enemy well equipped. When many used the opportunity, he rendered the rest more confident by saying that brave men would fight without slaves.

§ 8. Speed and agility are an indication of courage; anger is necessary in war. We remember no one swifter than Hazael, concerning whom Scripture speaks in the passage in question; and the matter itself shows that he nevertheless was a brave man.

§ 9. Finally, a multitude and crowd should be avoided. It has not strength but weight; it is more a hindrance than an aid. Hands are needed, not names. For in the greatest battles there are few who overthrow the enemy. If they preserve the ranks and fresh men are sent in, a battle line cannot be conquered unless all are slain. But now it generally happens through some accident that, when a very few have been slain, all are turned to flight.

§ 10. A multitude is harmful. The army of Xerxes so drained rivers that:

We believe that deep rivers failed,

and that streams were drunk dry by the Mede.

Justin records three hundred seventy thousand; others five hundred myriads, that is, fifty times one hundred thousand. Ctesias records in the army of Ninus one million seven hundred thousand infantry, two hundred thousand cavalry, and a little fewer than ten thousand six hundred chariots. Darius led eight hundred thousand against the Scythians. A multitude impedes itself and renders itself exposed to the enemy. If there is a multitude, let it be divided into several armies.

§ 11. The Romans prepared suitable soldiers by varied exercise; for it was not permitted to obtain honors unless a great part of one's periods of service had been completed, nor to take a wife before ten periods of service.

§ 12. The principal quality in a soldier is obedience, which is exercised in a most serious matter, since at a command one must go to death. Therefore those men must be restrained who prefer to interpret their commanders' orders rather than carry them out, and who thrust themselves into command. Such was the Roman army in Macedonia. Plutarch, in *Galba*: "Most men assert that an army, like a body, ought to be moved by no impulse of its own, but only by the movements of its commander. For this reason they say that Aemilius Paulus, when he received the army in Macedonia full of talkativeness and curiosity and intruding itself into the cares and duties of the commander, instructed it that each man should furnish him a ready hand and a sharp sword; the remaining matters would be his care." Myronides issued an edict that the Athenians should go out; and when not all had yet gone out, he began the battle, interpreting delay as fear. Agesilaus required a horse and a man from the wealthy at Ephesus, and thus received vigorous men in place of cowards.

CHAPTER XXII

The Office and Arts of a Good Commander

§ 1. A commander is especially necessary to an army; for an army without a prudent commander is like a vast beast without a head, like Polyphemus, “a monster horrible, misshapen, huge, whose eye had been taken away.” For this reason Demades too called Alexander’s army a Cyclops, because all things were present to it except prudence, by which that mass might be governed.

An army without a commander is a crowd, a body without a soul, a bank of rowers without a helmsman. In sum, an army is worth as much as its governor. An army without a commander is a lion without eyes; a commander without a steadfast army is a head without a body. When Caesar proceeded in Spain against Petreius and Afranius, Pompey’s legates, he said, “I am going to an army without a commander”; when he proceeded into Thessaly against Pompey, “I am going to a commander without an army.” For the legates had steadfast legions, whereas a great part of Pompey’s men were recruits. Scipio, Pompey, Gracchus, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and others have taught that good commanders with a middling army are of greater worth than a good army without a commander, for a good commander quickly forms a soldier.

§ 2. A commander of wars must be permitted great liberty in conducting the affair, nor should he be punished for an affair badly conducted. For since such great difficulties and such sudden changes arise in war that they cannot be foreseen by human counsel, liberty for a new counsel must be left in a new danger. Next, what is being done in the same camp is often unknown to each party, so far is it from being possible always to meet the contrivances of the enemy. Brutus was victorious against Octavius on his own wing; Cassius was defeated and, because he thought Brutus’s army had been routed, laid hands upon himself. Had he not done this, Roman affairs could have stood with equal fortune. The same occurred long before between the Aequi and the Romans, when Sempronius was consul, since each side believed itself defeated. Therefore, since such great confusion throws everything into disorder, magnanimous men should not be burdened with other dangers, but should rather be aided in adversity.

§ 3. Let him be prudent above all, since upon him depends the fortune of so many brave men and even of the kingdom. Let reason, not fortune, guide him in action; yet if fortune should invite him by an opportunity, let prudence govern that too. For an intelligence tested by dangers and affairs has been found able to accomplish very much in war, especially that virtue which the Greeks call ἀρχινοῦαν and the Latins call sagacity.

Great commanders have accomplished more by counsel than by force. The Carthaginians, because their commanders conducted wars with depraved counsel, crucified them even if prosperous fortune had followed. Valerius, book 2, chapter 7. For they attributed what the commanders had conducted well to the aid of the immortal gods, but what evil they had committed to their own fault. It is agreed that fortune is of no great importance. An army has scarcely perished except where there was an error in counsel. A provident commander is better than a bold one. And Caesar spoke truly: “It belongs no less to a commander to conquer by counsel than by the sword.”

§ 4. Let him be vigorous and energetic, not the shadow of a great name. Let him therefore be roused by dangers and animate others. Such was Lucius Marcellus: when he saw himself unexpectedly surrounded by the enemy, he charged into them and even carried off the *spolia opima*. Sempronius Tuditanus and Gaius Octavius, a tribune, passed through the enemy’s garrisons with twelve comrades. Vigor of mind and confidence produced victory. And when Leonidas was told that the Persians would create a cloud of arrows, he answered that he would fight in the shade. At times let the commander himself go before them by his example, as the greatest commanders have done. When, after Postumius’s exhortation, the soldiers asked what he commanded, he ordered them to imitate him; and, raising the standard, he went against the enemy and conquered.

§ 5. Let the commander of such great forces be blameless and injure no one; let him rouse all men by emulation of what is honorable and becoming. Such was the emperor Alexander, concerning whom his history bears witness: “Since, therefore, he was so great and such a commander at home and abroad, he entered upon the Parthian expedition. He conducted it with such great discipline and such great reverence for himself that it was said not soldiers but senators were crossing over. Wherever the legions made their march, the tribunes were girt for service, the centurions modest, and the soldiers amiable. Because of these so many and such great good qualities, the provincials received the emperor himself as a god. The soldiers themselves, moreover, so loved the young emperor as a brother, as a son, as a parent. They were honorably clothed, shod even for comeliness, nobly armed, and furnished also with horses and becoming saddlecloths and bridles, so that whoever saw Alexander’s army would recognize the Roman state. Finally, he labored to appear worthy of that name--indeed, to surpass that Macedonian--and he said that there ought to be a great difference between the Roman Alexander and the Macedonian.”

§ 6. Let him seek reputation from every quarter, not for the vanity of honor but for safety. Reputation is most powerful in war, and those whom reputation reports to have perished perish. Nowhere is an affair more tossed about by events; through the fall of one man a camp is conquered.

§ 7. Let him have piety especially at heart. Do not entrust yourself and your fortunes to an impious man. For in the end such men have at last perished miserably and have become examples. Even when the soldier is impious, he requires a pious commander.

§ 8. Wealthy men should ordinarily be selected, for they do not gape so eagerly after booty and are able to meet necessary expenditures.

§ 9. Let him have the affairs of the enemy thoroughly examined. Epaminondas used to say that the best commander was he who, although unable to learn the enemy’s affairs with certainty, at least knew them by conjecture.

§ 10. Let him be an example of temperance and labors to the army. The commander’s virtue is accustomed to be a great example. Cato was content with the wine which the rowers drank; Hannibal took food toward twilight; Aemilianus, Scipio, and Alexander took food while walking on the march. Masinissa, when ninety years old, took food standing.

§ 11. Let him be severe and be held to be such; let it scarcely be believed that he pardons offenses. For men swiftly and diligently obey such commanders, admire them, and, although they are sometimes angry with them, nevertheless revere them. Nothing except fear and severity restrains the soldiers’ wantonness, wickedness, hands stained with blood, and spirit gaping after plunder. But a reputation for severity causes offenses to be avoided, punishments to be rare, and exasperations of minds to be absent.

Meanwhile two reefs must be avoided in this sea. The first is excessive savagery, lest he seem to call tortures and insults discipline. The other is that the soldier not be at the discretion of commanders, but the commanders be dragged along by military violence. The former of these calls forth sudden mutinies, the latter destruction. By the military law of the Turks every offense is punished by death. They certainly have this advantage from it: that the rest of the soldiers do not readily riot; yet they do not dare to restrain the Janissaries by that severity.

§ 12. He will render severity tolerable, indeed lovable, by much affability: if he employs beneficence at the proper time; if he avoids savagery of words when decreeing punishments; if he visits and cares for the wounded. But there is no greater force which joins them more closely than common danger. For this reason commanders have been accustomed in battle to call soldiers comrades and brothers. For benevolence alone makes men faithful. Thus that distinguished commander in Tacitus, book 1 of the *Annals*: “And in order that he might soften the memory of the disaster also by affability, he went about among the wounded, extolled the deeds of each man, and inspected their wounds; by hope for one, glory for another, and conversation and care for all, he strengthened them for himself and for battle.”

§ 13. Let him have subordinate commanders, tribunes, and centurions who are strong in vehemence and speed, even if perhaps they lack prudence. It is expedient that some, but not all, be such. For certain things must be resolved suddenly and at the danger of a few, and these bold men rush upon them. Yet let him govern them himself, so that they expend their strength only at its proper time. For just as hunting dogs rise against the quarry with noble impetus but are held by leashes until the moment arrives, so these men ought to be esteemed highly, cherished, praised, and affected with rewards. They are accustomed to accomplish the greatest things and rouse others to equal distinctions. Indeed, let the commander not take it ill that he too is thought to be such, for the soldier rejoices in the ardor of his commander.

§ 14. Let him not change commanders. There is certainly something which I censure in the Roman military system. Since there were six tribunes in each legion, two commanded for two months, and thus after six months the command returned to the same men. Polybius: "Two tribunes make the entire inspection of the flank. Likewise, they are the men who conduct every other care of the camp. For, dividing themselves two by two, each pair commands for two months of a half-year's span, and those whom that lot touches then preside over the entire administration of the camp." The method by which the prefects commanded the allies was the same. At first light the horsemen and centurions come to the tents of the tribunes, and the tribunes to that of the consul; the consul gives the tribunes whatever order must be performed, the tribunes give it to the horsemen and centurions, and these to the common soldiers when the time for each matter comes.

This too was an evil of Roman ambition. For hence an opportunity was sought to harm rivals and please the soldiers when two men held command either simultaneously, on alternate days, or in alternate months. This was praiseworthy: that each morning the tribunes came to the commander, and the horsemen and centurions to the tribunes, to receive orders. Indeed, the soldiers came to the centurions, as Josephus says in book 4 of *The Jewish War*. Yet it could scarcely have happened that all the soldiers came to the centurion. Rather, it must be understood that the *subsignani* came; I do not think that the *velites* came, for they were scattered along the rampart. He then gives the tribunes the watchword and other commands. But when the tribune seeks the watchword, he at the same time reports to the commander the number of soldiers present. Thus Appian, book 5. And in Seneca, *On Tranquillity of Mind*, chapter 8: "That number of slaves was reported daily, like an army to its commander, to a man for whom two deputy slaves and a room a little larger ought already to have counted as wealth." Present-day frauds teach how prudently this was instituted, for they present blind--that is, fictitious--names to princes. This has now passed so far into custom that stealing in that manner is accounted industry.

The sum of all ranks tended toward this: that all should receive the command without error and swiftly. Livy, book 44: "He took care that everything in the column should be done in order and without confusion, at the nod and command of the commander. When what was to be done was announced to all at the same time, not all heard it; having received an uncertain command, some added more of their own than had been ordered, others did less. Then discordant shouts arose in every place, and the enemy learned what was being prepared before the soldiers did. It therefore pleased him that the military tribune should secretly give the command to the chief centurion of the legion, and that he in turn should tell each centurion next to him in order what needed to be done, whether it had to be carried from the foremost standards to the rear of the column or from the rearmost to the front."

§ 15. This also must be guarded against: that he should not place over others men infamous by some mark, although they appear to be excellent soldiers. What wonder is it that Elagabalus perished, concerning whom Herodian says: "Indeed, he placed a certain dancer over the armies, a man who in his youth had formerly performed publicly in the theater. He likewise placed one man from the stage over the youth, another over the senate, and another over the equestrian order. He entrusted the greatest offices of the empire to charioteers, comic performers, and actors of mimes. He gave the procuratorships of provinces to his slaves or freedmen according as each surpassed the rest in disgrace."

Nero too, through the height of madness, sent a freedman to the army. Tacitus, book 14. But he was an object of ridicule to the enemy, among whom liberty was still vigorous and the power of freedmen was not yet known; and they marveled that the commander and army which had completed so great a war obeyed men of servile condition.

§ 16. Let him be diligent and seize whatever opportunity there is for acting and conquering. Francesco Carmagnola, commander of the Venetians, used an opportunity excellently. For when the camps were near one another and one of his cavalrymen had enmity with one of the enemy's cavalrymen, and they wished to decide it by a duel, a place for the fight was appointed between the camps. While many hastened to the spectacle, the Venetian drew up the strength of his soldiers in the camp; suddenly attacking the unsuspecting enemy, he conquered and routed them.

The incident which I shall add shows how greatly opportunity prevails even against ingenuity. Cleomenes and the Argives had neighboring camps. The king announced everything by a herald; the Argives imitated him, so that when he dined, rested, or led out his men, they too repeatedly did the same things as though a common signal had been given. But on a certain day he secretly announced to his men that when the signal for dinner was given, they should take up arms. When this had been done, he came upon the Argives while they were dining and slew them. It was of such great importance to know what opportunity offered. Iphicrates the Athenian was in the utmost fear, but when he had learned that the Thracians would come by night from the hills through which alone there was a road to the camp, he secretly disposed his army along the sides of the road and kept very few fires burning in the camp. Then, attacking from the sides the multitude as it ran down, he slew it. How readily did a man of ingenuity turn the highest danger against the enemy and seek victory from their own counsel.

CHAPTER XXIII

The Prince or King Should Personally Be Present in a Great War

§ 1. Those who govern any single kingdom, however large, if a war should arise with an equal or a more powerful enemy, ought themselves, as kings, to preside over it and administer everything. For the presence of a good king carries very great weight; and deservedly did Antigonos say to a helmsman who warned him about the multitude of the enemy: “ἐμὲ δὲ αὐτὸν παρόντα πρὸς πόσους ἀντιτάττει;”--“But I myself, present here--before how many do you place me?” Augustus discharged not only the office of commander but also that of soldier; and in the midst of an engagement, when the eagle-bearer of his legion had been gravely wounded, he took the eagle upon his shoulders and carried it for a long time. The first signal advantage of the royal presence is that it carries with it the supreme right of fighting and of changing everything according to the occasion. For where the supreme commander is, there the present opportunity can be met; where he is not, many things must be sought from elsewhere.

§ 2. Otherwise a king will make his commanders more powerful than himself; since they have the army in their hands and are experienced, they can easily bring an unwarlike prince into subjection. Examples of many commanders who cast kings down from the throne show this. For when victory is attributed not to kings but to their ministers, it is dangerous for kings to have powerful, spirited, and popular commanders of war.

§ 3. Let him be present at a battle in which the whole issue is decided; in lesser engagements let war be waged through his commanders. Sarbaras admired Heraclius: “How boldly,” he said, “he stands for battle, and alone contends against a multitude, and like an anvil beats back the missiles.” This can be done under necessity; otherwise one must never allow the army to be placed in peril in the person of one man. Augustus, as seemed good, either took part in wars or conducted them through his commanders. Suetonius, *The Deified Augustus*: “Of foreign wars he personally conducted only two in all: the Dalmatian, while still a young man; and, after Antony had been defeated, the Cantabrian. In the Dalmatian war too he received wounds: in one battle he was struck on the right knee by a stone, and in another both his leg and both arms were injured by the fall of a bridge. The remaining wars he administered through his legates, yet in such a manner that in certain Pannonian and German wars he either intervened or was not far away, advancing from the city as far as Ravenna, Milan, or Aquileia.” Since, therefore, he ought to take part in battles rarely and without danger, much less does it befit him to put himself upon the road with a few men and reconnoiter the enemy. Theodosius did this when, accompanied by cavalry, he found the enemy--with the greatest boldness, indeed, but also with the greatest danger.

§ 4. If ever the king descends into the battle line, he must be subject to the doubtful chances of battles. Let him therefore either be protected by a guard in some place, or be in a neighboring city. Thus it was done in 2 Kings 18:2: “And the king said to the people, ‘I too will go out with you.’ And the people answered, ‘You shall not go out; for if we flee, it will not greatly concern them about us; or if half of us should fall, they will not care enough, because you alone are reckoned as ten thousand. It is therefore better that you be a protection to us in the city.’”

Writers also blame, not without reason, the rashness of Alexander, because he was accustomed to take part in every battle and to fight with his own hand in the front line. Now, because of the uncertain missiles of engines, much greater care must be taken that he not be wounded in whom lies the danger of all. The saying was more glorious than prudent:

First to enter the battle with his hand, last to cease from the fight.

And:

βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

A good king and a mighty warrior.

This is to be desired when necessity requires it; otherwise dangers ought not to be summoned against the king, who is the heart of the battle, any more than against the heart itself. In other matters let him maintain equality. Let it be unknown whether a commander or a soldier is marching; let him show that he endures labors, not merely command them. In this matter be cautious. Antoninus Caracalla furnished an example of a good prince, although he lacked constancy in the same conduct. Nevertheless, I judge that the things Herodian writes about him ought to be adopted by a good commander: “He himself,” Herodian says, “readily performed every duty of military service whatsoever. If anything had to be dug, he was the first to dig; if a bridge had to be laid over a river, an embankment built, any work of the hands performed, or any labor undergone, he was the first to undertake everything. He was content with a meager table, little wooden cups, and vessels for food; he even ate bread made without care. For he was accustomed to take as much wheat as sufficed for one man, grind it with his own hand, make a lump from it, bake it upon the coals, and eat it. In short, he disdained everything more elegant and used only the cheapest things, such as were most readily available even to the poorest common soldier. Then he preferred to be called fellow soldier rather than prince; he generally made the journey as though himself traveling on foot, and only rarely mounted a vehicle or horse. He carried his own arms himself. Sometimes he even took upon his shoulders the longest military standards, very heavy with many golden ornaments and difficult to carry even for the strongest soldiers.”

Trajan too always made the journey on foot with the soldiers and by that affability brought it about that a soldier never mutinied against him, as Dio attests. For the soldier is wonderfully kindled to labor when he sees his labors honored by the emperor’s sharing in them.

§ 5. Finally, he avoids the disadvantages which arise from the command of others in wars. Machiavelli correctly enumerates them, but reaches a wholly wicked and impious conclusion. I shall transcribe his words, book 1, chapter 30: “If any prince wishes to avoid occasions for suspicions of this kind, lest he be compelled to be ungrateful toward his own men for their benefits, he must himself take part in conducting affairs, as the first Roman emperors formerly did, and as in our own age the Turk and other princes of distinguished virtue are accustomed to do. For if they are present and conduct the affair splendidly and prosperously, all praise and glory belongs to them. If, while absent, they conduct the affair well through others, then, because the chief praise seems to rest with the man who took part in the business, they think that they cannot enjoy the victory gained according to the judgment of their own mind unless they extinguish the glory of the man through whom the affair was so well conducted; and in this way they become unjust and ungrateful. And although they themselves seem to gain glory from those whom they offend in this manner, nevertheless, if anyone weighs the matter diligently, he will find that they lose more than they gain.

“Although this is so, nevertheless it cannot happen otherwise than that all who through imprudence or negligence remain idle at home, but entrust the administration of affairs to other commanders of theirs, fall into errors of this kind. Nor is there any method of helping them so that they are not borne in the direction in which nature leads them. But the military commander who, after an affair has been splendidly conducted, wishes to avoid his prince’s ingratitude must do one of two things. For after he has obtained the victory, he must either immediately hand the army over to another and commit himself as a suppliant to the protection of his prince, and restrain all pride and ambition in himself. By this method alone will he be able to soothe the prince’s mind, so that the prince can suspect nothing concerning him but has manifest cause for rewarding rather than injuring him.

“Or, if he does not wish to do this, let him know that he will have an ungrateful prince. He has a single defense by which to protect himself against ingratitude: he must reserve to himself with a courageous spirit the victory he has gained and show that it does not belong to the prince; he must either win over to himself the affections of the soldiers and the chief commanders of the army, or, if there are some whom he cannot win over by kindness, remove them from his path for the sake of protecting himself; contract friendships with neighboring peoples; successively occupy the more fortified places; and strengthen them with garrisons. By this method he will be able to repay an ungrateful disposition in kind. These alone are the methods by which a deserving citizen can take care that he is not oppressed by an ungrateful lord. But because it is so arranged that men do not know how to be either altogether good or

outstandingly evil, they know neither how to return the army immediately after the victory has been gained, nor how to conduct themselves modestly and humbly, nor how to employ a certain outstanding and magnificent wickedness. And so, wavering between two extremes, they are crushed.”

The first counsel certainly appears safe and is in truth just: that he who has gained the victory should return the army to the man under whose auspices he served. Hundreds of commanders do this today and have done it; but I do not advise them to cast themselves down and become wretched lest they provoke envy. For by that counterfeit modesty of theirs they reproach the prince for his faintheartedness and envy, and offend him more grievously. The second counsel is not only wicked and seditious but also rash. For that outstanding and magnificent wickedness scarcely ever attains a good end. Since the army is well disposed toward the prince, and since noble and military men do not at once change the religious obligation of their oath, he will not be able in a single moment to make them all deserters. And from where will provisions and money be supplied? Consequently, defections of commanders of that kind are rare today; for they can scarcely occur in a well-constituted state if the measures I advised above are observed.

§ 6. No one would readily believe how greatly the presence of the emperor wins men’s affections. Tacitus, on Galba: “It was resolved that he should go into the camp; this would be honorable to the soldiers, whose favor, just as it is badly acquired by largess and canvassing, ought not to be disdained when gained through good arts.” In this manner there is, most especially, one emperor; for the others depend upon the supreme king and upon others, and are compelled to have their counsels approved by others.

But there is one emperor. Three tribunes with consular power, when each formerly strove toward his own counsels, opened an opportunity to the enemy.

One emperor, moreover, treats matters with few men, and therefore more secret affairs are kept secret, and silence, the foundation of all good counsels, is preserved.

Discuss with many what ought to be done; with the very fewest--or rather with yourself alone--what you are going to do. When Metellus was asked what he was going to do on the following day, he answered that he would burn his tunic if it could disclose the matter.

§ 7. They esteemed the presence of a commander so highly that at times they led not only the unwarlike but even infants into battle.

The Macedonians placed their infant king in his cradle in the front line and conquered the Illyrians. Pity for King Clothar likewise made the Franks brave when they saw the infant, hanging from his mother’s breasts, going before them.

The kings of the Persians were not accustomed to take part in battle, although Darius stood against Alexander. It is excessive if a commander is now exposed to blows when the safety of the army is placed in peril in him, or if, should he be captured, the kingdom is burdened by the expense. This happened to France under Francis.

In the year 1381 the Muscovite besieged Neuhusium, a fortress of Livonia, with three hundred thousand men; the prefect of the fortress pierced the commander’s heart with an arrow, and the whole army was put to flight. Through commanders Justinian, Charles VI, king of France, the kings of Spain, and formerly Augustus brought very many wars to completion. A king has more duties than that he ought to be occupied with the labors of a commander, unless the danger is great.

CHAPTER XXIV

Military Discipline Commended

§ 1. This discipline is one of morals, exercise, and labor. Our ancestors had the greatest care for morals; and it was said expressly concerning war, Deuteronomy 23:9: “When you have gone out to battle against your enemies, you shall guard yourself from every evil thing.” No one doubts that this must be done even in peace, but especially in war, because in it there are manifold causes of sinning and, at the final peril of life, the soul ought to be prepared for God, lest, if the body falls, the impious soldier be condemned also by the second death. Accordingly, a good emperor will severely and constantly form the soldier who has been levied to virtue, to knowledge, and to military fortitude. For discipline is the most tenacious bond; from it come all triumphs. It was so cultivated among the Romans that they overcame even affection for their children. “The discipline of the ancestors,” Alexander says in Lampridius, “sustains the state; if it falls apart, we shall lose both the name of the Romans and the empire.” For whatever is done without order and art is weak, just as if one should strike a wall with the side of a ram rather than with its head.

§ 2. In antiquity moral discipline consisted chiefly in moderating food, drink, and other pleasures, and in guarding against thefts. They had readily obtainable food: bacon and bread. At times they were compelled to carry provisions for half a month, at times for an entire month. The Turks excel so greatly in this respect that, if they added the other things, they would become invincible. They abstain from wine; when there is an abundance of rice, they easily do without bread. But if rice is lacking, they sustain themselves with a powder which they carry with them, made from salted meat ground small; for they put it into hot water and from it make a porridge effective for strengthening their bodies. Those who are more barbarous feed on the blood and flesh of horses.

§ 3. Their drink was *posca*, water mixed with vinegar. When the soldiers asked for wine, a brave emperor pointed to the Nile.

§ 4. They are moved by regular signals, and not by others unless necessary for a stratagem. Some signals are vocal, some semivocal, and some mute. The watchword, which they publish by voice, is vocal; trumpets, drums, and pipes are semivocal; standards, dragons, the *labarum*, and eagles are mute. Trumpeters sound for works or for the soldiers alone; horn-blowers sound when the standards are moved.

§ 5. Free men and slaves alike swore that they would carry nothing away from the camp by theft, and that if they found anything they would bring it to the tribune. The law was severe: let no one seize a chicken, lest a trace remain by which he may be thought to have injured one who was at peace. Frontinus, *Stratagems*, book 4, chapter 3, relates that a fruit-bearing tree which the laying-out of the camp had enclosed remained on the following day with its fruit untouched. Aulus Gellius, book 16, chapter 4, gives the formula of the oath: “When a levy was held in ancient times,” he says, “and soldiers were enrolled, the military tribune bound them by an oath in these words: IN THE MAGISTRACY OF GAIUS LAELIUS, SON OF GAIUS, CONSUL, AND LUCIUS CORNELIUS, SON OF PUBLIUS, CONSUL, IN THE ARMY AND WITHIN TEN MILES OF IT, YOU SHALL NOT COMMIT THEFT BY MALICIOUS FRAUD, EITHER ALONE OR WITH SEVERAL OTHERS, TO A VALUE GREATER THAN ONE SILVER NUMMUS ON ANY SINGLE DAY; and, apart from a spear, spear-shaft, wood, fruit, fodder, wineskin, leather bottle, and torch, if you find or take up anything there which will not be yours and which will be worth more than one silver nummus, you shall bring it or report it within the next three days to Gaius Laelius, son of Gaius, the consul, or to Lucius Cornelius, son of Publius, the consul, or to whichever of them you wish, whatever you have found or taken up, without malicious fraud; or you shall return it to its owner, whom you judge it to belong to, as you wish what is right to have been done.”

The punishment for theft was to be beaten with a club, according to Polybius. Tiberius punished with death a soldier who stole a peacock, Suetonius, chapter 60. Because of the plundering of a single cock, Pescennius ordered ten tent-companions who had eaten what one man had seized to be struck with the axe, according to Spartianus in his life of Pescennius.

But very much has often been indulged to the soldier. Aurelian's letter has been praised rather than observed: "If you wish," he says, "to be a tribune--indeed, if you wish to live--restrain the hands of the soldiers. Let no one seize another man's chicken; let no one touch a bird; let no one carry off a grape; let no one trample the crop; let no one demand oil, salt, or wood; let him be content with his own ration. Let him have his goods from the enemy's booty, not from the tears of the provincials. Let the arms be polished, the iron tools burnished, and the shoes strong. Let the new garment displace the old. Let him keep his pay in his belt, not in the tavern. Let him put on his neck-chain, armlet, and ring. Let him rub down his own packhorse; let him not sell a captured animal; let him attend kindly to the centurial mule. Let each obey the other as though he were a slave. Let them be treated by physicians without charge; let them give nothing to soothsayers; let them conduct themselves chastely in their lodgings. Whoever starts a quarrel, let him be flogged."

§ 6. Let there be modesty in adornment, so that they appear rough rather than ornamented. For:

The rough soldier is armed.

Those who are dressed too ostentatiously are sluggish for the works of military service; they fear the rain and take care both for their clothes and for their body. Here a prudent commander will imitate an ancient commander. When Chares saw that in foul weather the soldiers performed the work sluggishly because they were sparing their clothes, he ordered them to exchange clothes with one another. Since no one took account of another man's clothing, the work was quickly completed.

§ 7. The arms, nevertheless, should be polished and strong. Thus were the Silver-Shields; and in this matter especially military luxury is not useless, for in this way they cast their arms away less readily.

§ 8. The camp itself was also clean; the streets were accustomed to be sprinkled and swept.

That cleanliness was a defense against pestilence and contagion, although it is now scarcely ever observed. For this reason camps do not remain long without contagion.

§ 9. Let them abstain from lusts, for since they are generally men of little judgment, most are broken by pleasures. Antigonus consulted the chastity of citizens. For when he had heard, according to Frontinus, book 4, chapter 1, that his son had lodged in the house of a man who had three daughters of distinguished beauty, he said: "I hear, son, that you dwell in cramped quarters, since several masters occupy the house. Take more spacious lodging." And, after ordering him to move, he proclaimed that no one less than fifty years of age should lodge in the house of a mother of a family.

Quintus Metellus did not wish to have his son as a tent-companion, but wished him to earn his standing in the ranks. Rutilius did the same.

§ 10. Exercise is peculiar to Roman valor, because it was greater among them than among any nation. Josephus, book 3 of *The Jewish War*: "If anyone examines another part of the Roman order in military service, he will see that they possess this great empire as the reward of valor, not as the gift of fortune. For war itself is not for them the beginning of taking up arms, nor do they move their hands only when there is use or necessity, remaining idle in peace. Rather, as though born together with their arms, they never make a pause in exercise and do not await occasions. Their practices or exercises differ in no respect from the true employment of fortitude and boldness, but every soldier is trained daily with all eagerness as though for war. Hence they endure battles very easily and almost without any sense of labor. For neither confusion removes and disperses them from their accustomed order, nor does fear render them stupefied, nor labor weary them. Victory therefore follows them when they fight against men who have not been strengthened in the

same way. And surely one would not err who said that their exercises are battles without blood, and their battles exercises with blood.”

Hence they obtained the greatest victories with the smallest army; those who trained their men did the same. War therefore belongs not to multitude but to order and discipline. Xerxes complained that he had many human beings but few men, as Thermopylae showed. Who does not marvel that Cyrus began such great affairs at first with fourteen thousand men and Alexander with forty thousand? Epaminondas, with four thousand men, of whom four hundred were cavalry, defeated twenty-four thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry of the Lacedaemonians. Fourteen thousand Greeks who set out with Cyrus the Younger defeated one hundred thousand barbarians and returned through an impassable route against the will of the barbarians.

They were exercised throughout the whole day; every class of soldier was exercised, even the veterans. The younger men trained twice a day, the veterans once. The commanders themselves were exercised. Silius, book 8:

He himself among their midst gave signs of immense glory to come:
to brandish the stake, to pass in a leap across mural trenches,
and, wearing a breastplate, to break by swimming the billowing ford--
such were the spectacles of valor before the battle lines.
Often on swift foot he himself outstripped a horse
whose flanks were pierced, as it flew across the open fields;
often, standing tall, he also cast both stone and spear
across the breadth of the camp.

Agessilaus led the army around the camp three and four times every day, so that by cutting wood the enemy might be injured and the soldier exercised. The same judgment must be made concerning every kind of exercise, as I also advised above.

When Alexander wished to fill the ditch and make the rampart level at Tyre, he himself was the first to carry a basket of sand. Indeed, they thus won over their fellow soldiers. Livy, book 7, concerning Valerius: “No other man was more familiar with the soldier, because he performed without reluctance every duty among the lowest soldiers. Moreover, in military sport, when equals entered contests of speed and strength with one another, he was amiably ready to conquer and to be conquered with the same countenance; nor did he disdain any man as an equal who offered himself. In deeds he was kind according to the matter; in words he was no less mindful of another’s liberty than of his own dignity. And--nothing is more popular than this--he administered his magistracies by the same arts by which he had sought them.”

To this pertains what Plutarch says: that in the civil war Pompey, although already an old man and fifty-eight years of age, continually exercised himself among his men both as infantryman and as cavalryman. This indeed is not customary now; soldiers themselves are rarely exercised.

In rain they trained under porticoes roofed with reed or straw. Drillmasters--the *παιδοδιδάσκαλοι*, “teachers of the young”--arose later.

§ 11. The exercises were of many kinds and were always customarily required--for example, keeping the ranks. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 11: “Nothing must be guarded more carefully on the march or in the battle line than that all the soldiers preserve the order of marching.”

There has been a great withdrawal from diligence in exercising, for the command of Augustus and Hadrian was that infantry and cavalry should go out for a march three times in a month. Although this was only one kind of exercise, it is nevertheless agreed that other methods also existed.

§ 12. Running. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 9: “The younger men must especially be accustomed to running, so that they may run upon the enemy with greater impetus; may swiftly occupy advantageous places when the need arises, or forestall adversaries who wish to do the same; may proceed briskly to reconnoiter and return still more briskly; and may more easily overtake the backs of those who flee.”

Livy, book 27, says that the legions ran under arms for a distance of four miles. They ran every fifth day. When a run had been proclaimed for the Praetorians, Nero himself carried a shield before them.

§ 13. Accordingly, they ran armed and with their packs. Tullius, in book 2 of the *Tusculan Disputations*, acknowledges that the exercise of bearing burdens is severe and renders men strong:

“First, you see whence our armies have their name; next, what labor and how great a labor belongs to the column: to carry provisions for more than half a month; to carry whatever a man might wish for use; to carry the rampart-stake. For our soldiers do not reckon shield, sword, and helmet as burdens any more than shoulders, upper arms, and hands. For they say that arms are a soldier’s limbs, and indeed they are carried so suitably that, if need should arise, after the burdens have been cast aside, they can fight with their arms made ready as though with their limbs.” Virgil too describes the labor of the march:

Just so the keen Roman, in his ancestral arms,
as he makes his way beneath an excessive burden,
stands in ranks in a camp already pitched
before the enemy has expected him.

Among their burdens was the carrying of provisions for half a month. At times they carried enough for a whole month: Scipio Numantinus compelled them to carry thirty days’ grain, Livy, *Epitome*, book 57. Sometimes they carried twenty-two days’ provisions. Thus Caesar, book 2 of *The Civil War*: “The legionaries had some supply of grain, because they had been ordered to carry away from Ilerda grain for twenty-two days; the light-shielded troops and auxiliaries had none, since both their means of obtaining it were slight and their bodies unaccustomed to carrying burdens.”

Alexander, according to Lampridius, changed the practice, for he ordered them to receive supplies at their stopping places; in enemy territory, in accordance with the ancient custom, they were compelled to carry seventeen days’ provisions. At times they carried grain, at times flour, and sometimes twice-baked bread. The case of grain is established, for for this reason they also carried mills with which to break it. Livy, book 24, says that shields, helmets, spears, axes, mattocks, sickles, troughs, and mills were given to Scipio. Without doubt they also prepared flour while they remained in camp or while they were being prepared for a journey, for they did not live for the day alone. Indeed, I would believe that ordinarily they baked loaves unless they were called to a hurried journey. For they were accustomed to carry with them twice-baked bread, which they call *buccellatum*, according to Spartianus in his life of Pescennius and Ammianus in his life of Julian. The Greeks called them *paxamatia*. They carried them in leather sacks or upon carrying frames; the soldiers were commonly called “Marius’s mules” when they had bound the rampart-stakes to their packs.

§ 14. Riding for a long time, mounting, and dismounting. For whenever the emperor commanded it, it had to be done.

§ 15. Rushing together in the likeness of a battle, chiefly so that they might learn to preserve the ranks. Care for preserving the ranks was foremost among the Romans, for when those are thrown into disorder, the hope of victory also recedes. They ought not to be packed so closely that room for fighting is lacking, nor spread so loosely that they

can be broken through. They must also be accustomed to this: that they can change the formation of the battle line upon the moment.

§ 16. Performing works. Corbulo's distinguished saying was that the enemy must be conquered with the mattock. Galba, Suetonius says, strengthened both veteran and recruit by continual work.

§ 17. Fortifying the camp. They did not do this through slaves or camp-followers, but completed the labor with their own hands.

§ 18. They also exercised themselves by swimming. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 4: "In the summer season all must be compelled to swim." Formerly they learned to swim in the Tiber; public pools were also established for this use. Cato taught his son these things, and Augustus his grandsons. Plutarch concerning Cato: "He himself went before and taught his son not only to hurl missiles, fight with arms, and ride, but also to exercise at boxing, endure heat and cold, and overcome and cross by swimming the swirling and rapid currents of rivers."

Suetonius concerning Augustus, chapter 64: "He himself for the most part taught his grandsons both letters and swimming and other rudiments."

In the summer months every recruit alike ought to learn the use of swimming, for rivers are not always crossed by bridges. Plains are sometimes flooded, so that there is need of swimming if they wish to escape. Frontinus.

§ 19. They exercised themselves at the post. Vegetius exhibits the post exercises in book 1, chapter 11: "The ancients, as is found in books, exercised recruits in this manner. They wove rounded shields of wicker after the fashion of latticework, so that the lattice had twice the weight which a public shield was accustomed to have. Likewise, they gave recruits wooden clubs of double weight in place of swords. In this manner they were exercised at the posts not only in the morning but also after midday. For the use of posts is of the greatest advantage not only to soldiers but also to gladiators. Neither arena nor field ever proved a man invincible in arms unless he who was carefully trained was instructed at the post. Individual posts were fixed in the ground by the individual recruits so that they could not sway and projected six feet. Against that post, as though against an adversary, the recruit exercised himself with that lattice and club as though with sword and shield: now aiming as though at the head or face, now threatening from the sides, at times striving to cut down the knees and legs; he advanced, withdrew, assaulted, leapt upon it, and tested the post as though it were a present adversary--with every impetus and every art of fighting. In this practice that caution was observed: that the recruit should rise to inflict a wound in such a way that he himself exposed no part to a blow."

They struck the post not only with a club but also with a heavy *pilum*. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 14: "But I return to the undertaking. The recruit who is exercised with a club at the post is also compelled to hurl against that post, as though against a man, shafts of greater weight than the real missiles will be. In this matter the instructor in arms attends to it that he should whirl the shaft with great force and direct the missile with an aimed stroke at the post or beside it. For by this exercise strength increases in the arms, and skill and practice in hurling are acquired."

They said that one must strike not with a cut but with a thrust, for that wound opens the vital parts and, if driven in two inches, is mortal. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 12.

§ 20. Vegetius, book 2, chapter 13, seriously determines that skill in arms must be taught. Accordingly, instructors in arms, who are now almost wholly lacking, must be maintained. In the year 648 from the founding of the city, Rutilius, consul in the Cimbrian war, summoned instructors of gladiators from the school of Aurelius Scaurus to train the recruits. But Gaius Caesar trained recruits neither in a school nor through trainers, but in private houses through Roman knights and even through senators skilled in arms.

The fact that they were taught to strike with a thrust made the Roman especially formidable, since they knew that with a sure and aimed stroke he could touch τὰ καίρια--that is, the vital parts.

They were commanded to exercise horses not only on level ground but also among cliffs and ditches, Vegetius, book 3, chapter 2. Thus exercise from boyhood is of very great importance. From youth the Persians exercised themselves in hunting and horsemanship, Herodotus, book 1, and Strabo, book 5. Always girt with a sword, burdened with a quiver, and clinging to their horses, in the height of peace they practiced war. The Gauls were formerly so practiced in war that war was scarcely waged without them, Justin, book 25. Now, as soon as there is mention of war in Gaul, a levy is held for them in Germany and cavalry is sought.

§ 21. Marching in military fashion. Tertullian, *To the Martyrs*: “Even in peace they already learn to suffer war through labor and hardships: by walking about under arms, running across the field, constructing a ditch, and drying a tortoise.”

Vegetius, book 1: “Furthermore, both the ancient custom has remained and provision is made by constitutions of the deified Augustus and Hadrian that three times in a month both cavalry and infantry be led out for a march--for by this word they name this kind of exercise. The infantry, armed and equipped with all their weapons, were ordered to go ten miles at the military pace and return to camp, in such a way that they completed some part of the journey at a more rapid run. The cavalry too, divided into squadrons and armed, similarly completed as much of the journey, so that for equestrian practice they at times pursued, at times gave way, and by a certain wheeling return renewed the charge. Not only on plains but also in sloping and steep places, both forces were compelled to ascend and descend, so that absolutely no event or accident might befall them in battle which good soldiers had not previously learned by continual exercise.”

Vegetius, book 1, chapter 11: order cannot otherwise be preserved than if by continual exercise they learn to march swiftly and evenly.

In going and returning they completed twenty miles, and this in five summer hours; at the faster pace, twenty-four in four.

§ 22. Cutting down a forest. For this is necessary not only for making engines, fire, and roads but also for strength and exercise.

§ 23. Leaping over ditches. Plutarch attests that Pompey competed in leaping with the agile. Vegetius too has this exercise in book 1, chapter 9: “The soldier must also be trained in jumping, by which either ditches are leapt over or some obstructing height is surmounted, so that, when difficulties of that kind occur, he can cross them without labor. Moreover, in the clash and contest of missiles itself, the warrior who approaches with running and leaping dazzles the adversary’s eyes and terrifies his mind, and inflicts the blow before the other can surely prepare himself either to guard against it or to resist.” Sallust records this concerning the exercise of Gnaeus Pompey the Great: “He competed in leaping with the agile, in running with the swift, and with the strong at the lever.” For he could not otherwise have been a match for Sertorius unless he had prepared himself and his soldiers for battles by frequent exercises.

§ 24. Striking appointed targets. Those who belonged to the light armament were exercised with shafts, javelins, *pila*, arrows, and slings; this they called by the single name “armament.”

Vegetius, book 2, chapter 15, says that they were called *armaturae* and *exculcatores*. The first exercise was to throw shafts and whirl the stake. They did this under the supervision of centurions, and were said to throw “under the vine-staff” (*sub vineam iacere*).

In former times archers were of the greatest use. A third or fourth part of the young men was exercised in these things; Claudius and Scipio conquered by instituting archers. But now they are of little use, as are slings, which Vegetius sufficiently indicates were for driving off barbarians. They were always exercised in them, lest custom fail. Claudian, on the fourth consulship of Honorius:

First train the columns with hard exercises,

and prepare them for savage Mars;
 let neither winter's rest nor sluggish winter quarters
 enervate their hands with bodily ease.

See the laws of Theodosius and Valentinian, the law *Duces*, title *On the Office of the Military Judge*. Exercise, however, surpasses everything.

To dry the tortoise: in this manner its timbers were rendered stronger. The tortoise has been discussed in its proper place.

§ 25. Exercise is especially fitting for the man who fights for his fatherland and to whom it is not permitted to err twice. "The athlete," Vegetius says in book 2, chapter 24, "the hunter, and the charioteer, for a small reward or certainly for the favor of the common people, are accustomed by daily practice either to preserve or increase their arts. The soldier--by whose hands the state must be preserved--ought more zealously to preserve knowledge of fighting and practice in military affairs by continual exercises. To him falls not only a glorious victory but also more abundant booty, and the order of military service and the emperor's judgment are accustomed to raise him to wealth and dignities. Performers of the stage do not withdraw from their exercises for the praise of the crowd. The soldier selected under oath, whether a novice or already a veteran, ought not to cease from exercises in arms, since he must fight for his own safety and common liberty--especially since this is an ancient and prudent maxim: everything depends upon practice."

Hence it came about that among the Romans exercise in the camp was held more ancient than affection for their children: law *Postliminium*, section *Filius*, π., title *On Captives*.

An army is armed more strongly by nothing than by discipline. Pompey and Trajan were especially powerful through it. Salutory rigor conquers the empty appearance of clemency.

Hence great emperors went before their men. Marius, vigorous in digging and laboring, himself furnished his share of the common work. Antoninus always presented himself first in digging and in constructing embankments and harbors, Herodian, book 4.

Hence also those who were negligent in these indoor exercises were punished.

Those who were more negligent in exercise were compelled to receive barley in place of wheat. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 13: "The discipline of exercise was preserved among our ancestors in such a way that both the instructors in arms were rewarded with double rations, and soldiers who had made too little progress in that rehearsal were compelled to receive barley in place of wheat. Nor was their ration restored to them in wheat until, after furnishing proofs in the presence of the prefect of the legion, the tribunes, or the chief officers, they had shown that they had completed everything which belonged to military art." Plutarch, in his life of Marius, says that the Romans were so hardened by labors that you could see no man sweating or sighing. This was so in the long and laborious battle with the Cimbri. From this it has its name, so that an army is called *exercitus*, "the exercised body." Hippocrates says truly: "Ραθυμία ὑγραίνει, καὶ ἀσθενὲς τὸ σῶμα ποίει, πόνος δὲ ξηραίνει, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἰσχυρὸν ποίει."--"Idleness moistens and makes the body weak; labor dries and renders it strong." Labor in camp and on the march was great.

Josephus: "They carry a spear and shield; besides these, a saw and a basket, a mattock and an axe, and in addition a strap, a sickle, and a chain." Finally, they carried seven or twelve rampart-stakes apiece. Those stakes, indeed, are useless because of our artillery, except insofar as they can delay cavalry. If anyone could restore the other things, surely he would easily seize mastery of the world. For how great a protection it is that a soldier carries a month's provisions upon his shoulders! Where would an army not penetrate when its provision is at home with it?

Scarcely any common soldier had servants; ten men had one servant in common, who carried the mill and the other things. For cauldrons, the skins of tents, and other things were necessary. They also had some beasts of burden, for many instruments of war must be conveyed.

§ 26. One may well marvel at the ancient diligence in this matter when it is compared with our negligence. Octavius Augustus, in order to overcome Sextus Pompey, exercised his forces throughout the whole winter. Suetonius, *The Deified Augustus*: “Until, after ships had been built anew, twenty thousand slaves manumitted and assigned to the oar, and the sea admitted into the Lucrine and Avernian lakes, he made the Julian harbor near Baiae. After he had exercised his forces there throughout the whole winter, he defeated Pompey between Mylae and Naulochus.”

§ 27. Accordingly, an ancient army, and every army which is rightly constituted, is not a mere multitude. A multitude is rather often harmful; a larger multitude is exposed to more accidents. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 1: “Accordingly, in lighter wars they believed that one legion mixed with auxiliaries--that is, ten thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry--could suffice. Praetors, as lesser commanders, often led this force upon an expedition. But if great forces of the enemy were reported, a man with consular power, as a higher-ranking commander, was sent with twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. But when an infinite multitude from the fiercest nations had rebelled, then, under the compulsion of extreme necessity, two commanders and two armies were sent with a command of this kind: ‘Let the consuls, either one or the other or both, see to it that the state suffers no harm.’”

“Finally, since in different regions the Roman people fought against different enemies in almost every year, these numbers of soldiers sufficed for this reason: they judged it more useful to have armies not so large as well equipped with arms. Nevertheless, this proportion was observed, that the multitude of allies or auxiliaries in the camp should never be greater than that of Roman citizens.”

The other resources of the legions are worthy of wonder, so that Vegetius deservedly judges a legion to be a self-sufficient city. “A legion,” he says in book 2, chapter 25, “was accustomed to conquer not only by the number of its soldiers but also by its iron implements. First of all, it is equipped with missiles which no breastplates and no shields can withstand. For it was accustomed to have one wagon-ballista for every century; for drawing each of these mules were assigned, and for arming or directing it one tent-party--that is, eleven men. For the larger these machines are, the farther and more forcefully they hurl their missiles. They not only defend the camp but are also placed in the field behind the battle line of the heavy armament. Neither armored cavalry nor shield-bearing infantry can withstand their force. There are accustomed to be fifty-five wagon-ballistae in a single legion.

“Likewise, ten onagers--that is, one for each cohort--are carried fully equipped on wagons by two oxen, so that if the enemy should happen to come to attack the rampart, the camp can be defended with arrows and stones. The legion also carries boats hollowed from single timbers, together with very long ropes and at times even iron chains, so that by joining these monoxylous boats together, as they call them, and covering them over also with planks, rivers which cannot be forded without bridges may be crossed without danger by both infantry and cavalry. It has iron grappling-hooks which they call wolves, and iron sickles fastened to the longest poles. Likewise, for conducting work on ditches, it has two-pronged hoes, spades, stakes, rakes, troughs, and baskets in which earth is carried. It also has mattocks, axes, adzes, and saws, with which timber and stakes are shaped and sawn. It has, besides, craftsmen with all their iron tools, who make tortoises, gallery-shelters, rams, covered sheds, as they call them, and even movable towers for attacking the cities of the enemy. But lest still more be said by enumerating individual things, a legion ought everywhere to carry with it everything which is believed necessary in every kind of war, so that wherever it pitches camp it may make an armed city.”

CHAPTER XXV

Once Prepared, There Is Need of Speed

§ 1. When arms and men are now prepared, before all things there is need to attack the enemy swiftly and to anticipate report itself. For he who finds the enemy unprepared has attained half the victory. Thus Caesar was a great emperor if ever there was one, and the greatest orator gives testimony concerning him: “This τάχος,” he says, “is of incredible swiftness.” Plutarch shows the reason in his life of Caesar: “Since he saw that the beginning and first attack of his undertakings required no great force for the present, but that the enemy must rather be anticipated by the terror of boldness and by speed in timing--for the unexpected would strike and drive his adversaries more quickly than if he fell upon them with full preparation--he commanded his tribunes and centurions, armed only with swords and leaving their other arms behind, to occupy Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, with as little bloodshed and tumult as could possibly be.”

There is much military prudence in these few words. First, a sudden attack does not require a great force, because it is generally made against unarmed men.

The Athenians went out from their city, celebrated the rites of Minerva, and, with arms concealed beneath their clothing, suddenly devastated the territory of the Lacedaemonians; laden with booty, they returned without a wound, because they had already conquered the enemy before the latter armed themselves. Next, it is agreed that those upon whom men come unexpectedly are struck with consternation by speed. For unforeseen things terrify. Caracalla, though not a good emperor, unexpectedly cut down with great slaughter the Parthians--otherwise a brave people--while they awaited the nuptials. Hence arose that saying: “Delay has always harmed those who were prepared.” Caesar taught, both by words and example, that speed surpasses all things in military affairs. Accordingly, when setting out he forbade fires, lest the enemy learn that he was present and lest provisions fail his own men. And so, if you weigh everything correctly, he completed everything through speed. In Spain he conquered Pompey’s legates more slowly because, overcome by anger, he had lingered at Massilia:

Though we hasten toward the western pole of the world,
there is time to destroy Massilia.

§ 2. If men who are prepared are slow, the greatest part of their preparations perishes. Sudden assailants do not even need preparation, because they are permitted to come upon men while they sleep. By speed Ariston conquered the Athenians, Aemilius the Veientes, and Aruns Hannibal. The speed of Lucius Marcius in Spain was distinguished: for after the Scipios had been slain in Spain, he occupied two camps in the same night. There was no station and there were no guards, and so the Roman entered as though into his own camp. Livy, book 34. Thus Thrasybulus was slain in his own tent through the negligence of the guards.

Amage, a barbarian queen--and indeed the wife of a cowardly king--snatched this praise from very many men. For when the Gersonitae were being oppressed by the king of the Scythians, she took 120 men with her and, after an uninterrupted journey to the palace, killed the gatekeepers and the king together with his friends, and ordered his son to reign justly.

It is therefore less wonderful that Solon, as though in a single assault, armed ships, captured the matrons of the enemy, and stormed the city. Aelian writes the history thus: “By a distinguished stratagem Solon captured Salamis. At Colias the Attic matrons were celebrating the feast of Ceres with gladness and dances. Through a pretended deserter he announced this to the Salaminians. Meanwhile, he ordered beardless young men dressed in women’s clothing and carrying swords beneath their garments to conduct dances on the shore in place of the women. The Salaminians came to them and were killed; the young men boarded their ships and occupied Salamis.” Aelian, book 8. Julius II suddenly

attacked Bologna with equal speed and, armed, struck terror before the neighbors could take counsel. Thus he joined the Spaniard and the Frenchman to himself and held the Venetians suspended in terror. All congratulated him as victor who, had he been defeated, would perhaps have crushed him or, had he delayed, would have deserted him.

CHAPTER XXVI

Military Magistrates

§ 1. Lipsius, book 2 of *The Roman Military System*, says that military magistrates are of two kinds, common and proper: the common are the commander and the legates; the proper are the tribunes, the centurions, and the prefects of cavalry.

We described the commander previously. Among the Romans, however, he was of two kinds: either he served under his own auspices, when he was king, consul, dictator, or *imperator*; or under another's, if he was proconsul, proprætor, a man of consular rank, legate, or prætor. Cicero, book 1 of *The Nature of the Gods* and book 2 of *On Divination*, is witness that these men did not possess the auspices. They nevertheless had certain imitations of auspices, since a change is easy in superstition. For after sacrificing and taking the auspices they set out for their provinces; hence Scipio in Livy, book 28, attributes auspices to himself--although perhaps he is speaking of those very auspices which were customary in the legions.

§ 2. Commanders had legates. Their institution was that they should assist the commander by work and counsel; for they were πρεσβευταί, envoys, and σύμβουλοι, counsellors.

Sometimes the senate named them, sometimes the consul. The commanders themselves selected them for themselves, but not without a decree of the senate, as is established from Cicero's speech *Against Vatinius*.

§ 3. The duty of a legate was to bring forward for consultation everything which he thought pertained to the affair. Caesar, book 3 of *The Civil War*: "The functions of a legate and of a commander are different. The one must do everything according to prescription; the other must consult freely concerning the whole issue."

They possessed the insignia of command, Livy, book 29.

There were two for the most part, sometimes more, according as the senate decreed.

In the age of the princes, consular legates commanded entire armies. Men of prætorian rank commanded individual legions; these were also called legates of the legions, ὑποστράτηγοι and ὑπαρχοι, as though subordinate prætors and subordinate prefects. These same men were afterward called commanders.

§ 4. After the legates, the regular dignity was that of the tribunes. There were six in each legion; two at a time commanded in rotation. They administered justice in the headquarters and gave the signal. Livy, book 28: "They permitted the tribunes both to administer justice in the headquarters, and the signal was sought from them." The care of watches, fortifications of the camp, and exercises rested with them.

They therefore commanded not one cohort or a definite part, but the whole legion. Horace: "The Roman legion which obeyed me as tribune."

At first they were appointed by the kings, later by the people. Initially this was arranged so that the people should name six and the commander appoint the rest, whom they called Rufuli. In the year 444 from the founding of the city it was established that sixteen for the four legions should be appointed by the people, and the remaining eight by the consuls. Livy, book 9. Hence there were two classes of tribunes, Rufuli and those elected in the assemblies, and the latter were held in especial esteem. Sometimes men of consular rank were made tribunes. Livy, book 42: "Two consular military tribunes were sent with him." And in a great peril the senate forbade anyone to be made tribune unless he had held a magistracy.

If tribunes discharged their office rightly, they were readily admitted into the senate. Augustus gave the sons of senators a tribunate and a prefecture of cavalry wings, and the right of the broad stripe. From this they were called broad-striped tribunes, just as tribunes taken from the equestrian order were called narrow-striped tribunes.

It must by no means be approved that through canvassing they changed the tribunes every year; for when the emperors' freedmen afterward created six-month tribunes, it was like madness. Juvenal, *Satire* 8, ridicules them:

He too grants the honor of military service to many;
six months' service binds the seers' fingers round with gold.

§ 5. There were also tribunes of cohorts and of cavalry wings. Suetonius, in *Claudius*: "He so arranged the six-month military offices that after a cohort he gave a wing, and after a wing the tribunate of a legion."

Tribunes of cohorts are named in Caesar, book 2 of *The Civil War*. In his life of Probus, Vopiscus assigns six cohorts to one tribune; but Lipsius most correctly understands "tribunate" in these cases as "prefecture."

Tribunes possessed the right of golden rings, according to Appian in *The Punic Wars*.

The prefect of the camp began under Augustus.

§ 6. There were sixty centurions in each legion--that is, two in each maniple. They were appointed by two selections; the man chosen first was considered the more worthy. The centurions chose for themselves οὐραγούς, or *optiones*, who were their assistants, deputies, and subordinate centurions. The man chosen first commanded the right-hand century, the other the left.

Thus Polybius speaks of them in the translation of Lipsius: "From each of the aforesaid classes, except the youngest, they choose according to valor ten leaders of ranks. After these, in a second selection, they choose another ten; and they call all these men leaders of ranks. The man who was chosen first also becomes a participant in the council. These in turn choose an equal number of men whom they call *uragi*, or leaders of the rear. Thereafter, together with the leaders of ranks, they divide each age or class into ten parts, except for the *velites*, and to each part they assign from the men already selected two leaders and two *uragi*. They distribute the remaining *velites*, as numerous as they are, equally among all the parts. Each of these parts they call a rank, a maniple, and a standard; the leaders themselves they call centurions and leaders of ranks. In each maniple they also choose from the rest two standard-bearers outstanding in vigor of body and spirit. They rightly appoint two leaders in each maniple because, since it is uncertain what any man may do or suffer and military affairs admit no excuse, they never wish a maniple to be without a leader. When both, therefore, are present, the man chosen first commands the right part of the maniple, and the second the left. But when one is absent, the man who remains commands all."

§ 7. Here there are distinguished lessons of true military service and for strengthening spirits.

The first lesson: they choose according to valor, ἀριστίνδην, "by selection of the best," not, as sometimes now and under a declining empire, through favor, money, or other means. Scaeva in Lucan:

There, promoted through much blood,
he bears the Latian vine-staff after long service in the ranks.

Those who had not seen a camp used to demand the vine-staff by a written petition. Centurionates were obtained through friends, when:

Pelopeia makes prefects; Philomela, tribunes.

"The strength of the legions," Vegetius says in book 1, chapter 3, "has been broken by the negligence of earlier times, when canvassing seized the rewards of valor and soldiers were promoted through favor who had been accustomed to be promoted through labor. Next, when tent-companions whose terms of service were complete had been discharged

in the customary manner by letters of testimonial, no others were substituted. Furthermore, it is necessary that some should be weakened by sickness and discharged, some desert military service, and some perish through diverse accidents. Thus, unless a crowd of younger men succeeds every year--indeed, almost every month--in the place of those who depart, even a populous army is exhausted."

Although it is not foreign to reason that appointments be made according to the census, and it is agreed from the speech of Maecenas that men were sometimes made centurions at the outset, that nevertheless is rare and fitting only in the bravest and most prudent men, who grasped the rudiments without experience of military service. I believe that this happened among those who, having followed the camp as little children, crawled among the standards and learned the entire order and discipline.

The second: the consuls and tribunes assigned the rank. Since there were several of them and the business was conducted in the army, they could not easily place an unworthy man over brave men.

The third lesson: there was a double selection, so that greater regard might be had for valor.

The fourth: the first-rank centurion stood at the highest dignity. For he was first summoned to council with the legates and tribunes; but in alarming affairs the centurions of the chief ranks were also summoned. Thus Caesar, book 1 of *The Gallic War*, and book 5. Without doubt the prefects of cavalry were then also summoned; their dignity was greater than that of centurions.

The fifth: the tribunes appointed the *optiones*, but afterward this was granted to the centurions, so that they might choose brave and faithful men.

The sixth: they select two standard-bearers, for the standards were heavy, while each manipule had one standard. The eagle-bearers did not possess the dignity which our standard-bearers now possess. For the first-rank centurion governed the eagle; in Dionysius, book 10, he is also called prefect of the legion. "In another battle," he says, "in which it happened that the prefect of our legion fell and the eagle came into the enemy's power, I, fighting at the same time, both preserved the eagle and rescued the prefect. Returning thanks to me for this aid, he yielded the command of the legion to me and gave me the eagle." Indeed, he himself tore the eagle from the ground and gave it to the standard-bearer.

The seventh: those who had held the first rank attained the equestrian census.

§ 8. There are ten squadrons of cavalry; in each there are three prefects. The man named first commands the entire squadron; when he is absent, the second commands. Thus Polybius: "They likewise divided the cavalry into ten squadrons. From each they take three men who are to be leaders. These three themselves select *uragi*, or leaders of the rear. The man chosen first, therefore, commands the entire squadron; the remaining two hold the place of decurions, and thus all are called decurions. When the first is absent, the second assumes the place of prefect of the squadron."

§ 9. The allies had twelve prefects in place of tribunes. Polybius: "When the allies have been joined and assembled together with the Romans, their ordering and government is held by leaders appointed by the consuls. These are called prefects, twelve in number."

They were appointed by the consuls so that they might choose men who were more faithful and hold them bound by a benefit.

Finally, there were ten men in each tent-party. The man who commanded them was called a dean.

CHAPTER XXVII

Other Magistrates in Military Service

§ 1. Among the most ancient peoples of the East, the dignity next to kings was that of the master of the soldiers, such as the one in Genesis 26; in small kingdoms these men were both prefects of the praetorium and magistrates of the camp. The Assyrian also had Holofernes as commander of the army; Joab was over the army of David, who also had very many commanders, one in each tribe. Military service has always been ordered in every state. For an ordered and a disorderly army incur the same expenditures--indeed, the disorderly incurs greater ones--but the ordering was discerned in the magistracy and in the duties of its officers. Among the Romans under the emperors, military magistracies, just like civil ones, were gradually changed.

The admiral--ἀμειράλιος ἡγεῖται, says Codinus, τῆς ὅλης παντός--commands the whole fleet. The grand *heteriarch* presides over the reception of deserters. The prefect of the legions held nearly the office which the legates formerly held. Vegetius, book 2, chapter 9: "The prefect of the legion was its proper judge, possessing the dignity of a count of the first order; in the absence of the legate, as his deputy, he retained the highest authority. The tribunes or centurions and the other soldiers obeyed his commands. From him the watchword for a watch or for a march was sought. If a soldier had committed some crime, by authority of the prefect of the legion he was assigned by the tribune for punishment. The arms of all the soldiers, and likewise the horses, clothing, and grain allowance, belonged to his care. By his command the rule and severity of discipline, and the daily exercise not only of the infantry but also of the legionary cavalry, were maintained. As a diligent and sober guardian, he himself formed the legion entrusted to him by continual labors for every devotion and every industry, knowing that the valor of those subject to him redounded to the praise of their prefect."

The prefect of the camp was afterward added. Concerning him Vegetius, book 2, chapter 10, says: "There was also a prefect of the camp, who, although occupying an inferior dignity, was nevertheless engaged with matters of no small importance. To him belonged the positioning of the camp and the marking out of the rampart and ditch. The soldiers' tents or huts, together with all the baggage, were attended to at his direction. Moreover, sick tent-companions, the physicians by whom they were treated, and their expenses belonged to his diligence. He took care that wagons, pack-animals, and also the iron tools by which timber is cut or hewn, ditches opened, and a rampart constructed, together with aqueducts, timber or straw, rams, onagers, ballistae, and all the other kinds of artillery, should never be lacking. After long and approved military service, a man most skilled in all these matters was chosen, so that he might rightly teach others what he himself had performed with praise."

Tacitus, *Annals* 1, says that their dignity was greater than that of the tribunes. The grand *stratopedarch* presided over the whole army, in order to take care of food and equipment. Cantacuzenus, book 1, chapter 17, mentions the *stratopedarch* τῶν μονοκαβάλλων, who presided over those who served with one horse.

There was a *stratopedarch* of the Murtati, who were stationary javelin-throwers; a *stratopedarch* τῶν θράκων, who presided over the spearmen; and a *stratopedarch* τῶν τζαγγρατῶν, who presided over the bowmen.

The prefect of the craftsmen had under him all the craftsmen, the arms, the wagons, the sappers, and the others.

§ 2. The dignity of the masters of the soldiers was great. There were five of them in the East; they were also masters of arms. In the West there were two, and sometimes one.

In the fleet the *drungarius* obeyed the commander alone; he commanded the counts, the admiral, the *protocomes*, and *drungarii* of inferior rank.

The magistrates of the cavalry were formerly called τετραρχοὶ, Leo, *Constitution* 3, §43; he also calls them μεράρχες and στρατηλάτας.

At times triumvirs were created to conduct levies. Livy, book 25, says that this occurred in the Second Punic War, when there was a great scarcity of soldiers.

§ 3. There were also *primipili*, whose dignity was great; they supplied the grain allowance, according to Dionysius, book 9.

The counts of military affairs were made equal to the commanders of the provinces, Code, title 12, *On the Counts of Military Affairs*.

There were several of them. At one time they commanded infantry, at another squadrons of cavalry. Some were equal to the masters of the soldiers.

The counts of the schools and of the guards belonged to the offices of the palace.

§ 4. The prefects of frontiers and of soldiers were called commanders. Crispus was one of these, and he made a mockery of commands and powers; for this reason Nero caused him to be drowned in the sea.

The *drungarii* were afterward held to be higher than commanders and counts. A *drungus* is Δροῦγγος τῶν ἐκ τριῶν μοιρῶν συγκείμενον ἄθροισμα, an assemblage composed of three *moerae*, or parts. A *meros*, or μοῖρα, sometimes contained three *drungi*. For the names vary.

There is much mention of these men in Maurice and Codinus; the Deacon, book 25, names a *drungarius* of the watch.

The officers set over the *labarum*, or λαβάρων, as they were called, carried it by turns. They were fifty in number, according to Eusebius, book 2 of *The Life of Constantine*. They were men of the highest distinction and equal to men of consular rank, according to the Deacon, book 11.

Officers placed under the tribunes commanded a fixed number of soldiers, according to Suetonius in *Otho*.

There were also tribunes of the provinces, Cassiodorus, book 12, chapter 34: the tribune of the maritime districts; and tribunes of the praetorian cohorts.

The *aphoplistae* disarmed private persons so that they might not commit murders; Justinian abolished them in Novel 15. Our people call this office the red staff. After wars, a magistracy for restraining petty brigands is necessary.

They are also commonly called *latrunculatores*. The *irenarchs* were similar to these and prevented murders.

The *metatores* and measurers selected a place suitable for the camp.

As a bold quartermaster, I shall come into the Hesperian fields.

The judge of the camp, later called κριτὴς φοσσάτων, judged among the soldiers, as the tribunes formerly did.

The camp instructors, ὀπλοδιδάσκαλοι, were present in each legion, as appears in the acts of the Thebans.

§ 5. Whether the *evocati* should be counted among the soldiers or among the military magistrates might seem uncertain; but in dignity they were equal to centurions, while in status they were private men. They were the most excellent soldiers of every class, who had completed their terms of service but voluntarily served for the sake of their country or of their commanders. Thus Dionysius says: "Among these men was L. Siccus, who commanded a cohort of eight hundred men who were already beyond military age and were not subject to the laws of military service, just as Siccus himself was not. Nevertheless, honoring the man and having received many benefits from him, they were unwilling to desert him when he went to war. And this band was by far the foremost of the entire army, whether in experience of battles or in steadfastness amid dangers."

They were also taken from the allies, and in great number. Quinctius collected three thousand, and Plutarch calls them *σόμεμα*, the edge of the battle-line. In this respect those who had many beneficiaries were powerful. Octavian collected ten thousand from the Campanian beneficiaries of his father, according to Appian. He kept these under one standard as bodyguards. Tacitus calls it the standard of the veterans.

They were exempt from duties, unless the enemy had to be repelled. Many enrolled in the hope of commanding ranks. Caesar, book 1 of *The Civil War*, seems to make them equal to centurions: “He promises four *iugera* to each man, and a proportionate share to centurions and *evocati*.”

Dio, in *Augustus*, says that they were permitted *ράβδους φέρειν ὥσπερ οἱ ἑκατόνταρχοι*, to carry rods like the centurions.

§ 6. When the state had been corrupted, almost all military offices passed into disgrace and profit-making. Thus no account was taken of valor, but only of money and vices.

Tacitus, book 4 of the *Histories*, shows what discipline there then was in the camp and what manner of levy: “At the command of Vitellius, the youth of the Batavians was summoned for a levy. This, burdensome by its very nature, the officials aggravated by avarice and lust: they gathered the old or infirm, whom they might release for a price; on the other hand, they dragged off immature boys conspicuous for beauty--and in most of them boyhood is tall--to be debauched. Hence arose resentment, and the authors of sedition, acting in concert, induced them to refuse the levy. Civilis summoned the leading men of the nation and the boldest of the common people, under the appearance of a feast, to a sacred grove. When he saw that night and merriment had warmed them, he began with the praise and glory of their nation and recounted their injuries and exactions and the other evils of slavery. For there was no alliance, as formerly; rather, they were treated as slaves. When did a legate come, accompanied though he was by a burdensome retinue and with insolent command? They were handed over to prefects and centurions, who, when they had glutted themselves with spoils and blood, were changed, and new pockets and various names for plunder were sought. A levy was at hand, by which children were separated from parents and brothers from brothers, as though for the last time. Never had the Roman state been more afflicted; there was nothing in the winter quarters except booty and old men. They should only lift up their eyes and not fear the empty names of legions. They themselves possessed the strength of infantry and cavalry, Germans were their blood-relations, and the Gauls desired the same thing. Nor would this war be displeasing even to the Romans; if its fortune were doubtful, he would impute it to Vespasian, while no account had to be rendered for victory.” Heard with great assent, he bound them all by a barbarian rite and their ancestral imprecations.

CHAPTER XXVIII

The Domestic Soldier Is Preferable to the Foreign; Yet the Foreign Must Not Be Neglected

§ 1. This matter is most difficult not only to treat, but also in practice itself. I see authors go in opposite directions: some wholly recommend τὸ ξενικόν, the foreign soldiery; others, the domestic. Princes follow now the former, now the latter.

Against the foreign soldier, these things are generally said.

First, that foreigners are unfaithful and, when offered greater pay by the other side, cast off both right and divine law.

Second, that they do not obey, cannot be commanded, and cannot be governed--and that when danger is close.

Third, that they flee without shame and are bound by neither fidelity nor affection to the prince or the country, for the soldier is a mercenary.

Fourth, that they have no cause for which they should contribute their blood to another's dominion. Epaminondas exhorted his men to charge the Lacedaemonians, saying that when these had been slain, there would be no steadfastness in the rest.

Fifth, that when they come as auxiliaries, they regard the land as foreign and therefore, whenever they can, ravage the very land which they were hired to defend.

Sixth, that foreign auxiliary soldiers cannot readily be employed; for since they receive their pay from another, they will not be faithful to the man for whom they face danger, but to the man by whom they are supported.

Seventh, that he who wages wars by another's aid is in the power of the man by whom he is assisted. Auxiliary Goths plundered the East and invaded the West. After the Saxons had defeated the Picts and Scots, they possessed Britain.

Eighth, that the mercenary soldier is useless because he does not expose his life for a small stipend. Further, he is either brave or cowardly: if brave, he is to be feared; if cowardly, he is a traitor. Finally, what you give a domestic soldier remains in the kingdom; what you give a foreigner makes your neighbors stronger.

§ 2. Nevertheless, in my judgment many things must be considered in this matter, and at times foreign soldiers must be preferred to domestic ones. Nor must it always be asked what is best absolutely, but what can be done and what, after the circumstances have been considered, must be embraced.

§ 3. Accordingly, it is to be wished that, just as in the Roman state in the time of Romulus and the other kings all citizens were soldiers, so also in kingdoms and cities the care of war should be joined with the arts of peace, so that all citizens may always be prepared both to sustain and to make war and, when it is ended, may be content with the triumph and return to the civil arts. Thus Atilius Regulus asked the senate to permit him to return home to care for his farms, because they had been rather negligently managed by his tenants; and other Roman soldiers laid aside their arms most eagerly.

Yet I do not think such a state can be stable, because no such state has appeared down to the present day which endured for a long time. For even at Rome, although there were many thousands of citizens, nevertheless only a few were enrolled for wars. For what were two or four legions in comparison with two hundred or three hundred thousand citizens?

§ 4. Those who possess extensive kingdoms composed of diverse nations can not only levy soldiers from their subjects, but can also hire them from other peoples. For what we see done today in most kingdoms is no reason why we should condemn it, unless an evident reason persuades us otherwise. Nor do we approve Machiavelli's opinion that

no kingdom and no state possesses a lawful ordering of warfare or skill in it. Thus, when the Roman emperor has war against the Turks, he employs not only Pannonian and German soldiers, but Italian and French soldiers also, thinking it contributes wonderfully to victory to exercise in camp the warlike men of every nation. Indeed, this was also the institution of the Romans: they conducted levies from all provinces and always had the auxiliaries of allied kings. Rarely, however, did the beginnings of disturbances arise from them; if anything adverse occurred, it began with the legionaries.

Machiavelli entirely rejects auxiliaries in *The Prince*, chapter 12, because there is no goodwill in them, they cost much, and they overthrow the prince. The Carthaginians were almost crushed by auxiliaries after the First Punic War. He adds other examples. Philip of Macedon, after the death of Epaminondas, was made commander by the Thebans; when he had gained victory over their enemies, he took away their liberty. When their prince Philip had died, the Milanese resolved to hire Francesco Sforza against the Venetians. After defeating the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined them in order to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father Sforza, while receiving pay from Joanna, queen of the Neapolitans, suddenly deserted her while she was unarmed, so that, to avoid losing her kingdom, she was compelled to cast herself into the arms of the king of Aragon.

If someone should object that the dominion of the Venetians and Florentines had been defended with these arms after the emperors had been driven back, and that their commanders had not brought it under their own power, I answer that the Florentines had a certain fortune favorable to them in that affair. For among their commanders who were vigorous and from whom they would have had something to fear, some suffered adverse battles, some met opposition, and ambition had carried the rest elsewhere. The man who administered the war unsuccessfully was John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be known when victory had been lost. But no one will deny that, if he had gained victory, the affairs of the Florentines would have been administered at his judgment. The Sforzas continually opposed the Braccios, each watching the other. Ambition drew Francesco wholly into Cisalpine Gaul, whereas Braccio turned against the state of the priests and the kingdom of Naples.

But let us proceed to what happened recently. The Florentines entrusted command of the war to Paolo Vitelli, a man of distinguished prudence who had acquired a very great name for himself from a private condition of fortune. If he had captured Pisa, no one would have denied that the state of the Florentines would have had to submit to his command. For if he had gone over to serve for pay on the enemy's side, there was no means of escape; if they had retained him, they were compelled to take action at his command.

If the progress of the Venetians is examined, anyone may understand very easily that they conducted themselves most safely and successfully when they waged wars with their armies gathered from the Venetian people. This was their custom before they turned their zeal toward expeditions on land. At that time, equipped with arms from the patrician order and the urban common people, they conducted themselves with the greatest bravery. But as soon as they began to wage war on land, they neglected this valor and followed Italian customs. At the beginning of the enlargement of their dominion on the mainland, both because they had not yet extended the boundaries of their state very far and because they were held in great esteem, they had no reason to fear greatly for themselves from their own commanders. But when the boundaries of their dominion had been extended and Carmagnola was made commander of the army, they then obtained a specimen of this error. For when they had recognized him as a most vigorous commander, after they had beaten the petty ruler of Milan under his leadership, but then saw him become more remiss in waging war, they judged that they would obtain no further victory with him as commander. Therefore, lest everything already gained be lost, they neither wished nor were able to dismiss him. Accordingly, to render themselves safe from him, they killed him. They then appointed Bartolomeo of Bergamo, Roberto Sanseverino, the Count of Pitigliano, and others of this kind commanders of their forces. With these men as commanders, it was to be feared that they would bring injury to their state sooner than advantage. This is what occurred in the war fought at Vailà, where in a single engagement with the enemy everything acquired by so many labors over three hundred years perished. With these

arms only slow, late, and slight increases of affairs are made, but sudden and unforeseen losses and calamities break forth.

Yet, since we see that mercenary soldiers are now employed everywhere, it must not be thought that amid so great a desire for victory no state follows what is most prudent. Foreign auxiliaries must nevertheless be used with moderation. The Venetians appoint one of their own as commander at sea; they themselves pay the mercenary soldier on land through their own men; they join associates and councils to the commander; from the council chamber they themselves direct the wars; and they especially desire to prolong them, so that they may wear out the enemy by expense and not readily bring the matter to the hazard of battle.

Auxiliaries given by a more powerful man are pernicious unless he is faithful, as when you summon the Turk to your aid, as the Greeks did. But if they come from a faithful kinsman, they are salutary. Julius II summoned Ferdinand of Spain; Ferdinand now summons Philip, and he summoned him against the Venetians, yet he did not lose a foot of his land through him. Thus, where there are fidelity, fear of God, common advantage, friendship, affinity, and kinship, they readily take up arms against common enemies or common objects of suspicion. For it concerns the Spaniard as much that Bohemia be defended as that Italy be defended.

§ 5. First, in sedition and civil war most men employ foreign soldiers. Pompey brought barbarians from Asia, Caesar Gauls and Spaniards; the Caesars found foreigners most faithful to themselves. Now also foreigners serve in Belgium--Germans, Gauls, English, Scots, Irish, Italians, Epirotes, and Swiss; the Swiss too are hired by many for garrison service abroad. Princes must not be accused of tyranny for this reason. For when their own people sustain factions and conspire to violate the safety of the prince, the princes can by merit and right defend themselves with a foreign garrison. Nor do kings alone do this; states themselves also say that they protect the liberty of their citizens with a foreign garrison. The Batavians station French and British garrisons throughout their notable towns to keep their own citizens obedient. They would by no means do this unless they judged that it had been prudently devised against internal movements and foreign wars.

The arguments advanced by Machiavelli and others are not in truth of great weight. They say that the foreigner is unfaithful: *πᾶν τὸ ξενικόν*, every foreign body, is of wavering fidelity. I indeed admit that many examples of foreign perfidy can be recounted, and that the Roman Empire was overthrown through Goths, Alans, and others who had come as auxiliaries. But there are more examples of domestic perfidy. Sulla alone brought more injury than all the barbarian multitude poured into the city by Alaric. Indeed, it was not so much the foreign auxiliaries as the perfidy of their commanders together with them.

For this reason auxiliaries must not be summoned from every nation, but from one among which laws and treaties, both public and private, are sacred. Thus no Christian prince summons Turks, Tartars, or Muscovites to his aid; for they are *ἄσπονδοι*, without treaty, and are especially glad when they have deceived with perjury. Constantine summoned ten thousand Turks into Greece. After they had gained victory, they refused to depart, and from this flowed the causes of many calamities. Hiero of Syracuse, when he saw that his mercenaries were growing insolent, so that he could neither retain nor dismiss them without danger, employed a stratagem and killed them all. This was cruel and harsh, but they had deserved it.

Second, foreigners generally obey more readily and fight more bravely, since they place the hope of their safety in the favor of the prince alone and in victory.

Third, shame also restrains foreigners from flight, because they do not wish to be seen as cowards by foreigners or by their own people, to whom they would have to return without glory.

Fourth, I do not know whether you will more easily find a man prepared to establish the dominion of a foreign prince over others than one prepared to fight for the power of his own prince over himself. Thus it was done formerly: foreigners established Roman dominion. As the Romans grew in power, they had allies whom they gathered at the

same time, as Polybius says: “At this very time the consuls give notice to the magistrates of the allied cities in Italy from which they wish to have auxiliaries and fellow soldiers, and inform them of the number, the day, and the place at which the men whom they select must assemble. The cities, making a levy similar to that already described and likewise binding the men by oath, send them and appoint a prefect,” and so forth.

The Romans, when they were pressed by the most grievous war of Hannibal, hired auxiliaries for pay, that is, the *Volones*. Tome 1, book 2: Μεταστάντας δὲ ἀπὸ Καρχηδονίων Γαλάτας, ἢ ἄλλους τῶν σφῶν συμμάχων τινάς, οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἐπὶ μισθοφορᾷ ἀπεστελάβοντο, μήπω πρότερον τρέφοντες ξενικόν. The Romans hired for pay the Gauls who deserted from the Carthaginians and certain others of their allies, although previously they had not been accustomed to maintain foreign soldiers.

Fifth, foreigners plunder more readily, since they are moved less by affection for the country and by a sense of shame; citizens, however, are more skillful, being acquainted with the places and circumstances. Accordingly, the things said against auxiliary soldiers are empty, for provision against them can be made with little trouble. Although they receive pay from another, since they nevertheless receive it on your account, they will also esteem you greatly. One must, however, take care not to seek auxiliaries from a suspect man, lest he impose a bridle upon the victor. Thus the most faithful σύμμαχος, ally, is the one whose interest it is that you conquer and be as powerful as possible.

§ 6. A commander must take great care that foreign auxiliaries do not possess more strength in the camp than his own men. Scipio experienced this in Spain: he hired the Celtiberians with money, but when the enemy corrupted them with other money, he was crushed.

CHAPTER XXIX

Certain Regular Soldiers Must Be Maintained

§ 1. Although Servius instituted the order of the classes, the Romans at first nevertheless did not have regular soldiers. Rather, when the country had to be defended or a war waged, they conducted levies. Later, however, as their dominion increased, they maintained regular and permanent legions, and even praetorian soldiers for the protection of the prince. The Greeks had already done this formerly, and the orator of the Athenians recommended it. For Demosthenes, in Oration 4, thought that four legions should be maintained permanently.

§ 2. Great care must be applied so that there may be a supply of regular soldiers; for wars ordinarily arise suddenly and last a long time, and therefore there is need of a remedy that is swift and enduring. Hence Augustus, after surveying the whole mass of the empire, established regular soldiers, and this was preserved by his successors.

I see that practice concerning a permanent soldiery has varied greatly in many kingdoms, especially in France. Gregory of Toulouse, in his book *On the State*, says: “There are also many other disadvantages of foreign arms. Charles VII, king of France, considering these, after the English had been driven from the kingdom, established a regular soldiery of fifty thousand infantrymen, who, supported by continuous pay, were to devote their labor to military knowledge and meanwhile to assemble more readily against every incursion, while other men were being levied if greater forces were required. But because such men were devoted to brigandage, they were abolished by Louis II, who took Swiss guards into their place as attendants at his side. Again, however, Francis I, the king, mindful of the dangers to which Gaul had been exposed by foreign auxiliaries, restored in the year 1534 the legions of fifty thousand infantrymen; and when these afterward had been almost entirely extinguished, his son Henry II restored them, though without great advantage to the kingdom because of their undisciplined ordering.”

Nor are there lacking men who judge that it is also not expedient for princes to employ their subjects in war, because arms make subjects fierce and therefore cause them more readily to raise their crests in rebellion. For they promise themselves everything from the strength of the sword and of arms, as examples still surviving in France and Flanders show.

§ 3. Honor must be paid to the regular soldier as one who is solicitous for the repose and peace of all. From this the whole nobility formerly had its origin. But it is that soldier who must be supported who serves as a defense, is exercised under good discipline, and is not permitted to rest or be idle. For the evils which arose from such soldiers flowed from another source.

The whole evil, I say, arose from neglected discipline. For if they were kept occupied with some work in different places and supported with moderate pay, they would easily protect even a great kingdom; indeed, they would render it unconquered.

§ 4. They must certainly be kept to their duty; otherwise they become burdensome to princes and intolerable to subjects. For arms give men the spirit to inflict injury; and because they put their lives in danger, they think they have earned everything. If they have failed to extort anything, they are more savage than enemies.

§ 5. They must also be exercised in time of peace; otherwise they very quickly grow feeble through idleness. Thus the garrisons of the present day are not schools for soldiers, but sources of corruption.

Agasilaus exercised his soldiers in the gymnasium and offered rewards for valor. Alexander ab Alexandro, book 1, chapter 20. Philip likewise exercised the Macedonians diligently. They often completed three hundred stadia under arms, carrying all their weapons, provisions, and utensils for sustenance.

§ 6. They must be stationed in different places, both because in that way they are a protection to more people and less burdensome, and so that they cannot conspire. For they do not perceive their own strength unless they are gathered together. When they have formed a marching column, they are terrifying.

§ 7. It is also a prudent policy to join together men of different nations. In this way they cannot easily conduct intercourse or enter into a conspiracy.

§ 8. Nevertheless, it is fitting that at times they should assemble together once, twice, or on some other occasion, to display valor or skill and to encourage mutual emulation.

CHAPTER XXX

The Division of the Roman Soldiers

§ 1. Polybius describes the division of the ranks in this manner: “When the tribunes at Rome have administered the military oath, announcing to each legion the day and place at which they are to assemble, and that without arms, they then dismiss them. But when they have appeared on the appointed day, the tribunes select from among them especially the young and poor for the *velites*; those nearest to them, for the *hastati*; those most flourishing in age, for the *principes*; and those greatest in age, for the *triarii*. For so many and such distinctions both of names and of ages and of arms exist among them in each legion. They divide them in such a way that the oldest in age, whom they call the *triarii*, are six hundred; the *principes*, twelve hundred; the *hastati*, the same number; and the rest, who are also the youngest in age, the *velites*. But if the number is greater than four thousand, they divide them proportionately, with the exception of the *triarii*, whom they always keep at the same number.”

The reason why the *triarii* remained at the same number was that their dignity was great and their dangers rare. Therefore, lest they keep the most excellent part of the soldiery in the battle-line without employment, they did not wish it to be increased, although the other ranks were increased.

At this point I cannot pass over in silence what he says: that τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς νεωτάτους καὶ πενιχροτάτους εἰς τοὺς γροσφομάχους, the youngest and poorest of the men, were chosen for the *velites*.

Here regard was had both to age and to wealth. Lipsius thinks that poor men who were strong in age and experienced were chosen for the *triarii*. But in the case of men who were very poor, or the poorest, I would deny it; and he himself agrees. They were certainly selected according to the census, and this practice continued for a long time. The objection was made against the Romans: “You select your cavalryman according to the census and your infantryman according to the census,” Livy, book 37. In this respect, therefore, the institutions of the Lacedaemonians, in which particular regard was had for valor, are more pleasing. This practice harmed the Roman state very greatly. From it also arose the difficulties of levies, when men were unwilling to answer to their names and refused military service.

Indeed, I possess both a reason for my opinion and the approval of a commander of the greatest name. The reason is that, although, when pay was being given, it was humane for the sixth class to be exempt from service except in a great emergency and tumult, it was nevertheless a great error in a state devoted to military service and living amid perpetual enemies to give freedom from service to so great a multitude, especially when the state itself possessed the right of commanding magistrates. How many brave, active, and industrious men, who clamored for arms and Mars, is it credible there were among them? Certainly the whole of history bears witness that there was a very great multitude of poor men at Rome. Yet now the poorest men, made *velites*, stand foremost and are exposed to the enemy as light-armed soldiers.

For this reason Marius, as Sallust writes in the *Jugurthine War*, “enrolled soldiers not according to the custom of the ancestors nor from the classes, but as each man desired, for the most part men counted by the head.” Behold Marius, a great commander in the most dangerous wars, changing the custom of selecting soldiers which had been practiced for so many years through the ambition of the rich: passing over the rich, he selected those counted by the head. These, according to Aulus Gellius, book 16, chapter 9, are the men assessed at no property or at exceedingly little. Plutarch also relates this: “When declared consul, he splendidly held a levy at once contrary to law and custom, enrolling very many men from the poor and from the servile class, although earlier commanders did not accept men of this kind but gave arms, like any other honorable thing, only to honorable and worthy men, since each man seemed to pledge his family property as a security.”

He adds freedmen and the sons of freedmen. Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, chapter 11, teaches that this was retained in the Social War and proved worth the labor: “In the Social War, the service of twelve cohorts enrolled from freedmen displayed memorable valor.”

Indeed, afterward poor men for the most part went to serve as soldiers and gained both property and reputation. The legions themselves indicate this fact: when their terms of service had been completed, they received lands, so that after exhausting labors they might not waste away in a destitute old age. In this manner, therefore, better provision was made for the state. For this reason also I approved above more strongly the levy of volunteers.

The *velites*, *accensi*, and *rorarii*, therefore, were not to be selected in this manner according to the census. Because they were going to be the bravest and most ready men in battle, they were thus being neglected.

§ 2. The *hastati* were so called because in ancient times they fought with spears, but afterward with *pila* and swords. That was a heavy manner of service and not of great use, since, when two *pila* had been cast in vain or received upon shields, they immediately came to swords. The *hastati* were young men. Livy, book 8, calls them “the flower of young men reaching maturity”; the *principes*, however, were mature men--Livy calls theirs the more robust age. From this you may gather that rich men, although recruits, were not among the *velites*.

§ 3. The *triarii* were so called because they sat down in the third rank or battle-line, or, as Varro says, were posted as a reserve in the last positions. They were weighty in age and in courage. They sat with one knee firmly bent. They were formerly called *pilani*; they numbered six hundred. With them were the eagle and the commander, the picked and extraordinary men, and also the *evocati*.

I see that our commanders have preferred another arrangement. For they place each of the bravest men in the first battle-line and in advantageous positions, whereas among the Romans the bravest rarely fought. Sometimes the *velites*, often the *hastati*, and ordinarily the *principes* routed the enemy; the greatest danger was announced when the affair had come down to the *triarii*. In arranging this rank, therefore, the rich consulted more for their own safety than for the public good, and wished the dangers to belong to the poor and the younger men. Yet it had this advantage, that very rarely was the whole battle-line put to flight. For when the younger men had been slain or had fled, the *triarii*, who possessed strength and courage, remained steadfast; but if they had received defeat at the beginning, the younger men would have scattered swiftly from fear alone. For it is easier to possess a soldier who fights bravely than one who, having seen defeat, does not flee.

This entire multitude, properly composed, was called a legion by the Romans. In it the *velites*, *hastati*, and *principes* numbered twelve hundred each; the *triarii*, six hundred. The total number of all was four thousand two hundred. If the legion was larger, the fixed number of *triarii* remained, while the others were increased in equal proportion, as has been said. The legion of Romulus consisted of three thousand; it did not have the *velites* separated from the rest.

§ 4. Another division of these soldiers is into maniples and cohorts. Polybius describes it in this way: “After this, together with the leaders of the ranks, they divide each age or class into ten parts, with the exception of the *velites*. They distribute the *velites*, however numerous they are, equally among all the parts. And they call each one of these parts a rank, a manipule, and a standard.” There are thirty maniples: each class is divided into maniples.

Thence Romulus divided the hundred Fathers into groups of ten,

and established ten companies of *hastati*.

The *principes* had the same number of companies, the *pilani* the same,

and likewise those who served on duly allotted horses.

The *velites* were distributed equally among these. There were four hundred in each rank and forty in each manipule. A manipule consists of one hundred and twenty men, while a century consists of sixty. This applies to the *hastati* and

principes; for the *triarii* are half their number. This is without the added *velites*; if you add these, there will be one hundred and sixty in each maniple and eighty in each century.

A cohort is constituted from three maniples--one of *hastati*, another of *principes*, and a third of *triarii*--with a maniple of *velites* added; there are four hundred and twenty men, like a small legion, for it contained all the kinds of the legion. Cohorts were named from a rustic enclosure. They were sometimes detached and stationed in garrisons where it was not necessary for an entire legion to reside. The Greeks call them *σπείρας*, and sometimes *ἄλας*, as if you were to say wings. At the beginning, however, maniples existed without distinction, and consequently cohorts did as well. For one hundred men, before whom a pole bearing a bundle of hay was carried, were called a maniple. Ovid, *Fasti* 3:

A long pole bore suspended bundles,
whence the manipular soldier has his name.

There are therefore ten cohorts in a legion. Romulus made a legion of three thousand men and then doubled it after the Sabines had been admitted. Scipio, Marius, and other ancestors made the legions larger.

There were three hundred cavalymen divided into ten squadrons, each of which contained thirty.

§ 5. If we consider the infantry, the allies had the same number, but twice as many cavalymen. They were stationed on either side, at the right and left. From the six hundred cavalymen of the allies they called the third part extraordinary men, *ἐπίλεκτες*, picked men. Concerning them Polybius says: "The prefects first select from all the allies the men most suitable for the personal service of the consuls, both cavalymen and infantrymen, whom they call extraordinary men. Interpreted, this means 'picked men.' The whole multitude of the allies, however, is as a rule equal in infantry to the Roman legions and double in cavalry. From these they take approximately a third part of the cavalry and a fifth part of the infantry for the extraordinary men. They divide the rest into two parts and call one the right wing and the other the left wing."

A portion of the extraordinary men, who were called the selected, always attended the commander. It was prudently done, first, that they divided the allies on either side for the sake of security. Second, they selected extraordinary men from both the infantry and the cavalry--that is, each man most ready and likely to dare something--and from these very men the selected, who under the appearance of honor were, as it were, hostages around the consul.

Later the number of the allies was much greater; and in the end we see legions enrolled first from Italy and finally from the whole empire. They call the forces of the allies horns and wings even when they speak of infantry.

CHAPTER XXXI

Cavalry Contributes More to Victory than Infantry

§ 1. This matter must be considered generally; for in certain wars cavalry is scarcely of any use, while in others cavalry accomplishes everything. When cities in mountainous places, or beside rivers and seas, are besieged, and when the contest is conducted by siegeworks, cavalry is not of great use. We are speaking, therefore, of war and battle, in which I affirm that the man who abounds in cavalry will easily become superior.

There are many reasons. First, the man who is preeminent in cavalry holds both his own territory and that of the enemy in his power. He conveys supplies freely, prevents all excursions and foraging expeditions by the enemy, and keeps him, as it were, in loose confinement. The Ottomans place the whole hope of their kingdom in the *timariots*, who constitute their cavalry and are able to harm the enemy especially when, in a great number which no one can resist, they rush into hostile land and in one assault produce the devastation of a full-scale war. The Tartars, and formerly the Huns, were very powerful through the same means.

It makes no difference to the argument that, as men say, heavy expenses must be incurred for cavalry; for a smaller number of infantrymen ought rather to be selected, and the expenses are compensated by the speed of the war. The expense can also be diminished if the cavalry become accustomed to live from enemy territory, which is easy for those who are superior.

In assaults upon cities and other stationary engagements, cavalymen were also accustomed to dismount and fight as infantry. With the present license of soldiers, however, a commander will hardly accomplish this. But when a storm of cavalry was hurled forward in battle, the enemy quickly sought flight. In battles themselves, when cavalymen are compelled to give ground, the infantrymen, as though abandoned, look only to flight.

CHAPTER XXXII

Camps Arranged According to the Custom of the Ancients

§ 1. It is agreed among all that the ordering of the Roman camps was most excellent. Lipsius describes it most accurately in book 5 of *The Roman Military System*. This is a schematic outline of it, in which I note these matters briefly.

1. The praetorium occupies the place most suitable for observation and command, and is in the midst of the commanders. They mark out for the commander a square place whose sides are two hundred feet long.

Here the commander's tent-companions, baggage, and other things were quartered. Around it were the quaestor, the legates, and the tribunes.

2. The quaestorium was on the right, two hundred feet long and one hundred feet wide.

3. The legates were stationed to the left of the praetorium, with their tents joined together; its length was one hundred feet and its width fifty feet.

4. The tribunes and prefects pitched their tents in a straight line behind the praetorium, each in a separate tent, so that all might have their own legion in view. Lipsius places the prefects of the allies at the sides and gives good reasons for it, though he thinks that they were placed without intervals.

The cavalry among the *evocati* were beside the prefects of the allies, and the infantry close to them. The extraordinary cavalry and infantry were stationed across the open space toward the rampart. Lipsius arranged this most prudently. Behold: they wished to entrust the protection of the chief commander and the other commanders to the allies. Why, unless so that, by trust thus placed in them, they might bind their fidelity more closely? But there was also another, more hidden reason: they kept the chief men of the allies near themselves, before their faces and eyes, lest they secretly form any plan or undertake an innovation.

Although these men surround the commander on every side and hold him under guard, it is nevertheless not so arranged that there is no citizen protection if it is needed. For the *evocati*, veteran soldiers, are on either side; there are several hundred men in his own tent-company; the quaestor and legates sit nearby with their men; and the tribunes are stationed in front, among whom there is always a refuge for him and, through them, a passage into the midst of the legions.

Another consideration is that the spaces here are large and empty. Why? Either for dignity or for usefulness. For dignity: there are the two forums, where, if any dispute or injury arises, those who can settle or punish it are near at hand. For usefulness: there is the great *Quintana*, because, if it is necessary to draw up the army within the camp, that can be done very easily there and in both forums. Likewise, if the army must be led out, when the extraordinary troops have been removed and set aside to the flank, there is a great space for arranging it. The rest of the distribution is clear to sight.

Lipsius places the *velites* near the rampart. Its system of foot-measurements must also be carefully noted here, though it does not apply to our camps. "I call *podismi*," he says, "footages, or measurements in feet. But because the foot is twofold, simple and great, we shall use both: the former in measurements of length or breadth, and the latter in measurements of both together. For in Varro a great foot is that which others call flat or spread out, and which our people commonly call square or superficial."

Those who relate that the Romans received this system from Pyrrhus seem to me to err; for before the war which they waged with Pyrrhus, I read of camps, a rampart, and all the rest. It is certain, however, that the Persians or Parthians

instead borrowed many things from the Romans. They excelled to such a degree that they carried empty sacks with them and, in sandy places, filled them with sand to place them in front of the rampart.

§ 2. Our camps are arranged altogether better, and those who mark them out take the greatest account of the sites. Bernardino de Mendoza, part 1, chapter 36, requires so great a distance between the legions that other soldiers can be brought in if necessity demands. He also so arranges the camp that the standards stand at a definite interval, by which each man may easily find his own. He then creates greater spaces at the front and sides than existed among the ancients, chapter 36. He separates the watch station eighty feet from the standard. He places the king in the center.

There are still appointed inspectors of the rounds, although they also employ the labor of others. Those who are general inspectors and traverse the entire camp must know the languages of the nations serving on watch.

The master of the artillery resides near the commander, as do those assigned to the engines. The market for saleable goods must be neither far from the prince nor far from the judge of capital cases, because many disputes arise there. Men are generally grouped according to nations, so that individual nations occupy separate places. Mendoza orders the cavalry to be divided in the same way, so that the armored and light cavalry are separated; disturbances otherwise arise easily.

The fortifications which Mendoza describes yield little to the ancient ones. First, he orders a ditch to be dug down, and it is fitting that a rampart from the excavated earth be added. He orders the inner side of the ditch to be fortified with wagons. This fortification is stronger than the stakes of the ancients, for men could tear down a rampart with their hands, but by no means wagons. Artillery and loads, useful for offense and defense, can also be placed upon the wagons. I marvel that those who admire everything ancient do not understand that fortifications made from wagons are stronger and more convenient than the ancient ones were--not only because they are stronger, but also because they are movable and useful on a march.

Above all things the gunpowder must be guarded most carefully, not by gunners, who always need a burning match, but by spearmen and men bearing double axes.

Great care is taken concerning the gates, so that the soldiers can depart in complete ranks. The road which leads to the watering-place must also be wide, lest those going and returning hinder one another. If a river flows through the camp, this is greatly useful; nevertheless, provision is made so that the livestock are watered at a lower place or outside the camp, while the upper part is kept clean for the soldiers' uses.

Great account is also taken of the watches. Toward evening those whose duty this is come to the commander--indeed, most of the chiliarchs and centurions. At night the heavy-armed soldiery generally keeps watch, because greater protection is necessary.

Among prudent and resolute commanders the order of watches is very advantageous to security and health. A fourth part of the camp keeps watch; three parts rest. Therefore, if there are twenty thousand men in the camp, five thousand keep watch. Because armored soldiers and veterans are among them, this is a force great enough against sudden assaults. Nor is it burdensome for anyone to provide for the repose of the rest by his own labor every fourth day.

The watches are led out in the evening, lest the enemy discover the place where the advance sentries take their positions. The watches are ordinarily thirty paces from the ditches and rampart; the advance sentries are as far from them again as allows them to remain in sight.

Watches of cavalry are spread all around, so that no one can secretly enter or leave the camp. The watchword is not given to the advance sentries until they have taken their places.

Because camps are not always arranged in the same manner, but account is taken of hills, rivers, roads, and forests, provision is made in another manner lest men err on the roads or in finding the praetorium and other advantageous places. When cohorts have been stationed by tent-companies, the tribunes, centurions, and decurions immediately take

care to traverse and observe those roads, and then the other soldiers do so. This is accomplished most readily when the standards are displayed and there is no great variation in the camp.

This must be attended to especially: not merely a good place but the best place must be selected for the camp. For if you pass it by, the enemy will take it, and thus you will be inferior to him because you have given him an opportunity against you.

CHAPTER XXXIII

Fortifications of Camps Are Necessary

§ 1. It has often seemed unworthy to our commanders to cherish a camp and place their trust in a rampart.

Thus at times they station even the greatest armies in an open field without any fortification. The Romans did not do so. Concerning them Polybius says that everything was ordered and fortified after the fashion of towns. These are the words of Polybius: “When these things have been established in this way, the whole shape of the camp becomes an equilateral square. Its parts, both in the division of the rows of tents and in their other arrangement, have an ordering like that of a city. They separate the rampart itself from the tents by two hundred feet on every side. This empty space supplies them with many notable advantages. It is suitable both for the departure and for the entrance of the troops--for individual bodies go out into this empty space beside their own rows of tents, and do not run together in confusion and trample one another. They also drive or carry into this place the livestock brought in and the booty captured from enemy territory, and guard them there during the nights. Its chief advantage, however, is that during assaults at night neither fire nor missile reaches them, except for a few; and even these are made almost harmless, both by the extent of the interval and by the tents placed around it.

“The two sides of the ditch and rampart which lie beside the two wings of the allies fall to the allies to construct; the other two fall to the Romans, one to each legion. Each side is divided among the maniples; the centurions have the care of the individual parts, and the men assist them. Two of the tribunes have the inspection of the whole work.”

You see everything fortified here. The soldiers are two hundred feet distant from the rampart, and the rampart and ditch themselves occupy enough space for them to be altogether safe.

§ 2. The allies constructed two sides and the legions two. The centurions measured them with ten-foot rods. The tribunes go around and do not depart until the entire work has been completed. The work of the rampart was of this kind: they first drew a ditch along the outside. Tibullus:

Where it is fitting to draw before the camp a protecting ditch.

They dug it down so that it was eight feet wide and equally deep, so that, if an enemy leaped into it, his whole body would be below the earth. Its width was such that no one could leap across it. When a greater force was feared, it was made wider and deeper. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 8, says that at times it was nineteen feet, although the depth was not then equal to the width.

On the inner side of the ditch was added a rampart made from stakes and turf, or heaped earth, three or four feet high. The measure of each turf was half a foot in height, one foot in width, and one and a half feet in length.

But in danger, and I believe in winter camps, the mound was much higher. This followed naturally if the ditch was greater, for the mound grew from the earth taken from it. Book 3 of *The Civil War*: “In that place there was a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart facing the enemy ten feet high; the mound of that rampart likewise extended ten feet in breadth.” The palisade stake was branched and sharpened, so that it could not easily be torn up or crossed. Thus camps were placed behind stakes fixed in the manner of very sharp sword-points.

It would be most useful to resume even today this method of fortifying camps, or to retain another equal to it. For the soldier rests safely and is not disturbed at a noise, being secure in the fortification of the place; this contributes very greatly to strength and health. Further, since a camp can be defended easily, it will be possible, even when the enemy is nearby, to send a force elsewhere as opportunity requires. Claudius Nero does this in Livy: leaving a garrison in the

camp, he goes on a long march to meet Hasdrubal, defeats him, and returns to camp. He could not have done this unless the camp had been fortified. Third, far fewer soldiers are worn down by sentry duty.

§ 3. There was one gate in each side. The praetorian gate, which stood beyond the praetorium and faced the enemy, was the gate through which the army was led out into battle. Next were the two principal gates, because they corresponded to the *principia*. Finally, there was the decuman gate, because the tenth cohorts pitched their tents there.

Not content with this fortification, they at times also added towers. The *History of the Gallic War*, book 8: “He placed doors and higher towers upon the gates.” Josephus, book 3 of *The Jewish War*, says that towers were positioned around the circuit; and at Numantia Scipio placed them at intervals of one hundred feet in every *iugerum*. Finally, there was often a double rampart and a double ditch.

§ 4. Those works were not difficult because of the multitude of those who performed the fortification. One side of the camp was 2,050 feet long. If an entire legion were assigned to fortify it, there would be two soldiers for one foot, if the exempt men were few. For centurions, cavalymen, *evocati*, discharged soldiers, and volunteers had exemption from duties.

But there is no doubt that sutlers, servants of the camp, and slaves came to take part in these works and gave assistance. For why would masters, wearied by labor, have permitted their slaves to be idle? Florus, book 2, chapter 18, calls them servile works. Caesar in *The Alexandrian War* says: “Since he had believed that the great multitude of slaves which carried earth for the mound, in the manner of daily work, were soldiers.” Trebonius also, in book 2 of *The Civil War*, summons men from the province for these works. The ditch was therefore drawn very quickly.

§ 5. But who acted more correctly: Lycurgus, who favored circular camps, or others, who favored square or quadrangular ones? Xenophon, in *The State of the Lacedaemonians*, says that Lycurgus approved the circular form: “I shall also say in what manner Lycurgus thought a camp should be marked out. Since he considered the angles of a square camp useless, they placed their camps in a circle, unless they were protected either by a mountain, a wall, or a river behind them.” He gives as the reason that the angles were useless.

Yet it is more advantageous for camps to be square or quadrangular for the purpose of defense, since from one angle two sides can be seen and defended. Moreover, a square form is more convenient for every method of building than a round or oblong one. Nevertheless, if the matter is considered as a whole, nothing is better than to weigh the nature of the site. If there is a river, lake, mountain, valley, wall, marsh, forest, or something else that presents a natural fortification, they should employ it to reduce their labor. Beside rivers it is expedient for a camp to be extended lengthwise because of the convenience of obtaining water.

§ 6. Fortification ceased in the Roman military service for various reasons. The first was the indulgence of the emperors, when by their favor they made many men exempt. From this it followed that those who remained subject to duties were more heavily burdened--indeed, crushed.

The second cause was that, as a kind of military service was distributed through towns, the soldiers became unacquainted with the labors of a camp. Tacitus, *Annals* 13: “It was sufficiently established that in that army there were veterans who had never entered upon guard duty or watches, and who gazed at a rampart and ditch as though they were new and marvelous things. Gleaming and enriched, whether in helmets or breastplates, they had completed their military service throughout towns.” From both causes the praetorians arrived at the utmost degree of idleness. For when Didius Julianus wished to lead them into the field and exercise them, they hired substitutes for the works at a price. More shameless still were the Egyptians, who, when ordered to fortify the camp with a ditch and rampart, cried out that the work should be contracted at public expense.

The third cause was the avarice and savagery of the centurions, who compelled men to purchase release from duties. Tacitus, *Histories* 1: “It was demanded that the payments customarily made to centurions for exemptions be abolished. For the common soldier paid, as it were, an annual tribute. Some wandered through the maniples, some on furloughs,

and some within the camp itself, until they paid the price to the centurion. No one had regard for the amount of the burden or the kind of profit: by brigandage and plunder or by servile tasks they purchased release from military duty. Then each soldier who was richer than the rest was wearied by labor and cruelty until he purchased exemption. When, exhausted by expenses and made wretchedly feeble by idleness, he returned to the maniples poor in place of rich and idle in place of vigorous, another after another, corrupted by the same poverty and license, rushed toward sedition and discord and finally civil wars.”

Afterward the centurions were paid from the public treasury, until at last they ceased to fortify camps. In the time of Vegetius, who lived under Valentinian the Younger, that knowledge had already died out. “The knowledge of this matter,” he says, “has utterly perished; for no one for a long time has established a camp by drawing ditches and fixing stakes.” Nevertheless, it was revived by many at intervals.

§ 7. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 21 and the following chapters, teaches the fortification of camps: “The recruit,” he says, “must also learn the fortification of camps, for nothing is found in war either so salutary or so necessary. If the camp has been correctly established, the soldiers spend days and nights within the rampart in such security—even if the enemy besieges them—that they seem to carry a walled city with them everywhere. But the knowledge of this matter has utterly perished. For no one for a long time has established a camp by drawing ditches and fixing stakes before it. Thus we know that many men have frequently been afflicted by an unexpected arrival of barbarian cavalry by day or night. Not only do those who settle down without a camp suffer these things; but when, through some mischance, they begin to give ground in battle, they have no fortifications of a camp to receive them and fall unavenged like animals. There is no end to their dying until the enemy loses the will to pursue them.”

They fortified the camp even amid the greatest dangers. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 25: “It is easy to fortify a camp when the adversaries are absent. But if the enemy presses upon them, then all the cavalry and half of the infantry are drawn up in battle-line to repel the attack; the rest behind them draw ditches and fortify the camp. It is proclaimed by a herald which century is first, which second, and which third, until the whole work has been completed. After this the ditch is inspected and measured by the centurions, and punishment is inflicted upon those who have worked too negligently. The recruit must therefore be trained for this use, so that, when necessity demands it, he may be able to fortify the camp without confusion, swiftly, and cautiously.”

In the African War one part of the battle-line stood in the field while another performed the work. In the Spanish War against Afranius, the third battle-line deceived the enemy by performing the work secretly.

§ 8. Mendoza, part 1, chapter 52, relates another and rapid method of fortifying a camp. He bound small beams together at their joints and, in a very short time, erected a square platform thirty geometrical feet high and sixty wide. Four such structures suffice not only for defense but also for harassing the whole field, if they are placed in suitable positions; for they can be filled with musketeers and other soldiers. He requires no timbers larger than can be gathered and carried by horses or mules. A watchtower fifty feet high can nevertheless be placed above them. This can be done quickly. Other defenses must nevertheless be added, for those structures can easily be cast down by artillery.

§ 9. Of the works formerly used for fortifying camps and enclosing enemies, some were, as it were, barbaric and possessed little usefulness; others contributed to necessary protection. The work which Caesar made in book 1 of *The Gallic War* was altogether useful. “With the one legion which he had with him and the soldiers who had assembled from the province, he drew a wall sixteen feet high and a ditch for nineteen miles, from Lake Geneva to Mount Jura. When this work had been completed, he stationed garrisons and fortified strongholds, so that, if they attempted to cross against his will, he might more readily prevent them.” By this he terrified the Helvetians so that they abandoned their plan and hope of breaking out. The extent was five of our miles, which Caesar occupied after fortifying it with strongholds. But if the Helvetians had not been frightened by that undertaking, it would not have been difficult to break the wall at some point and fill up the ditch.

The same Caesar, when he was besieging Alesia with no great number of soldiers, captured the city by fortifications in the face of the many thousands of men who were in the city and the two hundred and forty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry. First he made a circumvallation extending for eleven miles and a ditch twenty feet wide. Withdrawing four hundred feet from it, he made other fortifications. These were two ditches fifteen feet wide and of the same depth; he filled the inner one with water diverted from the river. Behind these he constructed a mound and rampart twelve feet high; to this he added a breastwork and battlements, with great forked branches projecting, which would delay the enemy's ascent. He also surrounded the entire work with towers standing eighty feet apart. Against those who came to aid the besieged he constructed other, similar fortifications, embracing fourteen miles.

It was barbaric and done for display when he attempted to enclose Pompey with a wall that extended for twelve hundred stadia--an extent of about one hundred and fifty miles, or thirty-seven of our miles. For he did not hamper Pompey the Great by such extensive contrivances; and how easily Pompey could have broken through them with an armed force!

Lucan describes it in this manner:

Mountains are broken, and Caesar leads a level work
 through steep places; he opens ditches and stations towered forts
 upon the highest ridges. Enclosing boundaries in a great circuit,
 glades and wooded wastes and forests, in a vast ring
 he pens the wild beasts. Fields are not lacking, nor forage lacking
 to Pompey the Great; surrounded by Caesar's mound,
 he moves his camp. So many rivers arising there weary their courses;
 Caesar, exhausted, remains amid the fields.
 Let ancient legend now raise up the walls of Ilium;
 let the Parthians who fled marvel at Babylon's fortifications.
 Behold how much territory the Tigris, how much the swift Orontes,
 shall love; how much of the eastern land suffices for Assyrian peoples
 as a kingdom: a work suddenly seized in the tumult of war
 enclosed it. How many labors have perished!

Crassus constructed against Spartacus a ditch three hundred stadia long, fifteen feet wide and fifteen feet deep, and above the ditch he constructed a rampart of admirable height and strength, according to Plutarch in *Crassus*. These matters pertain to fortifications. They are now made in another manner because of artillery, but are neglected in camps.

§ 10. In the camps themselves were tents which seem to have been strong, because, as Polybius says, they even kept off missiles. In winter quarters and permanent camps they were perhaps made from boards, posts, and woven fencing; otherwise, they were of hide and stretched with ropes, and in this manner could delay missiles whose force was spent. Isidore adds boards and curtains. Curtains of linen easily resisted feeble missiles, and indeed missiles hurled strongly, especially when the curtains hung loosely. They certainly covered their upper parts with hides.

Tacitus, concerning the Frisians: "Drusus had ordered them, because of the narrowness of their resources, to pay a moderate tribute, namely, that they should furnish ox hides for the use of the camp." Caesar's soldiers in the African

War made tents, some from clothing, reeds, and mats. Belisarius has tents made from boards in Procopius, book 2 of *The Persian War*. Herodes, in Trebellius, had embossed tents and gilded pavilions.

Their size was such that they easily held everyone, and indeed could also receive some multitude of visitors. If there were several legions, the camp was larger. If there were two consuls, each held his own praetorium and arrangement within a doubled space, as Polybius relates. In the battle at Cannae we read of a larger and a smaller camp, separated by a proper interval, undoubtedly for a proper reason, although it has not been explained.

I therefore conclude: individual soldiers are covered by breastplate, helmet, and shield; all together are covered by the rampart and encircling defenses of the camp. Camps which are unfortified are unarmed, and are then compelled to fight at the enemy's discretion.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Laws and Customs of Ancient Camps

§ 1. In camps there is the highest discipline and the highest order.

1. Two maniples have charge of the place which is before the tribunes; they are taken from the *hastati* and the *principes*. That place is the *principia*, where assemblies are held and all business is transacted.

2. Three maniples erect the tribune's tent. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 8.

3. From these men two watches are also formed, one before and the other behind the tent.

4. They served in the place of attendants. Alexander Severus permitted there to be no attendants: he would not allow anyone except soldiers to go before tribunes or commanders.

5. The *triarii* furnished the cavalymen, as citizens of higher rank, with a guard. Polybius. They tended and watched the horses.

6. One maniple each day kept watch for the commander.

7. There were guard-posts at the gates, for entire cohorts and troops of cavalry kept watch. Sometimes several cohorts did so at a distance from the camp. They called these rural guard-posts. There were certainly several of them, and it was a capital offense to abandon them unless the men were swept away by great force. Thus Polybius and Suidas. Suetonius likewise says of Augustus: "He punished centurions who had deserted their post with death, just as he punished common soldiers." The chief matter was the careful distribution of the passwords.

8. Pammenes showed how great a care must be taken over the password. For after he had been shut in with a few men and could not escape, he learned the password of the enemy's camp from a deserter; trusting in it, he led his men through the middle of the camp, killed many of the enemy, and escaped.

9. The procedure concerning passwords was in truth different from ours. A small tablet was marked and returned before darkness; sometimes useful commands were announced in that order. Now only passwords are announced. The tribunes received them from the commander, and the *tesserarii* from the tribunes.

10. A maniple kept watch at the praetorium by night. Three further watches were established by night: one at the quaestor's quarters and two at those of the tribunes.

11. The *velites* fill the rampart; small tablets are also given to the watchmen.

12. Nothing was stricter than the rounds. Cavalymen went around by night; sometimes, in danger, the tribunes and the commander himself did so. At times the watches were established with no intervening space. Later the centurions also made the rounds. Finally this became the particular office of those who were called *circuitores*. The decurion who ranked first in the troop performed this duty.

The tribune designated for these men in writing which watch they had to make and how many rounds. The man making the rounds goes with his friends. The punishment for a soldier or a *circuitor* who failed in the night watches was cudgeling to death.

13. Diligent care of the watches was exacted by bells rung in a fixed order at the same time. Alcibiades, fearing negligence among his men on watch, commanded that, when he himself was about to display a light from the citadel, everyone should raise up lights, and that whoever neglected to do so would pay the penalty. Thus, while they kept watch attentively for this signal, they avoided the danger.

14. Paulus Aemilius ordered the sentries to keep watch unarmed, so that they might remain awake more diligently. Plutarch, *Paulus*.

15. All newcomers must be questioned, so that the matter of spies may be ascertained.

16. Our first watch is from sunrise to noon; the second extends to sunset; the third to midnight; the fourth to sunrise. Ordinarily the masters of the watches make their rounds through them twice, and sometimes the commanders and those to whom the commanders entrust them do so.

17. If the enemy attacks by night, the sentries sound the alarm and indicate from what direction he is coming. The sentries join together and await the enemy. The alarm is then sounded at the commander's guard-post.

18. By frequent admonition the army must be trained not to be moved by any event or by any voice it hears unless it proceeds from the commanders and prefects. This must especially be guarded against by night, because that time is most liable to alarms.

CHAPTER XXXV

The Military March

§ 1. The ancients had two forms of military march, as Polybius observes. They depart from their camp in this manner. When the first signal has been given, they strike their tents and all pack their baggage. But no one is permitted either to take down or to set up a tent before those of the tribunes and commander are set up or taken down. When the second signal has sounded, they load the baggage upon the pack animals. At the third, the first men must advance and the whole camp must move.

They generally place the *extraordinarii* at the head of the column. The right wing of the allies follows them. After these come the pack animals belonging to the men just mentioned. The first Roman legion succeeds and follows their column, having its own equipment and baggage behind it; then comes the second legion, followed by its own pack animals and likewise by the baggage of the allies who are stationed in the rear. For the left wing of the allies is last in the column. The cavalry, moreover, are sometimes in the rear, each body behind its own division; sometimes they ride beside the pack animals, keeping and restraining them and also furnishing security.

But when there is apprehension about the rear, the remaining bodies retain the same manner and order; only the *extraordinarii* leave the front, attend to the rear, and are transferred there. On alternate days one legion and one wing lead, and the same bodies in turn follow, so that all may share equally in the advantage which comes from finding water or forage whole and untouched, as they continually change the order and advance first by turns.

They also employ another kind of column in times of insecurity, when they have open country. For they lead a threefold phalanx or battle-line, with its divisions at equal distances--the *hastati*, the *principes*, and the *triarii*. They place the pack animals of the first maniples before all of them, those of the second maniples behind the first maniples, and those of the third behind the second; and in this manner they always arrange the pack animals alternately. When the column has been formed in this way, if any hostile attack occurs, they incline at one time toward the shield and at another toward the spear, and bring the maniples out from among the pack animals and baggage into view of the enemy. Thus in a short time the body of armed men assumes the order for battle, except that the *hastati* must be brought out and the pack animals and the multitude following them must find a place suited to the emergency. When they have approached the place where camp is to be made, the tribune and those centurions who are always selected for this duty go ahead.

These arrangements were frequently changed according to the circumstance of places, enemies, and auxiliaries. Josephus, in book 5 of *The Jewish War*, says that, as Titus advanced into enemy territory, royal auxiliaries and all the allied forces went before him. After their armed men came Titus himself, having with him both other picked men and lancers, or scouts. After him came the cavalry of the legions, who preceded the engines; and after the engines came the tribunes and prefects of cohorts together with picked men. After these were the standards around the eagle, with the trumpeters before it. After these came the phalanx, or column of the legions, extended six men abreast. The servants and camp-followers of each legion came behind it and before its pack animals. Last of all came the mercenaries and their guards, the *uragi*, or men who closed the column.

Today they generally divide an army into two parts: by a term now customary they call the first the vanguard and the latter the rearguard. When the multitude is greater they add a middle body, which they call the battalion. The infantry is divided in this way; skillful commanders divide the cavalry differently. Although the ancients generally placed their camps in the same manner, they nevertheless had men who went ahead, who afterward were called measurers of camps. Silius:

Bolanus hastens to seek ridges suitable for the camp.

All things in the march of our armies are better arranged, chiefly because of the multitude of wagons.

When the place was unknown, they used guides, deserters, and sometimes prisoners in bonds. It was a sign that they were leading by a direct way if they gave accounts that agreed.

§ 2. When the enemy is near, the dangers of a march are greater than those of a battle-line. This must therefore be done: the departure must be made as like a battle-line as possible. In a battle-line all are armed in mind and body, the place is known, and the enemy is before their eyes. The contrary happens on a march; it must accordingly be arranged so that every danger is guarded against with the greatest caution.

“First, therefore,” Vegetius says in book 3, chapter 6, “there must be itineraries of all the regions.” The Franks who formerly marched against Fredegund were pitiable, because they did not explore the roads even in their own kingdom. Fredegund sent ahead of her army a threefold row of leafy branches with bells, so that the enemy would think that he was encountering a forest and grazing pack animals, for the light was still dim. A Greek commander compelled his men to be attentive by another method. Diocles aroused vigilance by a notable device: when they were advancing without order, he repeatedly changed the password; consequently, believing that the enemy was present, they marched with the battle-line formed.

§ 3. The method of a march is generally the same as that of other military matters: a commander should do one thing and appear to the enemy to be about to do another. Agesilaus, when it appeared that the Thebans were going to impede his army in narrow places, marched toward the walls of Thebes. They withdrew in alarm, and Agesilaus escaped through the narrow places with no one opposing him.

Pericles acted admirably when he was driven within precipitous mountains where there were two exits. On one side he drew a vast ditch, as if he intended to keep the enemy away; toward the other he drove his soldiers as though he intended to break through. When all the enemy had assembled on that side, thinking that he would not cross the ditch, Pericles himself laid down bridges which he had made and crossed the ditch undisturbed. The chief point is this: the enemy must not know what is to be done.

Alexander made steps upon Mount Ossa and crossed over them while the Thessalians held the narrow places. Pompilius covered or dug up the well-worn roads with sand and prepared new ones.

§ 4. When any province is invaded, every effort must be made to occupy and fortify some place at the outset, so that the army may establish a footing in it and extend itself toward other places. This is not only useful, but is in some measure the chief point of the matter. The sick, provisions, and booty can be deposited in that place. Next, if reinforcements are sent, they have a place to which they may withdraw. Third, loss is inflicted upon the enemy and his authority is diminished; his people think themselves captives so long as the invader maintains himself in some fortified place. Finally, if he is defeated in battle, he has a safe refuge.

Fifteen years ago, when Ambrogio Spinola suddenly crossed the Rhine, he possessed nothing pacified in that province, and the enemy had fortified Rheinberg because they expected a siege. He joined the Rhine with a bridge and raised temporary fortifications, so that he would be prepared for every event. As this occurrence was unexpected by the enemy, so it was deeply grievous to him, but advantageous to Spinola; for, safely withdrawing from the river in this way, he swiftly occupied Lingden and other cities. Afterward, when he held Rheinberg in his power, he demolished the earlier fortifications and took down the bridge.

It was with no other intention that Count Bucquoy maintained Budweis in Bohemia with such great industry and courage that, if he had occupied all Bohemia with a larger army, he would scarcely have gained greater glory. Indeed, after Spinola occupied Wesel, he fortified it with works and a garrison, judging it to be of very great importance that he should possess a seat of war suitable for controlling the Rhine and the Lippe.

Wagons are used on the march and in battle; but in order that they may be joined and serve as a rampart, they are customarily fastened together with beams and chains. If smaller cannon, which military usage calls falconets, are placed upon them, they keep the enemy away and close the rear and flanks with the greatest security. They can be drawn by two horses. The Duke of Alba used them in the Low Countries with great advantage, and the Turks always use them. I would consider it most useful if several wagons of this kind followed and protected the flanks, each carrying eight or ten pieces twice as large as muskets and having their gunners in the same wagon. No armor would resist these, and by their number they would keep the enemy away.

§ 5. If cavalymen go ahead in a large body, they serve as scouts, provided that some are also in the rear of the column. Vegetius likewise places cavalry at the beginning, with concealed purpose, because they can easily withdraw and join the column.

§ 6. Sometimes men are compelled to fight while on the march because they cannot escape in any other manner. Agesilaus, when he saw the allies drawing back, went through the narrow places and ordered the Laconians to go first and the allies to follow. The enemy attacked them and compelled them to fight bravely. Without doubt this was a hazardous cast of the die; for what if the allies had joined the enemy? Polyainos, book 2.

In the same manner Leucon too was lavish with the blood of his allies. For when the Heracleots were disembarking from a ship, and he had set armed men opposite them, he ordered those who were in reserve to kill the allies unless they prevented the enemy from disembarking.

When the enemy pursues, the road must be blocked by artifice until you escape to safety. Pompey blocked every road leading to the port of Brundisium; then, after posting archers, he led his army down to the ships. The archers followed by routes known to them and sailed in small boats to the fleet.

§ 7. When Iphicrates was about to march through a scorching region, he set out by night, after ordering his soldiers to take water for two days.

§ 8. When I consider everything, military service today seems to me more exact and more circumspect in taking precautions. For this procedure is observed on a march. While the man undertaking an expedition sets out with one army, he must gather another. If he conquers, he will easily pursue the victory or dismiss the newly levied soldier; if he is conquered, he will keep his allies and subjects in their duty and wrest the fruit of the battle from the victor.

There is now a particular officer who has charge of the guides, couriers, and those who reconnoiter the road and surrounding places. The master of the engines arranges the artillery and the things pertaining to it; under him are miners for leveling roads where there is need of it. The chief officer placed over supplies has care of provisions. He has his own standard so that he may easily be found.

They undertake the march in this manner. After the roads have been reconnoitered and outriders sent forward, the vanguard advances; in time of danger some field pieces are added to it. Then the artillery follows in this order. First come wagons loaded with stakes, mattocks, spades, and every instrument for digging. Then follow the smaller and larger cannon, and in like manner the smiths' tools. After these come lead, powder, ropes, and, as it were, their guard--mounted lancers and gunners. Wagons in which cannonballs are carried close them. Finally come the wagons of the master of the engines and everything pertaining to the engines, as well as provisions and what they call the hospital; they also carry the sick and wounded in wagons. Next are carried the commander's wagons and baggage. Then come the remaining soldiers, in the order which dangers and the character of the places require.

The commander is placed in the middle, both so that he may be safer and so that he may more easily hasten to every part and send commands. Yet it is sometimes necessary that the commander be among the first, as Mendoza relates that he himself saw. For when the commander knew that he was being sought and that the enemy was close at hand, he hastened, selected a place suitable for battle, fortified himself and drew up the battle-line before the last part had arrived, and won.

When cavalry spreads itself out, one must notice whether there is darkness or light beneath its feet. If there is darkness, the battle-line is deep; if there is light, there is only a front rank. If it is viewed from a higher place, an inference concerning the whole number will be easy.

When roads divide on the march, they are customarily guarded until the baggage has passed. If the army passes through a forest, men take possession of it after musketeers have been sent forward, so that the march may be safe. Today rivers can scarcely be crossed except by a stratagem and secretly, for cannon can scarcely be used in a river.

It is not advisable to place a camp in mountains, because supplies are easily obstructed. On a plain, a stream, forest, hill, or marsh is generally advantageous. There is a military proverb: "There is no advantageous place where there is another more advantageous." The chief advantage must therefore be sought. The most advantageous site for laying out a camp is one to which approach is difficult and departure easy.

They place the cavalry in such a manner that the fortifications are not seen until the work is finished. If villages are within the camp, the soldiers must not dwell in the houses, for they are easily attacked secretly and set on fire. But this matter is easily attended to.

The care taken over camps is immense. When the soldiers enter them, all the men of the vanguard remain standing in order until the middle body enters. The middle body remains standing until all the baggage has entered. Then all turn to the care of their bodies, except those on watch.

Watches are posted wherever it is thought that the enemy may approach either by force or by deceit. If the camp is near a forest or thicket, many advance sentries must be posted, so that the more distant may warn the others in order and all things may be reported to the commander. The rule of sentries today is that they hold their ground until they are driven away by force. They do not fight even if they are stronger; if they are attacked, they defend themselves and report everything to their own men. If they see that they are inferior, they retreat while preserving their ranks.

When the enemy can attack from many places, many strong watches must be established. From this it is apparent how thoroughly camps must be fortified. Cavalrymen who are to protect foragers are customarily sent ahead of them. When danger exists, a third part of the army keeps watch, and in the most extreme danger one half. Among the regular watches they also station extraordinary ones, which they call small watches, and arrange double advance sentries, so that security may be provided on every side.

Sometimes they place cavalry watches near the camp of the enemy, which on account of the danger they call lost watches. Scouts are customarily sent out by night. They are not given the password, lest, if one of them is captured, he be compelled to disclose it to the enemy. If they are to return by night, one soldier is sent ahead to the advance sentries and informs the prefect of the watches that the scouts are returning. He informs the commander. A companion from among those who know the password is added to the men entering the camp, so that they may be admitted. The same procedure is customarily observed by day when cavalrymen return from a distant mission. Thus there is now greater care of watches than formerly; and certainly, while I consider everything which anyone among the soldiers can observe, I clearly see that military prudence has increased from day to day.

§ 9. This must especially be noted: those err who think that any region is so fortified by rivers, forests, mountains, and other things that an enemy cannot enter it. Moses led an army through sands impassable because of serpents, under the guidance of ibises. They try places without a road. Hannibal broke through the Alps with vinegar. Recently men broke through into Bohemia although the way was besieged and denied them. Our own Bohemia is therefore a witness: in a single year a way was opened so many times for its devastation. Accordingly, an approaching enemy must be resisted with arms; everything else permits him to pass.

§ 10. It was formerly common for men to protect themselves by placing captives in the way of missiles. When Aemilius Paulus led his army against the Lucanians and the Tarentine fleet attacked him with scorpions, he covered the flanks of his men with captives. Agesilaus the Laconian did the same when returning from Phrygia.

CHAPTER XXXVI

The Crossing of Rivers

§ 1. Armies cross rivers in four ways: by bridge, by boat, by diverting the river into channels, and by swimming. For if it is possible to cross by a ford, there is no need of a new art. Then attention must be given only to this: that the enemy has not obstructed a slender stream by night so that, when the water swells, it is no longer passable. The Dutch garrison did this in the siege of Ostend. There is another danger if they cast down caltrops, which easily escape notice when the water has been disturbed.

§ 2. There is therefore severe difficulty at rivers. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 7. It is difficult, I say, when the enemy is nearby, for making a bridge is a greater labor. Boats are easily driven back by cannon and fixed stakes; today it is scarcely possible to cross by swimming, although under Charles V certain Spaniards swam across the Elbe. But the enemy's panic gave them their opportunity, for if even five cavalymen had been on the bank, they could have repelled those approaching.

§ 3. The entire art therefore consists in pretending that one will cross in one place and crossing in another. When crossing a river, Labienus made a noise with oars in one place, so that he might appear to be crossing there; while the enemy prepared himself, Labienus crossed in another place. Sinan Pasha also did this in the year 1594. For after pretending that he would cross the Danube in several places, he crossed at one place distant from the Christian camp and at the same time carried off part of their baggage.

The Tatars crossed the Danube with utter foolishness in the year 1596, holding the tail of a horse with one hand and a sword with the other; but they were cut down when they had crossed. That method is dangerous, because horses are easily burdened, and if they perceive danger, they kick.

§ 4. They were accustomed to check the current of a river with horses or elephants. Caesar positioned cavalry above and below, so that they would break the river's current, in book 1 of *The Civil War*: "He leads out the remaining legions without baggage and, after stationing a great number of pack animals in the river above and below, leads the army across." Hannibal positioned elephants in the Po.

§ 5. Ice must be crossed cautiously. Scatter straw upon it and pour water over it so that it freezes, lest the pack animals or soldiers fall upon the slippery surface. Julius II crossed the Po in this way.

The Tatars were afraid to cross the frozen Danube. They therefore left a multitude of cattle together with their tents and withdrew as though afraid. The Hungarians who were on the opposite side drove the herds across. When the Tatars learned this and understood that an army could cross, they followed and devastated Hungary. Fulgus, book 7.

§ 6. Datames joined carts to carts and affixed boards to the rims, so that they would not sink too deeply into the mud. He had ordered the strongest men to swim across together with the pack animals; these men drew the carts, and in this manner he led the army across. Rafts can nevertheless be joined together by an easier method.

To destroy bridges men are accustomed to send fire-ships against them. At present there is the greatest opportunity for this. They employed that art admirably at Antwerp; nor, when two attempts had failed, did they desist. The third caused immense loss.

§ 7. Because it is exceedingly difficult to cross rivers, very many stratagems have been devised for that labor. While the Pisidian inhabitants guarded the narrow places, Autophradates began to prepare a crossing elsewhere. When they went to meet him, he occupied the narrow places by night and led his army across.

Pompey repeatedly led his army out and brought it back into camp. When this had been done and the enemy thought that he was being mocked, he became negligent, and Pompey crossed by a sudden movement. Alexander and Xenophon, pretending to cross in one place, crossed in another.

By an amusing stratagem the Laconians sailed through a Carthaginian fleet stationed in their way and reached Syracuse. They had ten captured Punic ships; they caused these to be led first as if victorious, with the other ships joined to their sides and fastened to their sterns. By this appearance they deceived the Carthaginians and passed through.

The crossing of Sertorius was laborious. He drew a rampart in the form of a hollow crescent, filled it with material, and set it on fire, and in this way shut out the enemy. But much material was needed, lest the enemy attack when the fires were scattered. Today they can be kept away more easily because of the danger that gunpowder will catch fire. Pelopidas the Theban also did the same, as did Herculeius, the lieutenant of Sertorius, between two mountains.

Hanno, when shut in, heaped up light materials in a place suitable for breaking out and set them on fire. After the enemy had been called away to the other exits, he went out through the flames, the soldiers' faces protected by shields and their legs by cloth.

When the enemy occupied the bank of a river and Quintus Lutatius Catulus could not cross, he pretended that he was about to establish a camp. The Cimbri believed this to be true and did the same themselves. When they had gone out to gather wood and forage, Catulus crossed and attacked their camp.

When Croesus could not cross the Halys, he drew a ditch behind the army and diverted the river into it.

§ 8. Necessity often discovers many devices. When Metellus lacked ships for transporting elephants into Sicily, he joined barrels together and covered them with platforms. Hannibal ordered a soldier to wound an elephant beneath the ear and then to swim across the river. The beast, eager for revenge, followed him and gave the rest an example of daring the same thing. Otherwise the elephants could not be compelled by any force to cross.

§ 9. This principle is general: they should break in where they are not expected. Yet the industry of Scipio in this matter is both excellent and necessary. At Carthage he broke in by following the tide of the sea, declaring that he was following God as his guide.

Take an example from other actions in order to cross rivers, for whatever is done on land is less difficult than what is accomplished through the waves. Marius sent soldiers into a fortress over a rugged mountain. You will make the attempt through whirlpools. When Joshua had placed an ambush beside the city of Ai and the soldiers fled, he occupied the city through those who had been placed in ambush. Lucius Cornelius imitated this in many towns in Sardinia; Cato among the Lacetani; Lucius Scipio in Sardinia; Hannibal at Himera and Saguntum; Himilco at Agrigentum; Viriathus at Segobriga; Barca at Lilybaeum; and the Scordisci at Heraclea.

They sound the alarm in one part and attack in another. In this way Alcibiades occupied Cyzicus, Pericles a fortress of the Peloponnesians, Thrasybulus Miletus, and Antiochus Ephesus. Rivers, harbors, and marshes all furnish both greater necessity and greater opportunity.

Some made bundles of reeds and sedge in order that cavalrymen might place their arms upon them while they themselves crossed by swimming. Appian, book 8, writes concerning barrels: "But there was a great scarcity of timber and vessels with which, by joining them together, a bridge might be made. Certain workmen reported that there were very many empty, round barrels in the deserted fields there, which the inhabitants had formerly used for importing wine. Since these were hollow in the likeness of ships, when bound to one another they seemed likely to float after the manner of small boats. Indeed, once fastened together with bindings, with wickerwork laid over them and a great deal of earth heaped upon them, they could not sink. When this had been done, the soldiers easily crossed to the farther bank."

Lucan likewise, book 4:

New devices for flight across the waters
are sought out. They do not extend keels in the customary manner
and raise sterns; instead they bind stout timbers, capable of bearing
great weights, in an unfamiliar construction.
For empty barrels sustain a raft on every side;
their row, bound with chains stretched at length,
receives slanting alders in two ranks.

They also made bridges from inflated skins, lest the army's necessary march should sometimes be impeded by the courses of rivers, as very often happens. Resourceful necessity discovered a remedy for this matter which is both easy to make and of outstanding utility. It is constructed in the following manner.

Calfskins are softened by the Arabian art, for among the Arabs particular care is given to their preparation because water must be drawn from wells in skins. These, then, are carefully sewn as has been said, so that the structure is three and one-half feet in size. Thus, when the same skins have been inflated with air and swollen, they do not raise up a belly; rather, by a certain evenness, the very fullness of the skins produces level surfaces. They are bound to one another at their sides by straps fastened underneath. Rings project above them on one side, and hooks are inserted on the other. Thus the complete structure, joined part to part in the form of a bridge, is unfolded.

The same work, however, will be extended more easily aslant across the river to the opposite bank on account of the force of the current. Iron stakes are fixed on each bank, and strong ropes are stretched in the middle beneath the skins themselves to sustain the weight of those walking and above the edges for stability. By this novel and foreign preparation for a road, it will within a short space of time furnish a free opportunity to cross the river.

We must further be advised that coarse cloths should be spread over the joined skins beneath the feet of those walking, lest the smooth dressing of the hides deny them a firm footing. Nevertheless, hand-ballistae will be positioned on both banks, lest an enemy force hinder those working upon the bridge.

In the Mithridatic War Lucullus saved Cyzicus in this way. Florus, book 3: "But a messenger gave the townsmen confidence to resist by teaching them that Lucullus was approaching. Horrible to tell, he passed through the midst of the enemy's ships suspended from an inflated skin and guiding his course with his feet. To those watching from a distance he escaped like a sea-monster." Indeed, Gaius Caesar too, supported by inflated skins, often outran the messengers concerning himself.

Caesar says in book 1 of *The Civil War* that the Lusitanians did not go to war without inflated skins; and Livy, book 30, says the same of the Spaniards, who also placed their clothing in the skins. Others used shields. The Lycians secretly returned to their city by swimming underwater through the Xanthus; Brutus caught them in nets.

A safer method is to make dugout canoes, or small boats from one piece of wood. Caesar used these in Britain, and in Spain; Livy, book 30; Ammianus, books 14 and 24. They also carried skiffs with them. Julian did so in Persia, Ammianus, book 14. Semiramis had boats that could be taken apart and carried them upon camels. Diodorus, book 3. The emperor Alexander also laid a bridge upon dugout canoes when he crossed the Rhine. Caesar made ships against Sextus Pompey from wickerwork of willow and ox hides.

Battles very often arise at a crossing. Caesar, book 2 of *The Gallic War*: "The fighting in that place was fierce. Our men attacked the enemy while they were encumbered in the river and killed a great number of them. By a multitude of

missiles they drove back the remainder, who attempted with the greatest boldness to cross over the bodies of their men. They surrounded with cavalry and killed the first who had crossed.”

The ancients also drove off the enemy by ingenuity. Diodorus, book 19:

παρασκευασάμενοι γὰρ δέσμους καλάμων εὐμεγέθεις ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὴν λίμνην· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπικάθηνται οὐ πλείω τριῶν, ὧν δύο μὲν ἔχοντες προσδεδεμένας πλάτας κωπηλατοῦσιν, εἷς δὲ φορῶν τόξα τοὺς προσπλέοντας ἐκ τοῦ πέραν ἢ βιάζεσθαι τολμῶντας ἀμύνεται.

For after preparing large bundles of reeds they cast them into the lake. Upon these no more than three men take their seats: two, holding blades fastened to them, row, while one, carrying a bow, wards off those sailing against them from the opposite side or daring to use force.

The Liburnians acted bravely and amusingly when they occupied shallow places with only their heads projecting. They caused the enemy to believe that the sea was deep; and when a trireme pursuing them became entangled in the shallows, they captured it.

Men are accustomed to obstruct harbors and the mouths of rivers. Our countrymen have learned to obstruct a crossing in every manner. At Hamburg Duke Valdemar of Schleswig obstructed the Elbe with chains; at Danzig Stephen, king of Poland, obstructed it with a bridge. But here the river and the surrounding places must be considered.

CHAPTER XXXVII

The Formation of the Battle-Line

§ 1. The ancient Roman battle-line, as it seems to me, was certainly not established altogether advantageously. Livy, describing in book 8 the war between the Latins and the Romans, indicates that the younger and weaker men fought at the beginning. For the battle was especially like one in a civil war: so completely was there nothing among the Latins at variance with the Roman state except their courage.

Lipsius maintains that the *hastati* fought first in a stationary battle, and so it was done; for the light-armed soldiers ran forward. No account was taken of the *velites*. The reason why I think that the battle-line was not rightly established is that all the bravest men must be placed in the first line, so that they may overthrow or terrify the enemy at the first assault.

For there are two disadvantages in that battle-line. The first is that the war begins with the slaughter of the younger, poorly armed citizens. Once defeated, they withdrew; yet they were not defeated without slaughter, nor could they abandon their place and withdraw except under the utmost necessity, since death was the punishment for abandoning one's place. The other disadvantage is that the enemy's courage increased after he had routed the *velites* and *hastati*, and he pressed on all the more stoutly.

This certainly became evident in the Latin War, where the same battle-lines were on both sides: they could easily have been defeated if strong men had been opposed to the weak at the beginning. For when Manlius had ordered the *accensi* to run forward, the Latins suspected that they were the *triarii*, because the *accensi* were stationed behind the *triarii*. They therefore also roused their own men, who, while defeating and driving back the Romans in a fierce fight, became exhausted and had their spears broken or blunted. Manlius finally sent the *triarii* against these men and conquered.

But if he had sent the *triarii* out together with the *accensi*, he would have saved many citizens whom he allowed to be killed and defeated up to that point, until the enemy, wearied out, was exposed to fresh troops. Numisius, commander of the Latins, gives no false account of how great a slaughter occurred. He affirmed that Mars had indeed been impartial in the war; that both battle-lines had been laid low with equal slaughter; that only the name of victory was in the possession of the Romans, but that in every other respect they too bore the fortune of the vanquished; that both praetoria of the consuls were marked by death, one by the parricide of a son and the other by the slaughter of the devoted consul; that the whole army had been cut to pieces; that the *hastati* and *principes* had been slain; that slaughter had been wrought both before and behind the standards; and that at last the *triarii* had restored the situation.

But if they had strained against the enemy with all their strength at the beginning and preserved their youth, the Latins would by no means have thought of renewing the war. Yet, as I advised above, the leading men held the populace cheap and did not take it ill that the multitude of the poor should be exhausted through wars. The Turk now acts in the same manner in storming cities and in battles: he casts an unwarlike crowd before the enemy to be torn to pieces, until, when the enemy is weary with killing, he sends in the Janissaries.

Antiquity also approved my opinion. Homer places the weak in the middle of the battle-line and the strong in its first and last parts, with the best judgment: so that the enemy may be broken by the first assault; so that those in the middle may be incited by those before them and compelled by those behind; and so that they may be unable to flee. It must not be doubted that Homer speaks from the usage of ancient times; but he places the strong at the front:

Ἰππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισι καὶ ὄχεσφιν,

πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθε στήσεν πολέας τε καὶ ἐσθλοὺς,

ἔρκος ἔμεν πολέμοιο· κακοὺς δ' ἐς μέσσον ἔλασεν.

He placed the cavalry with their horses and chariots at the front. At the rear he placed many brave infantrymen as a wall of war, and he cast the weak into the middle. Certainly the cavalry and chariot-drivers were a principal part of warfare.

Next, it was anciently so among the Romans that the richest men, who were likewise the best armed, fought in the first battle-line, and the poorest in the last. Lipsius, book 4 of *The Roman Military*, dialogue 2. For after Dionysius had stated the property-rating and arms of the first class, he added:

χώραν δὲ κατεῖχεν αὐτοῖς πολέμοις τὴν προηγουμένην ὅλης τῆς φάλαγγος·

it occupied the first place in wars and stood before the entire remaining force. Again, concerning the second:

ἐκοσμεῖτο αὐτοῖς ἀγῶσι μετὰ τοὺς προμάχους·

it was drawn up in the battle-line after the foremost fighters. Concerning the third likewise:

χώρα καὶ τάξις τούτων ἐν ταῖς μάχαις μετὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας τοῖς προμάχοις·

their place and station in battles was beside those who stood behind the *principes*. Finally, concerning the fourth:

τάξιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὴν ὑστάτην·

it held the last place in contests. What, then, of the fifth class, Dionysius?

τούτοις ἔξω τάξεως ἔταξε στρατεύεσθαι·

he says that he ordered them to serve outside the line of battle. Afterward, at the trial of Coriolanus, he repeats the same things in nearly the same number of words. I have adduced these passages at greater length so that the origin and order of ancient military service, and the manner in which it gradually changed, may be established once for all.

Accordingly, by the ordinance of Servius all the richest men were in the first battle-line. This is why Varro derived the name *principes* from the front, and asserted that they had anciently fought with swords from the beginning. The others followed in order of wealth, and at the extreme rear were finally the meaner and poorer men and those who fought with light missiles.

But who were those *Quintiani* outside the order? They were the *accensi*, according to Livy, and each was not even a regular soldier. These things were so in ancient times; but when experience and reason had shown that many features in that order deserved condemnation, they changed it over time. For what reason is there to expose all the best and richest men to dangers by placing them in the first battle-line? They were unwilling to do so and placed the *principes* in the second position.

Let it be permissible for me to agree with the ancients and to dissent from Lipsius--not because I approve the Servian order, but because I think that men who will fight bravely, rather than merely die, must be placed in the first battle-line. At the end, however, I would have a strong reserve placed for every contingency. Yet I would add *velites*, archers, and slingers to the front, but in such a manner that strong men protect them in stationary combat.

Later writers changed the places of the *principes* and *hastati*. Vegetius, book 2, chapter 20: "The combatants in the first battle-line were called *principes*; in the second, *hastati*." And in book 1, chapter 15: "The first battle-line was of the *principes*, the second of the *hastati*." Lipsius holds that this began under Trajan or Hadrian. Very rightly indeed, for now the battle-line was arranged according to equity and merit, not according to the caprice of the patricians. The order which history exhibits after the expulsion of the kings was the earlier one.

Now let the manner in which a battle-line must be formed when battle is imminent be explained by the example of a single legion; if need requires, it may be transferred to several. The cavalry is placed on the wings. The battle-line of the infantry begins to be arranged from the first cohort on the right wing. The second cohort is joined to it. The third cohort is placed in the middle of the battle-line. The fourth is attached to it. The fifth cohort occupies the left wing. But

those fighting before the standards, around the standards, and also in the first battle-line are called *principes*, that is, regulars, and the rest are called *principales*.

This was the heavy infantry. They had helmets, cuirasses, greaves, shields, larger swords which they called *spathae*, and other, smaller swords which they called *semispathae*. They had five lead-weighted darts placed in their shields, which they cast at the first assault. They likewise had two missiles. The larger had a triangular iron head nine inches long and a shaft five and one-half feet long. They called it the *pilum*; it is now called the *spiculum*. The soldiers were especially trained to cast it, because when directed with skill and force it often pierced both shield-bearing infantrymen and armored cavalrymen. The other was smaller, with a triangular iron head five inches long and a shaft three and one-half feet long. It was then called the *verriculum* and is now called the *verutum*.

The first battle-line of the *principes* and the second of the *hastati* are taught to be equipped with such arms. After them were the *ferentarii* and the light infantry, whom we now call auxiliaries and light-armed troops: shield-bearing men equipped with lead-weighted darts, swords, and missiles, just as nearly all soldiers now appear to be armed. There were also archers with helmets, cuirasses, swords, arrows, and bows. There were slingers who cast stones with slings or staff-slings. There were also crossbowmen who discharged arrows from hand-ballistae or crossbows.

The second battle-line was more lightly armed; the soldiers standing in it were called *hastati*. In the second battle-line, however, the sixth cohort was placed on the right wing, and the seventh was joined to it. The eighth cohort held the center, with the ninth accompanying it. The tenth cohort always held the left wing in the second battle-line.

Scipio, the distinguished commander, teaches this; Lipsius also agrees with him in book 4, dialogue 6. Scipio employed it in Spain. After observing for several days that the enemy's battle-line was arranged with the best men in the middle and the weaker on the wings, he formed his own in the opposite manner and placed the auxiliaries in the middle, but the citizens and all the strength on the wings.

Finally, two supreme commanders, Caesar and Pompey, showed how much it matters that strong men be in the first battle-line. Caesar placed his strongest legions at the front in the battle-line at Pharsalus. Caesar himself, thus preserving the arrangement stated above, had placed the Tenth Legion on the right wing and the Ninth on the left, although it had been severely reduced in the battles at Dyrrachium. He joined the Eighth to it in such a manner that he made almost one legion from the two and had ordered each to serve as a protection for the other.

He had eighty cohorts in the battle-line, the total of which was 22,000 men. He had placed Antony over the left wing, Publius Sulla over the right, and Gnaeus Domitius over the center; he himself took his position opposite Pompey. At the same time, having observed the circumstances which we have explained, and fearing that the right wing would be surrounded by the multitude of cavalry, he swiftly drew individual cohorts from the third line and formed from them a fourth line.

Pompey acted in the same manner, as Caesar relates in book 3 of *The Civil War*: "When Caesar had approached Pompey's camp, he observed that Pompey's battle-line was arranged in the following manner. On the left wing were the two legions delivered by Caesar under the decree of the Senate at the beginning of the dissension, one of which was called the First and the other the Third; Pompey himself was in that place. Scipio held the middle of the battle-line with the Syrian legions. The Cilician legion, joined with the Spanish cohorts which, as we have shown, had been brought over by Afranius, was placed on the right wing. Pompey considered these to be his strongest troops. He had interspersed the rest between the center and the wings and had filled out one hundred and ten cohorts; these amounted to fifty-five thousand men. There were about two thousand *evocati*, whom he had dispersed throughout the whole battle-line."

Frontinus, book 2, says that Pompey placed the legions on the wings and in the center according to the valor of each and filled the intervening spaces with recruits. Thus he willed that the strongest should be first.

§ 2. It must be considered, first of all, that few men fight in a great battle: in a legion only one hundred fight simultaneously, except that when the first men have cast their spears, they sink down upon their knees and others cast theirs. This must be done especially when the enemy is superior in number, for he can easily be conquered by a few when the action takes place in narrow or rugged places. Those few must therefore be brave, so that they may inflict slaughter.

The Roman battle-line is accurately presented both by many writers and especially by Lipsius. According to Lipsius the battle-line among the Romans did not vary greatly, and it was generally either double or triple. It was double when the whole battle-line was divided into two wings, the right and the left. This arrangement very often prevailed in a consular army, when there were two legions and their own auxiliaries were joined to each. It is certain that this division was ancient and was employed by other nations as well. Polyainos indeed attributes its invention to Pan:

Διονύσου στρατηγὸς ἦν ὁ Πάν, ὅτι πρῶτος τάξιν εὔρεν, ὠνόμασε φάλαγγα, κέρας ἔταξε δεξιὸν καὶ λαιὸν· ταύτη τοι ἄρα κερασφόρον τὸν Πᾶνα δημιουργοῦσι.

Pan was the commander of Dionysus, or Bacchus, in military affairs. He first discovered an order of battle, named the phalanx, and established a right and left wing. From this they commonly depict Pan with horns. To seek out and set down a few examples of this disposition among the Romans would be to take drops from a bucket: there are six hundred of them.

It is triple when, besides the wings, another division also rises up in the middle. This too is frequent, not only when there are several legions but even when there are two--these being placed in the middle, with the allies at each wing. The matter is clear in itself, and the examples readily present themselves.

But there is also another method of a double and triple battle-line: in addition to that simple division, a separation and distinction are also made in the rear. Thus, if I have four legions, I place two in front with their allies and set the same number behind them, as reserves. The same was also done with two legions: either each wing of allies--or *ala*, if you prefer--was placed in front with the legions attached behind, or the reverse.

See the matter in Livy, in the battle of Marcellus against Hannibal: "The fighting continued for more than two hours. Then the right wing and the *extraordinarii* on the Roman side began to give ground. When Marcellus saw this, he brought the Eighteenth Legion into the first battle-line. While some gave way in alarm and others came up sluggishly, the whole battle-line was thrown into disorder." Again, concerning the same Marcellus in another battle: "The battle long remained undecided, inclining to neither side. The Third Legion took the place of the First, and the left wing that of the right."

There are also examples of the legions themselves disposed in this way. In Livy: "The praetor's legions were in the first battle-line; Cornelius held his own in reserve." Elsewhere: "Sempronius led his own legions into the first battle-line; the legions of Publius Licinius were stationed in reserve." And there are more.

These legions or forces placed in the second or third position were called reserves or reserve forces. Livy again: "When the Twelfth Legion, which was on the left wing, gave ground, he brought the Thirteenth Legion from the reserves into the first battle-line as a support." Sallust: "There, after changing the ranks, on the right side, which was nearest the enemy, he formed the battle-line with three lines of reserves." Entire legions were not always substituted in this manner, but sometimes a number of cohorts. Livy: "He immediately sent the reserve cohorts, which were being preserved intact for the contingencies of a longer battle, into the first line."

The following verses of Tibullus to Messalla pertain to these dispositions:

If there is need, let the battle-line stand as a square column,
so that the straight order may advance with fronts made equal;
or if it please you to behold a double Mars or a joined one,

so that you, a soldier, may hold the left with the right and the right with the left,
and so that the victory in a twofold event may itself be twofold.

He produces what he calls a varied aspect of battle. First comes the simple square formation, with a straight front; second, the double formation with a wing on each side; third, the joined formation, which I called triple, namely, one formation joined to the other two. For in this manner what is said here occurred: the soldier on the left sees with his own right the left side of the middle body, and the soldier on the right sees with his own left the right side of that same middle body. Look at it, and you will understand.

But what follows delays this interpretation, or rather calls it back: “and so that the victory in a twofold event may itself be twofold.” For thus, in a triple battle-line, the victory and the event would be not double but triple. Does he therefore understand by “joined” the battle-line attached below and doubled, of which we spoke, so that one line is placed behind another? This is what I think. In either formation, certainly, a man sees with his right the left of the wing placed beside him, and conversely.

Nor would I object if the text were written: “to behold a double, separated Mars,” so that he names only two dispositions: the simple, undivided square, and this one separated into two wings. The sense is easy in this way.

These are the principal and accepted formations among the Romans, although they varied them slightly by advancing or withdrawing them. Examples will teach what I mean. For generally they charged equally with each wing and at the same time. Cato, in Festus, called this “with a straight front”; Tibullus, in the verses cited, “with fronts made equal.” Vegetius says on this subject: “One manner of fighting is with a long front and the army squared, just as even now battle is customarily conducted almost always.”

The second manner of fighting is oblique, when one wing is advanced before the other. The Greek tacticians write:

Λοξὴ φάλαγξ, ἣ τὸ μὲν κέρας ἕτερον, ὁπότερον ἂν προηγήται, πλησίον τῶν πολεμίων ἔχουσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιουμένη, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἐν ἀποστάσει δι’ ὑποστολῆς ἔχουσα.

An oblique phalanx is one which brings one wing--whichever has been designated--nearer to the enemy and conducts the battle upon it, but holds the other at a distance by withdrawing it.

Vegetius writes concerning this kind: “The second manner of fighting is oblique and is far better. Its method is as follows. When the battle-lines have been formed and come to the encounter, you will then separate your left wing”--he means the wing and soon afterward calls it so--“farther from the enemy’s right, so that neither missiles nor arrows reach it. But join your right wing to his left wing, and there first begin the battle.”

But he wishes battle to be joined from the right side only, not likewise from the left. He condemns the latter because, as he says, “the assault is then as though maimed, and men whose bodies are exposed attack the enemy with difficulty.” He advises well in view of the ancient armor. For if you advance your left wing against the enemy’s right, you plainly expose your uncovered side to the enemy, who will safely attack it with missiles or arrows from his own left. This is what Vegetius means when he says that exposed men then attack the enemy, because shields are of course carried on the left. Whoever sought another cause and referred it to the weakness of the left-hand parts assuredly understood neither Vegetius nor the matter.

Caesar fought Ariovistus by this method. Although he had formed a triple battle-line, he nevertheless “joined battle from the right wing”--these are his words--because he had observed that this part of the enemy was least strong.

The third kind occurs when, in a triple battle-line, you withdraw the third and middle body from the enemy and send in only the wings. Seneca touches upon it: “Just as the same army at one time is spread out more widely, at another is contracted into a narrow space, and is either curved into wings while the middle part is recessed, or extended with a straight front.”

Scipio employed this in Spain. After observing for several days that the enemy's battle-line was formed with the best men in the middle and the weaker on the wings, he arranged his own in the contrary manner and placed the auxiliaries in the middle, but the citizens and all the strength on the wings. "When the time for beginning the battle had now come," Livy says, "he ordered the Spaniards"--this was the middle battle-line--"to advance at a slow pace. He himself sent a messenger from the right wing to Silanus and Marcius, ordering them to extend the wing on the left side in the same manner as they saw him extending his on the right, and with the light infantry and cavalry to join battle before the middle battle-lines could meet one another. When the wings had been drawn apart in this manner, there was a hollow in the middle, because the standards of the Spaniards advanced more slowly."

This foresight and formation gave certain victory, because the strongest met the weakest, while the others, awaiting their own enemy, remained idle in the middle and were finally terrified by the flight and slaughter of other men.

The fourth kind is contrary to this, namely, when the middle battle-line itself projects and charges the enemy first. The Greeks call it *bent*, ἐπικαμπής, or also *convex*, κυρτόν. Aelian writes:

Ἐπικαμπής συμβαίνει ἡ τάξις, ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα τοῖς πολεμίοις προσπίπτει, τὰ δὲ κέρατα ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσω μερῶν ὀρθία ὑφ' ἑαυτὴν ἔχει τεταγμένα.

A formation is called bent when its middle falls upon the enemy, while it has its wings placed straight behind it. Hannibal used this most skillfully in the battle of Cannae, but with this additional art: he made his wings exceedingly strong and preserved them intact; then, after the middle had been driven back and a hollow had been formed, he sent the wings in from both sides against the legions, thereby establishing a certain cause of his victory.

How useful it would be for our commanders to consider and employ such things! I believe that they will gradually do so, as I see the native ability and training of certain men who are now growing up.

§ 3. This battle-line, therefore, was customarily divided into wings when there were two legions and auxiliaries, which held the extreme wings.

§ 4. Sometimes two legions were in front with the allies, while two were placed in the rear. Thus Livy, book 27.

§ 5. Sometimes the battle-line is crescent-shaped, with the wings projecting on both sides, such as that of Scipio.

In this battle-line Vegetius approves an oblique movement, so that battle is fought first against the enemy's left wing; for in this manner the attacking wing will rise up more vigorously and be less exposed.

§ 6. Contrary to this is the formation in which the wings are drawn back and the middle advances.

Hannibal defeated the Romans in this manner at Cannae, but only after he had conquered in the cavalry battle. Livy, book 22: "Toward the end of the cavalry contest the battle of the infantry began. At first the ranks of the Gauls and Spaniards held together both in strength and courage. At length the Romans, after long and repeated exertions, drove back with an oblique front and a dense line the enemy's wedge, which was too thin and therefore insufficiently strong and which projected from the rest of the battle-line. Then, as the enemy were driven back and retreated in alarm, the Romans pressed upon them and were carried in one continuous advance through the headlong column of fugitives, first into the middle battle-line and finally, with no one resisting them, reached the African reserves.

"These had stood with their wings drawn back on both sides, while the Gauls and Spaniards stood in the middle and their line projected somewhat. When this wedge had been driven back, it first made the front level; then, by continuing to give ground, it even produced a hollow in the middle. The Africans had already made wings around it. When the Romans rushed incautiously into the middle, the Africans surrounded them with their wings; then, by extending the wings, they also closed the enemy in from the rear. From this point the Romans, having to no purpose completed one battle and lost the Gauls and Spaniards whose rear ranks they had cut down, entered into a fresh battle against the Africans--not only an unequal one because they were enclosed against enemies surrounding them, but also because, exhausted, they fought against fresh and vigorous men."

§ 7. In ancient times great account was taken of reserves. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 17: “The best method, however, and one which contributes very greatly to victory, is for the commander to have behind the battle-line, prepared in reserve, the most select infantrymen and cavalymen, together with deputies, companions, and tribunes who are free of other duties--some around the wings, others around the middle. Wherever the enemy presses more violently, they should suddenly rush forward, lest the battle-line be broken, and fill the places; and by adding valor, they should break the enemy’s audacity.

“The Laconians first discovered this. The Carthaginians imitated them, and afterward the Romans preserved it everywhere. No better disposition is found than this. For the straight battle-line must attempt this alone, if it can: to repel or rout the enemy. If a *cuneus*, or wedge, must be driven forward, or a *forfex*, or shears, you must have men behind the battle-line from whom you may form the wedge or shears. If a *serra*, or saw, must be drawn out, it will likewise be drawn from the surplus troops. For if you begin to transfer a regular soldier from his place, you will throw the whole formation into disorder.

“If a detached *globus*, or compact body, of the enemy begins to press either your wing or any part, unless you have surplus men whom you can oppose to the body, whether you remove infantry or cavalry from the battle-line, while you seek to protect one place you will expose another to greater danger. But if you do not abound in a multitude of fighting men, it is better to have a shorter battle-line, provided that you place a very large number in reserve. For near the middle parts of the field you ought to have the most select men from among the well-armed infantry, from whom you may form a wedge and immediately break the enemy’s battle-line. Around the wings, moreover, it is fitting for you to surround the enemy’s wings with cavalymen armed with lances and cuirasses and reserved for this purpose, and with light infantry.”

At the beginning the Gauls had an assault more than manly; afterward, as they languished, one less than womanly, because without order and discipline they expended everything upon the first attempt. When their arms failed them, they fell. Indeed, this is true of most enemies: wars that are strong in their first assault vanish through delays.

§ 8. The greatest care must be given to forming the battle-line. For just as stones heaped together at random do not contain water and do not make a wall, so even the bravest men cannot withstand an enemy assault unless they are arranged in the best manner. Accordingly, Nestor, the wisest of the Greeks, forms the battle-line in *Iliad* 4. Pyrrhus excelled in this art, and Hannibal gave Scipio the first place in it. Hence kings were called λαῶν κοσμήτορες, “arrangers of peoples.”

§ 9. Writers command that the battle-line be formed first, because this appears more courageous and because one can do it more conveniently. I think otherwise when the camp is fortified or when you cannot be compelled to battle: form your line second. For you see the enemy’s order, which is a great advantage, and he is compelled to wait for you while armed. You will add courage to your own men if they think that you are arranging them prudently; this will also be so because the enemy follows your movement, if you are cheerful.

One must observe whether the adversary is swift and rash; for then such men will easily be conquered, because the man who stands first in battle-line is less able to act. Since the man who first takes his position in the battle-line cannot easily withdraw, he is compelled to await the other. When Hasdrubal had led out his army without food, Scipio commanded his own men to rest and take food. At the seventh hour, when the enemy was returning to camp because of hunger, thirst, and weariness, he led out his forces and conquered.

§ 10. It matters greatly on what side you attack in battle. When Scipio had Spaniards on his right wing and Hanno had Africans on his left, Scipio attacked the left wing; after defeating the Africans, he received into surrender the Spaniards, who were fighting for a foreign dominion. When Philip saw that the front of the Illyrians was strong and their wings weak, he attacked the wings and routed them.

Pammenes the Theban acted more dangerously. When he saw that the strongest Persians were on their right wing, he placed weak men opposite them on his own left and ordered them to flee, but with his own right wing he attacked and defeated the enemy's left. For he had ordered the men on his left to withdraw into rugged places.

The man who forms his battle-line second chooses on what side he will attack and whom he will oppose to whom. The arrangement of a battle-line therefore cannot be determined once for all, much less can the same intervals always be used. It must be disposed according to practical need, according to what the enemy does, or according to what one can advantageously do oneself.

When Scipio saw that Hannibal had eighty elephants, he established open ranks with large intervals, so that he could receive and elude the beasts without harm. When Archelaus had an abundance of chariots, Sulla fixed stakes so that they would be caught. He made open ranks and sent cavalymen through them, who threw the battle-line into disorder.

§ 11. Sometimes it is better to form the battle-line first in order to inspire terror, but this has no place except against the inexperienced. Thus, when the Turks were about to fight at sea against Don John of Austria, they persuaded themselves that the Christians would flee as soon as they saw the fleet. Otherwise it is best to see what the enemy is doing, so that you may place obstacles in his way.

In the same manner, when Hirtuleius had brought his soldiers up to the rampart of Metellus Pius on a sweltering day, Metellus held his own men back until the sixth hour and then defeated the enemy when they had been exhausted by the heat.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Stratagems of Those Engaged in Battle

§ 1. Those who deny that these are lawful think in a manner that is excessively old-fashioned and arrogant. Joshua and David employed stratagem, as did not only other great commanders but also holy men. Those are excessively simple who think:

οὐδεὶς ἀνὴρ εὐψυχὸς ἀξιοῖ λάθρα κτεῖναι τὸν ἐχθρόν.

No one of sound mind thinks it right secretly to kill a public enemy. “I do not wish to steal victory” is an impious rather than a noble saying. Holy and noble is that theft by which citizens are preserved and vain glory is despised for the sake of public safety. A skilled hunter takes wild beasts by guile. Augustine puts it excellently in his Questions on Joshua 4, questions 9 and 10: “When a war is undertaken justly, whether a man fights openly or from ambush makes no difference to justice.” Indeed, if victory can be sought by a good guile or stratagem, one must not proceed by force, because danger would be encountered without cause. And the resourcefulness of that most warlike state is to be praised, which commanded that a cock be sacrificed for a bloody victory but an ox for an ingenious one.

Furthermore, this must be considered: success does not always attend one who is fully prepared against the weak, and victory can turn upon a very small matter. An example is the battle that took place in the city of Perugia between the noble and rival families of the Oddi and the Baglioni. Machiavelli relates the matter in book 3, chapter 14, of *The Discourses*. For when that city was afflicted by civil dissensions and was wholly divided into the two factions of the Oddi and the Baglioni, the latter, having become more powerful, drove the former into exile. The exiled Oddi had gathered an army through the assistance of friends and, having entered Perugia on a certain night, were secretly hastening to seize the forum. But because the individual streets in that city, fortified beforehand with chains stretched across them, impeded the passage of cavalymen, a certain man with an iron hammer went before them and broke the fastenings of the chains. All the chains had already been broken except only the one that closed the entrance into the forum itself. When the same man was attempting to break it with great exertion, and was prevented from raising the hammer high enough by those who followed at his back and had already sounded the call to arms, he said to them, “Go back,” so that he might, of course, break the chain more freely. But this utterance, sent like an echo from the first men to those behind, and by these to others, gradually reached the last men. It caused those at the rear, who did not understand why it had been uttered, to flee with great violence. The rest gradually followed them, abandoned their undertaking, and themselves became the cause of their own destruction, having been disturbed by so slight and accidental an occurrence.

All stratagems are lawful provided that faith and dignity are preserved; all that contain treachery are to be abominated. Pompey defeated Mithridates in Armenia by ordering his cavalry to withdraw until it had reached the place of ambush. Cassius in the same manner drew the Parthian into an ambush after showing cavalry in front and concealing infantry. Ventidius crushed them by the same means, so that they were compelled to depart from the province. Thus he defeated and killed Pharnapates. Caesar preoccupied the hills against Afranius; Juba drew Curio out into the plain and routed his encircled cavalry. Hannibal never failed to employ ambushes. He exposed a few soldiers to Fulvius through the mist and attacked the opposite part of the camp. Against Minucius he concealed infantry in the mountains, and he would have destroyed Minucius had Fabius not come to his aid. At the Trebia Hannibal with remarkable skill so deceived Sempronius that he wore out his fasting army in severe cold by making it cross the river. At Lake Trasimene he drew the Romans into the mountain, and Flaminius did not perceive the ambush before he was surrounded in front, on the flank, and in the rear and was destroyed with his army. He attacked Junius’s camp after keeping the Romans disturbed for the entire night by means of six hundred cavalymen. At Cannae he crushed the Romans by the pretense of six hundred deserters, a device Licinius the consul imitated against the Iapygians.

Care must diligently be taken that guiles do not become known. For how did it profit Semiramis to bring forward camels in the trappings of elephants if the Indians knew of it? What advantage did a childish stratagem bring the people of Fidenae when they sent infantry with torches into the army? Guiles are not guiles unless you manage them with cunning. Certainly the foremost prudence of a prince is to guard especially against the guiles of war. They depict a sword smeared with garlic and thereby separated from a magnet, and inscribe upon it the maxim, “Neither by force nor by guile,” which is the emblem of an unconquered prince.

§ 2. Some stratagems belong to war, others to battles. Certain stratagems of war are general and must always be observed when this can be done. The Roman people had various stratagems, of which this was the principal one: they would not readily enter a war or attempt a new province unless they had friends in it or nearby whose assistance they could employ. They defended their Campanian friends against Samnium, and that became the cause of the destruction of the Samnites. They occupied Etruria through the assistance of the Camertes and Sicily through the Mamertines. The Athenians led them into Macedonia; the Rhodians, into Asia; the dissension of the Jewish brothers, into Syria; and royal offspring, into Egypt. By the same method the Spaniard occupied the greatest regions in both Indies, since they always procured with great effort, payment, and hope certain men who preferred foreign dominions. The Turk also overturns everyone while bringing assistance to others; he has faithful friends even in the midst of Europe.

§ 3. Another fraud is to introduce discussion of a truce and peace until one’s forces are better prepared, or so that the spirits of the enemy may grow slack and, enticed by the sweetness of peace, abandon their care for war.

§ 4. This too is customary: to aid belligerents in such a way that assistance is sent to the weaker party until, after each side has been weakened, it submits itself to the victor. For a state that sustains a war not by its own assistance but by another’s is in the power of its helper.

§ 5. A war must never be greatly feared when many conspire against one; for the man who can withstand their first assaults will easily overcome them all. In 1484 the Italians conspired against the Venetians. The latter won over Ludovico, duke of Milan, with gifts and easily dispelled every danger. Thus also, when the German princes conspired against Charles V, the war was brought to an end at its first assault.

§ 6. Some men have wearied an enemy with sleeplessness by nocturnal disturbances while remaining within a fortified camp. Epaminondas harassed the camp of the Lacedaemonians throughout the entire night by means of a few light-armed cavalrymen and on the following day attacked them when they were exhausted. When Epaminondas came to Mount Oneium, he ordered his army to rest; in the morning he defeated the enemy when they were worn out by their watch. When Titus Quinctius thought that the Volsci would attack his camp, he left a cohort on station during the night, but commanded the trumpeters to ride around the rampart on horses and sound their instruments; then in the morning he attacked and routed the weary enemy.

§ 7. Many men have used the enemy’s superstition for their own advantages. I shall adduce only this single instance here, because it shows in a wonderful manner the remarkable wretchedness of the superstitious. Panarmus and Gonippus, Messenians, went into the camp of the Laconians with beautiful horses, white tunics, and purple military cloaks. They were believed by those men to be Castor and Pollux, killed many, mocked the superstition, and then returned unharmed to their own men.

§ 8. When the flight either of the entire army or of one part is feigned, great care must be applied lest some of the soldiers think that it is a true flight and panic arise. When the Romans on one occasion perceived that the enemy was strong, they ordered the *velites* and *hastati* to withdraw to their starting positions once battle had begun; then they killed those who followed with ill-considered ardor. Hannibal placed torches and hay upon the horns of oxen and drove them through the woods. While the Romans were astonished at the movement of fire by night, he escaped by another road. The Spaniards struck the Carthaginians still more violently with a stratagem, for they sent burning carts drawn by oxen into Hamilcar’s army and threw its ranks into disorder.

§ 9. When Scipio saw that the strength of Hasdrubal's army was in the middle of the battle-line, he arranged matters in the battle-line itself so that those men should remain idle. For he ordered the wings to advance more swiftly and the middle battle-line more slowly, so that after the wings had been defeated the courage of the middle also might fail. Justinian, the prefect of the emperor Tiberius, conquered while he waited until the Persians had emptied their quivers; for when matters came to swords, he found them inferior.

§ 10. The best stratagem is to guard against opposing stratagems. Archelaidas, although unaware of the ambush, nevertheless ordered his men to advance in formation, saying that there was an ambush; and one truly existed, so that he easily dispersed the men lying in wait. Otherwise, both those who fall into an ambush and those who come to their assistance are in equal danger. Sertorius cast Pompey's soldiers into an ambush and slaughtered, while Pompey himself looked on, the legion that had come to their assistance; ten thousand were killed.

Assistance is cunningly diverted elsewhere, because that terrifies the enemy more. When Parmenion saw that the Tyrians had made a sortie and that the Macedonians were giving way and being hard pressed, he did not aid them but attacked the city. Polyainos, book 5.

§ 11. If a man, enclosed between mountains and rivers or the enemy's garrisons, despairs of being able to escape, he will display everything as though he were going to escape through trackless places, while in the meantime he secretly prepares everything pertaining to bridges and swimming the river; and after threatening one part, he will flee by another.

Iphicrates most skillfully corrected his error. When, on his way to Sicyon, he had passed beyond an ambush, someone from the city cried out, "Now you will pay the penalty." Suspecting that these were not empty threats, he swiftly withdrew by another road and crushed the ambushers.

§ 12. Remarkable also was the stratagem of Titus Didius, who, when he knew that a legion was to be intercepted, pretended that he wished to fight and, after leading out his army, diverted the enemy from concern for the intercepted legion.

§ 13. When camp is set opposite camp, it will be of great advantage if you divide the enemy's forces. For this purpose it will be especially advantageous to have a camp as strongly fortified as possible, so that many men may be dispatched in different directions from it.

§ 14. Men sometimes spread certain reports suddenly in order to animate their soldiers and terrify the enemy--for example, that the enemy's commander has fallen. When Quinctius saw that one wing was giving way, he proclaimed that the other had conquered, and thus added eagerness to his own men and fear to the enemy. This is also a customary means of terrifying enemies.

Edward of England withdrew Philip the Fair from his attack upon Belgium by fraud, for he persuaded Philip's sister that the princes of Gaul had conspired to desert him in the battle-line. Memnon of Rhodes persuaded the enemy that his soldiers were afflicted by mutiny and thereby drew them out into the plains. There was more pretense in Antigonos Hierax. After he had been defeated and had withdrawn his army into safe places, he pretended to be dead. Men were sent, supposedly by the soldiers, to seek the dead man's body and make surrender; when four thousand men had been sent to accept the surrender, Antigonos killed them.

§ 15. Fraudulence resting upon such petty lies is unworthy of a commander. The stratagem of Croesus, who opposed camels to horses because the latter cannot bear their smell, proceeded from natural observation and from intelligence and prudence. Pyrrhus likewise stationed elephants opposite the cavalry, so that he might fill both horses and horsemen with terror of the beasts.

§ 16. Cruel and rash was the deed of Sertorius. When the death of a certain commander was reported to him during battle, he killed the man who had reported it, lest the matter spread. It was cruel, I say, and rash, because others already

knew it, and the messenger had not reported it to Sertorius alone. The anger and fear arising from this could therefore have turned the battle-line away.

§ 17. When Lutatius Catulus the consul had to cross a river with the Cimbri in pursuit, he pretended that he was going to fight, fortified a camp, and sent out foragers. Then, when the Cimbri did the same, he quietly crossed the river.

The man who has the greater number in battle must be admonished to fight with the utmost caution. For since the weaker man attempts everything, he does not require admonition; great forces produce pride, carelessness, negligence, and disaster. The weaker enemy must therefore be feared, because he will strike with an unexpected blow. But the stronger man has many resources for stratagems: he can suddenly extend the battle-line; he can place many men separately in ambush on the flank; he can send in what is, as it were, a new column from the rear; and he can detach men to attack the camp in the midst of the heat of battle. When he employs some or all of these measures, he does so not as though fearing the enemy but in order to finish the war quickly and with little loss.

§ 18. When a battle must be fought, the commander should be continually occupied in considering stratagems, for that is accomplished best which the enemy does not expect. After Epaminondas had created the expectation of a cavalry contest by raising an immense cloud of dust, he suddenly reached the rear of the unsuspecting enemy.

§ 19. Prudently to conceal and dissemble a disaster has brought the name of victory. Titus Licinius buried his own dead. When the enemy on the following day saw that far more of their own men had been slain, they immediately fled. Thus the nocturnal burial of the bodies produced a complete victory.

§ 20. Sometimes the enemy is deceived while he thinks provision is being made for him. Eumenes' soldiers were going to plunder the enemy's baggage at great risk. When he could not persuade them to change their plan, he warned the enemy to guard it better.

§ 21. When an enemy pressing upon you tries to compel you to do something which necessity demands, and you cannot escape the necessity, undertake it voluntarily and submit to the danger with great courage. For in this manner you will act in an orderly way, without disturbance or fear, and you will thoroughly terrify the enemy by the impression of magnanimity and boldness. Is it dangerous for your fields to be burned? Concede them voluntarily as a benefit. Timotheus permitted a part of the territory to the enemy and forbade ravaging with fire or sword.

When Chares the Athenian feared that his camp might be attacked out of contempt for the smallness of his force, he secretly sent many men out by night so that, when they returned in the morning where the enemy could see them, they might present the appearance of reinforcements. When Ptolemy had advanced before his army, he attached wagons to every kind of livestock and ordered them to be driven by cavalymen; by raising a very great cloud of dust, he presented the appearance of an immense army. Gaius Marius and Sulpicius ordered camp servants mounted upon pack animals to appear from a mountain during the battle and present the appearance of another army; by this means they threw the enemy's battle-line into disorder.

§ 22. Whether it is better to make an assault upon the enemy or to sustain one is disputed among commanders. Decius attacked the enemy; Fabius sustained the assault. The soldier who attacks is more courageous; the one who receives the enemy is more prudent. If the intervening space is somewhat long, it is better to receive him, for the enemy arrives out of breath. If the enemy is more timid, he must be attacked; if he is bold, his assault must be sustained, for he will be wearied by his first onset.

But firearms have now changed the practice of war. When matters have come within missile range, the man who is ready first inflicts loss and kills some who would have done harm; but this depends upon other circumstances, and especially upon the place.

§ 23. The nature of places often profits more than the valor of the combatants or a veteran commander. Place certainly has the greatest importance for the matter. Marcus Curius defeated Pyrrhus by drawing the phalanx into narrow places.

Men generally contrive to fight from elevated ground. Thus Pompey defeated Mithridates, Caesar defeated Pharnaces, and Lucullus defeated Mithridates and Tigranes. Themistocles defeated Xerxes in narrow waters, the few defeating the many. Datames with a few soldiers always defeated many because he never joined battle without keeping the enemy confined by the narrowness of the places. Thus Aemilius Probus.

Sertorius wore down the Roman forces by skirmishes. Hannibal placed precipitous roads as an obstacle on one flank and defeated Marcellus; at Cannae he used the river Volturnus as a fortification. The Roman Hannibal, Caesar, imitated this in book 3 of *The Civil War*: “His right wing was protected by a certain stream with difficult banks. For this reason he had posted all his cavalry, all the archers, and the slingers on the left wing.”

§ 24. Many men have made a suitable place by art. Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian encumbered with trees the plain upon which he was going to fight Hippias with cavalry and made it impassable for a horseman. Xanthippus led the Carthaginian army, which was strong in horses and elephants, into a plain and defeated the Romans. Clearchus caught the enemy’s cavalry in pits that were suddenly made; Quintus Sertorius crushed the hostile cavalry by making trenches.

Camps must be fortified with wagon wheels sunk into the ground, chains, a rampart, and caltrops; the soldiery must remain united. The Germans, while pitching camp in different places in Gaul, were cut down by the Guises. Hannibal also awaited the wind at Cannae and conquered by this means. The Cimbri likewise fought against Marius on the Raudian Plain by the same stratagem. The Cimbri also employed the assistance of the sun so that, by the reflection of its rays, they might dazzle the enemy’s eyes; but this was a small assistance. The Romans were also aided in the Pontic War by the setting moon. For since it was already near its setting behind the Romans and cast their long shadows, the men of Pontus, in great error, expended their missiles upon those shadows.

Because Eumenes was strong in cavalry, by occupying the ground he brought it about that he drew the enemy down into level places. Hannibal did the same, but cautiously, so that he took account of the cavalry engagements on each side; for he also defeated the Romans’ left wing by stratagem.

§ 25. Therefore, just as a camp must be disposed according to the advantage of places, so I judge that a battle-line must be disposed. It is customarily divided in general into various forms: first, so that it is oblong; second, broad; third, resembling a crescent turned toward the enemy; and fourth, crescent-shaped with its horns turned away. For the remaining forms are generally not customary when battle is fought with an entire line. Nevertheless, an extraordinary formation must always be held in readiness.

§ 26. The instruction of Bernardino de Mendoza, part 1, chapter 44, is remarkable. “It is held to be a useful stratagem in battle,” he says, “if some troop of lancers and firearm-bearing cavalry is drawn out from the right side of the column, even if it is a fifth part of the column, to attack the enemy from the flank when the battle grows hot. Thus, if the enemy turns against the troop, he presents a bare flank to the column; if he opposes himself to the column, he exposes his flank to the troop. Because the stratagem is of great assistance toward victory, I do not indeed know whether it has been customary among infantrymen; it was of great use to me among cavalrymen, when I arranged light-armed troops for this purpose. I observed that the enemy was affected by great loss in this way even if there were only twenty-five men in a single troop; and with divine assistance I broke up very many columns and, as a soldier, obtained notable victories for our king, the father of Your Majesty.”

He teaches that lancers are most suitable for this plan. For a squadron of one hundred or one hundred and twenty lancers can disperse a squadron of four hundred or five hundred firearm-bearing cavalrymen if they divide themselves into smaller troops and attack impetuously in several places; for firearms are rendered useless in that manner and cannot be brought into action.

In their reserves our countrymen not only establish definite ranks but also keep for employment, even among the foremost troops, certain columns which they call “flying.” These sometimes provoke the enemy, sometimes assist

those who are hard pressed, and also fight, if the enemy has formed his battle-line first, until the other battle-line has been formed.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Other Forms of Battle-Lines

§ 1. Almost all outstanding commanders, because they do not fight without a favorable opportunity, have discovered something new in forming a battle-line. Hence wedges, compact bodies, shears, towers, and saws. They call it a wedge when the battle-line is triangular. Vegetius, book 1, chapter 26. The Greeks call it ἔμβολον, “a ram”; in the time of Ammianus it was called the “boar’s head.” Suidas, drawing from Agathias, as translated by Lipsius, says:

“Their form of battle-line was like a beak. For it resembled the letter Δ. The front part, where it ended in a point, was covered and dense, because it was fortified on every side with shields. You might say that they had fashioned a boar’s head by this structure. But the legs on each side, arranged in depth according to ranks and cohorts and extended obliquely for the most part, gradually came together and separated until, having extended to the greatest breadth, they came to an end. Thus the middle space was left empty and the unprotected backs of the soldiers were visible rank by rank.”

The Franks and Romans employed it when they wished to break through a battle-line. But it must be used when a way must necessarily be made, for it is an altogether dangerous thing. Secondly, it must be used only when the enemy’s ranks are sparse; otherwise they will strike against a solid body. Thirdly, it must never be used when fighting against skilled men, for it is easy for them either to oppose a dense battle-line or to open their ranks so as to enclose the wedge in the middle. “Wedge” is sometimes said of the Macedonian phalanx and of another form of battle-line, as Lipsius teaches.

§ 2. The inverted wedge is the *forceps*, or shears; the wedge is received or worn away by this formation. The formation called a tower, and the one called a brick, do not differ from the preceding forms. In it men repeatedly advance and withdraw.

The Polybian legion had one hundred men in its front and thirty-four inward along its side; the *triarii* were half as numerous as the other divisions of the legion. In antiquity a soldier had three feet in every direction, so that he could handle his weapons conveniently, and this was the minimum. Polybius gives this account, but Vegetius speaks otherwise in book 3, chapter 14:

“Individual armed men have customarily occupied three feet each in a straight line. That is, within one thousand paces, one thousand six hundred and sixty-six infantrymen are arranged lengthwise, so that the battle-line does not show daylight through it and yet there is space for handling weapons. But they wished the distance in breadth between one rank and the rank behind it to be six feet, so that the combatants might have space to advance and withdraw; for missiles are cast more violently with a leap and a run.

“In these first two ranks men mature in age, confident from experience, and protected also by heavier arms are stationed. These, like a wall, must be compelled neither to give ground nor to follow another, lest they throw the ranks into disorder; instead they must receive the advancing adversaries and repel or rout them by standing and fighting. The third rank is formed of the swiftest light-armed troops, young archers, and good javelin throwers, whom they formerly called *ferentarii*. The fourth rank likewise is formed of the nimblest shield-bearers, younger archers, and those who fight vigorously with darts and *martiobarbuli*, which they call lead-weighted darts; these were called the light-armed troops.

“One must therefore know that, while the first two ranks remain standing, the third and fourth ranks always go forward first to provoke the enemy with missiles and arrows. If they have been able to turn the enemy to flight, they themselves pursue together with the cavalry. But if they have been repulsed by the enemy, they return to the first and second

battle-lines and are received between them into their own places. The first and second battle-lines sustain the whole war when matters have come, as they say, to swords and javelins.

“In the fifth battle-line were sometimes placed wagon-mounted ballistae, hand-ballista men, staff-slingers, and slingers. Staff-slingers are those who cast stones with staff-slugs. A staff-slug is a staff four feet long, to the middle of which a leather sling is fastened; propelled with both hands, it directs stones almost in the manner of an onager. Slingers are those who, with a sling made of flax or woven hair--for they say these are better--direct stones by whirling an arm around the head. Those who lacked them fought in this rank either with stones cast by hand or with missiles; they called them *accensi*, as being younger and added afterward.

“After all the others, the sixth rank was held by the strongest warriors, bearing shields and fortified with every kind of weapon; the ancients called them *triarii*. These men, so that, rested and fresh, they might attack the enemy more vigorously, customarily sat behind the last battle-lines. For if anything had befallen the first ranks, the entire hope of restoration depended upon their strength.”

And in chapter 15:

“Now that the manner in which battle-lines ought to be formed has been explained, I shall set forth the *podismos*, or measurement, of the formation itself. Within one thousand paces of ground, one battle-line receives one thousand six hundred and sixty-six infantrymen, because individual combatants occupy three feet each. But if you wish to arrange six battle-lines within one thousand paces of ground, nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-six infantrymen are necessary. If, however, you wish to extend this number in three ranks, you will encompass two thousand paces. But it is better to make more battle-lines than to spread out the soldiery.

“We have said, moreover, that six feet in breadth ought to intervene in the rear between the individual battle-lines, and the combatants themselves, standing, occupy one foot each. Accordingly, if you arrange six battle-lines, an army of ten thousand men will occupy forty-two feet in breadth and one thousand paces in length. But if you wish to arrange them in three, an army of ten thousand will occupy twenty-one feet in breadth and two thousand paces in length. According to this calculation, whether there are twenty thousand or thirty thousand infantrymen, they will without any uncertainty or difficulty be able to be arranged according to the measure of the *podismos*. Nor is the commander deceived when he knows how many armed men a place can contain.

“Finally, if the place is narrower, or if the multitude is sufficient, it is fitting for even nine or more battle-lines to be formed from them. For it is more expedient that they fight close together than separated too widely. For if the battle-line has been made too thin, it is swiftly broken through by an assault of the adversaries, and afterward no remedy can exist. Which numbers ought to be arranged on the right wing, which on the left, and which in the middle is either observed by custom according to their ranks, or certainly changed according to the character of the enemy.”

§ 3. The form of the battle-line is now determined according to the advantage of the places and according as the enemy establishes his own. Account is also taken of nations, some of which are more disposed toward certain forms; and therefore, if that form is adopted, they fight more skillfully and confidently. When the front is broad, they wish it to exceed the depth by one third; when the battle-line is deeper than it is broad, they require the same proportion. Nevertheless, I understand that this must be varied if the enemy's battle-line or the situation of the places requires it.

The wings of firearm-bearing cavalry surround the flanks. Light-armed cavalry fights by troops; cuirassiers preserve their ranks more closely. Mendoza compares the battle-line to a human body. He says that firearm-bearers are like the hands and feet; light cavalry, the lower legs and arms; cuirassiers, the hips; legions of infantry, the breast; the commander, the head; and the baggage, the belly. The man who attacks the enemy puts forward his right hand; if he must wrestle, he exerts himself with all his strength at once.

When there are lancers and firearm-bearing cavalrymen, the latter occupy the battle-lines and begin the engagement a little sooner than the lancers; the lancers cast down those whose order has been disturbed. They employ these methods

even in conflicts between few men. Some think that lancers are joined to others disadvantageously because they can effect nothing at a distance. But when joined to cavalrymen carrying long firearms and to infantrymen whom they call musketeers, they are useful. Therefore they must by no means be neglected.

CHAPTER XL

Various Examples of Battle-Lines

§ 1. Crassus formed a square against the Parthians, so that twelve cohorts held each side and a troop of cavalry was attached to each cohort. But he did this in alarm and like a man stunned. For by dividing the cavalry he rendered every part weak, although the Parthians were superior in cavalry.

§ 2. The Triballi in Stobaeus, Discourse 52, make a different disposition. The first part contains the weak, who provoke the enemy to battle; the second, the strongest; the third, cavalymen; the fourth, women.

Xanthippus's battle-line was skillfully contrived. For he commanded the light-armed auxiliaries to provoke the enemy and withdraw; the bravest men then received the enemy, and while the battle took place between them, the auxiliaries were again to break out from the wings.

Cyrus, following Croesus's counsel, advanced into the kingdom of Tomyris, whereas otherwise he would have lost his kingdom. Herodotus, book 1. And there he established a new battle-line by which he also conquered.

§ 3. Those who have chariots and elephants place them in the first battle-line. For they very easily throw the enemy's ranks into disorder, whereas if they are in the middle of the battle-line they crush whatever stands in their way.

§ 4. The battle-line of the Hungarians against the Turks, established by Toroneus, had cavalymen and infantrymen intermingled, so that it could not be surrounded; for he expanded the ranks in such a way that it was equal to a great multitude.

They now approve another method, which is customary. Against the Turks' crescent-shaped battle-line the army must be divided into three parts, so that two fight against the wings while the middle battle-line remains immovable until it comes together with the enemy and fights.

§ 5. Alexander also established another battle-line at Arbela. Frontinus, book 2, chapter 3: "When Alexander at Arbela feared the multitude of the enemy but trusted the valor of his own men, he formed a battle-line facing in every direction, so that, if surrounded, they could fight on every side."

§ 6. Vegetius proposes several kinds in book 3, chapter 20:

"There are seven kinds or manners of fighting when hostile standards clash on each side. The first manner of fighting is with a long front and a squared army, just as battle is customarily conducted even now and almost always. But men skilled in arms do not judge this manner of fighting to be the best, because when the battle-line is extended over a long space, the ground that occurs is not always level; and when a hollow or curve occurs in some part of it, the battle-line is frequently broken in that place. Moreover, if the adversary is superior in number, he surrounds either the right or the left wing from the flanks. In this lies great danger unless you have surplus troops to run forward and sustain the enemy. Only the man who has both more numerous and brave warriors ought to engage by this method, so that he may surround the enemy from each wing and enclose the hostile army, as it were, within his own bosom.

"The second manner of fighting is oblique, and is much better. In it, if you arrange a few vigorous men in a suitable place, even if you are troubled by the enemy's multitude and valor, you will nevertheless be able to carry off victory. Its method is as follows. When the formed battle-lines come to the encounter, you will then separate your left wing farther from the enemy's right, so that neither missiles nor arrows reach it. But join your right wing to his left wing, and there first begin the battle, so that with your best cavalymen and most approved infantrymen you attack and encircle his left part, to which you have joined yourself, and, by thrusting it back and overrunning it, reach the enemy's rear. If you once begin to drive the adversaries from there, as your own men come up you will attain an undoubted

victory, while the part of your army which you have removed from the enemy will remain secure. In this manner of fighting the battle-line is formed in the likeness of the letter A or a carpenter's level. But if the adversary has done this first, you will gather at your left wing those cavalymen as well as infantrymen whom we have said ought to be placed as surplus troops behind the battle-line, and thus you will resist the adversary with great forces, lest you be driven away by his art.

"The third manner of fighting is similar to the second, but is worse in this respect: you begin from your left wing to clash with his right. For the assault of those who fight on the left wing is, as it were, maimed, and men whose bodies are exposed attack the enemy with difficulty. I shall explain this more clearly. If at any time your left wing is much better, join the strongest cavalymen and infantrymen with it, and in the encounter apply it first to the enemy's right wing; and hasten as much as you can to drive back and surround the adversary's right part. But remove the other part of your army, in which you know that you have the worse warriors, as far as possible from his left, lest it either be attacked with swords or reached by missiles. In this kind care must be taken lest your battle-line be struck transversely by the enemy's wedges. Battle will be conducted advantageously in this manner in one case only: if the adversary has a weaker right wing and you a much stronger left.

"The fourth manner of fighting is as follows. When you have formed the battle-line, four or five hundred paces before you reach the enemy, who does not expect it, you ought suddenly to urge forward both your wings, so that from each wing you may unexpectedly turn the enemy to flight and attain victory more quickly. But although this manner of contest swiftly conquers if it brings forward trained and exceedingly brave men, it is nevertheless dangerous, because the man who fights thus is compelled to expose his middle battle-line and separate his army into two parts. If the enemy is not conquered at the first assault, he afterward has an opportunity to attack both the divided wings and the abandoned middle battle-line.

"The fifth manner of fighting is similar to the fourth but has this one thing in addition: it places light-armed troops and archers before the middle battle-line so that, by resisting, they may prevent it from being broken into. For thus it attacks the enemy's left with its own right wing and the enemy's right with its own left. If it can put the enemy to flight, it immediately conquers; if not, its middle battle-line does not suffer because it is defended by the light-armed troops and archers.

"The sixth manner of fighting is the best and almost similar to the second. It is employed by those who despair of both the number and valor of their own men, and, if they have formed their line well, they often attain victory although they have fewer men. For when your formed battle-line approaches the enemy, join your right wing to the enemy's left and there begin the battle by means of the most approved cavalymen and the swiftest infantrymen. But remove the remaining part of your army as far as possible from the adversaries' right part and extend it in a straight line like a spit. For when you begin to cut down their left part both from the flanks and from the rear, you will without doubt turn them to flight. But the adversary cannot assist his struggling men either from his right part or from the middle battle-line, because your battle-line is extended and stretches in its entirety in the likeness of the letter I, and withdraws very far from the enemy. Battle is often joined by this method on marches.

"The seventh manner of fighting is one in which the advantage of the place assists the combatant. In this manner also you will be able to withstand the adversary both with fewer and with less brave men. That is, if on one side you have a mountain, sea, river, lake, city, marshes, or precipices from which the enemy cannot approach, and arrange the rest of your army in a straight battle-line. But on the wing which does not have a fortification you should place all the cavalymen and *ferentarii*. Then you will fight more securely with the enemy at your discretion, because on one side the nature of the place fortifies you, while on the other almost double cavalry is placed.

"Nevertheless, this must be observed, for nothing better is found: whether you wish to fight with the right wing alone, place the bravest men there; or with the left, station the most vigorous there; or if you wish to form wedges in the middle by which you may break the enemy's battle-line, arrange the most experienced warriors in the wedge. For

victory is customarily achieved by a few. It is enough that men selected by the wisest commander be arranged in those places which strategy and advantage require.”

§ 7. The battle-lines of Archelaus and Sulla departed greatly from the common formation. Frontinus, book 2, chapter 3:

“Against Lucius Sulla, Archelaus placed scythed chariots in front to throw the enemy into disorder; in the second battle-line, the Macedonian phalanx; in the third, armed auxiliaries according to the Roman custom, intermingled with deserters of the Italian nation, in whose agility he had the greatest trust; and he stationed the light-armed troops in the last position. Then on each flank he placed cavalry, of which he had a great number, for the purpose of surrounding the enemy.

“Against these measures Sulla drew trenches of great breadth on each flank and fortified their ends with forts. By this method he secured himself from being surrounded by an enemy superior in the number of infantry and especially in cavalry. Then he formed a triple battle-line of infantry, leaving intervals through which he might send the light-armed troops and the cavalry, which he had stationed in the last position, when circumstances demanded it. He then commanded the soldiers before the standards, who were in the second battle-line, to drive thick, numerous stakes firmly into the ground. As the chariots approached, he withdrew his battle-line within the stakes and behind the standards. Then at last, after a universal shout had been raised, he ordered the *velites* and light-armed troops to shower missiles upon them.

“When these things had been done, the enemy’s chariots either became entangled in the stakes or, terrified by the shouting and missiles, turned against their own men and threw the Macedonian formation into disorder. When it gave ground while Sulla stood firm, and Archelaus opposed his cavalry, the Roman cavalrymen, suddenly sent forward, turned them away and completed the victory.”

CHAPTER XLI

Military Exhortation and the Responses of an Army

§ 1. A dismayed army is impelled to fight either by shame or by fear. By shame, as when the commander casts a standard among the enemy. Servius Tullius did this as a young man under Tarquin; Furius Agrippa, Titus Quinctius Capitolinus, Marcus Furius Camillus, and Salvius Pelnus imitated him. Or it occurs when the commander flies forward into the first battle-line. Thus Lucius Sulla, when the legions were giving way before the army of Mithridates, darted into the first battle-line with his sword drawn and told the soldiers that, if anyone asked where they had left their commander, they should answer, “In Boeotia.” Julius Caesar also sprang forward on foot into the first battle-line at Munda, and thus the soldiers conquered while they were ashamed to desert him.

Quintus Furius restrained men fleeing through fear by threatening that he would receive no one into the camp unless he was victorious. Scipio at Numantia threatened that those who fled would become enemies to him. Marcus Atilius and Philip of Macedon did the same. Priscus the dictator and Cornelius Cossus killed a standard-bearer who hesitated.

§ 2. A brief exhortation in a crisis is effective. Iphicrates promised victory if, when he gave the signal, they would advance one step; he gave it when the situation was inclining toward defeat and conquered. Epaminondas too employed the same kind of exhortation. When Alexander saw his men giving way, he said, “Once more, Macedonian men, let us advance once more”; and thus they drove back the enemy. Therefore, when the battle-line gives way, restrain those retreating; if they return, they have conquered. Caesar indeed:

He himself puts swords into their hands and supplies their missiles;

he himself moves forward the battle-lines and drives the backs of his men,

and with the butt of his reversed spear rouses those who cease and hold back.

§ 3. There is greater danger when an army is afraid. In such a situation it must be aroused by some remarkable confidence, and this generally can be accomplished in no other way than for the soldiers to think that there is a hidden reinforcement and a stratagem. Fulvius Nobilior gave courage to his men, who were about to fight the victorious Samnites, by saying that one enemy legion had been corrupted by him with money for the purpose of betrayal; and he commanded the tribunes, centurions, and chief centurions to contribute whatever gold and silver they had for the immediate payment of the reward to the traitors. Hence came eagerness and victory.

Therefore one must exhort not only openly--which is sometimes the act of a man who lacks confidence--but through hidden channels, so that courage may increase. When Lucullus saw the army of Tigranes from elevated ground, he said, “We have conquered, soldiers; we have conquered.” He pierced the legs and thighs of the cuirassiers with swords; they cut apart their spear shafts with swords.

§ 4. It is useful to arouse emulation. Against Ariovistus Caesar said that he would fight with the Tenth Legion. It gave him thanks for his judgment, and the others were inflamed by shame for battle.

§ 5. Marcus Fabius and Gnaeus Manlius inflamed soldiers who refused battle because of mutinies by delaying, since they could not endure the enemy’s insults. Lucius Sulla wearied his soldiers with works until they demanded battle; thus labor served in place of exhortation. When the Lacedaemonian soldiers had deposited their most precious possessions at Orchomenus, Agesilaus ordered the townsmen not to receive anything, so that the army might fight more ardently for its own property. Here avarice drove it into battle.

Sometimes terror is struck into the enemy and courage struck out of him by a single utterance. When the Ionians were wavering, Leotychidas spread the report that the Persians had been defeated at Plataea; by this means he animated them.

When Pan, the commander of Bacchus, learned that a hollow mountain was nearby, he ordered a shout to be raised by night; doubled by the echo, it struck terror into the enemy. When Aristomenes saw the triremes intermingled and the battle undecided, he ordered his soldiers to shout, "Permit them to flee." The enemy, truly thinking that their own men were fleeing, fled themselves as well.

§ 6. It was customary in antiquity to exhort men to battle by setting forth the enemy's arrogance and injustice. Thus, when the Carthaginian envoys brought most unjust conditions, Fabius filled the army with indignation. Epaminondas declared that the Lacedaemonians had resolved, if they conquered, to kill everyone of the male sex, to carry off wives and children into slavery, and to destroy Thebes. So great was the ardor of the combatants that they routed their adversaries at the first assault.

By now there is too much experience of this imposture, whereby, in order to move subjects against their princes, men invent everything done and not done. But such things are of use among the inexperienced, and if matters are properly arranged, the whole thing will become an object of ridicule. For what is easier than to expose the emptiest falsehoods? The same Frontinus in book 1, chapter 12, has examples of many men who exposed them all.

It easily falls back upon its authors, moreover, if they have soldiers subject to superstition. When Caesar knew that the Germans had a law against fighting during the waning moon, he defeated them in battle when they were hindered by religious scruple.

Although impostures must never be employed, they nevertheless have sometimes raised the foolish spirits of soldiers. Thus Archidamus secretly established and adorned an altar by night and led horses around it, so that Castor and Pollux might be thought to have been present.

Epaminondas by night arranged through an artisan that the statue of Pallas should hold in its hand the shield that at first had been placed before its feet. The Boeotians, born in dense air, thought that the goddess had taken up her shield and would be their protectress, and fought bravely. He also brought forward the prophet of Trophonius. Alexander likewise abused the superstition of his men. For he inscribed upon the diviner's hand letters that foretold victory; when the diviner held the entrails, the marks were imprinted upon them. Attalus did this still more carefully against the Gauls. Polyainos, book 4.

CHAPTER XLII

The Ancient Battle-Line Cannot Be Preserved in Our Time

§ 1. Machiavelli would wish it to be restored, but with no advantage to the state and with immense harm to the military. He thinks rightly in this: he judges that armies must be arranged so that all are not endangered by the fear or flight of a few. But in pressing the ancient Roman custom he acts beside the point. For the method of fighting which we now employ is much better and much firmer.

The first principle of the Roman battle-line was that exhausted or defeated *velites* withdrew into the ranks of the *hastati*, and the latter into the intervals of the *principes*. But such a withdrawal is not now approved; instead, one body after another is sent into the place of those who are weary. The Romans would have acted much more prudently if they had established matters so that, if they saw the *hastati* being hard pressed, they sent the *principes* to them, and the *triarii* to these.

For when Machiavelli thinks that disorder and the disruption of ranks would arise from the forward movement of those who occupy the second and third battle-lines, he does not sufficiently consider that graver disorder of the ranks arises from the withdrawal and virtual flight of men who give way or have been repulsed than from the forward movement of men who fight and bring aid. For those who are about to fight possess more reason and courage than those who are fleeing; the former advance forward, while the fleeing move backward. Indeed, to raise courage and sharpen boldness it is more effective to aid a man who stands and fights than one who gives way. Confidence is also taken from the enemy by our manner of fighting but increased by the order of the ancients; for he presses more fiercely upon men who give way but fears the man who stands.

§ 2. Furthermore, it must be observed that the nature of our artillery requires a different order of battle-line. For the guns must be brought before the battle-line and disposed with great care; they too must be avoided. This at least is certain: if skill is applied in aiming the artillery, victory is easy. I shall speak of this in its own place; for now it is sufficient if it is understood that the ancient battle-line cannot be established.

For the bravest soldiers now employ firearms, especially those they call muskets, and men rarely fight at close quarters unless one side is fleeing. Accordingly, missile troops are now the chief men and the body of the battle-line. It is prior in nature, moreover, that battle should be fought at a distance rather than at close quarters. Here the guns and muskets, which are the heaviest arms, are discharged at the beginning.

§ 3. In antiquity men sometimes evaded arrows by a swift forward rush. This cannot now be done, for firearms are not impeded by shields and breastplates.

Ventidius did not lead out his army against the Parthians before they were five hundred paces away; by a sudden forward rush he eluded the arrows and defeated the barbarians through the appearance of confidence. To attempt this now is the act of an insane man.

§ 4. Now the employment of artillery on the flanks requires another battle-line. When it is feared that the enemy may surround the battle-line, the fronts must be extended and artillery placed upon the flanks; during the fighting, however, they must be drawn in, and unexpected missiles discharged. In antiquity the cavalry was spread out; now it is held together and sent forward with the utmost caution.

CHAPTER XLIII

General Precepts for Forming a Battle-Line and Fighting a Battle

§ 1. One must not readily fight unless necessity compels it or you see that you have victory in your hands. An army eager to fight but unequal to the enemy must be restrained by a gentle method, so that its spirit may remain brave and eager and yet entrust itself to the commander's prudence. Sertorius taught the barbarous Lusitanians by an example that the Romans must not be conquered all at once but worn down in parts. Then, when he saw that they were going to fight with disastrous loss, he sent a troop of cavalry to provoke the enemy, sent assistance to it when it was hard pressed, and brought them all back. He thus showed what the outcome of the battle would have been if they had tried fortune with all their standards brought together.

§ 2. Battle must not readily be joined. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 9: "Therefore all things must be considered beforehand, attempted beforehand, and done beforehand, before the final extremity is reached. For good commanders always seek to conduct battle not by open combat, in which the danger is common, but from concealment, so that, while preserving their own men intact, they may kill as many enemies as they can, or at least terrify them. In this part I shall relate what extremely necessary measures were discovered by the ancients."

Paulus Aemilius said that an exceedingly good commander very rarely fought with standards brought together unless the highest necessity or the greatest opportunity had been given to him.

§ 3. Therefore he is a great commander who can endure taunts and the name of delayer with an even mind, lest he fight before the proper time or outside his own place and time. Fabius could endure it; Pompey could not. Accordingly, Fabius fought at the urging of others, and Pompey to his own hurt; for a colleague drew Fabius on, while the inexperienced bent Pompey. Against them all Pericles stood unconquered. When Pericles, unequal to the enemy but called to battle even with abuse by his own men, who were eager to fight, answered that felled trees very easily grow again but slain men are restored with the greatest difficulty. Plutarch, *Pericles*.

§ 4. The plan of Gnaeus Sulpicius the dictator was sound, when, as Livy says in book 7, he "protracted the war, being unwilling to commit himself to fortune against an enemy whom time and the foreignness of the place were making worse day by day."

What Machiavelli thinks--namely, that if the enemy wishes absolutely to enter battle, it cannot be avoided--is true. But if he wishes this, the prudent commander will enter battle to his own advantage and with certain victory. For just as a man who has fallen headlong into an absolute desire to buy and eagerly desires to buy another's farm is compelled to buy it for whatever price the seller names, so the man who rashly hastens into battle is compelled to accept the time and place according to the other's will. But it is dangerous to accept from the enemy the conditions for fighting.

Charles V was unwilling to fight the Germans because he did not doubt that their army would soon be dispersed. For he saw that within the league the cities which supplied its sinews were despised and complained with justice; he therefore thought that they would depart from the league, as they did.

§ 5. The necessity of fighting presses if one must yield a place while the enemy is near. For a man who is compelled to depart after removing the baggage scarcely escapes without battle if the enemy follows. For the enemy follows and, by occupying places advantageous to himself, will compel him to fight at a disadvantage.

One must fight when provisions or pay appear likely to fail, and much more if the enemy lays waste to the countryside. At other times, when necessary for safety, it is not dishonorable to defend the walls and not advance into the battle-line. When the Thebans besieged Sparta, all were eager to go out to fight, but Agesilaus delayed because he said that the Athenians also had once been confined within their city by the Lacedaemonians.

§ 6. Nor shall I condemn a commander if he withdraws for a time. For if a stratagematic flight which is soon turned against a careless enemy is praiseworthy, why is not one which lasts for weeks or months also praiseworthy? When Metellus saw that the enemy was eager, he led his army back. Agesilaus likewise, when he saw the order and forces of the Athenians to be such that he could not conquer, withdrew. Polyainos, book 2.

Contempt must not be feared but loved. For whoever despises the enemy is unprepared for battle. An eagerness to fight must be nourished in the soldier; foresight for victory belongs to the commander.

Nor must one readily undertake war against practiced men. When Croesus was contemplating wars against the islanders, Bias dissuaded him by saying that the islanders were preparing a great number of horses against him. Croesus laughed and said, "Would that I might catch them on the mainland." Then Bias replied, "And they desire to catch Croesus at sea." For a naval battle was as difficult for Croesus as a land battle for the islanders.

§ 7. One must not fight if there is a danger of losing a kingdom. The duke of Alba was unwilling to fight Guise in the kingdom of Naples, for the French, if defeated, would have lost only their army, while the Spaniards would have lost a kingdom.

§ 8. Nevertheless, I would sometimes advise battle if the enemy has an army of recruits, which becomes better through experience, while you have one of veterans; likewise, if the enemy is afraid.

Let the weaker man terrify; let the stronger render the enemy careless. It is a part of victory for the enemy to be terrified. The man who fears lives only by half. The suspicion of danger contributes as much to victory as danger itself.

A lion is terrified by the noise of wheels, the crowing of a cock, and fire. The enemy flees if you cast before him a mask of fear.

The man who has a veteran and victorious army, as did Hannibal and Caesar, can readily advance to battle. But lest he introduce vigilance into the enemy, it belongs to a commander to wish to appear afraid; it belongs to a Thraso to wish to be feared. Accordingly, an equal will never fight with an equal except to his own advantage. But the fear which makes the enemy cautious must be removed, while that which makes him flee must be struck into him.

CHAPTER XLIV

The Enemy Must Not Be Awaited at Home but Harassed in His Own Country

§ 1. If war has been altogether resolved upon and one's forces are thought equal or greater, it is not prudent to keep the army in pacified territory; it must immediately be led against the enemy. For those who fight abroad possess many advantages.

Great courage and confidence in one's forces are formidable in the man who attacks voluntarily.

Secondly, it contributes greatly to the reputation and authority necessary to those who wage war that you possess so much power that you can not only defend your own possessions but also lay claim to another's.

Thirdly, you can thus transfer your own dangers to the enemy. For if war is waged at home, the enemy is received within one's innermost parts; everything is driven off, carried away, and burned; a friendly and a hostile soldier are equally burdensome. Hence arise dejected spirits, complaints, mutinies, and disturbances, all of which are transferred to the enemy when the soldier is carried across into his country.

Hence we see that the Roman people, while struggling at home, nevertheless did not neglect the Spains but transferred the terror of war into Africa; and in this manner at last they recalled rather than drove Hannibal from Italy. Nor is it doubtful that, if the Romans had abandoned the Spains, they could not have defended their own Italy. For the Carthaginians, having attained undisturbed possession of the Spains, could easily have defeated the Romans by the forces and resources of that nation.

§ 2. Battle must not be permitted to a veteran army that is afraid, because it sees itself to be inferior for a certain reason. Whether it is timid or eager the soldiers themselves will declare, even unwillingly. Pallor and trembling betray the man who is afraid. They expressed approval by assent if they raised their hands, gave a shout, and struck their shields against their knees. Lucan, book 1:

At once all the cohorts assented to these things

and, raising their hands high, promised whatever wars he called them to;

so great a shout goes to the heavens.

Ammianus indicates the differences between their expressions: "After these words had been finished no one remained silent, but all the soldiers, striking their shields against their knees with a dreadful crash--which is a full indication of prosperity, for, on the contrary, when shields are struck with spears, it is evidence of anger and grief--approved with immense joy, except for a few, the judgment of Augustus."

CHAPTER XLV

It Does Not Belong to a Good Commander to Impose the Necessity of Fighting

Among the other precepts for destroying a state, Machiavelli in book 3, chapter 12, also thinks that a necessity of fighting must be imposed. These are his words:

“We have shown elsewhere how useful Necessity is for bringing human actions to completion, and at the same time we have demonstrated that men compelled by necessity have often performed deeds by which they were raised to singular glory. The moral philosophers also declared that the tongue and the hands, although in themselves they are most noble instruments, would nevertheless never have been able to advance and bring human affairs to the perfection and dignity in which they now stand unless some necessity had compelled them.

“Because this matter was not unknown to ancient commanders, and they readily understood that the spirits of soldiers compelled by necessity become brave and obstinate in fighting, they strove especially to impose upon their own men a necessity for battle by seizing any opportunity, but deliberately to remove that same necessity from the enemy. For this purpose they very often opened to the enemy a passage through routes which could easily have been guarded and closed to their own men a route which they could easily have opened.

“Therefore, whoever desires either to make the citizens of some city brave, bold, and obstinate in its defense, or to render another army brave and persistent in fighting in battle, ought to strive with the greatest effort to impose upon them the necessity of this thing, or at least to persuade their minds that such a necessity presses upon them.”

This is evil and dangerous teaching. To impose upon oneself the necessity of encountering the utmost danger is not the act of a prudent or a good man. But those who did this either were rash or were already pressed by necessity; they did not cast themselves into a new necessity but displayed the one into which they had been cast. For who is so senseless as to reduce himself to such a condition that he is compelled to conduct the matter according to the enemy’s will and judgment? The man who is compelled to battle is already in the enemy’s power.

Who can approve Julian’s rashness in a foolish plan harmful to himself and the entire empire, when he burned his ships so that the soldier, as a captive, might fight more bravely? Ammianus immediately says in book 23: “After crossing, he commanded that the bridge be torn away, so that none of the soldiers might retain confidence of returning from his own column.”

And afterward: “Leaving the river on his left, with ill-fated guides going before him, he resolved to take the inland roads at a swift pace. And as though the deadly torch of Bellona had been applied, he ordered all the ships to be burned with fire except twelve smaller ones, which he arranged to be carried on wagons because they would be useful for constructing bridges. He thought that he had ordered this advantageously, lest the fleet left behind be of use to the enemy, or lest, just as had certainly been done from the beginning of the expedition, almost twenty thousand armed men be occupied in hauling and steering the same ships.

“Then, when every man, fearing for himself, murmured, and manifest truth showed that the soldiery, if perhaps repulsed by the aridity or height of the mountains, would not be able to return to the waters, and deserters under torture openly confessed that they had deceived them, it was ordered, with the greatest rush, that the flames be extinguished. And because the fire, having increased enormously, consumed most of them, only twelve could be preserved untouched; these were separated so that they might be guarded.”

The army itself blamed these actions and Julian as well, for sadness entered everyone in place of courage.

No prudent man therefore casts himself into this danger. Instead, each man must act so that he can fight to his own advantage.

How much more prudently did Hannibal act when he feared Marcellus. He did not cast himself into an absolute necessity in which, if defeated, nothing but death remained; instead, he so arranged his battle-line that he could have a retreat into fortified places.

I add this also: you have been defeated if a cunning enemy thinks you have been placed under a necessity of fighting. For if he wishes to fight only to his own advantage, he has without doubt conquered.

CHAPTER XLVI

Stratagems of Those Conducting a Siege

§1. Speed has the greatest importance for taking cities, for the besieged cannot prepare what is necessary, and they do everything in alarm. Cato secretly completed a journey of four days in two days and took a strong town in Spain. No city, when unexpectedly besieged, long sustains force, because something necessary must inevitably be lacking. None is so weak that it is defeated without difficulty if it foresaw its fate, prepared its forces, and resolved steadfastly to resist. Yet, even when thus prepared, they can never be secure.

§2. The Lucensians were certainly deceived all too easily by Domitius Calvinus. For, when he repeatedly went around the walls with his army without attacking, they thought that he did this for the sake of exercise; and when they took no precautions, he suddenly occupied the fortifications. A commander, therefore, will always do something by which he may lead them into error; and even if they do not believe it, they will nevertheless entertain various suspicions.

§3. Hannibal captured cities by sending many men ahead in Roman dress who knew Latin. Antiochus brought the fortress of Suenda into his power in this way: after the foragers had been killed, he dressed his own soldiers in their clothes and sent them back with the grain. Thymarchus the Aetolian, using the cloak and cap of the slain Chamardes, was admitted in his place into the harbor of the Samians. The Arcadians were besieging a fortress of the Messenians; when they heard that other reinforcements were coming, they assumed arms and dress like theirs and, once admitted, occupied everything.

If you set fire to something nearby and the citizens pour out to extinguish it, the city can be taken amid that alarm. Thus Cimon the Athenian occupied a city in Caria after setting fire to a place and to a temple of Diana. Provision is therefore now made for one part to run to fires and another to arms.

It was already customary in ancient times to send soldiers into a city in another's dress. When women were wandering around a city in Arcadia on a festival day, Epaminondas mixed his soldiers among them in women's clothing; admitted into the city as night approached, they occupied the gates and opened them to their own men.

They are also accustomed to take cities by sending soldiers in the dress of merchants. Aristippus the Spartan took Tegea in this way, sending pack animals with sacks of grain.

The Thebans occupied the harbor of the Sicyonians by enclosing soldiers in a ship while merchandise lay above the decks.

Mainius took Dieppe through pretended deserters. Alençon, pretending to depart, returned and almost occupied Antwerp when one of the servants cried out that he had broken his leg and the horsemen and infantry halted; but at last he was repulsed by the strength of the citizens and withdrew. He undertook so great an enterprise too hastily.

Ranzovius relates in book 4, chapter 2, that a city was even set on fire by domestic birds by Hadding. Indeed, a city can be taken by a stratagem of this kind: if birds which are familiar and domestic to the besieged city, and nest in its houses, are caught by fowlers, and lighted pieces of tinder are fastened to their feet and feathers, and they are then released, these birds, returning to their customary lodgings in the houses, will set the city on fire everywhere. The fire, moreover, will not only bring enormous destruction upon the city, but will also compel the townsmen, running together from every quarter to extinguish the fire, to leave their posts for defending their walls and gates; and these, then deprived of their defenders, can be stormed. By this device Hadding, son of Gram, king of Denmark, stormed the city of Duna. For, when he was unable to gain possession of it because of its very high ramparts and walls, he had birds of different kinds, accustomed to dwellings in that place, caught by men skilled in fowling, and caused pieces of tinder kindled with fire to be fastened to their feathers. Returning to their nests, they filled the city with fire. While the

townsmen ran together to extinguish it, Hadding stormed the gates, which were empty of defenders, and thereby took the whole city.

A commander may certainly imitate, when occasion permits, those things which are done without perfidy and perjury. But to proceed by frauds and perjuries is impious and detestable. And yet examples of this kind are more numerous than examples of a just stratagem.

Milo betrayed Tarentum after bargaining for his safety; Sosistratus betrayed Syracuse to Marcellus; Tarquinius, Gabii to his father; Eoneus, Tarentum to Hannibal; Mandro the pirate, Ephesus to Lysimachus; Zopyrus, Babylon to Cyrus. The histories of the gentiles contain innumerable examples.

The best-fortified cities have been compelled by hunger to surrender, and hunger has been increased by stratagem. Fabius withdrew from Campania at sowing-time, so that they would expend more grain upon the sowing; then, returning, he trampled down what had been sown. Antigonus likewise afflicted the Athenians in this manner. Others permitted many persons to take refuge in the cities under siege, so that the grain would be consumed more quickly. Thus Alexander took Leucadia.

By an evil deception, under the appearance of peace, Dionysius subdued the people of Rhegium and of Himera by hunger. For, after making a treaty and granting peace, he required them to furnish what was necessary for his army; when their grain had been exhausted, he compelled them to surrender.

Phalaris took certain fortified places by a more ingenious wickedness. For, after feigning the establishment of peace, he placed his own grain among them as a pledge and assurance of his friendship, and thereby brought it about that the townsmen consumed or sold their own grain. The tyrant, however, had deliberately ordered the roof-vaults to be opened so that his grain would spoil. Therefore, at the beginning of summer he besieged them and soon took them.

Nothing disturbs cities as much as the fear of a long siege. For ordinarily no spirit for defense remains unless they hope that the enemy will depart shortly or that assistance will come. Hence Clearchus the Spartan, knowing that the Thracians sustained themselves with the hope that food for the besiegers would run short, ordered a captive to be killed in the sight of their ambassadors and his flesh to be distributed among the soldiers' quarters as though for food. Terrified by this, they surrendered themselves.

When towns are held by a stronger garrison than can be overcome, one must act so that they withdraw it, and this can be effected in various ways. First, if you depart while feigning fear and despair, as Scipio brought cities in Africa into his power through Masinissa and the Numidians. For citizens, although they scarcely admit a garrison in the utmost danger, desire, once they have passed through the crisis, to be relieved of it.

Next, if many allies defend one city, should an army lay waste their fields or carry terror against them, they will presently disperse to defend their own possessions. In this way Scipio occupied Delminium. For, by pretending to despair of taking that town and to be preparing himself for other enterprises, he caused all who were defending it by common agreement to be summoned away, and he himself entered the city when it was empty of defenders. By the same device Pyrrhus took the capital of the Illyrians, and Rufinus took Croton, except that the latter also employed the perjury of a deserter.

When Fabius Maximus was about to fight the Etruscans, Umbrians, Samnites, and Gauls, he ordered Fulvius and Postumius to go against Sutrium; in this way he called the Umbrians and Etruscans away to defend their own possessions.

§4. Concord among those conducting a siege must be maintained, and suspicions must be avoided.

Domenico Michiel, doge of the Venetians, when he was under suspicion during the siege of Tyre, sent the planks of the ships' hulls to Warmund in the camp in order to show that he was not thinking about sailing away.

§5. It is also an ingenious device to bring one's own reinforcement in as though it belonged to the enemy. When Iphicrates understood that a Spartan garrison was to be brought into Corinth by night, he waited at the gates and entered with the last of them, and killed them.

§6. If a city is being besieged in vain, one must withdraw with the utmost caution.

When Philip was besieging Carrhae in vain and could not easily withdraw his artillery, he ordered it to be taken apart, but with the same sound with which it was usually assembled. The people of Carrhae, supposing that their walls were to be battered more fiercely, were fortifying them while he meanwhile departed.

§7. It is a harsh necessity when one's own villages and towns are burned lest they assist the enemy. This was customary among the Persians. Vercingetorix so thoroughly persuaded the Bituriges of this course in Caesar, book 7, that more than twenty towns were burned in one day. The same is found in Ammianus, book 24.

§8. Nor is the complaint less when the infirm are sent away; yet at times this is done necessarily. The Gauls do this: they order those feeble in health and age to depart. Caesar, book 7, and likewise book 8. At the same time they send away all the baggage.

§9. A shortage of water has compelled invincible cities in many places to surrender. Thus Bethulia came into the utmost danger and was saved by the prudent piety of one woman.

Scipio dug wells in the Spanish war, as Appian relates, but salt water was frequently found. Vitruvius, book 8, chapter 1, and Cassiodorus, book 3, teach how to find water.

It is a wretched practice, yet a customary one, to distribute water by measure. Josephus did this in book 3 of *The Jewish War*.

§10. Fortifications are the chief defense. They make walls not straight but angular. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 2:

"The ancients did not wish the circuit of a wall to be carried in a straight line, lest it be exposed to the blows of rams; but after laying the foundations, they enclosed cities with winding bends and erected more numerous towers at the very angles for this reason: because, if anyone wished to apply either ladders or machines to a wall constructed according to such an arrangement, he is overwhelmed not only from the front but also from the sides and almost from the rear, being enclosed as though within a curve."

Now they construct projecting fortifications and bastions, and separate them by a longer interval, because the artillery more easily reaches those who wish to occupy the intervening spaces.

In former times many fortifications were unconquerable; now scarcely any are. A fortification consists of nature, art, or both. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 1:

"Cities and fortresses are fortified either by nature or by hand, or by both, which is deemed stronger. By nature they are fortified either by an elevated or precipitous position, by the sea or marshes flowing around them, or by rivers; by hand, by ditches and walls. In that natural advantage, the very safe judgment of the person selecting the site is required; on level ground, the skill of the founder is sought. We see that the most ancient cities were established in open plains in such a way that, although the aid of favorable locations was lacking, they were nevertheless rendered unconquerable by art and labor."

In the siege of cities this is generally observed: all approaches and exits are closed, and the strength of the camp is of chief importance; for in this way they can sometimes shut in a great multitude with a smaller body of soldiers.

They are accustomed to approach the walls through trenches, because no arms can resist the enemy if artillery thunders against those approaching.

When the walls are battered, they do this continually, so that in one day they may cast down more than can be repaired in two days. They sometimes also discharge missiles at night, so as to impede those making repairs.

When a city is being attacked, all stand in order, so that, if some are driven back, fresh men may promptly succeed them. When the signal to attack has been given, the ruins of the demolished wall are battered with the smaller pieces of artillery until hand-to-hand fighting has begun; and because only a few can fight at one time, if the garrison is courageous it is scarcely possible to take the city unless they prevail through the exhaustion of the besieged.

As for fire-darts, they are nothing if compared with fiery cannonballs. In the game of chess, however it is begun, it is never concluded in the same manner. So too it happens in war and in a siege.

§11. Many towns are taken by fear alone. Philip ordered earth to be carried to a mound against the fortress of Trinassus; its defenders, supposing themselves to have been undermined by tunnels, gave themselves up.

Pelopidas the Theban, while besieging two towns of the Magnesians, ordered horsemen wearing wreaths to come from one of them in the dress of captives and to affirm that the other had been taken. Consequently the one which was being besieged surrendered itself through false fear, and the other through true fear.

A siege is also raised by fear alone. When Cato could neither send assistance to the Vergetes nor wished to refuse it, he ordered a third part of his soldiers to board ships, to plead the wind as an excuse, and to return; the mere report of assistance liberated his allies. Tynnichus liberated the city of Theodosia by the sound of trumpets, when the enemy believed that a great fleet was arriving.

§12. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 24, shows the great use of tunnels:

“Another kind of attack is subterranean and secret, which they call a tunnel, from the hares which dig caverns beneath the earth and are hidden there. Accordingly, a multitude of men is employed after the fashion of mines in which the skill of the Bessi searches for veins of gold and silver; the earth is dug with great labor and, after a cavern has been hollowed out for the destruction of the city, a path below ground is sought. This fraud operates by a twofold ambush. For either the tunnel penetrates the city, and at night, without the townsmen perceiving it, men emerge through it, open the gates, lead in the column of their own men, and kill the enemy unawares in their very houses; or else, when they have reached the foundations of the walls, they undermine a very great part of them and, after setting dry timbers beneath them, temporarily support the impending fall of the wall by this work. On top they add bundles of brushwood and other kindling for the flames. Then, when the fighting men have been made ready, fire is put underneath; and, once the wooden columns and floors have burned, the wall suddenly collapses and an entrance is opened for an assault.”

The Gauls were most skilled in tunnels because there are workings of copper mines among them. Caesar, book 3.

Alexander took Gaza through tunnels; the Romans likewise attacked Fidenae and Veii. Tunnels were made so that they might secretly reach the interior. Thus men went from the camp into the citadel of Fidenae. Livy, book 4. The tunnels driven toward Veii required great labor. Livy, book 5:

“Then the army was led to Veii and forts were constructed at closer intervals. By an edict that no one should fight without orders, the soldiers were transferred from the sallies--which were numerous and conducted rashly between the wall and the rampart--to the work. By far the greatest and most laborious of all the works was the tunnel begun toward the enemy citadel. Lest the work be interrupted, or continuous labor underground wear out the same men, he divided the number of workers into six divisions; six hours in rotation were allotted to the work by night and by day, and it was never abandoned before they made a way into the citadel.”

This is generally observed: when the tunnelers are about to break out, they display threats elsewhere, so that those intent upon empty dangers may not perceive the true ones.

Sometimes they undermined the wall alone and supported it with beams; when these had been burned, the fortifications fell. In our age, walls, towers, and bastions that have been undermined are hurled high into the air.

Sometimes they pretend to make tunnels when these cannot be completed. Charles of Naples deceived the garrison of the fortress of Matrone. For, after pretending that he was driving tunnels, he took care that rubble be brought from elsewhere and thrown down in their sight. Supposing it to have come from the foundations of the wall, they surrendered themselves. Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 4.

§13. Tunnels are rendered useless by opposing trenches. Sometimes they keep the soldiers away with stones and burning pitch. Caesar, book 7 of *The Gallic War*. During the siege of Apollonia, Trypho of Alexandria discovered where the enemy were about to enter by suspending bronze vessels, for these sound at the blows of those digging; he then killed them with water and heated dung. The people of Themiscyra sent bears and swarms of bees into the tunnels. To have discovered a tunnel, however, is to have conquered it. A bronze vessel sounds if you dig underneath it; in this way a bronze-worker detected a tunnel in the siege of Barca. Our basins and drums sufficiently indicate such places if peas are placed upon them.

§14. The diversion of rivers to other places is akin to tunnels. By diverting the Euphrates Alexander took Babylon, as Semiramis had done before him and as others relate of Cyrus. Lest the enemy perceive what was being done, Alexander constructed a mound, for which the Babylonians believed the earth was being carried out.

Publius Servilius compelled Isaura to surrender by diverting its river. Caesar compelled a city of the Cadurci to do so by drying up its spring through tunnels and denying access to the river by means of archers.

Cleisthenes acted more wickedly. For, after cutting off the watercourse of the Crisaeans, he restored it to them when they were afflicted by thirst, but poisoned the water with hellebore and killed them through looseness of the bowels.

§15. Other cities have been taken by fires and by smoke spread around them. The Turk took Famagusta. They heaped up and kindled a great pile of pine-torches, which burns very readily and exhales a deadly and foul smoke; bundles and timbers were added, and while it burned for four days and could not be extinguished, they meanwhile drove tunnels and compelled the defenders to accept terms.

§16. The Alexandrians entered the tunnels which Frederick had dug and killed his soldiers. Others dig wells to oppose tunnels.

CHAPTER XLVII

Stratagems of the Besieged

§1. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 7, enumerates two kinds of siege:

“There are,” he says, “many kinds of defenses and attacks, which we shall insert in their appropriate places. At present it must be known that there are two kinds of siege. One is when the adversary, after arranging garrisons in advantageous places, attacks the besieged with continual assaults. The other is when he either prevents those enclosed from obtaining water, or expects their surrender from hunger after he has barred every supply-route. For by this plan he himself, idle and safe, wears out the enemy. Against these eventualities the possessors, even if alarmed by only a slight suspicion, ought most diligently to gather every supply of food within the walls, so that substance may abound for them while scarcity compels their adversaries to depart.

“Not only pork, but also every kind of animal which cannot be kept alive while enclosed ought to be allocated for salting, so that grain may suffice with the assistance of meat. Farmyard birds, however, are nourished in cities without expense and are necessary for the sick. Fodder must especially be gathered for horses; and what cannot be carried in must be burned. Supplies of wine, vinegar, other produce, and fruits must be gathered, and nothing that may be of use must be left to the enemy. For consideration of both utility and pleasure urges that the cultivation of gardens be practiced in the pleasure-grounds or courtyards of houses.

“Yet it profits little to have collected a very great quantity unless, from the beginning, its distribution is moderated by suitable stewards according to a wholesome measure. Those who began to preserve frugality amid abundance have never been endangered by hunger. An age and sex unfit for war have also frequently been shut outside the gates because of the necessity of subsistence, lest scarcity oppress the armed men by whom the walls were being defended.”

Speed also is useful for everything. Because in cities, however strong they may be, there are usually more inhabitants than are occupied on watch, they must leave no stone unturned, construct great new works, and prepare everything. Let no age and no sex be exempted from labor.

In the Epirote war the Spartan women refused to depart from their men, but said that it was honorable for Spartan women to live or die with their men. Accordingly, they dug trenches, tended the wounded, and furnished every service to those fighting.

§2. When a city is being attacked, the first assaults must be resisted, for in this way courage readily increases in the besieged. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 12.

The besieged now have need of many things: gunpowder and the other things pertaining to artillery, of which I have spoken elsewhere.

§3. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 8, advises what must be prepared by the besieged:

“It is fitting to prepare bitumen, sulfur, liquid pitch, and the oil which they call incendiary, in order to burn the enemy’s machines. Iron of both tempers and charcoal are stored in repositories for making weapons. Wood needed for spear-shafts and arrows is likewise laid away. Round stones from rivers, because they are heavier on account of their solidity and more suitable for those casting them, are most diligently collected; with these the walls and towers are filled. The smallest are to be cast by slings or staff-slings or by hand. The larger are directed by onagers. The largest, however, of weight and a rolling shape, are arranged on the battlements so that, when released down a slope, they may not only crush those coming up but also shatter their machinery.

“Very large wheels are also fashioned from green wood; or sections cut from the strongest trees--called rollers--are smoothed so that they may roll. Rolling down an incline with sudden force, these strike down fighting men and are accustomed to terrify horses. Beams also, floorboards, and iron nails of different sizes ought to be ready at hand. For it is customary to oppose the machines of those attacking by means of other machines, especially when height must be added to the walls or bastions by sudden works, lest the adversaries’ movable towers rise above them and take the city.”

§4. Cities can be saved especially by opportune sallies. Since these cannot be made with equal forces, they must be assisted by art; for the besieged are generally inferior either in number or in strength. Therefore, when they are about to make a sally, they must act so that they appear least likely to do so. When the Romans held Palermo, they displayed only a few defenders upon the walls and cut down Hasdrubal when he incautiously approached. By the same device the people of Asculum routed Pompey, and the Numantines routed Popillius Laenas. The people of Apollonia, when besieged by Philip, king of the Macedonians, admitted a Roman garrison by night and rested throughout the following day; then at night they came suddenly upon the enemy when he felt secure. Livy, book 33.

§5. It was also customary in ancient times to place hanging portcullises before gates. Vegetius, book 4, chapter 4:

“Care is taken, moreover, lest the gates be burned by fires placed beneath them; for this reason they must be covered with hides and iron. But what antiquity invented is of greater benefit: a defensive work is added before the gate, at whose entrance a portcullis is placed, hanging from iron rings and ropes, so that, if the enemy should enter, it may be let down and those enclosed may be destroyed. The wall above the gate, however, must be arranged to receive openings through which water poured from the upper part may extinguish the fire placed beneath.”

Livy, on the people of Salapia:

“The gate had been closed by the fall of the portcullis. Some raised it with levers; others drew it up with ropes to such a height that they could pass beneath it upright. The way was scarcely open enough when the deserters rushed competitively through the gate; and when nearly six hundred had entered, the rope from which the portcullis was suspended was released and it fell with a great noise. Some of the Salapians attacked the deserters, who were carrying their arms carelessly on their shoulders after their journey as though among peaceful men; others from the towers of the gate and from the walls kept the enemy away with stones, stakes, and javelins.”

The besieged can easily be liberated in any place if at first they remain quiet and then burst out with sudden boldness. The consul Furius, when at first he was besieged and was thought to be afraid, burst out by the rear gate and cut down the incautious enemy. Livy, book 3. Caesar also, in book 5 of *The Gallic War*, when he was so thoroughly despised that they began to tear apart the rampart by hand and fill the trenches, sent out infantry and cavalry from every gate and put the enemy to flight. Indutiomarus was thus routed by Labienus, and so too were the Pompeians in Africa. Marius also endured the insolence of the Cimbri for a long time until he accustomed his soldiers not to fear them.

Even when the wall has been breached, its defense is nonetheless easy, provided only that courage is present. They defend themselves in many ways, especially with weapons; therefore, when the defenders are brave, it is a small thing to have opened a doorway if it is barred with steel. Sometimes they suddenly block the openings with sacks filled with wool, barrels filled with earth or dung, beams, chests, baskets filled with earth, and iron stakes, with wet straw and earth placed around them. They throw down bundles of brushwood and set them on fire; they scatter caltrops and, in place of caltrops, planks filled with nails upon which the attackers may impale themselves; they send down a rotating machine and draw it back; sometimes they raise portcullises. It is best to dig close behind the breach, so that men cannot descend from the wall into the city, and to build defensive works at the sides of the demolished wall. Everything, however, must be prepared before the attack so that it may be at hand amid the utmost haste. They also throw stones and fiery materials of every kind, in which task women and boys can be of assistance.

When Conon was besieged, he sent two cutters which kept different courses; in the evening, after most of the enemy had approached the shore, they escaped.

When Hippodamas, while besieged, could not admit a messenger, he shouted to the man standing outside that the woman bound in the temple of Athena Chalcioecus was troubling him. That woman was an image of Hunger. Although the enemy heard, they did not understand the matter.

A prostitute informed Diognetus of Naxos after obtaining permission to send something to her brothers, the sellers of sweetmeats. She placed a lead tablet in a cake, upon which it was written that they should attack the Milesians by night when they were buried in wine. She had instructed the messenger, moreover, to tell her brothers to eat the cake themselves.

When the Spartan harmost had provisions for two days, a herald sent from Sparta was ordered to say, in the presence of the Athenians conducting the siege, what instructions he had. He said: "The ephors order you to be of good courage; assistance will come." The harmost replied: "Do not hurry; we have provisions for five months." Deceived by this falsehood, the Athenians raised the siege because winter was approaching. Polyaeus, book 2.

§6. No less ingenuity is required in displaying an abundance of supplies, lest the enemy hope that the city will be taken by hunger. The Athenians and Romans scattered wheat. When Hannibal had plowed up the place near Casilinum so that they could not gather herbs, the people of Casilinum cast seed upon it, so that they might appear to have grain until the harvest. The survivors of Varus led captives around their granaries for the whole night.

When the people of Segeberg were besieged by Waldemar and lacked grain, they nevertheless roughened and turned millstones so that the enemy might think that they abounded in it.

In the year 1535 the people of Münster, lest they appear to be deprived of food, began to plow the suburban field as though intending to endure the siege until the harvest. Others ordered empty granaries to be closely guarded.

Lucius Antonius acted more cruelly, for he filled the prisons with slaves and destroyed them by hunger because he was unwilling to expend food upon them or to release them; and that is the Perusine famine.

Francesco Barbaro held Brescia until the siege of the Visconti was raised, because, by bringing in mules laden with sand, he furnished the appearance that grain had been brought in and thus gave courage to the multitude.

§7. Many have endured hunger for a very long time. In famine the people of Petelia cast out their parents and children; they sustained life with hides, leaves, and every kind of animal. The people of Casilinum did the same, as did the Numantines. But stronger were the people of Cyzicus, who could not be driven to surrender by the death of their captives, nor could the people of Aegina, who preferred to behold the punishment of their hostages rather than desert the Romans. Caesar used to say that his plan was the same as that of physicians: to conquer by hunger rather than by the sword.

§8. They contrived to bring in supplies by various devices. At Casilinum the Romans first sent casks filled with flour down the Volturnus; then, after the casks had been caught by a chain, they scattered nuts upon the river. Hirtius sent livestock downstream to the people of Mutina.

There was a pleasing spectacle in bringing pigs into a city. When the besieged could not bring a drove of pigs into the city, they seized one and ran ahead with it; at its grunting the whole herd followed at a rush.

CHAPTER XLVIII

Flight Is Sometimes Permissible, and What Must Be Observed in Flight

§1. Flight is either stratagematic or genuine. We are treating the latter, which is twofold: that of the whole army or that of a part. I shall explain the whole class by a few propositions.

Proposition I. When danger threatens the whole army in a just war, it is better to fight with heroic courage than to flee, because there is great disgrace in flight. Judas Maccabaeus is an example, 1 Maccabees 9, from verse 6:

“And they saw the multitude of the army, that they were many, and they were greatly afraid; and many withdrew themselves from the camp, and there remained of them only eight hundred men. And Judas saw that his army had slipped away and that the battle pressed hard upon him, and he was broken in heart because he had no time to gather them, and he was disheartened. And he said to those who remained: ‘Let us arise and go against our adversaries, if we shall be able to fight against them.’ And they tried to turn him aside, saying: ‘We shall not be able. Rather, let us save our lives now and return to our brethren, and then we shall fight against them; but we are few.’ And Judas said: ‘Far be it from us to do this thing, that we should flee from them; and if our time has drawn near, let us die courageously for our brethren, and let us not bring a charge against our glory.’”

Judas acted most bravely, and Nicolaus Serarius, a learned and equally pious man, defends him excellently. But it is asked whether he acted rightly in casting himself into so great a danger when he had so few men. I answer that he acted rightly, since he performed a work of heroic courage; and he rightly undertook it because he knew that great forces of the enemy had often been routed by a few with divine aid, and he himself had experienced it. For how great were the armies which Abraham, Gideon, Jonathan, David, and others led out to encounter hostile forces? Heroic courage does not enter the common and well-worn road of courage, but rather the steep and more difficult one, trusting more in God’s strength than in its own.

And so, above, 2 Maccabees, the final chapter, verse 7: “But Maccabaeus always trusted with every hope that assistance would be present for him from the Lord.” And in the same place, verse 9, he addressed them from the Law and the Prophets, reminding them also of the contests which they had previously accomplished; or, as it is still more forceful in Greek, προσυπομνήσας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας οὓς ἦσαν ἐκτετελεκότες, bringing back to their memory also those very grievous contests which they had completed. Therefore, himself recalling all these same things to his own memory, and at the same time those magnificent promises made in the Law and the Prophets--of which Deuteronomy 28 speaks, and this book above in chapter 3, verses 18 and 19, and chapter 4, verse 8--the most valiant hero thus rushed against the enemy. Judas preferred to die in battle rather than appear to have refused battle, lest he appear to have hoped too little in God. His own glory also pertained to the glory of God.

Proposition II. Although this courage is most praiseworthy, a prudent commander can nevertheless deny the enemy an opportunity to fight and can even withdraw inferior forces, lest he engage an unequal enemy. For that caution harms the state less than a headlong battle does. Nor is danger prudently undergone when the hope of victory is slight. Therefore, one must do what Antigonus used to do, who preferred utility to empty glory; for while yielding ground he used to say that he was seeking the victory placed behind him. It is indeed more honorable to do this by declining battle, but if the army can be withdrawn without danger, it can be done even in the battle itself.

These things concern genuine flight, for feigned flight is praiseworthy, as when Paulus Aemilius pretended to be afraid until the Ligurians, after rashly attacking his camp, were cut down. Fimbria appeared so thoroughly to fear the son of Mithridates that the latter’s horsemen, after advancing within the narrow passages of the defenses, exposed six thousand of their number to slaughter. Livius asked Hasdrubal to permit him to depart unharmed; by this pretense he led the enemy into a sense of security and cut him down. When Caesar, coming with two legions to Cicero’s

assistance, pretended to be afraid and held back his soldier, he caused the Gauls to approach the camp without caution and consequently killed them while they were out of formation.

The deed of Aristides of Elea was excellent. Dionysius was attacking Caulonia; Aristides displayed a reinforcement of twelve triremes. But when Dionysius opposed fifteen to him, Aristides withdrew as though afraid and at night kindled torches which the fleet of Dionysius followed. He gradually set other torches upon great pieces of cork and released them into the sea; then, withdrawing on an oblique course, he reached Caulonia while Dionysius followed the torches.

If the whole army genuinely flees, let it be collected, strengthened, and fortified as quickly as possible, and let ambushes be prepared for the enemy. If one part has been routed and the other has conquered, let the victorious part claim the victory for itself and make every provision so that it may be able to set an ambush; for then the enemy is exposed and feels secure.

Proposition III. It is never fitting for a commander to decree that the army should hurl itself away in a headlong rout after its ranks have been dissolved. For in battle a few perish; in flight almost all perish. The battle between Campson and Selim was famous. Men fell on both sides, but flight carried off more than the battle.

Proposition IV. A soldier is not permitted to flee for as long as the ranks remain, or the standard, the commander, or the centurion stands firm, even if he sees himself in the most immediate danger of death. For he promised this by oath. Therefore, if he flees, he is perjured. Next, he pledged his fidelity to the public good: by fleeing he betrays the state; by fighting and dying he preserves it.

Proposition V. If the standards have been captured, if a great part of the army flees, and if there is no hope at all in resisting, a soldier can flee. For he would die without any public utility, whereas a man who flees can fight again: ἀνὴρ ὁ φεύγων πάλιν μαχήσεται.

§2. It is commonly said as a proverb that there is greater art in fleeing than in fighting; but to flee ingeniously and to pursue victory elsewhere is praiseworthy.

Flight by stratagem is not cowardice, but industry, as I have said.

Plans for flight, therefore, are salutary when necessity causes it. Tryphon scattered gold so that the soldiers would be delayed. Sertorius and Viriathus wished their soldiers to scatter and to assemble at an appointed place. Many are saved in this manner; for if the enemy also scatters his men, he will do so at peril, and once the soldiers have assembled they will easily be able to harm him while he is dispersed. Those in pursuit, however, never scatter unless they wish to lose the victory. Callicratides pursued Conon with triremes, but when Conon saw that the fleet had been drawn apart, he raised the signal, attacked his pursuers, and defeated them.

When Afranius, fleeing Caesar, could not escape, he fortified a camp. When Caesar did the same and sent men out to forage, Afranius set out on his journey. This was great dexterity, and all the more distinguished because it deceived Caesar.

When Antony was being harassed by the Parthians in the morning, he delayed until the fifth hour. The Parthians, already tired and supposing that he would remain on that day, went back to tend their bodies; he completed a full day's march during the remainder of the day without interruption.

Philip, defeated in Epirus, sought a truce for burying the dead and thus escaped, abusing a pretense of piety for the preservation of the living.

The Carthaginians, defeated at sea, pretended that they were stuck in shallows and did everything that men who are stuck customarily do. The Romans turned aside because they supposed the places to be shallow and gave space to the fugitives. For, to the fugitives' very great advantage, the enemy avoided the very places through which they themselves were fleeing.

Titus Vastus placed an effigy in his bed and fled while the guards watched over the effigy. Polybius, book 8.

Nicon deceived the enemy by covering his own ship in the same manner as theirs.

Many, moreover, have employed the method of adapting the enemy's insignia and clothing to themselves.

Demetrius of Phalerum escaped by hiding himself in a wagon filled with straw. It was a most wretched escape, but salutary in the worst circumstances.

When the enemy attacked his rear in a narrow road, the same man opposed all the wagons and set them on fire; he delayed the enemy until he escaped. Polyaeus, book 4.

Artemisia had two standards, a barbarian and a Greek one, and raised whichever of them was advantageous. Polyaeus, book 8. When she was in danger of being captured by the Greeks, she ordered the Persian standards to be taken down and made an attack upon a Persian ship; by this means she sailed away to Caria.

When Aegyptus knew that he was being sought, and that there were accordingly men lying in wait upon a ship, he told the shipmaster to go and seek Aegyptus, for it was now time to sail. On hearing this, the men lying in wait rushed into the city to seek him; he cut the cable and sailed away. Polyaeus, book 6.

When Themistocles had been carried to Ionia, he disclosed himself to the shipmaster and threatened that, unless he sailed away, he would say that the man had been hired for money to carry him off. Thus, through fear of an accusation, the shipmaster conveyed his country's enemy to safety.

When Diotimus was fleeing with ten faster ships, he backed their sterns some distance into twenty Spartan vessels and sank them. Polyaeus, book 1.

When Eteonicus the Spartan was being besieged by the Athenians and heard that his own men had been defeated at Arginusae, he offered sacrifice as though at joyful news and ordered messengers wearing wreaths to go about. Consequently, the dismayed Athenians remained inactive. He escaped and led away his army. Of such importance is it to send messengers promptly. If Callicratides had perceived the matter before the Athenian commander, the war would have been brought to an end in both places. Eteonicus instilled error in the enemy and thus escaped.

When Brasidas and others were being enclosed by a rampart, they waited until the embankment had in fact been closed; and thus, in the narrow space, protected at the side and rear, they fought.

§3. It has been effected by various stratagems that the enemy should not pursue fugitives. Croesus delayed Cyrus from pursuing by means of flame. Polyaeus, book 7. Mithridates, while fleeing, placed the furnishings of a certain city in a public place; these delayed his pursuers so greatly that they refused to obey their commanders.

Frotho, king of the Danes, defeated by the English, delayed the victor by scattering money. The Gauls abandoned wagons laden with silk and other things and inflicted disaster upon the Caesarians while they contended over the booty. Antigonus likewise deceived the Gauls in this manner in ancient times, for avarice is exceedingly exposed to disasters.

Commius the Atrebatian is worthy of great praise. For, when defeated and fleeing Julius Caesar, he came to ships which stood upon dry ground. The wind was favorable, but the tide opposed him. He therefore ordered the sails to be spread; when Julius observed these from afar and supposed that Commius was departing with a favorable passage, he withdrew.

Iphicrates made a trench behind his soldiers so that they could not flee. But I believe it was rather so that they could not be surrounded from behind, for he was fighting with a small force against a great multitude; indeed, crossing the trench was not so very difficult.

§4. The protection of fugitives lies in concealing a defeat. Artabazus concealed his defeat while he crossed Thessaly. Some have deceived the enemy with fire.

Ammianus Marcellinus, when he could neither flee nor hide, sent a horse upon which he had placed a light across the plain to the right; while the Persians followed it, he himself escaped with his men to the left into the mountains.

It has also been a device of military cunning to give a public signal for flight, but meanwhile privately to warn the rear of the column to stand fast.

When Philip was being routed by the Thracians, he ordered the rear of the column to halt at the signal for flight, so that the others might occupy the road in advance. In slender hope, boldness is the safest course.

When Eumenes, fleeing from the Gauls, was carried in a litter, he ordered himself to be placed upon a hill. They suspected an ambush and desisted from pursuing.

§5. The flight of certain men has appeared ignoble, but nevertheless cunning.

Seleucus, fleeing from Cilicia, assumed the dress of an armor-bearer and performed that office for the commander Amyction. Niccolò Piccinino, enclosed in a sack, was carried through the midst of the enemy by his attendant Todeschino; when men asked what was being carried, the answer was “bread.” Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 3.

Lachares was fortunate in fleeing. At Thebes he hid up to his head in a sewer; at Sestos he went out with women mourning a dead man; at Athens he went out in a servant’s dress, with his face blackened, carrying a basket covered with dung. He then mounted a horse and delayed his pursuers by casting down darics. Bohemond, passing through the dominions of his enemy Alexius, caused himself to be carried in a coffin as though dead.

§6. When one must withdraw from the enemy because he is stronger, the first thing to be done is that it not be thought to occur through fear but through prudence; otherwise the soldiers flee. Next, everything must be done so that the enemy does not perceive the departure. Hence they are accustomed to place the cavalry at the opening, kindle fires at night, and feign battle. But one who has withdrawn far enough to cross a forest, mountains, or a river easily completes the rest of the journey; for, after stationing a garrison, he can delay the enemy until he has reached the appointed place. When the Greeks who had marched into Persia with Cyrus the Younger were being followed by the enemy, and consequently withdrew by night and pitched their camp farther away lest they be attacked in the darkness, the Greeks themselves set out by night and went so far ahead that the Persians first overtook them on the fourth day.

§7. The end of flight, however, is that they recover victory; of this Antigonus is a notable example. No one is easily found who recovered victory as nobly as that Antigonus of whom I have spoken. Polyaeus describes the matter in book 4.

Antigonus had one hundred and thirty ships, over which Nicanor presided. With these he engaged in a naval battle against Polyperchon’s fleet, which Cleitus commanded. The battle was joined in the Hellespont. Nicanor, after his men had been forced by inexperience into the opposing waves, lost seventy ships. Although the enemy plainly held victory in their hands, Antigonus arrived toward evening and did not fear the defeat he had suffered. Instead, he ordered those who remained in the other sixty ships to be ready and equipped for naval battle again during the night. He stationed the bravest of his attendants at the vessels and gave them instructions to threaten that they would bring death upon all who did not go forth into the battle.

And since the nearby city of Byzantium was joined to him by alliance and friendship, he ordered shield-bearing and light-armed soldiers and one thousand archers to be sent from there at once to handle the oars and to cast javelins and arrows into the enemy’s ships. These things were arranged in the course of one night. But when dawn began, while they were casting spears and darts upon the ships, and the enemy, not yet released from sleep but only then awakened, received wounds without precaution, some began breaking the cables, others drawing back the boarding-bridges, others raising the anchors--in brief, all began to raise shouting and tumult. Antigonus also gave the signal to the sixty

ships to approach and make an assault with fury and force. Thus it immediately happened that, while some cast missiles from the shore and others brought hostile ships forward, the victors were overcome by the vanquished.

Parallel to this is the following deed of Sertorius. When Quintus Sertorius, military tribune under the praetor Didius, had his winter quarters in the city of Castulo, the people of Castulo received the enemy Gyrisaeni into the city by night, and together they began to attack and kill Sertorius's men. On hearing the clamor, Sertorius secretly went out from the city with a few men, halted not far from the gate, and began to collect his fleeing men and arrange them in battle-line. When he now saw that he had collected a sufficiently large body, he reentered the city by the same gate through which the enemy had gone. He found them scattered into different places and intent upon plunder alone; and thus he routed them within a short time and put on their arms. Having drawn up his battle-line in this manner, under the appearance of the Gyrisaeni he hastened toward Gyrissa. There, since no one suspected anything and they supposed that their own men were returning, the gate-leaves were opened. Thus he took the city and plundered it completely, so that he abundantly repaid the enemy for the evil they had inflicted at Castulo. Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 4.

§8. Those who are sailing sometimes direct lights one way while they themselves keep a different course without a lamp. When Frederick Marabotto the Guelf was fleeing Auria and had already despaired of being able to escape, he advised his triremes by night where he intended to sail; then he placed a lamp upon a shield which was cast toward the shore. The enemy followed it and gave him the opportunity to escape. Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 4.

CHAPTER XLIX

The Enemy's Flight Must Not Readily Be Blocked

§1. Scipio prudently used to say that a road should be prepared for those fleeing. Themistocles even advised Xerxes to flee, lest he keep so great a multitude of barbarians within the vitals of Greece. Alfonso had the same judgment: he thought that a silver bridge should be laid down for a fleeing enemy. Iphicrates also followed fugitives gradually and did not press them toward rivers, lest they despair. After a city had been taken, when they ran together in the forum, he ordered the gates to be opened so that, as they poured out, they might be cut down without danger.

The reason is that, when necessity presses experienced and brave men, it penetrates everything. It is a hard weapon, and those who fought under the utmost necessity have rarely been defeated. Despair makes men mad: because they fear nothing, they either conquer or are conquered with great slaughter. Pontius, commander of the Samnites, gives that warning when they could satisfy the Romans neither by surrendering those responsible nor by any other means.

The prudence of the Roman legates was distinguished when they opened a road to the Etruscans. Livy, book 2:

“Manlius also presented himself in person to restore the battle-line; the recognized faces of the two consuls inflamed the spirits of the soldiers. At the same time the enemy's battle-line was now weaker, since, trusting in their abundant multitude, they had withdrawn their reserves and sent them to attack the camp. Having made an assault upon it without a great struggle, they wasted time mindful of plunder rather than battle. The Roman triarii, who had been unable to sustain the first assault, sent messengers to the consuls to report the state of affairs, returned in a body to the praetorium, and of their own accord themselves renewed the battle.

“The consul Manlius, having been carried back into the camp, had opposed soldiers at every gate and blocked the enemy's way. This despair inflamed rage rather than courage in the Etruscans. For, after they ran wherever the hope of an exit displayed itself and had several times made a vain assault, one body of young men attacked the consul himself, who was conspicuous by his arms. The first missiles were received by those standing around him; afterward the force could not be sustained. The consul, struck by a mortal wound, fell, and all around him were routed. The courage of the Etruscans increased. Terror drove the Romans in alarm throughout the camp, and matters would have come to the extremity had not the legates, after seizing the consul's body, opened a way for the enemy through one gate. They broke out through it and, departing in a disordered column, encountered the other victorious consul. There they were cut down again and routed in every direction.”

And in book 4, when the Volsci had been surrounded and formed themselves into a circle, Messius exhorted them and led them out, and inflicted enormous slaughter upon the Romans:

“Are you,” he said, “going to expose yourselves defenseless and unavenged to the enemy's weapons here? Why, then, do you have arms? Or why did you voluntarily undertake war--you who are turbulent in peace but sluggish in war? What hope is there for you while you stand here? Do you think that some god will protect you and carry you away from here? A road must be made by the sword. Go in this direction in which you see me go before you; you who wish to see your homes, parents, wives, and children, come with me. No wall and no rampart, but armed men, stand in the way of armed men. You are equal in courage, and superior in necessity, which is the last and greatest weapon.”

“After he had said this and was putting his words into action, they followed him with renewed shouting and made an assault where Postumius Albus had opposed his cohorts; and they moved the victors until the dictator came to his own men, who were now giving ground. The whole battle turned toward that point. The fortune of the enemy rested upon one man, Messius. There were many wounds on either side and much slaughter everywhere. By then not even the Roman commanders were fighting unwounded. Postumius alone, struck by a stone and with his head broken, withdrew

from the battle-line. Neither the dictator's wounded shoulder, nor Fabius's thigh nearly fastened to his horse, nor the consul's severed arm removed them from so uncertain a battle.

"Messius's assault carried him with a body of the bravest young men through enemies laid low by slaughter to the camp of the Volsci, which had not yet been taken. The whole battle-line inclined to the same place. The consul, having pursued those pouring forth as far as the rampart, attacked the camp and rampart themselves; the dictator moved his forces toward the same place from the other side. The attack was no less spirited than the battle had been. They say that the consul even cast a standard within the rampart so that the soldiers would go up more fiercely, and that the first assault was made in recovering the standard."

If they had furnished those surrounded with an opportunity to flee, they could have destroyed the enemy without receiving a wound; as matters stood, the battle was renewed more severely than at the beginning. For one man--made mad by despair and anger, and fearing death accompanied by torment--is stronger than three upon whom no necessity of fighting presses.

§2. Therefore, fugitives must be pressed cautiously, lest necessity make them resist, so that they may flee more readily thereafter, believing that the victors will not press fugitives toward destruction. For those oppressed by a peril on either side nevertheless wage a memorable battle. Necessity sharpens even cowardice, and often despair is the cause of hope. Curtius, book 4, taught this. By his own example, the courageous soldier Sempronius Gracchus, having fallen headlong into an ambush, brought it about that they did not fall unavenged. Livy, book 34.

The prudence of the Roman Senate also sufficiently taught us that an enemy must not be enclosed: they decreed that the Gauls, who desired ships, should be conveyed across and assisted with provisions. The Gauls were also given the power to flee through the Pomptine territory. When the Carthaginians, surrounded, were resisting in despair, Lucius Marcius gave them room to flee and cut them down without danger as they fled. Caesar did this to the Germans, and Hannibal at Lake Trasimene. Antigonos allowed the Aetolians who were breaking out to flee and then cut them down from behind. Agesilaus likewise let the Thebans out, and Themistocles let Xerxes out.

Pyrrhus's precept was that fugitives should not be pressed forcefully, so that on another occasion they would flee more readily. For the man who knows that he will certainly die willingly desires to die together with others. "The one safety of the conquered is to hope for no safety."

Datames even defeated Lucullus in this manner. Concerning Datames, Frontinus writes in book 2, chapter 7:

"Datames, commander of the Persians, when he learned that part of his cavalry was deserting while he was fighting Autophradates in Cappadocia, ordered all the rest to come with him. After overtaking the deserters, he praised them because they had briskly gone ahead of him and even exhorted them to attack the enemy courageously. Shame brought repentance upon the deserters; and because they did not suppose that their plan had been detected, they changed it. Thus, while he despaired of his life because of the desertion of his own men, he obtained the victory."

Cato's deed was certainly distinguished. When the Aetolians were attacking Ambracia, he arrived in a small vessel and by voice, hand, and gesture appeared to be summoning ships of his own men which were arriving; the Aetolians therefore desisted from the attack.

Among the laws of Lycurgus was this: not to kill fleeing enemies. The Spartans, the best of soldiers, therefore observed it, so that they preferred to see an enemy fleeing rather than resisting.

CHAPTER L

The Method of Naval War

§1. The plan of Themistocles formerly, and afterward of Pompey the Great, was that particular account should be taken of fleets; for all things are possessed by him who holds the sea.

Hence the Romans always prepared a great fleet--or, rather, had one. Vegetius, book 5, chapter 1:

“The Roman people, however, in keeping with the dignity and advantage of their greatness, did not prepare a fleet for the occasion because of the necessity of some disturbance; but, lest they should ever sustain such a necessity, they always kept one prepared. For no one dares to provoke by war or inflict injury upon a kingdom or people whom he knows to be equipped and ready to resist and avenge. At Misenum, therefore, and Ravenna, individual legions stood with the fleets, so that they would not withdraw too far from the protection of the city and, when circumstances demanded it, might arrive by sea without delay and without a circuitous route at every part of the world. For the fleet at Misenum had Gaul, the Spains, Mauretania, Africa, Egypt, Sardinia, and Sicily close at hand. The fleet at Ravenna, however, was accustomed to seek Epirus, Macedonia, Achaea, the Propontis, Pontus, the East, Crete, and Cyprus by a direct voyage.”

Dominion of the sea, therefore, contributes very greatly to power. The Spaniards say that a kingdom without a port is like an oven without fire. And indeed it has appeared in the case of Portugal, a kingdom not great, how by dominion of the sea the Portuguese occupied the Indies and preserve them even today. Lipsius counts more fleets in *On Roman Greatness*, book 1, chapter 5. He thinks that there were four upon the sea and three upon rivers.

§2. Vegetius demands the greatest care in building ships, because it is more dangerous for a ship to be defective than for a house. “The Liburnian,” he says in book 5, chapter 4, “is constructed from cypress and from domestic and wild pine, larch, and especially fir, and should more advantageously be fastened with bronze nails than with iron ones. For although the expenditure may appear somewhat heavy, nevertheless, because it lasts longer, it is proved to bring profit. For rust quickly consumes iron nails through time and moisture, whereas bronze nails preserve their own substance even amid the waves.” Timber must be cut from the fifteenth day of the moon through the twenty-third. It can be cut from the summer solstice until January.

Ships were of various kinds in former times. The largest had six banks of rowers or more, as Vegetius says; but he is speaking of the ordinary form of ships, for from the ship which is drawn by one bank of rowers they advanced as far as fifteen and sixteen banks of rowers. But biremes, triremes, and quadriremes were commonly used; they have that many banks of oars, rowers, and benches in each order. Indeed, when the Romans first took up maritime affairs, they thought the construction of quinqueremes difficult. Later, however, Antony and Augustus erected high fighting-towers upon their ships. Antony even had δεκήμες, deciremes, as Dio records. Alexander the Great had twelve banks, as Pliny is the authority.

Ptolemy Philadelphus had two ships of thirty banks, one of twenty, four of thirteen, two of twelve, and fourteen of eleven; thirty hepteres, five hexeres, and seventeen quinqueremes. Great also, and like a town, was the ship of Ptolemy Philopator. It had forty banks; its length was two hundred eighty cubits and its height thirty-eight. There were four hundred sailors in it, four thousand rowers, and nearly three thousand soldiers; it had seven beaks and four rudders. Yet all these things were more for display than for use. For so great a multitude could neither live conveniently nor discharge its duties.

§3. Most approve smaller and more agile ships, because they are driven even by a lighter wind and do not strike upon sandbanks so easily. In the battle against Austria the Turkish ships discharged harmless missiles, because their prows

were much higher. But nevertheless, if we wish to confess the truth, Augustus against Sextus Pompey and Antony used high fighting-towers upon their ships. And the six large Christian ships which, in front of the half-moon formation of our fleet, tore apart the hostile fleet won the victory for the Christians against the Turks in great part.

It is entirely necessary to observe the warnings of storms and obey them, for more fleets have perished by storm than by battle. When you have foreseen everything, one can still perish from thirst in the midst of water. Therefore provision must also be made concerning water.

If you are going to fight at sea, you will be able to advance first into the battle-line; for soldiers already prepared will be able to rest and take food. Nor are they wearied as in a land battle, yet they cannot fight unless the enemy approaches. Timotheus, commander of the Athenians, sent twenty very swift ships against the enemy to make sport of them. These wearied the enemy; afterward he himself cut them down when they were weary.

§4. Naval forces must be trained with enormous care, so that they become accustomed to pull the oars, direct the helm, cast and recover anchors, arrange ropes, spread and contract sails, turn ships, angle the sails, climb the mast, and keep watch from the fighting-top. Finally, they must be fearless before every danger; for, besides the common evils of war, the waters themselves and sea-monsters supply sufficient terror. Then there are the conflicts of winds, shoals, Euripi, whirlpools, tides, bays, promontories, rocks, sandbanks, and that which is especially pleasing to spectators, the stillness of the sea, or dead calm itself.

At night they signal everything to one another more easily by fires. The admiral's ship and vice-admiral's ship always carry a fire before them; but when the latter is present, the admiral's ship displays two, and all imitate this arrangement so that they do not collide through proximity. When a whirlwind arises, a signal is given twice with a great cannon that the ships need not follow the admiral's ship. They also have commands consigned in writing stating the place in which they ought to assemble if they are dispersed. If enemies appear at night, the ship that notices them gives the signal. A watchword for the ships is also given with great care. At sunset, and likewise at sunrise, all the ships come to salute the commander upon the admiral's ship. They receive the watchword in the evening; but if they are hindered by a storm, every captain has the watchwords for the whole week written down and distributes them.

Nothing is more dangerous than a naval battle, for the sea itself is an enemy: ships are easily pierced and burned; one must leap onto enemy ships and fight there. The ships themselves are sometimes entangled with one another and impede one another, and a conquered ship drags the victorious ship with it.

The order of naval battle generally is that the admiral's ship is in the middle, and the larger ships are joined to it, while the smaller hold the wings. I understand this to apply unless the enemy has stronger ships upon the sides. Great care must be taken that those ships which first receive the wind are strong, for the strongest can make the assault. They advance in an even order; the lighter ships regulate their sails so that they are not carried more swiftly than the heavier.

The enemy is harmed chiefly in two ways: by cannon and by grappling-irons, by which vessels are joined together. Formerly they did not have cannon with which to tear vessels apart, but drove the ships' beaks at speed into their sides. Now the method is different, for those who most quickly and skillfully thunder upon enemy ships, and who can strike mast, yards, or rudder, generally emerge victorious. Formerly they fought especially with fire: Cassius sent burning transports into the enemy fleet and set it on fire; Gnaeus Scipio hurled jars filled with pitch and pinewood upon enemy ships; Hannibal hurled vipers.

Against smaller firearms they protect themselves with thick planks, and sometimes with a double barrier of ropes one foot apart. Meanwhile they struggle with great disadvantages, whether while they fight with ships joined and fastened together, or while they cast the enemy's fires upon a ship; for at the same time they themselves too are endangered, lest they be burned together. Every noncombatant throng should be employed in repairing ships and caring for the wounded. The danger is increased by the fact that, when it comes to hand-to-hand combat, one ship attacks one, or two attack one; and thus there are at once as many battle-lines as ships.

§5. With the same wind a fleet advances more slowly--even when the ships are the same--than individual ships do separately. Therefore, when departure is necessary, a commander will prepare himself for a longer voyage than a merchant will.

When a maritime battle is to be fought, a flag is displayed from the admiral's ship. If a ship appears from elsewhere, the ship nearest to it suspends one flag; if two appear, it suspends two, and warns the commander of the fleet.

When scout ships judge that something is seen by them, if the commander wishes them to advance and investigate it better, he suspends a flag at the prow. Indeed, many things are indicated at sea by flags, because sight extends for the greatest distance across the water, whereas in fields it is impeded by thickets and other things.

When a ship has struck something or is stuck upon sandbanks, it fires a cannon three times, and someone requests assistance from the fighting-top by waving a flag. If a hostile ship secretly enters the fleet for the purpose of spying and there is suspicion of the matter, a flag of a certain or variegated color, such as all the ships possess, is raised from the admiral's ship. Since the spy ship cannot do this, it is immediately detected; it could nevertheless remain hidden if it had previously been informed about the kind of those flags.

§6. A fleet requires many more things than a land army; for the arms of fleets must be furnished in such a way that they can also fight upon land and besiege cities. Ranzovius recounts that many things were present in the Spanish fleet. He says in book 1, chapter 8:

"This fleet was assembled from 130 ships and carried 57,868 units of weight, or what they call lasts; 19,295 marines; 8,052 sailors and rowers; 2,441 larger cannon; 123,090 balls, or cannon-shot; 5,175 hundredweights of gunpowder; 1,238 hundredweights of lead; and 1,151 hundredweights of fire-kindling. There was, besides, an enormous supply of fresh water, wooden dishes, lamps, larger and smaller lanterns, likewise nails and oxhide, and a great quantity of flax and tow for stopping and repairing ships which opened at the seams or were pierced; also shields, many wax tapers, tallow candles, and rather long sacks.

"In addition, all those things were present which serve for moving the larger cannon: 40 mules, lower wagons, wheels, and other things of that kind; and, among other things, equipment sufficient for landing twenty of those greater wheeled cannon which they call cartauns. With these were also conveyed twenty-one of another kind, which, from the use that they render especially in the open field, are called field serpentines or culverins, and 3,500 balls with which these might be loaded.

"As for the smaller weapons, the fleet was abundantly equipped with them. There were at hand 7,000 longer handguns; 1,000 forked guns bent toward the stock, together with their requirements; 10,000 long shafts; 1,000 javelins and double axes; 6,000 shorter spears; and many other things prudently prepared, with which, if circumstances permitted, a land battle could be entered against the enemy and towns besieged and captured. At the same time there were present 700 miners, more than sufficiently equipped with their apparatus for use in driving mines.

"The number of all the persons for whose provisions provision had been made was 30,693. Of this class were hired soldiers, bold musketeers, physicians, surgeons, chaplains, monks, noblemen, and the other attendants of the fleet's supreme commander, judges, sailors, rowers, cooks, and similar persons necessary for the equipment of the fleet. For their sustenance for six months these provisions were held: 11,000 hundredweights of baked bread; 21,255 amphorae of wine; 6,000 hundredweights of salted meat; 3,433 hundredweights of cheeses; 8,000 hundredweights of salted provisions; 3,000 hundredweights of rice; 6,320 hundredweights of beans and vetch; 11,398 bath-measures of oil; 13,687 of vinegar in the same measure; and 11,870 pipes filled with drinking water.

"It was also learned from Spaniards whom the English captured that 12,000 ducats were spent each day to maintain the fleet, and that, in addition, a great quantity of gold and silver was conveyed upon the admiral's ships for the support of the war; but that ten thousand cannon-shots were discharged by the hostile English fleet against the fleet itself."

For the Danish fleet he gives this equipment of the admiral's ship: 100 gunners skilled in loading and discharging the larger cannon; 500 sailors; 700 marines; 20 whole and half carts; 14 whole serpentines or culverins; 14 three-quarter serpentines; 4 half serpentines; 15 falcons; 2 bronze fire-projectors; 8 tower-breakers or wall-mounted phalaricae; 8 Tyrian rams; 8 grappling-irons or hooks; 68 machines which they call *Barssen*; 100 hooked machines; 10 units of weight, or lasts, of gunpowder; besides lead, balls, and fuses or fire-kindling in great number.

Provisions were assigned to this same admiral's ship for six months' sustenance: 7,400 sides of bacon; 3,143 pieces of beef; 6,248 quarters of mutton; 6,248 smoked geese; 30 units of weight, or lasts, of butter; 60 lasts of pickled herring; 60 lasts of smaller cod; 1,480 wagonloads of stockfish or hake; 4 lasts of salted pike; 4 lasts of salted eel; 4,000 sea *albicae*; 8,000 dried sea-scallops or flatfish; 8 bundles of long cod; 8 bundles of larger cod or *capitones*; 24½ lasts of oats prepared for human food; 24 lasts of vetch; 402 lasts of bread; 700 lasts of beer; 4 lasts of Lüneburg salt; 10 lasts of coarse foreign salt; and 4 lasts of vinegar.

When ships are lacking, it is customary to detain merchant vessels after the price of carriage has been paid. The kings of Spain and Denmark are accustomed to do this; in this matter one must act so that justice is observed in all things.

Nevertheless, the care of provisions should come first.

οὐ γάρ τι στυγερῇ ἐπὶ γαστέρι κύντερον ἄλλο

ἔπλετο, ἢ τ' ἐκέλευσεν ἔο μνήσασθαι ἀνάγκη

καὶ μάλα τειρόμενον καὶ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔχοντα.

Nothing else more shameless than the hateful belly comes upon a man, since it of necessity commands him to remember it, even if he is sorrowful and turns grief over in his mind.

In an army this evil is more grievous, because a soldier driven to corrupt and foul foods contracts plague and other diseases; and because he grows weak, his spirits fail and he becomes timid.

In order that provisions may be held, it will be advantageous to require not merely money--which, while passing through the hands of Harpies, is diminished--but grain, bacon, cheeses, butter, oil, fish, and other things. For subjects bring these more willingly, and they are kept more profitably.

CHAPTER LI

Scouts Must Be Employed

§1. To know the enemy's plans and conceal one's own has the greatest importance for victory. And scarcely anyone has been defeated in war except one who was ignorant of the enemy's design. Tomombeius lost a most valiant army and was stripped of his kingdom for almost this very reason: all his plans were betrayed.

To have known the enemy's plans is almost to have conquered. Fulvius Nobilior learned that the enemy would seize the rear of the column. He ordered the strongest legion to march first and the baggage to follow. The enemy, enticed by the opportunity, plundered the baggage. But Fulvius had directed five cohorts of the legion to the right and five to the left of the road, and they cut down the occupied enemy. Iphicrates did the same in a not dissimilar manner. Epaminondas said that nothing in a commander was more praiseworthy than to know the enemy's plans.

§2. Even amid military disturbance and slaughter, Germanicus had scouts among the Germans. Tacitus, *Annals*, book 1: "A longer route having been selected, the other things were hastened; for scouts had reported that that night was festive among the Germans and sportful with solemn banquets."

§3. Great kings sometimes go at their own peril to various places in order to learn the enemy's equipment. Saladin, hearing of the Christians' equipment, traveled through Germany, the Gauls, and Spain. Egnatius, book 9, chapter 8. More prudent in this class of action was Memnon, who sent another man with his envoy, namely a famous lyre-player to whom a multitude flocked. Polyaeus, book 5.

§4. Much less should the fortune of one's own army be unknown, for this has sometimes brought destruction. Indeed, men within the same army sometimes do not know the fortune of its parts. Brutus was victorious, while Cassius was defeated upon his own wing; and because Cassius thought that Brutus too had been defeated, he brought death upon himself. When the king of France had defeated the Swiss in Insubria, some intact formations of the Swiss thought that their own men were victorious, and on account of that error almost the whole army perished.

§5. Scouts must always be sent, but cautiously, lest after being intercepted and tortured they disclose your plans. Heraclides, under the appearance of a deserter, burned the Rhodians' dockyards.

§6. Every means, and sometimes novel stratagems, must be employed so that scouts may be discovered. When scouts were in the army of Chares, he ordered each man to seize the man nearest him and ask him his formation, standard, maniple, and mess-company. Since the scouts could not answer these questions, they were discovered. When Theognis ordered all to put on their own arms, he discovered the scouts. But when they hide among baggage-servants and merchants, those men too must be examined, for they are generally known by someone.

§7. Secret characters in letters, whether written upon the carrier's body or in some other manner, are now generally discovered. The safest course is to agree upon the characters before the parties are separated. Formerly, a Carthaginian wrote the secrets of the Romans upon a tablet covered with wax and sent them to his homeland. Demaratus the Greek gave warning of Xerxes' expedition. Gellius, book 17, chapter 9, says that letters inscribed upon heads whose hair had been shaved with a razor, and then concealed by the same hair after it had grown again, were sent to friends.

The Spartan scytale is made with remarkable art. Each party has a piece of wood of the same shape and size. A long strip of paper, like a strap, is wound around it and is then written upon. The recipient winds it around his own piece of wood, and it will reproduce the same conjunction of letters that was upon the first piece of wood. Nor can an enemy draw out any meaning unless he has learned the size of the pieces of wood.

Philip, most cunning of kings, wrote a letter to Antipater: "The Thracians have rebelled; come, leaving everything." When the Athenians intercepted it, supposing that they had received the secrets of the Macedonians and being free from concern, they withdrew their fleet. Philip's commanders passed over with no one opposing them.

There is indeed a great opportunity to delude the enemy if fictitious commands are sent to commanders. Yet to recognize them and distinguish the true from the fictitious will not be difficult if some sign known to them alone is added. Mendoza relates that during a siege a sheet enclosed in lead was given to two men, which they swallowed. The sheet was written in such a way that they themselves did not know its contents and could not disclose them even under torture; but they came to the enemy under the appearance of deserters.

Men not only intercept letters sent to allies, but also direct purported letters of the enemy to the enemy by imitating the seal and handwriting, so that they may afflict them with some error. They are accustomed to write letters for the punishment of deserters which are intended to be intercepted, so that the deserters' credit among the enemy may be destroyed and they may appear to be scouts. Conon, abandoned by his allies, sent a deserter to report that they were fleeing. When the allies perceived men lying in wait, they returned.

§8. Every method of messengers and letters pertains to reconnaissance. Necessity has devised various ways of sending out messengers and delivering letters. Pontius Cominus lowered himself down the Tarpeian Rock and, after swimming across the Tiber, arrived at Veii; afterward he returned unharmed to the Capitol. A Campanian soldier carried a letter enclosed in his belt to the Carthaginians. Letters are also enclosed in the inner part of scabbards. By letters sent upon arrows and by persuading captives that he was coming to liberate the state of the Troezenians, Cleonymus fell upon them while they were divided.

Caesar's messenger hurled letters into the camp, but there is a danger that they may not be noticed. Therefore, they are better sent through men secretly instructed for the purpose--through those who bring hay, straw, fruit, and similar things into camps. Letters are easily carried by unknown and lowly men. Eric, king of Sweden, wooed the queen of England by letters enclosed in a staff, but the Danish commander intercepted them. Harpagus inserted a letter into a hare.

§9. Scipio followed a remarkable method of reconnaissance. When Laelius was sent as envoy to Syphax, Scipio sent with him, in the place of servants, the choicest tribunes and centurions. Chasing a horse which had been let loose through the camp, they saw all its fortifications and obtained an easy victory for Scipio. The Carthaginians ordered Hamilcar to go to Alexander under the appearance of an exile and report Alexander's plans to them. The same was also done with the Romans. Cato interrogated one enemy whom he had seized and tortured concerning the enemy's plans. This is uncertain, since few generally know them.

In this matter, however, the greatest sagacity and the greatest prudence are needed. When Paulus Aemilius saw a great multitude of birds fly out of a forest all at once, he did not groundlessly judge that an ambush of Etruscans was there. By the same sign Tisamenus, son of Orestes, learned that the ridge was occupied by the enemy.

The Carthaginians seem to me to have signaled from a distance most expediently of all. For they could give a signal such that whatever was lacking could be seen at Carthage. They had made two water clocks of equal size and had also established rings at equal intervals. Upon these they had inscribed various things which they might at some time require--for example, engines, gold, grain, cavalry, and infantry. If, therefore, they requested any one of these things, when the water had descended to the ring upon which that thing was inscribed they kindled a fire. Upon seeing this and inspecting their own water clock, assistance was sent from Carthage.

Two things had to be diligently observed in this matter: first, that diligent account be taken of the turning of the water clocks; second, that the fire be made in a fixed manner and place, lest, if there were some accidental or hostile fire in the vicinity, the senate should think that assistance was being requested.

When letters are sent by pigeons, care must be taken lest the birds fall into the enemy's hands, as happened to the sultan while the Christians were besieging Ptolemais. When a signal is given by fires, contrary fires must be kindled so that the enemy may doubt whose they are. The Plataeans did this while they were being besieged by the Spartans. The enemy is especially deceived by changing signals. When the Arabs used smoke by day and fires by night to signify that enemies were approaching, they did this for successive days; but when the enemy was present, they deliberately omitted the signals. Since that omission was itself the signal to them, the enemies, thinking that they lay concealed, conducted everything with greater confidence.

CHAPTER LII

How Traitors Are to Be Endured

§1. Most men love treachery but hate traitors.

I call those men traitors who secretly surrender their homeland, prince, army, secrets, or other things to the enemy, or who share counsels with enemies for the destruction of those to whom they owe fidelity. Accordingly, those who open gates or bring about something advantageous to the enemy are called by this name. Those, however, who come from the enemy, secretly insinuate themselves, and employ fraud are not traitors. Indeed, in a just war this is a stratagem, not treachery. Such are those who secretly approach enemy places in rustic dress and by other means; they are scouts rather than traitors.

§2. Men frequently employ feigned treachery in order to draw into destruction those who know how to solicit the minds of soldiers; and thus even traitors are not easily trusted. Alcibiades, employing a fugitive, persuaded the Syracusans to leave the city, which he himself soon captured. He had an army at Catana. A fugitive asserted that the Catanians wished to crush the Greeks and could do so if they received assistance from the Syracusans. The Syracusans went to Catana with all their forces, and Alcibiades captured Syracuse undefended.

The Romans were too credulous. When they were going to free Piso, who was besieged in a tower, they heard from a fugitive the report which Mago had cunningly spread: that Piso had been captured. Terrified, they withdrew.

Guido of Friuli, while besieged, arranged that some citizens should bring certain enemies into the city through feigned treachery. He himself went out by another gate and cut down those who were outside and unprepared; then, returning, he killed or captured those who were wandering through the city intent upon plunder.

§3. When Frederick, king of Aragon, did not know in what place Robert of Naples was going to invade Sicily, he commanded certain citizens of Trapani to persuade Robert to besiege Trapani. As it happened, Frederick himself placed a garrison in it and compelled Robert to remain there throughout the summer, and even to make peace as winter approached.

Mentor, sending letters under the seal of the defeated Hermias, occupied many cities. Frederick, count of Ferrara, sent letters to the commander of Varrueal after imitating Sigismund's hand; he asked whether the commander required a garrison, and, when the latter answered affirmatively, Frederick sent his own.

§4. Care must be taken in various ways that credit be taken away from deserters; for this both restrains desertions, prevents the enemy from learning your plans, and punishes traitors. Hannibal took credit away from deserters. For when he knew that scouts of the Romans were in his camp, he publicly denied that his soldiers who had deserted to the Romans should be called deserters, since they were most skillful soldiers who, at his command, were gathering the enemy's plans. Hannibal was believed, and the genuine deserters, regarded as scouts, were sent back with their hands cut off.

It belongs to a good commander to conceal matters not only from the enemy but even from his own soldier and to deceive him. When Marcus Licinius Crassus was asked at what time he was going to move camp, he replied: "Are you afraid that you will not hear the trumpet?" With a similar plan Furius, having been cast into an unfavorable place, feigned hope in his expression and led the column around, bringing men ignorant of the danger out of it. Claudius Nero's deed was bold and then too hazardous: he kept Hannibal ignorant of it until he had killed Hasdrubal. Mithridates remained hidden from Pompey while passing by his camp. When Hamilcar was seeking Sicily, he gave out tablets which were not to be read unless the ships wandered away from the admiral's ship.

§5. Meanwhile, to use traitors also for concealing plans and to turn them to one's own use belongs to an industrious commander. Frontinus says in book 1, chapter 1:

“In the Parthian War against King Pacorus, Ventidius was not ignorant that a certain Pharnaeus, a Cyrrhestian by nation, one of those who seemed to be allies, was reporting to the Parthians everything that was being done among his own men. He turned the barbarian's perfidy to his own advantage. For he pretended to fear that those things which he especially desired to happen might happen, and to desire that those things which he feared might happen. Therefore, anxious lest the Parthians cross the Euphrates before the legions which he had beyond the Taurus in Cappadocia came to him, he carefully worked upon the traitor so that, with his customary perfidy, he would persuade the Parthians to convey their army across by Zeugma, where the route is shortest and the Euphrates flows in a confined channel. For he asserted that if they came that way he would use the advantage of the hills to elude the archers; but that he feared everything if they advanced into open plains.

“Induced by this assertion, the barbarians led their army around by the lower route. While they joined the more widely spread banks with bridges, which were for this reason more laborious, and constructed the apparatus, they spent more than forty days. Ventidius used this interval to gather his forces; and, having received them three days before the Parthian arrived, he joined battle, conquered the Parthians, and killed Pacorus.”

That opportunity is never lacking, especially when wars are among neighbors. Therefore a commander ought to institute now one thing, now another, so that he may deceive the enemy; nor is there any doubt that those who seek a reward from the other side will report it.

The deed of Titus Didius was also prudent. Distrusting the small number of his own men, when he had decided to prolong the war until the arrival of those legions which he expected and had discovered that the enemy was proceeding to meet them, Didius called an assembly and ordered the soldiers to be made ready for battle. He deliberately commanded that the prisoners be guarded rather negligently. A few of them escaped and announced to their own men that a battle was imminent. But the enemy, from suspicion of battle and lest they divide their forces, omitted to intercept those for whom they had been lying in wait. The legions reached Didius in complete safety, with no one intercepting them. Frontinus, book 1, chapter 8.

CHAPTER LIII

Moderate and Fixed Pay Must Be Established

§1. The Romans gave no pay to their soldiers for nearly three hundred years, for they sent the wealthy into battle, and these sustained military service at their own expense. Nor is it surprising that this was so, for while their kings were at home they wore them down like slaves in various works--in constructing sewers, roads, walls, and temples--so much so that many voluntarily met death. For those living so wretchedly, it was desirable to perish in war and to obtain a noble death through wounds.

Justus Lipsius, in book 5 of *On the Roman Army*, thinks that something was paid to the soldier even before this. He proves it from Dionysius, book 5, and Livy, book 9. But he thinks that it was a public contribution toward the costs of war. I add that these things were sometimes required as a reward for the soldiers, or were customarily contributed by the citizens in a necessity.

§2. Afterward, when military service was too burdensome if each man served at his own expense, pay was established in the Veientine War. It is called ὀψώνια, because it was given for buying provisions. Polybius says that foot soldiers receive two obols in pay each day, commanders of formations twice that, and cavalymen a drachma. According to the calculation of Justus Lipsius, this was ten denarii a month, that is, one philippus. It is a small payment now; at that time it was large, and, because it was new, also very welcome to the people. For that reason it also remained for a long time. But if we consider the cheapness of goods, we shall find that payment to have been by no means slight.

§3. Pay among the Greeks was generally of this kind. The Spartans promised one daric to a soldier, twice that to a centurion, and four times that to a commander, στρατηγῷ. Xenophon, book 7 of the ἀναβάσεως. The Athenians paid a drachma a day, which was more generous, for a daric is worth twenty drachmas.

§4. Every effort must be made that, just as grain was formerly given, so bread should now be given. Formerly, indeed, it was disgraceful to sell grain and to buy bread. But now, since neither grain nor bread is given, money is easily consumed, and then soldiers turn to plunder.

Four modii a month were given to a Roman soldier. This was the ration of slaves, although they sometimes received even five modii. Seneca, Epistle 71. Three times that amount was given to cavalymen, that is, twelve modii, so that they could feed two servants. The cavalymen of the allies received eight modii, because they were content with fewer servants.

§5. Meanwhile it was a golden custom to deposit money at the standards, so that the soldiers would not easily consume it and would not easily desert the standards. Vegetius discusses it in book 2, chapter 20:

“This, moreover, was divinely instituted by the ancients: from the donative which the soldiers receive, half should be sequestered at the standards and preserved there for the soldiers themselves, lest it be consumed by their comrades through luxury or the purchase of vain things. For most men, and especially the poor, spend as much as they have been able to possess. This setting aside of money is shown to be advantageous, first, to the comrades themselves; for, since they are sustained by the public ration, their camp property is increased by half from all donatives.

“Then the soldier who knows that his resources have been deposited at the standards thinks nothing of deserting; he loves the standards more and fights more bravely for them in the battle-line, in accordance with the custom of the human disposition, by which a man has the greatest care for those things in which he sees his substance to have been placed.

“Finally, ten purses--that is, ten sacks--were set up for each cohort, and this account was stored in them. An eleventh sack was also added, into which the whole legion contributed some small part, namely for burial, so that, if anyone among the comrades died, the expense of his burial might be provided from that eleventh sack. This account was preserved in a basket in the keeping of the standard-bearers, as they are now called. Therefore, standard-bearers were chosen as men not only trustworthy but also literate, who both knew how to preserve deposits and knew how to render an account to each man.”

There was often an enormous sum of money at the standards. Suetonius, in *Domitian*: “He prohibited the camps of two legions from being joined, and prohibited anyone from depositing more than one thousand sesterces at the standards, because Lucius Antonius, who was attempting a revolution in the winter quarters of two legions, seemed to have gained confidence from the sum of the deposits.”

§6. Besides these things they gave legumes, peas, lentils, and salt. Plutarch, in *Crassus*, regards it as an omen of every evil that, at the beginning, when necessities were being measured out, lentils and salt were given, because these things were regarded as funereal.

Of Carinus the emperor, Synesius says: τὸ δεῖπνον ἦν πίσινον ἔωλον ἔτνος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τεμάχια ἄττα ταρίχη κρεῶν ὑείων. His dinner was a pea porridge from the previous day, and in it were several pieces of salted pork. Spartianus counts among camp foods bacon, cheese, and sour wine.

Metellus prohibited the sale of cooked meat; the soldiers themselves roasted or boiled it. Hence a soldier’s spit and pot were among his equipment. The soldiers themselves baked bread--useless labor, since it can readily be baked by bakers for a great multitude.

§7. These things were therefore given in such a way that something was nevertheless deducted from the pay, namely a fixed price. But they were given freely to the allies; I believe that the allies received less pay from their cities.

§8. Paymasters made agreements with the soldiers and gave money and rations as loans. For each solidus they could receive half a solidus, and nothing more for the entire period of deferred payment: law *Quicumque*, Code, *On Public Receipts*; law *Iubemus*, Code, *On Disbursement*.

§9. Great mutinies have frequently arisen in armies because pay was not rendered. Many devices have also been discovered for pacifying the soldier. Sometimes men employed a wicked art. When the soldiers sought an assembly from Iphicrates on account of their pay, he secretly instructed men skilled in the Persian language and dressed in Persian garb to say that the pay was approaching and that they themselves had been sent ahead. Thus the assembly was broken off.

When Demetrius lacked pay, he enrolled twice the number of soldiers so that, once the enemy had been defeated more quickly, he might compel them to pay the soldiers. When Antigonus, after becoming victor, had previously promised that he would give one gold coin to each Gaul, the Gauls demanded payment also for their boys and women, because he had said “to each Gaul,” and threatened death to the hostages. Antigonus said that he would give it and ordered those who would receive it to come; but he detained them until the hostages were returned. Polyaeus, book 4.

§10. When the credit of the state is intact, the best course in a necessity is to strike coins from readily available material. Perdiccas struck a tin coin and gave the grain of his region in exchange for it. The Venetians at Tyre employed leather money, the senate afterward making good the public credit. When the soldier is foreign and the prince’s credit suspect, this method exasperates the army more than it pacifies it.

CHAPTER LIV

The Method of Provisions and Pay

§1. Military provisions pertain to pay or sustenance, for all things are in vain if the soldier hungers. But because an immense expenditure and great care are needed here, so that provisions may be given at the proper time and not be corrupted, I preferred to speak of the matter separately.

§2. The power of a monarch must be estimated from the multitude and ready availability of his provisions. The Turk excels in the art of war and generally observes these practices: first, always to have forces prepared; second, to forestall the enemy; third, to strike treaties with the enemy's neighbors; fourth, gradually to occupy a region; fifth, to seize useful occasions for campaigns; sixth--and this especially obstructs rulers--not to keep faith. For that is the reason why those whom he besieges defend themselves to the extremity.

Those who write about his power exalt his strength beyond measure. As far as equipment for war is concerned, they say that he indeed possesses enormous and almost incredible resources. He has innumerable cannon. From all Hungary he carried away five thousand, from Cyprus five hundred, and from La Goletta not many fewer. The engines among the Turks are of such monstrous size that they demolish walls by their noise, not merely their blow.

It is established that he has never fought with all his strength against the king of Spain, although strength should not be measured from a battle. I assert that this power would be four times greater if he took account of provisions, that is, of agriculture. For now he is often left destitute, although from Egypt alone he could feed two hundred or three hundred thousand soldiers. But God did not will so savage a tyrant to excel in all things; he diminished the fodder of so savage a beast.

§3. This, therefore, must be done: the soldiers' beggary must be prevented; they must have food and the other things whose denial causes human nature pain. But the camp should be content with little. The Persians subsisted upon bread and water and sometimes watercress; now beggars, once they have fastened a feather to their hat, seek delicacies with the greatest insolence. The emperor Avidius Cassius permitted them to carry only bacon and hardtack. Vulcatius, in *Avidius*.

As Appian says, Scipio conducted foraging with great diligence. He marked out the place which he was going to harvest and rode around it himself with selected squadrons; by this method he eluded African ambushers. Tribunes sometimes received the ration from the soldiers, which Theodosius prohibited: law *Septem*, Code, *On the Disbursement of the Military Ration*. Alexander subjected to capital punishment tribunes who did this and who had taken anything through *stellaturae*. There is also a law of Justinian: law *Secunda*, § *Pro limitaneis*, Code, *On the Office of the Praetorian Prefect of Africa*.

§4. Caesar judged it best to conquer the enemy by hunger. Corbulo preferred the mattock: "For what can be accomplished by sweat does not require blood." Caesar always acted with the greatest diligence so that want would compel the enemy to battle. Marius always provided for himself so that want of provisions could not compel him unwillingly to battle.

§5. The care of surgeons and the wounded also belongs here: there should be as many surgeons as possible in camps, so that the sick may be cared for. Great care must be taken for health, because those dwelling in close quarters very easily spread pestilence. Accordingly, air, water, soil, cold, heat, clothing, and exercises must all be directed to this end: that the soldier remain healthy and vigorous.

§6. If anyone wishes to consider the costs of war, although they increase day by day, he will be able to take an example from Ranzovius's catalogue, book 1, chapter 7.

For the support of the commander of one legion, 400 florins were given each month. For his retinue and attendants--namely, a guard of eight praetorians; a mounted guard of the same number of horsemen; one wagon; a drummer; a trumpeter; a preacher; a secretary; an interpreter; a dispatch rider; a forerunner; and so forth--200 florins were given. To the military praetor, 40 florins; to the prefect of capital matters, 40; to the prefect of the watches, 40; to the assigner of lodgings, 40; to the legionary scribe, 40; to the administrator of the court, 32; to the judicial scribe, 32; to ten commanders of formations, 20; to the prefect of baggage-servants and camp-followers, 8; to the prefect of the prison, 12; to six lictors, 48; to the executioner, 16. The sum was 1,068 florins. This sum was given each month to the commander and attendants of one legion, and amounts to 12,816 florins for a whole year.

In place of travel money or hiring money, captains received 500 florins for each cohort, and one florin and ten batzens for each soldier. As concerns the soldiers' pay, the same commander established for each month--as is also observed in decrees of the Roman Empire concerning universal contributions--four florins for a foot soldier, but twelve florins for a cavalryman.

Privileges, or rather extraordinary pay and honoraria, were established for each month for the commanders and prefects of individual cavalry cohorts, which are commonly called standards: to the commander of cavalry, 200 florins; to the master of cavalry, 100; to the legate, 32; to the standard-bearer, 50. The sum was 382 florins. Moreover, for every twelve cavalymen a packhorse and a four-horse wagon are assigned; single pay is rendered to the former, double pay to the latter.

From this, therefore, after a calculation has been instituted, we can gather in some measure what sum of money is required for the monthly or annual pay of a large or small army. Let us suppose, for example, that a certain king has decreed a war, for the conduct of which he wishes to enroll an army of 46,200 men, among whom are 6,000 cavalry and 40,200 infantry--approximately the army which one king probably leads out against another. He now deliberates with his men concerning the monthly and annual costs which the pay of so many soldiers will consume. Accordingly, from the figures just set down, he will institute a reckoning of this kind.

For 40,200 infantry.

The number of infantry constitutes 134 cohorts. According to common custom one cohort has 300 soldiers, among whom there are generally 96 recipients of double pay--namely, 82 armored pikemen who use long shafts, and 10 advance musketeers, by which name I call those who discharge larger guns of a more dreadful sound after placing them upon rests. These recipients of double pay, as their name also indicates, are entitled to two payments. Therefore, for maintaining one cohort, apart from the pay of the captain and the other prefects, 1,584 florins are required each month and 19,008 florins over the span of a whole year. Hence, for 134 cohorts, 212,256 florins will be counted for monthly pay and 2,547,072 florins for annual pay.

For the cavalry.

Six thousand cavalymen constitute twenty cohorts or standards. Three hundred cavalymen complete each cohort. Hence we shall reason thus: since twelve florins are paid to one cavalryman each month, one cohort requires 3,600 florins in one month and 43,200 florins in a whole year. The entire cavalry, however, which consists of twenty cohorts, claims for itself 864,000 florins for each month and 10,368,000 florins for a whole year. So much money must be procured for the common cavalymen, without considering commanders, chiliarchs, masters, centurions, decurions, quartermasters, curators of provisions, and other administrators of military duties.

If one now wishes to investigate how great a quantity of silver is required for the entire army, the pay of the cavalry and infantry set down in the preceding rough outline, when collected, amounts to 1,076,256 florins for a single month and 12,915,072 florins for a whole year.

Moreover, for the principal commanders and their remaining attendants, the calculation of pay proceeds approximately in this manner. The 40,200 infantry make eight legions, assigning 5,000 to each. Each legion has its own particular

head or commander and its other superior prefects, for whom, as is clear from the foregoing, monthly costs of 1,068 florins and annual costs of 12,816 florins must be collected.

If, for the individual magistrates of every cohort, 100 florins are counted as monthly pay, the cost pertaining to the lower commanders and prefects of the whole infantry will be 13,400 florins monthly and 160,800 florins annually. If the pay of the principal commanders and other legionary prefects just set down is added to these sums, the sum required for the superior as well as the inferior magistrates of the infantry comes to 14,468 florins for one month and 173,616 florins for a whole year.

The commanders and prefects of the cavalry, or of the twenty cavalry cohorts, cannot perhaps be maintained at a smaller cost. Accordingly, this sum doubled will give the pay of all those who hold command in an army of 46,200 men, though without including the supreme commander of the war: 28,936 florins in one month and 347,232 florins for a whole year.

Finally, if the preceding sum, which contains the pay of the soldiers--infantry and cavalry together--is added to these amounts, there emerges, after a fashion, the sum of sums, or aggregate of all the money that must be assigned for maintaining an army of 46,200 men: 1,105,192 florins for each month and 13,262,304 florins for a revolving year.

These figures, however, do not include the costs of cannon or of the vehicles by which pontoon bridges, ladders, rams, and other things necessary for a campaign and the storming of cities are moved; nor the costs of the horses drawing them, gunpowder, cannonballs, and reconnaissance. Experts in military affairs estimate the sum of these things as no smaller than that which pertains to maintaining the entire army. But even if the accounts are contracted as narrowly as possible, they will exceed a third part of the sum which I have stated.

Tables of pay decreed for the army to be enrolled against the Turk.

We shall now append those tables which were composed in the year just past, when a common deliberation concerning the Turkish war was undertaken among the estates of the Empire at the Diet of Regensburg.

First, it was proposed that an army of 60,000 Germans and Hungarians should be opposed to the Turks. Among them were to be 12,000 ordinary German cavalymen; 5,000 cavalymen equipped with longer firearms, whom they call arquebusiers; 12,000 Hungarian cavalymen; six legions of German infantry, which, assigning to each 4,000 soldiers or ten companies, make 24,000 infantrymen; and finally 7,000 Hungarian retainers.

For the pay of this army and its magistrates, a calculation of this kind was instituted. First, for one thousand ordinary German cavalymen--including the money to be spent upon the support of the commander, the master of cavalry, the prefect of baggage, and the decurions, and likewise the enlistment bounty and travel money, or the money with which the soldiers are first hired--17,000 florins were decreed for a month. Thus 12,000 cavalymen claim 204,000 florins for themselves each month and 2,448,000 florins in a revolving year.

Furthermore, one hundred cavalymen armed with long firearms necessarily require 1,400 florins monthly. By this reckoning, 70,000 florins monthly and 840,000 annually must be assigned to 5,000 cavalymen of this kind.

Third, since five florins must be counted out to the Hungarian cavalymen each month, 6,100 florins monthly must be assigned to one thousand cavalymen, including at the same time the chiliarch's allowance and the doubled pay of the pipers and guards. Hence, for 12,000 cavalymen of this kind, 73,200 florins must be counted monthly and 878,400 florins annually.

Fourth, if 30,000 florins are assigned each month to each legion together with the commanders' allowances, those six legions will require 180,000 florins monthly and 2,160,000 florins annually.

Finally, the monthly pay of a Hungarian retainer is two thalers. Hence, after a particular calculation has been completed--if the commanders' allowances and the doubled pay of the decurions, standard-bearers, and drummers are counted--20,620 florins monthly and 247,440 florins annually must be assigned for a force of 7,000 retainers.

Now, if all the expenses to be disbursed upon the whole army divided into these five kinds of soldiers are collected into one aggregate, the sum will come to 547,820 florins for each month and 6,573,840 florins for a revolving year.

Besides these expenses, their own costs must also be assigned to the supreme commander of the war, his legate, tribune, and the other attendants and prefects of the highest magistrates, as well as to scouts, bronze engines and those appointed to care for them, and the many other things necessary for war. Even if these are calculated most sparingly, they will equal 100,000 florins each month and 1,200,000 for a whole year. Yet not all things pertaining to the use of military artillery are included in the preceding calculation, but only their prefects and curators and the beasts appointed to draw them. If all are truly defined according to their costs, they will amount to a third of the other expenses of war.

§7. He describes provisions in this manner. For each horse six pounds of hay are given as nightly fodder; and to every nine horses as much oats as the common vessel called a *tonna*, in which herrings are pickled, holds.

To each man there are distributed daily two pounds of bread, one and one-half pounds of meat, one herring, and three measures of beer. For a whole week, two pounds of bacon, the same amount of cheese, and the same amount of butter are distributed. For a whole month, one cup of salt is distributed.

From this, a calculation of rations would have to be instituted according to the number of men. Thus, to make what we have said clear by an example, let the question be proposed how much monthly food is required for one cohort of soldiers, which according to common custom contains 300 persons. This question, solved by the rule of proportion, produces the following calculation of provisions.

For the monthly sustenance of three hundred soldiers there are due: 18,000 pounds of bread, that is, 180 hundredweights; 13,500 pounds of meat, that is, 135 hundredweights; 2,400 pounds of bacon, that is, 24 hundredweights; the same number of pounds of cheese; the same of butter; 9,000 herrings; 27,000 measures of beer, that is, 306 amphorae together with 72 measures; and 300 cups of salt.

§8. I have recounted above, in the same chapter concerning the method of naval war, the provisions for the fleet. The tables of the Danish fleet in 1567 contained: 20,854 sides of bacon; 6,040 pieces of smoked beef; 11,560 quarters of smoked mutton; 29,000 smoked geese; 104 lasts and $4\frac{1}{2}$ *tonnae* of butter; $206\frac{1}{2}$ lasts of herring; $206\frac{1}{2}$ lasts of smaller cod; 5,104 wagonloads of stockfish or hake; 16 lasts of salted pike; 16 lasts of salted eels; 16,000 sea *albicae*; 32,000 dried sea-scallops or flatfish; 32 bundles of long cod; 32 bundles of larger cod or *capitones*; 87 lasts of oats prepared for human food; $81\frac{1}{2}$ lasts of vetch; 1,366 lasts of bread, including bread twice baked; $4,741\frac{1}{2}$ lasts of beer; 10 lasts of vinegar; 24 lasts of Lüneburg salt; and 31 lasts of coarse foreign salt.

§9. In order that what is needed for one ship may be understood, let the chapter cited concerning the equipment of the Danish admiral's ship be read.

§10. It has rightly been asked whether kings should act so that the costs of war are diminished or rather increased. I indeed would prefer that they be increased, lest wars be declared more easily and promptly if they are waged at small expense. Provision has been made for human nature by the fact that a man cannot be killed without great expense: if humanity does not spare a human being, at least avarice may restrain it.

CHAPTER LV

The Roman Soldiers' Discharges Are Not to Be Approved by a Prince

§1. The lawful terms of service were twenty years for infantrymen and ten for cavalrymen. If anyone withdrew himself from military service within that time, he was either liable to death or, after being beaten, was sold. Thus Matienus, a deserter from the army, after being beaten for a long time with rods, was sold for one sestertius. The term of service of the praetorians was reduced to the sixteenth year, that of sailors extended to the twenty-fifth.

This length of time, which seemed to many to have stabilized Roman military service, caused great loss. For it made that service as hateful as possible and provided many brave men with an occasion to buy themselves out of it. For apart from the fact that it was laborious and dangerous to be exposed to various enemies for twenty or twenty-five whole years, it could not even be just that, while so many hundreds of thousands sat at home in the theater or securely attended to their fields, a few should be afflicted with perpetual military service.

I speak of those who were not volunteers but were compelled and gave in their names according to law. That inequality displayed the state as badly constituted. Why should citizens banished to the Rhine or the Danube for twenty whole years be absent from their own people, while young city-dwellers were meanwhile nourished at home in leisure?

Nor was it useful to the state. For while some were detained in wars for so long, it was necessary for the rest to become unwarlike. Thus the state was left destitute of brave men. Indeed, although many took part in twenty or thirty battles, attacked cities, fought in skirmishes, and were diminished by hunger, plague, and flight, very few at all completed their service and reached twenty campaigns--much less twenty-five, since more die in the fleet. But even if those men returned home, broken by labors or mutilated, poor, and ignorant of domestic affairs, they could accomplish little for the state. Hence mutinies arose from them not seldom.

Suetonius, chapter 49:

“Whatever soldiers there were anywhere, he bound to a fixed rule of pay and rewards, defining according to the rank of each both the periods of service and the advantages of discharge, lest after discharge they could be solicited to revolution either by age or by poverty. And so that expenditure for maintaining and rewarding them might be available perpetually and without difficulty, he established the military treasury with new taxes. And so that what was being done in each province could be announced and learned more quickly and readily, he first stationed young men at short intervals along the military roads and afterward vehicles. The latter seemed more convenient, so that those who carried letters all the way from the place could also be questioned if circumstances required anything.”

Who can doubt that the worst provision has been made for a city and kingdom in which those who sustained twenty years of the most burdensome military service are endangered by poverty?

§2. Hence benefits were devised: that they should be led into colonies, and that land and at the same time money should be given to them. But it is also burdensome to the state to enrich upon their discharge soldiers whom it had maintained with pay for twenty years.

For let us suppose that 4,000 veterans are discharged in each year, and that five iugera, agricultural equipment, and a young slave are given to each, twice as much to centurions, and three times as much to cavalrymen: this makes 25,000 iugera. If these are given for many years, it is necessary that within a short time all the soil pass to the soldiers. Nor can any state make such great distributions without injury to others.

Experience taught this so thoroughly that, when the state could not render those rewards at once, the soldiers were formally discharged and retained under the standards, exempt from all duties except battle against the enemy. Tiberius, an avaricious emperor, made discharges extremely rare, awaiting death from old age and profit from death. Hence the just complaint in Tacitus: that old men sustained thirty or forty campaigns. Nor can those men be brave who follow military service with so unwilling and sorrowful a disposition.

§3. Hence it came about that the soldiers, when they understood that they alone labored and that the strength of the empire resided in them while the rest were only a shadow, arrogated to themselves the right of naming the emperor and seized almost everyone's wealth for themselves. Hence also the saying: "Cherish the soldiers; despise the rest."

It is therefore much more equitable and safe either to accept volunteers or to shorten the term of service.

CHAPTER LVI

Truces Must Be Interposed and Observed

§1. A truce is peace in the camp, as Varro defines it. Gellius, book 1, chapter 25:

“A truce is not peace, for the war remains though fighting ceases; and we therefore think *indutiae* to be so called as though *inde uti iam*, ‘from then onward to act now.’ For a pact of truce is of this kind: that until a fixed day there should be no fighting and no harm inflicted, but that from that day onward all things should now be conducted under the law of war. Aurelius Opilius, in the first of the books which he entitled *The Muses*, defined a truce as occurring when enemies from both sides go among one another, from the one side to the other, with impunity and without fighting, so that the name seems to have been formed as though from *intus* and *introitus*, ‘within’ and ‘an entrance.’”

Truces differ from peace because peace is considered perpetual, whereas truces, however long, are defined by a fixed period. The Veientes obtained from Romulus a truce of one hundred years, afterward one of forty. Livy, book 2. Yazdegerd the Persian, appointed guardian of Theodosius the Younger, likewise made a truce of one hundred years. Nicephorus, book 14, chapter 1.

§2. Truces must not be made deceitfully so that one who is in danger may escape necessity; safety must be sought by another way. Lysander, through perfidy toward the Thasians, killed those who had favored the Athenians after he had promised them impunity. Polyaeus, book 1.

The Corcyraeans acted wickedly and after the custom of their nation. For when the captives had submitted themselves to the judgment of the Athenian people, but in such a way that the treaty which had been made would become void if they broke it, the Corcyraeans advised flight because they feared that the Athenian people would judge too leniently. Thus they were delivered to the Corcyraeans as though breakers of the treaty and were all killed. Polyaeus, book 6.

The perfidy of Galba toward the Lusitanians was remarkable: after persuading them to lay down their arms as though they were friends, he stationed them in three places and killed them. Sulla, Archelaus, and Hasdrubal acted without sufficient honor when they escaped through lies and the pretense of truces.

§3. Let truces be made upon just and equitable conditions. Brasidas the Spartan proposed excellent conditions to the Amphipolitans. For when he saw that the city could be conquered only with difficulty, he promised the Athenians the opportunity to depart, and liberty to the Amphipolitans if they entered into an alliance with the Spartans. Polyaeus, book 1.

In entering into agreements and making peace, virtue and equality should be employed instead. Scipio brought the Spaniards to his side by virtue, returning the betrothed maiden and the money which was given for her ransom. In the same manner Alexander too joined entire nations to himself.

CHAPTER LVII

Rewards Must Be Distributed to Brave Men

§1. The Romans did this, if any people anywhere did, according to Polybius. Moreover, they admirably rouse and incite young men to undertake dangers. For when an occasion for action presents itself and some of them have acted bravely or spiritedly, the commander summons all the forces to an assembly, places beside himself those who were the authors of an outstanding deed, and first recounts their praises, both for this deed and for anything else they have accomplished in their whole lives that is worthy of praise and remembrance. After this he presents a spear to the man who has wounded an enemy; to the man who has struck an enemy down and stripped him, however, he presents a bowl if he is an infantryman, and phalerae if he is a cavalryman--although in former times he presented only a spear. These rewards are received not by one who has wounded or stripped an enemy in a regular battle or in the storming of a city, but by those who, in a raid, a skirmish, or some such occasion in which there was no necessity for individual men to incur danger, have then, I say, exposed themselves to it of their own accord and voluntarily. Similarly, when a man has defended and saved a citizen or ally, the commander honors him with gifts, and the tribunes compel those who were saved--unless, indeed, they do it voluntarily--to crown their savior. The man who was saved thereafter honors him throughout his whole life as a parent and is obliged to offer and accord him all things just as if he had begotten him. By an incentive of this kind they incite to contest and rivalry amid dangers not only those who are present and hearing them face to face, but also those who remain at home. For men who have obtained gifts of this kind, besides their glory in the army and their reputation at home, enter games and processions conspicuously when they have returned to their country, since only those who have been presented with them by the commander on account of valor are permitted to wear and display these decorations. In the most conspicuous part of their houses they place the spoils as indications and testimonies of their valor. Accordingly, since such care and diligence were exercised in the camp concerning both rewards and punishments, their military successes were deservedly fortunate and illustrious. That which is of the greatest power in every state--reward and punishment--possesses universal power in military service. In these rewards, however, worth and honor reside. The following are enumerated.

The first reward: a public commendation by the commander, while the generals, tribunes, centurions, and entire army stand in a circle. This practice has now fallen into disuse, for Christians and more cultivated men are not captivated by such encomiums as rustic hearts are. Since, therefore, the danger would be equal for the timid man and the brave--indeed, greater for the timid, for the danger is always greatest to those who fear most--boldness serves as a wall. Honor, in addition, incited the brave.

The second: the *hasta pura*, or unheaded spear. Polybius calls it *γαῖσον*; it was a *δόνυ ἀσίδηρον*, “a spear without iron”:

You see that young man who leans upon an unheaded spear.

But why was it without iron? Because it was given for the sake of honor, not for fighting. This was the reward of the man who had struck down an enemy.

The third: the infantryman who struck down and stripped an enemy was presented with a bowl, the cavalryman with phalerae. In place of “bowl” Lipsius conjectures that *ψέλιον*, “armlets,” should be read. Phalerae, armlets, and torques were sometimes joined together. Am I mistaken in thinking that from this the Anakim too were formerly called *Torquati*, that is, wearers of torques?

The fourth: standards. In the Suda they are called *ὑφάσματα*, “woven fabrics,” although the word may also signify other textiles. In Vopiscus’s *Aurelian* we read that four two-colored standards were presented. After the naval victory Augustus presented Agrippa with a blue standard. Ribbons or insignia are still worn by soldiers and presented for the sake of honor; when frequently altered, they also deceive the enemy.

The fifth: various crowns. The civic crown was given to the man who had saved a citizen and killed an enemy; the siege crown, made of grass, when an army had been released from a siege; the mural crown to the man who had first mounted a wall; the camp crown to the man who had first mounted the enemy's camp, and this was also called the vallary crown; the naval crown to the man who had first set fire to an enemy ship; and the rostral crown to the man who had gained some great distinction at sea. The civic crown was made of oak, the siege crown of grass, and the others of laurel. Other crowns of gold were also frequently given for other deeds. Sometimes these rewards were given to whole maniples.

The sixth: oxen. Thus Scipio presented Laelius with a golden crown and thirty oxen.

§2. These rewards were powerful not only through their worth and the honor attending them when they were given, but were also useful for the future. For, first, they formed a step toward more honorable and more lucrative military service. This is still observed altogether, except where military service has been corrupted. The rewards involved in promotions were immense. Vegetius, book 2, chapter 21. Alexander gave great rewards to those who contended--namely, chiliarchies. Alexander ab Alexandro, book 1, chapter 20.

They were carried in front in a triumph, and indeed always. Valerius, book 3, chapter 2, relates of Sicinius: "Having followed nine triumphal chariots of commanders, he turned the eyes of the entire citizen body upon himself by the numerous procession of his gifts. For there were carried before him eight golden crowns, fourteen civic crowns, three mural crowns, one siege crown, 183 torques, 160 armlets, eighteen spears, and twenty-five phalerae"--decorations numerous enough even for a legion, much more for one soldier.

They were displayed not only in a triumph but also in the review of the cavalry--indeed, even when a man stood in danger, as Manlius Capitolinus did. Livy, book 6: "He not only recalled the distinctions of war but also brought them forth to be seen: the spoils of as many as thirty slain enemies, as many as forty gifts from commanders, among which were two conspicuous mural crowns and eight civic crowns. In addition, he produced the citizens he had saved from the enemy, among whom Gaius Servilius, master of the cavalry, was named although absent. And when he had recounted also the things done in war, matching the grandeur of the achievements with magnificent words in his speech, he bared his breast, distinguished by scars received in war. Repeatedly looking toward the Capitol, he called Jupiter and the other gods down to the aid of his fortunes and prayed that they would give the Roman people in its hour of peril the same spirit which they had given him when he protected the Capitoline citadel for the safety of the Roman people. He entreated them, individually and collectively, to look upon the Capitol and the citadel and so turn to the immortal gods when they passed judgment concerning him."

These rewards also opened an approach to public office. Livy, book 23: the senate was replenished from those who had been aediles, tribunes, or quaestors, or had received the civic crown. Finally, in the public games men attracted notice by relying upon their gifts.

Among us not only are insignia given, but men of the plebeian order are made knights and are presented with insignia and nobility. The lawful distribution of spoils also belongs among rewards.

Spoil is most advantageously divided equally, as was the custom among the Romans. Dionysius, book 7: "You all know that whatever spoils and booty we obtain from the enemy through our valor, the law commands all of it to be public property. Not only does a common soldier or any private person have no right to it; not even the commander himself does. Rather, the quaestor receives it, sells it, and deposits the money in the public treasury. Since we have inhabited this city, no one has--I will not say broken--but not even censured this law." Lycurgus forbade soldiers to strip their enemies, lest a soldier become rich and abandon the fighting. This was entirely disadvantageous, because he took away an incentive to fight.

And Polybius, book 10: "The Romans have the following custom and system in the storming of towns. At one time they divide the forces each day according to the size of the city, at another time they distribute them by maniples, but

in such a way that they never employ more than half for this work. The rest remain in their ranks as reserves, sometimes outside the city, sometimes within it, yet so that they are always kept visible. Since the forces are usually divided into two Roman legions and two allied wings--for rarely do all four legions assemble together--all who have been assigned to booty and plunder carry whatever they have acquired, each to his own legion or wing. When this has been done, the tribunes divide it equally among all, not only among those who were on guard or held in reserve, but also among those who guarded the camp, and likewise among the sick, the wounded, or those sent elsewhere upon some duty. As soon as they come into the camp to go to war, they all swear that they will neither defraud nor withhold anything from the spoil. I have spoken of this matter at greater length in what I have written about the state. Moreover, when half the soldiers scatter after spoil in this way, while half preserve their ranks and guard and support them, it never happens that the Roman imperils the supreme issue. For, because the hope of gain is assured equally to all, whether they remain or engage in plunder, no one deserts his place or rank--a thing which often tends to harm others."

Citizens and allies shared the spoil in equal portions. This was done at that time; afterward it was changed, and the soldier was incited by the desire for spoil. At present it can scarcely be done otherwise, since there are such diverse nations in a single army.

CHAPTER LVIII

Military Punishments

§1. In military service--that is, in restraining men whom no piety or justice draws back from crime--great severity of punishments is needed; for unless fear is present, everything must necessarily go to ruin.

The first kind of punishment was a fine, and the power to exact a pledge so that it would be paid rested with the tribune. Polybius. The same also remains in present armies, although it is scarcely expedient to employ it, because every very wicked man is also very needy.

The second: if a man had neglected his watches, he was beaten with a cudgel. Polybius. The punishment is of this kind. Taking a cudgel, the tribune lightly touches and grazes the condemned man. When this has been done, all who are in the camp strike him, some with cudgels and others with stones, and kill most of them within the camp. But if anyone escapes, he will not be safe even so. How could he be, when there is neither a return to his country for him nor anyone among his relatives who will receive him under a roof? Thus those whom this calamity has overtaken perish most completely.

The third: they were exposed to swords, although this was rare. Tacitus, *Annals*, book 1: "The legions stood in assembly with drawn swords; the accused was displayed upon the platform by the tribune. If they acclaimed him guilty, he was cast headlong to them and slaughtered, and the soldiers rejoiced in the killings as though absolving themselves." Now they are shot with the firearms of their comrades, and this death is considered more honorable.

They are handed over to the soldiers to be killed so that the odium may rest upon them, not upon the commanders. Alexander handed over to a cohort those whom he wished to be killed by tortures, so that the others might prove their loyalty by cruelty.

The fourth punishment: the Macedonians buried men beneath stones. Curtius, book 6: "At the given signal, all who had been named by Nicomachus were buried beneath stones according to the custom of their country."

The fifth: those who had abandoned their rank were struck with the axe. Livy, book 2: the consul Appius scourged with rods and beheaded the centurions and soldiers receiving double pay who had abandoned their rank. An entire legion which had occupied Rhegium was beheaded. They are now struck down with the sword; rods are not customary in military service.

The sixth: to mitigate the punishment of death, bloodletting was devised, which was customarily performed for the sake of disgrace. Gellius, book 10, chapter 8: "This too was a military punishment in antiquity: to order a soldier's vein to be opened and his blood released for the sake of disgrace. The rationale of this practice is not found in the ancient writings which I, at least, have been able to discover. But I think this was first done to soldiers whose minds were benumbed and had declined from their natural condition, so that it seemed not so much a punishment as a remedy. Later, however, I believe that through custom the same was repeatedly done for many other offenses, as though all who offended were regarded as less than sane."

Other offenses were also punished. Polybius speaks of them in this manner: "Soldiers ought to pay attention and hearken to the tribunes, and the tribunes to the consuls. A tribune nevertheless has the right and power to fine, exact a pledge, and scourge. The prefects have the same power over the allies. The man who has stolen anything from the camp is beaten with a cudgel, as is the man who has borne false witness, the man who is discovered in the prime of life to have abused his body, and likewise the man who has been fined three times for the same fault. They punish acts of this sort as crimes. But they ascribe the following to cowardice and military disgrace: if any falsely report to the tribunes some brave deed of their own for the sake of honor and reward; if any who have been placed in a guard post

or station desert their place through fear; or if anyone has cast away some part of his arms in the very crisis through fear. As a result, some men in guard posts deliberately perish when greater numbers rush upon them, since they are afraid to desert their post for fear of this punishment. Some, even in the very conflict, if by some accident a shield or sword or another weapon has been knocked from them, hurl themselves upon the enemy, resolved either to recover what they have lost or, by dying, to escape manifest disgrace and the reproaches of their own men.”

The seventh: sometimes men are summoned to punishment by lot. Polybius: “But if it happens that a larger number have offended and that several maniples have abandoned their post together, they do not wish to beat them all with cudgels or kill them. Instead, they have discovered a measure and procedure at once expedient and terrifying. For the tribune summons the army, brings the guilty men into the midst, and sharply accuses them. He then chooses by lot sometimes five, at other times eight or twenty--in short, always considering the size of the multitude so that they amount to approximately a tenth part of the offenders--from among all the cowards. Those upon whom that lot has fallen he beats with the cudgel, without any possibility of entreaty, in the manner already described. Measuring out barley instead of wheat to the rest, he orders them to pitch their tents outside the rampart and the protection of the camp. Thus, because the danger and fear arising from the lot hang equally over all, and likewise because the example of the barley given reaches all, that custom produces the greatest measure both of terror and of correction.”

This was decimation, customary among the Romans, which they sometimes changed into punishment of every twentieth or every hundredth man. Capitolinus, in his *Macrinus*: “When he suffered military mutinies, he decimated the soldiers much more often; sometimes he even ‘centesimated’ them”--which is his own peculiar word--“because he said that he was merciful when he punished every hundredth of those who deserved decimation.”

The eighth: they were struck with a cudgel, or with a vine staff, by a centurion, sometimes severely. Catiline beat M. Marius with vine staffs throughout the whole city while the Roman people looked on. It is still the custom to strike with a cudgel, although not in the ancient manner.

The ninth: they were scourged with rods if, though liable to capital punishment or deserving it, they were permitted to discharge their debt with a milder penalty.

The tenth: to be fed with barley. Augustus decimated cohorts which had yielded their position and fed them barley. Suetonius, book 24. That punishment is not in use, just as decimation is not.

The eleventh: a soldier was said *aere dirui* or *aes resignari* when his pay was denied and his years of service did not advance. Valerius, book 2, chapter 7: “Consider how severely the senate regarded the fact that the soldiers had allowed the consul Quintus Petillius to be killed while fighting most bravely against the Ligurians. For it refused to allow the year to count toward the legion’s term of service or to give it pay.”

The twelfth: to pitch camp outside the rampart. Livy, book 10, shows that they were also deprived of tents. And Valerius, book 2, chapter 7: “They decreed that none of them should pitch his quarters within the camp, or fortify with rampart or ditch the place assigned outside it, or have a tent made of hides. They offered a return to their former military rank if anyone took two sets of spoils from the enemy.”

The thirteenth: they were ordered to stand ungirded before the praetorium or in the headquarters, or to dig a ditch, clad only in a tunic for the mockery of all. Caesar Julian led men clothed in women’s dress through the camp, thinking that this punishment would be more grievous to men than death. Charondas ordered those who had not taken up arms for their country to sit in the forum for three days in women’s clothes.

The fourteenth kind of punishment, the gravest among the moderate ones: to change a man’s kind of service. Cavalrymen were reduced to infantrymen, and infantrymen to slingers. Livy, book 25; Valerius, book 2; Ammianus, books 24, 25, and 29. If they failed in their duty in some respect, they were thrust down into an inferior branch of service. Captives returned by Pyrrhus were reduced from cavalryman to infantryman and from infantryman to light-armed soldier, and were ordered to pitch camp outside the rampart until each had taken two sets of spoils from

the enemy. Otacilius employed the latter punishment against those whom Hannibal had sent under the yoke. Domitius Corbulo ordered them to redeem disgrace by valor.

The fifteenth: to take their dinner standing, for they always took their midday meal standing. Even now they are compelled to stand for many hours burdened with large firearms if they have committed some offense.

The sixteenth: it was also a military punishment to furnish a spear. Festus: it was called *censio hastaria* when, as a fine for a military offense, a soldier was ordered to furnish spears.

The seventeenth: to march among the baggage. Ammianus, book 25: "After taking away the standards and breaking their spears, he imposed upon all who were accused of having fled the requirement to march among the baggage, packs, and captives."

The eighteenth: they were also compelled to winter outside camps and towns. Livy, book 35; Valerius, book 2, chapter 7.

The nineteenth: among the Egyptians it was established by law that the tongue of the man who disclosed secret counsels to the enemy should be cut out.

The twentieth: among the Romans hands were sometimes cut off. Ammianus, book 29; Livy, book 35. Indeed, even legs were cut off. Ammianus, book 23: "Let each man follow his own standards, knowing that if he remains behind anywhere he will be left there with his legs cut off."

The twenty-first: at times a more severe punishment was to be raised upon a cross. Livy, book 30: "Those who were of the Latin name were struck with the axe; the Romans were raised upon crosses." A man who deserts to the enemy is tortured and condemned to the beasts.

The twenty-second: at times they were also deprived of burial. Valerius Maximus, book 2, chapter 7.

The twenty-third: Ammianus, book 29, says that deserters were burned. The tribune Hortarius was burned because he had written certain things to the enemy. Ammianus, at the passage cited, and book 21. Those who had given barbarians the opportunity to plunder, or had divided the booty with them, were burned alive.

The twenty-fourth: the emperor Avidius Cassius tied condemned men from top to bottom upon a stake 120 feet long, killing some by fire, others by smoke, and some by fear.

The twenty-fifth: men were also killed beneath a hurdle. Livy, book 4.

The twenty-sixth: they were also killed with arrows, as men now are with firearms. These punishments were unusual.

The twenty-seventh: Macrinus ordered a tribune who had allowed the watches to be deserted to be tied upon a wheeled cart and dragged, both alive and dead.

The twenty-eighth: Aurelian tied an adulterous soldier by the feet to the tops of two trees which had been bent down; when the trees were suddenly released, the man was torn apart and hung from both. Vopiscus, in his *Aurelian*.

The twenty-ninth: Macrinus also enclosed in ox carcasses two soldiers who had violated the chastity of their host's maidservant; the heads of the beasts were cut off so that the men could speak with one another more easily.

§2. Punishments were often great even where the faults were not great; their end, however, was discipline. The saying of Clearchus is ancient: "The commander should be feared more than the enemy." A soldier who refuses battle is punished capitally. Gaius Vacienus cut off the fingers of his left hand so that he would not have to serve, and was punished by confiscation of his goods. In Trajan's time, a father who rendered his son unfit for war was deported. Ammianus, book 15.

Avidius Cassius ordered centurions to be raised upon crosses because, without his command, they had killed three thousand Sarmatians who were behaving incautiously with only a few soldiers; he said that an ambush might have lain beneath it. Atilius Regulus ordered a fleeing army to be beaten. Cato put to death a soldier who, having been left behind after the fleet had sailed, begged to be taken aboard. When Valerius was consul, a defeated army was ordered to pass the winter under tents. Titus Scaurus forbade his son, because he had yielded his position, to come into his sight; through shame at the disgrace, the son procured death for himself.

Metellus Macedonicus ordered five cohorts which had yielded to the enemy to make their wills, and sent them back to recover the position, threatening that they would not be received except after victory. Manius Curius ordered a legion which had refused the war to cut straw while ungirded, abolished its standards and its name, and enrolled its men in the other legions as replacements. Lucius Piso ordered a cohort prefect to stand daily in the headquarters with the belt of his toga cut, his tunic loosened, and his feet bare, and to abstain from banquets and baths. Corbulo ordered Aemilius Rufus, a prefect of cavalry, to stand in the headquarters with his clothing torn.

In general, military service itself was a punishment, since the soldiers were compelled to labor even without necessity. For Publius Nasica, lest the soldiers decline or become corrupted in the idleness of winter quarters, ordered a fleet to be built.

CHAPTER LIX

Ancient Military Service Compared with Ours as Regards Arms

§1. It is worthy of inquiry and useful, not merely pleasant, to ask whether ancient military service is comparable with ours. Many admire everything ancient and despise our own things. Others walk a middle path; some disdain ancient military service in comparison with ours. There are five things to be considered in military service: namely, the levy, organization, arms, the battle line, and discipline. I have spoken about the levy: ours is more expeditious and, if the other things are added, is a levy of the best soldiers, because it consists of volunteers. Although a great part of the soldiers is drawn from the dregs of mankind, many princes, counts, noblemen, and rich men nevertheless enroll in military service and bring it about that this refuse of the common people is governed and submits to organization and discipline. Concerning organization also there is no question: the ancients have theirs and our men ours, but ours is exact and in part better, since they place the best men at the front and intend men under pressure not to yield but to be aided by those who come to their support. The question, therefore, concerns arms.

§2. Justus Lipsius is regarded as a most prudent judge of these matters, and he inclines strongly toward the ancients. Against our firearms he sets slings and javelins. First, he says that the lead was liquefied. Lucretius:

A leaden bullet too,
rolled through a long course, grows liquid.

Ovid:

It burned no otherwise than when the Balearic sling
casts lead: it flies and grows incandescent as it goes,
and beneath the clouds finds fires which it did not possess.

Lucan:

Then firebrands and stones fly, and bullets, loosened through the expanse
of air and melted by their hot weight.

Statius:

Bullets destined to burn through the void of heaven.

Indeed, the same poet compares them with a thunderbolt:

The flying bullets imitate lightning.

Perhaps you do not put faith in poets? Let our philosopher Seneca join them: "Motion thins the air, and the thinning kindles it. Thus a bullet cast from a sling liquefies, and through the friction of the air drips as though by fire." Something of this kind is also written elsewhere in Aristotle. Yet this does not destroy the force of the missile; rather, it came fiery into the body in this manner.

Virgil:

And with liquefied lead he cleaves the middle of his adversary's temples
and stretches him out, extended over a great space of sand.

Behold, it kills with one blow. Nor do I marvel at David, who as a young man and one of the slingers struck down the enormous Goliath with this weapon. And so that you may know its force once for all and fully, take these words of Diodorus Siculus about the Balearic islanders:

βάλλουσι λίθους πολὺν μείζους τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτως εὐτόνως, ὥστε δοκεῖν τὸ βληθὲν ἀπὸ τινος καταπέλτου φέρεσθαι.

“They cast stones”--for you know that stones too, and not only lead, were sent from the sling--“much larger than other men do, so powerfully and vigorously that the missile seems to be carried from some catapult.” As you see, he compares it with an engine of war, and he adds:

ὥστε θυρεοὺς καὶ τὰ κράνη καὶ πᾶν σκεπαστήριον ὅπλων συντρίβειν.

“So that they shatter shields, helmets, and every covering of armor.” I deny--deny--that our firearms can have greater force, perhaps not even equal force. I except those which they call muskets. Now in one respect slings certainly prevail: they are carried much farther and do harm. Which of our firearms preserves its direction and force beyond two hundred or three hundred feet? It loses force or strays if you extend the range. But the sling’s missile carried and retained force to six hundred feet, as is clearly written in Vegetius: “Archers or slingers,” he says, “placed brooms--that is, bundles of brushwood or grass--as a mark, so that they were six hundred feet distant from the mark, in order that they might more often strike the mark with arrows or at least with stones aimed from the staff-sling.” Here he joins the sling with arrows and gives both the distance which I stated; others even place slings ahead of arrows and maintain that their missiles travel farther. In Strabo you will read, *μακροβολωτέραν τὴν σφενδόνην ἢ τόξον*: “that the sling casts farther than the bow.” In Dio:

οἱ σφενδονῆται μακροτέρω τῶν τόξων ἰέντες, πάντα καὶ τῶν καταφράκτων ἱππέων ἐλυμαίνοντο.

“The slingers, casting farther than the archers, injured every man, even among the cuirassed cavalry.” He says this in his account of Marcus Antonius’s campaign against the Parthians, who nevertheless, it is agreed, were well armed and employed arrows with the greatest skill. Yet the slings prevailed over them, as Xenophon too expressly writes in his account of his Greeks:

μακρότερον γὰρ οἱ τε Ῥόδιοι τῶν Περσῶν ἐσφενδόνων καὶ τῶν πλείστων τοξοτῶν.

“For the Rhodians slung farther than the Persian slingers, and indeed farther than most of the archers.” They therefore cast far; but did they also cast accurately? Everyone affirms it, especially concerning the Balearic islanders, and says that they had learned those aimed blows from infancy. Indeed, it is also read in the Holy Scriptures that the inhabitants of Gibeah, numbering seven hundred, cast stones so accurately with slings that they could strike even a hair.

He extols the force of slings because the lead liquefies, because it cleaves the temples, because a sling-stone breaks shields and helmets, and because the force of the blow is carried to six hundred feet. The blow is also accurate, for the Gibeonites could strike even a hair.

Those forces seem great to me, but by no means equal to our firearms. For lead’s growing liquid or a reed’s burning is an indication of great violence, but not the greatest. Acestes casts into the air, and what happens is regarded as a portent:

For the flying reed burned amid the liquid clouds,

marked its path with flames, and, consumed,

withdrew into the thin winds.

Yet that reed was not carried more violently than our wall-breaking artillery, whose balls do not mark their path with flames, although sometimes combustible things are present. But, to confess the truth, the matter of the flame and the liquefied lead leaves me doubtful. Motion thins the air and renders it hot; but it is difficult to understand how heat so vehement could arise at such speed and in so very brief a time when the missiles do not strike a hard body. Experience,

indeed, testifies to the contrary. Those struck by slings and arrows are harmed by a wound, not by a burn. But if the temples are cleft by liquefied lead, they must necessarily be burned and, when scorched, give off the smell of burning. If lead liquefies, iron also, when it is sent more violently from an engine, ought to grow incandescent, for the force of a firebolt cast from an engine is greater than that of a bullet from a sling. But experience teaches that the iron is not hot, for, when lodged in shields and wounds, it would burn them and destroy the wounded with immense pain. As it is, however, no one complains of burning but of the wound. Even those wounded with muskets, although the leaden pest remains lodged in their viscera, are nevertheless not burned; and yet the bullets from fire-vomiting engines ought to be hotter. The arms of the ancients, therefore, ought not to be preferred because their missiles take fire. Otherwise, when we strike a spark from flint, we would have to believe that its impetus was greater than when an artillery piece is discharged. Another cause of these effects must therefore be sought, which is not part of my undertaking. This is sufficient: ignition is not a sign of the greatest violence.

His argument from what is said about the breaking of shields is better. But not even on this account ought slings to be preferred to our artillery. In Virgil a brave warrior cleaves the temples with liquefied lead. And:

We have seen Goliath, fearsome in body and spirit,
fall by a feeble hand; against him a boyish right hand
hurled a little stone with the whirring of a sling,
and pierced his bare forehead with a penetrating wound.

The stone lodged in the Philistine's forehead; but if David had used a firearm, the blow would have passed through the whole head and, carried far onward, would also have wounded another man in its path. Lipsius therefore deservedly grants greater force to muskets. As for what Diodorus Siculus relates about the Balearic islanders, it is not remarkable that large stones broke defenses of bronze which were borne against pila and arrows, since the coverings were not very strong. Meanwhile, I deny that, once the coverings were broken, the stones penetrated bodies; the force of the blow was broken by the coverings. Slings therefore did not penetrate bodies which were moderately covered but struck them and harmed them in the manner of stones hurled by hand. Hurdles, cloaks, and the curtains of tents were placed in their way. As to Vegetius's statement that a sling casts to six hundred feet, it is certain that firearms carry their blow farther, and a blow which penetrates. A sling will not pierce a board one inch thick, but an iron ball will pass through many at once.

It is agreed, moreover, that slingers cast farther than archers. For Homer's Ulysses sufficiently shows that arrows did not carry their blow far:

δουρι δ' ἀκοντίζω ὅσον οὐκ ἄλλος τις οἴστω.

"But with a spear I cast as far as no other man does with an arrow." Certainly no one casts a spear so that it flies beyond the range of an artillery piece. At times a pilum or arrow passed through shield and cuirass, but more frequently it remained lodged in them. So that you may see clearly how greatly our firearms excel arrows, two matters must be considered. First, pila and arrows lodged in shields so that they often burdened the bearer. But those shields were made of boards, wickerwork, and leather, all of which are playthings if referred to our military service; the smallest handgun, of the size of a palm, would penetrate them. Thus two thousand musketeers would easily defeat two veteran Roman legions drawn up in formation and armed in their own manner. But if one chose to set cavalry against them, one thousand cuirassiers would suffice against ten thousand men, or two legions, because Roman coverings do not withstand firearm balls and cavalymen need not come within the cast of a missile.

Bernardino de Mendoza, part 1, chapter 52, teaches how great the forces of our firearms are: "At that time I presented to His Majesty an artillery piece of a new kind, cast from metal, whose price is forty crowns and whose weight is thirty pounds. The ball which it casts is one pound. It is, however, carried with such violence that it passes through a wall

two geometrical feet thick. This is remarkable, since the instrument is so light and the ball heavy in proportion to it. Moreover, it does not easily grow incandescent, which is to be valued greatly. These pieces can be useful in a fleet, even if the ships are small, nor do the sides of any ships seem so strong that they will not perforate them. If several are joined together, they can also be employed in breaking walls.” So great is the force of a firearm. Finally, with whatever force you hurl a sling-bullet against a tree, it rebounds; every firearm ball lodges in it. No other proof is required. It is permissible to set up anyone who denies this as the target. Nothing is more violent than the petard, which was invented a few years ago, for it carries off and bursts through gates. Ignited powder casts down mountains and ramparts together with their bastions.

§3. From this I also conclude that Roman arms ought not to be taken up again or mixed with ours. The outstanding judgment of all our commanders maintains this against certain writers, for they care neither for arrows, nor javelins, nor pila. First, because a pilum can be seen, it can easily be avoided. Second, pila can scarcely be cast beyond forty paces; the pilum-men can therefore be killed before they can harm the enemy.

§4. Besides the fact that the Roman legion cannot inflict harm, it is also naked if set against our firearm troops; therefore it can in no way hold its ground.

§5. Strength of body was required in Roman and Greek military service; in most parts of ours, dexterity is required instead. Provided that men know how skillfully to brandish a sword and handle a firearm, they easily learn the rest.

§6. The shield was the principal defense of ancient military service, and therefore ἀσπίζειν καὶ ὑπερασπίζειν, “to shield and to shield on behalf of,” is applied by a Greek proverb to every kind of defense. But now no shield can be made which is trustworthy and turns away the iron balls of muskets or their leaden ones. For since a shield, so that it may cover the whole man when he inclines slightly, has a length of four feet, as Lipsius teaches in book 3 of *On the Roman Military*--and since a larger one exceeds this by a palm, while its breadth is two and a half feet--a soldier cannot carry such a shield by hand at the present time, because it must be four times thicker than it was formerly. For it must be made either of willow, fig, linden, birch, elder, or poplar, from which shields were made formerly, or of hard woods, oak, heart-of-oak, or cedar. If it is made of the softer woods, it must be one foot thick, for a musket-ball penetrates beyond that. If it is made of heart-of-oak, the wood will be heavier than can conveniently be carried, turned, and employed in defense. But if the shield is made of bronze or iron, the plate must necessarily be of a thickness which is excessively heavy for one hand. We easily gather that the shields of the ancients were not very thick from the fact that they were often made of wickerwork and covered with hides, and even those were considered heavy. Theocritus:

Ἀχθόμενοι σακέεσσιν βραχίονας ἰτείνουσιν.

“Their arms burdened by wicker shields.” But it would be ridiculous to set men armed with these against our firearms.

§7. Our soldiers generally cannot be sufficiently protected against firearm shots. For the armor of the ancients is useless, since it is easily penetrated. If it is made twice or four times stronger, it will be useless because of its weight. It has therefore seemed better to have unencumbered soldiers than immobile ones. Accordingly, our military service is more dangerous than ancient service. Although in former times men sometimes fought for whole days, battles now are concluded very rapidly, because naked men clash with naked men. More steadfast spirits are therefore required in it.

§8. Hence those who have the greatest number of cuirassed cavalymen easily conquer, because, trusting in their defenses, they break through everything with the greatest boldness.

§9. Finally, this one thing must be lamented in our military service: although in former times defensive arms by which bodies were covered were devised against every offensive weapon with which life was assailed, now, so many years after firearms were invented for the killing of man, no cuirass or shield has yet been invented which can protect a man while he fights and charges. So much more ingenious is human nature for its own destruction than for its safety. But if any king could make an impenetrable shield or cuirass from some mixture of metals and of moderate weight, assuredly with one army he would easily obtain dominion over the world.

CHAPTER LX

The Discipline of Our Soldiers Compared with That of the Romans

§1. Justus Lipsius, in his commendation of Roman discipline, says that Justice, Chastity, and Innocence dwelt in their camps. Nor can I deny that many things among them were excellent. But I deny that their observance of laws and discipline was much better than ours. There are some examples of integrity but more of wickedness, and that vigor of discipline was frequently interrupted. Concerning the justice of the soldiers there is nothing to debate. It was said of those of old: "Law is where the reward is greatest." Marius denied that he had been able to hear the laws amid the din of arms. I understand their chastity much less, since fornication was freely permitted them. Women, indeed, were kept away from the camps of the Romans. Their successors too preserved this rule. A law of Frederick I says:

No woman shall be with us in our camps;
whoever is found guilty will depart, stripped of his spoils,
shamefully, and she will be mutilated in her nose, once restored.

But a more grievous crime nevertheless existed among the pagans. Scipio expelled two thousand prostitutes from the camp at Numantia, but the same Lipsius denies that they were women. What purpose did it serve to commend a chastity which dishonored the male sex by an unspeakable crime?

No other innocence greatly worthy of commendation remains, even while the state was uncorrupted.

§2. Our own practices, therefore, which possess so many soldiers who fear God, appear not to deserve contempt. For there are very many historical records even from the present age. This is an argument for their innocence: among the Romans very many commanders were killed by their armies; among our men this is scarcely heard of. Their organization also is not inferior today, although perhaps more costly.

§3. If we compare laws with laws, there is no doubt that ours are holier. If we compare customs with customs, judging from the observance of the laws, there are some matters in which we are surpassed; in most we surpass them. Those who are eulogists of time past and disdainful of the present will laugh at this. But I, unless I am mistaken, will prove it with the aid of the good God.

THE MILITARY LAWS, THEREFORE, ARE AS FOLLOWS.

I.

Let them not blaspheme; let them punish blasphemers; and let them swear that, where they have offended, they will pay a fine. Year 1530.

But the whole system of German military service was set down in the year 1570, and constitutions were made by the emperor and the princes. I shall present them at the end of the book, preserving the order of the articles, so that it may plainly appear that we by no means lack good laws, but sometimes lack the practice of the laws.

First, after the cavalrymen have thoroughly trained their soldiers through preliminary exercises, and have equipped each and every one of them both with belts, sleeves, cloaks, breastplates, gloves, and helmets suitable for fortifying and covering them, and also with two smaller handguns ready to hand, let them come with those men to the place and at the time appointed and established by Us and the Holy Empire for the army to be mustered. There, after receiving half a month's pay as enlistment money, let them render their faithful and steadfast service during the three months immediately following the levy, and in the other months which follow thereafter, for as long as it shall be necessary to Us and the Empire.

II.

Before the army is led out upon campaign, let N. kreuzers be paid to them for each horse and for each wagon. Let them notify the recruiting officers, in accordance with the oath by which they are bound, of the beginning of their departure, and let them advance four miles each day; nevertheless, let it be permitted at times to halt in order to take some rest.

III.

They shall thus proceed to the review of arms to await the levy. If it is deferred longer, let N. kreuzers be added for each horse for as many days as intervene, besides the expense of the wagons.

IV.

And so that their expedition may be more expeditious and entangled in no difficulty, the magistrates of every place to which they turn aside shall establish a tolerable rate for public innkeepers. Thus, being content with N. kreuzers for a cavalryman and horse and N. kreuzers for a wagon and horses, let them neither exact a greater price for lodging nor escape punishment for their exaction. Meanwhile, we desire our cavalymen no less to remember moderation, so that they demand nothing beyond a sufficiently moderate and fitting table.

V.

At the beginning of the march, let the commander of the army and the master of the cavalry divide the cavalry into squadrons, and let them place over each squadron a decurion or a designated man. They shall arrange for the name of one or the other to be proclaimed and recorded in every place through which they march. From this it may be known, if complaints are lodged concerning any violence committed by the cavalymen or any injury done to the inhabitants, against whom punishment must be taken according to the nature of the offense, either by bodily penalty or diminution of pay, so that the man who suffered the loss may be compensated.

VI.

After the muster has been held, one month's pay shall be paid immediately to the cavalymen--namely, N. florins for each horse approved at the levy--and likewise for a baggage wagon, the master of the decury, and other necessities, as is established in the agreements made.

VII.

Together with the levy, the month of meritorious service shall begin immediately and shall be completed by the passage of thirty days, whether they are dismissed by Us or the Holy Empire as no longer necessary a short or a long time afterward.

VIII.

To men who arrive after the first levy, at which we desire every man to be present with his men in readiness, neither shall a second levy be granted nor shall We or the Empire owe anything, unless manifest impediments arising from marriage have created the delay for some of them. But if any of the enrolled cavalymen should bring more men than the number prescribed or permitted to him allows, wishing them nevertheless to be supported equally with the others, let him understand that We will be bound to him on no account and that the Empire will incur no obligation.

IX.

If, after the army has been mustered, We or the Empire should dismiss them as superfluous within or before the completed space of three months--in the first or second month, of which correspondingly fewer or more days will have passed--the pay for three months shall nevertheless be paid to them in full, although their departure is to be computed. On the other hand, a particular accounting shall be made if dismissal is given at any time in the third month.

X.

Whatever number of draft horses a man lacks from the prescribed number at the levy, the commissioners shall deduct the corresponding amount from his money. It shall be their responsibility to supply every deficiency among horses of this sort, whether their failing strength gives out or death leaves them broken down. Nevertheless, those which have fallen at the hands of the enemy shall be reckoned as whole and sound for the entire month and afterward replaced by others free from every defect.

XI.

If some exigency of war should demand the cavalrymen's wagons, especially at a time when they can do without them without notable loss, let them willingly surrender the wagons and obey the common necessity.

XII.

Let no one harness to a wagon a coursing horse which has been examined and approved, unless necessity demands it and the master, being informed, gives his consent. He shall not be impelled to grant this except by a matter of very great importance.

XIII.

Let each master lead approximately three hundred men beneath his own standard, according to the judgment and regulation of the recruiting officers and commanders.

XIV.

The master of a squadron shall be paid one florin each month for every horse approved through the levy.

XV.

Over every fifty men let their own decurion be placed, whose pay shall be twenty-five florins. Likewise, let a baggage horse be attached to every twelve horses, and let six florins be expended upon it. Let there also be allotted, above ordinary pay, thirty-two florins to the lieutenant; twenty-four to the standard-bearer; twelve apiece to each of two trumpeters, as also to the scribe, barber, and quartermaster; in addition, twelve to the gunsmith, six to the saddler, eight apiece also to two attendants if they are present at the levy, and finally twenty-four florins to one minister of sacred rites or preacher, if one is available.

XVI.

Although it is assigned to the decurions to form the whole body of cavalry and its leaders in military discipline and order, nevertheless, because masters have hitherto sometimes reserved this allowance to themselves and have consequently lacked designated decurions whom the cavalrymen assigned to definite places and stations might obey, confusions and disturbances have arisen rather often. Therefore, so that these may be avoided hereafter, let the masters take care to distribute the cavalrymen of their standard equally among decurions and to declare, by fixed names, each decurion over each body of fifty. Thus every decury may know whom it ought to follow whenever it is to be sent to any places or stations.

XVII.

Whatever, in addition, the commanders of the army and the masters of the cavalry receive to be divided among the leaders of ranks and common cavalrymen, let them distribute by name and in good faith. If they act otherwise, let them undergo the censure of an inquiry and punishment.

XVIII.

Whenever the soldiers are reviewed, let every decurion pass together with the fifty men entrusted to him, in the order in which they were entered in the levy-book.

XIX.

On every march, in foraging, and elsewhere whenever it shall be necessary, let the decurions carefully watch those committed to their care and custody, so that by this means accused offenders may more easily be investigated and punished.

XX.

Since trains extended to great length are burdensome to military operations for many reasons, let no master of cavalry be assigned more than twelve horses, no nobleman more than six or eight, and no count or lord more than ten or twelve, unless one among them, more powerful in resources and authority, should appear at the levy well equipped and prepared in every respect with a greater number. The recruiting officers may accordingly permit him more.

XXI.

Let neither the commanders nor the masters of cavalry permit several men to combine into one rank under the pretext of a single name. Instead, let them take care that each man pass through the levy in the place and rank which he holds in the register, with his own name and surname recorded and his horses entered.

XXII.

Among these cavalrymen, no lord or nobleman who serves with only four or three horses shall be permitted to use a servant--

XXII. --but let those who lead five or six horses have the use of only one servant. Even if they exceed the number six but do not reach twelve, let them still have only one; if any completely fulfill the number twelve, let them have the right to two servants.

XXIII.

Let every lord or nobleman who serves with six or more horses train one of his men who, equipped with a longer firearm, can skillfully employ it against the enemy, since we have found that a firearm of this kind is as advantageous to military operations as it is exceedingly useful to the cavalry itself.

XXIV.

In accordance with these constitutions, let the commander of the army and the masters of cavalry permit no cavalryman to enter the number of the enrolled, the levy, or its book unless the lord himself is present in the field; nor let them permit horses to pass under an assumed name which the men falsely claim, or under the person of one to whom they do not belong.

XXV.

Inasmuch as in these times the custom has also arisen that certain noblemen, after they have subjected their horses to some standard, themselves wish to live freely and be subject to no one, together with one or another coursing horse which they allege that they have in reserve; and inasmuch as this practice, because men of this kind obey no one other than their own mind and will, tends to produce inequalities and to disturb military discipline and even the battles themselves, partly through rebellion and partly through confusion; therefore let the masters leave no place among their men to any lord or nobleman who, equally with the others, is not entered in the register and held bound by the same laws of obedience.

XXVI.

As far as possible, the masters shall endeavor to recruit and gather their cavalrymen from noblemen, not from common soldiers. Moreover, at the levy let no extended ranks be approved for them, unless perhaps only in the case of veteran

soldiers who have completed their service and whose valor has been proved; even then, with their own master individually interceding, let only so many horses be approved as the recruiting officer has seen fit.

XXVII.

Let every lord and nobleman clothe his men in such a way that, after their departure from home, their bodies are protected from cold and other injuries of the weather, and let their firearms likewise have their own coverings.

XXVIII.

Likewise, let every lord or nobleman so establish his men that they bring their service to be engaged until the end of the period prescribed, and indeed to remain obligated to Us and the Holy Empire for as long as need shall require. Let none of those who receive pay either demand or induce his lord to dismiss him while the campaign is still continuing, whether at the beginning of the opening year or toward the end of its completed circuit. Rather, let all remain steadfast, and while they remain let them not solicit greater pay. But those who, as deserters from military service, depart against the will of their lord without either an honorable or a causally justified dismissal shall, if apprehended, be delivered to punishment; if they escape by flight, let them be publicly proclaimed perjurers, under which name they shall everywhere be held infamous and shall nowhere be tolerated.

XXIX.

Let no man insolently insult his lord and no man show himself refractory. To point a firearm or sword at him shall be a capital offense.

XXX.

Let no one entice any soldier or servant away from another. But if anyone should depart from his lord with hostile intent or while manifestly guilty of some offense, or should be dismissed, let no other lord or nobleman following the same campaign receive that man unless the former lord has ratified it.

XXXI.

Conversely, let these men also preserve moderation and cultivate equity in treating their servants. If the contrary is done and spirits on both sides are inflamed through disputes and complaints, it shall belong to the masters of cavalry or the commander of the army to investigate the matter diligently. If they themselves cannot compose the dispute, it must be referred to the judgment of the military tribune, who, after hearing both sides and weighing the matter, shall assess the case according to truth and equity.

XXXII.

Let no commander or master release one or more cavalymen from their oath or give them permission to depart without the knowledge and will of the commander-in-chief; nor let him dare to receive newly arriving cavalymen and place them beneath the standards.

XXXIII.

If one or more of the cavalry should fall ill, or even, while engaged by command of his commander in honorable business, be led away captive by the enemy, they shall be regarded as sound and whole in every month while the army remains in the field. But their horses and armor shall also be produced at every review.

XXXIV.

If the horse or servant of any cavalryman should fall at the hands of the enemy, or perish through another manifest misfortune of war, then, unless the man substitutes another within one month, or at most two months, after the commissioner has learned of it, let him thereafter expect no pay for the one lost.

XXXV.

Let no man who wishes to preserve both the faith of the oath by which he has bound himself to Us and the Holy Empire and his own honor receive from another or lend to another any cavalryman, horse, armor, or other necessity of war, either at the review of arms or outside it. Instead, let each man diligently and sufficiently equip himself in every respect, prepared to go out and undertake watches with the same arms with which he appeared at the review. Whoever is improvident or negligent concerning this constitution shall be fined his pay.

XXXVI.

Apart from these, let no immunity from watches be given to any horses except the twelve belonging to the master of cavalry and the six belonging to the standard-bearer.

XXXVII.

Let the commanders and masters of cavalry labor with diligent attention and serious care, when arranging the marching columns, to ensure that the cavalymen present around the standards, in accordance with the levy-book, both the horses and every item of equipment complete and filled out in their proper numbers and parts.

XXXVIII.

Whenever the commissioners come to them to inspect each standard separately, let the commanders and masters of cavalry permit one to be presented apart from another and the number of each to be taken. If a notable deficiency or one suspect in number is then encountered under any standard, inquiry must be made among the cavalymen both so that the reason and origin of the deficiency may be established and so that the necessary care may be applied thereafter, lest by any fraud committed or by some small diminution of the number paid for by Us, We or the Empire be frustrated. Accordingly, we also desire the commanders, together with the masters of cavalry, to attend every review and always to be present with the recruiting officers, supplying whatever assistance, support, and aid they can, so that not only may the latter duly execute the matters entrusted to them, but service may also be rendered faithfully and steadfastly to Us and the Empire.

XXXIX.

Let the commander, the masters of cavalry subject to him, the leaders of ranks, and the cavalymen observe Us in the first place, then the supreme legate appointed by Us and the military tribune, and thereafter the captains set over them. Let them await the command of these men in every contingency and outcome of affairs with the faith and obedience owed, ready by day and by night, with full or half-full standards and squadrons, collectively and individually, as either the matter itself or the command of Us and Our legate shall require, to enter the field, be placed in garrisons, perform watches, forage, and conduct escorts. Moreover, without the permission of their superiors let them neither depart with the standards or squadrons, nor otherwise from their rank or from camp, nor send away any baggage, nor even join battle with the enemy when not ordered. Rather, let each remain in that very place to which he is directed by the commander-in-chief, his commander, or his master. Let them obey these men in every place and at every time, in accordance both with what befits true soldiers and with what they owe by right to their commanders and captains and also by force of these constitutions.

XL.

Likewise, let the said prefect of the soldiers and his masters of cavalry, leaders of ranks, and cavalymen, in proportion to the care they bear both for maintaining the dignity of their lineage and the equestrian order and for fulfilling the faith by which they bound themselves to Us and the Empire, also see to it that the cavalry law praised from antiquity is established, confirmed, and proclaimed with the utmost zeal and diligence. Let all subject themselves and obey it as the rule of perfect Justice, and let them also undergo judgments and punishments for offenses in accordance with these constitutions, the imperial decrees, and the laudable custom of war transmitted to Us.

XLI.

We, by the grace of God Emperor of the Romans, by imperial power and majesty, both from the authority of Our office and with the consent of the electoral princes, the estates general, and the counselors and legates of those absent, will that these equestrian laws, employed from antiquity with great praise, be restored to their former vigor and preserved. We further confirm and deliberately command that whatever is done duly and lawfully, in accordance with the established constitutions, within the boundaries of the Empire or outside them under the dominion of foreign rulers--not only by Us, Emperor of the Romans, at Our court and in Our campaigns and garrisons, but also throughout the entire Empire and through all Our hereditary dominions--be regarded as ratified, firm, and perpetual, to be pursued and executed without possibility of contradiction.

XLII.

Let all things which are handled and decided in any place before an equestrian court for as long as the campaign continues be committed to the book or volume in which the acts of the war are recorded. From it, after the war has found its end, let two copies be transcribed, to be secured by the seal either of the military tribune, if he was present, or of the commander.

XLIII.

And because, for some years past, disobedience, various confusions, and a certain rather free and unrestrained manner of living and acting have crept into the German forces--things which they did not derive from their ancestors, who carried away the palm of valor and probity before other nations and were especially renowned for their observance of military discipline--therefore, so that hereafter not only may precautions be taken against these evils, but Christian Piety, Good Order, Justice, and Obedience, upon which the safety and preservation of men rest, may also recover their former vigor and receive greater increase from day to day, let the cavalymen henceforth restrain every license of life with the bridle of right reason. Above all, let them abstain from blasphemies and contempt of the divine word; let them inflict neither molestation nor violence upon anyone; and let them have no intercourse with immodest women or with women following the camp. If, however, women free from a shameful reputation are present, whose honorable service is employed and used both for attending to the sick, for washing, and for other things without loss of chastity, they may be tolerated with the consent of the commanders.

XLIV.

Let commanders, masters, and prefects also apply themselves most diligently to this: that, in accordance with the care by which they are solicitous to defend their own honor and discharge the faith they have given, they themselves should above all be zealous to institute a pious and Christian life and should be vigorous defenders of justice and of the poor, thereby offering their cavalymen examples and incentives to imitate the good, rather than inviting them to evil by their own conduct.

XLV.

Let every lord and nobleman, together with his men, come when summoned to the sermon on Sundays and at other times whenever the signal is given by trumpet, and let them attend divine service. But if anyone is meanwhile found at drinking parties, taverns, or other places suspected of levity, let him be punished, with this distinction: let a servant be confined in prison, bound with fetters, unless another manner of punishment seems appropriate to the nature of the offense. But if he is a lord, let him, when called to account by his master or commander, first be sharply chastised in words; then, if he shows little or no amendment, let him be arraigned as guilty before the prefect and judge of the camp; finally, let the cavalry laws also be threatened against him, according to whose uniform and perpetual tenor, if he were thereafter to devote his life to crimes and disgraceful deeds through manifest wickedness, he should be punished by dishonorable discharge as an example to others.

XLVI.

Furthermore, by force of these constitutions, let none of the prefects of provisions draw and sell wine, beer, or anything similar while sacred rites are being performed and the sermon is being held.

XLVII.

Likewise, let there be severe punishment against those who blaspheme publicly, and let all who violate the sacred name of God by deliberate will be punished with an ignominious death.

XLVIII.

Since shameful drunkenness has gained such strength among the Germans, especially in war, that they consider nothing earlier and nothing more important than drinking together after the manner of beasts, by which fault the whole nation brings itself not only into contempt and infamy among others--

XLVIII. --but are also accustomed to procure little favorable success in military affairs and victory. Therefore, in accordance with these constitutions of Ours, we earnestly charge commanders, masters, prefects, lords, noblemen, and cavalrymen that they too endeavor to wash away this stain upon the soul and to set a limit upon drunkenness, and especially that they not allow their servants to be prone to this vice.

XLIX.

If anyone who holds an office is marked as so addicted to drunkenness that he cannot attend to and fulfill his office sufficiently, let his position be taken from him by the prefect of the camp and his commander and entrusted to another, more worthy man who is more sober. Let no one oppose this, and let no one undertake the patronage and defense of that man's cause, since this constitution and the personal oath by which each man is bound forbid it.

L.

In every offense worthy of accusation which has been committed by lords, noblemen, servants, or men of the highest or lowest rank, let neither the name of drunkenness be advanced nor approved by the prefect of the camp, the commander, and the equestrian court as an excuse for the deed or a mitigation of punishment. Rather, let judgment be pronounced more sharply and severely on this very account, and let the guilty man be condemned to a doubled penalty.

LI.

Let anyone who, rendered improvident by drunkenness or overcome by drunken sleep, has neglected a danger threatening from the enemy suffer punishment.

LII.

If any among the cavalry or the cavalrymen's servants should gorge themselves with wine to such a degree that they are found deprived of reason, let them immediately be consigned to prison and chains, and let them not be released without the consent of their commander or master. Let these superiors also possess discretion, after the matter has been ascertained, to punish those men and to leave to the equestrian court any who flee punishment.

LIII.

Whoever lays armed hands upon the prefect of the camp or the military tribune, or in any other manner opposes his commanders, masters, prefects of watches, or leaders of ranks--especially in matters which they impose by virtue of their office--shall, in accordance with the decree of the equestrian law, pay the penalty in his body and through the loss of honors and goods.

LIV.

Whoever has violated the authority of his superiors either through contempt or through an insulting word shall be arraigned before the equestrian court and punished according to the gravity of the matter.

LV.

Whoever has stirred up sedition against the commander-in-chief or others appointed as his superiors shall, when summoned to judgment, pay the penalty with his head.

LVI.

In the camp, with respect both to summonses and notifications and to commands and prohibitions, let all adapt and conform themselves, as they ought, to the requirements of justice and military discipline.

LVII.

Let no one lay hands upon the executors of justice--such as the prefects of capital matters, investigators of seditions, and their attendants or assistants, by whatever title distinguished--or oppose them either through violence or recklessness, or place any impediment in their way so that they cannot execute their office. Rather, let all strive to protect them against violators and to preserve them from every injury and violence, understanding that all these matters fall under the penalty of death.

LVIII.

If any cavalryman in camp or elsewhere hears and learns anything which could bring loss or impediment to Us, the Holy Empire, military service, Our provinces or peoples, or those of the Empire, or if he sees or knows of suspicious persons, he shall immediately disclose it to his master of cavalry or, if the gravity of the business so demands, to the commander himself. But if one or another does not do this, then, when the matter is discovered, that man or those men shall pay, as authors of the fault, with their heads or fortunes, without pardon.

LIX.

Let both those who draw up the ranks and the common cavalymen diligently ensure that the columns march in a straight and unbroken order. Let no one dart about or wander before the standards; above all, let no one mingle with the baggage or wagons, or, by leaving camp too early, go ahead of his own standard. For a good cavalryman who loves equity and wishes to appear honorable ought to judge that consideration is owed not only to himself but also to his comrades, so that he appears present nowhere except at his own standard, to which he has been assigned. Accordingly, let him take care that neither through himself nor through his servants is the order disrupted by wandering horsemanship. He must in no manner and for no cause depart from this order without the knowledge of his commander or master. If the contrary is done, let punishment be incurred according to the discretion of the tribune or before the equestrian court.

LX.

Likewise, without permission received from Us, Our legate, and the commanders and officers subordinate to him, let no one depart from the camp or standard with one or more horses, or remain away at night after going out to forage. Whoever acts otherwise shall be fined according to the judgment of the marshal and commander and also according to the tenor of the equestrian law.

LXI.

Whoever deserts his station in the field without the consent and permission of his commander shall, besides the equestrian judgment which the marshal will pronounce against him as a fugitive and deserter, also suffer the free plundering by everyone of his horses, arms, and, finally, everything he possessed.

LXII.

Whoever has defected to the enemy shall be publicly proclaimed and declared infamous by the marshal and the equestrian court, with the disgraceful mark of desertion to the enemy.

LXIII.

Whoever, after abandoning his standard, has undertaken either secret or open flight shall be punished with disgrace and death. But if another man checks the fugitive then and there with a firearm or sword, let this not be imputed to him as a crime; rather, let it be regarded as a meritorious act.

LXIV.

Without the commander's permission, let them neither send a trumpeter to the enemy nor receive one sent by him, nor communicate with him through any exchange, whether of business, conversation, or letters. But if anyone receives some message or letters from the enemy, let him not conceal the matter from his commander and master. Instead, let him immediately arrange through that superior for the letters, closed, covered, and known to no one, to be carried to the commander.

LXV.

Let no man who follows the enemy's side, whether male or female, young or old, have free passage through the watches either when entering the camp or when departing from it. Rather, if such a person is observed, let the guards intercept the person and conduct him or her to one of the commanders or to the supreme commander of the army.

LXVI.

On marches and at stations, while the standards have been raised and are flying in good order, and also among guards who have been posted, let no one direct armed hands against another or engage in single combat with anyone. Let the man guilty of the deed immediately be delivered as a captive to the marshal by the leaders of ranks who are present, or be consigned to prison, soon to be arraigned and to pay the penalty with his head.

LXVII.

Let no one attack or assail anyone from behind, whether within or outside the camp, with a firearm or other lethal weapons. Let no one challenge another to an equestrian duel or violate him in any other manner, under the penalty established by the equestrian law.

LXVIII.

Whoever with wanton audacity has overwhelmed and violated another in that man's own tent or lodging shall incur the supreme penalty and the rigor of the equestrian court.

LXIX.

Whoever plunders horses or draft animals from plows; whoever destroys or breaks down without permission mills, ovens, and similar structures erected for the common use of the state, whether they belong to friends or enemies; and whoever pours out or destroys wine, grain, or flour, or wantonly inflicts any other loss, shall be punished in body.

LXX.

Let all take care not to put to death persons already of decrepit age, priests, preachers, or women when they are found unarmed, or likewise infants, under penalty of death.

LXXI.

Let no private person conspire or stir up disturbances against another; and let no nation of any kind or cohort of soldiers, whether infantry or cavalry, do so against another or call upon its own nation, under penalty of death.

LXXII.

Let no one render the watches uneasy by discharging a firearm, raising songs and shouts, or in other ways. Let the man who does so not go unpunished.

LXXIII.

Let no one maintain ancient rivalries and inveterate hatreds either in the field or in garrisons, or attempt vengeance. If he has some matter in dispute with another, let him either defer it until military service has been brought to an end, arrange for it to be settled by the marshal or officers, or have it decided by the common law. Whoever acts otherwise shall be punished according to what is equitable and just.

LXXIV.

If men, their anger aroused, should clash with one another and begin a contest, let the spectators who are present restrain the disturbance and bring the divided minds together again once peace has been restored. Let both reconciled sides thereafter uphold that peace steadfastly and willingly for as long as the campaign continues.

LXXV.

Let no one neglect his office and assigned part in keeping watch, refuse to perform it, or depart from his station sooner than he is led away from it. Rather, let him remain immovable in the place where he is posted. But whoever neglects this law shall be brought before the prefect of the field, his commander, and his master; unless he can sufficiently clear himself of his negligence, let him bear the sentence of the equestrian court and be dishonorably discharged without pay or honorable dismissal, or be punished in another manner as the matter requires.

LXXVI.

Let each man proceed to stand watch with the armor and arms assigned to him at the army's review. Except for a special cause of marriage, let no one dismount from his horse either during the daytime watches or the watches by night. Whoever acts otherwise shall forfeit his horse and armor as a fine to the governor of the field, to be divided equally with the prefect of the watches, while he is to be punished further after the matter has been ascertained.

LXXVII.

Let no one on watch raise the cry to arms without cause. Rather, let each perform his duty of watching with the greatest diligence so that no disadvantage arises from it to the commander or the army. But whoever has through his own negligence omitted anything in this duty shall clear himself before the marshal and the equestrian court.

LXXVIII.

Whoever goes to his watch so drunk that he can neither discharge the duty of watching sufficiently and properly nor give the watchword shall be punished by decree of the marshal and his commander or of the equestrian law.

LXXIX.

Let no one receive suspicious persons as guests or permit them to remain with him; rather, in accordance with the oath by which each is bound, let him deliver them to the commander of the army or his centurions.

LXXX.

If anyone should perceive a method of circumventing the enemy or forestalling adversaries, or if some plan and counsel should occur to him either for wearing down the enemy or preventing loss, let him report it secretly to the commander, the marshal, or his own leader; he will thereby obtain great and deserved favor.

LXXXI.

Let no one extort money by threatening fire or devastate the camp or any other place with flames except by command of the commander.

LXXXII.

If a battle must be fought or a conflict with the enemy undertaken in another manner, let each man remain in his own place, which he occupies by command of his superiors, and let him not depart from it without their will, under danger of infamy. Although his comrades might meanwhile prove victorious in another part, nevertheless the man who has carried out the command through obedience of this kind shall be held in equal esteem with those who, obeying in a different manner, contributed their aid to the accomplishment of the victory itself. For we must look to this: that obedience, as the foundation of every good government, be established on every side, and that, conversely, every disobedience be eliminated.

LXXXIII.

Although by the goodness of God victory over the enemy should fall to us, nevertheless let no one, without permission, abandon his rank or standard, carried away either by hope of booty or by eagerness to pursue the enemy. Instead, let each remain steadfast in his rank and conform himself to the command of his superiors, under danger either of contracting infamy or of violating his faith, lest through some confusion or disobedience on our side toward the enemy, loss or disadvantage flow back upon the whole army.

LXXXIV.

Let no one seize or take away from another, whether by force or in another manner, booty which that man himself has captured or lawfully acquired. But let them arrange for disputes and disagreements which arise from this cause to be distinguished and settled by their own commander or master, or--

LXXXIV. --by the marshal through the judgment of the equestrian court.

LXXXV.

Let no one despoil the suppliers of provisions within or outside the camp or lay hands upon them. Likewise, let no one rush into the place where provisions are kept or seize anything there by force. Let the man guilty of the deed be restrained in prison and punished by the marshal or equestrian law in his body and the goods of his fortune, as the offense requires.

LXXXVI.

Let no one who has gone out of the camp forestall others by buying provisions earlier; rather, let them await their free sale within the camp.

LXXXVII.

If any livestock or other provision is taken from the enemy, let no one divert any of it elsewhere without the permission of the marshal or his commander. Instead, let him sell it in the camp itself at a tolerable price. If a dispute arises concerning the price, recourse must be had to the same marshal as arbitrator.

LXXXVIII.

Whoever among the aforesaid cavalry, whether in camp or in other duties, notices anything which would bring disadvantage or impediment to Us, the Empire, military affairs, or the dominions subject to Us or the Empire, or whoever has knowledge concerning suspicious persons, shall take care to disclose it all without delay to his master or commander--indeed, if the matter has greater importance and weight, to the commander of the army himself. Whoever becomes known not to have done this shall be punished, as an author of the fault, in the goods of his fortune and in his body, without favor.

LXXXIX.

If We, Emperor of the Romans, or Our supreme commander and legate of the army should grant to one or more persons, cities, towns, villages, hamlets, houses, and other goods an escort, safe-conduct, safeguard, or immunities, or should bestow other favors, let Our cavalrymen attempt in no manner whatsoever, either by themselves or through others in their name, to attack or impair privileges of this kind.

XC.

Let them burden none of those who, whatever their condition, are subject or allied to Us or the Empire; let them impose tribute or exaction upon no one, and let them harm no one by pillaging or similar means, whether when beginning or ending their campaign, or at other times when they have passage or establish a stationary camp. On the contrary, let them most justly pay each and every person what they owe. Similarly, let public innkeepers show them equitable reciprocity in the prices charged for things. But when they are to be in the field against the enemy and under arms, let them have a more liberal supply of fodder.

XCI.

If at any time, because the pay ordered has not been provided at its proper time, they must live at the expense of innkeepers and common people, let them conduct themselves equitably and honorably, sparing their hosts and persons of slender fortune as far as possible. Let them keep a diligent account of what they receive by acknowledgments made and given in writing, and afterward permit an equal amount to be deducted from their pay.

XCII.

Conversely, payment shall be made to the poor for losses caused by the passage of cavalry and infantry, through the ordinary quaestor of Us and the Holy Empire.

XCIII.

When camp has been made in enemy territory, if that land nevertheless belongs to the Empire, let no one go out to harass the inhabitants with pillaging, exactions, or other injuries, and let no one permit this to be committed by his servants. Rather, let him watch them with painstaking care and ensure with diligent circumspection not only that they bring nothing belonging to another into the camp by an unjust means, but also that, as regards provisions and fodder, they follow the rate, measure, and ordinance which the prefect of the camp and the marshal shall prescribe to them at every time, in accordance with the oath which they have taken. If some cause of complaint should arise from this, let the masters restore the loss to the needy subjects with money to be subtracted from the pay of those who inflicted the loss. Let noble lords also compel their servants, when they have investigated the case and found them guilty, to make restitution. Indeed, let the guilty also be summoned to judgment and punished as plunderers.

XCIV.

But if, through the present aid of the divine Majesty, the commander of the enemy army or other commanders should be captured by Our cavalrymen, let persons of this kind be presented either to Us or to Our commander, or be delivered into the hands of the man who carries this commission for him--not without a rich reward and the bounty owed.

XCV.

But if persons other than the commanders and leaders already mentioned are made captives, let the man who captures and subjects them have discretion to treat them by exactions and by methods received in military usage. Nevertheless, let the commander-in-chief be informed of every captive, and let none of them be released without his consent.

XCVI.

And if any cities, citadels, villages, dominions, or nations are conquered by war, let all of them, together with their artillery, fortifications, and collected provisions, pass entirely into Our power and be conveyed to the Empire, not diverted elsewhere. Then, after such conquered cities, citadels, and villages, and such subjugated regions and peoples, have rendered homage and been received by Us into Our protection, We will that all the remainder of their substance, which otherwise would be booty by military custom, be immune from every injury and exaction, and We take precaution that no one dare invade it.

XCVII.

Since cavalrymen and infantrymen diverse in origin and nation flow together into a single army, so that the quarrels and disagreements which readily arise and are stirred up from so great a diversity, even from slight causes, may accordingly be avoided, let foreign nations by no compact assail one another with words or deeds, rend one another by conduct or insulting expressions, or attempt to issue forth and provoke one another to debate. Nevertheless, if one injured nation appears to have a just action against another, it must be instituted and pursued before the ordinary magistrate and according to the customary form of military law.

XCVIII.

If one or more among the cavalry offends against these constitutions, or in another manner commits an act contrary to military laws and customs, his own honor, or the faith he has given, let them bear punishment in body, by infamy, or through loss of goods, according as the nature of the offense demands, by the judgment of the prefect of the camp, the commanders and masters, or by decree and custom of the equestrian law.

XCIX.

And if this cavalry should lack an ordinary marshal, or the marshal should not be present, so that a lawful equestrian court cannot be held by him, then, when capital causes and other crimes nevertheless arise which, because of the accompanying guilt, do not admit delay or postponement of punishment, let the commander-in-chief meanwhile assume for himself the task of avenging injustice. Having summoned the masters of cavalry, lieutenants, standard-bearers, and also, if necessary, some of the centurions, and having interposed their judgment, let him, in accordance with these constitutions and the tenor of the equestrian laws, show himself no less sharp a judge against the accused and an avenger of crimes.

C.

Even among German cavalrymen, although they may possess fewer or more standards and may lack a designated marshal, let investigators of capital matters nevertheless be established. Whether they follow the camp on marches or are placed in garrisons, let the men experience them as avengers of evils by force of this constitution, which none of them may refuse.

CI.

If one or more men, after receiving enlistment money from a master, are not present in the ranks when the soldiers are reviewed, or, before or after the review while military order has not yet been established, withdraw with arms scarcely received, or arrange to be enrolled in another man's service, let them, as is equitable, appear when summoned before the equestrian court and clear their deed. If anyone remains refractory, after an action has nevertheless been brought against him and the case heard, let judgment and sentence be pronounced just as against one who is present.

CII.

If, either during this campaign or during others beyond the boundaries of the Empire under foreign rulers, some error or dispute undertaken for the sake of honor has remained among Germans while they were performing military duties, and it is decided to prosecute it before the equestrian court, then, when the accuser comes and seeks justice against the

opposing party who is remaining in Our army, let justice itself be rendered to him, and let the accused, lawfully summoned into court, answer. Meanwhile, the man who brings the case shall also bind himself to the marshal and the commander of the army by furnishing adequate security for everything required in a matter of this kind until it is examined and concluded by law.

CIII.

In all these matters let the said commanders, masters, and cavalrymen conduct themselves as befits soldiers of approved valor and good faith.

CIV.

Furthermore, the aforesaid commander must not only be personally present with and remain attached to the masters and cavalrymen subordinate to him; he shall also not dare to appoint a legate in his own place or entrust his delegated duties to another. Mindful of his dignity, he shall preserve the manner of duly carrying these things out in person, as the representative of the equestrian order, and of answering suitably when questioned concerning them.

CV.

Moreover, let the aforesaid cavalry submit to its review every month, or whenever it is requested, and let the payment of wages follow it. But if, because money is not ready, payment does not always and immediately follow the end of the month, let them patiently endure this delay and meanwhile faithfully perform their share of the duty, as just soldiers do, neither neglecting watches nor refusing marches.

CVI.

At the first review these constitutions and articles shall also be read publicly to the common cavalrymen in the open field beneath the raised standards.

CVII.

This reading of the constitutions and laws shall also always be repeated to the cavalrymen in the circle whenever the number of those serving is afterward taken, so that, their memory having been refreshed, they may more readily know how to direct and conduct themselves according to them.

CVIII.

In the same manner, if cavalrymen should afterward join, once the army is ready for action, and, after receiving enlistment money, be enrolled in the same military service, they shall be bound to observe these same laws no less than if they had contracted for service from the beginning.

CIX.

Let the masters be cautious and provident in gathering soldiers, lest any person of frivolous character, marked by the stigma of a shameful crime or infamy, mingle among their cavalrymen. This is both so that every danger of rebellion, confusion, and sedition may be the farther removed from the army and so that honorable and freeborn soldiers may live more quietly and attend to their duties more easily. But if any persons of this kind become known while lurking among the standards, they shall, on account of their crime--whenever and wherever they have committed it contrary to right--be arraigned before the equestrian court and, in accordance with the nature and measure of the offense, either expelled from the army or punished by another penalty.

CX.

Moreover, if among the enrolled soldiers there is found either a public despiser and blasphemer of God and the divine word, a notorious violator of virgins and women, a man who has bound himself by the crime of unjust homicide, or one who has brought disgrace upon himself through perfidious desertion to the enemy or another deed alien and

unworthy of a nobleman, then, when charged and convicted, let him be punished according to the judgment of the equestrian court.

CXI.

Finally, if on this occasion something has escaped Us or been omitted in these articles which, both by the nature of what is right and by the custom and institution of the ancestors, is required to be observed by cavalrymen, let all be bound to follow and observe it just as if it had been expressly stated, and let transgressors be punished.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CAVALRY LAW

I.

First, let all commanders, masters of cavalry, leaders of ranks, lords, and noblemen, together with the other cavalrymen who are their comrades in arms, be enrolled and admitted under the constitutions which have been set forth, in which are contained, in order, the articles of the equestrian law and military discipline composed and established by Us, Emperor of the Romans, by the electoral princes, and by the estates general of the Empire.

II.

When the assembly has therefore been held, let Our commander-in-chief--who has accepted as his foremost care the governing of the army of the Emperor of the Romans and the Empire--arrange for the whole cavalry to be summoned into one place, unless perhaps its greater multitude appears to require division into parts. Then let him, together with the marshal and those who hold the higher offices, go around the same body in a circle, while the herald carries a drawn sword before them. There, after the signal has been given by the trumpet, let him first address the cavalrymen openly with a gracious speech because they have offered their service with so liberal a spirit for Our good and the advantage of the Empire, and then let him speak the remaining words with kindness according to the following sense.

III.

Since obedience and good government are both exceedingly pleasing to God Himself and so salutary and useful to us that our German ancestors always judged that they must apply themselves to them with the most vigilant spirit, therefore he wishes, in Our name, in the name of the Empire, and also in his own name, to admonish all men that they should be willing to embrace discipline and obedience, follow laws and judgments, cultivate Christian charity, and adopt honorable conduct worthy of a nobleman. That is, they should be zealous for piety toward God and lovers of an honorable life and, conversely, should avoid and flee utterly deeds which are more like those of a rude pagan and an ignoble man than of a noble cavalryman imbued with illustrious blood and the Christian faith.

IV.

And so that these things may be observed more rightly and certainly, We wish Our constitutions and those of the Empire now to be read to them. They contain the most ancient and most highly praised articles of the equestrian law, which We and the Empire have ordered to be recalled to their former vigor, established, and put into practice for the advantage and glory of the German nation. In this manner they shall serve according to the ancient custom.

V.

Nor is there any doubt that, in accordance with the freeborn character of German cavalrymen, they will regard these very things as equitable and good, and will not only accept them with a willing and joyful spirit but also put them into effect. After these preliminaries, let the reading of the articles follow.

VI.

When it has been completed, let the commander-in-chief exhort them again that, with the sincerity which is proper, princes, counts, magnates, noblemen, and common cavalrymen--of whatever condition and whatever age they are,

high or low, youthful or declining in years--should all be willing, as they ought, to conform themselves to what has been read, obey faithfully and obediently, and remain in the faith given to their commanders, the Emperor of the Romans, the Empire, Our legate, and the officers subordinate to him. Whether they occupy the open fields extensively or reside in garrisons, let each man by night as well as day, according to his own measure of strength and the custom of the ancestors, discharge his duty even with contempt for danger to his fortune and his head, prodigal of life and heedless of his goods. Let them not think themselves released from this faith before this military service is dissolved, unless death intervenes or other grave and just causes arise. Rather, let them maintain a spirit and conduct worthy of a freeborn German cavalryman, uphold equity and right, commend the whole military enterprise by fervent prayer to the almighty Deity, and finally show themselves free from every fault and disgrace and from the punishment of disgrace. At the end of his exhortation the commander-in-chief shall ask them, in accordance with ancient custom, to bind themselves by this oath and, with all raising their hands, to be willing to swear to these laws and to the performance of everything contained in them.

VII.

When the laws and articles of war have been read and the oath pronounced, the commander of the war shall establish the ranks of the legions and shall indicate to the cavalrymen those who are to hold the principal offices.

VIII.

First, let him take the sword from the herald's hand and deliver it to the marshal. Let him entrust to the marshal the care of Justice, or of Equity and Right, for protecting the good and obedient and, conversely, punishing the wicked and guilty, earnestly impressing upon him the oath which he has taken with the common voice of all.

IX.

Then let the commander-in-chief name the remaining persons appointed to the other higher offices, and at the same time commend to them a diligent and faithful care of the number of their men, corresponding to the oath which they have taken. In addition, let him impress upon the cavalrymen collectively that they render to each and every officer of this kind the obedience which is proper in matters pertaining to each man's particular office.

X.

Thereupon the officers in turn, after giving thanks, promise due submission to the commander-in-chief and the performance of their office to the cavalrymen.

When these things have been completed, the circle is dissolved at the sounding of the trumpets.

BY WHAT PROCEDURE THE CAVALRY LAW IS TO BE CONSTITUTED

Let the marshal appoint as his legate a nobleman distinguished by uprightness of life, maturity of judgment, and experience in affairs, and let him entrust to this man, besides other matters, the care of Justice and the equestrian law. Let there also be joined to him a person well skilled by practice to discharge the office of scribe. At the first equestrian court, let this man bind his faith by a public oath.

HOW THE SAME LAW IS TO BE OBSERVED

I.

So that the equestrian law may be duly observed, let it first be proclaimed throughout the camp by a trumpeter at the marshal's command; or, if that appears more convenient, let it be announced in order to each part of the divided army.

II.

Then let the marshal, to whom the chief care and burden of justice has been committed, select three masters of cavalry, three lieutenants, three standard-bearers, likewise the same number of decurions, together with one cavalry commander. With these men let him enter and complete the court; indeed, on the preceding day as well let him take counsel with them, if it appears necessary and useful for the case that this be done beforehand.

III.

If the cavalry is more numerous, so that men are readily available from the multitude for this purpose, or if some capital cause or another grave matter of honor arises, let the court be doubled by establishing twenty-four persons and selecting more decurions from the standards accordingly.

IV.

When the aforesaid persons have assembled before or within the marshal's chamber and he is about to proceed to the place of judgment, let him arrange for a herald or another man to precede him, carrying a drawn sword before him, and for a trumpet blast to go before them, both to add authority to the law and to offer a terror to the soldiers. Let those persons follow immediately in pairs and in unbroken order, bearing their own swords resting upon their shoulders, with the point rising upward if the cause is capital, but fitted to the side if it is not a criminal cause.

V.

In every judicial cause, especially if it demands a penalty or concerns the preservation of reputation, property, or military discipline, let the marshal himself be present and administer justice and equity with the greatest zeal and defend it by his authority. But if civil causes of lesser importance arise while he is detained by more serious business, let his duties be fulfilled instead by his legate.

VI.

When the marshal and the others have taken their full seats in the place of judgment, let the marshal himself first place his sword upon the table. Then let the judges invert their swords, with the points turned toward the ground, if the cause is capital.

VII.

Likewise, let the book of constitutions be placed upon the table.

VIII.

After this, let the marshal first propose and command the judges who have been requested and appointed that they be willing to judge neither corrupted by money, gifts, and largesses, nor for the sake of obtaining a gift; and that, with hatred and envy removed, and without regard either for friendship or enmity, they instead hear the causes argued on both sides by allegation and defense, in accordance with the imperial constitutions and decrees, and deliver and pronounce sentence with that sincerity of justice with which they pray that they themselves may be judged by God the Judge at the Last Judgment. Then let him receive from each of them his pledged faith to preserve this equity, confirmed by the giving of the right hand.

IX.

Furthermore, let the marshal inquire according to custom concerning the court: whether the men in whose hands it rests are qualified; likewise, whether it is being held at a lawful time; and whether any impediment intervenes which forbids the imperial equestrian court from being held.

X.

Then he shall adjure the judges by almighty God, the fountain of all justice, and thereafter in Our name as the supreme magistrate, in the name of the Empire, and also in the name of Our commander: let no one speak without permission and without his advocate; let no one depart from the court, lest the surrounding crowd crush them.

XI.

Then let him inquire whether a day has duly been appointed for the litigants and whether they have been summoned.

XII.

In capital causes and those which concern the good of military discipline, let the investigator of capital matters come forward; and, if because of the greater weight of the matter it so appears to the marshal, let his legate come forward in addition to him. In civil causes, however, where a monetary dispute is brought, let the plaintiff and defendant, when they come forward, each request one person from the court and one or another from the assistants, by whose counsel they shall arrange for their cause to be pleaded and examined.

XIII.

In penal causes, the relevant article contained in the cavalry laws and the imperial law concerning crime are the most exact norm and rule of judgments.

XIV.

While the inquiry is conducted, let the cavalrymen be admonished under their oath that each man keep his vote concealed and wrapped in perpetual silence and bury it with himself in the same grave.

XV.

Before judgment is pronounced, if a criminal cause or a matter of honor is disputed among men of high station, let the marshal always disclose the matter itself to the commander-in-chief in order also to learn his mind. In accordance with the dignity of the person, the condition of the time, and the circumstances of affairs, the commander may consequently mitigate and soften the severity of the punishment.

XVI.

When judgment is pronounced in penal causes, let the marshal hold his sword in his hand with its point directed upward.

XVII.

But while the inquiry is being made and opinions delivered, let the others appointed to judge lower the points of their swords. When the judgment has been made public, let them then raise them, and let the marshal break his staff. Then let them depart from the court to the place from which they came, with each judge bearing his sword resting upon his shoulder or, if it was not a criminal cause, fastened at his side.

XVIII.

Finally, whatever is handled and concluded anywhere in courts of this kind while military service continues shall be written and recorded in good order in the book appointed for this purpose. When the war has now been completed, let two copies of this book be authenticated by the marshal's seal, and let one be transmitted to Our chancery and the other to the chancery of Our beloved electoral prince of Mainz, so that anyone may have recourse to it in the future.

ARTICLES OF THE GERMAN FORCES**I.**

The German forces shall first swear to Us, Emperor of the Romans, and to the Holy Empire that through faithful military service they will serve Us and the Empire both in averting evils and in advancing advantages. They shall likewise bind themselves by obedience to Our supreme legate, their commanders, captains, lieutenants, standard-bearers, leaders of ranks, quartermasters, and others appointed by Us to higher offices. All, of noble and ignoble blood and condition alike, shall take care not to resist or evade anything which they receive as commanded by these men under the equitable condition of a soldier. Let them beware of confronting them with a fickle and seditious spirit, violent hands, or an insulting mouth. Instead, let them be ready to approach and abandon the enemy and to obey every necessity whatsoever which arises on marches, in battles, in incursions, or on watches by day and night. But if anyone shows himself disobedient, let him be punished according to law by the judgment of the commander, as is declared in the articles written below.

ARTICLES OF THE GERMAN FORCES -- CONTINUED

II.

Let every soldier keep as far away as possible from all impiety both of words and of works, and let him entreat God with the suppliant prayer of his spirit for victory over the enemy. Whenever he is summoned by the sounding of the drum, let him come to the sermon and not omit it unless prevented by grave business. But if anyone does not fear to offend God with a blasphemous mouth or deed, let him be punished in body and life by decree of the commander and of the law. If anyone is found during the sermon and divine service in wine cellars, at drinking parties, or in other places serving as lodgings of levity and shamelessness, let the investigator have the right to place him in fetters and to fine him by judgment of the commander. Meanwhile, while sacred rites are being performed and the sermon is being held, let none of the prefects of provisions draw or sell any wine, beer, or anything similar.

III.

Whoever are to carry spears and shorter swords shall appear at the review of arms equipped with swords sufficiently strong for defense, serviceable sidearms for either hand, or suitable German swords. Above all, however, let the firearm troops equip themselves with trustworthy and serviceable swords. Let no one exchange his arms, of whatever kind; rather, preserving them with diligent custody and care, let him not destroy them by abusing them for cutting wood or for other purposes, so that, as good soldiers, they may bear and employ those same arms whole against the enemy when the time requires it. Whoever is found to have acted otherwise shall pay a fine for it, especially by diminution of his pay when the soldier is reviewed.

IV.

Likewise, let every man keep the aforesaid arms--and especially let the firearm troops keep the larger firearms and the things pertaining to them--placed in safety and readiness. Let them take every precaution not to be found without gunpowder, bullets, and tinder. But if anyone presents himself so unarmed on marches and watches that he can engage the enemy with neither sword nor firearm, let him pay the penalty in his body.

V.

Likewise, let all be provided with cloaks, so that they may more easily endure the onset of rains and the force of cold, and above all so that the firearm troops may cover their firearms and powder flasks and use them more conveniently.

VI.

Let every company under a standard, whether collectively, separately, or even by decuries, as the matter requires, present itself prepared and ready both to undertake marches and to perform station and garrison duty, obeying Our command, the command of Our commanders, and necessity itself.

VII.

If at any time a captain or another officer should, under the compulsion of necessity, entrust something not contrary to military valor to be accomplished together with the standard-bearers, leaders, and soldiers of another captain, they must obey these men just as if their own captain had given the command.

VIII.

Let them keep women in childbed, pregnant women, virgins, men worn out by age, those initiated into the priesthood, preachers of the divine word, and other ministers of the Church uninjured and unharmed, inflicting no injury upon them under penalty of death.

IX.

Under the same penalty, let them abstain from churches, monasteries, cloisters, houses and hospitals, and places consecrated to literary instruction, harming them in no manner.

X.

Let the passage of thirty days complete a month of paid service, according to accepted custom, and let four florins--each consisting of fifteen batzen or sixty kreuzers--be paid to each man for every month. But if, when the appointed time has already elapsed, a delay occurs in paying the money commanded, let them nevertheless neither more sluggishly nor more impatiently refuse to perform their turns of watch or to march against the enemy, as befits soldiers.

XI.

Whoever at any time and place either withdraws as a fugitive after receiving enlistment money or afterward departs from the army as a deserter without permission and an honorable discharge shall, if apprehended, be condemned to death once the cause has been introduced, even without being brought into court; and let his goods be subjected to plunder. But if he is not apprehended or brought back, let him be branded with the public mark of infamy and deprived of every freedom, security, and protection of safe-conduct.

XII.

Let no one depart from his rank on marches unless a grave cause presses. But whoever does not comply in this matter, let the commanders, leaders of ranks, and public officers bring him back into rank by force. If, resisting in turn, he rejects their commands and thereby furnishes a cause for his own killing, let the man who kills him not be summoned on a criminal charge.

XIII.

Whoever on marches or at stations, after being justly rebuked by another leader for causes arising from the fact that he conducts himself otherwise than befits a soldier, rises against him either supported by an assembled crowd or insulting him with reproaches shall be punished according to the commander's decree and the prescriptions of the law.

XIV.

When opinions are requested, let the cavalymen be reminded of their oath and obligation so that each man's vote is preserved in silence to the grave. Let them show themselves equally ready and prepared to undergo the final hazard of life with courageous faith in defending the same matters. Indeed, for the sake of their honor and the oath taken, let them enter into neither conversation nor counsel concerning the betrayal of them.

XV.

By force of their oath, when danger and necessity from the enemy threaten and the captain or one of the commanders requests it, let them not refuse to be employed in laboring and building.

XVI.

When placed in a garrison of this kind, even if they are attacked by the enemy in one or more assaults, let them live content with their same ordinary pay, since We or the Empire owe them nothing additional for this. And let no one invade in order to plunder or force himself into citadels, cities, and other garrisons which are received under conditions, unless opportunity or an order has been given by the commander.

XVII.

Let them leave dismissed and unassailed all who have been presented by Us with a guarantee of safety or have come under oath into Our protection, devising nothing against them under penalty of death without the consent and permission of the commander-in-chief or the man performing his duty in his place.

XVIII.

Let them not plunder, pillage, or inflict any loss upon places which enjoy a safeguard, under penalty of death.

XIX.

If at any time We, or Our supreme legate whom We have appointed, engage in a second battle against the enemy, or if some principal fortification is captured by a powerful assault--which may God turn to good--then the period of paid service of each soldier, regardless of the point which the month has meanwhile reached, shall be regarded as completed and shall begin anew, although We or the Empire are to be bound to them for nothing beyond this. If, although money is not yet ready, it appears that further loss can be inflicted upon the enemy, let them not refuse, at the commander's order, to pursue them and deter them by whatever means they can. Whoever resists shall be regarded as perjured and afflicted with capital punishment. Nevertheless, in these matters We do not wish the established customs and agreements in kingdoms and hereditary provinces to be changed or prejudiced by Us; rather, let all things remain unmoved.

XX.

In battles and incursions and after their favorable success, let no one be more intent upon booty or gape more greedily after plundering goods.

XXI.

Without the knowledge and against the will of his captain, let no one go out of the camp to plunder or for other reasons, or remain away from his standard at night, under penalty both of death and of another punishment to be inflicted by decree of the commander.

XXII.

If one or more men incline toward flight in battle or elsewhere, let the nearest man either run them through or strike them. Indeed, if anyone weaving a flight of this kind is killed by someone, the killer has committed not a criminal deed but a deed to be rewarded with singular favor.

XXIII.

But whoever removes himself by flight shall first be reported by name to the commander; if he is afterward apprehended, let him pay the penalty with his head; if not, let him pay for his perfidy by the mark of public infamy.

XXIV.

By force of the oath they have taken, let them beware of holding assemblies without the knowledge and against the will of the commander. Those who hold them shall, as a faithless crowd and with every hope of favor cut off, be punished with death.

XXV.

Under penalty of death, let no one maintain any communication by conversation or letters with the enemy or with their drummers and trumpeters, whether in camp, on marches, or in garrisons; and let him neither send a messenger into the enemy camp nor receive one from it without the commander's order and permission.

XXVI.

Let no person among the enemy or those adhering to them, of whatever sex and whatever age, be permitted to enter and leave Our camp freely by passing through the watches. Rather, let whoever discovers them also apprehend them or conduct them either to his captain or to the supreme commander of the field.

XXVII.

If anyone should become aware of treason and of other crimes which one or more men intend or inflict either to the detriment of the army itself or to the injury of its commander, let him either immediately disclose the names of the evildoers before the master and the investigator of capital matters, so that by revealing his knowledge he may discharge his oath, or let him pay as though he himself were the author, guilty of the same perfidy.

XXVIII.

If anyone should discover a method dangerous to the enemy for harming them and suitable for aiding his own men, let him disclose and explain it to the commander or supreme commander-in-chief, and he shall receive great favor for this deed.

XXIX.

Let all diligently avoid quarrels arising from the insolence of mutual contention, under penalty of death, joined most closely to one another by peace and the concord which unites minds.

XXX.

During quarrels, by force of the oath he has taken, let no one employ lethal arms against another, such as firearms and longer swords. Meanwhile, let the free use of side-swords be permitted for defending life by cutting or thrusting.

XXXI.

If inveterate hatreds exist among some of the soldiers, let them lie still and remain at rest while this laudable campaign is conducted, unavenged by word or deed unless vindicated by law. Whoever acts otherwise shall, when summoned to judgment and convicted, be punished with disgrace and death.

XXXII.

Let no one stir up others against another. If, however, some dispute and disagreement should happen to arise among certain men, let the nearest who are present endeavor to render them peaceable, demanding an equitable peace from both sides. Whoever rejects that peace after it has been sought two or three times, and is killed by someone on that account, shall be judged to have atoned in this manner for the injury of thrice rejecting peace. The man who strikes one who seeks peace or is stripped of arms shall be arraigned and, according to decree, punished with an ignominious death.

XXXIII.

Whoever, after peace has been composed, attacks another standing before him with his arms, whether by hurling or casting them, shall be punished in body.

XXXIV.

If two or more men, after a disagreement has arisen, rush into blows, let no one, by joining the faction, support only one side. Rather, so that the evil may not receive a greater increase, let him interpose himself for the purpose of separating the altercation and ending the fight. Whoever acts otherwise shall be punished according to the judgment and decree of the commander or commander-in-chief.

XXXV.

Under penalty of death, let no one discharge a firearm at a place and time when danger and loss from the explosion are feared, whether this occurs in camp, in cities, or in citadels, especially when the watches have been posted and it is night.

XXXVI.

Whoever does not come when summoned to the watches shall be fined according to the commander's decree. If, however, he does not appear because of ill health, let him notify his captain through a comrade both of his absence and its reason, and ask permission from him.

XXXVII.

Whoever, when he ought to perform his portion of the watch, departs from his station without permission shall be punished with every favor cut off; and his comrades are bound by force of their oath to report this very act.

XXXVIII.

Let no one furnish a substitute guard against the will and without the knowledge of his captain. Above all, let each exercise diligent care concerning the watchword which will be designated to them at any particular time. For whoever consigns it to oblivion or gives a different one shall be arraigned and punished with an ignominious death.

XXXIX.

Whoever is found overcome by sleep while on watch, or departs before he is relieved, shall be punished capitally, beyond every favor which might remit fault or punishment.

ARTICLES OF THE GERMAN FORCES -- CONTINUED**XL.**

When the night watches have been completed, likewise during the daytime watches and in the ranks, let no one quarrel with another either in the streets or in lodgings, under penalty of death.

XLI.

In friendly territory and upon land belonging to Us and the Empire, whether they are engaged in marches or encamped, let no one take anything from another by force or without paying the price, and let no one invade in order to pillage the poor common people. Rather, let each leave the host with whom he lodges in cities or villages satisfied by equitable payment.

XLII.

Whoever acts otherwise and furnishes cause for a just complaint shall, besides the restitution to which he will be compelled by his captain and commander, pay penalties in life and body when the matter has been ascertained.

XLIII.

Under corporal penalty, let no one stir up sedition and disagreements or raise a disturbance against a foreign nation, if one is present in the army; and let no one engage in a duel with anyone of that nation, so that greater disadvantage may be avoided. But if some controversy arises with it concerning any matter, let them refer it to their superiors, who will

uphold justice and equity on both sides. And when provisions are carried to the army, lest the prefects of provisions be affected by any violence or molestation, let no one invade or plunder the provisions, either before or after they have been brought into camp, before their value has been assessed.

XLIV.

Under the same penalty, let no one run out of camp in order to buy provisions too early. Rather, let each endure the delay until they have been brought into the open area of the camp and a price has been placed upon them.

XLV.

When the prefect of capital matters or his officers are about to apprehend violators of the laws and of obedience, let no one impede them by gathering factiously against them or by attempting seizures beyond what is equitable. Rather, let them protect those officers. Whoever brings so much delay and impediment upon them that the guilty man escapes, snatched from their hands, shall pay the penalty which would have been inflicted upon the guilty man himself.

XLVI.

If anyone is caught in the commission of a flagrant crime--for example, manifestly guilty of a killing which has been committed, theft, treason, or similar offenses--when the investigator or his officers are not immediately present, let the nearest persons who are present detain the guilty man for the good of military discipline until the investigator comes with his men.

XLVII.

Let no one enroll his name under two captains, arrange to be reviewed twice, or pass under another man's name. Let no one promise his arms to another as assured or lend them to him in order to deceive the army's review. Whoever is guilty of this fault shall have punishment established against him.

XLVIII.

At the review, let each man declare, besides the name of purification which he received at the sacred baptismal font, his surname also. Indeed, let him name his native city or the place of his birth near that native city, so that they may be entered in the record.

XLIX.

Let no one, in violation of the faith of his oath, cause prejudice or devise fraud. Nor let anyone join aid and counsels with any man by any method through which We and the Empire might at last be burdened with unjust and unlawful military pay, circumvented, and deceived.

L.

At the review of the soldiers, let the commanders themselves and those who hold offices, as well as the noblemen, appear clothed in all their armor.

LI.

If cavalrymen and infantrymen must at any time reside together in one camp, let both sides endure this conjunction peacefully, and let the infantrymen willingly concede to the cavalrymen as much space as is sufficient for placing their horses.

LII.

Let each man remain content and with a peaceable spirit in the place which has fallen to him from the quartermaster.

LIII.

Under corporal penalty, let no one despoil a plow; let no one without permission destroy or break down mills, ovens, or anything constructed for the use of the state, whether it belongs to friends or enemies. Let no one from mere wantonness pour out wine, grain, or flour, or destroy them in another manner.

LIV.

Let no one slaughter men worn out by advanced age, preachers of the divine word, or women, if they are found unarmed, or infants either, under penalty of death.

LV.

Without a particular command of the commander-in-chief, let no one impose an exaction by threatening fire; and let no one set fire to a fort or anything else, under penalty of death, especially in places past or through which Our forces have a free passage, lest some obstacle be placed before the provisions.

LVI.

Let every man establish such a measure for himself in drinking together that he both restrains himself from drunkenness and does not importunately urge another to drink. If anyone when drunk inflicts either violence or hands upon another or commits another fault, let him undergo not merely a penalty as severe as if he had offended while sober, but one twice as grievous.

LVII.

Above all, let the man whose part it will be to keep watch take care not to admit drunkenness. But if anyone is found so drunk on watch that he cannot perform his turn sufficiently, let him be consigned to fetters and punished in addition according to the decree of his commander.

LVIII.

If, moreover, anyone is found upon public roads or on the marches themselves so dissolved by wine that, deprived of the necessary use of reason, senses, and limbs, he can neither stand nor walk, with an uncertain gait and wandering foot, let the investigator or his officers apprehend him and consign him to chains and prison.

LIX.

Under penalty of death, let no one, impelled by any necessity, raise the cry to arms against the will or without the knowledge of the commander.

LX.

And when the cry is raised, let each man seize as quickly as possible the area or place assigned to him, with no one remaining within his lodging except for a grave cause of ill health, under penalty of death.

LXI.

Whoever, oppressed by wine and sleep, neglects a danger threatening from the enemy or the signal for battle shall be punished with his head.

LXII.

Let each man possess, according to military law and custom, whatever he has acquired by plunder from the enemy in battles and incursions, except artillery, gunpowder, fortifications, provisions laid up, and other things which contribute to the support of a town; and except also the captive persons of the enemy's magnates, princes, commanders of the field, and prefects of camps. These shall come into the power and judgment of Us, Our commander-in-chief, or Our legate and must accordingly be delivered to them; meanwhile, however, let the merit of the man who captured them be

compensated by the grateful return of a just reward. Likewise, under penalty of death, let no one release any captive without the commander's grant.

LXIII.

If anyone, injured either by the enemy or by another honorable cause, is weakened, or even through the dispensation of God suffers ill health, let him nevertheless meanwhile enjoy his pay.

LXIV.

Let those who have taken livestock or other provisions away from the enemy not conduct them elsewhere, but sell them in the camp itself, for the good and convenience of the common soldier, at a price which is not burdensome but tolerable and has been imposed according to the judgment of the investigator or their commander.

LXV.

Let no one seize or carry away by force the booty which another man has gained for himself. Those guilty of this fault shall be punished according to the commander's decree.

LXVI.

Let no one attempt to violate the freedom which executioners possess under the common law. Whoever violates it shall be punished with death.

LXVII.

While the order of march is being led, let no one march among the army's baggage unless he is weakened by grave ill health and has obtained permission for this indulgence from his captain.

LXVIII.

When they have received the command from the commander-in-chief or their captain, either at the very first levy or afterward, let each, in accordance with the faith pledged by his oath and under danger of losing reputation and honor, dismiss his baggage and any attachments of immodest women who adhere to him but are not truly wives.

LXIX.

Let none of the captains receive another's soldiers, if any desert from their own standard, without the knowledge and will of the other captain. Let no cavalryman who deserts his lord during the same campaign be enrolled in any body of infantry; and, finally, let no one entice any man away from another.

LXX.

Let no one challenge a fellow player by laying down a greater stake, and let not the man who has money present prolong the game. However great a winning it may happen that one man is to give another in the future, let the latter nevertheless owe him nothing.

LXXI.

If any do not observe these written articles, let them pay the penalties as perjurers and men guilty of a crime, in accordance with the decree of the law and the sentence of the commander-in-chief. If anything not alien to the name and valor of a soldier has been passed over in the laws related above, whether by forgetfulness or silence, let all offenses and errors of the soldiers nevertheless be left to the judgment of the commander-in-chief and punished by his avenging sentence.

LXXII.

Moreover, all infantrymen who, a short or long time afterward, begin to serve and earn pay for Us and the Empire in this army, give their names, and receive their allowance shall, although they were not present when the oath to these laws was sworn, nevertheless be bound by the same necessity and observance of them just as if they had been present in person.

LXXIII.

If forgetfulness of these constitutions should creep upon any, let them at any time approach the military praetor in order to receive a rereading and instruction concerning them, which he will be obliged to provide.

LXXIV.

Let them swear for three months. If their service is necessary beyond these months, by force of these constitutions let them serve, enrolled and accepted, for all the time for which there is need, neither refusing nor excusing themselves, understanding all things in accordance with the tenor of these written articles.

ANNOTATION OF CERTAIN ARTICLES ANNEXED TO THE FOREGOING

I.

Since German commanders, masters of cavalry, and captains are permitted and free to lead German forces to foreign rulers, not only in accordance with the privileges flowing down to them from their ancestors and the liberty transmitted to them, but also according to the tenor both of the former constitutions of the Empire and of those now in force; but since at the present time others who are not German by birth wish to arrogate and usurp the same right for themselves, not without prejudice and loss which could thereby flow back upon the German nation; therefore, henceforth no foreigner who is a native neither of the Empire nor of a territory committed to the protection and good faith of the Empire shall be permitted to collect, enroll, and lead German forces, whether cavalry or infantry, in the manner of a commander, master of cavalry, or captain. But if one or more foreign commanders and commissioners attempt the contrary within the Empire, every endeavor of theirs must be removed and prevented both by the general governors of the circles and by Us Ourselves whenever necessity demands it. Meanwhile, the magistrate to whom they are subject shall also take notice and establish punishment against any who, contrary to Our constitutions and those of the Empire, give their names to foreign commanders and commissioners, whether moved by a legal action brought against them or by his office. They shall never thereafter be tolerated among the number of German soldiers.

II.

The German forces and all others who are enrolled by foreign rulers and serve for annual pay shall specifically except in their letters of enlistment that they are never willing to take up arms against the Holy German Empire, their dear fatherland, or any nation thereof, whether those arms are to be taken up for offense or for defense. Indeed, let them testify beforehand that they give themselves to military service chiefly from zeal for its safety and love of its preservation, and that they will resist it in no manner whatsoever, whatever foreign princes may at last propose and prescribe to them.

III.

The German soldier, and the commanders and masters who govern him, while they serve under foreign rulers, shall observe the military order and discipline already related--

ANNOTATION OF CERTAIN ARTICLES ANNEXED TO THE FOREGOING -- CONTINUED

III.

--and shall establish and maintain it in conformity with the laws constituted by Us and the Empire, and, in addition, with the equestrian law and the articles already set down.

IV.

But if any one of the commanders, masters of cavalry, captains, or others who hold offices either among the cavalry or among the infantry--and, speaking universally, if any one of the soldiers--while they serve foreign princes should commit an offense against these laws of Ours and of the Empire, against the laws of the cavalry, and against the articles set down above, by departing from military order and discipline, or should in another manner impair his reputation and good name; and especially if leaders of ranks should deal perfidiously and unjustly with the soldiers subject to them, whether by the circumventions of enemies or by fraudulent devices, whether in relation to provisions or to clothing, or even by imposing unsuitable arms upon approved men, or by defrauding them, in whatever ways this can be done, of their pay and of the protection owed them against enemies: although all such men may have departed from that place unpunished, nevertheless let the ordinary magistrate to whom they are subject, as soon as he learns of it, summon them to judgment and inflict punishments upon them, whether moved by his office or by an action brought by someone. And if in any place a magistrate should be lacking, while the manifest deed demands punishment, it will be Ours--as those who wield the supreme power over affairs--to take cognizance of the cause, either by virtue of Our office or because a complaint is brought before Us, and, in accordance with Our constitutions and those of the Empire, the laws of the cavalry, and the articles, to establish and pronounce an equitable punishment against the guilty man.

V.

And because, in order to forestall losses and injuries of every kind, the matter altogether seems to demand good order--namely, that the companies under the standards be furnished with and consist of soldiers as thoroughly trained and experienced as possible, and also of a suitable equipment of arms, but especially of distinguished firearm troops, whose skill and valor are altogether of very great importance in these times of ours, when foreign nations in particular are instructed and trained in this kind of military service--it has therefore been established that under each standard there be four hundred men, and among these one hundred exceptionally well armed with long pikes, each of whom is to be furnished with a shorter firearm. Of this hundred, let the men be armored to half their bodies; those, namely, whose pay rises above eight florins are to march as heavy troops in full armor with completely mailed sleeves. In addition, let there be fifty veteran and thoroughly trained soldiers, who themselves are to carry their armor both for closely attending the standard and for whatever other use occasion may offer; besides broadswords and other shorter weapons, such as battle-axes, let each also carry a smaller flintlock firearm suspended from his belt. Let the remaining fifty form a body of common soldiers who carry pikes. All these things shall henceforth be earnestly commended to the commanders and captains at levies and enlistments.

VI.

Let the two hundred who remain be firearm troops, well furnished with siege helmets, swords, and likewise hunting guns equipped with fire-striking flints. Moreover, let them be trained every month and taught to discharge the firearm applied to the cheek. But let every man untrained in or ignorant of skillful shooting be demoted, as a punishment, from the firearm to carrying the pike, and let a man from the common soldiers who appears suitable be substituted in his place, so that both eagerness and spirit may be added to them for learning the art of shooting properly and for advancing in mutual view of one another.

VII.

And because foreign nations are becoming accustomed to use fearsome firearm troops equipped with a double firearm, let each company under a standard establish ten men of this kind.

VIII.

Of the aforesaid firearm troops, let the hundred already mentioned be maintained at five florins per month, fifty at six, forty at seven or eight, and the remaining ten, who are burdened with a double firearm, at ten florins.

IX.

Under each standard let there be at least eight or ten noblemen, or other soldiers of proven valor and singular experience, who, engaged for higher pay and furnished with their own horses--which it will be for them themselves to maintain--shall obey the will and necessity of their commander or captain, but shall serve especially in directing the firearm troops.

And these are the laws of German military service. If they were kept accurately and severely, the Sultan's arms would assuredly not be feared, nor would the ancient military service of the Romans seem worthy of admiration to us. And yet many things are observed excellently. But frequently want of pay, the commanders' dissimulation, the centurions' avarice, and the soldiers' license--especially in civil wars--not only oppress good laws but do not permit even their voice to be heard.

CHAPTER LXI

Victory Must Be Used Seriously, Justly, and Moderately

§1. What Maharbal said to Hannibal--“The gods, clearly, have not given all things to the same man. You know how to conquer, Hannibal; you do not know how to use victory”--has happened to many. The use of victory hung upon a moment no less than the winning of it. The delay of that day is sufficiently believed to have been the salvation of the city and the empire. Thus the Romans believed, as Livy bears witness; and not without reason, for if he had come upon the stricken city, he could easily have occupied it. A victory purchased with much blood is very easily spoiled. Therefore this must be done: they must bring the war to an end, not celebrate a triumph. After the Teutons had been defeated, Marius throughout the whole night terrified their remnants by means of a few of his own men; on the following day he conquered them. Hermocrates the Syracusan provided for the security of his men by introducing fear of a new enemy. Frontinus, book 2, chapter 9: “Hermocrates the Syracusan, after defeating the Athenians in battle, feared that the captives, an immense body of whom he had reduced into his power, would be guarded with too little diligence, because the outcome of the engagement could impel the victors toward feasting and freedom from care. He pretended that the enemy cavalry would come on the following night; by this expectation he brought it about that the watches were kept more attentively than usual.” Lucius Martius, a Roman knight, diligently used his first victory. Frontinus, book 2, chapter 10: “Titus Martius, a Roman knight, who commanded the remnants of the army of the two Scipios, when two camps of the Carthaginians lay nearby, separated by a few miles, exhorted his soldiers and attacked the nearer camp in the dead of night. And when he had attacked an enemy disordered by confidence in victory and had not even left any messengers of the disaster, after giving the soldier a very brief time for rest, in the same night he hastily preceded the report of the deed and invaded the other camp of the same men. Thus, twice enjoying a similar outcome and destroying the Carthaginians everywhere, he restored to the Roman people the Spains which had been lost.”

§2. Victory, therefore, must be used seriously, successes must be pressed, and the terrified must be pursued. For since even in great battles, as affairs are now conducted, few are killed and the rest easily collect themselves again, a recent victory generally gives more advantage in time than it inflicts damage, especially if the enemy too has inflicted deaths of his own and fortune has a way of returning. Pisistratus and Cimon, Athenian commanders, made outstanding use of victory. Pisistratus the Athenian, says Frontinus, book 4, chapter 7, “when he had intercepted the fleet of the Megarians, by which they had put in at Eleusis by night in order to carry off the Athenian women engaged in the sacred rite of Ceres, and had avenged his own people by inflicting a great slaughter upon them, filled the same ships which he had captured with Athenian soldiers, placing certain matrons, in the garb of captives, where they could be seen. Deceived by this appearance, the Megarians poured forth to meet them as though they were their own men sailing back with success, and, being unarmed, were again overwhelmed.” Cimon, commander of the Athenians, after defeating the fleet of the Persians near the island of Cyprus, clothed his own soldiers in the arms of the captives and sailed in the same ships of the barbarians against the enemy in Pamphylia, near the river Eurymedon. Because the Persians recognized both the ships and the appearance of those standing upon them, they took no precaution. Thus, suddenly overwhelmed, they were defeated on the same day in both a naval and a land battle.

§3. As regards the defeated man, he must be treated in such a way that he either does not wish or is not able to rebel--indeed, that he neither wishes nor is able. That he does not wish it must be effected by kindness; that he is not able, by caution. The Romans established their empire in both ways. At the beginning they employed kindness: they received the defeated Tatius with the Sabines into the city. They also brought the Albans into the city together with their wealth, and thus took thought both for themselves and for the defeated, since they brought it about that they had, in place of enemies, friends and most faithful citizens. For afterward there was no distinction between Sabines, Albans, and others; all were Romans. It is not lawful to kill a captive who is not resisting, because when he is captured a pledge

is given for his life; otherwise he would have defended himself. It is not lawful to rage against captives, as the Carthaginians did. Nevertheless, the goods of captives pass to the victor. The law is:

τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικόντων γίνεσθαι.

All the goods of the defeated pass to the victors. But if the Romans had wished to command that hostages, tributes, levies, and services be imposed upon the defeated, assuredly they would not have held those noble cities in obedience; they would have rebelled either among themselves or together with their neighbors. Afterward, when their power had matured, they did this and were more cruel in victory.

§4. But if it does not please the victors to admit them into the city and to the rights of citizens--as the Romans did when they were more powerful--let them make them allies and subjects. For after the Romans had acquired so many allies and citizens that they feared no other state, they made the defeated tributaries and subjects. In this kind of matter care must be taken that the subjects fare well; for thus the victors will bring it about that they do not fear being oppressed, and this security makes them faithful. Therefore let there be clemency in victory itself, because by the law of nations those who surrender are spared, so that hostility may cease after victory.

§5. A victory obtained in a just war against injury must also be just: it must not be grievous to the innocent; it must be welcome to auxiliaries and not burdensome to neighbors. To extort treasures by tortures, to slaughter the unarmed and those below the age of puberty, and to defile everything with lusts is unjust. The commander will avoid these things with greater care than the enemy's arms, for through them he will lose the fruit of victory.

§6. Let victory be moderate, lest it range about proudly, cruelly, and intemperately. Pride has indeed overthrown very many in the midst of victory itself. Pontius, commander of the Samnites, had conquered the Romans at the Caudine Forks by a stratagem--that is, by the noblest victory, without blood; for he had surrounded them by an encirclement. Although his father had wisely advised him either to dismiss all of them unharmed or to kill all of them, he made them more hostile to himself by provoking them with insult, for he sent them beneath the yoke. In like manner Sesostris, king of the Egyptians, offended the world by the insolence of his victory, when he drove Pharian chariots by the necks of kings, and when in the regions which he had easily occupied he erected carvings of female genitals as a reproach of their cowardice. And so within a short time the kingdom of Egypt fell. A man will be modest if he knows that he was victor by occasion alone and that, through an easy change of occasion, he can be defeated. Polybius speaks truly:

κρατεῖ ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καιρὸς, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν.

In all human affairs, but especially in affairs of war, occasion prevails--often more than valor.

§7. Let cruelty also be absent. Anger against a suppliant enemy is unbecoming; clemency is divine. Those who have not been cruel and savage must be preserved. Machiavelli's counsel is savage, book 3, chapter 31; for although he also approves other means, he nevertheless prefers the destruction of free cities. In *On Princes*, chapter 5: "When a territory under dominion has by ancient custom been free and its manner of living has been under its own law, a threefold method is offered for retaining your right over it. The first is that you utterly destroy it; the second, that you yourself migrate there to dwell; the last, that, exacting only an annual payment, you permit it to pass its life under its own laws and liberty. You are likewise to establish there a government of a few men who will take care that that dominion is preserved for you in friendship. Since that government has been established there by the prince, it knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and power, and therefore it will consider that all things must be earnestly done by it so that they may preserve that dominion for him. The Spartans and Romans can be examples for us. The Spartans possessed Athens and Thebes and established in them a government of a few, but nevertheless lost them. The Romans determined that Capua, Carthage, and Numantia were to be destroyed, and did not lose them. They wished to retain Greece approximately in the manner of the Spartans and did not abrogate its laws, but it did not answer their wishes, so that, in order to retain it, they were compelled to destroy many cities in that province. Therefore no counsel can be offered by which they may be securely possessed that is safer than destruction. For whoever gains power over a city

accustomed to pass its life under its own laws and does not think that it ought to be destroyed should expect that it will destroy him. For at a time of revolt it always has something to which it may flee for refuge--namely, those ancient institutions of its own, which can never be handed over to oblivion either by length of time or by the conferral of benefits; and whatever is done, whatever is foreseen, unless the inhabitants have been drawn apart and dispersed, that name of liberty and those institutions never fall from their minds. At every turn of affairs an immediate return is made to them, just as we have seen done by the Pisans after so many years of that servitude into which the Florentines had driven them."

It is excessively harsh and barbarous to kill men lest they rebel at some time, when there are so many means of averting rebellion, such as migration, the removal of the noblemen, the introduction of colonies, the addition of citadels, and the taking away of arms. Nor is it doubtful that the Romans took the worst counsel for themselves when they destroyed Carthage, Numantia, and Corinth. For besides the fact that they fought against desperate men at the cost of great slaughter, they also diminished their own advantages: with the money and men by which they destroyed those cities, they could have acquired entire kingdoms. Nor was there any other cause than insatiable hatred or the empty glory of a name sought for commanders through the destruction of famous cities. Yet not even thus were they secure against rebellions. Let there be moderation, because victory stood at the distance of one blow: if in one moment he had anticipated you, the enemy sword which received your steel would have lodged in your throat. The pagan poet teaches us beautifully:

ῥεῖα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥεῖα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,

ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,

ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολὶὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει

Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.

Easily he exalts, and easily brings down the exalted.

Easily he diminishes the illustrious and increases the obscure.

Easily he straightens the crooked and reduces the proud to nothing--

high-thundering Jupiter, who inhabits the highest dwellings.

The Romans sometimes exercised victory more mercifully according to the character of the commander. Marcellus was mild in victory, as Silius relates in book 14; but such commanders were rare.

When the Ditmarsians, hard pressed by the Holsteiners, had fled into a church and hoped that they would be safe through its sacred character, the Holsteiners attempted, after applying fire, to burn them alive. But the former made a sortie, avenged the victor's impious cruelty, and slew twelve commanders and counts and two thousand men.

§8. Nevertheless, a more severe vengeance is permitted against enemies who are savage and ignorant of human law. David sawed the people of the Ammonites and drove iron carts over them, not without a divine command, because they had deserved punishments of that kind. Otherwise one must deal very gently with those who, as subjects, serve their prince and neither examine the causes of the war nor are able to do so--indeed, even with those who appear to have rebelled. Sthenius had solicited the Mamertines to revolt, and Pompey was considering destroying them. Then Sthenius said: "You do what is not equitable, Magnus, because you prepare to kill so many innocent men on account of me alone, who am guilty." Pompey rewarded this greatness of spirit with the safety both of Sthenius and of the city. How much more savagely did Severus act, who slaughtered indiscriminately all who had stood on Albinus's side, though they pleaded in vain the necessity of the time? Indeed, severity is sometimes commanded. Saul was cast down from his kingdom because he had spared Agag, who deserved death. Because Ahab dismissed a man worthy of death, he was given in place of that man, and his people in place of the Syrian people.

§9. The Romans' disposition in victory was sometimes more peaceable, but for the most part there was excessive cruelty and arrogance. It was ordinary for the defeated to be sold; it was customary for them to be preserved for a triumph--that is, for certain death. Many were also condemned to the gladiatorial school or to the beasts, so that it is no wonder that nations resisted them more fiercely. Otherwise, until the signal for retreat was given, the Romans slaughtered all, even dogs and animals, in order to terrify. But this is a cause for resisting more bravely.

§10. Victor, do not shatter everything; for there is a protection even in disaster. Remember that you are now destroying what is yours.

§11. I also counsel the victor to make peace. If the Carthaginians had listened to Hanno after the victory at Cannae, they would have obtained from the Romans an equitable and honorable peace, far better than that which Hannibal sought from Scipio before the battle. It has happened to many that, having been inexorable when they denied peace amid another's disaster, they were afterward compelled, when fortune had changed, to seek it in vain. There is always a danger that the defeated may join themselves to someone more powerful and stir up a new war.

The defeated are wretched, but their last valor is more violent, because they fight for safety, while the victors fight for honor.

An equitable peace must be given; for no one will observe a harsh and insulting one any longer than is necessary. For who would persuade the Athenians to preserve peace with Minos when they were commanded to give

Each year seven

bodies of their children?

Peace is most welcome and most lasting when, contrary to expectation, it is given advantageously and unexpectedly to the defeated. For this brings it about that the defeated are drawn onto the victor's side.

Restrain the victors, lest they scatter. A routed battle line has often routed its pursuers. Take care first that you are not conquered, and then that you conquer. When you have conquered, govern your spirit and show that you fought for the sake of peace. Those who cannot flee will fight, and they will either extort the peace denied them or impose their own upon the victor.

CHAPTER LXII

What the Defeated Man Must Do

§1. It is expedient for the victor to accept peace; for the defeated it is necessary. Indeed, it is sometimes advantageous to be defeated, so that men whose ferocity has been broken may learn to endure peace.

§2. Although he has been struck by a great disaster, nevertheless let him retain his spirit--indeed, also his arms: peace is better concluded beneath a shield. The Romans, defeated in three immense battles, to which the disaster in Spain was joined, retained their empire for this reason alone: that they did not fall in spirit. After the battle of Cannae the citizens were conspiring, the allies defected, and Hannibal sold the bankers' stalls. Nevertheless, Roman valor--or Roman fear of Carthaginian cruelty and perfidy--stood firm. By receiving disaster bravely, they made a step toward victory. Barbarians have sometimes imitated that valor. After Avaricum had been taken by assault, Vercingetorix neither failed in spirit nor hid himself in concealment, but moved about before the eyes of his fellow citizens and retained authority and praise amid adversity. Caesar, book 7.

§3. Let the defeated man, therefore, display his former courage and spirit and hope for better things, for the saddest things have passed. The fortune of one hour has accomplished little if the spirit is erect. A man who has often been defeated in battle can be victor in the war.

After the Venetians had been defeated in a very grievous battle by Francesco, Duke of Milan, when almost no one had escaped, within three days they repaired their army and compelled the enemy to seek peace. For Francesco Foscari, their doge, cast money into their midst and admonished all to contribute according to his example; he brought it about that all understood what greatness of spirit could accomplish. Egnatius, book 3, chapter 2.

§4. Defeated, strive with every force, art, and vigilance to spoil the fruit of victory; rouse your heart and discover every kind of honorable stratagem. The victor's freedom from care will furnish an opportunity. Do not pursue only old devices. New ones must always be discovered. Thucydides, book 1:

ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄφ' αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον.

War can least of all be conducted according to settled prescriptions; of itself it skillfully contrives many things in response to the events which occur.

§5. If the victor commands moderate terms, let them be accepted; if grievous ones, let the defeated commit themselves to a powerful prince as *dediticii*, men who have surrendered. The Campanians, hard pressed by their neighbors, surrendered themselves to the Romans, and their enemies were destroyed. When the Florentines were being oppressed by Castruccio the Sienese, they received Robert, king of Naples, into their city. The forces of Castruccio, and afterward those of the Sienese too, were worn down.

§6. Draw your arms also. For if, after a great disaster, you trouble the unwary victor by skirmishes and small losses, you recover authority and tear the reputation of his victory. Let necessity remove sloth, for its bites are most grievous when it has been provoked. By whatever art you can, restore Mars in hope of peace. Pompey, defeated in Spain and driven from Italy, did not regard those disasters; defeated at Pharsalia, he sought Egypt. War was renewed in Africa, Spain, Philippi, and Sicily. Antony was afraid and did not renew the war, although he could easily have gathered Egypt and the aid of many nations; instead, he preferred to perish alone.

§7. A defeat is to be concealed as far as possible, but in such a way that remedies are not delayed. Meanwhile, cities must be occupied at the opportune time and fortified, and those who are wavering must be retained in obedience. Forces will never be lacking if you deliberate.

§8. All these things tend toward this: that you enter upon an equitable and entirely unsuspected peace. Such a peace is generally best agreed upon between those who appear equal. Can a prince make peace in such a manner that he compels private persons to remit the losses inflicted upon them? We certainly see it done in this way. Others think restitution should be made at common expense. It is, however, more difficult to make peace than to wage war. The English boast that they have defeated the French in war; they complain that they have been defeated in peace.

§9. Therefore let both the victor grant peace and the defeated accept it, for peace is the end of war. “For so great,” says Augustine in books 19, chapters 11 and 12, of *The City of God*, “is the good of peace that, even among earthly and mortal things, nothing is customarily heard with greater pleasure, nothing is desired with more longing, and, finally, nothing better can be found. If at some time we wish to speak at somewhat greater length about it, we shall not, as I judge, be burdensome to our readers, both on account of the end of this city, concerning which our discourse is, and on account of the very sweetness of peace, which is dear to all. For whoever in any manner observes human affairs and our common nature recognizes with me that, just as there is no one who does not wish to rejoice, so there is no one who does not wish to have peace. Since even those who desire wars desire nothing other than to conquer, they therefore desire to arrive through war at a glorious peace. For what else is victory but the subjection of those who resist? When this has been accomplished, there will be peace. Wars, therefore, are waged with the intention of peace, even by those who endeavor to exercise military valor in commanding and fighting. Hence it is evident that peace is the desirable end of war. For every man, even by waging war, seeks peace, but no one seeks war by making peace. For even those who wish the peace in which they live to be disturbed do not hate peace, but desire that it be changed according to their own judgment. They do not, therefore, wish that there be no peace, but that it be the peace which they wish. Finally, even if they have separated themselves from others through sedition, they do not accomplish what they intend unless they maintain some kind of appearance of peace with the very men who have joined or conspired with them. Accordingly, robbers themselves, in order that they may be enemies of the peace of others more violently and securely, wish to have peace among their associates. But even if one man is so preeminent in strength and so wary of accomplices that he commits himself to no associate, and, laying snares for and prevailing over those upon whom he can, acts as a plunderer after they have been oppressed and killed, he certainly maintains some kind of shadow of peace with those whom he cannot kill and from whom he wishes what he does to lie hidden.”

Although that peace is sought as something firm, nevertheless it will not exist without some war or suspicion of war. Injuries and suspicions have altogether filled human life, even the life of friends. “But not even the saints,” says Augustine, book 19, chapter 10, of *The City of God*, “and the faithful worshipers of the one true and supreme God are safe from their deceits and manifold temptation. For in this place of weakness and in evil days even this anxiety is not useless, so that the security where peace is most complete and certain may be sought with more fervent desire.”

Let us therefore aspire to this peace not only through wars but also through the peace of the human city: the most ordered and most concordant fellowship of enjoying God; peace where there is no evil and no contradiction; blessed and full peace; the peace of the Jerusalem above. You, O God, grant it in your strength, with abundance in your towers.

THE END.