

St. Albert the Great

# ON INTERPRETATION, BOOKS I–II

*Liber I-II Perihermenias*

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## **Book I Perihermenias. Tractate I. Chapter I. In what order it stands among the logical books.**

BOOK I PERIHERMENIAS. TRACTATE I. ON THOSE THINGS WHICH MUST BE SET BEFORE THE BOOK. CHAPTER I. In what order it stands among the logical books.

As was determined from the beginning of this science, the intention of logic is to teach how someone may come to knowledge of the unknown through what is known; and this indeed is intended in every philosophy, although it is not taught formally except in logic. On this account Aristotle says that logic is the mode of philosophy. And because logic is the science through which someone comes to knowledge of the unknown through what is known, while the unknown, as it is in diction, is twofold, namely incomplex and complex, the incomplex cannot be known except by definition. And the complex cannot be known except by syllogism and demonstration. Just as, in order to have definition, it was necessary to set beforehand the discovery and acceptance of things definable and defining, and for this it was necessary to posit those things according to whose account predicables are reduced to order, and secondly it was necessary to posit how the predicables themselves are ordered, and thirdly how from division the definition of any incomplex thing is gathered, so, in the mode by which one comes to knowledge of the complex, it is necessary first to treat those things which the syllogism, through which one comes to knowledge of the complex unknown, accepts as posited and presupposed. Such things are interpretation and enunciation, and those things which surround interpretation and enunciation.

But interpretation and enunciation, insofar as they are such, are not things concluded by a syllogism for the manifestation of the unknown; because, if this were true, it would follow that every interpretation and every enunciation would be, or could be, the conclusion of some syllogism, which is not true. Rather, interpretation is called speech which speaks in words about a thing as it is, for explanation. On this account it is composed from the preposition *inter* and *praetor*. Now a *praetor* is one who is a prince, and goes before by commanding, as Papias says; because whatever speech goes before with a mode of saying and explaining about a thing according as it is or is not, and what must be held about it, is called interpretation, since a *praetor* is one who, as prince and preceptor, commands publicly and public matters, altogether what must be commanded, that is, universally, particularly, and according to affirmation and negation.

On this account in some respect it differs from enunciation. For interpretation occurs in many ways, as has been said. But enunciation says only that something is said or predicated of something. And although enunciation is the most powerful interpretation, nevertheless it is not convertible with interpretation, which says the exposition of a thing according to every mode, whether in part, as in noun or in verb, or in the whole, as in the quality of affirmation or negation; or in quantity, as in being-in universally and particularly, whether finitely or infinitely, whether by one speech or not by one; none of these does enunciation say by its own name. But interpretation is not made according to its best power unless it is made in all the modes which have been said.

Therefore, because interpretation contains in itself all the things which have been said, this book is better inscribed *On Interpretation* than *On Enunciation*. For many things are determined in it which do not belong to enunciation according as it is enunciation, as is clear from the things which have been said. Nevertheless it is also called *On Enunciation* as concerning that about which it chiefly is, just as Averroes says that philosophy is about being according as it is common to everything, as about a common subject to which all things whatsoever determined in the science are reduced, and that it is about substance as about the special subject about which that science chiefly intends. For a subject is given to a science in many ways, and not in one way: namely, that the subject is that of whose parts the properties are proved in the science, or that it is what is chiefly intended, on account of which all other things are determined in the science. And that is called the subject which is most worthy among the things about which the science treats, as metaphysics is called

theology because in its most worthy part it treats divine things.

In this way just mentioned, interpretation and enunciation differ in account from proposition. For proposition is an enunciation standing under the form of syllogism. And many things happen to it which do not happen to interpretation or enunciation, such as the disposition of three terms which are in predicate and in subject, without which disposition they are not parts of a syllogism; and about such things determination is made in the book of the Prior Analytics, where the form of syllogism and its power are treated. But this does not belong to interpretation, nor even to enunciation. Rather, if there is interpretation, it belongs to it to interpret by affirming and denying universally and particularly, finitely and infinitely, both as it is one and many, and as contradictory, contrary, and of this sort; without these a perfect interpretation concerning a thing is not made through speech. And therefore, because these things are without the combining and figure of syllogism, in these respects they ought not to be reduced to syllogism as to a whole; and therefore, as to this, they have to be treated not in the book of the Prior Analytics but in their proper book, which is called *Perihermenias*. For such properties do not happen from syllogism, but from the fact that there is interpretation, and they would happen to it even if there never were a syllogism.

Nevertheless this book is ordered to the book of the Prior Analytics, as the books of the Categories and of the Principles are ordered to this one, because, just as from ordered predicables subjects and predicates are received from which interpretation is made, so from ordered interpretations and enunciations a syllogism is made. And therefore interpretation is ordered to syllogism materially and finally. I say materially, not as proximate or necessary matter, for in this way proposition is related to syllogism, but as remote matter capable of being under the form of syllogism. It is ordered finally because it is sought for the sake of syllogism, in which, once posited, it elicits knowledge of the unknown, as has been said. For it is taken according to the second act of reason, which is to compose and divide, and it is composite understanding; because, as Aristotle says in the third book *On the Soul* <sup>[1]</sup>, the understanding of indivisible things is in those things in which there is no true or false; there is also a certain composition of intelligible things, and in this composition those things which belong to one another according to reality are interpreted. For every interpretation is according to whole and part, quantity and quality, opposition and expression of truth, which must be taken up for the declaration of the unknown which is complex.

And because interpretation and enunciation encompass all these things, interpretation is the common subject of this science. *Perihermenias* is said from *ζαίενημρέ ἰρεπ*, which is from the Greek preposition *ἰρεπ* and *αίενημρέ*, interpretation, that is, *On Interpretation*, because the Greeks do not have the ablative, but use the genitive for the ablative.

From the things already said the solution of four questions, or five, is clear: namely, about what it is as subject, what the title of the book is, what its end is, and what order it has among the books of logic. For since logic is ordered into three things, namely into the science of incomplex things, which is had through definition, about which it has already been said, and into the science of complex things, which is divided into two, namely into the science of the interpretation of those things through which one arrives at knowledge of complexes, and into the science of syllogism through which someone is led to cognition of complexes, which will be handed down after this book, it is evident that this science obtains the second place in the science through which one comes through the known into cognition of unknown things. For it concerns the interpretation of those things which are taken up in a syllogism for having knowledge of unknown things.

The solution is also clear to the question by which one can ask why interpretation is not determined in the same book with syllogism. For in this book interpretation is not determined according as it stands under the form of syllogism, or according as it is proximate to it. Rather, it is determined according to the proper properties which belong to it, not according as it is matter of syllogism, but according as they belong to it according to itself, namely so that through it there may be an interpretation of the things gatherable in syllogism for eliciting knowledge of the unknown through the known. For every intellectual science comes

from pre-existing cognition.

The solution is also clear to that which can be asked, under what part of philosophy it is placed. For it is not an essential or real part of philosophy, but a rational or sermocinal part: for it considers being standing under speech. Interpretation is useful for having cognition of the complex unknown through a complex known thing, and that known thing is interpretation in speech. Therefore it obtains a middle place among the books of logic; an accident supplies to it the subjectable and the predicable. And this book supplies to the later books what is gathered in a syllogism.

It is also clear, as Boethius says, that Andronicus <sup>[2]</sup> does not speak well when he says that the subject of this book is speech. For there are many speeches and parts of speech about which nothing is here intended or treated, and which are ordered rather to the grammarian if they are ordered to the end of congruity, or to the rhetorician if they are ordered to the end of charm, or pertain to the poetic art if they are ordered to those things which provoke to abhorrence or delight or to some imaginable utility. Therefore speech is not the subject, for many speeches are not interpretative or enunciative, such as deprecativae, optative, conjunctive, and infinitive speech.

But what some ask about the author is superfluous, and was never asked by any Philosopher except in the schools of Pythagoras, because in those schools nothing was received except what Pythagoras made. But by others this was not asked: for by whomever the things were said, they were received, provided that they had the account of proved truth. For the efficient cause is outside the thing, and from it the thing does not have firmness or infirmity, but rather from the account of the things said <sup>[3]</sup>. But Aristotle was the first author of this science. Therefore Andronicus does not speak truly when he attributes this book to others. And thus the order is clear, and under what part of philosophy it is placed, and concerning the author, subject, and title.

## Notes

[1] Text commentary 11. (*Tex. com. 11.*)

[2] Andronicus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished at Rome in the time of Cicero, in the year 63 before Jesus Christ, received the writings of Aristotle brought to Rome by the will of Sulla from Tyrannion the grammarian and Sulla's librarian, and, after rereading them with great zeal, was the first to restore them; he was also the first at Rome to make public those things which he had corrected, whether they had been corrupted by the passage of injurious time or by other causes, and he took care that they be written again cleansed from faults. (*Andronicus Rhodensis, Philosophus Peripateticus, qui Romae, tempore Ciceronis, ann. ante J. C. 63 florebat, et Aristotelis scripta Romam e Syllae voluntate delata, a Tyrannione grammatico Syllaeque bibliothecario, recepit, eaque studio cum magno relecta primus instauravit; primus etiam Romae manifestans illa quae sive decursu temporis injuriantis, sive aliis de causis corrupta castigaverat, et iterum inscribi mendis abstersa curaverat.*)

[3] The custom of asking about the name of the author flowed from the Pythagoreans, and it is a superfluous matter, because a thing does not have firmness from the effective cause but from the account; and therefore Seneca said in the treatise On the Cardinal Virtues: "Do not attend to who says it, but to what he says." (*Consuetudo quaerendi de nomine auctoris emanavit a Pythagoricis, et est res superflua: quia res non habet firmitatem a causa effectiva sed a ratione: et ideo dicebat Seneca in tract. de cardinalibus virtutibus: "Ne quis dicat, sed quid dicat intendito."*)

## Chapter II. On the mode of the science and its end.

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The mode of the science must also be determined. It must be said that one must proceed in this book in the mode of interpretation. For here there is interpretation of all the things which surround enunciation, whether according to the parts or according to the whole enunciation. Yet in the same book there is the mode of science in this, that here properties and proper attributes are proved both about enunciation or interpretation and also about its parts; and this is the mode of science.

Although some object that in demonstrative science no properties are proved of the subject according to itself, but of its parts, as in Euclid's geometry nothing is proved of continuous quantity, but rather of its parts,

as of triangle, circle, square, proportionable quantity, commensurable quantity, and so with the others. But to this it must be said that in demonstrative science demonstration can be made about the subject according to itself, provided that that science contains in itself the principles of that subject. But this is not so in geometry, because it does not consider the principles of continuous quantity; rather the metaphysician considers them, and the geometer receives continuous quantity from the metaphysician. Therefore he proves properties about its parts and not about the quantity itself. But another science, which considers the subject and the principles of the subject, can prove properties about the subject and about its parts. Therefore it can prove properties about interpretation or enunciation and about its parts, since it considers the principles of interpretation and enunciation.

And if someone should still object that a part must be treated with the whole, while the whole of enunciation is the syllogism, to whose composition it comes, therefore it ought to be treated with syllogism in the book of the Prior Analytics. Again, the necessary proposition, which is the matter of demonstration, is treated in the same book with demonstrative syllogism, and the probable proposition in the same book with dialectical syllogism; and thus it seems that enunciation, which is a simple proposition, not determined to this or that, ought likewise to be determined with syllogism in the book of the Prior Analytics, and ought not to be a special science.

But all these things are easily solved through the things said before: for proposition, as simply proposition, is not interpretation or enunciation, but rather is proposition, which in the disposition of terms is related to another proposition which is a fellow-part with it in the syllogism, in the disposition of terms orderable into the combining and figure of syllogism<sup>[1]</sup>. And in this way proposition is determined in the book of the Prior Analytics. But in this way it is not called interpretation or enunciation; rather it is called that which makes interpretation about a thing, as it is or is not. And under this act it is indeed remotely orderable to syllogism, but it is not under a proximate disposition. Therefore, insofar as it is such, many things happen to it which do not happen to proposition according as it is proposition. And with respect to those properties it was fitting to treat enunciation in a special book. Nevertheless all disputations of this sort concern the circumstances of the science, and not the matter itself about which it treats. Therefore they contribute little to the true science concerning what is asked. Nor are the Ancients found to have inquired into such matters.

Such a mode of science, however, as has been said, is observed here. It can also be said that here there is the custom of an art, because an art concerns the generations of things constituted through art. But here principles and precepts are given by which interpretation or enunciation is constituted. It is also definitive and inductive of examples. And it is inventive in this respect, that by certain dispositions it teaches one to discover what interpretation is, what its oppositions are, its unity and plurality, and other things of this sort. It is also resolute, because it teaches one to resolve interpretation into parts<sup>[2]</sup>. And many other modes of this sort are easily found; nevertheless it principally observes the mode of doctrine, which is through the mode of a science considering the subject and the parts of the subject, about which it proves properties through proper principles. The mode also is, as Boethius says, one which, because of the brevity of the sentences, is more obscure than certain other books.

It should be noted that the substantial principal end of this science is to constitute interpretative speech about a thing under discourse, perfecting a true and perfect interpretation, as we have said. But it has a further end, because it is ordered to syllogism through which the unknown is known through the known in interpretative speech.

And thus determination has been made about form, matter, end, and efficient cause, and also of what philosophy it is a part, in what place it is ordered, what act of reason it perfects in logic, and that it must be treated in a special book. These are the preambles to the proposed matter. But we, as in other works, shall pursue Aristotle's sayings by expounding and by supplying where they are diminished and brief, by proving where it is opportune, by bringing in other doctors, and, to speak generally, by doing all things which make

for the ease and perfection of teaching. And in every way we shall follow Aristotle's order as we do in other matters. From what has been said it is clear what interpretation properly is, and it is also clear that enunciation is the most powerful interpretation.

There is also a doubt about the mode: because Aristotle, in certain books in which he treats those things which do not concern matter, posits transcendent terms, such as A, B, C, as is clear in the book of the Prior Analytics. But here, where he teaches about interpretation not as concerning determinate matter but simply, he does not use transcendent terms, but posits terms according to determinate matter. The response is that this is because syllogism, as it is syllogism, is not formally variable according to the matter in which it is, but is a form equally regarding every matter. Therefore terms of determinate matter do not belong to such a form. But here interpretation is treated according as it is a vocal sound referred to the signification of a thing, from which it receives affirmation, negation, universality, particularity, and multitude. Therefore it is necessary that, according to the diversity of signification, the constitution of interpretation be made by diverse terms; therefore transcendent terms do not fit it, especially because interpretation is not perfect when a thing is not interpreted as it is. But this cannot be done by transcendent terms.

It must be understood that, in order for someone to arrive at knowledge of the unknown through the known, three things are required. The first is interpretation of things through interpretative vocal sound. The second is a coupling of the things which have been interpreted toward the consequence of one with the other. The third is proof that it is thus and not otherwise. The first is done in the Perihermenias, the second in the Prior Analytics, and the third in diverse ways in the Posterior Analytics and Topics. And thus the order of this science toward the following sciences is known.

The mode of signifying in vocal sound differs in the Categories and here. For in the Categories the beginning of signification is from the thing and terminates in vocal sound. For the book of the Categories is about the ten vocal sounds signifying first principles, and according to the properties of things, not of vocal sounds. But here, in the science of interpretation, since interpretation is made through speech, the beginning is from speech or vocal sound and terminates in the thing, because otherwise there would not be interpretation. And on this account many things are said about interpretation which happen to it insofar as it is in vocal sound. Thus therefore the mode of this science is clear.

## Notes

[1] These things were also said in the preceding chapter. (*Haec dicta sunt etiam in praecedenti capitulo.*)

[2] From this it is clear that we are not taught to resolve only in the book of the Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics, nor to discover only in the book of the Topics. (*Ex quo patet quod non docemur resolvere solum in libro Priorum et Posteriorum, nec invenire solum in libro Topicorum.*)

## Chapter III. On the proemial part.

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Proceeding to treat interpretation or enunciation, we shall determine first concerning simple enunciation or interpretation, before we say anything about interpretation contracted to the greatest degree. And we shall determine those things which belong as parts or as properties to simple enunciation. Therefore, in order to treat enunciation, it is necessary first to constitute what a noun is and what a verb is, according to logical acceptance, because the composite is not known unless it is known from how many and what sort of things it is, since the principles of the being of the composite are the components. And because they are principles in being, they are also principles of knowing that thing of which they are the principles. Therefore for these reasons one must foreknow and constitute what a noun is and what a verb is. Moreover, enunciation is that in which something is enunciated of something. A noun is that about which something is enunciated. A verb is what is enunciated of another. And so noun and verb, under the account of what is enunciated and that about

which it is enunciated, fall into the definition of enunciation. On account of this it is necessary first to constitute what noun is and what verb is. Afterward immediately, because a verb is not enunciated of a noun except by means of composition, to which affirmation and negation happen, it is necessary to determine what affirmation is and what negation is, which are about composition and are principles of opposition. Although this opposition is equally between affirmation and negation, nevertheless opposition is not caused or completed except in negation. For being is not the cause of any opposition, but rather non-being referred to being; and therefore opposition is completed in negation. On this account, in this division and proem, negation is set before affirmation.

But some say that there is a twofold cause of negation, namely a general defect of being, as before the world existed there was nothing of the being of the world, and a particular defect, namely that this or that did not exist. And they say that the negation which is caused by a general defect precedes affirmation, as the being of the world is after the non-being of the world. But negation caused by a particular defect follows affirmation, which it always sets before itself <sup>[1]</sup>. This is trifling, and it avails nothing for the proposed matter, because it is evident that the Peripatetics say nothing about the defect of general being, nor about negation caused by that defect; whence this is frivolous. But in the first way it must be said that, although negation follows affirmation according to nature, nevertheless because opposition is completed in negation, for this reason it is sometimes set before affirmation, especially where affirmation and negation are being treated insofar as they are the principle of opposition, as happens here. But I speak of affirmation and negation which are opposed as material things with respect to enunciation, since the noun is the subject and the verb is the predicate. Now composition is a part of enunciation, to which affirmation and negation happen; and because these are parts of enunciation, or accidents or properties of the parts, we call them the material principles of enunciation, and therefore they must be set beforehand and constituted. Afterward one must treat consequently the formal principles, according to the difference and the species to be defined, which is enunciation, and according to the proper genus, which is speech.

Therefore, when we say that one must constitute first, we understand first in the account of the constituting principle. And when we say “one must,” we understand that this has necessity of supposition or of end. For if interpretation is to be known, then it must be done thus; nevertheless this is not necessary simply, according as the necessary is what cannot not be. But because we say “constitute,” it is understood that these things are constituted which by that very attestation are the things they are. But “noun” from the grammarian’s attestation is not sufficient for it to be a constitutive part of enunciation, if it signifies substance with quality, the substance of that to which it is imposed and the quality from which it is imposed; and thus it makes only knowledge about the thing of which it is the name, and in this way nothing is enunciated about it. But the noun, as it is established here, is established according to the form by which something can be enunciated about it, and therefore by dialectical constitution it receives such a form, “noun and verb.”

When these have been constituted, one must afterward consequently attend to what “affirmation and negation” are. For these, since they are qualities, do not first constitute enunciation, but consequently, because they happen to the composition of enunciation. And when the material principles of enunciation of this sort have thus been had, around which the form of enunciation is posited, one must attend to the formal principles: namely, what enunciation is according to the constitutive differences which are implied in the name of the species, and what speech is, which is the genus of enunciation to be contracted by differences to the constitution of enunciation.

## Notes

[1] Why the Philosopher in this proem sets negation before affirmation. See, however, Boethius in the second edition, because he assigns another cause. Jammy. (*Quare Philosophus in hoc prooemio praeponit negationem affirmationi. Vide tamen Boetium in secunda editione, quia aliam causam assignat. JAMMY.*)

## **Tractate II. Chapter I. On the defining things that are the principle of enunciation.**

TRACTATE II. ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMON PRINCIPLES DEFINING THE PARTS OF ENUNCIATION, AND ON NOUN, VERB, AND SPEECH. CHAPTER I. On the defining things that are the principle of enunciation.

That some vocal sound is significative by convention, and without institution signifies nothing, is proved thus: because those things which are outside the soul are things caused by nature, causing their cognitions in the soul through the universal abstracted from the singular, or through the sensible which sense receives, from which the intellect, by reflection upon sense, receives the universal. For in this way the external thing impresses and in some way acts upon the soul, and introduces a passion into it, because the soul according to mind and intellect is passive and receptive. And because the intellect is thus affected and receives from the external thing, therefore the forms and intentions of things which are thus made in the soul are called passions. And because articulated vocal sounds cannot be formed except by one understanding and conceiving a thing and receiving a passion according to the form of the known thing, therefore articulated vocal sounds are constituted by such an intellect. But it does not constitute an articulated vocal sound except for signifying the species of the thing and the passion which it has conceived within itself from the thing.

Therefore a vocal sound which is thus imposed for signifying a thing is a note of the passion which the intellect itself has conceived from the thing. And thus those things which are in vocal sound, constituted for signifying by such an intellect, are notes of those passions which have been conceived from things in the soul. But the thing generates its species in the soul, and the intellect, informed by that species, institutes the vocal sound. Whence the passion of the soul is the species of the thing, and the vocal sound signifying according to the institution of the intellect so formed expresses a note of the passion which is in the soul. And therefore the instituted vocal sound itself becomes a sign and likeness of the thing in the one who hears. Whence what is a note of the passion in the mouth of the speaker is a sign and likeness of the thing in the ear of the hearer. Thus, therefore, vocal sounds are notes of those passions which are in the soul.

Letters, however, and figures are also by convention; and therefore such figures and vocal sounds were invented through which those things which must be said may be pronounced in right syllables according to a lettered vocal sound, which the articulated vocal sound, or the vocal sound significative by convention, informs. And therefore, just as an articulated significative vocal sound is by convention, so also are the figures of letters. For letters, complexed in this or that way, are notes of vocal sounds significative by convention, or of those things which are in vocal sound, that is, of things signified by the vocal sound itself, so that vocal sounds are notes of passions, as letters are notes of vocal sounds according as they stand under the form of lettered and articulated vocal sound.

And from this it is clear that, just as letters are not the same for all or among all, because neither the conception nor the intellect in conceiving them is the same among all, so no lettered and articulated vocal sound is the same for all; but the first conceptions of those things of which vocal sounds are immediate notes are the same among all, just as the passions of the soul are. Because things generated which have one generator of one form are the same in form and species, passions are likenesses of things in the soul. But things are in the soul through the likeness of the generator. Therefore, since things everywhere and among all are the same, they will generate the same passions in species; and therefore the conceptions for rightly conceiving all things are the same in species. And similarly also things, of which the passions of the soul are notes, are in species among all and everywhere, because they are likenesses of things in animals, generated by things. But our institution changes nothing in the things of nature. Concerning such matters, how likenesses of things are generated from things in the soul, enough has been said in the third book *On the Soul* <sup>[1]</sup>, where it was determined that things are not in the soul, but likenesses of things. For those matters belong to another business and pertain to the natural philosopher.

Thus, therefore, it is clear that the things to be constituted by us are vocal sounds; and through the fact that those vocal sounds are notes, and no vocal sound is a note except one that is significative, we have that the things to be constituted by us must be constituted in significative vocal sound as in a genus.

But through the fact that they are notes of passions which are caused in the soul from the intentions of things, it is held that they are not first notes of things, but rather first notes of the likenesses which are in the soul, and through those likenesses they are referred to things. And in this the notes considered here differ from the consideration of the grammarian, who considers those vocal sounds according as they are signs of things immediately, and therefore says that a noun signifies substance with quality. But the logician says that it is a vocal sound signifying by convention.

And through this it is clear that the logician does not presuppose these things from a preceding science, namely grammar, but constitutes them through proper definitions constituting these things according to the being by which they can constitute and compose enunciation. For vocal sound significative by convention is considered in two ways: namely according to institution and use, and according to the cause of institution <sup>[2]</sup>. According to institution and use, it is a note of the concept which is in the soul. But the one instituting has no regard in instituting except to this or that which he has already conceived in the soul. And the one using vocal sound in speaking, as Plato says, uses it only to disclose the concept by which the soul is now affected or has been acted upon. But the cause of institution is that, since we cannot carry out things themselves so that we may communicate with one another by the presentation of things, articulated vocal sounds were invented by which we may express the things themselves or the intentions of things, so that we may communicate with one another by vocal sounds. And in this final way vocal sounds are referred to the significates of things. Therefore now from the things which have been said it has been held that the things to be constituted through definition, for the generation of enunciation, are in vocal sound as in a genus, and in vocal sound signifying the concept of the mind, which is a passion made in the soul by external things. And therefore it is articulated vocal sound significative and referred to the designation of a thing. And because the same vocal sound referred to designating the same thing is not the same among all, but is varied, it must have a variable cause of its institution, which is the will of the one instituting by convention.

On this account Avicenna says that lettered vocal sound without the convention of the one instituting signifies utterly nothing. Yet because it does not make a sign of a thing to another except under a determinate certificative figure of vocal sound, such a vocal sound must be lettered, because figures have certainty only under the elements of letters; without that certainty there cannot be a certain sign of the thing. And because letters describe the figure of the vocal sound in utterance, and, as it were, paint it, so to speak, therefore, just as the lettered vocal sound itself is from institution, so also letters are from institution; and therefore they are not the same among all, but are changed just as the vocal sounds themselves figured according to letters are changed.

Therefore, although vocal sound is sound, nevertheless, because sound is nothing but a breaking and blow of air struck by a solid, flat striker, changing the drum of the ear, not every sound is vocal sound; because vocal sound is sound uttered from the mouth of an animal, with the image of some signification. For this image can be affective and moving toward alteration or flight; and then vocal sound signifies the passion of joy, pain, or sadness, as the vocal sounds of brute animals mostly signify, and also of certain rational beings, as groaning and those things which are conveyed through interjections. The imagination can also be received from a thing, in which reason receives truth or falsity, or the true concept of any thing; and in this way sound uttered with the imagination of speech belongs only to a human being, and that vocal sound alone will truly be vocal sound.

Therefore vocal sounds are always significative, for they signify at least themselves. But those vocal sounds which, although they are lettered, do not have institution for signifying something, nor are uttered with the image of something to be designated by vocal sounds, are not called significative vocal sounds, as bu ba

blicteri; these examples have customarily been posited because they are not instituted for designating anything. But among significative vocal sounds some designate not by institution but by nature, as those which we have mentioned, such as groaning and exclamation in pain or joy, or in the vocal sounds of brute animals. And nevertheless these become signs of their signification if they are received through institution, and become significative concepts, as euge and other interjections which signify by affect, not as affect, but as a concept of affect designated by a lettered vocal sound. But vocal sounds which are significative through institution are significative of every diversity. Articulated vocal sound is so called because it makes a sign of a thing articulately. But in order that it become a certain sign, it must become lettered by signs elementally composed from the elements of letters, which are not the same among all; and so now we have that what must be constituted by us are significative lettered vocal sounds, which are not the same among all.

This is the reason why it was not necessary to say that first one must constitute what diction is, or what term is; instead we said that one must constitute what noun is and what verb is. For here we do not intend every diction which is a part of speech, but only these according as something is enunciated about them, or they themselves are enunciated about something, as are noun and verb and the composition of these. Nor do we intend term, because we proceed not by resolving but rather by generating enunciation from the principles of its generation; on account of this we also begin from simple things.

Although we have set beforehand that one must also constitute what speech is and what enunciation is, which are composite things, we did not say that these must be preconstituted insofar as they are composite, but insofar as they are formal principles as genus and difference of those things which fall into the definition of enunciation or interpretation. And by this way of generation and collection of the things which pertain to the definition of interpretation, we shall proceed.

Therefore, now that it has been held that vocal sounds are such, that they are significative vocal sounds, that they are first significative of passions and consequently significative of things, and that they are by convention and not through what is the same among all, and now that it has also been held that they are articulated and lettered vocal sounds, it remains to investigate further about them, namely whether they are complex or incomplex.

## Notes

[1] Text commentary 38. (*Tex. com. 38.*)

[2] Note this distinction, because through it many arguments are solved and it is preserved both that vocal sounds first signify things and also that they first signify concepts under diverse respects. Jammy. (*Nota hanc distinctionem: quia per eam solvuntur multa argumenta et salvatur quod voces primo significant res, et etiam quod primo significant conceptus sub diversis respectibus. JAMMY.*)

## Chapter II. On the incomplex vocal sound which signifies neither true nor false.

CHAPTER II. On the incomplex vocal sound which signifies neither true nor false.

Therefore, because vocal sounds, speaking logically, signify those things which are in the soul as passions, the same thing which happens in the soul according to passions happens in the vocal sound designating the passions. But in the soul there occurs the understanding of simple and indivisible passions, or, so to speak, of incomposite ones, such as the understanding of human being, or wood, or another thing. This understanding is the same as the intuition of the thing through the mind in the likeness which is with the soul; and this understanding is without true and false, because, as Aristotle says <sup>[1]</sup>, the understanding of indivisible and incomplex things is in those things in which there is neither true nor false; and where there is true and false, there is already a certain composition of intelligible things. And because this happens in the soul, which composes and divides things, namely that sometimes understanding is without true and false, but sometimes with true and false, so that one or the other of these must be in the understanding, namely when it conceives this to be said or denied of this, it is necessary that the same thing happen in significative vocal sound for

such an understanding: namely, that some vocal sound be articulated and lettered and incomplex, as “human being” and “ass”; while certain vocal sounds signify with true and false, as interpretation or indicative enunciation, as “a human being runs” and “a human being does not sleep.” Yet not every complex lettered and articulated vocal sound immediately signifies true or false, because neither deprecatative, nor optative, nor conjunctive, nor infinitive speech signifies with true or false, although they are complex vocal sounds. But sometimes a complex vocal sound significative by convention always signifies with true and false, when it is indicative, enunciating this of this, and so makes a perfect interpretation concerning the thing.

But vocal sounds significative by convention are nouns and verbs, and they are alike in this, that they are notes similar to the understanding which is without composition, as “human being” or “ass” is, when nothing is added but each is taken by itself alone. For then neither of them is true or false, and this is when nothing is added which is affirmed or denied of them.

The proof of this is through an argument from the greater. For it seems more likely that a composite diction signifies something with true and false than that a simple and incomposite one does; but a composite one signifies nothing with true and false; therefore neither does a simple one. That a composite signifies nothing with true and false I prove by an example: for hircocervus is composed from goat and stag, and yet when I say hircocervus, it signifies neither true nor false, unless I add something denied or affirmed of the hircocervus. Therefore no incomplex diction will signify anything with true and false. For none of such things will signify with true and false unless some being or non-being is added to the incomplex thing through composition, either simply or according to time.

But I say that something is added simply when it belongs through itself and always, as “a human being is an animal”; for this enunciation is always true, whether a human being exists or does not exist, as was said in the books had before, because the predicate is always in the subject simply and in act and in understanding. But something is added according to time when it belongs according to time and not simply, as when it is said, “a human being is,” because being happens to a human being according to time and not simply, or when it is said, “a human being runs.” And this is the true understanding of this saying, in which Alexander, Avicenna, and Boethius agree. Yet others say that something is said simply of something when what is simple according to time is said of it, as according to the present, which is not time but the continuation of time. Something is said according to time of what is said according to past or future. A third group also says that something is said simply of a thing when it is said without determination of this or that being, as “a human being is.” But according to time is that which happens determinately according to those things which come to be in time, as “a human being is today.” Thus, therefore, it is clear that the parts of noun or verb signify nothing outside the whole, since by the example of a composite name a part outside signified nothing, and that none of such things signifies with true or false when it is posited by itself.

But many things about these matters have been said at the beginning of this logic of ours: for nothing is said to signify if it signifies nothing of the understanding of its whole, as when dominus is said, neither the syllable do, nor mi, nor nus signifies anything of the understanding of the whole, either according to part or according to whole. Thus also when hircocervus is said, neither hircus nor cervus signifies anything of the understanding of the whole: for hircus does not signify the part which is goat and cervus another part; rather each by itself signifies nothing of the whole, but both joined together signify the indivisible understanding of the whole hircocervus.

Further, so that all these things may be understood more easily, one must recall to memory what was said in the science of the Universals. For there it was said that the cause of composition in vocal sound is inherence, by which one thing according to reality is in another. And although in the thing one thing according to reality is in another without any intermediate composition, nevertheless the intellect can signify this neither to itself nor to another, neither by interior speech with itself nor by exterior vocal sound with another, unless it posits one thing to be said of another by means of composition. This composition the composing intellect first

makes; and just as it makes it with itself, so it designates it through extrinsic speech with another. And because speech announces by a sign what is with the intellect, therefore exterior speech among the Greeks is called the angel of intelligence. And because composition is first in the soul, therefore Aristotle says that where true and false are, there is already a certain composition of understandings. And in the sixth book of First Philosophy <sup>[2]</sup> he says that true and false are in the soul: for as in an agent composition is in the soul, so as in a sign it is in enunciative vocal sound; but as in a cause it is in external things, because the fact that one thing is in another in external things is the cause of composition.

There is nevertheless another truth of incomplex things, by which true being is the unmingled being of the thing. And true is said in many further ways, about which it has been said elsewhere, but they do not belong to the present intention. For here we speak only about truth which is the adequation of speech and understanding, because that truth in speech is caused by a passion which is in the soul from external things, which are properly active upon the power of the soul, which is a power of receiving and is passive. And therefore what is acted in the soul from without in this way is called a passion. And therefore, insofar as it is referred to the thing, it is a likeness; but insofar as it is in the soul, it is a passion; and insofar as it is caused in vocal sound by the soul, it is called a note in the mouth of the speaker; insofar as it proceeds into the ear of the hearer, it is called a sign.

But if someone asks why it is not so in the other objects of the other senses as in hearing, it must be said that the objects of the other senses are caused according to nothing of themselves by the soul, but by the external thing; and the soul does nothing in them except receive them. But in vocal sounds the soul itself makes a certain institution. And the note which vocal sound makes is from the soul. But it is not so in sight, smell, taste, or touch. The soul does this in vocal sound because in none of the other sensible things can it have the note of all things except in hearing. For the visible represents neither the audible, nor the tasteable, nor the smellable, nor the tangible; but only the object of hearing, through institution, becomes the sign of all things, and in some way is all things. And therefore in hearing there is that in which all communicate to themselves their effects and concepts. And these in the soul are called passions. Yet passion is said in two ways, as Aspasius says in the first book *On the Passions of the Soul*. In one way, passion is called the form which an object introduces into a passive power, whether it is sensible or intelligible, as the visible introduces a passion into sense, and the intelligible introduces a passion into the possible intellect. In another way, passion is called a motion of the soul by which it is moved into the body, and it shows the motion by the motion of spirits and blood, as the passion of anger, the passion of desire, the passion of joy and sadness, of mercy, of fear, and of other things of this sort are spoken of, in that sense in which we say to suffer

## Notes

[1] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, book 3, text commentary 21. (*ARISTOTELES, In 3 de Anima, tex. com. 21.*)

[2] Text commentary 8. (*Tex. com. 8.*)

## Continuation of Chapter II and Chapter III. On doubtful matters concerning the things that have been said.

which is moved according to the diastole or systole of the heart; and in this way we do not speak here about passion.

When these things have thus been determined, the things that have been said are sufficiently plain. For we know that noun and verb must be preconstituted, and enunciation and speech also, and that these are in one common cause in this genus which is vocal sound significative by convention. But some of them are vocal sound which is without true and false, as noun and verb; while some of them are vocal sound which is sometimes with true or false, as speech; and some are always either with true or with false, as interpretation or enunciation. We also know that significative vocal sound, speaking logically, is a note of the passions of

the soul and a sign of the thing, and that those things which are in the soul are passions acted into the soul by things; but they are not passions moving the soul to flight or pursuit of something. We also know how truth is in things as in a cause, how it is in the soul as in the efficient cause of composition, and how it is in speech as in a sign. These things have been said in part in the Categories and in the Six Principles. Therefore let these things suffice here for the present intention.

CHAPTER III. On doubtful matters concerning the things that have been said.

Although the greater doubts have already been solved in the foregoing, nevertheless, for the goodness of teaching, we shall still solve certain sophistical importunities which seem to be against the predicated things. For some object, saying that the intellect, or the passions of the intellect, are not the same among all. For an accident is varied according to the diversity of its subject; but a passion is an accident of the intellectual soul; and the intellectual soul is not the same among all; therefore the passions also are not the same among all.

Again, they seem to prove that vocal sounds are the same among all, because this vocal sound, “human being,” by whomever it is pronounced, is always the same; and it is similar with other pronounced vocal sounds.

Again, they press on, proving that things are not the same among all, because climates and habitable and inhabitable places vary the species and natures of things among diverse people; therefore things are not the same among all.

Again, from the fact that likenesses of things, which are passions in the soul, are the same among all, it follows that sciences of things will be the same among all; therefore teachings of things will be the same among all; and this manifestly appears to be false.

To these and similar points it is not difficult to respond through the things said before. And although many things have been said here by others, nevertheless according to the proposed intention we say that what remains the same among all is that which does not receive diversity from us, that is, from our will and from our institution. And because the generation of passions in the soul is according to the mode of nature in this, that a passion is generated in the soul according to the species of the mover, and similarly the thing is not from us but from nature, therefore things and passions remain the same among all, not the same in number, or in proper being, or in genus, but as caused by nature, either outside or in the soul, and not diversified by the will of man.

And as to what is said, that there is not one soul among all, it must be said that this mode of speaking is false. For there is one soul among all by the unity of the producing nature, but not by unity of number.

To that which is objected about vocal sound, that it is the same among all, it must be said that there is a twofold consideration of vocal sound. One is according to the substance of vocal sound, according as it is a discrete quantity; and thus vocal sound is one of the things of nature and the same among all. In another way vocal sound is considered insofar as it is an instituted sign for signifying under a definite figure and definite elements; and thus it is by convention, and not the same among all. For although it strikes the drum of the ear insofar as it is a thing of nature and according as it is acute or grave, which happens to it insofar as it is a thing of nature, nevertheless it is not ordered to designating the passion of the soul and intellect except insofar as it is figured and determined by definite elements, and thus significative. And to vocalize in this way belongs to man alone; on account of this the vocal sounds of brute animals are vocal sounds by an imperfect account, because they are inarticulate and designate nothing externally, but signify an affect in the one calling. Therefore according to this, that vocal sounds are from us, they are diverse according to the institution of diverse people.

To that which is objected about science, that it is the same among all, it must be said that science follows the natures of the things about which the science is; and thus it is not diversified by our institution, and therefore

in this way it remains the same among all. But this does not follow about teaching, because teaching is the act of one teaching, which proceeds from a will that is not the same among all; and therefore one person teaches one and the same knowable thing in this way, and another in another way.

But what is said, whether one intellect is among all or is not, belongs to a higher business than can be determined here. Nevertheless, so far as now suffices, we say that the intellect which is an intelligible power is not the same among all, nor can the speculative intellect which is a species in the soul be the same among all except in the mode which was said a little above. But the intellect related to the intelligible is the same among all through the fact that the intelligible is the same among all.

They also ask further in this way concerning the things already introduced: how the intellect is sometimes said to be without true and without false, and it is not said that the thing is sometimes without true or false.

Again, how is truth and falsity said to be around composition and division? For true and false are either around composition and division as around the same things, or as around diverse things. If it is said that they are as around the same things, then affirmation and negation will be the same, which is false, since Porphyry and Boethius say that they are opposite species of enunciation. But if they are as around diverse things, then it seems that negation does not deny the same thing which affirmation affirms; and this cannot be, because they would not be opposed unless they concerned the same thing in number and species.

To this it must be said that, as a thing is related to being, so it is related to truth, as Aristotle says <sup>[1]</sup>; and as it is related to non-being, so it is related to falsity. And because it is not simultaneously related to being and non-being, therefore a thing never simultaneously is and is not, but is related only to being if it is, or only to non-being if it is not. Therefore a thing is never without true or false; but true and false are in things as in a cause, as was said in the preceding books. But the intellect, since it is the species of intelligible species, as the hand is the instrument of instruments, operates among intelligible things both without combination and with combination by receiving them, and thus designates in vocal sound. Therefore intellect and vocal sound are sometimes without true and false, and sometimes with true and false; but the thing is always in the other mode, namely with true or with false.

To what they object about composition, it must be said that composition and division are names said in many ways by analogy. Sometimes composition signifies the act, or the composite and one thing affirmatively predicated of another; and in this way composition is an affirmative proposition or enunciation, and oppositely division is a negative proposition; and in this way composition and division are diverse propositions. Sometimes also composition signifies the note of composition in a proposition, and thus substantially composition is in division, as the objection proves; and therefore Aristotle says that division is altogether in negation. And although it is substantially the same, nevertheless in power and act they are opposed because of the opposite qualities of affirmation and negation. Therefore when it is said that true and false are around composition and division, around must be explained by in, which is a preposition noting containment, because they are in composition and division, and not in what is simple and incomplex. But they are in it as relation is in the relative, as we said in the Categories; and therefore because the thing is or is not, speech is true or false. For understanding this, however, one must know that composition is not the cause of truth in a true proposition, nor is division, but rather the adequation of composition with the composing intellect and with the external thing; and non-adequation is the cause of falsity. And because such relation is the cause of truth and falsity, and relations are things assisting extrinsically, perhaps for this reason true and false are said to be around composition and division.

The sophists also doubt about this which is said, that the incomplex is neither true nor false, because in verbs of the first or second person a determinate supposit is understood, as when I say, "I read," it is the same as "I read"; "you read," that is, "you read"; therefore "I read" is an incomplex thing which signifies true or false. The same objection concerns verbs of exceptional action, such as "it lightnings," "it thunders," and

impersonal verbs, such as “it is read”; all these are incomplex, and yet have the force of a perfect enunciation; and thus certain incomplex things seem to be with true or false.

To these things it is easy to respond, because although some have the power of perfect speech according to the grammarian, nevertheless they do not have the power of perfect speech according to the dialectician. For in verbs of the first or second person a definite supposit is understood, because it is determined through what is co-signified by the verb. For a verb of the first person refers its act to the substance whose same act it is, and therefore the supposit is determined by the verb. And it is similar with verbs of the second person, in which the supposit is also determined from what is co-signified. Therefore such an incomplex thing is now complex according to cause and power. And in this way true and false are around them, namely as they are complex, and not insofar as they are incomplex. The same is true of verbs of exceptional action, which determine for themselves a supposit not from what is co-signified, but from the signified of the verb, which belongs to one thing alone. In impersonal verbs it is also the same. For they are not called impersonal because they are acts of no person, since this is impossible, as acting and undergoing are proper to substance; but they are called impersonal because they do not determine a definite person, namely first, second, or third, as when it is said, “it is read,” the sense is that it is read by someone. And thus again the verb, by reason of the act, determines for itself an indefinite supposit; and this, with the verb, suffices for the combination in which there is true or false. And I think this is the true solution of that doubt.

Yet some say that, although in those verbs speech is perfect as to the grammarian, nevertheless it is not perfect as to the dialectician, because the grammarian does not intend the perfection of speech with respect to act and whose act it is, which can be determined through the verb from what is co-signified or signified. But the dialectician intends the perfection of speech according to relation to the intellect and to the thing; according to this mode speech is not perfect unless it enunciates something of something according to act. For this is properly called interpretation, which interprets concerning intellect and concerning the thing as it is or is not.

#### Notes

[1] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book 2, text commentary 4. (*ARISTOTELES, In 2 Metaph., tex. com. 4.*)

### Chapter IV. On the definition of noun and its declaration.

CHAPTER IV. On the definition of noun and its declaration.

Therefore, in treating enunciation, about which we intend here, we shall speak first about its material principles, which are noun and verb, in which and at which the resolution of enunciation stands. For in the *Categories*, because vocal sounds are treated as they stand under the signification of things, the resolution must stand at the ten things which are the first principles of things signified through vocal sounds. But in grammar, because every speech constructed congruously from dictions is treated, the resolution must stand at the eight parts of speech. But in logic, in which there are true and false, nothing is intended except enunciation, whose principles are only that about which something is enunciated and that which is enunciated of something as inhering in it or divided from it. That about which something is enunciated is the noun; and that which is enunciated of another is the verb. Therefore the resolution of enunciation stands at noun and verb. But that about which something is enunciated is prior to that which is enunciated of it; and because the subject is a noun as being is, and what is enunciated of another is like a certain inhering being, while that in which something inheres is prior to what inheres, therefore we set the treatment of noun before the treatment of verb, as being is before to-be, which is the act of being. For the verb is as the act of the noun to which it is joined, as to the agent of that act.

Therefore let us speak by first setting down the whole definition of noun at once: a noun is vocal sound significative by convention, without time, no part of which is significative separately. In this definition given

by the ancient Peripatetics, noun is not defined according as it is diction or according as it is part of speech. And this indeed is the cause of this: diction is referred to the thing said, but noun according to the logician is referred to the intellect by which it is formed so that it may be a note of that concept. It is not called part of speech, because part says what is orderable in a whole toward the due construction of the whole; and what is due is congruous. For it has this due character from the fact that it is constructive for designating concerning the thing and the mode of the one speaking, according as the mode says the varied affect of one pronouncing speech, either indicatively, deprecatively, or in another affect of one pronouncing speech. But here noun, verb, and speech are not intended in this way, but rather insofar as they are indications of the passions of the intellect.

But the first thing which proceeds from the intellect for declaring the passion which is in that intellect is vocal sound; and therefore here noun and verb properly have to be defined through vocal sound.

For there is another reason for this, and a more fitting one: here those things are treated which signify by convention and which signs we use for things, as was said in the preceding matters. But such things are formable only in vocal sound; and therefore the definition of such things is through vocal sound as through proper matter. For although in natural things matter is not predicated of that of which it is the matter, because in natures form is the substance which gives being and name and account, nevertheless in arts and in those things which are from will, because will does not give substance but a certain accident of composition, sculpture, or incision, matter is predicated, because it is the whole substance of such things. Therefore a ring is called gold, a cup silver, a house wood and stones. And thus here vocal sound is predicated of noun as matter, not indeed as matter from which, but as matter in which the noun is formed. For in such things, where the substantial form of the matter is not added, by which the matter is drawn to another species and substance, the division of species is made through matter, as among houses one is wooden and another stone, and so with other similar things.

Yet if someone says that in the definition of noun vocal sound is posited as genus, he does not err; for a genus divided through differences is distributed into species. We divide thus: of vocal sounds, some are significative and some not. Of significative vocal sounds, some are by convention and some not. Of significative vocal sounds by convention, some are complex and some not. And of incomplex ones, some are without time and some with time; and thus through divisions of differences the species which are noun and verb are received, although through an immediate division of vocal sound they could not immediately be received. Thus noun is vocal sound either materially or formally, according as vocal sound is the genus.

But the addition “significative” is added for the exclusion of non-significative vocal sound. And about this, indeed, it was said in the preceding matters: because although every vocal sound signifies itself or the one calling, nevertheless that is called significative which has been instituted to signify a passion of the intellect which is a likeness of a thing. But another vocal sound, although it may be lettered, is called non-significative because it has not yet been instituted.

And the addition “by convention” means according to the will of the one instituting, as was said in the preceding matters. And some ask what the difference is between will and convention. It is said that will says an appetite of the soul tending from the interior to the exterior; but convention says the affect made by what is desired, proceeding from the mover outside to the interior. And therefore convention is will, because it is affected in the thing willed.

And when “by convention” is said, this preposition “by” notes at once three causes: namely the final cause, because the end of signification is that satisfaction be made for the convention through the noun which designates the thing; the efficient cause, because convention is what institutes and causes it to designate that thing; and the formal cause, because it signifies according to the form of the passion by which the soul of the one instituting is affected, according as Aristotle says <sup>[1]</sup> that the three causes, namely efficient, formal, and

final, coincide in one and the same thing. Thus, then, it is vocal sound significative by convention. But attend that it must be a certain sign, because otherwise it would not certify about the thing. It is not made certain except through lettering, by which it is figured into this or that vocal sound. Therefore it must be a lettered vocal sound; for if it were uttered without lettering, it would not be distinct, nor determined to signifying this or that. And therefore, in order that it be a certain sign, such vocal sound must be lettered for the certification of the hearer; for it happens to vocal sound, according as it is only a sign referred to the understanding of the thing, that it be lettered.

But the addition “without time” seems to be a fault, because “without time” is a privation founded in negation; but definitions ought not to be assigned through privation and negation, because definition says being, while privation and negation take away being from those things of which they are. But it must be noted that this privation “without time” is founded in a habit and affirmation, namely in this, that it signifies its thing in rest and not in motion as a verb does. And such a privation, thus founded in habit and affirmation, does not take away being; and in this way it is placed in the definition. And through this a noun has the fact that it is the subject of enunciation, because thus it has standing and fixed being, and substance remaining in itself, about which something can be enunciated as being in it. But what signifies with time signifies with motion; and motion is being in becoming, which is from another and is not according to itself. Therefore it can indeed be enunciated of another, but nothing can be enunciated of it according as it is taken verbally. Therefore, because noun signifies the substance about which what is enunciated is enunciated, noun had to signify the thing without time.

But what is said, “no part of which is significative separately,” is said because the signification of the noun is so referred to the whole noun that it is not referred to the parts. For the first part, whether syllable or letter, does not have the first part of the signified, and the second part the second, and so thereafter. As when I say dominus, this very do, which is the first syllable, does not have the first third of the signification, and mi, which is the second syllable, does not have the second, and nus, which is the third syllable, does not have the last third. Thus the whole noun says and has the whole signification, because no separated part has anything of the signification, either according to the whole or according to a part; and therefore it retains utterly nothing of the signification of the whole.

But the cause of this, as Avicenna says, is that institution is the cause of signification in a noun. It has not been instituted so that a part would signify something separately, but so that the whole would signify the whole; and therefore a part signifies nothing. And because art imitates nature, something similar is found in nature, as in the movements of animals, for example in flight, which is not made by one part separately according to one part and by another part according to another part, but by both wings moved at once. A mixture also is not made by one mixable thing alone, nor by one according to one part of the mixture and by another according to another part; but when each thing exists with each thing, the mixture is perfected. Therefore signification is not infused into a noun in such a way that it is suitable to the parts, as it is in homogeneous things, in which any part has the name and account of the whole, as fire or air; for any part of fire is fire, and any part of air is air. Nor again is signification infused as in heterogeneous things, in which one part has one part of the whole and another has another, as head and foot and heart in the body of a human being; rather, it belongs to the whole in such a way that it belongs to no part, neither according to the whole signification nor according to a part.

This is proved by an argument from the greater: because if it is so in the composite, in which parts seem more to signify something of the whole than in the simple, then much more is this so in the simple. An example of this is in the composite name equiferus. For ferus, insofar as it is part of this composite name equiferus, signifies nothing by itself, separated from the signification of the whole. And this is because this name equiferus is imposed on a horse from the quality of wildness mixed into the equine quality; and because ferus does not signify wildness as mixed, therefore it signifies nothing of the whole. For the name is

not imposed from two divided qualities, but from united qualities; and therefore, because it signifies one as divided, it signifies nothing of the signification of the whole name. Therefore *ferus* signifies nothing when it is part of the composite name in the way in which it signifies something by itself when it is part of this speech which is *equus ferus*, “a wild horse.” For in this it is a part of speech, and taken by itself as a noun, it signifies something of the whole signified of the speech. For the signified belongs to speech in such a way that it is in the speech according to parts, and one part says one part of the signification, and the other the remaining part.

Although it has been said that neither in composites nor in simples does a part signify anything of the signification of the whole, no one should suppose that it is similar in every respect in the parts of composite and simple nouns. For a composite noun is one that is divided into two intelligible parts capable of the same sense; but a simple one cannot be divided in this way. Therefore it is not altogether with composites as it is with simples. For in simples a part is in no way significative. But in composites, a separated part, insofar as it is a noun and taken by itself, does indeed by aptitude of institution wish to signify something separately; nevertheless it is significative of nothing which belongs to the whole signification of the composite, either according to the whole or according to a part. The cause of this was said just now.

But “according to convention” is added because signifying does not happen or belong to a noun as it is the sound of one calling and a thing of nature; whence in this way it is not a noun, because it does not make a note. For noun is said from the noting that it makes, and in order that something signify, a note must be made through it, and then it is a note of the passions which are in the soul. For as Plato says, imposed speech exists so that indications of mutual will may be at hand. Therefore a noun must be significative from institution, and not from nature, because even unlettered sounds designate certain affects or passions in those who utter them; and yet no such sound is a noun. For vocal sound according to the full signification of vocal sound does not belong to brutes, as was said a little before.

## Notes

[1] Aristotle, *Physics*, book 2, text commentaries 70 and 8, and *Metaphysics*, text commentary 12. (*ARISTOTELES, In 2 Physic. tex. com. 70 et 8 et Metaph. tex. com. 12.*)

## Chapter V. What an infinite noun is, and why it is not a noun for the logician.

CHAPTER V. What an infinite noun is, and why it is not a noun for the logician.

Once the definition of noun, thus posited and expounded, has been seen, it is clear that according to this definition an infinite noun is not a noun. Because a noun signifies substance with quality, and unless it signifies in this way, nothing certain could be enunciated about it. Therefore, because an infinite noun is deficient in this, that it is not of finite quality and something cannot be enunciated about it, it is clear that an infinite noun does not have the perfect account of noun, because it is not of finite quality. Therefore we say that non-human, which is an infinite noun, is not a noun according to the perfect account of noun. Yet nevertheless, although it is not a noun, it is also not another part of speech; and therefore the infinite noun falls away from the perfect account of noun, and is not another part of speech, and no name has been imposed on it by which it ought to be called among the parts of speech. Therefore, if it pleases, let it be called an infinite noun, so that it may both have the account of noun with respect to the mode of grammar, and with respect to dialectic may be drawn outside the perfect account of noun. In this way, then, it is called not a noun simply, but an infinite noun. For it is not simply a negation, because negation leaves nothing; nor is it speech, because when non-human is said, the negation is joined by composition to what is human, and non-human is one diction and not speech. Therefore, since it does not have the perfect account of noun, according to our institution it becomes an infinite noun.

But there are many doubts about this infinite noun. And among them the first is: by what can negation be joined to a noun through composition? But to this the response is immediately ready: because just as in any predicated verb there is understood the note of composition, which is “is,” as when I say “a human being runs,” the sense is “a human being is running,” so in the noun which is subjected there is understood being, as when I say “a human being runs,” the sense is “a human being, being or existing, runs”; and by reason of this, negation can be added to it which makes an infinite noun.

But if it is asked by what the infinite noun in logic differs from the infinite noun which is called infinite in grammar, it must be said that in grammar a noun is infinite, such as “who” and “of what quality,” because it is bounded away from every determinate number, as who or what sort of two, three, four, and so concerning any other. But the infinite noun in logic is that whose determinate quality has been deprived, with infinite substance left, which infinite substance is supposed through this which I say, being; whence non-human is a being not having the form of humanity.

And therefore, since non-human is a noun, while an infinite noun cannot be reduced to any other part of speech except to noun, one asks what it has for substance and what it has for quality. It must be said that it has indeterminate and infinite substance, and it has privation of quality for quality. This suffices for the grammarian, in order that something be a noun, although for the logician it does not suffice for the perfect account of noun. And when it is said that the infinite noun signifies infinite substance, it is not necessary that that substance be something in the nature of things, but it suffices that it be something in apprehension or diction, according as we say that a chimera is something, and privations and negations are something, through the fact that they have something in apprehension. For in this way substance is called infinite, because it is not bounded to any form of being.

On this account it is asked whether an infinite noun posits something or not. And some say that it posits something, bringing forward reasons for this: because Aristotle says at the end of the *Prior Analytics* that it differs to say “is not equal” and “is equal” with the negation outside; because the negation “is not equal” posits nothing, but the infinite term “not-equal” posits something.

Secondly, they say and introduce what is commonly said and is true, namely that negation differs from the infinitive and privative: for negation, since it is outside the genus, posits nothing. But the infinite, since it is negation in the genus and community of being, posits something, namely infinite being. Privation also is in a genus, and posits a subject with aptitude and disposition toward habit, as “blind.” From this it is received that the infinite posits something.

But if this is granted, the contrary will seem to follow from this, that every imposition of a noun is from form, as this noun human is imposed from a form. From the same form both the name of a habit and the name of the privation of that same habit are imposed; therefore, when non-human is said, that name is also imposed from the form of human being. But the difference is in this: one is imposed from the form itself according to itself; the other from the privation of that same form. But if this noun human is imposed from the form according to itself, wherever this form human is found, that thing is human, and it is enunciated of it that it is human. And oppositely, wherever the privation non-human is found, it is enunciated of that that it is non-human. For non-human is found equally in being and in non-being: non-being is non-human, and being diverse from human being is non-human; therefore non-human is said equally of being and non-being; therefore it determines neither. And if it determines neither being nor non-being, it posits nothing; therefore non-human posits nothing.

Again, if one noun can be infinite in such a way that it posits something, then every noun can be infinite in such a way that it posits something, because there is one and the same account of one noun and of every noun. But being is a noun; therefore if it is made infinite so that non-being is said, non-being will posit something according as it is an infinite noun; therefore it will posit something which belongs to non-being;

therefore there is something common to being and non-being. But nothing is common to being and non-being; therefore it posits utterly nothing, or it remains that there is non-being in the nature of things.

Again, when I say human, I say a form; and when I say this human, I say a form in this matter. And in such things the being of human and of this human is the same, just as the being of the universal and of the particular in which the universal is is the same. But the universal in which it is, and the particular, is what it is; therefore, when the universal which is in the particular has been removed, it is necessary that the particular according to what it is be taken away from the universal. But when non-human is said, human is taken away, by which this human is this human; therefore this human is also taken away, and thus, when human does not remain, this human does not remain. Therefore when I say non-human, neither universal nor particular is posited; and everything that is is either universal or particular of some nature. Therefore it seems that non-human posits nothing which is of any nature.

Again it is objected logically that, if non-human posits something, since this proposition is true, “every human being is an animal,” this will be true by conversion made through contraposition, “every non-animal is non-human”; and a stone is a non-animal; therefore a stone is non-human; therefore from the first, if every human being is an animal, a stone is non-human, and it is something which does not follow. And therefore, since that consequence follows if non-human posits something, it seems that non-human posits nothing.

To these and similar points it is commonly and quite suitably customary to say that there is a difference among infinite nouns. For they are either substantives or adjectives. In substantives, indeed, the noun which is infinite posits nothing, because when the quality of that noun is deprived, the very thing which is determined by that quality is also deprived; and thus, when the quality by which it is has been removed, the substance itself according to what it is is deprived. And because the infinite noun deprives quality, it also deprives substance according to what it is, and thus posits nothing which is in the nature of things. And if it is said that it leaves infinite substance, it must be said that it leaves that only under apprehension, according as it is supposed through this name infinite being, and according to this it is not in the nature of things. But in adjectives, which have finite quality and infinite substance, when quality has been denied, substance according to what it is is not necessarily denied, and therefore in such cases it posits something. Whence when non-equal or non-similar is said, the sense is a being which is not equal, and a being which is not similar. Aristotle speaks about such infinities at the end of the *Prior Analytics*, but not about substantive infinities. Thus, therefore, sometimes it posits something, as in adjectives, and sometimes it posits nothing, as in substantives; and thus the infinite noun seems to be common to being and non-being, which is not unfitting in that mode in which the infinite is common to being and non-being, because although it sometimes leaves being, nevertheless it does not leave being which is something in the nature of things. From this it is clear how it makes negation in the genus of being and what sort of being.

But then it is asked, since, when nullus and neuter are said, negation comes into the composition of a noun, just as when non-human is said, how does it make an infinite term in one case and not in the other? This is not difficult to solve: because when nullus or neuter is said, the distribution which is implied by the distributive sign divides the supposita of the subject in comparison to the predicate; and therefore it denies the predicate from the parts of the subject, and does not deny the quality of the subject; and therefore it does not make an infinite noun. But when non-human is said, the quality of the noun in itself is denied. For this reason non-human is an infinite noun. Thus it is clear that the infinite noun deprives quality and leaves infinite substance, which is supposed through this name infinite being, according as it falls under apprehension and speech, because it is not being in nature; as we say that somehow the same thing is being around which there is understanding and about which there is speech. And thus sometimes an affirmation of being is similar to a negation, as when I say “seeing darknesses,” for there seems there to be an affirmation of vision. But when it is considered that darknesses are nothing, it is known that one seeing darknesses sees nothing; and one seeing nothing does not see; and thus one seeing darknesses does not see. Therefore, when

non-human is said, by understanding non-human, since non-human posits nothing, one understands nothing.

But attend that although an infinite noun posits nothing and signifies nothing, nevertheless it is not a non-significative vocal sound, like bu ba baf, because a non-significative vocal sound does not stir the intellect to understand something about something; but non-human stirs it to understand concerning that which has deprived quality, which nevertheless is nothing in the nature of things, although it is in apprehension. And in this way opinion concerns that which is only in apprehension. And it is similar to when we say “unnameable”: this is nothing, and yet, insofar as it falls into apprehension through its opposite, which is nameable, it stirs the intellect toward something. In this way it appears how an infinite noun posits something and how it posits nothing.

Nevertheless it must be attended that transcendent names cannot be made infinite, such as thing, being, and something, because when the quality of those names is removed, since they are infinite, no infinite substance can be left even according to apprehension; for this reason they cannot be made infinite. For in order that some name be made infinite, it must have a determinate quality, which thing, being, and something do not have. It must also have a quality ordered to bounding and determining substance; and therefore every, any, no, and no one cannot be made infinite, because they do not have a quality of this sort. It must also not have been infinite beforehand; and therefore indeclinable parts, such as conjunction, preposition, and things of this sort, cannot be made infinite, because they would be made infinite only by case, since of themselves they are infinite. Therefore also an adjective, with respect to the substance which it has as infinite, is not made infinite by the removal of quality, but infinite substance remains, from which quality is taken away; on account of this such infinitation is equivalent to negation.

It must also be attended that a finite noun is of determinate and circumscribed signification; and through the fact that it is made infinite, it becomes of uncircumscribed signification, which cannot be bounded either to being or to non-being. And this is especially the cause why an infinite noun posits nothing.

And further it must be noted that when it is said that a noun signifies substance with quality, the substance of the noun is what it is and what is supposed in the noun; but quality is that by which what it is is what it is. These, in most cases, must not be received in the abstract but in the concrete, as if we say that human is that by which what is human is human. And thus it appears that, when that quality which is said through this noun human is removed, there does not remain human as that which is human; and consequently nothing posited about human is left, because whatever is posited through the finite when human is said is taken away through the infinite when non-human is said. And when it is said that non-human is non-human being, as we said before, that being is not a being of the thing or of nature, but a being in the apprehension of the soul; and this is not something or being simply, but is being in opinion, about which we can reason and speak, as was said in the preceding matters.

For having perfect knowledge of infinite parts, one must know first, concerning the infinitation of terms, and especially of noun and verb, that negation takes away the form of the verb or noun and leaves the substance which is in this common thing, being, according as it is common to being according to nature and to being of reason, either in reason or in significative diction in whatever way. For this being is infinite, that is, determined to no definite form, although through negation signification is taken away, and consequently the finiteness which first existed; nevertheless, through the addition of negation, which is added as form above infinite substance, another diction is generated, which is an infinite noun or verb; and it has that very privation for form or quality, and thus signifies substance with quality. And similarly the verb which signifies being and acting has the privation signified in acting for being and acting, and is called an infinite noun and an infinite verb.

Secondly it must be noted that although one negation can deny two compositions, as when it is said, “not the one who runs is moved,” nevertheless negation does this only if it is free, not falling into the composition of

some part posited in that speech, and only if the second composition is the determination of some part of the first composition. But infinitating negation falls into the composition of the infinite term, and therefore denies nothing outside it; and therefore that negation cannot make two dictions infinite at the same time, as when it is said, non-white human being or non-white wood. For although it denies two compositions of predicate to subject, those compositions express being and the composition of non-being. For the composition of being is twofold. One is from substantial form and matter; the other is from accident and substance, which is that of adjective with subject, and infinitating negation takes away that one. Therefore, joined with a term of accidental composition, it can regard nothing outside it; but when negation exists free, it can regard both parts of the composition of being, which is from predicate and subject, and at the same time the determination of the part of that composition, so that it can deny one through the other.

Thirdly it must be noted that indeclinable parts, because they are of infinite signification in themselves and their signification is not bounded except through things joined to them, cannot be made infinite. For infinitating negation always falls into the composition of an infinite term, and leaves something and takes something away; and this cannot be in an indeclinable part, for it does not signify a certain composition of being or to-be to which negation can be referred.

Fourthly it must be noted that a pronoun of itself signifies mere substance; and since the quality which it acquires through demonstration or the relation of the pronoun is not of the signification of the pronoun, it cannot be made infinite, because it is infinite and has no posited or circumscribed signification. And if Aristotle sometimes says “not this,” he does not intend that the pronoun be made infinite, but that whatever name has been demonstrated or given be made infinite, as this non-wood and this non-white. And the fact that a pronoun is comprehended under noun by the dialectician does not make the pronoun become a noun, but makes it supply the place of a noun in supposing. Therefore, although a noun is made infinite, a pronoun cannot be made infinite. For if it were made infinite, since infinitating negation takes away the lower finite form and leaves the higher infinite one, as being is form, it would follow that a pronoun would have a substance composed from a higher and a lower form, and thus would signify substance with quality and would be a noun; which is absurd. Therefore it cannot be made infinite.

Fifthly it must be noted that not every noun can be made infinite. For two things are required for the infinitation of a noun. One is that in what is to be made infinite, a single quality be signified, which is finite in itself and somehow bounds the signified substance to one. The second is that it not be negated, because if it were negated, the negation coming upon it for infinitating would remove the negation, and, once that was removed, a finite noun would remain.

From these things it is clear through the first supposition that distributive signs, every and things of this sort, cannot be made infinite, because they express the disposition of the subject according as it is subject and do not have a circumscribed signification; just as also infinite names, who and of-what-quality and things of this sort, cannot be made infinite.

Again, since an infinite noun deprives the lower finite form and leaves the higher infinite one, and this name being has nothing higher, it cannot properly be made infinite. It is similar with other names, one, thing, and something, as Avicenna says. Nevertheless, if being is taken as the name of this thing which is being, then it can be deprived, because being in act is deprived and what is common to being in act and imagined being, or being signified by speech in whatever way, is left; and this is an infinite noun.

And it is similar concerning that which is one and something, and further because one adds indivision over being, something adds particularized being over being, and thing adds fixedness over being; by reason of these additions those names can be made infinite.

For although certain nouns signify a simple nature and no composition, and negation, whether denying or infinitating, wants to find some composition, nevertheless those nouns can be made infinite; such nouns are

God, whiteness, line, and things of this sort. For although in reality they signify that there is no composition, nevertheless they have substance, because they are what they are; and they have as quality the form by which they are that by which they are formally; and thus they have what-is and that-by-which that which is is; and infinitating negation requires this composition. They also have powers by which they are determinately or indeterminately, and infinitating negation takes away the composition of these in them.

Sixthly it must be noted that one noun is substantive and another adjective. But in substantives there is a substantial quality which does not differ essentially from the substance which the noun signifies; and therefore, when the substantial quality is removed, the substance of the noun is also taken away, and, as far as it is concerned, nothing is left except infinite being. Yet this is compatible with the supposition of what is not actually under the negated form, as non-human is wood; nevertheless of itself it does not signify that substance, and therefore of itself signifies nothing, although it is compatible with something along with itself. And therefore it does not follow if someone argues thus: every human being is an animal; therefore every non-animal is non-human; but a stone is a non-animal; therefore a stone is non-human; and a stone is not human; therefore a stone is; therefore from the first, if a human being is an animal, a stone is. For this does not hold because an infinite term of itself posits or signifies nothing, although along with itself it is compatible with something lacking that form which it deprives. But the adjective, whose quality differs essentially from the infinite substance which it signifies, leaves something, namely infinite substance; this is clear through exposition, for non-white is a non-white thing. Yet if an adjective is denominated from a substantial form, as rational, sensible, animate, and so with the others, the same judgment applies to it as to substantives, because of itself it posits nothing. Yet because the privation which is in it is preserved in being, and posits an inclination to the subject in which that privation is, which nevertheless the privative diction of itself does not signify, therefore a privative term is not negative, nor is speech in which a privative term is posited negative, but affirmative. But being, taken in commonality, is not properly made infinite unless it is taken for being in act, as was said before; because if it were made infinite in its commonality, it would leave utterly nothing. And this does not belong properly to infinitating negation, but to negation, according to which it was said that an infinite noun signifies nothing. And one who says human signifies something posited; but one who says non-human takes away what is posited and posits nothing except privation, which of itself signifies nothing. And this is understood of an absolute noun taken according to itself. For if it is posited in speech as subject or predicate, then it must signify something, as when it is said, non-human is white, non-human runs, or one running is non-human.

Seventhly it must be noted that a privative noun is said in one way for the grammarian and an infinite noun in another way according to the logician. For a privative noun for the grammarian signifies substance with quality, and signifies both positively. An infinite noun for the logician signifies truly neither substance nor quality, but the privation of quality; and it does not signify true substance, but signifies substance common to true substance and to that which is in opinion or diction, about which it happens to speak and to imagine in whatever way. Therefore, as Boethius says, an infinite noun is said both of being and of non-being.

Eighthly it must be noted that negation coming into the composition of a noun sometimes makes pure negation, as when neuter, nemo, and things of this sort are said; and sometimes it makes infinity and not pure negation, as when non-human is said. The reason for this as certain is that sometimes it denies and removes the predicate from all parts of the supposed noun, and then it makes pure negation. But when it denies the essential quality which is in the composition of the substance signified by the noun, then an infinite term is made.

Ninthly it must be noted concerning privative terms that they differ from infinite terms. Although every noun signifies in the mode of a certain habit, and every habit can be deprived, just as that which signifies substance with quality can be deprived of quality, nevertheless, because habit says what is actually in substance, and especially because privation says a power toward repeated reception of the habit, therefore properly speaking

only an accidental term can be deprived, such as unjust, impious, and things of this sort

### **Continuation of Chapter V. What an infinite noun is, and why it is not a noun for the logician.**

and then that privation is signified by an abstract name, as injustice, impiety; and therefore in *in homo* or *in substantia* is not said. And therefore such a term signifies such a real substance with a potency toward habit, which an infinite term does not do, as has been said, whether it is substantive or an adjective denominated from a substantial form, such as rational, irrational, insensible, inanimate, and things of this sort, as is clear from the foregoing. For they do not leave substance with a potency of returning to habit, but take away potency and quality, and leave substance signified through being common to true being and according to pure imagination. But pure negation leaves utterly nothing as far as it itself is concerned. But a privative adjective formed from an accidental form takes away the habit and leaves real infinite substance with potency for returning to the habit.

Tenthly it must be noted concerning the infinity of the participle, as concerning the infinity of an adjective signifying an accidental form, that although privative and infinite names in such cases are not much posited, nevertheless, if they were posited, then in this way they would be made infinite and would be made privative.

Eleventhly it must be noted concerning the infinitation of the verb that, although it is said that an infinite verb deprives the action signified in species and leaves the action signified in genus, nevertheless this is not true. Rather, it leaves action in commonality to being or to-be in act and according to imagination and speech. Therefore this verb is made infinite when it signifies to-be in act, just as this noun being is made infinite when it signifies being in act. And just as being is not made infinite as common to being in act and according to imagination, so neither is this verb to be made infinite when it signifies to-be in such commonality, because from such infinitation nothing would be left.

Again, there are certain verbs which through their significations can be posited around being and non-being, such as it is opined, it is accustomed, it is fitting, and things of this sort; and because those have this infinity from their forms through significative power, and not from the negative particle, therefore those too can be made infinite, because they signify their forms in a finite mode and therefore receive infinitation.

Again, although certain verbs signify infinite and conceived negation, and not negation as exercised, such as to deny, to annihilate, to be deprived, and things of this sort, nevertheless because they do not signify negation except positively through forms of negation, they too can receive an infinitating particle depriving that determinate form of privation, as does not deny, does not annihilate, does not deprive.

But concerning a verb of exceptional action it must be noted that it determines for itself a definite supposit; and therefore when negation is added to it, the thing of the verb is denied of a determinate and actual supposit; and thus this negation becomes pure and does not infinitate the verb. For this reason, in my judgment, a verb of exceptional action cannot be made infinite.

Twelfthly it must be noted that when Boethius says that an infinite verb posited in speech does not become infinite, but the negation which is joined to it becomes a negation denying the supposit and the thing of the verb from a determinate supposit, by the same reason verbs of the first or second person, in which determinate supposits are understood, ought not to be said to be able to be made infinite. And if negation comes upon them, it will be negating the thing of the verb from a determinate supposit. This also is the cause in a verb of exceptional action in the third person, that it cannot be made infinite, because the negation becomes a denying negation. Unless perhaps someone should wish to say that every diction receiving negation through composition is infinite; because in this way even verbs of exceptional action and verbs of the first or second person are made infinite. But then there will be no real difference of such a verb from a purely negative verb or a verb of pure negation.

Thirteenthly it must be noted that when an infinite verb is said, such as does not run, it can be expounded in one of two ways, namely that does not run is the same as not-running. If it is expounded in the first way, then the participle is made infinite more than the verb. But if in the second way, then it does not differ from pure negation, and therefore it seems to posit nothing, especially because Aristotle says that it is equally in what is and in what is not; for this could not be if it posited something, because nothing is common to to-be and not-to-be, just as nothing is common to being and non-being.

If it is said that there is general and special action, and that the infinite verb takes away the special and leaves the general according to reality, this saying is not general in all infinite verbs. For it does not apply to this verb is, which nevertheless is made infinite according to some mode, as was said before. Again, when I say does not run, it is true when absolutely nothing is being done and when something other than running is being done; and thus it cannot posit general action. Therefore about this it seems that one must say that it posits nothing in the nature of things. Yet it posits something according to reason and speech, as a privation of act, which is compatible with something that is not that action; and yet this of itself does not posit that thing, but leaves it, in such a way that this does not deprive it. But pure negation posits nothing and leaves nothing, whether according to reality or according to reason. Whence does not run must be expounded thus, is not running, and not thus, is not-running. Yet it is not a verb of pure negation; the cause of this has already been stated, for because in anything there is what it is not or what it is, therefore it posits nothing.

If someone opposes this, saying that as nouns are related to infinitation, so too are verbs, and thus, just as any noun can be made infinite, so any verb can be made infinite, it must be said that nouns are of diverse natures with respect to infinitation, and it is not so with verbs. Thus, although some infinite noun posits something, nevertheless it does not follow from this that an infinite verb posits something. By something I mean something which is in the nature of things and is being simply. Yet an infinite verb in speech, since it says that something inheres in something, or through the mode by which something inheres in another, posits something and simply denies something, as is clear from what has been said above. But it does not follow that for this reason an infinite verb according to itself posits something; rather, it more deprives.

Fourteenthly it must be noted concerning what is customarily asked, whether an infinite verb in speech differs from that same verb simply denied, or does not differ from it. For a verb signifies to-be obliquely and toward being or an existing thing. On account of this, if that being and to-be are posited in speech, as soon as negation comes upon it, the thing of the verb according to being is removed from such a being. And since first such being inheres, and afterward negation occurs, a removal of the thing of the verb from an actual supposit is made. And thus the infinite verb does not differ from the purely denied verb. Again, this is also because if negation comes upon an actual composition, which is between things actually being, it denies the verb from another, simply making negative speech; but this is the case when an infinite verb is posited in speech. For this reason, according to Boethius, there is pure negation there; and this seems to be true. But it must be noted that, although the infinite verb in speech has been denied, it does not have this from itself, but from the extremes which are actually signified in speech; and therefore one is necessarily removed from the other through negation. But the verb which is posited as negative and is purely negative has from itself that it actually denies something of something, and from itself has that it makes negative speech.

Thus, therefore, those things which seem to have to be asked concerning infinite verbs can be clear, and what the nature of infinite terms is, considered both generally and specially, and what the nature of privative terms is, and how it is related to infinite terms.

## **Chapter VI. On the case of a noun.**

CHAPTER VI. On the case of a noun.

Now we have said in the definition of noun: finite and right. For since there are two things in a noun according to the perfect account of noun, namely substance and quality, an infinite noun cannot be that about which something is enunciated because of the defect of quality. Similarly, a case of a noun, or an oblique noun, cannot be a noun here, because it is deficient in the signification of substance, which must be designated in such a way that something can be enunciated about it; this cannot be done except in the right case. For the genitive does not signify substance, but that something belongs to it. Similarly, the dative does not signify substance, but signifies that something is for it. And in the same way the accusative does not signify substance, but something toward it. Therefore no case directly signifies substance except the nominative, which signifies it according as something is enunciable about it.

But it is not so in the case of a verb according to past and future. For past and future, with a nominative, make a right enunciation, as a human being read, a human being will read. And some say that the cause of this is that a right verb is in the case of the verb which is the present now; whence, as they say, the present from the past is past, and the present from the future is future. And these words are laughable, for although the same now according to substance is the substance of time, nevertheless this has one form and one being in the past and another in the future. Therefore it must be said that it is not so in the verb as in the noun, because the verb says what inheres in another; and it does this equally through every difference of time in the indicative mode, which is also called enunciative. Therefore through the account of mode it has that throughout the whole indicative mode it has the power of the nominative. But in other modes it falls away from that power. And this is the cause why, with a verb of past time or future time, there is a perfect enunciation. For the verb, by the fact that it is a verb, always belongs to another as act or passion, and is not signified as this or that; and it has this obliquity in all cases. But the fact that it falls away from the mode of signifying through past and future does not make it be made oblique in an oblique case away from the inherence which it says in the present. Therefore there is a perfect enunciation according to any of the stated times, provided that it is according to the enunciative mode. But when it falls away from the mode, then it is not interpretation or enunciation, but either deprecation, optation, doubt, or something of this sort; and therefore with those modes there is no enunciation. In this way, therefore, Aristotle says that Cato's and to Cato, and whatever such things are from the oblique cases of a noun, are not nouns, but cases of a noun, which cannot suppose substance according as something can be enunciated about it.

And indeed the account of noun in the nominative and in the oblique is the same in many things, because the signified is the same; but it differs in this, that an oblique joined with *is*, *will be*, or *was*, that is, with a present, past, or future verb, makes neither true nor false speech. But a noun joined with *is*, *was*, or *will be* is always either true or false. And if I say Cato's *is*, or *is not*, I do not yet speak truth or lie, because it is incongruous speech which signifies nothing.

But if objection is made concerning speeches of this sort, it belongs to the king to do this, it must be said that all such speeches have what is apposited as supposit; and the infinitive with the case is virtually nominative. Whence the sense is: to do this belongs to the king.

### **Tractate III. Chapter I. How the verb belongs to logical consideration.**

TRACTATE III. ON THE VERB. CHAPTER I. How the verb belongs to logical consideration.

Interpretation, which interprets concerning a thing as it is or is not, cannot be made by noun alone, but it is necessary that a verb be joined to it, because the verb, through the fact that it signifies acting or undergoing, which is proper to the substance of a noun, signifies that which inheres in the noun. But in-being in that in which it inheres is the cause of predication about another, as was said in the science of Universals; and therefore interpretation concerning the being or non-being of a thing can be made only through a verb. For this reason it is fitting that determination be made about the verb in the science of interpretation, because it is

the other element of interpretation.

And if it is objected that the verb is not always the predicate which is said of another, but that nouns are predicated more often, as a human being is an animal, Socrates is a human being, a human being is rational or risible or white, and so concerning the others which are contained under the five universals and predicates, it is easy to solve this: because predicate is twofold, namely material and formal. The formal predicate is what conceives within itself the form through which it turns back to another in which it inheres and about which it is as about a subject. But this form is nothing except composition; and the verb, through the fact that it belongs to another, conceives this form in itself. Therefore only the verb is the formal predicate. This is proved by an example: because when it is said, a human being runs, the sense is, a human being is running, so that the participle is the thing of the verb predicated materially; but the very thing that I say, is, which is the note of composition, says the form by which the thing of the verb is referred to the subject as inhering in it or as something of it, and as something which belongs to it. But such a form is not conceived in the signified of a noun.

But if the reason is asked why composition is conceived more in the verb than in the noun, especially since composition is a middle between the things composed and seems equally to regard both extremes, it must be said with Dionysius that no composition is from the first, but every composition begins and is principled from the second. For the first, as first, inheres in nothing, but the second can inhere. Again, because what inheres is signified through the verb, therefore composition is conceived in the second and not in the first.

Therefore if someone says that truly there are five predicates which are truly universal, and thus the verb alone is not a predicate, the response is clear: because all those are predicates materially, but only the verb is predicate formally because of the reason already introduced. Whence neither pronoun nor participle is formally a predicate; on account of this, determination is not made about these in logic as about parts of interpretation.

Therefore, when determining about verb according to the intention of the logician and about noun, we do not call them subject and predicate, although nevertheless noun is the subject about which the other is, and verb is the predicate which is about another. For subject in the account of subject exists only insofar as it is in enunciation and stands under the form of enunciation; and it is similar concerning predicate if it is taken in the account of predicate. In this way knowledge of subject and predicate depends on knowledge of enunciation; and thus subject and predicate are posterior in account to enunciation and not prior. Therefore, since here we were seeking the elements of enunciation which are prior in account to the composite, we determine these elements under the account of noun and verb, and not under the account of subject and predicate.

It is also clear from what has been said why we do not determine about the other parts of speech. For they either do not signify anything, or they only co-signify with others, as indeclinable parts do. For if I say in, or above, or formerly, or whence, or and, or therefore, it signifies utterly nothing unless something is added concerning which the mode which that part conveys is posited, as if it were said in the house, or above the pond, or formerly there was the Trojan war, or something of this sort. But because a pronoun signifies mere or pure substance, it cannot make a true interpretation concerning the thing, and therefore it does not pertain to the logician except insofar as, made finite by demonstration or relation, it is posited for a finite noun. On account of this, properly speaking, a pronoun also cannot be made infinite, because what is infinite through itself would be made infinite superfluously. But a participle is the thing of the verb, which is contained materially in the verb; and therefore it is neither formally nor materially an element constituting enunciation. On account of this the logician does not determine about such things.

But just as we treat noun, so also we shall treat verb according to the most powerful acceptance of verb, and not according as the grammarian considers it, because the grammarian considers it for the end of congruous

speech, and therefore seeks out the accidents of the verb according as the verb can be a principle of congruous or incongruous enunciation. But the logician refers them to the end of the true or false, through which interpretation is made; and therefore we shall consider about the verb only those things which make for this intention.

## **Chapter II. What a verb is by logical definition.**

### CHAPTER II. What a verb is by logical definition.

Therefore let us say that a verb considered logically is that which co-signifies time, no part of which signifies anything outside, and is always a note of those things which are predicated of another. This definition is expounded by Alfarabi thus: to co-signify time says two things, one from principal intention and the other consequently. From principal intention, to co-signify time says that it is not to signify time or to signify a thing which is necessarily in time, but by the mode by which it is with time, that is, by the mode of acting or being moved. For this noun running signifies what is necessarily in time, yet it signifies it as an essence separated from time, because it signifies its thing wholly at once and not stretched out in time. But this is not done except by signifying it as acting or being moved, because thus acting signified in the agent is in becoming, and time is its measure. Consequently there is said what it presupposes, namely that a verb is vocal sound significative by convention, because, as Avicenna says, a verb which co-signifies with time in this way does not have this from itself, but from the convention of the one imposing.

Yet there are some who say that a verb has two things, namely to signify the thing of the verb; and they say that it has this from convention. But after it has been determined for signifying its thing, it has from necessity to signify its thing with time or to co-signify time, because its signified is necessarily signified as being in some difference of time. For all acting and undergoing is in some difference of time, since the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics that to be in time and to be measured by some part of time are the same.

But what is said, that it is always a note of those things which are said of another, is said because of the composition which is conceived in the verb; for through this it turns its thing back to the subject in which it inheres. But inhering is the cause of predication about another; and therefore through its thing and composition it is a note of those things which are predicated of the subject through the fact that they are in the subject.

There are, however, things which seem to be verbs, but according to the most powerful account of verb are not verbs. For a verb, according to its most powerful account, is that through which something can be interpreted about a subject; and according to this does not run, does not labor cannot be called a verb. And likewise the other infinite verbs. But a name has not properly been imposed on such a part of speech or such a difference of verb. For in this it agrees with a verb, that it always co-signifies time, and in this, that it is always predicated of something. Therefore, if it pleases, let it be called an infinite verb, because it is bounded neither to being nor to non-being. And this is because similarly or equally there is in anything both what it is and what it is not. The cause of this is that, just as in an infinite noun the form is deprived and infinite substance remains, which is bounded neither to being nor to non-being and is designated through this noun being, according as it commonly says that which is either in nature or in reason or in estimation alone, about which thought or speech can be had, so the infinite verb deprives the thing of the verb and leaves an infinite act ordered to infinite substance. By reason of this it co-signifies time and has composition in itself, through which it thus turns the infinite act back to the subject; and through this it is a note of those things which are said of the subject. But because it signifies no finite thing of the verb, therefore nothing is interpretable of a subject through it, and therefore it cannot be a part of interpretation.

Similarly, will run and was running and the other cases of a verb declined from a verb are not verbs according to logical intention, but cases of the verb. And the cause of this is not what some say, namely that it is more innate to each person to interpret the present than the past or future. But this is the true cause: that nothing can be predicated of a thing or even truly interpreted through having-been-in or going-to-be-in, but whatever is predicated of a thing or interpreted about it is done only through being-in. Therefore having-been-in or going-to-be-in are cases of the verb and not verbs, according as verb is part of speech or interpretation. For the logician attends to declension according to time in the verb, because it happens to the verb according to its proper signified; but declension according to persons, or according to numbers, or according to agents and patients, and declension according to modes, happens to the verb according to the affects of the agent. Therefore the logician is not concerned with those.

But what he says, no part of which signifies outside, is understood as in the definition of noun, namely in this way, that no diction which is a verb signifies what, according to part or according to whole, would belong to the understanding of the whole; and therefore this also need not be expounded here.

But just as an infinite verb is not a verb according to the logician, so verbs of past time and verbs of future time are not verbs according to the logician, because they do not signify the present, through which alone something that inheres can be interpreted, or can be proved to inhere, but they signify two times which embrace present time. The present has passed into the past and is extended into the future; and thus past and future signify two times which embrace the present, and of which the present itself is the continuation, and which certainly are not simply, but are in a qualified respect, according as they are reduced to that which is the substance of time and to the things embracing it. And if they are received according to the natural being of time, then first there is the present now, which has passed according to the being of an end into the past, and according to the being of a beginning is extended into the future. But if time is received in the temporal thing, which comes to be first in potency before act, in this respect the future is first, then the present, and last the past. But if time is received as the space of the period of generated things, then the past is first, then the present, and last the future is expected.

But caution is needed in this: because in the order by which past and future, on this account, make a verb about the past and a verb about the future right, as some badly say; for a verb is not right or not right on account of this, but is right on account of this, that through being-in, which it signifies, it makes a right interpretation concerning what is or is not. This cannot be done in the past nor in the future, because through having-been-in nothing can be interpreted about a thing according to reality, because it does not follow: this has been in that; therefore it can be predicated of it. And it is similar concerning the future, as is clear to anyone; and therefore only the present makes right interpretation<sup>[1]</sup>. In the same way, what we said about the infinite, that it is not a verb, we said for this reason: because when the form and thing of the verb have been removed, nothing remains except privation as act with a composition which is bounded to nothing. Therefore it is equally in what is and what is not, not indeed as contradiction or as affirmation and negation, because of that there is no middle according to itself, but it is in both what is and what is not as bounded to neither.

And if someone says that negation also is infinite, it must be said that negation is infinite in that through this it posits nothing; but it is bounded through this, that the things which it denies or divides from one another are of finite signification. In this way an infinite noun and an infinite verb are not finite; whence it appears that it is not similar. And if the reason is posited in the form of an argument, it will be a fallacy of equivocation. Similarly also the verb, through composition conceived in itself, is always a note of those things which are said of another as of a subject; and it is a note of those things which are said of another through the fact that it is in another as act or passion, as we have said. Thus, therefore, the introduced definition of verb is understood.

It must also be known that an infinite verb cannot be infinite in speech<sup>[2]</sup>. The reason for this is that, since negation is what is in an infinite verb through composition, it is referred only to the thing or form of the verb,

and by taking that away it leaves an infinite verb, which is bounded neither to any being nor to any non-being. And this is because a verb taken according to itself does not conceive a determinate and finite composition which is determined through its components or things composed; and therefore negation cannot be referred to composition, but to the thing and form of the verb. And therefore in speech the composition which is in the verb is finite; and therefore in speech negation must be referred to composition, because division belongs to the same thing to which composition belongs. And therefore negation will then make negative speech and not an infinite verb.

It must also be attended that if some verb is infinite of itself, it cannot be made infinite, just as neither can a noun that is infinite of itself. Therefore, just as being cannot be made infinite, so neither can this verb is. Such, therefore, is the definition of verb according to the logicians.

## Notes

[1] This seems contrary to the things said above in the last chapter of the second tractate, where he says that the whole indicative mode has the power of the nominative. Consider well and you will solve it. Jammy. (*Hoc videtur contra dicta supra in cap. ultimo tractatus secundi, ubi dicit quod totus modus indicativus habet virtutem recti. Bene considera et solves. JAMMY.*)

[2] But this also seems contrary to the things said above, chapter 5, tractate II, where he says in the fourteenth notable point that a verb can be infinitated in speech, and asks whether its infinitation differs from its negation. The answer is that here he understands that a verb cannot be infinitated in speech unless it is also denied, but that it can well be infinitated outside speech. Jammy. (*Sed hoc videtur etiam contra dicta supra cap. 5 tract. II, ubi dicit in decimo quarto notabili, quod verbum potest in oratione infinitari, et quaerit utrum ejus infinitatio differat ab ejus negatione. Respondetur quod hic intelligit verbum non posse infinitari in oratione nisi etiam negetur: sed bene extra orationem. JAMMY.*)

## Chapter II. That verbs said according to themselves are nouns.

### CHAPTER II. That verbs said according to themselves are nouns.

Verbs themselves said according to themselves, that is, taken by themselves alone and not posited in speech as parts of speech, are nouns. The proof of this is that they signify something determinate, which is proper to a noun, namely a note. And if it is asked, what is the name of this verb which is amo, it will be said that its name is love; and we say, this verb amo is an active verb. And such things said in this way show that verbs taken according to themselves, and not bent back to subjects through composition, are accepted as nouns. The proof of this is that one who first imposed such a name on a verb, and similarly one who says or names a verb by a simple diction, intends to constitute such an understanding, namely that such a verb be signified by that name. And one who hears someone thus saying and naming a verb rests in such a simple understanding and does not seek further. For if I say verb, and it is asked which verb, and it is said amo or lego, the hearer of the verb immediately rests; but he would not rest unless he knew that amo is the name of a determinate and definite verb. And therefore he rests in it through a simple understanding. But a verb taken by itself does not yet signify true or false; for it does not signify concerning a thing whether it is, or whether it is not by negation.

And the cause of this is that a verb taken by itself is neither a sign of the being of a thing nor a sign of non-being: being, indeed, through affirmation, and non-being through negation. But in order for it to be signified as being, it must actually be composed with the thing whose being it signifies according to some act or passion; and then it is properly a verb, because then it has conceived determinate composition toward that of which it is. Whence, taken according to itself, it has nothing of the signification of verb. This is proved from the greater thus. For if some verb by itself signifies something of the intention of verb, then it especially seems that that verb taken by itself signifies what is conceived in every verb, and this is this verb is. But if you say this verb is pure and simple, it indeed is nothing and signifies nothing finite. For since it signifies infinitely a certain composition which cannot be understood without extremes, as Avicenna says, if I say is, it signifies utterly nothing unless what-is is added with either a substantial or accidental predicate, so that it is

said, is a stone, is white, or is rational, or something of this sort. Yet there is another reason for this: because composition is the middle joining the things composed; but it does not join except through the account of the things composed. And thus the account of composition is taken from the things composed. Thus, therefore, what is said about verbs said according to themselves, that they are nouns, is understood most truly.

Yet there are some who say that verbs said according to themselves are verbs in the thing of the verb received through the infinitive, as to love or to read <sup>[1]</sup>. And they say that these are in the force of nouns, because they can be subjected like nouns, as when it is said, to read is good, or something of this sort. But the first is better, because that is the understanding of the Philosophers.

Nevertheless, against what has been said, that a verb taken according to itself does not signify being or non-being, objection is made by an instance concerning verbs of exceptional action, such as it lightnings, it thunders. But the response to this is easy, because that verb does not have this insofar as it is a verb, but insofar as it is of exceptional action.

Again, if objection is made concerning verbs of the first or second person, in which the supposit is determinate, it is solved in the same way. For those verbs do not have this insofar as they are verbs, but insofar as they determine a definite agent. Therefore there is no instance from these.

These things, then, have been said about the verb with respect to the nature of interpretation, about which we are chiefly asking here. For because we interpret only something which is as to-be, about another which is as being, and noun signifies as being while verb signifies as to-be, therefore it is not necessary to seek more parts of interpretation for this. A pronoun does not signify as finite and perfect being. A participle, however, does not signify as to-be by comparison to that to which it is reduced; and therefore by a perfect account they are not elements of interpretation. On account of this they must be omitted. But once the elements of interpretation have been had, now those things must be sought which are the formal principles of interpretation.

## Notes

[1] Compare St. Thomas, who rejects this opinion. Vives edition, volume XXI, Perihermenias, book I, lecture 5. (*Cf. S. Th. qui hanc improbat opinionem. Ed. Vives, tom. XXI Periherm. liber I, lectio 5.*)

## Tractate IV. Chapter I. On the definition of speech which is the genus of enunciation.

TRACTATE IV. ON ENUNCIATION. CHAPTER I. On the definition of speech which is the genus of enunciation.

Now that those things which pertain to the elements of enunciation or interpretation have been had, it must now be investigated what interpretation is. And because interpretation is in speech as in a definitive genus, one must begin from speech. And because the immediate genus of interpretation is perfect speech, therefore we shall seek the definition of perfect speech according to the logician <sup>[1]</sup>. For thus the composite will correspond to the components, because when we defined noun and verb, we defined them insofar as they are most perfectly elements of speech. Therefore also, speaking about speech, we speak about it as perfect.

Therefore let us say that speech, which is the proximate genus for interpretation, is significative vocal sound, something of whose parts signifies separately as diction, not as affirmation. For diction is equivocal <sup>[2]</sup>, because diction is the pronunciation of any diction, such as of noun or verb. Diction is also the affirmative enunciation of something about something, in which something is said of something; in that way it does not signify something separately, because in that way it would signify true or false. But it signifies something separated according as the whole is signified in the parts. I say this by expounding what has been said, as human, which is a diction constituting a simple understanding and therefore signifies something; but it does not signify something in such a way because it is affirmatively or negatively. Rather, then there will be

affirmation or negation if something is added as something affirmed or denied of a human being. For although we say that the parts of speech signify something, we understand this only of the parts of speech from which speech is immediately composed, which are dictions. And we do not understand this of the parts of parts, as of one syllable of a noun which is a part of a diction, because, as we have said, the syllable of a diction has neither a part nor anything in the whole from the signified of the diction.

And this appears through an argument from the greater: because if in any cases a syllable by itself signified something of the understanding of the whole, it would seem more that this would happen in double or composite words than in others. And in these it does not signify anything separately. Therefore neither in others. As in this name, *sorex*, *rex* taken by itself signifies nothing, neither according to the whole nor according to a part of the understanding of the whole. And therefore neither does a part of the diction of other nouns signify anything separately by itself: indeed, the part of a composite diction does not signify anything separately; that is to say, what is a part, according as it is a part, signifies nothing of the intention of the whole.

But when we call speech significative, we do not say that it is significative as an instrument, but, as has been said, we say that it is significative by convention. For every instrument of some cause is an instrument and is naturally and accidentally ordered to one thing and not to another. But lettered and articulated vocal sound, whether it is diction or speech, is not ordered to one thing, because what sounds as one thing in one language immediately sounds as the opposite or another thing in another. Therefore it is not significative as an instrument, but by convention<sup>[3]</sup>.

Nevertheless, in the definition of speech it is not said that it is significative by convention, because to signify by convention belongs to it from its parts more than from itself. For since the parts signify by convention, when that signification has been received from the nature of the dictions, speech signifies what the parts signify. Yet, because the origin of signification is by convention, to signify by convention is attributed to speech through its parts. Nevertheless it is not placed in the definition, because only those things which immediately belong to the defined thing are placed in a definition. Therefore this is speech according as it is the genus of interpretation or enunciation. But imperfect speech is neither perfectly significative vocal sound, nor does any of the other things belong to it perfectly.

Nevertheless the sophists object against this definition, saying that speech which is one by conjunction, as Socrates runs or sleeps, or if Socrates snores, Socrates sleeps, or Socrates runs or reads, is such that all these are perfect speeches, and their parts signify separately as affirmation<sup>[4]</sup>. To this it must be said that the definition introduced is the definition of perfect speech, whether it is one simply or one by conjunction. But in the definition of speech it is said, something of whose parts signifies separately, not as affirmation. And from this it does not follow that perfect speech has no part signifying as affirmation, because the partitive construction prevents this; rather, it follows that the parts which of themselves and proximately compose speech as speech signify something, not as affirmation, but as diction of simple understanding.

But this perfect speech which has been defined is divided: for not every speech is enunciation, but among perfect speeches only that one is enunciation in which true or false is signified indicatively. For this does not belong to all perfect speeches. For deprecation, or deprecatative speech, is perfect because it generates a perfect sense; and nevertheless it is neither true nor false, because it signifies neither true nor false. And it is similar with other speeches, as with optative and conjunctive speech<sup>[5]</sup>. Therefore all such speeches which say neither true nor false, which alone the logician intends as the end, are to be left aside. For concerning such speeches the rhetorician or poet speculates more suitably, since such speeches are useful for the supplication of a judge, plaintiff, or defendant, and not for the signification of truth or falsity. For enunciative speech, which signifies truth and falsity, alone belongs to the present speculation.

## Notes

[1] In the definition of speech, D. Albert and Philoxenus are of one opinion. Boethius and St. Thomas hold that common speech, common to perfect and imperfect speech, is defined here. (*In diffinitione orationis D. Albertus et Filoxenus sunt unius opinionis. Boetius et S. Thomas volunt quod hic diffiniatur oratio communis ad perfectam et imperfectam.*)

[2] The expression diction is an equivocal name; and because Aristotle often takes the expression to say for to affirm, lest someone understand the expression diction as affirming, he adds not as affirmation, and this is the exposition of Alexander. Jammy. (*Ly dictio est aequivocum nomen; et quia Aristoteles saepe accipit ly dicere pro affirmare, ne quis intelligeret ly dictio pro affirmare, addit non ut affirmatio, et est expositio Alexandri. JAMMY.*)

[3] This is said because of Plato, who held that speech signifies naturally, since it is an instrument of a natural power, as Boethius said. (*Hoc dicitur propter Platonem qui voluit orationem naturaliter significare, cum sit instrumentum virtutis naturalis, ut dixit Boetius.*)

[4] This is the objection of Aspasius, which Boethius and St. Thomas also touch upon, and which Antonius Alexandrinus solves. Porphyry, however, and Aspasius said that Aristotle here defined simple speech as prior. (*Haec est objectio Aspasii quam etiam tangunt Boetius et S. Thomas, et quam solvit Antonius Alexandrinus. Porphyrius tamen et Aspasius dixerunt hic Aristotelem diffinivisse orationem simplicem tanquam priorem.*)

[5] From these things it is clear that, according to D. Albert, Aristotle here suggests the division of perfect speech into deprecative, imperative, interrogative, vocative, and enunciative speech; but according to Boethius and St. Thomas, the division of speech common to perfect and imperfect speech is suggested here. (*Ex his patet quod, secundum D. Albertum, Aristoteles hic innuit divisionem orationis perfectae in deprecativam, imperativam, interrogativam, vocativam et enuntiativam: secundum Boetium autem et S. Thomam, hic innuitur divisio orationis communis ad perfectam et imperfectam.*)

## Chapter II. On the definition of enunciation in its species.

### CHAPTER II. On the definition of enunciation in its species.

Now that those things which pertain to the being and definition of speech have been had, one must now treat its division and parts or species. First it must be noted that according to the three things which are in enunciation, it has to be divided in three ways. For if it is attended according to the things composing it, then it is divided for certain that among enunciations one is simple, another composite, and another plural, simply and in a certain way one. For if there is one account of enunciation and of only one enunciation, then just as one is not divided into many, so enunciation is not divided into many, because many enunciations are not enunciation but enunciations. For what divides ought to participate in the divided thing and receive its name. But if the quality of enunciation is attended, then enunciation is divided by affirmation and negation; and let us carry out all these divisions.

Therefore it must be known that among enunciations one is simple and one, another is one by conjunction, and another is many. Or it can be divided thus, that one is one and another many. But of the ones, one is simple and one, another one by conjunction. The one which is simple one and one in the first place is that in which one predicate is said or denied of one subject, as a human being runs, or a human being is not an animal. But the composite, or many, is that in which either many things are said of one, or one thing of many, or many things of many. And this is in two ways, because many things can be copulated through conjunction, or joined without conjunction under one utterance, as if I say, Socrates and Plato run; or if I say, Socrates runs and disputes; or if I say, Socrates and Plato run and dispute; or without conjunction if I say, the white musical human being reads; or if I say, the white musical human being is a curly-haired harp-player. Therefore such enunciations are many, both unjoined and joined through conjunction. But of the ones, some are simply one, and some are one by conjunction. Those are simply one which are from a simple and one form of simple composition, as a human being is an animal. But those are one by conjunction in which consequence, which the conjunction notes, makes unity; and this is only in the conditional and the disjunctive, because in the conditional the things following from the natural order of antecedent to consequent touch one another in one consequence; but in the disjunctive, from opposition plurality does not remain, but when one has been destroyed the remainder is inferred and one remains. And according to Boethius and Avicenna and Algazel, only those two conjunctions make an enunciation one by conjunction, and not the copulative conjunction, because in copulated things there is no unity except that of aggregation,

which is simply plurality and not unity. It can also be said that just as in natures some things are from a simple form, as an element, and some from forms of diverse things ordered to one through composition or combination, as is the case in heterogeneous things, so there are two unities in enunciation. Therefore one is simply one, while another is one by conjunction; and some are joined, and some unjoined or uttered by conjunction. But this contributes little to the proposed matter.

But it must be attended that of one enunciations, some are one in signification and not in vocal sound, some in vocal sound and not in signification, and some in vocal sound and signification at once. One in signification and not in vocal sound is this: a rational mortal animal is a human being. For this is one by unity of signification, although not by unity of vocal sound, because all the defining things are united by the unity of the ultimate difference, which is a real, natural, and essential unity. But one by unity of vocal sound and not of signification is that in whose subject and predicate there is a term signifying many things, as dog. But one by unity of vocal sound and signification is that in which

## **Treatise IV, Chapter II (continuation): On the division of enunciation according to one and many**

simply one thing is predicated of one thing which is not equivocal or multiple.

But according to the things that have been said it seems that this is not one: "white Socrates runs," because Socrates and white are not simply one, but an aggregate. To this it must be said that it is not one primarily, but accidentally, just as accidentally one thing is one. But if it is then objected that this also is one, "white musical man runs," it must be said that it is not true, because white and musical, because they are two accidents not having an essential order to one another, make two subjects; and thus the proposition is not one, but several. But it is not so here, "white colored man runs"; and therefore that is one by unity through accident.

Therefore, with these things noted beforehand, it is easy to find the division of enunciation, and its dividing parts. For we say that that which is one and the first enunciative speech is affirmation, and then negation<sup>[1]</sup>; because although affirmation and negation are coeval species of enunciation, and thus are related equally to the genus which is enunciation, nevertheless, if they are compared to each other, and through that by which they are and from which they are, affirmation is before negation, because it is as a part of it and its cause; and therefore affirmation is prior, and then negation. But the other enunciations which are one are one by conjunction. Therefore this division of enunciation is had: of enunciations, some are simply and primarily one, others are rather united by conjunction than one. But whether it is one in the first way, or in the second way, or even not one.

Here it must be known that from several nouns only, or from several verbs only, there cannot be an enunciative speech; but it is necessary that enunciative speech be from a noun and from a verb, or from a noun and a case of a verb. And if someone objects that enunciative speech is from an infinite noun, which is not a noun, and a verb, as when I say, "non-man runs," the objection is not valid, because it is not an enunciation concerning an infinite noun. Or, although an infinite noun is not a noun for interpreting, nevertheless it is a noun for enunciating in whatever way. For it does not lose every power of a noun.

But that without a verb, through nouns alone, enunciation does not come about is proved from the greater case. For if any speech without a verb made an enunciation, definitional speech would do this more, because it says being. But definitional speech does not make an enunciation. Therefore neither does any of the others<sup>[2]</sup>. An example of this is that if to the account of man which is "gressible two-footed animal" there is not added "is," or "was," or some verb, it will not yet make an enunciation; for when "gressible two-footed animal" is said in this way, that whole is a certain one thing and not many, because by the unity of the ultimate difference the whole is one. And because it is thus one and not many, therefore it cannot say one

thing of one thing; and this belongs to the substance of enunciation, that something be said of another. And since only the verb is the mark of saying one thing of another, there cannot be an enunciation without a verb or a case of a verb. For a definitional account is not simply one because the parts of that speech, which are words and nouns, are uttered when they have been placed near, that is, without distance, or without a coupling conjunction; but, as we said, they are one because the preceding and general things are united and determined by the ultimate difference, which is one simple act.

But to determine the cause why a definition is one and not many belongs to another business; for this must be determined in the seventh book of the First Philosophy<sup>[3]</sup>.

Therefore according to the things that have been said, then an enunciative speech is one when by the simplicity of its composition it signifies that one predicate is said of one subject. But if otherwise it signifies or denies that several are said of one, or one of several, or several of several, it cannot simply be one; but if it is one, it will be one by conjunction either of terms or of enunciations, as we have said. But that enunciation is several which signifies plurality in those things which are said of themselves, either in the subject, or in the predicate, or in both. And those are several which are conjoined through a copulative conjunction. And those are several which are unconjoined, and nevertheless signify that either several things are said of one, or one of several, or several of several.

Moreover, unconjoined and conjoined are said in another way, as some say, so that conjoined are those which are uttered without distance in one utterance, but unconjoined because they are uttered in several utterances with an interruption of continuous utterance.

But just as enunciation is not without noun and verb, so by a noun alone or a verb alone an enunciation can never be made; because a noun is one single diction, and a verb is one single diction. For by a noun or a verb in a simple utterance it does not happen that something is enunciated or that something is put forth enunciatively, whether one puts this forth to another after being questioned by him, or puts this forth within himself when not questioned. Therefore by a simple verb an enunciative speech is not made, because by a simple intellect something cannot be enunciated.

But of these one enunciations, whether simply one or one by conjunction, that enunciation is called simple in which it is signified that some one thing is predicated of some one thing, as in a simple affirmative categorical; or it is signified that some one predicate is denied of some one subject, as in a simple negative categorical. But this other, namely that which is also one, is composed and conjoined out of these, either terms or propositions, as has been said; and such are hypothetical conditionals or disjunctives, because in them a hypothetical syllogism is made. For a simple enunciation is a significant utterance concerning this, that something is according to affirmation, or is not according to negation, or was, or will be, just as times or differences of times which befall verbs are diverse, as was said in what preceded. But by quality enunciation is divided into affirmative enunciative speech and negative enunciative speech. Now affirmation is an enunciation of some predicate concerning some subject. But negation is an enunciation of something from something through division. Therefore these are the species of enunciations.

### Marginal Labels - 409: Objection. - 409: Solution. - 409: Objection. - 409: Solution. - 409: Objection. - 409: Solution.

## Notes

[1] Compare also St. Thomas, *Perihermenias*, Book I, lectures 8 and 9, volume XXII of the Vives edition. (*Cf. etiam S. Thom. Perihermenias L. I, lect. 8 et 9. Tom. XXII ed. Vives.*)

[2] St. Thomas, in lecture 8 of Book I of the *Perihermenias*, gives three answers why Aristotle does not make mention of the verb. Volume XXII, page 26 of the Vives edition. (*S. Thomas, in lect. 8 Lib. I Perihermenias, tres dat responsiones cur de verbo mentionem non faciat Aristoteles. Tom. XXII, pag. 26 ed. Vives.*)

[3] Text, commentary 42. (*Tex. com. 42.*)

## **Treatise V. On The Attribute Of The Parts Of Enunciation Which Is Opposition.**

### **Chapter I. That To Every Affirmation A Negation Is Opposed, And Conversely.**

TREATISE V. ON THE ATTRIBUTE OF THE PARTS OF ENUNCIATION WHICH IS OPPOSITION.

CHAPTER I. That to every affirmation a negation is opposed, and conversely.

Now it is possible to enunciate also that which is true to be, as it is enunciated that God is. It is also possible to enunciate that which is true not to be, as if I say that God is not, I enunciate that which is, not to be. It is also possible sometimes to enunciate that which is not to be, as if I say that a chimera is. And again it is possible to enunciate that which is not not to be, as if I say that a chimera is not. For Avicenna says that these four are diversified in this way: because it is possible to enunciate that which is to be, in an affirmative enunciation. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not to be, in the negative of the same. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not to be, in an affirmative opposed to the negative. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not not to be, in a negation opposed to a negation, as "no white man is," "not no white man is." Therefore in such a way, by affirming and denying concerning being and non-being, it is possible to make an enunciative speech. And just as this diversity occurs around enunciations which are about the present, so it occurs around other times which are outside the present, which are past and future. For in every difference of time, by an enunciative speech it is possible to deny everything that someone has affirmed. And everything that someone has denied, it is possible to affirm by an enunciative speech; and this is according to opposition taken in the genus. Therefore it is manifest that to every affirmation a negation is opposed, and to every negation an affirmation is opposed according to any genus of opposition; because this is true both in contradiction and in contrariety.

From this it is clear what opposition is. For opposition, insofar as it is an attribute of enunciation and insofar as opposition is intended here, is opposed affirmation and negation. And because in one what is affirmed in the other is denied, therefore in common sometimes either opposition is called contradiction, when the species is put for the genus on account of the account which we have stated<sup>[1]</sup>. But when we say that opposition is opposed affirmation and negation, I say that there is opposition when it is of one and the same predicate about the same subject, taken not equivocally. And all such things are considered around opposition, whatever we determined must be considered in Refutations, when we were speaking of the refutation which is a syllogism of contradiction. And those things must be considered around sophistical annoyances, because the annoying man presses more strongly. And therefore opposition must be of the same concerning the same, and around the same thing and according to the same thing, at the same time. For then the opposition is true, although concerning the refutation it has not yet been determined, since the things which have been said are considered with respect to the refutation; and therefore now according to the account of a refutation those things have been declared and determined which belong to the account of a refutation. Therefore this is the opposition which occurs around the parts of enunciation.

But this opposition is said in many ways according to universal and particular, affirmative and negative. For of subjects and predicates in enunciations, these are universal and those are singular. But I say, by way of exposition, that a universal is a subject or predicate which is naturally apt to be predicated of many and to be in many; because a universal is what is in many and of many. But a singular is what is not so, but from it there is no predication, as was said in what preceded. For example, man is a universal subject or predicate, because it is naturally apt to be in many and to be said of many. For Plato is of the number of those things which are singular, because he is not naturally fit to be said of many and to be in many; and therefore a universal subject and predicate is one thing, and a singular is another. But since enunciation is made about anything and in any mode, it is necessary that sometimes it be enunciated about something that some predicate belongs to some subject according to every mode in which it can belong and not belong to it; therefore it is necessary that sometimes it be enunciated that something belongs to some one of those which

are universal subjects, as if something is enunciated to be a man. But sometimes it is necessary to enunciate that something belongs to some one of those which are singular, as if something is enunciated to belong to Plato.

Therefore from these things the division is taken of oppositions which belong to enunciation. For if someone enunciates in the universal universally, that it is and is not, by affirming universally and by denying universally, then they will be contrary enunciations. But I say, by way of exposition, that enunciation is made in the universal universally when the subject is universal and is taken through a distributive sign so that it stands for the parts which separately participate in the distributed and confused predicate, both by affirming and by denying, as "every white man is," "no white man is." But when opposition or contradiction occurs in universal terms not universally distributed through a distributive sign, they are not contrary enunciations, but fall into another genus of opposition. But I say, by way of exposition through an example, that an enunciation is made in a universal or about a universal both by affirming and by denying, as "white man is," "white man is not." And these propositions or enunciations must be ordered according to the due position of the terms, which is that of subject and predicate, so that it be said thus, "man is white," "man is not white." And because these indefinite propositions are equivalent to particular ones, namely to these, "some man is white," "some man is not white," they are not contrary enunciations, but subcontrary; because although they are not contrary propositions, nevertheless the subjects and predicates which are signified in them can be contrary in quality, because what is affirmed of one in one is denied of the same in the other; and such opposition has the mode of contraries in quality. And because in every opposition it happens in this way, that the same is denied of the same in one which is affirmed of it in the remaining one, therefore by Aristotle contradiction, by the name extended, is often put for every opposition. Therefore in such things which are subcontrary, although the universal is the subject of the proposition, nevertheless without distribution it does not use enunciation universally, because without a universal sign the subject is not actually distributed for standing for particulars, although by nature it is naturally apt to stand for many insofar as it is appellative or common and universal.

For this distributive sign which is "every" is not a universal, properly speaking, but is a sign through which the universal to which such a sign is joined stands universally for particulars. But the cause why it is not a universal is that, although according to the grammarian it is an appellative noun, that is, agreeing with many according to the aptitude of its nature, nevertheless according to form it is infinite; for it says no one nature, on account of which it is distributive of every common nature. But a universal is what is in many and of many supposit of its nature; and therefore "every," and "none," and signs of this sort cannot be universals, but are signs designating whether the universal is taken universally or particularly according to its supposit; and these are the words of Avicenna.

In a universal subject the distributive sign must be ordered, because through the division of the subject the predicate is attributed to the parts of the subject, so that through predication they participate in it separately, and it must not be placed in the predicate; because since the predicate is taken formally, it is not properly divided except by the division of another, that is, of the subject, but it is rendered unequally to the subject and to its parts. Hence that which is universal can be predicated, as "every man is an animal"; but a universal taken universally cannot be predicated. For there can be no true affirmation in which predication is made of some universal predicate; for universally in this way it is clear that "every man is every animal" is false, even if it be posited that there is no animal except man. For since man is subjected for the sake of its parts, and predicates are taken formally, it would be necessary that each man be every animal, which is false.

Nevertheless some object and press through this: "no man is no animal"; this is proved by the fact that its contradictory is false, namely this, "not no man is no animal"; for from this follows this, "some man is no animal," which is false and contradictory to the first. But to solve this is not difficult if this proposition, "no man is no animal," is duly ordered in such a way that each negation is referred to the composition thus: "no

man is no animal." For this is equivalent to this, "every man is not no animal." And from this follows this, that each man is some animal, which is true; and in this sense its contradictory is false, as is apparent to anyone; and thus it is established that a universal sign must not be put with the predicate.

From all the things which have been brought forward in this chapter, it is apparent that opposition is an attribute of the parts of enunciation: from this it is possible to enunciate according to every mode of opposition, both contradictory and contrary and subcontrary. Now therefore the laws of these oppositions must be given.

### Marginal Labels - 411: Opposition. - 412: What contrary propositions are. - 412: What subcontraries are. - 413: Objection. - 413: Solution.

## Notes

[1] Contradiction is sometimes taken for opposition, and thus the species for the genus; and in this way it is taken here by the Philosopher according to D. Albert. But on the contrary: if this is granted, the same thing would be placed in the definition of itself, for in the expression "opposed" opposition is included. It is answered that here there is no impropriety concerning the same thing taken in diverse ways. But St. Thomas wishes contradiction here to be taken for the determinate species of opposition. Jammy. (*Contradictio quandoque capitur pro oppositione, et sic species pro genere: et hoc modo capitur hic a Philosopho secundum D. Albert. Sed contra: hoc dato, idem poneretur in diffinitione sui ipsius; nam in ly oppositae includitur oppositio. Respondetur quod hic non inconvenit de eodem diversimode sumpto. S. Thomas autem vult quod contradictio hic capiatur pro determinata specie oppositionis. JAMMY.*)

## Chapter II. On The Laws And Consequences Of The Said Oppositions.

CHAPTER II. On the laws and consequences of the said oppositions.

Therefore I say that affirmation and negation are opposed contradictorily because one signifies universally, and the other, contradicting it, signifies not universally, but particularly, or indefinitely, or singularly, as when it is said, "every man is white." For to this is opposed contradictorily and immediately this, "not every man is white"; and to this this is equivalent, "some man is not white," which is also contradictory, not immediately, but by means of that to which it is equivalent. Likewise if I say, "every white man is," "white Socrates is not," it is a contradiction, because there was affirmation of the predicate concerning any part of the subject; and Socrates is a part of the subject; for it follows, "Socrates is not white"; therefore some man is not white, and therefore not every man is white; and this is the contradiction of the first. And the opposition is similar between a universal negative and a particular affirmative, as "some man is white" and "no man is white." For to this, "some man is white," this is immediately opposed, "not some man is white"; but to this is equivalent, "no man is white," which is contradictory through that to which it is equivalent; and so it is in the others<sup>[1]</sup>.

But I say that in enunciations the universal affirmative and the universal negative are opposed contrarily. And I call universal that which designates universally, as when it is said, "every man is just," and when it is said, "no man is just." For between these there is an opposition of contrariety, because both are universal. And it is not possible that these ever be true at the same time in any matter; because if the predicate is essential to the subject, then it will be necessary, and one will be true and the other false, as when it is said, "every man is an animal," "no man is an animal." But if the predicate is repugnant to the subject, then the matter is impossible, and the negative will be true and the affirmative false. But if the predicate is accidental to the subject, then the enunciation will be in contingent matter, and then both will at once be false, if the accident is taken as able to be either way, namely when it is said, "every man is white," "no man is white." For these are contrary, and both are false.

But opposites to contraries in the mode of the universal sign are subcontraries, because each of them is particular, while each of the contraries is universal. And their law is that both can be true at the same time in contingent matter; for these are true at the same time, "not every white man is," and "some white man is." For

this, "not every white man is," is equivalent to this, "some man is not white," which is subcontrary to this, "some man is white"; and both are true in contingent matter able to be either way.

Taking up again what concerns contradictorily opposed things, we say that whatever contradictions of enunciation, or things contradictorily opposed, are of universal subjects and universally distributed, in these it is always necessary that one enunciation be true and the other false in every matter, through that principle which is said: of anything affirmation or negation is true, and of nothing are both at once true, as "every man is just" and "some man is not just"; and "every man is an animal" and "some man is not an animal"; "no man is a stone" and "some man is a stone."

Similarly it is in contradictory enunciations, whatever are in singular subjects, as "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is not white." For in all such contradictories one is always true and the remaining one false in every matter. But whatever contradictions or oppositions, because contradiction by the extended name of contradiction is said commonly of every opposition, whatever oppositions of such things are indeed in universal enunciations, in which the subjects are universals but not universally distributed, in every matter it does not always happen that one is true and the other false, because both such can be true at the same time, as those which are subcontrary. For it is at once true to say that man is white and that man is not white; and since an indefinite is equivalent to a particular, it will at once be true to say, "some man is white," and "some man is not white." And similarly it is true to say that man is upright, and that man is not upright, because if he is shameful in morals, then he is not upright. And in the same way it will at once be true to say that man is beautiful according to the body, and that man is not beautiful. For if he is foul in body, which frequently happens, then it follows that he is not beautiful. Likewise it is in permanent things which come to be by contingent causes and to which it happens to be such; and in such things these are true at the same time, that some contingent thing is, and that some contingent thing is not, because what is such, while it is still in becoming, is not. And thus it is clear in many cases that subcontraries, in which the universal is not enunciated universally, can be true at the same time.

Yet this, if it is inspected at first glance and not subtly, will seem to be unfitting. And this is because this enunciation, "not is white man," seems by equivalence to signify the same as "no one is a white man," or that no man is white; for this, "no one is white," is neither the same with this, "not is white man," nor is it verified at the same time with this, "man is white." For it is impossible for these two to be verified at the same time, because they are contradictories. But this happens because, when it is said, "not is white man," the negation, because it precedes the subject, seems formally to look to the subject and deny; and thus "not is white man" is the same as "no one is white." But, as we have said, if the terms of these enunciations are duly ordered, then this does not happen; for if that, "not is white man," is resolved into this, "man is not white," then it is not the same with this, "no one is white," and it is verified at the same time with its subcontrarily opposed, "man is white," because then the negation is not referred to the form of the subject, but to the composition.

Moreover, in contradictories and in other oppositions it must be considered that one negation ought to belong to one and the same affirmation. And this is proved by this: because if affirmation and negation are opposed, the negation must deny that same thing which the affirmation affirmed; and thus there cannot be except one negation of one affirmation<sup>[2]</sup>. And if sometimes there are several in voice, nevertheless they are reduced to one first one, as was said a little before. It must also be that affirmation and negation are about the same subject, whether this subject is about one of the singulars, as about Socrates or Plato, or about one of the universal subjects, as about man or ass; or even whether that universal subject is supposed as universally distributed or is not distributed. For in all these opposition requires unity and identity, not indeed only of genus or species, but of number, because opposition wishes to be around the same thing in number.

And if someone objects that "every man runs" and "some man does not run," or "Socrates does not run," are not around the same thing in number, but around the same thing in genus or species, it must be said that this is false, because when it is said, "every man runs," man there stands for any of its suppositis; and therefore it

stands for that for which it is supposed when it is said, "Socrates runs," or "some man runs." Therefore if every man runs, then some man runs; and if some man does not run, then some man runs and does not run, and this is a contradiction. Similarly, if every man runs, then Socrates runs; and if with this Socrates does not run, then it follows that Socrates runs and does not run, and this is a contradiction. Therefore opposition must be around the same thing in number, as we have said.

But the exemplary account or declaration of this is as if I say, "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is not white." But if I say some other predicate about the same subject, or the same predicate about another subject, such an enunciation will not be opposed to that one, but will be another and separate and diverse by disparity from it. As if I say of Socrates that he is musical, and I say of Plato that he is white; for neither of these is opposed to this, "Socrates is not white," or to this, "Plato is not musical."

Therefore to this affirmation, "every white man is," there is opposed contradictorily and immediately the negation of the same concerning the same, which is "not every white man is"; and through that, its equivalent, which is "some man is not white." But to that which is "some man is white," that which is "not some man is white" is opposed contradictorily and immediately, and through that its equivalent which is "no man is white." And to that indefinite which is "white man is," that which is "not white man is" is opposed contradictorily, because this is equivalent to the universal, "no white man is," insofar as negation formally looks to the subject<sup>[3]</sup>.

Therefore it is manifest, as we have said, that to one affirmation one negation is opposed; and if there are several according to equivalence, they are reduced to one and the same. It is also manifest that of enunciations some are contrary, others contradictory. For subcontraries are those which are contained under contraries. It has also been said which are contraries and which are contradictories. Moreover, it has been determined when, or in which cases, contradiction, or opposition which by an extended name is called contradiction, does not always signify true or false. It has also been said why, or on account of what. And it has also been said when one of them is true or false of necessity.

But if it is asked which opposition is greater, that of contradiction or that of contrariety, because contrariety contradicts the universal universally, while contradiction contradicts the universal particularly, it must be said that the opposition of contradiction is greater than all, because it has no middle which prevents it from always dividing through true and false. But contrariety has a middle in which it does not divide the extremes, but both will be false. And as to what is said, that it universally denies what was universally affirmed, it is said that this is not to join a predicate to one universally and to remove it from another according to reality and truth, but it is only according to the sign and not according to reality; but in contradiction the extremes of the opposition are removed from each other through truth. And thus it is clear that in something the extremes of contraries are joinable, namely in the false; but in nothing are the extremes of contradiction joined, neither in the true nor in the false.

Moreover, it must be noted that although an indefinite is equivalent to a particular, nevertheless it is not the same to say "man runs" and "non-man runs," and indeed "man runs" and "some man does not run"; because through a particular sign the universal subject is drawn to standing for a supposit, yet it is not drawn to this when it stands by itself without a particular sign; and therefore then it can be looked to materially or formally by the negation which is opposed to it in the same enunciation. Hence it is not the same to say "man is white" and "non-man is white" as with these, "some man is white" and "some man is not white"; and thus judgment must be made in the others.

### Marginal Labels - 415: Objection of the text. - 415: Solution. - 416: Doubt. - 416: Solution.

## Notes

[1] From this it is clear that the universal negative does not immediately contradict the particular affirmative, but one which is equivalent to it does; and so you should speak concerning the universal affirmative and particular negative. (*Ex quo patet quod*

*particulari affirmativae non contradicit immediate universalis negativa, sed una quae ei aequipollet: et sic dicas de universali affirmativa et particulari negativa.)*

[2] Of one affirmation there is only one principal negation. Boethius understands this in contradictories; but St. Thomas and D. Albert seem to understand this in every genus of opposition. (*Unius affirmationis est una tantum negatio principalis. Boetius hoc intelligit in contradictoriis; S. Thomas autem et D. Albertus videntur hoc intelligere in omni genere oppositionis.*)

[3] Note that St. Thomas seems to wish these, "man is white," "non-man is white," to be subcontraries; and he preserves that they are opposites. Yet D. Albert's exposition is less doubtful. Jammy. (*Nota quod S. Thomas videtur velle istas, homo est albus, non homo est albus, esse subcontrarias; et salvat quod sint oppositae. Expositio tamen D. Alberti est minus dubitabilis. JAMMY.*)

### **Chapter III. Whether Always One Of The Contradictories Is Determinately True.**

CHAPTER III. Whether always one of the contradictories is determinately true.

Now it remains to determine whether one of the contradictories is always determinately true, and the other false. But for declaring this we will take contradictories under the extended name, according as those which are under unity of voice, although they are not under unity of signification, are called contradictories when they differ through affirmation and negation.

But that one is not necessarily true is proved in this way. Let that be resumed which was said in the preceding chapter, that an affirmation or negation is one which signifies, or by signifying enunciates, one predicate of one subject. And this in two ways, namely either so that the subject is universal universally, as these contradict, "every man is white," "not every man is white." For a universal sign added to the subject does not make a composite enunciation, since it does not say some form or determinate being, but the distribution of the subject's form; or also when it signifies not universally, as when a particular is opposed to a universal, as "some white man is," "no white man is." And because this also, "not every white man is," is equivalent to a particular, and this, "not no white man is," is equivalent to a particular. For in these, white, which is the predicate, signifies one and the same thing about the same subject, which is man.

But if a proposition by the signification of the subject is several, while nevertheless by the voice and name of the subject it is one, as if one name has been imposed on two things, from which two one thing does not come to be, nor can one thing come to be as in a definition one thing comes to be from genus and difference, then according to signification there is not one affirmation in which such a subject is subjected to one predicate, because on account of two impositions actually made that name actually signifies both of those, and thus it actually signifies several things. And an example of this is if someone imposes this name, "tunic," on man and horse by two actual impositions, and says, "the tunic is white," or "the tunic is not white"; it is not simply an affirmation or negation, because in actual signification it is not one. For although Boethius says that, once a term has been taken, one cannot use it equivocally, nevertheless nothing prevents two persons from being able to use it equivocally by two acceptions of the term; and thus between the respondent and the opponent it can be taken equivocally; and thus there is no contradiction between them, because they do not refer the affirmation and negation to the same thing. For according to this it makes no difference to say "the tunic is white" than "man and horse are white" dividedly, so that the sense is that man is white and that horse is white. Therefore in this way this enunciation, "man and horse are white," would signify many things on account of diverse and explicit plural subjects. It is manifest that the first also signifies many things on account of many institutions of one name for signifying many things. For institution is principal in the signification of a noun, since a noun is a significant utterance by convention and not by nature. For by equal reason by which it signifies one, it signifies also the remaining one. Hence either it signifies both, or neither, or it signifies that which comes to be from the two; but it does not signify neither, nor what comes to be from both, because not some one thing comes to be from the two, namely man and horse; therefore it actually signifies both. On account of this, in these and in such equivocal things it is not necessary that this proposition, one part of a contradiction, be determinately true, and the other determinately false; but each is

doubtful. And, as we said, here we take contradiction broadly, insofar as contradiction consists in unity of voice and not of univocal signification; and this is what seems contradictory and is not.

But in those non-equivocal things which either are according to the present, or have been made according to the past, because they have no part of themselves in potency dependent on the future, as "man is," or "man was," or "man is not," or "man was not," if affirmation and negation are referred to the same thing, it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be determinately true or false. Nevertheless we call present or past-made things those which have no dependence on the future, as we have said, because if they have some dependence on the future, they simply are not, or have not simply been made, but are and have been made in a certain respect. But simply they are in potency and depend on the future, as those things which are present or have been made in the disposition of the stars, which still according to inferior causes and according to effect depend on the future, and in many ways, as Ptolemy says, can be impeded. The same is true of those things which are enunciated in a prophetic mode.

Therefore in such things which are and have been made, not having dependence on the future, it is necessary that one part be determinately true and the other false. In universal contradictories, indeed, universally, as when I say, "every man runs," "not every man runs"; "no man runs," "not no man runs." For in such things it is always necessary that this one be determinately true, and that one contradictorily opposed to it necessarily be determinately false. But in those things which are singular, it is also necessary that one be determinately true and the other false, as "Socrates runs," "Socrates does not run," as was already said before. But in these enunciations which are said or enunciated in universal subjects not universally distributed, as before we spoke in equivocal, it is not necessary that one be true, as was already immediately said about these.

### Marginal Labels - 416: Contradictories taken broadly are also in equivocal things.

## **Chapter IV. Whether In Future Singular Contingents There Is Determinate Truth.**

CHAPTER IV. Whether in future singular contingents there is determinate truth.

But in singular and future things there is not similarly determinate truth in one of the contradictories. For singulars which according to their own being and cause are future are contingent, and therefore they are related to either alternative, and neither of them is determinately true or false<sup>[1]</sup>. For if in such things every affirmation were determinately true or false, and they were necessary to be, it would follow that every singular and future contingent would have to be or not be; which is false, since a contingent can be and not be, that is, can be, and similarly can not be, because otherwise it would not be contingent. For let us posit that here someone says that something will be, while that man, or another, says that it will not be, or denies that it will be; this is said if it has been said through affirmation and negation. For it is manifest that one of these speaks truly; and thus it is manifest that one of these things is truly said, because either it will be or it will not be, through this principle which was proved in the fourth book of the First Philosophy<sup>[2]</sup>, that every affirmation or negation for the other part is true or false of anything, and that both, namely affirmation and negation, will never at the same time be true of anything. Hence in such contingent things affirmation and negation will not be contradictory and true at the same time. But this is proved by such an argument: for if it is true to say of something that it is white, or from the opposite, that it is not white, then it is necessary that one of those be true, namely that it is white or that it is not white, whichever it will have been true to say of it. And if it is necessary that one of those be true, namely that it is white or is not white, then one thing is true, either to affirm or to deny about it. For if it is white, white is truly affirmed of it. But if it is not white, then white is truly denied; because if it is not white, he who says that it is white lies, and if he lies by saying that it is white, then it is not white; on account of which it is necessary that either affirmation or negation be determinately true or false.

Therefore if on account of this it is necessary that affirmation or negation be determinately true or false about the future, then it follows that nothing comes to be by chance, and it follows that nothing comes to be as able to be either way. For if of two men one says or affirms that something will be, and the other denies that it will be, as a naval battle, it is necessary either that he who says or affirms that it will be is true in affirming, or that he who denies that it will be is true in denying that it will be, because both cannot be verified at the same time. For the thing itself is the cause of truth or falsity; and affirmative or negative saying does nothing toward this, that the thing happen thus or not thus. On account of saying or affirming, the thing will not have itself more thus or thus. And therefore, if in singulars and contingents concerning the future one part of the contradiction is necessarily and determinately true, whatever will happen, it is necessary that it happen and cannot not happen; and thus nothing will be by chance and nothing will be able to be either way.

Further, this same thing is proved from the thing itself in another way. For if about something it is true to say that now it is white, about the same thing, first before this now, it was true to say that this will be white, because every present thing, before it came, was future. For if it is granted that it was never future, it follows that the present time will never come in which it could be said of it that it is white. Therefore of any of those things which have been made in some present, always in every past time, which is before this now in which they have been made, it was always true to say of that thing that it is, or will be; because in the present in which it is or has been made, it is true to say of it that it is. But in the past which was before this present, it was true to say that it will be; therefore it is always true and was true to say that it is or will be. Thence it is argued further: because about whatever it is always true to say that it is or will be, that is related inevitably and immutably to being and becoming; but what is related inevitably and immutably to being and becoming cannot not be, and cannot not be future. And from this argument it is again argued further: because what cannot not be and what cannot not come to be, it is impossible for it not to be, and impossible for it not to come to be; and what is impossible not to be or impossible not to come to be, necessarily comes to be or necessarily is. Therefore all things which are future and will be in some present necessarily come to be. Therefore among those things which come to be or are in some present, nothing is related to either alternative, namely to coming to be and not coming to be, and nothing in such things comes to be by chance. For if it is granted that something of such things is by chance, and that it is related to either alternative, that is, to coming to be and not coming to be, it would follow that it was not from necessity; but it has been proved that it happens from necessity, if the other part of the contradiction is necessarily and determinately true.

But if someone, fleeing these inconveniences, wished to say that in such singulars and contingents about the future neither part of the contradiction is true, but both are false, as if it were said that a future contingent in singulars neither will be nor will not be, this is not fitting to say in any way; because from this several inconveniences follow, of which one, and the first and greatest, is that in contradictories according to this it will happen that the affirmation is false when also the negation opposed to it will be not true; and thus contradictories are both false, which is impossible. And conversely it also follows that when the negation in contradictories is false, the affirmation opposed to it is not true, but false; and thus the first principle of every demonstration is destroyed, which is that it does not happen that a contradiction is true or false at the same time.

Moreover, another argument is brought in: for if it is true to say of something that it is white and great, it must be both of those, because a copulative is not verified unless each part of it is true. Therefore if it is true to say of something that tomorrow it will be white and great, each of those must come to be tomorrow. But if it is said that neither of them will be tomorrow, and it is said that it will neither be tomorrow nor not be tomorrow, then it follows that it is not related to either alternative, because there will be neither negation nor affirmation. And let an example of this be given in a naval battle, which can take place tomorrow and can fail to take place: for it follows from this, that it is said that neither contradictory is true, but both are false,

because a naval battle tomorrow must, or must necessarily, neither take place nor not take place; which is false, because it is necessary that a naval battle tomorrow either take place or not take place.

Therefore the inconveniences which follow or occur from this, that in singulars and contingents about the future one part is determinately and necessarily true, are these which have been stated; for these inconveniences follow if it is said that, of every affirmation and negation, whether in these contradictories which are said by the opposition of contradiction in universal subjects taken universally, or in those singular things which are taken by the opposition of contradiction, it is necessary that of the opposed enunciations in contradiction this one be determinately true, while the other must necessarily be determinately false. But if it were so, in those things which come to be nothing would be related to either alternative, both what could come to be and what could not come to be; but according to these, all things which come to be or are either would be and would come to be from necessity.

## Notes

[1] He said "which according to their own being and cause are future" in order to exclude singular necessary and impossible things, of which one contradictory is determinately true and the remaining one false; yet St. Thomas says that Aristotle, speaking of singulars, therefore did not make mention of contingent matter, because all know that it is the matter which belongs to singulars; indeed, according to Alexander and Porphyry, through singulars he gave contingents to be understood. Jammy. (*Dixit quae secundum suum esse et causam futura sunt ad excludendum singulares, necessarias et impossibiles, quarum altera contradictoria est determinate vera et reliqua falsa: dicit tamen S. Thomas quod Aristoteles loquens de singularibus, ideo non fecit mentionem de materia contingenti, quia omnes sciunt illam esse materiam quae convenit singularibus; imo, secundum Alexandrum et Porphyrium, per singulalia dedit intelligere contingentia. JAMMY.*)

[2] Text, commentary 19. (*Tex. com. 19.*)

## Chapter V. On The Inconveniences Which Follow On The Part Of Those Things Of Which We Are The Cause.

CHAPTER V. On the inconveniences which follow on the part of those things of which we are the cause.

Moreover, concerning those things of which we are the cause, it is shown that it is not necessary that this or that one of the contradictories in contingents be true or false: for if all things either will be from necessity or will not be from necessity, then it is not fitting for us to deliberate about anything, because counsel, as Aristotle says in the Ethics<sup>[1]</sup>, concerns operations possible through us to come to be otherwise.

Moreover, if it were so as has been said, it would not be fitting for us to be occupied in acquiring anything for ourselves; for we are not occupied about anything unless it is possible for us to have it, and unless we can also not have it. To what end, then, would we deliberate or be occupied? Because if we deliberate or are occupied, one of the contradictories will be necessary. And if we do not deliberate and are not occupied, nonetheless what is future will still be necessary. For nothing prevents saying that some things will be future, or will not be future, either in a future near future, or in a remote one, as in the thousandth year.

And then from the things said it follows that either one of those which are the parts of a contradiction will be from necessity, whatever that was about which it was true to say in the past that it will be or that it will not be. Therefore if it will be, then it will be of necessity. But if it will not be, it will not be of necessity. For then in saying things and putting forth contradictory things by voice there is no difference, namely whether someone says an affirmation or negation, or has not said it; for because of saying, nothing will happen in the thing. But it is manifest that in the thing itself and in the causes of things it is so, either that it comes to be or that it does not come to be; hence it is in the thing itself and not in this, that one particular person has said or affirmed one of the contradictories, while another, contradicting him, has denied the same thing. For it will not be so because of a man's denying or affirming, as it is affirmed, nor will it not be so as it is denied; but, as we have said, to come to be or not to come to be in this way is prior in the very causes of contingent or necessary things.

Nor again is there a difference in this if the future is said to be in the thousandth year or in any part of time, great or small; because if one part will necessarily be determinately true, then after however much time it comes to be, it will always be true to say that it is of necessity. And if in every past time which is before it comes to be it has itself so that one of the contradictories is truly said to come to be, then it follows that that necessarily comes to be. But each of those things which has itself so, that before it comes to be it is true to say that it will be or will come to be; it follows that each thing which comes to be comes to be from necessity. For if it is so, then whenever someone says of something that it will be, it follows that it will be in such a way that it cannot fail to come to be, if this is determinately future; for concerning what has already now been made, in every past time which was before it came to be it was always true to say that this will be, and it was false to say that this will not be.

But if these inconveniences which have been introduced

are not possible, it follows that it is impossible in future contingents for the one part of a contradiction to be true of necessity; but if it will be contingent, it will be and will be able not to be. But that everything which happens contingently is able not to happen is proved from us: for many contingent things are operable through us, and we are their principle and cause. This is proved from the fact that we deliberate about such things, in what way they may come about more usefully; we would not do this if they could not happen otherwise. It is also proved from the fact that we do such things through will; will is not a principle having itself in one way. For what someone wills, he can not will, and what he does through will, he can not do.

Moreover, the same thing is proved otherwise by a general argument. For altogether or universally, in those things which are not always actually, neither in themselves nor in their causes is it always so that it is possible for them to be and possible for them not to be, as one may see in all things in which each is contingent, namely being and not being. But in such things it also happens that it is possible for them to come to be and possible for them not to come to be; and also in sense there are manifest to us many singulars which have themselves thus, as this, that it is possible for this given garment to be cut violently, and nevertheless it can be that it will not be cut; for it is possible that it be worn away by use and consumed by age and not cut. Likewise it is possible that this garment not be cut; for it would not be possible that it be worn away or consumed by use and age unless it were possible that it not be cut. On account of this also in other futures which are said according to potency toward being and toward not being, it is so that such things are possible to be and possible not to be. Since therefore there are many such things, it is manifest that not all contradictories in singulars and about the future happen by necessity in such a way that one of them is future by necessity; but some indeed are related to either alternative, namely being and not being, and in such things the affirmation is not more than the negation. But other contingent things are certain things which are more related to one than to the remaining one, so that one happens more and in more cases, while the other happens least or in fewer cases; nevertheless each of those is contingent, to come to be and not to come to be, and neither is of necessity.

## Notes

[1] Aristotle, in Book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 6. (*ARISTOTELES, In 3 Ethic. cap. 6.*)

## Chapter VI. On The Determination Of The Doubt Introduced.

CHAPTER VI. On the determination of the doubt introduced.

For the determination of all the things which have been introduced, it must be noted beforehand that necessity is twofold. One is the necessity of the thing, by which the thing is necessary in itself, in that it has a standing and necessary cause. The other is the necessity of position, which is from some determination. And an example of this is that the being which is, when it is, is necessary, as it is necessary that Socrates sit when he sits. And similarly it is in negation: that which is not, when it is not, is necessary not to be, as Socrates not

sitting when he does not sit. Yet not on account of that necessity is everything which is necessary to be simply; nor is everything which is not necessary simply not to be according to the necessity which is the necessity of the thing itself and absolute. For these two are not the same, namely that what is, when it is, is necessary, and similarly that something is of necessity. And similarly it has itself in what is not, because that which is not, when it is not, is necessarily not to be is not the same as that something not being is necessarily not to be.

In the same way and similarly in contradiction: for under disjunction one of the contradictories is necessary to be, and under disjunction one is necessary not to be; but it is not determinately necessary that this one or that one be or come to be, but each is and comes to be contingently.

Hence when it is said that it is necessary that one of the contradictories be, if the necessity is referred to the disjunction indeterminately, what is said is true<sup>[1]</sup>. But if it is referred to the disjuncts determinately, then what is said is false. Hence every contradictory must necessarily be or not be under an indeterminate disjunction. It is similar in what has been done, because it is necessary that it will be or will not be under an indeterminate disjunction. Yet on account of this, by dividing the disjuncts, it does not happen that one can say that one determinate thing must necessarily come to be or be future. An example of this is that "a naval battle will be tomorrow" or "a naval battle will not be tomorrow" is necessary under a determinate disjunction. Yet on account of this the disjuncts are not determinately necessary; for it is not necessary that a naval battle be tomorrow, nor again is it necessary that a naval battle not be tomorrow.

Since therefore speeches are true in the same way as things are, because in that a thing is or is not, speech is said to be true or false, and thus speeches are related to necessity and contingency as things also are. And from this it is concluded that whatever things have themselves so that they are toward either alternative, that is, that their contraries or opposites can or are able to happen concerning those things, if contradictory speeches or enunciations are made, it is necessary that the contradictories have themselves similarly as the things, that is, that each of them, taken determinately, can be and can not be. But this happens in contingent matter only; for these are such that they neither always are nor always are not, but sometimes are and sometimes are not, because they are in potency or possible toward either alternative. For in such things it is necessary under an indeterminate disjunction that one part be false and the other true. For determinately this one is not false, nor that one which is opposed to it, because each can happen; but both are toward either alternative, that is, having themselves toward being and not being. And it can be in such things at some time, and indeed it happens in such things at some time, that one part of the contradiction is true in more cases than another; nevertheless from this it does not follow that it is determinately true according to act, but that it can be true. But from all the things which have been said it is manifest that it is not necessary that all affirmations and negations of opposed contradictories have themselves so that one is determinately true and the other determinately false. For it does not have itself so in those things which are, nor in those things which are not, which are possible to be and not to be; but in these there is necessity of the disjunction and not of the disjuncts, and in these it has itself as has been said.

### Marginal Labels - 421: Twofold necessity: of supposition, absolute.

## Notes

[1] He wishes to say that, in contradictories, it is necessary that one be true by necessity of the disjunction, and not by necessity of the disjuncts, as he says at the end of this chapter. (*Vult dicere quod, in contradictoriis, necesse est alterum esse verum necessitate disjunctionis, et non necessitate disjunctorum, ut dicit in fine hujus capituli.*)

## Chapter VII. On The Solution Of Doubtful Points Which Are Around The Foregoing.

CHAPTER VII. On the solution of doubtful points which are around the foregoing.

Around those things which have been said there are many sophistical doubts, some indeed making for the proposed point, but they cannot be solved from the principles of this science. For the sophists object, saying that this is per se: future contingents are future. But if it is per se, it can be modified by the mode of necessity, so that it is said: future contingents are necessarily future, and thus contingents will happen necessarily. But to this it must be said that when it is said, "future contingents are future," this is not per se unless future contingents are taken formally, namely insofar as they are under the form of futurity, because then the future is of necessity future, and in this way it receives the mode of necessity, and thus the argument proceeds. But if it stands materially for those things which are future and contingent, then they happen contingently and do not receive the mode of necessity. Yet some speak otherwise, that future contingents happen of necessity in the mode in which they are future, that is, contingently; and thus it is necessary that this or that happen, but not that one determinate thing happen necessarily, as was said before.

Nevertheless they still object concerning singular and future things in this way: Antichrist will be or will not be necessarily; therefore either he will be necessarily, or he will not be necessarily. But to this it has already been said that when it is said, "Antichrist will be or will not be necessarily," there can be necessity of the disjunction conjointly, and thus it is true; or necessity of the disjuncts separately, and thus it is false.

Some still object that an enunciation about the past is not true, because as the thing is related to being, so it is related to truth. But the past is not, but has gone away into non-being. Therefore it cannot be true. Moreover they ask how the past verb is determinate and not the future, since neither of them is. To this it must be said that although the past according to itself has passed away, nevertheless it has not passed away from its pastness; and thus it belongs to enunciation; and in this way what is about the past is determinately true. To the other it must be said that it is not similar concerning the past and the future, because the future never was; and therefore neither in itself nor in its futurity is it determinate. But the past at least in its pastness is determinate.

Some also ask here about the necessity of the order of causes, about fate, about fortune, about counsel, about chance, about the certitude of divine providence in singular and voluntary contingents. But to ask about these here is foolish, because those questions cannot be determined from the principles of this science, since logic proceeds from common things which are found in many or in all; but they wish those things to be determined from proper principles.

Therefore now all the things have been said which pertain to the constitution and substance of enunciation in the first book, both definitively and divisively; and the species of enunciation which are its substantial parts have been determined. For it has been said what one and many enunciation are, and what simple and composite enunciation are, and what affirmative and negative enunciation are, and what is one by conjunction and what enunciations are unconjoined. And because accidents contribute a great part toward knowing what a thing is, therefore it has also been determined concerning the proper attribute of the species and parts of enunciation, that is, concerning opposition according to every mode of opposition which can occur to enunciation. But all these things pertain to the perfect constitution of enunciation according to substance and to that which most nearly follows substance. Yet there are certain things which belong to enunciation not from species or substance, but from the comparison of oppositions to each other, or from the multiplication of opposition itself, such as the consequence of one to another. And these we will determine under the beginning of the other book. Therefore let these things said by us about the constitution of enunciation suffice for the present intention.

### Marginal Labels - 422: Objection. - 422: Solution. - 423: Another solution. - 423: Objection. - 423: Solution. - 423: Another objection. - 423: Second objection. - 423: Solution of the first. - 423: Solution of the second. - 423: Epilogue of the first book.

**Book II Perihermenias. Treatise I. On The Consequences Of Enunciations About Being-In. Chapter I. In What Way Enunciations About Being-In Are To Be Taken, Among Which There Is Consequence, Which Are One, And In Which Is Is Adjacent As Second.**

BOOK II PERIHERMENIAS.

TREATISE I. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENUNCIATIONS ABOUT BEING-IN.

CHAPTER I. In what way enunciations about being-in are to be taken, among which there is consequence, which are one, and in which "is" is adjacent as second.

Now that all things have been determined which pertain to the constitution of enunciation, both elementally, as noun and verb, and formally, as speech; and also those things have been determined which pertain to its division, because division is made into formal parts, which is through differences coming forth from the genus, as one and many enunciation, and simple and composite enunciation, and affirmative and negative enunciation; and opposition has also been determined, which is the attribute immediately following the quality of the species of enunciation, because it comes from affirmation and negation, since knowledge of such accidents greatly helps toward knowledge of what a thing is, because the proper attribute flows from the essential principles of the species: now, under the beginning of the other book, concerning the consequences of enunciations. For since consequence does not follow enunciation insofar as it is enunciation taken in the genus, nor does it follow the species of enunciation insofar as they are considered in species, but follows enunciation through some addition made to the subject or to the predicate, either of a negation infinitizing the subject or predicate, or of a case, that is, of some oblique term which is placed in the predicate or in the subject; or through the addition of something which makes one subject many, or makes one predicate many; or through the addition of a mode, namely possible, or contingent, or necessary, or impossible; all these diminish the account of the first or simple and most perfect enunciation. For from all these the mode of opposition is multiplied in enunciations and equivalence is multiplied in them, and from these consequence is multiplied, when the things which have been said are multiplied by indefinite, universal, particular, and singular. And because consequence thus does not occur to enunciation in the genus or in the species as such, therefore consequence did not have to be determined in the same book with the constitution of enunciation. Yet because it follows enunciation varied by some addition to those things which constitute enunciation, therefore consequence must be treated in the same science in which enunciation is determined, under the beginning of the other book.

Therefore, treating of the consequences of enunciation, we will first determine the consequences of those enunciations which are about being-in. And in these this is the order: first one must treat those in which a predicate is said of one subject, before those in which either one predicate is said of several subjects, or in which several predicates are said of one subject. Moreover those in which one predicate is said of one subject are taken in two ways. For there are those in which the simple verb "is" is the mark of composition; and there are those in which there is another verb, namely "runs" or "walks." And because this verb "is" is as the root of all verbs, one must first speak about the consequences of enunciations in which this verb "is" makes diversity, before those in which another verb is the cause of diversity. Moreover there is diversity in enunciations in which this verb "is" makes diversity, because this verb "is" sometimes is adjacent as second and sometimes is adjacent as third. And therefore first the enunciations must be taken in which this verb "is" is adjacent as second, because those are simpler than all and prior. And because the matter is not difficult, but is intricate, to treat about these, therefore as far as possible we will aim at ease and order, so that those things may be treated easily and in order.

Therefore, beginning, we say that affirmation or affirmative enunciation which is one and simple is signifying some one predicate about some one subject. But this subject is a finite and direct noun, or an

innominable as an infinite noun, which we call innominable because it names nothing. For Boethius says: if I say "man," I establish a thing; but if I say "non-man," I take away the establishment and posit nothing of beings or non-beings. On account of this we call an infinite noun innominable. Therefore the subject of such an enunciation is varied into two, namely into noun and innominable. But the predicate cannot be varied, because this verb "is" is the predicate in such cases, and it cannot be infinitized, as is clear through what was said before. For it signifies a certain infinite composition, which cannot be understood without things composed, and the infinite cannot be infinitized. Therefore, when the subject has been varied through finite and infinite in such an enunciation in which "is" is adjacent as second in affirmation or in affirmative enunciation, one simple predicate must be said of one subject.

But in the preceding parts of the preceding book it was said what a noun is and what an innominable is. For according to the intention of the logician I do not call "non-man" a noun; nor nevertheless does it fall into another part of speech, but it is called an infinite noun, which is a noun in a certain respect, because it signifies substance with quality; but it does not have the perfection of a noun, namely that it signify and interpret what that quality is by which the substance of the noun has to be determined. And because it takes away the finite quality which in man is humanity, and posits none, therefore it does not interpret and signify substance except as infinite, whose quality is infinity itself. But such a quality suffices for this, that it be a noun according to the intention of the grammarian, who considers modes more than things. For in this way an infinite noun signifies that which is in some way one; and such unity suffices for the unity of the subject in a proposition or in one enunciation. But I speak similarly about an infinite verb, such as "does not run," which indeed is not a verb according to the intention of the logician, and nevertheless does not fall into another part of speech; and therefore it is called an infinite verb. Therefore from the fact that the subject is thus varied through finite and infinite, it follows that every enunciation generally is either from finite noun and verb, or from infinite noun and finite verb.

For an infinite verb, as was said a while ago, cannot be infinite in speech<sup>[1]</sup>. And the cause of this is that, when the thing of the verb has been taken away by an infinitizing negation, nothing remains except the root of the verb, which is "is"<sup>[2]</sup>. And this is the mark of infinite composition, which cannot be understood without composed things; on account of this it would affirm nothing in such cases. And negation cannot be made to it, because it says nothing except the reflection of the verb to the subject; if this were denied, the verb would not be a verb, nor could it be a predicate, and enunciation would be destroyed. And therefore when an infinite verb is placed in speech, the negation must be referred to the composition and deny that the thing of the predicate belongs to the subject; and thus an infinitizing negation is made. Therefore every enunciation is either from a noun and a verb, or from an infinite noun and a verb.

But apart from a verb there can be no affirmative or negative enunciation. But in the first enunciations this verb "is," or this verb "was," or this verb "will be," as some say, are in potency in the present, and determine their own pastness or futurity to the present. And other verbs of this sort do similarly; and therefore those are in potency to compose the enunciation itself, because from their own proper signification they consignify the time in which the predicate belongs to the subject.

Therefore, according to these things which have been said, the first of all enunciations is affirmation and negation, namely "man is," "man is not"; and so they should be ordered: "man is," "man is not." For those opposed enunciations are simpler than all, and therefore prior to all. Then there are those which are about an infinite subject, as "non-man is," "non-man is not," and so they should be ordered according to the propriety of Latin speech: "non-man is," "non-man is not." But after those are the ones which have a greater addition, as those which are about a universal universally taken, as "every man is," "not every man is," and so they should be ordered: "every man is," "every man is not"; and the same taken of an infinite subject, so that I may say, "every non-man is," and "not every non-man is," which should be ordered thus: "every non-man is," "every non-man is not." And there is a similar variation according to past and future, which are times

extrinsic to the present now, because one precedes it and the other follows it.

But we do not make a variation from the particular sign<sup>[2]</sup>, because it adds nothing beyond the indefinite term except a certain vague relation of the universal to the particular, which the indefinite universal also brings in indeterminately. But the universal sign posits distribution for all universals and posits a certain form around the universal which the universal does not have from itself. Therefore these are the first four enunciations: "man is," "man is not," "non-man is," "non-man is not." If these four are multiplied by indefinite, particular, universal, and singular, they make sixteen, which are these: "man is," "man is not"; "non-man is," "non-man is not"; "every man is," "every man is not"; "every non-man is," "every non-man is not"; "some man is," "some man is not"; "some non-man is," "some non-man is not"; "Socrates is," "Socrates is not"; "non-Socrates is," "non-Socrates is not." For four indefinites, and four universals, and four particulars, and four singulars make sixteen in the whole. For although the particular adds nothing beyond the indefinite except what has been said, nevertheless it varies opposition, and consequently also varies consequence. Therefore these are first of all, in which this verb "is" is the predicate adjacent as second.

But in all these it is easy to notice that from an affirmative with a definite subject follows a negative with an infinite subject, and conversely from a negative with an infinite subject follows an affirmative with a finite subject, both in indefinites and in universals, and also in particulars and singulars. Therefore these things about simple enunciations about being-in, in which this verb "is" is the predicate adjacent as second, and about their consequences, have been said and let them suffice.

### Marginal Labels - 426: The order of things to be said, the cause of the order.

#### Notes

[1] Yet note, lest there be a contradiction between these things and what was said in the preceding book, that he understands here that a verb cannot be infinitized in speech with an infinitization distinct from negation, that is, so that it is infinitized in such a way that it is not denied. Jammy. (*Nota tamen, ne sit contradictio inter haec et dicta in praecedenti libro, quod intelligit hic verbum non posse infinitari in oratione infinitatione distincta a negatione, hoc est, quod ita infinitetur quod non negetur. JAMMY.*)

[2] He was silent about particulars and singulars, as St. Thomas says, because in them every difference cannot be found both on the part of quality and on the part of quantity. (*Tacuit de particularibus et de singularibus, ut inquit S. Thomas, quia in eis non potest inveniri omnis differentia et ex parte qualitatis et ex parte quantitatis.*)

## Chapter II. On The Multiplication And Consequence Of Enunciations In Which Is Is Adjacent As Third.

CHAPTER II. On the multiplication and consequence of enunciations in which "is" is adjacent as third.

When this verb "is" is the predicate adjacent as third, oppositions are said to be made in two ways: either because they are made on the part of subject and predicate, finite or infinite; or because they are made twice as many, because eight are made, namely when those first ones were only four. But attend that this verb "is" is said to be adjacent as third in a proposition in which this verb "is" is not the predicate, that is, the thing predicated, but is only the mark of the composition of the predicate with the subject, as when it is said, "man is white." And then it is called adjacent as third not in order, but in number, for in order it is adjacent as second. But because things capable of conjunction are before their conjunction, and things capable of composition before composition, since composition cannot be understood without composed things, speaking in this way this verb "is," since it is the mark of composition which cannot be understood without composed things, is also adjacent as third in order. Therefore, declaring by example, I say that in the aforesaid way double oppositions are made, as "just man is." In this affirmation the mark or verb predicated of the subject is adjacent as third. Hence the mark of composition is one of three. And when it is made so, the first oppositions must be four, of which any two have themselves to each other according to consequence with respect to affirmation and negation, but two have themselves least of all according to consequence<sup>[1]</sup>.

But they have themselves to consequence as privative propositions. Now we call privative propositions such as "unjust," which is privative and not infinite. But I say this by explaining: because this verb "is" will be adjacent either to the finite predicate which is "just," or to the infinite predicate which is "non-just." And if affirmations in this way are four, it follows that negations will also be four, and thus between affirmations and negations there are necessarily eight.

But what has been said we understand more easily from these arrangements of enunciations which are written below, so that we may say "is just man," which must be ordered thus: "man is just"; but the negation of this is "is not just man," or "man is not just." But another with an infinite predicate, which is "is non-just man," or this, "man is non-just," is an affirmative about an infinite predicate; for its negation is "is not non-just man," or "man is not non-just." For this verb "is," in such cases, is adjacent as third, and is adjacent as third to the finite predicate just and to non-just, which is an infinite predicate. Therefore all these have themselves as was said in the prior Analytics concerning propositions.

But all things have themselves in the same way as to finite and infinite predicate when the affirmation, that is, the affirmative enunciation, belongs to a universal noun; and I call it universal when it is taken universally through a distributive sign, as "every man is just," "not every man is just," which are opposed affirmation and negation about finite subject and predicate. "Every man is non-just," "not every man is non-just," are opposed through affirmation and negation about an infinite predicate. But in such cases it does not happen similarly as in the prior cases that angular propositions are true at the same time, as happens in the prior cases. Nevertheless it does sometimes happen that angulars are true at the same time.

Therefore those two which are "is just" and "is non-just" are opposed and make two oppositions and four opposites.

But the other two oppositions and four opposites have something added, or composition or conjunction, to "non-man," as to an infinite subject. But I say something added because an infinite subject is not properly a subject with which something can properly be composed; nevertheless it has a predicate added to it, so that what is composed with it makes the mode of enunciation and not a perfect enunciation. Such are, for example, "just is non-man," or "non-man is just"; and its negative, "just is not non-man," or "non-man is not just." Similarly, when an infinite predicate is said or not said to belong to an infinite subject through affirmation and negation, as when I say "non-just non-man is," or "non-man is non-just," which is affirmative, and its opposed negative is "non-just non-man is not," or "non-man is not non-just." Therefore these are eight, namely "man is just," "man is not just"; "man is non-just," "man is not non-just"; "non-man is just," "non-man is not just"; "non-man is non-just," "non-man is not non-just."

But more in number than these in which this verb "is" is adjacent as third are not opposed, or taken through the opposition of affirmation and negation, because there cannot be more. Therefore these in which this verb "is" is adjacent as third are outside those, that is, outside the number of those in which this verb "is" is adjacent as second; and those which are about finite subject or predicate are outside those which are about infinite subject and predicate, and they have other opposites and other consequences; and thus they are outside those which of themselves are perfect enunciations, as those which are about finite subject and predicate are. But they are outside them by the infinite noun which is in them, as "non-man" is. For with an infinite term an enunciation is not made which of itself is a perfect enunciation.

Take, therefore, those eight which are "man is just," "man is not just"; "non-man is just," "non-man is not just"; "man is non-just," "man is not non-just"; "non-man is non-just," "non-man is not non-just," and multiply by these four, indefinite, universal sign, particular, and singular, so that each of the introduced affirmatives and negatives is taken indefinitely, and each universally, and each particularly, and each singularly; and there will be four times eight, namely indefinite ones, four affirmative and four negative, and eight universals in the same way, and in the same way eight particulars, and likewise eight singulars; and

there will be thirty-two in the whole, because four times eight make thirty-two, which with the sixteen introduced before in which this verb "is" is predicated as adjacent as second make forty-eight enunciations about being-in, and there cannot be more. But they must be arranged so that each opposed negative stands directly and in the same line against its own affirmative, so that such a figure is made, because through this what is said becomes more intelligible when it is demonstrated to the eye. Therefore let them be arranged thus:

Man is. Man is not. Non-man is. Non-man is not. Every man is. Every man is not. Every non-man is. Every non-man is not. Some man is. Some man is not. Some non-man is. Some non-man is not. Socrates is. Socrates is not. Non-Socrates is. Non-Socrates is not. Some man is just. Some man is not just. Some non-man is just. Some non-man is not just. Some man is non-just. Some man is not non-just. Some non-man is non-just. Some non-man is not non-just. Socrates is just. Socrates is not just. Non-Socrates is just. Non-Socrates is not just. Socrates is non-just. Socrates is not non-just. Non-Socrates is non-just. Non-Socrates is not non-just. Man is just. Man is not just. Non-man is just. Non-man is not just. Man is non-just. Man is not non-just. Non-man is non-just. Non-man is not non-just. Every man is just. Every man is not just. Every non-man is just. Every non-man is not just. Every man is non-just. Every man is not non-just. Every non-man is non-just. Every non-man is not non-just.

In these it happens that the angulars, that is, those directly opposed in the angles, are not always true at the same time. Nevertheless it sometimes happens; because in contingent matter particulars, which are subcontraries opposed angularly, are true at the same time, as "some man is just," "some man is not just."

But these things are evident, which follow each other and which do not, through the accounts of equivalences. For this, "man is just," follows this, "man is not non-just." And similarly that, "man is not just," follows this, "man is non-just." Because the negative about a finite predicate and the affirmative about an infinite predicate are equivalent, and one follows the other. Similarly that follows this and conversely, "every man is not non-just" and "every man is just"; and similarly that, "not every man is just," follows this, "some man is not just"; and similarly this, "not some man is just," follows this, "every man is not just," or "no man is just."

And thus it is easy to see in all the things introduced which things follow and to which things they follow, and which do not follow each other according to the accounts of equivalences. And this happens especially from the diverse position of negation, because, since negation is the form of enunciation not only informing it but also transmuting it, negation takes away that to which it is composed. And therefore when it is said, "non-man is just," this term man is here formally denied, and in this way non-man is no man, and not some man is no man. But when it is placed after, it does not deny what precedes, but denies the predicate from the parts of the subject, either universally or particularly; and therefore "every man does not run" is equivalent to that, "no man runs"; and so it is when it is said, "not some man runs," particularity is denied and universality is left; and therefore "not some man is just" is equivalent to this, "no man is just." And thus it is easy to see in all cases, once the position of negation has been considered.

Moreover, in such cases sometimes two negations are equivalent to one affirmation on account of the cause which we have stated, namely because negation is not only forming that upon which it falls, but also transmuting it; and therefore if it supervenes upon negation it takes it away; and because it cannot transmute except into the opposite, therefore it transmutes to the value of an affirmation, as this, "not every man does not run," is equivalent to this, "some man runs"; and this, "not some man does not run," is equivalent to this, "every man runs"; and so it is in all cases. Therefore let this have been said about the oppositions and consequences of enunciation about being-in, in which this verb "is" is adjacent as second or as third.

### Marginal Labels - 429: The number of all propositions about being-in is forty-eight. - 430: Rules of the moderns concerning equivalences, and the reasons for those rules.

## Notes

[1] Here he briefly extricates himself concerning the exposition of the words of the text, concerning which words Boethius and St. Thomas bring forward many expositions. (*Hic breviter se expedit circa expositionem verborum textus, super quae verba Boetius et S. Thomas multas afferunt expositiones.*)

### Chapter III. On Those Enunciations In Which This Verb Is Is Not Placed, But Another.

CHAPTER III. On those enunciations in which this verb "is" is not placed, but another.

But in those enunciations in which this verb "is" is not placed, but some other verb, as "runs," or "reads," or "walks," they make as many enunciations with respect to opposition and consequence, according to what has been said, if they are posited as was said, as if this verb "is" were added. This can be seen by example, if it is said, "every man runs," "not every man runs," which are to be ordered thus: "every man runs," "every man does not run"; and so with an infinite subject, "every non-man runs," "not every non-man runs"; and so they should be ordered, "every non-man runs," "every non-man does not run." Yet this variation ought not to be made except by placing an infinitizing negation with the universal which is in the subject; because, since it is of a finite and determinate form, it can be infinitized. But an infinitizing negation ought not to be placed with a universal distributive sign, or even with a particular sign, because those do not say determinate and finite qualities and forms, but things applicable to anything; and therefore, because they are not finite, they cannot be infinitized.

But if someone objects that a verb in speech cannot be infinite, as Boethius says, and thus that this variation cannot be on the part of the finite or infinite predicate, it must be said that this was not said, that so great a variation is made as in the things treated before, but that on the part of the finite and infinite subject it is similar in these and in those. Some say that if the verb is resolved into this verb "is" and into its participle, then these do the same in all respects as those. For "man runs" and that man is running are the same. Therefore it must be said that in these a variation is made so that negation, when it is infinitizing, is not referred to the sign but to the universal, because the distributive sign does not signify the universal which belongs to a circumscribed and finite form, but signifies universally, and the universal to which it is joined is distributed; and therefore it belongs to an infinite and circumscribed form, which cannot be infinitized.

Therefore in this way the plurality of enunciations about being-in, in which this verb "is" is adjacent as second or third, grows into forty-eight enunciations, of which sixteen are when this verb "is" is adjacent as second, and thirty-two when it is adjacent as third. These have opposition among themselves through affirmation and negation; and some follow upon others, because of the multiplication and position of negation, making diverse equivalences, as it is easy for anyone considering to see, if in the figure he sets opposite against opposite, and afterwards reduces what is opposed to one to the equivalence of the opposite of another. And from the fact that another verb is placed in the enunciation than this verb "is," there does not arise a new number of enunciations, or a new opposition, or a new consequence, which cannot easily be had from the foregoing. For propositions are easy to describe against one another, and to oppose the opposed ones to one another contrarily or subcontrarily or contradictorily, and to adapt equivalents to consequence by lines drawn from one to another in the arrangement or figure in which they are described.

And it must be known that from the position of an infinitizing negation with a distributive sign no variation of enunciations can be made, since the sign cannot be infinitized. Thus it is manifest when it is said, "man runs," "man does not run": these are subcontrary. And similarly when the same are posited with an infinite subject thus, "non-man runs," "non-man does not run": these also are subcontrary. Therefore these four indefinites do not differ from those which are universal and contrary except that those are distributive universally, and these are not universally distributed; and they do not differ from each other in this, that these are about a universal subject and those are not, because both those and these agree in this, that they are about

a subject which is universal.

From this it follows that those signs "every," "none," and whatever other such signs there are, do not signify a universal of a determinate and common form, but signify universally; and similarly particular signs signify particularly. In these enunciations which were introduced above, the distributive sign signifies nothing other than that universally about man or non-man, the one who enunciates either affirms or denies.

From this it also follows that the remaining things which vary enunciation, or opposition, or consequence, must be applied to those in which there is another verb than this verb "is," whatever are applied to those in which this verb "is" is placed as adjacent as third with subject and predicate. Therefore all things whatever which are applied around the oppositions and consequences of those which are with the verb "is," which is adjacent as third, are also in these in which another verb is placed than this verb "is."

But this is further proved by this, that the consequences are the same in those in which there is another verb and in those in which this verb "is" is placed. It is clear that a universal affirmation is contrary to a universal negation, as this which says that every animal is just is contrary to that which says that no animal is just. Concerning these it is manifest that they follow the law of contraries, because they will never be true at the same time, nor can they be together at the same time, that is, so that they are simultaneously in the same time. But those which are opposed are both particular, and therefore sometimes in contingent matter they can be true at the same time, as "some man is just," "some man is not just"; or "some animal is just," and "not every animal is just," because this, "not every animal is just," is equivalent to that, "some animal is not just." And in such things that which is "no man is just" follows that which is "man is non-just," and that which is "every man is non-just," because the negative and the affirmative about an opposite predicate are equivalent. But that which is "some man is just" follows that which is opposed to the preceding, namely this, "not every man is non-just"; for this is equivalent to that, "some man is just." Yet this consequence is in those things which are made with constancy of subject, namely that some man be or some animal<sup>[1]</sup>. But altogether the same opposites and contraries are also in those in which another verb is placed than this verb "is."

### Marginal Labels - 431: Objection. - 431: Solution. - 431: Otherwise.

#### Notes

[1] Note this limitation, because it is also of service to the rules placed in the preceding chapter. (*Nota hanc limitationem, quia deservit etiam regulis positus in praecedenti capitulo.*)

### **Chapter IV. On The Removal Of Errors Which Can Be Around The Things That Have Been Said.**

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Around those things which have been said there can be many errors. For from the fact that negation placed before or after makes a difference of opposition and consequence in universals and particulars and indefinites, one might also believe that similarly negation placed before or after would make a difference of opposition and consequence in singulars; but this is not true. For it is manifest that if in singulars someone who has been questioned can deny this about which he has been questioned, then he can also affirm the same thing about the same singular. An example of this is as if I say: Do you think Socrates is wise? And let the answer be no; by denying, it is immediately concluded by saying: Socrates is not wise; or therefore Socrates

### **Chapter IV (conclusion). On The Removal Of Errors Which Can Occur Concerning The Things That Have Been Said.**

not wise: and it is the same whether the negation is put before or put after.

But in universals that which is similarly said by the position of the negation is not true; for example, if I say, "Do you think every man is wise?" If then you answer, "no," and if then I infer and say, "Therefore every man is not wise," putting the negation after the distributed subject, I infer badly, because each is false, both that which says, "every man is wise," and that which says, "every man is not wise," since it is equivalent to this, "no man is wise." These are contraries and false together; and therefore it was not contradictorily opposed to that which the respondent says. But when the one asked whether man is wise says "no," he ought to have inferred, "therefore not every man is wise"; for this is contradictorily opposed to that, "every man is wise." And thus it is clear that the position of the negation in universals makes a diversity of opposition and consequence, and not in singulars.

There is also an error from the infinitization of negation, because someone could believe that infinitizing negations are true negations, and that propositions about an infinite subject or predicate are true negatives; and this is not true. For those finite and infinite words which are set over against each other according to infinite nouns or according to infinite verbs, as in that which is "non-man" or "non-just" (which are infinite nouns set over against this "man" and "just"), seem to be negations which are taken without noun and verb; and this leads into error. For they seem similar to negations, and yet they are not true negations simply. For in a contradiction a negation must always be true or false, and it is never true or false together with the affirmation. But one who says "non-man," through an infinite term, has said absolutely nothing by the word about man; rather, when "man" is said, something is posited, and when "non-man" is said, what has been said is taken away, and nothing is posited by the word. Therefore concerning man there was nothing more but less true, or wholly false of man, insofar as true is convertible with being and false with non-being, when true and false are in incomposites. And therefore negation is not in an infinite term unless something is added; for then a true affirmation or a true negation can be made, as when it is said, "non-man runs."

There could also be an error from the fact that it has been said that the proposition about an infinite predicate follows the negative about a finite predicate. For perhaps someone would think that also, from an infinite subject, an affirmative would follow a negative about a finite subject; and it is not so. For this, by which it is said, "every non-man is just," signifies the same in following or in equivalence as none of those which are negative about a finite subject; and similarly neither does the contradictorily opposed negation, which is "not every non-man is just," signify the same in consequence as any of those which are about a finite subject. And therefore that proposition about a finite subject does not signify the same in consequence as that proposition about a finite subject. And therefore consequence between an affirmative and a negative is not taken in the same way concerning finite and infinite subject as consequence is taken between those which are about an infinite predicate and a finite predicate. But the universal affirmative about both, namely with subject and predicate infinite, signifies the same as the universal negative about an infinite subject and a finite predicate; and therefore they follow one another: "every non-just thing is non-man," and "nothing just is non-man"; and so they must be ordered: "every non-man is non-just," and "no non-man is just." Therefore these two signify the same in consequence.

But because it was said above that transposition of negation varies opposition and consequence, someone could believe that transposed nouns and verbs would not make the same thing; this is not true. Therefore that error must be helped by saying that transposed nouns and verbs, taken according to themselves, signify the same thing according to opposition and consequence, as is clear in these: "white man is" and "there is a white man," which must be ordered thus: "man is white" and "the white is man." For if this is denied, and it is said that transposed nouns and verbs do not signify the same thing, an inconvenience follows, namely this, that there will be many negations of one and the same affirmation; and this is inconvenient, because in the preceding things it has been shown that of one affirmation there is one negation opposed by contradiction. For of the enunciation which is "there is a white man," the negation opposed by contradiction is this, namely, "there is not a white man," in which the same thing is denied of the same thing which was affirmed of the

same thing in the affirmative. But of the enunciation which is "man is white," in which the verb has been transposed, the negation is either the same as that which is "there is a white man," or another. If the same, then the proposed point is had, that transposed nouns and verbs signify the same thing in consequence and opposition. But if it is not the same, then I argue thus: because of that which is "man is white" (if it is not the same in consequence as that which is "there is a white man"), there must be another negation than that which negates this, "there is a white man." Therefore its negation is either that by which it is said, "there is not a non-man white," or that which is "man is not white." But this, "there is not a non-man white," is the negation of another proposition, which is "there is a non-man white," which is affirmative. But the other, which says "man is not white," is the negation of another enunciation, namely of that which says "man is white," and this follows upon this, "there is a white man." And thus of two affirmations there are two negations; and if these two are negations of one and the same, then it follows that two negations belong to one affirmation, which is inconvenient. Therefore it remains that these in consequence are one and the same, "there is a white man" and "man is white."

Therefore it is manifest that, when a noun or verb has been transposed, if nothing prevents it, there is the same affirmation and the same negation. And this is true as to the fact that they signify the same thing and have the same opposite and the same consequent, if nothing occurs there except transposition; for this, "the white is man," follows this, "man is white." But if from the construction of some words, when transposed, amphiboly, or composition, or division comes about, then there is not only transposition there; and then what is said is not true. Therefore let these things have been said about enunciations about being-in in which one predicate is said of one subject. From these, therefore, similar things are easily seen.

## **Chapter V. On The Consequence Of Enunciations In Which Many Things Are Said Of One Or One Thing Is Said Of Many.**

CHAPTER V. On the consequence of enunciations in which many things are said of one, or one thing is said of many.

But with these things held, one must determine concerning enunciations in which either many predicates are said of one subject, or one predicate is said of many subjects. For since there are four differences of enunciations according to these things, namely that one thing is said of one, or many of many, or many of one, or one of many, enough has already been said about those in which one thing is said of one. But those in which many things are said of many we omit here, because we intend only an enunciation which in some way is one. But that in which many things are said of many is in no way one; therefore it must not be treated. Since therefore it has already been treated concerning those in which one thing is said of one, it remains now to speak concerning those in which many things are said of one, or one thing is said of many.

Therefore let us say: if it is not to affirm or deny one thing of many, or many things of one, but always to affirm or deny many things of many, then such affirmation and negation is not one in any way, because it is not one on the part of the subject, nor is it one on the part of the predicate; and we do not intend such an enunciation here. But in such cases I call one not what is one only in voice, as in equivocal terms, as if one name has been imposed on many things, which nevertheless actually signifies many things and equally principally, from which many things no one thing comes to be through essence or through accident; as if I were to say, with interrupted pronouncing or utterance, "animal and tame and two-footed." For these, uttered in this way, do not make one enunciation, because each of them is signified as an act, and acts as acts constitute no one thing. But if they are pronounced continuously as act and potency, so that "two-footed tame animal" is said, from these one thing comes to be which is said by one name, which is man; that name does not signify many things, but one, because act and potency are one. And therefore I said "perhaps"<sup>[1]</sup>, because if this name, "man," had been imposed separately on animal and tame and two-footed as on acts, it would not have to be one in signifying, nor in supposing, nor in predicating. But when it is imposed on those things

which have been said as on potencies and act, then it stands for one, whether it is subject or predicate. From white and walking one subject does not come to be, because they do not make one thing according to substance or essence, nor one thing through accident; because although man and white and walking can be one subject according to the substance which underlies each, nevertheless in an enunciation "white man" and "walking man" do not have the true account of supposing or standing under the verb; and therefore white man is one subject, walking man another, and white walking thing another.

On account of this also, if someone affirms some true predicate of such a subject which is many, the affirmation will not on this account be one. But it is similar if, in the way stated, he predicates many things of one subject; for that enunciation is many in which one thing is predicated of many, or in which many things are predicated of one, or in which many things are predicated of many, as was determined in the prior book of this science. Therefore in such enunciations, which are not one but many, the voice indeed is one when the pronunciation is one and not interrupted; yet nevertheless the affirmations or negations are many. But that such an enunciation is many is clear from this: because if every dialectical interrogation is a request for a response, and in this way the opponent asks that a response be made to him by the way in which he interrogates, for he asks from the respondent an affirmative or negative proposition which is the other part of a contradiction<sup>[2]</sup>, then, if it is as has been said, that an affirmative proposition belongs only to one contradiction, because one proposition has only one contradictorily opposed proposition, there will not be one dialectical response to an interrogation of this sort which signifies many things, as was said, just as neither was there one interrogation. Although perhaps in the whole, or in those many things which are supposed or predicated, there may be one response, because such a response could be argued by sophists who must be guarded against. But in the dialectical Topics it has been said how one must interrogate and how one must respond about these things. But in the Topics on elenchi, because both sophistical arguments and elenchi are certain topical things, it has been said concerning an interrogation of many things as one.

It is also similarly clear that, because dialectical interrogation is a request for a response through the other part of a contradiction, whichever part the respondent chooses, there is no dialectical interrogation about the question "what is it?" as if someone asks, "What is animal through definition and substance?" But in a dialectical interrogation the respondent must, from any given dialectical interrogation, choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes. For in such an interrogation it is necessary that the interrogation determine whether man is the animal about which it asks, or not. But this is not permitted in the question "what is it?" in which the response of definition is determined<sup>[3]</sup>.

But from all the things introduced it is established that the many enunciation about which we intend here is that in which either many things are enunciated of one or one thing of many. For those enunciations have something of unity, and therefore we intend them for the present. Therefore let us ask about them whether the many things which are predicated compositely or conjointly of some one subject are predicated separately of the same common subject. But to determine this we should take what has already been determined, namely that certain things are predicated compositely of one subject which are so conjoined that the whole category or whole predicate comes to be from all those things either substantially or essentially, so that any of the things joined, taken separately outside the composition, of itself entails the subject when it is taken outside the composition. For if we ask in this way or enunciate that, of those things which are predicated conjointly, many of one subject, joined or composed, certain things are predicated separately of the whole composite, and certain things conjointly, things fitting together are not predicated separately of the whole, which are different in this way between these and those: as of man it is true to say that he is a two-footed animal; and again it is true to say outside the composition or separately that man is animal and that man is two-footed. And similarly of this whole conjoined thing which is two-footed animal, it is true to say that it is animal, because two-footed animal is animal. And again of this same thing it is true to say that it is two-footed, because two-footed animal is two-footed, with the predicate taken separately; and of man, who implicitly is

two-footed animal, it is true to say separately that he is animal and that he is two-footed. For these are predicated conjointly and uttered without interruption insofar as one thing is from them, or insofar as they themselves are one. Likewise when "white man" is said conjointly, white and man are predicated separately of this, because white man is white and white man is man. And these are also predicated as one thing in subject and one thing through accident, because white does not have the account of supposing or standing under except through the subject in which it is; and therefore this was one with the subject or in standing under, and the account of standing under is not multiplied in them, since they are not one through substance and essence.

But this is not similar in all cases. For if I say, "this man is a good lyre-player," these indeed are predicated conjointly of this man; and nevertheless the predication is not valid separately. For if I say, "this man is a good lyre-player," the predication is true if it is so in reality as is enunciated in the predication; nevertheless it does not follow, "this man is a good lyre-player; therefore this man is a lyre-player and this man is good." Nor does it also follow, "he is a lyre-player and is good; therefore he is a good lyre-player." For if it were granted that whenever one of two or more things is said conjointly of something, each of the two or each of the three things which are said conjointly is predicated separately of the same thing, many inconveniences follow. For first in such cases it follows that in many things useless repetition will be explicit: for of man, conjointly and separately, it is true to say both that he is man and that he is white. Therefore if each of these is true to say separately of the whole conjoined thing, then it is true to say of white man that he is man and that he is white, and thus white man is man; and this is to conjoin again, so that "white man man" is said. And of this conjoined thing it is again true to say separately that it is man; therefore man-man-white is man; therefore he is man, man-man-white. And it is similar concerning that which is white, because white man is white; and white will be said of this whole; therefore white-man-white is white; and this proceeds to infinity. And similarly if I say, "man is musical walking," which conjointly belong to man. And if of the whole conjoined thing those things which are conjoined are predicated separately, there will be useless repetition, and by repeating uselessly one will proceed to infinity. For these are both implicit or conjointly fitting the subject, because they are conjoined to the subject in act and in understanding and in voice. If they are again said of it separately, there will be explicit and expressed useless repetition.

Moreover, in substantial things from which one thing comes to be through substance, the same inconvenience follows if, of the whole conjoined thing, those things which compositely belong to the subject are predicated separately. For if, because Socrates separately is both man and two-footed, two-footed man also is man and two-footed, then two-footed man is man; and of this conjoined thing man is again predicated; and thus two-footed man is two-footed man-man; and by the same reason there will be two-footed man man man two-footed; and so by this manner one proceeds by useless repetition to infinity. Therefore it is manifest that many inconveniences happen if someone posits that a complex, that is, a composite predication, is made from those things which separately belong to the whole composite, as has already been shown in part.

But if the components are predicated separately of the composite, both in accidental predicates and in substantial predicates, this will further also be led back to implicit useless repetition. For if whatever things are predicated conjointly are also predicated separately, since we know that Socrates is both man separately and two-footed separately, according to this Socrates will be two-footed man conjointly; and of this whole conjoined thing both man and two-footed are predicated. Therefore Socrates the two-footed man will be man and will be two-footed; and again those will be said conjointly of Socrates the two-footed man. Therefore Socrates will be man-man two-footed-two-footed; and this will proceed to infinity as before. Moreover, in man, in act and in understanding, two-footed is present; therefore it is not necessary to add it, and if it is added, there will be useless repetition. For if it is said thus, "Socrates is man," through this which I say, "man," two-footed also is posited; and two-footed also is added. Therefore Socrates is two-footed two-footed

man. Likewise, as soon as Socrates is named, man is understood. For if I say, "Socrates man," it follows that Socrates is man-man, and so on to infinity. And know that Alfarabius posits this manner so, and it cannot be expounded otherwise so that what is placed here may be clearly true.

### Marginal Labels - 437: Exposition of Alfarabius.

Therefore whatever things are of the number of those which are predicated, or whatever things also are of the number of subjects of which those things are predicated, are such as are predicated of something according to accident; or they are such that one of them is predicated of the other according to accident. These, fitting separately, will not be one conjoined predicate: as if I say separately, "man is white" and "man is musical," there will not be the same composite predicate, musical and white, because those are accidents of the same thing, and conversely; and one of them is not as potency and the other as act, and therefore they do not make one conjoined predicate. Hence, although it is sometimes true to say that white is musical, that is, that some white thing is musical, nevertheless on account of this there will not be one conjoined predicate from these which are white and musical, as one thing comes to be from potency and act, as if "colored white" is said; for these, conjoined as act and potency, make one actual predicate.

From this it follows that neither were those things introduced above, when it is said "if he is a good lyre-player," simply one, that is, universally one predicate, since this which I say, "good," does not always state the goodness of the lyre-player; but when it is predicated simply without that to which it is joined and around which it posits the form of its goodness, it states the goodness of that of which it is predicated, as when it is said, "man is good," it states the goodness of man and not of the lyre-player. And therefore, if those things are predicated separately as conjointly, as when it is said, "good lyre-player man," so "lyre-player man" and "good man" would be said, then what I say, "good," would be varied according to equivocation. For good is said according to prior and posterior of moral good and of the good of a lyre-player, because, as Aristotle says, the virtue of a man in the good is one thing, and the virtue of a lyre-player another. Hence good and lyre-player are not one simply as act and potency, as animal and two-footed are one, if two-footed is posited as a constitutive difference which, with the genus, constitutes the species; because then two-footed animal is one conjoined predicate, as when it is said, "man is rational animal." For lyre-player and good are not related to one another in this way. Therefore accidental predication prevents things fitting separately from always being predicated conjointly. On account of this also, because to be man happens to animal, some say that it is well said, "Socrates is man and is animal"; nevertheless it is not said, "Socrates is man animal," useless repetition preventing it, because animal is supposed in man in act and in understanding; and therefore if he is man-animal, he will be man-animal-animal, and one proceeds by useless repetition to infinity. But because man is not supposed in animal in act and understanding, but only in potency, it is well said "Socrates is animal man," because they are related to each other as one substantial thing; for man states the act of that which is in potency in animal.

Moreover, further in such predicates which are many and composite, one must observe whether they are in something as in a subject through understanding or in voice or supposed in understanding. For then from the conjoined things it is not permitted to infer the divided thing; by this consideration useless repetition is avoided, because thus it does not follow that white is said frequently, nor man, nor anything else which is in something. This is as if I say of someone, as of Cicero, "white Cicero is white man." And if he is white man, and is man and is white, and I infer, "therefore white Cicero is white man, white man"; or if I say thus, "Cicero man is two-footed animal; therefore he is animal and is two-footed," and thus Cicero man is animal-animal two-footed. Therefore things fitting separately, with those things which are present in them, must not be composed; for in man, through understanding, both animal and two-footed are present and are actually supposed. Nevertheless sometimes it is true to say or predicate composite predicates of something, and also separately or simply without composition. For just as it is true to say that someone is man simply without composition, or just as it is true to say that someone who is white is a white man simply without

composition, so it is true to say that some white man is white, so that white is predicated of him separately as conjointly with man; for it follows well, "Cicero is a white man; therefore he is white."

But this is not always nor in all composite predicates true to say; for it is false whenever in the predicate there is opposition in the adjective, because the composite is joined to the predicate. For then the argument is not valid from the composite to the divided, as if I say, "this is a dead man," it does not follow, "therefore he is man and is dead," because this which I say, "dead," deprives the account of man simply, and thus is opposed to man. But when in such composite predicates there is not something of the things composed in the other component, from which contradiction or privation of the other follows, then it is true to infer separately the conjoined things. And indeed when the opposition is in the adjective with respect to the predicate, it is always false that one proceed from the conjoined composite to the divided. But when there is not opposition in the adjective, it is not always true that the divided is inferred from the composite. For if I say thus, "Homer is something as poet," or "Homer is poet," there is no opposition in the adjective of the predicate, because being as poet is not opposed to anything that is predicated of Homer. Nevertheless it does not follow, "Homer is something as poet; therefore he is something and is poet," because to be as poet happens to Homer; and therefore from such an accident being simply is not inferred, because to be as poet for Homer is to be in a qualified respect, and this does not infer being simply. Moreover, another more express example is posited, which is: "Homer lives as poet"; it does not follow, "therefore he lives," for to live as poet is to live in the memory of the poetry which he made.

But from these things which have been said it is taken that, in however many or whatever composite predicates in which there is no contrariety or in any way opposition in the adjective which is composed with the predicate, one must consider in such cases whether the definitions of those predicates are predicated of the subject and can be put in place of the names<sup>[4]</sup>. For if it is so, then those are predicated per se and substantially, and then from the composite predicate the divided can be inferred according to itself, because such things are not predicated according to accident. What simply is not cannot be concluded to be because of something opinionable in some way, as we said about Homer, who lives in opinion, that is, in the fame of human beings; for such opinion is an accident to Homer, and it does not belong to him that he is, if it belongs to Homer that he simply is not, but that he is something according to accident.

### Marginal Labels - 439: Note the rules when from divided things it is permitted to infer conjoined things, and when not.

Because before now many and diffuse things have been said about these matters, in all such predicates this teaching has been given by some, that one must consider in composite predicates which are two or many: either both will be substantial, or both accidental, or one substantial and the other accidental. And if both are substantial, either they are convertible with each other, or not. And if indeed they are convertible, from things fitting separately a conjoined predicate cannot be inferred, useless repetition preventing it, as if I say, "this is man and is risible; therefore he is man-risible." But if they are substantial and not convertible, then one is in more and another in less; and then one must consider that one of them in the composite predicate is ordered before the other. But if the more common is put first, and the more common is appended to it, then from things fitting separately the conjoined thing is well concluded, as "this is animal and is man; therefore this is animal man," because man is not conceived in the account of animal, but is appended in the predicate animal for determination. But if the less common, which includes in itself the more common, is put first, then from things fitting separately the conjoined thing is not inferred, useless repetition preventing it, as "this is man and is animal"; it does not follow, "therefore this is man-animal," because implicit useless repetition prevents it. But if both predicates are accidental, one ought to consider whether one belongs to the subject through the other or not. And if indeed one belongs through the other, then that which belongs through the other is of the account of that through which it belongs, and then from things fitting separately the conjoined thing is inferred, if in the conjoined predicate that through which the other belongs is put first, because it is more

common; as if I say, "this is colored and is white; therefore this is colored white." But if conversely the less common is put first, then it does not follow on account of useless repetition. But if both are accidental and one does not belong through the other, then the process from things fitting separately to the conjoined is never valid, as if I say, "this is white and is musical; therefore this is white musical." Let these things said about the consequence of enunciations which are about being-in suffice.

## Notes

[1] Compare Boethius, because he expounded the word "perhaps" otherwise. (*Cf. Boetium quia aliter exposuit ly fortasse.*)

[2] From this place it is gathered that the dialectician interrogates only one part of a contradiction. The contrary is found in Topics I, chapter 3, at the end. It is answered that if the dialectician interrogates by a dialectical proposition, then he interrogates only one thing explicitly; but if by a dialectical problem, then he interrogates many things explicitly. Jammy. (*Ex hoc loco colligitur quod dialecticus non interrogat nisi unam partem contradictionis. Contrarium habetur I Topic. cap. 3. in fine. Respondetur quod si dialecticus interrogat per propositionem dialecticam, tunc tantum unum interrogat explicite; si autem per problema dialecticum, tunc plura interrogat explicite. JAMMY.*)

[3] On the contrary: definition is a dialectical predicate, as is clear in the first book of the Topics. Therefore the dialectician interrogates through "what it is." Compare John the Grammarian and Themistius, On the second book of the Posterior Analytics, around the beginning, for the solution of this. (*Contra: Diffinitio est praedicatum dialecticum, ut patet primo Topic. Ergo dialecticus interrogat per quid est. Cf. Joannem Grammaticum et Themistium, 2 Posteriorum, circa principium pro solutione hujus.*)

[4] He said "if definitions are put in place of names," just as Boethius says, so that he might give a way of knowing opposition in the adjective, if it were hidden; and it is a rule of Topics I according to D. Albert. But he said this so that he might restrict his rule to essential predicates; but such are predicates in place of which it is permitted to put their definitions. Jammy. (*Dixit si diffinitiones pro nominibus ponantur, quemadmodum dicit Boetius, ut daret modum cognoscendi oppositionem in adjecto, si esset occulta: et est regula I Topic. secundum D. Albertum. Dixit autem hoc ut restringeret regulam suam ad praedicata essentialia; talia autem sunt praedicata loco quarum licet ponere suas diffinitiones. JAMMY.*)

## Treatise II. On The Consequence Of Modals. Chapter I. What Modal Enunciations Are.

### TREATISE II. ON THE CONSEQUENCE OF MODALS.

#### CHAPTER I. What modal enunciations are.

After the consequences of enunciations about being-in, which are simpler, one must treat modal enunciations, which are called modal from the addition of some mode. And therefore first one must see what mode makes a proposition modal, and how many such modes there are, and of what they are modes, namely of the predicate, or of the subject, or of the composition; and what the predicate is in a modal enunciation, and what the subject is in it, and other things of this sort, because without these there cannot be an opposition of modals or a consequence.

### Marginal Labels - 440: First doubt. - 440: Second. - 440: Third. - 440: Fourth.

Therefore let us say that a modal enunciation is said in two ways, namely from the mode of composition and from the mode of the thing predicated. But from the mode of the thing predicated, as when it is said, "Socrates reads well" or "loftily" or "badly"; and this mode, because it does not modify the whole enunciation but only the thing of the predicate, cannot make the whole enunciation modal. But a mode of composition is that which is a special mode disposing and placing composition in a special form, as possible, contingent, necessary, and impossible, true and false. And these special modes specially constitute that enunciation which is specially called modal. For the first four of those modes extend composition, which consignifies time, beyond the present time. For possible and contingent extend the present to the future, and to being, and to not-being, because the contingent is future and can be and not be. But necessary and impossible extend composition to all time, because necessary and impossible posit composition in every time; and therefore those are special modes making the whole enunciation modal: necessary, simply, to belong at every time, and impossible, simply, never to belong. And because such modes are modes of

composition, and composition formally surrounds the things composed and is the principle of understanding them according as they stand under composition, and thus the mode of composition is the mode of the whole enunciation, therefore those modes modify the whole enunciation and make the whole modal. But true and false, although they are modes determining composition, nevertheless, because they do not extend composition according to time nor form composition into some special mode, but state the general mode of those about being-in, therefore they are not special modes, but are certain modes making a proposition modal only in a qualified respect. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is said to be true or false; but not from the fact that a thing is or is not is speech said to be possible or contingent, necessary or impossible. Rather, from the fact that the thing is related in this way or that way to its cause, in this the speech formed or composed about the thing is possible or contingent, or about the necessary or about the impossible. And therefore these four modes, possible, contingent, necessary, and impossible, are the special modes by which an enunciation is called modal.

### Marginal Labels - 440: To the first and third.

From this it is also taken that negation which is brought to composition does not make a modal enunciation, because it does not extend it according to time, nor even inform it with a special mode, but simply divides it in the form in which it is signified. From these things, therefore, it is clear that modal enunciation is said in two ways, namely generally and specially. And generally indeed it is called modal from mode taken generally, whether it is a mode of the predicate or of the composition. But specially it is called modal in the four modes which have been stated, because denomination is made from species and not from genus. From this, moreover, it is further clear that modal enunciation differs substantially and through its constituents from a simple enunciation about being-in, because mode is substantial to a modal enunciation and is a substantial constitutive thing.

### Marginal Labels - 441: To the second.

But there are four such modes, because in composition there is nothing except being. But that which says being either says being mixed with potency, or what is in perfect act. If in the first way, then it is possible or contingent being. And these two differ in this, that possible determines being according to itself, but contingent does so in comparison to a non-standing cause; whence non-standing being is possible, but contingent is that which does not have a standing cause. But if it is being perfected according to act, either it is taken in being itself, and thus it is necessary, or it is taken in not-being itself, which is opposed to being simply, and thus it is impossible. But contingent and possible cannot be taken according to the division of being and not-being, because each says being mixed with not-being. Therefore those are the modal modes making an enunciation, and making the modal enunciation differ from an enunciation about being-in, and the opposition of a modal from the opposition of that which is about being-in, and its consequence from the consequence which is in those about being-in.

But if it is asked what the predicate is in a modal enunciation, we say with Boethius and Alfarabius that the mode is the predicate in being-in, and being or not-being are subjects, as is clear when it is said, "that Socrates runs is possible," because the accusative case with the infinitive renders the suppositum for this verb "is"<sup>[1]</sup>.

### Marginal Labels - 441: Objection.

But if it is objected against this that mode is a determination of composition, while the predicate is one of the things composed, and therefore it cannot be the determination of composition: it must be said that in a modal proposition there is a twofold composition, namely one composition of the dictum which is subjected. For, as Aristotle says, to say "Socrates walking" is nothing other than to say "Socrates being walking"; and thus being and not-being, with composition, are subjected in a modal enunciation, and the mode is the determination of that composition, and not of the composition which is the composition of the enunciation.

And therefore it can be both the determination of the composition of the dictum and the predicate of the enunciation.

### Marginal Labels - 441: Solution. - 441: Objection.

And if it is said that the predicate is not a determination of composition, Alexander answers to this that it is true when the predicate is predicated as being and not as a mode, as "runs" when it is said, "man runs," or as "white" when it is said, "man is white." But in a modal enunciation, because a substance in which the predicate inheres is not subjected, but the dictum with its composition is subjected, the predicate mode is predicated not as being, because this says the predicate of the dictum, but it is predicated as the mode of the being which the composition of the dictum states; and therefore it is both predicate and mode of composition. And this solution must be noted, because it is useful for many things both here and in the science of the book of the Prior Analytics.

### Marginal Labels - 441: Alexander's solution to be noted. - 441: Objection.

But if it is still objected that according to this every such enunciation is singular, while concerning singular enunciations there is no syllogism, and thus no syllogism can be made from modals: one must say that the subject of a modal enunciation is twofold, namely the subject of locution and the subject of enunciation. But I call the subject of locution that about which the locution is, as in this, "Socrates to run," the locution is made about Socrates; and therefore the subject of locution is Socrates. But the subject of enunciation is not what is supposed by the infinitive, but rather the subject is the whole dictum, that is, the case with the infinitive. Therefore in this second way a modal enunciation is singular, and in this way a syllogism is not made from modals, because in the complexion and figure of the syllogism the middle is not taken under the whole dictum, nor the minor extreme under the middle, but it is assumed under the subject of the dictum thus: "every man can run; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates can run." And by taking quantity from this subject, the dictum is of such quantity as its underlying enunciation from which it is formed, as here "that Socrates runs is possible," the dictum is singular, because it is formed from this, "Socrates runs." But this universal, "that every man runs," because it is formed from this its underlying proposition, "every man runs," and thus a syllogism is made about a modal enunciation or proposition.

### Marginal Labels - 442: Solution. - 442: Objection.

But if, still against those things which have been said, it is objected that according to this every modal proposition is composite and not twofold from composition and division, and thus all such would be false simply, as "that a non-running one runs is possible," "that a non-reading one reads is possible": one must say that this does not follow in a predicate which is predicated not as being but as a mode, because what is predicated as a mode is not predicated as a mode of itself, but of other things; and therefore it can be referred to other things, either under division or under composition, as is clear to anyone considering a little. Yet there are some who, on account of the reasons introduced, say that modes are not predicates; but we do not care about their sayings, because they neither agree with the commentators nor rest upon truth<sup>[2]</sup>.

### Marginal Labels - 442: Solution.

One must also know that every dictum is singular according to quantity, because its appellation is similar to the appellation of a singular term; for under this common thing which is this dictum, "that every man runs," it does not appell for anything except for this same dictum which is "that every man runs," and it cannot appell for another, because it is not the dictum except of this singular proposition which is "every man runs." But it is not so in an enunciation about being-in, because its subject is universal or singular; and the universal is taken universally, or particularly, or indefinitely with respect to its appellata, and therefore it receives quantity from these. Thus therefore one must understand concerning modal enunciation.

## Notes

[1] The mode is the predicate in a modal enunciation; but on the contrary, if it were so, then it would not be a mode. This is clear, because the same thing cannot be the mode of an enunciation and an extreme of the same, since a mode is a determination, and an extreme is determinable. Solve from the sayings of D. Albert below in chapter 6. (*Modus est praedicatum in enuntiatione modali: sed contra, si sic esset, tunc non esset modus. Patet, quia idem non potest esse modus enuntiationis et extremum ejusdem, cum modus sit determinatio, et extremum sit determinabile. Solve ex dictis D. Alberti, infra in cap. 6.*)

[2] From this is clear the error of the moderns who say that a proposition is not of the divided sense except when the mode stands between the parts of the dictum, nor of the composite sense unless the mode entirely precedes or finally follows; for wherever the mode is placed, the proposition must always be distinguished according to composition and division, as D. Albert also intimates here, and as is gathered from the first book of the Sophistical Refutations. Jammy. (*Ex hoc patet error modernorum dicentium propositionem non esse de sensu diviso nisi quando mediat inter partes dicti, nec esse de sensu composito nisi modus totaliter praecedat aut finaliter sequatur: nam ubicumque ponatur modus, propositio semper est distinguenda juxta compositionem et divisionem, ut etiam innuit D. Albertus hic, et colligitur primo Elenchorum. JAMMY.*)

## Chapter II. In What Way The Opposition Of Modals Is To Be Taken.

CHAPTER II. In what way the opposition of modals is to be taken.

But with these things thus determined, one must look into in what manner or in what way affirmations and negations are related to one another according to the opposition of contradiction. An example of this is that we ask how these are related to one another according to opposition: "it is possible to be," "it is not possible to be," "it is contingent to be," and "it is not contingent to be," and similarly concerning impossible and necessary, as if I say, "it is necessary to be" and "it is not necessary to be," "impossible to be" and "not impossible to be," whether they are taken with nominal mode or with adverbial mode; for this is the same according to the present intention, as if I say, "Socrates runs contingently," or if I say, "that Socrates runs is contingent," and so with the other modes whether they are taken adverbially or nominally. Therefore the modes of such enunciations must be taken with respect to opposition and consequence.

### Marginal Labels - 443: Doubt.

For these have certain special doubts, because oppositions are not taken similarly in these and in those about being-in. For if, of enunciations which are comprised from a subject and a past thing [read: predicate] comprising, those contradictions are in that composition, or are opposed to one another according to contradiction. Whatever things, according to being which is affirmed in one and according to not-being which is denied in the other, are disposed over against each other from the opposite, as was said in those which are about being-in, then the opposition in those which are about being-in and in modals will be similar; and this is impossible. But let us posit an example of this, saying that in those which are about being-in, of that which is "to be man," the opposed negation is "not to be man"; and its negation is not that proposition which is "to be non-man," because that is affirmative like the first, although it is about an infinite predicate. And this is in those about being-in in which this verb "is" is predicated as adjacent as second, for "to be man" is the same as "man to be." It is similar in those in which this verb "is" is adjacent as third, because of that which is "to be white man," or "man to be white," the negation is "not to be white man," or "man not to be white," and not that which says "to be non-white man," or "man to be non-white," because each is affirmative, although one is about a finite predicate and the other about an infinite predicate.

For if opposition had to be taken in modals according to this manner, so that the negation were referred to being, which the affirmation affirms, since in contradiction always either the saying<sup>[1]</sup> or affirmation or the negation is true, since it is false to say "man wood," it will be true to say of man that man is not wood. But if it is in this way in those in which this verb "is" is predicated as adjacent as second or third, then this same thing is true also in enunciations in which this verb "is" is not added, neither as adjacent as second nor as adjacent as third, but another verb is placed. For in these enunciations another verb which is placed in place of being, without this verb "is," will make the same thing with respect to the mode of opposition, as is clear in examples. For of that which is "walks man," or "man walks," the contradictory negation is not "walks

non-man," but rather that which says "man does not walk"; for as to opposition it differs in nothing to say "man to walk" and "man to be walking," or "man walks" and "man is walking."

Therefore, if in all enunciations, namely about being-in and modals, opposition were taken thus according to being and not-being, an inconvenience would follow, that contradictorily opposed propositions would sometimes be true together. For if it is true that in modals opposition is taken according to being and not-being, then it follows that of that which is "it is possible to be," the negation is "it is possible not to be," and that which is "it is not possible to be," in which the mode is denied, will not be its negation. But against this is what is said, that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be; for everything which is possible to be divided and possible to walk is also possible not to be divided and possible not to walk. But the reason and cause of this is that what is possible in this way to either alternative is not always in act; indeed it is in potency, which is related to being and to not-being. On account of this, in what is possible in such a way there will also belong a negation intermixed according to potency; and thus what walks can not walk. Therefore that which is walkable according to potency can also not walk, and that which is divisible in this way according to potency can not be divided. But as was proved in the preceding matters, it is impossible that opposed affirmations and negations should be true together of the same thing, because if this is granted, contradictories can be true together. Therefore that which was introduced as the negation of that affirmation which has been stated is not its negation, because they are true together when the dictum in each is taken in potency. For according to this it happens, or it follows, that one and the same thing is truly at the same time said, and affirmed and denied at the same time of the same thing, which is impossible; or that one must deny that in modals opposition is taken according to being and not-being, and that affirmations and negations contradictorily opposed in modals are not made according to being and not-being. Rather, one must say that in such cases opposed affirmations and negations are made according as negation is referred to the mode. But between these two things it is more impossible that contradictories be true together than that negation be referred to the mode. Therefore it will be more to be chosen that negation is referred to the mode than that contradictories are conceded to be true together.

### Marginal Labels - 444: Objection.

For to this, that negation be referred to the mode, nothing stands in the way except this, that negation has to be referred to composition, and mode is not composition. And this is easily solved, because although mode is not composition, nevertheless, as has been said, mode is of composition; and thus negation, by mediation of the mode, is referred to composition.

### Marginal Labels - 444: Solution.

Therefore according to this which has been said, the contradictory negation of that which is "it is possible to be," or "possible is to be," is this which is "not possible to be," or "it is not possible to be." But the same account applies in that which is "it is contingent to be," for its negation is "it is not contingent to be"; and in the other modals too opposition must be taken wholly similarly, as in necessary and impossible. For in all such modals oppositions are made through affirmations and negations of the opposed mode, just as in those which are about being-in oppositions are made according to being and not-being. For oppositions of modes determining composition in modals are made as being and not-being are related in enunciations about being-in; so that, just as in those about being-in the things subjected to composition are subject and predicate, as the subject man and the predicate white, in the same way in this place in modals the dicta signifying being or not-being become the subjects of the modal enunciation. But contingent, possible, necessary, and impossible are the oppositions determining the composition of the dictum; on account of this they are predicates in that manner which was stated before. And as in those about being-in it happens that there is truth or falsity according to being or not-being, so in these which are modal it happens that there is truth and falsity according to the affirmation or negation of the modes.

Therefore according to those things which have been said, of that which says "it is possible not to be," the negation is "it is not possible not to be." But the other two, which are "it is possible to be" and "it is possible not to be," are not set over against each other according to contradiction; this appears from the fact that they are true together and seem to follow upon each other. For the same thing at once and at the same time is possible to be and possible not to be. But "possible to be" and "not possible to be" never are or can be true together. Therefore those are contradictorily opposed which are taken according to affirmation and negation of the mode. Likewise, "it is possible not to be" and "it is not possible not to be" are never true together. Therefore these are opposed through contradiction, and these also are taken according to affirmation and negation of the mode. Likewise it is in that which says "it is necessary to be"; for its contradictory is not that which says "it is necessary not to be," but that one

which says "it is not necessary to be." But of that which says "it is necessary not to be," the one contradictorily opposed is that which denies the mode and says, "it is not necessary not to be." Similarly, of that which says "it is impossible to be," the contradictory is not that which says "it is impossible not to be," but that which denies the mode and says, "it is not impossible to be." And similarly that which says "it is impossible not to be" is the contradictory of that which says with the mode denied, "it is not impossible not to be."

Therefore, universally and regularly, in modals one must posit being and not-being as subjects which suppose, and concerning which the mode is enunciated, as was just now said. But the affirmation and negation making what we have said in modals, that is, the opposition of contradiction, must be appended or referred to one thing only, that is, to one and the same mode, and not to being or not-being. And thus one must reckon them, that is, represent the opposed sayings or affirmations or negations contradictorily opposed, which are with affirmation and negation of the mode. For example: possible, not possible; contingent, not contingent; impossible, not impossible; necessary, not necessary; true, not true; false, not false. For although these last are not modes simply, nevertheless they are certain modes.

#### Notes

[1] Here he takes "diction" for affirmation, and this was said above in the first book of this treatise On Enunciation, chapter 1. (*Hic capit dictionem pro affirmatione, et de hoc dictum est supra in I hujus tract. de Enuntiatione, cap. 1.*)

### Chapter III. On The Consequences Of Modals According To The Opinion Of The Ancients.

CHAPTER III. On the consequences of modals according to the opinion of the Ancients.

But now, after the determination of the oppositions of modals, one must determine concerning their consequences. But because some of the Ancients seem to have erred in something concerning the consequences of modals, therefore first let us arrange the consequences according as the Ancients arranged them, and let us show what is true and what is false in their consequences, and afterwards let us arrange the consequences according to truth. For in this way what we intend will be better made clear.

Therefore let us say that, according to some, consequences are made among modals according to the order which they posit among them, so that they are arranged thus: namely, that to that which is "possible to be" there is immediately joined or subordinated that which is "it happens to be"; for "to happen to be" is converted with that which is "possible to be," and each of these precedes and follows upon the other. Third, that which is "it is not impossible to be" is subordinated. And to these in the fourth place they subordinated that which is "it is not necessary to be." And these four they placed in the first line as following one another in turn.

### Marginal Labels - 445: First line of modals.

Then in the second line they first placed that about a negative dictum and an affirmed mode, which is "possible not to be"; and they subordinated that which is about the contingent, which is "contingent not to be." And to that, third, they subordinated that about the impossible with the mode denied, which is "not impossible not to be." And to that in the fourth place they subordinated that about the necessary with the mode denied, which is "not necessary not to be." Similarly they arranged these in the second line.

### Marginal Labels - 445: Second line.

But to that which is about the possible with mode denied and dictum affirmed, which is "not possible to be," they joined, by the same mode, "not contingent to be"; and to that they joined that which is about the impossible with mode affirmed and with dictum affirmed, which is "impossible to be"; and to that they subordinated that which is about the necessary with mode affirmed and dictum denied, which is "necessary not to be." And these four they placed in the third line.

### Marginal Labels - 445: Third line.

But to that which is about the possible with mode denied in a negative dictum, which is "not possible not to be," they joined that about the contingent with mode denied in a negative dictum, which is "it does not happen not to be." And to this, third, as consequent they subordinated that about the impossible with mode affirmed and dictum denied, which is "impossible not to be." And to this they subordinated that about the necessary with mode affirmed and dictum affirmative, which is "necessary to be." And from these they constitute a fourth line of things following one another. But these can be more easily considered from the subscription of such a figure which follows:

### Marginal Labels - 445: Fourth line.

Figure of modals, according to the four lines of things following one another:

First line: it is possible to be; it is contingent to be; it is not impossible to be; it is not necessary to be.

Second line: it is possible not to be; it is contingent not to be; it is not impossible not to be; it is not necessary not to be.

Third line: it is not possible to be; it is not contingent to be; it is impossible to be; it is necessary not to be.

Fourth line: it is not possible not to be; it is not contingent not to be; it is impossible not to be; it is necessary to be.

But in this arrangement let us see what has itself well and what not well. Therefore let us say that, as they say, impossible and not impossible, that is, impossible affirmed and impossible denied, follow well upon that which is contingent and possible, and upon non-contingent and non-possible, as the Ancients say. And these follow conversely, so that any of them both precedes another and follows upon it. But they follow one another contradictorily, so that the negation of impossible which is contradictory to impossible affirmed follows the affirmed possible and contingent. For that which is about denied mode with affirmed dictum, which is contradictory to this, "it is impossible to be," follows this enunciation "possible to be," with both mode and dictum affirmed. Hence the negation of impossible follows the affirmation of possible and contingent, and affirmation of impossible follows the negation of possible and contingent; and similarly negation of impossible follows affirmation of possible and contingent. For this which is said "possible to be" is followed by "not impossible to be." And similarly that which says "not possible to be" is followed by "impossible to be." For this which says "impossible to be" is an affirmation. But this which says "not possible to be" is a negation. But we said just now that in such matters the negation about the possible follows the affirmation about the impossible, and the affirmation follows the negation. For this was well said by the Ancients in all four lines of things following one another.

And, to speak briefly, in no line was there a fault except in the first, and this only with respect to the fourth, namely concerning the necessary. Therefore one must consider how that which is about the necessary has itself according to consequence. But this is manifest to anyone considering, that they do not have themselves according to consequence in the same way as those men said. Rather those which are about the mode of necessity follow from the impossible in a contrary mode, and not contradictorily. But modals about the necessary taken contradictorily are outside the consequence, and do not follow upon those about the impossible. But this is proved thus. Let this be taken: "it is necessary not to be"; for its contradictory negation is not this, "it is not necessary to be." For it happens that both of those are sometimes true of the same thing: for it is necessary that man not be wood, and also it is not necessary that man be wood; these are true together of the same thing, and consequently are not contradictory. And thus it happens that both are true together, because everything which is necessary not to be is not necessary to be.

But the cause why that proposition about the necessary does not follow that proposition about the impossible according to the arrangement of the Ancients is this: because they are opposed not contradictorily but contrarily; and therefore, with negation put after the mode, the enunciation about the impossible and the necessary are reduced as having the same force and as equivalent. And therefore "impossible to be" and "necessary not to be," which are about modes affirmed and dicta disposed in a contrary way through affirmation and negation, are rendered to each other through consequence and have the same force through equivalence. An example of this is that, as I may say, "it is impossible to be" concerning mode and dictum affirmed; to this I oppose, from the necessary, the contrary dictum, that is, the denied one. Those follow one another; and therefore to that which is "impossible to be" there is rendered that which is "necessary not to be," as "it is impossible for man to be stone" is followed by "it is necessary for man not to be stone," because these have the same force. Thus therefore they follow one another and have force fittingly.

Moreover this is declared by reduction to the impossible, because if something is impossible to be, it follows that this same thing is necessary not to be. But if something is impossible not to be, it follows that it is necessary to be; and this is contrary to that which is "necessary not to be." Therefore it is clear that it is impossible to posit consequences from impossible to necessary on the ground that they are opposed by contradiction, that is, by affirmation and negation of the mode, because those alone make the opposition of contradiction, as was proved in the preceding matters. But affirmation and negation of the dictum make contrariety, that is, the mode of contrariety; and therefore impossible in this way, as the Ancients are said to posit it, would necessarily contradict, which is clear, because what is necessary to be is possible to be, as to consequence.

And if someone contradicts this, he must give the opposite which can stand with what was premised; and thus he will give the negation of that which is "possible to be," which is "not possible to be." For it is necessary in all things to affirm or deny of anything whatever, that is, that in contradictories the affirmation and the negation about anything whatever be true. On account of this it follows that, if something is not possible to be, it follows that it is impossible to be, because in such matters non-possible and impossible are equivalent. And thus, that what is impossible to be and not possible to be is necessary to be, is very inconvenient. Therefore the hypothesis was inconvenient, which was that the opposite of this, "possible to be," follows upon this, "necessary to be"; therefore upon this, "necessary to be," follows "possible to be," as has been said. But that which says "something is possible to be" is followed by that which says "it is not impossible to be." But this which says "it is not impossible to be" follows that which says "it is not necessary to be"; and therefore according to the Ancients, by the force of that argumentation from the first to the last, it happens that what is not necessary to be is necessary to be, which is very inconvenient, because thus contradictories would be true. Thus therefore it is clear that in the order of the necessary to the impossible the consequence of the Ancients fails.

## **Chapter IV. The Error Of The Ancients Is Corrected, And The True Consequence Of Modals Is Shown.**

CHAPTER IV. The error of the Ancients is corrected, and the true consequence of modals is shown.

But with these things held, we must investigate the true arrangement of modals and the true consequence. Therefore let us say that necessary to be does not follow upon possible to be; nor also, upon possible to be, does necessary not to be follow. For both of these can happen or follow to that which says something possible to be, namely possible to be and possible not to be. But of the others which are about the necessary, whichever is true, the other will not be true; for at the same time something is truly possible to be and possible not to be. But if something is necessary to be, it will not be able not to be; and if it is necessary not to be, it will not be able to be; and therefore whichever of those is true, the other is not true. Therefore it remains from what has been said that that which says "not necessary not to be" follows upon that which says "possible to be." For possible to be is true of that which is necessary to be and of that which is not necessary to be; for this is the contradiction of that which says something is necessary not to be. But this which says "it is necessary not to be" follows upon this, "it is not possible to be"; for that which is "it is not possible to be" follows upon this, "it is impossible to be," and this is followed by "it is necessary not to be." But its negation is "it is not necessary not to be."

Thus therefore contradictions arranged according to the aforesaid mode follow, and absolutely nothing impossible happens or follows when they are so arranged, as we said. But this arrangement is in a figure so that what has been said may be seen more easily:

First line: it is possible to be; it is not possible to be; it happens to be; it does not happen to be.

Second line: it is possible not to be; it is not possible not to be; it happens not to be; it does not happen not to be.

Third line: it is not impossible to be; it is impossible to be; it is not necessary to be; it is necessary not to be; they are equivalent.

Fourth line: it is not impossible not to be; it is impossible not to be; it is not necessary not to be; it is necessary to be; they are equivalent.

In this arrangement always the superior follows upon the third beneath itself, and nothing inconvenient follows. For the first line follows the third, and the second the fourth, through all modes of possible, contingent, impossible, and necessary. And thus also the error of the Ancients has been corrected, and the true consequence of modals has been arranged in this way.

But if the consequences are taken in relation to one another otherwise than has been said, as if the first line is compared to the second and the second to the third, the consequence fails. In the same way, if the first is compared to the fourth and the second to the third, the consequence will not be valid. But this is easily clear to anyone looking. But if he wishes to find the consequences, he will find them infallibly in the aforesaid way. Thus therefore they must be arranged.

## **Chapter V. The Doubt About The Consequence Of The Possible To Necessary Being Is Solved.**

CHAPTER V. The doubt about the consequence of the possible to necessary being is solved.

But perhaps someone will doubt whether what has been said is true, namely that possible to be follows upon necessary to be. Therefore let us first show that it follows upon it; and afterwards let us posit, against this, the arguments which appear to show that it does not follow upon it; and afterwards let us posit the solution and determination of this doubt. Therefore that possible to be follows upon necessary to be is proved by leading

to an impossibility. For if it is granted that it does not follow upon it, that is, if it is granted that possible does not follow upon necessary to be, then the contradiction or contradictory of that which is possible to be must be verified together with necessary to be; but this is not possible to be. Therefore these two will be true together: necessary to be and not possible to be; and they will be true together of the same thing. Therefore it follows that that which is necessary to be is not possible to be; and what is not possible to be is impossible to be. Therefore what is necessary to be is impossible to be; and what is impossible to be is necessary not to be. Therefore what is necessary to be is necessary not to be, which is altogether inconvenient. Therefore also the hypothesis was impossible and inconvenient which posited that impossible [read: possible] does not follow upon necessary to be. If perhaps someone says that the contradictory of this sort of enunciation, "it is possible to be," is not this, "it is not possible to be," but this, "it is possible not to be," although this is false, then still an inconvenience follows if this is granted, because according to this it follows: it is necessary to be; therefore it is possible not to be. But what is necessary to be is impossible not to be; and what is impossible to be is necessary not to be. Therefore it follows that it is necessary not to be and necessary to be, which is very inconvenient. Therefore the hypothesis which posits that possible to be does not follow upon necessary to be was impossible.

### Marginal Labels - 448: Doubt. - 448: Argument. - 448: To the opposite.

But if this is conceded, an inconvenience seems to occur, because what is possible to be is also, together with this, possible not to be; an example of which is that what is possible to be cut is, together with this, also possible not to be cut; and this man is possible to walk and possible not to walk. And this generable thing is possible to be and possible not to be. Therefore if possible to be follows upon necessary to be, then upon that which is necessary to be there follows possible to be and possible not to be. Therefore what is necessary to be is possible not to be; but what is possible not to be is not necessary to be. Therefore what is necessary to be is not necessary to be; and thus contradictories will be true together, which is false. Therefore in every way the hypothesis which says that possible follows upon necessary to be is impossible. And we must answer the argument which seems to prove the opposite.

### Marginal Labels - 449: Solution of the doubt.

But for the solution of this doubt we say first that it is manifest to anyone even a little knowing that not every power or potency by which something is called possible in relation to something has force for opposites. But in certain things this is not true, as is clear in certain of those things which have natural powers from a natural form, which is active of necessity. And they do not have animal or rational powers, which belong to the rational soul, which is most free and is not bound by matter to doing this or that, but can do this or that, and even the opposite. And it can do this and can not do this through freedom of will. Therefore whatever do not have such powers, but natural ones, since nature is only toward one thing, can only be toward one thing; and they do this necessarily and cannot not do that, as fire is heatable or heat-producing.

Therefore it is clear that whatever have irrational, that is, non-rational or non-animal, powers, but natural powers and from natural form, are not toward opposites according to their potencies. But whatever have rational powers are toward opposites, and can belong to opposites according to one and the same potency while it remains one, because that which of itself is not bound to one thing is of opposites. But whatever things are able by non-rational or irrational powers, not all nor always according to one and the same power are toward opposites, as we said of fire, that it is heat-producing and not cold-producing, nor can it even be non-heat-producing. Nevertheless not all things which are able by natural and irrational potencies are always toward one thing; but whatever are able by active potencies, which are from form, are toward one thing, and whatever are always in perfect act<sup>[1]</sup>. But whatever are possible according to passive potency are related to either of the opposites. Nor was this, which was said, that irrational or natural potencies are not toward opposites, said generally because it is true; but it was said so that an objection might be brought against this which is said, that every potency by which something is possible is of opposites and toward opposites. For it

is clear that even potencies which are in the same species, such as natural potencies which, insofar as they divide this common thing which is potency against rational or animal potencies, are not all toward opposites.

Therefore for the solution of the introduced doubt one must know that potency and possible are said equivocally in relation to those things of which they are said according to active potency and passive potency, in the way in which it is when some common thing is said which belongs according to prior and posterior to those of which it is predicated. For what is in act itself is possible to act, as we say that someone is possible to walk because he already walks. And universally speaking, as we say, this is possible or able to be, which already is in act. But we call another possible which is not in act, but perhaps will be in act, as we say it is possible to walk when he does not walk but perhaps will walk. For that which is possible from material potency is related to opposites; and such possible is in those things which are movable according to moved substance, as generable and corruptible things. But another possible is that which is according to active potency which is in act, and in perpetual and incorruptible things. Yet in each of these it is true to say that each of them is possible. For what already walks is possible to walk, and what will walk is possible to walk; and thus possible, by community of analogy, is common to each.

Therefore it must be said that this possible which is before act and not in act is not truly said of the necessary, as has been proved. But that which is in act follows upon the necessary, as was proved at the beginning. Therefore because a subjective part is followed by its universal, which is predicated of it as a common genus or an analog, and possible is as universal to that which is in act, as necessary, and to that which is before act, as possible to either alternative, therefore one must concede that possible as common and universal follows upon the necessary, although possible does not altogether, that is, according to every species of possible, follow upon the necessary.

And what is more, from what has been said it is held that that which is necessary or not necessary to be is the principle of all other things as to the fact that they are or are not; and thus all other things must be considered as consequent upon necessary being or not-being. And according to this one must arrange the consequences in this way: necessary to be, not possible not to be, not contingent not to be, impossible not to be. Thus in the second line: necessary not to be, not possible to be, not contingent to be, impossible to be. But in the third: not necessary to be, possible not to be, contingent not to be, not impossible not to be. But in the fourth: not necessary not to be, possible to be, contingent to be, not impossible to be.

But it is further manifest from what has been said that those things which are necessary are in act and do not have power before act. On account of this, if those things which are in act are prior to those which are in potency, as was determined in the ninth book of First Philosophy<sup>[2]</sup>, because those which are always in act are everlasting, it follows that necessary things are prior to these possible things which are possible before act; and indeed these things which are everlasting are always in act in such a way because they are possible without material power. But other generable things are possible so that they come to be in act; and when they are in act, they are still with power toward the opposite act, because such an act does not perfect the potency in such a way that it does not leave in it possibility toward the opposite act. And in these very things, act and those things which are in natural act are prior to those which are in potency, although in the same thing to be in potency is prior in time to being in act, because it is in potency earlier and in act later. But certain things are never in perfect act, but are only in potency, as the potency of division to infinity in the continuum and the potency of increase to infinity in number, and as it is in motion and time.

### Marginal Labels - 450: Objection which Boethius also touches and solves.

And if it is objected that a potency is vain which cannot be reduced to act, this is easily solved: because if such a potency were reduced to act in no way, then what is objected would be true. But those potencies continually go out into imperfect act, and never stand in perfect act, through which nothing would remain of potency.

From all these things it is clear what we have said, that possible to be as universal and common follows upon necessary, although not every possible follows upon necessary. And by the same reason this is clear, that contingent to be also follows upon necessary to be, because possible to be and contingent to be follow each other in turn, as is clear through all the arrangements of consequences which were determined in the preceding matters. But in order that these things may be better understood, one must insert a discussion about the distinction of possible and contingent.

## Notes

[1] Compare Boethius, because he preserves this concerning even active potencies, namely that certain irrational active potencies can be toward opposites. (*Cf. Boetium, quia salvat hoc de potentiis etiam activis, scilicet quod possunt in opposita aliqua potentiae activae irrationales.*)

[2] From text-commentary 13. (*A tex. com. 13.*)

## Chapter VI. On The Distinction Of The Possible, And On The Difference Between The Possible And The Contingent.

CHAPTER VI. On the distinction of the possible, and on the difference between the possible and the contingent.

Therefore, for the understanding of those things which have been said, attend that, as Avicenna says, possible being divides being with that which is necessary being. And since necessary being is that which is in no way in potency, necessary being will be what has no cause, because being which has a cause in any way is in potency compared to that cause according to that which is in it. And by opposition possible being is what has a cause, and it is possible according as it is compared to that cause and according as, through being, it depends on it; and thus all caused things are possible. And in this way necessary being is not possible being, nor conversely, because it is impossible that the uncaused be caused, or that caused being be uncaused. But necessary to be is said otherwise in enunciations, namely when the co-inherence of predicate with subject is inevitable and necessary. Such a necessary is not necessary being, because nothing prevents such necessary being from having a cause; indeed that possible is predicated of that which is necessary to be while having a cause.

### Marginal Labels - 451: What necessary being is, and what possible being is.

In another way something is called possible not with respect to being but with respect to operation or action; and because action or operation is only according to active potency, in this way that is called possible which has a power or faculty of doing something; and this is twofold. For that faculty or power already belongs either from a natural form or from a rational or sensitive soul. And if it belongs from a natural form, then it acts through necessity and, so far as it is of itself, cannot not act, because according to such a potency, so far as it is of itself, it is always in act. And if at some time it does not act, this is by accident, namely because it does not have something on which it may act; and therefore this possible, according to itself, is not toward opposites, whether those are taken as contraries or as contradictories. For such a possible does not act something and its contrary, as hot and cold; and those things which are contradictories cannot act and not act together. But if it is from soul, then it cannot be from the vegetative soul, because that acts as nature through necessity. But although the actions of sensitive soul are opposed, as to walk or not to walk, to see or not to see, to pursue something or flee, nevertheless because where the sensitive is apart from reason, there action is done by nature, and therefore in many things it has itself in one way, as one swallow makes a nest as another does, and in the time in which one makes it, another also makes it, and it is not found that any one then does not make it. Therefore it does not so appear in the potencies of the sensitive soul as in the potencies of reason. For those are acted by nature; but reason itself is mistress of its operations, and can act and can not act, and can do this and the opposite of it by one and the same power by which it is called possible with respect to operations. Therefore in these ways possible is said according to active potency. And that which is

according to natural irrational potency is not removed from the necessary, but that which is according to animal potency and especially rational potency is removed.

### Marginal Labels - 451: What possible according to material potency is.

Possible is further said according to material potency toward being, which potency, I say, is with privation, as possible to come to be or to be generated or possible to be; and this, because it is with privation, is toward being and toward not-being, and it follows that it is possible to be and possible not to be. And this possible according to mode is opposed to that which is necessary to be.

And attend that whether possible is said actively according to active potency, which is rational and toward opposites, or according to material potency, disposed or indisposed, in each way it is taken in two ways, namely as before act or as existing in act. And the example of this is what is said about someone: it is possible for him to walk when he sits or lies down; and it is said about him that it is possible for him to walk when he already walks. It is also said about something that it is possible for it to come to be or be before it is; and it is said about something that it is possible to be when it is. And before act it has more of power and of potency. But when it is in act, it has more of act than of potency. And therefore, taken before act, it is toward opposites and is removed from the necessary. But existing in act it has a greater access to the necessary, which is always in act. Yet with a defect, because it falls short of it, as that which is in act mixed with potency falls short of that which is in pure act; and because it approaches the necessary, with reduplication of act it becomes necessary, as we say that it is necessary for man to walk while he walks.

Therefore possible is said in all the aforesaid ways. But possible, taken in genus, abstracts from all these and has toward them either community of genus or community of analogy. And therefore, just as animal is predicated of man, and universal is predicated of particular, yet it is not necessary that according to all its species it be predicated of him, for animal is not predicated of man according to the species of animal which is ass; so possible taken in genus, which is common to all the modes of possibles that have been stated, is predicated of the necessary, and thus possible taken in common follows upon the necessary.

### Marginal Labels - 452: What the difference is between possible and contingent.

Moreover, contingent to be is converted with possible to be; and it is not true what certain persons say, that contingent differs from possible in this, that contingent states an extension of time into the future and possible does not state this. For possible taken before act is extended into the future. But possible and contingent differ in this: because possible simply states potency, either agent or material, and is varied according to the variety of such potency. But contingent looks to a cause which is not a cause per se, and therefore it is distinguished according to the distinction of the cause<sup>[1]</sup>. But if it is a cause not per se disposed and inclined to being, it is called contingent by nature or as in more cases. But if the cause is indisposed and not inclined to one thing more than to another, it is called contingent to either alternative. In this therefore it differs from possible and makes a mode diverse from it.

It has been said in the preceding matters about the necessary and the impossible, because they universally regard every time, and with respect to time they are universal, although not according to the distribution of subjects. And it is the same that negation put before or put after makes contrariety or contradiction: when put before, contrariety; and when put after, contradiction, as "for Socrates not to be is necessary" and "for Socrates to be is necessary." But this is not the case with the others.

### Marginal Labels - 452: In four ways an enunciation can be called singular.

It must be noted that, as we said in the preceding matters, the appellation of the dictum of which the mode is predicated as mode of the composition of that dictum is the appellation of a discrete term under this common thing which is dictum or enunciable; and therefore this is singular: "that every man runs is contingent." And therefore it must be noted that a proposition or enunciation is called singular in four ways. The first way is

when the subject or suppositum by its signification, through the quality which it signifies, is discrete, as "Socrates reads." In a second way it is called singular with respect to the signification of something causing discreteness around a common term placed in the subject, as when it is said, "that man reads." For pronouns are discrete and especially through demonstration. In a third way it is called singular when the subject simply stands for the simple essence which it signifies, as when it is said, "man is a species." In a fourth way it is called singular when from the common term which is in the subject there is deprived that which is to be predicated of many, which it does only through a universal or common term, as when it is said, "that every man runs is possible." For the appellation of this dictum which is subjected is the appellation of a discrete term.

But although modal enunciations are singular in this way, nevertheless from the position of negation they are made of every quantity, that is, both universal and particular; and this is from universality of time, and not of appellation. Hence all those which are in the first line of the first arrangement determined above are particular affirmatives. For of the first line there are these: possible to be, contingent to be, not impossible to be, not necessary not to be. But all those which are in the second line are particular negatives, as possible not to be, contingent not to be, not impossible not to be, not necessary to be. But all those which are in the third line are universal negatives, namely not possible to be, not contingent to be, impossible to be, necessary not to be. But all those which are in the fourth line are universal affirmatives, namely not possible not to be, not contingent not to be, impossible not to be, necessary to be; and quantity must be taken with respect to time and not with respect to supposita, as we said in the preceding matters. One must also attend that although a modal enunciation is singular with respect to the whole dictum, nevertheless with respect to the subject of the dictum it can be universal or particular or indefinite or singular: universal, as "that every man runs"; particular, as "that some man runs"; indefinite, as "that man runs"; singular, as "that Socrates runs." For although the mode is the predicate of the enunciation, nevertheless it is the mode of the dictum which has to be referred to the composition of the dictum. For it is not inconvenient that something with respect to diverse things be predicate and mode.

## Notes

[1] Compare Boethius also, because he posits the difference between possible and contingent otherwise. (*Cf. etiam Boetium, quia aliter ponit differentiam inter possibile et contingens.*)

## Chapter VII. In What Way There Is Opposition Of Contrariety And Contradiction.

CHAPTER VII. In what way there is opposition of contrariety and contradiction.

Because every consequence is varied according to opposition, as was said in the preceding matters, and opposition according to some is taken in contrary things, as good and evil, just and unjust, white and black are contraries. But we said in the preceding matters that it must be taken according to the opposition of affirmation and negation; therefore here we must ask how opposition must be taken, lest, when opposition is unknown, error occur in consequences.

Therefore let us take the name of contrary broadly, so that it comprehends contradiction and contrariety strictly so called, and let us ask whether an affirmation is contrary to a negation, or a speech to a speech, although they do not differ through affirmation and negation; because if contraries are those things which are enunciated about contrary things, an affirmation will be contrary to an affirmation, and a negation to a negation, as will immediately be manifest in what follows. But let us posit this in examples, so that it may be more easily understood. Therefore let us ask whether to that enunciation which says, "every man is just," that one is contrary which is opposed to it according to the mode of negation of the same predicate about the same subject, as that which says, "no man is just," or whether that is not its contrary, but rather that which enunciates a contrary thing about the same subject, as if it were said that "every man is just" is contrary to that which says "every man is unjust." And in singulars it can similarly be asked, as when it is said, "Callias

is just," whether contrary or contradictory to it is that which says "Callias is not just," which denies the same predicate of the same subject, or that which enunciates a contrary thing of the same subject, as when it is said, "Callias is just," "Callias is unjust." Therefore let us ask which of those is contrary to the other.

Therefore first let us posit arguments for this, that oppositions of contrariety must be taken according to contrary things. For, as was said in the first book of this science, for the logician, who takes the significations of names from the institution made at pleasure and according to the concept of the institutor, those things which are in voice follow those things which are in the soul; and the concepts which are in the soul are caused by things outside. And thus an opinion or concept will be contrary to an opinion which is about contrary things referred to the same subject; and this opinion which says that every man is just is contrary to that which says that every man is unjust. Therefore if those things which are in voice, as we said, follow those things which are in the soul, then it seems that it is similar in affirmations which are in voice, that contrariety in them must be taken according to contrary things. But if in the soul there is not an opinion contrary to an opinion which is about a contrary thing, then also one affirmation is not contrary to another because it is about a contrary thing. But rather contrary to an affirmation will be that negation which has been stated, as "no man is just" will be contrary to this, "every man is just."

And because those things which are in voice follow immediately those things which are in the soul, on account of this one must ask what true opinion it is which is contrary in this way to a false opinion. Therefore here we broadly call opinion any concept of the soul, whether true or false, which is about things apprehended in the soul. But one must ask whether an opinion affirming something of something is contrary to the negation which denies the same thing of the same thing which the affirmation affirmed, or whether it is not contrary to it, but to that which opines a contrary thing about the same thing. But I speak by positing this in examples in this way: there is a certain opinion or concept about good, that good is, and this is a true opinion. There is also another conception of good, namely that good is not good, and this is a false opinion. There is also another false one which is about good, namely that it is evil. Since, therefore, there are two false opinions, let us ask which of them is contrary to the opinion which says and grants about good that good is.

Therefore let us say that to judge that opinions are defined and determined in this, that they are contrary because they are about contrary things, is false; and this is proved thus<sup>[1]</sup>. And let us suppose that true is not contrary to true, and that one thing is contrary to one thing first and immediately. For the opinion about good, that good is, and the opinion about evil, that evil is, are opinions about contrary things; and yet perhaps they are both one in species and form of unity, although materially they are diverse. But in this there is no force as to the proposed intention, because whether they are both one opinion or many, it is established that both are true; but true is not contrary to true. Since, therefore, they are about contrary things, it is clear that contrary opinions or conceptions are not determined through this, that they are of contraries, that is, about contrary things, but are rather determined through this, that as contraries, that is, according to the mode of contrariety, they are related to one another according to affirmation and negation, namely so that negation denies the same thing of the same thing which affirmation affirms. Therefore if the true opinion is about good, namely that good is, and it is asked which is its contrary, although according to the thing it has many contraries, nevertheless none must be posited to be its contrary except that which says that good is not good and denies the same thing of the same thing. But that there are many according to contrary things is apparent from this, that about good we can opine that good is white, or something dishonorable, or something base, or something useless, or something not advantageous, or not desirable, or anything else which neither is good nor can be good. For infinitely many such things can be conceived about good, both things which are good and things which are not good, as has already been shown. For good is honorable, desirable, an end, useful; and infinitely many such things can truly be opined about good.

Someone can also opine that good is evil, and not advantageous, and dishonorable, and infinitely many such things which neither belong to good nor can belong to it. In all these there will be no contrary except that

which denies the same predicate of the same subject and says that good is not good.

### Marginal Labels - 455: Solution of the question of the text with respect to enunciations.

But in determining that question, namely whether contrariety in enunciations is attended to in contrary things or in a contrary mode of enunciating, we say that the opposition of contrariety or contradiction is attended to according to those things in which there is the first fallacy or falsity. And I call first that which is through itself and not through another; for what is through another occurs by accident and does not happen through itself and first. But the first falsity is in the opposition of affirmation and negation in enunciations. For the first fallacy or falsity is that from which generations of contrary things are made. But generations first and through themselves are made in terms which differ through affirmation and negation; for man comes to be from non-man, and white from non-white, and musical from non-musical. And that generation in some things comes to be from a contrary, this is by accident; for white does not come to be from black except because not-white happens to black. And the reason of this is that generation comes to be from privation; but privation is enunciated through negation. Therefore generations come to be from opposites; and therefore first and through itself fallacy or falsity is from the opposite through affirmation and negation; and that opposition which is of contrary things enunciated about the same thing is a fallacy or falsity which occurs through that which is between affirmation and negation. Therefore if we say about good that good is, and we say that good is not evil, this which we say, that good is good, is through itself and first, because the predicate has not only been conceived with the subject, but is also the same as the subject, and therefore through itself and first. But when we say that good is not evil, evil is not denied of it except on account of this, that good is good and good is contrary to evil. And therefore they cannot be in the same thing at the same time; and therefore evil is not denied of good on account of itself and first, but on account of another, and therefore by accident; for it happens to good not to be evil on account of this, that good is good<sup>[2]</sup>. But in each genus that which is true according to itself is more true than that which is true according to accident, and that which is false according to itself is more false than that which is false according to accident. And since contraries and contradictories are of those which are most distant in true and false, the true opinion which is about good, namely that good is good, will be most contrary to that opinion which is about good, namely that good is not good. Therefore contrariety as much as contradiction must be taken according to affirmation and negation of the same thing about the same thing. For that which is about good, that it is not good, is false according to itself and first; that which says about good that it is evil is false by accident. Therefore that which is of negation will be more false about that which is good than that which is that some contrary to good, as evil, belongs to good; but that is more false which, concerning singulars which are parts of the subject, has contrary opposition. For contraries are those which are most distant according to the same subject<sup>[3]</sup>.

But if it is also granted that the other of these, namely that which says that good is evil, is also contrary to that which says that good is good, nevertheless from what has been premised it follows that that which is contrary to it by the mode of contradiction is more contrary than that which enunciates a contrary about good according to being; for that which is first and through itself contrary is more contrary. And thus between these two, good is good and good is not good, there is the first contrariety. But the other, which is that good is evil, is not contrary except because it is implicated in this which says that good is not good, because from the fact that good is not good, being evil happens to that which is not good; and thus it is not contrary except through another, and this is to be contrary by accident. For when it says that good is evil, it is necessary that one opine that to be evil happens to it because it is not good; and if it were good, being evil would not happen to it.

Moreover, if in other things which do not have a contrary it is possible to take a contrary according to contrary things, then also in those things which have a contrary it has been well said that contraries are taken according to contrary things. For if there is a general art of taking a contrary enunciation, they must be taken

everywhere in every matter in one and the same way; and therefore either everywhere there will be contraries, or nowhere. But in those things in which there is not a contrary according to the thing, such as substances, it is necessary to take the contrary through affirmation and negation, as about that opinion of it which thinks or opines that man is not man, which is contrary to that which opines that man is man. Therefore if in such matter contrariety in enunciations is taken through affirmation and negation, it follows that in all things contrariety is taken according to contradiction of affirmation and negation<sup>[4]</sup>.

Moreover, the opinion of good which says that good is good and the opinion which says of non-good that non-good is non-good have themselves similarly in truth. And similarly to these in falsity has itself the opinion saying that good is not good, and the one which says that non-good is good. Therefore let us ask what is contrary to this true opinion which says that non-good is not good. For that which says that non-good is evil cannot be its contrary, because this, that non-good is not good, and that which says that non-good is evil, are sometimes true together; but true opinion is not contrary to true opinion, because true cannot be contrary to true. But some non-good is evil, as injustice is non-good, which is evil. And therefore if those which have been stated were contrary, it would happen that contraries are true together, which can never be in any matter. Moreover, to that true opinion which says that non-good is non-good, neither can this be contrary which says that non-good is non-evil. For these two are also true together: for it is indifferent that it is non-good and it is evil. Therefore from all these things it remains that to that true opinion which is of the non-good, that it is not, this is contrary which says that non-good is good. Similarly also to that which says that good is good, that one is contrary which says that good is not good. And thus by opposition of affirmation and negation of the same thing and according to the same thing contrariety must be taken.

## Notes

[1] Opinions are not contrary because they are about contrary things, but because we do not opine them in a contrary mode; and in this appears the solution of the question of the text with respect to opinions. (*Opiniones non sunt contrariae quia de contrariis rebus; sed quia non eas opinamur contrario modo: et in hoc apparet solutio quaestionis textus quoad opiniones.*)

[2] Whence it follows that this proposition, "good is good," is truer than this, "good is not evil," because the former is true through itself and first, while the latter is only true through another, that is, by reason of the former. (*Unde sequitur quod ista propositio, bonum est bonum, est verior quam ista, bonum non est malum, quia prior est vera per se et primo, dum posterior est tantum vera per aliud, id est, ratione primae.*)

[3] It further follows that this proposition, "good is not good," is more false than that one, "good is evil," because the second is not false except by reason of the first. (*Sequitur adhuc quod haec propositio, bonum non est bonum, est magis falsa quam ista, bonum est malum; quia secunda non est falsa nisi ratione primae.*)

[4] If contrary is taken for something common to the truly contrary and the contradictory, as D. Albert says at the end of this chapter, this argument seems to be nothing, because nothing can be assumed which does not have a contrary in this way. It is answered that here he does not take contrary broadly in that way at the beginning of this argument, because he is speaking about incomposites, when he says "in those which do not have a contrary," etc. But D. Albert says that contrary here is taken broadly, and he understands this about contrary as it belongs to complex things, namely for a contrary proposition; and the sense is that contrary, that is, a contrary proposition, is taken for what is common to a truly contrary proposition and to a contradictory proposition. Jammy. (*Si contrarium capiatur pro quodam communi ad vere contrarium et contradictorium, ut dicit D. Albertus in fine hujus cap., ista ratio nulla videtur esse; quia nihil est assumere quod non habeat contrarium hoc modo. Respondetur quod hic non capit contrarium illo modo large in principio hujus rationis: quia loquitur de incomplexis, dum dicit in his quae non habent contrarium, etc. D. Albertus autem dicit contrarium hic accipi large, et hoc intelligit de contrario prout convenit complexis, scilicet pro propositione contraria: et sensus est, quod contrarium, id est, propositio contraria, capitur pro communi ad propositionem vere contrariam et ad contradictoriam. JAMMY.*)

## Chapter VII, Conclusion of Perihermenias

and not according to contrary things which are enunciated about the same thing.

It is also manifest that there is no difference with respect to the taking of contrariety, even if we posit affirmation universally: for to this universal affirmation a universal negation will be contrary, just as to that opinion which opines that every thing which is good is good, or that every good is good, that opinion is

contrary which opines that nothing of those things which are good is good, or that no good is good; for that opinion which is about good, saying that good is good (if good is taken universally), is the same as that which says that whatever is good is good, or that every good is good. And so it holds in the non-good: because if we posit non-good universally, or for every non-good, it is the same to say that non-good is non-good as to say that every non-good is non-good.

On account of this, if in opinion or in conception of the soul it holds in such a way that affirmation is contrary to negation, and contradictory, as has been said, then in vocal enunciation the opposition of contrariety and contradiction must be taken in the same way, and not in contrary things enunciated about the same thing: for affirmations and negations which are in voice are signs of those affirmations and negations which are in the soul, as has often been said. Therefore it is manifest that contrary to an affirmation is that negation which is about the same universal taken universally, as to that one which is, that every good is good, or to that one which is, that every man is good, those are contrary which say that no good is good, and that no man is good. But the contradictories of these two are those which say that not every good is good, and that not every man is good. Moreover, it is manifest from the things said before that a true opinion or enunciation cannot be contrary to a true opinion or enunciation. For contraries are those things which are opposites concerning the same subject. But concerning the same subject it is indeed possible to say truly several things about the same thing, as that good is good, and that it is not evil, and that it is not non-good, and in several other ways. But contraries which are truly and primarily contraries cannot belong at the same time to the same thing; and therefore both true contrary things cannot be at the same time: on account of which true things are not contrary to true.

And attend that in this last chapter almost everywhere we take contrary broadly, which contains under itself contrary and contradictory; and this was done for this reason, because we showed that contrary in enunciations must be taken according to the mode of affirmation and negation, and not according to contrary things enunciated about the same thing. But that mode is the same with respect to affirmation and negation both in contraries and in contradictories, except that in contraries, because they are universal, negation negates the predicate materially by regarding the subject for the distributed parts. But in contradictories the negation is formal and not material, and it negates the predicate of the subject taken according to form.

Now therefore two parts of logic have been completed, namely concerning the science of coming to an unknown incomplex thing through definition received through division, and concerning the science of interpretation. For in general everything through whose knowledge someone can come into cognition of the unknown must be interpreted. And because everything which is required for interpretation has now been set down beforehand, we must reach toward the nature of syllogism and demonstration through which someone can come into cognition of the unknown which is complex.