

St. Albert the Great

ON THE SIX PRINCIPLES

Liber de Sex Principiis

Translated from the Borgnet edition of the Opera Omnia (Paris, 1890–1899) — volume 1, pp. 305–372

English translation

Mind of the Church — mindofthechurch.com/albertus — edition build 2026-09-01

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Book on the Six Principles. Tractate I. On Form, chapters I-VI · 3	
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate I chapter VII; Tractate II on Action, chapters I-VI · 13	
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate II chapter VII; Tractate III on Passion; Tractate IV on When, chapters I-IV · 25	
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate IV on When, chapters V-VI; Tractate V on Where, chapters I-V · 35	
TRACTATE VI. ON POSITION. · 46	
TRACTATE VII. ON HABIT. · 52	
TRACTATE VIII. ON MORE AND LESS. · 57	

Book on the Six Principles. Tractate I. On Form, chapters I-VI

BOOK ON THE SIX PRINCIPLES.

TRACTATE I

ON FORM.

CHAPTER I.

Why this book is called the book of the six principles.

Although concerning the order of predicables it has already been determined in the Categories sufficiently, so far as belongs to the intention of the logician, nevertheless for easier teaching, so that concerning each thing it may be known what things are predicated, and in what way each predicable in genus and species and individual is ordered to one common thing (which is their principle), we shall again determine specially concerning the six, concerning which in the book of the Categories there was only a brief treatment and by way of example. But as in the book of the Categories we have followed and pursued the knowledge of Aristotle, so in this book we follow Gilbert Porretanus, who discovered and composed those things (which are said about the six principles) for an easier understanding of the things which seemed to have been stated succinctly in the book of the Categories; although they could have been omitted, nevertheless on account of the usefulness of students we have undertaken this labor. Therefore we also explain these things with the others for the instruction of students.

It is asked, however, why these six are called principles, when the other four, concerning which it was said in the book of the Categories, have been called categories. Many indeed have assigned many reasons: for according to the doctrine of Porretanus the ten first genera are the ten principles of things, in which every resolution stands, and which, by their essentiality, are constitutive of the first essences, and which by the scope of their commonness contain all things that can be ordered to the determination of predicate and subject. Concerning their coordination, as we have said, one must treat in the first part of logic, because reason does not gather except the things which it has set before itself, nor does it compose except the things which it has first ordered according to the ratio of comparable things. On this account the ratio by which ordering takes place was first handed down in Porphyry. But ordering insofar as it is in ordered things is handed down in the science of the book of the Categories, and in the science of the six principles, and in the science of divisions. But since every ordering of subjects and suppositis is toward one thing and stands in one thing, that in which the ordering stands at the summit is the first and the principle of all the others. But genus is called so insofar as it is the first formable subject for the determination of all the things contained in the form of species and individual. But principle is said insofar as it is the first thing constituting and essencing all things which are of its coordination, in which it itself is contained according to act and understanding, as principling their essences.

But although all the most general things are called so in this way, nevertheless certain things are called genera more and more properly, and certain things rather principles. For substance, quality, and quantity are called genera more, because absolutely in these the things contained by them are contained in act and understanding; this is proper to genus according as genus is that under which species is placed. But principles are so called as a consequence, because they do not principle simply and with respect to being, but rather conversely with respect to being they are principled by their inferiors. Relation, however, is a genus in this way as the others are, and not so properly as the others can be or can be called a principle, because according to being it is always founded in something else, and more often it is founded in other genera and in the things of other genera.

But the remaining six are not properly called genera, because they are not said to be simply contained in others according to act and understanding as something that belongs to their ratio, as is clear by induction of

each of them. For action does not say what is contained in the substance of others, nor does passion, nor where, nor when, nor position, nor habit: but they are said in some way to stand in the manner of a principle of that of which they are. For action, since it is in act, says the principle from which an agent effects that which it does. Likewise passion, since it is in the patient, says that by which the patient is moved to the form of the agent, and it does not say what exists as belonging to the ratio of some substance; and therefore passion by its own name does not say a genus, but a principle. The same is true of where, because it proceeds from place, and place is not a principle except of that which is in place; but the located thing is compared to place when it is in where. Therefore, since where belongs to extrinsic things, but genus belongs to the intrinsic things of substance, it is named more as a principle than as a genus. In the same way it is with when, which proceeds from time. But time is the number of motion; motion, however, is the act of that which is moved, leading it to the form of the mover. And therefore when, which is in that which is in time, by comparison to time, likewise does not name anything of substance that would be as a genus, but names a principle through motion, of which it is the measure. Position, however, says the ordering of parts in place and in the whole, and it says a principle more than a genus, because motion and action and passion, transforming the things in which they operate, are the cause of the order of parts to the form of the whole; and therefore position does not say what the positioned thing is, but according to its own name, which is position, it says the principle of the essence of the whole which is principled from the position of the parts in the whole and in place. Habit, however, in relation to that of which it is the habit, says nothing that is the what of the haver, according as a genus is the what of that of which it is the genus, but it says the principle of preservation of the haver. And on account of this, while the others say principles with respect to the being of the things of which they are, this last says the principle of preservation. Therefore they are rather called principles than genera. On this account also they are rather forms, that is, remaining outside, than they are essences.

These things, however, can be understood thus. For the six are principles either for being or for well-being. If for being: either from the part of the agent, and thus it will be action; or from the part of that which is acted upon; and this in two ways, namely according as it is receiving the act of the agent, or according to the effect which follows the act of the agent. If in the first way: either according to the very action which the patient receives, and thus it is passion; or according to the measure adjacently present from without, or according to the effect which action makes in the substance and parts of the patient. If according to the adjacent measure: either it is according to the measure of action or passion according as it is of this, and thus it is when; or according to the measure of the thing suffered, or of that which suffers, and thus it is where. But if it is according to the effect which the agent makes in the patient itself, then it is position, because from the action of the agent and the passion of the patient the parts are situated in the thing suffered for the reception of the form which the agent impresses, and one is made above, another below, one on the right, and another on the left, according as the power of the agent operates in it. But if it says a principle not for being, but for well-being, thus it is habit. Yet although in this way by their own names they say principles, nevertheless the things signified by their own names predicate principles of their coordination insofar as being is signified by their names, and the things contained in act and understanding in that of which they are predicated are called genera. Therefore by their own names they are called principles, and the things which they signify are genera.

But if someone asks in what way this science, which is about the six principles, is one, one must say that these six are united in the intention of principle, and so nothing prevents one science from being about the six.

But as in other matters, so also in these, the mode of philosophy must be held. For it belongs to the philosopher, as Aristotle says, to accept only demonstrative discourse, so that namely passions and differences may be demonstrated of the subject and of the parts of the subject, for having perfect knowledge

of the things that are handed down. And therefore also the definitions of each must be set down, from which, as from means, everything that must be taught may be proved. For in this way the soul is perfected according to its contemplative part, which is the ultimate of its happiness, as Aristotle teaches ^[1].

But what certain people say about art, namely whether philosophy proceeds in the manner of art, is foolish, because art is only in things made upon exterior matter, since Aristotle says ^[2] that art is a principle productive with reason, and in this way to make is not to act.

CHAPTER II.

What form is, and in what way it is treated here.

Therefore, wishing to determine concerning the six principles, all of which are forms and as it were extrinsic to those things of which they are, because they are not of the being and substance of those things of which they are, and form is called, as Plato says, as though remaining outside, we must begin from the determination of form, so that it may be known from what, as from a first genus, they receive their origin. For Boethius says at the beginning of *On the Trinity* that those things are not properly called forms except those which are separate; but those which are in matter are properly called images, because they are produced in relation to those forms by assimilation and imitation. But all these things which we call principles are outside the substance of the agent, and passion is nothing of the substance of the patient; and it is similar concerning when and where, neither of which is anything of the nature of those things which are where and when. Position, however, is extrinsic on this account, because it says the order of parts in place, and this is outside the substance of the parts and of the whole. But concerning habit there is no doubt that it belongs to extrinsic things. Therefore, since all these remain outside, all these, according to the name of form, participate in the predication of form, and as they are called principles, so also they are called forms.

But form spoken of in this way cannot be determined unless form is defined generally and by the definition one arrives at the intention of the form about which the intention is. Therefore, speaking generally about form, we say, according as the logician ought to speak about form, that form is something contingent to composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence; for we define form by a logical definition. For speaking logically, form is an intention which gives the formal being of the whole, and the very notion of the whole, as has been said in the science concerning Universals. But I say that it says the being of the whole, whether this being is substantial or accidental, whether it is potential or actual being, as animal says the potential being of the whole, and rational says the actual being of the whole human. But human says the whole composed from both; white, however, says the accidental being of the whole; and risible says the accidental being of the nature and species as a whole.

But this kind of being is nothing other than contingent to composition, that is, to the composite or from composition, because if it were contingent to a part of the composition or of the composite, it would not be predicable of the whole, nor could it be called the notion of the being of the whole. And I say contingent, not because this form always continges, or comes to the composite accidentally, according to that which is form, because in this way there is species, or accident, or property, or difference, or genus, and therefore it does not always contingently belong, but sometimes is substance. But it is contingent for this reason, because the mode of receiving it as it is the notion of the whole is always accident and always contingent. For there is a universal which is before the thing, and this is the cause of the thing per se or accidentally. And there is a universal which is in the thing, and this is the substance of the thing or of the accident inclined toward substance. And there is a universal which is after the thing, and this is the universal separated from the thing itself by understanding, and this is contingent to the thing and is accidental to the thing; for this is nothing other than the reception of the universal form without this here and without this now. This reception of the thing is simple and separated from the particular and from particulars; and in this way form is called the universal which the understanding orders in genus and species, and whose coordination it reduces to a

category or to a principle. And in this way form is the formal being of the whole received through understanding, which cannot be received in the ratio of a form that is the form of a part, because this form belongs to matter in the particular and is not predicable of the whole. Thus, therefore, form taken in common with respect to the substantial or accidental being of the whole, predicable of the whole and not of a part, is form which is contingent to composition.

But what is added, that it consists in a simple essence, is added for this reason, because although such being is of a composite whole, nevertheless it is received from the part of form and not from the part of matter. But it is not received from the part of form insofar as the part is a part of the composite, but it is received from form insofar as form is the cause of the whole being, encompassing the whole and terminating it to being. And because that form is nothing except form, although it is of the whole, therefore it has no principle of composition in itself, but is a simple essence, although it is not the essence of a simple thing, but of a composite. For in this way matter is not a simple essence, because matter at least potentially has part and part; but form has part and part neither potentially nor actually. And therefore this belongs to form and not to matter.

But if it is objected that species is form and nevertheless has a part, because it has genus and difference, we say that those parts are not divided in the species, because the same thing which is in the genus is as confused and indeterminate, and in the species specified and determined. But genus says it as confused, difference as determining, and species as determined; and these do not differ in formal being, although they belong to different things, just as the determinable nature differs from the nature of the determining thing and from the nature of the determined thing. Difference is determining and does not determine except through the formal which is in act, and it determines the formal which is in potency. And determined species says nothing except the formal thus determined. And if it said anything else, genus would not be predicated of species, nor would difference be predicated of species; and therefore it is established that these three say the same formal thing. And because difference is in the genus by potency, and to be by potency in another according to the potency of the formal cause is to be in it according to inchoation, and the inchoation of form and perfection are the same in the substance of form, diverse in being, therefore one and the same thing is in potency and in act. And therefore that definition is one and many; and in this respect, according to substance, essence is simple, although those things are in it which differ in nature according to them. And therefore it is said that form consists in simple essence.

But it is invariable, because nothing is varied according to mutation except matter or a subject composed from matter and form; but form, insofar as it is universal form, is neither of these, and therefore in itself it is an immutable essence. It is varied accidentally, however, when sometimes according to the being which is in this or in that, it is generated or corrupted. But we are not speaking here about the variation which is according to accident. It is proved in another way also that form which is a universal, whether it is accidental or substantial, is contingent to the composite and is not the composite. For such form is not composition or a composite, because each composite, coming to another composite, makes something greater either according to essence or according to quantity. But form coming to composition makes something greater least of all; therefore form is not a composite, but is contingent either to the composition or to the composite^[3]. But that form coming to the composite does not make something greater is proved both in accidental form and in substantial form. In accidental form, because in the fact that something is white it is not said to have been made greater or lesser than if it were not white, but it is said only to have been altered. But in substantial forms, because in the fact that body and soul conjoined is a human being, it is not said to have been made greater or lesser, but perfected in the form of the species.

Yet this has a difficulty: because a universal form coming to something is a certain essence, and therefore that to which it comes seems to be increased according to essence. To this one must say that the universal is posterior to that of which it is the universal, although the universal nature itself is prior to that of which it is

predicated; and insofar as it is universal it has only intentional being, or, as Boethius says, notional being. This is not being according to nature, and therefore as a notion it adds nothing essential to that which exists according to nature. But this is plain to understand from those things which have often been said in the science concerning Universals.

But since concerning certain other things which are universal forms the same thing can be put forward, namely that in this they are simple essences, because they are not composed of matter and form, as in the soul of a human being, which is not composed in this way, therefore in the definition it was said, consisting in invariable essence. For in the soul of a human being, according to the sensitive part which is in it, alteration of contrariety is found according to the motion of passions, such as of sadness and joy; for although the motions of the passions of joy and sadness are conjoined and not of the soul as of a subject, as Aristotle says ^[4], nevertheless, as Averroes says, in these the soul suffers together with the body, and thus is varied in some way, and therefore it is not form as we speak here about form.

Further, since, as certain people say, there is something which is a subject for the simple, and is subject to no variation, as they say in the case of that which is the soul of the world, which they say is both simple and invariable, therefore, so that I might separate and divide this form about which we speak here from all others, I added contingent to composition. For what and of what sort the soul of the world is is long and difficult to determine, and belongs to the first Philosopher according to that part in which he determines about primary and universal causes. Nevertheless we say briefly that it is not the first cause, nor is it some intelligence, but the mover of the first movable thing, which is for itself the principle of life and motion in all things, as is said in the book *On Causes*; and this soul is not contingent to composition or to a composite, but is the form of one thing, which is the first heaven. On account of this, it cannot be a form which is universal being, because a universal is a form contingent to the composite, and is not the form of a part, as has often been said. Therefore the definition previously introduced and given of form will be a term; for that definition is called a term which includes the terms of the being of that defined thing. For this definition will be seen to contain neither something superfluous nor something less than suffices for declaring the being of form, if someone wishes to investigate subtly and not superstitiously.

Yet this must be noted: the things that have been said are not true of substantial form, nor of accidental form, but are true of form which is a universal, whether it is substance or accident, insofar as it is predicable as genus, or difference, or property, or accident in whatever genus or principle of predicables.

CHAPTER III.

On the difficulty whether form is variable.

It has, however, a difficulty occasioned from the things said before. For we are speaking of form insofar as it is common to the accidental and substantial, and insofar as it is a universal predicable either in what or in quale, because it is signified as the notion of the whole being of a thing, according as even speech is a form, and whiteness is predicated of that whiteness, and according as formal reason and opinion is a form of the soul, predicated of this or that reason or opinion. Therefore, in saying about such form that it is invariable, there seems to be an objection in many cases. For it seems that many forms are variable or mutable into contraries. For the same speech is receptive of truth and falsity: "me to be sitting" is wholly true while I sit, and the same is false while I do not sit. Likewise also the same whiteness is receptive of clarity and obscurity. And the formal reason or one opinion seems receptive of that truth which is in the thing and of falsity which is not in the thing, although all these are forms, notions of the whole being, and predicable of the whole; and thus they are contingent to composition.

But to this it is said, as has been said, that form consists in invariable essence. And what is said about whiteness is not as it is said. For the same whiteness, according to that which is form, is not receptive of clarity and obscurity; rather, there are two whitenesses in the subject, of which one is clearer and the other

more obscure from the opacity and clarity of the subject. For it makes no difference to say clear whiteness and to say a subject or receiver that is clear, since whiteness according to the being of whiteness has itself as one and the same in the same way. For it is obscured and clarified from the obscurity or clarity of the subject; and that which is more obscure by it is not the same whiteness in number as that which is clearer. And similar to this is what is said in the fifth book of the Physics ^[5], that the same health is not in the morning and in the evening, because in the humors of the animal the same equality does not remain, although the receptive subject of health is the same in the morning and in the evening, yet not under the same form of health.

Likewise also, in the same way, reason or opinion and one speech in number is not receptive, according to a mutation of itself, of truth and falsity, namely that which is in the thing or is not, but rather, as the Philosopher says ^[6], speech which is in voice is the mark and sign of the passions which are in the soul, which passions have been brought into the soul from the forms of things conceived. And therefore truth in reason or in the mind or opinion is the adequation of things or opinions or concepts. And falsity in the mind or opinion is the inequality of the mind and things. And similarly truth in speech is the adequation of the sign signifying a thing in voice and of the thing signified. And therefore it is changed from true into false not according to its own mutation, but as signs are changed through the mutation of those things to which they are referred. Therefore in the fact that the thing signified is or is not, in this the mind or opinion and speech are true or false without any variation of opinion or speech. And Boethius gives an example of this: when one thing remains immobile and another crosses to the opposite side, the one who previously was left is made right, without any variation of his own, from the change alone of the other which is referred to him, as right or left according to position. But concerning these things we have spoken elsewhere.

Yet it must be understood here that there is a twofold truth in speech. For there is the truth of the sign insofar as the sign is referred simply to the act of the sign, and not to signifying this or that, as a true sign is said to be one that does not fail in the act of signifying. And this truth, as Anselm proves, speech does not lose because of the change of the thing signified. For this speech, "me to sit," is a true sign of this, that I sit, whether I sit or do not sit; for it always signifies that I sit, and in this it does not fail, because it signifies this rightly and truly, because it received this to signify insofar as it is a sign. For a true sign is what rightly signifies that which it has to signify, and in this it does not fail. But there is another truth in the sign related to signifying this and adequate to it, as this speech, "I sit," is adequate to the thing while I sit; and this is changed by the change of the thing itself, and of this we speak here, and not of the first. For the first remains immobile while the sign remains. On account of this certain people also thought that the first truth is truth, and one and the same in all true signs, although this is doubtful; since a sign is right and true when it signifies that which, in the first truth instituting and ordering all things, it received to signify, and thus the sign becomes the rightness of the sign related to the first exemplary cause of itself. Nevertheless relation can be numbered beginning from the first truth, and thus it is one; it can also be numbered from the part of the related signs, and thus it falls into multitude, and thus it is numbered simply. Therefore simply it is many, and according to something it is one.

CHAPTER IV.

What the substantial is, and consequently what the accidental is.

But since every form which is a whole and the notion of a whole, and which is predicated of something, is either substantial or accidental, we must here speak of what the substantial is, and consequently also determine what the accidental is. Therefore we say that the substantial according to its name is that which has the mode of substance in that to which it is substantial; and this sometimes is substance, and sometimes is not substance according to matter, yet it has the mode of substance. It is substance, indeed, when it is in the genus of substance, as animal is both substance and substantial to human, and human is both substance and substantial to Socrates. And similarly rational is substantial to human and to Socrates. But sometimes it is not substance while having the mode of substance, as color stands to whiteness, and as quality stands to color, or

the disgregative of sight stands to whiteness, and as being an extremity of the transparent stands to whiteness, and as being an extremity of the transparent stands to color. For genus is substantial as matter, and difference is substantial as form. Yet substantial is said otherwise, namely of what is in something as a per se cause, as risible is called substantial to human because it is in the nature of human as a per se cause; and that is neither substance, nor does it have the mode of substance in constructing substance, but insofar as it belongs to inhere inseparably, it has the mode of substance. Further, in a fourth way, what is present in the definitive ratio in place of a difference is called substantial, although it is nothing of the essence and being of the thing itself, as nose is substantial to snub, eye to bleary-eyed, shin to lame, and back to hunchbacked, and generally substance to its proper accident.

And because in this way something which is not substance is sometimes called substantial, yet has some mode of substance, therefore Boethius says that the substantial is a middle between substance and accident. But it is not a middle said by the denial of both extremes according to its own proper nature and entity, because such a middle cannot exist, since everything that is is substance or accident according to the nature of its own entity. Rather, it is a middle because something participates in both, as we have said, for it has the nature of accident and the mode of substance.

But in opposite modes the accidental is said, namely that a nature sometimes is substance and has the mode of accident, as something extraneous which is in or belongs by the favor of another, as a sixth finger, which, although it is substance, nevertheless because it does not come to be through the formation of the hand, but through abundance of matter, is therefore accidental. There is also accidental what has the nature and mode of accident, as the whiteness of Socrates; or what inheres and not through a per se and proper cause.

Therefore, since substantial and accidental are said in these modes, we say that the substantial is what confers being upon composition, that is, upon a composite from a certain composition. But I say that it confers being, as genus or matter does, and as difference or form does upon the composite, which is composed from genus and difference or from matter and form. And I say from a certain composition, because true composition is indeed from matter and form, which are divided from one another by nature, and neither is the principle of the other. But a certain composition, and not simply composition, is from genus and difference, because difference, just as in inchoation, is essentially in the genus, and the genus is its principle from which it is drawn out by the agent intellect; and on account of this it does not make an absolute composition. And therefore the defined thing from genus and difference is one and not many, for the same thing is in potency and in act, nor is difference another essence except what is contained in the formal potency of the genus. This, therefore, is the substantial in most cases, and it is impossible for this to be absent from that thing to which it is substantial. But this is clear in formal things, as reason inheres in human and sense in animal, or things similar to these in others. And in accidental things, indeed, an example is that in continuous things the continuous is line, surface, and body; and the discrete in discrete things is speech and number. But if what has been said is substantial, namely what confers being on a thing and what cannot be absent from a thing, then among substantial things one is as matter, and one as form, as body is substantial to human as matter, soul is substantial to human as form, and as body is substantial to human, so also soul similarly is. And because logical or rational composition corresponds to natural composition, therefore reason or rational would be substantial to human, and animal as genus likewise. These things, however, have been expounded elsewhere in the science of the book which is inscribed *On Categories*. But it was fitting to say something about these here, because through these we receive how certain principles have to be ordered in the six principles, and certain ones excluded from the coordination of such things. For whatever things depend in such a way upon some principle that the principle confers being upon them, and that their being cannot exist without that principle, without doubt these belong to the coordination of such principles. But the things which do not regard them except perhaps accidentally are ordered to another as to genus and principle; or perhaps according to one thing they are in one, and according to another thing they are in another. For

nothing prevents one and the same thing from being in diverse categories according to the diverse things that are in it; of these one perhaps is substantial, but the remaining one accidental, as a white two-cubit body, which, insofar as it is body, is in substance; but insofar as it is white, is both quale and quality; and insofar as it is two cubits, is in the category of quantity. And this has already often been determined elsewhere, both in the *Isagoges* and in the *Categories*. Therefore for this cause the substantial and accidental have been introduced here by us.

CHAPTER V.

On the origin of forms, whether they are from nature or from the operation of art.

But it seems that a certain form, whether it is substantial or accidental, which is taken as a universal and as the same with the whole of which it is predicated, is produced by nature; but a certain form is produced by act or by the operation of art. For reason or rational form is produced by nature in the rational thing itself. Likewise also the things which are in the forms of accidents: for color is a natural form produced by nature. And likewise another passion in the genus of quality, such as color, odor, and flavor, and things of this kind, and health and sickness; for in all such cases it is clear that these forms, both substantial and accidental, are from nature. But other forms are from act or from our operation, such as house, cup, bed, and things of this kind. In certain cases there is a doubt whether they begin from nature or from act or work of art, as in the figure of incision, as when a stone or a Hector is sculpted. For in such cases the ratio of doubt is that because such figures are from nature, this seems from the fact that art in such things adds nothing to matter, and therefore what was in it by nature remains; because what art does in such things consists wholly in taking away and separating certain parts from the subject. And because it adds nothing from the work of art, it does not seem to be from the work of art in the figured thing. And therefore such figures seem to be from nature and not from art.

But to this one must say that in such cases this is the subject of the figure, and the matter of the figures is not from act or from the work of art. But that the figures are sensed and appear is from act or from the operation of art. For that which is in matter is wholly from nature, to which nothing has been added by art. But a thing separated from it is added. And if from those things which are natural in the whole some things are separated and nothing is added to them, the things which are left are natural and are from nature. Therefore such a figure, according to all the things which are in it, seems to be from nature. But that it is sensed by sight as terminated by lines in this way or that way cannot be except from act and the operation of art, because nature did not make such a termination of lines. But what is said has the same force as if it were said that the matter of the figure is from nature, and the figure itself, insofar as figure is the termination of quantity, is from act or from the operation of art. And this is the truth, because although art adds nothing material, nevertheless by separating it contributes to the being of the figure, to whose formal being the separation of parts contributes more than the placing-on of some matter, because we do not say that a figure is such a what that has matter from which it is, but only matter in which it is. But to the formal being of figure, removal or separation of material parts contributes more than the gathering of some material parts.

But although we speak thus about the figure of incision which consists in the separation of the parts of the subject, nevertheless it is established that whatever of such figures is of conjunction and not only of separation, as we speak of the figure of a house, of a bed or of a tripod and things of this kind, because in these art operates something by way of placing-on, these are from act and are from the operation of art, not of nature. Thus, therefore, one must speak concerning the figure of incision, which is produced into act by incision of parts alone. Thus, therefore, the things that are like a figure of incision are manifest. And therefore Empedocles said that in all things which receive form from art, nature is matter, but form is an accident^[7]. If the wood of a bed is planted, a bed will not sprout, but wood will. Therefore, since nature is that from which the sprouting thing sprouts, the nature will be the wood, and not the form of art which is in the bed.

But such a determination does not hold in common or universal things, which are in many and are of many, and which are predicated of them. For the common or universal essence of those things which are in many, predicated of them, cannot be from the operation of art, because it is impossible for such an essence to be from the operation of art, since every form of art is an accident; but such a form is substantial and inheres per se in those things of which it is the form. Further, such a common form does not seem to be made by nature, for this reason, that the things which are produced by the potency of nature seem to be made by the act of one creating and generating, and take their principle from the one creating or generating. But what belongs to one creating and generating is then always particular and not universal. Therefore they are not from the work of nature, as we see. But if it is said that creatures are universal and common forms of this sort, immediately it can be plain to anyone that this is not true, because since the term of creation or generation is not universal but particular, nothing can be assigned in the way of reason, nothing in the way of example, as to how the common thing has been created or generated. Therefore it is necessary to say that forms of this kind are natural and perfected by nature, and not by the operation of art or by proposal.

But it seems one must say that nature operates hiddenly in such things, and this is a particular nature: in the agent and patient, indeed, it intends this one and produces it; but the universal nature which orders this one to divine being intends the simple and universal. And because universal nature operates in the particular, therefore since particular nature produces this one, and because this one is a human being, universal nature produces this one in human, and so in other cases. And in this way, consequently, that which is universal is produced, although it is not universal according as it exists in this thing, as was said in the science concerning Universals. But a universal is in aptitude for existing in many or in several things. But when matter is actually divided through generation, it is made in many things in act, and nature does this hiddenly.

But nature is said to operate hiddenly in these things for two causes. One of them is that acts always belong to particulars. And therefore a particular nature operating is manifest. But when a particular nature operates, it operates only by the power of the universal nature which is hidden in it, and is considered only by understanding; and thus universal nature is operating hiddenly. The second cause is that what is operated by nature is a particular manifest to the senses; but that by which that thing has the form of species and nature is hidden and consequently generated, and therefore this one generates this one, and this is manifest. But because this generating one is a human being, therefore this one generated is a human being, because otherwise generation would not be univocal; and this is hidden with respect to us, received only by understanding; and therefore we say that nature operates hiddenly in such things. For just as from the conjunction of many things having one ratio of unity (as many horses or many humans) a certain constitution of discreteness is effected, which is formed from the prior things from which that conjunction is made and which exceeds the discrete quantity of each one of them, so that all together are of greater quantity than each single one of them; so from the discreteness of singulars which are one in species or genus, when they are compared with one another in the form in which they are essentially similar, one thing common to all is understood. Yet this is whole in the singulars, and exceeds the predication of the prior singulars in this, that any singular is predicated of one alone, but that thing which is their likeness is predicated of many. On account of this every such commonness is natural, because it proceeds from singularity, that is, from the essential likeness of singulars. And thus singularity in one is a like cause of commonness. But nature is the cause of such a singular. And therefore nature is the cause of commonness, because whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused by that cause in some way. But singularity is coequal with creation or generation, because the term of generation and creation is a singular.

But those speculating subtly find nature operating in the operations or actions of art, because in animals lacking reason we find nature attaining to the work of art, as in the little dwellings of bees and the nests of swallows; and nature has this insofar as it is the work and instrument of intelligence. Thus also we find the first creator of all creatures operating in the creature. And we grasp this from the very act of the creator. For

we see that by a certain number and proportion he established all nature, which proportion belongs only to the wisdom of the creator. For that intelligence operates toward this proportion of this or that nature, it does not have insofar as it is intelligence, but has insofar as it is divine; for this is the wisdom of him who disposes, produces, and orders all things by their proper proportions. But let these things, said thus far by us for the explanation of the things said, suffice. For these matters belong to another and higher inquiry; indeed they also belong to that part of first philosophy which is about universal and first causes.

CHAPTER VI.

On the division of predicable forms, concerning which there is intention here.

But with these things thus determined concerning predicable forms, the division of forms must be received, so that it may be known concerning which forms there is intention in this book. Therefore let us say that form which is universal, whether substantial or accidental, is one kind in a subject as an accident, and is said of another as of a subject, which is its subjective part, and is said or predicated in what, as indeed science is in a subject, in the soul, in the same way as an accident is in a subject, and is said of a subject, as of grammar, which is a species of science and a subjective part. And such a form is a universal accident compared in quale to the subject in which it is, and compared in what to the species which is subject to it. But a certain form is in a subject as an accident, and is said or predicated of no subject or subjective part, as the whiteness of Socrates. And likewise whatever forms are like individuals: for these are compared indeed to the subject in which they are, and they are predicated of it in quale; but they cannot be compared to that which underlies them, because nothing underlies an individual, since it itself is the ultimate thing underlying. But certain of such forms are said of a subject, yet are in no subject, as substantial forms which are not in a subject as an accident, because they confer toward being and are part of that which is the being of a thing. They are said of a subject, however, because they are predicated in substantial quale, as difference is, or in what, as genus is. And an example of this form is rational and mortal, and the other substantial differences.

But of those forms which indeed are in a subject as accidents and are unsayable of a subject, because they contain nothing substantial as a subject for themselves, as individual accidental forms do, some are sensible, that is, perceptible by a proper or common sense; others are insensible, which are perceptible by no proper or common sense. For the sensible is what is comprehended by some sense, as the whiteness of Socrates, or the taste of this thing, or heat, or also striking. These are perceived according to the sense of touch; or striking, which is this or that sound; or sweetness, or odor, or anything of such things, which is perceived by proper or common sense, as magnitude, or figure, motion, or rest, number, or something of such things. But insensible things are those which are comprehended not by sense, but by simple reason or understanding, as teaching and discipline, which are in the soul according to understanding. And likewise also virtue, whether intellectual, moral, or even economic. For none of such things is perceptible by sense. But simply or universally nothing which is of the number of those things which are said of a subject, or which is universal as universal, is sensible. For a universal, insofar as it abstracts from this and from that, exists only in the understanding. And therefore Boethius says that the particular exists while it is sensed, the universal while it is understood. But all these things have to be determined and declared in the matters that belong to the soul.

But from these things which have now been set down here by division, it is manifest that certain things which are of the number of particular forms are situated somewhere according to a determinate part in the subject in which they are, as blackness is in the pupil of the eye. But certain of such particular forms are of such a sort that it is difficult to assign according to what part of the subject they are situated, as science, paternity, and like things, as filiation. Unless perhaps it is said that they are situated in the complexion of generating and composing things. For paternity certainly is a form of relation which inheres according to the whole, and not according to a part. The cause of this is that it is born into the generator from the act of active generation. But the act is of the whole and not of a part. Likewise filiation is according to the whole to the one who is born, on account of passive generation, which belongs to the whole. Nevertheless these are situated according to

cause and not according to subject in the complexion of the generator, which complexion is the cause of the complexion of the seed; and according to cause they are situated in the composition of the generators, which composition is attended to in the position and order of the members in which seed is manifested for generation, as are the members which are called seminal vessels. But science, received according to act, has no position; but received according to aptitude, it is situated in the complexion of the knower, because people of subtle humors and spirits are more apt for knowing. On account of this Alexander also said that the potential intellect is a certain preparation in the body ^[8]. Nevertheless some say that science is situated in the whole and not in a part, because in it there is the understanding receiving as the light of intelligence and the phantasm from which it receives; and thus it is said to be in the whole which pertains to the one understanding, because it is neither without soul, nor without body, nor without intelligence. But concerning these things we need not be much concerned here, because they are not to the purpose.

But this must be noticed: each of the things that have been said is a certain notation or mark or name of an incomposite thing which is in voice. For each of them is the mark of an incomposite voice, and is not signified by a composite speech. But what is thus marked by an incomposite voice will either be subsistent, that is, substance, or contingent to another, that is, accident. But of those things which are contingent, that is, which befall a subject, each one either comes to substance extrinsically, that is, through an extrinsic cause; or it is considered simply according to being and cause within substance, as within the substance to which it inheres, line, surface, and body which is in threefold dimension are considered according to being and cause. For quantity is caused by matter and belongs to things measuring intrinsically. Likewise also it is so concerning qualities, which are caused by form and dispose substance intrinsically. But of those things which are contingent upon substance or come to substance extrinsically according to substance, they are either act which is to act, or to suffer or passion, or disposition or position, or to be somewhere or where, or in delay or when, as formerly, yesterday, today; because, as Priscian says, time is the measure of mutable things, and as when is caused by time, or is taken according to having. For there are not more extrinsic accidents of substance, and therefore there are only six principles. But this has already been proved in the preceding parts of this book. Concerning those predicables which subsist, as substance is and the things that are contained in the genus of substance, there has been sufficient disputation and determination in the book which is called or inscribed *On Categories*. Likewise also concerning those things which do not come extrinsically, but exist only according to cause and being in those things in which they are through existence, and similarly concerning something, which more often arises through intrinsic things. But concerning the remaining things which more frequently come to substance through extrinsic things, which also for that reason do not have the name of predicables, but of principles, because they do not predicate something inhering simply, but something that stands in some way toward another, it will be spoken continuously in what follows.

Notes

[1] Aristotle, *Ethics* 10, chapter 10. (*Aristoteles, 10 Ethic. cap. 10.*)

[2] The same, *Ethics* 6, chapter 5. (*Id. 6 Ethic. cap. 5.*)

[3] It is customary to object concerning water added to ash or flour. See D. Albert, *Physics* 4, tractate on the vacuum, chapter 1. (*Solet objici de aqua addita cineri vel farinae. Vide D. Albertum, 4 Physic. tract. de vacuo, cap. 1.*)

[4] Aristotle, in the first book *On the Soul*, text-comment 12. (*Aristoteles, In primo de Anima, tex. com. 12.*)

[5] Text-comment 37. (*Tex. com. 37.*)

[6] In the first chapter of *On Interpretation*. (*In cap. primo Perihermenias.*)

[7] A saying of Empedocles and also of Averroes, *On the Soul* 2, comment 8. Compare further *Physics* 2, text and comment 13. (*Dictum Empedoclis et etiam Averrois, 2 de Anima, com. 8. Cf. adhuc 2 Physic. tex. et com. 13.*)

[8] On this opinion of Alexander, see *On the Soul* 3, comment 5. (*De hac opinione Alexandri vide 3 de Anima, com. 5.*)

Book on the Six Principles, Tractate I chapter VII; Tractate II on Action, chapters I-VI

CHAPTER VII.

On the discovery of form, for the understanding of the things said.

Marginalia: Exposition of certain men; Rejection of the exposition; Exposition of others.

For the understanding of all the things that have been said, one must know that the Stoics first discovered the name and account of form, and before them those Epicureans who were philosophers referred every cause to matter. For seeing that there is nothing in matter by which that which is formable is formed, and that formable matter cannot be the cause of the form forming itself, they said that forms are separated from matter: because whatever forms are in matter have been introduced into matter, and therefore they cannot be causes of the formation of matter. For that which through itself and substantially and according to itself is the cause of formation is not formed, but forming according to itself; and therefore they posited such forms, forming indifferently, to be outside matter, and to exist separated in the light of the first agent intellects: from which, as from a certain seal, the forms of all things which are formed must be produced.

But these forms thus remaining outside and forming all things, they said to be expanded with the very light of the agent intellects over the things to be formed; and therefore they said that such forms are incorruptible formal principles, through which true science and knowledge of things is had, just as by the light of the sun color is expanded or poured over colored visible things, according to those who say, as is also true, that colors are not in darkness, but at the coming of light are expanded over bounded bodies. On this account the Pythagoreans also named color epiphanium, that is, supereminent. In this way, therefore, they said that material forms are poured from separated forms through the light of the agent intelligence, and therefore that material forms are not truly called forms, but images of true forms; but that both the separated forms and their images are predicated of things: the separated forms indeed, because in matter, through the light of intelligence, which is penetrative of things, they are poured into all things and make being, and are principles of knowing those things; the images, however, because they are likenesses of those forms, and are in matter according to being, and are changeable according to the change of matter. But that the images are principles of knowing the things of which they are forms, they have this from the separated forms, which are stable and certain causes of things ^[1].

Therefore some say that this sort of form is the form which is contingent to composition, because it is diffused over the composite by the light of intelligence; and that this is the one which consists in simple and invariable being, because that which is in the light of intelligence is simple, and that is invariable which is not varied by the variation of matter. For although matter is varied under that form, nevertheless the form itself rests only on the light of intelligence and is not varied, just as we see in art that, when colored things are varied, colors are not varied, because they rest only upon light, which is in the transparent not insofar as it is an element, or something made of elements, or a body changeable according to form, but insofar as the transparent communicates with the perpetual higher body. But this exposition of theirs does not fit the present purpose, because such a form is not divisible into substantial and accidental, nor into universal and particular.

Therefore others say that the form which is contingent to composition is accidental form. For an accident is that which is in something that is perfect according to being, as Avicenna says. And therefore it is also an accident because it follows upon whole and perfect being. And because that which is perfectly is composite, therefore they say that this form is contingent upon composition only according to substance, so that composition according to accident always presupposes for itself composition according to substance. But in what way this form consists in a simple and invariable essence is not easy to prove, since an accident, as Aristotle proves in the eleventh book of First Philosophy, is not essence but being; nor is it altogether a simple essence, since a subject is always in its account; nor can it be altogether invariable in being, since according to being it always rests upon that which is continuously varied. For this reason Aristotle says ^[2] that health is not the same in the morning and in the evening, because health rests upon the complexion of the

animal, which is continuously varied on account of the continuous action and passion of agents and patients. Further, this accidental form does not receive the divisions of form in general which have been introduced.

Therefore it is necessary to say that the form about which we have spoken is the form which is universal. This form is the form of the whole, and not of a part, and the composition itself in the composite is material in relation to it, just as the composite from a rational soul and a material body is material in relation to human being. For otherwise it would not be predicable, unless it were an intention not of a part but of the whole; and this is the form of reason and logical form. But the form which is a principle in physical things is the form of a part and not of the whole. And because this form is of the whole, therefore the definition which belongs to such a form says the quiddity and contains within itself both potential and actual things, and both material things referred to form and formal things referred to matter, as rational and mortal animal: for animal is potential and material, but the others are actual or formal. This, therefore, is to be contingent to composition in the way that has been said, at least to the composition of that which is and that by which it is, concerning which there must be a full determination in the book *On Causes*. And this form consists and is an essence resting on the light of intelligence, and consisting invariable through itself or through its own proper being, but varied accidentally according to the being which it has in this or in that. This form also is divisible by every division of form which has been determined. And this is the form by reason of which everything that is ordered in genus or species receives the account of its own coordination. Therefore everything that has been said here about form must be understood of this form.

TRACTATE II

ON ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

Whether action is a category or a principle.

Marginalia: From what action is caused; First objection; Second; Third; Fourth; Why action was first among the principles; To the first objection; To the second; To the third and fourth; Action belongs to the perfect, but passion to the imperfect; Difference between to act and to make.

Therefore, with these things that are said about form thus set beforehand, it remains now to speak about each of the things that have not been discussed in the *Categories*. And first concerning action, which among the others seems to agree with those things which befall substance extrinsically. For it is caused by the natural potency of a thing; but natural potency is rooted in the very substance of the thing. And note that certain people say that action is not a principle, because a principle posits nothing before itself as a cause preceding it. But action posits before itself, according to understanding, both the agent and the natural potency of the agent.

They also say that Aristotle seems to say ^[3] that action and passion are the same in number, just as the road which is from Thebes to Athens is the same in number as that which is from Athens to Thebes. Thus, since action is the comparison of agent to patient, and passion conversely is the comparison of patient to agent, action seems to be the same in number as passion. And so those two principles must not be called two, but one and the same in number, diverse nevertheless by their terms.

Further, because motion is the act of the agent by which the patient is moved, and is the act of the patient by which it is moved by the agent, motion seems to be one nature of action and passion; and things of which there is one nature are one. From this it seems that action and passion are one principle and one category, and that this category is motion.

Further also it seems more fitting that motion, rather than action, should be a category, because motion is the act of the mover in such a way that according to it a moved substance acts; and thus motion seems to be the cause of action into that which is subjected, because if it did not move, it would not act upon it. Therefore

motion is the cause of action, and thus a principle with respect to action. Therefore it seems more fitting to say that motion is a category than that action or passion is.

But to these and similar points one must say that action is a principle and the first among the principles, as has been said, because it is caused from the intrinsic formal principle; but passion is caused from the intrinsic material principle, and therefore it is related to substance in a posterior way. And because a composite substance consists of the formal and the material, and in every nature, as Aristotle says ^[4], there is something by which there is acting, and something by which there is suffering and becoming, therefore to act and to suffer are proper to substance. And as for what he says, that action posits something before itself, namely natural potency, one must say that it is true that it puts natural potency before itself according to the efficient cause, but it does not put it before itself as the formal principle of its own commonness. But the efficient cause, because it puts nothing of itself in the effect and is not the cause of the unity of a thing nor of diversity in the effect, does not for this reason prevent action from being able to be a principle, and from being the formal principle of the whole of that coordination which its own thing names as to make or to act. For these are coordinated not in the category of quality but in the genus of action; for in this way the ten genera are called the first principles of things, because they are the first forms, to whose mode of predication all things similar to them must be reduced, as things coordinable into that common form.

But concerning the objection that action and passion are the same, one must say that they are the same only in matter, which is indeed that in which action exists as in the subject to which the action of the agent is directed and at which it is terminated, and the very same matter is the subject of passion. But on account of such identity of matter, it is not necessary that the same formal principle be the principle of action and of passion, insofar as one is action and the other is passion. For this is impossible. For the formal modes of action and passion are opposed. For the mode and form of action is like that of impressing and flowing in; but the mode of passion is like that of what has been impressed or flowed into. On this account also the words signifying these things are diverse categories or principles ^[5].

And concerning the objection about motion, one must say that motion is not as one nature and one form of the mover and the moved, nor of the agent and the patient. For it is a perfect act insofar as it is the act of the mover and agent; it is also an imperfect act insofar as it is the act of the movable and patient. And because it does not belong to both as one nature, therefore it cannot be the cause that action in the agent and passion in the patient are one principle or category. Motion also in itself is not of one form and nature, because it is not of some perfected species of being, but a flowing from nature into nature, from form into form, and from potency into act. And therefore through the unity of the nature of motion nothing can be proved about the unity or diversity of principles or categories.

And concerning the objection through the likeness of a road of two termini, that action and passion are the same in number, one must say that it is not similar, because in a road the substance of the matter and the substance of the form remain the same, having nothing diverse except termini; but motion does not remain the same according to form. Hence what is blackened and what is whitened are changed according to different forms. And similarly what is suffered compared to the agent, and the agent compared to the patient, are according to a different form; on account of this they are diverse categories. For action always belongs to the perfect, insofar as it is in the agent as in cause and subject. Passion, however, always belongs to the imperfect, insofar as it is in the patient as in subject and movable thing. Therefore from all these things that have been said, it remains that action is a special category.

But to act differs from action in this, that action names action as conceived; but to act names action as exercised. And in this second way it is a category, because in this way it names a special mode of predication, which cannot be reduced to any other of the ten modes of predicating. This mode, as it is designated by a word, gives a first word which is one of the ten words signifying one of the first genera. But action as designating a concept does not name that mode of predication, and therefore by the name action

that principle is not properly designated; rather it is named verbally as to act by signifying verbally, because it does not designate action as exercised.

It must also be attended to that although to act, according to Aristotle in the sixth book of the Ethics, differs from to make ^[6], for to act is done by an action pertaining to will or choice, but to make is to operate upon alien or extrinsic matter; nevertheless, as to act and to make are taken here, they are received as the same. For they have one common mode of predication, to which all their predicables are ordered according to genus and species. For everything which proceeds continuously from an agent or one operating into a patient is here called action or to act. And this is what Averroes says, that action is the effective comparison of agent to patient. For thus action is a flowing operation from agent into patient; and therefore, because it is the form of the agent flowing into the patient, the patient is moved, just as a generator through itself or accidentally moves that in which it introduces its form. And this mover is the agent, and the motion of the mover is its action. And likewise the one understanding is an agent, and to understand is an action; and the maker is an agent, and to make is its action. And within this scope of commonness, to act or to make names a certain most general genus and principle; and the word itself signifies one of the first things which, by its own commonness, embraces many things, such as genera, species, and individuals, in one coordination contained under the first common thing. Its subalternate genera are to act, when it is properly received that action is an operation of choice. And the other genus is to make, according as to make is to operate by art in extrinsic matter. But the species are, for example, to cut wood or bodies, and to burn, and things of this sort. But the individuals are, for example, this or that cutting made by Socrates, and other things of this sort. Therefore this accidental category is reducible to no other genus, and according to this mode action is in the agent as in cause, not indeed as standing and resting in it, as quantity or quality or relation does, but it is in the agent as proceeding and flowing from it continuously into the patient.

Further, it must be attended that the form of each thing perfect according to form is called act, and from act the verbal noun action is formed; and therefore action is an operation proceeding from the agent into the patient according to the form of the agent. And therefore form is always the principle of action. Thus, therefore, the category or principle of action must be understood.

CHAPTER II.

What action is according to definition.

Marginalia: First objection; Second; Third; Fourth; Fifth; Solution of the first; To the second; To the third; To the fourth and fifth; Objection; Solution; Objection; Solution; Objection; Solution.

But action, received in such most general commonness, is defined by Gilbert Porretanus thus: Action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected. This description, of whatever sort it is, is an assignment that gives greater declaration than the name. And when it is said, according to which, the mode of a formal cause is imported. For the agent is informed by action, since action is nothing except the effect of the process of the potency of the agent according to the form which is the principle of action and passion; because every action, as action, passes into a patient, and every active thing is transitive in this way. But because it passes into a patient, therefore there is added, into that which is subjected. For the patient which receives the agent's action is subjected to the agent. And the virtue of the agent prevails over it and through action impresses form upon it. And because the virtue of the agent penetrates into the patient and transforms it, therefore it is said, into the patient, and not toward the patient or upon the patient. But it is said, we are said to act, so that it may be denoted that the agent is denominated in this way from action, just as denominated substance receives the predication of an accident; and thus the agent is denominatively said and predicated from action, and this is the predication of an accident concerning the subject in which it is ^[7]. For this subject is the cause of action; for in this way the subject falls into the definition of the accident, as Aristotle teaches in the seventh book of First Philosophy ^[8]. Thus a cutter is said into that which is cut; and thus a burner is said into that which it burns, because burning proceeds from it into that which is burned; and

so it is in other cases.

There are, however, certain sophists objecting against the introduced assignment, saying that the quality which is a natural potency is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and thus natural potency seems to be action.

Further, form is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and thus form seems to be action, which is false.

Further, art is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and so art seems to be action.

Further, an instrument, such as a sword or a spade, is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; therefore an instrument seems to be action.

Further, the hand or foot is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; therefore such a member seems to be action.

But all these and things similar to them are solved through the explanation introduced for this assignment, namely that when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected, this phrase which I say, according to which, marks the formal denomination of the agent, as from cutting one is called cutting, and from burning one is called burning, and so with the others. And in the actions of the soul, from teaching one is called teaching, and from understanding, understanding, and so with the others. For although this is not without passion, because to receive is to suffer, nevertheless insofar as to understand is the actual process of the intellect into the understood thing, those are called actions by which the agent is denominated. This, therefore, is the solution to the foregoing, because according to natural potency we are not said to act according to act. But note that natural potency is the potential principle of action.

Likewise also what is objected about form is solved: when it is said that form is that according to which we are said to act, this phrase which I say, according to which, does not mark that which formally denominates what is an agent according to act, but then marks that which has been perfected so that it can act; and therefore the form which is the principle of action is not denominated as an agent according as it is an agent in effect.

In this way also what is objected about art is solved, because art names only the faculty for action, and does not name that which is actually acting.

Likewise what is objected about the instrument is solved. For the instrument does not make the agent act, nor does it denominate it, but it names a middle cause helping in the action. And therefore this phrase which I say, according to which, is not taken univocally in the definition and in the objections against the definition.

But if someone objects by saying that this phrase which I say, according to which, is indefinite, and therefore is not a cause of knowledge but rather of ignorance, whereas definitions are made as causes of becoming known, and thus this phrase which I say, according to which, cannot be definitive of action, then one must say that because action is one of the first principles, it cannot have something defined and certain by which it may be defined; but it can have something indefinite, which nevertheless is determined finitely by the things placed in the same expression. And in this way, being determined and defined, it can be a principle of becoming known.

And if it is objected that the same thing is placed in the definition of itself when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act, for to act and action do not differ in reality, although they differ in the mode of signifying, one must say to this that to act, by its mode of signifying, names action as exercised, and in this way it is better known to us than when it is signified as a certain concept; and thus to act is placed in the definition of action as diversified.

But if someone further objects by saying that this definition is not valid, since it has not been given through genus and difference, for definitions ought to be given through genus and difference, let the one who objects in this way attend that we said that this definition is not properly a definition, but said that it is an assignment of whatever sort, which gives greater declaration than the name. But such assignments are not given through genus and difference, but through other things, such as accidents, or cause, or effect, or sign. And generally they are given through all those things through which in some way the thing assigned can become known better and more expressly than it becomes known through the name. Thus, therefore, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected.

CHAPTER III.

On the division of action into action of body and action of soul.

Marginalia: What action of the soul is; What action of the body is; Objection; Solution; Another way; Doubt; Solution; Doubt; Solution; Objection; Solution.

But action, received thus in genus, is divided into action of soul and action of body, or into animal action and corporeal action; for these are the first and formal differences of action. And in this way action of the soul is called every non-corporeal action, whether it belongs to the intellect or to the soul, as to vivify, to move insofar as the soul moves by progressive motion, or by vegetating, or by sensing, for this is to vivify; and such action is non-corporeal, because it is not according to some form of body, and when it names the agent, it does not denominate it by some corporeal form, but by the form of some life, as living, or directing, or increasing, or something of that kind. But action of body is denominated from corporeal form, as something is called heating, or whitening, or something of that kind. Therefore these are the first differences and species of actions, containing every action under themselves. For every action in this way is either animal or corporeal. And these are the subalternate genera and subalternate species of this category.

But action of body differs from action of soul in this, that action of body necessarily moves that very thing in which it is as in cause and subject; and that thing is not an agent unless it acts by its own motion; and while existing immobile it acts nothing, because, as Aristotle says ^[9], if it does not touch, it does not act, and thus alteration does not follow. And because a body does not act except by its own motion, it is necessary that in corporeal action the agent itself be movable, and that the body in which the action itself is, as in an agent denominated from that action, be moved: just as one cutting does not cut unless he is moved, and one burning is moved by the active burning itself; for he must approach that which is burned, and to approach is to be moved. Therefore that which acts by corporeal action is found to be moved in some way. But when the soul performs such incorporeal actions, it is immobile and is not moved; nevertheless it moves the body by vivifying, and when it moves according to place in progressive motion and in other motions of life, the soul itself is immobile. The cause of this is that every action of life is essential to it, and the soul through its own substance and according to itself moves by the motion of life, and does not need to be moved toward something by which it would receive a form or place according to which it would become the principle of motion. On this account it acts with the proper action of the soul without a motion by which it would be moved. But action is not in body in this way, because body through itself is not an agent principle; and therefore it needs a motion by which it is moved toward the form by which it becomes an agent principle, and thus it needs an instrument which receives the form of motion from the one who uses it. And therefore the hand, first moved toward the form of the mover, is moved so that by the motion of the body it may introduce the form of the first mover into the patient. But animal actions are simple actions of which the soul through itself is the cause; and therefore in such actions it is not necessary that the soul acting be moved. This, therefore, is the difference between actions of soul and actions of body.

But that the soul is immobile by the motion of body is proved by induction. For while the soul acts, it does not move that in which the action is, as if it moved the soul, but the conjoined thing. But the soul itself, while it acts, is immobile; and although it is immobile, nevertheless it moves the body by the motion of life and by

motion according to place if it is a perfect soul. But the soul remains immutable in itself and is not moved by the motion by which it moves. And therefore in its own order it is proved to be a moving principle. For the soul is not moved according to place, nor according to any of the other motions, by receiving increase or decrease, since it is not quantified. Nor is it moved by rectilinear motion by passing from one place to an opposite place; for place, locating, is a body, whose locating surface is place, and it does not locate in itself except something to which a beginning, middle, and end are assigned according to the parts of the circumscribing place. But the soul is not a body, nor does it have beginning, middle, and end according to the termini of place. Therefore it cannot be moved according to place. And on account of this the soul can receive no change of place; for something is not moved according to place in this way unless it is a body, and it is moved according to place in that it passes from place to place. Therefore the soul is not moved in any way, except perhaps by the motion of alteration, which motion nevertheless, as we said in the foregoing, belongs not to the soul, but to the conjoined thing, in which nevertheless the soul somehow communicates, as was determined in the foregoing.

Yet certain people object against the foregoing, because the higher bodies move the lower bodies, and nevertheless they are not moved by that motion. But if the higher bodies move, it is established that this is a motion of body, and they do not move by corporeal motion. But to this one must say that the higher bodies move by the motion of the virtue of their movers, and thus they act moved and acted by the motion and action of their mover. Or let it be said that such motion belongs to the virtue which is from species; and thus, although it belongs to body, nevertheless it is not of corporeal quality but of incorporeal virtue. And therefore in it there is no need for body to be moved, because it is not corporeal action, but incorporeal.

Further, it seems doubtful that seeing, hearing, tasting, and imagining are actions of the soul; and nevertheless in all these the thing in which the action is is moved, and it is not immobile. But this is easy to solve: for actions of this sort are all truly and according to matter passions, because they all consist in body rather than in action. And when in such things there is that which is moved, it is not moved by physical motion, but rather by motion of intention, which is motion according to reason.

But if someone asks what sort of division this division of action into action of soul and action of body is, one must say that if body names only an agent, and soul likewise, then the division of an accident is into subjects. But if soul names an agent, and body as agent names the form of action, so that action of soul is action according to the account of animal, while action of body is corporeal action, then the division can be that of genus into species; and so it is taken here. And therefore we said that this division gives the first subalternate genera in this most general thing which is action. This therefore is the division of action, so that action of soul is of an immobile agent, while action of body is of a moved agent, because a body does not act unless moved.

But certain people object against the things that have been said, saying that substance insofar as it is substance is neither active nor passive, because action and passion belong to contraries, but substance does not have a contrary. Therefore it seems that action belongs neither to soul nor to body insofar as they are of this sort. To this one must say that, as was said before, action here is taken broadly, according as to move also is to act. Action of soul is the same as to move; and thus to act belongs to the soul. But if action is taken strictly for physical action, then it is true that action belongs to contraries and is between contraries. Therefore, with action accepted broadly, substance acts, because, as Damascene says, there is no substance which is deprived of its proper operation. And therefore Aristotle proves that each thing has an act and a proper action to which its virtue is ordered.

CHAPTER IV.

On the image in a mirror, where there seems to be an instance against the foregoing.

Marginalia: Objection of the text; Solution of the objection.

Against the things that have been said, namely that a non-body cannot be moved by a body, there seems to be an instance. For there is a difficulty in certain cases whether it is generally true that a non-body cannot be moved by a body, because, while the mirror, which is a body, remains immobile, there seems to occur in the mirror a motion of an image, which is not a body, toward opposed changes according to place. For it seems to be moved from right to left at the motion of the beholder of the mirror, and from depth to surface if the beholder of the mirror approaches and withdraws from the mirror. Therefore a non-body is moved by the motion of a body according to place, so that beginning, middle, and end are assigned to it according to place. And if indeed it is granted that the image is in the mirror as in a receiver and as in a place, then it will be impossible, or very difficult, to solve the difficulty, because then it follows that the image is moved by the motion of the mirror; for as Aristotle says ^[10], when we are moved, the things which are in us are moved, and when a vessel is moved, what is in the vessel must be moved. But if the image is said to be in the mirror, the mirror will be the place of the image like a vessel. For there is place as place, and there is place as vessel, as has been proved in the fourth book of the Physics ^[11]. But if the image is said not to be in the mirror, although this is in some way true, nevertheless among the unskilled crowd, which follows the judgment of sense rather than reason, this will be an intolerable error, because sight announces that the image is in the mirror.

But to solve this difficulty one must use the things which have been more subtly declared in the book *On Sense and the Sensible*. For light, through the fact that it is a celestial form, whose being is spiritual, has the virtue of conferring spiritually transparent being upon that which materially exists in a terminated material body. But a terminated, polished, and scraped transparent thing has the property of reflecting the light falling upon it to a pure angle. Here, therefore, it happens that light or illumination abstracts the image from material being, and gives it spiritual being in the transparent, and this is the being of light or illumination. Therefore, when it falls upon the terminated mirror, since it cannot conduct the image through the mirror, it is reflected by the customary surface of the mirror; and thus the image appears under two positions: one, indeed, of the light falling from the beholder into the mirror, but the other position of the light reflected from the mirror to the beholder. And therefore that image is indeed in the body of the beholder materially. But in the light of the transparent thing which is the medium between the beholder and the mirror, it is as in a bearer and according to the spiritual being which it has in the light of the transparent. But in the mirror it is as in that which terminates the incident ray and reflects the reflected ray to the beholder.

On this account it is not moved by the motion of the mirror because it is not in it as in a subject, but only as in that which reflects; and therefore it is in it according to the point at which the reflection occurs. And the quantity of the image which appears is intentional quantity and not quantity extended by measure. But the intention of quantity is indivisible and inheres according to the indivisible; on account of this the whole hemisphere appears in a small mirror and in the pupil of a mouse's eye, which could not be if the image had extended and material quantity. For since in the angle of the ray falling on the surface of the mirror and of the ray reflected from the mirror there is only a point, it is established that the image is seen in the mirror at a point, although nevertheless the whole quantity of the image is seen. And this cannot be except for this reason, that the image which appears is the intention of the image and not the image, as has been said. And because such reflection occurs at any point of the mirror, therefore the whole image is seen in any part of the mirror and at any point.

Therefore the cause of the image must be said to be that which is opposite the mirror; and when that is moved, the image seems to be moved. But the reflection occurs from the surface of the mirror in which the image is not as in a subject, but as in a point from which the reflection occurs. And therefore when the mirror is moved, the image is not moved, but in the same position points are successively set before it, from which reflection of the same image occurs continuously. And therefore the image of the mirror seems to stand immobile.

But as for what is said, that an incredible error would arise among the crowd if the image were not said to be in the mirror, it can be said that this is true if it were said in no way to be in the mirror. But we say that it is in the mirror according to some mode, namely as in something representing through reflection. Therefore it is clear in what way the proposition introduced still stands in truth, namely that it is impossible for a non-body to be moved by a body. Thus, therefore, it is clear that one action belongs to the soul and another to the body.

CHAPTER V.

On the property of action, that action is in motion and motion in action, and in what way motion is a *quale* and a quality.

Marginalia: Objection; Solution; Doubt; Solution.

But one must know that, since motion is the perfect act of the mover, and action is the effect of the process of the agent into the patient, by which the mover impresses motion into that which is moved and action into that which suffers; and thus by moving it acts, and by acting it moves; and thus everything which is in motion is in action. It is in motion according as motion is the act of the mover; and action indeed is proceeding from the mover into that which suffers; and thus to be moved by a mover is action impressed by an agent. Therefore if something is moved in this way, it necessarily acts, because by the virtue of the moving form it acts itself toward the form of the first agent, just as seed by the virtue of the generator acts itself toward the form of the first generator. Thus, therefore, in generating, every action, so long as it is in becoming from the agent, is in motion, which is the act of the mover in that which is moved; and every motion which is the perfect act of the mover is confirmed and stabilized in action which is in becoming, and is that which proceeds from the agent into the patient.

On this account the property of action, insofar as it is in becoming, is to be in motion, according as continuous motion is the process of the moving form into that which is moved; just as also conversely it is proper to motion, insofar as it is the act of the mover, to be in action according as action is the process of the form of the agent into the patient. For physical motion and action cannot be separated in this way; nor can motion taken generally be separated from action taken generally, because in this way to move is to act, and conversely. But this is plain in all those actions in which something is acted upon or generated toward the form of the agent, because in all these the continuous process of active and motive virtue into the patient and moved thing is action, and motion is form introduced after form, as Averroes says. And thus there is action after action.

But in the things which are corrupted, in which there is continuous casting away of substance, perhaps someone will object that there is not action there, although there is motion, because in such cases nothing is acted upon, as it seems, but rather what had been acted upon is de-acted or corrupted. And therefore the one who destroys is indeed continuously in motion and moves that which he destroys, but seems to act nothing; for he effects nothing in such things, but rather destroys that which has been made. But the solution of this is that action, insofar as it is the act of an agent, does not require what it acts toward the form of the agent, but rather requires upon what it acts, that is, into what it impresses its action. And that action, thus impressed upon the patient, it sometimes destroys, as when it finds the patient itself contrary to the form of the agent; and sometimes it constructs, as when it adapts the patient for receiving the form of the agent. And thus to destroy is also to act; and thus it remains true that what has been said is so, that every action is founded in motion, and every motion in action. But one must consider here that what has been said is not true insofar as motion is the imperfect act of the movable thing; because in that way to be moved is not to act, but to suffer. And if act in motion were in this way, since motion in this way is in the patient, it follows that action would be in the patient^[12]. And because that acts in which action inheres, it would follow that the patient would be agent, and action would be passion; all of which are inconveniences. And therefore the first thing is inconvenient, from which all these follow, namely that action is in motion insofar as motion is the act of the movable thing.

But although action is in motion in a certain way, and motion in action, nevertheless action is not motion, but a quale. This is proved from this, that to be at rest is a quale; on account of this also motion accepted simply is a certain quale. This is clear through this principle, that whatever things receive the opposition of contraries receive predication of the same genus, because contraries are in the same genus. And therefore, since to be at rest is a quale in quality, to be moved also will be a quale in quality. But action is not a quale or quality. Therefore action is not motion.

But it must be attended here that motion, insofar as it is the act of the imperfect, is in all genera, because in all there are potency and act, and potency going out into act is moved, and motion is its act. And since potency and act are of the same genus, just as imperfect and perfect are of the same nature, it is necessary that motion taken in this way be in all genera. But motion considered according to the species of the nature which is moved, or toward which there is motion, is in four genera, namely substance, quantity, quality, and where. But motion insofar as it is the form of the mover proceeding from the mover into that which is moved is quality, according to which the mover is called a quale; and in this way it is said here that motion is quality, and here motion is taken logically. For thus rest is a status in the form of the mover, which is to be a quale according to motion and the form of the mover.

But then perhaps someone will ask according to what species of quality motion is a quality. For it cannot be form or figure standing around something. Nor can it be passion or passible quality inferring or inferred, as is clear to anyone. Nor can it be natural potency or impotency, because this is rooted in substantial things. Therefore it remains that it is habit or disposition. And this indeed is true, especially insofar as motion is the act of the perfect, and the perfect is a habit; but insofar as it is the act of the imperfect and is imperfect, it is a disposition disposing and advancing toward the habit which is the perfect act.

CHAPTER VI.

On the property of action, that every action effects passion, and how it is generated.

Marginalia: A more remote doubt.

But the natural property of action, which is founded in the very nature of action, and which belongs to every action, to it alone, and always, is that which belongs to action: to bring passion from itself into that which is subjected to it as patient. But it is said from itself because it is the form of the agent insofar as it is agent. And therefore here this belongs to it according to the substance of action. For every action is effective of some passion, because otherwise it would not tend from the agent into the patient unless it were received for transformation in the patient; and such receiving is to suffer, and reception is passion. Therefore action effects passion, and everything which through itself and according to its own substance brings in passion is action. For although a sword and fire bring in passion, nevertheless they are not passions or actions, because they do not do this according to their own substance, but as instruments, as has been said in the foregoing.

But it happens sometimes that action is effected and caused by action, as the heating of fire is the cause that an ignited stone heats; as is also clear in those things which are moved through themselves, such as animals which have the principle of their own motion in themselves, and therefore are moved through themselves, as Aristotle says^[13]. For often the action of an animal which is moved through itself becomes effective of that action which is action through another. For example, an action inflicted by some animal, such as a push, or bite, or some impulse, is caused by the action of that animal itself, as by running, or walking, or striking of the foot, or even compression of the teeth, or something of this kind; and thus action effects action. For an action inflicted upon another takes its principle from that action which the animal does in itself.

And if perhaps someone were to say that the animal does not act in itself, but rather suffers, this makes no difference as to the proposed intention. For if it is said to suffer, it follows that this passion is the bringing-in of action. And what is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused thing; hence if passion is the cause of an exterior action, the action which is effective of that passion will be effective of that exterior action. And thus

it is held that action sometimes effects action, provided that the first act of the animal, or the first action, is the principle of the passion which is effective of the exterior action. Although act, which is the pure action of the agent, is the primordial principle, while to suffer, which is caused by action, is a mixed principle, because it both has been made and makes: made indeed by the first action, but making the exterior action; on account of this it remains that act, which is first action, is generative both of passion and of action. And an example of this is as when an animal walks, and by walking collides, and when collided strikes with horn or foot. Thus, therefore, it happens accidentally that action is productive of action; but through itself it is generative and productive of passion; and therefore it is defined through what belongs to it through itself, and is not defined through what belongs to it accidentally. But through itself that which is a quale and a quality begets and causes making from itself, as is clear, because heat is a certain quale and quality, and that quality from itself begets heating, which is to make and to act. On this account nothing is properly active except quality, as Aristotle says; and in the genus of active quality qualities are passions or passible qualities, if action is taken properly. But it suffices to say only this here, that quality is the per se cause of action, and action is caused by it, as has been said.

Nevertheless it does not follow that action is in the category of quality, because that which is the efficient cause of something is outside it, and therefore through it the thing is not placed in a genus. But if it were the formal principle, the very thing itself, then through it the thing could be placed in a genus or in a species. In this way, therefore, to make or to act is begotten by quality; and in this way it is not unfitting for a thing of one category to be generated by a thing of another category, although nevertheless on this account it is not in the same genus as that by which it is caused.

For thus position is effective of certain particular qualities, and also of certain quantities. For qualities considered in species, such as roughness, or the smooth, or smoothness, and things of this sort, which are called qualia from quality, are caused by position, namely from this, that parts on a surface are positioned according to equality or not according to equality.

Likewise also quantities considered in particular are effected by position, such as line, surface, and body. For when parts are positioned equally in the species of length, line is caused. But if they are placed toward two diameters, of length and breadth, a surface comes to be. But if toward three, body comes to be. Therefore, although quality and quantity are not generally caused by position, nevertheless in particular certain qualities and certain quantities are caused by position. Yet on this account they are not in the genus of position, as has been said in the foregoing. For all these things which have been said have their substance and generation from site or position.

Likewise quantity is sometimes effective of quantity, just as the line of a body makes breadth, and the threefold dimension of body makes in body, which is a substance, length, breadth, and depth. Likewise, however, quality sometimes.

Notes

[1] The Author seems to say the contrary of this in book 2 On the Soul, on text-comment 67. Solve this through the things he says there, through which he agrees with Avicenna and Alexander. (*Hujus contrarium videtur Auctor dicere 2 de Anima, super tex. com. 67. Solve per dicta ejus ibi, per quae concordat Avicennae et Alexandro.*)

[2] Aristotle, Physics 5, text-comment 37. (*Aristoteles, 5 Physic. tex. com. 37.*)

[3] Aristotle, Physics 3, text-comment 11. (*Aristoteles, 3 Physic. tex. com. 11.*)

[4] The same, On the Soul 3, text-comment 17. (*Id. 3 de Anima, tex. com. 17.*)

[5] Action and passion are the same in matter, although they are distinguished formally. (*Actio et passio sunt idem in materia, licet formaliter distinguantur.*)

[6] Compare what D. Albert said above, in the Categories, tractate 6, chapter 1. (*Confer quae dixit supra D. Albertus, in Praedicamentis, tract. 6. cap. 1.*)

[7] Here it is gathered that action is in the agent as in a subject, as he seems to allege at the end of the preceding chapter. (*Hic colligitur quod actio sit in agente ut in subjecto, ut in fine cap. praecedentis videtur allegare.*)

[8] Text-comment 17. (*Tex. com. 17.*)

[9] Aristotle, In book 16 On Animals. (*Aristoteles, In 16 Animalium.*)

[10] Aristotle, In Topics 2. (*Aristoteles, In 2 Topic.*)

[11] Comment 23. (*Com. 23.*)

[12] But on the contrary, that consequent does not seem unfitting, indeed necessary, as he himself said above in this tractate, chapter 1. Consider this point, and solve it from the things said above. JAMMY. (*Sed contra, istud consequens non videtur inconueniens, imo necessarium, ut dixit ipse supra in hoc tract. cap. 1. Considera in hoc, et solve ex dictis supra. JAMMY.*)

[13] Aristotle, In Physics 8, text-comment 27 and 28. (*Aristoteles, In 8 Physic., tex. com. 27 et 28.*)

Book on the Six Principles, Tractate II chapter VII; Tractate III on Passion; Tractate IV on When, chapters I-IV

Marginalia: Objection; Solution.

makes quality, and the heat of fire makes heat in water.

But site or position sometimes makes suffering and acting. An example of this is that, in the disposition of composable things in bodies which have been mixed from the contrary first qualities, there comes to be a certain continuous generation of the simple things themselves, which are mixed, one transforming the other. This generation or transformation must consist in motive action, so that continuously one moves the other, and is moved by it, and continuously one acts into the other and suffers.

But of that which is where, place is the cause, although place is quantity and where is another genus of category. But of that which is when, time is the cause; and these are diverse genera. Likewise, of that which is to have, as to be clothed or to be shod, the cause in some way is body, because habit is changed by the figure of the body and is sought on account of the body. And thus in many ways a thing of one category is the cause of a thing of another category. Yet on account of this the effect is not in the same genus as the cause.

But as for the individuals of substance which are not in a subject, because they are not accidents, the reason why they are first is corruption without generation, because the first things were created, and generation did not precede that creation, but corruption followed it. But corruption is the cause of such things, because if they could subsist in the being of the individual, they would not be generable; but because they cannot remain in the being of the individual, therefore they have been made generable. Hence generation was not indeed in the first created things, but generation was and is in those things which immediately subsist after the constitution of the first things. For at once in those things there was propagation of generation.

But of the common universals which are predicated of first substances and which are second substances, the first substances themselves are the causes according to being, from which there is no predication of any of these. Thus all particular humans are the generation of that human who is common to all and universal to all; for although according to act he is in each one, nevertheless insofar as he is actually common and is actually predicated of many or of all, then he must belong to each. And thus commonness proceeds from singularity, and is generated or effected from it.

But in all these things it must be considered that generation is sometimes univocal, as heat generates heat. Sometimes, however, it is equivocal, as position generates quality, and conversely. Sometimes generation is natural, as when line generates surface. Sometimes there is generation of reason and of some nature, as when the common is generated from a multitude of singulars.

But all these things have been introduced so that it may be known that the coordination of principles or categories is not this, that the account of order is attended according to efficient cause, but rather according to this, that the inferior encloses in itself the superior in act and understanding. For such an order necessarily stands in one highest thing which is the first principle of the coordinated things, and stands in certain lowest things which are not in the understanding of anything.

CHAPTER VII.

On the common properties of action and passion.

Consequently, after the things that have been said, action must be determined through properties, which indeed belong to every action, but do not belong to action alone; for the passions which are truly properties are postponed here for this reason, because they are truly proper principles through which those things that are causes must be proved concerning action. But in determining these things, we say that making and suffering receive contrariety, and receive more and less, or intension and remission. They receive contrariety both in the effect of actions and in substance and form. For in effect to cut, or to burn, or also to uproot, is contrary to planting, and thus action is contrary to action in effect; and likewise to be planted and to be cut are contrary passions in effect. But in the substance and form of action, to heat is contrary to to make cold, and to dry is contrary to to make moist; and in passions, to be heated is contrary to to be made cold, and to be dried to to be made moist. Thus also to burn is contrary to making moist.

Likewise action and passion receive more and less; for heating is said more and less. And heating is more intense and more remiss. Likewise it is so in passion, because to be heated and to be made cold is more and less by more intense and more remiss heating or cooling; and so it is in being dried and being made moist. And likewise in inflicted passions, as in being saddened and rejoicing, more and less is said.

But if someone says that sadness and joy are not passions which are in the category of passion, but rather are in quality, and therefore should not have been introduced here, we shall say to him that sadness and joy are not without motion and action of the heart and passion. For the heart in these acts and suffers according to motions which are called diastoles and systoles; and according to these they are reduced to the genera of action and passion. Therefore let these things said about the category of action suffice.

TRACTATE III

ON PASSION.

CHAPTER I.

What passion is insofar as it is a category.

Marginalia: Account of the order.

After the principle which is action there is placed the principle which is passion, as effect after cause. Therefore let us say that passion, which is a category, is the effect and bringing-in of action. For there are two things in passion, namely the form of the agent received by the patient, and in this respect passion is the effect of action. There is also motion insofar as it is the act of the imperfect and imperfect in the patient; and this motion flows continuously from the mover into the patient which is moved; and in this respect passion is the continuous bringing-in of action. And these two things together make this, because the assignment of passion is the effect and bringing-in of action. And as we said in the preceding things, this is not the true definition of passion, because the most general things cannot have a true definition; but it is an assignment of whatever sort, which gives greater declaration than the name. But just as in the preceding things it was declared that when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected, so we say here that passion is that which is brought in by the agent insofar as it is agent. And this is the form of the agent insofar as it is agent; and this is varied according to the form of the agent. And there will be one passion in the agent per se, another passion in the agent accidentally, another according to a univocal agent, another according to an equivocal agent, another according to action of soul, and another according to action of body.

But this is generally true, that passion is according to the form of the agent insofar as it is agent. And therefore agent and patient communicate in form, and the form which is the act of the agent is the passion of the patient insofar as it has been received from the agent. But in the agent it is as perfected; in the patient it is

as a way to perfection. And this is generally true, so that even one striking brings in a blow of the form imagined by him when he gave the blow. And therefore Aristotle says that in such things there is stroke from stroke, and wound from wound, and so with the others. This is the cause why certain people said that action and passion are the same, differing only by their termini. But concerning this enough has been said in the preceding tractate on Action.

Therefore passion is the effect and bringing-in of action, and according to this bringing-in of action certain things indeed suffer which are receptive or susceptible of the form of the agent and of action for their transformation; but certain things least of all, that is, non-passible things, namely those which are not susceptible of the form of the agent and of action for their own change, as those things of which there is not one matter, as Aristotle says. For these neither act nor suffer in relation to one another. But things of which there is one common matter act upon and suffer from one another. And therefore among those things certain ones are more passible by agents, but certain ones less, according as different mixtures and complexions are disposed for actions of the soul in diverse things according to the differences of admixtures and complexions. For as Plato says, forms also are given according to the merits of matter. And therefore brute animals receiving better and more equal complexions from the actions and passions of the first qualities are more animated, that is, more powerfully operating in the powers of the soul and in acts, than trees which have a complexion less passively brought to equality. And humans, because they have been best made passive toward the equality of touch, so that the mean of the complexion of the human is proportioned also to the equality of heaven, are still more animated than the brute in the nobler virtues of the soul and operate more nobly than brute animals. And as things are always better passively brought to equality through the action and passion of the first things that complexion, so they are more ready in the operations of the soul. For they are not called more animated in such a way that the soul, which is a substantial form, inheres according to more and less, for the donkey and the human participate in soul equally; but certain things are called more animated than certain others because they act more readily and more nobly according to the potency of the soul.

But all things which were said in the preceding tractate about Action or generation can be said the same way about passion, which is from that action whose effect and bringing-in that passion is: namely that it is confirmed in motion, but otherwise than action is. For action is confirmed in motion which is the act of the movable and the act of the imperfect; for that which is moved suffers and comes to be either simply or according to something, as that which is moved in place insofar as it suffers, namely by going out from potency into act, especially according as local motion is from a generator. But in other motions it suffers simply and according to the subject. Likewise, that which has been said, that there is action of soul and action of body, is similarly passion of soul and passion of body. Passion of soul indeed is that which begins from the soul, as the heart in motion, since it moves according to systole. It is similar in sadness and joy and hope; for in all these the soul, conceiving good or evil, also suffers in them. But passion of body is, for example, to be burned, to be made cold, to be struck, and things of this sort. And therefore the things said about action are said about passion, not indeed by a straight appellation, but by a transformed one: so that what he called active potency, this he calls passive potency, just as the appellation is changed when heating and being heated are spoken of, and burning and being burned, and so with the others. So also what has been said is this, that just as it is the natural property of action from itself to bring in passion, so it is the natural property of passion to be brought in by action. And so it is in all other cases. And in this way whatever has been said about action or generation can all be said about passion. But I say that action is a certain generation because in every action there is generation of the form of the agent in that which suffers, if it acts univocally. But if it acts equivocally, then it is action accidentally and not according to the intention of the agent; and one need not be concerned with this, because it is indefinite, unless perhaps the equivocal is reduced to the univocal; and then they are the same in reality. And then it will be generally true that the agent, insofar as it is agent, impresses its form in the patient.

CHAPTER II.

On the multiplicity of that which is called passion.

Marginalia: He removes a doubt.

But passion is of the number of those things which are said in many ways. For each one of the actions of the soul is called a passion; yet according to the intention of the category of action we place these under action, such as love, hatred, being saddened, and rejoicing, all of which we call passible actions of the soul. For all these are passions insofar as they have been brought in by things conceived. For conceived things are conceived either as good or as evil. If they are conceived as good, either they are conceived as present for use or enjoyment, or as absent. If they are conceived as present for use or enjoyment, the heart is dilated toward them and the spirit is diffused, and the heart is poured out upon them through diastole; and thus there is joy. But if it is conceived as not present, then the heart is directed toward it and the spirit is raised, and the passion which is called hope comes to be. But if it is conceived as evil, as contrary, then again it is conceived either as present and bringing in harm, or as future and expected. If in the first way, then it elicits the passion of pain or sadness. But if it is conceived as future, then it elicits the passion of fear. Yet in all these the soul acts by fleeing, or by contracting itself, or by opening, or by dilating itself toward use or expectation.

And therefore these are passible actions of the soul; and therefore they are passible, because they arise from the motions or actions of things conceived. But they are actions because in these the soul acts upon the body and moves the body according to systole and diastole, as we have said. Thus, therefore, action of the soul is called a reception of good or evil inducing flight or apprehension of the conceived good or evil. For thus to love is a certain acting induced by the passion of the loved thing, and to hate is acting induced by the passion of a present saddening thing. And in this way to be saddened is a passible action, and to rejoice in this way is an action induced by the concept of a fitting thing. And in this way to be delighted is an action of the soul induced from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting; on account of this Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Ethics* ^[1] says that delight is in the genus of operation. For he says that delight is the operation of a proper and connatural habit not impeded. And in this way passion is said from the Greek *πάθειν*, which in Latin sounds as to receive, and passion is everything that is brought into the soul from sensible things received, or from things apprehended otherwise, moving it to apprehension or flight. And thus the motion or flight of the powers of the soul moved in this way, by which they thus move bodies, are called passible actions; and thus passion is said broadly.

But properly passion ^[2] is said to be what acts upon nature or against nature as something contrary and harmful to nature, like that which punishes. For punishment is not called evil except because it is contrary to the good of nature and takes it away and diminishes it, whether it is the nature of the conjoined thing, or the nature of the soul, or the nature of the body. And thus passion is something dissolving the conjoined thing, or something introducing what is contrary to the nature of the soul, or distempering, or a division of the continuity of the body; as disease, fever, and sickness contrary to complexion or contrary to the composition of the body are called passion. And in this way passion is not said from reception simply, but is said from reception of a contrary and harmful agent toward the corruption of nature or being, according as Boethius defines being, saying: Being is that which retains and preserves order and nature.

Nevertheless we did not put this distinction of passion before the definition of passion, because the definition belongs to passion according to both modes of passion, according as passion is the effect and bringing-in of action. For passion, as has been said, is the first generation, that is, the first thing that is ingenerated in the patient from action directed to it from the agent. And although the form which is ingenerated in the patient is first in the agent, nevertheless on this account passion is not in the agent, because insofar as it is in the agent, it is agent, and action is its process into the patient. But insofar as it has been received in the patient through the action of the agent, thus it is passion and the disposition of the patient. Therefore this form is passion in that into which action is done, that is, in that which receives the act or action of the one operating or of the

agent as impressed upon itself by the agent. For the striker giving a blow is not said to suffer, but rather that which is as matter or the subject to the agent, which as patient receives the blow of the striker. And let these things which have been said about passion suffice. For the things which remain are treated and have been treated in the preceding tractate, which is on Generation or Action; for there it has been said how it receives a contrary and how it receives more and less.

TRACTATE IV

ON WHEN.

CHAPTER I.

What when is insofar as it is a principle or category.

Marginalia: What place is; What time is; What things are aeviternal; Time is not when; The instant is not when; What it is to be in time; What age is.

But when, insofar as it is a principle or category, is that which is left in that which is measured by time or by another duration from the duration measuring it in that which is thus measured. For it is not left only from the adjacency of time, but also from the adjacency of eternity and aeviternity, as will be clear below. For we say, God was, God is, God will be. And in all these we signify God to have been in the past, and when in the future and in the present. Therefore whatever is predicated in a temporal, eternal, or aeviternal thing, caused in it from duration, is called the most general when, under whose scope of commonness its genera and species and individuals are contained, just as the genera are to have been, to be, and to be going to be. But the species are then to have been, or now to be, or then to be going to be. But the individuals are this to have been, or this to be, or this to be going to be. And to this scope of predication many things are reduced which receive per se predication of no other genus, such as to have been formerly, lately, now, and the future distant or near. Therefore, because this genus of things, signified in this way by a first word, cannot be reduced to any of the other genera, it remains that it is through itself a category and the first principle of its own coordinations of predicables. Therefore this when is left from the adjacency of time, or of another duration measuring being.

Place is, as is said in the book On Intelligibles, the measure of a being which is not extended according to the duration of intelligence, but is received by the understanding as wholly at once comprehended in place. But time is the measure of being according to being, which is received as stretched out by duration, because being is the act of being. But the potency of being in all things is understood as stretched to the measure of duration, either through itself or through another. Through itself indeed in those things in which being is not wholly at once, but comes to be continuously. But toward another in those things in which being is wholly at once, which cannot be distinguished except toward lower things, whose being it exceeds according to indeficiency, as when God is said to have been, who was not absent, and God is said to be going to be, who will not be absent. But of those things whose whole being is at once, certain things are such that their being and possibility and act are all one at once, and the measure of these is eternity. But certain things are such that their being indeed is at once, and the possibility which they have for being, but their acting is not at once, as certain people say of intelligence; but the true and philosophical example is concerning the heavenly body. And these are called aeviternal by philosophers, and their measure is aevum. And from these, in those things to which these measures are extrinsically adjacent, there is left something which names the comparison of such duration from that duration itself, and the comparison of those things to duration; and this is called when. Because only time among these three is divided substantially and receives differences, according to which when itself is distinguished into species. For this reason when is defined not through eternity or aeviternity, but through time, because even eternity and aeviternity are not distinguished through formal differences except in relation to the distinction of time.

But what is said, that it is left from the adjacency of time, is not the same as from adjacent time, because from that way of speaking the infective mode of time is not determined. But when is the infection of time which it makes in the temporal thing, according as we say that one thing has been and another is, and we call one old and another young, not because old or young names when, but because old age and youth are caused from time through when, by having been for a long time or not a long time. But it is called adjacent because time is not some one of the intrinsic qualities, but rather something adjacent extrinsically, which is in a period according as it is the measure of the being of that which is; and therefore it is called adjacent and is not said to inhere. But it is called adjacent because it lies all around as a measure measuring the whole being, so that there is no part of being to which it is not adjacent, and in the whole being it leaves its infection according to the substance of some when caused by present, past, or future time. Thus, therefore, when is spoken of insofar as it is a category, and it predicates that thing which it leaves in the subject, according as the measure of duration is adjacent to that very subject. And this is what is said, that when is that which is left from the adjacency of time, so that time, for every measure which is extrinsically adjacent, according as that which is its measure will be being and not a being. For being is as the act of a being and not as a being; for as we have said, being is the act of the being which is; and therefore as it is act, it is referred to duration, while the being is enduring and having being.

And because cause is not effect, and when is what is left from the adjacency of time, it follows that when is not time, according as time and when have conjoined definitive accounts as effect and cause. This is clear because past time indeed is not when, but the effect of the past and the infection which it leaves in that which is past is when, as you were yesterday, or the day before, or a year ago, or formerly, or lately, or something of this sort. Likewise any instant or now is not when, but according to its act or acts it is equal or unequal, as time is said to be or to have been or to be going to be, and not when; because thus it is time as the number of that which is in time. But the effect of that equal or unequal time is when. For to be in time, as Aristotle says ^[3], is to be measured by some part of time; and thus unequal time, if it exceeds, is measurement, and according as it is adjacent in this way to the measured thing, thus it leaves infection in the temporal thing through motion, of which time is the number. And this infection, considered absolutely in the subject according to comparison to the difference of time from which when is left, is called age.

And the same instant is not time, but to be in the instant leaves the when of the present, as now to be. Although now is not time or any part of it, nevertheless, because now is adjacent to that which is moved, or to that which is, whose act is being to which time is adjacent; and therefore with regard to adjacency extrinsically it is not a difference of time. And therefore the instant leaves when just as the past does. Similarly future time is not when, but rather that which as temporal is future, because according to the succession of time it is necessary for it to happen by the necessity of motion and of the number of motion, according as something is said to be future. Thus, therefore, when is what is left from the adjacency of time from the future, as soon, or long after present being. Therefore from these things that have been said it is clear what when is insofar as it is a principle or category.

CHAPTER II.

On the species and differences of that which is when.

Marginalia: Eternity; Division of temporal when.

But the division of that which is when is multiple. The first is the division which is received according to the adjacencies of those things from which it is caused, as when it is said that one thing is when of eternity, and another is when of time. The when which belongs to eternity is, for example, when God is said to have been from eternity, and God always to be going to be, and God now to be. For eternity, although it is indivisible and simple and unextended, because it has nothing of itself outside the present now instant, and is not moving itself, nor extending itself by influx into some continuum which is in becoming as motion is, nevertheless, standing in its simplicity, it does not fail, nor is it absent from any present, nor was it absent

from any past, nor will it be absent from any future. Yet eternity is the measure of existing temporal and aeviternal things, not through extension, but through indeficiency. And therefore, of that of which time is the adequate measure, eternity is the non-adequate measure, but one exceeding according to beginning, middle, and end. And this is in the substance of all standing and necessary things according to that mode in which they are necessary. And because it is the measure of temporal things in this way, as we have said, on this account the when of eternity is distinguished accidentally into the differences of time, and that which is eternal is said to have been, to be, and to be going to be.

But here it must be attended that when it is said that God is, or the first cause which necessarily is heaven, and that generated thing is, this phrase which I say, when, signifies the when of eternity, because this exists in the measure both of the aeviternal and of the temporal, as has been said, and cannot signify the when of time, because time can in no way be the measure of the necessary or eternal. Likewise when we say, when heaven is generated, this very phrase which I say, when, signifies the when of aeviternity, not of time, because the aeviternal is a measure exceeding temporal things; therefore it can be referred to temporal things. But time is not the measure of aeviternal things, and therefore the when of time signifies nothing in aeviternal things. And thus it is distinguished toward the differences of time through indeficiency, just as the superior measure, exceeding and undivided in itself, is distinguished toward the divisions of the inferior measure, which according to itself is divisible through what is proper to it. This, therefore, is the first distinction of that which is when. For as eternity is related to the eternal, which is in every way indivisible and necessary, so aeviternity is related to the aeviternal; which indeed in a certain way is not simultaneous, because although its substance is in the now of eternity, nevertheless its essential act, which is motion, is in time, and potency related to motion is related to the now of time, which continuously flows. Thus, therefore, through that there is distinguished the when of eternity and the when of aeviternity. And it must be attended that as eternity is related to time, and the now of eternity to the now of time, so the when of eternity is related to the when of time.

But it must be noted that the being of things, and of those things which are generated and corrupted, can be considered in two ways. For if it is considered according as it is the simple act of a simple essence, then without doubt it is indivisible and wholly at once; and therefore it is in the now of eternity or aeviternity, and thus it loses nothing into the past, nor awaits anything in the future, but is all at once, extending nothing of itself outside itself. But if it is considered insofar as in things of this kind there is matter mixed with contraries, then being is flowing, and is not simply, but has had something in the past which it does not have, and will have something in the future which it has not yet had in the past or present; and thus it receives the differences of time, and is said to have been, to be, or to be going to be.

With these things thus handed down, let us approach the certification of the division of that which is temporal when. But this is divided so that one when is from that which has gone away, that is, from the past; another when is from that which now stands near and is present; but another is from that which must happen according to the succession of time, and it is when concerning the future, and it is when left from the differences of times. But the differences of times themselves do not have when. It has also been said in the *Categories* that past and future are quantities in the genus of quantity as contained species. And it was said in the same place that they are continuous quantities. For the past is continued to the present; and this seems to suggest that the past has permanence, for what is continuous with an existing thing remains. But it must be understood that it was not said of the past that it is continuous with an existing thing because it remains or because it has some permanence in its parts, but it was said to be continuous to the present because in its excess, that is, in its last point in which it is continuous with the present, it has not passed away; for in that point it is continued to the present now. It is similar concerning the future, which in its beginning is continued to the present now.

But this is the sign that all past whens are joined to the present either through themselves or through another. The past also is that which is continuous with the present and is continued to the present. But the imperfect past is that which according to its end is not extended into the present, and is not terminated at the present. But the pluperfect past is that which was terminated in the past at the present, and through the past is referred to the present. But concerning the future we say that when is left according to an infection left from time; for although the future does not yet exist, nevertheless from the succession which it has to the present, it must happen that, as regards receiving the substance of when itself, it has as much force as if it were standing near. For with respect to receiving when there is no difference in that which remains standing near, in that which is future, and in that which has gone away in the past: for one now is the whole substance of time. But the being of time is caused by the flux of now, and therefore any part of it leaves when in that which is in time. On account of this future things are treated and determined, although the future does not yet exist; and something is said according to the future, and future things themselves obtain the designation and name of existing things. And therefore when is received from the future just as from the present, because from the very flux of time future time will be made certain. As we say, tomorrow there will be a naval battle; yesterday Socrates died: for these signify when. Thus, therefore, something is said when according to that which is future; therefore, as we say, the future is necessarily born according to succession from that which is now present. This also flows into the future by continuous and necessary flux, and through the necessity of the first motion. Hence we say, Callias will dispute tomorrow, or Callias will not dispute tomorrow, referring our actions to future time as to present, because we are certain of the succession of the future. For he will dispute signifies a future action, of which action there is as yet nothing in his substantial actions.

Thus, therefore, it is clear that from every difference of time when is left; hence it is in that which is in time as in measure and number. For in this way, since time is the cause of corruption through motion, which makes a thing stand apart from its principle, time leaves the infection of such distance in a temporal thing. Therefore this infection can be considered in two ways. In one way, absolutely, insofar as it is infection as a form existing in a subject existing in a temporal thing; and thus it is age. In another way, insofar as that in which it is is compared through it to time or to the difference of time from which it is left; and thus it is when and sometimes, which are imported when something is said to have been formerly, or to have been or to be before this, or to be going to be afterward. And in this way when is a category, as was said in the foregoing, and according to this by its commonness it surrounds when from eternity, when from aeviternity, and when from a part, and predicates one thing of the general things, which with the others divide the most general things into the ten first genera. For although eternity is in the eternal as differing from it by substance and not according to the account of the name, it names an extrinsic adjacent duration, and indefinite being itself can be measured by all things. Thus there is left from that mode of that which is when, as we say that what exists in all ways must always have been according to past being, and always be according to present being, and always according to future being. But concerning time there has been disputation in the fourth book of the Physics; and concerning eternity there has been discussion in the book On Causes.

CHAPTER III.

On the difference between where and when, and how one when differs from another.

Marginalia: False opinion of certain men.

But when differs from that which is where in this, that in whatever thing time exists leaving its infection, as in whatever thing there is, was, or to have been, or to be going to be, or to be in the present, because that when is in the same thing as in the subject which it denominates as when, and in the same thing was or will be, or to be or to have been or to be going to be, because those whens are said according to those times or time. For the when from the present instant now is always with that present now itself. Hence when we say, when are you? the answer is, now I am. But the whens which are left from that which has gone away and that future which is expected are never with the times from which they are left, as is clear when people ask us and

say, when did you read, when were you? we note the when which is with the present now, and past time is answered by saying, then I was, formerly I was, or now I was. Likewise when people ask us and say, when will you read, or when will you be? the when is with the present now, and future time is answered, as after a year, or a day, or a month. Hence these two whens will never be at once with the times from which they are left.

Yet this is general: when and time, insofar as time is number, are in the same thing as in a subject. But where and the place from which where itself comes to be as from a cause are never in the same thing as in a subject. For where as in a subject is in the circumscribed and located body. But place, which is the outermost surface of the containing thing, is not in the located extended thing as in a subject, but is in the embracing and containing thing, whose outermost thing is the locating surface.

Yet here it must be attended that time as continuous, and as a form measuring from outside, is in a subject in the first motion and movable thing. But as measuring and numbering essentially in temporal things, it is like a material number, both ten sheep and ten dogs, although formal number and the form of number and the species are one, just as there is one time of temporal sheep, as one numbering or measuring thing, although in the mode of measuring there are as many temporal things as there are whens. And in this way a temporal thing is said, according as it stands under time as under number, to have when; and when in this way is in it as in a subject, and time taken in this way in a temporal thing is always in the same thing in which when is. But where is never in the same thing in which place is.

But, as Anselm says, the now of eternity is related to the now of time and to all time, as the now of time is related both to every place and to all things which are in place. For the now of time, as indivisible, contains place and all located things, which are very divisible, because through one thing which is in all things, there is their measure, and this is being, whose proper measure is time, or the eternal, or the aeviternal. Likewise the now of eternity, which is indivisible, comprehends now time and the whole present by indeficiency, through this, that flowing duration, as from a cause, and exclusion flow from standing or indivisible duration. And this is what Boethius says in the Consolation of Philosophy: You command time to go from eternity.

It must also still be considered that that when which is left from what is past differs from that which is left from the future in this, that the when which is from the future is always prior to the past; but the when which is from the past is later than the future. But if one and the same when is received according to the substance of time, that is, in the now which is the substance, then when is one and the same: first indeed from the future, but second from the present, and later from the past according to the circulation of the period, in which the future is either present or past; just as time is first future, afterward present when the future arrives, and then past when the present has gone away. And as it is in time, so in the indeficiency of eternity when receives distinction according to the differences of time, for whether the measure is divisible according to itself or indivisible, it makes no difference, because it leaves when which is simple or composite not from this, but from this, that as extrinsically adjacent it is the measure of being in that which is. For thus by its indeficiency it leaves an impression in that which is, through which that which has being is compared in this way or that way to the extrinsic adjacent measure; and this is when insofar as it is a category.

Yet there are those who say that the when of eternity and of time is one and the same, differing accidentally, namely that it is in eternity as standing, but in time as flowing continuously. But we think this position is false, unless they say that the now of eternity exists in the now of time exemplarily and causally. But then from this it will not follow that it is the same now according to substance, but only according to form, in the way in which an exemplar and what is exemplified can be similar in form, not according to genus or species, but according to proportion.

CHAPTER IV.

On the division of when itself compared to the time by which it is caused.

But just as time is one thing composite and another thing simple, and indeed composite time is that which is in a composite action, that is, that which is the measure of a composite action, while simple time is that which proceeds with a simple action, of which it itself is the measure; so also when, which is left from the adjacency of time, one is simple and another composite. Simple is what is said to be in a moment and to be in now. Composite is what is left from composite time, as to be in an hour, or in a day, or week, or month, or year, and in similar things.

But these things which have been said have a sophistical attack. For if it is objected that action is in motion and every motion is confirmed in action, as was said in the tractate on Action, but no motion is simple, it will seem that no action can be simple, but every action is composite.

Further, since every time is continuous, and any part of a continuum is continuous and composite, it seems that no time is simple.

Further, it is said that simple time is like being in a moment and in now. But a moment is indivisible time; and thus a moment is neither time nor a part of time, and so it will not be time; and it follows further that when is not simple.

Further, concerning now Aristotle says ^[4] that it is not time, nor a part of time, but the substance of time; and thus what is said here seems to have an attack.

To these and similar things one must say that there is simple action and composite action. For the action of a generator, insofar as generation is the end of motion and not motion, is truly an action which is generation, and it is wholly simple and impartible, and is a simple and non-composite change from non-being into being. And simply it is the action of one creating insofar as he is creating. And likewise Averroes says concerning illumination to this or that place, insofar as it is the end of the local motion by which the illuminating thing is moved, that it is a simple action, not having any division, just as the end of every continuum is simple, and each of those is truly an action. But as for what he introduces, that every action is in motion and every motion is confirmed in action, the solution is clear in the same place in the tractate on Action: for you should understand this of motion insofar as motion is the act of the perfect and is perfect; but this is according as it is the act of the mover, and not of that which is moved. But motion according to this mode is a simple act and not continuous or composite; but insofar as it is an imperfect act, in this way it is continuous and composite.

But to what is objected about time, one must say that time is received in two ways, namely according to being and according to substance. Received according to being, it is true that no time is simple, but every time is composite; but according to substance there is some simple time, namely now and moment, which, as we have already said before, does not differ from time in this, that when is left from it as from time. And thus it is understood when it is said, time is simple, and when is simple.

Certain people, however, spoke otherwise, that action is simple, namely with respect to us, and not simple in relation to us, when it happens suddenly, that is, in time whose distinction is imperceptible. And they say likewise about simple time. And this is an evasion, and what they say is not true. For there are many simple actions, as is clear through the things that have been introduced; and simply, with the substantive verb, one says, I am, you are, he is; nevertheless its whole inflected set names substance as act and action. If this action is received as the action or act of essence, it can only be understood as simple action; and with this, temporal action or simple time, which by adjacency is its measure, leaves when. For just as time is adjacent to the movable thing, so to that which is moved, according as it is one in the whole motion, the measuring now is adjacent; and therefore when leaves now just as time does; and with respect to this, because it is the substance of time leaving when from itself, this is said to be time. Thus, therefore, what has been said here must be understood.

Moreover, time and when also agree further in this, that just as the parts of time succeed one another without delay, or continuously, so likewise the very whens which are left from times succeed one another. For when which is in the past and when which is in the future are copulatively reduced or joined to the present now, as parts of a continuum are joined to a point. But they would not be joined in this way unless there were such a succession from past into present, and from present into future, or conversely from future into present and from present into past. For succession is variable according to the period; but according to the actions which are measured by time, it is from past into present and from present into future.

Although time and when agree in these things that have been said, nevertheless time differs from that which is when, because what is in time is in it as in a numbering number; and because number is the measure of the numbered thing, therefore something is measurable according to time, as we say that someone is annual from time or the measure of time, and someone is daily, and someone is weekly as measured. And sometimes without distinction of number we say that motion is much, because that motion remains or endures through much time. But according to when nothing is measured, but simply to be when or sometime, or to have been or to be going to be, is said; and this is according to the same thing according to which the temporal or variable thing is varied as temporal; and according to the same thing also when is varied; and thus.

Notes

[1] Chapter 14. (*Cap. 14.*)

[2] What passion properly is; and concerning this signification see Metaphysics 3, text-comment 26. (*Passio proprie quid, et de hoc significato vide 3 Metaphys. tex. com. 26.*)

[3] Aristotle, In Physics 4, text-comment 115. (*Aristoteles, In 4 Physic. tex. com. 115.*)

[4] Aristotle, In Physics 4, text-comment 110 and 121. (*Aristoteles, In 4 Physic. tex. com. 110 et 121.*)

Book on the Six Principles, Tractate IV on When, chapters V-VI; Tractate V on Where, chapters I-V

one is from the past, another from the present, another from the future.

CHAPTER V.

On the properties of when, which are not to receive more or less, and not to have a contrary.

But the property which belongs to every when, but not only to when, is that it belongs to that which is when not to receive more and less, just as it does not belong to time to receive more and less. For one day is not called a day more or less than another, nor is one hour called time more or less than another, and so with the others. And it is similar in when: for the when of the past is not called more or less when than that of the present or of the future; nor is measured time said according to more and less, as daily, more than another; nor is one thing called more daily than another. And likewise it is so with all the others. Therefore it is concluded generally that it belongs to every when not to receive more and less. And because not receiving more and less is caused by not having a contrary, therefore also when has no contrary. And this also is a property of when which belongs to every when and not only to when.

But this is proved as follows: because one and the same when, with respect to the substance of now, from which when is left, is from the present, the future, and the past; because the same thing that is future is made present and past. And this is on account of that which is the substance of time, which is the same in the whole of time. But of the same indivisible thing according to substance it is impossible for two contraries to be predicated; and since it is predicated of itself, it is impossible for it to have a contrary that is predicated of the same thing. Further, contraries will never be at once in the same thing; for one is naturally apt to expel the other from the same susceptible thing. But the when which is according to the present, and that which is according to the past, and that which is according to the future, will be at once in the same thing, because, as has been said, when is not in time, but in a temporal thing. And therefore in one and the same thing there is

when according to the future, and when according to the present, and when according to the past; and at once and together it is said that it was future, is present, and passes into the past. But this could not be if one when were contrary to another when according to form and species. For the same thing which is this to have been is true as that which is going to remain. But the account of contraries is never to exist in the same thing at once, nor to be said of the same thing according to the same and at the same time; on account of this it is generally concluded that contrariety will not be enunciated in this genus which is when.

Marginalia: First objection.

Yet there are sophists disputing against these things that have been said, saying that time is the cause of corruption in all things in which it is. Wherever there is a cause of corruption, according as corruption is motion or change, there are more and less and a contrary. Therefore it seems that it belongs to time to receive more and less and a contrary.

Marginalia: Second.

Further, they introduce for this that time makes a thing stand apart from its principle; but to stand apart is according to more and less. Therefore time seems to receive more and less, and consequently when seems to receive more and less.

Marginalia: To the first.

To these things one must say that the things introduced are very sophistical. For as has been proved, when receives neither more nor less and has no contrary. And when it is said that time is the cause of corruption, this is not true, nor does Aristotle say this simply, but that it is more the cause of corruption than of generation; and this not through itself, but through motion, of which it is the measure.

Marginalia: To the second.

And likewise also through motion it is the cause of distance from the constituting principle; and therefore it does not follow that time according to itself receives more and less or a contrary. But it must be noted that although when does not have a contrary, nor receive more and less, nevertheless the same thing which is when receives modes, which indeed are contrary modes, just as an indivisible point, and the same thing has the mode of beginning and the mode of ending or terminating. For pastness, presentness, and futurity are opposed modes; but in such things there are not contrary forms and species. Nor can there be in such things more of that which is when; nor is there need to determine this here, because it is manifest from the things previously introduced.

And this is what is proper to that which is when: to be left from the adjacency of time, and not to be in time, but in a temporal thing according to the comparison which it has to time or to the differences of time. And such a property is also that when succeeds when, just as time succeeds time, and other things similar to these; all of which are easy to determine from the foregoing. For when, as has been said, is not time, but a certain infection or impression left in that which is temporal, according to which it has to be referred to time or to the differences of time. And therefore time and when have conjoined accounts.

CHAPTER VI.

On the subject of that which is when.

But if it is asked in what it is as in its proper subject, let us say that when, which is left from time, is properly in everything that begins to be. But I say to begin to be through nature, as those things begin to be which are generated or are made by art or choice or will; for universals have the principles of their inception, such as privation and matter. But whatever things indeed begin, and do not have such principles of their inception, need not have in them when which is from a part, although the when of eternity and of aeviternity belongs to them through an accidental distinction by which it is distinguished toward the differences of time, as has been said in the foregoing. Such things are intelligences and the substances of the heavenly bodies.

But other generable and corruptible things receive temporal when according to their substances and according to their actions and works, because they are varied by time. But when Damascene says that every creatable thing is variable, and Plato says this same thing, and Boethius says that everything that is below the first is changeable, this is not understood of changeability of time or when, but rather of the nature which has been caused, which from itself does not have whence it may be, or whence it may be able to stand. Thus, therefore, everything that begins, having the principles of its inception, matter and privation, receives in itself the when which is left from time. But every or the whole body that begins in the aforesaid way is such; for if it begins to be otherwise, it does not have the principles of its inception within itself, and therefore the Philosopher does not have to speak about those things, because the Philosopher determines nothing except that which has the principles of its determination within itself. Thus, therefore, the whole body which receives in this way sometimes is, and is in time; this is proved from the fact that it receives the variation of times of the heavenly period. For this body is varied in the heat of summer toward heat, dryness, and hotness; in spring toward the hot and moist; and in autumn toward the cold and dry, on account of which then plants shed their leaves; and they are destroyed in winter toward the cold and moist ^[1]. For such things beginning through generation receive alterations in this way according to times; and therefore when is predicated of them denominatively.

Likewise it is also so in the soul insofar as it reaches to a body beginning in this way. For the soul, as is said in the book *On Causes*, is on the horizon of eternity and time; and therefore in its actions and passions it reaches time, and thus when also belongs to it. This is clear in the speculative part of the soul, which nevertheless seems to be more separated from body than the motive part which uses the body in motion. For according to the speculative part we see that certain people speculate more acutely in spring, such as melancholics, because then the spirits which carry the forms of speculation are made subtle and movable from heat, and are moistened by moisture, so that they may receive forms more easily. Conversely, certain people speculate more acutely in winter, and these are choleric, for whom, when the heat of choler is multiplied together, it mixes operations, and dryness of forms impedes good reception. But in winter, when cold is overcoming, the heat mixing operations is tempered, so that it does not mix them, but moves well. And when the moisture of winter introduces phlegm, dryness is tempered toward good reception and good retention from the natural dryness of choler. But certain people contemplate more acutely in summer, such as phlegmatics, whose coldness is tempered by outstanding heat or warmth so that it moves the spirits well, and much moisture is tempered by dryness so that it both receives well from natural moisture and retains well from temporal dryness. But certain people speculate more acutely in autumn, such as sanguine people, for whom the moderated coldness of autumn tempers the heat of blood. But the moderated dryness of autumn restrains the overflowing moisture of blood to temperance. These varieties are according to the variety of the instrument, that is, of the body which the soul joined to the body uses as an instrument in its operations. For the soul joined to the body follows the complexions of the body.

And therefore those who are of dry, or parched, or icy, or cold complexion or joining in the body often become more foolish than themselves in autumn, so that they have less strength in the operations of the mind, because the time of autumn multiplies melancholy, which has dark and silent spirits, and cold is increased by cold, so that it stops the motion of the spirits; and dryness then increases the dryness of the complexion so that it is not of good reception. But those in whom blood rules are more foolish than themselves in spring, because then the heat of the time increases the heat of the complexion so that it moves less, and therefore makes mixed operations; and the moisture of the time increases the moisture of the complexion so that it indeed receives well, but does not hold well. Similarly it is with the others, because phlegmatics become more foolish in winter on account of the double cold of time and complexion, which stops the motion of the spirit and thickens it, and on account of the double moisture which makes it not retain forms well. Likewise in the others, provided that the likeness of the complexion of animals and of times is attended to. Therefore whatever receives the variations of times and is altered according to the quality of time or times will be in

time, whether that is in the complexion or nature of the body, or whether it is also in the operations or passions of the soul.

TRACTATE V

ON WHERE.

CHAPTER I.

In what way where is a category, and what where is.

But where, which is caused by something extrinsically adjacent, which is adjacent to that to which it is not adjacent without the duration of the thing, is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of place. But I say that the circumscription of a body is a certain fittingness of a body, according to which beginning and middle are assigned to the contained thing according to the outermost part of the containing body, so that just as the whole is in the whole, so the first is in the first, the middle in the middle, the extreme in the extreme, the indivisible in the indivisible, and the composite in the composite.

But for understanding this, in what way that which is where is and in what way it says being insofar as it is where, one must understand that to be circumscribed is to be figured, because it is wholly contained according to the figure of the container, and conversely. And therefore there is a threefold circumscription. For there is the circumscription of the containing body, and this is a certain action. And there is the circumscription of the circumscribed thing, and it is a certain passion. And there is a circumscription proceeding and caused by both of these, and it is the commensuration of the located thing to place, according to which it is compared to place in itself and in common, or to this particular place. And this circumscription is where insofar as it is a special category, because this is one of the species of being which is a category when it is designated under a word. For in this way everything that is somewhere is said to be where; and this being compared in this way to place is placed in none of the other categories. Thus, therefore, what is said is true, that where, insofar as it is a category, is circumscription from the circumscription of place and does not proceed immediately from place. Therefore, since mention is made of three things, namely of place, of the located thing, and of the circumscription of place, place indeed according to subject and according to substance is in the body which receives, that is, which contains and locates. For it is the outermost part of the containing and surrounding body in which it receives what it contains, that is, the located thing, and circumscribes it; and from this it follows that whatever is circumscribed by place is in place, as has been said. But as was said in the preceding tractate, place and where are not in the same thing according to substance and subject; for place is in that which receives and contains and circumscribes. But where is in that which is received, contained, and circumscribed, and is embraced by another exterior thing.

But place does not seem to be present to or to belong to the soul, or to some incorporeal thing. For the soul and other incorporeal substances are nowhere as in a place, because they occupy no place circumscriptively, so that their middle is in the middle and the whole in the whole. For everything which is in a whole place by occupying in this way occupies and fills a place in such a way that the place itself, if it is the proper place of that thing, cannot contain another thing together with that thing which is in the same place in the same way; and thus the soul occupies no place and fills no place. But an animated thing filled with soul, insofar as the soul is the principle of life and motion, can receive locally, as food, drink, and air for breathing. Therefore the soul in the body itself is not as the located thing in a place, but the soul itself is in the body as the principle of life and motion. For in no way could it happen that a place filled by something filling it can receive and embrace or contain another located body together with that, unless that which first occupied and filled it first gives way and another enters its place. This is clear by example: for a grain coming into a measure as to a vessel and place is in no way received in the measure as in a vessel and place while the air which first filled the vessel remains at rest in the vessel; and so it is with wine, water, cask, oil, and all other similar things of this sort. For when the air has first been driven out, the grain and another thing to be

contained in the vessel is certainly received, because two bodies cannot be in the same place. For as we have proved determinatively in the fourth book of the Physics ^[2], if two bodies were in the same place, it would follow of necessity that two bodies were one and the same body in number. But let this be supposed here; for to prove this belongs to natural science.

But just as two bodies cannot be at once in the same place, so indeed the same body also cannot actually be in diverse places at the same time. The proof of this is that if it is in one place separated from another, then the termini of that body are contained in that place, and nothing of it is outside that place. But if this were in another place, its termini would exist inside that place and outside it; and this is for something to stand at once and together within one whole and, according to itself, within one and not within it, which is for affirmation and negation to be true at once of the same thing, which is impossible. Therefore this also is impossible, that the same body can exist at once in diverse places.

But from this it follows that the soul will in no way be local, since it occupies and fills no place as a located thing fills and occupies a place. Likewise all those things which dissent from or recede from the account of body according to quantity, by saying that body is measured by threefold dimension, but are defined as simple and indivisible according to quantity, are in nothing as in a place; for all such things lack the circumscription of place, because beginning, middle, and outermost cannot be assigned in place. Therefore this is where insofar as it is a category or principle.

CHAPTER II.

On the difficulties concerning the things introduced, namely that the same body could be at once in diverse places.

Marginalia: Difficulty of the text.

But someone can raise a difficulty about the things that have been said, that the same body cannot be in diverse places at once and together. For voice is in the ears of diverse people at once and together. But since voice is struck air, as Priscian says, it will never and nowhere be able to exist without air. Therefore it is not in ears without air. Therefore struck air too is in the ears of diverse people. Therefore, since one voice is formed in one air and in the same way, one and the same air in number will seem to be in the ears of diverse people. But air is a body. Therefore the same and one body in number seems at once and together to be in many and diverse places.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

But in solving these points we say that one and entirely the same voice cannot at once and together either be formed or exist in diverse parts of air. Therefore if we grant that one and the same voice in number is sensed at once and together in the ears of diverse people, we will also be obligated to grant that one and the same particle of air in which that voice is formed reaches the ears of diverse people at once and together and in diverse places, and exists in the ears of diverse people. But this is impossible, because it is impossible for that which is simply one and the same body in number to be able to be at once and wholly in several places, because it is impossible for it to be somewhere other than where it is.

Marginalia: Reason which moves D. Albert.

We have been led to this, that one of two things must be conceded, namely either that the things sensed in the ears of diverse people when some one person calls out are diverse, or that one and the same body in number is found at once and together in several and diverse places. But between these two, anyone philosophizing rightly chooses that the things sensed by diverse people are diverse, and are diverse in number, not in the figure and species of voice, nor diverse in accent such as in the sharpness or heaviness of voice, but they are diverse in number in relation to one figure of voice which is the formed voice of the first caller, shaped and generated with one sharpness and heaviness; and this is imaginably and similarly for one voice to be

generated from that one according to the image and likeness of the first voice. And thus the things sensed in this way are diverse, although any one of them is sensed by an image and likeness of the voice which belongs to the first caller; on account of which the same thing is not sensed in the ears.

Marginalia: Objection of the text.

But from this it follows that the second and third voice, and so successively, is imaged in the air, and being similarly formed by the voice of the first caller is not immediately an animal voice formed by the calling animal itself, because it is not immediately uttered by the animal. And thus it follows that there is some voice which is not an animal voice, which is contrary to the things treated in the book *On the Soul* ^[3], where it is said that voice is sound uttered from the mouth of an animal, and so on.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

But to this we say that every voice belongs to the calling animal; nor has anyone from the beginning ever heard a voice when all animals were silent, or in the silence of animals. On this account every voice is said to be animal, because every voice is generated by some animal uttering and calling. But originally and causally every voice which is heard by many is animal and is one in likeness, figure, and accent. But substantially, through the substance of the matter in which it is formed, there are several voices formed in every delimited air. And thus the voice of each animal is directed to the ears of diverse people, which originally is of one thing; but it is not contingent, indeed it is rather impossible, that one voice in number be at once in the ears of diverse people; and this is the solution of the difficulty.

Yet here it must be attended that certain things are in place through themselves, and certain things through another or accidentally. For those things are in place through themselves which are described by place into beginning, middle, and outermost according to the particles of place. And these are bodies needing a container in their exteriors according to nature, whose motion is toward place as toward what generates and preserves. But accidentally and through another, whatever things are not circumscribable in that way are in place, or are in those things, or are of those things which are thus circumscribed by place from surrounding things, such as the soul and accidents of body. For the soul is not in body as in a place, but as the principle of life and motion. And therefore the body is not determined for it as place; and therefore it is neither in it as everywhere in it, nor as existing somewhere by it, but it is in it as in that in which it operates the essential operations of the principle of life and motion, and according to this it is whole in the whole. But to live is multiple, namely to vegetate, to be moved locally, to sense, and to understand; these are acts of spiritual life, which occur by spiritual powers and organs; and according to this it is not whole in the whole, but it is in one member with respect to one thing, and in another with respect to another. Thus, therefore, the soul is not in place except accidentally and through another, namely because the body is in the place in which the soul itself is, not as in a place, but as in that which it vivifies and moves.

For accidents of body are accidentally in place, and in place accidentally according to more and less. For certain accidents are accidental as situational, such as line, surface, and generally quantity, and situational quality, such as whiteness, taste, odor, and things of this sort, which are greater in a great thing and lesser in a small thing; and these are less accidentally in place than those which are not situational, such as knowledge, virtue, and things of this sort.

But of those things which are accidentally in place, such as species of visible things which are in air, not as in place but rather in it as in a carrying medium. And because the carrying air is in place, therefore these also are said accidentally to be in place. And because the carrying air seems to be at once in the eyes of many people distant in place, the same question concerns things seen in diverse places and in diverse eyes as concerns things heard in the ears of diverse people. And although the visible is in transparent air according to spiritual being, but sound according to being more material, nevertheless according to spiritual being one and the same terminated thing cannot simultaneously be in diverse places, unless that in which it is, whether

according to material being or according to spiritual being, is in diverse places.

Marginalia: Solution of the question about the visible.

For the sensible is not a substance such that it can exist through itself; rather it must always be in something as in a subject. And therefore that doubtful point must be solved as before, namely that one thing is generated by another according to the image and likeness of it; and thus originally it is one, but materially it is many, which is in the senses of diverse people. But such things are in place accidentally, and therefore they are diversified by matter when they are in diverse places.

But John Damascene says that certain things are in place definitively; and these indeed are not essentially in place, but as much as belongs to them they are everywhere and always, because they determine no place nor any difference of time in their being, such as the intelligences and the substances which are called angels. Although these do not determine place for themselves from themselves, nevertheless through the matter around which they operate they are referred to place. For they are essentially there where they operate, whether they operate sensibly, intellectually, or spiritually. And because these are in place for the sake of another, therefore they are referred to place through another; but Aristotle calls to be referred through another to be referred accidentally. There are also things in place which are in place by none of these modes, but are in something of those to which the principles of place are referred, as point, surface, and line are in place. For they are principles of the joining of the dimensions of place to the dimensions of the located thing, because it was said in the Categories that the particles of place are joined to the same common terminus to which also the particles of the located thing are joined, because the distance of place and of the located thing is one in number. Therefore in these ways something is said to be in place. But here we do not distinguish all the modes by which something is said to be in something, because this belongs more to the fourth book of the Physics and not to the logician.

Marginalia: What it is to be per se in place.

But from the things said it is clear that something is said to be in place through itself and properly when it is referred to place in such a way that the indivisible by which place is joined, such as point, is referred to the indivisible by which the located thing is joined, and the length of place to the length of the located thing, and the breadth of place to the breadth of the located thing, and the depth of one to the depth of the other. And this circumscription is actively in place, or as in a form. But it can be taken as in the thing formed, in the located thing; and thus according to the same thing the located thing is comparable to place. And where, insofar as it is a category, says this comparison.

And thus anyone can notice in what way the essential particles of the quantified located body are joined to the particles of place: for the points of the located thing are fitted to the points of place, and line to lines, surfaces to surfaces, depths to depths, and, to speak briefly, dimensions to dimensions and diameters to diameters. And from this it is clear that two bodies cannot be at once in the same place, because it would follow that the points and dimensions of two bodies would be made essentially the same, and thus two bodies would essentially be one body, which is impossible. But this must be demonstrated in the fourth book of the Physics ^[4]. There are also many modes of those things which are in place through themselves, as Avicenna says in the Sufficiency, concerning which we shall make mention in what follows as much as pertains to the present intention, because the subtle treatment of them belongs to the science of the physicists.

CHAPTER III.

On the division of that which is where into simple and composite where.

But where is divided thus, that one where is simple and another composite. Simple where is what proceeds from simple place, as a point is simple, but line and surface are both simple in one way and composite in another, while threefold dimension is simply composite. But composite where is what proceeds from composite place. For since where is circumscription proceeding from the circumscription of place, it follows

that simple where proceeds from simple place, and composite where proceeds from composite place. But because it has already been shown in the Categories that place is quantity, and no quantity is so simple that it does not have quantitative parts, therefore we must determine what we call simple place.

Marginalia: Bad understanding of certain men.

For this must not be badly understood here, as certain people badly say, that place is called simple not simply, but with respect to us, which according to sense is indivisible by us. This is nothing said in logical matters except to approach simply according to understanding^[5]. But it is said that simple place is the origin and constitution of that which is of the number of continuous things. But it is established from the things that have been said about quantity in the Categories that the origin of all continuous things is the simple indivisible. Therefore simple indivisible place is the simple indivisible, which is the origin and constitution of the continuity of place insofar as it is quantity. But this indivisible is called indivisible place because we have said enough that when the located thing goes out from place to place, it is not referred to place except because its particles are joined to the terminus of place. And according to this the indivisible of the located thing is referred to the indivisible of place, and the divisible of the located thing to the divisible of place. For composite and whole place, as was said in the Categories, has particles joined to the same terminus to which also the particles of the located body are joined. And the cause of this is that the distance of place and of the located thing is one in number. But this terminus of joining is a point. Therefore the parts of place, joined next to a point or in a point, must necessarily come to be or be joined. And thus there will be simple place, in which it will be established that the point adjacent to the point of the located thing is adjacent.

Marginalia: Objection.

But if someone objects that Aristotle does not say that a point is in place, and that if it were said to be in place, the place of the point would not differ from the point itself,

Marginalia: Solution.

it is said that the point is not said to be in place through itself as contained, but is in place as that to which, as to the point of place, the contained thing in place is referred; and in this respect it is called place, as is clear from the foregoing, and because the particles of place and of the located thing cannot be joined to anything else except to the point of place. To the saying of Aristotle also one must say that the point is not in place through itself; and if it were in place through itself, then it would follow that the point and the place of the point were the same. But we say that it is not in place except according as it is referred to the joining of the particles of place and of the located thing; and thus it is called simple place, and not because simple place exists through itself, for simple place does not exist, but is an opposition in the adjective and deprives the account of place. And therefore simple place is place according to something, because namely it is referred to the joining of place and of the located thing.

But it is manifest from the things introduced that the particles of place, not only quantitative but also essential insofar as place is quantity, such as point, line, and surface, enclose, contain, and terminate. And thus simple punctual, linear, or superficial places occupy, contain, and terminate that which is the minimum and simple part of the contained and located body. For thus point is referred to point, line to line, surface to surface, depth to depth, diameter to diameter, and so with the others. And these, indeed, according to the distance of place and located thing, are substantially the same; but related to container and contained they have the difference of place and located thing. From all these things it is concluded that place cannot exist without body, for the surface of some body must be the outermost part. And because there cannot be a vacuum, it must belong to something as contained in it as in a place. And likewise corporeal solidity seems unable to exist without place, that is, without being in something as in a place.

Marginalia: Sophistical objection.

And certain people seem to reject this sophistically, saying that everything terminated in figure and quantity is terminated at something in which the end of its termination is. But in nothing that is in the world can there be the end of its termination, because if it is within, it is essential, and its being is in it; but the end or terminus is that in which there is nothing of the being or nature of the thing. Therefore it must be terminated at something outside, and that again at another, and so to infinity; and thus they said that there are infinite worlds outside heaven. But this does not agree with the sayings of the Peripatetics. And therefore one must say that not everything terminated is terminated at what is outside; rather the outermost thing has no terminus except the surface which is the terminus within. And concerning what is said before, that the terminus within is that in which the being of the terminated thing does not fail, one must say that it is not necessary that being fail in it, but that it fail at it, so that beyond it there is nothing of being; and therefore in the outermost surface there is the terminus both of being and of place.

Marginalia: Solution.

But all these things are proved and required in the first book *On the Heavens and the World*, because for this science it is required only to know that it is so; but the proof of those things depends on natural matters. But for the easy teaching of these things we shall still speak about those things which are in place in many ways, and those which are in place through themselves and naturally, as we have said. Further, place is also given in a certain way; and through all these, certain doubtful matters about place must still be investigated, from which the things that have been said are more easily understood.

CHAPTER IV.

Whether the first heaven is in place and in what way it is in place in diverse ways.

Marginalia: Question.

But since it has been said that place and where are always in diverse things, for place is always in the locating body, but where in the located thing, a dispute arises here about the last sphere in ascending, which is the same as the first in descending, whether it is in some locating thing or not. For place is always in the body of the thing locating. For if it is not in place, then it is not in where either; and if it is not in where, then it seems to follow that it is not moved in where and according to place, and this is against all the Philosophers. But if it is said to be in place as where, thus it seems to be false, because place is the surface of the exterior body which is outside the located thing. But nothing seems to be outside the surface of the last sphere, since it is the last terminus of all things. If it is said that the surface itself of the located thing is place, this will not be able to stand, because it has already been determined that place and located thing are always diverse and of diverse things; and therefore the surface of the located thing, since it belongs to the located thing itself, cannot be place, but is something of the located thing or a located thing. Therefore, if some confess that the last sphere is local, without doubt it must be confessed and one must confess that the last sphere has another surrounding body which contains place beyond the sphere. But it is established that beyond the last sphere there is nothing else except the sphere itself and something diverse from it. Therefore one must say that the last sphere is not in another as in a place. Therefore the extremity of the last sphere is not in place nor local.

And certain people say that the extreme surface and the place of the heavenly body are the surface, and that it itself is not in place. This is against all the things that have been said, because then place is something of the located thing, and since the located thing is moved to place, it will be moved together toward something that it has within itself, which is impossible and against nature^[6]. And therefore certain people say that something of this sort is unusual, and that to announce anything certain about these things is hidden, since on account of distance these things are insensible to us.

But one must know about these matters that the things which are in place are in place in many ways. For certain things are in place as in something generating and preserving; and because local motion is from what

generates and preserves, therefore such things are moved to place, and thus those things are movable in place by rectilinear motion which need an exterior container so that they may be preserved, and thus the elements and things composed of elements, movable by rectilinear motion, are in place. In another way, whatever things are as place and a vessel containing and preserving the things which are contained by it through the virtue of the first preserving thing are in place; and thus whatever things preserve are in place, as incorruptible existing things and things containing all other things in themselves; and thus the whole heavenly body is in place, which in itself is preservative of all other things, and therefore is moved about place. But in those things which are in place in the first way, there are two motions: one toward the substance of the preserving thing, which is motion from the middle; the other toward the virtue of the preserving thing, which is motion to the middle, for the virtue of the heavenly sphere is not gathered except in the middle which is the center of the heavenly sphere. Therefore in these two ways whatever things are moved to place or in place are in place. But of those things which are in place as preserving and surrounding, certain things are as preserving through themselves, such as the first or last sphere; but certain things are place as a preserving vessel, and not through themselves but through another, such as the lower spheres, which have other things surrounding them extrinsically.

According to this, therefore, one must say that the first sphere is in place as first place and vessel; and this is to be in place, because it is referred to place, that is, to the distance of place, as the first preservative and generative of all things according to form, and it is not referred to place as having something extrinsically surrounding it by virtue of which it would be preservative and generative. And this is the true solution of this question.

Marginalia: Objection.

But to what is objected, that place and where are in one thing and another,

Marginalia: Solution.

one must say that this must be understood of those things which are in place as in something preserving and containing; for in these the preserving and containing thing cannot be the same as the preserved and contained thing. But in those things which are in place, that is, are referred to place as preserving and containing, it is not generally true, but is true in those which preserve and contain not through themselves. But in those which do so through themselves it is not true in this way; rather they are place more than located thing, and as place they are referred to the account of place.

Marginalia: Objection.

But to what is objected, that they are moved in place or according to place in this way,

Marginalia: Solution.

one must say that it is true, but to be moved in place or according to place is one thing, and to be moved to place is another. For these are moved either because they are moved in the distance of place equally from every side around the middle; or they are moved according to place because they are moved according to the differences and positions of place, which are before and behind according to the position of the poles, and from right and left according to the distance of East and West, and things of this sort. But they are not moved in place in such a way that they are moved to some place. Therefore in these ways whatever things are said to be in place through themselves are in place. Nor is it necessary that the first sphere, which through itself has the account of place and not of located thing, have outside itself something containing it in which it would be as in the place of a container. Nor on account of this will one go to infinity, because one stops at the first sphere, which through itself contains and preserves.

CHAPTER V.

On the properties of where, which are not to receive more and less and not to have a contrary.

But where lacks intension and remission, so that it is not said according to more and less. And this is proved from this, that among those things which are in place we do not say that one is more in place than another; for what is above is not more in place than what is below, nor is what is moved circularly more in place than what is moved by rectilinear motion. But to be in place is said in one way and another, not according to more and less. Therefore although one thing according to quantity possesses a greater place than another, nevertheless one is not more in place than the other. For the more formal something is than another, as higher things than lower things, the more it possesses a greater place, as water exceeds earth, air exceeds water, fire exceeds air, and heaven obtains the greatest place. For more and less, said according to intension and remission, is not said according to where or according to any quantity, but is said according to quality which can be intensified or remitted from proper causes according to the causes of its subject. Therefore in this way the property of where, which belongs to every where but not only to it, is not to receive more and less.

Likewise it will be a property of where not to have a contrary. This property belongs to every where and always, but not only to where. But in being in place, which is the cause of that which is where, there is no contrariety. And that there is contrary to no other thing is manifest through itself, because contraries are in the same genus. But things other than place are not in the same genus with place. This is also proved because, if it has a contrary, this will be according to the view of the Ancients, that above is contrary to below on account of this, that what it is to be above seems to stand far apart from what it is to be below, just as above and below seem to stand apart most of all. On account of this, contrariety which is in where seems to many to be especially about being above and about being below. For to be above is where, and to be below likewise is where. Therefore in these contrariety in where seems especially to exist; and the contrariety of quantity seems especially to be about place.

But if they grant above and below to be contraries, an inconvenience follows, namely that two contraries can be at once in the same thing in number; for above and below, by diverse respects, are in the same place or where. For the same place in number is above and below, taken or compared to diverse things, as is clear in an example: the height of a tower, compared to us looking from below upward, is above; but compared to the height of the heavenly sphere, it is lower and below. Further, from this it follows that the same thing will be contrary to itself. For if above and below are contraries, since the same place in number is above and below, it is gathered by syllogism that the same thing is contrary to itself. Therefore there is no contrariety in where. But concerning all these things it is clear, the things that have been said, that contraries are contrary according to their absolute forms, and this is not varied in them through respect to this or to that. And therefore if above and below were contraries, there would be contrary forms in them, which cannot exist in the same thing, whether they are compared to diverse things or not compared. Nevertheless concerning all these things, so far as pertains to the intention of the logician, enough has been determined in the book of the Categories, in the tractate on Quantity. And therefore from these things it is clear concerning all the properties of that which is where.

Marginalia: Objection.

But if someone asks why the proper property of that which is where is not designated here, and likewise in when, since the common property is known from that which is truly proper, and thus the truer property should be posited rather than the common one,

Marginalia: Solution.

it can be said, as was said in the tractate on When, that the proper property of where is sufficiently understood from the foregoing, namely that it belongs to it to be equal to that in which it is, that is, to body, which is the cause of where through circumscription, because where is circumscribed, and it belongs to it to be equal to that from which it proceeds as from a cause, and other things of this sort which are easy to assign.

Marginalia: Otherwise.

Yet it could be said in both these principles, namely when and where, that their substance is considered in comparison, and it has not much of substance in its account, and has less in natural being; and therefore in the substance of these things many proper properties are not rooted as in those things which have absolute essences. And therefore substance especially has such properties, and quantity after substance, and after quantity quality, and relation has them according to being said. But the others do not have properties of this sort, and therefore they are not posited. And therefore I think that this account is true, because proper properties are not posited here. And let these things said about Where suffice.

Notes

[1] Understand this whole thing with respect to what-it-is, but not with respect to whether-it-is; for abstract substances are considered by the natural philosopher with respect to whether-it-is, as is clear in Physics 1, final comment. JAMMY. (*Hoc totum intellige quantum ad quid est, non autem quantum ad si est: nam substantiae abstractae considerantur a naturali quantum ad si est, ut patet 1 Physic. com. ultim. JAMMY.*)

[2] On text-comment 76. (*Super tex. com. 76.*)

[3] In book 2, text-comment 87. (*In 2, tex. com. 87.*)

[4] On text-comment 76. (*Super tex. com. 76.*)

[5] That is, to posit that exposition is to proceed lightly according to understanding. (*Id est, ponere illam expositionem est incedere leviter secundum intellectum.*)

[6] D. Albert attributes this opinion, in Physics 4 on text-comment 43, to Gilbert Porretanus himself, and in this matter he refutes him. (*Hanc opinionem attribuit D. Albertus (4 Physic. super tex. com. 43) ipsi Gilberto Porretano, et in hac ipsum redarguit.*)

TRACTATE VI. ON POSITION.

TRACTATE VI

ON POSITION.

CHAPTER I.

What position is insofar as it is a category.

Position, insofar as it is a principle or category, is a certain site of parts and an ordering of generation. For site is more common than position is, because site says the ordering of the parts of quantity, and in mathematical things it is referred more to place than to the parts of a surface compared among themselves or in place. In this way, however, mathematical things have site. And because it more says ordering in place, for this reason the differences of place are also called differences of site, such as upward and downward, rightward and leftward, before and behind. But although site is thus said more commonly than position, nevertheless it does not have the commonness of a genus toward position, because then position would not be a first genus; rather it has the commonness of analogy. For this reason it is said first of natural things and later of mathematical things. Further, since site first says the ordering of parts in place and secondarily says ordering in a whole, position, conversely, first says the ordering of parts in a whole and secondarily says ordering in place. For this reason, so that site may be determined, in the assignment of position it is said that position is a certain site of parts. Not every site is position properly and principally so called, but it is a certain one, as has been said.

Marginalia: Objection.

But if it is objected that according to this an ambiguous name, namely site, is put in the definition,

Marginalia: Solution.

one must say that, as has often been said, the assignments of the most general things are not definitions properly taken, but are assignments of some sort, of greater clarification than the name. And in such assignments such ambiguous terms, determined in this way from one part of their ambiguity, are customarily

put down. And therefore he says that it is site. Nor is site the same as position, because in that case the assignment would be nugatory; but we call it position from its commonness, which nevertheless is not the commonness of a genus, as has been said.

But as to what is said, site of parts, this is because position says more the ordering of parts in a whole than in place, and site is determined to this and restricted when a certain site is said.

But as to what is said, and an ordering of generation, this says that the generation of that which has parts, both integral parts and quantity, is from the ordered composition of parts, and it cannot be generated except through this. And therefore generation itself, through the formative power which operates in generation toward the form of what is generated, operates the ordering of such parts. And therefore generation is put here as the proper cause of such ordering. And therefore those speak badly who expound generation as the generator. But in other things in which there is not generation, and yet there is an ordering of parts, there is a similar cause: for the form terminating the whole is the cause of the ordering of parts to this or that site, since everything that has parts is composed from its own parts, whether it is generable or ingenerable. Then one must distinguish that a certain composite has its components in act within itself, not before itself except by nature and intellect, and in this way it is generated; and there is a certain thing that has its components in act before and outside itself, and this is generable. And for this reason, when the parts come together for composition, then it is generated from them. Thus, therefore, one must understand it when it is said, and a certain ordering of generation in parts, namely generating parts.

But as to the fact that a copulation is also put in the middle, and through this what is said in the assignment does not seem to be one, but gathered from several things not essentially constituting one thing, one must say that the copulation which is put in the middle marks an exposition, and not a copulation of diverse things. For this, that position is a certain site, that is, and that not every site is position. It could be doubtful what and what sort of site it was; and therefore there is added and, that is, that is, an ordering of generation, which orders the parts to one another and to the whole, as under the form of the whole, the form being terminated in the due mode for constituting the whole. But I say of parts to one another, because a part must have a double ordering: one, namely, toward appearing together with that with which it fittingly constitutes the whole in quantity and figure; but it has another order toward the form of the whole terminating all the parts to the being of the whole and containing all the parts. For the name that says the form of such ordering, according to which the parts are referred first to one another and to the whole and to the place which they have in the place of the whole, that same name rightly predicates position, as to be placed above or below in the whole, or equally or unequally, or to be placed within the extremes or outside the extremes, or something of this sort. This, therefore, is the genus of position.

But its subalterns are to be placed either equally or unequally, or to be placed bent or straight, as in standing or sitting. But the most special species are, for example, sitting and standing. But individuals are, for example, the standing of Socrates, the sitting of Plato, and things of this sort.

CHAPTER II.

On those things which are true positions, and on those things which seem to be and are not.

Position, therefore, is that according to which other things are called sitting and standing and lying adjacent, which are truly called positions. For sitting belongs to one whose vertebrae are extended straight to the loins, but whose legs are not extended downward for support. Lying belongs to one whose right or left side rests upon the remaining side. Standing belongs to one whose upper parts rest straight upon the legs. Reclining, however, is a position composed from lying adjacent and sitting, as a leaning made from the back, while nevertheless the upper parts still sit upon the lower parts.

Smooth and rough things are also said according to position, or things disposed in any other way according to site, that is, placed according to the order of parts, although smoothness and roughness can be considered in many ways, as was said in the Categories. For they can be considered according to the ordering which the generation of the whole makes from the parts, and they are certainly positions. They can also be considered according to this, that they act on sense through acute things, or blunt things, or non-angles, and in this way without doubt they are passible qualities. They can also be considered through the mode by which they compose the figure of the whole and enclose termination in an angle, and in this way certainly they are qualities which are forms or figures standing around something.

It must be attended that to sit and to lie and the other things which are denominatively said from position are not positions, but things said denominatively from positions and predicated of the placed substance.

Marginalia: Difficulty of the text.

From these things that have been said, a question is customarily introduced about curved and straight, rough and smooth, quadrangular and triangular, two-cubit and three-cubit, great and small, short and long, whether these say differences of positions or not. For all these things seem to signify a certain position or disposition of parts, and thus they seem to predicate differences of position. For the curved, as Plato says, is that whose middle goes out from the extremes, and thus it says an order of the middle parts to the extreme parts. But the straight, as the same Plato says, is that whose extremes cover the middle so that it cannot be seen with the extreme; and this again says the order of the middle parts to the extremes. The rough, however, is that whose parts do not lie in one plane surface, but are extended outside the surface; this again says the ordering of the expressed part and the projecting part to the surface. But the smooth is that whose parts lie equally in flatness. But the quadrangular and the triangular and the polygonal can be considered in three ways. If they are considered according to sides terminated straight at angles, they seem to say position of parts. But if the mode of the enclosing of lines is considered, then they say figure and quality. But if they are referred to act insofar as they act upon sense, then they seem to say passible qualities. But two-cubit and three-cubit and so on are considered in two ways, namely insofar as they say species of quantity which is the measure of substance, or insofar as they are termini mutually of members constituting a whole, as the joint of the hand to the arm, and of the arm to the joint; for in this way they say the order of quantified things constituting a whole to such a mode of quantity, and thus they seem to say positions. In the same way great or small are considered either simply according to quantity, and in this way they are not positions. They are also considered according to proportions to parts and to the whole according as the great constitutes with the whole or the small constitutes, and in this way they seem to say positions. It is the same in all respects concerning short and long. For if they are considered simply, they say quantities; but if according to proportion, as a short ear to a round head, and a long ear to an oblong head, in this way somehow they seem to say differences of positions. Thus, therefore, the rough is said to be that whose parts stand out above one another. But the smooth is said to be that whose particles are extended equally. And it is in the same way concerning all these things which say a certain ordering of parts in the whole and in the place of the whole.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

For the solution of the introduced question, it must be attended that not all the things which have been said say positions or differences of position, but they are qualified things and also qualities existing around site. For from the fact that the parts are disposed in this or that way in the whole or in the place of the whole, from the same thing they bring such or such passions into the senses, by pricking or not pricking; and from the same fact, that in this way they bring passions into the senses, they are judged by the senses to be such things or qualified things. And therefore in such things the position of the parts is the cause of such or such a sense, and not conversely, because from the fact that they bring such passions into the senses and are such according to sense, it comes about that they are rough or smooth, or two-cubit or three-cubit. Hence position is the cause of sensibility, and not conversely. Likewise it is in other things of this sort, which have the

disposition of parts in the whole and in the place of the whole. Therefore each of the aforesaid things will not be position principally, but will be something saying a certain qualified thing around position or site ^[1]. But this is because the name is imposed more on the effect than on the cause, because the effect is better known to sense than the cause. Hence, since site is the cause of sensibility in touch, namely that what is positioned is sensed in this or that way according to touch, these will be names of qualities caused from site and around site and named from it.

CHAPTER III.

On the common property of position, which is not to receive contrariety.

But position or site seems to have contrariety according to appearance, for to sit seems contrary to that which is to stand according to a certain account of contraries.

Marginalia: Difficulty of the text.

For contraries are things which are impossible to find in one and the same individual and at the same time, but which can belong to the same thing in turn. But one sitting, after he has arisen, will be able to stand, and one standing, after he has stood, to sit; but while someone is sitting, it is impossible for the same someone to stand while he sits. And thus, since sitting and standing can belong in turn to the same thing and to none at once, sitting and standing seem to be contraries, and position seems to have a contrary, because one species of position seems to be contrary to another.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

But if on account of this argument we posit that things of this sort which have been said are contraries, we shall be compelled to receive the inconveniences which will be stated. First, indeed, that the same thing according to the same thing is contrary to several. For although Aristotle ^[2] says that one thing can be contrary to several, as the involuntary through ignorance and the involuntary through violence are both opposed as involuntary to the voluntary, Aristotle does not intend that according to the same thing two things are opposed to one thing, because this is impossible. But if in these things which have been said they are granted to be contraries, it follows that according to one and the same thing two things are opposed contrarily to one thing. For if we confirm contraries according to the rules of contraries, we find that what it is to stand is no more contrary to sitting than to reclining. But just as sitting and standing are never in the same thing at once, so neither are standing and reclining or sitting; and according to disputation of this sort no contrariety will belong to site or position, because this is without doubt true, that only one thing is opposed to one thing according to the same thing and in the same genus of opposition.

Marginalia: Objection of the text.

Further, perhaps someone will say that it is not inconvenient nor unusual for one thing to be contrary to several, for the pale seems to be contrary to white and black through this rule and account of contraries, that they are in the same proximate genus, which is color, and are never found at once according to the same thing in the same thing, but they mutually expel themselves from the same susceptible thing and can belong in turn to one and the same thing which is transmuted according to them. From this perhaps it seems that one thing can be contrary to several according to the same thing.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

Yet this is not true, because the pale is not contrary to black and white according as contraries are things which stand most apart under the same genus. For one of these participates nothing of the other, as white and black, hot and cold, sweet and bitter, and other things similar to these. For pale and the other middle colors are made from white and black and mixed together from them, for which reason it is necessary, in whatever thing the pale exists, that in the same thing white and black exist in some way. It is likewise concerning the other middle colors. Therefore it does not seem to be contrary to white and black. And the truth of this is that

Aristotle ^[3] says that the middle, compared to an extreme, is an extreme, because it is compared to the extreme on account of the opposition of the other extreme, which is in it essentially constituting it. And thus the pale is compared to black through the white which is in it, and is opposed to it in some mode of contrariety; and it is compared to white through the black which is in it, and is opposed to it in a certain mode of contrariety according to a non-full opposition, such as the simple extremes have which stand most apart among those things which are under the same genus. But from this it is clear that the pale is not opposed to several according to the same thing, but according to several things which are in it; and this is not inconvenient.

Marginalia: Another solution of the text to the first objection.

Moreover, to the things that have been introduced it can also be said, namely that the account and rule of contraries is that they are naturally apt to exist around the same thing which is susceptible of both, unless one belongs through nature, as was said in the Categories ^[4]. But sitting and lying, if they are granted to be opposites from another account, nevertheless from this it is clear that they are not contraries, because they are not always naturally apt to occur around the same thing in species and number, but the things susceptible of them are separate. For in certain rational things sitting properly belongs; but lying and reclining also belong to irrational things which are opposed to rational things. A sign of this is that horse and human being are similar in this, that by an undoubtedly proven account both lying and reclining belong to both. But sitting does not properly belong except to man alone. Therefore something lies and reclines to which sitting does not belong, such as a horse. Therefore sitting and standing and reclining are not always naturally apt to occur around the same thing. It follows, therefore, that these are not truly contraries, although they have some mode of contraries. Thus, therefore, not to have a contrary belongs to site or position; and in the first argument by which standing and sitting seem to be proved to be contraries, there is a paralogism consisting from this, that the things required for certain things truly to be contraries are not sufficiently enumerated. And this is a common property which belongs to every one always, but does not belong to it alone, but also to several other categories.

CHAPTER IV.

On the property of position, which is not to receive greater and less.

Further, the property of position commonly is to be said neither with more nor with less by comparison of intension and remission. For sitting, since it is a certain position, is not more and less a position than reclining or standing, which are also positions. Likewise in the same species of position, someone sitting or standing is not said to be less sitting or standing than another is more sitting or standing. And speaking universally, according to no position is something said according to more or less than another ^[5]. Thus, therefore, from induction it is concluded that the property of position is not to receive more and less. For to have a contrary is the cause of that which is more and less, according as less is to have more of the contrary, as Aristotle says.

CHAPTER V.

On the properly proper property of position, which is to assist substance most nearly.

But the more proper and convertible property, which belongs to every one, to it alone, and always, seems to be proper to position: to assist substance most nearly among the things which assist substance. For certain accidents are said to be those which simply inhere; but certain ones assist more than they inhere, which do not simply exist, nor are they caused from things extrinsic to the subject, but, caused from the intrinsic, according to them subjects are compared to other things, such as relation, when, where, position, and habit. And this is the distinction which the Author of the book of the Six Principles, Gilbert Porretanus, first found.

Therefore the property of position is that, among the assisting things, it assists substance most nearly and assists substance more nearly than all the other forms which are supposed to assist substance. This, however, is proved syllogistically through the definition of position: for the position of a substance is nothing other than the natural order of a substance according to this or that position. For natural order according to sitting is sitting, and natural order according to standing is standing, and so with the other positions. But this natural ordering is either innate to the substance from the principle of the composition of the substance, or is innate to the substance by the accustomed motion of nature. From the principle of composition, indeed, as in smooth and rough, or in things equal according to surface, or unequal according to the same surface, such as flat and bristly things; but by the motion of nature, the bending of members, such as sitting and standing and other things of this sort.

And because the properly proper property is convertible, therefore it follows that whatever assists substance most nearly among the assisting things, this according to truth is position, which receives the proper predication of this account. For among the assisting things the nearest to substance is called position, and not among inhering things; for they do not have position except on account of extended quantity, and thus it is clear that position supposes quantity as nearer than itself to substance. Further, since quantity is caused by form in a composite, but position is the ordering of composites, of which form is the active cause, quantity is not nearer to substance than position, especially since position does not only say the ordering of parts in the whole, but also the ordering of parts in place, the place which the parts have in the place of the whole.

But Gilbert called those forms assisting which draw their account not from the fact that they inhere in substance, but from the fact that through them substance is compared to something existing outside itself, such as relation, when, where, position, and habit; none of these by its own name says that it inheres, but only by the name of its genus, either of substance or of accident, while by its proper name it says a comparison of substance outward to something, such as relation, when, where, and things of this sort. For relation as relation, and not as an accident of substance, says comparison according to that which it is. And it is similar concerning the others, although they do not say the composition of relation, but of place, or time, or order, or something of this sort. And because these forms assist rather than inhere, therefore the same Gilbert said that according to such changes of forms substance is not properly changed, but when such forms are changed, substance remains unchanged, as a father exists while the son is living and is not a father when the son is dead, without a change of himself. Thus also he spoke of the others, as when and where, by which nothing of the things that are in substance is changed when a change occurs according to when or where; nor is it necessary for a change to occur in substance or in an accident that is in these. This could not be if these or other forms simply inhered. Therefore Gilbert said that they do not properly inhere but assist as though from outside, and therefore it is possible for changes to occur according to them, with no change made in substance or in any accident of it.

But among the assisting things position, as has been said, assists more nearly, and among all things relation assists most nearly, because that alone according to what it is is only of another. But when and where assist in a middle mode, because in these some change occurs in the subject. For something is cast away in the past, and something is acquired in the future. And likewise in where the whole is changed from place to place. But habit assists more than relation, because habit is changed toward the form of the one having. But action and passion, since they are from interior principles, are not numbered among accidents mutually, but among those things which inhere simply and absolutely. Therefore these things have been said about position.

Notes

[1] From this he concludes the intended point. (*Ex hoc concludit intentum.*)

[2] In book II of *Perihermenias*, or *On Interpretation*. (*In II Perihermenias, sive de Interpretatione.*)

[3] In book X of the *Metaphysics*. (*In X Metaphysicae.*)

[4] Chapter *On Opposites*. (*Cap. de Oppositis.*)

TRACTATE VII. ON HABIT.

TRACTATE VII

ON HABIT.

CHAPTER I.

What habit is insofar as it is a category.

Habit is the adjacency of bodies and of those things which are around the body, according to which these things are said to have, but those things to be had. For habit belongs to the one having, and habit is in the one having, and it is predicated of that one through denomination. Hence, insofar as it is an accident, it is in the one having as an accident in a subject. But when it is said that habit is of bodies, this very thing that I say, of bodies, is in the relation of a final cause, because habit is sought on account of the body. But when it is said, and of those things which are around the body, the material cause is touched upon, namely that from which habit is taken. And when adjacency is said, the mode of that accident which is habit is touched upon. For the adjacency of habit to body says the nature of that accident: for this adjacent thing is as a shirt, and from this someone is called shirted; and something is adjacent as a tunic, and from this someone is called tunicked, and likewise armed, shod, and other things of this sort. Therefore habit, insofar as it is a category, is the relation of a body to something surrounding it, which receives such or such a figure of the body, because from this or that figure someone is called cloaked, or tunicked, or shod, or otherwise clothed according to habit. Therefore the form which is in the clothed body, according to which it is compared and denominated to the surrounding thing outside, is the thing of this category, and the name signifying that exists as the name of this category. Therefore this name of the category is what is signified, and it is clear that such a form is not imported in any of the other categories. And for this reason it specially requires a category, which is one of the most general things, whose subalterns are to be clothed and to be armed. But the most special species are to be tunicked, cloaked, armored. But individuals are for Socrates to be armored, or for Plato to be tunicked, and things of this sort. But what is added, according to which these things are said to have and those things to be had, is a specification of the relation between the one having and the thing had. For in this, that it gives figure and is as a final cause, it is called the one having; but this, that receives the figure of another, assumed on account of the other, is called the thing had.

But this is special in this category or principle, because this is said simply to inhere, whether it is according to the whole or according to a particular division. But in other things, what inheres according to the whole is simply said to inhere; what inheres according to a part is not said simply to inhere, but in a qualified respect, as an Ethiopian is white in a qualified respect and is not simply white. But here what inheres according to a part is simply said to inhere, as one shod according to the foot is simply said to be shod, and one ringed according to the finger is simply said to be ringed. Therefore it is habit simply, whether it is said according to the whole or according to a part, as to be ringed indeed according to the finger and to be shod, which inheres according to a part, although nevertheless both are said simply.

But on these things, neither on the things which are habits nor on the forms which predicate habit, have simple names been imposed, by which those things which are truly habits may be called. But I call those names simple which are truly primitive and signify only one thing absolutely, not in comparison to other things. For such names do not have genera and species of habit, but are called names of habit, as arming and shoeing; the first of these is derived from arms and signifies a relation, because the body is proportioned and compared to arms. The second, however, is derived from a shoe and marks the relation by which a part of the body is compared to a shoe. The second, however, is derived from a shoe and marks the relation by which a part of the body is compared and proportioned to a shoe. And likewise it is in all the remaining things which

are said to be names of the genera or species of habit, as clothing, cloaking, tunicking, and things of this sort. For because habit is caused from two things and is owed to one as to the one having, but to the other as to the thing had, therefore a name could not be imposed from one simple thing, but it had to be derived from other things. But because habit belongs to the one having and not to the thing had, therefore it had to be named denominatively, as cloaked, shod, and things of this sort.

But because habit is in exterior things, not interior things, therefore that which belongs according to a part is referred to the whole in some cases, because someone who is shod according to the foot is simply said to be shod; and someone helmeted is simply said to be helmeted, who is helmeted according to the head. But this is in those things in which the habit of a part is for the whole. For one shod according to the feet is shod for the whole, because the feet protect the whole; and someone ringed according to the finger is simply ringed, because the ring of the finger is an ornament of the whole. But in those things in which that which belongs to a part cannot be referred to the whole, it is not so. For one protected according to the loins is not simply protected; as one having a veil of the head is simply veiled; and likewise it is in the others.

But in natural things, although intrinsic and extrinsic things are surrounded, nevertheless there is habit according to a mode and not according to truth, as fleshed, incarnate, bony, and marrowed. For these things are not truly habits, but parts of the body according to constituted substance, although these things are said according to the mode of habit. And therefore these are not called habits, but are called parts of substance according to the mode of habit, as has been said.

CHAPTER II.

On the common properties of habit, which are to receive more and less and not to have a contrary.

But habit receives more and less according to some mode, but it is a property which does not belong to it alone, nor always. For a horseman is called more armed than a foot soldier, because he is more prepared for defending and for attacking, because he is prepared with the warlike instrument which is a horse, and he uses the horse as a habit of arms more than he uses it as a vehicle. And in this way a horse as a warlike instrument is in the genus of habit, just as also a sword is when someone is called sworded, or lanced, or denominated from some other warlike instrument. And in this way, according to another species of habit, one is more shod who uses boots and shoes than one who uses only boots. But this belongs to habit according to some of its species; in some habits it is not true, because when more and less are predicated, as to be clothed, or to be tunicked, and similar things. For one is not more clothed than another who uses more garments than one who uses fewer, or who uses better garments than one who uses poorer coverings. For in habit, some things in a species are compared according to more and less: for to be clothed is a genus to being tunicked, to being toga-clad, and to being fur-clad, just as armed is a genus to armored, sworded, lanced, or to being in equestrian war, so to speak, right-sided or mounted. But in the genus of arms it receives more and less according to genus and species. But in the genus of clothing it receives more and less in neither. But in the genus of shoes it receives more and less.

Marginalia: First objection.

Yet it also seems that in the genus of clothing it receives more and less, for one is said to be more clothed than another, and another less clothed, just as we say that one is more shod than another.

Marginalia: Second.

Further, let the cause be asked: since one is more armed than another, and one is more shod than another, why is one not more clothed than another?

Marginalia: To the first and second.

To this one must say that clothing is referred to one use only, which is to cover by fostering warmth. But the body is covered simply and wholly by any one garment, and it is not covered more by several than by one;

and therefore with respect to this act habit is not predicated with more and less. But it is not so in shoes and arms. For arms are not for one act of war, but certain ones are for attack, certain ones for defense, certain ones for this or that invasion. And all these look to war and the proper acts of war in defense and in attack; and therefore he is more armed who is more prepared for several things which belong to war. It is likewise concerning shoes, which are not sought for the covering of the foot only, but also for the speeding of the way, so that the foot may be better defended from harms and moved more easily and in the present motion be less confined. And in this way he is more shod who is more prepared for several such things from shoes and boots. Likewise also in ornament, he is more adorned who is more adorned and prepared for more beauties. But in clothing insofar as it is clothing, there is only one use, which is to preserve the things to be covered, and thus the body is covered by one as by several, and by one as by many. Nor is he less covered who rules with one, provided that he is covered wholly and throughout by one, than he who is covered by many; and to be clothed is not with more and less. This, therefore, is a property which neither belongs to every one, nor to it alone, nor always.

But nothing is contrary to habit, and this is a property which belongs to every habit and always, but not to it alone. This is proved by induction and by the positing of examples. For arming is not contrary to clothing or shoeing, because if it were contrary, it could not be at once in the same thing. But the same thing is at once and together armed, shod, and clothed. That nothing is contrary to other habits is evident. It is similar in others as in these, as it is easy to see for one inducing species and genera of habit. And because it does not receive a contrary, therefore also it does not simply receive more and less. For more and less are according to one and the same form more and less separated from a contrary. But when we say that someone is more armed, or shod, or adorned, we do not say this according to some one same form which inheres in the one having the habit, but by referring this to the act for which arming or shoeing or adorning is useful. And this is not intension or remission properly. For although preparation is one toward this or that act, since the things preparing are not one except insofar as they are arming or shoeing or adorning, nevertheless, because these do not arm or shoe or adorn according to one and the same power of fighting or going or adorning, therefore they do not leave one form except in comparison to one common act, as we said. And therefore habit also does not properly receive more and less, but does so through comparison to the perfection of an act, as has been said.

But this can be plainly seen from this, that it does not have a contrary simply, except the genus which is quality. Therefore also nothing simply receives more and less except quality. Habit, therefore, does not receive more and less except in comparison to the act of something in comparison to which the habit is more perfect. But that action and passion also receive more and less must be because action and passion are caused by active and passive qualities ^[1].

CHAPTER III.

On the properly proper property of habit, which is always to be in several things.

But the property of habit, which belongs to every habit, to it alone, and always, is that it is in several things and not in one, namely in the body as having, and in those things which are around the body as had, as in clothing, arms, and ornament. Nor can it ever be in one thing except with another. For habit is a form which does not inhere in the one having unless it is with that which is actually had as surrounding the body; and this is not in any category of coordination, as is easily clear in all, as in where and when. But in where, indeed, where is in that which is in place ^[2], and in no way is it in place; the reason for this is that place is not where or somewhere, because otherwise one would go to infinity. Likewise when is in time as in a cause, but nevertheless it is not necessarily with time; for when from the past does not necessarily exist with the past, because that has passed. But in habit, habit never truly inheres in the one having except when the habit surrounds the one having.

Therefore this belongs to habit alone, always to exist not in one thing but in several. For habit is the adjacency of a body and is of those things which are around the body. But body is adjacent to habit as causing the figure of the whole or the figure of the member which is clothed or armed or adorned; habit, however, is adjacent to the body as surrounding it, and thus each is adjacent to the other in a diverse way. And this double adjacency is the cause of the adjacency which is habit. Hence body is adjacent to habit, and habit to body. And these two adjacencies cause the adjacency which is imported through the names of the species and genera of habit, as armored, ringed, tunicked, and generally armed, clothed, or adorned. But the fact that habit is always in several things according to the same division which is in parts is not indeed in parts having position, as certain people badly say; but it comes about because the division is in those parts in which habit exists as in things parted and divided. And these are the one having in one part and the habit in another part, which are substantially divided and in no way united. But that a genus or principle is in several things in this way, you will find in few cases. For you will not find the thing of any principle or category to be in several things in this way, except in a certain quantity and in certain things which are relative. In relatives, indeed, to speak figuratively according to what appears at first sight, as likeness and unlikeness, equality, inequality, difference, agreement: all these are in several similar and dissimilar, equal and unequal things, or in things related otherwise to one another, all of which nevertheless are united in one thing, which is the same or diverse quality that is the cause of all those things. But quantity which is in several things in act, as number which is in countable things, as in those things which are several in act and are numbered, which indeed are carried on in plurality according to the discretion of their units while in many ways according to assumption. For the discretion of unity makes number.

And it is not so in habit. For there several things are in act, which are not multiplied according to one assumption of unity. Hence although you find absolutely nothing that can be distributed to so many parts as number, because it increases to infinity by the addition of units, and although we might even grant that a certain quantity and relation consists in several things, nevertheless not every quantity and relation is such that it is always in several things. For continuous quantity is not in several things, nor is every relation. For the same is referred to that which is the same, and father to son, and it does not consist in several things at once in act, existing mutually from themselves. But every habit is such that it always consists in several things embracing one another. For it consists in a body and those things which are around the body, which do not suppose the same thing from which they are caused, as relatives do. Nor are they multiplied from the material unity of one and the same thing. But this is manifest from this, that every habit is consisting in the body having and in those things which are around bodies. And because it is in several things having no unity, nor is it founded upon one, it obtains the name habit, and being in several things in this way belongs to no other category. For every mutual adjacency of a body and of those things which are around the body obtains the name habit; for this reason the property of habit, and its true property, is the adjacency of a body and of those things which exist around the body according to that division which belongs to parts. But that which exists around the body has many divisions, not only material but also formal, as according to arming, clothing, warring, adorning, and play which is brought forth by habit. For in all these it is proper to habit to exist in several things which cannot be reduced to any unity, and this belongs to no other category. For the name habit itself draws its account from several things, namely from the one having and from that which is had.

Marginalia: He removes a doubt.

And although the one having is not multiplied according to subject, nevertheless it is multiplied according to forms and offices, as the weaver has one thing, and the leatherworker has another, and the baker another, and the citizen has another, and the householder another, and the statesman who governs cities another, and so with the rest. For this reason this category always consists in several things which are at once in act, and that is the true property which belongs to none of the others: namely that the one having is considered according to several powers, and according to these it needs several things, and it has several things for the requirement

of those powers according to the diversity of the powers of the habit itself, according as it is disposed in clothing, or arming, or ornament. For no one is clothed with one simple thing, nor armed with one simple thing, nor adorned with one simple ornament, but the one having always wills to consist in several powers, and habit in the plurality of instruments.

CHAPTER IV.

On the modes in which to have is said.

But to have is not the category habit, although habit is had; and here the modes of having must be altogether distinguished. To have is said in many modes, as someone is said to have an alteration and an affection left from alteration, as whiteness or blackness^[3].

Marginalia: First mode of having.

But because the mode of having quantity by the mode toward a subject is similar to that of having quality, for this reason having quality and magnitude and length are reduced to the same mode, namely that quantity is the measure of quality, since to have whiteness or length or breadth is nothing other than to be white or long or broad; because, since whiteness is a bodily form, it is accidentally extended with the quantity of the subject, and thus the two modes of having determined in the Categories are here reduced to one.

Marginalia: Second mode of having.

In a second mode also, to have is said as a vessel is said to have something; and although this is in many ways in liquid and dry things and in other things of this sort, nevertheless in common there is only one relation of the one having to the thing had, as a bushel is said to have grain, or a flask wine. For in things of this sort to have is nothing other than to contain, and to be had is nothing other than to be contained.

Marginalia: Third mode.

To have is said in a third mode according to a part and not according to the whole, although the habit is referred to the beauty of the whole, as in a member. For example, we are said to have a ring on a finger, or an ornament on the forehead or on the foot or on the ear; for all these are reduced to one common mode. For when we are said to have a ring on a finger, it has as much force as if the finger is in the ring and is had; and because even an organic member is had for the use of the whole, to have a member is reduced to the same mode.

Marginalia: Fourth mode.

To have is said in a fourth mode as having a wife. Yet this is an unusual mode of having, as was said in the Categories, so that what is had is the one having, and it is said to have; and this having is nothing other than to cohabit.

Marginalia: How Many Are the Modes of Having Itself.

Therefore if the first mode is divided into two, as was said in the Categories, then the modes of having which have customarily been said more and commonly are terminated in the number five. But if the two which have been mentioned are posited as one mode, then the mode which is manifest to all is understood beneath it, as to have possession, and again there are five; or from the prior modes there is left the mode which is habit insofar as it is a category, so that the modes of having are terminated in five. And perhaps other apparent modes of having will exist besides those which have been numbered as said, and we leave these to be found by the diligence of the reader. In the Categories seven are posited, but here five, which are more suitable to the six principles which have been determined. For principles are of act and have operation toward substance, and the first mode fits this. For a principle is a flowing and dispersed being, and is of assisting things more than of inhering things, and the third mode makes for this. For a principle also assists more than it inheres, and thus in a certain way they cohabit, and the fourth mode makes for this. But the conjoined mode according to the true intention is the one which surrounds extrinsically, and the fifth mode makes for this.

But other modes, which are as when the whole has a part or something of this sort, are not put down here, because in this mode there is not an accident in a subject, as a certain part is; and therefore this mode has no position for the habit of principles.

But the things to be noted with respect to the matter which was said about having in the Categories are these: namely that the one having in every genus of having is the principle of that which is had; but it belongs only to an accident assisting from outside to be what is had. And this can be considered according to itself, or according to essence, or according to the mode of assisting substance. If in the first way, since the being of the same thing is to inhere, the first mode is received in this way. But if it is to consist in essence with a flowing and dispersed essence, then with respect to this the mode is taken, namely that which is contained in a subject, so that it does not flow and become dispersed. But if the mode of inhering is considered, then it is considered in two ways, namely with respect to cause, and to with respect to effect; and then it is considered in these two modes, namely according to that which it is, and in this way there is the proper mode which is left from things had. But if it is considered according to the mode which inheres, then there is a similar unusual mode, which is nothing except in a certain way to cohabit, as a wife with a husband.

Therefore let these things that have been said about the six principles, which were omitted in the science of the Categories, suffice. For if there are any other things, and if any principles belong to sciences and demonstrations, they have to be determined in that book which is On the Posterior Analytics, and let them be sought there. But if any other things have been omitted, either they have been stated in the book of the Categories, or they are more proper to the first philosopher and have to be determined in the fifth book of First Philosophy, where it is distinguished in how many ways each thing is said which is a part or species of being.

Notes

[1] Concerning this, see above in the tractate On Quality, chapter 11. (*De hoc vide supra in tract. de Qualitate, cap. 11.*)

[2] Namely in the located thing. (*Scilicet in locato.*)

[3] Here he joins into one two modes of having, which he had separated in the Postpredicaments, in the last chapter. (*Hic conjungit in unum duos modos habendi, quos sejunxerat in Post praedicamentis, capite ultimo.*)

TRACTATE VIII. ON MORE AND LESS.

TRACTATE VIII

ON MORE AND LESS.

CHAPTER I.

On the opinions of the ancients concerning that which is more and less.

But because in this science we have followed, one by one, both accidental forms in general and the principles which in several things are assisting forms, and because it belongs to certain accidental forms to receive more and less, therefore it is fitting to determine concerning more and less, so that the teaching of those things which have been said in the Categories and here may be easier. Concerning contrariety and opposition, which is the cause of receiving more and less, it has been sufficiently determined in the Categories. But as Boethius says, affirming it from Alexander, three opinions concerning more and less were received among the ancients.

Marginalia: First opinion.

One of these was the opinion of those who said that in everything in which more and less is found, there is found in some way matter whose quantity, as they say, consists of indivisibles; where more similar things come together in one thing, they say that that thing is intensified, and where fewer are present, they say that that thing is remitted. And therefore the whitest things are those in which more indivisibles of whiteness

concur; but remission occurs where fewer come together. And this opinion, as Boethius says, was Plato's. But it seems to have been derived from the ancient Anaxagoras, who said that like is generated by like, and that all things are in all things, but lie hidden; and therefore also anything is intensified and remitted according as more and less appears of the like itself.

Marginalia: Second opinion.

The second group said that forms neither grow nor decrease, nor are intensified nor remitted, but rather take on the increases or decreases of subjects: for what is in well-digested, pure, and luminous parts grows, and what receives such parts for increase, this is intensified toward whiteness; and what does not receive such parts for its own increase, this is remitted.

Marginalia: Third opinion.

But the third group said that intensifications and remissions do not happen to all forms, but in those which are intermediate; and therefore they say that the most certain of sciences or arts and virtues are not intensified or remitted, as perfect grammar or justice is, but things possessed in an intermediate mode, not perfectly, are intensified, as from disposition there comes to be an intermediate habit.

Therefore these were the opinions of the ancients concerning more and less; and in imitation of these opinions later thinkers also said that they assert in three ways concerning receiving more and less: certain people said that those things which receive more and less receive more and less according to the increase of their subjects, which are called substances; and this is according to the second mode which was stated among the opinions of the ancients, and this must be understood as it was explained before.

But in another way others say that the forms themselves which are received in a subject are diminished and grow according to themselves in the subject itself receiving them, while the subject does not grow or diminish; and this opinion has been taken according to the first opinion of Plato and Anaxagoras; and they said this especially in incorporeal qualities, as knowledge and virtue, which they said were gifts of the gods; and in these a thing first given grows by a second thing added, and they said that this is intension and remission.

But others, seeing that many qualities are intensified from causes changing the subject, said that intension and remission, and more and less, come to be according to both of these, as certain people assert, according to increase and decrease of the subject; and they try to imitate that opinion introduced above, because some motion is both of the subject and of the form which is in the subject: of the subject, indeed, as of that which is moved; but of the form as of that which is received in motion.

Beginning from the first things, therefore, we must manifest which of these opinions is ratified in truth and by firm confirmation of argumentation; for in this way we shall know better what is true about these matters. Yet this must be known beforehand, that if someone destroys the first and second opinion, then the third opinion also has been destroyed, since it too is nothing except the conjunction or composition of two opinions, namely the first and the second.

Marginalia: Disproof of the first opinion.

I say, therefore, that forms are not said, or said with more and less, without intension and remission; and that is very unfitting, because substance receives neither more nor less, as was said in the Categories. For these things frequently receive increase and diminution in the parts of substance. Further, a horse and other animals frequently undergo motions both of increase and of diminution; but a stone does not receive increase or decrease except of number, and then a horse is called greater or lesser than a stone, which never receives increase. And this would not happen if intension came to be according to this, which, with respect to two bodies in relation to one another, is not in that except what is not in both. And therefore, if a horse were called greater than a stone intensively, each would have to receive magnitude according to the same account,

which is false. Therefore this is false, that through the increase of a subject something receives intension and remission, or more and less. Further, one mountain is called greater and lesser than another mountain, although neither grows or decreases by increase or decrease. Moreover, indeed, a pearl is called whiter than a horse, although the horse has a white foot which is greater than the pearl. But this is not said because the horse is surpassed by the pearl in quantity of essence or in subject, since even the foot is greater than the whole pearl, but because the whiteness of the pearl shines more than the whiteness of the horse or of the horse's foot. From these things, however, one must gather by reason that either it is pronounced that the pearl is whiter than the horse in this, that it surpasses the horse in magnitude of subject, which is false, since conversely the horse surpasses the pearl by quantity of subject; or it is said that it is not true that the pearl is whiter than the horse, which is contrary to sense; or it is said that nothing at all is called more and less, or according to intension and remission, according to the magnitude or smallness of subjects, nor according to increase or decrease. And this is true: for it is evident that according to magnitude of subject the pearl is not called whiter than the horse, and nevertheless it is not false that the pearl is whiter than the horse. Therefore it remains that nothing is said according to more and less according to magnitude or smallness of subject, and it is established that the first opinion is false and did not assign the true cause of that which is more and less.

Marginalia: Disproof of the second opinion.

Moreover, neither is the second opinion true. For more and less cannot be said according to the quantity of the qualities which stain the subject or affect it. For if according to the magnitude of whiteness or of some exterior accident, which forms are corporeal and in a smaller thing are greater and in a smaller thing smaller, someone were called whiter than another, or on account of the smallness of whiteness one thing were called less white than another, or in any other way it were said according to comparison of form, in this way without doubt a human being or a horse or some other great white thing would be called more white or whiter than a pearl; for a greater quantity of whiteness happens to a horse than to a pearl. Further, more and less is said, one thing than another, not according to decrease of subject or according to decrease of accident, or because greater and smaller is said in forms according to intension and remission. For that something is not called more or less than another according to increase or decrease, magnitude or smallness of subject, is manifest in the things that have been said. It can also be clear from what has been said that one thing is not called more and less in relation to another on account of a fuller quantity of accident which a corporeal form has in the subject. For the quantity of a corporeal form cannot be extended beyond the subject, because then an accident would not be in a subject, which is impossible. This is clear in quantity, which nevertheless seems to be more through itself than any of the other accidents; and that cannot do so; therefore no other accidental form can. But that quantity does not exist without a subject is clear from this, that the term of quantity is the body to which quantity belongs, so that nothing of quantity is found outside the quantified body. This is clear from this, that every quantified thing is great or small; but the smallness of quantity is wholly supposed in a small body, and beyond a small subject nothing of the said smallness is extended. Therefore, the smaller the subject which is quantified substance becomes, so much also is the smallness of quantity, which is in the subject, lessened. And so it is clear that nothing is predicated with more and less according only to increase or diminution of subject or accident.

Marginalia: Disproof of the third opinion.

For this reason it is concluded that neither does less come to be according to both these modes at once, as the third opinion said.

CHAPTER II.

On the cause of intension and remission.

Therefore, when the opinions have been disproved and refuted as not true, it is necessary to find other things concerning those things which are said with more and less according to intension and remission. But things

of this sort are those which are in speech, or in the name imposed on that form which is said with more and less. For forms which come to substance and are accidental are designated by proper names; then more and less does not befall those forms according to the increase or diminution of a movable subject, but rather according to the imposition of those names which are in speech and signify those forms. For every imposition of a name is from a form; and therefore a name signifies a positive form, as white first signifies what is colored by whiteness. Hence whatever things are nearer in signification to the prior and principal imposition of the name more attain the simplicity and truth of that name, and those things are said with more and less; but that form is predicated with less concerning those things which are more remote from the primary imposition of the name. Thus whatever white thing is more like what is white by the name signifying it is nearer; but what is more unlike such a nature is less. But white is said simply in that in which there is pure whiteness. Therefore, the more some accident is stained or affected by purer whiteness according to the first imposition of the word and of the name, so much also will it be pronounced, judged, or assigned to be brighter and whiter. And this indeed is in all forms coming to substance which are said with more and less. But quantity, which is not said with more and less, is excepted from this, because that is said to be smaller according to quantity which, compared to other things according to quantity of stature, is said to fall short of them in quantity. Therefore whatever is surpassed by the measure of quantity is immediately pronounced smaller according to decrease of quantity in body and in quantity. And it is similarly in other things compared according to quantity, whether according to length, breadth, or depth. But in all other things which have intension and remission, intension and remission are according to approach to or departure from the true imposition of the name, as was said a little before.

Marginalia: In how many modes intension and remission come to be.

But one must know that there are many modes of intension and remission. And therefore it must be noted that whatever things are compared to one another according to more and less are compared according as they are one in some way, either in genus, or in species, or in analogy or proportion: one in species, indeed, as white, in which one thing is whiter than the other; but one by analogy to one thing, as intellectual, for one thing is more intellectual than another, as intelligence through essence is more intelligent than intelligence through attainment of intellect. That which is rational through essence is more intellectual and more rational than that which is called rational by participating, as Aristotle says in the third book of the *Ethics*. Thus, therefore, the things which are compared to one another according to more and less must always be one by a unity according to analogy. But those things which are one in genus or species are compared according to one form which is in them. Those things, however, which are one according to analogy do not indeed have one form, but through a form said according to prior and posterior they are compared according to more and less to one act, which is to understand in intellectual things, or to reason in rational things. For comparison also happens according to two things not said in a genus, namely according to purer and less pure: to participate in a form simply, or to participate in a form according to comparison to act. And in the first mode, indeed, intension is according to approach to the true imposition of the name. And this is the same as according to departure from the admixture of a contrary, as when white is called whiter. Or it happens for readiness of act; and in this way intension happens according as the subject becomes more disposed to act, and according to this alone intension or remission happens according to the disposition of the subject.

Therefore, since intension happens in these modes, speaking according to every mode at once, intension or remission happens according to this, that the thing in which there is intension comes to be either in effect or in form approaching the true imposition of the name, because the imposition of the name names the form which, without impediment, is ready for doing the proper act and effect of that form. But comparison to the true imposition of the name happens in two ways: namely according to departure from a contrary in those things which do not have something to which they may approach, or according to approach, or according to both of these at once. According to approach, indeed, it happens in that which does not have a contrary, as good is better; for good does not truly have a contrary, but a privatively opposed thing. For if it had a

contrary, then that contrary would be in some term in which there would be a standing-point. But nothing is the highest evil, nor is there anything in which there is a standing-point of evil. But according to departure from a contrary there comes to be a standing-point of evil; for according to departure from the contrary it is compared according to more and less, namely bad, worse, worst. For there is not something in the term of evil to which these may be compared, but they receive such comparison according to departure from the best.

But according to both of these at once there is comparison in qualities of accident, whether they are active and passive through themselves, or according to their causes, as hotter and colder, wetter and drier, whiter and blacker, and things of this sort in flavors and odors. For all these things together, in flavors and odors, are treated according to departure from a contrary and according to approach to the true imposition of the name. For in all such things departure from a contrary is compared according to the same mode as approach to the true imposition of the name.

CHAPTER III.

On the cause why certain things are not compared according to more and less.

Marginalia: Difficulty of the text.

But someone will wonder why certain things are said and compared with more and less, such as certain qualities and certain other things, as action and passion and certain habits, but substance least of all, because substance according to its whole genus receives neither more nor less.

Marginalia: Solution of the text.

This happens because all names of substances are imposed in a term beyond which it is impossible to pass. For the form of substance which is signified in the name itself is as the act of matter which terminates the whole imperfection of matter; and therefore what terminates the whole is a term in the form itself, and nothing remains of matter which is unterminated, and therefore it cannot have more. For this reason the very reception of that form itself is also in a moment, and is more the end of motion than a change. But accidental form comes to substance already existing, and does not terminate the potency of the subject so that it would not be susceptible of more and less according as it is susceptible of that which is more and less; and therefore in accidental form comparison is always according to more and less.

But just as in substances the imposition of their names is in a term, so also it is concerning certain accidents, which are therefore said without more and less because their imposition is in a term, as in the fourth species of quality quadrangular and triangular and similar things. For one thing is not called more and less than another according to this, that they are in the name of figure, in which the imposition of names exists. Nevertheless, one thing can be more quadrangular than another; but this is not according as they are names of figures, but according as it is denominative and designative of substances, because a quadrangled body is said, and quadrangle is named a quality, which is a form or a figure standing around something. But when it is said, a quadrangle is a figure or quality, the species receives the category of its genus. A quadrangular body is also called quadrangularly; and this is said through denomination and according to a greater or lesser disposition of the subject. Hence quadrangular alteration is in these accidents which do not receive composition.

The same account, which was stated above, forbids and impedes this, because if the imposition of names of this sort has been made in a term beyond which it is not permitted to go beyond, for a quadrangle and a square are formed only when sides and angles have been posited equal, and this is only in one and the same mode, in which namely it would have less or more, then neither can a triangle be called square, nor can it be called a quadrangle. And similarly it is in other accidents which cannot have comparison with more and less; and therefore they are not compared with more and less. A sign of this sort, however, is that even in those things which are compared, if something marks comparison in a term, by an excess beyond this it cannot be compared further, as is seen in superlatives, whitest and blackest; and all things, namely, which are said

according to superabundance belong to one alone and are said without more and less. For since the imposition of superlatives is in a term beyond which term, because it is indivisible, it is impossible to extend further into something participating according to that in which there is comparison; for when a false but not impossible thing is posited, no impossibility follows. Hence if it were possible for that which is in a term to be extended further into something of the same nature according to more, what would follow from this would be false and not impossible. But every term is indivisible. Thus, therefore, that which is in a term is extended further as divisible. But through an indivisible nothing is added and nothing is intensified according to more and less, because if all points are composed, they make no magnitude, since a point composed with a point increases nothing, and a point taken away from a point diminishes nothing. And similarly, when the term of something is said to be extended further, it increases or lessens nothing of the form, because a term is indivisible, to which nothing can be added, nor can anything be diminished. And this, therefore, is the cause of intension and remission.

CHAPTER IV.

On the distinction of generation from alteration, through which intension and remission comes to be.

But for knowing that more and less does not belong to that which is in the term itself, one must know the distinction of generation from another generation, which is the cause of that which is with more and less. Therefore we say that there is generation simply in substance, and also corruption simply. But generation simply does not happen by the gathering-together of simply indivisible atoms, from which accidents would be made which receive more and less; nor also does corruption in such things happen by the separation of atoms, from which the remission of intensified things is caused, as Democritus and Leucippus said, who said that accidental forms are intensified and remitted according to substance, and generated and corrupted by the gathering-together and separation of atoms; and thus they said that a thing is intensified when it proceeds to the being of form, but remitted when it recedes from the being of form. And they said that this happens by the gathering-together and separation of atoms, although intension and remission do not happen in this way, nor also generation and corruption ^[1].

Rather, generation and corruption happen when the whole composite from matter and form is transmuted into a whole, as is to be seen in specified air, that is, through the form which is a determinate species ^[2]. Therefore when the whole composite is transmuted into another composite, as air according to species and matter into water, then there is generation simply. For although matter, according as it is matter or a certain substance, is not changed, as Aristotle says ^[3], nevertheless according as it itself, standing now under this form, is changed, because it is brought about under another, and thus the form of the corrupted thing is changed while it is cast away; but the matter of that same corrupted thing is changed while it passes to another form, and thus the whole is changed. For in the subject which, as Avicenna says, is a being completed in itself and made according to the being of substance, there are two things, one of which is form, which is species according to reason, that is, that according to which being completed in itself is received, and according to perfect substantial being, that is, that according to which the definition is received. But the other is being according to the nature of the subject. For the subject is that which stands under; but what stands under does not have the nature of subsisting except from that which first subsists, and this is matter. Therefore when there is transmutation in these two substantial things in the aforesaid mode, then generation and corruption happen according to truth and simply.

Marginalia: Generation simply in a double way.

Nevertheless simple generation is said in two ways. In one way, indeed, according as simply is opposed to according to something; and in this way generation simply is called generation of substance, and generation according to something is called generation according to accident. Or in another way simple generation is called generation of the simple, not indeed of what is simple simply, because this is immobile, but of the simple according as what is spiritual in relation to the incorporated is called simple, as fire first and air

second are called simple in relation to water and earth. And in this way the simple, or simply generation, of this generated thing is spoken of, as fire, that is, that it is fire, is something more spiritual and is species and simple more than earth ^[4]. And in this way simple generation is opposed to material and composite generation. Therefore generation is called simple in these modes.

But according as simple generation is opposed to generation according to something, it is generation in the way we speak when, from a musical man, through forgetfulness of music, an unmusical man comes to be, that the musical man has been corrupted; and in this mode an unmusical man has been generated while one and the same subject has been preserved in each case. For this remains the same according to subject. Therefore, if in these things music and its opposite, unmusic, between which there is motion, were not passion and quality according to themselves but were substantial forms, without doubt in these there would be simple and substantial generation, and in the others there would be corruption: generation, indeed, when the musical man came to be from the unmusical, but corruption when the unmusical comes to be from the musical. But because this is not so, and music is a certain passion or accidental quality in every case, therefore the generation of a musical man is generation and not simple generation, and corruption to an unmusical man is a certain corruption and not simple corruption. For now, because music is a passion of the human being remaining in one and the same subject, and unmusic likewise, such motions are of alteration and not of generation. But this is proved from this, that hyle is especially the subject susceptible of generation and corruption, but the subject of alteration is not hyle, but rather the individual substance composed from matter and form, or from hyle and species. And because the subjects are diverse, therefore the changes also are diverse in genus. And for this reason one learning music or another science is not said to be generated simply, but is said to be generated according to something; for he is generated in a teachable way, and not simply.

But these things which seemed to be said about the species of names as making for logical intention have been sufficiently determined in the Categories. For it has been said that certain things signify this something and substance, but certain things signify the qualified in the genus of quality. Therefore whatever things signify not substance but accidents are not said, in their changes, to be generated or corrupted simply according to those things, but according to something, as has been said; and in these there can be more and less according to some genera of accidents, since in these accidents in which there is not generation but alteration, there is something that belongs according to nature, as to fire it belongs according to nature to be moved upward, and as hot belongs to fire. And in such things the change of quality induces the change of substance, and therefore in those things change makes generation which is simply generation; but this generation is mixed with alteration, and the completion of that generation is the end of alteration. But in all other generations there is no generation except according to something.

CHAPTER V.

On the cause which moved the Author of this book, and on assisting forms and inhering forms.

But for the understanding of all those things which have been said, one must know that Gilbert Porretanus compiled the science of the Six Principles for this reason: because he saw that those things which are referred to substance as accidents are referred to it in two ways. For certain things by their very name say something which belongs to substance and is not substance, as quality, which by its very name says a disposition of substance; but quantity, which by its very name says substance alone modified for the senses, is never found. In many qualities the heaven is disposed, and elements and mixtures descend in due quantities. But certain other things by their very name say nothing in substance, but say that the substance itself is related in some way to something; and because these things by their name predicate nothing inhering in substance, he said that they say forms assisting substance, and as if looking extrinsically upon substance from some other thing compared to substance. And therefore the change of these forms induces neither alteration nor generation simply, but only another mode of being related to something. Therefore there is generation simply in

substance; in quality, which has a contrary and receives more and less, there is alteration. But in the others there is neither simply, but change in these induces another mode of being related to something.

But when he says that these forms assist and do not inhere, he did not understand that they were not accidents, but that there was not an accident according as an accident is that which is simply in another, not as a certain part; for in this way quantity and quality are accidents. But he said they are accidents according as an accident is in any way whatever toward substance. And in this way relation and the other accidents are accidents, because they say only comparison to something, and do not say something which inheres simply. For this reason he called these forms assisting rather than inhering. For action is the comparison of agent to patient, and passion the comparison of patient to agent, where the comparison of the located thing to place, and when the temporal comparison to time or to a difference of time, but position the comparison of parts to the whole and to the place of the whole, and habit the comparison of the one having to the surrounding habit. Therefore in this way he posited assisting forms. And concerning these, because they have another mode of predication, he completed the science of the Six Principles.

Notes

[1] On this opinion of Democritus and Leucippus about intension and remission, see also the book On Generation, in book I, text-commentary 5, 6, and 7. (*Super hanc opinionem Democriti et Leucippi de intensione et remissione, vide etiam librum de Generatione, in I, tex. com. 5, 6 et 7.*)

[2] Book I of On Generation, text-commentary 23. (*I de Generatione, tex. com. 23.*)

[3] Aristotle, at the end of book I of the Physics, text-commentary 28. (*Aristoteles, In fine primi Physicorum, tex. com. 28.*)

[4] Compare book I of On Generation, text-commentary 18, 19, and 20. (*Cf. I de Generat. tex. com. 18, 19 et 20.*)